DEFENDING DEMOCRATIC NORMS

International Actors and the Politics of Electoral Misconduct



Daniela Donno

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DANIELA DONNO

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For my parents

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CONTENTS

List of Figures ix
List of Tables xi
Acknowledgments xiii
Abbreviations xvii

1. Introduction 1
   The Argument in Brief 4
   Implications for Democratization and Elections 7
   Implications for International Norms 11
   Definitions 12
   Research Design 15
   Plan of the Book 17

2. Norm Enforcement and Democratic Change 20
   The Actors, Choices, and Outcomes 21
   When is Enforcement Imposed? 24
   Tools of Enforcement 29
   The Effect of Enforcement on Electoral Conduct 33
   The Effect of Enforcement on Electoral Outcomes 38
   Alternative Explanations: Passive Mechanisms of International Influence 44
   Conclusions 46

3. Electoral Misconduct 49
   Studying Electoral Misconduct 49
   Coding Electoral Misconduct 52
   The Severity of Misconduct 56
   Can IGO Membership Deter Misconduct? 60
   Conclusions 62

4. Explaining Enforcement 64
   Coding Enforcement 65
   Who Enforces? 67

The Consistency of Enforcement 77
Who is Punished? 80
Conclusions 92

5. The Effects of Enforcement 93
Improving Electoral Conduct 95
Electoral Outcomes 107
Do Improvements in Electoral Conduct Benefit the Opposition? 117
Which International Actors Are Effective? 118
Are International Actors Selecting Easy Cases? 121
Conclusions 123

6. The Mechanisms of International Influence 125
Dominican Republic 127
Serbia 133
Conclusions 141

7. The Limits of International Pressure 143
Armenia 145
Kenya 152
Cambodia 163
Conclusions 172

8. Conclusion 175
Summary of Findings 176
Conditionality versus Diplomatic Engagement 178
Indirect Mechanisms of Influence 179
The Power of Regional Organizations 181
Active versus Passive International Influence 182
Implications for Electoral Politics 183
The Complex Effects of International Norms 184

Appendix A: List of Countries and Flawed Elections, 1990–2007 187
Appendix B: Coding Rules and Search Procedures 203
Appendix C: Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5 207
Notes 221
References 235
Index 257

LIST OF FIGURES

2.1. Sequence of Choices and Outcomes 23
2.2. Causal Mechanisms of Enforcement 47
3.1. Percentage of Elections Experiencing Misconduct over Time 55
3.2. Intensity of Misconduct over Time 57
3.3. Election Observer Verdicts over Time 58
3.4. Percentage of Elections Experiencing Misconduct by Polity Score 59
3.5. Percentage of Flawed Elections by Membership in Densely Democratic Regional IGOs 61
3.6. Percentage of Flawed Elections by Membership in Regional IGOs with Democratic Commitments 62
4.1a. Consistency of Enforcement 78
4.1b. Consistency of Regional IGO Enforcement 79
4.2. Effect of Regional IGO Attributes on the Consistency of Enforcement 80
4.3. Percentage of Elections Experiencing Enforcement and Conditionality by Election Observer Verdict 82
4.4. Percentage of Elections Experiencing Enforcement and Conditionality by Number of Previously Flawed Elections 82
4.5a. Effect of Geopolitical Importance and Information on Probability of Enforcement after a Flawed Election 87
4.5b. Effect of Geopolitical Importance and Information on Probability of Conditionality after a Flawed Election 87
5.1a. Changes in the Intensity of Electoral Misconduct Following Flawed Elections 96
5.1b. Changes in Election Observer Verdicts Following Flawed Elections 96

5.2. Effect of Enforcement on Electoral Conduct 104
5.3. Effect of Domestic and International Factors on the Intensity of Electoral Misconduct 105
5.4. Conditional Effect of Opposition Protests on Postelection Concessions 111
5.5. Effect of Domestic and International Factors on Alternation in Power 115

LIST OF TABLES

2.1. Tools of Enforcement 32
3.1. Categories and Common Tools of Electoral Misconduct 53
4.1. Attributes of Regional IGOs 72
4.2. Determinants of Enforcement 85
4.3. Determinants of Conditionality Imposed by the United States, European Union, and Regional IGOs 89
5.1. Determinants of Changes in Electoral Conduct 102
5.2. Determinants of Postelection Concessions 110
5.3. Determinants of Alternation in Power 114
5.4. Effect of Enforcement by International Actor 119
6.1. Tools of Enforcement in the Dominican Republic and Serbia 126
6.2. Mechanisms of International Influence 126
7.1. Tools of Enforcement in Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia 144

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ABBREVIATIONS

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
AU	African Union
CARICOM	Caribbean Community
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
COE	Council of Europe
COMESA	Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
EU	European Union
ICG	International Crisis Group
IRI	International Republican Institute
JIOG	Joint International Observation Mission (Cambodia)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NDI	National Democratic Institute
OAS	Organization of American States
ODIHR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
PACE	Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe
SADC	Southern African Development Community
UN	United Nations
UNTAC	United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

DOMESTIC POLITICAL PARTIES AND INSTITUTIONS

CPP	Cambodian People's Party
DOS	Democratic Opposition of Serbia
ECK	Electoral Commission of Kenya
JCE	Central Electoral Board (Dominican Republic)
KANU	Kenya African National Union
NaRC	National Rainbow Coalition (Kenya)
NEC	National Election Committee (Cambodia)
ODM	Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya)
PLD	Party of Dominican Liberation
PNU	Party of National Unity (Kenya)
PRD	Dominican Revolution Party
PRSC	Revolutionary Social Christian Party (Dominican Republic)
SPS	Socialist Party of Serbia
SRP	Sam Rainsy Party (Cambodia)

Defending Democratic Norms

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1

Introduction

Nearly every country in the world today holds multiparty elections. With unexpected speed, in the early 1990s a brushfire of political change swept through the former communist bloc and much of the developing world. Democracy became the only legitimate game in town, and people around the world embraced this new norm, an "emerging right to democratic governance" (Franck 1992). Twenty years later, however, it is clear that early, unbridled optimism was misplaced. Many leaders have strategically adapted to the shift in international expectations, constructing a democratic façade to deflect attention from distinctly undemocratic practices. Sometimes labeled "hybrid" or "pseudodemocratic" regimes, these countries have democratic credentials on paper: opposition parties are allowed, and political offices are filled through multiparty elections. But in practice the norms of free and fair political competition are regularly and systematically violated. Thus, although holding elections is now crucial for attaining political legitimacy, this has done "less than expected to create well-functioning mechanisms of democratic accountability" (Carothers 2007, 21).

The reality is that in any given year the number of flawed elections around the world greatly exceeds the number of clean ones. Although fraud has long figured in the repertoire of authoritarian rule, electoral misconduct is on the increase even among nominally democratic leaders. An array of methods is at their disposal. In Peru, for example, democratically elected president Alberto Fujimori used bribes and intimidation to ensure the cooperation of key players in the judiciary, legislature, and media in the run-up to the 2000 presidential election, violating campaign regulations with impunity and even rigging the software used for vote tabulation on election day (Conaghan 2006, ch. 8). Prior to Armenia's 2007 legislative elections, police and local officials created a climate of intimidation to prevent opposition parties from campaigning freely.[1] In other cases, incumbents have resorted to tried-and-true forms of election-day fraud. In Albania's 1996 parliamentary election, votes cast for the opposition were altered, and premarked ballots for ruling party candidates were stuffed into ballot boxes

by polling station officials (ODIHR 1996). In the Dominican Republic's 1994 election, at least seventy-three thousand names of opposition supporters were mysteriously deleted from registration lists on election day, preventing those individuals from casting ballots and contributing to President Joaquín Balaguer's narrow victory (Espinal 1998).

Governments that employ these crooked tactics often get away with it. Since 1990 well over half of elections held around the world have involved misconduct, and the majority of these contests have been won by the incumbent. Whereas the rate of victory for the ruling party or candidate in clean elections is 55 percent, this figure rises to more than 70 percent in flawed elections. In only thirteen cases—a mere 5 percent of the total—have leaders been forced to step down or cancel results after winning a fraudulent election. The upshot is that electoral manipulation feeds a vicious cycle. It reinforces incumbent dominance and over time becomes embedded within a broader context of institutional bias and corruption. This in turn fosters a climate of tacit acceptance in which opposition parties are weak and citizens too disengaged—or simply too afraid—to defend their right to vote in free and fair elections. Once this occurs, electoral misconduct is exceedingly difficult to eradicate. Many regimes, like the ruling Frelimo party in Mozambique, can safely use elections as nominal democratic cover while remaining conveniently "free of any exposure to uncertain outcomes" (Manning 2010, 161).

Yet against the odds, stolen elections do sometimes trigger democratic change. In the Philippines (1986), Serbia (2000), Georgia (2004), Ukraine (2004), and Kyrgyzstan (2005), mass outrage in response to electoral manipulation directly precipitated the government's downfall. Laurent Gbagbo's dubious victory in Cote d'Ivoire's 2010 election resulted in a prolonged postelection standoff, but he was eventually dislodged. In other cases, change is more gradual. Consider a country like Albania, where abysmally flawed elections in 1996 were followed by incremental but steady improvements in the professionalism and transparency of election commissions, the quality of the legal framework governing elections, and the impartiality of electoral dispute resolution. In the 2009 parliamentary contest, a single computerized voter registration list was introduced, which sharply limited opportunities for fraud, and—for the first time in Albania—election observers found "no evidence of irregular counting or manipulation of results" (ODIHR 2009, 4).

What explains this variation? Why do governments get away with manipulation in some cases, but not in others? How do some countries escape the vicious cycle and experience real improvement in electoral quality? Domestic factors alone do not answer these questions. Consider, for example, the 1990 and 1994 elections in the Dominican Republic. In both contests the opposition enjoyed broad popular

support. Both races were won by the incumbent president, Joaquín Balaguer, by an exceedingly small margin. Even the technology of fraud was the same in the two elections. But only in 1994 did misconduct spark democratic change. From a domestic standpoint, this outcome is puzzling, because the two contests were seemingly similar in every relevant respect. The key difference was the response of the international community. In 1994 election observers presented detailed evidence of manipulation, and the Organization of American States (OAS) and United States took rapid action in response. By repeatedly criticizing the election's legitimacy, they validated the opposition's claims that tens of thousands of its voters had been disenfranchised. They imposed sustained diplomatic pressure, making it clear to Balaguer that the status quo could not stand. Ultimately, in August 1994 internationally mediated talks culminated in a negotiated settlement—the "Pact for Democracy"—wherein Balaguer agreed to hold early elections in which he would not stand for reelection. At the behest of the international community, important changes to election administration were also agreed upon, including purging the central election commission, cleaning up voter registration lists, and creating a national judiciary council to adjudicate electoral disputes.

The same mechanisms of international influence apparent in the Dominican Republic are echoed in numerous other cases in which opposition parties have sought international allies, mediation has produced incumbent concessions, or international actors have demanded reforms to institutions of election management. They resonate in the words of those most directly affected by manipulation, such as when Albania's opposition candidate claimed in 2001 that his "only hope" was that international organizations would force the government to overturn the election results,[2] or when Viktor Yuschenko, addressing hundreds of thousands of his supporters in Kiev, declared: "Today, as never before, we need international attention to focus on this fraud."[3] They are echoed in the disappointment of those for whom international support is not forthcoming, such as in Azerbaijan, where opposition protesters called on the West to be true to its values: "Do not exchange democracy for oil."[4]

The broader point conveyed by these examples is that the domestic electoral game plays out before an international audience. The members of this audience do not merely influence domestic costs and benefits from afar. Nor are their activities limited to those of election observation missions, which can document and publicize misconduct, but otherwise have no ability to punish cheating. Rather, international actors *enforce democratic norms* by responding to electoral misconduct in concrete and immediate ways: they wield sticks and carrots to induce government concessions, mediate conflicts between opposing parties, shame norm violators, and validate the opposition's claims of fraud. By altering the balance of power between government and opposition, these efforts can provide

the decisive push toward democratic change. In short, conceiving of electoral misconduct as a violation of international norms—and therefore as an act that has external repercussions—is essential for understanding variations in domestic outcomes after flawed elections.

The idea that enforcement matters may at first seem surprising. International promotion of democracy is often criticized as inconsistent and weak. Only some of the countries that hold flawed elections are punished, and sanctions that impose tangible costs on norm violators are rare. These facts raise important questions about whether international actors are simply choosing to involve themselves in "easy" cases, where democratic change would result anyway. Moreover, electoral misconduct is widespread and persistent, pointing to the international community's failure to establish a credible deterrent. For all these reasons, it would be tempting to conclude that the international defense of democratic norms is meaningless, that we are simply witnessing a game of "organized hypocrisy" in which norms are regularly violated with impunity (Krasner 1999). This book argues otherwise. Even if enforcement is selective and politicized, or appears on its face to be weak, it can deepen democracy by influencing both the conduct and the outcome of elections.

THE ARGUMENT IN BRIEF

Norms are shared understandings about appropriate behavior.[5] With the end of the Cold War there emerged a growing consensus—a shared understanding—that governments should be chosen through free and fair elections. This includes the concepts that no party or candidate should be unduly or arbitrarily prevented from competing; campaigns should be free to operate without intimidation; all parties and candidates should enjoy equal access to the media; state institutions involved in organizing and arbitrating elections should be impartial; no voter should be arbitrarily denied the right to cast a ballot; voters should be free to express their political preferences and should vote by secret ballot; and ballots should be counted in a transparent and accurate manner. I refer to these standards collectively as "democratic electoral norms" (or simply democratic norms). Their origins in international law date to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Through the subsequent efforts of election monitoring organizations, the United Nations, and a number of regional organizations, a set of more specific standards for electoral conduct has now emerged within a growing body of hard and soft law (cf. Fox and Roth 2001; Rich 2001).[6]

Democratic electoral norms are global in scope. These standards are used by international and domestic actors in all regions of the world as the benchmark against which to evaluate electoral conduct. A country does not have to be a

member of a particular international institution or sign onto a particular international commitment to be held to account. Yet there is wide variation among countries and regions in whether—and to what extent—violations of democratic electoral norms are punished. Enforcement—understood as policies that aim to improve norm compliance through pressure, incentives, or suasion—is selectively imposed. The goals of this book are twofold: to explain this variation in norm enforcement and to explain the impact of enforcement—when it *is* applied—on electoral conduct and outcomes. In other words, this study explores both the causes and effects of the international enforcement of democratic norms.

Some countries are more likely than others to be punished for electoral misconduct, and the intensity of enforcement can differ substantially across cases. Any attempt to assess the effects of international enforcement must first account for this variation in when and where it is imposed. One reason is simply a country's regional location. In Latin America and Europe, regional organizations are the first line of defense against democratic backsliding. A virtuous combination of member state will and institutional capacity has resulted in entities like the OAS, European Union (EU), Council of Europe (COE), and Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) developing a strong track record of monitoring elections and responding to electoral misconduct. Other regions lack this key component. Africa's regime for protecting democracy is far less developed, and in Asia it is virtually nonexistent.

Variation in enforcement is also shaped, at the country level, by interests and information. Enforcement is less likely to be found in geopolitically important countries or strategic allies where the external actor's interest in promoting democracy is trumped by other foreign policy goals. But patterns of enforcement are not dictated solely by power relations. The decision to enforce in a particular case—even in a strategically important country—is also shaped by the degree of uncertainty about the scope, source, and severity of electoral misconduct. When information about a norm violation is compelling and credible, it provides a justification—and creates outright pressure—for an international response. Within multilateral organizations, states that favor enforcement can marshal evidence of misconduct to shame other, more reluctant member states into providing their support. Election observation missions are one prominent source of information on electoral conduct. But international actors can also learn about the intentionality of misconduct simply by observing a regime's behavior over time. Repeat offenders—countries that experience a series of flawed elections with no evidence of improvement—are more likely to be punished, because it is clearer in these cases that violations are deliberate and willful. Importantly, repeat offenders also represent the more intractable cases, which runs counter to the idea that international actors choose to intervene primarily when conditions are easy.

Once enforcement is imposed, what are its effects? Can international actors influence domestic political outcomes? Understanding the mechanisms of international influence requires first understanding key features of the domestic political context. In the wake of a flawed election, two barriers stand in the way of democratic change: institutional bias and opposition weakness. By targeting these barriers, international actors can transform the electoral context, leveling the playing field and altering the balance of power between government and opposition. Their influence runs through two specific channels. First, by promoting institutional reform, enforcement *improves electoral conduct*. At issue is the quality, impartiality, and professionalism of the institutions of election management and oversight. When they are weak and politicized, and accountability mechanisms are poor, opportunities for manipulation are extensive, and cheating is easy to pull off. By inducing governments to agree to institutional reform and ensuring implementation, international actors contribute to an environment that favors clean elections. Importantly, this pathway of influence requires no change of heart on the part of the incumbent. Rather, an improved institutional environment renders electoral misconduct more costly and difficult, even if the incumbent still wants to cheat. It may seem puzzling that any leader would agree to such changes, but institutional reform is more incentive compatible than it might first appear. For an incumbent with a short time horizon—one that is focused simply on retaining power in the near term—institutional change provides a way to alleviate postelection pressure without giving up power entirely. The "bite" of these reforms is only felt in the next electoral cycle.

In the second channel, by empowering the domestic opposition, international enforcement *increases the probability of alternation in power*. In the immediate aftermath of a flawed election, the opposition faces two strategic dilemmas: its claims of fraud may lack credibility, and attempts to orchestrate protests are plagued by collective action problems. International actors mitigate these problems by providing external validation and reducing the likelihood that protests will be repressed. Enforcement also bolsters the opposition's electoral prospects. International actors can increase the incentives for opposition parties to unite by employing targeted threats and promises; they alleviate fear and increase confidence in the electoral process, thereby boosting turnout among opposition supporters; and by tying valuable international benefits to a change in government, international actors increase the incentives for voters to support the opposition.

Different enforcement tools have different strengths. Conditionality—the wielding of sticks and carrots—marshals the power of concrete material incentives. This form of influence is particularly well-suited for inducing governments to implement institutional reform and encouraging opposition parties to forge a united electoral front. Tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions, and shaming—instead marshal the power of social pressure

and suasion. These methods prove particularly adept at empowering opposition voices and lending credibility to their claims during the immediate period of postelection contestation. This runs counter to the idea that concrete threats and punishments are necessarily the best—or the only—way to induce compliance with international norms.

IMPLICATIONS FOR DEMOCRATIZATION AND ELECTIONS

This book joins a growing body of research that carves out a space for international actors in an area typically studied through the lens of domestic politics. This wave of scholarly inquiry is challenging the assumption that democracy must come from the bottom up. In a pioneering set of studies, Pevehouse (2002a, 2002b, 2005) finds that membership in densely democratic regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) promotes both democratic transitions and consolidation. His causal story relies on the idea that IGOs impose costs on democratic backsliders—through sanctions or suspension of membership—and in so doing tie the hands of would-be norm violators.[7] Studies of the EU's enlargement echo this conclusion about the powerful effects of conditionality—at least when it is tied to a highly valued reward, like EU membership (Vachudova 2005; Jacoby 2006). Under certain conditions softer tools of influence, which do not rely on threats and coercion, appear to matter as well. Foreign aid, for example, has been found to lead to improvements in democratic performance, especially when it is specifically designed to target democratic institutions (Finkel et al. 2007; Goldsmith 2003).

Other studies forego theorizing about the effects of particular tools for promoting democracy and instead conceive of external forces as structural or background conditions, as the international "context" of democratization. Early research on the international dimensions of the third wave of democratization largely adopted this approach (cf. Pridham 1991; Whitehead 1996). Studies of the liberal peace find that membership in international organizations is associated with democracy (Russett and Oneal 2001). More recently, Levitsky and Way (2005, 2010a) offer a structural account of competitive authoritarian regimes that emphasizes the role of economic, social, and political linkages with the West as a primary cause of democratization. Research on the diffusion of democracy similarly focuses on the importance of geographic location (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008). Taking stock, the value of structural accounts lies in their ability to illuminate variation in countries' long-term propensity to democratize. They are less useful for answering more nuanced questions about the particular timing and

character of democratic breakthroughs. Bunce and Wolchik (2011) emphasize this point in their study of postcommunist regimes, in which they find that structural conditions exhibit only a very weak correlation with successful electoral revolutions.[8] Similarly, Birch's (2011) study of electoral malpractice finds only limited evidence that dependence on trade, investment, and foreign aid is associated with electoral quality (2011, ch. 3). The problem is that structural accounts fail to model international actors as agents that choose when, where, and how to intervene in domestic politics. To gain a complete understanding of international influences on elections, it is not enough to examine aggregate patterns of international linkage, trade, flows of financial assistance, or membership in international institutions. One must account for active forms of international intervention during particular moments of electoral contestation.

A second limitation of existing research is the tendency to focus broadly on democratization writ large, customarily measured via aggregate ratings on the Polity or Freedom House indexes. These aggregate "umbrella" concepts can sometimes conceal more than they reveal.[9] Much work remains to be done to understand how insights about international pressure and engagement apply to the specific realm of electoral politics.[10] This is the essential task taken up in this book. Elections are the heart of democracy; indeed, they are the single element that even the most minimal definitions of democracy agree upon.[11] Thus, by demonstrating that international actors can improve electoral quality—and the conditions under which they do so—this book provides compelling new evidence about the precise causal mechanisms through which international forces promote democracy.

No less important is the contribution this makes to the study of electoral misconduct, the large majority of which locates the causes of misconduct within the domestic sphere. In an extensive cross-national study of electoral malpractice, Birch (2011) argues that a leader's decision to engage in manipulation is shaped by legitimacy costs: in systems where relations between citizens and the state are based on patronage and clientelism, backlash against electoral malpractice is likely to be lower than in countries with strong and autonomous civil societies. She finds, accordingly, that malpractice is higher in countries with high levels of corruption and lower in countries with strong freedom of the press and a history of protests. Other studies have found that misconduct is more likely in contexts where power is disproportionately concentrated in the hands of the incumbent (Simpser 2013); in more competitive races (Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Lehoucq 2003); in winner-take-all electoral systems (Birch 2007; Lehoucq 2003); and in districts marked by high socioeconomic inequality (Ziblatt 2009). Simpser (2013) argues that leaders' incentives to perpetrate electoral misconduct stem from its long-term and far-reaching political benefits. Especially when manipulation is blatant and excessive—that is, beyond what is needed to win the election

at hand—it serves to intimidate opposition supporters, ensure that bureaucrats remain loyal to the regime, and increase the government's postelection bargaining power vis-à-vis potential opponents. This logic helps explain why, in many countries, manipulation feeds into a self-perpetuating, vicious cycle. Yet transformative change is sometimes possible. Certain proximate factors have been found to facilitate the demise of cheating incumbents, including a unified opposition, voter turnout drives, divisions within the police and security forces, and postelection protests.[12]

Taken together, these accounts paint a rich picture of the domestic politics of electoral misconduct. By comparison, the role played by international actors has been relatively underdeveloped in the literature. One important exception is a wave of new research on international election observation. Explanations for the rapid increase in election observation in recent decades emphasize the role played by changing ideas about state sovereignty (Santa-Cruz 2005) as well as post–Cold War changes in the international distribution of power (Kelley 2008). Hyde (2011a, 2011b) argues that election observation became an international norm because the rise of democracy-contingent international benefits provided an incentive for leaders to signal their commitment to democracy by inviting in election observers. Interestingly, this dynamic has led many governments to invite observers even when they intend to cheat. Moving beyond the question of norm emergence, other research focuses on the effects of election observation. Evidence suggests that monitoring is associated with higher-quality elections, though there are caveats.[13] In a comprehensive cross-national analysis, Kelley (2012a) finds that monitored elections are on average better than unmonitored elections, but that the effect of monitoring is stronger in transitioning democracies, and that meaningful change may require repeated engagement over multiple electoral cycles. Examining microlevel evidence of voting returns in Armenia's 2003 election, Hyde (2007) finds that polling stations visited by international observers exhibited lower vote shares for the incumbent, consistent with the idea that the presence of observers deters fraud. The effect of election observation is far from uniform, however. Monitoring missions face many dilemmas when issuing their verdicts, and in certain cases there may be powerful incentives to dilute criticism of misconduct (Hartlyn and McCoy 2006; Kelley 2012a). Moreover, different monitoring groups exhibit different levels of credibility depending on the preferences of their principals and donors (Kelley 2009).

In sum, this growing body of research on election observation sheds light on the effects of one prominent instrument for promoting democracy. But it is important to recognize that election observation is just one tool in a much larger international "toolkit" for promoting free and fair elections. Indeed, when observation missions issue their reports, this is often only the first step in a long process

of engagement with norm-violating regimes. At issue is the distinction between monitoring, which reveals information about behavior, and enforcement, which punishes noncompliance.[14] Whereas research on election observation examines international efforts to expose misconduct, this book zeroes in on the repercussions of misconduct. I examine a more extensive range of international actors and policy tools than that explored in previous studies. Moreover, by drawing the distinction between monitoring and enforcement, this study is poised to address novel questions about how the two phenomena relate: namely, how international actors respond to election observers' reports, as well as whether, in the absence of these reports, outside actors glean information on electoral conduct from other sources. Although the presence of election observers may signal an increased probability that electoral misconduct will be punished,[15] it is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for enforcement.

Two additional contributions flow from this book's focus on the enforcement of international norms. First, it critically probes the argument that membership in international institutions—whether IGOs, treaties, or economic agreements—promotes democracy through a hand-tying mechanism.[16] This claim rests on the idea that violating international commitments is costly, which in turn depends on whether—and how strongly—they are enforced. For example, Pevehouse's (2002b, 2005) account of the effects of regional organizations on democracy relies on the idea that these organizations enforce conditionality. Yet until now this insight has not been subjected to a systematic test. Like Pevehouse, I find that regional organizations play a unique and consequential role. But crucially, their enforcement of democratic norms is selective. This does not mean that enforcement is irrelevant as a mechanism of international influence; it can still have powerful effects when it is applied. But enforcement must be explained rather than assumed, and international organization membership should not be used as an unproblematic proxy for enforcement.[17] Instead, this study underscores that the effect of membership in international institutions varies across countries and organizations in ways that have not been fully appreciated by prior research.

Finally, in contrast to studies that conceive of international forces as structural conditions, this book emphasizes the importance of theorizing the role of international actors during particular moments of electoral contestation. These actors do not merely alter the domestic context from afar. Rather, they actively interpose themselves between domestic political rivals, mediate conflicts between the government and opposition, lend credence to the opposition's claims of fraud, demand institutional reforms, pressure incumbents to hold repeat elections, and bolster the opposition's electoral support. Accounting for these active forms of influence provides an improved ability to link international forces to specific domestic outcomes.

IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL NORMS

Democratic norms have experienced a rapid cascade in recent years, but they are as yet in the middle of their "life cycle" (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). Although their legitimacy is rarely challenged rhetorically, many leaders attempt to feign compliance by holding multiparty elections while violating the fundamental standards of free and equal competition. Constructivism—traditionally the dominant approach to the study of international norms—has difficulty explaining this process of strategic adaptation and the varying patterns of compliance that it implies. A substantial body of work explores the issues of norm emergence and change.[18] But as Checkel (1999, 85) argues, a weakness of constructivist scholarship is its inability to explain state-level variation in the impact of norms, or in other words, why "the same norm will have a dramatic constitutive impact in one state, but fail to do so in others." Similarly, Johnston (2001, 492) criticizes the tendency to assume that the "diffusion and homogenization of values in the 'world polity' is virtually automatic," leaving unexplained variation in the degree of socialization across units. Part of the problem has been a failure to account for the agency of domestic actors—the "norm takers"—which leads analysts to overpredict the influence of norms (Legro 1997; Shannon 2000; Checkel 1999; Johnston 2001). To address this issue, some constructivist scholars have worked to specify the empirical conditions under which socialization—the process of inducting actors into the norms and rules of a given community—is more or less likely to occur (Checkel 2005; Cortell and Davis 2000; Gurowitz 1999; Hawkins 2004; Hooghe 2005). But an equally important shortcoming in the literature has been the dearth of theorizing on how (and why) international pressure for compliance with norms varies among countries and over time.[19] As this book makes clear, international norm enforcement can have powerful effects—reshaping domestic incentives and conditions in ways that favor improved compliance—but it is imposed in an uneven manner.

Far from being a monolithic force in international politics, then, norms "matter" more for some states than others. As Bush (2011, 116) argues in her study of the global adoption of gender quotas, "norms affect states differentially due to international inequalities," specifically, in her account, differences in the degree of international pressure and incentives. Lutz and Sikkink similarly conclude in their study of human rights in Latin America that it is the "norms themselves, *together with accompanying domestic, regional and international enforcement*" that influence state behavior (2000, 657; emphasis added). In sum, an overarching implication of this book is that enforcement must be more fully incorporated into the study of international norms and commitments. This should not be viewed as an attempt to pit rationalism against constructivism, but rather as a move toward greater theoretical synthesis. The concept of enforcement advanced here

is broad and inclusive, encompassing tools that employ both material incentives and social pressure.[20] I therefore join other scholars in noting the many linkages between rationalist and constructivist mechanisms of influence.[21]

DEFINITIONS

The questions explored in this book center on two key concepts: *electoral misconduct*, which is the type of norm violation that delimits the universe of cases under study, and *international democracy enforcement*. I define these concepts here and discuss how they are measured. I then introduce the outcomes of interest to this study, namely, changes in electoral *conduct* and *outcomes* in the wake of flawed elections.

Electoral Misconduct

Elections are the cornerstone of democracy. But to serve as instruments of democratic choice, they must be contested, and they must be free and fair. In his seminal work on polyarchy, Robert Dahl (1971, 5) notes that the right to participate in an election is meaningless if it is decoupled from the right to freely oppose the government. Free and fair elections now constitute an established norm that is enshrined in international law and is regularly monitored. Article 21 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states: "The will of the people shall be the basis of the authority of government; this will shall be expressed in periodic and genuine elections which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and shall be held by secret vote or by equivalent free voting procedures."[22]

But what does it mean for an election to be "free and fair"? Fundamentally, a fair election is one in which all parties and candidates compete on a level playing field, all are subject to the same procedures for registering and appearing on the ballot, and all have equal access to the media. A free election is one in which parties are free to campaign, voters are free to vote for their preferred candidates, and official results accurately reflect the votes that were cast.[23] This study conceives of electoral misconduct as any action that violates one or more of these core principles. Misconduct can therefore occur at multiple points during the electoral process, from the campaign through the tabulation of votes and the announcement of results. The specific tools of misconduct are many and varied, but they can be grouped into three categories: restrictions on opposition parties' and voters' freedom of movement, expression, and association; practices that create a biased playing field favoring the ruling party; and irregularities in the casting, counting, or tabulation of ballots.[24] The term *misconduct* therefore denotes a wider set of

practices than *fraud*, which typically refers, more narrowly, to the illegal alteration of ballots or election results (Lehoucq 2003). Moreover, the technical definition of fraud may vary depending on particularities of a country's legal code, but misconduct is defined here in reference to international standards that apply across cases.

This study focuses on elections that are marked by systematic misconduct. I refer to these as "flawed elections." Within this group some contests are more severely manipulated than others. Nevertheless, it is useful to define a minimum threshold. Because no election is perfect—even in the longest-lived democracy—my classification of flawed elections excludes cases of isolated misconduct that cannot be attributed to deficiencies in electoral management at the national level. I also limit my focus to elections in developing and postcommunist countries, because these are the potential targets of norm enforcement. Of course elections in developed democracies are far from perfect, as voters in Florida learned all too well after the irregularities in ballot counting in the 2000 presidential race. But unlike in the developing world, such irregularities typically reflect decentralized, localized deficiencies that are not orchestrated by national leaders, and they only lead to questions about electoral legitimacy under rare circumstances when contests are exceedingly close.

A final definitional issue has to do with culpability: Who is responsible for misconduct? It is conceivable that both the government and opposition may engage in manipulation, but in practice it is the government that is responsible for—and benefits from—the large majority of electoral malpractice. Opposition parties may perpetrate localized fraud in some contexts, but their ability to orchestrate systematic, nationwide manipulation pales in comparison to that of the government, which controls the institutions and resources of the state. Moreover, regardless of the source or reason for misconduct, it is ultimately the government that is responsible for ensuring the country's compliance with international norms. Accordingly, I treat electoral misconduct as a violation of democratic norms that is either directly sponsored or (indirectly) countenanced by the government.[25]

International Democracy Enforcement

This study analyzes the causes and effects of a particular set of policy tools—collectively labeled international democracy enforcement—that are implemented in response to electoral misconduct. Though enforcement may be colloquially understood as the imposition of sanctions, it is defined more broadly here as the implementation of a range of policies that aim to improve compliance with democratic norms through pressure, incentives, or suasion. It is important to note that these tools of enforcement are treated as distinct

from the activities of international election observers, whose primary role is to gather and disseminate information on electoral misconduct. Thus, criticism, assistance, or recommendations issued by election observation missions are not included in my operational definition of enforcement. Instead, the presence and verdicts of election observers are coded as separate variables. By drawing this distinction between monitoring and enforcement, I am able to examine questions about how the two phenomena relate: for example, how international enforcers respond to the information conveyed by election observers.

Two categories of enforcement are examined:

- *Conditionality*, which is the threat or application of punishments, or the promise or implementation of rewards, in response to electoral misconduct and conditional on future improvements in electoral conduct.
- *Diplomatic engagement*, which can take two forms:
  - A *diplomatic or mediation mission* sent to the target country to exert pressure for democracy or to resolve postelectoral conflicts between political parties.
  - *Shaming*: declarations, resolutions, or statements that criticize electoral misconduct, but that do not link changes in the target state to punishments or rewards.

These tools work in different ways. *Negative conditionality* imposes concrete material or political costs (e.g., economic sanctions or suspension of IGO membership) on the government to attempt to coerce it to change its behavior. The flip side is *positive conditionality*, which holds out the promise of rewards for future improvement in electoral quality. *Diplomatic or mediation missions* and *shaming* are not tied to explicit threats or promises. Rather, they rely on social pressure and suasion. The influence that these methods exert on governments can sometimes be indirect. For example, by setting up forums for dialogue between the government and opposition, mediation missions can empower opposition voices and increase domestic pressure for governments to introduce electoral reforms or hold repeat elections. Shaming, though not backed by the threat of material punishment, can nevertheless impose reputational costs on a regime.[26]

Outcomes: Democratic Change

Democratic change is understood here as an improvement in the freedom and equality of electoral competition. It can occur along two metrics, one relating to the electoral process and the other to electoral outcomes. One advantage of focusing on elections, rather than on democratic transitions writ large, is that

I can uncover with greater precision exactly what type of domestic political change is occurring. No less important, this focus provides an improved ability to specify the causal mechanisms that link international actors to democratization.

The first outcome of interest, *changes in electoral conduct*, refers to an improvement in the degree to which the electoral process is free and fair. These changes may occur suddenly—for example, following a breakthrough, transitional election—or may be more gradual and incremental. Indeed, it is not uncommon for improvements in electoral quality to occur in a piecemeal fashion over several electoral cycles. Tracking improvements in electoral conduct is the most direct way to measure compliance with democratic norms, and it resonates with a recent growth of scholarly interest in democratization by elections (Lindberg 2009), or what Howard and Roessler term "liberalizing" electoral outcomes (2006, 369).

The question of *electoral outcomes* instead centers on the political fate of the cheating incumbent. This is the issue of greatest concern to the domestic actors competing for power. But electoral outcomes are also important from a normative standpoint, in that regular turnover is a sign of robust political competition and governmental accountability. Two electoral outcomes are explored in this book. First, in the wake of a flawed election, is the incumbent forced to resign or cancel electoral results? Second, if the ruling party or incumbent wins an election through manipulation, does it lose power to the opposition in the next election?

Although improvements in electoral conduct and changes in electoral outcomes often coincide in practice, they are not necessarily linked. The quality of elections may improve over time in a country even if the same party continues to hold onto power. Moreover, as postcommunist electoral revolutions have taught us, ousting a cheating incumbent does not guarantee that future elections will be free and fair. For this reason—as well as a desire to maintain a reputation for neutrality—international enforcers focus primarily on improving electoral conduct, rather than on promoting a particular electoral outcome (cf. Gershman and Allen 2006).

RESEARCH DESIGN

This book adopts a two-track methodological approach. Quantitative evidence is used to assess the causes and effects of enforcement in a global sample of elections. Qualitative evidence then zeroes in on the causal mechanisms that underpin these relationships. This multimethod design, together with the global scope of the analysis, expands upon previous research on democracy promotion by regional organizations in Latin America and Europe.[27] These studies have uncovered important insights, yet questions remain about how their conclusions fare in other regions of the world with weaker regimes for democracy protection.

Moreover, analysts disagree about the causal importance of particular international actors. Positive accounts of EU and OAS democracy promotion in Serbia, Ukraine, Peru, and Guatemala,[28] for example, are countered by skeptical accounts that may cite the very same cases to argue that international actors have only a marginal impact.[29]

To some extent, these disagreements stem from a simple degrees-of-freedom problem: because many factors influence a country's political trajectory, it is difficult to isolate the effects of international forces when just a few cases are examined. To gain traction on the relative effects of international and domestic factors, this book features a new cross-national data set on the Enforcement of Democratic Electoral Norms (EDEN) that records the implementation by fifteen international actors of the three tools of democracy enforcement: conditionality, diplomatic/mediation missions, and shaming. The data cover 668 national elections (both presidential and legislative), 384 of which experienced misconduct, in 119 countries from 1990 to 2007. Because this data set includes the full set of flawed elections (including those that were not targeted by enforcement), it can be used to explain variation in enforcement—that is, why international actors choose to involve themselves in some cases, but not in others. Also, different from prior data collection efforts,[30] the EDEN data set covers forms of international involvement in elections that are separate from the activities of election observers.

Three sets of international actors are covered: regional intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), the United States, and the United Nations. Of the many regional organizations now in existence, I focus on the limited subset—thirteen in total—of those that have a track record of monitoring democracy or responding to electoral misconduct on at least one occasion. Five are from Europe (the EU, Council of Europe, OSCE, North Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO], and Commonwealth of Independent States [CIS]), four from Latin America (the OAS, Caribbean Community [CARICOM], Mercosur, and the Andean Community), and four from Africa (the African Union, Economic Community of West African States [ECOWAS], Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa [COMESA], and Southern African Development Community [SADC]).[31] These organizations have been selected out of the wider sample of regional IGOs based solely on the fact that they have a track record of at least once using enforcement to respond to flawed elections. Differences in their effectiveness are explored extensively in chapters 4 and 5.

Although the enforcement efforts of regional IGOs, the United States, and the United Nations sometimes overlap, it is important to recognize that each is an analytically distinct player with different sources of leverage. The United States is vastly more powerful in material terms than the rest, but IGOs have the more intangible benefits that derive from multilateral legitimacy. Regional organizations, for their part, are better attuned to local customs, practices, and needs than

the United States or United Nations. They hold out hope for countries around the world to develop their own homegrown regimes for protecting democracy. They are also of theoretical interest because many have adopted formal commitments to democracy, making them an excellent testing ground for competing arguments about the enforcement of international commitments.

The main strength of quantitative analysis is the ability to uncover *whether* international democracy enforcement promotes democratic change. To get at the question of causal mechanisms—that is, *how* enforcement matters—qualitative evidence is needed. To this end, I first explore electoral politics over time in two confirmatory cases: the Dominican Republic and Serbia. In each of these countries, outcomes align with the expectations of my theory: international enforcement is associated with alternation in power and subsequent improvements in electoral conduct. Selecting cases that fit the theory allows me to examine whether the hypothesized causal mechanisms are indeed at work and which of these mechanisms is most prominent in different contexts. To complement this, I then examine three "outliers"—Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia—in which enforcement was imposed in multiple elections over time, but democratic change was marginal or nonexistent. Examining these failed cases is useful for shedding light on the scope conditions of the theory—that is, the conditions under which enforcement is likely to be ineffective. This is in part an exercise in theory building, with the goal of generating new insights about causal relationships that can inform future research.

In constructing my narrative accounts of electoral politics in these five countries, I draw from a range of sources, including first-person interviews, scholarly research, news articles, reports issued by policy institutes and NGOs, and leaders' biographies. In each country multiple electoral cycles are examined, affording additional within-country variation in the factors of interest. Thus, each country study actually contains multiple "cases" from which to draw comparisons. The purpose of these studies is not to provide a comprehensive historical account of electoral politics in the selected countries; such a task lies well beyond the scope of this book. Rather, by situating the theory in a real-world context, the case studies serve to demonstrate its plausibility and power, as well as its limits.

PLAN OF THE BOOK

Chapter 2 develops the theory about the causes and effects of norm enforcement. Beginning with simple assumptions about the interactions among the government, opposition, and international enforcers, I argue that the likelihood of enforcement is shaped, at the country level, by variation in interests and information. Geopolitically important countries are less likely to be punished

for violating electoral norms, but information about the scope, intensity, and intentionality of misconduct can encourage enforcement by convincing reluctant international actors that punishment is both warranted and justifiable. Turning to the domestic effects of enforcement, I begin by identifying two key barriers to democratic change in countries that hold flawed elections: biased institutions and a weak opposition. By responding to electoral misconduct with tools of conditionality and diplomatic engagement, international actors mitigate these barriers and provide a crucial push for democratic change. But enforcement works in subtle—and sometimes unexpected—ways. Outside pressure is unlikely to directly alter the government's preference for manipulation. Instead, it works by transforming the institutional and political context in which elections are held. It incentivizes institutional reform, encourages opposition unity, empowers postelection protests, and increases the opposition's electoral support. Building from these mechanisms, I derive testable hypotheses about the effects of conditionality and diplomatic engagement. I contrast these expectations with alternative hypotheses about "passive" forms of international influence.

Chapter 3 begins the empirical portion of the study. It introduces the data set and provides a lay of the land by examining patterns of electoral misconduct around the world. It documents where misconduct occurs, how frequent and intense it is, and how these patterns differ by region and regime type. Some unexpected conclusions emerge. For example, misconduct is surprisingly prevalent even in democracies, in countries that are members of densely democratic international organizations, and in countries that have made formal international commitments to democracy. This evidence is inconsistent with the idea that membership in international institutions has a deterrent effect across the board, suggesting instead the need to account for country-specific variation in enforcement.

Chapter 4 takes up this challenge. It explains selectivity in the enforcement of democratic norms and in so doing reveals how—and why—the cost of violating norms differs among countries. I begin by exploring which international actors enforce electoral norms, how consistent they are, and which policy tools they favor. I show that regional variation in enforcement is pronounced: international organizations in Europe and Latin America are robust defenders of norms, those in Africa rarely respond to electoral misconduct, and those in Asia never do. Country-level variation in enforcement is further shaped by both the presence of competing geopolitical interests that serve to deflect pressure for democracy and the quality of information on norm violations. The effect of information is particularly important, because it can create momentum for enforcement even in powerful countries that are otherwise unlikely to be punished for holding flawed elections.

Chapter 5 uses quantitative evidence to assess the effects of enforcement on electoral conduct and outcomes. I find that enforcement works—and often has a more robust effect than other factors that are widely perceived to be important predictors of democratic change. Specifically, postelection conditionality is associated with improvements in electoral quality in the next election, whereas pre-election conditionality is associated with opposition electoral victories. These findings attest to the power of concrete incentives for inducing institutional reform and empowering opposition support. Tools of diplomatic engagement—mediation, diplomatic missions, and shaming—instead are associated with immediate postelection concessions, namely, a decision by the incumbent to step down or cancel electoral results. Crucially, these efforts interact with, and augment, the effects of opposition protests, indicating that international validation and support are indeed key ingredients for the success of mass mobilization after flawed elections. The chapter concludes by probing the robustness and nuances of these findings. I find, first, that not all actors are equally effective. Enforcement by regional organizations proves to have the strongest and most consistent positive effects, which points to these organizations' unique combination of leverage and legitimacy. Second, I find no evidence to support the idea that enforcement is imposed disproportionately in "easy" cases that are otherwise more likely to democratize. On the contrary, if anything, conditionality is imposed in more intransigent regimes, where change is more difficult to achieve.

The final two chapters present qualitative evidence that fleshes out the statistical relationships uncovered in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter 6 examines contested elections in the Dominican Republic and Serbia. These cases support several key insights of the theory: that the effect of enforcement is often gradual and delayed; that institutional reform constitutes an essential channel of international influence; and that opposition parties are empowered by international support. These cases also underscore that enforcement does not merely correlate with the opposition's strength; rather, it exerts a causal effect on the opposition's ability to translate mass outrage into democratic change. Chapter 7 then examines the three cases of "failed" enforcement—Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia—in which international efforts had, at best, partial or superficial effects. These cases generate insights about the scope conditions of the theory and shed further light on the relationships between international actors and the opposition. They suggest, for example, that in the absence of a minimally viable and cohesive opposition, international pressure is likely to produce only limited, cosmetic improvements in electoral quality. The ability of international actors to produce even marginal changes in such cases depends, in turn, on the consistency and strength of the enforcement effort itself.

2

Norm Enforcement and Democratic Change

International norms may enjoy wide acceptance yet still be regularly and flagrantly violated. For realists, this gap between principle and practice comes as no surprise, aligning easily with the view that states are driven by material self-interest, and norms are mere window dressing (Mearsheimer 1995). In contrast, for constructivists norms are an elemental force in international politics, and variations in compliance with them are explained by differences in long-term processes of socialization and identity change (cf. Checkel 2001; Koh 1997; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999; Sunstein 1997; Tannenwald 1999). A third perspective on norms is rationalist in orientation, emphasizing the role of concrete incentives in producing compliance. From this viewpoint, a norm can shape behavior even if the actors being influenced do not genuinely buy into its legitimacy. Incentives for compliance could come from international sources, such as conditionality in foreign aid (Hyde 2011b; Wright 2009) or the desire to join international organizations (Schimmelfennig 2001; Vachudova 2005), or from domestic sources, such as pressure from interest groups (Dai 2005, 2007; Simmons 2009) or courts that are empowered to enforce international treaty obligations (Hathaway 2005).

Notwithstanding these theoretical differences, a shared focus of much research has been explaining broad patterns of compliance and noncompliance. Though enforcement is central to theories of compliance, few studies have explicitly considered whether, and when, the international community responds to violations of norms.[1] As a result, valuable opportunities to hone in on the interactions between norm violators and norm enforcers have been missed. This study focuses explicitly on these interactions. Rather than asking what explains compliance writ large, I ask what happens when norms are violated. Are norm violators punished? Does international enforcement of norms make a difference? The answers to these questions have important implications for our understanding of when and how norms "matter." For constructivists, a focus on enforcement sheds

new light on the socialization process, illuminating the conditions under which noncompliant actors are most vulnerable to social pressure. For rationalists, examining international responses to violations elucidates the cost of noncompliance, which is a central element of domestic actors' behavioral calculations. And for realists, exploring the effects of enforcement probes and challenges the idea that norms exert no real impact.

This chapter provides a theory of the causes and consequences of international norm enforcement in response to electoral misconduct. Beginning with some simple assumptions about electoral competition between the government and opposition, I identify two key barriers to democratic change in countries that hold flawed elections: biased institutions and a weak opposition. Norm violations play out before an international audience, but international actors do not impose enforcement everywhere. The probability of punishment is shaped, at the country level, by patterns of geopolitical interest and by information. Strategically important countries are more likely to hold "trump cards" that allow them to avoid any real consequences for violating democratic norms. But information on the scope, severity, and intentionality of norm violations also plays a role by facilitating and encouraging enforcement, even in the more strategically important cases.

When enforcement is imposed, it can have a powerful impact. By targeting domestic institutions and empowering the domestic opposition, tools of conditionality and diplomatic engagement can transform both the conduct and outcome of elections. These are two distinct types of effects: an improvement in electoral conduct entails a change in the procedural quality of elections, whereas the question of electoral outcomes centers on the political fate of cheating incumbents. Are they forced to resign in the wake of the flawed election? Do they lose power in the next election?

This chapter's focus on indirect channels of international influence—via domestic institutions and the opposition—leads to some counterintuitive propositions about how, and under what conditions, enforcement works. First, the effects of enforcement are often gradual; changes may not emerge until the next electoral cycle. Furthermore, although concrete sticks and carrots have their place, softer tools that rely on symbolic incentives can shape domestic outcomes by altering perceptions about an election's legitimacy. And perhaps most important, international pressure can have transformative effects even when faced with an intransigent norm-violating regime.

THE ACTORS, CHOICES, AND OUTCOMES

The theory discussed here centers on the interactions among the government, the opposition, and international enforcers. I begin by outlining basic assumptions

about the preferences, choices, and strategic problems that these actors face. I identify two barriers to democratic change and explain how international actors can target these barriers through the active enforcement of electoral norms.

Within the domestic political arena, competition between the government and opposition is the fundamental force that shapes electoral politics. I assume that both parties seek to hold power, and that elections are the means to achieving this goal. However, the government has the potential to engage in electoral manipulation to skew the playing field and increase its vote share. The ease with which manipulation can be employed, and the potency of its effects, depends on the domestic institutional context. As mechanisms of electoral accountability and oversight improve, the possibilities for government-sponsored manipulation decline. Thus, a biased institutional context is one key barrier to democratic change.

Manipulation places the opposition at an electoral disadvantage. Accordingly, opposition parties in countries with a track record of flawed elections are characteristically weak, a second barrier to democratic change. To combat this disadvantage, the opposition may choose to protest fraud. Opposition parties may also choose to forge a unified coalition to increase their electoral weight. Yet the opposition faces two strategic dilemmas. First, opposition factions encounter bargaining and distribution problems that hinder the formation of a single electoral coalition. Second, orchestrating successful protests is difficult and risky. The opposition's claims of fraud will lack credibility if the public is unable to distinguish between real and spurious allegations. Moreover, if met with repression, protests may leave the opposition in an even weaker political position than before.

The core insight developed in this chapter is that this electoral conflict between government and opposition plays out before an international audience. Through the active enforcement of democratic norms, international actors have the potential to transform the domestic game, altering the institutional context and shifting the balance of power between government and opposition. To start, I assume that for any given state there is a set of international actors that care about the quality of its elections. The particular identities of these actors vary depending on a state's region and its configuration of IGO memberships. Unlike domestic actors, international actors are concerned primarily with electoral quality, not electoral outcomes.[2] These actors may decide to respond to electoral misconduct with tools of norm enforcement. However, enforcement is costly. It can lead to political backlash; ruptured diplomatic relationships; or disruptions in trade, investment, and economic exchange. An international actor's interest in enforcing democratic norms may therefore be trumped by competing geopolitical interests. Yet another obstacle to enforcement is a lack of reliable information about the scope and extent of electoral misconduct. Such uncertainty raises questions about whether punishment is appropriate and justifiable.




Figure 2.1 Sequence of Choices and Outcomes.

Figure 2.1 illustrates the events that fall within the scope of the theory, mapping the actors' choices in a two-election sequence. The domestic outcomes of interest are shown in italics. As the figure makes clear, I am not concerned with explaining the government's initial choice to engage in electoral misconduct. This question has been studied extensively by others, with the overall conclusion that the incentives for manipulation are numerous and that misconduct occurs under a wide range of conditions: it is perpetrated by governments both strong and weak, in electoral races that are both competitive and hegemonic, and in a variety of regime typess.[3] I therefore bracket the question of why a government first violates democratic norms, focusing instead on explaining international responses and domestic outcomes *given that a norm violation has occurred*. In other words, a flawed election is the trigger that brings a country within the scope of my theory.

When a flawed election occurs (Election 1 in figure 2.1), opposition parties may respond with protests, and international actors may respond with tools of norm enforcement. In turn, the government may respond by canceling some of the disputed results, or by stepping down altogether. I refer to these actions as "postelection concessions." If the government does hold onto power, the opposition and international actors must turn their attention to the next election (Election 2). In an effort to improve their chance of victory, opposition parties may choose to unite in an electoral coalition, while international actors may employ tools of enforcement intended to ensure a free and fair contest. The question is whether these efforts do in fact lead to an improvement in conduct or an opposition victory. To sum up, three domestic outcomes are of interest: first, whether the country experiences an improvement in electoral conduct in the contest that follows a flawed election; second, whether the incumbent makes postelection concessions after engaging in manipulation; and third, if the incumbent does hold onto power, whether alternation in power occurs in the next election.

It is important to note that these outcomes are analytically distinct. Improved electoral conduct and alternation in power do not necessarily go hand in hand. As the postcommunist electoral revolutions have shown, ousting a cheating incumbent does not guarantee future respect for democratic norms.[4] Kyrgyzstan, for example, experienced a dramatic political rupture in 2005, but absent any meaningful institutional reform or political will on the part of the new government, politics quickly returned to the old pattern of skewed electoral competition and ruling party dominance (Radnitz 2006). Conversely, electoral conduct may improve over time even when the same party holds onto power. In Zambia, for example, incumbent president Levy Mwanawasa won re-election in 2006 in a contest marked by improvements in the quality of election administration and in the freedom of the campaign environment.

WHEN IS ENFORCEMENT IMPOSED?

Not all countries are punished for holding flawed elections, and even within a country, the cost of violating norms can vary over time. Understanding the reasons for this variation is essential for comprehending why international norms "matter" for some countries (and at certain times) more than for others. From a methodological standpoint, any attempt to gauge the effects of norm enforcement on domestic politics will be incomplete without first understanding the conditions under which it is imposed. This section explores two factors that together shape country-level and temporal variation in enforcement: the presence of competing geopolitical interests and uncertainty about the source, scope, and impact of the norm violation. Both of these factors, if present, weaken incentives for enforcement. But the problem of uncertainty can be mitigated by information. If present, international election observers can reduce uncertainty by reporting on the scope, intent, and effects of misconduct. Even in the absence of monitors, uncertainty declines as enforcers observe the government's behavior over time. If it repeatedly engages in misconduct, international enforcers can infer that misconduct is intentional and hence more worthy of punishment.

Competing Geopolitical Interests

Among potential enforcers, the question of whether to respond to a flawed election is often contested. States must balance a number of foreign policy goals, of which protecting democracy is just one. Military interests, access to oil, ensuring cooperation in the fight against transnational terrorism, maintaining trade relations, and promoting civil peace are all pressing priorities that may be at odds

with the competing goal of promoting democratization (cf. McKoy and Miller 2012).[5] As Schraeder (2002, 227) notes, promotion of democracy enjoys only "secondary status" in the hierarchy of foreign policy goals of the advanced industrialized democracies. The problem all too often is that imposing pressure for free and fair elections encroaches on sensitive issues of state sovereignty and can easily lead to a deterioration in relations between the enforcer and the target. Powerful countries with a high degree of economic or military leverage are especially likely to hold "trump cards" that override the enforcer's interest in defending democracy. Studies of the OAS and EU, for example, show that these organizations have been less likely to respond to violations of democratic norms in larger, more powerful states (Levitt 2006; Cooper and Legler 2001a; Dannreuther 2004; Emerson et al. 2005; MacFarlane 2004; K. Smith 2001). In the African-Caribbean-Pacific group of former colonies, the EU has been selective in its suspension of foreign aid in response to violations of the Cotonou Agreement's democracy clause, with strategically important countries like Nigeria getting a pass (Santiso 2003, 161). Research on other issues echoes these conclusions. Simmons (2009, 122) notes that the incentives for enforcing human rights treaties are especially weak in "strategically, politically or economically important countries." Lebovic and Voeten (2006) find that militarily powerful states are less likely to be criticized by the UN Commission on Human Rights. Military intervention in response to violations of territorial integrity norms is less likely in countries that have strong security ties with a hegemon (van der Maat 2011), and relative power is a robust predictor of vulnerability to economic pressure (Nooruddin and Payton 2010). The enforcement of economic agreements is plagued by similar inconsistencies. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), for example, imposes less stringent punishment on strategically important countries (e.g., Russia) than on smaller, weaker countries (e.g., Poland) when they deviate from the terms of their agreements (Stone 2002, 2008).

In short, for enforcers, the cost of upsetting relations with major powers far exceeds that of offending weaker countries with few sources of international leverage.[6] Punishing powerful states may even prompt retaliation. Russia, for one, has unabashedly used its status as an energy exporter to Europe to stave off pressure for democratic reform in its near abroad (the independent republics that border it) (Goldman 2008).[7] Indeed, natural resource wealth is one of the most effective shields that norm-violating regimes can use to deflect international pressure, a fact to which domestic opposition parties are keenly attuned. Following a fraudulent election in oil-rich Azerbaijan in November 2005, for example, the responses of Western actors were widely perceived as soft. In postelection protests, Azeri opposition supporters expressed frustration at the lack of international support, with one protest sign summing up the situation: "Stand true to your values. Do not exchange democracy for oil."[8]

Uncertainty

The dictates of geopolitical interest do not tell the whole story, however. Much variation remains to be explained. Why, for example, did international actors fail to respond to the Dominican Republic's fraudulent election in 1990, but then impose intense pressure following a similarly flawed contest in 1994? How can instances of norm enforcement in strategically important countries, such as Ethiopia or Venezuela, be explained? To understand these questions, we must account for the role of information. Although some violations of international norms—such as military coups or the use of weapons of mass destruction—are public, clearly observable events, other norm violations are more difficult to detect. Human rights violations present particular informational problems. Lutz and Sikkink (2000, 635) discuss the challenges of documenting and assigning blame for "disappearances," the practice of secretly imprisoning and killing political opponents. These types of rights violations "are difficult to prove because the accuser must show that the victim was deprived of his or her freedom by government agents, notwithstanding government claims to the contrary." Torture is another practice bedeviled by uncertainty, because governments can claim that agents acted contrary to orders or that local police forces were outside of state control (Hafner-Burton 2008, 709–711).

