CHINESE STRATEGIC CULTURE AND FOREIGN POLICY DECISION-MAKING

Confucianism, leadership and war

Huiyun Feng

ASIAN SECURITY STUDIES

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This book examines the motivations and intentions of a rising China. While most scholarly work on this question approaches it at a structural level by looking at the international system and its impact on China's foreign policy, this book tests rival hypotheses by examining the beliefs of contemporary Chinese leaders and their strategic interactions with other states since 1949, when the communist regime came to power. The focus is on tracing the historical roots of Chinese strategic culture and its links to the decision-making of six key Chinese leaders via their belief systems. Applying both qualitative and quantitative analysis, the book draws upon the disciplines of history, psychology, and political science to provide a better understanding of China's past and present, and its strategic culture. In addition, an assessment is made concerning the impact of China's rise on major US security concerns in the Asia Pacific, especially the future of Taiwan. The findings suggest that the Chinese leaders are not offensive realists, as often thought, but, rather, defensive Confucian leaders.

This book will be of much interest to students of Chinese politics, Asian security, international relations, and US foreign policy.

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TO MY PARENTS,
XIUHUA WANG AND HAORAN
FENG, AND MY MENTOR,
STEPHEN WALKER

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ABBREVIATIONS

APEC	Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN	Association of South East Asian Nations
CBMs	confidence-building measures
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CPV	Chinese People's Volunteers
DPP	Democratic People's Party
GMD	Guo Min Dang
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	New Security Concept
NMEs	nonmyopic equilibria
NUC	National Unification Council
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PRC	People's Republic of China
ROK	Republic of Korea
TIP	Theory of Inferences about Preferences
TMD	theater missile defence
TOM	Theory of Moves
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act
UN	United Nations
VICS	Verbs in Context System
WTO	World Trade Organization

1

CHINA AS A RISING POWER

> The art of war, then is governed by five constant facts to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. These are: The moral law; Heaven; Earth; the commander; method and discipline.
>
> Sun Tzu

> War is an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will.
>
> Clausewitz

> Let China sleep, for when the Dragon awakes, she will shake the world.
>
> Napoleon

Will there be a war between the US and China now that China is rising and catching up? China is the largest remaining communist state that is dictatorial, nationalistic, and, at the same time, uncivilized to many Westerners. What kinds of problems will such a state pose to the world? In order to explore the decision-making motivations behind China's decisions for war, in this book I construct a historical analysis of the roots of Chinese strategic thinking by key Chinese leaders during three major war cases—the Korean War (1950–53), the Sino-Indian War (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese War (1979). Did Chinese leaders follow a defensive or offensive strategic culture when making foreign policy decisions for war? The central conclusion from this analysis is that Chinese decision-makers followed the norms of a defensive strategic culture, which questions the view that China has an offensive realist culture. How and why this pattern occurred within a communist revolutionary regime is an intriguing historical and cultural puzzle with political and strategic implications for the future, which I address by also analyzing China's new leaders Jiang and Hu–Wen.

First, I present a theory of strategic culture that examines the historical roots of China's foreign policy, unlike many realist descriptions and analyses of Chinese foreign policy behavior which focus on material power. This theory aims at better understanding some unique Chinese behavior on the world stage as well as predicting Chinese foreign policies regarding current disputes over Taiwan and other strategic issues. My theoretical framework draws heavily from the cognitive branch of social psychology and from game theory in political science to advance three major propositions: first, Chinese strategic culture is defensive in nature; second, Chinese leaders under this defensive culture display a preference for peaceful strategies rather than aggressive ones; third, Chinese foreign policy behavior as analyzed during three major wars is in line with a defensive subjective game of strategic interaction.

This argument employs cultural norms—deeply rooted, shared beliefs—to broaden the understanding of international relations especially of countries other than Western Europe and America, which have experienced different historical and cultural influences. The mainstream theory in Western political science—realism—has been under attack for decades. Chinese foreign policy behavior, in particular, poses a serious puzzle to neorealist, balance-of-power, offensive or defensive realist theories. Moreover, the constructivist cultural realist argument by Alastair Iain Johnston also fails in its deterministic insistence on the exclusive impact of a Parabellum strategic culture of offensive realism in Chinese grand strategy, which results in the wrong prediction that Chinese leaders under this strategic culture are all offensive in nature.[1]

After identifying the deviations in Chinese behavior from the predictions of these theories, this book presents new propositions to understand, explain, and predict the dynamics of Chinese foreign policy behavior. Why and how did the policies of the revolutionary Mao and the reformist Deng differ under similar crisis or non-crisis situations? What are the causes of these differences? Contrary to the predictions of realist theories, why do leaders' beliefs change over time and across situations of war and peace? This analysis aims to catch the variations and changes of leaders' beliefs under different temporal, social, and historical contexts in order to specify and delineate the conditions under which different decisions are made and why beliefs differ between leaders and change across situations.

To test my argument that Chinese strategic culture is defensive in nature, I use both quantitative content analysis and qualitative case study methods to test its main hypothesis against rival hypotheses from structural realist and cultural realist arguments, both of which predict offensive Chinese behavior. Quantitative methods provide scientific rigor and permit the analysis of several leaders under different situations. This book will employ a quantitative content analysis of Chinese leaders' public statements through an automated computer program, the Verbs in Context System (VICS).

Quantitative results can be replicated easily due to the application of automated content analysis, which provides high reliability. Together with in-depth case studies, VICS provides a closer mapping of the decision-making process, clarifies further the causal chain of actions, and supplies the necessary clues for tracing strategic interactions between China and its adversaries. Sequential game theory links the historical case studies and psychological content analysis methods, complementing each other with their respective contributions of behavior and beliefs in constructing patterns of strategic interaction.[2]

China as a rising power

Will China become the next enemy of the US? Is China going to be a benign power? Will there be war between China and the US over Taiwan? Will a change of leadership in China result in a new foreign policy dynamic? With the impressive economic growth of the last two decades, the answers to these questions have far reaching implications for the security of the Asia Pacific region and for world peace. The study of Chinese decision-making behavior also has significant policy implications for the US as the hegemon in the current international system.

In *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995), Alastair Iain Johnston has made a historical study of Chinese strategic culture and concludes that, historically, China's strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. He claims that as seen from its grand strategy, a realpolitik Parabellum strategic culture—not a Confucian strategic culture[3]—is guiding Chinese foreign policy behavior. Elsewhere Johnston argues, "Chinese decision makers have internalized this strategic culture [Parabellum strategic culture] such that China's strategic behavior exhibits a preference for offensive uses of force, mediated by a keen sensitivity to relative capabilities."[4]

Johnston's argument is problematic first because his use of classic Chinese philosophical works and military works raises issues of face validity.[5] I also question some of Johnston's interpretations of ancient Chinese language. Ancient Chinese language is different from modern Chinese language, which leads to quite different interpretations. One character in Chinese can have different pronunciations and can be translated into different meanings. For example, the word "*yi*" with a third tone can mean first "use," or "through means of," or "depending on," etc., much depending on the will of the writer and the context. Also, the punctuation of sentences may mean different things. Misinterpreting some key characters can result in a completely different meaning and understanding.

Johnston's sources also display a selection bias that some other scholars have pointed out.[6] His use of the Seven Military Classics focuses on military

strategies and the tactics of how to fight a war after it has started, which are appropriate only for war-fighting situations; the cases that Johnston uses to test his theory also focus mostly on military generals and not top political leaders. Further, his Ming Dynasty case ignores the fact that it is immediately after the Yuan Dynasty when the Mongols invaded the Han people's Southern Song Dynasty from the north. After the defeat of the Yuan Dynasty, the northern border of the Ming Dynasty was constantly harassed by the troops of the Mongols. Defense at the northern border was tough and urgent all the time because threats in the north were always high during the Ming Dynasty. On the other hand, the Ming Dynasty was weak in control and governance. The Mongols tried to take back the lands from the Han people. Therefore, the Ming Dynasty would naturally be a time of belligerence. Finally, Chinese behavior in the Korean (1950–53), the Sino-Indian (1962), and the Sino-Vietnamese (1979) cases shows a defensive pattern,[7] which is difficult, even impossible, to explain empirically using Johnston's theory. These puzzles lead me to question both Johnston's theory and his methodology.

Whether China's strategic culture is offensive or defensive in nature is an important question for describing and explaining Chinese foreign policy behavior. Different theories provide different explanations. Structural realism can only provide a partial explanation for Chinese foreign policies. It can hardly explain the balancing behavior of Mao's China during the height of the cold war. The post-cold war "new security practices" adopted by China's leaders are also difficult for the structural realists to fathom. China has not balanced against *power*, nor has China balanced against *threat*, as the balance of threat theory would predict.[8] Instead, China has formed friendly strategic "partnerships" constructively with most of the major powers in the world.

Offensive realists also fail in providing a comprehensive explanation of Chinese foreign policy behavior.[9] First, China did not expand in history when it was strong. Second, China did not seek a conflictual settlement over the South China Sea but has pursued a policy of "putting aside differences for mutual development" towards the other claimants. Third, during the Sino-Indian War, Chinese troops retreated back to the Chinese border without taking any disputed territory. Furthermore, the border issue between China and India was finally settled in 1994 through confidence-building measures.

While the foregoing suggests theories other than variants of realism are needed to explain Chinese foreign policy behavior, there is no denying that the international system constrains state behavior. As Reiter states, "the barebones structure of realism is a good starting point for understanding international relations,"[10] but as Reiter also acknowledges, the parsimony of realism limits the accuracy of predictions and displays an indeterminacy preventing falsification.[11] Chinese foreign policy decisions are under structural constraints, but domestic politics cannot be excluded from the picture.[12]

After the foundation of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949, Mao soon adopted the "lean-to-the-one-side" policy after calculating the choices presented under the bipolar system. However, the complex picture of domestic politics was the major reason for Mao's initiation of the Great Cultural Revolution. Bureaucratic politics also provides an institutional perspective in understanding some unique decisions by China.[13] "Unit-level factors, such as evolutions in weaponry and the development of nuclear weapons, also can play a decisive role."[14] Some unit-level factors can strongly influence systemic ones, as seen from the break-up of the former Soviet Union and the end of the bipolar international system in the early 1990s.

Moreover, to understand comprehensively and completely Chinese foreign policy behavior, the beliefs of individual Chinese leaders cannot be ignored or underestimated. The footprints of major Chinese leaders—Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping—can never be erased nor can the historical/philosophical impact of such major Chinese philosophers as Confucius, Mencius, and Sun Zi. Structural realist theories share the microfoundation of classical rationality borrowed from economic theories.[15] They assume that actors (states) do not differ in making rational decisions, acting to preserve their survival under the anarchic system where there is no overarching authority to oversee state interactions. However, as Herbert Simon points out, "If we take into account the limitations of knowledge and computing power of the choosing organism, then we may find it incapable of making objective optimal choices."[16] Therefore, in decision-making, when state leaders are faced with limited information and knowledge, what we are discussing is bounded (subjective) rationality as opposed to substantive (objective) rationality when considering both the constraints from external situations and the limits of the organism in processing information.[17]

Consequently, structural realist theories that focus mostly on the external constraints of material power distribution for explanation are radically incomplete. As Simon points out, "To deduce the procedurally or bounded rational choice in a situation, we must know the choosing organism's goals, the information and conceptualization it has of the situation, and its abilities to draw inferences from the information it possesses."[18] Jervis also identifies the danger of war resulting from misperceptions of state leaders.[19] This possibility represents a common critique of structural realist theories. In response, structural realists argue that beliefs change and leaders also change or die. Leaders' beliefs never last, and are hard to measure or predict, and, therefore, remain epiphenomena. In addition, leaders constrained by the same structure and following the same material interests will react the same way regardless of their different historical and cultural experiences.

Some neoclassical versions of realist theories do tend to touch on the issue of leaders' beliefs when discussing state intentions and identities. Walt's balance of threat theory points to the threat perceptions of states; however, he does not specify how perception comes about but rather relies on material factors to

measure threat perceptions. Schweller provides us with a "zoo analogy" of states with different interests—revisionist (jackals and wolves) vs. status quo states (lions)—yet he does not elaborate where these identities come from, that is, why the "lions," "wolves," and "jackals" are what they are, and what motivates them to act the way they do. In addition, how we can tell for sure a state is a wolf when we see it, that is, what measurement can we apply?[20]

By admitting the necessity of realist arguments about structural constraints, other scholars have rediscovered a "realism-plus-beliefs" framework.[21] In two works in the 1950s, Nathan Leites studied the Soviet Politburo's Bolshevik doctrine regarding the exercise of power through analysis of "operational code" beliefs, that is, the conceptions of political strategy. The significance of his research was to point out that (Bolshevik) operational code beliefs significantly influenced Bolshevik decisions. The operational code is a psycho-cultural construct influencing the behavior of individuals. Who you are influences what you do.[22] Alexander George systematically refined the Leites approach and defined two sets of operational code beliefs; philosophical and instrumental beliefs.[23] Research by Ole Holsti and Stephen Walker developed a typology of belief systems that connected motivations with operational code beliefs.[24]A content analysis computer program, VICS, has recently been developed for "retrieving and analyzing a leader's operational code beliefs."[25]

The development of the operational code research approach provides useful tools to measure and analyze beliefs as elements of strategic culture. As a psycho-cultural construct, the operational codes of individual leaders can be studied through careful research designs and tested against rival theories for confirmation. When Jack Snyder first proposed the term strategic culture in the 1970s[26] to study its implications for foreign policy decision-making, he explicitly acknowledged that there is some significant "Soviet-ness" in Soviet behavior. Like Leites, he assessed the ideological impact of Marxist-Leninist thinking on Bolshevik decision makers' views of the world. Similarly, in the 1990s, studies of Gorbachev's beliefs as a leading cause of the collapse of the Soviet Union further popularized studies of leaders' beliefs.[27] I will employ operational code analysis at its current stage of development to analyze Chinese leaders.[28]

The focus of this book, therefore, is twofold: (1) the nature of Chinese strategic culture and its historical and philosophical roots, and (2) how strategic culture affects the decision-making of key Chinese leaders (Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, and Hu Jintao–Wen Jiabao) as they make decisions for war or peace. I use Johnston's argument about an offensive Chinese strategic culture as a starting point and test his hypotheses and my counter-hypotheses using the methodology of operational code analysis. I will also look backward into the Warring States Period when Confucianism was formed and then engage in a process-tracing analysis of Chinese decision-making in three wars (Korean War, Sino-Indian War, and Sino-Vietnamese War).[29]

Specifically, I analyze the operational codes of China's decision-makers in these wars to test the rival hypotheses that, contra Johnston, (1) Confucianism is a key factor in the historical origins of the Chinese strategic culture, and (2) it is still applicable in the policies of the PRC. Last, I include an analysis of the current leaders—Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao—to assess whether the new Chinese leaders will become more offensive-minded as China's national power grows and whether there will be potential conflicts in the Taiwan Straits, as many realist theorists have predicted.

The application of both quantitative and qualitative methods offers double verification of the results. A traditional case study is first carried out on the historical materials, and new evidence is introduced to process-trace how China's decisions for war were made under different historical circumstances. The documentation includes sources in both English and Chinese languages. Translations and interpretations inferred from Chinese sources are made by the author in some parts. Chinese *Pin Yin* is provided in the standard Mandarin form. A quantitative content analysis is also performed on the major leaders' speeches. The major sources for speeches are:

- the selected works of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai plus the following sources for Jiang, Hu, and Wen;
- *Beijing Review* (*Peking Review*);
- *People's Daily* (online version);
- Chinese Foreign Ministry and Embassies in Foreign Countries' web pages;
- Lexis-Nexis Academics; and the following archival and news sources:
  - Xin Hua News Agency Web;
  - FBIS (WNC);
  - *Far Eastern Economic Review*;
- National Security Archives; and the following archival sources for Mao, Deng:
  - international Cold War History Project;
  - transcripts of telegrams;
  - letters exchanged (Zhou to Nehru).

Variations in beliefs among China's leaders during different time periods show that leaders matter in relation to environment. Unlike the domination of a single strategic culture thesis advanced by Johnston, Chinese leaders' beliefs are actually much more complicated and display significant variance over time and settings. These differences in beliefs can help us understand the foreign policy behavior of China at a given historical time. Then, sequential game models developed by Steven Brams are used to link beliefs and behavior, because they mimic strategic interactions between states in a sequential manner.[30] To model more effectively the strategic preferences of Chinese leaders during particular strategic interactions, the subjective games embedded in their operational codes are analyzed with Brams' Theory of Moves (TOM).

The operational code construct

The operational code construct was developed by Nathan Leites to study the beliefs of the Soviet Bolshevik Politburo in the 1950s.[31] It was a psycho-cultural construct that incorporated cognition, character, and culture.[32] Alexander George modified this broader view of operational code in 1969 into two sorts of beliefs: "philosophical" and "instrumental" beliefs. Philosophical beliefs refer to the assumptions and premises made by an actor regarding the fundamental nature of politics and political conflict and the image of the opponent; the general prospects for achieving one's fundamental political values; the extent to which political outcomes are predictable; the extent to which political leaders can influence historical developments and control outcomes; and the role of chance. Instrumental beliefs, on the other hand, have to do with questions of correct strategy and tactics, such as the best approach for selecting goals for political action; how such goals and objectives can be pursued most effectively; the best approach to calculation, control, and acceptance of the risks of political action; the matter of "timing" of action; and the utility and role of different means for advancing one's interests.[33]

The operational code construct offers a perspective that bridges the gap between motivation and cognition as mechanisms of political choice.[34] Operational code analysis is advantageous for studying the systematic relationships between an individual's political beliefs and the needs for power, affiliation, and achievement.[35] Depending upon a person's constellation of needs for power, affiliation, and achievement, the contents of the operational code beliefs differ.[36] The motivational needs of leaders position them within a typology of belief systems in Figure 1.1 developed by Holsti and modified by Walker.

Four key beliefs locate a leader in the Holsti typology. The horizontal axis in Figure 1.1 represents the leader's belief in the degree of control over historical development (P-4). The vertical axis represents increasing friendliness and cooperation (upper-half) vs. increasing hostility and conflict (lower-half), attributed by a leader to self (I-1) and other (P-1). The VICS indices for these key operational code beliefs, P-4, I-1, and P-1, locate the coordinates for self (P-4a, I-1) and other (P-4b, P-1) within the Holsti typology. The location of self in a quadrant reveals the leader's strategic preferences for different political outcomes. For example, a leader with a Type A operational code attributed to self has the following strategic preference ranking: settle > deadlock > dominate > submit. The different types of beliefs represent different motivational imagery associated with operational code beliefs. Type A's beliefs contain images of affiliation while Type DEF expresses images for power. Types B and C share an image of achievement while differing in their images of power (Type B) and affiliation (Type C).[37]



Figure 1.1 Contents of the revised Holsti operational code typology. (Instrumental beliefs are in bold and philosophical beliefs are not.)
Source: Walker 1983, 2003

The typology is a dynamic one that can catch the variations in the beliefs of leaders under different contexts. A cooperative type leader might shift to conflictual type beliefs during war/crisis time or under diplomatic pressure. A leader's operational code beliefs can be very complex and vary over time and situations so that the same leader might exhibit different types of operational code beliefs under different situations. Operational code analysis focuses on the choice propensities of leaders through diagnosing the use of power by others in the political universe and on the leader's own propensities for exercising political power.[38]

STEPS IN THE VERBS IN CONTEXT SYSTEM

1. IDENTIFY THE SUBJECT AS

SELF OR OTHER

2. IDENTIFY THE TENSE OF THE TRANSITIVE VERB AS

PAST PRESENT FUTURE

AND IDENTIFY THE CATEGORY OF THE VERB AS

POSITIVE (+) OR NEGATIVE (–)

APPEAL, SUPPORT (+1) OPPOSE, RESIST (–1)

WORDS OR OR

PROMISE BENEFITS (+2) THREATEN COSTS (–2)

DEEDS REWARDS (+3) PUNISHMENTS (–3)

3. IDENTIFY THE DOMAIN AS

DOMESTIC OR FOREIGN

4. IDENTIFY TARGET AND PLACE IN CONTEXT

AN EXAMPLE

A quote taken from President Carter's January 4, 1980 address to the nation: "Massive Soviet military forces have invaded the small, non-aligned, sovereign nation of Afghanistan ..."

1. **Subject**. The subject is "Massive Soviet military forces" which is coded as other, that is, the speaker is not referring to his or her self or his or her state.

2. **Tense and Category**. The verb phrase "have invaded" is in the past tense and is a negative deed coded, therefore, as punish.

3. **Domain**. The action involves an actor (Soviet military forces) external to the speaker's state (the United States); therefore, the domain is foreign.

4. **Targets and Context**. The action is directed toward Afghanistan; therefore, the target is coded as Afghanistan. In addition, we designate a context: Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict-1979–88.

The **complete data line** for this statement is: other –3 foreign past Afghanistan Soviet-Afghanistan-conflict 1979–88.

Figure 1.2 Steps in the Verbs in Context System for coding verbs

Source: Walker *et al.* 1998

PHILOSOPHICAL BELIEFS

	Elements	Index*	Interpretation
P-1.	NATURE OF THE POLITICAL UNIVERSE (Image of Others)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Other Attributions	+1.0 friendly to –1.0 hostile
P-2.	REALIZATION OF POLITICAL VALUES (Optimism/Pessimism)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Other Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 optimistic to –1.0 pessimistic
P-3.	POLITICAL FUTURE (Predictability of Others' Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation** for Other Attributions	1.0 predictable to 0.0 uncertain
P-4.	HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT (Locus of Control)	Self Attributions divided by [Self plus Other Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low self control
P-5.	ROLE OF CHANCE (Absence of Control)	1 minus [Political Future × Historical Development Index]	1.0 high role to 0.0 low role

INSTRUMENTAL BELIEFS

	Elements	Index	Interpretation
I-1.	APPROACH TO GOALS (Direction of Strategy)	%Positive minus %Negative Transitive Self Attributions	+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high conflict
I-2.	PURSUIT OF GOALS (Intensity of Tactics)	Mean Intensity of Transitive Self Attributions divided by 3	+1.0 high cooperation to –1.0 high conflict
I-3.	RISK ORIENTATION (Predictability of Tactics)	1 minus Index of Qualitative Variation for Self Attributions	1.0 risk accept-ant to 0.0 risk averse
I-4.	TIMING OF ACTION (Flexibility of Tactics)	1 minus Absolute Value [%X minus %Y Self Attributions]	1.0 high to 0.0 low shift propensity
	a. Coop v. Conf Tactics	Where X = Coop and Y = Conf	
	b. Word v. Deed Tactics	Where X = Word and Y = Deed	
I-5.	UTILITY OF MEANS (Exercise of Power)	Percentages for Exercise of Power Categories a through f	+1.0 very frequent to 0.0 infrequent
	a. Reward	a's frequency divided by total	
	b. Promise	b's frequency divided by total	
	c. Appeal/Support	c's frequency divided by total	
	d. Oppose/Resist	d's frequency divided by total	
	e. Threaten	e's frequency divided by total	
	f. Punish	f's frequency divided by total	

Figure 1.3 Indices for philosophical and instrumental beliefs

Notes:

* All indices vary between 0 and 1.0 except for P-1, P-2, I-1, and I-2, which vary between –1.0 and 1.0. P-2 and I-2 are divided by 3 to standardize the range (Walker *et al.* 1998).

** The Index of Qualitative Variation is a ratio of the number of different pairs of observations in a distribution to the maximum possible number of different pairs for a distribution with the same N [number of cases] and the same number of variable classifications (Watson and McGraw 1980: 88).

A computerized automated content analysis system, VICS, was developed to perform a content analysis of public statements and draw inferences from these public statements. To the extent that a particular leader is in control of the state's behavior or to the extent that a leader's beliefs are shared by those individuals with the power to act on behalf of the state, these inferences then become predictions about a state's behavior.[39] The VICS scores are calculated through extracting values for six attributes in Figure 1.2 for each recording unit (verb) and its surrounding context: subject, verb category, domain of politics, tense of the verb, intended target, and context.[40]

The raw VICS scores are used to calculate aggregate scores and standard deviations from group means. The leader's operational code indices in Figure 1.3 are related in a hierarchical order. Content analyses of leaders' operational codes are conducted through the automated computer software Profiler Plus and the VICS dictionary.[41] The indices for I-1 and P-1 summarize the balance between the leader's attribution of cooperative and conflictual properties to self and others. P-4 scores show the leader's belief in his/her control over historical development. I-1, P-1 and P-4 are "key indices" because they summarize the information from the indices for all of the other beliefs in Figure 1.3 by calculating the balance between the two basic elements used to construct the indices: valence (+/–) and actor (self/other).[42]

Subjective games

Recent developments in the operational code research program indicate that a subjective games framework can help map out strategies, tactics, and moves. Steven Brams offers a TOM for 2 × 2 sequential games of strategy.[43] The Holsti typology provides the possibility of linking strategies with beliefs through subjective games following TOM. Subjective games can model the strategic interactions of players with ordinal preference rankings for the outcomes of settlement, domination, submission, and deadlock formed by the intersection of cooperation (CO) and conflict (CF) choices by two players.[44] A common culture could lead the players toward the same strategies over other alternatives.[45]

By using sequential game theory, it is assumed that most games have a history; therefore, it is essential that an initial state is specified. "The choice of the initial state, and what constitute future states and eventually an outcome, depends on what the analyst seeks to explain."[46] The payoffs for a game are strictly ordinal, and the final state or outcome is reached when the move–countermove process cannot proceed further by either player.[47] Because TOM is a sequential game theory, each move by one player alternates with the previous one taken by the other player. Instead of having just a Nash equilibrium,[48] in a sequential game there may also be different nonmyopic equilibria (NMEs)[49] based on which player is the initiator and what the initial state is. Thus, it provides more possibilities for actors to make strategic choices

of tit-for-tat or reciprocity and to avoid deadlocks. Brams identifies five rules of play for TOM:[50]

1 Players start at an outcome, called the initial state, which is at the intersection of the row and column of a 2 × 2 payoff matrix.
2 Either player can unilaterally switch its strategy, and thereby change the initial state into a new state, in the same row or column as the initial state. The player who switches is called player 1 (P1).
3 Player 2 (P2) can respond by unilaterally switching its strategy, thereby moving the game to a new state.
4 The alternating responses continue until the player (P1 or P2) whose turn it is to move next chooses not to switch its strategy. When this happens, the game terminates in a final state, which is the outcome of the game.
5 A player will not move from an initial state if this move:
   a leads to a less preferred final state (i.e., outcome); or
   b returns play to the initial state (i.e., makes the initial state the outcome).