Like disappearances and torture, electoral misconduct is an activity shrouded in ambiguity. Governments may go to considerable lengths to hide their actions (Hyde 2011b, ch. 5). And even if it is clear that misconduct took place, higher-order informational problems emerge. Was misconduct intentional? Did it influence the outcome of the election? These questions are difficult to answer even in information-rich environments (Hartlyn and McCoy 2006; Simpser and Donno 2012). The consequences of this uncertainty are severe. For international actors to impose enforcement, the alleged offender must be viewed as an acceptable and justifiable target. If doubts exist about the intention, scope, or impact of electoral misconduct, the will to punish is reduced. Within multilateral organizations in particular, uncertainty can generate disagreement among member states about the appropriateness of taking actions that could be construed as punishing a government without just cause (Donno 2010). Hurd (2005, 509–510) provides a detailed account of just such a dynamic in the United Nations. In the wake of UN Security Council sanctions on Libya imposed in 1992, the Libyan regime skillfully capitalized on uncertainty about its role in the Pan Am Lockerbie bombings—arguing that accusations had not been fully investigated or proven through judicial channels—to convince other UN members to withdraw support for the sanctions. A similar process played out in the OAS during the US and Canada's (failed) campaign to convince other member states to suspend Peru's membership in the wake of its manipulated presidential contest in 2000. Dissenting states—led by Mexico and Venezuela—were

reluctant to set a precedent for intervention in electoral politics without just cause (Levitt 2006).[9]

Reliable information on the scope, effects, and intentionality of electoral misconduct is therefore a valuable commodity that plays a key role in shaping debates about the justifiability of enforcement. In an innovative set of survey experiments, Herrmann and Shannon (2001) found that perceptions about the norm violator's motivation are a key factor influencing the willingness of elites to undertake enforcement. Research on the enforcement of human rights violations further attests to the importance of information and publicity (cf. Murdie and Peksen 2012; Roth 2004). Within IGOs, information on electoral misconduct can be used to pressure and even "shame" states that are reluctant to support enforcement (Donno 2010). But the supply of information varies considerably among elections. How can informational asymmetries be overcome?

Election Observation

One prominent source of information on electoral quality is the verdicts of international observation missions. Since the end of the Cold War election observation has become a widely accepted tool for gathering and publicizing information about electoral misconduct (Kelley 2008). Yet the presence and quality of election observation missions varies widely across cases (Kelley 2009), a fact which has sparked a growing body of scholarly research. Most studies have focused on assessing how observers influence the behavior of those being monitored, for example, by reducing fraud in polling stations (Hyde 2007), inducing governments to hide misconduct (Hyde 2011b), or increasing governments' reliance on pre-electoral tools of manipulation (Hyde and O'Mahoney 2010; Simpser and Donno 2012). Here I highlight a different effect, namely that the information revealed in monitors' reports influences the choices of external actors, specifically those that are in a position to punish the state being monitored.

International election observers perform two functions that affect the choices of would-be enforcers. First, when observers criticize an election, they send a powerful message. Their reports reveal information about whether misconduct, if present, was systematic, was intentionally orchestrated by the government, and influenced the outcome of the election. Second, observers publicize misconduct: they hold press conferences, and their reports are widely circulated in the international media. By drawing attention to flawed elections, observers increase expectations for an international response. This is an essential function. Scores of countries hold elections in any given year, making it impossible for international actors to deliberate on and respond to every flawed or problematic contest.

Publicity is therefore critical for getting an election on the international community's agenda for action.

Within IGOs, publicity generated by international observers can also be used to pressure those that are reluctant to support enforcement, convincing them to prioritize defense of democratic norms over other competing interests. Debate in the EU over Ukraine's controversial 2004 election illustrates this dynamic. The election brought to light differences between the EU's new postcommunist member states—which favored a more vigorous response to the contest that would exacerbate tensions with Russia—and the old member states, which favored a more conciliatory approach. A highly critical report issued by the OSCE's election observation mission helped shine light on hypocrisy when certain member states were reluctant to back up their commitment to defend democracy. Seizing upon the information contained in the OSCE's report, Poland took the lead in pushing for a strong EU response, joined by other new member states.[10] As an EU official explained, the observers' report—which concluded that fraud had likely affected the outcome of the election—was essential in inciting the EU's unprecedented decision to withhold recognition of an election in a non-member state.[11]

History of Electoral Conduct

Enforcement is more likely to be imposed if it is clear that electoral misconduct was intentionally orchestrated by the government. Election observers are one source of information on this point, but even when observers are absent, enforcers can learn whether misconduct was intentional by observing a government's behavior over time. This is the central insight of Bayesian game-theoretical models, in which actors update their beliefs about other actors' preferences—or "types"—based on their revealed behavior over time or in iterated rounds of play.[12] Applied to electoral misconduct, the intuition is simple: the first time that a country holds a flawed election, there may be legitimate disagreement about the reasons behind the irregularities. Perhaps the regime is a new democracy that is still finding its legs; perhaps election management bodies were not well trained, or the logistics of the election were too complex. Moreover, even if there is solid evidence suggesting that misconduct was intentional, would-be enforcers may be unsure about whether the incumbent is a determined, unrepentant norm violator or might change in the future. If, however, misconduct persists over time, there can be little doubt that the government is at the very least committing a sin of "omission" by failing to take steps to clean up its act. This logic implies that international actors will tend to give norm-violating regimes an initial grace period, then ramp up the intensity of enforcement as the number of violations increases over time.

Hypotheses about the Imposition of Enforcement

Three testable hypotheses flow from this section's discussion of the barriers to enforcement:

- First, competing strategic and foreign policy interests reduce the ability and willingness of would-be enforcers to prioritize the defense of democratic norms. Thus, *enforcement is more likely in countries that are of low geopolitical importance*.
- Second, because information about the scope, intent, and effect of electoral misconduct shapes debates about the justifiability of punishment, *enforcement is more likely when international election observers criticize the election*.
- Third, international actors glean information about whether the misconduct was intentional by observing governments' behavior over time. Repeat offenders are more likely to be viewed as deserving punishment. Thus, *enforcement is more likely as the number of previous flawed elections in the country increases*.

TOOLS OF ENFORCEMENT

When responding to flawed elections, international actors have a range of tools at their disposal. Enforcement—defined broadly as efforts to improve compliance with democratic norms through pressure, incentives, or suasion—can include policy tools that marshal both material and social incentives. Thus, rather than making an artificial assumption that actors are motivated by either material calculations or ideational forces, I integrate rationalist and constructivist perspectives. I assume that the choices of domestic actors can be swayed both by a logic of consequences—whereby actors calculate the costs and benefits of their actions—and by a logic of appropriateness—whereby actors seek to conform to socially accepted standards of behavior (March and Olsen 1998). These two logics of action can be proxied by distinguishing between policies of *conditionality*, which wield concrete, material incentives, and policies of *diplomatic engagement,* which employ symbolic, social incentives.[13]

Conditionality entails linking concrete punishments or rewards to improvements in the quality of elections. "Negative" conditionality threatens either material (e.g., economic sanctions) or political (e.g., suspension of IGO membership) costs for the government for electoral misconduct, whereas "positive" conditionality holds out the promise of rewards if conduct improves. In practice, threats

and promises are often linked. The US Millennium Challenge Corporation, for example, makes grants conditional on democratic performance (a positive "carrot"), and the United States has used this instrument to punish countries for electoral misconduct (a negative "stick"), as it did in Armenia in response to widespread human rights abuses surrounding the February 2008 presidential election.

Conditionality works by altering actors' cost-benefit calculations. Research on a range of issues attests to the power of this approach. International conditionality has induced governments to introduce far-reaching political and economic reforms (Nooruddin and Simmons 2006; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, 2003; Vachudova 2005; Vreeland 2003), to change state policies toward ethnic minorities (Kelley 2004), to hand over war criminals to international tribunals (Subotic 2009), and to deepen trade liberalization (Allee and Scalera 2012). When applied in response to a flawed election, conditionality motivates governments to improve electoral quality. The particular demands associated with conditionality vary from case to case. International actors may seek to directly alter the government's choice to manipulate, though as discussed below, this is unlikely to work against proven, intransigent norm violators. More indirectly, conditionality may induce governments to reform domestic institutions of election management and oversight.

In responding to electoral misconduct, international actors may also employ softer tools of enforcement that marshal social incentives and symbolic costs. The most prevalent tool of this kind is *shaming*: the issuing of declarations, resolutions, or statements that criticize electoral misconduct. Different from conditionality, shaming does not link improvements in conduct to concrete punishments or rewards. But it can still have an effect on behavior, provided that the target government seeks to maintain a reputation for democracy or desires international approval. As Lutz and Sikkink (2000, 659) explain, international pressure works "not only at the pragmatic level by imposing material costs . . . but also at the social level by creating ostracized 'out-groups' of norm breakers." As members of an international society of states, leaders are "socialized to care about what other states think of them" (ibid., 659). A number of studies find that shaming does have real effects. Hafner-Burton (2008) shows, for example, that criticism by human rights NGOs, the United Nations, and global media is associated with improved respect for political rights.[14] In addition to signaling international disapproval, shaming can create negative repercussions in the domestic arena if the government bases its claims to legitimacy on its democratic credentials. In the Dominican Republic, for example, president Joaquín Balaguer was keenly sensitive to international criticism in the wake of fraudulent elections in 1994. The race had been extremely close, and Balaguer considered external validation essential for stopping any momentum to overturn the results. Ultimately, one

of the factors influencing his decision to make postelection concessions to the opposition was the need to "stop the pressure from abroad."[15]

A second form of engagement is the use of *diplomatic or mediation missions* sent to the target country to push for democracy or to resolve postelection conflicts between political parties. Mediation missions have long been an important tool for resolving civil and interstate conflict (Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth, 2008; Regan and Aydin 2006). Such missions rely on direct, face-to-face contact to impose normative pressure on a noncompliant regime. Beyond their effects on the government, these missions empower the domestic opposition and civil society. By setting up an official forum for dialogue, mediation missions strengthen opposition voices and increase domestic pressure for electoral reform or repeat elections. In the aftermath of Peru's fraudulent election in 2000, the OAS organized a long-term mediation mission (the *mesa de dialogo*) that brought together representatives from the government, opposition, and civil society. The *mesa* set the agenda for reform by forging agreement on twenty-nine points for strengthening democracy in Peru, including increasing judicial independence, reforming electoral governance, and providing for greater congressional oversight of the executive (Cooper and Legler 2001b, 2005). The *mesa* later became the de facto authority in the country when Alberto Fujimori stepped down in November 2000 in the wake of a bribery scandal. Mediation also created space for the resolution of Madagascar's postelection crisis in 2002, when internationally sponsored talks between the government and opposition brokered a pause in violence. The agreement forged from these negotiations—the Dakar Accords—was never fully implemented, but it was the first document in which both sides agreed to respect the results of a vote recount. This later became a salient focal point when the country's constitutional court announced that opposition candidate Marc Ravalomanana had won a majority in the recount (Randrianja 2003).

As different modes of influence, conditionality and diplomatic engagement have distinct advantages and disadvantages. For one, these tools differ in the speed and ease with which they can be applied. Relative to diplomatic engagement, conditionality is difficult and politically costly to impose. Within international organizations, threats and punishments must typically be approved by all, or a majority of, member states. Thus, even a small divergence in preference among members can create barriers to agreement (Donno 2010). Even for a single country like the United States, imposing (or threatening) sanctions requires the approval of multiple gatekeepers or branches of government. Moreover, conditionality is materially costly to the implementer. It involves the use of concrete punishments and rewards, such as an increase in foreign aid, the promise of IGO membership, or the imposition of economic sanctions.

That conditionality is slow and costly to implement can be seen as a weakness. In the wake of a flawed election, it may be months before international

actors agree on a scheme for incentivizing compliance or punishing a norm-violating regime, and by then the window of opportunity for political change may have closed. Yet the difficulty of imposing conditionality also implies that—if it is implemented—it conveys a costly signal of international resolve. It sends a clear message to norm violators that the international community is unlikely to give up until concessions are made. This ability to signal resolve, then, is the second noteworthy difference between conditionality and diplomatic engagement.

Compared to conditionality, tools of diplomatic engagement are easier and less costly to impose. They are the most agile and speedy tools for responding to norm violations. Within IGOs, certain officials may be empowered to make statements about elections at their discretion, without seeking approval from higher bodies, as in the EU, where the country that holds the rotating presidency enjoys the ability to rapidly issue statements on matters of foreign policy. Similarly, in the United States, the State Department can criticize electoral misconduct well before an official policy is hammered out through the interagency process. However, because tools of diplomatic engagement are relatively easy and cheap to implement, they send a weaker signal of resolve than conditionality. Some criticize naming and shaming as little more than cheap talk (Power 2002). There are limits to what it can achieve. Although this approach conveys international disapproval and reveals information to domestic actors about the legitimacy of the election, it does not send a signal of determination and tenacity on the part of the enforcers.

The differences between tools of enforcement are summarized in table 2.1. To sum up, the weakness of conditionality—that it is slow and costly to implement—is also a strength, in that it allows international actors to send a stronger signal of resolve. Diplomatic engagement is faster and easier to implement, but sends a weaker signal of resolve. These differences imply that the tools of enforcement will have different domestic effects. By altering the government's

Table 2.1. Tools of Enforcement

	Type of Incentive	**Mechanism of Influence**	**Ease and Speed of Implementation**	**Signal of Resolve**
Conditionality	Material, concrete	Alters costs and benefits of particular actions	Low	Strong
Diplomatic engagement	Social, symbolic	Alters perceptions and beliefs about legitimacy	High	Weak

cost-benefit calculations, conditionality influences the incumbent's choices and induces changes in behavior, but these effects take hold in the longer term. Because it can be deployed more quickly, diplomatic engagement exerts an immediate impact on postelection outcomes, but its effects are more diffuse, in that they tend to bypass the government. Rather than directly altering the incumbent's cost-benefit calculations, diplomatic engagement shapes public perceptions about the election's legitimacy. When domestic conditions are right, this can have knock-on effects for the opposition's level of popular support and for the government's ability to maintain a coherent support coalition. The remaining sections in this chapter draw out these arguments further, exploring how—and under what conditions—the tools of enforcement influence the conduct and outcomes of elections.

THE EFFECT OF ENFORCEMENT ON ELECTORAL CONDUCT

When deciding whether to manipulate an election, the government must weigh the expected costs and benefits. On the one hand, misconduct increases its vote share. The benefits of this are obvious in close electoral races with an uncertain outcome. But even in hegemonic contexts, cheating pays. Manipulation reduces the size and competitiveness of party systems (Donno and Roussias 2012). It contributes to large margins of electoral victory, which in turn create an aura of invincibility that deters future opposition challengers (Simpser 2013). As Lust notes, leaders in contemporary electoral regimes seek not only high voter turnout, but also "an overwhelming majority of votes" (2009, 123). Electoral misconduct is a means to both ends.

However, manipulation is costly. Intimidating opposition supporters, biasing electoral management bodies, ensuring the cooperation of the media, and perpetrating ballot fraud all require the expenditure of time, money, and political resources. The magnitude of these ex ante, sunk costs of manipulation depends crucially on the domestic institutional context. When mechanisms for political accountability are well established—as in consolidated liberal democracies with independent courts, freedom of the press, and robust constraints on executive power—it is exceedingly difficult for incumbents to perpetrate electoral misconduct. In authoritarian regimes or in new, unconsolidated democracies, institutions are typically far more open to political manipulation.

When choosing whether to engage in electoral manipulation, the government must also consider the potential ex post costs: if exposed, misconduct may lead to a loss of legitimacy, domestic protests, or declining public support. International enforcement increases these costs. Yet crucially, the extent of these costs can

never be fully known in advance. This is so, for one thing, because enforcement is only selectively applied, meaning that governments may rationally expect to get away with cheating. Moreover, even when enforcement is imposed, the degree to which it will resonate with—and activate—domestic channels of pressure is uncertain. The historical record is peppered with examples of leaders who have engaged in electoral misconduct, only to be surprised later by the unexpected strength of domestic and international backlash. For a government contemplating electoral manipulation, then, there is always some uncertainty about the consequences. This is an important point, because it means that the ability of international actors to deter electoral misconduct through the threat of punishment is at best highly imperfect. However, there is a second channel of international influence. By targeting institutions of election management, international actors can promote reform that renders future misconduct more costly and difficult. Because the effects of these changes are not felt until the next electoral cycle, governments may view institutional change as an acceptable concession. The advantage of promoting institutional reform, then, is that it is incentive compatible for governments with short time horizons.

Deterrence

The most straightforward way to achieve compliance with an international norm is to deter violations in the first place. In his study of regional IGOs and democracy, Pevehouse argues that the costs of reneging on democratic commitments—which can include "a loss of trade, economic aid, military assistance, international status or military protection"—can serve as a deterrent to those who would undermine democratic gains (2005, 37–39). Mansfield and Pevehouse further argue that this deterrence effect—which rests on the assumption that international organizations do punish violations of democratic norms—helps states make credible commitments to democracy (2006, 143). Several other researchers support the claim that international commitments serve to deter deviant behavior, at least at the margins (Hafner-Burton 2005; Hathaway 2003; Reinhardt 2003; Simmons 2000, 2009; Simmons and Danner 2010). Consistent with the idea of deterrence, microlevel research on international election monitoring has demonstrated that polling stations with observers experience lower levels of fraud (Hyde 2007). Less clear is whether international actors can deter manipulation at the national level.

Indeed, when considering the incumbent's choice to authorize electoral misconduct, there is reason to question whether deterrence works in most cases. Consider that two conditions must exist for the threat of enforcement to deter misconduct: first, the leader must believe that he or she will, in fact, be punished

for violating norms; and second, the expected costs of this punishment must be large enough to outweigh the immediate political benefits of manipulation. Both conditions are often problematic. For one thing, the international community's track record of responding to flawed elections is inconsistent. Norm violations are widespread, but enforcement is relatively rare. This is so, quite simply, because "there are always trade-offs involved in enforcing conditionality, and the temptation to compromise can be compelling" (Stone 2004, 578). When threats lose credibility, their effect on domestic outcomes is weakened (Bearce and Tirone 2010; Dunning 2004; Stone 2004; Kelley 2004, ch. 2). Furthermore, even when enforcement is imposed, varying levels of support among international actors—a problem that emerges whenever some favor more stringent punishment than others—can lead to mixed messages and loopholes that undermine the effectiveness of the overall effort. This can occur even in the most democratic regions, and even within international organizations, like the EU, that are strongly committed in principle to protecting democracy (Donno 2010).

A second problem for deterrence is the government's time horizon. For a typical power-seeking leader, the immediate and tangible political benefits of electoral misconduct outweigh the future (and uncertain) costs of enforcement, which are not felt until after the election. When a leader believes that misconduct is necessary to win an election, this concern will easily trump any possible longer-term consequences of international pressure.[16] Furthermore, at the time when the government is deciding whether to engage in misconduct—which is often months before the election—the eventual effects of enforcement are ambiguous and difficult to predict. Some regimes targeted by even stringent conditionality and diplomatic pressure are able to survive—as Mugabe's continuing grip on power in Zimbabwe and Lukashenka's survival in Belarus illustrate. In short, incumbents who are focused on retaining and consolidating power in the near term are likely to view the prospect of international punishment as an acceptable risk. The threat of enforcement is unlikely to provoke a change of heart or otherwise deter electoral misconduct.

Institutional Reform

A different channel through which international actors can influence electoral conduct relies not on the threat of future enforcement, but rather on the effects of imposed enforcement. Recognizing the difficulty of eliminating a government's demand for misconduct, the goal of these efforts is instead to disrupt the supply of misconduct by targeting the institutions of election management and oversight. Clean elections are impossible without effective electoral governance to secure the credibility and legitimacy of the process (Mozaffar and Schedler 2002, 6). Equally

essential is a level institutional playing field on which state institutions are impartial and all parties enjoy access to the media (Levitsky and Way 2010b). Thus, for governments that want to cheat, the ease with which misconduct can be engaged in and the range of available tools of manipulation depend crucially on the quality of domestic institutions. Of primary importance are those institutions directly involved in administering elections: election management bodies, electoral legislation, and electoral tribunals. When these bodies are biased and weak, governments enjoy free rein to skew the electoral playing field, as in Mozambique, where the ruling Frelimo party stacked the national election commission with supporters prior to the October 2009 election, ensuring that it could exclude numerous opposition parties and candidates from appearing on the ballot (Manning 2010). Flawed or incomplete voter registration lists are another boon for cheating incumbents, who can use ambiguities in these lists to disenfranchise opposition voters, as in Uganda's constituent assembly election in 1994, when unpublished registration lists prevented scores of voters from knowing which polling station to go to (Elklit and Svensson 1997, 40).

Also important are the broader institutions—the media, judiciary, and legislature—that play a role in exposing misconduct and holding governments accountable. Politicized control of legislative and judicial institutions "allows the government to violate democratic procedure with impunity. . . . and ensures that major electoral disputes will be resolved in the ruling party's favor" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 60). In the months surrounding the 2000 presidential election in Peru, for example, incumbent president Alberto Fujimori bribed judges and members of the legislature to ensure their quiescence in the face of mounting evidence of vote fraud (Simpser and Donno 2012).

Strengthening the institutions that play a role in election management and oversight can therefore lead to a dramatic transformation in electoral quality (Lehoucq 2002; Mozaffar and Schedler 2002). As mechanisms of accountability increase and the professionalism of election administration improves, stealing elections becomes increasingly difficult and risky. Mexico's experience in the 1990s is a compelling testament to the power of institutional reform (Eisenstadt 1999, 2004b): over time, improved regulation, delegation of election management to independent authorities, and increased party supervision combined to "render the commission of election-day fraud almost impossible" (Schedler 2007, 93). Evidence from a broader set of cases further supports the idea that autonomous election commissions are associated with better electoral conduct and more legitimate electoral outcomes (Hartlyn, McCoy, and Mustillo 2008; Hoffman, Long, and Metzroth 2013). It is not surprising, then, that many international organizations such as the OSCE, Council of Europe, and EU emphasize the institutional and legal framework governing elections and incorporate demands for specific institutional reforms in their interactions with norm violators.

Yet why should a government comply with these demands? The key, again, lies in considering the government's time horizon. From the incumbent's perspective, cleaning up institutions provides a way to alleviate international pressure for democracy without giving up power in the short term. The catch, of course, is that institutional reform constrains—sometimes quite significantly—the government's future freedom of action. But these constraining effects do not kick in until the next electoral cycle, and they may not be fully understood or anticipated in advance. Thus, incumbents focused on retaining power in the near term are likely to view institutional reform as an acceptable concession. From the perspective of international actors, the advantage of promoting electoral change through institutional reform is that it relies on the longer-term effects of policies that are enacted with the government's consent.

The job of international norm enforcers is not only to elicit this initial consent for reforms, but also to ensure that reforms are actually enacted. Of all the policy tools at the international actors' disposal, conditionality is particularly well suited to this twofold task. A government that has proven willing to violate international norms by manipulating elections is unlikely to be swayed by symbolic pressure alone. Concrete costs and benefits must be involved. Indeed, Kelley (2004) shows that international conditionality in postcommunist Europe induced even highly intransigent governments to implement changes in state policies toward ethnic minorities. Normative suasion was ineffective in these cases and in fact is likely to work only when targets are already open to persuasion and new ideas (Checkel 2005). A second reason to expect that conditionality will be more effective than diplomatic engagement for achieving institutional reform is that conditionality policies entail long-term monitoring and follow-up. This type of sustained engagement, coupled with the wielding of sticks and carrots, is well suited for guiding a country through the drafting, passage, and implementation of institutional reform, a process that takes months or years. In contrast, shaming and diplomatic missions are one-shot events that are unlikely, alone, to ensure that reforms are implemented.

Hypotheses about Electoral Conduct

- First, by deterring leaders from engaging in electoral manipulation and by inducing leaders to implement institutional reform, *enforcement will be associated with improvements in electoral conduct*.
- Second, institutional reform is a long-term and gradual process. Enforcement that is imposed in response to a flawed election is unlikely—or simply too late—to make a difference in electoral conduct in the current election. Thus, when operating via the mechanism of

institutional reform, *the effect of postelection enforcement on improvements in conduct will be felt in the next election.*

- Third, governments that have proven willing to violate international norms by manipulating elections are unlikely to be swayed by symbolic pressure, but they are sensitive to concrete sticks and carrots. Furthermore, conditionality entails sustained monitoring and follow-up, which is essential for ensuring the implementation of institutional reform. Thus, *the positive effect of conditionality on electoral conduct will be greater than the effect of diplomatic engagement.*

THE EFFECT OF ENFORCEMENT ON ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

When international actors respond to electoral misconduct, their primary focus is on the electoral process. They seek to improve procedural compliance with democratic norms. As Gershman and Allen (2006, 49) explain, this focus on process—on nurturing "democratic culture, practices and institutions" rather than on determining outcomes—is essential for countering accusations that promotion of democracy is "simply the pursuit of regime change by other means." An emphasis on process is also likely to have a moderating effect on voters' attitudes, in contrast to the polarizing effects of partisan electoral stances (Corstange and Marinov 2012).[17] Domestic actors have very different priorities. For them electoral outcomes—that is, who wins or loses—matter most. International actors can influence, but never dictate, these outcomes, which are determined fundamentally by the balance of political power and support between the government and opposition. Electoral turnover requires the existence of a credible alternative to the government, a viable opposition leader or movement that can attract enough votes to win the election (Bunce and Wolchik 2011). The strength of the opposition, in turn, is shaped by a number of path-dependent domestic conditions—the nature of ethnic and social cleavages, the electoral system, the country's political history—as well as more idiosyncratic factors such as the emergence of a charismatic leader. International actors cannot directly produce or alter these conditions, but they can play a crucial supporting role by increasing the opposition's incentives for unity, boosting its credibility, and increasing its electoral support.

The interests of the domestic opposition and international norm enforcers are therefore aligned. Although they work to achieve different ultimate goals—with the international community focused more on process than outcome—the opposition benefits politically from international enforcement. There is a

"boomerang" effect, whereby domestic groups seek out international allies and "appeal to international rules and norms to further their own interests in the domestic political arena" (Cortell and Davis 1996, 452; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999, 18–19). Of course these appeals to international principles may be purely strategic (Schimmelfennig 2001; Bush 2011, 104); opposition leaders are not necessarily committed democrats, and they may use the language of norms simply to improve their own political fortunes. For international actors, then, it is an open question whether an electoral victory for the opposition is also a means to ensure future respect for democratic norms. Certainly on many occasions alternation in power has ushered in durable democratic change, but history is also replete with examples of opposition victors that are just as prone to autocratic excess as their predecessors.

Postelection Concessions

In free and fair elections, competing parties jockey for public support during the campaign period. But in flawed elections, the most crucial period of contestation often does not occur until after the election. When campaigning is stifled by harassment, intimidation, biased election management, or unequal access to media, the opposition's best—and perhaps only—chance to challenge the regime comes during the days and weeks following the election. During this time, the opposition competes not for votes, but for perceptions of the election's legitimacy. As Schedler (2002b, 104) notes, in countries that hold flawed elections, electoral competition and the struggle for electoral reform "unfold simultaneously and interact in a 'nested' two-level game."

The most dramatic concession an incumbent can make in the aftermath of a disputed election is to step down, relinquishing power to the opposition or to a transitional government. This famously occurred in three of the postcommunist electoral revolutions—in Serbia (2000), Georgia (2003), and Kyrgyzstan (2005)—when the incumbent resigned in the wake of large and sustained domestic protests (McFaul 2005; Tucker 2007). Governments may also make more incremental concessions by canceling portions of the disputed results or by agreeing to hold repeat elections. Although these types of concessions may be intended as a safety valve to release pressure and avoid giving up power completely, they nevertheless imply a substantial weakening of the regime's political position. And in some cases, such as Ukraine's Orange Revolution, the ruling party goes on to lose a repeat election.

The opposition faces two interrelated challenges when contesting an election's conduct. First, it must succeed in portraying the contest as illegitimate. Because opposition actors are those most directly harmed by electoral misconduct, they

are well positioned to document and publicize it—an excellent example of what Dai (2002) calls low-cost domestic monitors. However, the opposition faces a credibility problem. Because it can only stand to gain from discrediting the government, it may have incentives to level spurious allegations of fraud.[18] Ideally, domestic institutions should adjudicate the validity of the opposition's electoral complaints. Following Mexico's 2006 presidential election, for example, losing candidate López Obrador claimed for months that he had won the election. Ultimately the Federal Electoral Tribunal's transparent and professional handling of his complaints bolstered confidence in the outcome (Estrada and Poiré 2007). Institutions with this degree of credibility and public confidence are rare, however. In most developing countries, election management bodies are incompetent and biased, making it much more difficult for the wider public to determine whether allegations of misconduct are valid. As a result, the opposition's claims of fraud—even truthful claims—may be dismissed by the regime, be discounted by the public, or possibly even provoke a popular backlash if voters perceive complaints as little more than the whining of sore losers.

International actors can aid in the task of distinguishing between genuine and spurious complaints, thereby providing the opposition with much-needed external validation.[19] When they impose enforcement in the wake of an election—even through the simple step of issuing a critical statement that shames the government—international actors send a message to the domestic audience that the norms of free and fair electoral competition were violated. The extent to which the public believes this message depends, of course, on the international actor's credibility. In the presence of uncertainty about electoral misconduct, "citizens will tend to embrace the story that they hear from the source which to them seems most credible" (Schedler 2007, 99), which is one important reason why international promoters of democracy seek to nurture a reputation for fairness and neutrality.

If these actors can succeed in portraying the election as illegitimate, the second challenge facing the opposition is to convert this sense of injustice into mass mobilization against the regime. The destabilizing effects of protest are well known: to hold onto power, incumbents require the support of their political allies and the state's coercive apparatus, including the army and police (Hale 2005, 140; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Way 2005, 2010). If large and long enough, postelection protests create doubts about the government's support and its ability to maintain the acquiescence of the populace, thereby triggering elite defections, which erode the government's ability to hold onto power. In Serbia, for example, following large postelection protests that attracted up to 700,000 demonstrators, Slobodan Milošević was forced to step down when it became clear that the army and media would side with the people (Pavlakovic 2005; Thompson and Kuntz 2004).[20] A similar chain of events played out in

Georgia three years later, when the army, police, and presidential guards refused to attack civilian protesters, triggering the resignation of incumbent president Eduard Shevardnadze (Fairbanks 2004, 117).

Mobilizing the masses is no easy task, however. As Bunce and Wolchik explain, for demonstrations to achieve critical mass, citizens must be convinced that protests against electoral misconduct are both necessary and have a reasonable chance of success (2009, 97). Most obviously, citizens must be convinced that major electoral fraud did occur.[21] The credibility boost provided by international actors is therefore a crucial asset in the opposition's campaign to mobilize and sustain protests.

Beyond this credibility boost, international enforcement mitigates another obstacle to mass mobilization by reducing the likelihood of repression and retaliation. Achieving widespread participation in protests is particularly difficult in regimes that can wield their control of the state to punish dissenters. In Belarus, for example, the government's control over the economy significantly raised the cost of protest because "individuals faced dismissal from state jobs or universities for participating in opposition activity or failing to attend pro-government rallies" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 206). In regimes with a history of repression, potential protesters are reluctant to join demonstrations out of fear for their physical safety. By sending a message to the government that the world is watching and that violence will be met with consequences, international actors can alleviate fears of repression.[22] This in turn should increase the size and strength of protests. Murdie and Bhasin (2011) find, for example, that shaming of human rights violations by international NGOs is associated with a rise in antigovernment demonstrations.

Which tools of enforcement are most effective for generating immediate postelection concessions? When the goal is to create a tipping point in public perceptions about the election's legitimacy, a speedy response is crucial. There is just a short window of opportunity during which people can be mobilized against misconduct, before a return to politics as usual. Tools of diplomatic engagement can be implemented with relative speed and ease, making them particularly useful during periods of postelection contestation. Shaming is one such tool. Another means of empowering the opposition is through mediation. Negotiations established by international mediation missions legitimize and lend force to opposition voices by putting them on an equal footing with the government (cf. Cooper and Legler 2005, 2006; McCoy and Diez 2011). In countries as diverse as Kenya (2007), Madagascar (2002), Peru (2000), and Venezuela (2002–2004), postelection crises have been resolved—and government concessions attained—through internationally mediated talks. Of course conditionality also serves to validate the opposition's claims, but it is slower and more difficult to implement than the swifter tools of diplomatic engagement. Moreover, conditionality's

stronger signal of international resolve—though important for eliciting changes in government behavior—is less important for the more diffuse goal of generating a shift in public perceptions about electoral conduct.

Hypotheses about Postelection Concessions

- First, by validating the opposition's claims of fraud and facilitating mass mobilization, *international enforcement imposed after flawed elections will be associated with a higher probability that the incumbent steps down or cancels results.*
- Second, because it is faster to implement than conditionality and helps generate a tipping point in perceptions about the election's conduct, the *effect of diplomatic engagement on incumbent postelection concessions will be greater than the effect of conditionality.*
- Third, international enforcement empowers opposition protests by validating their claims and reducing the likelihood of repression. Thus, *postelection protests will have a greater effect on incumbent concessions when they are accompanied by international enforcement.*

Alternation in Power

If the government retains power in the wake of a manipulated contest, international and domestic actors must turn their attention to the next election. The central task for opposition parties at this time is to attract enough votes to defeat the incumbent. The odds are stacked against them, however. A track record of flawed elections tends to leave opposition parties weak and divided. Nowhere is this more evident than in the Arab world, where authoritarian regimes have been "particularly good at sowing divisions within opposition ranks," and secular and liberal groups are reluctant to join forces with their Islamist counterparts (Hamid 2011, 75). Opposition fragmentation is also widespread in sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet republics, where personalist, patronage-based systems have fostered the emergence of numerous parties that are centered around personalities rather than issues. If latent opposition to the regime among the population is strong, divisions among opposition leaders can be the key barrier that prevents these parties from translating popular support into an electoral victory. In such contexts, forging a coalition can greatly increase the opposition's electoral fortunes, as in Kenya, where the opposition's initial inability to unite cost it control of parliament and the presidency in 1992 and 1997 (Brown 2001,

728–730). In 2002, however, a broad coalition ensured it a landslide victory against incumbent president Daniel arap Moi.

The problem is that forging a coalition requires the solution of complex strategic dilemmas: opposition parties must not only agree on how the spoils of power will be shared should they win the election, they must also trust one other to abide by their agreement. Trust and willingness to compromise are two commodities in short supply among opposition factions riven by years of rivalry and division. Thus, despite the obvious electoral benefits of working together, if left to their own devices opposition parties are often unable to unite (Van de Walle 2006).

International enforcement alters the opposition's incentives. Although international promoters of democracy typically try to maintain a politically neutral stance, their efforts to improve the electoral process can imply support for the opposition if the incumbent is perceived to be the source of electoral norm violations. When this is the case, international actors may encourage opposition coalition building by pressuring opposition leaders and helping them resolve their disputes. These efforts may also be accompanied by promises of international benefits in the event of democratic change, which provides powerful added incentives for opposition parties to coalesce. Prior to Serbia's breakthrough election in September 2000, for example, years of bitter rivalry between opposition leaders prevented them from mounting an effective electoral challenge to Milošević. International pressure and incentives—including the prospect of sanctions being lifted—helped to finally convince the factions to hammer out a compromise and work together (Cohen 2002, 374–378; LeBor 2004). Similarly, in the run-up to Kenya's 2002 election, international donors contributed to the creation of the "Rainbow" coalition by encouraging opposition politicians to forge a united front (Brown 2004, 331).

In addition to fostering greater opposition unity, international enforcement can increase voter turnout for the opposition. In countries with a track record of flawed elections, voter participation is suppressed by the belief that outcomes are predetermined. Cross-national survey evidence reveals that perceptions of electoral integrity are positively associated with turnout (Birch 2010). Another study of voters in Africa finds that supporters of those who lose elections are less likely to feel that voting matters (Moehler 2009). As one Russian voter lamented in the run-up to the 2007 parliamentary election, "There'll be no real choice, so what's the point of voting? Everything is decided for us in this country."[23] Would-be opposition voters are particularly likely to stay home, discouraged not only by the lack of real choice, but also by the possibility of targeted intimidation and violence. International attention and pressure can help persuade these individuals that their votes will count, and it can alleviate fears of repression. The resulting increase in voter participation, particularly among the young, can have a game-changing impact on electoral outcomes (Bunce and Wolchik 2006).

Beyond increasing voter participation, international enforcement can also influence voters' choices.[24] This is particularly true of conditionality. If it becomes clear to the public that aid, integration, and good standing in the international community depend on democratic change, this can increase the opposition's popular support and ultimately its share of votes. The coordinated international sanctions on South Africa in the final years of apartheid, for example, made it clear to voters there that the country's very survival was at stake, contributing to a precipitous decline in public support for ruling party hard-liners (Klotz 1995). A similar dynamic played out in the run-up to Slovakia's 1998 election, when the EU triggered the downfall of incumbent Vladimir Mečiar simply by pronouncing that the government's illiberal policies would prevent the country from beginning EU accession negotiations (Vachudova 2005, ch. 6). It is important to recognize that this type of effect is likely to operate only when the perceived consequences of a loss of international standing are especially severe (as was the case in South Africa and Slovakia). Moreover, international enforcement can only bolster the opposition if it already has a solid—though possibly latent—base of public support. In short, international conditionality is unlikely to be the primary factor that sways electoral outcomes, but it can make a difference at the margins.

Hypothesis about Alternation in Power

- By increasing the opposition's incentives to unite and increasing the opposition's electoral support, *international enforcement imposed during the pre-election period will be associated with a higher probability of opposition victory.*

ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONS: PASSIVE MECHANISMS OF INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

This book's focus on active international intervention in domestic politics differs from research on structural international forces that are farther removed from the drama of politics on the ground.[25] Levitsky and Way (2010a) focus on the role of international linkage and leverage, arguing that conditions for democratization are more favorable in countries that are highly integrated with the West. Studies on international diffusion, aid, economic linkage, treaties, and IGO membership portray domestic actors as operating within the constraints of their international context. Several types of effects may be at work: international norms shape expectations about appropriate behavior; the quality of a country's neighborhood

influences the degree of "peer pressure" it feels; membership in certain treaties and organizations can increase the reputational costs of norm violations; and for some countries, conditions set by international donors delimit the set of policies the government can consider implementing.[26] These are just a few of the ways in which a country's external context can influence domestic actors' calculations about complying with democratic electoral norms, irrespective of whether international actors choose to actively involve themselves in domestic politics. It is important, then, to consider the role of these contextual factors, which can be thought of as alternative—though not necessarily competing—mechanisms of international influence on elections.

Two types of contextual factors are especially likely to influence compliance with democratic norms: regional effects and membership in international institutions. I refer to these as "passive" mechanisms of influence to contrast them with policies of enforcement that entail active intervention in domestic politics. Whereas existing research has explored how passive forces affect broad processes of democratic transition and consolidation, this study is concerned more narrowly with what happens after a violation of norms has occurred. How might passive mechanisms of influence shape electoral conduct and outcomes in the wake of flawed elections?

First, in democratic regions, norm-violating incumbents may be socialized into compliance with prevailing regional norms through intense interaction with their neighbors (Checkel 2005). Pro-democracy groups in neighboring countries can assist and provide inspiration to opposition groups in norm-violating countries (Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Beissinger 2007). Improvements in electoral conduct may also emerge as the result of regional diffusion, as policymakers learn from and emulate the best practices of their neighbors (Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008, ch. 1).

Membership in international institutions is another factor that shapes the incentives of domestic actors. Some institutions matter more for democracy than others. One body of research points to the importance of densely democratic international organizations—those composed of consolidated liberal democracies—for promoting democracy and human rights (Hafner-Burton, Mansfield, and Pevehouse, 2013; Mansfield and Pevehouse 2006; Pevehouse 2002a, 2002b, 2005). Densely democratic organizations are more likely than other IGOs to punish violators of democratic norms—the mechanism of active influence explored in this book. But there are a number of other ways in which membership in densely democratic IGOs can matter for democracy. Bearce and Bondanella (2007) find that, over time, the interests of an IGO's member states converge, which suggests that organizations composed of democracies might bring norm breakers back into the fold through socialization.[27] Along these lines, Pevehouse (2005, ch. 2) argues that membership in densely democratic IGOs

serves to socialize military and economic elites, as well as providing economic benefits to mollify opposition to democracy.

Formal international commitments to democracy are another factor that can encourage compliance. When a government publicly and formally commits itself to abide by certain principles, the costs of violating these principles—in terms of negative publicity and mass mobilization—increase. In such cases, perceptions of hypocrisy can become a problem for the norm-violating regime, and reputational concerns should help induce a return to compliance.[28] Moreover, as Simmons (2009, ch. 4) shows, being party to a legally binding commitment can empower domestic pro-compliance groups even in the absence of reputational concerns or an expectation of international enforcement.

In sum, three testable predictions can be derived about the effects of passive international forces in the wake of flawed elections.

Hypotheses about Passive International Influence

- Improvements in electoral conduct, incumbent postelection concessions, and alternation in power will be more likely in countries (1) located in democratic regions, (2) that are members of densely democratic regional organizations, and (3) that have made formal international commitments to democracy.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has explored the causes and consequences of international norm enforcement. Though the enforcement of democratic norms is variable and selective—with geopolitically important countries often getting a free pass—there is nevertheless reason for optimism. We should not expect enforcement to be dictated by strategic interests alone. Calculations about the enforcement of international norms are also shaped to a large extent by the perceptions, beliefs, and reputational concerns of would-be enforcers. This means that high-quality information about the scope, effects, and intentionality of norm violations can encourage enforcement by cultivating a perception among international actors that imposing punishment is both justifiable and necessary.

Turning to the question of domestic effects, the chapter then focused on the mechanisms through which enforcement—whether via conditionality, diplomatic pressure, mediation, or shaming—generates transformations in electoral conduct and outcomes. Figure 2.2 summarizes these mechanisms and their effects.




Figure 2.2 Causal Mechanisms of Enforcement.

To recap, enforcement can produce improvements in electoral conduct by inducing governments to reform domestic institutions—such as electoral commissions, courts, or legislation—that play a role in the management and oversight of elections. Over time, improvements in accountability, transparency, and efficiency make it ever more difficult for would-be norm violators to perpetrate misconduct. The effect of enforcement on electoral outcomes instead runs through the domestic opposition. In the wake of a flawed election, international actors can lend credibility to the opposition's claims of fraud, help unite fractious opposition leaders, and boost the opposition's turnout and electoral support.

Notably, these pathways of influence do not depend on the ability to directly deter the government from perpetrating electoral misconduct. Targeting domestic institutions implies a more indirect channel of influence, and targeting the opposition bypasses the government altogether, focusing instead on more receptive domestic conduits. In these ways, international actors can create domestic change even when faced with an intransigent regime. The effects of enforcement are rarely immediate, however. When international actors respond to a flawed election that has already occurred, they may be able to push for results to be canceled, but they are too late to influence electoral conduct in the current contest. By altering the domestic political and institutional context in the longer term, however, the international community can gain the upper hand against incumbents that are focused on short-term retention of power. Such incumbents may view concessions for institutional reform as an acceptable, and manageable, price to pay. The catch is

that these reforms hinder the government's future ability to generate an uneven playing field, and the opposition may take advantage of these new and improved conditions in the next election.

Evidence from a number of cases suggests the applicability of these mechanisms in various geographic regions and political contexts. Quantitative evidence in chapter 5 will further demonstrate the strength of the association between enforcement and democratic change. Yet it is also important to consider the conditions under which enforcement is unlikely to work. In some exceptional cases, norm-violating regimes are immune to democratizing pressure due to a lack of international leverage. This could result from an absence of economic or social linkage with the West or from the support of alternative international patrons—so-called "black knights" such as Russia and China—that offset pressure for democracy (Levitsky and Way 2010a). In other cases, international enforcement may have only limited effects on electoral outcomes because there is no viable opposition that poses a credible alternative to the regime. The effects of enforcement may also be superficial if international actors prove unwilling to enforce conditionality against determined norm violators. Chapter 7 explores these dynamics, drawing from the cases of Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia to shed further light on the limits of international pressure in certain contexts.

3

Electoral Misconduct

The previous chapter presented a theory of norm enforcement that explained both where international actors respond to electoral misconduct and what the effects of these responses are. This chapter turns to empirical evidence. Norm violations are the "trigger" that bring a country into the scope of the theory, so this chapter begins by examining them. Which countries experience electoral misconduct? How prevalent are flawed elections in various regions of the world? To explore these patterns, I introduce the data set on the Enforcement of Democratic Electoral Norms (EDEN). Here the data are used to provide a systematic picture of where electoral misconduct occurs, how frequent it is, and whether misconduct tends to be more or less intense in different regions and domestic political contexts. I then explore whether membership in international organizations or international commitments to democracy—which are both passive mechanisms of international influence—are associated with fewer norm violations. Evidence of such a deterrent effect is weak, highlighting the importance of the active mechanisms of international influence that are the focus of this book.

STUDYING ELECTORAL MISCONDUCT

Early research on the conduct of elections centered on definitional debates about what counts as manipulation and how it should affect a country's classification as a democracy or dictatorship. These questions are central to the burgeoning literature on hybrid regimes, because the distinction between electoral authoritarianism and democracy turns on the conduct of elections (Diamond 2002).[1] In democracies, elections meet a threshold of fairness that authoritarian elections do not: parties compete on a level playing field, the casting and counting of ballots are conducted "in the absence of massive voter fraud," and election results "are representative of the public will" (Freedom House [2010]). Of course the question of what makes an election free and fair is a thorny one (Elklit and Svensson

1997), but analysts agree that the electoral process cannot be judged solely on the conduct of election day. Accordingly, Schedler (2002a, 2002b) proposes a broad conception of electoral manipulation that encompasses a wide "menu" of tools, such as political repression, excluding opposition candidates, manipulating the rules of representation, generating unfair conditions through media bias, and perpetrating ballot fraud. [2] Manipulation in any of these areas, he argues, breaks the "chain of democratic choice" (2002a, 40).

Qualitative evidence on these tools of misconduct is plentiful. Reports from election observation missions are one rich source of information, but a number of descriptive and analytical case studies also catalog electoral misconduct in countries around the world. Much of this research chronicles single elections; some studies compare multiple cases within particular regions (Bunce and Wolchik 2010a; McFaul 2005) or within certain categories of hybrid regimes (Schedler 2006; Howard and Roessler 2006; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Kalandadze and Orenstein 2009). Quantitative evidence on the conduct of elections is scarcer. One problem for researchers is that the most commonly employed measures of regime type—the Polity IV and Freedom House indexes—are poor proxies for electoral quality. These indexes are designed to capture attributes of formal institutions, such as rules for executive and legislative selection or the existence of constitutional checks on executive authority. To the extent that behavioral factors such as electoral conduct are taken into account by these indexes, they are lumped together with other factors under aggregate headings such as "political competition" or "political rights," making it difficult to isolate information on electoral quality.

Recognizing the limitations of existing data sources, some scholars have compiled region-specific data on electoral conduct. Staffan Lindberg's (2006) study of elections and democracy in sub-Saharan Africa devises a four-part index of electoral quality, in which contests are coded as free and fair, irregular but with a valid outcome, irregular with an invalid outcome, or wholly unfair. One limitation of this index is that it combines coding of procedural violations of electoral norms with questions about whether fraud affected the outcome of the election. Other coding schemes are more narrowly focused on process. Birch (2007) uses election observation reports to construct an index of electoral misconduct in postcommunist countries. For their analysis of party system development, Donno and Roussias (2012) collected detailed information on the timing and tools of electoral misconduct in Latin American and postcommunist legislative elections from 1990 to 2004.

Region-specific analyses are useful for generating what Bunce has termed "bounded" conclusions (2000, 715). For example, although evidence suggests that the repeated holding of elections is beneficial for democracy in Africa, this relationship does not appear to exist in Latin America or the Middle East (McCoy

and Hartlyn 2009; Lust 2009). Inevitably, small-N or region-specific studies raise questions about broader generalizability. Moreover, there are limitations on how much can be inferred from analyzing a small number of cases (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994). This issue is likely to be especially problematic for the study of elections, given the long list of factors that potentially play a role in shaping electoral conduct and outcomes. Expanding the domain of analysis to cover multiple regions and longer time periods therefore provides greater leverage with which to explore competing hypotheses about electoral quality. It also creates a better match between theory and empirics, because electoral misconduct is a global phenomenon that transcends regional boundaries and regime type.

Three pioneering research projects have expanded the spatial and temporal scope of data on elections. Hyde and Marinov's (2012) database on national elections in both democracies and autocracies (NELDA) relies on a wealth of scholarly and journalistic sources to code information on electoral conduct and outcomes in all countries with a population greater than half a million, from 1945 to 2010. These data have been used to explore the emergence of election observation as an international norm, as well as the domestic effects of election observers (Hyde 2011a, 2011b; Hyde and O'Mahoney 2010), among other topics. For her exploration of the causes, effects, and biases of election monitoring, Kelley (2012a) created a detailed record of the activities and assessments of 673 monitoring missions from 1975 to 2004. To complement this, she coded a second data set on the quality of elections using the US State Department's annual human rights reports—a source of information that also covers elections that did not host international monitors. Birch's (2011) study of electoral malpractice relies on election observation reports to construct a "malpractice index" for sixty-one countries in Latin America, the postcommunist region, and sub-Saharan Africa, from 1995 to 2007. The index codes for misconduct in three areas: manipulation of the legal framework for elections, manipulation of vote choice, and manipulation of electoral administration.

Missing from these data sets, however, is a record of international actors' responses to electoral misconduct. Scholars can now draw on a wealth of information about the presence, severity, and tools of manipulation, but questions about the international repercussions of electoral misconduct remain unanswered. To fill this gap, this book introduces the data set on the 'Enforcement of Democratic Electoral Norms' (EDEN), which covers 668 presidential and legislative elections held between 1990 and 2007 in 119 countries. All countries that held at least one multiparty election during this period are included in the data set, except for the advanced industrial democracies and authoritarian regimes that never held multiparty elections.[3] For each election, the data cover international enforcement in response to electoral misconduct, specifically the use of conditionality and diplomatic engagement. This is the most detailed record to date of

international pressure for free and fair elections. Further explanation of the rules and sources used to code the enforcement variables is provided in chapter 4 and appendix B.

To complement the enforcement variables, the data set also contains information for each election on the presence and intensity of misconduct, electoral outcomes, and opposition party behavior. The NELDA data are used to create the list of elections, as well as variables for whether the incumbent was running in the election, who won the election, and whether postelection protests occurred. Other variables are originally coded from primary documents and journalistic reports, including an expanded coding of opposition electoral coalitions. The remainder of this chapter introduces the variables for electoral misconduct and presents descriptive evidence on the prevalence and location of flawed elections around the world.

CODING ELECTORAL MISCONDUCT

A free election is one in which parties are able to campaign openly and without hindrance, voters are free to vote their preferences, and official results accurately reflect the votes cast. A fair election is one in which all parties and candidates are subject to the same procedures for registering and appearing on the ballot, and all compete on a level playing field.[4] Electoral misconduct can be defined as any action that violates these standards. The tools of manipulation are myriad, limited only by the imagination of those seeking to skew the results in their favor. In Zimbabwe, for example, party loyalty was used as a litmus test for the distribution of scarce food rations in the run-up to the 2002 election (International Crisis Group 2002). In Ukraine the leading opposition candidate was poisoned during the 2004 campaign. Leaders have also devised elaborate schemes for manipulating the tabulation of ballots, as in Kenya's 2007 election, in which returning officers responsible for reporting constituency-level ballot counts to the national tallying center were reappointed at the eleventh hour by a governmental "steering committee" (International Crisis Group 2008, 7)

Though many and varied, tools of misconduct can be classified in three broad categories: (1) restrictions on opposition parties' or voters' freedom of movement, expression, or association during the campaign period; (2) practices that create a biased playing field that favors the ruling party; and (3) irregularities in the casting, counting, or tabulation of ballots. In this study a violation of democratic norms is considered to have occurred if one or more of these types of misconduct was present and part of a systematic, nationwide pattern.[5] I refer to these as "flawed elections." Table 3.1 provides a list of some of the most common tools of misconduct.

Table 3.1. Categories and Common Tools of Electoral Misconduct

Restrictions on Freedom of Movement, Expression, or Association:

- Existence of harsh or arbitrary burdens on opposition parties' ability to register and/or appear on the ballot
- Intimidation of opposition parties, candidates, or supporters
- Restrictions on opposition party campaign activity

Creation of a Biased Playing Field:

- Restrictions on the media's ability to report on the campaign
- Imbalance in media reporting and access
- De facto or de jure bias within institutions that organize and arbitrate elections
- Misuse of state resources to help the incumbent's or ruling party's campaign

Ballot Fraud:

- Intimidation of voters on election day
- Systematic omission of voters from registration lists
- Violation of the secret ballot
- Multiple voting
- Ballot box tampering or stuffing
- Destruction or alteration of ballots
- Faulty counting or tabulation of ballots
- Certification of fraudulent results

The coding of electoral misconduct centers on identifying for each election whether norm violations occurred in each of the three categories identified in table 3.1. It is agnostic as to the particular actor that perpetrates misconduct or whether it was intentional. Such issues are notoriously difficult to determine, even for election experts on the ground. Some types of misconduct may be attributed to administrative or technical incapacity. Others may be sins of "omission" rather than "commission"—for example, if a government repeatedly fails to correct deficiencies in the legal framework governing elections. Regardless, it is the government that holds ultimate responsibility for the administration of elections and hence for any violations of international electoral norms.

A few additional points about what counts as misconduct should be noted. First, when coding for tools of pre-election misconduct, only policies specifically related to the election in question are counted; preexisting restrictions on civil or political rights that are not electorally motivated are not coded. This distinction is particularly important in nondemocratic countries, where electoral misconduct must be differentiated from the general practices and tools associated with authoritarian rule. Gerrymandering and altering electoral system design is another method whereby incumbents can generate an electoral advantage (Schedler 2002a, 2002b; McElwain 2008), but here it is not coded as a tool of misconduct, simply because it is impossible to formulate objective criteria to distinguish between manipulative versus legitimate reforms to electoral systems.

Even in-depth analysis of particular cases often fails to make clear whether, on balance, the short-term effects of changes in electoral rules were manipulative (Diaz-Cayeros and Magaloni 2001).

Perhaps the most important challenge in coding for misconduct is a lack of full information. For one thing, cheaters may attempt to conceal their actions (Hartlyn and McCoy 2006; Pastor 1999; Hyde 2011b, ch. 5). Even if misconduct is perpetrated in the open for all to see, information about transgressions may be limited in settings where media freedom and civil society are weak or when outside observers are absent. To alleviate these problems, I made use of a variety of sources of information. First, to identify the set of elections that occurred during the time period under study, I consulted Hyde and Marinov's (2012) NELDA data set, as well as the election data compiled by Simpser and Donno (2012). Appendix A contains a list of countries included in the data. To code for misconduct, I first gathered information from NELDA, which includes answers to more than sixty questions on the conduct and outcome of elections using a variety of sources, including international news reports, US State Department Human Rights Reports, and other election databases.[6] Four questions from NELDA are relevant to the categories of electoral misconduct identified in table 3.1:[7]

- Were opposition leaders prevented from running?
- Is there evidence that the government harassed the opposition?
- In the run-up to the election, were there allegations of media bias in favor of the incumbent?
- Were there allegations by Western monitors of significant vote fraud?

To supplement and triangulate this information, and because some data points are missing in NELDA, each election was then subjected to extensive additional investigation. First, information on the verdicts and reports of international election observers was collected for the 496 elections in the data set that hosted international monitors.[8] Coding is based on information reported by observers from nine reputable entities, which analysts consider to be among the most professional of the international monitoring groups:[9] the Carter Center, Commonwealth Secretariat, COE, EU, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OSCE, OAS, United Nations, and the United States.[10] Information from these observation missions was gleaned by accessing their official reports and press releases. For cases in which international observers were not present or where information on the observers' reports was not available, coding of misconduct was supplemented using exhaustive searches of international newspapers and newswires in the LexisNexis Academic database.[11] See appendix B for a description of search procedures and coding rules.

Information from these sources was then used, first, to construct a simple dummy variable: if evidence of misconduct was found in at least one of the three areas identified in table 3.1, the election is coded as flawed.[12] This yields a total of 384 flawed contests out of 668 elections in the data set.

Even though care was taken to triangulate multiple sources of information, it is possible that some measurement error remains. However, any such error should run in the direction of underreporting the true extent of misconduct. If media freedom in the country is weak, for example, or if the election fails to garner international attention, news reports may fail to report evidence of misconduct. International election observation missions also may have incentives to underreport manipulation, because criticizing governments can be politically costly for observer groups, particularly for missions sent from IGOs to their member states (Kelley 2009). Thus, it is far more likely for an election to be wrongly classified as "clean" than to be wrongly classified as "flawed." Because the goal of this study is to assess the effectiveness of international enforcement in response to flawed elections, this type of error is unlikely to pose a problem. Moreover, even if there are some cases of unreported electoral misconduct, one could hardly expect an international response to occur (or even be considered) if there is no publicly available information that a norm violation took place.

To provide an initial picture of trends in electoral conduct, figure 3.1 shows smoothed estimates of the percentage of elections classified as flawed in five




Figure 3.1 Percentage of Elections Experiencing Misconduct over Time.

regions: Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and the postcommunist countries.[13]

The postcommunist region and MENA have the highest average rates of electoral misconduct for most years in the sample, hovering between 50% and 70%. For postcommunist states, the average is driven up by the high incidence of electoral misconduct in the former Soviet republics; in most Eastern and Central European countries, misconduct had become a rare phenomenon by the mid-1990s. It should be noted that figure 3.1 does not distinguish between more or less severe cases of misconduct, which is one reason the percentage of flawed elections is so high overall. Even so, the prevalence of misconduct may come as a surprise, because the majority of countries in the sample are typically classified as at least nominal electoral democracies. Also of note is that with the exception of Latin America, misconduct has not appreciably declined over time. This, too, may be surprising, given the steady increase since 1990 in international election observation and democracy aid. In short, the initial picture is not an encouraging one for proponents of democracy. Electoral misconduct is widespread, and it is not declining in the aggregate, though as this book demonstrates, international actors can help eliminate misconduct in those cases where they choose to enforce democratic norms.

THE SEVERITY OF MISCONDUCT

Thus far I have focused on a minimalist distinction between clean and flawed elections. Within the set of flawed elections, however, there are differences in the severity of misconduct. In some contests manipulation is limited in scope, whereas in others manipulation is present in every stage of the electoral process, from the registration of candidates, to the campaign period, to the adjudication of postelection disputes. Creating a measure that captures these shades of gray is important, because the intensity of misconduct likely influences the outcomes of concern to this study, namely, whether international actors respond to flawed elections, as well as the likelihood of alternation in power and improvements in the conduct of future elections. I adopt two approaches to capture the severity of misconduct, the first based on objective criteria and the second on more subjective evaluations of electoral quality.

First, I create an index of the *intensity* of misconduct. This is an ordinal measure, ranging from 1 to 3, that sums the number of areas identified in table 3.1 in which misconduct is present. For each election, one point is given for pre-election restrictions, one for a biased playing field, and one for ballot fraud.[14] Elections that did not involve misconduct are coded "0" for this variable. Admittedly this measure does not directly capture the intensity of effort an incumbent expends




Figure 3.2 Intensity of Misconduct over Time.

on misconduct (which is impossible to operationalize empirically), but it does capture the breadth of tools employed. Intuitively, an election in which the government employs the full gamut of tools of misconduct can be considered a more severe case of misconduct than an election in which the pre-election period was clean, but the counting of ballots was irregular.

Figure 3.2 shows the percentage of elections in the data that experienced misconduct, by year, as well as the distribution of cases at different levels of intensity. Although no obvious temporal pattern emerges, the graph does suggest that the percentage of cases with the lowest intensity score (those experiencing misconduct in just one of the three areas) has decreased slightly over time. Certainly these data offer no support to the idea that aggregate trends in electoral quality have improved since 1990.

A second way to measure the severity of misconduct is to examine the verdicts of international election observers. Unlike the index of intensity, which captures the range of tools employed, election observers' verdicts take into account more intangible, qualitative issues, such as whether misconduct is intentional, how widespread it is around the country, and whether it influences the outcome of the election. To create this measure, the election observation reports issued by thirteen entities were examined: Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL), the Carter Center, Commonwealth Secretariat, COE, European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO), EU Commission, International Republican Institute (IRI), NDI, OAS, OSCE, United Nations, and United States.[15]

For each election in which one or more of these groups was present, the observation missions' reports were collected from the websites of the sponsoring entity. When reports were not available, I made use of information on the observers' verdicts from international news reports.[16] These sources were then used to code a three-part variable for *election observer verdict*. The verdict is coded *clean* if the election was deemed to be without misconduct, or at most, isolated cases of procedural flaws were found in some districts or polling stations.[17] The verdict is coded *irregular* if evidence of systematic misconduct was found, but was attributed to weak administrative capacity or disorganization or could not be definitively linked to intentional government manipulation. The observers' verdict is coded *reject* if they reported clear evidence that misconduct was intentionally perpetrated by the government or misconduct altered the outcome of the election. When multiple observer groups are present in an election, the verdict from the more critical mission is used. Thus, if one group issues an "irregular" verdict while the other "rejects" the contest, the verdict is coded "reject."

Figure 3.3 graphs the percentage of elections over time deemed clean, irregular, or rejected. The total height of each bar represents the percentage of elections that hosted international observers in that year. In the figure, 2000 stands out for the high proportion of elections rejected by international observers. A number of particularly flagrant norm-violating regimes held elections in that year, including Azerbaijan, Belarus, Cote d'Ivoire, Peru (under Fujimori), and Zimbabwe. Although the data exhibit no obvious increase over time in the number of




Figure 3.3 Election Observer Verdicts over Time.

elections deemed "clean," one can observe a trend toward fewer outright rejections and more "irregular" verdicts since 2000. This could reflect a genuine qualitative improvement in electoral conduct, or it could be that incumbents are becoming more skillful over time at masking their manipulation as administrative or procedural irregularities (a point explored further in chapter 7). For this reason, it is important to regard the distinction between "irregular" and "rejected" elections with some caution.

The data can also be used to assess whether electoral misconduct is more likely in more authoritarian settings. It is often taken for granted that democracies hold free and fair elections, but this is too simplistic an assumption. In reality, the enhanced political competition that comes with higher levels of democracy can exert countervailing influences on electoral conduct. On the one hand, in more democratic countries—which have greater media freedom and stronger institutions of political accountability—it is more difficult for governments to perpetrate manipulation. On the other hand, as the political system becomes more open and competitive, governments' need for manipulation increases. Which of these forces prevails? Figure 3.4 sheds light on this issue, showing the percentage and intensity of flawed elections at different ranges of the Polity index (scaled from -10 to 10). Recall that the index of intensity captures the number of areas in which electoral misconduct occurs. As might be expected, the rate of misconduct declines in the positive range of the scale. But it is striking that still slightly more than 40% of elections in countries with Polity scores of 7 or higher (which is the




Figure 3.4 Percentage of Elections Experiencing Misconduct by Polity Score.

threshold conventionally used to delimit "full" democracy) are flawed. Further evidence that greater democracy not only inhibits but also produces demand for misconduct is the fact that elections with the highest levels of misconduct intensity are proportionally greater in the mid-range autocracies (those coded from -6 to -1 on the Polity scale) than in closed autocracies (-10 to 7). In short, these patterns warn against a naïve faith in democratization. A country may exhibit the formal trappings of democracy—as captured by the Polity scale and other widely used measures of regime type—yet still exhibit fundamental deficiencies in respect for the norms of free and fair competition.

CAN IGO MEMBERSHIP DETER MISCONDUCT?

The finding that electoral misconduct is prevalent in unexpected settings is further bolstered by examining patterns of norm violation in countries with different portfolios of IGO membership. The conventional wisdom is that membership in certain international organizations provides a way for states to signal their commitment to international norms. This works particularly well if IGOs screen their new members, requiring them to demonstrate compliance with norms before entering (Allee and Scalera 2012; Schneider and Urpelainen 2012). International institutions can also have a constraining effect by increasing the costs of violating norms after a state becomes a member (Simmons 2009, ch. 4). This occurs, for example, in IGOs that have judicial bodies imbued with the authority to investigate norm violations among member states and in IGOs that have adopted mechanisms for suspending or punishing members that violate their core principles.

Which types of IGOs are likely to exert these effects on compliance with democratic norms? Pevehouse (2002b, 2005) and Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) argue for the importance of membership in densely democratic regional IGOs—those whose members are highly democratic—in helping states make credible commitments to democracy. Through monitoring, these organizations increase information about democratic performance. Further, reneging on commitments to democracy can spark a suspension of membership or other benefits, as well as trigger the reputational costs associated with breaking international commitments (Pevehouse 2002b, 613–614). If these mechanisms are at work, membership in densely democratic organizations should be associated with fewer violations of democratic norms. Figure 3.5 examines whether the data support this prediction. It shows the percentage of elections that are flawed as a function of the number of memberships a country has in densely democratic regional organizations, defined as those IGOs whose full members have an average Polity score of seven or higher (on a scale




Figure 3.5 Percentage of Flawed Elections by Membership in Densely Democratic Regional IGOs.

of -10 to 10).[18] The data do reveal that misconduct declines noticeably as the number of memberships in densely democratic IGOs increases, though there is considerable variation. However, misconduct remains quite prevalent even at the higher ends of the scale. For example, in countries with membership in more than twenty densely democratic IGOs—a select group that comprises just 13% of the sample—41% of elections are flawed. Electoral misconduct only disappears completely in countries that are members of thirty-two or more densely democratic organizations—a select group of Latin American regimes after 2000.

What about membership in regional organizations that have adopted formal commitments to democracy? Is commitment making associated with fewer norm violations? Liberal theorists and international lawyers have long argued that formal international commitments generate pressure for compliance by focusing expectations and marshaling reputational incentives (Keohane 1997; Simmons 2000; Chayes and Chayes 1993). Figure 3.6 examines this possibility. Here, an IGO is coded as having a democratic commitment if the founding treaty, an amendment to the treaty, or a binding resolution specifies democracy as a condition or goal of membership in the organization.[19] The data provide only limited support for the idea that commitments are associated with better behavior: only countries with four regional commitments (a select group of European states that comprise just 1% of the sample) exhibit a lower incidence of electoral misconduct. The reality




Figure 3.6 Percentage of Flawed Elections by Membership in Regional IGOs with Democratic Commitments.

is that many IGOs have incorporated democratic language into their constitutive documents, but these commitments exist on paper only.

In sum, the prevalence of flawed elections in densely democratic organizations and those that adopt commitments to democracy is inconsistent with the idea that membership in these institutions serves as a blanket deterrent to violating norms. If deterrence is at work, it is probably operative only at the margins or in a subset of countries. For most IGOs there is a mismatch between the principles espoused on paper and the actual practices of their member states. The implications of this point are important: we cannot simply use IGO membership as a proxy for credible commitments. The track record of the majority of IGOs in enforcing democratic norms is highly spotty. Enforcement must be explained, rather than assumed. Moreover, rather than focusing on "passive" mechanisms of international influence on elections—such as IGO membership and formal commitments to democracy—a more fruitful approach is to zero in on active international involvement in domestic politics.

CONCLUSIONS

Taken as a whole, the picture painted in this chapter is not an encouraging one. Flawed elections are widespread. More than half of the elections in the sample

experienced some kind of misconduct. Even countries conventionally classified as full or liberal democracies are not exempt. Moreover, neither the occurrence nor the intensity of misconduct has appreciably declined over time. These facts suggest that if the international community is playing a role in improving electoral conduct—whether through aid, election monitoring, or as this study argues, the active enforcement of democratic norms—these effects are felt only in a subset of cases. Clearly leaders have not converted en masse to the ideals of democracy. Rather, many leaders in the post–Cold War era are attempting to feign democratic credentials. They adopt democratic constitutions and hold multiparty elections, yet they regularly violate the fundamental principle undergirding these institutions: that political competition should be free and equal.

The prevalence of electoral misconduct around the world underscores the need for scholars to move beyond a narrow focus on the deterrent effects of IGO membership or international commitments and ask instead how international actors shape outcomes through their active involvement in domestic politics. But before we can assess the effects of enforcement, we must first understand where and when it is imposed. This task is undertaken in the next chapter.

4

Explaining Enforcement

Albania's parliamentary election in May 1996—the country's second multiparty contest since the fall of communism—was beset by severe misconduct. Opposition parties faced police harassment, rallies were banned during the campaign period, and hundreds of candidates from the opposition socialist party were prevented from appearing on the ballot. On election day scores of ballots were improperly invalidated, voter registers were tampered with, and protocols were falsified in plain view of international observers (ODIHR 1996). Even though the ruling Democratic Party enjoyed Western support, the international response to the irregularities was swift and firm. Less than a week after the election, the US State Department called the contest a "significant step backward" for Albania, and it later took the rare step of calling for a new election (Biberaj 1998, 300–301). The EU announced a halt in any further upgrading of economic cooperation with Albania until the quality of elections improved. In the years that followed, Albania's elections, its constitution, and its legal framework continued to be heavily scrutinized. Yet in other cases of electoral misconduct in the very same neighborhood, international actors adopted a hands-off approach. Georgia's presidential election in 2000 exhibited problems similar to those seen in Albania four years earlier, but it was met by little more than passing criticism from the EU. Commenting on this inconsistency, one member of the British Helsinki Human Rights Group noted that "compared with the elections in Armenia, Georgia, Belarus and Russia . . . the infringements in Albania were minor" (quoted in Biberaj 1998, 300).

As these examples suggest, the enforcement of democratic norms cannot be taken for granted. It is imposed selectively, and its intensity can vary significantly across cases. This selectivity is important, because it means that the consequences of noncompliance differ among countries and over time. Exploring the sources of this variation will therefore deepen our understanding of when norms are more costly to violate, and, by extension, why norms may "matter" more in certain countries and contexts than in others. Chapter 2 provided a theory of enforcement. It argued that country-level variation is shaped by both interests

and information. Enforcement is less likely to occur in geopolitically important countries or in strategic allies where pressure for democracy may threaten the attainment of other foreign policy goals. Yet information can mitigate the effects of geopolitical interest: even in strategically important countries, enforcement becomes more likely as information on the scope, source, and effects of the norm violation improves. Using the EDEN data set, this chapter first examines which actors enforce democratic norms and how consistent they are in their responses to flawed elections. It explores the reasons for variation in the strength of democracy protection regimes across regions and compares the enforcement patterns of regional IGOs to those of the United States and United Nations. The chapter then turns to the question of country-level variation in enforcement—in other words, who is punished for violating democratic electoral norms? Consistent with the theory, the analysis provides broad support for the role of interest and information in explaining enforcement patterns.

CODING ENFORCEMENT

Previous research has featured data on particular tools for promoting democracy, such as democracy aid, election monitoring, and shaming of human rights violations (cf. Finkel, Pérez-Liñan, and Seligson 2007; Kelley 2012a; Hafner-Burton 2008; Hyde 2011a, 2011b; Murdie and Davis 2012). The EDEN data set provides a comprehensive record of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement imposed in response to flawed elections. It contains detailed information on the use of conditionality, diplomacy, mediation missions, and shaming, implemented by fifteen international actors in 119 countries. The data cover three enforcers whose activities are global in scope—the United States, United Nations, and European Union—as well as twelve regional IGOs whose activities are limited to their member states: in Europe, the OSCE, COE, NATO, and CIS; in the Americas, the OAS, Mercosur, CARICOM, and the Andean Community; In Africa, the African Union, SADC, COMESA, and ECOWAS.

These organizations were selected out of the larger population of regional IGOs based on two criteria. First, they have adopted formal commitments to democracy, signifying that promoting and protecting democracy is an explicit goal of the organization.[1] Second, they have enforced democratic electoral norms (through conditionality or diplomatic engagement) at least once during the time period under study. In short, for these IGOs, the enforcement of democratic norms is a demonstrated possibility. They therefore comprise the complete set of regional norm enforcers. The actual track record of enforcement varies considerably among these organizations. Some are more active than others. Some of their commitments to democracy are even of dubious sincerity, in that they were

adopted—as in the case of the CIS—simply to mimic, or balance, other more established democracy promotion agencies. Ultimately, then, it is an empirical question whether a given regional IGO is an effective norm defender. Though all of the organizations examined here share a commitment to democracy on paper, there is likely considerable variation in their effectiveness.

For each actor, EDEN records data on the implementation of the enforcement tools introduced in chapter 2:

- *Conditionality*: the threat or application of punishments, or the promise or implementation of rewards, in response to electoral misconduct, and conditional on future improvements in electoral conduct.
- *Diplomatic engagement*, which can take two forms:
  - A *diplomatic or mediation mission* sent to the target country to exert pressure for democracy or to resolve postelectoral conflicts between political parties.
  - *Shaming*: declarations, resolutions, or statements that criticize electoral misconduct, but that do not link changes in the target state to punishments or rewards.

Enforcement is coded as occurring only if it is clearly targeted toward the country and election in question, and if the stated reason for the punishment was concern about electoral misconduct. See appendix B for detailed information on coding rules, sources, and methodology.

It is important to emphasize that the coding of enforcement in the EDEN data does not include the activities of international election observers. This reflects the theoretical distinction between monitoring (as information revelation) and enforcement (punishment for noncompliance).[2] Although observation missions do engage in a form of shaming when they issue critical reports, and they are sometimes tasked with mediating between state and opposition actors (McCoy 1998; Pastor 1998), they have no independent capacity to impose conditionality. The EDEN data set therefore draws a distinction between enforcement—the phenomenon of concern to this study—and monitoring. The presence and verdicts of election observation missions are coded as separate variables. One benefit of this approach is that it allows me to investigate the relationship between monitoring and enforcement—that is, whether, and how, the international community responds to the information conveyed by election observers. Moreover, while the causes and effects of election observation have been extensively studied by others,[3] until now the enforcement of electoral norms has been subject to far less scrutiny.

The empirical record supports the idea that monitoring and enforcement should be treated as distinct phenomena. Election observation is far more

common than enforcement: 73% of elections in the EDEN data hosted international observers, but only 43% were met with norm enforcement. Among flawed elections, 82% were monitored, but in only 56% was norm enforcement implemented. Nor is monitoring a necessary precondition for enforcement: 25% of unmonitored elections in the data were nevertheless targeted for enforcement.

Recall from figure 2.1 that enforcement may be imposed in the pre- or post-election periods. In the wake of a flawed election, international actors may respond with shaming, a diplomatic/mediation mission, or conditionality. They may also (or alternatively) impose these tools in the run-up to the next election, for example, by stipulating that a particular reward will be granted if the country demonstrates an improvement in electoral quality vis-à-vis the previous contest. Pre-election enforcement may also be implemented in response to misconduct that is perpetrated during the campaign period. For example, prior to Kyrgyzstan's presidential contest in October 2000, the EU issued a declaration criticizing the deregistration of opposition parties and the indictment of leading opposition figures on questionable charges.[4] Enforcement is coded *pre-election* if it was implemented within a four-month window before the election in question, and *postelection* if it occurred within a four-month window after the election.[5]

WHO ENFORCES?

The United States

Promotion of democracy is one of the most enduring elements of US foreign policy, although, as the world's superpower, this commitment has often been trumped by competing interests. This was particularly true during the Cold War, when the pressures of competition with the Soviet Union led the United States to tolerate—and often openly support—"friendly" dictators around the globe. The end of the Cold War breathed new life into US democracy promotion.[6] Under the first Clinton administration, "democratic enlargement" was the guiding principle of foreign policy (Cox 2000, 223; Hook 2002, 115). George W. Bush, though initially committed to a more realist approach, was converted to democracy promotion after 9/11, viewing it as an integral part of the war on terror. As Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice articulated in a 2006 speech, "the fundamental character of regimes now matters more than the international distribution of power for peace and security" (quoted in Wallander 2007, 92).

Nevertheless, US presidents have always recognized the existence of important competing foreign policy interests and that, in practice, US promotion of democracy would have to be conditioned by these other goals. As Clinton's national security advisor, Anthony Lake, summarized in 1993, "Our interests in

democracy and markets do not stand alone . . . other American interests at times will require us to befriend and even defend non-democratic states for mutually beneficial reasons" (quoted in Cox 2000, 229).[7] Chief among these other interests is the need to ensure the cooperation of key strategic allies. Since 9/11 this imperative has only become stronger (Hook 2002, 117), and it has led the United States to overlook democratic deficiencies in many countries, even while its rhetoric firmly proclaims the importance of spreading democracy. Its policy in Central and South Asia serves as just one illustration (Blank 2007). The long-standing US cooperation with Pakistan has meant years of support for military dictators. The former Soviet republics in Central Asia—whose leaders have provided the United States with basing rights and other forms of military cooperation—have been similarly exempt from the American agenda for promoting democracy. No less important are energy concerns, as the United States has assiduously courted the region's dictators in efforts to prevent Russia from gaining a monopoly over Central Asia's vast oil and gas reserves (Blank 2007, 314). Thus, in Asia as in much of the Middle East, there is a mismatch between rhetoric and reality. Although US officials are quick to criticize autocratic excesses in statements and speeches, they do not necessarily back up these words with deeds.

European Union

The end of the Cold War invigorated the EU's external relations. As it began to assume a more assertive role in the world, the EU sought to differentiate itself from the *realpolitik* persona of the United States and instead nurtured a reputation for a normative, value-based foreign policy centered on the promotion of democracy and human rights (Leonard 2005; Manners 2002; Smith 2003). As early as 1991 EU members resolved that democracy would be a condition for receiving EU foreign aid (Olsen 2002). Another milestone occurred in 1995, with the passage of a commission communiqué requiring all economic cooperation agreements between the EU and third countries to include an "essential elements" clause stipulating mutual respect for democracy and human rights as the basis for all agreements (Commission of the European Communities 1995). This binding clause—which provides grounds for suspending the agreement if violated—is particularly important in light of the EU's legalistic approach to foreign policy, which is organized around a number of formal partnership programs (Eeckhout 2004; M. Smith 2001). These include the Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) with the Western Balkans; Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) with former Soviet republics; the Cotonou Agreement (previously the Lomé Convention) with the African, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) countries; and a number of other bilateral trade and cooperation

agreements with countries in Latin America and Asia.[8] Layered on top of these treaty relationships is the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), which includes the countries ringing the Mediterranean, as well as Ukraine, Moldova, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. All of these programs specify democracy and respect for human rights as a basis for cooperation, meaning that the potential exercise of democratic conditionality is built into the agreements. In practice, however, the EU's defense of democracy varies considerably across cases.

The region in which the EU has had the clearest influence is Central and Eastern Europe. Here the imposition of strict democratic conditionality "has been seen as integrally intertwined with EU self-interest" (Youngs 2010, 9). Through its enlargement policy, the EU guided ten postcommunist candidate countries through the difficult process of political reform, and by several accounts has played an integral role in these countries' transformation into stable democracies (Vachudova 2005; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Jacoby 2006; Pridham 2005; Pridham, Herring, and Sanford 1994; Schimmelfennig 2002; Zielonka and Pravda 2001). The effectiveness of the EU's particular brand of conditionality—which combines detailed periodic reviews, technical assistance, and a willingness to withhold benefits until conditions are met—has been widely praised (Leonard 2005; Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2004).

The EU's will to enforce democratic norms weakens considerably in countries beyond its future member states. Indeed, its leverage depends to a large extent on the carrot of membership (Mungiu-Pippidi 2007). The ENP, for example, is an attempt to apply the successes of the enlargement policy to the EU's wider neighborhood, but the incentives on offer are considerably smaller, and the will to enforce conditions is more feeble (Gawrich, Melnykovska, and Schweikert 2010; Kelley 2006). When competing objectives are at stake, it becomes increasingly difficult to forge agreement among member states and overcome the hurdles of policy making within the EU's complex institutional framework. This is especially true if a norm-violating regime is a former colony with whom a powerful member state shares close ties (see Kotzian, Knodt, and Urdze 2011, 3–7). Accordingly, several studies have documented that despite its idealistic rhetoric, the EU's actual track record of promoting democracy in Africa, Asia, and the former Soviet republics has been uneven and often weak (Emerson et al. 2005; Joffé 2008; Lannon, Inglis, and Haenebalcke 2001; MacFarlane 2004; K. Smith 2001; Youngs 2001, 2010; Zagorski 2004). In response to a military coup following Algeria's 1992 election, which was won by the Islamist opposition, the EU actually increased aid to the dictatorship, a clear case of prioritizing stability and security over democracy (see Olsen 2002, 140–142). Studies of the EU's foreign aid allocation similarly find that respect for human rights has had at most a moderate impact on aid commitments (Carey 2007). One review of EU democracy promotion over two decades concludes that, like the United States, the EU "favors a more cautious

mix of norms and *realpolitik*. . . . The application of democratic conditionality has been far from uniform and is often molded to the aims of other policy imperatives" (Youngs 2010, 6–10).

United Nations

Though democratic norms have been embedded in the fabric of the United Nations since its founding, the injunction against interfering in "matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State" (UN Charter, Article 2) has traditionally prevented it from actively promoting democracy. As with many international organizations, however, the end of the Cold War sparked a renaissance in the United Nations,[9] which is now increasingly called upon to fulfill its role as guarantor of international peace and security. In the past two decades there has also been a dramatic increase in government requests to the United Nations for assistance in building democratic institutions (Newman 2004, 193–194; Joyner 2002). Secretary General Boutros Boutros-Ghali seized upon the chance to make democracy promotion a priority of his term in office, establishing the Electoral Assistance Division in 1992. Since then, the United Nations has provided electoral assistance to more than one hundred countries.[10]

In numerous reports and speeches, UN officials have underscored the linkage between democracy and peace. For Boutros-Ghali, "[t]he promotion of democracy is both an end in itself and part of the responsibility of the United Nations to maintain international peace and security" (quoted in Rushton 2008, 103).[11] Secretary-General Kofi Annan used similar rhetoric, noting in 2001 that the three key priorities of the United Nations were "eradicating poverty, preventing conflict, and promoting democracy." However, because promoting democracy can be seen as conflicting with the principle of nonintervention, to take root, it had to be framed as instrumental to a goal more clearly embedded within the UN's sphere of competence: the maintenance of peace and security. As Rushton (2008, 104) notes in his analysis of Boutros-Ghali's efforts as a norm entrepreneur, "the 'traditional' justification of peace and security" nearly always served as the frame for incorporating democracy promotion into UN operations. An important precedent for intervention in the electoral politics of a sovereign state was set in 1990 when the United Nations supervised postconflict elections in Nicaragua (Santiso 2002, 565). Subsequent peace-building operations in El Salvador, Guatemala, Cambodia, Haiti, and East Timor in the 1990s also featured democracy promotion as an integral part of the missions, whose goal was to build "sustainable" peace. Democratic elections—not just the signing of a peace agreement—came to be viewed as essential in the transition from war to peace (ibid., 559–563).

These developments were controversial. Backlash against involvement in elections is reflected in a UN General Assembly resolution passed in February 1996, "Respect for the principles of national sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of States in their electoral processes," which outlines clear limits to the scope of UN action, stating that "electoral assistance to Member States should be provided . . . only at the request and with the consent of specific sovereign states, . . . *or in special circumstances such as . . . in the context of regional or international peace processes*" (UN General Assembly 1996; emphasis added).[12] In short, the UN's mandate and culture place sharp limits on when and where it can respond to flawed elections.[13] Enforcement is far more likely to occur in post-conflict settings, particularly in countries where the United Nations is engaged in peace building or reconstruction, or in which it has a history of intervention.

Regional IGOs

There has been a growing tide of regionalism in recent decades (Mansfield and Milner 1999). Of the hundreds of regional IGOs in existence, most were created to enhance cooperation in economic and technical areas. Only a select number of political organizations have adopted formal commitments to promote or protect democracy among their member states.[14] Table 4.1 lists these IGOs, noting whether their commitment to democracy is expressed in binding language[15] and whether they have a track record of enforcement in response to flawed elections.

As the table makes clear, democratic commitments span the globe. In fact, only twenty-six countries in the data set were never party to a regional democratic commitment between 1990 and 2007. This means that commitments crop up in some unlikely places, including in a number of organizations with predominantly autocratic member states, such as the CIS, whose members include Belarus, Russia, and Uzbekistan, or COMESA, whose members include Libya, Sudan, and Egypt. Furthermore, despite obvious differences in their level of institutionalization and effectiveness, many of their democratic commitments sound similar on paper. For example, Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union (1992) states that "the Union is founded on the principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States." In the Lomé Declaration (2002), the African Union's member states similarly declare their determination to "promote respect and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms, democracy, rule of law and good governance." Indeed, many African IGOs borrow liberally from EU treaties when drafting their own documents (Gray and Slapin 2011).

Although the insertion of democratic language into constitutive documents is common, enforcement of these commitments is far more spotty. Only thirteen

Table 4.1. Attributes of Regional IGOs

		Commitment		Agency for	Enfct. After Flawed Election?	
IGO	**Acronym**	**Legally Binding?**	**Enforcement Procedure?**	**Dem. Promotion?**	**Postelec.**	**Pre-elec., Next Elec.**
European Union	EU	yes	yes	yes	yes	yes
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe	OSCE	yes		yes	yes	yes
Council of Europe	COE	yes	yes	yes (1990)	yes	yes
North Atlantic Treaty Organization	NATO	yes			yes	yes
Commonwealth of Independent States	CIS	yes (2002)		yes (2002)		yes
Council of the Baltic Sea States	CBSS			yes (1994)		
Organization of American States	OAS	yes (1990)	yes (1991)	yes (1990)	yes	yes
Southern Cone Common Market	Mercosur	yes (1998)	yes (1998)		yes	yes
Caribbean Community	CARICOM	yes (1997)			yes	yes
Andean Community (previously the Andean Pact)	CAN					yes
Latin American Economic System	SELA					
Central American Integration System	SICA					
Association of Southeast Asian Nations	ASEAN	yes (2007)				

(*Continued*)

Table 4.1. (*Continued*)

IGO	Acronym	Commitment: Legally Binding?	Commitment: Enforcement Procedure?	Agency for Dem. Promotion?	Enfct. After Flawed Election?: Postelec.	Enfct. After Flawed Election?: Pre-elec., Next Elec.
South Pacific Forum/Pacific Islands Forum	PIF	yes (2000)	yes (2000)			
South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation	SAARC					
Southern African Development Community	SADC	yes (1992)	yes (1992)		yes	yes
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa	COMESA	yes (1993)				yes
Economic Community of West African States	ECOWAS	yes (1993)		yes (1993)	yes	yes
Entente Council	Entente					
African Union (formerly the Organization for African Unity)	AU	yes (2000)			yes	yes

of the twenty IGOs in table 4.1 have a track record of at least once employing either conditionality or diplomatic engagement in response to electoral misconduct in a member state. And even among organizations with a history of enforcement, some are more active than others. What explains this variation? One clearly important factor is the regime type of the IGO's member states. Pevehouse (2002b, 2005) shows that densely democratic IGOs—those organizations whose member states are predominantly democratic—are more likely to enforce democratic norms through conditionality. This is so because democratic member states are likely to share ideas about what constitutes a norm violation and how to respond. Dictatorships or hybrid regimes, in contrast, are more likely to oppose enforcement, simply because they value democracy less. They may also fear setting a precedent for regional intervention for democracy that could then be used against them in the future (cf. Levitt 2006).

The idea that democratic density matters for enforcement rests on the notion that democratic states share similar preferences and values and will therefore be more likely to agree to punish norm breakers. Even if this is true in a broad sense, democracies are not a monolithic group. Every country has its own economic and strategic concerns that may limit its willingness to punish a particular norm violator. Divergent preferences give rise to disagreement among member states. How can enforcement occur in the face of such disagreements? On this point, it is important to consider how certain institutional attributes of the IGO can facilitate more consistent enforcement. First, by delegating authority to an agency for democracy promotion within an IGO, enforcement decisions can be insulated from the individual whims and biases of member states. The OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), for example, issues independent election observation reports that are often highly critical, despite fierce opposition to its activities from Russia (Chivers 2007; Ghebali 2002). In Latin America, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has been an important driver of the region's now robust regime for protecting democracy and human rights (Goldman 2009). Although democracy promotion agencies do not have the independent ability to impose conditionality, many are able to shame norm breakers or authorize diplomatic missions without the explicit approval of the IGO's intergovernmental bodies. Moreover, as specialized agencies with some autonomy, these bodies accrue expert knowledge (Barnett and Finnemore 2004) and may be more likely than the member states to be even-handed guardians of norms.

The rules that govern collective decision making matter for enforcement as well. With few exceptions, IGOs make decisions based on unanimity or consensus, meaning that decision rules themselves vary little across organizations. But there is variation across IGOs on another dimension: whether the organization has a formal procedure for enforcing democracy. In some regional organizations,

norm violations are dealt with in an ad hoc manner, hindering the organization's ability to speedily and efficiently respond to crises. Other organizations have adopted formal procedures for enforcement. Table 4.1 shows six IGOs that have adopted procedures of this kind.[16] An example is the Inter-American Democratic Charter, signed by all OAS member states in 2001, which states in Article 21:

> In the event of an unconstitutional alteration of the constitutional regime that seriously impairs the democratic order in a member state, any member state or the Secretary General may request the immediate convocation of the Permanent Council. . . . When the special session of the General Assembly determines that there has been an unconstitutional interruption of the democratic order of a member state, and that diplomatic initiatives have failed, the special session shall take the decision to suspend said member state from the exercise of its right to participate in the OAS by an affirmative vote of two thirds of the member states in accordance with the Charter of the OAS.

These types of clauses preempt a number of questions that would inevitably arise if enforcement were determined on an ad hoc basis, including how a case gets on the agenda for consideration, what the consequences for a norm violation are, and by what voting rule these consequences are imposed. By dealing with these procedural questions in advance, such agreements remove obstacles to enforcement that would otherwise stand in the way. Of course, politics still matters. In the case of the OAS's Democratic Charter, member states may disagree on whether an event constitutes an "unconstitutional interruption of democratic order." But at a minimum, the charter increases the likelihood that an event will be debated, and if a consensus is reached, it provides an agreed-upon procedure for moving forward. In response to the coup in Honduras on June 28, 2009, for example, OAS Secretary General José Miguel Insulza was immediately dispatched on a fact-finding mission. On July 5, one week after the coup, a special meeting of the General Assembly decided in a unanimous vote to suspend Honduras's membership.

Variation across Regions

Densely democratic and highly institutionalized organizations tend to cluster in particular regions of the world. These clusters of formal organizations, rules, principles, and procedures for enforcing democratic norms therefore constitute distinct regional regimes. In Europe and the Americas, regional regimes for democracy protection are established and robust; in sub-Saharan Africa, a

nascent regime is emerging; whereas in Asia and the Middle East, democracy protection regimes are absent.

Europe and the Americas have developed strong democracy protection regimes (Hawkins 2008; Parish and Peceny 2002).[17] This is so, perhaps most importantly, because the third wave of democratization was most complete and deepest in these two regions, providing greater demand among member states for regional institutions to protect democracy (cf. Moravcsik 2000). The spread of democracy was also accompanied, after the end of the Cold War, by reduced fears that unilateral intervention would be undertaken in the name of promoting democracy (Hawkins and Shaw 2008). Many IGOs, including the OAS, OSCE, and EU, experienced an institutional rejuvenation in the early 1990s as their member states granted them greater autonomy, expanded the realm of issues they dealt with, and established more rapid and efficient decision-making procedures. Finally, the high levels of economic interdependence and interaction within these regions also mattered. As Horne (2009) explains in her "relational" theory of norm enforcement, the benefits of sanctioning norm violators are greatest when group members are highly interdependent; close in-group ties magnify the benefits of enforcement. The virtuous combination of democratic membership, legalization, and interdependence therefore created a favorable setting for the establishment of effective democracy protection regimes in Europe and the Americas.[18]

In sub-Saharan Africa, a regional regime for protecting democracy is emerging, but is still in the early stages of development. Most countries in Africa are at best weakly institutionalized democracies, and they coexist alongside several outright authoritarian regimes. Many leaders are reluctant to set a precedent for international intervention in electoral politics, lest it should come back to haunt them later. This is particularly problematic if the state resisting norm enforcement is a regional hegemon, such as South Africa, which has long been reluctant to allow the SADC to take action in response to Zimbabwe's grave violations of democratic norms (van der Vleuten and Hoffmann 2010). In short, regional democratic commitments, agencies for democracy promotion, and enforcement procedures within African IGOs remain weaker than those in Europe and the Americas, as is Africa's actual track record of responding to flawed elections. The African Union has taken tentative steps toward democracy promotion with the passage in 2002 of the "Declaration on the Principles Governing Democratic Elections in Africa." A Democracy and Electoral Assistance Unit was created in 2006 to streamline management of the organization's election observation missions, and the African Peer Review Mechanism provides a structure that could in theory be used for putting pressure on violators of democratic norms.[19] But the voluntary and consultative nature of this mechanism undermines its utility as a tool for pressuring intransigent regimes. ECOWAS helped plan and secure Liberia's postconflict

election in 1997 and has since assisted in restoring democracy and monitoring elections after coup d'états in Sierra Leone and Cote d'Ivoire (Khobe 2000; Haftel and Thompson 2006). These are important developments, but as yet efforts by regional IGOs to defend democracy have most often been focused on coups, rather than on the region's (many) problematic elections.

Finally, at the time of this writing, democracy protection regimes are wholly absent in Asia and the Middle East. Democracy is less prevalent in these regions, and norms of nonintervention are far stronger. In Southeast Asia, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has taken initial steps toward setting up a human rights mechanism, but its long-standing commitment to noninterference and its tradition of making decisions by consensus (the "ASEAN Way") have limited its ability to take action against violations of democratic norms in member states such as Myanmar and Cambodia (Emmerson 2008).[20] Passage of the long-awaited ASEAN Human Rights Declaration in December 2012 disappointed human rights activists and observers in the West, who criticize its vague wording and apparent allowance of cultural or security-related derogations.[21]

THE CONSISTENCY OF ENFORCEMENT

In his study of aid conditionality, Crawford concludes that despite the sea change in rhetoric, the post–Cold War era is marked by continuity "in the selective manner in which Northern governments approach issues of human rights and democracy" (Crawford 1997, 102). Though the enforcement of democratic norms has increased since the Cold War years (cf. Dunning 2004; Goemans and Marinov 2013), it is still selective. Indeed, the data reveal that enforcement occurs less than half of the time in response to violations of electoral norms: only 40% of flawed elections are met by postelection international enforcement, and only 47% are met by pre-election enforcement in the next election. Diplomatic engagement is the most common tool. This is unsurprising, given that these methods are less politically and materially costly than conditionality. Yet some actors use conditionality more than others. Figure 4.1a shows the percentage of flawed elections responded to with norm enforcement by the United States, European Union, and United Nations, the three actors in the data whose activities are global in scope. For each, the first bar shows the consistency of enforcement of any kind (diplomatic engagement or conditionality), and the second bar shows the consistency of conditionality.

The graph provides clear evidence that different actors gravitate toward different policy tools. The United States is the most active enforcer of democratic norms overall—responding to 40% of flawed elections worldwide. Relative to other international actors, the United States plays an important role in the




Figure 4.1a Consistency of Enforcement.[1]
[1]Graphs show the imposition of enforcement either in the postelection period or in the pre-election period before the next election.

Middle East and Asia—two regions that do not have regional organizations active in democracy promotion. But it is evident that US efforts are dominated by the softer tools of diplomatic engagement. There is some foundation, then, for the perception that the United States fails to back up its pro-democracy rhetoric with costly action. It is quick to criticize electoral conduct, but far more reluctant to wield concrete promises or threats against norm-violating regimes. In contrast, the European Union is an avid wielder of conditionality. Strikingly, more than 30% of flawed elections around the world are targeted by threats, promises, punishments, or rewards from the EU. This propensity for imposing democratic conditionality perhaps reflects the uniquely value-based nature of the EU's foreign policy (Kagan 2003; Leonard 2005; Manners 2002). But it is also shaped by the EU's institutional culture, in which conditionality is ingrained as standard operating procedure for exerting influence on third countries.

The United Nations is markedly less active than the United States or EU in enforcing democratic norms after flawed elections. Where it does play a role, its efforts often form part of a broader peace-building campaign. The region of greatest UN activity is Central America and the Caribbean, where it has deployed multidimensional peacekeeping and election management missions in several cases, including in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Haiti. The data also make clear that UN democracy promotion is dominated by the softer tools of diplomatic engagement. As its long post–Cold War engagement in Cambodia—explored in chapter 7—demonstrates, the organization has proven reluctant (or simply




Figure 4.1b Consistency of Regional IGO Enforcement.

unable) to use conditionality in response to democratic backsliding, even when electoral misconduct is blatant and severe. Disagreement among member states is too intense.

Figure 4.1b turns to the consistency of enforcement by regional organizations within their regions. Recall the characterization of regional regimes for democracy protection as "established" (Europe and Latin America), "emerging" (sub-Saharan Africa), or "absent" (Asia and the Middle East). Patterns of enforcement do line up with these classifications. Regional IGO enforcement is most likely in Europe (coded here to include all former Soviet republics), followed by Latin America. African IGOs are notably less active in responding to electoral misconduct than their counterparts in Europe and Latin America. Finally, regional IGOs in Asia and MENA have no track record of enforcing democratic norms in the wake of electoral misconduct. When it does occur, enforcement in these regions is implemented mainly by the United States and is nearly always limited to tools of diplomatic engagement.

Regional differences go a long way toward explaining variation in enforcement, but it is also important to investigate whether an IGO's institutional design exerts an effect, potentially mitigating the problem of disagreement among member states. An analysis of the set of twenty regional IGOs with democratic commitments (see table 4.1) reveals that having a formal procedure for enforcement is the single most powerful predictor of the consistency with which the IGO punishes violations of democratic norms. Figure 4.2 demonstrates this finding. It shows the effect of IGO attributes on the consistency of enforcement, measured as the percent of flawed elections among member states that were punished by




Figure 4.2 Effect of Regional IGO Attributes on the Consistency of Enforcement.

the regional IGO using either tools of conditionality or diplomatic engagement.[22] In the data, consistency ranges from 0 (e.g., ASEAN) to 54% (the EU). The existence of an institutional mechanism for enforcement is associated with a substantial 31% increase in consistency, and this effect is significantly different than 0. In contrast, democratic density (measured here as the average level of democracy among member states over the entire sample period, 1990–2007) and an agency for democracy promotion are associated with small but statistically insignificant increases in enforcement consistency. This underscores the point that though many regional organizations are composed of democracies, not all of these are active enforcers of democratic norms. Democratic density may therefore be a necessary but not sufficient condition for enforcement. Within regions, certain IGOs specialize in democracy promotion. In Latin America, for example, the OAS—and to a lesser extent Mercosur and CARICOM—are the main entities that member states work through when responding to threats to democracy. Other regional bodies, such as the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and the Central American Integration System (SICA), have no track record of responding to flawed elections.

WHO IS PUNISHED?

The previous section illustrated differences among international actors in their propensity to enforce democratic norms. But this is just one piece of the puzzle.

There is also country-level variation in enforcement. Some countries are more likely to be punished than others, and even within a single country, certain elections generate more controversy and are met by a stronger international response. Chapter 2 provided a theory to explain this country-level and temporal variation in norm enforcement. Three testable predictions were derived.

First, enforcement should be more likely in countries of low geopolitical importance. This is so because relations with such states are characterized by few competing strategic and foreign policy interests that would reduce international actors' will to enforce democratic norms. A preliminary look at patterns in the data lends support to this claim. Countries targeted by enforcement tend to have smaller economies, lower military expenditures, and less natural resource wealth, and they are less likely to have a nonpermanent seat on the UN Security Council. In the next section, these relationships are tested more rigorously using multivariate statistical analysis.

The second prediction holds that enforcement should be more likely when international election observers criticize the election. This is because information about the scope, intent, and effect of electoral misconduct shapes debates about the justifiability of punishment. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the association between election observers' verdicts and international responses to flawed elections. The vertical axis on the graph shows the percentage of flawed elections met by enforcement either during the postelection period or in the pre-election period before the next election. Enforcement occurs in 41% of elections that are flawed but given a passing grade—an "acceptant" verdict—from international election observers. This occurs when observers report the presence of limited electoral irregularities, but determine that flaws were not systematic and did not influence the outcome of the election. Enforcement following critical verdicts—in which observers report systematic, intentional irregularities or reject the legitimacy of the contest outright—is much higher, occurring 66% of the time. However, election observer criticism exerts a weaker effect on conditionality. The percent of elections met by conditionality is only slightly higher following criticism (28% versus 20%), and this difference is not statistically significant. This suggests, then, that election observers' reports do shape enforcement patterns, but their effect is strongest on the tools of diplomatic engagement—shaming, diplomacy, or mediation missions. This in turn suggests that for governments, the consequences of a negative report from international observers may not be as severe as some might assume.

Third, international actors glean information about the intentionality of misconduct by observing governments' behavior over time. When a government repeatedly violates norms, it becomes increasingly difficult for international actors to give it the benefit of the doubt. Repeat offenders are therefore more likely to be viewed as deserving of punishment, and enforcement should be more

likely as the number of previous flawed elections in the country increases. The empirical record supports this claim. Figure 4.4 shows enforcement patterns by the number of flawed elections held in a country, ranging from 1 (the first flawed




Figure 4.3 Percentage of Elections Experiencing Enforcement and Conditionality by Election Observer Verdict.




Figure 4.4 Percentage of Elections Experiencing Enforcement and Conditionality by Number of Previously Flawed Elections.

election) to a maximum of 9. As before, the y-axis indicates enforcement that is imposed either during the postelection period or in the pre-election period before the next election.

The figure shows that the consistency of enforcement increases markedly as the number of norm violations rises, reaching levels of 80% or more when a country has had more than six flawed contests. Conditionality in particular is imposed far more frequently on repeat offenders than on first-time offenders. The use of conditionality makes a large jump following a country's fourth norm violation—perhaps conforming to a "three strikes, you're out" rule. In Armenia, for example, flawed elections in 1998 and 1999 were met with criticism and weak warnings, and the country was handed an important—and premature—reward when it was admitted to the COE in 2001. When electoral conduct actually worsened in 2003, it could only be interpreted as a willful violation of international norms. In response, the COE placed the country under a long-term monitoring program and threatened suspension of membership unless constitutional reforms were enacted.

Interests or Information?

Evidence supports the idea that enforcement patterns are shaped by both interests and information: punishment is less likely in geopolitically important countries where competing interests stand in the way of defending democratic norms, but more likely as the quality of information on the norm violation improves. But how do these two forces stack up against each other? Can information trump the dictates of geopolitical interest? Moreover, do the effects of interests and information on enforcement hold even after controlling for the intensity of electoral misconduct? To answer these questions, I ran a series of probit models that weigh the importance of interests and information in predicting the probability of enforcement after electoral misconduct. The sample is composed of all flawed elections, and the dependent variable is an indicator for enforcement imposed by one or more actors, either during the postelection period or during the pre-election period before the next election.

Because geopolitical importance can have multiple sources, four variables are used to operationalize this concept.[23] First, a country's *GDP* captures economic size.[24] Second, as a measure of military power, I employ data on annual *military expenditures*.[25] Third, to capture the potential importance of energy wealth as a shield against international interference, I use Ross's (2011) data on the value of *oil and gas production*.[26] Because the distribution of these three variables is right-skewed, I take the natural log of each measure. Fourth, to capture a country's geopolitical standing and weight, I have created an indicator for whether the country

holds a seat on the *UN Security Council* (this variable includes both permanent and nonpermanent seats).[27] To ensure that I am capturing the effect of geopolitical importance on enforcement, rather than the other way around, each of these four measures is lagged one year.

Next, two variables capture the quality of information available to the potential enforcers. First is the variable for *election observer criticism*, coded "1" if one or more international observation missions deemed the contest irregular or rejected it outright.[28] Second, to capture the updating of beliefs about the intentionality and severity of misconduct over time, I include a variable for the *number of flawed elections* held in the country since 1990.

As a control, I include the three-part index for the *intensity of electoral misconduct* (described in chapter 3), which measures the scope of misconduct in terms of the number of areas in which manipulation occurs (pre-election restrictions on freedom, pre-election biased playing field, and ballot fraud). Inclusion of this variable creates a hard test for the effect of information, because election observer criticism and the number of previous flawed elections are likely correlated with the intensity of misconduct. If these variables are still shown to have a significant effect, this would constitute persuasive evidence in support of the effect of information on enforcement. As an additional control, I include a variable for the number of formal *regional democratic commitments* to which the country belongs, lagged by one year.[29] Enforcement may be more likely in countries that have publicly committed themselves to adhere to democratic norms. Finally, I include a set of *regional dummy variables* in the models.[30] Differences in the probability of enforcement across regions stem from, among other things, variations in the capacity of regional organizations to respond to norm violations. As shown previously, IGOs in Europe and the Americas are more active enforcers than African and, especially, Asian IGOs. Table 4.2 presents the results. Figure 4.5 provides a graphical interpretation, showing the predicted effect of geopolitical interests and information on the probability of enforcement. The first graph shows predictions for enforcement via any of the three tools—conditionality, diplomatic/mediation missions, or shaming—and the second graph shows predictions for conditionality only. The results do in fact differ across tools, revealing once again that the use of conditionality is governed by a different logic than diplomatic engagement. Notably, geopolitically important countries, particularly those that are militarily powerful, oil and gas producers, and members of the UNSC, are less likely to be targeted by conditionality. But geopolitical importance has no discernible effect on the likelihood of enforcement overall. Thus, it appears that economic size, military strength, oil wealth and Security Council membership work best as shields against concrete threats and punishments, but they do not serve to deflect shaming or diplomatic missions.

Table 4.2. Determinants of Enforcement

	Enforcement (Any Tool)				Conditionality			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
GDP (log, t-1)	0.03				–0.10			
	(0.62)				(0.13)			
Military Expenditures (log, t-1)		–0.02				–0.09**		
		(0.64)				(0.00)		
Oil and Gas Production (log, t-1)			–0.01				–0.03*	
			(0.47)				(0.01)	
UNSC Member (t-1)				–0.48				–0.92**
				(0.14)				(0.01)
Election Observer Criticism	0.48**	0.37*	0.45**	0.43*	0.12	–0.09	0.05	0.09
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.44)	(0.57)	(0.76)	(0.61)
No. Prev. Flawed Elections	0.05	0.04	0.05	0.04	0.13**	0.10**	0.13**	0.13**
	(0.20)	(0.39)	(0.21)	(0.29)	(0.00)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Misconduct Intensity	0.30**	0.27*	0.29**	0.32**	0.16	0.14	0.14	0.21
	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.19)	(0.29)	(0.23)	(0.11)
Regional Democratic Commitments (t-1)	0.22*	0.17	0.19+	0.12	0.07	0.07	0.01	0.00
	(0.04)	(0.16)	(0.07)	(0.33)	(0.47)	(0.58)	(0.88)	(0.99)
Latin America/Caribbean	0.54+	0.45	0.42	0.55+	0.49	0.13	0.34	0.46
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.14)	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.77)	(0.44)	(0.32)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.19	0.07	-0.00	0.16	0.39	0.18	0.29	0.69+
	(0.60)	(0.85)	(0.99)	(0.64)	(0.38)	(0.67)	(0.49)	(0.10)
MENA	0.56+	0.50	0.50	0.49	0.23	0.16	0.25	–0.26
	(0.08)	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.15)	(0.59)	(0.70)	(0.56)	(0.53)
Central and Eastern Europe	0.28	0.13	0.19	0.30	0.74+	0.68	0.78*	0.96*
	(0.42)	(0.71)	(0.57)	(0.41)	(0.07)	(0.11)	(0.05)	(0.02)

(*Continued*)

Table 4.2. (*Continued*)

	Enforcement (Any Tool)				Conditionality			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**
Former Soviet Union	0.43	0.66+	0.41	0.61	0.44	0.62	0.64	0.70
	(0.25)	(0.07)	(0.23)	(0.12)	(0.33)	(0.18)	(0.13)	(0.13)
Constant	–2.04	–0.73	–1.02**	–1.11**	0.38	0.17	–1.46**	–2.02**
	(0.19)	(0.35)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.81)	(0.84)	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	382	333	381	324	382	333	381	324

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. Sample = flawed elections. Dependent variable measures whether enforcement is imposed in either the postelection period or the pre-election period before the next election.




Figure 4.5a Effect of Geopolitical Importance and Information on Probability of Enforcement after a Flawed Election.[1]

[1]Simulations are performed using the *CLARIFY* package for Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). Graphs show the predicted change in the probability of enforcement in response to a one standard-deviation change in the variables for GDP, military expenditures, oil/gas production, and past flawed elections, and a one-unit change (from 0 to 1) in the variables for UNSC membership and election observer criticism.




Figure 4.5b Effect of Geopolitical Importance and Information on Probability of Conditionality after a Flawed Election.

For proponents of democracy promotion, the effects of information are encouraging, because they reveal that enforcement patterns are not solely determined by the dictates of geopolitical and strategic interest. Even after controlling for a country's level of geopolitical importance, criticism from election observers is associated with a large increase—of nearly 20%—in the chances of enforcement (figure 4.5a). But importantly, this effect is limited to tools of diplomatic engagement. Election observers' verdicts have no discernible effect on the probability of conditionality (figure 4.5b). Instead, the country's track record of norm violations is perhaps the single most powerful predictor of conditionality. As the number of flawed elections rises, enforcement in general—but conditionality specifically—becomes more likely. Repeat offenders, which are arguably the most intransigent cases, are more likely to be punished. This also implies, importantly, that international actors are not shying away from engaging the more difficult cases—a subject explored more extensively in the next chapter.

Unilateral versus Multilateral Enforcement

We have seen that enforcement patterns are shaped by information about the severity and intentionality of norm violations. An additional question to consider is whether some actors are more responsive to this information than others. This issue is important because it sheds light on which actors impose enforcement in a more objective manner—that is, whether enforcement decisions are driven by publicly available information about the severity of misconduct or by other geopolitical, partisan, or particularistic interests. On this point, an important distinction can be made between the United States and the multilateral actors included in this study. When acting unilaterally, states are free to pursue their own particular foreign policy goals, which may entail support for a norm-violating regime. Multilateral organizations, on the other hand, require the agreement of multiple stakeholders to act. Greater "political cover" is needed to punish norm violators.[31] This sets a higher bar for action, but it also means that policies are laundered of narrow, particularistic interests (Abbott and Snidal 1998; Voeten 2005). This logic implies that enforcement by multilateral organizations should be more responsive to information about norm violations: as uncertainty about the scope and intentionality of electoral misconduct declines, the probability of enforcement should increase. Enforcement by the United States, in contrast, should not conform as closely to an objective, impartial logic. It should be swayed to a greater extent by the dictates of geopolitical interest.

Table 4.3 presents evidence in line with this expectation, revealing clear divergences in how international actors respond to information about electoral misconduct.[32] The models predict the imposition of conditionality by the United

Table 4.3. Determinants of Conditionality Imposed by the United States, European Union, and Regional IGOs

	United States				European Union				Regional IGOs			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
GDP (log, t-1)	−0.03 (0.69)				−0.12+ (0.05)				−0.14 (0.14)			
Military Expenditures (log, t-1)		−0.10* (0.02)				−0.10* (0.02)				0.02 (0.77)		
Oil and Gas Production (log, t-1)			−0.02 (0.18)				−0.01 (0.51)				−0.03** (0.00)	
UNSC Member (t-1)				−0.77* (0.01)				−0.51 (0.14)				−1.00** (0.00)
Election Observer Criticism	−0.09 (0.62)	−0.27 (0.13)	−0.17 (0.40)	−0.31 (0.20)	0.29+ (0.10)	0.21 (0.25)	0.28 (0.11)	0.40* (0.02)	0.21 (0.17)	0.11 (0.63)	0.18 (0.23)	0.33* (0.04)
No. Prev. Flawed Elections	0.02 (0.63)	−0.01 (0.86)	0.03 (0.59)	0.03 (0.57)	0.28** (0.00)	0.27** (0.00)	0.26** (0.00)	0.27** (0.00)	0.19** (0.00)	0.18** (0.00)	0.21** (0.00)	0.17** (0.00)
Misconduct Intensity	0.30* (0.01)	0.27* (0.03)	0.29* (0.01)	0.39** (0.00)	0.18 (0.11)	0.18 (0.15)	0.15 (0.18)	0.22+ (0.08)	0.09 (0.54)	0.02 (0.90)	0.09 (0.51)	0.08 (0.61)
Regl. Democratic Commitments (t-1)	0.05 (0.70)	0.13 (0.41)	0.02 (0.90)	0.03 (0.84)	0.27** (0.00)	0.32** (0.00)	0.28** (0.00)	0.30** (0.00)	0.21+ (0.07)	0.13 (0.26)	0.12 (0.32)	0.14 (0.27)

(*Continued*)

Table 4.3. (*Continued*)

	United States				European Union				Regional IGOs			
	1	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**	**6**	**7**	**8**	**9**	**10**	**11**	**12**
Latin America/ Caribbean	0.55 (0.22)	0.15 (0.75)	0.39 (0.36)	0.40 (0.38)	−1.24** (0.00)	−1.39** (0.00)	−1.33** (0.00)	−1.34** (0.00)	3.51** (0.00)		3.71** (0.00)	3.81** (0.00)
Sub-Saharan Africa	0.17 (0.74)	−0.22 (0.64)	−0.03 (0.95)	0.15 (0.76)	−0.45 (0.15)	−0.56+ (0.10)	−0.41 (0.17)	−0.36 (0.27)	3.29** (0.00)	3.96** (0.00)	3.57** (0.00)	3.78** (0.00)
MENA	−0.21 (0.63)	−0.28 (0.54)	−0.23 (0.61)	−0.68 (0.20)	−0.01 (0.99)	0.02 (0.94)	−0.14 (0.66)	−0.24 (0.52)				
Central & Eastern Europe	−0.53 (0.27)	−0.94+ (0.10)	−0.58 (0.19)	−0.51 (0.28)	−0.09 (0.78)	−0.29 (0.37)	−0.17 (0.63)	−0.26 (0.49)	4.57** (0.00)	5.09** (0.00)	5.04** (0.00)	4.91** (0.00)
Former Soviet Union	0.11 (0.79)	0.05 (0.91)	0.17 (0.66)	0.17 (0.71)	−1.23** (0.01)	−1.33** (0.01)	−1.17** (0.01)	−1.40** (0.01)	3.87** (0.00)	4.67** (0.00)	4.50** (0.00)	4.29** (0.00)
Constant	−1.08 (0.58)	0.46 (0.61)	−1.39** (0.00)	−1.75** (0.00)	1.12 (0.45)	0.24 (0.77)	−1.42** (0.00)	−1.69** (0.00)	−3.07 (0.13)	−6.85** (0.00)	−6.09** (0.00)	−6.34** (0.00)
Observations	382	333	381	324	382	333	381	324	350	248	349	297

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. Sample = flawed elections. Dependent variable measures whether conditionality is imposed in either the postelection period or the pre-election period before the next election.