Intersecting preferences for Self and Other from the Holsti typology identify the possible formal models of the subjective game in a leader's operational code belief system, based on the VICS scores calculated from a leader's public statements. In the Holsti/Walker typology, each type of leader has a corresponding preference ranking for outcomes depending on their instrumental and philosophical beliefs as shown in the following simple theory of inferences: Prop. 1 (Type A); Prop. 2 (Type C); Prop. 3 (Type DEF); Prop. 4 (Type B), where the midpoint of the vertical axis in the typology is divided between + and –, and the midpoint of the horizontal axis is divided between < and >.

A simple Theory of Inferences about Preferences (TIP)

Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit.

Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.

Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, <), then Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit.

Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, >), then Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.

By locating a leader in a quadrant of Figure 1.1, the leader's ranking of strategic preferences for Self and Other can be obtained. This ordinal preference ranking then can be inserted into the matrix for a subjective game.

The strategies of passive and active Confucian leaders are defined by the first two propositions while defensive realist and Parabellum offensive realist leaders are defined by the last two propositions above. Either type of leader may define others as similar or different from themselves. The following games may be played as examples based on this simple theory of preferences and TOM.

- When a Confucian leader (Self) in Quadrant A meets another Confucian leader (Other), the outcome is always settlement. The predicted outcome of this no conflict game will always be settlement (4,4), the best outcome for both (see No Conflict Game below). Brams (1994: 25) notes (4,4) is always an NME and Nash equilibrium in a no conflict game.
- When a Confucian leader in Quadrant A meets a defensive realist leader in Quadrant DEF, mutual cooperation is the predicted outcome as seen from the Mixed Motive Game below, where one player ranks cooperation (CO) highest while the other ranks conflict (CF) highest and settlement (4,3) is the NME (see Game 27 in Brams 1994: 217).[51]

When a Parabellum offensive realist leader in Quadrant B meets a defensive realist leader in Quadrant DEF and they both rank conflict (CF) highest, it generates a Total Conflict Game below with deadlock (2,3) as an outcome that is both an NME and a Nash equilibrium (see Game 11 in Brams 1994: 218). Brams has calculated the NMEs for the 57 2 × 2 ordinal games of conflict in which (4,4) is not an outcome.[52] In the case studies of subjective games for this book, I report the NME as the equilibrium for the subjective games of China's leaders from the Appendix in Brams (1994), based on an expanded theory of preferences developed by Walker and Schafer.[53]

	No Conflict Game			**Mixed Motive Game (27)**			**Total Conflict Game (11)**		
		Alter			**Alter**			**Alter**	
		CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF
	CO	4,4*	1,3	CO	4,3	1,4	CO	3,2	1,4
Ego				**Ego**			**Ego**		
	CF	2,1	3,2*	CF	2,1	3,2*	CF	4,1	2,3*
(I-1, P-4a)	Ego: (+, <)			(I-1, P-4a)	Ego: (+, <)		(I-1, P-4a)	Ego: (–, <)	
(P-1, P-4b)	Alter: (+, >)			(P-1, P-4b)	Alter: (–, <)		(P-1, P-4b)	Alter: (–, >)	

* Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. "A Nash equilibrium is a state—or, more properly, the strategies associated with a state—from which no player would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because its departure would immediately lead to a worse, or at least not a better, state. . . . In a two-person game, an NME is a state from which neither player, anticipating all possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a worse, or at least not a better, outcome" (Brams 1994: 224).

The expanded version of a simple TIP is "a more nuanced model of subjective games," based on inferences about the standard deviations of the leaders' operational code raw scores above or below the mean of the average world leaders' scores with respect to the master beliefs for Self (P-4a, I-1) and Other (P-4b, P-1). The signs for the six propositions below indicate whether the I-1 and P-1 indices are above (+) or below (–) the means (I-1 = +.33; P-1 = +.25) for a norming group (n = 35) of world leaders from different geographic regions and historical eras. The signs for the P-4 indices indicate whether they are greater than (>), less than (<), or within (=) one standard deviation (SD = .10) of the mean (P-4 = .21) for the norming group.[54]

An expanded TIP

Prop. 1. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate.
Prop. 2. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit.
Prop. 3. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit.
Prop. 4. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, <), then Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock.
Prop. 5. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, =), then Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit.
Prop. 6. If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, >), then Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit.

Conclusion

To sum up, this book emphasizes the role of beliefs in foreign policy decision-making and behavior. By tracing back historically the philosophical roots of Chinese strategic culture, an effort is made to answer the following questions: where do beliefs come from and what motivates state behavior? In looking more deeply at the motivational foundations of state identity, I argue that it is possible to understand and predict the foreign policy behavior of a particular state—no matter whether it is revisionist or status quo.

This chapter has provided a road map by presenting the main theoretical and empirical puzzles in this book and how I propose to solve them. Chapter 2 begins with a historical elaboration of how different strategic cultures were formed in China during the Warring States Period and why Confucianism blossomed and was practiced in political and foreign relations in Chinese history. This narrative is followed by demonstrating the method of content analysis and game theory's formal modeling for studying strategic culture and interaction. Chapter 3 provides an analysis of Mao and Zhou as revolutionary

leaders in the Korean War, while Chapter 4 focuses on the Sino-Indian War in the 1960s and the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979, with an emphasis on analyzing Deng Xiaoping as a reformist leader.

Chapter 5 focuses on three contemporary Chinese leaders (Jiang, Hu, and Wen) and three crises during their leadership (the Chinese Embassy bombing in Belgrade, the EP-3 incident in the South China Sea, and the Taiwan Strait election crises). This chapter is followed by Chapter 6—an analysis of the Taiwan Strait issue and a look at the future of Sino-American relations. Finally, a brief methodological appendix is also included as a reference for readers unfamiliar with automated content analysis or the analysis of sequential games in the operational code analysis research program.

2

CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND WAR

> History is always so old, and so new.
>
> Hsu Chuo-yun

> For more than a century, the U.S. has been the world's largest economy. The only nation with a chance of surpassing it in the next generation in absolute scale is China.
>
> Larry Summers[1]

Chinese philosophical thinking has deep cultural and historical roots impacting Chinese strategic behavior. According to the ancient Chinese philosophy of Confucianism, the Chinese are a people who love peace and harmony. Even the military strategist Sun Zi[2] stated the preferred strategic goal is to win a war without fighting (resorting to the use of force). This chapter provides a historical analysis of how different strategic cultures were formed during the Warring States Period in China by exploring the different schools of thought and how they evolved and were practiced in China's international relations. It will also discuss China's Confucian strategic culture, which provides a guidepost for Chinese strategic preferences. While Johnston argues that Chinese strategic culture exhibits an aggressive and expansionist preference, this chapter provides evidence from history that challenges Johnston's interpretation. To assess the merits of the Parabellum hypothesis of China's strategic culture and war, I use operational code analysis. This chapter will also look into why and how the operational code construct can help provide a valid and reliable explanation of Chinese strategic culture and beliefs.

China's strategic culture

To understand the philosophical roots of Chinese strategic beliefs, it is necessary to seek the historical origins of different philosophical beliefs. The Warring States Period (463–222 BC) was the time when major political institutions defining the Chinese state system were created. The creation of

the territorial state system was accompanied by the emergence of what later was called "a hundred schools of thought," among which Confucianism and Legalism were the major schools. This is also when major military works such as *The Art of War* were written. The Qin State succeeded finally in unifying China through Legalistic reformation (Lord Shang Yang was the major figure); however, it was Confucianism that finally won out in the philosophical struggles among different schools. From the Han Dynasty on, Confucianism was the major dominating state philosophy in the institutional and spiritual frameworks of the Chinese state.[3]

Hsu Chuo-yun argues that during the Zhou (Chou) Dynasty preceding the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States Period, a common cultural identity emerged, embracing the whole of China.[4] What the Chinese then saw as "China" or "Zhongguo" was only the northern part of the Yellow River with Luoyang[5] as the center. "Inter-state relations were conducted as though the leaders were cousins within a big extended family."[6] During the Warring States Period, "[A]ncient China witnessed considerable evolution in the nature of war, the composition of military forces, and the conduct of battle,"[7] and warfare was usually closely tied to rituals. The rituals conducted by the ruling family before and after wars brought about considerable suffering to the general population both materially and spiritually.[8]

The evolution of military warfare depended on improved productive capability as well as exploitation of the general public. The social, political, and military consequences of constant warfare were two-fold: on the one hand, the Warring States Period produced a large body of interesting military literature with Sun Zi's *Art of War* the best known. However, the period also saw a "hundred schools of thought" blossom, debating how to avoid endless warfare and improve the leaders' ruling strategy and human life. Thus, the Warring States Period is named by David Nivison as an "age of philosophers . . . of exuberant originality and variety, that settled into something steadier and less varied in the long subsequent centuries of empire."[9]

During this period, scholars advocating different philosophies and ideas made consistent efforts to "sell" their ideas on state reforms and warfare to rulers, and successful ones became the advisors to the ruling elites. Their ideas also dominated the administrative and strategic rule of different kingdoms. These scholars are called persuaders.[10] Their roles resemble today's diplomats or negotiators if authorized to represent a king to approach other kings to form or end an alliance. They also acted as councilors to state leaders in advocating reforms and persuading the rulers of the dangers of certain policies. The best known schools include the Confucian school (*rujia*), the Legists or Legalists (*fajia*),[11] Daoists (*daojia*),[12] Mojia,[13] and the military strategists (*bingjia*).[14] These scholars and their works provide the philosophical underpinnings of Chinese state ruling philosophy and military thought.

Confucianism: Confucius and Mencius

Nivison states, "The repertory of Chinese philosophers begins with Confucius."[15] Confucius (Kong Fuzi, his personal name is Qiu) was born in 551 BC. As the first philosopher, the impact of his philosophical ideas pervades all dimensions of Chinese social and political life. Confucianism was later further developed by Mencius—"the second sage"[16] in the Confucian tradition. Confucianism provides the most essential elements in Chinese military thought and Chinese conduct of international relations.

Confucianism emphasizes the rule of virtue for harmony (*he*), hence the best way to govern for a ruler is through the moral standards of "*ren*" (benevolence) and "*li*" (rituals, moral standards).[17] A ruler with high moral standards will be able to maintain harmony in family, stability in a kingdom, and peace in the world at large (*xiu shen, chi jia, zhiguo, ping tianxia*). "According to Confucius and Mencius, the virtue of rulers is symbolized by being benevolent towards their subordinates."[18] As Hsu elaborates, the Confucian virtues of governing emphasized that only a compassionate and just king would be supported by the people, would be able to avoid violence, and would promote moral values among the citizenry.

According to Confucius, only moral individuals can create a moral order at every level of society and, therefore, a moral world with China at its center. The Confucian, Sino-centric concept of morality and ethics, which dictated both domestic and international policies, maintained that through good government and internal peace and prosperity China would play a leadership role in the world and serve as a universal paradigm for other nations.[19] One example of this universal benevolence is that the barbarians (even the Mongols) adopted Chinese institutions and systems such as the Chinese civil service system. In the Qing Dynasty, Confucius scholars—Kang Youwei, Liang Qichao—advocated moral reforms to extend Chinese benevolence to the Westerners to avoid direct conflict.

Following Confucius, Mencius further developed the idea of humane ruler and humane government (*ren*), having virtuous rulers to win the support of people, therefore avoiding war. Mencius believed human nature is benevolent. This goodness enabled people to cultivate morality and virtue in inter-state relations based on the belief that good will prevail over evil even if the evil force is strong. The Confucian scholars emphasized that in order to achieve harmony and universal tranquility and love, no state was to attack another. Mencius defined "*yi*" (righteousness) as inseparable from human nature. If "*ren*" focuses more on self-cultivation, then "*yi*" stresses more the attitude and virtue towards the other.[20] If one follows these principles, they will elicit the others' respect and support. This personal to collective connection consolidates the final goal of universal harmony and order (a culturally hierarchical ruling order). This principle also applies to neighbors and the peripheral barbarians.[21] Trade and marital relationships were established to

pacify the minority border states even when the Chinese dynasties were much stronger than the bordering states.

Confucianism in its later development borrowed heavily ideas from other schools of thought. Confucianism survived much longer than the other schools and finally became the dominating philosophy. However, the first winner of the philosophical struggle was Legalism rather than Confucianism. The Warring States Period ended with the unification of China under the Qin Dynasty (221 BC). However, the Qin rule lasted only 15 years. Some scholars, such as Victoria Hui attribute the collapse of the Qin Dynasty to the rising costs of expansion and conquest (which Hui thinks Qin had mastered) but also the suppression of resistant populations (which Qin could have avoided). Yet, Hui's analysis based too much on material factors. The dominating philosophy that the Qin Dynasty adopted was Legalism,[22] which directed the emperors to expand and rule domestically through severely strict regulations and cruel punishments.

Though Qin Emperors—"*tianzi*"[23]— were able to consolidate their grip on power for some time[24] regarding the degree of bureaucratic coherence and coercive apparatus, and the amount of material resources, the Qin Dynasty failed to recognize that after centuries of war, the people were largely tired of war and violence. The Qin Emperor also tried to destroy Confucian scholars by the famous "*fen shu keng ru*"—burn all Confucian writings and bury alive all Confucian followers. This horrible attempt to control the intellectual heritage actually increased the dissemination of Confucian ideas. The Han Dynasty Emperors succeeding Qin abandoned many Qin institutions and practices, and, most important of all, Han adopted Confucianism as the national philosophy. This led to institutional changes in the bureaucracy and the military.

Confucianism won in the philosophical struggle among different schools of thought for many reasons.[25] First, like other schools, Confucianism reflected the people's general aspiration for peace. Second, the hierarchical ruling advocated by Confucianism had enormous appeal to the ruling elite. Third, Confucianism remained a domestically focused ruling philosophy; therefore, the Chinese way of expansion of the Chinese order was through cultural rather than military means and the final goal was not territorial or political rule over other states.

> Confucius scholars differed most with their opponents in their view that the universalized order of the Chinese world should be a cultural order and that the only way to accommodate an expansion should be by means of an outward radiation of cultural influence.[26]

However, the emphasis on peace and peaceful means does not rule out the possibility of punitive expeditions, although the first preference is effective

border defense. The strategic preference is first to fend off the intruders but not pursue them further; then negotiation for peace through gifts and marriages; and only last to fight wars and penetrate the enemy's territory.[27] Mencius argued that "to seek domination by force will simply turn the world against you"[28] because that will be against the virtue and the will of the people (mandate from heaven). As "the benevolent one has no enemy" the benevolent king will draw people to him.

Confucian philosophy dominated the thinking and administration from the Han Dynasty on in Chinese history. Han emperors initiated a movement to "get rid of the other schools of thoughts, respect only the Confucian thought" (*ba chu bai jia, du zun ru shu*). A number of Confucian scholars maintained significant positions in the royal court. The Confucian influence was also seen in the educational system, officialdom, bureaucratic institutions, domestic ruling principles and systems, societal relations, military affairs, and even relationships with other states. The impact of Confucianism on interstate relations was mainly seen through the Central Kingdom's relationship with bordering minorities in history. The emphasis was not affected much by the strength of the royal court. From the Han Dynasty, Emperor Wu sent out envoys to Xi Yu (today's Xinjiang) and India with gifts of agricultural products and silk mainly for cultural exchanges.[29]

Sun Zi and The Art of War[30]

Sun Zi's name is Sun Wu. *The Art of War* was written around 400 BC during the Warring States Period. Many works on Sun Zi and *The Art of War* recognize the fact that his work reflects not only the wisdom of military strategies but also a strong Confucian philosophical underpinning. Comparisons of Sun Zi with the famous Western philosopher and military strategist Clausewitz further demonstrate that Sun Zi and his work differs from the more pragmatic Western works.[31]

> The military wisdom of Sun-tzu would be valued and preserved not because he was the first military mind of China but because the Chinese already boasted a rich military and intellectual tradition with sophistication enough to appreciate the genius of *Art of War*.[32]

Famous Chinese military works were compiled into the famous *Seven Military Classics* (*Wu Jing Qi Shu*). *The Art of War* is undoubtedly the core piece of the Seven Military Classics.[33] Lynn acknowledges, "The Chinese military classics regard the state as founded on virtue not simply power. Authority, punishment, and reward play a role as well, but a state without virtue lacks the Mandate of Heaven and will be unsuccessful in war."[34] The Chinese military texts admit war is natural but disclaim it as evil.

The unavoidable warfare is "the *Way* to survive or extinction,"[35] and the ethical and moral virtue of Mandate of Heaven for the rulers of the state pose a dilemma for the state as to when and under what conditions war becomes necessary.

Therefore, the right and just cause for war is emphasized and only those virtuous leaders fighting for a righteous cause will ensure victory. The difference between "*wang dao*" (the righteous/kingly way) and "*ba dao*" (expansionist/hegemonic way) lies in the just cause fought by the just ruler with the Mandate from Heaven. The right *Dao* (way) is essential to win the support of the people and to maintain harmony (*he*). O'Dowd and Waldron argue, "[T]he concept of conflicting interests and turbulent competitiveness, which Westerners accept, was foreign to these early Chinese (of the Warring States period in particular),"[36] because Chinese society places a high value on harmony.

Sun Tzu argues that by disturbing the harmony of an enemy's society by destroying the enemy's *Shi Qi* (or *Ch'I*, morale, life energy), the political goal of warfare can be achieved.[37] With the same line of argument, ensuring domestic order and stability through the rule of benevolence can ensure victory over the enemy. For Sun Tzu, warfare was a last resort. When having to fight, Sun Tzu provided a hierarchy for courses of action: "attack walled cities only as a last resort; engage battle only under the most favorable conditions; isolate the enemy from his allies; and most important of all, attack the enemy's strategy."[38] O'Dowd and Waldron argue that the Chinese forces' behavior in the Korean War reflected this preference, especially the strategies and tactics adopted by Commander Lin Biao. Instead of confronting the much stronger American military directly, the Chinese volunteers attempted instead to create chaos (*luan*, the opposite of *he*/harmony) in the enemy and destroy the *chi* of the enemy.[39] The American soldiers noted the strange patterns of Chinese troops' movement. Instead of direct contact with the enemy, "the typical formation contained two units forward and one back." This one unit will later attack the breakthroughs the first two units created in the enemy's line or attack the flanks of the enemy to cut the enemy in two, therefore creating chaos. American soldiers admitted the success of this strategy in the Korean War.[40]

There is much in Sun Tzu that reflects Chinese Confucian thinking. However, Sun Tzu's views on the operations of warfare, strategies, and tactics of fighting are also similar to some Western military writings. The comparison of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz done by Burles and Shulsky shows that the notion of an abiding Chinese cultural aversion to the use of force seems overstated, but they admit some differences between the Chinese and Western perspectives toward the use of force.[41] Despite these, the fundamental philosophical underpinning of *The Art of War* remains Confucian. In other words, Sun Tzu remains Chinese in nature and his articulation of the art of

war maintains the preferences of war fighting strategies and tactics with Chinese characteristics. Green argues that armies "with similar organizations, doctrine, and equipment still exhibit markedly different behavior, especially during combat." He quotes Richard Holms as saying that "there is considerable evidence that battlefield performance is influenced, if not by race in the biological sense, at least by a society's culture and norms."[42] Therefore:

> To understand any army, one must look at not only its "body," but also its "soul." An army does not create its own culture out of thin air, but builds it through the selective use of its own past, as well as the history and culture of its larger society.[43]

There is no need to argue for a universality of Sun Tzu, as O'Dowd and Waldron argue, because "if there are universal principles, they are best learned through one's own culture," and "if the task is to understand another person's strategy, then the parts that require the most exploration are those that are most unlike our own."[44] One interesting point that O'Dowd and Waldron make is that they divide the ideas of Sun Tzu into two groups, fundamental philosophical concepts and universal strategic concepts, which to some extent here reflects the operationalization in this volume for strategic culture. Griffith also points out the "realism and moderation" in Sun Zi's *The Art of War*.[45] This acknowledgment of the philosophical and instrumental/operational underpinnings of Sun Tzu facilitates my research in measuring its impact on Chinese leaders' beliefs through operational code analysis.

The philosophical influences on inter-state relations

Were the Chinese unique in their international behavior? Hsu Chuo-yun argues that the inter-state relations of the ancient Chinese system (especially the Spring and Autumn Period 722–464 BC and the Warring States Period 463–222 BC)[46] resemble the European balance of power, the Greek city-states, and the cold war's two blocs in confrontation. "The history of the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period, for instance, actually looks quite familiar to us who have witnessed formation of blocs, efforts to organize collective security, and multi-lateral struggles among big powers."[47] Victoria Tin-bor Hui argues further: "European theories of international politics indeed operated in the ancient Chinese system. The logic of balancing—which encompasses the mechanisms of balance of power and rising costs of expansion—was triumphant for several centuries."[48] For Hui, the ancient Chinese system is like the early modern European system with war, international anarchy, territorial states in formation, balance of power, and attempts at universal domination.[49] However, unlike Victoria Hui, Hsu recognizes that there are differences between the Chinese and the West.

Lynn also points out that "Chinese battle in the sixth century BC did not resemble the collision of polis phalanxes in Greece."[50] These differences mainly lie in how the Chinese states treat inter-state relations culturally, how they treat the barbarians, and how warfare is treated in history and major historiography.[51] As Hsu states, "[I]ronically, after centuries of confrontation, cultural influences and economic exchanges finally incorporated these 'barbarians' into the world of Chou China."[52]

Furthermore, some scholars point out that despite a relatively rich record of ancient Chinese history, there is little military history, particularly historical records on wars, battles, and how they were fought. This paucity was attributed by some scholars to a Chinese preference for a pacific culture, that is, under the influence of the Confucian culture the Chinese despised the use of force and had always longed for peace. On the other hand, some scholars argue that this resulted from the fact that civilian officials (*wen guan*) not military officials (*wu guan*) recorded most of the historiography; therefore, it reflected a bureaucratic preference rather than a cultural preference.

David Graff and Robin Higham note that, despite the importance of armed conflict in Chinese history,

> the existing literature has tended to neglect or downplay the role of war and the military. Works on pre-modern China have emphasized (and reflected) the Confucian pacifism and anti-military bias of the scholar-official class, while the literature on the nineteenth and twentieth centuries gives pride of place to intellectual, cultural, and political developments.[53]

Echoing Graff and Higham's argument that "armed conflict has always played an important role in Chinese history,"[54] Green also argues that ignoring or downplaying the warfare in Chinese history "inevitably paint a falsely pacific picture."[55] For Green, the considerable bloodshed in Chinese history disproves the claim that "warfare in China was invariably a forced defensive response to foreign aggression."[56]

However, putting aside the dispute over who wrote history and why the historiography of Chinese warfare featured heavily a *wen*-dominated emphasis, there is no denying the impact of those historical writings from ancient times on the following dynasties in Chinese history. Lynn states that the clash of *wen* (civilization or culture) and *wu* (war, force or military) in ancient China reflects "an overarching struggle in Chinese history and historiography [which] goes beyond battles between particular armies or states—it is a clash between principles"[57] of the people who recorded history. Although *wu* was always important in history as well, the dominance of *wen* documentation of stratagems and tactics rather than the bloody depiction of different wars and battles, that is, words of minds rather than deeds, shows

pacific Chinese strategic and military preferences despite constant external threats from minorities in the border areas.

The cyclical feature of dynastic changes was punctuated by wars.[58] Traditionally, the Confucian ruling orthodoxy based on virtues probably assumes a high level of economic and military strength/power. Without this basis it would be difficult to maintain a united Chinese nation. The difference of attitude about power lies in the means of achieving it. Wealth and strength were significant in the Chinese state-building process. However, the unique part of Chinese Confucian thought is that, after achieving self-sufficiency, it relies on virtue and self-cultivation of leaders/rulers to maintain peace and prestige rather than resorting to the use of force to expand and invade for more wealth or power. The ruling elites depended more on cultural appeal and personal charisma to attract followings than resorting to force for obedience in handling inter-state relations. One problem for the century-long humiliation of the Qing Dynasty was that the ruling elites misunderstood the intentions of the Western countries but followed its traditional practice of exerting virtuous rule through self-cultivation. The Qing Dynasty's encounter with the West severely damaged the self-centered and isolated Chinese.

An interpretation of the Confucian strategic culture

The works of Confucius and Sun Zi significantly affect Chinese strategic thinking and behavior. In the following, I will lay out my understanding of the Confucian strategic culture whose role in Chinese decision-making has been downplayed or neglected recently by Western scholars.[59] I will explore the major characteristics of a Confucian strategic culture and why it is necessary in understanding Chinese leaders' beliefs and behavior.

The Confucian view on Chinese strategic behavior is that China, in general, shows a reluctance to use force. Even under security threats, diplomatic means and negotiations are preferred and proposed as the first preference. But this does not mean that the Chinese are so reluctant to use force that, when facing foreign invasions, they will not fight back. If needed, the Chinese will fight as bravely as anyone to protect their territory and national pride as shown in the anti-Japanese war.[60] However, even if force is employed under the condition that all other means turn out to be unsuccessful, the Chinese will still pursue opportunities to go back to the negotiation table for peaceful settlements, thus reducing further destruction as seen from the Civil War, the Korean War, and the Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese wars.

Several scholars have criticized traditional idealist Confucianism by questioning the impact or extent of the impact of this culture on Chinese behavior. However, they seem to ignore the fact that the directing and constraining impact of Confucianism is a constitutive process with deep historical and philosophical roots. In my view, this process consists of three

steps: an emphasis on non-violence (*feigong*), defensiveness (*fangyu*), and righteous war (*yizhan)*,[61] creating a Chinese strategic culture that has been primarily defensive since Sun Zi's time.