States, the EU, and regional IGOs. Strikingly, the results indicate that the US' choice to impose conditionality is unaffected by both of the information variables; neither election observer criticism nor the number of previous flawed elections in the country is significantly associated with enforcement. In contrast, regional IGOs and the EU are responsive to these sources of information.[33] This is particularly true for the number of previous flawed elections in the country, which is significant in every model predicting EU and regional IGO conditionality. This finding reflects the fact that, in a multilateral setting, reliable information about norm violations serves the essential function of supplying a justification for enforcement. States that favor punishment can use information about the intentionality of electoral misconduct to pressure other, more reluctant, member states to provide their support—or at least their acquiescence—for enforcement. This implies that enforcement by multilateral institutions does in fact conform to a more impartial and even-handed logic compared to enforcement by the United States, which is unaffected by information about the severity and intentionality of misconduct. This greater objectivity, in turn, imbues multilateral institutions with a source of legitimacy that can increase the ultimate effectiveness of their policies (a point explored in the next chapter). Although the United States is an avid norm enforcer in terms of the sheer frequency of its actions, the evidence here reinforces the view that US promotion of democracy is motivated to a greater extent by a self-interested, partisan agenda.

When Does the United States Act Unilaterally?

That multilateral institutions enforce norms in a more impartial manner imbues their actions with greater legitimacy. For the United States, there are therefore clear benefits from coordinating with regional organizations when responding to flawed elections. By gaining the approval and cooperation of other states, working multilaterally signals that US intentions are benign (Thompson 2006). The ability to coordinate with regional organizations is greatest in Latin America and the Caribbean, because the United States is itself a member of the OAS. In other regions—particularly in the Middle East and Asia, where regional organizations have no track record of protecting democracy—the United States may have no choice but to act unilaterally when enforcing democratic norms.

An examination of the US track record for enforcement in Latin America reveals that purely unilateral action by the United States (in which US enforcement is not accompanied by any regional IGO action) is not very common.[34] Moreover, in those cases in which the United States did act alone, information about misconduct was more uncertain (either because election observers were absent, or because it was the first flawed election held in the country). This supports the previous

finding that regional organizations typically require more solid information to act. The changing nature of the OAS's engagement with the Dominican Republic over multiple flawed elections—a case explored in chapter 6—illustrates precisely this dynamic; only after incumbent president Balaguer had proven to be a willful and unrepentant norm violator did the OAS apply pressure for free and fair elections. In sum, when US enforcement is not accompanied by corresponding multilateral action, this typically means that the country is a first-time offender or that the election did not host international observers. The next chapter considers what this implies for the likelihood that US enforcement will be successful.

CONCLUSIONS

This chapter has shown that although the enforcement of democratic norms is selective, it is not random. Enforcement patterns follow a discernible logic that depends on country- and case-specific conditions. The evidence presented here lends strong support to hypotheses about the effects of information. Enforcement is more likely when election observers criticize misconduct, as well as in countries that are repeat norm violators. Both factors are associated with a reduction in enforcers' uncertainty about the scope, severity, and effects of electoral misconduct. Though election observers are often unable to impose direct pressure on norm-violating governments, the findings here underscore that they can nevertheless have an important indirect impact by increasing the probability that other external actors will punish norm violators. However, the effect of election observers is limited to the "softer" tools of enforcement: diplomacy, mediation, and shaming. Conditionality is typically reserved for countries that are repeat norm violators.

Evidence for the effect of geopolitical importance as a shield against international enforcement is somewhat more variable, perhaps reflecting the subjectivity of this concept, which is difficult to operationalize with a single measure. Different indicators of geopolitical importance were found to matter more for some enforcers than others. The United States, for example, is less likely to enforce democratic norms in militarily powerful states and in countries that occupy a seat on the UN Security Council, whereas regional IGOs are particularly less likely to impose enforcement on oil and gas producers. Nevertheless, one robust finding is that geopolitical importance shapes patterns of conditionality, but not of enforcement in general. Thus, tools of diplomatic engagement are just as likely to be imposed on powerful states as on weak states, but tools of conditionality—concrete sticks and carrots—are reserved mainly for the weak. These results do not, however, imply that strategically important countries get a free pass to manipulate elections at will. Although these countries do have a lower baseline probability of conditionality, the probability of punishment may still increase over time if information on norm violations becomes more compelling.

5

The Effects of Enforcement

Electoral manipulation fuels a vicious cycle. By distorting election outcomes and bolstering incumbent dominance, it increases the likelihood of continued manipulation in future contests. As flawed elections become an entrenched feature of political life, voters may become too disheartened and opposition parties too weak to push for change. The data paint a sobering picture. Electoral misconduct reduces the likelihood of alternation in power, which occurs in just 35% of flawed elections for executive office, compared to 50% of clean elections. If one election is flawed, the next contest will be flawed 79% of the time, compared to just 32% after a clean election. And as the number of flawed elections grows, the chance of holding a clean election continues to decrease.

Nevertheless, some countries do manage to reverse this trend and move toward improved compliance with democratic norms. Consider the case of Zambia. The 2001 presidential race was beset by serious problems—misuse of state resources by the ruling party, barriers to voter registration, media bias, intimidation and lack of transparency during the tabulation of ballots, and suspicious discrepancies in the vote count—leading an observation mission from the Carter Center to conclude that the "legitimacy of the entire process is questionable" (2001). In the 2006 presidential election the government made a concerted effort to ensure a more transparent process. A new electoral code was introduced, and the electoral commission operated in a less partisan fashion. Though the vote counting remained slow and was not without problems, observers noted a distinct improvement in transparency, as well as a "pluralistic campaign environment" in which "freedom of assembly was respected" (European Union 2006). Electoral politics in Romania provides another example of improvements in conduct over time. Elections in 1990 and 1992 were held under highly problematic conditions, with campaigns marred by violence and severe media bias. The 1996 and 2000 elections were marked by more professional election administration, increased transparency, a more fair campaign environment, and as a result, increased public confidence in the process. In its final report on the 2000 contest, the election

observation mission from the OSCE's Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights concluded that "the polls further demonstrated that democratic elections are firmly entrenched in Romania" (ODIHR 2000).

As these cases suggest, achieving clean elections does not happen overnight. Improvements in electoral conduct are often incremental. Progress may be limited to a few areas, while problems persist in others. Nor do these improvements always lead to a turnover in power. Yet if sustained over time, the accumulated effects of reform and improved electoral quality can lead to wholesale political transformation. In Mexico sweeping reforms in election administration that began in the early 1990s fueled improvements in conduct in the 1994 and 1997 elections, culminating in a breakthrough opposition victory in the 2000 presidential contest that definitively marked Mexico's transition to democracy (Eisenstadt 2004a, 2004b).

Chapter 2 explained how international actors can promote these changes by motivating institutional reform and empowering the opposition. Building on chapters 3 and 4, which explored patterns of electoral misconduct and norm enforcement around the world, this chapter presents quantitative evidence on the domestic effects of international enforcement in a global sample of elections. The greatest strength of this macrolevel analysis is that I can assess the effects of enforcement in a large number of cases while controlling for a range of other, potentially confounding, factors. I first explore how enforcement shapes electoral conduct, focusing on two outcomes of interest: whether the intensity of misconduct—understood as the range of tools employed—declines, and whether international election observers' verdicts improve over time. I then shift focus from electoral conduct to electoral outcomes, examining whether enforcement helps unseat cheating incumbents, which is typically the question of greatest concern to domestic actors. I first assess whether the incumbent cancels results or steps down in the wake of a flawed election. These types of immediate concessions are rare, however, occurring after just 13 of 280 flawed elections won by the incumbent. Most of the time, norm-violating incumbents hold onto power. In these cases, I explore whether the government loses to the opposition in the next election.

To preview the findings in the simplest possible terms: enforcement works. Different tools have different strengths, however. Conditionality promotes improvements in electoral conduct and increases the probability of an opposition electoral victory. Diplomatic engagement is best suited to shaping the course of events during the immediate postelection period; tools of mediation, diplomacy, and shaming increase the power of opposition-led protests and increase the probability of the incumbent making postelection concessions. Probing the robustness of these findings in a number of ways, I ran the analyses both on the subsample of flawed elections as well as the full sample of all elections. Here I explore the

relative effectiveness of different international actors and find—perhaps surprisingly—that regional organizations are the most consistently successful defenders of democratic norms. I also explore, and reject, the possibility that the effect of enforcement is driven by selection bias—that is, that international actors choose to intervene in the easier cases. In short, the effect of enforcement is clear, robust, and independent of a number of domestic political factors that also play a role in shaping electoral conduct and outcomes. Moreover, although passive international forces—membership in international organizations, commitments to democracy, and regional diffusion—do exert an effect on electoral conduct, they do not have an effect on electoral outcomes, and their impact generally pales in comparison to that of active enforcement.

IMPROVING ELECTORAL CONDUCT

Chapter 2 outlined two mechanisms through which international enforcement creates improvements in the conduct of elections. First, enforcement may deter the incumbent from cheating (though this is only likely to occur under certain restrictive conditions), and second, enforcement incentivizes institutional reforms that increase the costs of engaging in misconduct. Figure 2.1 illustrated the timing of these effects in a two-election sequence. Following electoral misconduct in Election 1, international actors may impose enforcement either in the immediate aftermath of the election or in the run-up to the next election. The question is, how does enforcement shape the quality of Election 2?

I measure changes in electoral conduct in two ways. First, I examine changes in the *intensity of misconduct*. Ranging from 0 to 3, the index of intensity (introduced in chapter 3) assigns one point to each of three possible modes of electoral manipulation: pre-election restrictions on opposition parties' or voters' freedom of expression and association; the existence of a biased playing field favoring the ruling party; and flaws in the casting, counting, or tabulation of ballots.[1] Elections with no misconduct score a "0" on the scale. The second measure captures changes in the *verdicts of international election observers*, which are coded on an ordinal scale, where 1 indicates a "clean" verdict, 2 "irregular," and 3 "reject."[2] As explained in chapter 3, these two measures capture different aspects of electoral misconduct, and each has its own strengths and weaknesses. The index of intensity captures the scope of misconduct in terms of the range of tools employed. The advantage of this approach is that it is straightforward to code, requiring only factual information about the presence of various tools of misconduct. But this does not capture more subjective evaluations of the severity of misconduct, nor whether misconduct influenced the outcome of the election. The verdicts of election observers take these more intangible aspects of electoral




Figure 5.1a Changes in the Intensity of Electoral Misconduct Following Flawed Elections.

quality into account. The disadvantage of examining these verdicts, however, is that data are missing when observers are not present. In addition, although care has been taken to examine the verdicts of monitoring groups considered to be credible, observers may sometimes exhibit biases that influence their verdicts (Kelley 2009). In short, the two variables complement one another: the index of intensity yields a more objective measure of electoral conduct, whereas election observer verdicts better capture the qualitative severity of misconduct.

Figures 5.1a and 5.1b illustrate the distribution of the two dependent variables. Both are measured as the difference in conduct between election *t* and




Figure 5.1b Changes in Election Observer Verdicts Following Flawed Elections.

t-1, and both are rescaled so that positive changes indicate improvements in conduct—that is, a decline in the intensity of misconduct or an improvement in election observers' verdicts. Thus, in figure 5.1a, a change of "1" in intensity represents movement from 3 to 2, 2 to 1, or 1 to 0 on the index. In figure 5.1b, a change of "1" represents movement from a verdict of "reject" to "irregular," or from "irregular" to "clean."[3]

In all, 112 elections in seventy-one countries experienced a decline in the intensity of flaws, and 50 elections in thirty-one countries experienced an improvement in the verdict of international election observers. These include elections, such as Peru's 2001 presidential contest, that marked a shift from severe government-sponsored manipulation to less severe logistical irregularities, as well as contests in which misconduct declined in one dimension, such as the 2007 election in Sierra Leone, in which election-day irregularities declined relative to previous contests, though pre-election misconduct remained a problem (US State Department 2007). The data also capture cases in which conduct improved because of specific institutional changes, such as Albania's 1997 parliamentary election, in which improvements in the impartiality of election commissions contributed to a more fair balloting process (ODIHR 1997), and El Salvador's 2004 contest, in which the introduction of a single voter identity document reduced ballot fraud.

How does international enforcement influence these processes? Is one type of enforcement—conditionality or diplomatic engagement—more effective than another? To answer these questions, I first identify the full set of flawed elections around the world, from 1990 to 2007. Using regression analysis, I then compare future electoral conduct in cases with and without international enforcement, while controlling for the influence of other factors.[4] The units of analysis in the data are elections. Because the goal is to assess compliance with electoral norms after a norm violation occurs, the sample is composed of all elections that followed a flawed election. Nevertheless, to ensure that my estimates have not been influenced by processes dictating selection of the sample of flawed elections, I also ran all analyses on the entire sample of elections (both flawed and clean). Estimates for the effect of international norm enforcement remain robust.

The dependent variable, which captures changes in electoral conduct, is measured as the change in conduct between the previous election (at *t-1*) and the current election (at *t*). Four key independent variables capture the timing and tools of enforcement:

- *Postelection conditionality* and *postelection diplomatic engagement* are dichotomous variables indicating whether one or more actors implemented these tools following the (previous) flawed election.

- *Pre-election conditionality* and *pre-election diplomatic engagement* are dichotomous variables indicating whether one or more actors implemented these tools prior to the (current) election.

I estimate the following model, where subscript *i* denotes country and *t* denotes the electoral period, **Z** represents a vector of control variables, and *e* is the error term:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{post-election conditionality}_{i,t-1} + \beta_2 \textit{post-election diplomatic engagement}_{i,t-1} + \beta_3 \textit{pre-election conditionality}_{it} + \beta_4 \textit{pre-election diplomatic engagement}_{it} + \beta_k \mathbf{Z}_{it} + e_{it}$$

To uncover the effect of enforcement, one must also control for other factors that shape electoral quality. Research on elections draws our attention to several such factors. Because much prior research has examined single cases or a limited sample of countries, the analysis presented here is the first time that some of these hypotheses have been tested on a global sample of elections. The control variables can be divided into four categories: factors related to the electoral context, the country's electoral history, the country's political characteristics, and the country's international context.[5]

Electoral Context

- *Opposition coalitions* have been found to be a significant predictor of liberalizing electoral outcomes in competitive authoritarian regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006). This is captured via a dummy variable, coded "1" if all major opposition parties forged a unified platform, coordinated their campaigns, or united behind a single presidential candidate in the run-up to the election.[6] By forging a united front, opposition parties alter perceptions about the government's ability to hold onto power, which in turn can reduce its ability to obtain cooperation in perpetrating fraud (Donno 2013). Questions remain, however, about whether this relationship between coalitions and better electoral conduct holds beyond the sample of competitive authoritarian regimes.
- Sitting leaders enjoy a particular advantage when orchestrating misconduct, because they control the resources and institutions of the state. I therefore include a dummy variable indicating whether the *incumbent was running* in the election.[7] Consistent with previous research, I expect democratic change to be less likely when the incumbent is running (Hale 2005; Cheeseman 2010).

Electoral History

- *Criticism from international election monitors* can help mobilize popular anger and spur calls for democratic change (Kelley 2012a, ch.6). I include a dichotomous variable, coded "1" if one or more international election observers issued a verdict of "irregular" or "reject" in the wake of the previous (flawed) election. A negative verdict after one election may stimulate improved conduct in the next election by empowering domestic civil society or goading the government to make changes. This variable also captures a prominent form of international shaming that is not included in the coding of enforcement.
- It is also important to control for the *intensity of flaws in the previous election*. I include the index of misconduct intensity, lagged by one election. The expected effect of this variable could be positive or negative. On the one hand, countries that hold severely flawed elections may be governed by more entrenched authoritarian leaders who are better able to resist calls for democratic change. On the other hand, more severe cases of misconduct may stoke greater anger, providing a stronger motivation for citizens and civil society groups to rise up and push for change in the next election.
- A count of the *number of previous flawed elections* in the country tests whether electoral misconduct is a persistent and self-enforcing phenomenon—that is, whether misconduct tends to worsen as the number of previous flawed elections in a country increases.

Political Context

- A variable for the country's *Polity score* captures whether improvements in electoral conduct are more (or less) likely in countries with stronger (or weaker) democratic institutions. To guard against reverse causality, this variable is lagged by one year.
- A variable for *prior liberalization* measures the country's change in Polity score over the three-year period preceding the election. Improvements in electoral conduct may simply reflect an ongoing process of political liberalization that is not directly related to international pressure or electoral politics (cf. Howard and Roessler 2006).

International Context

Finally, I include three variables that capture elements of the international context. All measures are lagged by one year to ensure they are not endogenous to

the dependent variable. These are the "passive" international forces, discussed in chapter 2:

- The level of *democracy in the region*, measured as the average Polity score of all other states in country *i*'s region. Regions are defined as sub-Saharan Africa, Middle East and North Africa (MENA), Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet republics, Latin America and Caribbean, and Asia. Previous studies have shown that democracy does tend to diffuse within neighborhoods (Brinks and Coppedge 2006; Gleditsch and Ward 2006; Simmons, Dobbin, and Garrett 2008).
- The number of *densely democratic regional IGOs* in which a country is a member. An IGO is considered densely democratic if the average Polity score among its member states is 7 or higher (on a scale from -10 to 10).[8] Pevehouse (2005) finds that membership in densely democratic organizations is associated with democratic transitions and consolidation, but it remains an open question whether this variable exerts an influence specifically on electoral conduct.
- The number of *regional democratic commitments* to which a country is a party. This variable sums the country's number of memberships in regional IGOs that have adopted formal commitments to democracy (listed in table 4.1). A long line of research by liberal international relations scholars argues that international commitments influence state behavior. If so, we should expect to see a positive association between democratic commitments and improved electoral conduct.

Findings

Chapter 2 explained that conditionality should be particularly effective at inducing changes in electoral conduct after norm violations. Such changes require governmental consent—either a decision to reduce misconduct or an agreement to implement institutional reform that renders misconduct more difficult to perpetrate. Tools of diplomatic engagement—which rely on social, rather than material, incentives—are unlikely to induce such changes in behavior in cases where the government has already proven willing and able to violate norms. Only by marshaling concrete and immediate incentives are international actors likely to sway the government's decision calculus. Moreover, theories of socialization note the importance of shared worldviews, identity, and openness to new ideas as conditions for success (Gheciu 2005). As Checkel (2005, 813) explains, social pressure is unlikely to work when the target has "prior, ingrained beliefs" that

are inconsistent with the norms being promulgated. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 118) similarly note that social pressure works best against states that have already internalized the norms in question and that want to "resist being characterized as pariahs." Thus, for diplomatic engagement to work, the socializees should be open to persuasion—a condition that is unlikely to be met in countries governed by proven norm violators.

What do the data reveal? Table 5.1 presents the results of the statistical models. For ease of interpretation, figure 5.2 graphs the effects of conditionality and diplomatic engagement implemented in the post- or pre-election periods. The first panel of the graph shows the predicted effect of enforcement on the index of misconduct intensity; the second panel shows the effect on changes in election observer verdicts.

Notably, diplomatic engagement is not associated with improvements in electoral conduct. If anything, pre-election diplomatic engagement is associated with an increase in the intensity of misconduct—which may reflect a true causal effect or a selection effect, if international actors are more likely to use shaming during pre-election periods that are already fraught with widespread manipulation. Either way, the finding is clear: "soft" tools of engagement are not associated with improved compliance after norm violations. Manipulation of concrete material incentives is needed. Accordingly, the findings show that conditionality has a positive, significant impact on electoral conduct. Particularly large and strong is the effect of postelection conditionality on the conduct of the next election. That this finding holds for both measures of misconduct—the index of intensity and election observer verdicts—attests to the robustness of this relationship. When international actors respond to norm violations after an election, they are too late to alter the conduct of the current contest, but their efforts do set in motion changes that are felt during the next electoral cycle. Enforcement therefore has a delayed effect on electoral quality. Analysts focusing solely on the short-term consequences of international conditionality will miss this longer-term effect.

Pre-election conditionality is more marginally associated with improvements in conduct, a finding that speaks, again, to the long-term nature of the task of cleaning up elections. Improvements in electoral quality are rarely the result of a sudden change of heart on the part of the incumbent. If conditionality is implemented during the pre-election campaign period, it may simply be too late to make a difference in an electoral process that is already under way. Rather, changes in electoral quality result from months, even years, of hard-fought efforts to improve the institutional context in which elections are held and to credibly demonstrate to the government that there will be consequences for failing to take steps toward holding clean elections. Conditionality policies are well suited to this long-term task of coaxing, and when necessary, compelling countries to comply, as studies of the EU's engagement with its membership candidates have demonstrated

Table 5.1. Determinants of Changes in Electoral Conduct (OLS Models with Country Fixed Effects and Clustered Standard Errors)

	Sample: Elections Following a Flawed Election		Sample: All Elections	
	(1) DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	(2) DV: Change in Elec. Observer Verdict	(3) DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	(4) DV: Change in Elec. Observer Verdict
Postelection Conditionality, Prev. Elec.	0.50**	0.38**	0.33+	0.21+
	(0.01)	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.06)
Postelection Dipl. Engagement, Prev. Elec.	−0.17	−0.08	−0.05	0.01
	(0.20)	(0.46)	(0.63)	(0.93)
Pre-election Conditionality	0.32+	0.11	0.21	0.09
	(0.07)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.33)
Pre-election Dipl. Engagement	−0.32*	−0.15	−0.23+	−0.04
	(0.01)	(0.22)	(0.05)	(0.64)
Opposition Coalition	−0.36*	−0.02	−0.18+	0.04
	(0.01)	(0.84)	(0.06)	(0.59)
Incumbent Running	0.01	0.06	−0.04	0.06
	(0.92)	(0.48)	(0.63)	(0.30)
Election Observer Criticism, Prev. Elec.	−0.20	0.59**	−0.14	0.50**
	(0.16)	(0.00)	(0.23)	(0.00)
Intensity of Flaws, Prev. Elec.	1.04**	0.14+	1.11**	0.08
	(0.00)	(0.05)	(0.00)	(0.11)
No. Previously Flawed Elecs.	−0.10+	0.03	−0.10+	0.01
	(0.10)	(0.41)	(0.05)	(0.65)
Polity, t-1	0.03	−0.02	0.04+	−0.01
	(0.29)	(0.40)	(0.07)	(0.66)

(*Continued*)

Table 5.1. (*Continued*)

	Sample: Elections Following a Flawed Election		Sample: All Elections	
	(1) DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	(2) DV: Change in Elec. Observer Verdict	(3) DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	(4) DV: Change in Elec. Observer Verdict
Prior Liberalization	−0.03 (0.13)	0.03+ (0.06)	−0.01 (0.24)	0.02+ (0.08)
Democracy in Region, t-1	0.13+ (0.07)	0.03 (0.52)	0.06 (0.23)	0.01 (0.75)
No. Densely Democratic IGOs, t-1	0.04* (0.05)	−0.01 (0.58)	0.02+ (0.08)	−0.00 (0.55)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.12 (0.35)	0.02 (0.84)	−0.12 (0.13)	0.01 (0.86)
Constant	−1.10** (0.00)	−0.61** (0.00)	−0.94** (0.00)	−0.32** (0.00)
Observations	304	303	519	518
Number of Countries	84	84	107	107
R-squared	0.46	0.22	0.54	0.19

"t-1" denotes a one-year lag

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

(cf. Kelley 2004; Schimmelfennig, Engert, and Knobel, 2003; Vachudova 2005). Threatening, punishing, or promising conditional rewards to a government in the aftermath of an election can lead to institutional reforms whose effects are then felt in the next electoral cycle. Thus, the finding that postelection conditionality is the most effective tool of influence lends particular support to the idea that institutional reform is a key path through which enforcement improves electoral quality. If it were simply a matter of convincing the incumbent to behave better, one would expect to see an effect of pre-election conditionality in the current election.




Figure 5.2 Effect of Enforcement on Electoral Conduct.

Only a few other factors in the analysis exhibit a significant impact on electoral conduct. Figure 5.3 graphs the estimated effects of the control variables. Several results are of note, including some nonfindings. First, a critical verdict from international election observers is not associated with future changes in the scope of misconduct. This result should be interpreted as suggestive, because the models are not designed specifically to control for the biases of different observation groups. Nevertheless, it does resonate with Kelley's conclusion that the recommendations of election observers are seldom implemented immediately (2012a, ch. 8); only after repeated engagement do improvements typically occur, and even then changes are often gradual. This echoes the previous finding that diplomatic engagement is typically not an effective tool for inducing changes in electoral quality. Concrete incentives must be offered.

The results also show that countries with a track record of multiple flawed contests are marginally associated (at $p = .10$) with a further decline in electoral quality. This suggests that norm violations tend to feed into a continuing vicious cycle. As electoral manipulation becomes an ingrained feature of political life, it is much less likely that a country will see improvements in the quality of its democratic institutions. This finding is significant in light of the previous chapter's conclusion that international actors are more likely to impose enforcement—and especially conditionality—in countries with a longer track record of electoral misconduct. The fact that previous flawed elections are associated with further declines in conduct indicates that international enforcers are, if anything, choosing to involve themselves in the more difficult cases.




Figure 5.3 Effect of Domestic and International Factors on the Intensity of Electoral Misconduct.

What about the domestic opposition? Can it pursue strategies to help level the electoral playing field? The analysis reveals that contrary to initial expectations, when opposition parties forge a unified electoral coalition, this is associated with a decline in electoral quality (i.e., an increase in the intensity of misconduct). It is true that research on competitive authoritarian regimes has found that coalitions have a beneficial effect on electoral conduct, but the results here show that this relationship reverses in a wider sample of countries. To understand this result, it is important to bear in mind that opposition parties face a particular set of circumstances in competitive authoritarian regimes: they are systematically disadvantaged, yet they retain enough relevance that their coalitions can still be perceived as electorally viable by voters. For this reason, coalitions in competitive authoritarian regimes are particularly likely to sow doubts about the incumbent's ability to win the election, which in turn can lead to defections within the ruling elite that make it impossible for the government to perpetrate fraud (Donno 2013). In more hegemonic and closed authoritarian settings, where incumbents dominate the electoral arena, coalitions are unlikely to generate this kind of tipping point in public perceptions and elite defections. Moreover, the potential positive effect of opposition coalitions on

electoral conduct can be offset by a countervailing effect: when incumbents are faced with an opposition coalition, they may feel more threatened and resort to a wider range of tactics of manipulation. In sum, forging a coalition does not necessarily result in immediate benefits to the opposition as far as generating a freer and more equal playing field. But it may indirectly contribute to improvements in conduct in the next election: figure 5.3 also reveals that more intense misconduct in one election is associated with a reduction in intensity (in the range of tools of misconduct employed) in the next one. This could reflect a straightforward process of reversion to the mean, but it could also imply that excessive misconduct in one contest produces a backlash that impels the government to tone down its manipulation in the next.

Some noteworthy nonfindings also emerge from the analysis. Elections in which the incumbent is running are no more or less likely to experience changes in their conduct one way or the other. Nor does a country's level of democracy or track record of prior liberalization exert any significant effect on trends in electoral quality. This may seem counterintuitive, because it means that if a violation of democratic norms occurs in a more democratic regime, it is no more likely than an autocracy to move toward greater compliance and cleaner elections in the future. Thus, democracies may be less likely to hold flawed elections in the first place, but once electoral misconduct occurs, subsequent outcomes do not vary systematically among regime types.

This analysis reveals that international conditionality—an active form of involvement in domestic politics—yields results. But what of the variables that capture passive aspects of the international context? I find that certain types of passive international influence do work in tandem with active enforcement in improving compliance after violations of democratic norms. Most important, a greater number of memberships in densely democratic IGOs is positively, significantly associated with improvements in electoral conduct. There is also marginal support for the proposition that countries in more democratic neighborhoods are more likely to see improvements in electoral quality after a norm violation. But simply signing on to a commitment to democracy is not associated with improvement. As chapter 4 showed, commitment making is associated with a higher likelihood of punishment for violating norms. But after accounting for the effects of enforcement, being party to a commitment does not in itself help restore compliance. In their study of human rights norms in Latin America, Lutz and Sikkink (2000) similarly conclude that the legalization of international human rights norms does not, in and of itself, have an effect on behavior. Instead, legalization typically reflects, rather than creates, a regional normative consensus. Commitments do create new channels and prospects for enforcement, but treaties alone are "not the only, nor necessarily the most important, mechanisms through which human rights pressures are brought to bear" (ibid., 658).

Summary

The evidence reveals in no uncertain terms that conditionality improves compliance with democratic norms. But its effects are typically not felt until the next election. This supports the fact that improving compliance with international norms is a gradual process requiring months, even years, of painstaking effort. Conditionality—which entails monitoring a country's progress, paired with recommendations for specific reforms—is particularly well suited to enacting these types of changes that require persistent, long-term engagement. International pressure in the wake of flawed elections can lead governments to make changes to election administration and governance that may seem cheap or cost-free in the short term, but that later pose significant obstacles to the incumbent's ability to orchestrate misconduct. In contrast, diplomatic missions and shaming have no appreciable effect on electoral conduct. Governments that have proven willing to violate norms are unlikely to be swayed by social pressure alone.

ELECTORAL OUTCOMES

Alternation in power is a core component of democratic accountability (Przeworski et al. 2000); when citizens are able to vote governments out of office, this creates an incentive structure that favors better policy outcomes (Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999). By insulating leaders from the risk of losing power, electoral misconduct contributes to a lack of accountability and a host of associated ills, including corruption, economic mismanagement, and the erosion of civil liberties. Consider cases such as Russia and Azerbaijan, where electoral manipulation and consolidation of power has occurred in tandem with growing restrictions on freedom, and Zimbabwe, where an unpopular dictator hangs on despite dire economic conditions. Yet there are rays of hope. Though it is a difficult process, norm-violating incumbents are sometimes replaced. In cases as diverse as Ukraine, Madagascar, Bangladesh, and Haiti, uproar over electoral fraud has forced leaders to concede defeat or hold new elections that were then won by the opposition.

What explains this variation in outcomes? Why are cheating incumbents replaced in some cases, but not in others? What strategies can domestic and international actors pursue to "throw the rascals out"? And under what conditions are these strategies successful? A growing body of research has focused on the domestic side of this equation, highlighting the importance of such factors as splits within the ruling elite (Hale 2005; Way 2005), opposition coalitions (Howard and Roessler 2006), an upsurge in voter participation (Bunce and

Wolchik 2006, 2011), postelection protests (Beissinger 2007; McFaul 2010), and the incumbent's loss of control over security forces (Way 2010).

Chapter 2 theorized how international actors can enter the domestic arena and tip the scales toward incumbent concessions and an opposition electoral victory. In the immediate aftermath of a flawed election, international enforcement draws attention to the norm violation, making it more difficult for the government to sweep questions about the election's legitimacy under the rug. Enforcement empowers the opposition, lending credibility to its claims of fraud and reducing the chances that opposition-led protests will be repressed. In these ways, international enforcement increases pressure for immediate postelection concessions: a decision by the incumbent to cancel the results or step down from office altogether. These types of concessions are rare, however. In most cases, cheating incumbents hold onto power. In these instances, international enforcement can contribute to alternation in power in the next election. By holding out the prospect of rewards or by actively mediating relations among opposition leaders, international actors encourage opposition parties to unite. Enforcement can then strengthen the opposition's support among voters by contributing to perceptions that the government is putting the country's international legitimacy at risk.

Postelection Concessions

To create an indicator of incumbent postelection concessions, I first isolated the set of elections in which the initial outcome—as announced by the domestic body authorized to determine election results—gave victory to the ruling party or candidate.[9] Within this sample, the measure of *postelection concessions* is coded "1" for cases in which results were canceled or the incumbent stepped down, and "0" otherwise.[10] Instances in which the incumbent was replaced by a designated successor or another candidate from the ruling party are coded "0." Such cases represent regime continuity, not change.

In all, postelection concessions occurred after thirteen flawed elections in thirteen countries. This includes seven countries in which the incumbent gave up power outright, as in Madagascar, where months of postelection contestation and international mediation led to the resignation of President Didier Ratsiraka in 2002 (Randrianja 2003), and in Kyrgyzstan, where President Askar Akayev was forced to flee the country when protests spread to the capital after the 2005 election (Radnitz 2006). The variable also records six instances in which electoral results were wholly or partially canceled. This includes cases in which concessions were followed by repeat elections, such as in Ukraine's "Orange Revolution" following its supreme court's decision in December 2004 to annul the results of the second round of the presidential election (McFaul 2010).

Under what conditions do these concessions occur? And what role do international actors play? To answer these questions, I estimate probit models predicting postelection concessions. The models are run on the sample of 264 flawed elections in which the first announced results gave victory to the incumbent or ruling party. I estimate the following model, where subscript *i* denotes country and *t* denotes the electoral period, **Z** represents a vector of control variables, and *e* is the error term:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{ postelection conditionality}_{it} + \beta_2 \textit{ postelection diplomatic engagement}_{it} + \beta_3 \textit{ opposition protests}_{it} + \beta_4 \textit{ enforcement * protests}_{it} + \beta_k \mathbf{Z}_{it} + e_{it}$$

To test the hypothesis that enforcement empowers opposition protests, variables for *postelection conditionality* and *postelection diplomatic engagement* are interacted with a variable for *opposition protests*, coded "1" if one or more protests occurred within four months following the date of the election, and "0" otherwise.[11] Control variables are identical to those included in the models predicting electoral misconduct (table 5.1), with one addition: a variable for GDP growth (lagged one year).[12] Economic growth bolsters the incumbent's political support and should therefore be negatively associated with postelection concessions.

The results of the analysis, shown in table 5.2, reveal robust evidence of an interactive relationship between international actors and the domestic opposition. In a flawed election followed by no enforcement and no opposition mobilization, the probability of incumbent concessions is extremely small.[13] These odds change significantly when the opposition mobilizes. Protests can provoke defections among the ruling elite and security forces, making it far more difficult for the incumbent to hold onto power (McFaul 2005; Beissinger 2007; Kuzio 2005; Thompson and Kuntz 2004). Some studies find that protests are only weakly correlated with political change in the postcommunist region (Way 2008; Bunce and Wolchik 2009), but evidence from this global sample of elections reveals that mobilization works: in an average election, the probability that the incumbent will step down or cancel the results increases from essentially 0 to 0.10 in the presence of opposition protests (a 10% increase). Crucially, the power of protests is further enhanced when they are accompanied by international enforcement. Figure 5.4 shows the effect of opposition protests both with and without enforcement. In cases with protests, incumbent concessions are 14% more likely when international actors impose conditionality and 18% more likely when international actors employ tools of diplomatic engagement. In short, international involvement empowers the domestic opposition. When external actors punish electoral misconduct, they lend credence and force to the opposition's claims of fraud, and by focusing global attention on the controversy, they increase the repercussions of government repression. Periods of postelection crisis and contestation cannot be fully understood without accounting for these linkages between international and domestic actors.

Table 5.2. Determinants of Postelection Concessions

	(1)	(2)
Postelection Conditionality	−3.88**	0.41
	(0.00)	(0.31)
Postelection Dipl. Engagement	0.58+	−4.06**
	(0.07)	(0.00)
Posteletion Opposition Protests	0.84**	0.21
	(0.01)	(0.69)
Conditionality * Protests	4.57**	
	(0.00)	
Dipl. Engagement * Protests		5.36**
		(0.00)
Election Observer Criticism	−0.11	−0.06
	(0.72)	(0.85)
Incumbent Running	−0.31	−0.36
	(0.26)	(0.22)
Intensity of Flaws	−0.02	−0.07
	(0.93)	(0.76)
Polity, t-1	0.04	0.05
	(0.17)	(0.17)
Prior Liberalization	−0.03	−0.02
	(0.34)	(0.53)
Change in GDP, t-1	−0.03+	−0.03+
	(0.08)	(0.10)
Democracy in Region, t-1	−0.02	−0.01
	(0.63)	(0.77)
No. Densely Democratic IGOs, t-1	−0.02	−0.03
	(0.46)	(0.47)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.12	−0.13
	(0.51)	(0.49)
Constant	−2.00**	−1.72**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Observations	264	264

Robust p values in parentheses

+ significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%

Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country.

"t-1" denotes a one-year lag.

Sample = flawed elections won by the incumbent.

Furthermore, the evidence suggests that international involvement is actually necessary for opposition protests to succeed, and that it is diplomatic engagement—not conditionality—that plays the largest role. As figure 5.4 shows, in the absence of diplomatic engagement, opposition mobilization is not associated with any discernible increase in concessions by incumbents. For the opposition, then, the external




Figure 5.4 Conditional Effect of Opposition Protests on Postelection Concessions.

validation of shaming or a diplomatic mission is crucial. Whereas conditionality was shown to be the most effective tool for improving electoral conduct, diplomatic engagement appears to be the best approach for empowering opposition protests. Why are these seemingly weaker tools of enforcement more effective? As chapter 2 discussed, the key to producing concessions during periods of postelection contestation is to change perceptions about the contest's legitimacy. Shaming is well suited to this task, because it communicates international disapproval to the domestic audience. It also has the distinct advantage of being quick and relatively easy to enact. Speed of response is essential during periods of postelection contestation, because there is only a short window of opportunity during which doubts about electoral results can gain traction.

Mediation missions are another tool of diplomatic engagement that helps generate postelection concessions. International mediation missions were present following several noteworthy contested elections, including those in the Dominican Republic (1994), Madagascar (2002), Ukraine (2004), and Kenya (2007). To be sure, one could question whether mediation missions actually exert a causal effect on domestic outcomes, because incumbents who agree to talk with the opposition only do so because they already perceive themselves to

be in a weakened position. Yet evidence from a number of cases suggests that the ultimate magnitude of the government's concessions was not anticipated at the start of the mediated talks. Processes of iterated negotiation and compromise can take on a life of their own—a point explored in greater depth in the case studies in chapters 6 and 7. Incumbents may initially view internationally mediated negotiations with the opposition simply as a way to buy time. But as talks proceed in the public eye and under media scrutiny, the government often faces growing pressure to compromise.

Other factors were included in the models to assess the relevance of alternative predictors of incumbent concessions, but these were for the most part not significant. With the sole exception of GDP growth (which, as expected, is negatively associated with concessions), none of the other variables influence the probability of postelection concessions. In sum, this suggests that incumbent decisions to step down or annul election results are shaped by contingent and dynamic processes of postelection pressure, rather than by preexisting political or structural conditions. Opposition protests and international enforcement are the key to understanding why some governments give way after controversial displays of fraud.

Alternation in Power

As the previous section showed, governmental concessions after electoral manipulation are rare. An incumbent who cheats and wins is likely to retain power. Opposition parties, civil society groups, and international promoters of democracy must then turn their attention to the next election. Can the opposition defeat the incumbent at the ballot box? To explore this question, I have created an indicator variable, *alternation in power*, that codes whether the ruling party or ruling party candidate (including, if applicable, the incumbent) lost the election. In presidential elections, a loss is defined as a nonruling party candidate winning, and in legislative elections, a loss occurs when the ruling party does not retain its status as the largest party in the legislature.[14] In all, I have identified forty-four instances in thirty-four countries in which the ruling party lost the election that followed a flawed election. These include several well-known cases of opposition breakthrough, including Kenya's 2002 contest, which unseated the long-standing ruling party, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) (Anderson 2003), as well as Albania's 1997 legislative elections, which brought the opposition socialists to power after the ruling party won a fraudulent contest in 1996.

I estimate probit models to uncover the factors that predict alternation in power after a flawed election. The sample consists of all elections that follow a flawed contest won by the incumbent. To ensure the robustness of my findings,

I also report results from models run on the full set of all elections (regardless of their conduct). The effects of international enforcement hold even in this broader sample. I estimate the following model, where subscript *i* denotes country and *t* denotes the electoral period, **Z** represents a vector of control variables, and *e* is the error term:

$$y_{it} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \textit{ pre-election conditionality}_{it} + \beta_2 \textit{ pre-election diplomatic engagement}_{it} + \beta_k \mathbf{Z}_{it} + e_{it}$$

Table 5.3 presents the results. Control variables are identical to those featured in the previous analyses (tables 5.1 and 5.2),[15] except for the addition of an indicator for "main" elections, defined as those that determine who holds executive office.[16] The primary question of interest in the analysis is whether international actors can help oust norm-violating governments. My findings reveal that the answer is "yes," but only when concrete sticks and carrots are employed. In a typical election that follows a previously flawed contest, the probability of an opposition victory is just 0.32.[17] These odds improve greatly with the involvement of international actors. Figure 5.5 shows that pre-election conditionality increases the probability of alternation in power by 30%. This corresponds with Marinov's (2005) finding that sanctions destabilize leaders. He shows that sanctions are associated with a 28% increase in the probability that the sitting incumbent will be replaced—a result that is strikingly similar in magnitude to the effect of conditionality found here. In contrast, softer tools of diplomatic engagement—shaming, diplomatic pressure, and mediation missions—are not associated with any change in the probability of alternation in power. Thus, enforcement via the manipulation of social, symbolic incentives has its limits. Whereas the previous section showed that tools of diplomatic engagement are crucial for empowering opposition protests, their ability to sway electoral outcomes is limited. Only by the manipulation of concrete incentives through conditionality—actions that send a stronger signal of resolve—can international actors influence the electoral strategies of voters and opposition parties.

Chapter 2 outlined the mechanisms linking conditionality to electoral victory for the opposition. Conditionality increases opposition parties' incentives to forge a unified electoral front, and the prospect of international rewards for democratic change can provide the necessary push for opposition parties to work together. In some cases, international actors have worked directly with opposition leaders, pressuring them to unite and mediating their internal disputes. Beyond its effects on the opposition, conditionality influences voters' decisions to turn out on election day and to cast their ballots for the opposition. When voters believe that their country's international benefits and legitimacy are on the line, this can seriously undermine electoral support for the incumbent. Moreover, international enforcement serves to boost turnout, activating preexisting latent support for the opposition by reducing voters' fear of repression.

Table 5.3. Determinants of Alternation in Power

	Sample: Elections That Follow a Flawed Election Won by the Incumbent (1)	**Sample: All Elections** (2)
Pre-election Conditionality	0.81*	0.46+
	(0.03)	(0.07)
Pre-election Dipl. Engagement	−0.37	−0.11
	(0.19)	(0.56)
Election Observer Presence	0.36	0.43*
	(0.29)	(0.03)
Opposition Coalitions	0.13	0.26
	(0.62)	(0.17)
Main Election	0.80**	0.53**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Incumbent Running	−0.64*	−0.43*
	(0.03)	(0.01)
Intensity of Flaws	−0.32*	−0.28**
	(0.02)	(0.00)
Polity, t-1	0.13**	0.06**
	(0.00)	(0.00)
Prior Liberalization	0.01	0.01
	(0.68)	(0.78)
Change in GDP, t-1	−0.04*	−0.03**
	(0.01)	(0.00)
Democracy in Region, t-1	0.00	0.02
	(0.99)	(0.49)
No. Densely Democratic IGOs, t-1	0.00	0.01
	(0.90)	(0.42)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.32*	−0.26*
	(0.04)	(0.01)
Constant	−0.82*	−0.85**
	(0.03)	(0.00)
Observations	216	419

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

Probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag.




Figure 5.5 Effect of Domestic and International Factors on Alternation in Power.

Figure 5.5 also graphs the effects of six additional factors found to have a significant effect on alternation in power after a flawed contest. An opposition victory is more likely in main elections that determine who holds executive office, but less likely when the incumbent is running for re-election. The incumbency advantage is a well-known feature of electoral politics, but this advantage is magnified in patronage-based systems with a track record of poor electoral conduct (Cheeseman 2010). In these contexts, open-seat elections without an incumbent candidate are critical windows of opportunity that give the opposition its best chance for victory (Hale 2005, 139). Accordingly, Maltz has found that in electoral authoritarian regimes, incumbents win 93% of elections they contest, but their chosen successors win only 52% of the time (2007).

The results also reveal that, from the ruling party's perspective, electoral manipulation works. A one-unit increase in the intensity of misconduct—which represents the use of a wider range of manipulative tools—is associated with a 10% reduction in the probability of alternation in power. This is a substantial effect, and it indicates that electoral misconduct is indeed a key strategy that governments use to insulate themselves from the risk of losing power. Good economic performance also bolsters the government's electoral fortune. As studies

of retrospective voting show, voter satisfaction is higher, and opposition parties face greater obstacles to success, when the economy is growing (Kramer 1983; Gomez and Wilson 2006).

Other factors have no significant impact on alternation in power after flawed elections. Notably, passive forces of international influence—which were found to facilitate improvements in electoral conduct—do not increase the chances of an opposition victory. Membership in densely democratic organizations and location in a highly democratic region have no discernible effect. Moreover, after controlling for the effects of enforcement, membership in regional organizations with democratic commitments is actually negatively associated with alternation in power. In short, the opposition benefits far more from active international intervention in domestic politics than from "passive," structural aspects of the country's international context. Location in a democratic region and membership in pro-democracy international organizations are not enough to produce alternation in power. What is needed is a willingness on the part of international actors to wield concrete sticks and carrots.

A final, unexpected finding that emerges from the analysis is the lack of association between opposition coalitions and alternation in power. This runs contrary to conclusions reached in previous studies on electoral breakthroughs in competitive authoritarian regimes (Howard and Roessler 2006; McFaul 2005). As Van de Walle (2006) notes, however, unity among the opposition may not in and of itself have an effect on electoral outcomes, because opposition coalitions may simply reflect conditions that are otherwise favorable for bringing down the incumbent.[18] It is also likely that coalition building is an effective strategy for opposition parties in competitive authoritarian regimes, but not in political contexts where ruling parties enjoy greater electoral dominance (Donno 2013). Opposition parties in hegemonic regimes are too weak to be perceived as electorally viable, even if they do unite in a single coalition. Conversely, in fully democratic contexts opposition parties are less fragmented and disadvantaged to begin with, meaning that coalitions are unlikely to contribute significantly to electoral success.

Summary

This section has underscored the conditional effects of norm enforcement on electoral outcomes. Postelection enforcement in the wake of a flawed election increases the chances that the incumbent will step down, but only in the presence of a mobilized opposition. Indeed, the evidence indicates that international actors and the domestic opposition are mutually dependent; each needs the other to succeed. Just as enforcement is less effective in the absence

of a mobilized opposition, postelection protests are likely to fail in the absence of international diplomatic engagement, which validates and lends force to the opposition's claims of fraud.

Turning to the question of alternation in power, the analysis reveals that international actors can increase the odds of an opposition victory, but only when they make use of conditional threats and promises. That international actors should have such an effect is in many ways surprising, because domestic factors are typically assumed to be of primary importance in determining electoral outcomes. Moreover, alternation in power is normally not the explicit goal of external enforcers. International actors tend to focus on the electoral process, not on outcomes, and they often go to great lengths to ensure that their policies are politically neutral. Any perception of bias toward a particular candidate or party can undermine their credibility. And yet there is clear evidence that opposition parties benefit politically from international conditionality, above and beyond the benefit they enjoy from internationally induced improvements in electoral conduct. Thus, the electoral boost provided to opposition parties can be considered an indirect—and possibly unintended—effect of international enforcement of norms.

DO IMPROVEMENTS IN ELECTORAL CONDUCT BENEFIT THE OPPOSITION?

This chapter has analyzed electoral conduct and electoral outcomes as two separate phenomena. International enforcement has an impact on both. But it is possible that indirect effects are also at work: by generating improvements in electoral conduct, international actors may also shape electoral outcomes. And by increasing the likelihood of alternation in power, enforcement may also contribute to future improvements in electoral quality. The evidence suggests that changes in electoral conduct and alternation in power are positively correlated, although this link is not as tight as might be expected. Of the 112 elections in the data that exhibited a decline in the intensity of misconduct, alternation in power occurred in 37 cases (a rate of 33%). This compares to a slightly lower rate of alternation (28%) in elections marked by steady or increasing levels of misconduct. Alternation in power, in turn, is associated with future improvements in electoral conduct. When the opposition wins a flawed election, the next election experiences a decline in the intensity of misconduct 42% of the time, compared to just 33% when power does not change hands.

This implies, again, that there is an affinity between the efforts of international enforcers—who seek first and foremost to influence the procedural aspects of elections—and opposition parties, who seek to influence electoral outcomes. The

achievement of either goal facilitates the other. The frequency with which opposition actors appeal to the international community when contesting electoral malpractice—and their evident frustration when international criticism is not forthcoming—attests to this symbiotic relationship. Viktor Yuschenko certainly recognized the importance of international support when rallying his supporters to protest Ukraine's fraudulent election, declaring, "Today, as never before, we need international attention to focus on this fraud."[19] To be sure, this complementarity between the goals of the opposition and international actors does not apply uniformly. In numerous countries, norm-violating regimes have been replaced without any accompanying improvement in respect for democracy. Conversely, advances in electoral quality do not necessarily translate into improvement in the opposition's electoral prospects. One source of potential frustration for the opposition may be the fact that incremental positive changes in electoral conduct are negatively associated with postelection incumbent concessions: of the thirteen cases of concessions being made in the wake of flawed elections, five were after elections that marked a worsening in the intensity of misconduct, in six there was no change, and only in two did the intensity of misconduct decline. The probable explanation for this is that improvements in conduct, even when incremental, tend to ease international pressure on the regime. In some countries, international pressure for clean elections may even have unintended negative consequences for the opposition; as chapter 7 explains, skilled incumbents can strategically adapt to international enforcement by giving in to certain demands while simultaneously stepping up repression of the opposition outside the electoral arena.

WHICH INTERNATIONAL ACTORS ARE EFFECTIVE?

Thus far I have examined the effects of international enforcement writ large, without considering the identity of the enforcer. Yet a variety of actors are included in the analysis, and it is important to consider whether some are more effective than others. Criticism from the United States, for example, may be received very differently by domestic actors in Latin America and Africa than criticism by a regional organization like the OAS, African Union, or ECOWAS. To investigate this issue, I estimate a series of models that break up enforcement according to whether it is implemented by regional IGOs, the EU, the United States, or the United Nations. In these analyses the EU is treated as a regional organization in Europe and the wider postcommunist area, but as a separate external enforcer in Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). Thus, my analysis of the EU as a separate actor includes EU enforcement outside the postcommunist region, whereas EU enforcement within its region is covered

Table 5.4. Effect of Enforcement by International Actor

	Regional IGOs	European Union[1]	United States	United Nations
Electoral Conduct:				
Misconduct Intensity	+	n.s.	n.s.	+
Election Observer Verdict	+	n.s.	+	+
Election Outcomes:				
Incumbent Steps Down or Cancels Results	+	+	+	+
Alternation in Power	+	n.s.	n.s.	n.s.

n.s. denotes "not significant"

+ denotes a positive significant effect

[1]EU enforcement in Europe and in all postcommunist countries included under Regional IGO enforcement.

in the models that predict the effects of regional IGOs. Table 5.4 summarizes these findings, showing for each dependent variable whether enforcement by a particular actor had a positive, significant effect—denoted by a + sign—or was not significant (denoted by "n.s."). Full results are reported in appendix C.

In a striking pattern, the analysis reveals that regional IGOs are the most consistently effective promoters of democracy. Only they exert a positive, significant influence on all of the measures of electoral conduct and outcomes. Moreover, regional IGOs are the only actors to exhibit a significant effect on alternation in power. It is important to note that these findings are not driven by Europe, the region that has the most active and institutionalized organizations. When the analyses are run omitting European and postcommunist countries, results for the effectiveness of regional IGOs hold. If one begins from the expectation that wealth and military might are the most surefire means to exert influence on the world stage, these findings are certainly surprising. In addition to a relative lack of material power and resources compared to the United States (and even the United Nations), most regional organizations are beset by slow and cumbersome decision-making procedures. Disagreement among member states and inconsistency in enforcement is endemic (Donno 2010). Moreover, compared to global organizations like the United Nations or World Bank, regional organizations typically have small, overtaxed bureaucracies (the EU being the exception).

Despite these limitations, the findings here attest that regional organizations have unique sources of influence that set them apart from their more materially powerful counterparts. Enforcement by the United States—by far the most militarily and economically powerful actor in the analysis—does exert a positive effect on one measure of electoral conduct and on postelection incumbent concessions. But even after controlling for US involvement, enforcement by regional IGOs exerts an independently significant effect.

What can explain the particular effectiveness of regional organizations? One distinct source of leverage for regional IGOs is that they speak for a country's closest neighbors, with whom the target state shares dense cultural, historical, and economic ties. Many regional IGOs have also created autonomous agencies for promoting democracy, which has helped them establish reputations as credible and impartial actors when monitoring and responding to flawed elections (Cooper and Legler 2005; Hawkins 2008). Another fundamental point is that multilateral intervention is known to be perceived by domestic actors and foreign publics as more neutral and legitimate than unilateral action (Pelc 2010; Thompson 2006). The fact that UN enforcement is also associated with improved electoral conduct suggests that multilateral legitimacy is indeed an important ingredient for the successful enforcement of democratic norms. When states act through international organizations, policies are "laundered" through multiple gatekeepers (Abbott and Snidal 1998), a process that helps purge them of the particularistic interests of each member state. Indeed, the previous chapter showed that—compared to the United States—multilateral organizations are more responsive to information about the severity and intentionality of electoral misconduct. Their enforcement decisions are therefore more even-handed, in that they are shaped to a greater extent by impartial evaluations of norm violations, rather than adhering to the dictates of competing geopolitical interests.

Comparing the findings for regional IGOs and the EU (when acting outside of its region) further supports the idea that international enforcers have the greatest impact close to home. As table 5.4 shows, the effectiveness of the EU outside of Europe and the wider postcommunist space is limited: EU enforcement has a significant impact on postelection concessions (as do all other international actors), but not on any of the other measures of electoral conduct or alternation in power. This suggests that the EU's leverage diminishes considerably outside its neighborhood, both because it has fewer incentives to offer and because its will to enforce stringent conditionality is weaker (Dannreuther 2004; Olsen 2002; Youngs 2010).

This being said, the relatively weak effect of US enforcement deserves further consideration. Interpreting this result is not as straightforward as it may at first appear, because in some countries the United States can choose whether to act unilaterally or multilaterally. It may be the case, then, that unilateral action—when the United States imposes norm enforcement outside the purview of a multilateral

institution—occurs in the more difficult and normatively ambiguous cases, and conversely, that the easier, more blatant cases are those in which the United States chooses to work through multilateral organizations. As chapter 4 discussed, this logic of selection is particularly relevant in Latin America, where the United States has the opportunity to coordinate its enforcement with the OAS. There are distinct advantages to working through the OAS, particularly given the US track record of meddling during the Cold War and the long-standing resentment that this has bred in the region. When US enforcement does not align with OAS policy, it is typically due not to a lack of US effort, but rather to a lack of support among other OAS member states. A look at the track record of US and OAS enforcement in Latin America and the Caribbean suggests, however, that such cases of unilateral enforcement are relatively rare. Tellingly, in not a single instance did the United States impose negative conditionality without simultaneous enforcement by the OAS. When it has undertaken unilateral action in the region, the United States has limited itself to diplomatic engagement or positive conditionality. Furthermore, cases in which it did act alone occurred primarily during the early and mid-1990s, which tend to be elections for which information about misconduct is poor—either because election observation missions were absent or weak, or because a country had not yet proven itself a repeat offender. As the previous chapter showed, regional IGOs—including the OAS—are particularly sensitive to these informational factors.

Beyond Latin America and the Caribbean, concerns that unilateral US enforcement occurs in the more difficult cases (relative to cases in which the United States chooses to work multilaterally) have less merit. This is so, for one thing, because in Asia and the Middle East there simply are no regional organizations with a record of enforcing democratic norms. If the United States decides to respond to electoral misconduct in these regions, it must take matters into its own hands. In Africa, regional organizations have begun to take steps toward promoting and protecting democracy, but without being a member of these organizations, the United States has limited ability to influence their policies. In sum, this chapter's findings with respect to US enforcement should be interpreted with caution, given the US' choice to work multilaterally in certain cases. But on balance, for the majority of countries the estimated effect of US enforcement should reflect a true relationship.

ARE INTERNATIONAL ACTORS SELECTING EASY CASES?

This chapter has demonstrated that postelection enforcement increases the chances of incumbent concessions and helps improve conduct in the next election. Pre-election conditionality was found to increase the chances of alternation

in power. A possible concern, however, is that these findings may suffer from selection bias. Enforcement is not randomly applied; international actors choose on a case-by-case basis when and where to respond to violations of democratic norms, and as chapter 4 showed, these choices are influenced by country- and election-specific factors. Similar concerns about selection bias have prompted scholars to reexamine questions about the effectiveness of international sanctions (cf. Major 2012; Nooruddin 2001; Smith 1995). It is therefore important to consider how the choice to enforce democratic norms may be related to the outcomes of interest: improvements in electoral conduct and alternation in power. Are international actors choosing to involve themselves in "easy" cases, where democratic change is likely to occur anyway?

The evidence casts doubt on this possibility. First, as chapter 4 demonstrated, several factors that influence enforcement patterns are unrelated to country-specific political trends. The likelihood of enforcement varies by region, for example, and by whether regional organizations have adopted formal procedures for enforcing democratic norms. Moreover, at the country level, evidence suggests that, if anything, it is the harder cases that are more likely to be targeted by enforcement. This is so, first, because enforcement is more common following elections that are criticized by international election observers, which involve the more severe misconduct. Second, enforcement increases as the number of previous flawed elections in the country rises. These repeat offenders are the more intransigent cases in which misconduct is an entrenched practice. Such countries are less likely to experience alternation in power and improvements in electoral conduct. In short, global patterns of enforcement since 1990 lend little support to the idea that international actors are selecting successful cases; rather, they tend to focus on the more blatant instances of norm violation in which enforcement is more justifiable, but democratic change is likely more difficult to achieve. Another way to express this conclusion is that international actors seek out cases where their efforts can make a difference. It would make little sense to allocate scarce resources for promoting democracy to cases where international involvement is superfluous. As one EU official responsible for election observation noted, "determining where we can have the most impact is a major consideration. We do not just send missions to the 'shining lights.' "[20]

The statistical analysis described in this chapter took further steps to ensure that the estimated effects of enforcement are not tainted by selection bias. First, the models control for the effects of a number of factors that might influence electoral conduct and outcomes, including prior liberalization, whether the incumbent was running, opposition party strategies, the type of election (executive or legislative), and level of democracy. Second, in all models the main independent variables measure enforcement that occurred months, even years, prior to the

dependent variables. This temporal lag mitigates the concern that international actors are responding to, rather than influencing, events on the ground.

Selection models lend further support to the claim that international actors are not choosing to impose enforcement in the easy cases. This method controls for potential unobserved factors that may drive both enforcement and domestic political outcomes. I ran a series of selection models that allow for the potential endogeneity of postelection and pre-election enforcement by different international actors.[21] Based on the relationships uncovered in chapter 4, I employed four variables to predict enforcement: the country's military expenditures (to capture geopolitical importance), the number of regional organizations with enforcement procedures to which the country belongs, whether election observers criticized the election, and the number of previous flawed elections in the country. A key statistic for interpreting the results of these models is ρ (rho), which represents the correlation in the error terms of the equation predicting enforcement and the equation predicting the domestic outcome. Intuitively, ρ can be thought of as measuring the remaining unobserved association between the two outcomes after controlling for the influence of the included covariates. In nearly every model, ρ was not statistically significant, meaning that the null hypothesis of exogeneity cannot be rejected, and affording no support for the idea that international actors are choosing either easy or hard cases. In models predicting the effect of postelection enforcement on subsequent changes in the intensity of misconduct, however, ρ was found to be negative and statistically significant. This implies that postelection conditionality is more likely to be imposed in cases with a lower underlying propensity for improvements in conduct—that is, in the harder cases. After correcting for these selection dynamics, both postelection conditionality and diplomatic engagement are found to be positively, significantly associated with a decline in the intensity of misconduct.[22] In short, the evidence suggests that selection effects are present only in highly limited circumstances, and most important, that international actors are certainly not avoiding the easy cases.

CONCLUSIONS

Using a comprehensive global data set, this chapter examined the effectiveness of international efforts to improve compliance with democratic norms and to promote regime change in countries that hold flawed elections. The conclusion: enforcement works. It is associated with improvements in electoral conduct and increases the probability that cheating incumbents will resign or be voted out of office in the next election. Regional organizations were found to be

particularly effective norm enforcers, attesting to their unique sources of influence despite their relative lack of material and military might. Also of note is the conclusion that enforcement has a stronger, more robust impact on domestic outcomes than do two strategies of opposition parties—coalition building and protest—that are commonly hailed as important catalysts for democratization. Indeed, the effect of opposition protests is shown here to be greatly enhanced by international support. These findings belie the idea that democratization is a purely "bottom-up" affair and underscore the importance of incorporating international actors into theories of democratization. However, the findings should not be overstated to suggest that democratic change can be easily imposed from the outside. That enforcement typically has a delayed effect on electoral conduct—one that is not felt until the next election—supports the idea that building compliance with democratic norms is a lengthy process requiring persistent attention to institutional reform. That opposition protests are empowered by international support further suggests that the effect of enforcement on electoral outcomes is mediated by the strength of the domestic opposition. The next two chapters tease out these relationships further, marshaling qualitative evidence to uncover the mechanisms through which enforcement influences domestic political outcomes (chapter 6), as well as the conditions under which international efforts to promote electoral change are not successful (chapter 7).

6

The Mechanisms of International Influence

Using quantitative evidence, the previous chapter revealed that international norm enforcement is associated with improvements in electoral conduct, incumbent concessions, and alternation in power after flawed elections. This chapter employs qualitative evidence to shed light on the causal mechanisms that underpin these relationships. To do so, I identify cases that align with the expectation of my theory; that is, in which international enforcement is associated with democratic change.[1] Accordingly, this chapter examines countries from regions of the world—the Americas and Europe—that have established robust regimes for democracy protection, focusing on the Dominican Republic and Serbia. (The next chapter explores cases from regions where democracy protection regimes are weaker). Table 6.1 summarizes the tools of enforcement imposed in each country over time.

For each country I document the changes in international enforcement and electoral politics over multiple electoral cycles, focusing on the sources of conflict between the government and opposition, as well as on shifts in the balance of power between these actors. Thus, each country study contains more than one election "case," allowing assessment of the influence of international actors over time while holding constant a variety of country-specific contextual and historical factors. In addition to variation over time, the examination of countries from different regions of the world provides variation in the identity of the international enforcers. The simultaneous involvement of IGOs and the United States enables me to assess whether multilateral and unilateral enforcement are perceived differently by domestic actors and whether these perceptions, in turn, influence effectiveness.

Both cases support the causal mechanisms forwarded by the theory. In the Dominican Republic, pressure from the United States and OAS in the wake of the manipulated 1994 election validated the opposition's claims of fraud and forced

Table 6.1. Tools of Enforcement in the Dominican Republic and Serbia

Country	Conditionality	Diplomatic or Mediation Mission	Shaming
Dominican Republic	1994	1994, 1996	1994, 1996, 2000, 2004
Serbia	2000, 2002, 2003	2000	1992, 2000, 2002, 2003, 2004

the incumbent to accede to internationally mediated talks. Ultimately a negotiated settlement with the opposition paved the way for institutional reforms that led to improved electoral conduct and alternation in power via an early election, in 1996. In Serbia, international actors helped unite the fractious opposition and strengthen its popular support in the run-up to the breakthrough election in 2000, which brought an end to Slobodan Milošević's twelve-year rule. Since then, EU conditionality has helped at crucial junctures to push through institutional reform and to empower the more progressive elements in Serbian politics, ushering in a period of improved respect for the norms of free and fair electoral competition. The mechanisms at work in each country are summarized in table 6.2.

The case narratives draw from a range of sources, including scholarly research, news articles, policy reports, and biographies. To complement these secondary sources, I conducted interviews with twenty-eight officials in the EU (in the Council and Commission), COE, OSCE, and OAS, as well as with representatives to these IGOs from the target states.[2] During three research trips in 2004, 2005, and 2010, I also accessed reports, meeting transcripts, and internal communications housed in the EU and COE archives. The goal was to reconstruct, from the IGOs' perspectives, the motivation for enforcement; to understand the internal politics that determined the timing and force of this intervention; and to understand how instances of conditionality, mediation, and shaming were received on the ground by domestic actors.

Table 6.2. Mechanisms of International Influence

Dominican Republic:
- Validate opposition claims of electoral misconduct (1994)
- Empower opposition protests (1994)
- Increase incentives for institutional reform (post-1994)
- Ensure implementation of reform (post-1994)

Serbia:
- Increase incentives for opposition to unite (2000)
- Increase incentives for voters to support the opposition (2000)
- Increase incentives for institutional reform (post-2000)
- Ensure implementation of reform (post-2000)

In sum, the purpose of this chapter's case studies is not to test the theory—the task undertaken in chapters 4 and 5—but rather to uncover causal mechanisms by situating the book's predictions in real-world contexts. For each country, I characterize the strength and consistency of enforcement, the motivations of key domestic and international protagonists, and the broader political milieu in which they operate. The case studies also address other questions: How firm was the message conveyed by international enforcers? How did multiple international actors coordinate their efforts? What sources of leverage did enforcers have? These inherently qualitative issues are impossible to address in the quantitative analysis, which only codes for whether or not enforcement occurs. Therefore, the case narratives draw in certain contextual factors that are not present in the stylized presentation of the argument in chapter 2 or in the statistical models of chapters 4 and 5. In this sense, the case studies also serve a theory-building purpose, adding nuances to the predictions of previous chapters.

DOMINICAN REPUBLIC

The 1990 and 1994 elections in the Dominican Republic provide a rare opportunity to examine two unusually similar contests that had divergent outcomes. In both elections, incumbent president Joaquín Balaguer was running for reelection. Both races were extremely close, and both contests were marked by misconduct of a similar type and intensity. Yet the international community responded to them very differently. In 1990, despite widespread irregularities in the vote count, the OAS and United States declined to criticize the contest. In 1994, with better information about the fraud and less patience for the government's repeated disregard for democratic norms, the OAS and United States undertook a vigorous campaign to promote democratic change. Their efforts played a key role in validating and empowering the opposition's claims of fraud. Ultimately, an internationally mediated settlement provided for early elections as well as much-needed reforms to the judiciary and election administration bodies. The 1996 election was an important turning point, marking an enduring shift toward improved electoral quality and ushering in the first opposition victory in nearly two decades.

The 1990 Election

The Dominican Republic has a long history of contentious elections, under dictators Rafael Trujillo (who ruled from 1930 to 1961) and Joaquín Balaguer (1966–1978).[3] Though electoral misconduct was always present, two opposition

parties retained strong bases of popular support: the Dominican Revolution Party (PRD) and the Party of Dominican Liberation (PLD). In 1986 Joaquín Balaguer, of the Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC), was re-elected president in a contest plagued by irregularities and suspicion of misconduct.

Tensions came to a head again four years later. Due to internal splits within the PRD in the run-up to the elections, former president and PLD leader Juan Bosch emerged as the main opposition challenger. All signs during the campaign period pointed to the possibility of an opposition victory, with Bosch leading Balaguer by up to 10 percentage points in some polls. But as the sitting president, Balaguer was able to tilt the playing field in his favor—an advantage of which he fully availed himself. He stacked the Central Electoral Board (Junta Central Electoral) with his supporters, a move that ensured leverage over the counting and tabulation of votes, as well as over electoral dispute resolution. Irregularities on election day, particularly inaccuracies in voter lists, were severe, as were problems with the counting and tabulation of ballots. As Jonathan Hartlyn describes, in the Dominican Republic "election results were the consequence of a two-step process. First, ballots cast were more or less counted; second, political transactions and negotiations based on these 'preliminary' results determined the final outcome" (1998, 227). When results were announced on May 17, one day after the election, Balaguer had unexpectedly defeated Bosch by 1% of the vote. Citing evidence of vote buying, fraud, and tampering with voter registration lists, Bosch claimed that a "colossal fraud" had occurred.[4] He argued that he had really won the election by more than twenty thousand votes (Espinal 1998). Coupled with these allegations were repeated threats that the PLD would take to the streets (Hartlyn 1998, 249).

But uncertainty about the extent and consequences of misconduct was never overcome, hamstringing the opposition's ability to mobilize and limiting the international community's willingness to pressure the regime. Election observers from the OAS and the NDI had been present, but the missions were relatively small and had not coordinated a quick count to validate the results. As a result, international observers reviewed the opposition's accusations, but could find no firm evidence to confirm them (Hartlyn 1998, 249). After witnessing—but not independently verifying—two ballot recounts, observers confirmed that Balaguer was the winner of the election by a narrow margin of 1%. Bosch's attempt to mobilize protests failed to gain traction, due at least in part to this lack of external validation and support. As one observer from the Carter Center, Casimir Yost, described, "as the controversy unfolded, [former U.S. President] Carter shuttled between the factions, seeking to develop a compromise. It was primarily due to his efforts that Bosch did not send his supporters into the streets"[5]

In short, the core problem for international actors was a lack of reliable information about the intentionality, severity, and effects of misconduct. This was

the first post–Cold War election held in the Dominican Republic, and election observation in the Americas was still in relatively early stages of development. Although the NDI observers were credible and well intentioned, without independent information from exit polls or a quick count, they could neither confirm nor rule out the opposition's claim that Balaguer's victory was illegitimate.[6] Moreover, inaccuracies in voter registration lists—one of the most problematic aspects of the election—are a form of misconduct for which it is inherently difficult to assign blame.

Carter Center and OAS officials met with Bosch and PLD leaders on several occasions after the election, reiterating that despite the obvious irregularities, they could not reject the outcome.[7] Absent a negative verdict from its own election observers, the OAS lacked a pretext for taking further action which could be construed as unwarranted meddling in a member state's domestic affairs. The United States, for its part, had little desire to criticize a government it had historically supported, without a compelling cause. Balaguer had been a staunch US ally during the Cold War, installed with US support after Juan Bosch was deposed by a military coup in 1962. To be sure, US support for Balaguer was never unconditional; in 1978 US pressure had prevented a pro-Balaguer junta from overthrowing democratically elected president Silvestre Fernández (of the PRD). But in 1990, without clear evidence that the government had willfully violated democratic norms, the United States was reluctant to take action.

The 1994 Election

The context and conduct of elections in 1994 bore a striking similarity to the 1990 contest. The presidential race was again neck-and-neck, this time between Balaguer and opposition challenger Juan Francisco Peña Gómez of the PRD.[8] With control over the Junta Central Electoral (JCE)—which was responsible for final arbitration of all electoral disputes—Balaguer held sway over the entire electoral process, from beginning to end (Hartlyn 1998, 220, 226–227, 245–247). Election day was marked by irregularities and outright fraud at polling stations. The most serious problems again related to discrepancies in voter registration lists. Tens of thousands of opposition supporters were unable to cast ballots, because their names were suddenly and mysteriously missing from polling station lists. Conservative estimates place this number at 45,000 (Graham 2011), though it may have been as high as 200,000.

This time, however, election observation missions from the OAS, NDI, and Institute for Electoral Systems (IFES) were larger, more thorough, and better prepared. Criticism from the international observers was key to eliciting a rapid international response. On May 19, 1994, three days after the election,

the OAS mission issued a statement expressing concern about the irregularities and refusing to endorse the outcome until their impact could be assessed.[9] Yet counting and tabulation of the votes proceeded for days, with no transparency or explanation for the delays. On May 24 the JCE announced that Balaguer had won the election by fewer than 30,000 votes, a margin of victory of less than 1%. International reaction was swift. The United States, followed by the Permanent Council of the OAS, issued critical statements that refrained from recognizing the legitimacy of the election. State Department officials visited the country to pressure the authorities to conduct a recount.

From the moment the official results were announced, Peña Gómez was unequivocal in his refusal to accept the outcome of the election. His efforts were bolstered by international backing. As Hartlyn notes, opposition parties "believed they needed to appeal to international actors for support" (1998, 228). Peña Gómez courted the support of the OAS, United States, Mexico, Spain, and Venezuela.[10] The opposition also made a concerted effort to gather concrete evidence of fraud—including documentation of fake voter identification cards and discrepancies between official voter lists and those at polling stations—and presented this evidence to international actors. In early June representatives from the PRD traveled to the OAS General Assembly in Brazil in an effort to place the Dominican electoral crisis on the meeting's agenda.

No less important was the perception among policy makers in the OAS and United States that Balaguer had been given a second chance, but had blatantly flouted the norms of acceptable conduct. For the United States, strategic considerations were also at play. It had imposed an embargo on Haiti's military junta, which required better cooperation from the Dominican government, whose officials were profiting handsomely from the smuggling trade across the country's 220-mile border with Haiti.[11] Peña Gómez attempted to capitalize on this opportunity to gain US support, stating that as president, he would respect the country's commitment to enforce the embargo.[12]

Under pressure from his PRD colleagues, on July 11 Peña Gómez announced that his supporters would take to the streets.[13] Major demonstrations in Santo Domingo demanded that a provisional government take office until the electoral conflict was resolved,[14] and the protests spread to cities and towns throughout the country.[15] The situation was growing untenable for the government, and international actors were growing increasingly concerned about instability and violence (Graham 2011). Balaguer attempted to ease domestic and international pressure by establishing an independent commission—to include OAS representatives—to investigate the irregularities. On July 13, in a bold display of independence, this commission issued its conclusions that an estimated 73,000 voters had been prevented from casting ballots.[16] In response, Balaguer showed some signs of weakening, expressing his willingness to consider holding a repeat election,

"because it was a close election, and to stop the pressure from abroad."[17] But hope for a negotiated solution floundered when the JCE ignored the findings of the independent commission, again declaring Balaguer the winner of the election on August 2.[18] Acting OAS Secretary General Christopher Thomas immediately issued a statement calling the JCE's announcement unacceptable in light of the credible evidence of fraud found by the commission.[19] It soon became clear that Balaguer would be unable to ride out the controversy without acknowledging the legitimacy of the opposition's complaints. He agreed to engage in negotiations with Peña Gómez, mediated by an OAS delegation (headed by Ambassador John Graham, chief of the OAS Unit for the Promotion of Democracy), together with representatives from the Catholic Church and civil society organizations.

Private talks continued for ten days. An initial move to split the four-year presidential term into two two-year terms (one for Balaguer and one for Peña) was rejected by the OAS team as undemocratic (Graham 2011). Renewed negotiations culminated on August 10 with the signing of the "Pact for Democracy," in which the parties agreed that Balaguer would be allowed to take office, but early presidential elections would be held the following year. From Balaguer's perspective, the deal at least allowed him to hold onto power. Yet he was forced to make the key concession to not run for further re-election, effectively limiting his term in office to eighteen months (though he later wavered on this commitment by pushing back the date of the early elections). The parties also approved a set of crucial reforms to the judiciary and election administration bodies. It was agreed that all sitting members of the JCE would be replaced, a new National Judiciary Council would be created, and the electoral law would be revised to provide for a runoff round if no candidate won an absolute majority in the first round (Espinal 1998).

The 1996 Election

Continued international pressure was essential for ensuring implementation of the Pact for Democracy, particularly its most important stipulation, that Balaguer would give up power by holding early elections. On August 13, 1994, just three days after the pact was signed, the constitutional assembly that had been convened to ratify it extended Balaguer's term in office until May 1996, six months later than the date originally agreed upon with the opposition. This inflammatory move prompted opposition leaders to threaten a boycott of congress until the terms of the pact were fulfilled.[20] It was an inauspicious sign that raised questions about whether Balaguer had negotiated in good faith. International actors were quick to respond. State Department spokesman Michael McCurry urged President Balaguer to "spare no effort to rebuild public confidence in the electoral

process and to take other steps called for in the pact to strengthen democracy in the Dominican Republic," calling the two-year term only a "partial fulfillment" of Balaguer's agreement with the opposition.[21] The matter was also taken up by the OAS Permanent Council. In his report, acting Secretary General Thomas denounced the extension of the presidential term, reiterating that compliance with the pact was imperative for the maintenance of political stability in the country.[22]

Although the election date was never moved back to November 1995 as had been originally agreed, Balaguer did keep his promise not to run for re-election. The May 1996 presidential election was contested by three candidates, one from each major party: Peña Gómez of the PRD, Leonel Fernández of the PLD, and Jacinto Peynado of the ruling PRSC. Though Peña Gómez won a plurality of votes in the first round, he lost in the runoff to Fernández, thanks in part to Balaguer's decision to throw his support behind Fernández at the expense of the PRSC candidate, who was behind in the polls. Nevertheless, Fernández's victory symbolized an important break with the past. It was the first opposition victory in a Dominican election since 1978. No less important was the marked improvement in electoral conduct in 1996. Though the campaign period was plagued by violence, in a major turnaround from previous contests, the casting, counting, and tabulation of ballots was conducted freely and transparently. In its final report, the Carter Center observation mission underscored that reforms to the judiciary and election management bodies were crucial to this transformation: "The decision to reconstitute the JCE provided the basis for building trust in an institution that had lost credibility among the political actors and the public. . . . Cleansing the electoral lists and instituting other modifications to the electoral system, including the timely and regular release of election results, helped to build public confidence" (Carter Center 1996, 31–32). Certainly this improvement in electoral conduct was not the result of a change of heart on the part of the incumbent; Balaguer had done all he could to prevent Peña Gómez's victory in 1996. Had he been able to manipulate the vote count, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have availed himself of the opportunity.

Improvements in electoral conduct proved durable. Future contests were far from perfect—violence, vote buying, and opposition allegations of misconduct continued—but severe outcome-changing fraud was now a thing of the past, due largely to the greater professionalism of the JCE. Importantly, elections continued to serve as mechanisms for regular alternation in power. The opposition PRD gained a legislative majority in 1998 and then won the presidency for the first time in 2000. Power then rotated back into the hands of the PLD in 2004, when former president Leonel Fernández defeated incumbent president Hipólito Mejía. International involvement in Dominican elections tapered off as conduct improved. Although the OAS and United States continued to criticize remaining problems in 1998, 2000, and 2004, the intensity of enforcement abated.

Assessing the Effects of Enforcement

In assessing how international actors contributed to these changes, the key question is whether the Pact for Democracy would have been forged and implemented in the absence of international pressure and mediation. The balance of evidence suggests that the answer is no. Hartlyn concludes, unambiguously, that "without international pressure, Balaguer would not have felt it necessary to accept the constitutional reforms and promise new elections" (1998, 254–255). The Dominican case provides a natural counterfactual to support this conclusion, because the 1990 election was nearly identical to the 1994 election except for the lack of international pressure. No doubt, in 1994 Balaguer hoped and expected that he could get away with fraud, as he had in the past. But the degree of international attention and pressure, combined with domestic mobilization, proved too strong.

The simultaneous involvement of the United States and the OAS in the Dominican case also provides an opportunity to examine differences in how these two players were perceived by domestic actors. Findings in the previous chapter revealed that regional organizations are the most consistently effective enforcers, and evidence from the Dominican case bolsters the idea that the OAS did have unique sources of influence. Although the United States had inordinately greater material leverage, it also had a long history of intervening in the Dominican Republic in pursuit of goals that undermined democracy. The public was therefore skeptical of US intentions and suspicious of the activities of US-funded agencies, including USAID and NDI (Hartlyn 1998, 262, 264).[23] In the run-up to the 1994 election, a note from the US ambassador expressing concerns about campaign conditions was roundly denounced, with National Assembly president José Leger accusing the United States of meddling in the country's internal affairs.[24] In contrast, the OAS was perceived as a more neutral and even-handed actor. The need for agreement among its member states meant that it was slower to act than the United States, waiting until August 1994 (three months after the election) to definitively condemn the contest and call for new elections. But the process of multilateral negotiation lent greater credibility to OAS criticism when it finally was forthcoming. That the OAS ultimately mediated the talks between the government and opposition attests to the fact that domestic actors accepted it as an arbitrator of sensitive internal disputes.

SERBIA

Amid chaos and war in the early 1990s, Serbian president Slobodan Milošević concentrated power in his hands. But after costly wars in Croatia (1991–1995) and Bosnia (1992–1995) and the imposition of stiff international sanctions on

the regime, Milošević's "soft dictatorship" was showing signs of strain. By the fall of 1996, unemployment in the rump Yugoslavia exceeded 50%, with nearly one-third of the population living below the poverty line (Cohen 2002, 248). Though Serbian vulnerability to external pressure was relatively high, the international response to a series of manipulated elections in 1992, 1993, and 1996 was subdued. Notably, the international community failed to support opposition protests against the regime in 1996–1997.

The situation changed dramatically in the run-up to the 2000 presidential election. External actors played a key role in inducing Serbia's fractious opposition to unite behind a single presidential candidate and to orchestrate a coordinated, highly effective electoral campaign. The United States and EU helped bolster the opposition's electoral support by making clear that a change in leadership in Serbia would usher in a new era of improved relations with the West. When Milošević attempted to hold onto power through electoral fraud, public outrage reached a breaking point. Faced with a rising tide of anger and international isolation, Milošević finally resigned in October 2000, after weeks of nationwide protests. In the wake of Serbia's revolution, elections have seen a marked and enduring improvement in quality, and EU conditionality has served to bolster the more progressive, pro-reform elements in Serbian politics.

The 1996 Election

Against the backdrop of economic hardship and war, elections to the federal assembly were held in November 1996. Three of the largest opposition parties—the Serbian Movement of Renewal (SPO), the Democratic Party, and the Civic Alliance (GSS)—forged the Zajedno ("Together") coalition, in an effort to capitalize on growing discontent among students and the urban educated elite. They faced an uphill battle. Media coverage was severely biased in favor of the ruling party, with television broadcasts on TV Serbia—the main news outlet for over 80% of the population—devoting just minutes of airtime to the opposition.[25] During the campaign period, the Federal Election Commission "spread confusion among voters" about which parties made up the Zajedno coalition.[26] Not surprisingly, the ruling coalition—led by Milošević's Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS)—garnered 45% of the popular vote and retained a comfortable majority in the legislature. Zajedno received just 20% of the vote, but it performed much better in simultaneous local elections, reflecting its strong support in urban areas. While the SPS retained control of 144 municipalities (of a total 188), Zajedno gained control of 41 local governments, including Belgrade, in a major symbolic victory for the opposition.

The celebration was short-lived, however. Milošević nullified many of the local results on the grounds—ironically—of electoral irregularities (Cohen 2002, 251).

In response, large protests broke out in Belgrade, led by opposition leaders and student groups. But protesters received little in the way of international support. In December the EU issued statements in response to a crackdown on demonstrations and announced a delay in the granting of trade privileges to Serbia, but its criticism focused on violations of the protesters' human rights rather than on the election results.[27] The lack of international support was a "bitter pill for the Serbian opposition to swallow" (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 93). Nevertheless, the protests continued to grow, with an estimated size in January 1997 of 80,000 to 120,000 people per day (Cohen 2002, 254). In February Milošević acceded to at least some of the opposition's demands when he allowed the original local election results to stand. Significantly, this concession proved that the regime was sensitive to mass mobilization—a lesson the opposition would draw upon in the future. But the opposition's failure to achieve wholesale political change meant that Milošević, still safely ensconced in power, could focus on solidifying his control in the coming years. In July 1997 he shifted his power base to the federal level when he was elected president of the republic via a secretive and hastily organized vote in the legislature.

Milošević duly tightened his grip over the media and security forces and focused on feeding dissension within the opposition's ranks. These measures were highly effective. Despite Zajedno's local victories in 1996, the coalition unceremoniously collapsed in June 1997 amid a feud between its most prominent leaders, Vuk Drasković and Zoran Djindjić. When Drasković accused Djindjić of "betrayal" by secretly forming an alliance with the ruling party, Djindjić refused to allow Drasković to attend coalition council meetings.[28] Commenting on the possibility of Zajedno again contesting the upcoming elections, Djindjić noted, "We obviously could not reach any kind of agreement, and could not even create conditions for dialogue, because the chairman of the Serbian Renewal Movement [Drasković] is rejecting any contact with the other two members of the Together coalition."[29] In the end, the remnants of Zajedno boycotted the 1997 presidential and legislative elections, while Drasković's party—the SPO—took part. Divisions were further exacerbated in September 1997 when, with Milošević's support, Drasković spearheaded a successful campaign to remove Djindjić from his post as mayor of Belgrade (Cohen 2002, 261).

Uniting and Empowering the Opposition

The divided opposition was soon handed a golden opportunity when, in the aftermath of the war with NATO in the spring of 1999, the government faced its most severe economic and political crisis to date. Public support for the regime declined precipitously. Though Milošević did retain a core of staunch supporters comprising about 20% of Serbia's population, most Serbians blamed him

for losing Kosovo and turning their country into an international pariah. It was widely expected that Milošević would be forced to call early elections before the scheduled end of his term in 2001.

In addition, a change in the international climate was brewing. Throughout the 1990s, stemming the tide of ethnic conflict in the region had been the international community's overriding concern. The quality of Serbian democracy was simply not a priority. Moreover, until the war in Kosovo, Milošević was viewed by a number of policy makers—particularly in the United States—as part of the solution rather than the problem. Compared to Bosnian Serb leaders, Milošević had played a constructive role during the negotiation of the Dayton Accords, and his continued cooperation was viewed as necessary for their successful implementation. US support for Milošević was a long-standing source of frustration for the Serbian opposition. In an open letter to the US Embassy in Belgrade in 1996, Drasković captured this sense of angst, criticizing the Americans for being more interested in ensuring cooperation with Dayton than with promoting democratization and economic reform.[30] This began to change in 1998 with the escalation of the conflict in Kosovo. The United States, which had previously designated the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) a terrorist organization, now increasingly defended its actions and stepped up criticism of Milošević. Tensions culminated in the brief but fierce war with NATO in March–May 1999, which dealt a severe blow to Serbia's already battered economy and infrastructure. The United States and EU then stepped up their efforts to oust Milošević, who was indicted for war crimes by the International Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) in May 1999.[31]

The prospect of competing in early elections against an unpopular incumbent should have united the fractious opposition, but the Drasković-Djindjić power struggle persisted through October 1999. It was obvious to all that none of the opposition factions alone was strong enough to defeat Milošević, but the two sides continued to disagree bitterly over tactics, with Drasković favoring participation in early elections and Djindjić favoring a boycott. In addition to personality conflicts, a complex set of strategic dilemmas hampered the quest for opposition unity. Who should lead the coalition, and how should power be divided among the factions? Should the opposition join antiregime protests and risk being labeled unpatriotic or, worse, foreign agents?[32]

International pressure and incentives were instrumental in finally convincing the factions to hammer out a compromise (Cohen 2002, 374–378; LeBor 2004, 307). Preliminary meetings between opposition parties, mediated by officials from the EU and United States, were held in November and December 1999.[33] Western actors essentially offered opposition leaders a quid pro quo: unite in exchange for financial, technical, and symbolic support. In November the EU inaugurated the "Energy for Democracy" program, intended to boost popular

support for the opposition by providing low-cost heating fuel to cities with opposition-controlled local governments.[34] It also promised that an opposition-governed Serbia would be invited to begin the Stabilization and Association Process—the program for preparing the Western Balkan countries for eventual EU membership, a pledge it repeatedly emphasized during the electoral campaign.[35] The COE and OSCE made similar promises of reconciliation and integration if regime change occurred.[36]

These international incentives were surely not the only force pushing the opposition to coalesce. In the context of Milošević's declining popular support, opposition leaders recognized that they had a real chance of victory if they banded together. Yet the prospect of winning through unity had not been enough in the past to keep the disparate factions together. Zajedno had offered a glimmer of hope in 1996, but the coalition quickly fell apart after the election. Thus, a key difference in 2000 was that international actors played a facilitating role, mediating negotiations between the factions and providing them with additional incentives to unite.

At a "Trilateral Commission" meeting with the EU and United States on January 10, 2000, opposition leaders formally announced their electoral cooperation and called on the West to lift sanctions in exchange.[37] Eighteen parties united under the banner of the Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS), choosing Vojislav Koštunica, a constitutional law professor, as their presidential candidate. Koštunica was a clever choice for a number of reasons. Not only did he have greater nationalist appeal than Djindjić (a key selling point in post-Kosovo Serbia, where anti-Western sentiment was running high), he was not tainted by years of political feuding or, as Drasković's was, by a track record of collaborating with the regime (Pavlakovic 2005, 26).

The time was ripe for change in Serbia, but the opposition sorely needed to boost its appeal. As Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 95–97) explain, public distrust of the opposition was high; Milošević's political vulnerability meant little unless the opposition could remake its image. Evidence suggests that international actors played a deft role in helping to bolster the opposition's public support during the 2000 campaign. A poll from December 1999 demonstrates just how important the issue of Serbia's international status was to its voters: 85% of respondents reported being dissatisfied with Serbia's "international position," and 79% were dissatisfied with the country's "future prospects." When asked about Serbia's foreign policy, 43% favored "greater reliance on the West," compared to just 18% in favor of "alliance with Russia."[38] The US and EU's policy shift in 1998–1999 finally sent a clear signal of Serbia's international isolation, accompanied by an emphatic stance in support of free and fair elections (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 93, 107). But the United States had to tread carefully. In the wake of the war in Kosovo, Serbian public opinion about America was overwhelmingly negative.

Given the delicacy of the situation, any candidate perceived as having close ties with the United States would be damaged goods. The EU and United States therefore made frequent reference to a change in "government," "policy," or "direction," but did not explicitly throw their support behind Koštunica. This provided Koštunica with a powerful tool: the ability to claim that his election would improve Serbia's international standing, while at the same time maintaining his image as an independently minded nationalist who would not kowtow to the West. In September 2000, following a meeting with the foreign minister of Greece, Koštunica noted that "the messages of Europe—the expanded family to which Serbia and Yugoslavia belong—are encouraging . . . [they] reflect a new approach to the sanctions and awareness of the need to abolish or relax sanctions, as well as the need for the democratization of Serbia and Yugoslavia."[39]

The 2000 Election

When Milošević announced in July 2000 that a presidential election would be held in September, the stage was set for a decisive confrontation. The opposition employed a set of strategies now famously associated with the postcommunist electoral revolutions: it ran a united campaign, organized a major voter registration and turnout drive, and drew up plans to take to the streets if victory was stolen (Bunce and Wolchik 2006, 2010b). Increasingly desperate, Milošević clamped down. Police and security forces harassed opposition activists, particularly members of the grassroots student organization Otpor (LeBor 2004, 303–308; Cohen 2002, 400–401). The government took over media outlets and abducted opposition deputies (Pavlakovic 2005, 26). In July Milošević fired eighteen judges who were known affiliates of opposition groups, and Congress appointed a new federal election commission composed entirely of government supporters.[40]

Though Milošević had blocked all international observers, including the OSCE, from monitoring the polls, a considerable domestic observer presence ensured the availability of independent information about the election's results. On September 24, the date of the first round, these observers announced that their tabulations gave Koštunica 54% of the vote, which was enough to avoid a runoff (Pavlakovic 2005, 28). The official vote tally, however, gave Koštunica just 48% (LeBor 2004, 307). Otpor and the DOS took to the streets. Protests grew in strength over the next week, and a general strike spread to towns throughout the country. Despite mounting signs that the army and police forces would choose to break with the regime rather than put down the demonstrations, Milošević resolutely clung to power and insisted on holding a runoff election. Events were slipping out of his control, however. On September 28 the army chief of staff

announced that he would "respect the choice of the people,"[41] and on September 30 members of Milošević's own party urged him to step down.[42] On October 4 journalists at state-controlled media outlets also broke with the regime, publicly demanding that they be given greater freedom.[43]

Protests reached their apex on October 5, with more than one million demonstrators gathering in the streets of Belgrade. The next day they stormed the parliament building—some of them in a bulldozer, which resulted in the events being dubbed the "Bulldozer Revolution." Riot police fled, and the army ignored orders to quell the demonstrations.[44] Elite defections within the Interior Ministry, which housed a paramilitary unit, were also key to preventing repression (Pavlakovic 2005, 28). On October 6 Milošević finally conceded defeat, and in April 2001 he was handed over to the ICTY.

Credit for the opposition's victory must go, first and foremost, to the opposition parties themselves, and to the journalists and poll watchers who spoke out against fraud. Voters and civil society groups were highly mobilized, and Milošević was in an already weakened position after years of sanctions and war. It would therefore be misleading to attribute primary importance to international factors in bringing about Milošević's demise. This was in some ways a "perfect storm" in which multiple favorable conditions converged. However, the evidence does reveal that international actors played a key role in helping to forge opposition unity—which was by all accounts essential to success—and in bolstering the opposition's claim that it would take Serbia in a new and better direction.

Serbian Elections after the Revolution

The quality of elections in Serbia experienced rapid improvement after Milošević's ouster. In the December 2000 legislative contest, campaign conditions were greatly improved: the media operated without overt political interference, and parties were able to register candidates without hindrance and campaign under free and fair conditions. The vote count was conducted with only minor procedural errors, with the DOS winning the majority of seats in the legislature. A large influx of foreign aid ensued. Presidential elections in 2002 and 2003 initially failed because minimum voter turnout requirements were not met, prompting a change in electoral law that removed the 50% turnout threshold. This led to the successful election of the pro-Europe candidate Boris Tadić (of the Democratic Party) as president in 2004. This contest and legislative elections in 2003 and 2007 were generally well-administered. Media coverage remained free and balanced, and the casting, counting, and tabulation of ballots were carried out with only minor technical irregularities.

To be sure, Serbia continues to face numerous challenges: the pace of political reform is slow, nationalism remains a prominent feature on the political scene, and infighting among politicians continues. But the 2000 breakthrough election ushered in a decisively less repressive, freer, and pluralistic era in Serbian politics. These changes cannot be attributed solely to the demise of Milošević. Even after power shifted to the opposition, it was far from obvious that Serbia would continue to progress down a democratic path. As the electoral revolutions in Georgia and Kyrgyzstan have shown, the removal of cheating incumbents hardly guarantees an improvement in the conduct of future elections. Georgia's failure to consolidate democratic reforms is particularly striking given the zealously pro-Western orientation of its leadership. The challenges to consolidating democracy in Serbia have arguably been even greater than in Georgia. Radical nationalism and illiberal parties remain strong forces in Serbian politics to this day. The thorny question of Kosovo's independence remains contested. Yet Serbia has managed since 2000 to hold well-managed elections that serve as mechanisms for genuine political contestation and alternation in power.

This achievement can be attributed to at least two factors. First, Serbia has a capable and educated civil service, which has contributed crucially to the quality of election administration. As one EU commission official noted, "Serbia's administrative capacity is excellent. And they know what they need to do. It is mainly a matter of political will."[45] On this front—the key question of political will—the second factor that has kept the country on a democratic path is EU conditionality, which has served on repeated occasions to empower the more progressive elements in Serbian politics.[46] The importance of EU conditionality in the wake of the 2000 revolution is magnified by the fact that prominent Serbian civil society groups—including the youth movement Otpor—had tended to adopt a singular focus on ousting Milošević (Bunce and Wolchik 2011, 101). Once this goal was achieved, however, the work was far from over, and it is here that the EU played an instrumental role. On several occasions the EU has granted rewards and economic concessions to Serbia to help bolster democratic forces. Aid and trade preferences were awarded in November 2000 in response to the DOS's electoral victory. In 2004, after the victory of Boris Tadić (of the pro-Europe Democratic Party) in the presidential election, the European Council voted to begin negotiations for a Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA)—a key step toward eventual EU membership. In 2008 movement toward visa liberalization and the long-awaited signing of Serbia's SAA was credited with bolstering Tadić's re-election campaign in an extremely tight race against Radical Party candidate Tomislav Nikolić. The signing of the agreement became a central issue in the campaign. Whereas the president of the nationalist Serbian Radical Party, Dragan Todorović, compared the SAA with the signing of a pact with the

Nazis during the Second World War, Tadić hailed it as sending an irrevocable message that "our future lies in Europe."[47]

Although anti-Western sentiment in Serbia persists, evidence points to a firm base of public support in favor of integration with Europe. According to one poll, if a referendum on Serbia's membership in the EU had been held in September 2005, 64% of the population would have opted for accession to the EU, 16% would have abstained, and only 12% would have voted against it (Stojic 2006). Support for rejoining Europe has given the EU an important source of leverage in Serbia, allowing it to use conditionality to shape voters' calculations at critical electoral junctures. In 2012 Serbia found itself at yet another turning point, when former Radical Party leader Tomislav Nikolić won the presidency in a narrow victory over Tadić. Nikolić's track record of provocative anti-Europe statements—such as his declaration in 2008 that Serbia would be better off as a province of Russia—sparked concern in the West. However, public opinion forced Nikolić to significantly alter his position toward a more pro-EU stance in the run-up to the 2012 election. Upon his election, he affirmed that Serbia's path toward the EU was "inevitable," and indeed, essential for the Serbian government's most pressing priority: to deliver jobs and economic growth.[48] In sum, the moderation of the more prominent radical elements in Serbian politics and the emergence of a robustly competitive political system attest to the strides that Serbia has made since its landmark electoral transition in 2000.

CONCLUSIONS

Both countries examined in this chapter exemplify, each in its own way, a hard test of the argument that international norm enforcement produces democratic change. Both the Dominican Republic and Serbia were governed by skillful incumbents adept at using a variety of manipulative tools to strengthen their grip on power. Each country presented international actors with a particular set of challenges. This was especially true in Serbia, where the 2000 election took place in the context of strong anti-Western sentiment after years of economic sanctions and the war with NATO in 1999. In the Dominican Republic, interference by the United States was met with suspicion because of its support for the dictatorship during the Cold War.

Tracing the reasons for variation in enforcement over time in these countries reveals that different factors dominated. The Dominican Republic illustrates the essential role that international election observers can play in either inhibiting or inciting enforcement, whereas Serbia demonstrates the role of shifting foreign policy priorities. Importantly, the cases do not suggest that international actors are purposely choosing to focus their efforts on "easy" success stories. Even in

Serbia, where the choice to vigorously promote democratic change in 2000 could appear to conform to a logic of selecting a case that was ripe for change, there is no evidence that a desire to demonstrate success in promoting democracy was the reason for international involvement; rather, the international community's about-face was caused by a shift in the policies of the United States and Europe away from supporting Milošević. It was far from clear in 1998–1999 that dislodging Milošević would be feasible, and even less clear that replacing him would produce durable democratic change.

Comparing the countries reveals certain similarities in their political context that help explain why international enforcement was successful despite these obstacles. First and foremost, in both cases the opposition was electorally strong, providing international actors with a ready channel through which to promote political change. The Dominican Republic's pivotal election in 1994 and Serbia's in 2000 were both exceedingly close races. Despite having to compete on a biased playing field, the opposition was able to garner enough votes to create genuine uncertainty about the legitimate outcome of the election. Second, in both countries international pressure was triggered by credible information on the scope and extent of government-sponsored misconduct. In the Dominican Republic, international election observers were key providers of information, whereas in Serbia, it was domestic observer groups that gathered and publicized systematic evidence of fraud. Third, each country exhibited some underlying vulnerability to external pressure: the Dominican Republic because it is a small, poor state in the shadow of the United States, and Serbia because it had been weakened by years of sanctions and war.

7

The Limits of International Pressure

The previous chapter traced the mechanisms of international influence in two cases that align with the expectations of the theory that international enforcement is associated with alternation in power and subsequent improvements in electoral conduct. This chapter instead explores electoral politics in three outlier cases: Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia. All are countries in which the international enforcement of democratic norms, even over sustained periods of time, has failed to produce a wholesale transformation in electoral quality; instead, enforcement has had only partial or superficial effects. As Gerring (2007, 105–107) explains, examining outlier cases that deviate from theoretical expectations is useful for generating new insights and hypotheses that add depth and nuance to a theory. This chapter focuses in particular on identifying scope conditions. I draw from the experiences of Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia to illuminate the conditions under which international enforcement of democratic norms is likely to produce only limited or cosmetic change. Table 7.1 summarizes the tools of enforcement employed in each country over time.

In Armenia, President Robert Kocharian proved skilled at strategically adapting to international pressure. Following severely flawed elections in 2003, institutional reforms were introduced in 2005–2007 at the behest of the COE, OSCE, EU, and United States. Improvements in technical aspects of electoral conduct later emerged, but these changes were limited. Because of the long-standing weakness and fragmentation of opposition forces in Armenia, the regime retains a firm grip on power. In Kenya, international conditionality in the early 1990s was instrumental in producing a transition to multiparty politics, but external actors failed to impose consistent pressure in response to recurring and severe violations of electoral norms. Instead, international attention has been reactive and focused primarily on preventing violence. Intense conflict over the outcome of the 2007 presidential election was peacefully resolved via an internationally

Table 7.1. Tools of Enforcement in Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia

Country	Conditionality	Diplomatic or Mediation Mission	Shaming
Armenia	1998, 1999, 2003, 2007	2003	1996, 2003, 2007
Kenya†	1997, 2002, 2007	1997, 2007	1992, 1997, 2007
Cambodia	1998, 2003	1993, 1998, 2003	1993, 1998, 2003

† International actors imposed conditionality in 1990–1991 to push for a multiparty system, but this did not occur within the time window necessary to be coded as election-related conditionality.

mediated power-sharing agreement, but in dealing with postelection crises, international actors have prioritized stability over the meaningful redress of electoral fraud. In Cambodia, despite the potential for significant leverage, the enforcement of democratic electoral norms by the United Nations and United States was sporadic and superficial, allowing the government to take advantage of gaps in international attention between elections. In accordance with its long-standing policy against meddling in domestic affairs, ASEAN has failed to take action. As a result, only minimal lip service to international norms has been necessary for the Cambodian regime to continue to receive generous amounts of foreign aid each year.

Two recurring themes are evident in these cases. First, in Cambodia and Kenya, enforcement has been superficial and sporadic. Both countries hail from regions of the world where democracy protection regimes are weaker than in Europe and the Americas, underscoring again the importance of regional organizations in the effective defense of democratic norms. Second, in all three countries incumbents have strategically adapted to international pressure. Tactical concessions and cosmetic reforms have produced technical improvements in certain aspects of electoral governance, but meaningful, enduring transformation in electoral quality has been elusive. This process of strategic adaptation is enabled both by opposition weakness (Armenia) and by the weakness of enforcement itself (Kenya and Cambodia).

Taken together, the cases suggest four preliminary conclusions about scope conditions—that is, the conditions under which enforcement is likely to be ineffective or only partially successful. First, the absence of an electorally viable opposition limits the effects of international enforcement. This point is seen most clearly in Armenia, where international actors have been consistent and firm in their demands, but the opposition's inability to pose an electoral threat has allowed the government to get away with making only pro forma, technical concessions. Second, Kenya's experience suggests that the effect of enforcement via institutional reform is weakened in the presence of politicized ethnic

cleavages and electoral violence. Improvements in the de jure professionalism and impartiality of election management bodies mean little when violence is the reality of electoral politics on the ground. A related third point is that for international actors, the imperative to reduce violence and prevent civil war can trump the will to forcefully address violations of electoral norms. Fourth, the case of Cambodia indicates that in countries of low geopolitical importance, international enforcers may have few incentives to follow through on conditionality in a meaningful way, allowing the government to get away with tactical cosmetic concessions. Because Cambodia is a small, poor country of little strategic value, the pressing issue of electoral reform there fell off the US and European radar during interelection years, and—different from the Armenian case—there was no regional organization to fill the gap.

ARMENIA

In 1991 Armenia declared its independence from the Soviet Union and, like many former Soviet republics, quickly established a political system with power concentrated in the hands of the president. Legislative elections were held in 1995, but nine parties were banned from running, and the ruling Republican bloc easily maintained its majority. A presidential election in September 1996 was much closer. In a contest marred by irregularities and weak media freedom, President Levon Ter-Petrossian was re-elected with 52% of the vote. Supporters of opposition candidate Vazgan Manoukian staged large rallies in Yerevan, but they were forcefully repressed by the authorities. In these early years the international response to violations of democratic norms was weak. Enforcement—particularly conditionality—intensified considerably following manipulated elections in 1998 and 1999.

Yet despite sustained international engagement over more than a decade, Armenia has experienced only marginal political change. Robert Kocharian—president from 1998 to 2008—proved to be skillful in adapting to international pressure. He concealed electoral misconduct by shifting to tactics more difficult for international actors to criticize and punish, and he implemented just enough reform to appease the international community at key moments of intensified pressure. A chronically weak opposition failed to take advantage of the few opportunities for transformative change that international pressure provided. Electoral conduct in Armenia has improved in certain respects: the detail-oriented and persistent nature of international engagement, particularly after 2003, has forced the government to improve its "technical" compliance with international norms by reforming electoral laws and institutions and reducing its reliance on easily verified tools of misconduct. However, although the regime

must now work harder than before to perpetrate fraud and suppress dissent, it retains a firm—and increasingly authoritarian—grip on power.

The 1998 and 1999 Elections

In February 1998 Ter-Petrossian unexpectedly resigned in the midst of controversy over his softening position on the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. (An ethnically Armenian region of Azerbaijan that has exercised de facto independence—with Armenian support—since 1994, Nagorno-Karabakh is easily the most salient issue in Armenian politics.) After Ter-Petrossian's resignation, presidential power passed to the prime minister, Robert Kocharian. Presidential elections were held in March 1998. As acting president, Kocharian took a number of steps to guarantee his victory. Media bias during the campaign was severe, and on election day there was widespread multiple voting and ballot stuffing. Election observers from the OSCE's ODIHR documented a suspicious spike in turnout rates, accompanied by ballot box stuffing, during the last hour of voting. The observation mission recorded widespread discrepancies between the number of registered voters and ballots in 40% to 60% of polling stations across the country (ODIHR 1998). The final report, which concluded unambiguously that the election "does not meet the OSCE standards to which Armenia has committed itself," carried important repercussions for Armenia's quest for membership in the Council of Europe, which was on hold because of concerns about democracy and the quality of elections. In response to the ODIHR report, the COE again withheld Armenia's membership and called for improvements in the next election as a prerequisite for admission.

The 1999 parliamentary election—which Kocharian labeled the country's "last exam" for COE membership—was just the first of many instances in which the government achieved the bare minimum necessary to produce a temporary lightening of international pressure.[1] Though ODIHR observers noted that "serious issues still remain to be addressed and further improvements are necessary," the contest was a "step toward compliance" (ODIHR 1999). In a controversial move, the COE granted membership to Armenia and Azerbaijan in 2001. The decision followed directly from the COE's choice to embrace a more inclusive approach toward membership than the EU, believing that its leverage and persuasive powers would be greater if countries were brought into the fold rather than kept out (Jordan 2003). Nevertheless, to address concerns that Armenia and Azerbaijan were being rewarded before they had fully demonstrated their democratic credentials, their admission was accompanied by the creation of a special committee to monitor their progress toward fulfilling their democratic and human rights obligations. The "Ago" Monitoring Group—named for its

first chairman, Italian ambassador Pietro Ago—made regular visits to Armenia and issued progress reports with a particular focus on the quality of elections. In essence, the Ago Group was an institutionalized mechanism for diplomatic engagement and shaming; initially, no concrete consequences or threats were attached to its reports.

The 2003 Elections

The conduct of presidential and parliamentary elections in February and May 2003 reached a new low. The campaign period featured serious media bias, several parliamentary candidates were disqualified for questionable reasons, and at least two hundred opposition supporters were detained between the first and second rounds of the presidential contest. Observers noted a serious lack of transparency in the counting and tabulation of votes, as well as evidence that results had been systematically falsified. Both contests were deemed to "fall short of international standards for democratic elections" (ODIHR 2003a, 2003b). Kocharian was easily re-elected in the second round of the presidential race with 67% of the vote, while the ruling Republican Party and its allies captured a majority of seats (sixty-one) in the parliamentary contest, with the opposition Justice Bloc and National Unity Party gaining a total of twenty-four seats. In April 2004 the Justice Bloc staged public protests to demand Kocharian's resignation. But unlike the protests that had triggered the "Rose Revolution" in neighboring Georgia, the Armenian uprising never came close to bringing down the regime, which enjoyed the support of a capable and cohesive army and police force (Way 2010). The failed 2004 protests marked the end of any effective cooperation among the already weakened opposition factions.

As the number of consecutive flawed elections increased, international actors stepped up their pressure on the regime. The COE—whose influence rests crucially on its reputation as a guardian of democracy and human rights—reacted with shock and dismay to the 2003 elections. Commenting on the campaign, one member of the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) noted that, "even during the elections in Albania and Bosnia-Herzegovina people had more hope than in Armenia."[2] The EU, OSCE, and United States joined in the criticism. Negative reports from election observers were by now a constant feature of political life in Armenia. The key change that triggered stronger international enforcement in 2003 was the fact that the government had again willfully flouted democratic norms after years of monitoring and conditionality. Electoral misconduct in 1998 and 1999 could have been generously interpreted as an anomaly—a bump in the road as the new administration found its legs—but the 2003 elections could only be viewed as an intentional violation of Armenia's international commitments.

Conditionality and Constitutional Reform

In the wake of the 2003 elections, the COE sent fact-finding missions to Armenia to lay out the steps that the country needed to take to comply with the organization's democratic commitments.[3] In its June and September sessions, PACE threatened to suspend Armenia's voting rights, but ultimately opted to place the country under permanent monitoring—essentially a probationary policy—until constitutional reforms were enacted and clean elections held.[4] Thus, in 2003 PACE joined the Ago Group as a second monitor and wielder of conditionality in Armenia. International demands during this phase of engagement focused on reforming the legislative framework for elections. The OSCE sent a diplomatic mission to Armenia to discuss implementation of changes in electoral law proposed by the ODIHR.[5] It was backed by the EU's Special Representative to the region, who met with Kocharian in July 2003 to underscore the importance of these legal reforms. At the same time, the Ago and PACE monitoring missions zeroed in on the need to update voter registries and improve the electoral code.

Constitutional reform was another priority of the COE's engagement with Armenia. In response to persistent COE demands, the government proposed a series of constitutional amendments—drafted in consultation with the COE's Venice Commission for Democracy through Law—that would limit the powers of the president and strengthen those of the judiciary. To take effect, the amendments would have to be approved by more than 33% of registered voters in a referendum, scheduled for November 26, 2005. Sensing a chance to thwart the government's bid for international legitimacy, elements of the Armenian opposition called for a boycott of the vote.[6] Suspiciously, however, the referendum passed easily, with official results reporting 95% "yes" votes and a 65% voter turnout rate. International election observers noted the presence of serious irregularities in the balloting and counting, which only deepened doubts about whether the actual number of affirmative votes exceeded the necessary 33% threshold. Ultimately, although the conduct of the referendum was criticized, the results were allowed to stand. It was a paradoxical turn of events: Armenia had enacted important institutional reforms, but the conduct of the election that brought them about left much to be desired. Moreover, the referendum only bolstered the opposition's commitment to a self-defeating strategy of resisting the regime without forging a constructive alternative platform of its own.

Strategic Adaptation

The May 2007 parliamentary election emerged as yet another litmus test, not only for the COE, but also for the EU, which had recently accepted Armenia as a

member of its ENP.[7] A flurry of statements, diplomatic visits, and threats was issued in the months leading up to the election. In January ODIHR director Christian Strohal met with Armenian officials at the highest levels to discuss the upcoming contest. A similar visit by the EU's Special Envoy for the South Caucasus followed in March. The COE again threatened to suspend Armenia's PACE membership, while the US Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC) threatened to withhold a $250 million aid package if the election was not free and fair.[8]

The high level of international attention during the campaign period was reminiscent of Serbia in 2000. A major difference between these two cases, however, was the sorry state of the Armenian opposition, which was even weaker than it had been in 2003. At least thirteen self-proclaimed opposition parties fielded candidates in 2007, and popular support for most was exceedingly small.[9] Given that the electoral code required parties to win at least 5% of the vote to obtain representation in the legislature, opposition fragmentation was a sure-fire formula for defeat. The results of the election gave the ruling Republican Party 34% of the popular vote and its two allied parties 15 and 13%, respectively. Only two opposition parties passed the 5% threshold, Orinats Yerkir ("Country of Law"), with 7% of the vote, and the Heritage Party, with 6%. In terms of its conduct, however, the 2007 election exhibited some improvements. Whereas in 2003 ODIHR observers had assessed the vote count as "bad or very bad" in 33% of polling stations, in 2007 "deliberate tampering" with protocols was found in just 7% of polling stations (ODIHR 2007). Observers also noted a qualitative improvement in the kinds of problems most prevalent on election day. Previously violations had consisted mainly of ballot fraud (ballot stuffing or schemes such as "carousel" voting, in which individuals cast ballots that were already filled out) and protocol falsification, but the main violations noted in the 2007 contest were overcrowding of polling stations and failure to ensure conditions for secret voting.

Institutional reforms that had been enacted at the insistence of the COE, EU, and OSCE contributed to these improvements. The voter registry—computerized and centralized for the first time—contained far fewer inaccuracies than in prior elections, making it more difficult for the authorities to fabricate votes and disenfranchise targeted groups of voters. Also key to the improved management of the 2007 election were changes in the composition of the central and regional election commissions. Previously these bodies had been stacked with ruling party supporters, but the revised electoral code introduced in 2007 allowed the judiciary a greater role in appointing members of the commissions, enhancing their "institutional balance" (ODIHR 2007). Elements of the 2005 constitutional reform that provided for greater judicial independence also had important implications for the election, because electoral disputes are handled as civil cases in Armenia's court system.

In sum, technical aspects of electoral conduct—the casting, counting, and tabulation of ballots—had improved, as had the performance of electoral management bodies and the quality of the electoral code. But to compensate for this, the government increased its reliance on tactics of pre-election misconduct that are more difficult for international actors to verify and punish. Although twenty-two political parties were allowed to compete, the playing field was skewed in numerous ways. Celebrations for the fifteenth anniversary of the national army were combined with campaign events for the ruling party. Opposition requests for billboard space in Yerevan were denied on legal technicalities, and rates for purchasing television advertising were prohibitively high. Nevertheless, improvements in the technical handling of ballots resulted in a reprieve in international pressure. Disbursement of US aid proceeded, and the threatened COE suspension was not carried out.