This pacific strategic culture is rooted in the Confucian-Mencian disparagement of the use of force. Unlike Johnston, my reading of China's history indicates that in over 2,000 years of feudal rule the feudal empires of China seldom displayed aggressive intentions toward other countries nor made any attempts at expansion despite the capability to do so. In China's 5,000 years of history, there were only two large-scale military expansionist movements carried out by the nomadic minorities of Mongolian and Manchurian people.[62]

Much scholarly thinking has documented that peace-loving and non-violence are key characteristics of China's strategic culture.[63] Even Johnston does not dispute the existence of these traditions, just their influence. For example, he cites a famous strategic notion from the Chinese ancient strategist Sun Zi, *Buzhan Ersheng*, "win without fight or use of force." *Buzhan Ersheng* means that the highest tactic to defeat an adversary is not to use force but, instead, to win through non-violent or non-military actions. In the traditional philosophy of Confucianism, *he wei gui*, "peace is the most precious" was the key thought for maintaining national unification and stability. Fairbank argues that "in the standard formulation in the Chinese classics, 'war and weaponry is an inauspicious tool, and should only be used in unavoidable circumstances' . . . in Chinese strategic thinking, war should be the 'last resort'."[64] Thus, in Chinese culture, *Wu* and *Bing*, "force and military" are not welcomed. "Disparagement of the soldier is deeply ingrained in the old Chinese system of values" and can be understood by an old Chinese dictum, "good iron is not used to make a nail nor a good man to make a soldier."[65]

China's defensiveness can be seen from the world-famous Great Wall built during the Warring States Period (403–221 BC), and until the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), it was the defensive forefront against outside aggression. In fact, the Great Wall was a symbol of China's defensive security strategy. The Great Wall served as a huge shield for safeguarding the integrity of the nation. The evolution of thousands of years of civilization also cultivated a peace-loving and defensive strategic culture. Parallel to the Great Wall, *Dao De*, "civility and virtue" were considered the key means morally to maintain security and defeat the enemy. According to this security rationale, the Chinese people believed that "if one has virtue, one cannot be matched [e.g. by an enemy] (*youde buke youdi*)" and that one should "display virtue and do not flaunt the military instrument" (*guan de bu yaobing*).[66]

Third, when the use of force becomes "unavoidable," it must be based on the righteous standard (*yizhan*), which means that the aim of war is to fight against those who have created the condition of war (invasion) or to stop the strong from bullying the weak. According to Confucius' thinking, the *yi* or

"righteousness or high moral standard" was the basis for getting mass support and for uniting the people. China's political and military elite broadly believed that "there will be no escape from defeat if fighting a war without a righteous cause" (*buyi zhishi bi zibi*) and stressed that "force must be used under a just cause" (*shichu youming*). When war breaks out, the Chinese strategic propensities still lean toward the defensive and limited use of force. Offensive campaigns will only be launched for a punitive purpose, deterrence, and pacification rather than annihilation.[67]

Johnston summarizes the three basic elements of the Confucian culture discussed above as "war is inauspicious and to be avoided; the enemy is not necessarily demonized; violence is a last resort." He explains:

> When violence is used by the state to deal with external security threats, it is generally applied defensively and is limited in nature. This reflects a view that violence is not particularly efficacious in eliminating threats or producing security. Rather, the more reliable basis for state security is the moral and administrative quality of internal ruler-ship.[68]

However, Johnston denies the impact of this Confucian strategic culture on Chinese behavior.

The idea of the unique cultural impact of Confucianism on China is nothing new to Western scholars.[69] Recently some scholars questioned the traditional Western view towards Chinese culture, as articulated and exemplified in earlier works of Fairbank and others.[70] Unlike this recent trend among scholars, I am arguing that China does have a unique strategic culture, which is more peaceful and non-violent than the realpolitik Western one. By revisiting some of the works and arguments of old and current scholarship on the topic both for and against this view, I intend to provide a different understanding of cultural influence on state motivations, and thereby on state behavior.

Culture is not simply a context, and the cultural impact vs. non-cultural impact can be distinguished. There is universality in culture in that culture is a norm impacting on beliefs, and thereby culture can proceed to affect behavior. Under different social and historical contexts, however, culture develops with different features and produces different propensities for state preferences. The distinct characteristics of Chinese foreign policy-making and Chinese behavior make it an interesting case to test the views presented by different parties in the debate over strategic culture: What kind of strategic culture influences the Chinese most? From ancient history to the present, does Chinese strategic culture evolve? Does the impact of the strategic culture change over time and situations? How does the impact of strategic culture differ from other contextual and systemic impacts? How can we study strategic culture?

Confucian strategic culture in Chinese decisions for war

The question of whether Confucian strategic culture affects Chinese thinking directly relates to the current debate over what kind of power China will become. As China is acquiring increasing power capability, scholars posit that China's rise poses problems for the US, but it is not actually catching up in terms of relative or absolute power.[71] Under a Confucian strategic cultural influence, will China's rise be different from the Western ones, that is, peaceful as current Chinese leaders and scholars have been trying to argue?

Shambaugh evaluates the current Bush administration's policy toward China as appropriate, neither partners nor competitors.[72] Shambaugh argues, "China's clear and consistent opposition to alliances, including in East Asia, make China the revisionist power."[73] And even though China constantly advocates multilateralism through its preferred "New Security Concept," China only accepts "multilateralism in form, but not in essence."[74] Furthermore, China has persistently taken steps that damage US–China strategic relations since the 1980s, not only relations with the current Bush administration. Mearsheimer, in his book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*, predicts that China and the US are destined to be adversaries as China's power grows.[75] "China matters most for the West because it can make mischief, either by threatening its neighbors or assisting anti-Western forces further afield."[76] Friedberg further argues that in China's case, China is an emerging power that seeks to overthrow the status quo for their own conception of their status.[77] He predicts that China will cause serious problems for the future of East Asia. However, Peter Gries points out that the approach adopted by some scholars to "China's motivation is too narrow. Intentions should not be inferred from power alone, whether relative or asymmetric."[78] Chinese foreign policy behavior is an anomaly for many theories. Chinese decision-making displays a strong inclination to weigh reputation, justice, norms, righteousness, and other ideational factors as valuable and highly appreciated in Chinese cultural beliefs and social practices.[79]

As Johnston also points out, China's shifts in balancing behavior against the two superpowers during the 1950s and the 1970s cannot be explained completely by the bipolar system under structural realist theory. In the 1950s, the Soviet Union was a rising power dominating the communist world. Rather than balancing against the Soviet Union, China signed a friendship treaty with the Soviets in 1951 and followed the "lean to one side" policy mainly out of ideological concerns. In the 1960s, the relationship with the Soviets deteriorated and China was antagonistic to both the Soviet Union and the US.[80]

In the 1970s, the Soviet Union was in relative decline and China established formal diplomatic relations with the US. Both the US and the Soviet Union were concerned with China's moves, and neither could ignore the impact of

losing the China card. In the post-cold war period, the balancing behavior of China ought to be a "most likely case" for realism because China is a major state. However, rather than balancing against the hegemon—the US, China tried to establish "partnerships" with all major powers.[81]

If China is really a power maximizer, diplomatic and consultative means should be secondary concerns after dominance. China will be prepared for potential threats from bordering states, Japanese offensive power, or US involvement in its internal affairs, and should not choose mutually cooperative means due to concerns of potential threat. China's policy of "putting aside differences for mutual development" to settle the South China Sea disputes, the active involvement in regional organizations, and its confidence-building measures in settling border disputes with Russia and India should not be thinkable, not to mention the increasing trade and cooperation with Japan and the US. Up to now, although China has never renounced the use of force to reunify with Taiwan, it has reiterated several times that it will only use force if Taiwan declares independence. For the South China Sea issue, China has never given up the channel of negotiating for mutual development.

A rising state does not equal a revisionist state. It must have motivations to challenge the old system for unrealized interests. Therefore, a revisionist state's leaders must possess a high need for power and achievement. They will prefer and be more ready to use conflictual means, strategies, and tactics and will not easily give up their goals (change the system) or shift their propensities for aggressive strategies and tactics, and will take any opportunity possible. Revisionist states are willing to provoke conflict to increase their power or achieve their goals only when they have leaders with revisionist beliefs. Facing the window of opportunity that a power change creates, revisionist states may not display revisionist behavior if their leaders do not have the motive or desire to change the system or provoke war no matter what the cost is.

Conversely, a country with a revisionist leader who wants to address the pains from the past, even if the state has experienced a relative power loss and the opportunity is remote or non-existent, might strike, for example, Japan's attack on the US at Pearl Harbor in 1941 and Iraq in the first Gulf War. The current prediction of threat from North Korea is not based on the relative power change nor simply the nuclear program North Korea claimed. The unpredictability of the thinking of the leaders is of more concern to both academics and decision-makers. Therefore, the kind of beliefs their leaders possess presents a necessary indicator in determining if a state is revisionist or status quo.

The "quality and quantity of revisionism in a state's policy are not static properties,"[82] but change over time and issues. State identity might change as in the case of Japan (1870s–1930s),[83] and none of the existing realist frameworks provide an analysis of the dynamic changes of state identities. "Rising powers vary in their degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo."[84]

China may be neither a status quo nor a dissatisfied power, a combination of both,[85] or "no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War."[86] Even Johnston admits "the People's Republic of China (PRC) is more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional and global political and economic systems than ever in its history."[87]

Kang further points out that historically "when China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved (in Asia)" and "it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia."[88] Therefore, a strong and stable China implies a stabilizing force in the regional and international order, countering the predictions of many Western scholars. Given the ambiguity in deciding what China's rise will mean to the rest of the world, there seems an increasing demand for a more appropriate theoretical framework to avoid wrong and even dangerous foreign policy decisions. To better understand Chinese foreign policy behavior, cultural factors are important but not easy to understand. Alastair Johnston argues that China's security behavior actually originates from its strategic culture. He believes that Chinese decision-makers have internalized a strategic culture of realpolitik.

In *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (1995), Johnston does a historical study of Chinese strategic culture and argues that, traditionally, China's strategic culture has been offensive despite its weak material capability. Johnston's work is important in that his cultural realist approach raises the issue of culture and its impact on behavior. Furthermore, he rightly points out that Chinese culture and behavior are unique, and that there are two strategic cultures existing in China's case. However, Johnston's argument remains problematic because his use of classic Chinese philosophical works and military works raises problems with face validity. His use of the translations for some key phrases seems puzzling.[89] The analysis that only Parabellum realism is functioning in Chinese grand strategies is skewed, leaving unresolved many ambiguities regarding Confucianism and the Confucius strategic culture.[90] Johnston's conclusion that Parabellum realism dominates Confucianism is also potentially problematic as a result of his use of texts (a source selection bias), unrepresentative emphasis on the Ming Dynasty following the Yuan-Mongolian Dynasty when the Mongols invaded the Chinese hinterland (a case selection bias) alongside language translation problems (character translation bias).[91]

As Johnston takes it for granted that there is only one strategic culture affecting the Chinese leaders' beliefs throughout history, he ignores the possibility of change over time and situation as well as variance among different leaders. Therefore, Johnston prescribed one identity for the Chinese as a historically and culturally produced realpolitik state, and its offensive strategic culture further determines that its grand strategy is offensive. This deterministic feature in Johnston's cultural realism leads to a misperception that China is a rising revisionist state that is aggressive in nature. There are many problems with his argument, as other scholars have pointed out.

Scholars disagree over how many strategic cultures China has as well as its nature.[92] Some scholars agree with Johnston that a Parabellum strategic culture, and not a Confucian strategic culture, guides Chinese foreign policy behavior as seen from its grand strategy, and try to apply this claim to different cases.[93] Although acknowledging that Chinese strategic culture is offensive, these scholars disagree about how many strategic cultures China has, that is, if there is one or two strategic cultures. Some state that China has only one strategic culture, which is realpolitik because Confucianism does not function in actual policy making.[94] Others stress that China has one strategic culture, but it is the Confucian strategic culture that is influencing the beliefs and behavior of Chinese leaders.[95] A more complex view is that there are two strategic cultures, and the Chinese apply the Confucian strategic culture when burnishing their self-image while resorting to the realist Parabellum norms when encountering other countries.[96] Scobell calls this a "Chinese Cult of Defense."[97] The divergent views expressed here support the necessity to explore further the theme of strategic culture and its impact on foreign policy behavior.

Furthermore, post-cold war Chinese foreign policy behavior further departs from the offensive realpolitik argument by Johnston. Even he changed his position in a recent article when he questioned, "Is China a Revisionist Power?"[98] Johnston no longer appears to subscribe either to his views on Chinese leaders or to a cultural interpretation of Chinese security views.[99] While his own position has changed, others in the academic and policy communities continue to subscribe to the claim that China is a rising power with hostile intentions. Scholars, officials, and pundits continue to criticize China for defying complete compliance with international norms in terms of sovereignty, free trade, nonproliferation and arms control, national self-determination, and human rights.[100] However, these academics, policymakers, or pundits criticize Chinese behavior regarding "the rules of the game" using the standards that the United States would prefer.

Johnston points out three problems with the current characterization of China as either a status quo or revisionist state. First, there is the problematic issue of empirical evidence supporting the claim that China is a revisionist state.[101] Second, Chinese diplomacy in the last couple of decades displays some status quo-orientations, as the 1980s–90s was a period "sandwiched between Maoist revisionism and some post-Jiang quasi fascism."[102] Third, the above two problems result directly from ambiguities in the extant analytical frameworks, that is, the ambiguity in realist theories' depictions of revisionist or status quo states which is mostly static. Therefore, Johnston concludes that to claim that China is a revisionist state is premature.

However, Johnston does not claim that there is strong evidence to prove China is not a revisionist state either, because "the absence of clear evidence of an active effort by the PRC to fundamentally alter the distribution of power regionally or globally does not mean that such a desire does not exist."[103]

In his view, China might be in transition from the Mao period to a post-Jiang time. Therefore, China might change contingently even if it is now more status quo-oriented. Domestic problems and an intensified crisis over Taiwan between China and the US, or some other security dilemma dynamics, may ignite Chinese revisionism. The analysis of current Chinese leaders—Jiang and Hu—in this book will shed light on some of these questions.

Strategic culture: the concept and related debates

Strategic culture is a significant concept in international security studies, but it is also underspecified and under serious debate.[104] Strategic culture originated in ancient history but the concept was coined in the cold war by Jack Snyder in his famous study of the Soviet strategic decision-making process.[105] Scholarly works published on the cultural impact on national/international security issues include nuclear proliferation, arms control, regionalism, multilateral cooperation, confidence-building, military doctrines, grand strategies, and war fighting behaviors.[106] These studies no longer focus exclusively on the major powers. They also apply the concept more comprehensively to study and understand the decision-making processes of many states and even regional behavior.[107] However, different scholars tend to apply their own version of strategic culture in general, and in their understanding of a state's strategic culture in particular. Scholars further differ in how to detect and how to study/measure the strategic cultural impact on a state's foreign policy behavior.

Strategic culture is a cultural construct with operational dimensions that affect the behavior of individuals through the symbols, values or beliefs that it embodies, which affects the strategic thinking of leaders on war and peace, perceptions and assessments of threat, the utility of force and the possible outcomes. Though differing conceptually, the definitions provided by scholars usually consist of two parts in most of the conceptualizations: the political/philosophical part and the strategic/operational/instrumental part.[108] The political/philosophical part affects the individual's general worldview and the value assigned to the use of force and military. Any war decisions must rest on acquired political and philosophical views and beliefs of leaders over the issues of war and peace. Therefore, a leader who is more prone to believe in the lack of harmony in the world is more likely to resort to military force in cases of crisis.

The operational/instrumental part of the strategic culture concept refers to the more specific strategies, tactics, and moves to be adopted by leaders. The consideration is more instrumental than conceptual, involving more detailed calculations over a diversity of dimensions: force composition, logistics, geography, and the enemy's capability and intentions, etc. The structure of the concept of strategic culture is hierarchical, but that does not necessarily mean that one level determines another,[109] that is, the strategic and political level

may direct the operational level, but it does not determine the operational level's decisions. Although the decision to make war is in line with the general perception of utility assigned to war, in actual war situations the operational decisions are instrumentally made according to contingencies, the actual situations of the historical moment as well as the particular decision-maker's capability.

The relationship between the two levels changes over time, situations, social context, and leaderships. Different leaders might assign different significance to the philosophical or operational levels depending on the leader's personality or complexity of his belief system. The strategic cultural impact on decision-making in crisis and non-crisis situations also differs. Different countries follow different strategic cultural traditions resulting from their history, social traditions, value systems, and the philosophical traditions they follow. Although strategic culture matters in all societies, the content of the impact differs significantly. As shown in many of the case studies, scholars have been trying to delineate clearly the impact of different (for example, realpolitik, idealist, Confucius, Bolshevik, etc.) strategic cultures.

The debate between Johnston and Gray over the impact of strategic culture reflects to a certain degree the idiosyncratic vs. nomethetic role assigned to strategic culture.[110] Both acknowledge the impact of strategic culture on behavior (policies), yet they differ as to *how* it impacts behavior. For Gray, strategic culture provides the context, "directly challenging Johnston's methodological assumption that cultural variables can be separated from non-cultural variables."[111] Strategic culture as context gives meaning to strategic behavior but it is very difficult to separate from the non-cultural impacts as all agents (individuals) are subject to this cultural influence. Thus, strategic cultural impact is not causal but constitutive in nature, and Gray does not provide a particular methodology for factoring out cultural impact.

For Johnston, strategic culture is a causal factor in a state's strategic behavior. Specific cases are only for testing this assumed universal strategic cultural impact. Johnston criticizes realist theories' neglect of cultural analysis and their failure of providing meanings to material variables, for example, power, through a universal cultural perspective, and claims to provide a "falsifiable theory of strategic culture."[112] Therefore, in his argument Chinese strategic culture is not unique but, rather, in line with common Western realpolitik practice.

These attempts at developing a theory of strategic culture have been criticized on several grounds. First, as a general cultural construct, it is extremely difficult to operationalize or measure scientifically. Second, it is even harder to explain when and why strategic cultures emerge and become dominant,[113] and if/how/why they change. Third, even more difficult is to specify the causal mechanism through positivist lenses. Fourth, strategic cultural studies have been criticized for focusing mainly on elites and military organizations. Fifth, a theory of strategic cultures' impact on strategic

behavior will remain narrow and meaningless if scholars do not investigate the cultural context in which decisions are made.[114] Operational code analysis addresses some of these problems by linking culture and decision-making as seen from the discussion in Chapter 1 and Figure 2.1 below.

The different preference rankings for Parabellum and Confucian strategies in Figure 2.1 originate from different strategic cultures. Each type of leader shows a specific strategic preference ranking that can map into a specific game matrix. For example, the Confucian leader in Johnston's cultural realist model has a preference ranking of accommodation > defense > expansion,[115] which translates into the operational code vocabulary for ranked outcomes of settlement > deadlock > domination. The Parabellum leader's preference ranking is expansion > defense > accommodation,[116] which translates into ranked outcomes of domination > deadlock > settlement in operational code analysis. The intersection of these two sets of preference rankings generates the game below when they are mapped into the same matrix and submission is added as the lowest-ranked outcome for both Confucian and Parabellum leaders.



Figure 2.1 Strategic culture and operational code beliefs

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	4,2	1,4
	CF	2,1	3,3*

Preference Rankings

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	Settle	Submit
	CF	Dominate	Deadlock

Outcomes for Self

* Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. See Game 24 in Brams (1994: 217). Self = Confucian Player and Other = Parabellum Player.

Johnston's theory of cultural realism ranks preferences only for Self and not for Other, and, therefore, does not model the strategic setting and how different players react to the moves by the other player and changes in the strategic environment. Operational code analysis expands Johnston's model, supplying preference rankings for Other and specifying strategies for both players via TOM, under different conditions of historical control by Self and Other. To sum up, therefore, we see that strategic culture influences leaders' beliefs by shaping strategic preference rankings in their decision-making regarding grand strategies, that is, their view of the general situation in the world and how they should respond in general.

Grand strategies are not military strategies per se, but include many more dimensions. Leaders can possess very cooperative beliefs in general and operate under this influence with orientations towards peaceful grand strategic thinking for national security decisions; however, in times of war or crisis, they may turn to the other extreme when making military strategies for fighting and winning wars and prevailing in crisis situations. In terms of specific military or political operations, the strategies may shift and swing according to changing situations on the battlefield.

Yet, this does not mean that there is no need to study beliefs in general, because by understanding the general operational code beliefs of leaders, we can better understand their ways of interaction, choice propensities in general, and potential inclinations to change in terms of situations and conditions. As the case studies of Chinese decision-making in the following chapters will reveal, leaders' beliefs in dynamic strategic situations also matter. By studying both general beliefs and belief changes from situation to situation, we can better understand China's decision-making process and predict future policy trends.

3

MAO ZEDONG AND ZHOU ENLAI IN THE KOREAN WAR

> History shows that wars are divided into two kinds, just and unjust. All wars that are progressive are just, and all wars that impede progress are unjust. We Communists oppose all unjust wars that impede progress, but we do not oppose progressive, just wars. Not only do we Communists not oppose just wars, we actively participate in them. As for unjust wars, World War I is an instance in which both sides fought for imperialist interests; therefore the Communists of the whole world firmly opposed that war. The way to oppose a war of this kind is to do everything possible to prevent it before it breaks out and, once it breaks out, to oppose war with war, to oppose unjust war with just war, whenever possible.
>
> Mao Zedong "On Protracted War" (May 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 150

> Every Communist must grasp the truth, "Political power grows out of the barrel of a gun."
>
> Mao Zedong "Problems of War and Strategy" (November 6, 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 224

According to US General Omar Bradley, the Korean War (1950–53) was "the wrong war, in the wrong place, at the wrong time, and with the wrong enemy."[1] It was also a "limited war" that the Chinese military fought for the first time in history. It remained a conventional war though the United States warned the Chinese of possible use of nuclear weapons.[2] Kim Il Sung wanted to unify Korea especially after the success of the Chinese Communist Party in the Civil War on the mainland in 1949. Stalin changed his attitude toward Kim's decision from hesitation in 1949 to support in 1950 resulting from his miscalculation about possible American involvement. Mao never wanted to fight the American-led United Nations troops directly, but out of ideological and security concerns was forced to get involved.[3] Mao prepared for a full-scale war with the United States, and the US prepared to use nuclear weapons

on China; however, both parties exercised restraint on the battlefield. The developments on the battlefield prohibited either party from winning a complete victory. Negotiations for a ceasefire went on until July 27, 1953. The war ended with the signing of an armistice but the problem of a divided Korea remains to the present day.[4]

The international situation and domestic situation

By 1950, the cold war between the two blocs had intensified in Central Europe, and China declared its policy of leaning to the Soviet side. However, the newly founded PRC was not on very good terms with the Soviet Union despite the treaty of alliance signed in 1953. When the Korean War broke out, the PRC was facing a serious international situation from the threat of encirclement by the US. Domestically, the PRC needed political consolidation and the reconstruction of its war-torn economy. The US threat was the major external factor impacting on China's foreign and domestic policies. Sino-US confrontation intensified after 1949. Mao's China believed that China and the US were on a course toward military confrontation in Taiwan, Indochina or Korea.[5]

With a de facto alliance relationship established between China and the Soviet Union, the US threat to China increased. China saw its unification with Taiwan as the top priority on its security and foreign policy agenda[6] while the US continued to support the Guo Min Dang (GMD) government on Taiwan. Mao wanted to finalize unification of China after the triumph of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) in major battles against the GMD. In addition, the US did not intervene in the later days of the Civil War, leading to the impression that there might be an opportunity to take Taiwan.

Historically, China had maintained friendly relations with Korea. North Korea was a socialist buffer for the Chinese while South Korea had close relations with the US. Korea is essential for determining the balance of power in East Asia. However, when war broke out in Korea, for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) it meant danger as well as opportunity because, "failure to eject the Americans from Korea could mean insecurity for China; success would advance China's prestige and influence in the East."[7] Therefore, China did not totally reject the idea of involving itself in a Korean crisis.[8] However, China was in no position at that time to head into conflict with a superpower.[9]

When the Korean War broke out, the new CCP government was only eight months old. Everything was in need of reconstruction and recovery. Domestic disturbances by rebel groups and GMD leftover troops constantly threatened; particularly worrisome were the provinces of Taiwan, Xinjiang, and Tibet. CCP leaders feared that the international situation might create domestic chaos should there be a crisis close by. The Chinese economy was

shattered after wars against Japan and the GMD. The CCP needed a peaceful environment to rebuild its economy and to ensure domestic stability and consolidate power.

In 1945, Korea was divided along the 38th parallel with the industrial north and the agricultural south, respectively, occupied by the Russians and the Americans. Clashes of forces along the 38th parallel were constant. Both the North and the South wanted to unify the peninsula under its own rule. The North Korean leader—Kim Il Sung—was determined to win a quick victory for unification.[10] He approached Stalin several times in 1949 to obtain Stalin's permission to invade the South. Stalin hesitated, giving the excuse that the situation was not appropriate for the North to take military action.[11] After the CCP successfully drove the Nationalist government under Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek's GMD) to Taiwan, Kim approached Stalin again for support of Korean unification. Kim believed that the Americans would not interfere, and the communists in the South were ready to help from inside.

Meanwhile, the international situation changed. After the inauguration of the PRC, American troops started to withdraw from South Korea. Acheson in his famous Aleutians speech on January 12, 1950 defined the American defense line for the Pacific region and excluded South Korea from the US defensive perimeter in the Pacific.[12] Consequently, Kim became more determined to invade the South for unification. Stalin changed his attitude toward the issue of Korean unification in early 1950. But he only promised the North Korean leader that the Soviets could just provide military aid and the North should ensure Chinese force support if necessary.[13] In April 1950, Kim left Moscow for a secret visit to Beijing and informed Mao of Stalin's decision and his own determination to unify his country by military invasion. But Kim provided no details of his plan to Mao.[14] In response to Kim's request, Mao sent back to North Korea all Korean Chinese soldiers serving then in Northeast China who fought in the PLA during the Civil War (numbered 14,000). These troops were fully equipped.