Partial, "strategic" compliance with international norms continued in the 2008 presidential election, which international observers deemed "mostly in line with OSCE and Council of Europe commitments and standards" (ODIHR 2008), although the government continued to rely on its tight control over the media, election administration, and local officials to create an unequal playing field. Serzh Sargsian, Kocharian's designated successor, easily won the contest by a 30% margin. In the wake of the 2008 election, Armenian authorities employed heavy-handed tactics to disperse postelection protests, resulting in at least ten deaths and the arrest of hundreds of opposition leaders and supporters (the last of which were not released until 2011) (US State Department 2008). In May 2011 the legislature approved a newly revised electoral code, which the COE's Venice Commission deemed to be an improvement. But the problem, again, lay in poor de facto implementation of the law (US State Department 2011). In the 2012 parliamentary elections the ruling party and its allies retained the large majority of legislative seats in a contest characterized by a "vibrant" campaign period and orderly election day, but also by a seriously "unequal playing field" (ODIHR 2012). The opposition Orinats Yerkir and Heritage parties garnered just 5.5% and 5.7% of the vote, respectively.

The Limits of International Pressure

In addition to institutional reform, which limited the opportunities for ballot fraud, the improvement in technical aspects of electoral conduct in Armenia can also be attributed to a concerted effort by the incumbent to ensure better verdicts from international election monitors. In 2007 and 2008 Kocharian reduced the incidence of easily verifiable forms of ballot fraud, instead relying increasingly on tools of pre-election misconduct that are less likely to elicit international

enforcement. This shift can best be explained as a response to international pressure. Domestic pressure to clean up elections, though not wholly absent, was disjointed. Opposition parties were weak and divided, and protests against electoral misconduct in 1996, 2004, and 2008 were easily suppressed by the authorities.

Armenia's vulnerability to international pressure is relatively high. As a small, poor, landlocked country sandwiched between its historical enemies—Azerbaijan and Turkey—it depends on outside aid and support. Military assistance comes primarily from Russia, with which Armenia has maintained good relations since independence. But relations with the West are equally essential. The majority of Armenia's foreign aid comes from the United States and Europe, and the EU is the country's largest trading partner. Moreover, gaining acceptance in European institutions carries great symbolic importance for Armenia, which views itself as being historically and culturally part of Europe. As the Armenian ambassador to the COE explained, "membership in the Council of Europe is a fundamental expression of belonging. It signals that we are a European state, part of the European family."[10] COE membership is also viewed as a prerequisite for any chance for future EU membership.[11] When the COE speaks, Armenia listens. "There is a joke in Armenia," recounted the ambassador. "The first two words we learn are 'Mamma' and 'Papa,' the third word we learn is 'Council of Europe.' "

But high leverage and consistent enforcement over multiple electoral cycles was not enough to produce meaningful democratic change in Armenia. The case therefore illustrates the limits to what international actors can achieve when faced with a weak opposition and a cunning incumbent. Indeed, the combination of sustained international pressure but weak domestic opposition in Armenia has produced a muted form of authoritarianism that is tempered by "technical" compliance with, and prodigious lip service paid to, international norms. The Armenian opposition has conspicuously failed to take advantage of the few windows of opportunity granted to it. Opposition parties are personalized and locally based, serving more as vehicles for the ambitions of their leaders than as programmatic organizations oriented toward attracting votes. Time and again they have resorted to strategies of boycott and resistance, rather than the more constructive—but also more difficult—strategy of forging themselves into a credible and appealing alternative to the regime. This point is illustrated clearly by the opposition's failure to unite in the 2007 election. Because this contest was characterized by the cleanest vote count in Armenia's recent history, it presented the opposition with an opportunity to make gains in the legislature. But winning seats requires attracting votes—a difficult task when thirteen opposition parties, many of which were unknown to voters, appeared on the ballot.

To be sure, the bar for toppling the ruling party in Armenia is high, because of the government's command over an "extensive, cohesive, well funded, and experienced coercive apparatus that can reliably harass regime opposition and put

down protest" (Way 2010, 232). Yet these obstacles do not pose an insurmountable challenge. Opposition parties in other countries have overcome barriers of equal—perhaps greater—size. Serbia's opposition, for example, faced a serious uphill climb. In the run-up to the 2000 election, restrictions on media freedom were extremely tight; the judiciary, legislature, and election administration were stacked with Milošević's allies; and opposition campaign events were regularly obstructed. Although some reports indicate an erosion in the loyalty of security forces in the run-up to the Serbian election (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 110), public splits within the army and police only materialized after evidence emerged that the opposition had actually won the vote count. [12]

It is difficult to pin down the complex set of reasons for the Armenian opposition's failure to mount an effective electoral strategy against the incumbent. As Bunce and Wolchik conclude in their study of elections in nine competitive authoritarian regimes, opposition parties "responded differently at different times" in ways that are impossible to fully explain (2010a, 60–61). The lesson that can be gleaned from Armenia is that the ability of international actors to influence electoral outcomes depends on the existence of a receptive and resourceful set of domestic partners that enjoy a solid base of popular support. Through sustained conditionality and engagement, international actors can generate some improvements in electoral conduct, but ultimately these changes only translate to alternation in power if opposition parties seize their chance.

KENYA

Under pressure from international donors, Kenyan president Daniel arap Moi introduced multiparty elections in 1992. But as in many sub-Saharan African countries, this post–Cold War opening of the political sphere failed to spell the end of authoritarian rule. Aided by a divided opposition and a blatantly unequal playing field, Moi retained a firm grip on power, winning re-election in 1992 and 1997 (albeit with only a plurality of votes). At the end of Moi's term in 2002, opposition parties seized their chance to forge a unified electoral coalition, ushering in Kenya's first alternation in power since independence. But the hope and optimism that accompanied this landmark event shattered in the wake of the disputed election of December 2007. In just a few short weeks, more than a thousand lives were claimed in ethnic clashes after a close race between incumbent president Mwai Kibaki and opposition challenger Raila Odinga. Both sides claimed victory in a contest so marred by fraud that it was impossible to determine the rightful winner.[13] After four weeks of political deadlock and escalating violence, an international mediation mission—chaired by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan—brokered a power-sharing agreement between the two sides. This

was a significant achievement: Kenya's crisis presented an extremely thorny problem for international mediators, with negotiations constantly threatened by violence that created a hardening of positions on all sides. Only once it became clear that international pressure would not let up did the government recognize that it would have to concede some power to the opposition. Yet although the power-sharing agreement succeeded in stopping the violence in the short term, it failed to bring about transformative political change. Kibaki remained in power, and troubling signs of election-related violence persist.

Thus, the success of international enforcement in Kenya has been mixed. Through mediation and pressure, international actors played an essential role in promoting the shift to a multiparty system in 1992, as well as the 2008 power-sharing deal and subsequent constitutional reform. But the effects of these changes on electoral quality remain dubious. Time and again international enforcers have been willing to settle for cosmetic reforms. The weakness of enforcement can be attributed in large measure to the existence of a competing imperative to combat ethnic violence. In Kenya, international actors have been more focused on preventing civil war than on ensuring meaningful democratic change.

Competitive Authoritarianism in the 1990s

The early 1990s were characterized by growing restrictions on political freedom in Kenya, the low point of which was a bloody crackdown on pro-democracy demonstrators in July 1990 (Kuria 1991; Barkan 1993). In response to increasingly blatant human rights violations, the United States and Europe began to insist on political reform. The potential for international leverage in Kenya was high (Kuria 1991, 117–118; Levitsky and Way 2010a, 266–273). Economic growth slowed in 1990–1992, greatly increasing the country's reliance on foreign aid (Barkan 1993, 89). At a November 1991 meeting of the Paris Consultative Group, $350 million in quick-disbursing aid was suspended, and it was made clear that further assistance would be conditional on political reform (Barkan 1993, 91; Ng'ethe and Barkan 1998, 33). Within weeks Moi repealed the ban on opposition parties and scheduled multiparty elections for December 1992 (Brown 2001; LeBas 2011, 231).

The transition to a multiparty system did little to change the political reality on the ground, however. Time and again Moi proved adept at making tactical concessions to international pressure while retaining a firm grip on power. As Ng'ethe and Barkan (1998, 33) explain, "his strategy then was to amend the constitution to permit the existence of more than one political party, with the idea of harassing or bribing the leaders of any new parties until splits occurred or key members defected to [the ruling party] KANU." Indeed, ensuring a divided opposition

was key to the regime's continued electoral success; Moi won re-election in 1992 and 1997 with just 36% and 42% of the popular vote. During these years Kenya exhibited the hallmarks of a competitive authoritarian regime: political competition was allowed, and elections were open to opposition parties, but the playing field was blatantly unfair (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 266–273). Elections were marred by a "panoply of devious practices," including gerrymandering, malapportionment, voter intimidation, state-sponsored ethnic violence, and outright ballot fraud (Brown 2004, 327).

Despite continued pressure on Moi to liberalize and reduce corruption, the outcomes of the 1992 and 1997 elections were accepted by the international community (Barkan 1998, 217–219; Brown 2004). Threats were made, but not enforced. For example, Ng'ethe and Barkan (1998, 35) note that after the election in 1992, "because international donors had been relatively quiescent throughout most of the interelection period and had resumed quick-disbursing aid in 1994, Moi felt secure in ignoring their calls for a more level playing field." In the run-up to the 1997 contest, Moi again made tactical concessions regarding media freedom, registration of opposition parties, and the addition of opposition members to the central electoral commission (Ng'ethe and Barkan 1998, 38–39). These reforms convinced opposition leaders to participate in the contest and did produce some marginal improvements in electoral quality, but persistent fragmentation among opposition parties prevented them from posing a real threat to the regime.

An ongoing problem in Kenya has been the superficial quality of enforcement, with international actors content to view the holding of any relatively peaceful multiparty election as a sign of progress. Little real attention has been paid to specific, highly problematic features of these contests, including pervasive vote buying, a pliant and biased electoral commission, malapportionment favoring the ruling party, laws used to prevent opposition campaigning, and tight state control over the media (LeBas 2011, ch. 8; Levitsky and Way 2010a, 267–270). The international community's primary focus instead has been on halting electoral violence. Political loyalty in Kenya is organized around ethnic identity; party labels and coalitions are highly fluid, meaning that parties have failed to cultivate programmatic identities or strong ties with constituents, creating an environment conducive to the mobilization of ethnic violence (LeBas 2011, Ch.8). The result has been "the normalization of violence into periods of electoral competition" (Lebas 2011, 234). In 1992 an estimated 1,000 people were killed and 250,000 displaced in election-related clashes (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 268). In 1997 opposition rallies around the country were violently repressed, and ethnic clashes in Mombasa led to 65 deaths and an estimated 10,000 displacements (Ng'ethe and Barkan 1998, 37). This has created an ongoing dilemma for international actors: any effort to exert real pressure for electoral reform is perceived

as running the risk of inciting further instability and civil war (Daxecker 2012a; Kelley 2012a, 242–244).

The 2002 Election

Facing the end of his constitutional two-term limit in 2002, Moi made "one of the few serious mistakes of his political career," choosing Uhuru Kenyatta as KANU's presidential candidate (Brown 2004, 330–331). An inexperienced political outsider, Kenyatta lacked the support of party elites. Several senior KANU politicians—including Raila Odinga, who had allied with the regime in 1998—joined ranks with the opposition in the National Rainbow Coalition (NaRC), an alliance of disparate parties united by little more than their desire to win the next election (Howard and Roessler 2006, 378).[14] The NaRC selected longtime opposition MP Mwai Kibaki as its presidential candidate, but a number of stipulations accompanied this decision. In a memorandum of understanding (MoU) among NaRC leaders, it was agreed that Kibaki would serve only one term, that cabinet posts would be shared equally among the two main coalition factions, and that constitutional reform—including the creation of a prime minister post to be occupied by Odinga—would be enacted. All of these promises were later broken, creating a rift between Kibaki and Odinga that set the stage for the showdown in 2007.

After a disorganized and lackluster campaign by KANU, Kibaki swept into power with 61% of the vote—the first time in Kenya's multiparty era that a presidential election was won by an absolute majority. The election and subsequent peaceful transfer of power were hailed by outside observers as the most significant political landmark in Kenya since independence (Ndegwa 2003, 145). This complacency would prove misguided.

Kibaki and Odinga Part Ways

Kibaki was a capable steward of Kenya's economy. By 2005 growth rates had reached 5–6% per year, and dependence on foreign aid was declining. Kenya achieved its long-standing goal of providing free primary education, with free secondary education a core promise of Kibaki's re-election campaign (ICG 2008, 4). However, political blunders prevented Kibaki from capitalizing on these successes. Unlike Moi, who was a notorious micromanager, Kibaki was criticized for his laissez-faire style. Decision making was dominated by a small clique of ministers known as the "Mount Kenya Mafia," all of whom hailed from Kenya's largest ethnic group, the Kikuyu, who comprise roughly 22% of the population (Barkan 2008; ICG 2008).

This contributed to a widespread feeling among the populace that Kikuyu business elites were the main beneficiaries of Kenya's growth, at the expense of other, less-privileged groups.

Most damaging to Kibaki's political fortunes was the collapse of the NaRC. The coalition had been essential for victory in 2002, but it quickly dissolved once the shared goal of winning the election had been achieved. Kibaki failed abjectly at appeasing the NaRC's disparate factions (Brown 2004, 333). Core elements of the 2002 MoU—including the promise to grant an equal share of cabinet posts to the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) faction—were never implemented, leading a number of disgruntled coalition members to defect. The most prominent of these defectors was Raila Odinga, a longtime opposition figure and leader of the Luo ethnic group. In 2002 Odinga had campaigned tirelessly for Kibaki (Barkan 2008), but Kibaki's resistance to constitutional reform—most crucially, the introduction of a prime minister post—spurred Odinga to break ranks. Constitutional change had been at the heart of the bargain between Odinga and Kibaki in 2002, and it was a centerpiece of NaRC's campaign (Kramon and Posner 2011, 90). In the MoU establishing the NaRC, Odinga had been promised the PM post, and it was agreed that a new constitution would be adopted within the first hundred days of the administration (Kramon and Posner 2011, 91; Barkan 2004, 93). Yet once in office, Kibaki reneged on these commitments. Cleary he had not "waited 24 years to become president, only to hand over the bulk of his presidential power to a prime minister" (Cooke and Throup 2003).

In 2004 negotiations between a broad spectrum of political parties and civil society groups produced a draft constitution—the "Bomas" document—that called for a dual executive and extensive devolution of power to regions (Kramon and Posner 2011, 92). These measures were removed in the government-sponsored "Wako" draft that was ultimately put to a vote in a constitutional referendum in November 2005 (Kramon and Posner 2011, 92; ICG 2008, 2). A new opposition coalition, the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM), led by Odinga, was forged during the campaign for a "No" vote. In a stunning result, the referendum was rejected by a sixteen-point margin, with 58% voting "No" and 42% "Yes." The stage was set for a showdown between Kibaki and Odinga in the 2007 general elections, scheduled for December 27.

The 2007 Election

During the 2007 campaign Odinga emerged as the front runner, with up to a sixteen-point lead in some public opinion polls (ICG 2008, 4). Realizing that momentum was with the opposition, Kibaki cobbled together the Party of National Unity (PNU) in August, just four months before the vote. It was a

loose coalition of regional-based parties, with Kibaki's core support coming from Kenya's central province, where the Kikuyu are concentrated (EU 2008, 8). The ODM's core supporters were the Luo and Kalenjin ethnic groups (concentrated in the Rift Valley and western provinces), but the opposition coalition also incorporated leaders from coastal and eastern provinces (ICG 2008, 3). The campaign period was free of repression but marked by a significant pro-government media bias, with state television and radio devoting more than 70% of their airtime to coverage of the PNU campaign, compared to about 10% for the ODM (EU 2008, 25). Shortly before the election Kibaki hand picked nineteen new commissioners for Kenya's highest election management body—the Electoral Commission of Kenya (ECK)—without consulting parliament (EU 2008, 15). The practice of stacking the ECK with government cronies had long contributed to a lack of public confidence in elections (Barkan 1998, 215; Hoffman, Long, and Metzroh 2013). Although the ECK generally performed well during the preparation for the 2007 contest, it was far less professional during the counting and tabulation of ballots, failing to meet even minimal standards for transparency (EU 2008, 16–17).

The election was observed by the EU, Commonwealth, East African Community, and IRI, as well as a contingent of seventeen thousand domestic monitors from the Kenya Democratic Elections Forum (KEDOF). All of these groups agreed in their initial assessment that the casting of ballots was orderly and free (ICG 2008, 6). It was the subsequent tallying of results by the ECK that proved problematic. In one expert's assessment, the contest was possibly the "freest and fairest since independence through all stages except the last" (Barkan 2008). During an audit of votes on December 29, party agents identified forty-four constituencies with dubious tallies due to missing documentation, discrepancies between presidential and parliamentary turnout figures, and instances of more votes than there were registered voters (ICG 2008, 7). According to one observer, ECK officials "changed results coming from the constituency tallying centers or endorsed results which had already been changed, and instructed staff to accept and compile them without supporting documentation" (ICG 2008, 8). In one constituency that was typical of others, EU observers noted that Kibaki's polling station vote tally of 55,145 shot up to more than 75,000 in the final results.[15]

Amid mounting evidence of fraud, international observers were locked out of the final count. Despite unresolved ODM allegations, ECK chairman Samuel Kivuitu announced on December 30 that Kibaki had won the election by a 230,000-vote margin (notwithstanding a suspicious discrepancy of 325,000 votes between the presidential and parliamentary returns). In the concurrent parliamentary contest, the ODM won ninety-nine seats, compared to just forty-three for the PNU. Kibaki was hurriedly sworn in at an unpublicized ceremony.

Just two days after the results were announced, Kivuitu himself expressed doubt about their validity, admitting he had been pressured by the ruling party to declare Kibaki the winner.[16] The EU observation mission was the first to publicly criticize the contest, on January 1, 2008, when it issued a damning report that questioned the accuracy of the count and refused to endorse Kibaki's victory.[17]

Other actors soon joined in. Britain and the United States criticized the election and refused to endorse the outcome, calling on the parties to negotiate. UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon called for dialogue. On January 5 the leading US diplomat for Africa, Jendayi Frazer, led a diplomatic mission to Kenya, meeting with both candidates separately to urge them to negotiate. International leverage on Kenya was high. The level of post–Cold War political influence exerted by international donors in Kenya "has probably been greater than in any other African country except South Africa" (Barkan 1998, 217). Bilateral US assistance was projected at more than $500 million in 2007.[18] Moreover, Kenya is one of two "key strategic partners"—along with Ethiopia—of the United States for counterterrorism in East Africa, and host to the largest US diplomatic mission in the region. US strategic interests in Kenya are therefore strong, though these lean more toward promoting stability than democracy.

With shocking speed, ethnic violence—instigated at first by ODM supporters who sought revenge against the Kikuyu for stealing the election—claimed 260 lives in the first three days of clashes alone (ICG 2008). In a particularly shocking incident, up to 50 Kikuyu were killed in a church fire in the central city of Eldoret. A spiraling cycle of riots, repression, and revenge killings transpired, in which "gangs of youths armed with machetes, clubs and other crude weapons set upon their neighbors" (ICG 2008, 9). Odinga attempted to organize a "million man rally" in Nairobi, but protesters were beaten back by police with tear gas and water cannons.[19] At times police reacted with brutal force; at others, they stood by as violence was perpetrated against rival ethnic groups (ICG 2008, 9). The international community repeatedly called for an end to the violence, but the clashes were largely locally driven and out of the national leaders' control (ibid). Kibaki and Odinga nevertheless several times accused each other of genocide. By mid-February more than 1,000 deaths and 300,000 displacements had occurred (ICG 2008, 1).

International Mediation

The crisis in Kenya presented an acute challenge for international mediators. In the days following the election, Kibaki and Odinga adopted extreme positions with no apparent room for compromise. Odinga said he would negotiate with Kibaki through international mediators, but only if Kibaki first "publicly

owned up that he was not elected as president of the country."[20] He called for the creation of an interim government to oversee a repeat election.[21] Kibaki was far more reluctant to negotiate. As government spokesman Alfred Mutua said, "Kenya is not at war and does not need mediators or peacekeepers,"[22] insisting instead that any challenge to the election results should be channeled through the court system. But Odinga refused to submit himself to the justice of "Kibaki's courts" (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, 21).

Both sides softened their stances on January 5 after meeting separately with US envoy Jendayi Frazer, who made it clear that business as usual with the United States could not continue until a political solution to the crisis was found.[23] Kibaki expressed willingness to consider creating a government of national unity. But for Odinga, only a coalition government with genuine power sharing, brokered by international mediators, would be acceptable.[24] At Frazer's behest, African Union (AU) chair John Kufuor, president of Ghana, arrived on January 8 to mediate, but his efforts were rebuffed by the government, and he left the country two days later without brokering a meeting between the two sides, with the government reiterating that it had no interest in a mediated settlement.[25] Making matters worse, Kibaki then appointed a vice president and seventeen cabinet ministers, with no opposition figures among them. The prospects for an agreement were growing dimmer (Barkan 2008).

At the insistence of the United States, both parties agreed to a new AU-sponsored mediation mission—the "Panel of Eminent African Personalities"—led by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan, joined by Tanzanian president Jakaya Kikwete and former first lady of South Africa Graca Michel. Negotiations began January 29 and continued for four weeks. Annan faced a thorny task. Odinga was willing to compromise, but not if he perceived the talks as simply a means to sanitize Kibaki's victory. The government was more intransigent, with one minister openly deriding the mediation mission as pointless, since "we won the election."[26]

Throughout the talks, both parties jockeyed for international support. Gaining Western backing was particularly important for the opposition, because of the imbalance of power between the two sides (ICG 2008, 26). For the government it was enough to let negotiations drag on without resolution; eventually the country would return to normal, and momentum for a compromise would stall. Kibaki treated the Annan mission as a "sideshow," dragging his feet in an attempt "to wear down both the opposition and the international community's resolve" (ICG 2008). He sought international recognition from more sympathetic quarters, such as the East African Community.

To gain international backing, Odinga had to accept that international actors would not consent to his call for a repeat election. The country was simply too polarized. Annan, the EU, and the United States were united and unwavering in

their insistence on a power-sharing solution, to be accompanied by an agenda for constitutional reform. The idea of power sharing was difficult for both leaders to swallow, and it is unlikely they would have reached such an outcome if left to their own devices. In Odinga's words, "You want me to share power with a thief?"

Both sides faced hard-liners within their own ranks. Though Kikuyu business leaders and younger professionals favored a softer stance toward the opposition,[27] Kibaki depended on the support of old-guard political elites that vehemently resisted compromise. These PNU hard-liners allegedly orchestrated the assassination of progressive opposition MP Melitus Were on January 30. Odinga had his own set of hard-line allies to deal with, including thousands of angry followers who demanded he settle for nothing less than the presidency.[28] As one opposition supporter declared on February 8, "We won't, we can't agree. We want our rights, we will go back to the streets."[29] Negotiations were repeatedly endangered by inflammatory statements. After shaking hands with Odinga at the close of their first meeting, Kibaki incensed ODM leaders by calling himself the "duly elected president."[30] On February 4 the government abruptly rejected Annan's choice for chief mediator of electoral issues, South African businessman Cyril Ramaphosa.

Much credit goes to Annan for refusing to be derailed. He pressured both sides to work expeditiously, while at the same time making clear that they could not dodge a solution simply by waiting him out.[31] He was personally committed to the cause, promising to "stay as long as it takes to get the process to an irreversible point."[32] In public statements on February 8 and 16, Annan announced that the two sides were close to a deal, raising public expectations for a speedy agreement. The mediation was bolstered by the support of a united international community. A UNSC resolution on January 30 underlined the body's support for the talks. Ban Ki-Moon visited in February, urging Kibaki to "look beyond individual interests and party lines."[33] For Kenya, much was at stake: 40% of the country's $2.3 billion development budget is funded by foreign aid (ICG 2008, 28). The EU threatened to suspend more than €380 million in aid. The United States warned that a solution would be imposed from the outside if Kenyan leaders could not solve their own problems.[34] And in a move that hit a nerve among the Kenyan elite, the United States threatened to impose visa bans on political leaders involved in instigating violence.

Kibaki understood that the internationalization of the crisis was weakening his tenuous grip on power, but there was little he could do. By February 23 the broad outlines of a deal had become clear: Kibaki would retain the presidency but share power with Odinga, who would finally occupy the prime minister post that he had been promised five years earlier. But negotiations nearly broke down again when the parties reached an impasse over the specific powers that would be assigned to the prime minister. Odinga began once again calling for the

president's resignation and threatening mass mobilization. When Kibaki's team refused to compromise, a resolute Annan kept the process on track by instead negotiating with the two leaders directly, chastising both for their failure to take the steps that were necessary for Kenya's survival. On February 28 an agreement was finally reached: as prime minister, Odinga would have the power to "coordinate and supervise" the government.[35] Half of the cabinet seats would go to the opposition. The leaders also agreed on a broad reform agenda, including changes to the constitution and electoral law.

Mixed Results

Kenya can be characterized as a case of partial success for international enforcement. It is clear that the deal between Kibaki and Odinga could not have emerged without international mediation and pressure. Power sharing had been the solution favored by international—not domestic—actors. Indeed, it was Annan who first publicly proposed the idea of a "grand coalition" in a speech to parliament on February 14, a move that outraged the government, which was still refusing to entertain any notion of accommodating the opposition.[36] In the days before the final agreement, Annan's resolve, combined with US pressure, kept the parties at the table. When it appeared that talks would fall apart, US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was dispatched to Kenya, and President Bush sought to "rally the continent" behind Annan's plan on a tour of Africa.[37]

The Kenyan case also lends support to the idea that mediation empowers the opposition. Faced with an intransigent government that was intent on stalling for time, Odinga was the disproportionate beneficiary of international pressure. From the perspective of hard-line Kibaki supporters, Annan's mission had imposed nothing less than a "civilian coup" on behalf of the ODM (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, 21). The government was not the only side that was pressured to negotiate, however. International involvement was also essential for securing opposition concessions. Odinga had no faith that left to their own devices, Kibaki or the judicial system would actually follow through on a deal, but the prospect of international enforcement of the agreement changed his calculation. As one analysis concludes: "The inability to find an elite compromise until the arrival of international mediators . . . reflected a widespread lack of trust in the ability of key democratic institutions such as courts and electoral commissions to deliver fair political outcomes" (Branch and Cheeseman 2008, 20). Indeed, international pressure would again be needed to ensure implementation of the deal in April 2007, when the parties reached an impasse over cabinet appointments.

The power-sharing agreement paved the way for long-needed constitutional reform. In 2008 a Committee of Experts was convened to draft a new

constitution that would synthesize elements of the previous attempts at constitutional reform (Kramon and Posner 2011, 92). The new document allocated enhanced powers to forty-seven county governments—meeting the opposition's demand for devolution—and curtailed the power of the president vis-à-vis parliament (ibid., 97). Cabinet appointments—long an instrument of patronage—now had to be approved by parliament. However, the draft made no allowance for a permanent prime minister post. Though Odinga had long favored the creation of a dual executive, he backed down on this point, due in part to a decision among ODM allies to prioritize the issue of devolution. Odinga's own presidential ambitions likely played a role in his decision, because he had seen in 2007 that he probably would have been able to win a clean election (ibid., 93). The new constitution was adopted by referendum, with 68% voting in favor, on August 4, 2010.

Taking stock of the Kenyan case, international actors did succeed in easing ethnic tensions (at least in the short term) and avoiding an all-out civil war. But the realization of this goal came at the expense of any more meaningful attempt to address the problem of electoral misconduct. On the contrary, power sharing required the two sides to look forward and sweep lingering questions about the election under the rug. Without a repeat election or a thorough investigation into the fraud, it would never be known who was the rightful winner of Kenya's 2007 presidential contest. In this sense, power sharing is as an inherently antidemocratic solution to electoral crises. Like Mugabe in Zimbabwe—who also entered a power-sharing arrangement in 2008—Kibaki faced few consequences for electoral misconduct.

Going forward, it is an open question whether the quality of Kenya's elections will improve. On an encouraging note, reforms to election administration—including biometric voter registration and an electronic system for tallying and transmitting results—have been introduced (Yard 2012). An Elections Act was passed in 2011, and the ECK has been rechristened the Independent Elections and Boundaries Commission (IEBC). If they succeed in increasing public confidence in the electoral process, these measures should, in theory, dampen party leaders' ability to foment postelection violence. But it remains to be seen whether these changes will have any bite. Improvement in electoral quality now depends on the political will of Kenya's key stakeholders (Yard 2012). Meanwhile, troubling signs of electoral manipulation and violence continue. By-elections held in September 2012 were marred by allegations of vote rigging among rival ethnic-based parties (Mureithi 2012). In late 2012 mass killings and displacement in the Tana River region stoked fears of impending violence in the 2013 general elections.[38] Also of concern are reports from human rights groups indicating that the Kikuyu and Kalenjin ethnic groups in the Rift Valley had begun rearming themselves in anticipation of the 2013 presidential race (Cummings 2012).

As these events make clear, constitutional change in Kenya has failed to tackle perhaps the most important underlying cause of electoral misconduct: the politicization of ethnicity. The IRI's final report on the 2007 election explains: "Kenyan elections are made more vulnerable to fraud by the fact that parties and candidates tend to have strong ethnic, tribal and regional associations . . . in many areas there is some level of popular tolerance for rigging or intimidation on the basis of a perceived commonality of interest by a one-sided majority" (2012, 38). Thus, unless and until Kenya experiences a transformation in the structure of its party organization and political identity, flawed elections will continue to be the norm. And as long as electoral violence remains an issue, international enforcers will likely continue to prioritize stability over redressing electoral malpractice.

CAMBODIA

The Cambodian People's Party (CPP) has enjoyed an uninterrupted period in power since 1979. In the early 1990s an internationally backed peace agreement ended Cambodia's decades-long civil war, and a UN peacekeeping mission of unprecedented scope ushered in a transition to multiparty politics. However, the centerpiece of the UN mission—the May 1993 national election—brought neither transition nor reconciliation. Although it was won by the opposition party, Funcinpec, a crooked postelection deal kept the CPP's Hun Sen in power. By the mid-1990s the CPP was an "institutionalized patron-based machine" (Levitsky and Way 2010a, 330), and it further consolidated its power through flawed elections in 1998, 2003, and 2008. In Cambodia, sporadic and superficial international enforcement has allowed the regime to get away with paying mere lip service to democratic norms. Unlike in Armenia, international actors have not followed through on demands for improvements to the legal and institutional framework governing elections. As a result, the government has had to do little more than ensure a reduction of election day violence and use the right rhetoric once a year at the international donors' conference.

Transition to Multiparty Politics

The end of the Cold War marked a dramatic turning point for Cambodia. Throughout the 1980s Cambodia's Vietnamese-backed government had fought a protracted civil war against remnants of the Khmer Rouge, which were allied in a marriage of convenience with Funcinpec, the royalist forces of Cambodia's King Norodom Sihanouk. In 1989 the drying up of Soviet aid led to a withdrawal of Vietnamese troops, followed by a cut in Chinese funding for the Khmer

Rouge and a decision by the United States to recognize the Cambodian government after years of tacit support for the rebels. This confluence of events led to a remarkable agreement among all five permanent members of the UN Security Council on the need to broker a peace agreement for Cambodia. On October 23, 1991, the Paris Accords were signed by the country's four main factions: the government, led by prime minister Hun Sen; the Khmer Rouge; the royalists; and aging politician Son Sann. A UN peacekeeping mission was mandated to oversee and guarantee implementation of the Accords' key provisions: demobilization of the rival armies, repatriation of nearly 400,000 refugees in Thailand, and the holding of national elections in 1993. As UN special representative for Southeast Asia Rafeeuddin Ahmed noted, this was a mission of unprecedented scope, "something we had never done before—actually controlling, supervising, monitoring the way the government was functioning" (quoted in Brinkley 2011, 65). Yet despite twenty-two thousand personnel and a $3 billion price tag, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC) never gained full control of the state. In 1991 the First Gulf War diverted US attention to more pressing strategic priorities in the Middle East, and the UN mission was by then "just going through the motions," according to Assistant Secretary of State John Bolton (Brinkley 2011, 79).

Although the United Nations was nominally in charge, in practice Hun Sen ruled. Relying on the allegiance of Cambodia's army and police, he was determined not to be displaced by the internationally imposed transition (ICG 2000, 20). This was a man who had been "schooled by the Khmer Rouge and Vietnamese every day since he was a teenager to serve as an absolute, unflinching autocrat. . . . to do whatever was necessary to hold on to power" (Brinkley 2011, 68). During the 1993 electoral campaign, Hun Sen threw everything he had at Funcinpec, now led by Sihanouk's son, Prince Ranariddh. The CPP used its control of local governments to pressure and bribe voters. Electorally motivated violence was rampant. The United Nations confirmed at least nineteen political killings during the campaign period.[39] Funcinpec officials were assassinated and their headquarters burned. The Khmer Rouge, which had withdrawn from the peace accords without disarming, attacked UN staffers. Remarkably, however, the vote itself was largely peaceful. From May 23 to May 29, more than four million Cambodians (representing almost 90% of the electorate) cast ballots. To ensure the integrity of the process, the United Nations conducted the count and tabulation of votes. The message sent by voters was clear: Cambodians wanted change. With 45% of the popular vote, Funcinpec had won a decisive victory, but its 58 seats in parliament left it just short of a majority in the 120-seat chamber. The CPP won 51 seats (with 38% of the vote).

Hun Sen's reaction to his loss was to lambast the United Nations, criticizing it for running an election that was biased against the CPP, and—absurdly—asking

for an independent commission to investigate allegations of fraud. In a ploy to rouse international fears of renewed civil war, Hun Sen's deputy announced that seven eastern provinces—all CPP strongholds—were seceding. To the international community's shock and dismay, Cambodia's leaders were "plotting, scheming, bribing and backstabbing to come out on top, as if the election had never taken place" (Brinkley 2011, 83). In the end, Sihanouk prevailed upon his son to accept a deal whereby he would be first prime minister, Hun Sen the second prime minister, and Sihanouk the ceremonial head of state. Ranariddh was "first" in name only, however; in reality, the CPP retained control over the civil service, local governments, and security forces.

The United Nations was perhaps the only real winner of the election. Despite its failure to disarm the warring factions, the election and refugee repatriation were deemed critical successes. After the election, UN spokesman Eric Falt proudly declared: "We bet on the Cambodian people. With nearly 90% participation, we can safely say we won our bet."[40] In reality, however, UNTAC had been a "passing outside intervention that left the CPP's grip on power unchanged" (McCargo 2005, 99).

Hun Sen's Consolidation of Power

If there is any place where the international community has the potential for political influence, it is Cambodia—a country Levitsky and Way label "one of the most externally vulnerable states in the world" (2010a, 329). Since the first annual donors' conference in 1992 announced an astounding $880 million in assistance, each year more than half of the government's budget has been funded by foreign aid. But after the 1993 election international attention drifted away from Cambodia. This was, after all, "a small nation in a remote part of Asia of no strategic interest to anyone" (Brinkley 2011, 68). International actors failed to fully capitalize on their leverage. By the mid-1990s Cambodia's political situation had deteriorated markedly. Corruption was rampant. In a letter to US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright in 1997, US senators Kerry, Roth, and Frist summed up what the $3.5 billion in US aid had bought the country. Cambodia had become the "fastest-growing narcotics transshipment point in the world; scores of journalists, human rights workers and political activists have been killed in political violence; the government has failed to establish critical constitutional bodies or pass some of the country's most basic laws; and corruption has infested and overrun almost every government institution" (quoted in Brinkley 2011, 125). An influential report published by the International Crisis Group (ICG) in 2000 similarly concluded that "Cambodia remains a strongman's state, replete with lawlessness, human rights abuses, grinding poverty, bloated security forces

and an economy thriving on prostitution, narcotics trafficking, land grabbing and illegal logging."

Sam Rainsy—minister of finance from 1993 to 1994—emerged as the country's most outspoken critic against corruption. His cynical—but sadly accurate—take on the coalition between Hun Sen and Ranariddh was that "instead of bribing one party, you now have to bribe two" (Brinkley 2011, 94). Rainsy called for the international community to impose more conditions on its aid, and he worked tirelessly to turn the tide of international opinion against Hun Sen. After he was fired in October 1994, Rainsy formed his own political party, the Khmer National Party, in 1995, renamed the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP) in 1997.

By 1996 Hun Sen and Ranariddh were not speaking to one another. Each was building up an army, and the two sides engaged in isolated skirmishes throughout the early months of 1997 (Peou 1998). In July a three-day battle in Phnom Penh was swiftly and decisively won by Hun Sen, who justified his actions in terms of restoring security (Peou 2000). More than one hundred Funcinpec officials were killed in the fighting (ICG 2000, 3). Ranariddh and Rainsy fled the country. Although on-the-ground accounts suggest that Ranariddh had initiated the violence, the situation was widely characterized by the media as a coup d'etat. For the international community, Hun Sen's power grab represented the alarming demise of an elected government it had invested billions to install. Aid disbursements (but not pledges) decreased that year by 28% (Peou 2000, 378). The United Nations refused to allow the Cambodian government to occupy its seat in the General Assembly. But according to Peou (2000), the international community's main concern was restoring security and stability, not democracy. The United States was "the only major donor that responded in a forceful manner" to the coup, announcing a suspension of all nonhumanitarian aid to Cambodia that would continue for ten years (Peou 2000, 390). The United States attempted to muster wider support for its campaign to restore Ranariddh, to no avail.

Regional opinion on the coup was divided. Vietnam was an avid supporter of Hun Sen, and Malaysia was concerned about protecting its many government-backed investments in the country. On the other hand, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines favored a more punitive response (Peou 2000, 389). Meeting just days after the coup, ASEAN delayed Cambodia's admission "until a later date," on the grounds that the country was not politically stable (Peou 2000, 386). ASEAN then sent a three-member mediation mission, the "Asian Troika," to the country to help negotiate Ranariddh's return, but by August the issue was dropped. As Malaysian foreign minister Abdulla Badawi summed up, ASEAN's policy was simply to "deal with whichever government is in Phnom Penh" (quoted in Peou 2000, 387).

In the run-up to the July 1998 election, Japan brokered a deal for Ranariddh to return to the country after being pardoned by his father, Sihanouk (Peou 2000,

397–398). The contest went forward, with the CPP challenged by Funcinpec and the Sam Rainsy Party (SRP). Eight hundred international monitors were present, most of whom were part of a UN-coordinated Joint International Observer Group (JIOG) (Peou 2000, 399). The international stakes of the election were high: Cambodia's seat in the UN General Assembly and the resumption of aid ostensibly depended on a free and fair verdict (Hughes 2002, 543). Yet pre-election misconduct was severe. UN election monitors cited more than four hundred cases of murder and intimidation perpetrated by the government during the campaign.[41] Control of local administration gave the CPP a huge edge. More than 80% of the Cambodian population lived in rural areas with no media access, meaning that their only news of the campaign came from their village chiefs, all of whom were CPP stalwarts (Brinkley 2011, 140). The CPP-administered voter registration process produced suspiciously high numbers of voters, and IRI observers documented cases of individuals registering more than once and ineligible voters being allowed to register (IRI 1999, 9).[42]

Hun Sen had learned well how to "put on the appearance of a clean election" (Brinkley 2011, 143). Knowing that the conduct of election day was what really mattered to international actors, with a "single edict" Hun Sen brought an end to the violence that had marred the campaign (ICG 2000, 8). With a 90% turnout rate, the CPP won 41% of the vote, Funcinpec 32%, and Sam Rainsy 14%. The National Election Committee (NEC), stacked with CPP loyalists, devised a formula after the election that granted the CPP 53% of the seats in parliament, but this was still short of the two-thirds majority required to form a government. After a six month standoff, Hun Sen again co-opted Ranariddh. In a deal announced in November, Hun Sen would remain prime minister and Ranariddh would become speaker of the National Assembly.

The JIOG ambiguously deemed the contest free and fair "to an extent" and concluded that the polls reflected the will of the Cambodian people "in a credible way."[43] But the observers themselves were criticized for focusing primarily on election day and the vote count and for being too eager to issue a positive verdict (Kelley 2009). The EU, for example, which had contributed $11 million in electoral assistance, seemed particularly willing to overlook the pre-election problems and failed to "monitor how the National Election Committee really functioned" (Peou 2000, 400).[44] Observers from the United States were more critical of the contest. A mission from the IRI concluded that the pre-election period was "fundamentally flawed," and that the contest as a whole "did not meet the standards of democratic elections" (IRI 1999). But this was the minority view. ASEAN admitted Cambodia as a member in 1999, and Cambodia was allowed to take up its seat in the UN General Assembly. At the international donors' conference for Cambodia that year, $470 million was pledged.

The weakness of the international response caused great frustration within the Cambodian opposition, particularly Sam Rainsy, who had assiduously courted international support and had called for greater international oversight of the vote (Hughes 2002, 551). After the election thousands of protesters joined demonstrations billed as attempts to persuade the international community to reverse its assessment. Rainsy and Ranarridh both used statements of US support to rally crowds (Hughes 2002, 553). Before returning to compete in the election, Ranariddh had expressed confidence in US backing: "It took three and a half years for Aristide to return to Haiti, but the Americans are stubborn when it comes to democracy. Hun Sen will be left isolated and poor" (quoted in Hughes 2002, 552). How wrong he was. The Cambodian opposition had once again overestimated the degree of international concern about its fate (ibid., 552).

Elections in 2003 and 2008 reinforced CPP dominance. Hun Sen was simply better organized than his opponents, particularly outside Phnom Penh, where his control of village councils made him unbeatable. (In the long-awaited 2002 local elections, the CPP retained control of 1,600 of 1,621 of Cambodia's communes.) Moreover, Funcinpec had devoted precious little attention to party building after 1993 (Hughes 2002, 558), and Ranariddh's cooperation with the CPP had sapped his credibility. The SRP, for its part, was continually obstructed by the CPP in its attempts to open rural offices and establish media outlets. In short, the Cambodian opposition was "organizationally estranged" from the electorate (Hughes 2002, 558).

In the 2003 election, misconduct was again concentrated during the pre-election period. The by now familiar tactics included the intimidation and coercion of rural voters, violence against opposition party operatives, failure to enforce the electoral law, exploitation of state resources by the governing party, and a biased media environment (IRI 2003). International election observers were divided in their assessments. The IRI concluded that "the actual voting and vote counting processes were generally acceptable," but the election was "critically compromised by events and conditions preceding election day" (IRI 2003, 3). Yet slightly reduced levels of violence prompted the EU's observation mission to deem the poll "the freest and most democratic" the country had ever had.[45] The CPP won 47% of the vote (again failing to obtain the two-thirds majority needed to form a government), the SRP 22%, and Funcinpec 21%. After the election Rainsy and Ranariddh worked together to forge a set of demands that would have to be met before they would join a government with Hun Sen, including reform of the election commission, a new electoral code, judicial reform, and the passage of an anticorruption law. (These are precisely the demands the international community should have been making had it really wanted to secure political change in Cambodia). But Hun Sen simply continued ruling as if the election had never happened. After an eleven-month deadlock, Ranariddh announced he

was entering a coalition and would remain president of the National Assembly. Reportedly it was the offer of a lucrative 60–40 split on commissions on government contracts that co-opted Ranariddh (McCargo 2005, 108). The new government's platform addressed none of Rainsy and Ranariddh's original demands for reform (Brinkley 2011, 182).

In the July 2008 election Hun Sen finally secured a long-coveted electoral majority, winning 58% of the vote to Sam Rainsy's 22%. Funcinpec—which had expelled Ranariddh in 2006—garnered just 5% of the vote. Voter registers had been updated in 2007, but far from increasing confidence in the electoral process, opposition parties now complained of numerous disenfranchised supporters (EU 2008, 2). Indeed, more than two hundred prospective opposition candidates were barred from appearing on the ballot because their names could not be found on the registration lists. Rainsy filed complaints with the NEC and Constitutional Council regarding inaccuracies in the registries, but these complaints were summarily rejected (EU 2008, 14).

Superficial Enforcement

When the Paris Accords were signed in 1991, the prospects for democratization in Cambodia were bleak. The country was emerging from decades of civil war and genocide. It was desperately poor, with practically no middle class, a closed economy, and low education levels; it was in an undemocratic and unfriendly region; and it had no history of democracy. Despite all the obstacles, which combined to create "one of the largest and most complex development challenges ever faced by the international community,"[46] the very high degree of international leverage in Cambodia meant that here—if anywhere—international actors could have had a real impact. With half the government's revenues coming from foreign aid, Hun Sen was of necessity driven "by a desire for international legitimacy" (ICG 2000, 7). Yet two decades of international involvement in Cambodia have produced negligible results. International pressure has ensured the holding of regular multiparty elections. But Cambodian politics can best be characterized as "a tenuous compact among competitive patronage systems" (Gottesman 2002, 352–353). Elections themselves are "little more than a side-show" (McCargo 2005, 98).

One underlying problem in Cambodia was a lack of sustained international interest, which led to perfunctory, superficial enforcement, characterized by shallow demands and lenient follow-through. Cambodia's lack of geopolitical weight therefore had a twofold effect: on the one hand, there were no competing interests to prevent international actors from exerting pressure for democracy; and on the other, this very lack of importance meant that the quality of enforcement was weak. This draws attention to a second problem, and a key difference between

Cambodia and Armenia: the absence of a regional organization in Southeast Asia that was willing and able to enforce democratic norms. The United States had no defense, economic, or intelligence interests in the country, and its attention was constantly diverted to more pressing strategic priorities in the Middle East, Iraq, Afghanistan, and North Korea. As the US ambassador to Cambodia, Ken Weidemman, explained in 1999: "We don't really have much time to deal with Cambodia, Burma, the little countries . . . . So we let the human rights folks handle it." Beginning in 1997, with the suspension of all direct aid to the Cambodian government, the United States did spearhead a move toward more stringent enforcement of democratic conditionality, but it failed to garner the support of other international actors. Britain, Australia, France, and Japan continually adopted a weaker line toward the Cambodian regime (Brinkley 2011, 166). For its part, the United Nations turned its attention to other matters after the much-proclaimed "success" of UNTAC; by the mid-1990s, its main focus in the country was the creation of an international tribunal for the Cambodian genocide. In other parts of the world, particularly in Europe and Latin America, regional organizations with strong traditions of protecting democracy can step in to fill these voids. But ASEAN was not equal to the task.

Each year at the international donors' conference for Cambodia, international actors made demands for political reform, the government made promises, and aid pledges were announced. But there was no follow-through on either side: the government continued its corrupt, repressive ways, and the donors kept on giving. In 2004 the US Embassy released a devastating report on corruption in Cambodia, estimating that approximately $500 million each year—which amounted to roughly half of the government's annual budget—was stolen by state officials (Brinkley 2011, 183). Strikingly, this is roughly the same amount of money provided by donors each year. A 2004 World Bank report concluded that the international community was itself part of the problem: "The failure to speak out for Cambodia's poor with one voice or to link financial and technical support to performance and outcomes has sent mixed signals to the country's leadership, which has shown itself adept at doing just enough to win donor support" (World Bank 2004). The bank warned, weakly, that "if there is little progress, then we would certainly be concerned that overall pledges for Cambodia could well come down" (quoted in Brinkley 2011, 289). But true to form, donors promised $504 million in aid that year. By 2010 $18 billion had been given to Cambodia, with little to show for the money. In 2010 the government finally passed an anticorruption law—which it had been promising international donors since 1995—but the law failed to require state employees to make public declarations of assets (the core of any effective anticorruption regime). Moreover, it created an anticorruption body that reports to the Council of Ministers, the very body that should be under investigation (Brinkley 2011, 168, 295). Several other opportunities to exercise conditionality have been

missed. The United States granted Cambodia most-favored-nation status in 1996 and put Cambodia on its Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) list in May 1997. The EU signed a cooperation agreement with Cambodia in April 1997, and Cambodia became an ASEAN member in April 1999.

Human rights NGOs were among the only groups to speak out against the farce that was playing out between international donors and the Cambodian regime. Noting the international community's willful disregard for murder and intimidation prior to the 1998 election, the head of the UN Human Rights Center—an independent group on the ground during the campaign—decried that "there is a dishonesty here which has to be exposed."[47] He described the donor conferences as merely "a ritual, an annual ritual between the government and the international community" (Brinkley 2011, 291).

Thus, unlike in Armenia, where the government had to implement institutional reforms and then work much harder to get around them, in Cambodia all the government really had to do was use the right rhetoric once a year at the international donors' conference. A 2008 report from the UN Human Rights Council noted that it was not uncommon for the government to arrest opposition activists, convict them without evidence, and then pardon them to "soften up" international actors during key moments of pressure (Brinkley 2011, 306). Hun Sen used his power "like a light switch…and the donor community—ironically—continues to see this as grounds for 'cautious optimism' because power is occasionally exploited to achieve results they want" (ICG 2000, 8).

The problem has been not only that enforcement is lenient; oversight is haphazard—marked by a lack of attention to detail—and demands are shallow. Thus, unlike in Armenia, where the government had to contend with detailed international scrutiny of its electoral laws and institutions, in Cambodia the international community has paid little attention to low-level—but fundamentally important—issues like the composition of the election commission. In its report on the 1998 election, the IRI noted that the National Election Committee (NEC), whose members were hand picked by the CPP (as were the provincial- and commune-level election commissions), failed to address complaints of irregularities (IRI 1999). The composition of the NEC contravened the country's own election law, which required the body to include members from all parties in parliament (ICG 2000, 24). The NEC was "reformed" prior to the 2008 election; two of the body's nine members were now appointed by the opposition SRP, but they were powerless, because decisions were approved by a simple majority, and the agreement of three members was required to even place an item on the agenda (EU 2008). Serious problems in election legislation were dealt with in a similarly hollow manner. A "draft" election law lingered in various consultative stages for years; in the end, the proposed changes in legislation were insufficient to ensure the integrity of the electoral process (ICG 2000, 24–26).

In sum, the gradual consolidation of a hegemonic authoritarian regime has met with little real resistance from international actors that are "eager to detect signs of improvement, and happy to view the holding of virtually any elections as a step forward" (McCargo 2005, 107). It is therefore an open question whether the international community's role in Cambodia has, on balance, been detrimental to the country's political development. In a particularly frank assessment, the ICG noted in 2000 that "those who have kept the country financially solvent . . . should all be now honestly reviewing their role in creating and subsidizing the government that today controls the country." Elections are held regularly and are typically certified as credible, but the reality is that they serve simply as an instrument to legitimize the status quo. Hun Sen barely conceals his derision for international criticism of Cambodia's elections, remarking in 2002: "What are international standards? I don't understand. International standards exist only in sports" (Brinkley 2011, 165). By raising expectations for political change that they cannot meet, elections may be "actively troubling to the Cambodian people" (McCargo 2005, 109).

CONCLUSIONS

The twin problems of strategic adaptation and superficial enforcement highlighted in this chapter are by no means limited to the cases explored here. Even Hugo Chávez in Venezuela—hardly a leader known for his sensitivity to international pressure—recognized the importance of maintaining an electoral façade to avoid an "immediate international outcry" (Corrales 2011, 130). As a result, Venezuelan elections are characterized by the increasingly common pattern of technically clean balloting and counting, combined with harder-to-detect tools of manipulation like gerrymandering and increased state control over the media and economy. Increased scrutiny by election monitors only serves to encourage these tactical shifts (Simpser and Donno 2012; Ichino and Schundeln 2012). Like many aid-dependent regimes in Africa, Mozambique is another country that has "become adept at the game of give-and-take, carefully choosing highly visible opportunities to demonstrate its adherence to the donors' favorite good-governance agenda, while refusing to budge on the most sensitive matters" (Manning 2010, 162). Part of the problem, as in Armenia, is the Mozambican opposition's weak organizational base and persistent choice of inept electoral strategies.

The second problem highlighted in this chapter—that of superficial or sporadic international norm enforcement—is also extensive, particularly in Africa and Asia, where regional regimes for democracy protection are weakest. When the will to enforce is weak, or when a country is emerging from a particularly bad starting point, international actors may be willing to view the holding of any

multiparty election—no matter how flawed—as grounds for praise and an easing of pressure. Like Kenya and Cambodia, the track record of international engagement in Togo illustrates this dynamic. When long-serving autocrat Gnassingbé Eyadéma died in February 2005, his son, Fauré Gnassingbé, was installed as president with the backing of the military. Intense pressure from the EU and United States, as well as the threat of sanctions from the United Nations and ECOWAS, combined to force the military to hold a presidential election in April.[48] Although the contest was obviously fraudulent—and criticized as such by observers from the EU and Carter Center—international pressure, particularly from Togo's West African neighbors, eased up, and Gnassingbé's election was recognized as legitimate.

What explains these perverse outcomes? When is enforcement likely to fail? When is it likely to induce only superficial change? This chapter's exploration of Armenia, Kenya, and Cambodia points to several factors that condition the effectiveness of enforcement. It is useful to note, first, that all three are cases in which international actors enjoyed a potentially high degree of leverage. It was not for lack of influence, then, that enforcement was often weak and lacking in follow-through. Rather, competing interests—in Kenya, for example, the imperative to combat violence and promote stability—can stand in the way. Or, as the case of Cambodia suggests, a lack of strategic value may cause a country to slip off the international community's radar screen during the crucial interelection years, when the hard work of institutional reform must be carried out.

Domestic conditions are also important mediating factors. Even when international norm enforcement is firm and consistent, its effects depend on domestic politics. As the Armenian case demonstrates, a weak and divided opposition leaves international enforcers without a domestic ally, severing the potential link between institutional reform and meaningful political change. This contrasts with the cases of successful enforcement examined in the previous chapter, in each of which strong opposition movements were able to pose a serious electoral challenge to the regime. The case of Kenya further suggests that in a political system characterized by electoral violence and deeply politicized ethnic cleavages, improvements in the quality of election administration are less likely to prevent fraud and increase public confidence in the electoral process.

A final lesson suggested by comparing Armenia with Kenya and Cambodia is that strong regional organizations play an essential role in promoting democracy. In all three countries, the United States responded to electoral misconduct, but its foreign policy agenda proved too crowded for it to implement the type of persistent conditionality needed to create meaningful change. Thus, in Armenia, it was the COE and OSCE and, to a lesser extent, the EU, that did the nitty-gritty work of day-to-day monitoring and providing guidance on matters of institutional reform. Although this has not led to wholesale political change in Armenia,

it has at least produced measurable improvements in certain areas of electoral conduct. As ASEAN's wavering response to Hun Sen's 1997 "coup" made clear, no such regional organization exists in Asia. The problem is not simply disagreement or a lack of political will among ASEAN's member states. It is also the lack of an institutional architecture for promoting democracy—including binding enforcement mechanisms and agencies for election monitoring and democracy building—that enjoys some degree of autonomy to propel action even in the face of member-state opposition.

8

Conclusion

The end of the Cold War gave rise to a powerful new international norm, an emerging right to democratic governance. At a rhetorical level, this norm is firmly entrenched. Democracy's status as the only internationally legitimate form of government is rarely questioned. Compliance with the norm also appears—superficially—to be strong. Most countries have adopted democratic constitutions and now choose their leaders through multiparty elections. Yet if one looks just below the surface, the picture is different. Although it is true that most countries now hold multiparty elections, norms of free and fair competition are regularly violated by leaders who manipulate elections in all manner of ways. They pressure and intimidate journalists, deregister opposition candidates, stack electoral administration bodies with their supporters, remove opposition supporters from voter lists, and manipulate vote counts. These practices—which are just some of the most common methods of misconduct—are widespread. Since 1990 nearly 60% of elections around the world have experienced misconduct. Some 44% of contests hosting credible international election monitors have been criticized by these observers, and 17% have been rejected outright.

The sheer prevalence of electoral misconduct around the world motivates the questions explored in this book. Are norm-violating regimes punished for their actions? Can the international community make elections more meaningful? These questions are of central importance to the many opposition movements around the world that are fighting for electoral reform. The Arab Spring has shown that after decades of repression and elections that are just a façade, people are hungry for their voices to be heard, to have a real say over how they are governed, and by whom. They demand not simply elections, but free and fair elections. In Malaysia, the Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Bersih) has defied the ban on "illegal" demonstrations to demand a reconstitution of the election commission, cleaning up of voter registration lists, and equal access to the media, among other reforms. In July 2011 and April 2012 Bersih activists were arrested and protests violently repressed by the police.[1] Success remains, at the

time of this writing, a seemingly distant prospect. But in other countries, opposition movements have been empowered—and repression discouraged—by international support. Following Peru's manipulated 2000 election, unusually harsh international condemnation was essential for validating the opposition's claims of fraud and convincing the government to accept internationally mediated talks on political reform. In Kenya international pressure forced an intransigent government to acknowledge concerns about the conduct of the 2007 election and negotiate a power-sharing deal with the opposition. Conversely, when the international community fails to live up to its promise to defend democracy, as in Cambodia, this can be an immense source of frustration for opposition leaders, who feel betrayed, left alone to face the repercussions of defying the regime.

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

How does the international community respond when democratic norms are violated? Do these efforts make a difference? The findings in this book are optimistic, but with caveats. Most important, international norm enforcement—particularly by regional organizations—does make a crucial difference for the quality of fledgling democratic institutions. When international actors employ tools of conditionality, diplomacy, mediation, and shaming in response to electoral misconduct, they can have a transformative effect on domestic politics, shaping both the conduct and outcome of elections. However, there are conditions attached to this conclusion. International actors choose to exercise this influence selectively; not all countries are equally likely to be punished for holding flawed elections. Moreover, the effects of enforcement are often delayed, and the magnitude of these effects depends on the strength of the domestic opposition and the quality of enforcement.

The first task undertaken in this study was to explore the consistency of enforcement. The message, clear and simple, is that enforcement is selective. Less than half of all flawed elections are followed by international punishment, although there is much regional variation. Regimes for democracy protection are significantly weaker in Africa and Asia, compared to Latin America and Europe. Conditionality—the policy of linking sticks and carrots to improvements in electoral conduct—is especially unlikely to be applied in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East. Variation in the strength of regional organizations is essential for explaining these differences. The United States is an active global enforcer of democratic norms, but the divergence between its frequent use of diplomatic engagement and infrequent use of conditionality helps explain why it is often perceived as "talking the talk" of democracy, without actually backing up its words with actions. UN enforcement of electoral norms is rare, occurring primarily in

countries emerging from civil war. Regional organizations are therefore the first line of defense against democratic backsliding in the Americas and the postcommunist world. Indeed, chapter 5 showed that enforcement by regional IGOs has a consistently positive effect on electoral conduct and outcomes, compared to the more wavering effectiveness of the United States and United Nations.

Enforcement patterns also vary from country to country. Conditionality is less likely to be imposed in geopolitically important countries where competing foreign policy priorities trump concerns about defending democracy. Thus, economic and military powers, members of the UN Security Council, and energy exporters are less likely to be punished for holding flawed elections. Other aspects of a country's international standing are context-specific and therefore impossible to quantify. For example, the nature of the US engagement in the Dominican Republic was influenced by the need to elicit cooperation with the embargo on Haiti, and the international community's about-face in Serbia was driven by changing ideas about Slobodan Milošević's ability to play a constructive role in the resolution of ethnic conflict in the region. However, enforcement of norms is not shaped solely by geopolitical concerns. Information also plays an important role. When election observers criticize a contest, or when a country proves itself to be a repeat norm violator, uncertainty about the cause, scope, and effects of electoral misconduct declines, and the probability of enforcement increases. This is so because it is easier for international actors to justify—and lobby for—enforcement when it is clear that norm violations were severe and intentional. Moreover, pressure for enforcement increases when norm violations are highly publicized. These effects are noteworthy, because they imply that the right combination of monitoring and publicity can help transcend the dictates of realist power politics.

Armed with an understanding of the causes of enforcement, I then considered its effects. Using an original data set on the 'Enforcement of Democratic Electoral Norms' (EDEN), chapter 5 assessed both the international and domestic determinants of democratic change in the wake of flawed elections. Focusing first on the conduct of elections—which is the most direct way to capture compliance with democratic electoral norms—I found that conditionality leads to improvements in electoral conduct in the next election. Strikingly, this effect persists even after controlling for numerous aspects of the domestic political context, as well as the strategies pursued by the domestic opposition. Chapter 5 also explained electoral outcomes: whether, in the wake of a flawed election, the incumbent is forced to cancel results or resign, and whether, if the incumbent does hold onto power after cheating, the ruling party loses the next election. The findings again attest to the leverage of international actors. Diplomatic engagement—whether through diplomatic or mediation missions, or through shaming—increases the chances of immediate postelection concessions, especially when it is imposed in

combination with opposition protests, and pre-election conditionality is associated with alternation in power in the next election. A recurring theme throughout the analysis is that international enforcement interacts with and empowers the opposition. Although alternation in power is rarely an explicit goal of international enforcers, their efforts to nurture improvements in the electoral process have the additional effect of validating and strengthening the domestic opposition.

Skeptics might question whether the observed effects of enforcement are driven by selection bias. Yet the balance of evidence indicates that international actors are, if anything, intervening disproportionately in the more difficult cases. Chapter 4 showed that enforcement is more likely in countries that are repeat offenders, which are the more entrenched and intransigent regimes. Statistical selection models in chapter 5 also revealed that conditionality in particular tends to be imposed in harder cases that are otherwise less likely to experience democratic change. These patterns—which may on their face seem surprising—reflect the fact that international actors are more willing and able to impose punishment when they have credible information that norm violations are both intentional and severe. Election monitors are one source of information on these points, but even in their absence, external actors learn about governments by observing their electoral behavior over time. Indeed, the number of previous flawed elections in the country—which reveals information about the intentionality of misconduct—is the most powerful predictor of conditionality.

CONDITIONALITY VERSUS DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT

By focusing on tools of enforcement that marshal both material and symbolic incentives, this study answers the call for greater theoretical synthesis between rationalist and constructivist perspectives on international norms. I find that both material and symbolic incentives matter, but that different tools have different strengths and weaknesses. Conditionality works particularly well at promoting improvements in electoral conduct (though these effects are usually not felt until the next election). Conditionality is well suited to the long-term task of pressuring and coaxing countries toward improved compliance through the enactment of institutional reform. In addition, conditionality sends a stronger signal of international resolve, compared to softer tools of diplomatic engagement. As Armenia's experience illustrates, persistent monitoring by the COE, EU, and OSCE, coupled with the threat of suspension, led the government to enact constitutional and administrative reforms. Yet wholesale political change is elusive in the absence of a viable opposition. International actors cannot engineer all of the preconditions for success. Much depends on the opposition's

preexisting base of popular support. The 2000 election in Serbia showed how the promise of conditional international rewards can have powerful effects on a viable but divided opposition movement. Here, international conditionality increased parties' incentives to unite and made it possible for them to credibly promise voters that an opposition victory would lead to an improvement in the country's international standing. These conclusions about the mediating role of the domestic opposition resonate with changing ideas about conditionality within the international financial institutions. A core problem associated with loan conditions is that they are likely to be reversed in the absence of domestic support. The move toward greater local ownership within the World Bank and IMF therefore recognizes the need to focus on reforms that are politically viable and backed by a strong domestic support coalition (World Bank 2005).

Unlike conditionality—which makes use of concrete sticks and carrots—tools of diplomatic engagement aim to influence domestic politics through symbolic, reputational costs and normative suasion. These tools, which are relatively fast and easy to deploy, are particularly effective at empowering and lending credibility to opposition actors in the immediate aftermath of a flawed election. By communicating international disapproval, tools of shaming, diplomatic missions, and mediation influence public perceptions about the legitimacy of the contest. Because there is only a short window of opportunity during which beliefs can reach a tipping point and people can be mobilized against the regime, a key advantage of these tools is that they can be deployed quickly. However, because they fail to marshal concrete incentives, tools of diplomatic engagement are not the best methods for inducing governments to implement institutional reform. Once a government has proven willing and able to violate democratic norms, it is unlikely that symbolic costs alone will be enough to force a change in its behavior.

INDIRECT MECHANISMS OF INFLUENCE

Another message underscored throughout the book is that the most effective ways to promote democratic change are often indirect. Rather than seeking to directly alter the government's preference for electoral misconduct, enforcement works best when it bypasses the government's choice to manipulate and instead targets domestic institutions and the opposition. Through these "indirect" channels, enforcement renders electoral misconduct more costly and risky and increases the chances for an opposition electoral victory. Qualitative evidence attests to the prominence of these effects: in none of the case studies did electoral conduct improve because of a sudden change of heart by the incumbent. For most leaders, the short-term political benefits of electoral misconduct easily outweigh the

future (and uncertain) costs associated with international enforcement. Rather, improvement is typically achieved in spite of governmental resistance, or as in the case of Serbia, only after the incumbent is ousted. In short, once a leader has proved willing and able to violate international norms, mechanisms of persuasion and preference change—which receive pride of place in most constructivist accounts—are unlikely to work. International actors should instead focus on changing the domestic context in which the electoral game is played.

One such form of indirect influence occurs when international actors target domestic institutions. If the government can be pressured into reforming the institutions that play a role in election management—for example, cleaning up voter registration lists, increasing judicial independence, or improving the professionalism of election commissions—electoral misconduct will be more costly and difficult to perpetrate in future elections. This explains why enforcement was found to have a delayed effect on electoral conduct—that is, an impact that does not take hold until the subsequent election. It may seem puzzling that governments would agree to limit their future freedom of action in this way, but institutional reform is often an optimal response to international pressure for governments with short time horizons. A leader focused on retaining power in the short term may view institutional reform as a relatively cheap and easy concession—certainly preferable to giving up power completely. Leaders who face significant threats to their rule in the near term are particularly likely to discount the benefits of manipulating future elections. Thus, from the perspective of international enforcers of norms, the advantage of promoting institutional reform is that it encourages improvements in electoral conduct through changes that are enacted with the government's consent.

A second key channel for international influence is the domestic opposition. Because opposition parties benefit from enforcement, they are often eager and receptive allies of international actors. Indeed, the opposition may need international support for its complaints to gain traction, as in the Dominican Republic, where the opposition's efforts to contest the legitimacy of elections in 1990 fell flat due to a lack of international support. In contrast, with the support of the OAS and United States in 1994, opposition contestation led to a groundbreaking negotiated settlement that provided for institutional reform and early elections. Quantitative evidence further bolsters the idea that international norm enforcement empowers the opposition. Chapter 5 showed, strikingly, that opposition-led protests are much more likely to force incumbent concessions when they occur in tandem with international criticism, mediation, or diplomacy. This finding challenges the notion that the success of postelection contestation can be attributed solely to the tactics and strategies of domestic actors. International actors play a crucial supporting role. Notably, this occurs even though alternation in power is rarely an explicit goal of international norm enforcers. Most players

in the democracy promotion community favor a neutral, nonpartisan stance that focuses on the electoral process rather than on electoral outcomes. That criticism of the electoral process also leads to the empowerment of the opposition can therefore be considered a (perhaps unintended) byproduct of enforcement.

THE POWER OF REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

The fact that regional IGOs were found to be the most consistently effective enforcers of norms speaks to the importance of multilateral legitimacy and credibility vis-à-vis raw material power. Several features set regional organizations apart from the United States and United Nations, the other two international actors examined in this book. Because they are multilateral, regional organizations have a source of legitimacy that is lacking in states acting alone. Multilateral norm enforcement has some important advantages over unilateral enforcement: politically motivated punishment is less likely, enforcement decisions are more transparent, and perceptions of unfairness are reduced.[2] Working through a multilateral institution allows states to signal that their intentions are benign and increases support from foreign leaders and publics (Thompson 2006). Action by a regional IGO must typically be approved by all of its member states, which imbues its messages with greater weight. Moreover, in many situations regional IGOs are perceived as more credible and impartial than other international actors. Efforts by the United States to promote democracy in particular are often regarded with suspicion, especially in countries where it has a history of meddling to promote its own strategic interests (cf. Thyne 2010). This is not merely idle or paranoid suspicion. As Carothers (2009) explains, the United States does adopt a more partisan approach toward democracy assistance than other prominent multilateral actors like the European Union.

Being regional also matters. Unlike global multilateral institutions, like the United Nations, regional organizations speak for a country's closest neighbors, imbuing them with a unique source of leverage, because the densest networks of international interactions and diffusion occur between neighbors, on a regional scale (Bell et al. 2012; Haftel 2007). Horne's (2009) relational theory of norm enforcement attaches great importance to these types of linkages. In a series of lab experiments, she found that enforcement is stronger and more consistent in groups marked by high levels of mutual interdependence. Variation in the EU's effectiveness in different parts of the world further attests to the role of geographic proximity. Its leverage "at home"—that is, in Europe and the wider postcommunist world—is strong, but its effectiveness wanes in other regions. The EU simply has less to offer—and its threats are therefore less potent—in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Beyond the prospect of greater material leverage, the symbolic

power of regional organizations is also strongest closest to home. Under the right conditions, membership in regional clubs can be a highly valued good, and not only for economic reasons. As Armenia's relationship with the COE illustrates, membership brings important social benefits, conveying a sense of belonging and identity as a European state.

Obviously no regional organization—even the most densely democratic—is perfectly consistent in enforcing democratic norms. Internal politics over whether, and how, to respond to flawed elections is endemic even when member states are institutionally homogenous. Thus, differences in the consistency of enforcement across regional IGOs cannot be explained solely by reference to the democratic quality of their member states; also important is the presence of an institutional architecture for promoting democracy that can incite action even in the face of member-state reluctance. Thus the presence of a binding procedure for the enforcement of democratic commitments was found in chapter 4 to be an especially strong predictor of regional IGO enforcement. Along these lines, the OSCE is an intriguing example of an institution that has maintained a credible and respected agency for democracy promotion in spite of authoritarian backsliding among its post-Soviet member states. Russia has fought hard in recent years to curtail the independence of the OSCE's election monitoring missions, which are known for their detailed criticism of electoral misconduct throughout the postcommunist sphere, but such changes must be approved by unanimous agreement among all member states (cf. Chivers 2007). Institutional stickiness has thus far prevailed.

ACTIVE VERSUS PASSIVE INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

This book's emphasis on enforcement—which entails active involvement in the domestic arena—contrasts with studies that give pride of place to structural, contextual international forces. The trajectory of competitive authoritarian regimes, for example, has been explained by the degree of linkage with the West, operationalized as region- and country-specific traits that vary little over time. Other research examines the domestic effects of "passive" international associations—membership in international organizations, treaties, and economic agreements—which are argued to work through mechanisms such as hand tying and credible commitment making.

This book instead draws attention to active mechanisms of influence. Chapter 5 found that membership in densely democratic organizations and regional diffusion do have at least a marginal positive impact on electoral conduct (but no effect on electoral outcomes) after a norm violation. The crucial point, however, is that active enforcement matters independent of these structural factors, and its effects are more robust and large. Important policy implications flow from this

finding. While passive forces are slow moving and difficult to change—depending largely on geographic happenstance—the choice to employ concrete tools of conditionality and diplomacy is readily amenable to change. These tools provide a means for international actors to influence electoral politics even in structurally disadvantaged, difficult, and isolated regions of the world.

The analysis also consistently found that international commitments to democracy, in and of themselves, had no direct effect on norm-violating regimes. Instead, commitments "work" by increasing the likelihood of enforcement. Once the effects of enforcement are accounted for, countries that have formally committed themselves to democracy are no more likely to experience improved compliance or alternation in power after a flawed election. This corresponds with Lutz and Sikkink's (2000) research on the relative effects of legalization and enforcement in Latin America, in which they find no clear association between membership in human rights treaties and improvements in human rights practices, instead concluding that it was the "enforcement of international norms through multiple legal and political mechanisms" that primarily influenced behavior (654). Paraguay, for example, was not a member of any major human rights treaties during the Cold War, but there is still "substantial evidence that international human rights pressures contributed to stopping torture and other human rights abuse" (ibid.). Countries may be punished for noncompliance even without having formally committed themselves to an international norm. Moreover, legalization itself may be endogenous, confirming, rather than creating, an emerging normative consensus (Lutz and Sikkink 2000, 654).

The point is not that passive international forces—commitments, membership, neighborhood—are unimportant, but rather that their ability to induce a return to compliance *once a norm violation has occurred* is limited. Passive forces work in other ways. They may increase the chances of enforcement, and they may deter norm violations in the first place. Chapter 3 found, for example, that members of densely democratic regional organizations experience, on average, fewer norm violations, consistent with the idea that membership may serve as a deterrent. Once deterrence fails, however, it is through active involvement in domestic politics that international actors have the best hope of building or restoring compliance with democratic norms.

IMPLICATIONS FOR ELECTORAL POLITICS

The growth in hybrid regimes in recent years has prompted a surge in scholarly interest in the politics of electoral misconduct. Much early research was conceptual, focusing on the development of new regime typologies based on the quality and competitiveness of elections (Diamond 2002; Schedler 2006; Collier

and Levitsky 1997; Levitsky and Way 2002). Spurred by the wave of electoral revolutions in the postcommunist world, analysts then turned toward explaining political outcomes. A number of proximate domestic factors associated with breakthrough elections have been identified, such as splits within the ruling elite, opposition coalitions, and postelection protests (Brownlee 2007; Bunce and Wolchik 2010a; Hale 2005; Howard and Roessler 2006). But questions remain about how the chain of events leading to electoral breakthroughs can be triggered and successfully completed. After all, in countries that hold flawed elections, many barriers stand in the way of democratic change, including biased state institutions, weak opposition parties, and a passive, disenchanted populace.

The theory and findings in this book make clear that international actors are an important piece of the puzzle. By accounting for the effects of international involvement, we gain a more complete understanding of why electoral conduct improves in some countries, as well as why, against the odds, opposition parties sometimes manage to oust cheating incumbents despite decidedly unfavorable conditions. The introduction of the EDEN data set also makes a practical contribution to the study of electoral politics by providing systematic data on the implementation of international conditionality and diplomatic engagement in a global sample that encompasses 668 elections in 119 countries. The scope of these data allowed for the effects of several international and domestic factors to be tested in the same model. Some intriguing new findings emerged. For example, alternation in power is more likely in more democratic settings, but, more surprisingly, improvements in electoral conduct are not. Moreover, in a global sample of elections, opposition coalitions were not associated with improvements in electoral conduct, incumbent concessions, or alternation in power. This suggests that previous results showing the importance of opposition unity may be context dependent, limited to competitive authoritarian settings in which opposition coalitions are both consequential and electorally viable (Donno 2013). Postelection protests, in contrast, are a powerful tool for inducing governmental concessions after flawed elections, though their success often depends on international involvement.

THE COMPLEX EFFECTS OF INTERNATIONAL NORMS

This book departed from the premise that we cannot fully understand why states obey international norms without knowing what happens when these norms are violated. For students of international norms, enforcement is an issue of central importance, particularly for norms—like those related to democracy and human rights—that are widely affirmed but regularly violated. Whereas realists dismiss such norms as "organized hypocrisy" (Krasner 1999), this book has delved

deeper by probing the conditions under which they are costly to violate and what the nature of these costs is. In so doing, it contributes to the growing rationalist literature on international norms, which explores how norms shape behavior by changing actors' cost-benefit calculations. But material incentives are not the whole story. Compliance with norms is also influenced by symbolic, social incentives—including, as this book argues, efforts to shame norm violators—which resonate with the typically constructivist themes of identity and belonging.

An implication particular to the rationalist perspective, however, is that norms can be strategically appropriated by domestic actors. Incumbents may be insincere compliers, adhering to a norm not because they believe it is right, but because they desire the benefits associated with compliance. Hyde (2011b) documents just such a dynamic in her explanation of why governments invite international election observers even when they intend to cheat. The problem for these pseudo-democrats is that a number of benefits are now contingent on internationally endorsed elections, and by not inviting observers, a government sends a clear signal that elections are not democratic. Governments may also adapt to international norms by attempting to feign compliance, as the Armenian government did when it responded to international pressure by implementing limited changes in technical aspects of electoral conduct. This problem of strategic adaptation has become a real problem for international election observers, who may unwittingly induce governments to shift toward pre-election tools of misconduct that are less likely to evoke criticism (Simpser and Donno 2012). In her study of transitional justice in the Balkans, Subotic (2009) explains that when domestic resistance to norm adoption is strong, international coercion tends to produce, at best, shallow and narrow compliance. Opposition actors, too, can appropriate the international norm of free and fair elections to further their own political fortunes. Indeed, the domestic politics of norm compliance is often marked by bitter struggles among factions, each of which attempts to use international norms as "wedge issues to score localized political points" (Subotic 2009, 34).

The theory presented here has centered specifically on democratic norms, but certain of its core insights can be applied to other issues that are characterized by similar incentive structures. Like democracy, human rights norms are not self-enforcing: compliance is often not in an actor's self-interest, and the incentives for outside actors to enforce them are weak and easily subordinated to other, more pressing foreign policy interests. Like electoral norms, then, incentives to enforce human rights norms vary by country. As Rudolph (2001) concludes in his study on war crimes tribunals, "expanding liberal norms" explain the establishment of human rights courts in locales of little strategic importance, but power politics has blocked their establishment in other places, like East Timor in Indonesia, where the international community is loathe to apply pressure to a strategically important host government.

Other issues of broad applicability raised in this study are uncertainty and information asymmetry, which can create obstacles to enforcement. Just as certain forms of electoral misconduct are difficult for international monitors to verify, it is notoriously difficult to detect and evaluate noncompliance with international agreements relating to nuclear proliferation and environmental cooperation. Variation in the quality of information on norm violations, then, is one factor that helps explain apparent inconsistencies in enforcement. Solving these informational problems requires developing more effective monitoring or altering the design of international agreements in ways that make noncompliance more easily visible (cf. Mitchell 1994).

Even if violations are only selectively punished, the rise of international democratic norms has altered incentives for leaders around the world. Governments face myriad forms of pressure to demonstrate their democratic credentials, and they can no longer excuse abuses of power simply by claiming the rights of sovereignty and nonintervention. In many countries this has had a perverse effect: leaders submit themselves to being challenged through multiparty elections, yet they violate the norms of free and fair electoral competition. Countries that hold flawed elections can easily get caught in a vicious cycle. Unable to effectively compete, opposition parties become weak and fragmented. Robbed of their right to vote in free and fair elections, citizens become passive and disillusioned with politics. But the obstacles to democratic change are not insurmountable. This book has demonstrated that when international actors choose to do something about it, they can help reverse these trends.

Achieving democratic change is not easy. For international actors, it often takes years of sustained effort to elicit concessions from the government and promote institutional reform. Moreover, effectively promoting change often requires the existence of a strong, mobilized, and resourceful domestic opposition. But by marshaling the power of threats and promises and by actively engaging in domestic politics, international actors can help oust norm-violating regimes and move countries toward more free and equal democratic competition.

APPENDIX A

List of Countries and Flawed Elections, 1990–2007*

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Afghanistan	Asia	2	2005: legislative
Albania	Postcommunist	6	1991: legislative 1992: legislative 1996: legislative 1997: legislative 2001: legislative 2005: legislative
Algeria	MENA	7	1991: legislative 1997: legislative 1999: presidential 2002: legislative 2004: presidential 2007: legislative
Angola	Sub-Saharan Africa	1	1992: presidential/ legislative
Argentina	Latin America/ Caribb.	10	
Armenia	Postcommunist	8	1991: presidential 1995: legislative 1996: presidential 1998: presidential 1999: legislative 2003: presidential, legislative 2007: legislative

*In the fourth column, "presidential/legislative" denotes a simultaneous presidential and legislative election; "presidential, legislative" denotes that presidential and legislative elections were held in the same year but on different dates.

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Azerbaijan	Postcommunist	8	1993: presidential 1995: legislative 1998: presidential 2000: legislative 2003: presidential 2005: legislative
Bangladesh	Asia	3	1996: legislative 2001: legislative
Belarus	Postcommunist	6	1994: presidential 1995: legislative 2000: legislative 2001: presidential 2004: legislative 2006: presidential
Benin	Sub-Saharan Africa	9	1991: legislative, presidential 1995: legislative 1996: presidential 1999: legislative 2001: presidential 2003: legislative
Bolivia	Latin America/ Caribb.	5	1993: presidential/ legislative 2002: presidential/ legislative 2006: legislative
Bosnia	Postcommunist	5	1996: presidential/ legislative 1998: presidential/ legislative 2000: legislative 2002: presidential/ legislative 2006: presidential/ legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Brazil	Latin America/ Caribb.	5	
Bulgaria	Postcommunist	10	1990: legislative 1991: legislative 2005: legislative
Burkina Faso	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1991: presidential 1992: legislative 1998: presidential
Burundi	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	
Cambodia	Asia	3	1998: legislative 2003: legislative
Cameroon	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1992: legislative, presidential 1997: legislative, presidential 2004: presidential 2007: presidential
Central African Republic	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	2005: presidential/ legislative
Chad	Sub-Saharan Africa	5	
Colombia	Latin America/ Caribb.	11	1990: legislative, presidential 1991: legislative 1994: legislative, presidential 1998: legislative, presidential 2002: legislative, presidential
Congo (Republic of)	Sub-Saharan Africa	6	1992: legislative, presidential 2007: legislative

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Costa Rica	Latin America/ Caribb.	5	
Cote d'Ivoire	Sub-Saharan Africa	6	1990: presidential 1995: presidential, legislative 2000: presidential
Croatia	Postcommunist	10	1992: presidential/ legislative 1993: legislative 1995: legislative 1997: legislative, presidential 2000: legislative, presidential
Czech Republic	Postcommunist	8	
Dem. Republic of Congo	Latin America/ Caribb.	1	
Djibouti	Sub-Saharan Africa	6	1992: legislative 1997: legislative 1999: presidential 2003: legislative 2005: presidential
Dominican Republic	Latin America/ Caribb.	8	1990: presidential/ legislative 1994: presidential/ legislative 1996: presidential/ legislative 2000: presidential 2004: presidential 2006: legislative
East Timor	Asia	3	2007: presidential, legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Ecuador	Latin America/ Caribb.	9	2002: presidential/ legislative 2006: presidential/ legislative
Egypt	MENA	7	1995: legislative 2000: legislative 2005: presidential, legislative
El Salvador	Latin America/ Caribb.	8	1991: legislative 1994: presidential/ legislative 1997: legislative 1999: presidential 2000: legislative 2003: legislative
Estonia	Postcommunist	6	
Ethiopia	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	1994: legislative 1995: legislative 2000: legislative 2005: legislative
Gabon	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1998: presidential 2001: legislative 2005: presidential 2006: legislative
Gambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1996: presidential 2001: presidential 2006: presidential 2007: legislative
Georgia	Postcommunist	8	1991: presidential 1992: presidential/ legislative 1995: presidential/ legislative 1999: legislative 2000: presidential

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
			2003: legislative 2004: presidential, legislative
Ghana	Sub-Saharan Africa	5	1992: presidential, legislative 1996: presidential/ legislative
Guatemala	Latin America/ Caribb.	6	1990: presidential/ legislative 1994: legislative 1995: presidential/ legislative 1999: presidential/ legislative 2003: presidential/ legislative 2007: presidential/ legislative
Guinea	Sub-Saharan Africa	5	1993: presidential 1995: legislative 1998: presidential 2002: legislative 2003: presidential
Guinea Bissau	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	
Guyana	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	1992: presidential/ legislative 1997: presidential/ legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
			2001: presidential/ legislative
Haiti	Latin America/ Caribb.	7	1990: presidential/ legislative 1995: legislative, presidential 1997: legislative 2000: legislative, presidential 2006: presidential/ legislative
Honduras	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	1993: presidential/ legislative 1997: presidential/ legislative 2001: presidential/ legislative 2005: presidential/ legislative
Hungary	Postcommunist	5	1990: legislative 1994: legislative
India	Asia	5	1996: legislative 1998: legislative
Indonesia	Asia	5	1992: legislative 1997: legislative
Iran	MENA	9	1992: legislative 1993: presidential 1996: legislative 1997: presidential 1998: legislative 2000: legislative 2001: presidential 2004: legislative
Iraq	MENA	2	

(*Continued*)

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Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Jamaica	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	1993: legislative 1997: legislative 2002: legislative
Jordan	MENA	4	2007: legislative
Kazakhstan	Postcommunist	8	1994: legislative 1995: legislative 1999: presidential, legislative 2004: legislative 2005: presidential 2007: legislative
Kenya	Sub-Saharan Africa	5	1992: presidential/ legislative 1994: legislative 1997: presidential/ legislative 2002: presidential/ legislative 2007: presidential/ legislative
Kuwait	MENA	6	1990: legislative
Kyrgyzstan	Postcommunist	8	1995: legislative, presidential 2000: legislative, presidential 2005: legislative, presidential 2007: legislative
Latvia	Postcommunist	5	2006: legislative
Lebanon	MENA	4	1996: legislative 2005: legislative
Lesotho	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	
Liberia	Sub-Saharan Africa	2	
Lithuania	Postcommunist	8	1996: legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Macedonia	Postcommunist	6	1994: presidential/ legislative 1998: legislative 1999: presidential 2002: legislative 2004: presidential 2006: legislative
Madagascar	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1992: presidential 1993: presidential/ legislative 1996: presidential 2001: presidential 2006: presidential
Malawi	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	1994: presidential/ legislative 1999: presidential/ legislative 2004: presidential/ legislative
Malaysia	Asia	4	1990: legislative 1995: legislative 1999: legislative 2004: legislative
Mali	Sub-Saharan Africa	9	1997: legislative 2007: presidential, legislative
Mauritania	Sub-Saharan Africa	8	1992: presidential, legislative 1996: legislative 1997: presidential 2001: legislative 2003: presidential 2007: presidential

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Mauritius	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	1991: legislative 1995: legislative 2000: legislative
Mexico	Latin America/ Caribb.	6	1991: legislative 1994: presidential/ legislative 1997: legislative 2000: presidential/ legislative
Moldova	Postcommunist	6	1996: presidential 1998: legislative 2001: legislative 2005: legislative
Mongolia	Asia	9	
Montenegro	Postcommunist	3	2002: presidential/ legislative
Morocco	MENA	4	1997: legislative 2007: legislative
Mozambique	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	2004: presidential/ legislative
Myanmar	Asia	1	1990: legislative
Namibia	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	1999: presidential/ legislative 2004: presidential/ legislative
Nepal	Asia	3	1994: legislative
Nicaragua	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	1990: presidential/ legislative 1996: presidential/ legislative
Niger	Sub-Saharan Africa	9	1996: presidential, legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Nigeria	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	2004: presidential, legislative 1992: legislative 1993: presidential 1999: legislative, presidential 2003: legislative, presidential 2007: presidential/ legislative
Pakistan	Asia	4	1990: legislative 1993: legislative 2002: legislative
Panama	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	
Papua New Guinea	Asia	4	1997: legislative 2002: legislative 2007: legislative
Paraguay	Latin America/ Caribb.	4	1993: presidential/ legislative
Peru	Latin America/ Caribb.	6	1995: presidential/ legislative 2000: presidential/ legislative 2001: presidential/ legislative
Philippines	Asia	6	2001: legislative 2004: presidential/ legislative 2007: legislative
Poland	Postcommunist	10	
Romania	Postcommunist	5	1990: presidential/ legislative

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
			1992: presidential/ legislative 1996: presidential/ legislative 2004: presidential/ legislative
Russia	Postcommunist	10	1991: presidential 1993: legislative 1996: presidential 1999: legislative 2000: presidential 2003: legislative 2004: presidential 2007: legislative
Rwanda	Sub-Saharan Africa	2	2003: presidential, legislative
Senegal	Sub-Saharan Africa	7	1993: legislative 2007: presidential, legislative
Serbia	Postcommunist	12	1992: legislative, presidential 1993: legislative 1996: legislative 1997: presidential/ legislative 2000: presidential, legislative 2002: presidential 2003: presidential, legislative 2007: legislative
Sierra Leone	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	2002: presidential/ legislative
Singapore	Asia	5	1991: legislative 1993: presidential 1997: legislative

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Slovakia	Postcommunist	6	2001: legislative 1994: legislative 1998: legislative 2007: presidential
Slovenia	Postcommunist	7	
South Africa	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	
South Korea	Asia	8	1992: legislative, presidential
Sri Lanka	Asia	7	1999: presidential 2000: legislative 2001: legislative 2004: legislative 2005: presidential
Sudan	Sub-Saharan Africa	2	1996: presidential/ legislative 2000: presidential/ legislative
Taiwan	Asia	8	
Tajikistan	Postcommunist	7	1994: presidential 1995: legislative 1999: presidential 2000: legislative 2005: legislative 2006: presidential
Tanzania	Sub-Saharan Africa	3	1995: presidential/ legislative 2000: presidential/ legislative 2005: presidential/ legislative
Thailand	Asia	9	1992: legislative 1995: legislative 1996: legislative

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
			2001: legislative 2005: legislative 2007: legislative
Togo	Sub-Saharan Africa	8	1993: presidential 1998: presidential 2002: legislative 2003: presidential 2005: presidential
Trinidad & Tobago	Latin America/ Caribb.	6	2000: legislative 2001: legislative 2002: legislative
Tunisia	MENA	3	1994: presidential/ legislative 1999: presidential/ legislative 2004: presidential/ legislative
Turkey	MENA	5	1991: legislative 1999: legislative 2002: legislative
Uganda	Sub-Saharan Africa	6	1996: presidential, legislative 2001: presidential, legislative 2006: presidential/ legislative
Ukraine	Postcommunist	10	1991: presidential 1994: legislative, presidential 1998: legislative 1999: presidential 2002: legislative 2004: presidential, legislative 2006: legislative 2007: legislative
Uzbekistan	Postcommunist	1	1991: presidential

(*Continued*)

Country	Region	Number of Multiparty Elections, 1990–2007	Flawed Elections
Venezuela	Latin America/ Caribb.	8	1998: legislative, presidential 1999: legislative 2000: presidential/ legislative 2004: presidential
Yemen	MENA	5	1993: legislative 1997: legislative 1999: presidential 2003: legislative 2006: presidential
Zambia	Sub-Saharan Africa	4	1991: presidential/ legislative 1996: presidential/ legislative 2001: presidential/ legislative 2006: presidential/ legislative
Zimbabwe	Sub-Saharan Africa	6	1990: presidential/ legislative 1995: legislative 1996: presidential 2000: legislative 2002: presidential 2005: legislative

APPENDIX B

Coding Rules and Search Procedures

CODING OF ENFORCEMENT

The coding of norm enforcement is based, first, on comprehensive searches of international newspapers and newswires conducted using the LexisNexis Academic database for each election in the EDEN data set. Searches specified the name of the country; a date range from four months before the election through four months after the election; the name and acronym of each of the fifteen international actors coded in the data; and the following search terms: *election*, *elect*, and *electoral*. This was supplemented with searches of the ProQuest and Facts on File databases and *Keesings Record of World Events*. For IGOs, coding was also supplemented via reports, documents, and resolutions posted on the organizations' websites. Each election was investigated by the author and two research assistants working independently. Coding discrepancies occurred in less than 10% of cases and were resolved by the author.

Enforcement is only coded if the policy in question is clearly implemented in response to the conduct of elections. Enforcement that aims to punish a country for general democratic deficiencies unrelated to the election in question is not counted.

Negative conditionality is coded for each actor that threatened or imposed punishments (political, economic, or legal) conditional on democratic electoral change. Punishments are broadly defined to include any kind of economic punishment (e.g., sanctions, withdrawal of aid), political punishment (e.g., suspension of diplomatic ties, visa bans, suspension of membership in international organization), or legal punishment. Examples:

- Before the election, the international actor threatens that membership in an IGO depends on the conduct of the election being free and fair.
- After the election, the international actor imposes a visa ban on the country's leadership.

- After the election, the international actor threatens that future consequences depend on the resolution of electoral complaints, or on the conduct of the next election.
- Examples of particular statements that constitute threats are "measures will be taken," "further integration is at risk," and "closer relations are at risk."

Positive conditionality is coded for each actor that promised or granted rewards (political, economic, or legal) conditional on democratic electoral change. Rewards are defined to include any kind of economic reward (e.g., aid, trade agreements), political reward (e.g., IGO membership), or legal reward (e.g., starting negotiations on an association agreement with the EU). Examples:

- Before the election, the international actor promises a reward if the election is free and fair.
- After the election, the international actor begins negotiations on a trade deal in response to good electoral conduct.

Mediation and diplomatic missions are coded for each actor that sent a mission composed of politicians or diplomats to the target country with the aim of resolving electoral conflicts or exerting pressure for democracy. To be counted, one of the reasons for the visit must be related to the conduct of the election. The mission must make public statements related to the election or must engage in talks/negotiations/mediation with one or more domestic actors that are in conflict over the election.

Shaming is coded for each actor that issued an official declaration, resolution, or diplomatic statement that criticizes electoral conduct or urges democratization in the wake of electoral misconduct. This can include written statements, spoken statements made in official press conferences (e.g., US State Department or White House briefings), statements made by the secretary general or presidency of an IGO, or, for the United States, statements made by embassy officials. The following additional criteria must be met:

- Statements cannot link changes in the target state to punishments or rewards (in order to distinguish socialization from conditionality).
- Statements that contain praise for good elections do not count.
- Statements by election observers or election monitors do not count.
- Congressional hearings and/or statements by US congressmen or senators do not count.
- For IGOs, statements made by parliamentary assemblies do not count. Statements made by election observation or election monitoring missions also do not count.

ELECTORAL MISCONDUCT

The coding of electoral misconduct is based on election observer reports and international news articles. Searches in LexisNexis Academic specified the name of the country; a date range from four months before the election up to and including the date of the last round of the election; and the following search terms: *election, elect, electoral, observer, observation, monitor, monitoring, "free and fair," misconduct, manipulation, opposition, ban, banned, repress, repression, harass, harassment, media,* and *press*. Each election was investigated by the author and two research assistants working independently. Coding discrepancies were resolved by the author.

The election is coded as "flawed" if sources revealed that any one (or more) of the following types of misconduct was present and was not limited to one locality within the country:

- Restrictions on the media's ability to report on the campaign
- Presence of systematic media bias
- Existence of unduly burdensome or arbitrary restrictions on opposition parties'/candidates' ability to register and/or appear on the ballot
- Intimidation of opposition parties/candidates or supporters
- Restrictions on opposition party/candidate campaign activity
- Intimidation of voters on election day
- Systematic omission of voters from registration lists
- Violation of the secret ballot
- Multiple voting
- Ballot box tampering or stuffing
- Destruction or alteration of ballots
- Faulty counting/tallying of ballots
- Certification of fraudulent results

ELECTION OBSERVERS' VERDICTS

Coding for the verdicts of international election observers is based on election observer reports from the following groups:

- Asian Network for Free Elections (ANFREL)
- Carter Center
- Commonwealth Secretariat
- Council of Europe

- European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations (ENEMO)
- European Union Commission
- International Republican Institute (IRI)
- National Democratic Institute (NDI)
- Organization of American States (OAS)
- Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
- United Nations
- United States.[1]

When reports are not available, international news articles were used to glean information on the verdicts of these monitoring groups. Searches in LexisNexis Academic specified the name of the country; the name of the observer groups; a date range starting with the month of the election and ending two months after the election; and the following search terms: *observer*, *observation*, *monitor*, and *monitoring*. Each election was investigated by the author and two research assistants working independently. Coding discrepancies occurred in less than 10% of cases and were resolved by the author.

The election is coded "reject" if any of the monitoring groups rejects the conduct of the election by concluding that it was not free/fair, not credible or clearly did not meet international standards for elections. Following are examples of phrases that signify a verdict of reject:

- "The electoral process did not meet international standards for free and fair elections."
- "The electoral process was not credible."
- The electoral process was "not free" or "not fair."

The election is coded "irregular" if any of the monitoring groups concludes that it was marked by irregularities, but no monitoring group rejects the election outright (see above). Following are examples of phrases that signify an irregular verdict:

- "Despite problems, the election was 'mostly in line with international standards for free/fair elections.' "
- "Irregularities were not clearly intentional."
- "Flaws were due to disorganization" or "lack of capacity."

The election is coded "clean" if none of the monitoring groups concludes that the election was irregular or rejects the election (see above). Following is an examples of a phrase that signifies a clean verdict:

- "The election was conducted wholly in accordance with international standards."

APPENDIX C

Statistical Appendix to Chapter 5

C.1. Effect of Regional IGO Enforcement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Postelection, Previous Election:					
Regl. IGO Conditionality	0.57*	0.42			
	(0.05)	(0.10)			
Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement	0.31	0.29+			
	(0.11)	(0.08)			
Pre-election:					
Regl. IGO Conditionality	0.21	0.01			1.43**
	(0.33)	(0.95)			(0.00)
Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement	−0.36*	−0.24			−0.47
	(0.03)	(0.18)			(0.24)
Postelection:					
Regl. IGO Conditionality			−0.37	−0.72	
			(0.47)	(0.22)	
Regl. IGO Diplomatic Engagement			1.35**	−3.69**	
			(0.00)	(0.00)	

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Postelection Opposition Protests			1.16** (0.00)	0.64+ (0.07)	
Regl. IGO Dip. Engt.* Protests				5.66** (0.00)	
Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election	−0.08 (0.60)	−0.02 (0.81)			
Pre-election Enforcement	0.05 (0.71)	0.03 (0.78)			−0.23 (0.47)
Postelection Enforcement			−0.05 (0.91)	0.15 (0.67)	
Election Observers Present					0.42 (0.22)
Election Observer Criticism			−0.07 (0.84)	−0.04 (0.90)	
Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election	−0.27+ (0.05)	0.55** (0.00)			
Opposition Coalition	−0.26+ (0.08)	0.05 (0.66)			0.13 (0.63)
Incumbent Running	0.01 (0.91)	0.07 (0.46)	−0.54+ (0.08)	−0.79* (0.04)	−0.62* (0.04)
Intensity of Flaws			0.13 (0.47)	0.09 (0.65)	−0.36* (0.02)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election	1.01** (0.00)	0.12* (0.05)			
No. Previously Flawed Elections	−015* (0.03)	−0.01 (0.86)			
Polity, t-1	0.04 ((0.22)	−0.02 (0.48)	0.03 (0.26)	0.04 (0.20)	0.13** (0.00)
Prior Liberalization	−0.03 (0.13)	0.03* (0.05)	−0.02 (0.53)	−0.00 (0.97)	0.01 (0.75)
Democ. in the Region, t-1	0.14+ (0.05)	0.04 (0.35)	0.01 (0.86)	0.01 (0.90)	-0.00 (0.96)
No. Densely Democratic IGOS, t-1	0.04* (0.03)	−0.00 (0.69)	−0.03 (0.31)	−0.04 (0.27)	0.00 (0.89)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.13 (0.31)	0.02 (0.85)	−0.27 (0.18)	−0.30 (0.14)	−0.33* (0.04)
GDP Change, t-1			−0.02 (0.25)	−0.03 (0.13)	−0.04** (0.01)
Main Election					0.83* (0.00)
Constant	−0.99** (0.00)	−0.54** (0.00)	−2.19** (0.00)	−1.86** (0.00)	−0.85* (0.03)
Observations	304	303	263	263	216
R-squared	0.45	0.23			

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

C.2. Effect of EU Enforcement Outside Europe and Postcommunist Region

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Postelection, Previous Election:					
EU Conditionality	0.46	0.11			
	(0.13)	(0.61)			
EU Diplomatic	−0.20	−0.11			
Engagement	(0.37)	(0.54)			
Pre-election:					
EU Conditionality	0.64	0.10			−0.04
	(0.11)	(0.59)			(0.96)
EU Diplomatic	−0.26	−0.24			0.25
Engagement	(0.21)	(0.22)			(0.59)
Postelection:					
EU Conditionality			0.13	0.09	
			(0.78)	(0.85)	
EU Diplomatic					
Engagement			−0.46	−3.72**	
			(0.21)	(0.00)	
Postelection Opposition Protests			1.16**	1.12**	
			(0.00)	(0.00)	
Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests				3.40**	
				(0.00)	
Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election	0.02	0.12			
	(0.88)	(0.29)			
Pre-election Enforcement	−0.06	−0.03			−0.17
	(0.65)	(0.81)			(0.56)
Postelection Enforcement			0.48+	0.50+	
			(0.10)	(0.08)	
Election Observers Present					0.35
					(0.27)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict	DV: Postelection Concessions		DV: Alternation
Election Observer Criticism			−0.09	−0.07	
			(0.78)	(0.81)	
Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election	-0.28+	0.55**			
	(0.07)	(0.00)			
Opposition Coalition	−0.35*	0.02			0.25
	(0.02)	(0.84)			(0.32)
Incumbent Running	0.01	0.05	−0.16	−0.18	−0.67*
	(0.93)	(0.59)	(0.55)	(0.53)	(0.02)
Intensity of Flaws			0.10	0.09	-0.31*
			(0.59)	(0.63)	(0.02)
Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election	1.03**	0.11			
	(0.00)	(0.12)			
No. Previously Flawed Elections	−0.09	0.03			
	(0.18)	(0.29)			
Polity, t-1	0.03	−0.03	0.02	0.02	0.12**
	(0.31)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.45)	(0.00)
Prior Liberalization	−0.02	0.03+	−0.02	−0.02	0.02
	(0.12)	(0.05)	(0.62)	(0.57)	(0.63)
Democ. in the Region, t-1	0.13+	0.04	0.00	0.00	0.00
	(0.09)	(0.37)	(0.95)	(0.94)	(0.92)
No. Densely Democratic IGOs, t-1	0.03+	−0.01	−0.02	−0.02	−0.00
	(0.09)	(0.38)	(0.47)	(0.47)	(0.86)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.12	0.02	−0.02	−0.02	−0.24
	(0.37)	(0.82)	(0.88)	(0.90)	(0.10)
GDP Change, t-1			−0.02	−0.02	−0.03*
			(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.01)

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Main Election					0.81**
					(0.00)
Constant	−1.12**	−0.59**	−2.41**	−2.37**	−0.90*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.01)
Observations	304	303	264	264	216
R-squared	0.44	0.20			

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

C.3. Effect of US Enforcement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Postelection, Previous Election:					
US Conditionality	−0.92+	−0.33			
	(0.06)	(0.28)			
US Diplomatic Engagement	0.20	0.26*			
	(0.32)	(0.05)			
Pre-election:					
US Conditionality	0.23	0.21			−0.19
	(0.20)	(0.16)			(0.71)
US Diplomatic Engagement	−0.27	−0.07			−0.01
	(0.11)	(0.66)			(0.97)
Post-election:					

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
US Conditionality			0.43	0.30	
			(0.46)	(0.66)	
US Diplomatic Engagement			5.35**	0.31	
			(0.00)	(0.59)	
Postelection Opposition Protests			1.19**	0.24	
			(0.00)	(0.66)	
Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests				5.43**	
				(0.00)	
Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election	−0.03	−0.04			
	(0.86)	(0.77)			
Pre-election Enforcement	0.07	−0.05			−0.08
	(0.66)	(0.74)			(0.79)
Postelection Enforcement			−4.57**	−4.01**	
			(0.00)	(0.00)	
Election Observers Present					0.34
					(0.30)
Election Observer Criticism			−0.19	−0.15	
			(0.58)	(0.67)	
Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election	−0.29*	0.53**			
	(0.05)	(0.00)			
Opposition Coalition	−0.29+	0.00			0.27
	(0.07)	(0.99)			(0.32)

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Incumbent Running	0.03 (0.77)	0.08 (0.41)	−0.14 (0.68)	−0.22 (0.56)	−0.66* (0.02)
Intensity of Flaws			0.03 (0.90)	−0.05 (0.82)	−0.30* (0.02)
Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election	1.04** (0.00)	0.12+ (0.07)			
No. Previously Flawed Elections	-0.10 (0.11)	0.03 (0.37)			
Polity, t-1	0.03 (0.33)	−0.03 (0.36)	0.03 (0.44)	0.05 (0.20)	0.12** (0.00)
Prior Liberalization	−0.01 (0.38)	0.04* (0.01)	−0.01 (0.69)	−0.00 (0.99)	0.02 (0.68)
Democ. in the Region, t-1	0.14+ (0.06)	0.04 (0.37)	0.00 (0.99)	−0.01 (0.81)	0.01 (0.89)
No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1	0.03+ (0.08)	−0.01 (0.40)	−0.05 (0.16)	−0.05 (0.18)	−0.01 (0.74)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.11 (0.40)	0.04 (0.66)	0.05 (0.78)	0.02 (0.93)	−0.24 (0.11)
GDP Change, t-1			−0.03 (0.28)	−0.03+ (0.10)	−0.03* (0.01)
Main Election					0.79** (0.00)
Constant	−1.14** (0.00)	−0.61** (0.00)	−2.26** (0.00)	−1.79** (0.00)	−0.87* (0.02)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Observations	304	303	263	263	216
R-squared	0.42	0.20			

Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

C.4. Effect of UN Enforcement

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Postelection, Previous Election:					
UN Diplomatic Engagement	−0.14 (0.61)	−0.31 (0.12)			
Pre-election:					
UN Conditionality	1.39** (0.00)	-0.17 (0.66)			
UN Diplomatic Engagement	0.12 (0.60)	0.52** (0.01)			−0.08 (0.84)
Post-Election:					
UN Diplomatic Engagement			0.81 (0.10)	−3.60** (0.00)	

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict	DV: Postelection Concessions		DV: Alternation
Postelection Opposition Protests			1.22** (0.00)	1.08** (0.00)	
Regl. IGO Dip. Engt. * Protests				4.71** (0.00)	
Postelection Enforcement, Previous Election	0.08 (0.55)	0.15 (0.15)			
Pre-election Enforcement	−0.13 (0.34)	−0.19 (0.12)			−0.07 (0.79)
Postelection Enforcement			0.23 (0.45)	0.26 (0.36)	
Election Observers Present					0.35 (0.28)
Election Observer Criticism			−0.07 (0.83)	0.03 (0.93)	
Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election	−0.30* (0.04)	0.54** (0.00)			
Opposition Coalition	−0.30+ (0.05)	0.02 (0.89)			0.26 (0.32)
Incumbent Running	0.01 (0.91)	0.06 (0.52)	−0.30 (0.26)	−0.38 (0.15)	−0.65* (0.02)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
Intensity of Flaws			0.11	0.09	−0.32*
			(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.02)
Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election	1.04**	0.15*			
	(0.00)	(0.03)			
No. Previously Flawed Elections	−0.10	0.03			
	(0.13)	(0.44)			
Polity, t-1	0.02	−0.03	0.01	0.01	0.11**
	(0.54)	(0.21)	(0.73)	(0.71)	(0.00)
Prior Liberalization	−0.01	0.04**	−0.04	−0.03	0.02
	(0.43)	(0.01)	(0.25)	(0.48)	(0.66)
Democ. in the Region, t-1	0.13+	0.04	0.02	0.02	0.01
	(0.08)	(0.44)	(0.68)	(0.55)	(0.87)
No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1	0.04+	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01	−0.01
	(0.07)	(0.67)	(0.73)	(0.72)	(0.75)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1	−0.11	0.04	0.03	0.00	−0.24
	(0.45)	(0.65)	(0.86)	(0.98)	(0.11)
GDP Change, t-1			−0.01	−0.01	−0.03*
			(0.68)	(0.83)	(0.02)
Main Election					0.77**
					(0.00)
Constant	−1.10**	−0.66**	−2.49**	−2.43**	−0.86*
	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.00)	(0.02)
Observations	304	303	259	259	213

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
	DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws	**DV: Change in Elec. Obs. Verdict**	**DV: Postelection Concessions**		**DV: Alternation**
R-squared	0.43	0.23			

The very few instances of UN postelection conditionality caused these variables to drop from the models. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag. Models 1–2 are OLS models with country fixed effects and clustered standard errors. Models 3–5 are probit models with robust standard errors clustered on country. Sample = Models 1 and 2: elections following a flawed election. Models 3–4: flawed elections won by the incumbent. Model 5: elections that follow a flawed election won by the incumbent.

Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

C.5. Selection Models: Effect of Postelection Enforcement on Electoral Conduct

	(1)		(2)	
	Selection: Postelection Conditionality, previous elec.	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**	**Selection: Postelection Dipl. Engt., Prev. Election**	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**
Postelection Conditionality, Previous Election		1.21** (0.00)		0.22 (0.19)
Postelection Diplomatic Engagement, Previous Election		−0.20+ (0.09)		0.77* (0.01)
Pre-election Enforcement		−0.12 (0.25)		−0.11 (0.32)

(*Continued*)

	(1)		(2)	
	Selection: Postelection Conditionality, previous elec.	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**	**Selection: Postelection Dipl. Engt., Prev. Election**	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**
Election Observer Criticism, Previous Election	−0.24 (0.27)	−0.13 (0.29)	0.70** (0.00)	−0.36** (0.01)
Opposition Coalition		−0.26+ (0.07)		−0.28+ (0.06)
Intensity of Flaws, Previous Election		0.77** (0.00)		0.76** (0.00)
No. Previously Flawed Elections		−0.14** (0.00)		−0.17** (0.00)
No. Previously Flawed Elections, Previous Election	0.26** (0.00)		0.25** (0.00)	
Democracy in the Region, t-1		0.04* (0.02)		0.04* (0.03)
No. Densely Democratic IG0s, t-1		0.02** (0.01)		0.02* (0.02)
Regional Democratic Commitments, t-1		−0.17* (0.01)		−0.13+ (0.05)
Military Expenditures (log), Previous Election	−0.18** (0.00)		−0.08* (0.02)	

(*Continued*)

(*Continued*)

	(1)		(2)	
	Selection: Postelection Conditionality, previous elec.	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**	**Selection: Postelection Dipl. Engt., Prev. Election**	**DV: Change in Intensity of Flaws**
No. Membership in IGOs with Enforcement Mechanisms	0.32*		−0.02	
	(0.03)		(0.88)	
ρ (rho)		−0.66**		−0.63**
		(0.00)		(0.01)
Constant	1.38+	−0.31*	0.06	−0.27+
	(0.08)	(0.04)	(0.93)	(0.10)
Observations	274	274	274	274

Treatment-effects selection models with robust standard errors clustered on country. "t-1" denotes a one-year lag. Sample = elections following a flawed election.
Robust p values in parentheses

+ = significant at 10%; * = significant at 5%; ** = significant at 1%

NOTES

Chapter 1

1. Armenian Opposition Party Faces Obstacles to Election Campaign, *BBC Monitoring*, April 17, 2007. See also Opposition Candidate's Proxies Reportedly Beaten up in Armenia, *BBC Monitoring*, April 27, 2007.
2. Albania's Berisha to Fight Election Result. *Europe Information Service*, September 19, 2001.
3. Pro-West Ukraine Opposition Leader calls on Europe to Intervene, *Agence France Presse*, November 22, 2004.
4. West Soft on Azerbaijan Election, Advocacy Group Says, *Agence France Presse*, November 23, 2005.
5. Finnemore and Sikkink (1998).
6. These include regional commitments to democracy adopted by the African Union, CIS, COE, ECOWAS, OAS, OSCE, and SADC, as well as election monitoring handbooks published by the Carter Center, COE, EU, NDI, OSCE, SADC, and United Nations, among others. For a compendium of documents detailing international electoral obligations, see the Carter Center's Project on Democratic Election Standards (http://www.cartercenter.org/peace/democracy/des_development.html).
7. Relatedly, Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006) argue that joining IGOs helps democratizing states make credible commitments to reform.
8. See ch. 8, especially pp. 234–236 on US aid.
9. On the weaknesses of the Polity and Freedom House indexes, see Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland (2010), and on human rights indexes see McCormick and Mitchell (1997).
10. For a review of the literature on international influences on elections, see Kelley (2012b).
11. Cheibub, Gandhi, and Vreeland's (2010) dichotomous coding scheme focuses on electoral competition and alternation in power as two key elements of democracy; the literature on hybrid regimes identifies electoral quality as the main factor distinguishing electoral democracies from electoral authoritarian regimes (Diamond 2002; Levitsky and Way 2010a; Morse 2012; Schedler 2006).

12. See Howard and Roessler (2006); McFaul (2005); Van de Walle (2006); Bunce and Wolchik (2010a); McFaul (2010); Way (2005); Hale (2005); and Tucker (2007).
13. Under certain conditions, monitoring can have perverse unintended consequences by inducing leaders to shift toward tools of manipulation that are more difficult to verify and punish (Hyde and O'Mahoney 2010; Ichino and Schundeln 2012; Simpser and Donno 2012).
14. See, for example, Ostrom (1990), Keohane (1984), and Dai (2002).
15. Donno (2010); see also Kelley (2012a, 101).
16. See Mansfield and Pevehouse (2006, 2008); Pevehouse (2002b); Reinhardt (2003); and Russett and Oneal (2001). On international institutions and credible commitments in a broader set of issue areas, see Goodliffe and Hawkins (2006); Simmons and Danner (2010); Simmons (2000); and Stone (2002).
17. Stone's (2002, 2004) research on variation in IMF conditionality underscores this point, as does Horne's (2009) experimental study of norm enforcement, which concludes that "[t]o understand compliance, we need to explain both enforcement and people's expectations of enforcement" (130).
18. See, for example, Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Joachim (2003); Kollman (2008); Krook and True (2012); Panke and Petersohn (2012); Price (1995); Rutherford (2000); Sandholtz (2008); and Zacher (2001).
19. One exception is Klotz's (1995) study of international sanctions against apartheid. See also Walldorf (2010). Other research on enforcement includes Gilligan (2006), Johns (2012), Marcoux and Urpelainen (2012), and Mayerfeld (2003), but these studies focus on the formal rules of particular international institutions, rather than on international norms writ large.
20. Johnston (2001) explains social pressure as a process whereby "pro-norm behavior is rewarded with social and psychological markers from a reference group with which the actor believes it shares some level of identification" (494).
21. See Cardenas (2004); Fearon and Wendt (2002); Finnemore and Sikkink (1998); Kim and Sikkink (2010); and Kornprobst (2007).
22. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights similarly claims for each person the right to vote and to run for office in contests that are conducted by secret ballot and that guarantee free expression (Article 25).
23. See Elklit and Svensson (1997) and Elklit and Reynolds (2005) for a discussion of the criteria for evaluating whether an election is free and fair.
24. For a catalog of the "menu" of manipulation, see Schedler (2002a).
25. Other studies similarly assume that incumbents are the primary perpetrators of misconduct (e.g., Birch 2011; Simpser 2013).
26. On the effects of human rights shaming, for example, see Hafner-Burton (2008) and Lebovic and Voeten (2009).
27. See Acevedo and Grossman (1996); Dimitrova and Pridham (2004); Emerson et al. (2005); Hawkins (2008); Kelley (2004); Legler, Lean, and Boniface (2007); Pridham (2005); and Vachudova (2005).
28. See, for example, Cooper and Legler (2001b); Halperin and Lomasney (1998); Kuzio (2005); Millett (1994); and Vachudova (2010).
29. See, for example, McClintock (2001) and Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon (2004).
30. For example, Kelley (2012a) and Hyde and Marinov (2012).

31. Within this group, there is of course variation in institutional competence and in the strength of democratic commitments. For example, the CIS's electoral activities are widely understood as an attempt to offset the influence of the OSCE and other Western actors in the former Soviet republics, rather than reflecting a sincere commitment to electoral integrity.