Mao was particularly concerned about the possibility of American military intervention.[15] Mao did not think the Chinese were ready to confront directly the United States in early 1950.[16] He raised the issue with Stalin and Kim, but Kim indicated to Mao again that Americans would not interfere militarily and North Korea would win a quick victory before America could intervene. Mao, though reluctant, promised help as Korea was the communist brother who helped the CCP during the Civil War and had become the most significant strategic buffer country to China in East Asia against the imperialist United States.[17]

On June 25, 1950, North Korean troops crossed the 38th parallel and surprised the South. The North successfully prevailed and took Seoul in three days. On June 26, Truman ordered direct American air and naval support for South Korea with ground troops following on June 30. In addition, he also sent the 7th Fleet to the Taiwan Strait. On June 28, Mao denounced American

intervention, especially the American actions in the Taiwan Strait. The United States made use of the Soviet boycott of an emergency session in the United Nations Security Council, allowing the UN to send troops to Korea led by the US. The North Korean army pushed the South Korean and American forces southward toward Pusan at the southern tip of the peninsula. The successful Inchon landing of MacArthur's troops on September 15, 1950 marked a turning point by cutting off North Korean forces who were already overstretched. North Korea started to retreat, and within weeks much of Korea was in the hands of US/South Korean forces.

By September 25, the North Korean People's Army was retreating toward the 38th parallel. The situation turned severely disadvantageous for Kim. Kim turned to China—the big comrade neighbor—for help and urged Mao to send in Chinese troops. MacArthur's troops further closed in on the 38th parallel after the triumph of the Inchon landing, and the Chinese government warned the UN troops not to cross the parallel, declaring China would not "stand by with their hands folded." MacArthur did not pay attention to Mao's warning, taking for granted that the Chinese would not get involved. In October, US troops crossed the 38th parallel. On October 19, 1950, the North's capital of Pyongyang fell, and by October 28, US and ROK troops had pushed closer toward the Yalu River—the borderline between North Korea and China.

When the war drew near the Yalu River, Communist China intervened. The Chinese government entered the war on November 25, 1950[18] by sending "Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV)" across the Yalu River into North Korea and stormed the US/UN forces by surprise.[19] The Chinese official media formally declared that this move was to "resist America and assist Korea, and defend our home and our country (Kang Mei Yuan Chao, Bao Jia Wei Guo),"[20] despite the burden it caused the newly founded nation economically, militarily, and politically.[21] The entrance of the Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) dramatically changed the course of the war. Stalin suggested on December 4 that the Chinese forces continue their offensive by crossing the 38th parallel.

There is no question that China was a major player during the cold war.[22] However, the international and domestic situations were extremely unfavorable for the Chinese. According to a recent Russian account, Stalin changed his mind on intervening in the Korean War in 1950 because of the victory of the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949 in order to keep China from taking over Taiwan and directly confronting the US. He feared a Taiwan crisis would draw the Soviet Union into war as well. Therefore, Stalin pressured a reluctant China to enter the Korean War by promising that Moscow would arm the CPV and provide air cover.[23]

There was no immediate consensus during the high level meetings of the Central Committee of the Chinese Politburo when the idea of intervening in Korea was first raised. Lin Biao argued against Chinese intervention because of possible US military involvement as well as the logistical problems.

Gao Gang and Marshall Peng Dehuai were sympathetic to the Soviet Union and convinced Mao "that if all of Korea was occupied by the Americans, it would create a mortal danger to the Chinese revolution."[24] Those who opposed the Soviet plan pointed to the PRC's domestic fragility and the prospect that the Soviets would only provide moral support while not participating in the conflict. Other evidence shows that Beijing might have considered the possibility of war with the US at the beginning as even a nuclear war. Some suggested that in the case of a Soviet–US war, China should stay out. Further, Beijing needed not only to prepare for a limited war with the Americans in Korea, but also an all-out war, if the US invaded the Chinese mainland, or if US air and naval attacks targeted major Chinese cities and strategic locations. Worst of all, the US might help the Taiwan authority attack mainland China.

Mao delayed the CPV's entry into Korea several times, waiting for Soviet air support. Zhou Enlai visited Moscow in September 1950, and during his discussions with Stalin, Zhou wanted to confirm that the USSR would provide crucial air protection for the Chinese troops when the CPV entered Korea. To the Chinese Premier's surprise, Stalin claimed that the air protection that he once promised could not be realized soon and that China had to fight with North Korea on its own. Stalin had his concerns about getting involved in a direct conflict with the US, especially after the surprising American military involvement immediately after the North attacked. Hearing the news from Zhou, Mao organized a meeting of the Central Military Committee and called the recently appointed Commander of CPV—Marshall Peng Dehuai—to Beijing while postponing the date of Chinese entry into the war.

The final outcome of these meetings was the decision to intervene without Soviet air protection, and the date was set for October 19, 1950. Then Marshall Peng left for the front and Mao sent his son with Peng.[25] Mao informed Stalin of his decision, who praised the Chinese for their internationalism to support communist revolutionary movements and promised that the USSR would provide military aid and that the Soviet air force would join as soon as possible.[26] The CPV successfully threw back the US/UN forces to the 38th parallel but did not succeed in moving further due to severe casualties and other difficulties. Logistics proved the most difficult. Chinese troops were not well prepared to fight in Korea, especially in winter. Most of the troops were poorly equipped and malnutrition severely damaged the morale of the soldiers. Chinese domestic production was insufficient to provide enough assistance to the front line.[27]

Therefore, although the entry of the CPV made a big difference for the North and dealt a heavy blow to the US/UN/ROK forces, significant problems emerged. These problems may not have been foreseen by the Chinese leaders or may have been simply ignored. Some scholars suggest that Mao overruled opposing opinions for his personal "heroic desire."[28] "The [Korean] war also tested China's resolve. When the Chinese entered the Korean conflict, North

Korea's armies had virtually collapsed and the UN troops were closing in on the Sino-Korean border."[29] The Chinese entry, though successful at the beginning, did not sustain itself in later offensive campaigns.

Allen Whiting argues that China was forced to enter the war because it faced a direct security threat[30] and because there was no single positive gesture from Washington toward Beijing between October 1, 1949 and October 25, 1950. Beijing, therefore, had reason to believe that with the Pacific Fleet base in Taiwan, the US would target China.[31] Beijing made several efforts to prevent the Korean conflict from escalating to China through political means after war broke out and only after these attempts failed, in late August 1950, did Beijing begin the necessary military preparations in early September.

Even after the Inchon landing, Beijing tried again through both public and private channels to prevent UN forces from crossing the 38th parallel. Zhou Enlai contacted the Indian ambassador in Beijing to communicate with Washington. After these warnings were ignored by Washington and MacArthur, Beijing was convinced further that the safety of the Chinese-Korean border was severely menaced. Whiting concluded, therefore, that Beijing's management of the Korean crisis was based primarily on the Chinese communists' perception of America's threat to China's national security.[32] Christensen later argued that given the success of the US troops, the Chinese warnings were both too weak and too late to reverse American decisions; therefore, the Chinese attempt to deter the American crossing of 38th parallel failed.[33]

What kinds of leaders were Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai?

What was in the minds of Chinese leaders as they made the decision to intervene in Korea? Mao Zedong was the key figure during the Korean War decision-making and Zhou Enlai was the key diplomatic figure and negotiator.[34] What were each leader's views of the political universe and the most useful strategies, tactics, and means of political action? Were their beliefs stable or did they change with time and circumstances? Did the belief systems of each leader differ in important respects? Were their belief systems consistent with Confucian or Parabellum norms? Did any differences matter in making decisions to intervene in the Korean War and later to sign the ceasefire agreement to end the fighting? To answer these questions, it is time now to examine the operational codes of Mao and Zhou.

Mao and Zhou as individual leaders

Table 3.1 shows the mean scores for general operational code beliefs of Mao and Zhou in comparison to each other and to the mean score of the average world leader. The operational code beliefs of Mao differ significantly from the norming group. Mao's major beliefs about Self and Other are significantly more conflictual. Mao sees the political universe as significantly more

conflictual than the norming group (P-1 = –.087). Regarding the strategic orientation index, Mao is significantly more conflictual (I-1 = –.083) than the norming group (I-1 = .334). However, Mao is close to the norming group's view regarding the control of historical development (Mao P-4 = .192, Group P-4 = .212). Zhou's operational code beliefs are less conflictual than Mao's but less cooperative than the norming group. His major beliefs are more cooperative and are closer to the norming group than Mao's. Zhou sees the world as more cooperative than Mao (P-1 = .224 vs. Mao's –.087) and Zhou is much more cooperative than Mao (I-1 = .249 vs. Mao's –.083).

Table 3.1 A comparison of the general operational codes of Mao and Zhou with the norming group

		Mao (*N = 44*)	*Norming group* (*N = 255*)[a]	*Zhou* (*N = 11*)
Philosophical beliefs				
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	–.087***	.250	.224
P-2	Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	–.118***	.118	.102
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	.172	.148	.100
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	.192	.212	.193
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	.960	.968	.979
Instrumental beliefs				
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	–.083***	.334	.249
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	–.141***	.139	.075
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	.365	.304	.218
I-4	Timing of action			
	a. Conflict/cooperation	.542	.509	.731
	b. Words/deeds	.587	.525	.589
I-5	Utility of means			
	Reward	.099**	.167	.151
	Promise	.033**	.073	.016
	Appeal	.326**	.427	.460*
	Oppose	.235**	.147	.193
	Threaten	.043	.047	.023
	Punish	.264***	.138	.162

Notes:
* Significant at P < .10 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
** Significant at P < .05 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
*** Significant at P < .001 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
a For P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and P-5, the speech number for the norming group is 264. The data are provided by Prof. Mark Schafer from Louisiana State University.

Zhou's view of historical control is almost equal to Mao and lower than the norming group (Zhou P-4 = .193 vs. Mao's .192). The beliefs of Mao and Zhou differ significantly for some instrumental (I-2, I-4A, I-5AP) and philosophical beliefs (P-2). Zhou is more oriented towards cooperative tactics (I-2) and more optimistic (P-2 = .102 vs. –.118) regarding the realization of political goals.

Are the belief systems of Mao and Zhou stable, or do they change when war breaks out? We might expect that the Korean War affected the general beliefs of Mao and Zhou significantly. As the two major decision-makers during the early 1950s, Mao and Zhou played key roles in China's decision to intervene in Korea. Although there were different views among core leaders in the PRC government, the final decision was Mao's with Zhou as a key figure implementing Chinese foreign policy during that time. Mao and Zhou were of the same revolutionary generation of leaders and shared common strategic and tactical beliefs of the time under many of the same constraints. However, Zhou's key beliefs (P-1, P-4, I-1) in Table 3.2 are more cooperative in all three war periods (pre-war, war, to post-war) for the Korean War, and his beliefs change less sharply compared to Mao. The situational constraints of peace and war affect significantly only one belief (I-5RE) regardless of who the leaders are. Who the leaders are affects some beliefs (I-2, P-1, P-2, P-3) regardless of situation.[35] These results further vindicate the inferences that Zhou and Mao differ in their beliefs and Zhou is a more cooperative-oriented diplomat.

Table 3.2 Mao and Zhou's mean scores for pre-war, war, and post-war periods in the Korean War

		Mao Zedong			*Zhou Enlai*		
		Pre-war (n = 11)	*War (n = 8)*	*Post-war (n = 10)*	*Pre-war (n = 6)*	*War (n = 3)*	*Post-war (n = 2)*
P-1*	**Cooperation/conflict**	**–.05**	**–.23**	**–.07**	**.25**	**.04**	**.43**
P-2	Optimism/pessimism	–.08	–.24	–.08	.12	–.03	.26
P-3	Predictability	.09	.35	.14	.11	.09	.10
P-4*	**Historical control**	**.16**	**.30**	**.19**	**.17**	**.18**	**.29**
P-5	Chance	.99	.87	.98	.98	.99	.97
I-1*	**Strategy**	**–.23**	**–.04**	**–.26**	**.27**	**.23**	**.23**
I-2	Tactics	–.25	–.18	–.13	.08	.12	.00
I-3	Predictability	.34	.38	.38	.22	.15	.32
I-4a	Words	.64	.54	.42	.73	.77	.67
I-4b	Deeds	.67	.61	.46	.50	.86	.45
I-5	Appeal	.25	.34	.26	.48	.36	.56
I-5	Promise	.07	.02	.01	.03	.00	.00
I-5	Reward	.07	.12	.10	.13	.26	.06
I-5	Oppose	.20	.14	.43	.20	.16	.23
I-5	Threat	.09	.03	.06	.01	.06	.00
I-5	Punish	.32	.36	.14	.15	.17	.17

* Key beliefs are in bold

Mao and Zhou as types of leaders

Were the belief systems of Mao and Zhou consistent with Confucian or Parabellum cultural norms? The answer to this question depends on the location of each leader's image of Self and Other in the Holsti typology of political belief systems. The I-1, P-1, P-4 indices in the general operational codes of the two leaders identify Mao as a defensive realist in a hostile political universe while Zhou is a defensive realist in a cooperative, though mixed, political universe. The results in Figure 3.1 show that Mao and Zhou generally shared a defensive realist strategic orientation (I-1) and attributed hostility to others (P-1) in the political universe in varying degrees. They generally agreed that control over historical development (P-4) rested more with others than with themselves. However, their images of Self and Other shift somewhat depending on whether the international situation is defined as peace or war.

As Figure 3.2 shows, the philosophical beliefs of both leaders become more hostile. It is understandable, as China fought the Korean War with a major power and the US posed a severe threat to Mao and Zhou as leaders.[36] The Korean War was also regarded as a war concerning China's survival. Even though Truman had no intention to invade China, the Chinese leaders believed that they were threatened when the US troops crossed the 38th Parallel and the buffer zone was about to disappear.[37] This high level of external threat pushed the Chinese leaders to the edge of "live or die." When the enemy is at your door, even a defensive realist leader will not submit to the external threat despite their preference for settlement over deadlock or submission.

In Mao's case, however, he also shifted to an offensive realist strategic orientation in Figure 3.2. Although the evidence in Mao's public statements prior to November 1950 supports the claim that China's entry into the Korean conflict was a war of safety rather than a war of gain, the coordinates in Figure 3.2 for Mao's Self beliefs (P-4, I-1) shifted from a Type DEF defensive to a Type B offensive realist. Mao was a defensive realist in peacetime and became an offensive realist in wartime.

As a diplomat and Chinese Premier, whether the same situation affected Zhou's decision-making in the same way and in the same direction is an interesting question. We can see in Figure 3.2 that during the Korean War Zhou is a Type DEF defensive realist in a Type B offensive realist world. Zhou's Self beliefs change within the Type DEF quadrant during the Korean War. His Other beliefs change from Type A to Type B and back to Type A from pre-war, during war, to post-war situations. These changes reflect that the war had a significant impact on Zhou's beliefs. His view of Other turns more hostile during wartime although his self-image changes little, perhaps as a result of his subordinate position in the government decision-making process.



Figure 3.1 The general operational codes of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai

* MS = Mao Self, MO = Mao Other; ZS = Zhou Self, ZO = Zhou Other; Self Scores are in bold. The raw VICS scores for each leader's key beliefs have been calculated into standard deviation units from the mean scores for the norming group and plotted on the vertical and horizontal axes of the Holsti typology.



Figure 3.2 The operational codes of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai for pre-war, war, and post-war periods in the Korean War

The following abbreviations are used above: MPWS = Mao Pre-War Self; MPWO = Mao Pre-War Other; MWS = Mao War Self; MWO = Mao War Other; MP′WS = Mao Post-War Self; MP′WO = Mao Post-War Other; ZPWS = Zhou Pre-War Self; ZPWO = Zhou Pre-War Other; ZWS = Zhou War Self; ZWO = Zhou War Other; ZP′WS = Zhou Post-War Self; ZP′WO = Zhou Post-War Other. → Indicates the way Self moves from pre-war to war to post-war periods. Self scores are in bold.

The results for Mao and Zhou question the claims that Chinese leaders are either simple Confucians or Parabellum offensive realists. Unlike the popular image of a dovish Zhou, his operational code beliefs are more realistic and even exhibit signs of Parabellum traits like Mao's. However, Zhou is much more cooperative than Mao in general despite a lower control over historical development. Because he was not in a key position for final decision-making, his public speeches may reflect the consensus beliefs of the Central Committee under Mao's lead. Although his self-image (I-1) did not change quadrants over time during the Korean War, the variation in the beliefs of both leaders suggests that a leader's beliefs are not static but, rather, change across situations. Tests of the operational codes of other leaders and other situations confirm this implication.[38] In the case of Mao, the statistical analysis shows that he became an offensive Parabellum realist when the threat level increased in the strategic environment. However, the variation across situations calls into question that he was simply an offensive realist. He could be simply a defensive realist under high threat. A die-hard offensive realist would exhibit this strategic orientation in the conditions of both high and low threat.

The operational code analysis of Mao Zedong basically supports Johnston's claim that Mao was a realist and not a Confucian leader. The results show that Mao, in general, was less likely to use cooperative tactics such as rewards, appeals, or promises. Mao's view regarding the nature of the political universe was clearly hostile. However, the results of Mao's operational code beliefs may be partly due to a hostile external environment and threat. Under war/crisis conditions, Mao displayed more hostile operational code beliefs and was more ready to use force. Mao's realpolitik beliefs were not offensive in nature outside of a crisis/war period. As Mao's peer, Zhou was not as hostile as Mao in his worldview; neither was he a Confucian leader. In Zhou's case, we can see the impact of time as China was constantly under security challenges and threats, but we can also detect the more lenient Zhou on the inside. Because Zhou was not in charge of decisions, the foreign policy of China reflected more the influence of Maoist features during the Korean War period.

Overall, the operational code analysis of Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai reveals a more complex reality than a structural analysis of Chinese strategic culture would have anticipated. The results support Johnston's claim that Mao was an offensive realist, but only during war periods. Mao's peer, Zhou Enlai, does not conform to Johnston's claim that Chinese leaders are offensive Parabellum realists, and these results raise doubts about his claim that Mao's successors are also Parabellum realists. Moreover, the operational code analysis shows that strategic beliefs are not static but change for the same leader in different contexts as well as for different leaders.

Therefore, Mao can be seen as partly the product of his time and international historical setting. In Mao's era, the world was defined as an ideological struggle between the two antagonistic blocs, communist-East

and capitalist-West, and China was faced with military and economic "containment" by the US. The first security strategy of the new China was to forge a military alliance with the Soviet Union—the "big brother" of all communist states—against pressures from the West led by the US in the 1950s. Under the influence of military arrangements with the Soviet Union and ideological antagonism toward the US, China became involved in the Korean War to fight against the US despite the fact that the war was started by North Korea with the consent of the Soviet Union.

At that time the danger of a Third World War was still the major security concern for Mao. Therefore, Mao's view toward the nature of the political universe was hostile. Under war/crisis conditions, Mao displayed more hostile operational code beliefs and was more ready to use force. However, Mao's realpolitik beliefs were not offensive in nature outside of a crisis period. Mao's strong sense of independence stemmed from a deep-rooted vigilance or distrust in history towards the intentions of external big powers, even if in the same ideological bloc.

As David Shambaugh has argued: "He (Mao Zedong) quickly grew distrustful of Soviet support (or lack thereof during the Korean War and two Taiwan Straits Crises) and saw dependency on the Soviet Union as a violation of China's century-long struggle for national independence and dignity."[39] Mao's security strategy emphasized self-defense and isolation from the struggle of the two superpowers later on. China increased its military budget and detonated its first nuclear bomb while attempting to cultivate the Non-Aligned Movement and mobilize developing countries into a broad front against both superpowers.[40]

The subjective games of Mao and Zhou

To model more effectively the strategic preferences of the two Chinese leaders and examine how or whether they change, the subjective games of Mao and Zhou are analyzed using the expanded version of the TIP based on Brams' TOM.[41] The following analysis first focuses on the general subjective games inferred from their general beliefs and then turns to their Korean War games to analyze peace and war situations. Using the VICS aggregate scores of the leaders' operational code beliefs, the standard deviations from the mean of average world leaders for the major beliefs are calculated for Mao and Zhou in general and then for the three war periods: pre-war, war, post-war.

I have chosen 12 speeches by Mao from 1940–49 to retrieve his general beliefs. During this essential period in Mao's life the CCP finally achieved control of China. The CCP was fighting with the Nationalists and then the Imperialists for the sake of national survival and a revolutionary ideology in a conflictual world that Mao believed was uncompromisable. Mao's China was constantly under a security threat from the Japanese (1931–45), the Nationalists (1947–49), then from the US over the Taiwan issue and Korea,

and still later from the Soviet Union over interior borders. He led the Chinese PLA and CCP to win national independence and sustain national survival and development. Despite the power gap with the superpowers, particularly their nuclear superiority, he uttered the famous slogan that "imperialists are paper tigers" based on the belief that the masses held the key to overcome their power. But he was also aware of the fact that power came from gun barrels; therefore, China developed nuclear weapons even without Soviet help.

The Nash Equilibrium in Mao's general game is CF,CF (2,2), in which China and the West are mired in a deadlock situation. Another NME for Mao's general game is (3,3), which more accurately reflects the situation in the late 1940s. The new PRC would have liked to have a peaceful environment in which to develop and unify its nation. Although Mao felt sure of a war with the US, he did not want to fight one from a position of weakness.

Mao's general and pre-war subjective game (32)

	US	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"|←	1,4
China	↓	↑
CF	4,1→	2,2*

Self's Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	US	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"→|	1,4
China	↑	↓
CF	4,1 |←	2,2*

Other's Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (– =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

As seen from Figure 3.2, Mao's pre-war subjective game is the same prisoner's dilemma game as his general game. In early 1950, Mao was not prepared for a war with the US despite the fact that he wanted to take Taiwan. Mao believed that there would be a war with the US, possibly over Taiwan, Korea, or Vietnam, but he preferred this to happen later and not right after the civil war with the Nationalists who actually had US support. Therefore, the initial state of cooperation (3,3) reflects China's relationship with the US.

Mao's pre-war subjective game predicts that the US will stay and believes that China should stay as well at the initial state. In the discussions before the Korean War when Mao met Stalin and Kim Il Sung, Kim tried to persuade Mao into believing that the US would not intervene in Korea.[42] Although Mao was aware of Kim's intentions, he was not ready especially to get militarily involved with the US in Korea. Mao's pre-war game predicts a

move by the US to deadlock (2,2) if China and allies do not stay at (3,3) and move to domination (4,1). It also prescribes a move by China from (1,4) submission to (2,2) deadlock if the US escalates to (1,4) and threatens China. In late 1950, therefore, China intervened to surprise and overwhelm the UN forces after MacArthur crossed the 38th Parallel.

However, the Chinese did not triumph for long. The war entered a trench warfare phase in 1951, and the offensives from both sides were never completely successful after that. Territory constantly changed hands between the Chinese/NK forces and the UN forces. Mao ordered the Chinese commander Marshall Peng to destroy more US forces in the hope that the US would give in. But Mao was wrong and his order met with strong disagreement from Peng. The front-line troops were already exhausted and in need of food and other logistic supplies. The Chinese offensives were under heavy US air bombing without effective air cover.

Mao's subjective game remained unchanged during and after the Korean War. He chose to stay at deadlock during the war (see below), and he believed that the US would not move either. This mutual deadlock stopped both sides from making progress on the negotiating table, as Mao did not think the US would give in on anything. On the battleground, military deadlock continued with neither side making much progress. In July 1953 an armistice was signed, breaking the strategic deadlock on the Korean Peninsula. The US had threatened to use tactical nuclear weapons unless China moved to (1,4), creating the opening for the US to move to (3,3).[43]

Mao's subjective war game (32)

	US			Other			US		
	CO	CF			CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	3,3	|← 1,4		CO	Settle	Submit	CO	3,3 →|	1,4
China	↓	↑		**China**			**China**	↑	↓
CF	4,1	→ "2,2"*		CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	4,1 |←	"2,2"
Self's Strategy: Stay				**China Outcomes**			**Other's Strategy: Stay**		
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)							(P-1, P-4b) Other (– =)		

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Although the Korean armistice was signed, moving Sino-US relations to (3,3), Mao later chose to move to (4,1) with demands on Taiwan, and the US responded by threatening to move back to deadlock (2,2). Hostility

between the US and China continued, peaking over Taiwan in the late 1950s. The Korean War apparently had a serious impact on Mao's beliefs. Mao was feeling relatively confident of peace in 1950. He turned much more hostile during the war, and his view of historical control increased significantly. Although China fought a superpower without losing, Mao was less confident afterwards that the imperialists were paper tigers.

A comparison of Mao and Zhou in the Korean War can indicate whether Chinese decision-making was consensual all the time. As the key decision-makers for the Korean War, Mao as the head and Zhou as a subordinate present an interesting test. Zhou's general game was the same as his pre-war game, which differed from Mao's general and pre-war game; however, Zhou agreed with Mao that both China and the US would stay at the initial state of settlement (3,4). With the outbreak of the Korean war, Zhou's wartime game converged with Mao's game. The two leaders agreed that China's strategy should be "stay" at (2,2) deadlock and predicted the US would also stay at deadlock (see Mao's war subjective game above).

Zhou's general and pre-war subjective game (27)

	US			Other			US	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	"3,4"←	1,2	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	"3,4"→|	1,2
China	↓	↑	**China**			**China**	↑	↓
CF	4,1	→ 2,3*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	4,1	|← 2,3*
Self's Strategy: Stay			**China Outcomes**			**Other's Strategy: Stay**		
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)						(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)		

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Following the Korean armistice in 1953, Zhou's post-war subjective game changed back to his pre-war game. While he agreed with Mao's ranking for Self's preferences in the post-war period, his preference rankings for the US differed from Mao's. Therefore, he did not agree with Mao's prediction that the US would defect from settlement (3,4). If Mao chose to move from (3,4) to (4,1), Zhou's subjective game predicted that the US would move to deadlock (2,3). In a repeated play of this game with (2,3) deadlock as the initial state, the US would choose "stay" while China's strategy should be to choose "move" to (1,4) toward the status quo ante, as the analysis of Zhou's post-war subjective game shows below.

Zhou's post-war subjective game (27)

	US				Other				US			
		CO		CF			CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	3,4	←	1,2		CO	Settle	Submit		CO	3,4 →|	1,2
China		↓		↑	**China**				**China**		↑	↓
	CF	4,1	→	"2,3"*		CF	Dom	D/lock		CF	4,1 |←	"2,3"*
Self's Strategy: Move					**China Outcomes**				**Other's Strategy: Stay**			
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)									(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)			

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

To sum up, during the Korean War the subjective games of Mao and Zhou reflected closely the threat perceptions of the two key Chinese leaders. Even the diplomat Zhou turned more conflictual during a war with a superpower. However, they diverged again in their image of the US and in their respective strategic expectations after the Korean War. Mao had Taiwan on his mind and, as a strong leader, he was more willing to resort to the use of force. Zhou, as Premier of the New PRC, was more concerned with China's domestic situation as seen from his other speeches of the same time. In general, the logic of the subjective game analysis indicates that the individual differences in their key beliefs made a difference in their strategic preferences in dealing with the US following the Korean War. In the next chapter we shall examine whether these differences carried over in the road to war with India in 1962.

4

CHINA AS A REGIONAL POWER

Mao, Zhou, and Deng in India and Vietnam

> We are advocates of the abolition of war, we do not want war; but war can only be abolished through war, and in order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to take up the gun.
>
> Mao Zedong "Problems of War and Strategy" (November 6, 1938), *Selected Works*, Vol. II, p. 225

> If China does not have atomic and hydrogen bombs and has not launched satellites since the 1960s, it is not worthy of being called a big and influential country and will not have its present international prestige.
>
> Deng Xiaoping

When the cold war was at its height in the 1960s and 1970s, China's leaders were in a difficult situation domestically and internationally. Nevertheless, they decided to fight India and Vietnam—two close friends. Why? How were the decisions made? This chapter focuses on Deng Xiaoping, a key player in the second generation of Chinese leadership. As a transitional figure, his leadership spans the cold war and the post-cold war period. What was his role in China's decision to fight India and Vietnam? The following narrative interpretation of the two wars is accompanied by analyses of the operational code beliefs of the major decision-makers, Deng, Mao, and Zhou. The fit between the strategic preferences of these leaders and their decisions for war are compared and contrasted with the aid of sequential game theory and the subjective games embedded in their respective belief systems.

Mao, Zhou, and Deng and the Sino-Indian War in 1962

The Sino-Indian border war[1] was known as "China's Forgotten War,"[2] and it lasted about 30 days from October 20 to November 20, 1962 along both the eastern and western borders between India and China.[3] The Chinese and

Indian forces were of approximately equal strength.[4] No air power was introduced by either side. Tanks were fighting in Ladakh on the Chinese side, but they played a marginal role at best. Indian troops suffered a severe loss and defeat. No Chinese figures were released, but the PLA did not lose a single soldier and there were no civilian losses. The war ended with China's unilateral ceasefire and restoration of the status quo plus negotiations going on until the 1990s. This war had a significant impact on Sino-Indian relations, as India blamed China for invading its territory and the trust between the two largest Asian states never fully recovered. Though in 1994 both sides signed a treaty on confidence-building measures to solve the border issue, when India tested its nuclear bomb in 1998, it justified that action as a result of China's threat to Indian defenses. Negotiations between the two countries over the unresolved territorial issues are still going on; the latest round was held in December 2003.

Despite the fact that over 40 years have passed, there is little documentation from either side regarding the decision process. Scholars provide different interpretations of the reasons behind the Chinese decision. The border dispute seems a classical one with border clashes deteriorating into armed conflict. At first, most scholars attributed the war to Chinese aggression and expansionism. India particularly criticized China for invasions into the contested territories that India claimed. The Indian side stressed that China did not want India—a democracy and, furthermore, an ally to the Soviet Union—on its border to threaten China on the Southern front. But gradually, more research has shown that New Delhi, and Nehru in particular, was largely responsible for provoking the conflict politically, diplomatically, and militarily. Most observers put blame on the Indian side for starting the border conflict, and the Indian government even destroyed a significant document reported by two military generals after the war by declaring it as threatening national security.[5] Even a former Indian military commander in the North East Frontier Agency (NEFA) conceded that his troops occupied Chinese territory across the McMahon Line, which they refused to abandon in the face of PLA demands.[6] Nehru underestimated the Chinese resolve to use force against his "forward policy." Indian officials were under the wrong impression after their success in taking back Goa from Portugal.

Some scholars also focus on the international structure at that time and try to reason from systemic factors. They point out that positive changes in Soviet-Indian relations while Sino-Soviet relations were turning chilly had a direct impact on China's decision to use force. As the Sino-Indian border dispute related to historical/colonial legacies left over from colonial Britain, China had the same kind of dispute with the Soviet Union regarding a much larger area of territory that included Outer Mongolia. Mao fought India to avoid a two-front war with the Soviet Union and India at the same time should there be the need to discuss with the Soviets the historical border disputes

and unequal treaties regarding Soviet/Russian seizure of Chinese territories. India expected Soviet support but was disappointed, because the Soviet Union changed its neutral position and leaned towards China. In October 1962, two weeks before the Sino-Indian conflict, the Cuban missile crisis unfolded between the Soviet Union and the US. The Soviet Union definitely needed China's support in this regard. Therefore, strategically, the USSR changed its position in favor of China.[7]

Still others claim that both Mao and Nehru miscalculated the situation, especially regarding Tibet.[8] Mao thought the Indian government supported Tibet as the Indian government provided help to the Dalai Lama and sympathized with the Lhasa rebellion in 1959. Therefore, Mao thought India would help Tibet's independence even though Nehru recognized Chinese rule over Tibet.[9] When China started building the road in Aksai Chin, Nehru was confronted with severe domestic pressure especially in the parliament; therefore, he needed to show a strong China policy. He pushed for the forward policy without any clear idea of the readiness of the Indian forces and agreed to challenge the Chinese PLA without listening to his military officials.[10]

The Chinese PLA achieved a big success in their maneuvers against Indian forces in the Himalayas in the month-long conflict, inflicting severe casualties on the Indian forces and damaging Indian morale. In defeating India on the battlefield, China achieved its political goal of "teaching India a lesson" by demonstrating that if pushed, China would use force; the geostrategic goal was to avoid a two-front war (North with the Soviet, and South with India); the strategic goal was to maintain regional balance, especially in South Asia; and the military goal was to maintain the posts it claimed along the Line of Actual Control as of 1959.[11] However, instead of occupying what the Chinese claimed as their own territory, China declared a ceasefire unilaterally. China continuously offered to negotiate throughout the conflict, but the Indian government ignored the Chinese offer.

Therefore, the puzzles are: was the war planned long in advance or was it a result from ongoing diplomatic and military interactions between the two sides? Was Chinese policy reactive or proactive? The border disputes had been dragging on for years without armed conflict, why did war happen at that time in 1962? Is it an isolated occurrence or related to other situations, foreign or domestic, confronting China?

The international situation and China's domestic situation

The 1960s was a hard time for China. First of all, China was experiencing severe domestic economic and political crises. For Mao, the Great Leap Forward movement of 1958–59 resulted in a severe loss of resources and human lives. The estimated deaths differ in the Chinese sources and Western figures, but the figure is reportedly in the millions. To make the situation

worse, Mao's ideological struggle with the Soviet Union deteriorated from the late 1950s, leading to the Soviet withdrawal of all economic assistance, advisors, and technicians in 1960. Furthermore, from 1960 to 1962 China experienced three years of successive natural disasters, which were the most severe in its history, leaving China in desperate need of food and other resources. However, the Soviet Union demanded China repay the aid that had been provided to the Chinese during the Civil War and the Second World War. Premier Zhou agreed to the Soviet demand to preserve China's dignity and respect. Third, Mao's health was deteriorating, and in the late 1950s his power was also challenged by Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping who advocated economic reforms and development. Fourth, domestic stability was shaky with a serious rebellion in Lhasa in 1959 by Tibetan separatists supported by India and the US.[12] Mao was seriously concerned that external enemies would exploit the PRC's domestic vulnerability to sabotage the Chinese Communist regime.

The international situation in the 1960s was also challenging to China. The significance of the shifting strategic triangle among the US–USSR–PRC was essential in understanding the Sino-Indian War (the Sino-Vietnamese War as well). The cold war accentuated the colonial leftover territorial disputes. The intensity of the cold war in the 1950s led to short-lived, cordial relations among non-aligned India, Communist China, and Russia as the US sought a military alliance with Pakistan. The deteriorating Sino-Soviet relations after 1959, in turn, developed into Sino-Indian antagonism as India moved closer to the USSR (the same happened in the Vietnam case when Vietnam moved closer to the USSR), and China became allied with Pakistan (and with Cambodia in the latter case). In addition to the deteriorating Chinese relationship with the Soviet Union in the north, Indian Prime Minister Nehru constantly carried out provocative actions along the Sino-Indian border areas in the south.

The major reason that the Sino-Indian war did not bring in the superpowers was the Cuban missile crisis, which happened exactly one week before the Sino-Indian War. Both the Soviets and the US were preoccupied with a potential nuclear showdown. Thus, attention was not shifted to Asia. This might also have been a factor in the calculations of the Chinese leader, as pointed out by many scholars. Some scholars argue that Mao carefully calculated the time to teach Nehru a lesson while the two superpowers were preoccupied in Latin America; therefore, there was no possibility of involving the two in Asia.[13] That also contributed to China's withdrawal after achieving the primary goal. The US promised China that it would not support a Taiwan GMD (the Nationalist Party led by Jiang Jieshi) attack on the mainland. Meanwhile, in order to win Chinese support in a potential showdown with the US, Khrushchev offered support to the Chinese side in the Sino-Indian dispute, changing his original neutral position.[14]

For the Indian side, Nehru was blamed for the faulty step of carrying out forward diplomacy by setting up posts to encroach upon Chinese territory. If Indian Prime Minister Nehru had not courted Soviet favor, he would not have made this tactical mistake. Vertzberger blames Nehru for miscalculating the situation, resulting in the humiliating failure of the war.[15] Nehru had always taken for granted India's position as a big brother to the Chinese in the Non-Aligned Movement and the Third World. He also regarded himself as the indisputable leader of the Third World.

However, Mao challenged his position because of the Chinese revolution and support to Pakistan and Myanmar. Nehru was a strong figure in Indian foreign policy, but he was also under severe domestic pressure to show a strong stand against the Chinese when China started building a road from Xinjiang to Tibet through Aksai Chin, which India claimed was its territory. Nehru was also overwhelmed by the Indian success in taking back Goa from Portugal. Nehru personally hated the military, nor was his Minister of Defense, Menon, on good terms with the military. The big gap between the civilian leaders and the military officers hindered a fair and objective calculation of the situation before Nehru advanced the forward policy or decided to take on the Chinese PLA. Adding to this problem was the wrong intelligence information that China would not resort to the use of force. The Chinese diplomatic protests were mistaken as signals of weakness and lack of will from the Chinese side.[16]

Mao, Zhou, and Deng in the 1960s

Mao Zedong and Zhou Enlai continued to play key roles in the final decision to fight India. Deng Xiaoping, as a key negotiator with the Soviets during this time, also contributed to the decision-making. Therefore, a comparison of the operational code beliefs of the three leaders with each other and with a norming group of world leaders should present some interesting insights and provide further tests of the hypothesis that China may not be a revisionist state with an aggressive strategic culture.

In Table 4.1 are the mean scores for Mao, Zhou, and Deng during the Sino-Indian War. A comparison of the three leaders during this conflict shows that in general, and as expected, Mao sees the world as more hostile while Zhou sees the world as more friendly than Mao but much less friendly compared with Deng. Deng is also the most cooperative of the three leaders with Mao as the most hostile and Zhou in the middle. Mao also sees the least control over historical development while Deng thinks he has more control compared to Mao. This might be attributed to the leaders' concerns over the Soviet Union. Mao was more concerned about the Soviet role in the world revolution while, as the negotiator with the Soviet Union during the early 1960s, Deng showed more confidence and strength.

Table 4.1 Mean scores of Mao, Zhou, and Deng's beliefs in the Sino-Indian War

		Mao (N = 7)	*Norming group (N = 255)*	*Deng (N = 6)*	*Zhou (N = 6)*
Philosophical beliefs					
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	–.11*	.25	.39	.21
P-2	Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	–.15*	.12	.28	.08
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	.14	.15	.16	.10
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	.13	.21	.25	.17
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	.98	.97	.95	.98
Instrumental beliefs					
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	–.001	.33	.42	.37
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	.03	.14	.12	.13
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	.36	.30	.34	.25
I-4	Timing of action				
	a. Conflict/cooperation	.57	.51	.52	.63
	b. Words/deeds	.45	.53	.45	.60
I-5	Utility of means				
	Reward	.12	.17	.11	.01
	Promise	.04	.07	.04	.17
	Appeal	.33	.43	.57	.51
	Oppose	.39*	.15	.12	.14
	Threaten	.01	.05	.01	.01
	Punish	.10	.14	.15	.16

Notes:
* Significant at P < .05 level (two-tailed) from the norming group

Mao views the political universe as much more hostile than Deng and he is very pessimistic about the realization of his political ideals while Deng is much more optimistic. Mao shows very low control of historical development compared to Deng or the norming group. This has much to do with the international and domestic situation as well as Mao's leadership during the early 1960s.[17] Facing the breakdown of the Sino-Soviet alliance and the Soviet challenge, serious natural disasters, deteriorating domestic economic situation, and political turbulence, Mao was also experiencing serious health problems.

Zhou's operational code beliefs are very complicated as well. But unlike the general image of a dovish Deng, his philosophical beliefs are more realistic and even show signs of pessimism like Mao. However, Zhou is much more

cooperative than Mao in general, despite a higher control over historical development. This is probably because he was not in a key position for final decision-making. His public speeches may reflect the consensus beliefs of the Central Committee under Mao's lead. Zhou's operational code beliefs during the Sino-Indian War generally conform to the fact that Zhou was a major diplomatic figure during the Sino-Indian War trying to negotiate with the Nehru government and settle the conflicts through diplomatic means.

Overall, Mao's beliefs still mirrored the cold war concerns of China being threatened by both the Soviets and the US in the early 1960s. Zhou remained a realist who saw the world in the cold war realist's terms. However, Deng is an outlier compared to the general assumption of a cold war communist state leader. This might be because he was not in control of the state's decision-making, and his role as a diplomat. Mao was in a control position for this war while Deng was in a subordinate position. Deng was a major figure in Chinese negotiations with the Soviets in the early 1960s. Mao had a high trust in Deng's handling of the Soviets and called him by the nickname "my little man." However, his cooperative orientation already placed him as a Confucian type of leader. If these beliefs are his true beliefs as a Confucian leader, then in a control position during the Sino-Vietnamese War in 1979 fighting a weaker state, he should not change his beliefs. If he is hiding his real beliefs in the 1960s, his beliefs should change towards more hostility in the later Vietnam case.

What kinds of leaders are Mao, Zhou, and Deng?

In Figure 4.1, we can see that, in general, Mao and Zhou are defensive realists for the Sino-Indian War period, although Zhou was more cooperative than Mao and saw the world as less hostile. Deng is a Type C Confucian leader whose beliefs are much more cooperative than Mao and Zhou. The threat from India was not a serious one militarily despite the Soviet threat of involvement. Therefore, when breaking down the war situations into pre-war, war, and post-war in Figure 4.2, Mao's beliefs are not as hostile as those during the Korean War. In general, Mao's realist beliefs about Self and Other are still more conflict-oriented and more hostile than either the average world leader or Zhou and Deng. Mao changed from a Type DEF defensive leader to a Type B offensive leader during war and back to Type DEF after the war. His change, however, was not as sharp as during the Korean War.

During the Sino-Indian War, Zhou is a Type A (-1.55,.35SD) Confucian leader in a Type B (1.55,-.88SD) Parabellum world. Further, as seen from Figure 4.2, Zhou's Self beliefs change from Type DEF to Type A to Type C from pre-war to war to post-war periods for the Sino-Indian War. Zhou's view of Other shifts to Type A after the Sino-Indian War with the Chinese military triumph. Zhou's Self beliefs are relatively more peaceful in the Sino-Indian War compared with Mao.



Figure 4.1 The operational codes of Mao Zedong, Zhou Enlai, and Deng Xiaoping in the Sino-Indian War

MS = Mao's Self, MO = Mao's Other; DS = Deng's Self, DO = Deng's Other; ZS = Zhou's Self, ZO = Zhou's Other. Self scores are in bold. Scores are standard deviation from the mean of the norming group calculated from Table 4.1.



Figure 4.2 The operational codes of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping, and Zhou Enlai from pre-war to war to post-war periods in the Sino-Indian War

The following abbreviations are used above: MPWS = Mao Pre-War Self; MPWO = Mao Pre-War Other; MWS = Mao War Self; MWO = Mao War Other; MP′WS = Mao Post-War Self; MP′WO = Mao Post-War Other; ZPWS = Zhou Pre-War Self; ZPWO = Zhou Pre-War Other; ZWS = Zhou War Self; ZWO = Zhou War Other; ZP′WS = Zhou Post-War Self; ZP′WO = Zhou DPWS = Deng Pre-War Self; DPWO = Deng Pre-War Other; DWS = Deng War Self; DWO = Deng War Other; DP′WS = Deng Post-War Self; DP′WO = Deng Post-War Other. Self scores are in bold.

Deng's beliefs were relatively stable for the Sino-Indian War. Deng remained a cooperative-oriented Confucian leader with beliefs close to the average world leader. However, his Self beliefs did change from a Confucian Type A to the Parabellum Type B during wartime and then back to the Confucian Type C. Despite these changes, however, his view of the world remained Confucian. This continuity suggests that he had to follow the decisions made by Mao as his subordinate and implement his preferences during the war. However, he did not perceive the world in Mao's terms even during the war.

Mao, Zhou, and Deng's subjective games in the Sino-Indian War

Mao and Zhou shared the same pre-war subjective game, that is, a prisoner's dilemma game. Mao, Zhou, and Deng agree on the same strategy in their pre-war game with India, which is to choose "stay" at the initial state of (CO,CO) mutual cooperation. In Mao's and Zhou's subjective game of prisoner's dilemma, however, both China and India will be tempted to defect from mutual cooperation (3,3) leading to a Nash equilibrium of deadlock (2,2), because both states rank domination of each other as their highest ranked preference and mutual cooperation is not a myopic Nash equilibrium.[18] In order to maintain mutual cooperation as an NME, China would have to communicate a credible threat in preplay communication to move to deadlock (2,2) should India move from (3,3).[19] Deng is more optimistic regarding mutual cooperation, ranking this outcome highest for both states (4,4) in his subjective no-conflict game.

Nehru turned out to be as stubborn as Zhou's and Mao's game predicted. India's "forward policy" represented a defection from mutual cooperation to domination (CO,CF) by India, which was followed by a subsequent move by China to deadlock (CF,CF). According to the logic of their pre-war subjective games, Mao and Zhou expected this deadlock to be an equilibrium broken by force of arms while Deng anticipated that India would shift to a strategy of cooperation that would be reciprocated and move the conflict back to a final outcome of mutual cooperation. Differences in the respective subjective games embedded in their public statements, therefore, suggest that the pre-war consensus among the three leaders did not extend to a common assessment of India's strategic preferences, which affected their expectations of the likelihood of war between China and India. Mao's more pessimistic assessment turns out to be the one consistent with China's decision for war, suggesting that his influence was predominant in Beijing's decision-making during the pre-war period. Zhou as the key diplomat followed Mao's decision.

Mao's and Zhou's pre-war subjective game (32)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"|←	1,4
China ↓		↑
CF	4,1	→2,2*

Mao Self's Pre-war Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"→|	1,4
China ↑		↓
CF	4,1	|← 2,2*

Mao Other's Pre-war Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (– =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Deng's pre-war subjective game

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*←	1,3
China ↓		↑
CF	3,1	→ 2,2*

Deng Self's Pre-war Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+ =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*→|	1,3
China ↑		↓
CF	3,1	← 2,2*

Deng Other's Pre-war Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Mao's subjective war game (32)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	3,3 |←	1,4
China ↓		↑
CF	4,1 →	"2,2"*

Mao Self's War Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	3,3 →|	1,4
China ↑		↓
CF	4,1 |←	"2,2"*

Mao Other's War Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (– =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Once the war began, Mao's subjective game did not change, but the subjective games of Zhou and Deng did. Zhou's belief system now attributed an appeasement strategy to Self and attributed a bully strategy to Other. He defined the deadlock as a situation in which neither China nor India had much incentive to change strategies, as deadlock (3,3) was both a Nash (myopic) equilibrium and a Brams (nonmyopic) equilibrium. In this subjective game India did possess what Brams defines as "moving" power, "the ability to continue moving when the other player must eventually stop." If moving power is possessed by the stronger player in a game, then it may be used to induce a preferred outcome—in this case domination (2,4) by India.[20] However, India did not have the military capability or political will to take advantage of this cycling possibility.

Zhou's subjective war game (41)

	India			India			India		
	CO	CF			CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	4,2	2,4		CO	Settle	Submit	CO	4,2	2,4
China	↓	↑		China			China	↑	↓
CF	1,1	"3,3"*		CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	1,1	"3,3"*
Zhou Self's War Strategy: Stay (I-1, P-4a) Self (+ <)				**China Outcomes**			**Zhou Other's War Strategy: Stay** (P-1, P-4b) Other (– >)		

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). The Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Deng's belief system during the war shifted, too. With a new initial state of deadlock (2,3) rather than mutual cooperation (3,4), Deng's subjective game diagnosed the wartime situation as one in which India ranked settlement as its highest outcome, but was unlikely to make the first move toward settlement because of the risk that China would not reciprocate. The logic of his game prescribes that China should move toward settlement from deadlock even though India chooses to "stay" at deadlock.

In the end, China chose Mao's strategy to dominate by inflicting a military defeat on India and then shifted unilaterally to Zhou's strategy of cooperation by withdrawing its forces from Indian territory. This two-step strategy of escalation and then de-escalation was also partly consistent with Deng's strategic preference for disengagement from the battlefield and the pursuit of a diplomatic solution by China.

Deng's subjective war game (27)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	3,4 ←	1,2
China ↓		↑
CF	4,1 →	"2,3"*

Deng Self's War Strategy: Move
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	3,4 →|	1,2
China ↑		↓
CF	4,1 |←	"2,3"*

Deng Other's War Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Although the subjective games of all three leaders prescribed a cooperative strategy following the Sino-Indian War, Zhou and Deng's post-war subjective games differed from Mao's. Zhou and Deng were more optimistic than Mao, predicting that India would stay at settlement (4,4), while Mao predicted that India might move from settlement (3,3) to dominate (1,4), which would force China to move to deadlock (2,2). Chinese troops withdrew unilaterally, so there was no diplomatic settlement for the Sino-Indian border. In its absence Mao remained a prisoner of the logic of his prisoner's dilemma game, heightened by a sharp decline in his belief in control over historical development (see Figure 4.2).

Mao's post-war subjective game (32)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"|←	1,4
China ↓		↑
CF	4,1	→2,2*

Mao Self's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (– =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"3,3"→|	1,4
China ↑		↓
CF	4,1 |←	2,2*

Mao Other's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (– =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Zhou's post-war subjective game

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*←	1,1
China ↓		↑
CF	3,2 →	2,3*

Zhou Self's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+ >)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*→	1,1
China ↑		↓
CF	3,2 ←	2,3*

Zhou Other's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ >)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

As a major diplomat working and negotiating for a peaceful settlement for the conflict, Zhou's post-war game perhaps reflected his state of mind in this role, as he exhibited a dramatic increase in his belief in control over historical development (see Figure 4.2). Deng's secondary role in the decision-making process revealed him to be a Confucian in his orientation throughout the conflict. His belief system consistently contained a subjective game that prescribed cooperation as the best post-war strategy to reach a settlement of the territorial dispute with India.

Deng's post-war subjective game

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*←	1,2
China ↓		↑
CF	2,1 →	3,3*

Deng Self's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+ =)

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	India	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*→	1,2
China ↑		↓
CF	2,1 ←	3,3*

Deng Other's Post-war Strategy: Stay
(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

From this analysis we can see that differences in beliefs and different patterns of belief change characterized the subjective games of the three Chinese leaders. Mao's games were conflict-oriented in general and his view of the outcome was less optimistic. Although Zhou was very close to Mao regarding the Korean conflict in the 1950s, he moved away from Mao's view of the opponent in the Sino-Indian conflict during the 1960s. Zhou's subjective games continued to reflect his role as a key negotiator and diplomat in the Chinese government's decision-making group during the Sino-Indian conflict, displaying features of his personal role as a diplomat as well as a revolutionary. However, in terms of final strategic moves, Zhou's games showed that he followed closely Mao's decisions.

Deng's subjective games showed that he was loyal to Mao's strategic preferences regarding the different outcomes of domination, settlement, deadlock, and submission during the Sino-Indian War, shifting from a Confucian preference for settlement as the highest-ranking outcome prior to the war. However, his view of Other defined India's highest-ranking preference as settlement, leading him to favor a strategy of de-escalation to end the war. Both Zhou and Deng differed with Mao in the post-war period regarding the prospects for diplomacy to prevent re-escalation and provide a return to mutual cooperation between the two Asian powers.

Overall, the results from the subjective games analysis display a high degree of congruence with the course of the Sino-Indian conflict. The tensions among Mao's Parabellum belief system, the more moderate Zhou's belief system, and the Confucian orientation of Deng are consistent with the Chinese strategies of escalation and unilateral withdrawal pursued during the conflict. This pattern reflects a balance between Parabellum and Confucian propensities within the Chinese elite represented by Mao and his two major advisors. It also shows that the three Chinese leaders are not simply Parabellum realists driven by a static and monolithic cultural tradition of offensive realism. Their complex belief systems and their changes across pre-war, war, and post-war situations are captured through an analysis of their operational codes. The results show that Mao was, indeed, a relatively dogmatic leader whose beliefs did not change across the three time periods. However, both Zhou and Deng demonstrated that they were relatively pragmatic leaders whose beliefs changed across situations, indicating that they were capable of complex learning patterns leading to changes in their strategic preferences and strategies of conflict and cooperation. Whether this pattern continued for Deng in the Sino-Vietnamese War is explored below.