Chapter 2

1. Research on the EU's engagement with its membership candidates is one exception (see Dimitrova and Pridham 2004; Hughes, Sasse, and Gordon 2004; Kelley 2004; Pridham 2005; Schimmelfennig 2001, 2002; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Smith, K. 2001; and Vachudova 2005, 2010). Studies on naming and shaming human rights violators also address the consequences of noncompliance, although they focus on just one tool in the international community's toolkit (cf. Hafner-Burton 2008; Lebovic and Voeten 2006, 2009).
2. Taking a partisan stance in elections leaves international actors open to being criticized for favoritism and meddling. For this reason, a focus on process and neutrality is deeply engrained within the democracy promotion community (Gershman and Allen 2006). Although the United States has made its preferences about electoral outcomes known in certain well-known cases—such as the 2006 Palestinian election and the 2005 elections in Lebanon—this type of position taking is the exception rather than the rule.
3. Some view fraud as a tool of last resort in regimes with declining popularity (cf. Magaloni 2006), but Simpser (2013) demonstrates that even strong, popular incumbents have powerful incentives to manipulate elections. Institutional and societal factors, such as the nature of the electoral system, the type of election management bodies, the level of socioeconomic inequality, and the strength of civil society, also shape incentives for misconduct (Birch 2007, 2011; Lehoucq 2002; Lehoucq and Molina 2002; Ziblatt 2009).
4. Kalandadze and Orenstein (2009) find that only two of five successful postcommunist electoral revolutions resulted in a subsequent improvement in political rights.
5. On how elections can delay postconflict reconstruction and inflame tensions, see Flores and Nooruddin (2009, 2012).
6. See also de Nevers (2007) on the selective imposition of norms by great powers.
7. See also Parish, Peceny, and Delacour (2007) on Venezuela's use of oil wealth to fend of political pressure.
8. West Soft on Azerbaijan Election, Advocacy Group Says, *Agence France Presse*, November 23, 2005.
9. See also OAS Opposes Condemning Peru Election; U.S. Fails to Muster Support Against Vote, *Washington Post*, June 1, 2000, A15.
10. See, for example, Estonia Urges EU to Act Quickly in Ukraine Election Row," *Agence France Presse*, November 22, 2004.
11. European Commission officials, External Relations Directorate, interviews with author, Brussels, Belgium, June–July 2005.
12. See Tomz (2007) for an application of this insight to cooperation in international debt markets.

13. In practice, this distinction is not black and white. Conditionality not only employs concrete sticks and carrots; it also sends a normative message about a government's international standing. And diplomatic engagement may generate indirect material costs for governments, for example, if foreign aid decreases in response to criticism from international organizations or election observers (Lebovic and Voeten 2009; Hyde 2011b).
14. On the effects of human rights shaming, see also Brysk (1993); Franklin (2008); Krain (2012); Murdie and Davis (2012); Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink (1999).
15. President Calls for New Elections in Dominican Republic, *Associated Press*, July 15, 1994.
16. In a similar vein, Sorens and Ruger (2012) find that governments' political gains from repression typically outweigh the future economic costs of reduced foreign direct investment.
17. One study of Ukraine's 2004 election finds, for example, that when it was perceived as partisan, Western involvement was unwelcome to voters (Shulman and Bloom 2012). On the negative effects of partisan intervention in Lebanon's 2009 election, see Marinov (2013).
18. Hyde and Marinov (2013) refer to these as "sore loser" protests.
19. On the role of election observers in providing credible information about fraud allegations, see Hyde and Marinov (2013).
20. See also Glenny (2000) and Sandford (2000).
21. Tucker (2007) identifies outcome-changing electoral fraud as a focal point that helps citizens overcome their collective action problems.
22. In their discussion of postelection protests, Tucker (2007) and McFaul (2010, 211) note this possibility. More generally, research on the effects of "naming and shaming" concludes that shining an international spotlight on human rights violations increases the costs of repression (cf. Brysk 1993; Franklin 2008; Hawkins 2002; Krain 2012; Risse, Ropp, and Sikkink 1999).
23. Kendall (2007).
24. Experimental research has found that recommendations and policy positions by international actors influence voters' decisions about whom to support (see Corstange and Marinov 2012; Linos 2011).
25. See, for example, early research on the international dimensions of third wave democratic transitions (Pridham 1991; Whitehead 1996).
26. On the constraining effects of treaties, see Hathaway (2003); Hill (2010); Neumayer (2005); and Simmons (2009).
27. See also Greenhill (2010).
28. On the power of formal commitments, see, for example, Avdeyeva (2007); Kelley (2007); Nelson (2010); and Simmons (2000).

Chapter 3

1. See Schedler (2002a) on the challenges of determining the "blurry frontiers" that distinguish between electoral authoritarian regimes and democracies.
2. On the tools of misconduct, see also Calingaert (2006); Lehoucq (2003); and Schedler (2006).

3. A list of included countries appears in appendix A. Elections without multiparty competition are not included because they do not meet the minimal threshold for an election to be potentially competitive. The classification of single-party elections is based on data from Simpser and Donno (2012).
4. See Elklit and Svensson (1997) and Elklit and Reynolds (2005) for criteria to evaluate whether an election is free and fair.
5. This excludes cases in which isolated instances of misconduct are limited to one or a few localities outside of government control. For example, elections in Moldova in 1998 and 2001 experienced manipulation in the breakaway region of Transdniestr. I code such cases based on electoral conduct in the government-controlled areas of the country only.
6. For more information on the NELDA data set, see http://hyde.research.yale.edu/nelda/. At the time of this writing, NELDA stopped after 2006. For elections held in 2007, answers to the four NELDA questions listed in this section were gleaned via original coding supervised by the author.
7. Questions 13, 15, 16, and 47 in the data set. NELDA records information for each election round. If the answer to these questions for any round of an election was "yes," I code the election as flawed.
8. Data on the presence of observers was taken from Simpser and Donno (2012) and was further coded by the author based on the online records and reports of the observation agencies, as well as searches of international news reports done in the LexisNexis Academic database.
9. See Kelley (2009) and Bjornlund (2004) on the credibility of different observer groups.
10. Missions from the United States include those composed of members of Congress, the House of Representatives' Helsinki Monitoring Committee, or those organized by the US State Department or USAID.
11. Because the NELDA data set is also based in part on news reports, this exercise was a second comprehensive scouring of the same pool of sources.
12. For elections coded based solely on news reports, more than one source had to confirm the presence of misconduct in order for an election to be considered "flawed."
13. Appendix A shows each country's region classification. Estimates in figure 3.1 are generated using the lowess smoothing method in Stata 11.
14. Intensity can also be conceptualized in different ways, such as the likelihood that misconduct influenced the outcome of the election. However, it is notoriously difficult to assess the effect of misconduct on election results. Although parallel vote tabulations can shed light on the effects of ballot fraud, there is no method to quantify the effect of pre-election misconduct—such as media bias—on election results. The measure of intensity employed here has the advantage that it can be coded with a higher degree of accuracy and objectivity and with relatively few missing observations.
15. Missions from the United States include those composed of members of Congress, the House of Representatives' Helsinki Monitoring Committee, or those organized by the US State Department or USAID.
16. See appendix B for details on the coding of this variable.
17. The label "clean" does not imply that the election was perfect, but rather that flaws, if present, were isolated and not part of a nationwide pattern.

18. Data on IGO membership come from the Correlates of War (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), Version 2.3. Polity scores come from Marshall and Jaggers (2008).
19. In total, twenty organizations are identified as possessing democratic commitments. See table 4.1 for details.

Chapter 4

1. To identify this set of IGOs, I searched for the presence of democratic commitments in the larger sample of fifty-five regional IGOs featured in Pevehouse's studies on IGO membership and democracy (2002a, 2002b, 2005), which is based on information from Banks and Muller's *Political Handbook of the World* (various years).
2. See, for example, Ostrom (1990).
3. See Abbink and Hesseling (2000); Carothers (1997); Daxecker (2012b); Hartlyn and McCoy (2006); Hyde (2007; 2011b); Ichino and Schundeln (2012); Kelley (2012a); Lean (2007); McCoy (1998); Middlebrook (1998); Nevitte and Canton (1997); Pastor (1998); Santa-Cruz (2005); Simpser and Donno (2012).
4. EU Voices Concern over Kyrgyzstan Elections, *Europe Information Service*, October 14, 2000.
5. The four-month window helps ensure that policies unrelated to the election are not counted. Research conducted while coding the data indicates that if international actors do respond to electoral misconduct, they typically do so well within this window, usually within one to two months before or after the election.
6. For positive accounts of US use of aid and other policy instruments to promote democracy and human rights, see Azpuru et al. (2008); Gibler (2008); and Lai (2003).
7. Many studies document inconsistencies in US promotion of democracy and human rights. See Apodaca and Stohl (1999); Blanton (2000); Cutrone and Fordham (2010); and Thyne (2010).
8. On the Stabilization and Association Program, see Phinnemore (2003); on PCAs, see Dannreuther (2004).
9. On its increased ability to shame human rights violators, for example, see Lebovic and Voeten (2006).
10. UN Department of Political Affairs, http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/undpa/main/issues/elections/ (accessed July 2011). On UN electoral assistance, see also Joyner (2002) and Ludwig (2004).
11. See also Boutros-Ghali (1992, 1996).
12. On the repeated interplay between the "sovereignty" resolution and a competing resolution authorizing increased UN involvement in elections, see Kelley (2012a, ch.2).
13. This is true for the UN's defense of human rights norms more generally (see, for example, Forsythe 2012).
14. These are organizations that, as of 2008, possessed a founding treaty, amendment, or resolution that specifies democracy as a condition or goal of membership. Information on democratic commitments was coded using the websites of the IGOs, as well as the *Yearbook of International Organizations* (Union of International Organizations, 2005–2006), the *Political Handbook of the World* (Banks and Muller various years), and news reports from LexisNexis Academic Universe. Of the

fifty-five organizations that were investigated, information could not be found for nine that were dissolved or became inactive after the Cold War.

15. This is defined as the stipulation of democracy as a requirement or precondition for membership. Aspirational commitments that "express support" for democratic principles are not considered to be binding commitments.
16. The presence of such procedures is coded based on the IGOs' founding treaties, amendments, or official resolutions.
17. On Latin America as a pioneer in international election monitoring, see Santa-Cruz (2005). On NATO's role in consolidating democracy in Central Europe, see Barany (2004), Gheciu (2005), and Gibler and Sewell (2006).
18. On the importance of legalization and democratic density for effective conflict resolution, see Hansen, Mitchell, and Nemeth (2008).
19. On the APRM, see Killander (2008).
20. On the robustness of ASEAN's commitment to the norm of noninterference, see Acharya (2004).
21. Cambell (2012).
22. Estimates of effects are taken from OLS regressions, with the three attributes entered as independent variables. The unit of analysis is the IGO. The dependent variable is the consistency of enforcement in response to flawed elections.
23. Because they are highly correlated, each of these measures is entered in a separate model.
24. Data on GDP in millions of constant 2000 US dollars are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators (worldbank.org/data).
25. Data on annual military expenditures in thousands of constant 2000 US dollars are taken from the World Bank's World Development Indicators.
26. Data are in constant 2000 US dollars.
27. Data are from Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland (2009). Countries with larger populations are more likely to be elected for temporary seats on the UNSC (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010). Consistent with the idea that these seats are politically consequential, research has shown that UNSC membership is associated with higher receipts of foreign aid (Kuziemko and Werker 2006), less stringent aid conditionality (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2010), and favorable treatment from the World Bank (Dreher, Sturm, and Vreeland 2009).
28. If the verdicts of two or more groups diverged, the variable is coded as the most critical of the verdicts. See chapter 3 and appendix B for information on coding.
29. This variable sums the country's number of memberships in regional IGOs that have adopted formal commitments to democracy (listed in table 4.1).
30. Countries are coded as belonging to one of the following regions: Asia, sub-Saharan Africa, Latin America and Caribbean, Europe, Middle East and North Africa, and the former Soviet republics.
31. Accordingly, Lebovic and Voeten (2009) find that the World Bank is more likely to punish human rights violators when the UN Commission on Human Rights issues a critical resolution that provides information and signals the acceptability of enforcing rights abuses.
32. Models for the United Nations are not reported, because there are too few cases of UN conditionality.

33. In results not shown here, models predicting the imposition of any tool of enforcement display a similar pattern: the United States is unresponsive to information about misconduct, and enforcement by the EU and regional IGOs is more likely when election observers criticize the election and the country is a repeat offender.
34. Ten of seventeen cases of US conditionality in the region were not accompanied by regional IGO enforcement.

Chapter 5

1. See table 3.1 for the forms of misconduct associated with each category.
2. See appendix B for an explanation of how these variables were constructed.
3. Because of gaps in the presence of election observers over time in some countries, this variable is coded as the change in verdict in the current election compared to the last election that hosted international observers.
4. I employ fixed-effects OLS regression.
5. In results not reported here, the findings for international enforcement hold in parsimonious models with no control variables.
6. Howard and Roessler's (2006) data on opposition coalitions were used for the fifty elections included in their analysis. Remaining elections were coded using news sources gleaned from the LexisNexis database. Each case was coded by two individuals working independently; coding discrepancies were resolved by the author. A case is coded as having an opposition coalition if most (including the largest) opposition parties cooperate in one of three ways: by creating a new party or formal coalition that appears on the ballot; by creating a coalition of parties or candidates that campaign together, although individual parties still appear separately on the ballot; or by uniting behind a single opposition presidential candidate. Groupings of small parties that exclude one or more large opposition parties are not coded as coalitions; conversely, a case is coded as a coalition if it includes all major opposition parties even if one or more minor parties do not join.
7. This variable comes from NELDA (Hyde and Marinov 2012), which defines the incumbent leader as the individual identified in the *Archigos* data (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009).
8. Data on IGO membership come from the Correlates of War (Pevehouse, Nordstrom, and Warnke 2004), Version 2.3. Polity scores come from Marshall and Jaggers (2008).
9. For legislative elections, the victor is defined as the party receiving the largest number of seats in the legislature.
10. Questions 32 and 39 in the NELDA data set (Hyde and Marinov 2012) contain information on whether "results that did not favor the incumbent were cancelled" and whether the incumbent was replaced, meaning that the "leader of the country was different after the elections."
11. The stated reason for the protest had to be related to electoral misconduct in order to be coded. For elections with more than one round, only protests occurring after the last round were coded. Protests in the Americas and the postcommunist region were coded by the author using news sources drawn from the LexisNexis database, as well as reports from *Keesings Record of World Events* and *Europa World Yearbook*.

For countries in Africa, Asia, and MENA, protests were coded using Hyde and Marinov's (2012) data set on *National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy*, which records for each election whether there were "riots or protests after the election" that were "related to the handling or outcome of the election."

12. In results not reported here, the findings for international enforcement also hold in parsimonious models with no control variables.
13. Predicted probabilities are derived from simulations using the *CLARIFY* package for Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). Control variables in the simulations are held at their modal values (for dummy variables) or median values (for continuous and ordinal variables).
14. This variable is taken from question 24 in the NELDA data set, which codes information on whether the incumbent or ruling party loses the election (Hyde and Marinov 2012). Missing data points were filled in using Goemens, Gleditsch, and Chiozza's *Archigos* data set, which codes information on the occurrence of "regular" alternation in power through elections. At the time this data set was constructed, the NELDA and *Archigos* data sets ended their coverage in 2006. Elections in 2007 were coded by the author using *Europa World Yearbook Online* (www.europaworld.com), *Keesings Record of World Events*, African Elections Database (http://africanelections.tripod.com/), and news reports from LexisNexis Universe. In presidential elections, a "nonruling party candidate" is one that is not allied or affiliated with the president's party and is not his designated successor. In legislative elections, a "nonruling party" is one that is not allied with the incumbent or ruling party.
15. The findings for international enforcement also hold in parsimonious models with no control variables. The variable for election observers in this analysis codes whether an international election observation mission was present, rather than coding for the mission's verdict (which is only issued after the election, i.e., after the outcome of interest).
16. This variable is coded as a "1" for legislative elections in parliamentary systems and presidential elections in presidential or mixed systems. It is taken from Simpser and Donno (2012).
17. Predicted probabilities are derived from simulations using the *CLARIFY* package for Stata (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2001). Control variables in the simulations are held at their modal values (for dummy variables) or median values (for continuous and ordinal variables).
18. Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 45) similarly express doubt that opposition unity "stands alone" as a causal agent.
19. Pro-West Ukraine Opposition Leader Calls on Europe to Intervene, *Agence France Presse*, November 22, 2004.
20. European Commission, Directorate General for External Relations, interview with author, Brussels, Belgium, May 2010.
21. For the analyses predicting changes in electoral conduct, I estimate treatment-effects models (*treatreg* in Stata 11). For the analyses predicting incumbent concessions and alternation in power—which are dichotomous variables—I estimate bivariate probit models.
22. The results of these models are shown in appendix C, table C.5.

Chapter 6

1. See Gerring (2007, 91–93) on the use of "typical" cases for uncovering causal mechanisms and ruling out endogeneity.
2. When quoted, interviews are referenced in footnotes.
3. See Hartlyn (1998, ch. 8) for an overview of electoral conduct during the years of dictatorship.
4. Balaguer Agrees to Election Vote Recount, *Inter Press Service*, May 18, 1990.
5. Dominican Voters Welcomed Carter as Election Observer, *San Francisco Chronicle*, May 24, 1990.
6. NDI (1990).
7. Dominican Republic Electoral Board Announces Commission to Review Results, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 20, 1990.
8. Bosch's PLD had suffered a split in 1992 and did not unite behind a single candidate in 1994.
9. Election Results Still Uncertain, *Inter Press Service*, May 19, 1994.
10. Dominican Republic: U.S. Declares Elections "Fraudulent," *IPS Inter-Press Service*, May 21, 1994.
11. Ibid.
12. Gunson (1994).
13. Dominicans to Reject U.S. Influence, *United Press International*, July 11, 1994.
14. Dominicans Protest Alleged Fraud, *United Press International*, July 14, 1994.
15. Strikes against Alleged Electoral Fraud Spread to Various Regions, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, July 14, 1994.
16. Electoral Commission Finds Irregularities in Dominican Republic Vote, *Agence France Presse*, July 13, 1994.
17. President Calls for New Elections in Dominican Republic, *Associated Press*, July 15, 1994.
18. Electoral Commission Finds Irregularities in Dominican Republic Vote, *Agence France Presse*, July 13, 1994.
19. OAS Warns of Tension in Dominican Republic, *United Press International*, August 3, 1994.
20. U.S. Urges Balaguer to Fulfill Pre-Inaugural Promise, *Associated Press*, August 17, 1994.
21. U.S. Urges Balaguer to Fulfill Pre-Inaugural Promise, *Associated Press*, August 17, 1994.
22. OAS Report Says Election Timetable Violates Pact for Democracy, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, August 26, 1994.
23. State Department off the Fence, *Latin America Weekly Report*, June 30, 1994.
24. US Note on Forthcoming Elections Is Rejected by President and Causes Controversy, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, May 13, 1994.
25. In one typical broadcast, for example, ninety-nine minutes were devoted to the Milošević campaign, whereas the opposition coalition received only four minutes of airtime. See Pomfret (1996).
26. Renewal Movement Criticizes Conduct of Authorities." *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, November 7, 1996. Original source, Serbian Radio, Belgrade.

27. The United States issued similar calls for a halting of violence against protesters and respect for the election results, but ultimately did little other than to continue the long-standing targeted sanctions in place against the regime. On the EU and US response to the 1996 elections, see Washington Asks EU to Deny Trade Privileges to Serbia, *Agence France Presse,* December 3, 1996; 30,000 Students in Streets of Belgrade, *Agence France Presse*, December 5, 1996; Bildt Welcomes "Signs of Light" over Serbia, *Financial Times*, December 7, 1996; and EU Urges "Constructive Dialogue" in Serbia, *Agence France Presse*, January 9, 1997.
28. Coalition Leader Says Colleague Has Betrayed Opposition Cause, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, June 25, 1997.
29. Quoted in Independent Belgrade TV Reports on Rift in Opposition Coalition, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts,* June 25, 1997.
30. Pomfret (1996).
31. For a discussion of the shift in Western orientation, see Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 102–105).
32. On this particular dilemma, see Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 94–95).
33. Serbia's Main Opposition Parties in a Joint Commission with EU, US, *Agence France Presse*, December 4, 1999.
34. Serbian Mayors Sign Deal on Heating Oil Delivery with EU, *Agence France Presse*, November 13, 1999.
35. Commission of the European Communities (2000); EU Pledges "Radical" Shift on Serbia if Milošević Falls, *Agence France Presse*, September 3, 2000, "
36. CE Sec-gen Calls for Ensuring Free Elections in Serbia, *ITAR-TASS*, July 29, 2000.
37. Serbian Opposition Meets US, EU Officials in Montenegro, *Agence France Presse*, January 19, 2000; Serbian Opposition Joint Action Pleases the West, Montenegro, *Agence France Presse*, January 20, 2000; Serbia's Democratic Opposition Hails Easing of EU Sanctions, *Associated Press*, February 10, 2000.
38. The poll was conducted by the Centre for Politicological Research and the Public Opinion Institute for Social Services, both in Belgrade. Results taken from Bjekic (1999).
39. Quoted in Greek Foreign Minister, Serbian Opposition Candidate Hold Talks, *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, September 9, 2000.
40. 18 Justice Officials Sacked by Serb Parliament for Backing Opposition, *Agence France Presse*, July 12, 2000; Yugoslav Parliament Names Commission to Take Charge of Polls, *Agence France Presse*, July 25, 2000.
41. Graham (2000).
42. Glenny (2000).
43. Sandford (2000).
44. For a detailed account of the events of October 5–6, see LeBor (2004, ch. 24).
45. European Commission, Directorate for External Relations, interview with author, May 2010.
46. Bunce and Wolchik (2011, 321) discuss the prospect of European integration as a key factor in shaping postelection outcomes.
47. EU and Serbia Ink Key Pact Ahead of Vote, *EurActive.com*, April 30, 2008, http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/. Accessed July 2010.

48. Bilefsky, Dan, May 21, 2012. "Newly Elected, Serb Affirms Commitment to Joining European Union." *The New York Times.*

Chapter 7

1. Armenian President Describes Elections as "Last Exam" for Council of Europe, *BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit*, March 16, 1999.
2. Council of Europe Official Said Shocked by Situation in Armenia Ahead of Polls, *Financial Times Information*, April 24, 2003.
3. Council of Europe to Send Fact-Finding Team to Armenia, *Financial Times Information,* August 17, 2003; Armenian President Meets Council of Europe Monitoring Group, *Financial Times Information*, July 7, 2003; Council of Europe Presses Armenia, Azerbaijan on Democratization, *Agence France Presse*, September 9, 2003.
4. PACE Notes Violations at Parliamentary Poll in Armenia, *ITAR-TASS News Agency*, June 23, 2003.
5. OSCE Encourages Armenia to Amend Election Laws, *Financial Times Information*, July 23, 2003.
6. Armenians to Vote on Curbing President's Powers, Dual Citizenship, *Agence France Presse*, November 25, 2005.
7. Armenian Poll to Test Quality of Ties with Europe–EU Official, *BBC Monitoring Trans Caucasus Unit*, March 24, 2007.
8. Halpin (2007).
9. In total, eighteen of the parties that competed failed to win any legislative seats. Some of these parties were aligned with the government, however.
10. Zohrab Mnatsakanian, Permanent Representative of Armenia to the Council of Europe, interview with author, Strasbourg, France, May 2010.
11. Ibid.
12. Bunce and Wolchik (2010a). See especially footnote 46.
13. Though subsequent analyses using election forensics suggest that Kibaki was not the legitimate winner (Gibson and Long 2009; Kanyinga, Long, and Ndii 2010).
14. See also Anderson (2003).
15. Bloomfieldin (2007).
16. Bosire (2008).
17. Rice (2008a).
18. Carmichael (2008).
19. Bengali (2008a).
20. Kenya's Odinga Said Ready to Hold Talks with Kibaki through Mediator, *BBC Monitoring Africa*, January 1, 2008.
21. Kenya's President Kibaki Says Ready for Talks with Opposition, *Voice of America News*, January 4, 2008.
22. Bosire (2008a).
23. Bengali (2008b).
24. Kennedy (2008).
25. Bosire (2008b).
26. Bosire (2008c).

27. Rice (2008b).
28. Crilly (2008).
29. Vogt (2008).
30. Pownall (2008). Rival Kenyan Leaders Meet for First Time Since Disputed Election. *The Associated Press.*
31. Annan Says Time "of the Essence" in Kenyan Negotiations, *BBC Monitoring Africa*. January 26, 2008.
32. Kenya Crisis Talks: I Will Not Be Provoked to Quit—Mediator Kofi Annan Assures, *BBC Monitoring Africa*, February 15, 2008.
33. Nicholson (2008).
34. U.S. Threatens to Intervene in Kenyan Crisis, *BBC Monitoring Africa*. January 31, 2008.
35. Maliti (2008).
36. Landry (2008).
37. Ibid.
38. Kenya Tana Delta Massacres Raise Election Violence Fear, *BBC News*, September 17, 2012; Kenyan Official Killed in "Secessionist Violence," *BBC News*, October 15, 2012; Viewpoint: Can Kenya Avoid Election Bloodshed? *BBC News*, October 16, 2012.
39. Thurber (1993).
40. Ibid.
41. Richburg (1998a).
42. Richburg (1998b).
43. See also International Monitoring Group Defends Work During Cambodian Polls, *Associated Press*, August 5, 1998.
44. See also Richburg (1998b).
45. EU Says Cambodia Elections "Freest and Most Democratic" Ever, *Associated Press*, July 30, 2003.
46. UNDP administrator William Draper, quoted in Brinkley (2011, 89).
47. Richburg (1998a).
48. AU Wants Togo President to Step Down, Endorses Regional Sanctions, *Agence France Presse*, February 25, 2005.

Chapter 8

1. Gooch (2011).
2. Mayerfeld (2003) discusses these points in comparing the ICC to "unidirectional" models of human rights enforcement.

Appendix B

1. This includes missions composed of US members of Congress, the Helsinki Monitoring Committee within the US Congress, or missions organized by the US State Department or USAID.

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INDEX

Page numbers in bold denote figures and tables.

abductions 138
accountability 22, 59
adaptation, strategic 185
Africa 5, 43, **55**, 76
African Union 16, 65, 71, 76
  effectiveness of enforcement by 118–**19**
  and Kenya 159
"Ago" monitoring group 146–8
Ahmed, Rafeeuddin (UN representative) 164
Akayev, Askar (Kyrgyz president) 108
Albania 1–3, 64, 97, 112
Albright, Madeleine (US secretary of state) 165
Algeria 69
Allen, Michael 38
alternation in power 24, 39, 42–4, 93, 112–16
  as component of accountability 107
  determinants of **114–15**
  in Dominican Republic 132
  effectiveness of IGOs in causing 119
  and electoral politics 184
American States, Organization of *see* OAS (Organization of American States)
Andean Community 16, 65
ANFREL (Asian Network for Free Elections) 57
Annan, Kofi (UN secretary general) 70, 152, 159
  and power sharing in Kenya 161
Arab Spring 175
Arab world 42
Armenia 1, 9, 17, 19, 30
  1998 and 1999 elections 146–7
  2003 elections 147
  case study 145–52
  compared to Cambodia 171
  consistency of enforcement in 83
  and Council of Europe 182
  failure of enforcement in 143
  and pressure from IGOs 173, 178
ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) 77, 144, 166
  and Cambodia 167, 170–1, 174
Asia 5, **55**, 68
authoritarianism 115, 151, 153 *see also* dictatorships
Azerbaijan 3, 25, 107, 146

Badawi, Abdulla (Malaysian foreign minister) 166
Balaguer, Joaquín (president of Dominican Republic) 2–3, 127–31
  and effects of enforcement 133
  and sensitivity to international criticism 30
balance of power 6, 38, 159
ballots, counting & tabulation of 95, 128
Bangladesh 107
Barkan, J.D. 153–4
Bayesian game theory 28
Bearce, D.H. 45
Belarus 35, 41
Bersih (Malaysia) 175
Bhasin, Tavishi 41
biased playing field **53**, 56, 84, 95
bias, institutional 6, 18, 21
Birch, Sarah 50–1
Bolton, John (US Assistant Secretary of State) 164
Bondanella, Stacy 45

Bosch, Juan (PLD leader) 128–9
"bounded" conclusions 50
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (UN secretary general) 70
Britain 158
Bulldozer Revolution 139
Bunce, V.J. 41, 50, 137, 152
Bush, George W. (US president) 67, 161

cabinet appointments 162
Cambodia 17, 19
  case study 163–72
  and enforcement by US and UN 143–4
  low geopolitical importance of 145
  post-Cold War engagement by UN 78–9
  superficial enforcement in 169–72
Cambodian People's Party (CPP) 163–4, 167–8, 171
Caribbean countries 78
CARICOM (Caribbean Community) 16, 80
  and coding of enforcement 65
Carothers, Thomas 181
Carter Center 93, 128–9, 132
  and coding of electoral misconduct 54
  and coding the severity of misconduct 57
Carter, Jimmy (US president) 128
Central America 78
Central American Integration System (SICA) 80
Chávez, Hugo 172
Checkel, J.T. 100
China 47
CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) 16, 71
civil liberties 107
civil service 140
civil war 145, 155, 165
clientelism 8
Clinton, Bill (US president) 67
Coalition for Clean and Fair Elections (Malaysia) 175
coalitions 43, 98, 184
  and alternation in power 116, 184
COE (Council of Europe) 5, 126, 137
  and Armenia 83, 143, 147–51, 182
  and coding of electoral misconduct 54
  and severity of misconduct verdicts 57
Cold War 4, 9, 27, 67
  and Cambodia 163
  and EU 68
  and international democratic norms 175
  and United Nations 70
COMESA (Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa) 16, 65, 71
commissions, independent 130, 161
  in Armenia 149
  in Cambodia 165
commitments, democratic 84, 100, 106
  by IGOs 71
  international 34, 46, 61
  negatively associated with alternation power 116
  and percentage of flawed elections **62**
Commonwealth Secretariat 54, 57
competition, political 59
compliance 20
  feigned 11
concessions, postelection 23, 31, 39–42, 108–12
  determinants of **110**
  effect of protests on **111**
  and influence of United States 120
  and institutional reform 37
  magnitude of 112
  and mass protests 110
  by opposition parties 161
concessions, tactical 153–4
conditionality 14, 16, 29–30, 126
  in Armenia 148
  in Cambodia 170
  as causal mechanism of enforcement **47**
  and consistency of enforcement 77
  determinants of **89–90**
  difficulty of imposing 32
  vs. diplomatic engagement 31, 38, 109, 178–9
  effect on compliance 18, 33, 101, 104, 107
  and election observers' verdicts **82**
  by EU 69, 126, 134, 140
  and improvement in electoral conduct 94, 100
  incentives to enforce 145
  and influence on voter choices 44
  in Kenya 143
  negative vs. positive 14
  in postcommunist Europe 37
  postelection 97, 101, 103, 123
  pre-election 19, 98, 101, 113
  and repeat offenders 83

reserved for weak states 92
in Serbia 140
as signal of international resolve 41–2
by United Nations 79
by United States 88–9
yields results 106
conflict, sources of 125 *see also* ethnic conflict
conflicts, postelection 31
constructivism 11, 20, 29, 178
corruption 8, 107, 165, 170
cost-benefit calculations 33
Cote d'Ivoire 2
Cotonou Agreement 25, 68
Council of Europe (COE) 16, 36, 146
courts 20, 33, 161
Crawford, Gordon 77
credibility of monitoring groups 9, 40, 117
credibility of opposition **47**
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia, International 139
crisis, postelection 109

Dahl, Robert 12
Dai, Xinyuan 40
Dakar Accords 31
Dayton Accords 136
decision making, collective 74
defections 109, 139
democracy 1, 65, 100 *see also* democratization
democracy-contingent benefits 9
democracy promotion/protection 15, 70, 75, 172
in Asia and Middle East 77
in Cambodia and Kenya 144
by IGOs 119
by United Nations 78
by United States 91
democratic change 4, 14–15, 125, 186
democratic density 74, 80, 100
Democratic Opposition of Serbia (DOS) 137–9
democratization 15 *see also* democracy
and elections 7–10
promotion of 25
in Serbia 136, 138
demonstrations 41, 130 *see also* protests
in Cambodia 168
in Dominican Republic 130
in Serbia 138
deterrence of misconduct 34–5
dictatorships 74 *see also* authoritarianism
diplomatic engagement 14, 18–19, 29
as causal mechanism of enforcement **47**
and concessions 42
vs. conditionality 31–2, 178–9
consistently applied 77, 92
effect on opposition protests 110
impact on postelection outcomes 33, 94, 97, 101
and improvement in electoral conduct 100
and institutional reform 37
not effective for changing electoral quality 104
pre-election 98, 101
and selectivity of enforcement 123
and socialization 101
tools of 81, 113
and UN Security Council membership 84
diplomatic missions *see* missions, diplomatic
"disappearances" 26
dispute resolution 2
Djindić, Zoran (Serbian prime minister) 135, 137
Dominican Liberation, Party of (PLD) 128
Dominican Republic 2, 17, 19, 125, **126**
1990 election 26
1994 elections 30
case study 127–33
and democracy promotion 125
and Haiti embargo 177
and indirect influence 180
and mechanisms of international influence **126**
and mediation missions 111
and OAS 92
Dominican Revolution Party (PRD) 128
Donno, Daniela 50, 54
Drašković, Vuk (Serbian politician) 135–7

East African Community 159
economic mismanagement 107
economic performance 115–16, 153 *see also* GDP growth
economic pressure 46
ECOWAS (Economic Community of West African States) 16, 65, 76
effectiveness of enforcement by 118–**19**

EDEN (Enforcement of Democratic Electoral Norms) 16, 49, 177
and coding of enforcement 66
and electoral politics 184
and explaining enforcement 65
and record of international repercussions 51
education 155
election administration bodies 140
election results, release of 132
elections 1
administrative reform 162
concessions after flawed 184
and democratization 7–10
flawed 13, 27, 52, **62**, **82**
free and fair 12, 52
intensity of flaws 97
legal framework 2, 53
management institutions 34, 40, 145
monitored 9
as nominal democratic cover 2
number of previous flawed 99, 123
presidential vs. legislative 112, 122
process vs. outcomes 14–15, 21, 181
sequence of two **23**
vicious cycle of flawed 104
Elections and Boundaries Commission, Independent (Kenya) 162
electoral assistance 71
Electoral Commission of Kenya 157
electoral conduct, changes in **102–3**, 117–18
electoral system design 53
Electoral Systems, Institute for (IFES) 129
El Salvador 78, 97
Eminent African Personalities, Panel of 159
ENEMO (European Network of Election Monitoring Organizations) 57
Energy for Democracy program 136–7
energy wealth 83 *see also* oil
enforcement, international norm 4, 6, 10, 125, 172
agents of 67–75
aligned with opposition parties 38–9
in Armenia, Kenya and Cambodia **144**
barriers to 29
in Cambodia 171
causal mechanisms of **47**
coding of 65–7
consistency of 77–80, 83
costs of 35
defined 13–14
and democratic change 21
determinants of **85–6**
domestic effects of 18
in Dominican Republic **126**, 133
effectiveness of 19, 98, 101, 108
effect of IGO attributes on consistency of **80**
effect on electoral conduct 33–8, **104**
and election observers' verdicts **82**
and electoral outcomes 21–4
by EU 120
and geopolitical importance 84
by IGOs 176
and incumbent resignations 42
intensity of 5
in Kenya 153
and mobilizing the masses 41
vs. monitoring 66–7
motivation for 126
obstacles to 75
and opposition incentives 43
postelection 38, 77, 116, 123
pre-election 44, 67, 77
probability of **87**
procedures for 79–80
regional variation in 75–7
relational theory of 76, 181
scope conditions 143
selectivity of 18, 35, 64, 92
in Serbia **126**
strength and consistency of 127
study of 11
superficial, in Cambodia 169–72
superficial, in Kenya 154
targets of 81
tools of 13–14, 29–33, 66, **126**, 143
unilateral vs. multilateral 88–91, 125
by United Nations 120
variation in 24, 81
when likely to fail 173
ENP (European Neighborhood Policy) 69, 149
"essential elements" clause 68
ethnic conflict 136, 144–5
in Kenya 152–4
ethnic identity 154
ethnicity, politicization of 163
EU Commission 57
EU (European Union) 25, 28

aid to Kenya 160
and Albania 64
and Armenia 143, 146
and Cambodia 167, 171
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and coding of enforcement 65
and conditionality **89–90**, 101
and consistency of enforcement **78**
and democracy promotion 16
and diplomatic engagement 32
effectiveness of enforcement by 118–20
and enforcement of democratic norms 68–70
and institutional reform 36
and Kenya 153
and Kyrgyzstan 67
rejuvenated 76
and Serbia 126, 134–5, 137, 140
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) 69, 149
Europe, Council of *see* COE (Council of Europe)
evidence on conduct of elections 50
executive power 33
Eyadéma, Gnassingbé (Togo dictator) 173

Falt, Eric (UN spokesman) 165
Fernández, Leonel 132
Florida in 2000 presidential race 13
foreign aid 7–8, 20
to Cambodia 144, 165–6, 169
democracy as condition of 68
and EU former colonies 25
to Kenya 153–5
and respect for human rights 69
to Serbia 139–40
fraud, electoral 1, 28, 50, 84, 127–9, 132
in Armenia 149
defined 12–13
and intensity of misconduct 56
in Kenya 152, 157
methods of **53**
and NELDA database 54
and observers 27
in Peru 36
in Serbia 134
Frazer, Jendayi (US diplomat) 158–9
Freedom House 8, 50
Frelimo party (Mozambique) 2, 36
Fujimori, Alberto (Peruvian president) 1, 31, 36
Funcinpec party (Cambodia) 163–4, 166–9

Gbagbo, Laurent (Ivorian president) 2
GDP growth 109, 112 *see also* economic performance
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) 171
genocide 170
geopolitical importance of countries 29, 81, 83–8
and probability of conditionality **87**
as shield against enforcement 92
geopolitical interests, competing 18, 22, 24–5, 88, 185
and enforcement of democratic norms 120, 177
and information 65
Georgia 2, 39, 41, 64, 140
Gerring, John 143
gerrymandering 53, 154, 172
Gershman, Carl 38
governments 21–4, 53, 107
Graham, John (US ambassador) 131
Guatemala 16
Gulf War 164

Haiti 78, 107, 130
harassment of opposition 54, 138
in Armenia 151
in Kenya 153
Hartlyn, Jonathan 128, 130, 133
Heritage Party (Armenia) 149–50
Honduras 75
Horne, Christine 76, 181
Howard, M.M. 15
human rights 183, 185
Inter-American Commission on 74
NGOs 30
norms 106
UN Commission on 25
Universal Declaration of 4, 12
violations 26–7, 135, 153
Human Rights Center, UN 171
Human Rights Reports, US State Department 54
hybrid regimes 1, 49–50, 74, 183, 185
Hyde, S.D. 51, 54, 185
hypocrisy, organized 4

identification cards, voter 130
identity and belonging 185
identity change 20
IFES (Institute for Electoral Systems) 129
IGOs (intergovernmental organizations) 7, 10, 27, 125–6
  attributes of **72–3**
  and conditionality **89–90**
  and consistency of enforcement **79–80**
  and democracy promotion 173
  densely democratic 106, 116
  and deterrence of misconduct 60–2
  and diplomatic engagement 32
  and EDEN 16
  and enforcement of democratic norms 71–5, 177
  power of 181–2
  and publicity 28
  and socialization 45
  source of leverage 120
  suspension of membership in 29
IMF (International Monetary Fund) 25, 179
incentives, material 12, 19–20, 38, 137
  and conditionality 113
  and democratic norms 185
  in Serbia 136
incentives, social 185
incumbent advantage 98, 106, 115, 122
incumbents, cheating 15, 21, 108, 140
influence on electoral conduct
  active vs. passive 182–3
information 18, 22, 26, 46, 128
  about electoral misconduct 27
  asymmetry of 186
  effect on enforcement 84, 92, 177
  vs. geopolitical interest 83–8
  and probability of enforcement **87**
Insulza, José Miguel (OAS secretary general) 75
intensity index of misconduct 56, **57**, 95–6, 99, 123
  and observer verdicts 101
Inter-American Democratic Charter 75
interest groups 20
International Crisis Group (ICG) 165, 171
international influence, mechanisms of **126**
international organizations, membership in 7, 45
international pressure, limits of 150–3
intervention in domestic politics 45
  unilateral vs. multilateral 120
intimidation 1, 93, 154, 164
  in Cambodia 167–8
IRI (International Republican Institute) 57, 163, 167
  and Cambodia 167–8, 171
isolation, international 134

Japan 166
JCE (Junta Central Electoral–Central Electoral Board), Dominican Republic 128–31
Joint International Observer Group (JIOG) 167
judiciary 31
Justice Bloc (Armenia) 147

Kalenjin ethnic group 162
KANU (Kenya African National Union) 112, 153, 155
Keck, M.E. 101
Kelley, Judith 51
Kenya 17, 19, 173
  2002 election 112
  2007 election 52
  case study 152–63
  Democratic Elections Forum (KEDOF) 157
  and enforcement of democratic norms 144
  and failure of enforcement 143
  and mediation missions 111
  and mixed results of enforcement 161–3
  and opposition coalitions 42–3
  and postelection concessions 41
  and power-sharing 176
Kenyatta, Uhuru (Kenyan politician) 155
Khmer Rouge 163–4, 166
Kibaki, Mwai (Kenyan president) 152–3, 155–60
  and international mediation 159, 161
Kikuyu ethnic group 157–8, 160, 162
Kikwete, Jakaya (Tanzanian president) 159
Ki-moon, Ban (UN secretary general) 158, 160
Kivuitu, Samuel (Kenyan election commissioner) 157–8
Kocharian, Robert (Armenian president) 143, 145–7, 150
Kosovo 136–7, 140
Koštunica, Vojislav 137–8
Kufuor, John (AU chair) 159

Kyrgyzstan 2, 24, 39, 108
2000 election 67

Lake, Anthony (US national security advisor) 67–8
Latin America and the Caribbean 80, 91
and human rights norms 106
percentage of flawed elections **55**
US track record for enforcement in 91
Latin American Economic System (SELA) 80
leaders, charismatic 38
Lebovic, J.H. 25
Leger, José (Dominican politician) 133
legislation, electoral 36, 148, 171
legitimacy, multilateral 16, 33, 91, 181
Levitsky, Steven 44, 165
LexisNexis Academic database 54
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (Kenya) 156
liberalization, prior 99, 106, 122
liberalizing outcomes 15
liberal peace 7
Liberia 76–7
Libya 26
Lindberg, S.I. 50
Lockerbie bombings 26
Lomé Declaration 71
López Obrador, Andrés Manuel (Mexican politician) 40
loyalty, political 154
Lukashenko, Alexander (Belarusian president) 35
Lutz, E.L. 30, 106, 183

Madagascar 31, 41, 107–8, 111
Malaysia 166, 175
malpractice index 51
Maltz, Gideon 115
Manoukian, Vazgan (Armenian politician) 145
Mansfield, E.D. 34, 60
Marinov, Nikolay 51, 54, 113
McCurry, Michael (US State Dept.) 131
mechanisms of influence, indirect 179–81
Meciar, Vladimír (Slovakian president) 44
media 30, 50, 54–5, 93 *see also* press freedom
access to 36, 175
bias in Armenia 146–7
bias in Cambodia 168
bias in Kenya 157
freedom 59
in Serbia 134, 139
state control of 172
media freedom 145, 154
mediation 6, 41, 94, 126
by ASEAN in Cambodia 166
conflict 10
in Dominican Republic & Serbia 126
effect on postelection concessions 111
in Kenya 152, 158–61
and pressure to compromise 112
Mejía, Hipólito 132
Mercosur 16, 65, 80
Mexico 26, 36, 130
2006 election 40
and reforms 94
Michel, Graca (South African first lady) 159
military coups 69, 75, 77
military expenditures 123
military interests 24
military might 119
military power 83
Millennium Challenge Corporation, US (MCC) 30, 149
Milošević, Slobodan 40, 126, 133–41
misconduct, electoral 4, 26, 132
in Armenia 145, 147, 150
changes in intensity following flawed elections **96**
claims of **126**
coding of 52–6
contexts where likely 8
culpability for 13
defined 12–13
deterrence of 35
factors affecting intensity of **105**
improvement 23–4
intensity of 84, 94, 101, 115, 117
intentional 28, 81, 178
in Kenya 162
patterns of 18
politics of 183
pre-election 53, 150
pre-election, in Cambodia 167–8
prevalence of **55**, 175
qualitative issues 57
and reliable information 27
repercussions of 10
severity of 56–60, 88, 95
studying 49–52
tools of 12, 27, 52, **53**
underreporting of 55

missions, diplomatic 3, 6, 14, 16, 31
effect on misconduct 107
and institutional reform 37
mobilization, mass 46, 110
in Kenya 161
in Serbia 135
models, game-theoretical 28
Moi, Daniel arap (Kenyan president) 43, 152–5
monitoring 10, 38, 65, 177 *see also* observers, election
encourages tactical concessions 172
vs. enforcement 66–7
monitors, domestic 40
most-favored-nation-status 171
"Mount Kenya Mafia" 155
Mozambique 36, 172
Mugabe, Robert (Zimbabwean president) 35, 162
murder 167
Murdie, Amanda 41
Mutua, Alfred (Kenyan government spokesman) 159
Mwanawasa, Levy (Zambian president) 24

Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 146
narcotics 165
National Democratic Institute (NDI) 128
National Election Committee (Cambodia) 167, 171
nationalism 140
National Unity Party (Armenia) 147
National Unity, Party of (Kenya) 156–7
NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization) 16, 135, 141
natural resources 25
NDI (National Democratic Institute) 54, 128–9, 133
and coding the severity of misconduct 57
negotiations, multilateral 133
NELDA database 51–2, 54
Ng'ethe, Njuguna 153–4
Nicaragua 70, 78
Nigeria 25
Nikolic, Tomislav (Serbian politician) 140–1
noncompliance 20
norms, democratic 4, 44, 184–6

OAS (Organization of American States) 3, 5, 25–6, 91, 125–30, 132
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and coding of enforcement 65
and democracy promotion 16
Democratic Charter 75
and EDEN 16
effectiveness of enforcement by 118–**19**
engagement with Dominican Republic 92, 133
and Peru 31
rejuvenated 76
and coding the severity of misconduct 57
and United States 121
observers, election 3, 5, 9, 27–8, 128–9
in Armenia 146–8
in Cambodia 168
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and conditionality 81
criticism from 84, 88, 92, 99, 123
effects on enforcement and conditionality 81, **82**
EU, in Cambodia 168
EU, in Kenya 157–8
and history of electoral conduct 28
as an international norm 51
and justifying punishment 29
not effective for changing electoral quality 104
reports on intensity of misconduct 10, 50, 57, 74
in Serbia 138–9
and strategic adaptation 185
verdicts **58**, 95, **96**, 97, 101
Odinga, Raila (Kenyan politician) 152, 155–6, 158
and international mediation 159, 161
and power-sharing 160, 162
oil 3, 24–5, 68, 183
opposition parties 2, 19, 126, 181
and alternation in power 44
in Armenia 143–4, 147, 149
in Cambodia 168
conditionality's effect on unification of 113
and effects of enforcement 176
and electoral conduct 117–18
and electoral outcomes 21–4
empowerment of 31, 94, 161
exclusion of candidates 50, 64
fragmentation of 42, 173
incentives to unite 6, 38, **126**

and indirect influence 180
and international actors 109
in Kenya 152–4
lack of 47
in Serbia 134–8
unified 9, 18, 105, 107
voter support for 18, **126**
weakness of 6, 18, 21–2, 144–5
Orange Democratic Movement (Kenya) 156–8, 161
Orange Revolution (Ukraine) 39, 108
Orinats Yerkir (Country of Law) party (Armenia) 149–50
OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) 5, 16, 28, 94, 126
and Armenia 143, 146, 148, 150
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and enforcement of democratic norms 74
and institutional reform 36
and post-Soviet states 182
rejuvenated 76
and Serbia 137–8
and coding the severity of misconduct 57
Otpor (Serbian student organization) 138, 140
outcomes, electoral **23**, 107

Pact for Democracy 3, 131, 133
Pakistan 68
Paraguay 183
Paris Accords 164, 169
Paris Consultative Group 153
Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) 68
party systems 33, 50
passive mechanisms of international influence 44–6, 95, 182
patronage 8, 115, 162, 169
peace, civil 24
peacekeeping missions, UN 163–4
peace, sustainable 70
Peña Gómez, Juan Francisco (PRD leader) 129–32
Peou, S. 166
Peru 1, 16, 26, 36, 176
election of 2000 31
and postelection concessions 41
Pevehouse, J.C. 34, 45, 60
on IGOs' enforcement of democratic norms 74
on membership in densely democratic organizations 100
Peynado, Jacinto 132
Philippines 2, 166
PLD (Party of Dominican Liberation) 128–9, 132
Poland 28
police harassment 64
policies, politically neutral 117
political context of enforcement 99
politics, electoral 183–4
politics, internal 126, 173
Polity project 8, 50
intensity index of misconduct **59**
scores 99
postcommunist regimes 8, 109, 184
percentage of flawed elections in **55**
power-sharing agreements 144, 152–3, 160, 162
PRD (Dominican Revolution Party) 128–9, 132
press freedom 8, 33, 139 *see also* media
protests 19, 22, **126**, 128 *see also* demonstrations
in Armenia 147, 150
countries with history of 8
destabilizing effects of 40
in Dominican Republic 130
effect on postelection concessions 39, 42, 94, **111**
empowered by enforcement 109
and indirect influence 180
limited effect on outcomes 113
in Malaysia 175
and mobilizing the masses 41
postelection 18, 25, 108, 184
in Serbia 135, 139
PRSC (Revolutionary Social Christian Party) 128, 132
pseudodemocratic regimes *see* hybrid regimes
public confidence 93, 132, 157, 162
publicity 28, 46, 177
punishment 18, 21–2, 46
as deterrence 34
justifiability of 29
near-term effects 35
politically motivated 181

punishment (*Cont.*)
and retaliation 25
and United States 30
and UN Security Council membership 84

quantitative analysis 17
quotas, gender 11

Rainbow Coalition, National (Kenya) 155–6
Rainsy, Sam (Cambodian finance minister) 166, 168–9
Ramaphosa, Cyril 160
rationalism 11, 21, 29, 178, 185
Ratsiraka, Didier (Malagasy president) 108
Ravalomanana, Marc (Malagasy president) 31
realists 20–1
referendums 148, 162
reform, economic 136
reforms, institutional 6, 18, 94, **126**, 127, 131–2
in Armenia 148–9
as channel of international influence 19
and conditionality 30
in Dominican Republic 131–2
and indirect influence 180
influence on electoral conduct 35–7, 103
in Kenya 153, 156, 160–2
resulting from enforcement **47**
refugees 164–5
regime change 38
regional diffusion 45, 182
regional organizations 133, 170, 181–2
see also IGOs (intergovernmental organizations)
democratic 10, 60, 95, 182–3
membership in 123
regional regimes 75–7
repeat offenders 5, 29, 81, 92, 178
and selectivity of enforcement 122
repression 41, 50, 113, 118
in Kenya 153
Republican Party (Armenia) 147, 149
reputational costs of norm violations 45–6, 60–1
research design 15–17
resignations, incumbent 39
restrictions, governmental **53**, 56, 84, 95
Revolutionary Social Christian Party (PRSC) 128, 132
revolutions, electoral 8, 24, 184
Rice, Condoleezza (US secretary of state) 67, 161
Roessler, P.G. 15
Romania 93
Rose Revolution 147
Roussias, Nasos 50
Rudolph, Christopher 185
rules of representation 50
ruling elite 107, 109, 184
Rushton, Simon 70
Russia 25, 47, 74, 107
assistance to Armenia 151
and OSCE (Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe) 182
and Serbia 137

SADC (Southern African Development Community) 16, 65, 76
Sam Rainsy Party (Cambodia) 166–8, 171
sanctions 4, 13, 26, 29
approval of 31
destabilizing effects of 113
effectiveness of 122
on Serbia 43, 133–4, 137–8
on South Africa 44
Sargsian, Serzh (Armenian politician) 150
Schedler, Andreas 39, 50
scope conditions 143–4
Security and Co-operation in Europe, Organization for (OSCE) 5, 126
security forces 108–9, 147
selectivity of enforcement 18, 35, 64, 121–3, 178
Sen, Hun (Cambodian president) 163–5, 169
consolidation of power 165–9
and international donors 171
response to criticism 172
Serbia 2, 17, 19, 125, **126**
1996 election 134–5
2000 election 138–9, 179
case study 133–41
and democracy promotion 16, 125
elections after the revolution 139–41
and limits of international pressure 152, 177
and mass protests 40
and mechanisms of international influence **126**
membership in EU 141
and opposition rivalry 43
and postelection concessions 39

Serbian Movement of Renewal (SPO) 135
shaming 6, 14, 16, 94, 126
considered cheap talk 32
in Dominican Republic & Serbia 126
effect on misconduct 107
effect on postelection concessions **111**
and electoral history 99
of human rights violations 41, 65
and institutional reform 37
pre-election 101
as a tool of enforcement 30
and UN Security Council membership 84
Shevardnadze, Eduard (Georgian president) 41
Sierra Leone 97
Sihanouk, Norodom (king of Cambodia) 163, 166–7
Sihanouk, Ranariddh (prince of Cambodia) 164–9
Sikkink, Kathryn 30, 101, 106, 183
Simmons, B.A. 25, 46
Simpser, Alberto 54
Singapore 166
Slovakia 44
smuggling trade 130
socialization 11, 20–1, 45, 100
South Africa 76
sovereignty, state 9, 25, 71
Soviet Union 67–8
Spain 130
stability vs. democracy 69, 144
in Cambodia 166
in Kenya 158, 173
Stabilization and Association Agreements (SAAs) 68, 137, 140
state resources, misuse of 93, 168
status, international 138
Strohal, Christian 149
students 135, 138
Subotic, Jelena 185

Tadić, Boris (Serbian president) 139–41
talks, internationally mediated 126
Ter-Petrossian, Levon (Armenian president) 145–6
terrorism, transnational 24, 67, 158
Thailand 166
theory building 17
third wave of democratization 7, 76
Thomas, Christopher (OAS secretary general) 131–2
threats 35, 84, 117
time horizon, government's 35, 37
and postelection concessions 47
Todorović, Dragan (Serbian politician) 140
Togo 173
torture 26
trade relations 8, 24, 135, 140
Transnational Authority in Cambodia, UN (UNTAC) 164–5, 170
transparency, electoral 93, 147, 157, 181
treaties 10, 20, 45, 183
on European Union 71
tribunals, electoral 36
Trujillo, Rafael (president of Dominican Republic) 127
turnout, voter 6, 33, 43, **47**
affected by conditionality 113
in Armenia 146
in Cambodia 167
drives 9
effect on outcomes 107–8
in Kenya 157
in Serbia 139
turnover, electoral *see* alternation in power

Uganda 36
Ukraine 2, 16, 28, 39, 52
and electoral fraud 107, 118
and mediation missions 111
uncertainty about norm violation 24, 26–7
United Nations 4, 26, 30
in Cambodia 164–5
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and coding of enforcement 65
and consistency of enforcement **78**
and EDEN 16
effectiveness of enforcement by 118–**19**
and enforcement of democratic norms 70–1, 176–7
General Assembly 166
Security Council 26, 84
and coding the severity of misconduct 57
United States 3, 125, 127, 129–30
and Armenia 143
and Cambodia 167, 170
and coding of electoral misconduct 54
and coding of enforcement 65
and conditionality 88–9, **89–90**, 173

and consistency of enforcement 77, **78**
and Dominican Republic 133
and EDEN 16
effectiveness of enforcement by 118–20
effectiveness of reinforcement by 176
and enforcement of democratic norms 67–8
and Kenya 153, 158, 160
and Latin America 121
and partisan approach to assistance 181
and punishment 30
and Serbia 134, 137
and coding the severity of misconduct 57
State Department 32, 51, 64
and support for Milošević 136
and unilateral enforcement 91–2
weakness of enforcement by 120

Van de Walle, Nicolas 116
Venezuela 26, 41, 130
Venice Commission for Democracy through Law 148, 150
Vietnam 166
violence 93, 132, 143
in Cambodia 163–5, 168
electoral 145, 163
in Kenya 152–3, 158, 162
normalization of 154
visa liberalization 140
Voeten, Erik 25
vote buying 128, 132
vote count irregularities 93, 127
voter lists, inaccuracies in 36, 140
voter registration 93, 162
inaccuracies in 3, 128–30, 132
voter satisfaction 116
voters' attitudes 38
voters, disenfranchised 3

Way, L.A. 44, 165
wealth 119
Weidemman, Ken (US ambassador to Cambodia) 170
Were, Melitus (Kenyan MP) 160
West, linkages with the 7, 44
winner-take-all systems 8
Wolchik, S.L. 41, 137, 152
World Bank 119, 170, 179

Yost, Casimir 128
Yuschenko, Viktor (Ukrainian president) 3, 118

Zajedno coalition (Serbia) 134–5, 137
Zambia 24, 93
Zimbabwe 35, 52, 76, 107