The Sino-Vietnamese War: Deng's war

The Sino-Vietnamese War was the last major war for China.[21] Chen King stresses that the Sino-Vietnamese War was "Deng Xiaoping's war."[22] "The personal styles of Deng and his Vietnamese opposite, Le Duan, led to a war

their predecessors and colleagues would have worked harder to avoid."[23] Although China had backed North Vietnam in its struggle against South Vietnam and the US, tensions between the two communist states increased when Vietnam strengthened its ties with the Soviet Union, invaded Laos and Cambodia (Kampuchea) in late 1978, and expelled the Chinese living in Vietnam. China's decision to fight with Vietnam was taken immediately after Deng's state visit to the US. Deng learned that although the US would not support the Chinese effort, it would not oppose it either. During the interviews with four TV anchors, Deng reiterated that the Soviet Union was hostile and China would teach Vietnam a lesson in defense.[24]

Like the Sino-Indian War, the Sino-Vietnamese War[25] was another limited war involving only land power. If the Sino-Indian border conflict was a military triumph for the Chinese PLA, the Sino-Vietnamese War was certainly nothing of the kind. It was a military fiasco but, strategically, some scholars pointed out that China did achieve its goals. First, the USSR did not help its new ally, proving the untrustworthiness of the Soviet Union. Second, China once again demonstrated to the world that it was serious, meaning what it said particularly about issues involving territory and sovereignty. Third, China demonstrated its concern for the overseas Chinese people, though some declare this was motivated out of economic interests. Fourth, China showed its sincere concern over the Cambodia issue, demonstrating its support by trying to get the Vietnamese troops out of Cambodia. Fifth, China was able to maintain peace for the border provinces for quite some time despite some small clashes.

However, there is no denying that China did not succeed in its strategic goal of protecting its ally, the Khmer Rouge, nor did China force Vietnam to shift its best forces from Cambodia back to Vietnam to fight China. The Chinese leaders balanced the choices they had at hand and decided to fight the Vietnamese rather than intervene in Cambodia, which would certainly harm the Chinese reputation and risked drawing in the Soviets. Therefore, they avoided directly helping the Khmer Rouge. But China had to protect its ally out of security concerns. The Cambodian Prince Sihanouk visited China in early 1979 to obtain Chinese help. To fight Vietnam and indirectly release tension in Cambodia was finally chosen, but this goal was not fulfilled.

International and domestic situations of China in the late 1970s

The geostrategic relations among the major powers, US–USSR, China, and Vietnam in Asia, played significant roles in leading to the Sino-Vietnamese War. Deteriorating Sino-Soviet and Sino-Vietnamese relations paralleled the relaxation of Sino-US relations, and the Vietnamese–Soviet relationship warmed up. The late 1960s saw Sino-Soviet relations deteriorate into an

armed clash in 1969 over Zhenbaodao. Meanwhile, the US tried to extricate itself from Vietnam with honor. After the Korean War, although China proved itself a regional power daring to challenge one of the superpowers, China clearly did not want another war with the US. With the warming up of Sino-US relations and Nixon's 1972 visit, China saw the US as a potential counterforce to Moscow. Deng was able to ensure US acquiescence not to interfere if China chose to fight the Vietnamese during his 1979 visit to America. The Vietnamese government was aware of the Chinese preference of fighting a war with Vietnam given complete and intensifying media attention to this regard.[26] The strategic interests of China and Vietnam began to diverge significantly in the 1970s.[27] One argument about the cause of the war was that China intended to teach Vietnam a lesson for turning to the Soviet Union. Under Soviet support, Vietnam tried to exert regional power. Border conflicts with China increased as reported in Chinese media. Vietnam also intended to redress the territorial disputes in the Spratlys. In addition, as stated above, China needed to release the strategic tensions along its border, particularly the intensifying situation in Indochina between Vietnam and Cambodia, by helping out its ally Cambodia.

In cold war Asia, even though both China and the Democratic Vietnamese Republic were socialist countries, their strategic interests seemed to conflict directly.[28] First, the Chinese influence on Vietnam was overwhelming—even Ho Chi Minh was trained by the CCP in Southern China—and Mao's concept of People's war was translated into a Vietnamese variant after 1941.[29] China provided considerable assistance to Vietnam in its wars against France and America. With victories in the two Indochina wars, Vietnam was claiming to be the third largest military power behind the US and the Soviet Union in Asia in the late 1970s, and it was gaining more military support from the Soviet Union than from China.[30]

Although it was the Chinese who refused to increase aid to the Vietnamese, the Chinese certainly did not intend to drive Vietnam to the Soviet Union. The consequence of a two-front war—North with the Soviets and South with the Soviet ally, Vietnam—would be too daunting a threat for the PRC. Therefore, a turning point in the Sino-Vietnamese relationship was when Le Duan turned to the Soviet Union after his unsuccessful visit to Beijing in 1975, and joined the Soviet-dominated Council for Mutual Economic Cooperation (Comecon), and signed the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union in December 1978. The Chinese media named Vietnam the "Cuba of the East." Neither wanted war but neither was ready to compromise.

Second, the seeds for the Sino-Vietnamese War were sowed long before 1979. Vietnamese leaders were sensitive to a possible return to the old tributary relationship with Beijing. The Sino-Vietnamese relationship featured deep-rooted historical distrust. Vietnam had been a Chinese tribute state, and some scholars argue that the war demonstrated China's desire to resume its historical supremacy over Vietnam.[31] Vietnam, on the other hand, declared

that China had been a long-time threat. Even Vietnam's paramount leader Ho Chi Minh once stated "it was better for his countrymen to sniff French excrement for a brief period than to eat Chinese excrement for the rest of their lives."[32] The differences at Geneva reflected the clash of national interests based on differing geopolitical positions.[33] Vietnam felt betrayed by the Chinese at the Geneva conference in 1954. China's behavior strengthened Vietnam's belief that "the Chinese were willing to sacrifice Vietnamese interests to avoid a confrontation with the US. There were also clear signs at Geneva of the potential for future rivalry over Laos and Cambodia."[34] Historical distrust deepened after the Geneva conference when China pressed the Vietnamese to accept the French position of a divided Vietnam. Zhou Enlai also obtained from Ho Chi Minh the promise that in relations among Laos, Cambodia, and Vietnam the five principles of peaceful coexistence would be observed in return for China's continued aid to Vietnam.[35]

Mutual necessity between the Chinese and the Vietnamese continued to bind the two countries. Vietnam needed Chinese assistance for its unification, while China needed North Vietnam to balance against the Soviet Union in Asia. However, during Le Duan's visit to Beijing in August 1975, Beijing and Hanoi seemed to seriously disagree over ideology and the issue of the Soviet Union. No communiqué was issued afterward, despite some treaties on economic cooperation. Beijing also refused to increase aid to the Vietnamese government.[36] One speculation was that with victory over America, Vietnam was becoming too powerful in Asia. Consequently, Le Duan turned to the Soviet Union.

The turning point in Sino-Vietnamese relations, and the immediate causes for the war centered on the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia (Kampuchea). The Vietnamese–Cambodian–Chinese relationship was another fragile triangular balance in Asia. Vietnam's alliance with the Soviet Union led it to believe it would obtain support from the Soviets if Vietnam invaded Cambodia. Cambodia had been receiving support and aid from the Chinese. China was particularly watchful over Vietnam's intention of setting up an Indochinese Federation including the peoples of Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia[37] which ran directly into conflict with Chinese interests in creating a friendly buffer zone in Laos and Cambodia. This meant a change in the strategic balance in Indochina in the 1970s.[38] The realignment of Vietnam with the Soviet Union enabled Vietnam's military action. But China claimed it could not stand idly by to see its ally invaded.[39] China was in a strategic dilemma in its support of Cambodian forces. China chose to support Pol Pot despite the cruelty of the Khmer Rouge domestically. This was irritating for Vietnam because Pol Pot was fighting the Vietnamese-supported government. Many scholars attributed the Chinese attack as a strategic step to support its Cambodian ally—the Pol Pot government. The competition over Cambodia reflected a strategic conflict between the two regional powers.

Therefore, diverging strategic interests contributed to the war although there were other contributing factors including the maltreatment of the Vietnamese Chinese[40] and the deterioration of the border with armed clashes. Furthermore, China and Vietnam disputed territories in the South China Sea. While the immediate cause of the Sino-Vietnamese War was the border clashes, in fact, the Cambodia issue was the primary reason.

Adding to the complex strategic picture at the international level, China's internal politics also contributed to, and influenced, its policy toward its southern neighbor. The late 1970s saw the end of the Great Cultural Revolution, the death of Mao and Zhou, and the rise of Deng to power. Duiker points out that in China the party leadership succession issue resulted in a crisis between radicals and moderates. The power struggle between Deng and Mao's chosen heir, Hua Guofeng, resulted in faction politics leaving Hua Chairman with no actual control into the late 1970s. Deng retained firm military control as well in 1978 when he retained his post as the general-chief of staff of the PLA.[41] Deng not only won the party and military support, he also won the ideological debate against Hua.[42] The politics of leadership succession affected the Chinese war decision, that is, Deng used the war to consolidate his power and authority over the state and the military.

The leadership change also sped up military modernization to some extent. Up to the 1970s, Mao's people's war strategy had been the dominant military doctrine in the military thinking and teaching of the PLA. However, from the 1950s until the 1970s, military modernization made little progress, if any at all. The people's war doctrine emphasized man's power over weapons. However, realizing the new historical situation and the modernization drive of other countries' militaries, the reformist forces (Deng in the lead) cried out for immediate effort contributed to the backward PLA.[43] This demand ran into strong resistance from the conservatives (Hua Guofeng with some old veterans from the revolution) who argued for strictly following Mao's theory.[44] The result of the confrontation between the reform forces and conservatives tilted slightly towards the modernization end and significantly influenced Chinese command arrangements, strategy, and even battlefield tactics. The effect was clearly observed from the battlefield in 1979, directly contributing to the PLA's difficult victory.

At the Third Plenum of the CCP which opened in December 1978, Deng initiated the reform and opening-up policy. In January 1979, Deng's visit to America and the normalization of China–US relations further strengthened Deng's position in domestic politics. As Chen King points out, Deng's victory in the internal Chinese politics struggle was clear in December 1978: "His power, prestige, and revisionist viewpoints were clearly ascendant."[45] Furthermore, with a clear majority to command the Politburo and the Central Committee of the CCP, Deng was able to obtain support for his war decision.[46]

Deng was "sharp, daring, tough, and pragmatic"[47] and "his background, hardships, and ups-and-downs in power struggles had trained him to be pragmatic, resourceful, confident, risk-taking, and iconoclastic."[48] Deng's leadership was determinative in making the final war decision against Vietnam.[49] Yet, the war outcome was not as Deng expected. It was at least as much a lesson for the Chinese PLA as it was for Vietnam.

According to Chen King,[50] China had calculated carefully the military operation against Vietnam through comparing alternatives. The limited war was a compromise among the leaders given the Cambodia crisis. The Politburo's enlarged meeting in late 1978 featured diverse views of the military (more hawkish) and the civilian members[51] and the final decision to use military force against Vietnam, not in Cambodia, was leaning more toward the military preference. Deng calculated that there would not be large-scale Soviet interference, nor would there be unfavorable international opinions on China's "punitive" war of self-defense. Deng argued that the war would help China's modernization, and military modernization in particular. If China could achieve 70 percent success, the 30 percent would serve as a stimulus for military improvement.[52]

After mid-December, the PLA started regrouping and transporting troops to the Sino-Vietnamese border. It was already clear then to many analysts and media that "a Chinese-Vietnamese war was forthcoming."[53] On December 18–22, the Third Plenum of the Central Committee was held where the endorsement for the war decision was made. On December 25, China sent Vietnam a warning with the effect of signaling China's determination to attack if the border conflict did not calm down, and its willingness as well for negotiation.[54] Major Chinese media, *Renmin Ribao* (*People's Daily*), and *Beijing Review* (the English magazine) published consecutively articles issuing warnings after presenting facts of Vietnam's mistreatment of Vietnam's Chinese, border provocations and its hegemonic ambitions with Soviet support. Chinese military preparations started in late December on both the north border with the Soviet and the south border with Vietnam, further testing the sincerity of the Chinese. The southern troops were under the command of Xu Shiyou and Yang Dezhi (who reportedly directed the war in Vietnam). During Deng's visit to the US from January 28 to February 5, he discussed the possibility of war with Vietnam with Carter and requested moral support, which he was assured.

From February 9 to February 12, the Central Military Committee held a meeting to finalize the war plans despite the fact that the Soviet Union had sent ships to the coast near Hainan Island. The date was decided to be February 17, three days after the expiration of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation. Elleman made the argument that China fought the Vietnamese at that time as a sign to the Soviets that it would not sign the treaty again. On February 16, China sent the strongest protest against Vietnam's incursion into Chinese territory, which served as a war announcement, and war broke out the next day.

The warring brothers

There was no clear indication as to which party started the war.[55] Border clashes occurred in 1979. Each side blamed the other for being provocative along the border. However, before the major conflict, the Chinese government issued many signals to the Vietnamese. Even after Vietnam invaded and occupied Cambodia, on different occasions diplomats and media reported that Beijing warned the Vietnamese governments of the danger of war. However, Le Duan ignored them, as he was certain of backing from the Soviet Union.[56] The Chinese signals through propaganda, diplomatic exchanges, and open military demonstrations/military build-up by the PLA, though illustrating the seriousness of the Chinese, evidently did not communicate credibly to the Vietnamese. After these warnings without provoking[57] failed, China attacked along the Sino-Vietnamese border from two wings in a short, limited campaign that involved ground forces only.[58]

At 5 a.m. on February 17, 1979, China started its military campaign with ground forces. Air and naval power was not employed during the war because Beijing did not plan on expanding the war and Soviet ships were nearby at Cam Ranh Bay. The Chinese troops attacked under the protection of heavy artillery and tanks. The major targets for the attack were Lang Son, Cao Bang, and Dong Khe in the east and Lao Cai in the west.

The PLA was successful at the beginning, pushing hard onto the major targets. February 18–19 saw more fighting. However, progress was slow. By February 20–26, China had captured Cao Bang and Lao Cai, and moved on to Lang Son.[59] During this week, China declared that its Punitive War was limited in time and space and the PLA would withdraw immediately after obtaining its limited objectives.[60] The statement was made by Deng first to visiting foreign officials and media[61] and later reiterated by other officials. Until this time, the Soviets only provided arms and sent two destroyers to the South China Sea as gestures of support to Vietnam. It was clear that the Soviet Union would not intervene in the conflict despite its strong warnings and threats to China.

On February 21, the advance resumed against Cao Bang and against Lang Son. Chinese troops entered Cao Bang on February 27, but the city was not secured completely until March 2. Heavy casualties were reported on both sides. The PLA surrounded Lang Son on March 2, except for the strategically significant Khua Ma Son Mountain. Fierce fighting ensued and Lang Son fell two days later. From there the PLA moved on to within 100 miles of Hanoi. Fighting still went on for some time on a minor scale. On March 5,[62] the Chinese, declaring its punitive military operation against Vietnam a success, announced that the campaign was over and the PLA withdrawal was completed on March 16. After the war, both China and Vietnam strengthened their border region by deploying more troops. Low-level conflicts and incidents along the border continued into the 1980s with each accusing the other party of responsibility for them.

The consequences of war

Though it lasted less than one month, the conflict was fierce with high casualties on both sides. Besides difficult geographic situations, the PLA met strong Vietnamese guerrilla and militia resistance and the Chinese supply system experienced serious problems. The Vietnamese forces were familiar with the terrain and the tactics for fighting this form of warfare as a result of the Vietnam War with the Americans. The PLA, on the other hand, was poorly equipped and had to deal with unexpected hardships. The PLA had to fight under severe conditions with a long line of poor logistics.

The PLA employed overwhelming manpower to prove once again Mao's theory of men over weaponry from the iron law of the people's war,[63] but this time the PLA "victory" also entailed serious costs and a bitter lesson. The PLA realized that the Great Cultural Revolution had left it so backward that even the Vietnamese guerrillas and militia forces were able to inflict severe damage on the frontline troops of the PLA. Therefore, some scholars concluded that China's 1979 war against Vietnam was a strategic failure.[64]

In addition, contrary to the Chinese warning Vietnam against close relations with the Soviets, the border war strengthened Soviet–Vietnamese relations. Nevertheless, Beijing's policy can be seen as a diplomatic success, since Moscow did not actively intervene, thus showing the limitations of the Soviet–Vietnamese military pact. China achieved a strategic victory by minimizing the future possibility of a two-front war against the USSR and Vietnam, thus defeating the potential encirclement by Russia. However, the Soviet military role in Vietnam increased during the 1980s as the Soviets provided arms to Vietnam. Soviet ships enjoyed access to the harbors at Danang and Cam Ranh Bay, and Soviet reconnaissance aircraft operated out of Vietnamese airfields. A lesson for the PLA was also clear. The PLA failed the test in actual fighting. During both the Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese Wars, Mao's strategy of people's war was adopted. However, the test proved that the people's war strategy does not work in modern warfare. Fighting tactics and logistics management were insufficient. As Deng predicted, the PLA needed to modernize.

China saw the punitive war against Vietnam as well as that against India to be defensive in nature.[65] Deng declared the war a victory for China despite concerns about the financial costs expressed by some high CCP officials (Chen Yun). He stressed that "the PLA could have gone all the way to Hanoi if they wanted."[66] Chen King states that the war decision-making process was "gradual" and "pragmatic" and "it was a step-by-step development of a causal relationship rather than a hasty decision prompted by an unexpected incident."[67] Despite the external and internal contributing factors, "Deng's leadership was an indispensable element to the accomplishment of the decision making process."[68]

Deng Xiaoping: what kind of leader?

Deng's belief system resembles the key beliefs of the average world leader. Deng's view of the political universe (P-1 = .291) in Table 4.2 is very close to the mean for the norming group (P-1 = .250), and he is also close to the norming group's view regarding the control of historical development (Deng P-4 = .207, Group P-4 = .212). Regarding the strategic orientation index, Deng (I-1 = .408) is not significantly more cooperative than the norming group (I-1 = .334). Table 4.2 also presents a comparison of Deng with Mao and Zhou. Although of the same revolutionary generation of Chinese leaders, Mao and Zhou turned out to be realists in varying degrees, while Deng's statistical scores show that he is a Confucian.[69]

Deng 's beliefs

Are Deng's beliefs stable? Is Deng inherently a Confucian, or do his beliefs change over different situations? The Sino-Indian War was a case that showed Deng was a Confucian during the 1960s when China was having a difficult time with both the US and the Soviet Union. However, as Deng was not in control of the final decisions in the 1960s, his beliefs in the Sino-Vietnamese War become a crucial test to see if Deng's beliefs were different than during the Sino-Indian War. As Figure 4.3 shows, the war situation did not have a significant impact on Deng's beliefs leading up to the Sino-Vietnamese conflict. He remained a Confucian leader throughout the Sino-Vietnamese war.

In Figure 4.3, Deng's Self beliefs shift from Type C to Type A to Type C, remaining a Confucian from pre-war to war and to post-war time (the Sino-Vietnamese War), though Deng changes toward less cooperative beliefs during wartime. However, the Sino-Vietnamese War was not such a severe threat to the PRC's national survival as the Korean War. The Vietnamese were not challenging a superpower rival. Although North Vietnam was a Soviet ally, the Soviets did not become involved. The Chinese fought to teach the Vietnamese a lesson and not for territorial gain or survival. Therefore, the relative stability of Deng's beliefs could be due to the less severe external threat, as well as his inherent personality as a Confucian leader. On the other hand, the general consistency of Deng's beliefs as a Confucian leader facing the Indians and the Vietnamese indicates that Deng can be a true Confucian leader with a cooperative orientation.

This lack of variation in Deng's beliefs, therefore, may partly reflect the fact that the Vietnam War was a regional war fought between China and a regional medium power. It also occurred when China was trying to court the US to form a de facto alliance relationship against the Soviet Union. Internationally, Deng (who was paying a historic visit to the US in 1979 before the Sino-Vietnamese War and after Vietnam invaded Cambodia) focused on presenting an appropriate image to the world and the US in the hope of

Table 4.2 A comparison of the general operational codes of Mao, Zhou, and Deng with the norming group of world leaders

		Mao (N = 44)	*Norming group (N = 255)*[a]	*Deng (N = 72)*	*Zhou (N = 11)*
Philosophical beliefs					
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	–.087***	.250	.291	.224
P-2	Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	–.118***	.118	.169*	.102
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	.172	.148	.146	.100
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	.192	.212	.207	.193
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	.960	.968	.970	.979
Instrumental beliefs					
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	–.083***	.334	.408	.249
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	–.141***	.139	.179	.075
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	.365	.304	.379**	.218
I-4	Timing of action				
	a. Conflict/cooperation	.542	.509	.449	.731
	b. Words/deeds	.587	.525	.531*	.589
I-5	Utility of means				
	Reward	.099**	.167	.152	.151
	Promise	.033**	.073	.043**	.016
	Appeal	.326**	.427	.508**	.460*
	Oppose	.235**	.147	.179	.193
	Threaten	.043	.047	.014**	.023
	Punish	.264***	.138	.103	.162

Notes:
* Significant at P < .10 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
** Significant at P < .05 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
*** Significant at P < .001 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
a For P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and P-5, the speech number for the norming group is 264. The data are provided by Prof. Mark Schafer from Louisiana State University.

gaining international and US support.[70] In addition, the Sino-Vietnamese War was fought to teach a lesson to the Vietnamese for the invasion of Cambodia and to fight against Soviet and Vietnamese hegemonism in the region. The Soviet Union was not actually involved in the war aside from some military claims and ideological support to the new alliance in Asia.

Ultimately, who Deng was and what kind of leader he was did matter in his foreign policy decisions for the Sino-Vietnamese War. Deng came into power at the end of the Cultural Revolution. The Sino-Vietnamese War was



Figure 4.3 The operational code of Deng Xiaoping for pre-war, war, and post-war periods in the Sino-Vietnamese War

The following abbreviations are used above: DPWS = Deng Pre-War Self; DPWO = Deng Pre-War Other; DWS = Deng War Self; DWO = Deng War Other; DP′WS = Deng Post-War Self; DP′WO = Deng Post-War Other. → Indicates the way Self moves from pre-war to war to post-war periods. Self scores are in bold.

fought right after he took control of the government.[71] Deng modified Mao's view of "world war." While Mao and other leaders believed that the Third World War was unavoidable or (later) unavoidable but "postponable,"[72] Deng judged that "it was possible that no large-scale war would erupt for a fairly long time to come and there was hope of maintaining world peace."[73] Based on this assessment of the nature of the political universe, Deng focused on national economic development to realize the "four modernizations."

In this shift, China concentrated on "economic construction" or "modernization" instead of "class struggle." China showed a less confrontational posture in the international arena. China decreased its direct security threats, increased its international stature and accrued substantial benefits from the West-dominated international finance, trade and technological systems.[74] For Deng and his successors, under the new goal of "economic development" the main task for the military is not to win a forthcoming war, but to prevent the eruption of war or military conflict, which could hinder or destroy economic development. According to the Defense White Paper issued in 1998, "the work in defense must be subordinate to, and in the service of, the nation's overall economic construction."[75]

Deng's actual security practices demonstrated that he was still thinking on the basis of military alliance or alignment and balance of power theory. Compared with Mao's revolutionary propensities, however, Deng was generally more cooperative and pragmatic in security thinking. As Whiting states, China's primary security motivations have ranged historically across a variety of situations and responses: preemption of perceived attack (Korea), deterrence (the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union along the Sino-Soviet border), coercion (India, Vietnam), and coercive diplomacy (Taiwan).[76]

Deng's general game and the Sino-Vietnamese War

To better understand Deng's strategic preferences and how he interacted with others, Deng's subjective games are analyzed below, in general and during the Sino-Vietnamese War. Deng's identity as a Confucian leader is further proven in his general subjective game. Deng chooses to stay at the initial state of settlement and predicts that the other side will stay as well. Therefore, a mutual cooperative outcome should prevail (4,4). This win-win preference does not change in his subjective games during the Sino-Vietnamese War, and his subjective games for pre-war, war, and post-war periods are the same. For the pre-war game Deng chooses to stay and predicts that the Vietnamese will stay at the initial settlement state as well. Although the Soviets promised to help the Vietnamese as an ally, Deng thinks that internationally and domestically the Vietnamese will not fight the Chinese as both are Third World brothers.

Vietnam's invasion of Cambodia changed that picture. The Soviet's invasion of Afghanistan also alerted the Chinese to the possibility of Soviet intervention in Chinese neighboring affairs. Although Deng's strategy changes

from "stay" to "move" following the Cambodian invasion, he still prefers settlement. Deng chooses to move to war (3,3) from submission (1,2), and the PLA overruns major strategic cities and defeats Hanoi's forces in those battles (2,1).

Deng's general game and pre-war Vietnam game

		Other				Other				Other	
		CO	CF			CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	"4,4"*	← 1,2		CO	Settle	Submit		CO	"4,4"*	→| 1,2
Self		↓	↑	**China**				**Self**		↑	↓
	CF	2,1	→ 3,3*		CF	Dom	D/lock		CF	2,1	← 3,3*

Deng Self Strategy: Stay (I-1, P-4a) Self (+ =)

China Outcomes

Deng Other Strategy: Stay (P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Deng's war game following Vietnam's invasion

		Other				Vietnam				Other	
		CO	CF			CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	4,4	→| "1,2"		CO	Settle	Submit		CO	4,4	← "1,2"
China		↑	↓	**China**				**Self**		↓	↑
	CF	2,1	← 3,3*		CF	Dom	D/lock		CF	2,1	→ 3,3*

Deng Self's Strategy: Move (I-1, P-4a) Self (+ =)

China Outcomes

Deng Other's Strategy: Move (P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Deng announced a decision to withdraw from Vietnam following his military victories. Deng thereby chose cooperation and predicted the same for Vietnam in his post-war game. The Sino-Vietnamese War made Deng further aware of the shortcomings of the PLA and the need for Chinese modernization. Although he claimed a triumph, the war dealt a heavy blow to the state and the PLA. The scars of the Cultural Revolution on the nation and the army further pushed Deng to reforms. Given also the heavy casualties on the battlefield, Deng decided that the strategic objective was obtained and, therefore, signaled a willingness to reach a settlement.

Deng's post-war game

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	4,4*	→|1,2
China ↑		↓
CF	"2,1"|←	3,3*

Deng Self's Post-war Strategy: Move
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+ =)

	Vietnam	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	4,4*	← 1,2
China ↓		↑
CF	"2,1"	→ 3,3*

Deng Other's Post-war Strategy: Move
(P-1, P-4b) Other (+ =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Conclusion

It was during the height of the cold war that China fought three wars against a major power to assist a brother buffer state and against two regional powers to teach them (India and Vietnam) a lesson. Chinese leaders (Mao mainly) decided to enter the Korean War when US/UN forces crossed the 38th Parallel. The Sino-Indian and Sino-Vietnamese wars escalated from border disputes,[77] which had been in existence for some time. Both wars were limited, involving only the army for a short duration (Sino-Indian War for 30 days and Sino-Vietnamese War for 16 days) with a unilateral withdrawal from the Chinese side. To the outside world, these wars still featured power politics. However, an in-depth analysis of external, international, and leadership causes seems to confirm that it was not simply ideology and national interest that were the driving force for Chinese decision. Allen Whiting states "China's primary motivations included preemption of perceived attack (Korea), deterrence (the US in Vietnam and the Soviet Union along the Sino-Soviet border), coercion (India, Vietnam), and coercive diplomacy (Taiwan).[78] China's use of force shows "flexibility in theory and pragmatism in practice."[79]

Overall, the preceding analysis of Chinese decision-making in three wars during the cold war era indicates that China's use of force was defensive in nature, depending remarkably on key leaders' beliefs and perceptions of threat from the external environment and domestic situations. Their analysis was based on definitions of these situations in line with their beliefs, which then determined their policy choices. The international situation provided the framework and constraints while domestic and internal politics played into the needs and beliefs of leaders in key positions.

5

POST-COLD WAR CHINA UNDER NEW LEADERS

Jiang and Hu–Wen

After over 20 years of Deng's reforms, China is rising. There have been increasing concerns worldwide over the strategic implications of growing Chinese power. US scholars and policy makers debate and shift between two policies towards a rising China. One is an engagement policy focusing on the possible socialization of China through promoting bilateral trade and involving China in international institutions, thus reining in the rising power to play the rules of the game like others.[1] The other is a containment policy constraining China's rise before its military and economic power becomes an overwhelming challenge to the US. The latter assumes China is a revisionist state, and measures should be taken to stop it from seeking hegemony in the Asia Pacific region or worldwide.[2]

Cultural realists have stressed that an offensive strategic culture was internalized by Chinese leaders, leading to an offensive Chinese grand strategy in history and in the Mao era.[3] However, Johnston recently argued that China may have entered a transitory period in the 1980s and 1990s between Maoist revisionism and post-Jiang quasi-fascism.[4] This period saw some status quo-oriented diplomacy by China. He cautions that neither a revisionist nor a status quo status is static, but changes according to contexts or contingencies. In other words, today's status quo China can turn into a revisionist one tomorrow.

Does a rising China have the intentions and motivations to challenge the system? Are the new leaders Parabellum realists? Do they possess revisionist beliefs? States' strategic preferences are determined not only by power alone. External situations and threats are perceived through state leaders. Leaders' perceptions go through their prism of beliefs, which reflects their cultural

spectrum. To understand completely the historical trajectory of Chinese foreign policy behavior, analyzing leaders' beliefs is essential. The tension created by a rising China in the academic field has overheated ever since the end of the cold war when ambiguity prevailed in the international system in terms of identifying friends and enemies. China came to the spotlight mainly due to its increasing comprehensive national power[5] as a result of normal Chinese development.[6] The claim that China is revisionist by nature of its increasing power is problematic for several reasons.

First, this proposition ignores historical occasions when China has had the opportunity to expand but did not. Second, the focus of the claim is merely on military and economic development, which might be normal for any state of China's size and experiencing development. Third, the hot spots for potential Chinese aggressive behavior are not innate, but a legacy from Chinese historical humiliation. Fourth, and most important, current Chinese leaders are not inevitably revisionist leaders. Under some international and domestic conditions, for example, international crises, they might act aggressively in response to the stimuli of external or internal pressures. However, it may be the case that diplomatic and cooperative means are actually preferred and acted upon whenever there is an opportunity. The following analysis will test whether current Chinese leaders think like revisionist Parabellum or accommodationist Confucian leaders.

The containment school of China experts claim that China, given its size, population, and rapid economic growth, is closing the power disparity gap with the US and poses a very dangerous systemic threat. In addition, China has many unsettled issues with neighboring states and with the US. China has never given up the use of force to recover Taiwan if Taiwan should declare independence. China consistently opposes US arms sales to Taiwan and insists on other countries' declaration of "one China" as a prerequisite for developing peaceful relations. Further, the containment school asserts that China does not obey the old international rules and intends to set up a new order with rules against US interests. Last, so Johnston argues, China has a history of aggression and revolution under a Parabellum strategic cultural influence.

Because scholars in the field of international relations have long focused on the European system and have "often simply employed concepts, theories, and experiences derived from the European experience to project onto and explain Asia,"[7] there is a need for a new analytical framework to look into China's foreign behavior. It is difficult to say if China is a revisionist or status quo power, because the current analytical frameworks do not provide us with a distinctive tool of judgment; the "quality and quantity of revisionism in a state's policy are not static properties,"[8] but change over time and across issues. Even "rising powers vary in their degree of dissatisfaction with the status quo."[9] Therefore, it seems futile to discuss how to meet the China challenge with these tools.[10]

David Kang argues that, historically, "when China has been strong and stable, order has been preserved [in Asia]," and "it has been Chinese weakness that has led to chaos in Asia."[11] Therefore, a strong and stable China implies a stabilizing force in the regional and international order, countering the predictions of many Western scholars. And "China seems no more revisionist or adventurous now than it was before the end of the Cold War."[12] Even Johnston admits, "the People's Republic of China (PRC) is more integrated into, and more cooperative within, regional and global political and economic systems than ever in its history."[13] In his speech during his recent visit to Harvard, the Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao stressed that China is a rising power dedicated to peace. He also emphasized Chinese culture and history by saying that "the cultural element will have a more important role to play in the new century." The Chinese culture emphasizes peace and harmony, and, in Tolstoy's words, "the Chinese nation is the most peace-loving nation in the world."[14]

New leadership and new environment: new beliefs?

The end of the cold war also witnessed the change of Chinese leadership from Deng Xiaoping to his chosen successor Jiang Zemin. The systemic changes and the disintegration of the former Soviet Union brought about significant changes in China's security environment. Furthermore, after decades of reforms and opening up, the domestic situation of China also changed. Under these changes, and given China's unique political culture, it is important to study whether Chinese foreign policy changes as well and if the new leadership will turn more aggressive in their behavior.

Some Chinese scholars argue that the early years of the post-cold war was the "best period of China's security environment since the foundation of the PRC in 1949."[15] With the collapse of the Soviet Union, China no longer faced a direct military threat in the North. Moreover, improvement of bilateral relations with the surrounding countries provided China with a more relaxed external environment. Thus, since the 1990s, Chinese leaders officially have no enemies and have not even "decided which threats are greatest."[16] The Chinese leadership was able to pay more attention to its internal security problems, such as separatist movements in Taiwan, Tibet, and Xinjiang, the social turbulence resulting from institutional reforms, epidemics such as AIDS, and the "soft threat" of "peaceful evolution" from the West, aimed at changing the social values and ideology of China. How they handle these issues seriously threatens the legitimacy of the Communist Party.

Primary concern over Sino-US relations continues to increase, because "the US was the only foreign power capable of directly threatening China's security."[17] The Chinese leaders predicted a multipolar world after the cold war in which China would play a more appropriate role as a major power like the EU, Japan, and Russia. However, several events have changed this perception, as Chinese leaders see a more unilateralist trend in US foreign

policy decisions particularly in the current Bush administration. First, the US economic decline has been less severe since 1992. Second, the US military actions in the Gulf and Kosovo made the Chinese leadership realize that US military power was far ahead of the PLA. Third, Chinese leaders perceived a more threatening US from collisions between the two powers over the Taiwan Strait in 1996, the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in 1999, and the EP-3 airplane incident in 2001. Fourth, the US strengthened its alliances with many Pacific Asian states—Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the Philippines. In 1996 and 1997, the US strengthened the military alliance with Japan through revision of the "Guidelines of US-Japan Defense Cooperation."

For China, this strengthening of the military alliance will certainly improve Japan's military capabilities as well as its financial and technological ability to develop sophisticated power-projection capabilities on very short notice.[18] On the other hand, Beijing is wary of the US deploying a theater missile defense (TMD) in Japan and Taiwan, which would degrade China's second-strike nuclear retaliatory capability. It is especially suspicious that the guideline's ambiguity regarding the scope of the treaty obscures the US and Japanese intent to cooperate on the Taiwan issue.[19]

The changes in the international situation from the early 1990s to the late 1990s demanded that the new leader in China—Jiang Zemin—search for a "new way of thinking" as he leads China into the early twenty-first century.[20] Chinese leaders initially saw the world right after the cold war as one moving toward "multipolarity," with the US as the sole superpower together with other major powers—China, Japan, and Europe. Shambaugh has argued:

> [F]rom China's perspective, unipolarity was a far worse state of affairs than bipolarity. China would prefer to find itself in a mutipolar world in which U.S. global power declines absolutely and regional powers, such as China, are able to resist external interference in their respective regions.[21]

Under this perception China improved its bilateral "partnership" or "strategic relationship" with major regional powers, including Japan, Russia, Europe, and ASEAN in the 1990s.

In response to NATO expansion and the US military alliances and security ties worldwide perceived by Chinese leaders as an effort to encircle China, Jiang's leadership formulated a "New Security Concept."[22] The fundamental difference between the "new security concept" and "the military alliance theory" is the divergence over the understanding of what forms the basis of international security. According to the New Security Concept, common interests, not military capabilities, are the prerequisite for security; and mutual confidence-building measures (CBMs), not military balance or military deterrence, are the means for security.[23] Shambaugh argued, "Despite its Pollyannaish prescription for peace and harmony among nations, the new

security concept does represent the most systematic and official exposition of China's prescriptive view, to date, of how international relations should be conducted and security maintained."[24]

The New Security Concept (NSC) has contributed to shaping a new security strategy for China's new leaders.[25] By the end of the Deng leadership, China had begun to loosen ties with the US and advocated an independent policy of peace, the central point of which is reactive and passive, that is, it aimed to avoid involvement in war or conflict. Compared with this non-alignment approach, the NSC emphasizes actively preventing war and conflict through CBMs, dialogue, and consultation. The NSC helps China get actively involved in international affairs and, according to China's leaders, the CBMs and dialogues as advocated in the NSC will make it easy for China to gain political support, because it is based on the "virtue and morality" (*ren* and *yi*) standard of Confucianism.[26]

In building and modernizing the Chinese military, Jiang continued the military downsizing and modernization policy. In September 1997, China announced a reduction of military personnel by 500,000 within three years in addition to the one million downsizing move in the 1980s. This effort has continued after Hu Jintao assumed power in early 2003. Both Jiang and Hu have continued to emphasize the quality of the military by implementing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) to bring China's defense into a high-technology-focused information age. According to Jiang, "any future war would be a war involving high-technology, a war of multiple dimensions, a war of electronics and a war of missiles."[27] Thus, preparing a "high-technology war" has become the new military strategy guiding the RMA of the PLA since the 1990s.

Hu Jintao came to power facing an even more complicated international situation. New threats emerged from terrorist groups, from epidemics (SARS), from domestic chaos (worker lay offs, separatists, growing dissatisfaction of the general public over the party's rule, and corruption) and, most significant of all, from a new conservative Bush administration that declared China and the US are strategic adversaries. Under this situation, world attention focused on how the new leader would handle the situation. Most of all, would Hu show any significant difference from previous leaders over issues such as Taiwan? Would he continue the policies of Deng and Jiang?

As both Jiang and Hu are leaders with no revolutionary background, they experience some similar difficulties in their leadership. First, after Deng it takes a new leader some time to move out of the shadow of previous leaders and put forward their own worldviews. In terms of security and foreign policy, Jiang has put forward the NSC. We have yet to see what Hu will bring to his leadership. But the expectation of change is already high, as Hu is the first leader highly educated domestically (Jiang was educated in the former Soviet Union). Second, the new leaders will have to deal with the tremendous changes in the international situation as well as severe domestic issues, despite

rapid economic development. Third, how well they handle Sino-US relations will be the essential indicator of their foreign policy with implications for domestic politics. As Robert Ross has argued, the US as the sole superpower "plays a critical role in determining whether China can realize both of these (international and domestic) security objectives."[28] Whether China and the US can become strategic partners, strategic competitors, or strategic adversaries will have implications for both governments.

After the cold war ended in the 1990s, the relationship between China and the US became more ambiguous than ever. If the bilateral relationship between China and the US can be described as friends or enemies during the cold war, there is no such discrete term to define the relationship in the post-cold war era. China used to make optimistic assessments of the security environment and its future relations with the US. Thus, China actively responded to the US policy of "constructive engagement," and cultivated a "constructive strategic partnership" with the US during the Clinton years. This was especially apparent in 1997 during the state visit of President Jiang to Washington. The short honeymoon was disturbed during the Kosovo crisis, by US arms sales to Taiwan, the EP-3 incident, and the new conservative administration's way of handling world affairs (wars in Afghanistan and Iraq). A strong, pessimistic, nationalist sentiment prevails both among the political elite and the ordinary people in China. Even some Western scholars assess that the terrorist attacks of September 11 will not provide much opportunity for the two countries to cooperate, and, in the long term, Chinese and US interests will still collide, especially over the Taiwan issue, with human rights, trade, and international institutions as minor flashpoints.

Obviously, it is not in the interests of China to initiate a conflict with the US. As Ross notes:

> For China, the strategic imperative is to maintain an international environment in which it can focus its scarce resources on economic modernization. And America's overwhelming strategic power, its economic superiority, and its strategic influence in East Asia make China extremely vulnerable to conflict with the United States.[29]

Moreover:

> Washington can challenge core Chinese interests, such as the status of Taiwan, and pose a severe challenge to the Chinese military, imposing prohibitively high costs on the Chinese economy and the national budget and fundamentally transforming China's strategic environment and derailing its modernization plans.[30]

Therefore, how Jiang and Hu as new Chinese leaders perceive the world and the US, and what means they will prefer—cooperation or competition—will have a determining impact on the future of world peace. Jiang still exerts

some influence over the decision-making through his protégés; he may also continue to play some role, but a much lesser and diminishing one, as Hu establishes himself further.

Roy criticizes the Jiang NSC as a strategic reaction to American predominance and not a real change in belief.[31] This chapter will measure the operational code beliefs of the two Chinese leaders for a preliminary look at the strategic preferences of the new leaders. If Western scholars such as Roy are right, the revisionist Chinese leaders should display beliefs that change over time toward being more conflictual. They should prefer more aggressive strategies to cooperative ones. They should become more conflict-oriented than the average world leader.

Jiang and Hu: what kinds of leaders?

A comparison of mean scores of Jiang and Hu with a norming group of world leaders and Wen is shown in Table 5.1. As seen from the results, the operational code profiles of Jiang and Hu are very close to each other and are more cooperative than the average world leader. The P-1, P-4, and I-1 scores for both leaders are significantly different from the norming group averages. Jiang and Hu see the nature of the political universe as very friendly (P-1 = .536 for Jiang and P-1 = .517 for Hu as compared to P-1 = .250 for the norming group), and they prefer cooperative strategies (I-1 = .689 for Jiang and I-1 = .608 for Hu as compared to I-1 = .334 for the norming group). Both show a relatively low control over historical development for self, significantly lower than the norming group (P-4 = .117 for Jiang and P-4 = .153 for Hu as compared to P-4 = .212 for the norming group). These results indicate that Jiang and Hu are Confucian leaders with very cooperative orientations above the means for the norming group of world leaders.[32]

Are their beliefs stable?

Are Jiang and Hu true Confucian leaders or are they simply hiding their revisionist beliefs to wait for the right opportunity? It is necessary to test and see if different situational factors seriously impact on their beliefs and how their beliefs change over situations. To accomplish this, two crises are analyzed, the 1999 Embassy bombing and the 2001 EP-3 incident. Jiang was in control of decision-making during the two crises while Hu was in a subordinate position. The two crises affected several of the two leaders' beliefs. Jiang turned consistently more optimistic about the realization of the political future (P-2) from pre-crisis to crisis to post-crisis periods, but Hu's view changed towards more optimistic during a crisis and then back to pre-crisis level. Hu's view of the political future (P-3) changed towards more predictability from pre-crisis to crisis and then back to about pre-crisis level for the post-crisis period. Jiang's change was linear towards higher predictability from pre-crisis to crisis to post-crisis periods.[33]

Table 5.1 A comparison of the operational codes of Jiang, Hu, and Wen with the norming group

		Jiang (N = 41)	*Hu (N = 32)*	*Norming group[a] (N = 255)*	*Wen (N = 8)*
Philosophical beliefs					
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	.536***	.517***	.250	.579**
P-2	Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	.365***	.356***	.118	.410**
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	.164	.177	.148	.163
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	.117***	.153**	.212	.205
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	.980*	.973	.967	.968
Instrumental beliefs					
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	.689***	.608**	.334	.591
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	.335***	.305**	.139	.271
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	.477***	.405**	.304	.303
I-4	Timing of action				
	a. Conflict/cooperation	.311***	.371**	.509	.409
	b. Words/deeds	.342***	.460	.525	.464
I-5	Utility of means				
	Reward	.158	.189	.167	.160
	Promise	.114*	.058	.073	.070
	Appeal	.572***	.556**	.427	.569
	Oppose	.092**	.125	.147	.109
	Threaten	.013*	.018	.047	.021
	Punish	.051**	.055**	.138	.074

Notes:
* Significant at P < .10 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
** Significant at P < .05 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
*** Significant at P < .001 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
a The scores are provided by Mark Schafer, Department of Political Science, Louisiana State University, Baton Rouge, LA 70803. The norming group at the time this book was written contained 255 written speeches by 35 world leaders.

Both Jiang and Hu tended to use fewer threats during a crisis time than pre-crisis or post-crisis periods (pre-crisis/crisis/post-crisis I-5 TH scores for Jiang: .042, .001, .006; Hu: .037, .000, .010). Jiang became increasingly prone to use punishment tactics from pre-crisis to crisis to post-crisis while Hu was more likely to use punishment tactics for post-crisis but less likely to use punishment during a crisis (pre-crisis/crisis/post-crisis I-5PU scores for Jiang: .020, .054, .067 and Hu: .015, .000, .093).[34]

The audience factor also mattered, as the two leaders' beliefs changed before international and domestic audiences (P-1, P-2, P-4). Hu's view of the nature of the political universe (P-1) turned much less friendly than Jiang's when facing an international audience. Although both Jiang and Hu were more optimistic facing an international audience in terms of realization of political values, Jiang's change was sharper. Jiang's view of control of historical development (P-4) dropped significantly facing an international audience while Hu exhibited significantly higher control in front of an international audience than a domestic audience. As a result, Jiang attributed a greater role to chance before an international audience (.978 as compared to .969 for domestic audience) while Hu saw a much lesser role for chance before an international audience (.953 compared to a domestic audience .976) (P-5: $p = .074$).[35]

These results reveal some statistically significant changes in various beliefs for the same leader under different conditions and a few differences between the leaders in different circumstances. Although there were no changes significant enough to undermine the results for the key beliefs regarding the nature of the political universe (P-1) and strategic orientation (I-1), there were enough significant changes in the belief regarding locus of control (P-4) to differentiate the two leaders under certain circumstances and locate them in different quadrants of the Holsti typology. The following figures show the coordinates for each leader's image of Self (P-4a, I-1) and Other (P-4b, P-1) when they are plotted on the axes of the Holsti typology with the mean scores for P-4 on the horizontal axis and the mean scores for P-1 and I-1 on the vertical axis as coordinates above or below the mean for the norming group of world leaders.

The general Self images of Jiang and Hu in Figure 5.1 are located in the Type A quadrant with mean scores for I-1 above the mean and P-4a scores below the mean for the norming group. Their Type A strategic preferences for different political outcomes are settle > deadlock > domination > submission, which indicate that the two leaders have an accommodationist-defensive strategic orientation. They view others generally as Type C leaders who are above the norming group mean on both P-1 and P-4b. The strategic preferences attributed to Other are settle > domination > deadlock > submission, which indicates that Jiang and Hu generally view the political universe as one in which settlement is possible between Self and Others, though there is a risk of being dominated unless China is willing to resist.

The locations of the two leaders in the Holsti typology are generally stable during crisis and non-crisis periods, before domestic and international audiences, and in the subordinate and head roles. They remain Type A leaders in a Type C world with one exception. Jiang's (P-4) locus of control index goes down sharply in the international domain while increasing in the domestic domain during crisis situations. During non-crisis periods, however, Jiang's P-4 index remains below the mean of the norming group resulting in a

Type A self-image and a Type C image of others. Overall, the statistically significant differences in the beliefs of Jiang and Hu do not translate into substantively significant differences. That is, changes in the key beliefs (P-1, I-1, P-4) do not move Jiang and Hu from Confucian quadrants to Parabellum quadrants in the Holsti typology.[36]



Figure 5.1 The operational codes of Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and Wen Jiabao

The following abbreviations are used above: JS = Jiang's Self; JO = Jiang's Other; HS = Hu's Self; HO = Hu's Other; WS = Wen's Self; WO = Wen's Other. Self scores are in bold.



Figure 5.2 The operational codes of China's leaders in different situations

The following abbreviations are used above: MPWS = Mao Pre-War Self; MPWO = Mao Pre-War Other; MWS = Mao War Self; MWO = Mao War Other; MP′WS = Mao Post-War Self; MP′WO = Mao Post-War Other; ZPWS = Zhou Pre-War Self; ZPWO = Zhou Pre-War Other; ZWS = Zhou War Self; ZWO = Zhou War Other; ZP′WS = Zhou Post-War Self; ZP′WO = Zhou DPWS = Deng Pre-War Self; DPWO = Deng Pre-War Other; DWS = Deng War Self; DWO = Deng War Other; DP′WS = Deng Post-War Self; DP′WO = Deng Post-War Other; JPCS = Jiang Pre-Crisis Self; JPCO = Jiang Pre-Crisis Other; JCS = Jiang Crisis Self; JCO = Jiang Crisis Other; JP′CS = Jiang Post-Crisis Self; JP′CO = Jiang Post-Crisis Other; HPCS = Hu Pre-Crisis Self; HPCO = Hu Pre-Crisis Other; HCS = Hu Crisis Self; HCO = Hu Crisis Other; HP′CS = Hu Post-Crisis Self; HP′CO = Hu Post-Crisis Other. Mao, Zhou and Deng's scores are in bold.

This analysis suggests that the two current Chinese leaders are not revisionist leaders with aggressive intentions. Both show a very low historical control, much lower than the average world leader and their predecessors—Mao, Zhou, and Deng. A comparison of the two current leaders' operational code beliefs with their two predecessors—Mao and Deng—is in Figure 5.2. It is very obvious that the generational differences of beliefs of the four leaders are towards more cooperation, with Mao being the only leader with a consistent pattern of Parabellum beliefs across crisis and non-crisis situations. The world after the cold war is one of much ambiguity. The Chinese domestic situation is complicated as well. Further, the two leaders are from a younger generation with much less experience and prestige compared to the two revolutionary leaders. Therefore, their operational code beliefs display less confidence and control. They also remain cooperatively oriented in their major beliefs. Their belief changes are not sharp enough to bring about enduring shifts in strategic preferences. They remain very cooperative Type A leaders despite changes in role, situation, and audience and some differences in the direction and degree of changes between Jiang and Hu.[37]

The subjective games of Jiang and Hu

To model the strategic interactions of China with other states, Jiang's and Hu's key beliefs are mapped into subjective sequential games. The strategic preferences of the two leaders are inferred from their locations in the Holsti typology in Figure 5.1 to construct their general subjective game. These subjective games can help better estimate the strategies that the leaders are likely to follow in crisis and non-crisis situations. The subjective games inferred from the general beliefs of Jiang and Hu are the same game, specifying a strategy of ranking settlement as the highest outcome and indicating the expectation that both Self and Other will move to settlement no matter what the initial state of the game.

General subjective game

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"* ←	1,2
China ↓		↑
CF	2,1 →	3,3*

Jiang–Hu Self Strategy: Stay

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	Settle	Submit
China		
CF	Dom	D/lock

China Outcomes

	Other	
	CO	CF
CO	"4,4"* →|	1,2
China ↑		↓
CF	2,1 ←	3,3*

Jiang–Hu Other Strategy: Stay

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self or Other) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

How stable are the subjective games of the two leaders? If there is volatility in their Confucian operational codes, it should most likely show up under the provocations presented by crises with the US or the leaders of Taiwan. To answer this question, therefore, I first select a public statement by each leader at the height of two recent crises between the US and China while Jiang was the head and Hu was the subordinate leader in Beijing, followed by two post-crisis speeches after tensions subsided between Beijing and Washington. Then I address relations between Beijing and Taipei in the next chapter.

The American bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade

The speeches by Jiang and Hu, respectively, right after the 1999 bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade show that Jiang turns from a Type A leader to a Type DEF leader, and his image of Other changes to a very hostile Type B. Hu remains a Type A leader but his view of Other also changes to Type B. The Embassy bombing was a serious threat to the Chinese leaders, as it was a completely unexpected incident and ignited strong nationalist feelings domestically against the US as the single superpower. Jiang's subjective crisis game is a prisoner's dilemma with an initial state of submission (1,4), in which China is dominated/humiliated by the sole superpower's attack on the Chinese Embassy. Jiang believes that the US will stay at its best outcome of domination (1,4), and China should move to deadlock (2,2). The Nash equilibrium for a prisoner's dilemma is (2,2), which is the next worst outcome for both players. Although (3,3) settlement is a better outcome for both players, this Pareto outcome is considered potentially unstable because it is not a Nash equilibrium.

Embassy bombing subjective game for Jiang (32)

	Other			Other			Other		
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF	
CO	3,3 →	"1,4"	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	3,3 |←	"1,4"	
China	↑	↓	China			China	↓	↑	
CF	4,1 |←	2,2*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	4,1 →	2,2*	
Jiang Self's Strategy: Move			**China Outcomes**			**Jiang Other's Strategy: Stay**			

Jiang Self (I-1 = –.01, P-4a = –.02); Other (P-1 = –.78, P-4b = .02)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

According to Brams' sequential game theory, however, settlement (3,3) is an NME in this game from an initial state of (1,4) under certain conditions.[38] If the player with the next move is the player being dominated, and if prior communication is permitted between players, then this player may choose to "stay" at (1,4) after threatening to move to (2,2) unless the other player signals that it will move to (3,3). China had credible threat power because the US was at a moral disadvantage in the incident. The death of three Chinese reporters in the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade made a move to (2,2) deadlock by China a credible move in retaliation.

In fact, student marches and mass protests outside US embassies in China did occur. In some cases (Chengdu and Guangzhou) these crowds did surge out of control, and these protests appeared to be tolerated if not supported by the PRC government. They can be interpreted as communicating a threat that China would move to deadlock unless compensated adequately along with a US move back to cooperation in the form of an apology. Did prior communication by China elicit a US apology as a move to (3,3), which was finally agreed upon by both sides to avoid the Pareto-inferior outcome of (2,2)?[39] Or it is more plausible to interpret the protests as an unofficial Chinese move to deadlock (2,2)?

Hu's subjective game during the Embassy bombing was not a prisoner's dilemma game. His Type A Self preferences are settle > deadlock > dominate > submit while his Type B Other preferences are dominate > settle > deadlock > submit. Brams' TOM predicts that the US will stay at (1,4) and prescribes China to move to (3,2) in the absence of prior communication of a credible threat. An interesting overlap in both leaders' different subjective games is the prescription to stay at the initial state of submission (1,4), so long as prior credible communication occurs, in anticipation of a Pareto-optimal solution with a US move to settlement (4,3).

Embassy bombing belief system for Hu (27)

		Other				Other				Other	
		CO	CF			CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	4,3	→ "1,4"		CO	Settle	Submit		CO	4,3	←| "1,4"
China		↑	↓	China				China		↓	↑
	CF	2,1	|← 3,2*		CF	Dom	D/lock		CF	2,1	→ 3,2*
	Hu Self's Strategy: Move				China Outcomes				Hu Other's Strategy: Stay		

Hu Self (I-1 = .35, P-4a = –.74); Hu Other (P-1 = –.69, P-4b = .74)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

The significant difference between the subjective games of Jiang and Hu is the consequences of a move to deadlock (CF,CF). In Jiang's prisoner's dilemma game, deadlock (2,2) as a new initial state is also an NME with corresponding predictions for both players to choose "stay." In Hu's subjective game, however, the predictions with deadlock (3,2) as a new initial state are for China to choose "stay" and the US to choose "move" (see below). This difference in the definition of the situation reduces the incentive for prior communication by China to avoid a more costly and indefinite stalemate and raises the opportunity to take a harder line in response to the bombing.

Although foreign journalists criticized the CCP for allowing strong public protests and hawkish statements by the military, the repeated US apologies by the President and Secretary of State on different occasions permitted Jiang to overrule the military's signals for any stronger response. The NME of settlement (3,3) for Jiang's prisoner's dilemma game disposed Jiang to stay at (1,4) until he could see whether China's threat power was sufficient to get the US to move to (3,3). The NME of settlement (4,3) from an initial state of (3,2) deadlock for Hu's subjective game made him amenable to Jiang's strategy of prior communication. Hu ranked settlement as his highest preference and expected it to be the final outcome of the crisis either directly by a US move to (4,3) or indirectly through a Chinese move to deadlock (3.2) as the analysis of Hu's subjective game shows below.

Embassy bombing belief system for Hu (27)

	Other			Other			Other	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	4,3 |←	1,4	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	4,3 →|	1,4
China	↓	↑	**China**			**China**	↑	↓
CF	2,1 →	"3,2"*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	2,1 ←	"3,2"
Hu Self's Strategy: Stay			**China Outcomes**			**Hu Other's Strategy: Move**		

Hu Self (I-1 = .35, P-4a = –.74); Hu Other (P-1 = –.69, P-4b = .74)

* The initial state is in quotation marks and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

In any event, US President Clinton quickly apologized to the Chinese President in a telephone call, and compensation plans were worked out after negotiations. This incident also did not affect the bilateral WTO talks, which resumed in September 1999. One of the concerns for the Chinese side was

China's impending WTO entry. Jiang and Hu's post-Embassy bombing subjective games subsequently changed back to a general cooperative game. The incident was resolved to the satisfaction of both parties, despite some domestic divergent views from the PLA that were more hostile. As head of the state and the military, Jiang's two post-crisis speeches include one at a domestic conference in June and one at an APEC conference. His view of Self and Other are cooperative in front of the two different audiences. Jiang is a Type A Confucian leader again in a Type C world. Hu's beliefs mirrored Jiang's in the two speeches he gave before an international audience in July and a domestic audience in December 1999.

Post-Embassy bombing subjective game for Jiang and Hu

	Other			Other			Other	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	"4,4"* ←	1,2	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	"4,4"* →|	1,2
China	↓	↑	China			China	↑	↓
CF	2,1	→ 3,3*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	2,1	← 3,3*
Jiang and Hu Self's Strategy: Stay			China Outcomes			Jiang and Hu Other's Strategy: Stay		

Jiang Self (I-1 = .96, P-4a = –.83); (Other P-1 = .31, P-4b = .83)
Hu Self (I-1 = .57, P-4a = –.58); Hu (Other (P-1 = 1.94, P-4b = .58)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self or Other) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

The EP-3 incident

Another serious crisis—the EP-3 incident—happened on April 1, 2001 when an American surveillance airplane collided with a Chinese fighter jet over the South China Sea, ending in the death of the Chinese pilot, and the American plane landed without permission on the Southern Chinese Hainan Island. The crew of the EP-3 was detained and the aircraft disassembled. Both sides blamed the other side for the incident and claimed that the bilateral relationship may be damaged. China demanded a full apology while the US rejected any responsibility. The crisis ended short of further deteriorating bilateral relations when US President Bush apologized for the loss of the life of the Chinese pilot and the US plane's illegal landing on Chinese territory. The Chinese side released the 24 crew members on April 12, while diplomatic negotiations continued.

EP-3 incident subjective game for Jiang

	Other			Other			Other		
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF	
CO	4,4*	→| "1,2"	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	4,4*	←	"1,2"
China	↑	↓	China			China	↓		↑
CF	2,1	← 3,3*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	2,1	→	3,3*
Jiang Self's Strategy: Move			China Outcomes			Jiang Other's Strategy: Move			

Jiang Self (I-1 = .21, P-4a = –.83); (Other P-1 = .01, P-4b = .83)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self or Other) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

A speech by Jiang during his trip to Latin America was selected to demonstrate the beliefs of Jiang during the EP-3 crisis (see above). A speech by Hu during his participation at the 9th Vietnamese Communist Party Congress was analyzed to reveal Hu's beliefs under the impact of the crisis (see below). Jiang and Hu played different subjective games during the crisis. Jiang's no-conflict game predicts that both China and the US will move to settlement. In Hu's game, (3,4) settlement is also the NME. However, if the US chooses "stay," China should move to deadlock (2,3) as the final outcome. This subjective game is the same one for Hu as his Embassy bombing game, in which he would expect the US to choose "move" from a new initial state of deadlock (2,3) in a repeated play of this game (Game 27). The post EP-3 games of Jiang and Hu agree on Chinese and US preferences for settlement. The EP-3 incident was settled through diplomatic negotiations after the Chinese side recognized that Bush apologized for the loss of the Chinese pilot.

EP-3 incident subjective game for Hu (27)

	Other			Other			Other		
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF	
CO	3,4	→| "1,2"	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	3,4	←	"1,2"
China	↑	↓	China			China	↓		↑
CF	4,1|	← 2,3*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	4,1	→	2,3*
Hu Self's Strategy: Move			China Outcomes			Hu Other's Strategy: Move			

Hu Self (I-1 = –.01, P-4a = –.92); Hu Other (P-1 = .66, P-4b = .92)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self or Other) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Post-EP-3 incident subjective games for Jiang and Hu

	Other			Other			Other	
	CO	CF		CO	CF		CO	CF
CO	"4,4"*	← 1,2	CO	Settle	Submit	CO	"4,4"*	|→ 1,2
China	↓	↑	China			China	↑	↓
CF	2,1	→ 3,3*	CF	Dom	D/lock	CF	2,1	← 3,3*
Jiang and Hu Self's Strategy: Stay			China Outcomes			Jiang and Hu Other's Strategy: Stay		

Jiang Self (I-1 = .23, P-4a = –.58); (Other PI-1 = .75, P-4b = .58)
Hu Self (I-1 = .36, P-4a = –.75); Hu (Other (P-1 = .84, P-4b = .75)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move (Self or Other) given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked. (Dom = Dominate; D/lock = Deadlock)

Conclusion

The analysis of the belief systems and subjective games for Jiang and Hu supports the interpretation that current Chinese leaders are not offensive revisionists. They are leaders with Confucian belief systems that remain relatively stable even during international crises. These results question claims that Chinese leaders are under the influence of a realpolitik strategic culture and that they display aggressive behavior as a result of these beliefs. From the analysis of their subjective games during crisis situations we can confirm that the two current Chinese leaders' beliefs are subject to change under the influence of external stimuli and constraints. Even during crises, however, they also displayed cooperative orientations and responded to diplomatic efforts to settle the disputes. The use of diplomatic means rather than military use of force remained near the top of their strategic agenda throughout different situations. However, Jiang's or Hu's highest-ranked strategic preference sometimes shifted from cooperation to conflict during crises, making their cooperative strategic orientations contingent on US strategy.

The offensive realist and cultural realist arguments predict that China will get involved in conflicts with major powers, especially the US. However, we can see from these initial tests of this argument that the two current Chinese leaders are generally cooperative. Their beliefs indicate little preference for the realist path of revision through domination rather than negotiation. Preemptive behavior from the US suggested by some realist theories, as Johnston warns in his recent article,[40] might therefore be dangerous and result in the unintended intensification of the security dilemma between China and the US.[41] The most volatile test case for this analysis is the long-standing conflict over the status of Taiwan, which is the focus of the next chapter.

6

TAIWAN AND THE FUTURE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

> Our response combined balance of power with liberal integration . . . Political evolution has failed to match economic progress.
>
> Joseph Nye, Jr

The issue of Taiwan haunts the future development of Sino-American relations. As Joseph Nye, Jr argued at the time of Chinese President Hu Jintao's first official visit[1] to the US, China does not have the hard power in terms of economic and military development, nor the soft power in terms of universities and Hollywood (despite Yao Ming and Zhang Ziyi), to challenge the US position on Taiwan. However, as he states clearly, "The fact that China is a long way from overtaking the US does not prevent a possible war over Taiwan."[2]

The Taiwan issue is one of high political sensitivity to three major parties—mainland People's Republic of China (PRC), Taiwan, and the US. The repercussions of a potential military conflict between the mainland and Taiwan may draw the US in under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) signed in 1979. As a close US ally with self-interested considerations, Japan may also get involved in the conflict, which would draw in the three major powers in the Asia-Pacific region. The crisis over Taiwan's 2004 election has already inclined the major parties toward an arms race that is darkening the whole East Asian security future.

The Taiwan issue has brought the PRC and the US into serious crises in the past. There were two major Taiwan crises when mainland forces shelled the islands of Quemoy and Matsu in the 1950s, resulting in serious casualties, while the US supported the Nationalist Jiang Jieshi on Taiwan. A third crisis in 1995–96 ended with US warships in the Taiwan Strait. China's peaceful rise/peaceful development strategy faces a dilemma when dealing with the Taiwan issue, as China does not rule out the use of force should Taiwan declare independence. Beijing seems to be getting more skillful in dealing with Taiwan; however, Taiwan's Chen seems to be getting more and more desperate and erratic.

Is war across the strait unavoidable? If yes, who will provoke it, the mainland or Taiwan? If not, how can the crisis be deferred? Will China use force against Taiwan? A crucial related question is what will the US do?

Dire strait?[3]

Taiwan's two elected presidents, Lee Teng-hui and Chen Shuibian, seem to have consistently and gradually pursued "a Taiwan identity" from the middle of the 1990s. Lee's speech on a "state-to-state" relationship with the mainland initiated a period of crisis[4] with China's launching of missile tests in late 1995–96. Although Chen Shuibian initiated the "five nos" in his first-term inauguration speech in 2000,[5] ending that crisis with the mainland, his defensive referendum[6] and proposed constitutional revisions precipitated a new crisis in 2004. More recently, although China's charm diplomacy extends olive branches to all its neighbors, including the opposition parties and even the Democratic People's Party members in Taiwan, it does not include Taiwan's Chen Shuibian or Lee Teng-hui. The Taiwanese leader Chen is ostracized by the mainland, the US, and the Taiwanese public. Chen's opinion polls approval rate dropped to an all time low of 18 percent only one year into the second term.[7] Neither is he selling well with US officials who mentioned his name without official title to clarify their opposition to his position of ceasing the National Unification Council (NUC).

Perceptual differences over the issue of Taiwan's political status have hindered further cross-strait talks. Beijing distrusts Taiwan's Democratic People's Party (DPP) President Chen Shuibian deeply, believing that Chen is playing a strategy of moving gradually toward independence under disguise. Chen seems very dedicated to furthering Taiwan's independence. In March 2004, Chen initiated a defensive referendum held together with the 2004 election. Possible constitutional change for Taiwan in the form of a referendum in 2006 and other revisions in 2008 may follow. These moves provoked a strong message issued from mainland officials and the State Council's Taiwan Information Office. The constitutional revision in Beijing's eyes is tantamount to a declaration of independence. China scholars have detected a trend in the Chinese media, following the reelection of Chen Shuibian, towards a harder line on Chen, indicating an increasing sense of impatience.[8] Despite the victory of the Pan-Blue camp led by the Kuomingtang (KMT) with the First People's Party and the New Party in the December 2004 Legislative Yuan (LY) election, Beijing has stressed that tensions across the strait may continue.

China watchers are concerned that before the 2008 Olympics there might be a confrontation.[9] Former Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui even mentioned that, due to the Chinese concern over the Olympic Games, it might be a good opportunity for Taiwan to declare independence in 2008. Pessimists believe that it is an urgent situation because the Taiwan leader Chen is a risk taker.

They argue that as Taiwan independence is his and his party's life-long pursuit, he will definitely give it a try before his second term is over. Also, the PRC military posture is pushing many Taiwanese further away from the mainland rather than drawing them closer as expected from closer economic and cultural exchanges. It is generally believed that Chinese polices, such as the military exercises across the strait, have turned out to be counterproductive, as seen from the victory of the pro-independent DPP's Chen in Taiwan's 2000 election.

Recent developments show that the new Chinese President Hu Jintao is becoming more sophisticated in his policy towards Taiwan. On the one hand, he has changed the past ways of coercive diplomacy and played charm diplomacy by inviting opposition party leaders with significant political influence on Taiwan to visit the mainland in 2005 and again in 2006. The mainland officials even extended warm welcomes to DPP party members to visit the mainland. These actions were taken after US suggestions that the mainland contact not only the GMD—the Nationalist Party—but also the DPP party. Further, Beijing planned to send two pandas as gifts to Taiwan, but Chen turned them down. Beijing seems to be planning post-Chen, mainland–Taiwan relations by focusing on the GMD and its new Chairman Ma Ying-jeou.

As China never gives up the right to use force over Taiwan, and the US is bound under the TRA to provide defense for Taiwan, the situation demands that the US maintain an ambiguous position and hope the status quo continues. So far, American allies in Asia (Australia, Japan, South Korea, Singapore) have refrained from promising support in case of Taiwan contingencies. Japan remains a strong ally of the US, and the China–Japan relationship is deteriorating. US arms sales to Taiwan have met with strong opposition from the Taiwan public. The Chen administration officials have tried to sell the idea of buying offensive weapons given the perceived Chinese missile threat. The Chinese government has strongly opposed US arms sales to Taiwan and the upgrading of Taiwan defense systems or including Taiwan in the TMD system.

Although the US army may be over-stretched worldwide after the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, some analysts stress that it is a wrong perception that Washington will not intervene should Beijing invade Taiwan.[10] But will the US fight for Taiwan? US resolve to protect or not to protect Taiwan affects policies and policy changes in both the mainland and Taiwan. As a major third party with military forces deployed in the area and strategic interests in the region, the US role is vital.

None of the parties want war. However, the deepening distrust in the triangular relationship—between Beijing and Taipei, the US and China in particular—might lead to consequences unwanted and unintended by all parties. Lampton points out, "[T]he recent elections and broader development

in Taiwan, when combined with counterproductive policy in Beijing and some missteps in the Bush Administration, have made conflict more likely."[11] Both Beijing and the US will continue to adjust their Taiwan policies in light of the ongoing developments on the island.

The Taiwan situation is entering a new phase now with the US pushing the Taiwan issue aside a little to focus on more urgent issues of concern: trade, currency, and NPT with Beijing. The Taiwan issue, however, remains a heavy bargaining chip for the US in dealing with the PRC. During Hu's recent visit, Beijing wanted a clearer position statement from Bush about any provocative actions from Taiwan, expecting maybe harsher words toward the Chen authority. They have only received formal declarations of the traditional US official positions—a restatement of the old official positions. After Hu's visit, Chen was not given the opportunity to transit in New York or San Francisco. The US was definitely sending a message to Chen, contrasting particularly his visit with the Taipei Mayor's visit to the US sometime ago. Some US Congressmen complained that Chen was not given the appropriate diplomatic protocol and was shamed by the State Department's treatment. The implication is that the US was either under Beijing's pressure or trying to show Beijing something after Hu's visit.

The PRC needs American support for its policy on Taiwan to win over US leverage with Taiwan. Beijing is aware of its importance in settling the nuclear proliferation issue on the Korean Peninsula and Iran, but Beijing does not want to see too much US influence. Hu has serious domestic concerns, and there is no question that for some time, Hu prefers to focus on domestic issues. Nationalism can turn into a strong instrument for power consolidation and, therefore, the Taiwan issue is dangerous. If Chen takes risky steps, it may push the PRC into a corner while presenting the US with a dilemma.

Will there be war? When? Views differ over the level of danger posed by Taiwan's independence steps. When Chen was reelected in 2004, some thought that despite "all the rhetoric, there is little immediate risk of conflict."[12] David Lampton stressed, "[C]ross-Strait relations are entering a new and more dangerous phase."[13] "The issue is shifting, therefore, from one of deterrence and balance to one of confidence-building and tension reduction . . . The question is whether the Taiwan government, after the elections, will be inclined to move in this direction," Shambaugh told BBC news.[14] Many do agree that the danger for military conflict is real, possible, and foreseeable; however, some also believe it is avoidable.[15]

Beijing's concerns

Taiwan was part of the Chinese territory back in the Qing Dynasty when the Qing was defeated in the war with Japan in 1894–95 and Taiwan was taken by Japan for 50 years. After the anti-Japanese War the Nationalist government

then took back the island, which became their refuge after being defeated in the Civil War with the CCP. The CCP ever since has stressed the course of reunification with Taiwan. The military effort of reunification was interrupted by the Korean War in the early 1950s and the extension of US military assistance to Taiwan.

The Taiwan issue was constantly in the mind of the Chinese leaders during the cold war. For Mao, it was the unfinished business of the Civil War. Mao advocated unification of the motherland by the use of force. Deng proclaimed that China can wait one hundred years but it will never give up Taiwan. "It is true that under Deng, China's policy altered dramatically from liberation by force to peaceful unification."[16] According to Scobell, this policy change was more tactical than strategic. The Chinese leaders did not forget the strategic significance of Taiwan. Deng proposed Hong Kong's "one country, two systems" framework to Taiwan, which was followed by Jiang during his administration. In addition, Jiang put forward his "Eight-Point Proposal" in 1995 as the guiding principles concerning cross-strait political relations.

The basic line for Beijing over reunification has stressed the policy of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems."[17] The "One China Principle"[18] was the most fundamental. There is only one China and Taiwan is an inalienable part of China. The PRC government is the sole representative of China and opposes any separatist moves. Although the Mainland proposes "peaceful" reunification, it has never given up the use of force should Taiwan declare independence.

Since Hu Jintao came to power in 2003, the mainland's Taiwan rhetoric has become even tougher and more aggressive in response to Taiwan leaders' provocative pro-independence policies. Beijing emphasized through official media and academic sources that reunification, sovereignty, and territorial integrity are more important than economic achievements and the Olympics, that is, China is ready to sacrifice all of these for reunification. At the Fourth Plenum of the 16th Central Committee of the Communist party held in September 2004, Hu took over the military's high command from Jiang. As the Chairman of the Central Military Committee, Hu's first speech stressed the determination and will to use force should Taiwan declare independence. The Anti-secession Law was passed by the National People's Congress in March 2005.

In the recent 2004 Defense White Paper, the Chinese government points out that "Taiwan independence forces have increasingly become the biggest immediate threat to China's sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as peace and stability on both sides of the Taiwan Strait and the Asia-Pacific region as a whole." Hu's leadership stressed "[S]hould the Taiwan authorities go so far as to make a reckless attempt that constitutes a major incident of 'Taiwan independence,' the Chinese people and armed forces will resolutely

and thoroughly crush it at any cost." Some scholars point out that, although the 2004 Defense White Paper was not as tough as the 2000 one, it shows the extent of Chinese leaders' resolve over Taiwan. Mainland officials had been tough regarding the Taiwan elections by trying to sway voters to vote for their preferred candidates. However, their two efforts in 1996 and 2000 only met with increased opposition from Taiwan. In 2004, the Chinese government has conducted less saber rattling, yet the Taiwan leader Chen's defensive referendum stirred up another round of criticism of Chen and the DPP's independence orientation.[19]

On the other hand, scholars and politicians have noticed that, tactically and politically, the Hu administration's charm diplomacy and panda diplomacy are winning credits for Hu, along with the fast increasing economic relations with Taiwan. Despite the high-profile visits from Taiwan to the mainland and increasing economic ties, the number of missiles positioned across Taiwan Strait, as well as the PLA's defense budget and military R&D efforts has not decreased. These indicate that despite the positive developments, Hu is also preparing for the worst-case situation given the unpredictability of Chen further into his second term and with the diminishing hope of the DPP winning the upcoming election over the Taipei Major Ma Ying-jeou.

As some scholars point out, the Taiwan issue has turned into one of political legitimacy for the current Chinese leadership. Therefore, even though there might be changes and reforms in foreign policies in general, there will not be any change in the Taiwan policy.[20] The urgency over the Taiwan issue has only increased with the second term of Chen coming to an end. Despite dissension within and between the leadership, Jiang, Hu, and their successors cannot afford to lose Taiwan. In addition, the Taiwan issue is directly linked to other regions (Tibet and Xinjiang) with separatist activities. The Chinese government defines the Taiwan issue as one of internal affairs; therefore, international interference means encroaching on the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China. This calls to mind the historical Chinese humiliation of foreign exploitation in the early twentieth century. While the Taiwan authorities stress that there is a unique Taiwan identity, the Chinese government stresses that people on both sides of the strait share a greater Chinese identity. A common culture, shared history, and the Confucian tradition are the determining factors for this identity. The strategic importance of Taiwan to the mainland is also undeniable as a further extension of its coastlines.

Leaders' beliefs and Taiwan crises

Up to now, both parties have let rhetoric be the main sword. Both have displayed restraint while the US moderates and mediates.[21] The US tries to deter Beijing from exerting its military posture to threaten the island and

keeps on providing highly advanced defensive weapon systems to Taiwan under the TRA signed in 1979. At the same time, as it seems more and more difficult to rein in Taiwan president Chen Shuibian, President Bush is also trying to warn Taiwan to refrain from actions that might change the status quo, thus provoking Beijing and dragging the US into a confrontation with Beijing. The US is also asking the PRC to be more transparent in its military planning and explain more about its defense budget in an effort to calm down the arms race across the strait.

On the one hand, time is running against the mainland as the new generations in Taiwan and the mainland may not be as concerned with the reunification of the motherland. On the other hand, the military balance is leaning toward the mainland with its increasing defense budget, growing number of short-range missiles (estimated 750–800), and kilo-submarines. The arms sales from the US to Taiwan are constantly drawing criticism from the mainland while domestic pressure is also increasing on the Taiwan leadership about their procurement of arms systems from the US, even for defensive purposes. To show somehow their resolve to attack and to defend, respectively, both the mainland and Taiwan have followed their threats with military exercises (or joint exercises with allies) in which the other party is the potential target.

The previous two elections Taiwan held in 1996 and 2000 resulted in crisis situations short of a military confrontation between the two sides, although US warships ended up in the Taiwan Strait in 1996. The 2004 election witnessed fewer military moves by both parties; however, tension again intensified when Chen initiated the defensive referendum. During these crises, how political leaders made decisions have affected the final outcomes of the events. If Jiang had not conducted military exercises across the strait, the pro-independence leaders, such as Lee in 1996 and Chen in 2000, might not have been elected. By the same token, if Chen were not reelected in 2004 and had not pushed for the referendum, the tension across Taiwan Strait might not have heated up. With the current Chinese leaders Hu Jintao and Wen Jiabao in power, if a new Taiwanese leader (say, Ma Ying-jeou) gets elected in 2008 along with a new US president, how will they interact? Will there be a crisis again or will there be peace?

We cannot neglect the role of key political leaders in explaining and predicting the evolution of the Taiwan conflict. The following analysis compares the operational codes of Chinese and Taiwanese leaders during crises associated with the 1996, 2000, and 2004 elections to test whether it is a Confucian or a Parabellum strategic culture that is functioning in Chinese decision-making toward Taiwan. This task is complex, as seen from the analysis of other crises in previous chapters, made doubly so in this chapter by a focus on the leaders in both Beijing and Taipei. Chinese leaders may be Confucian or Parabellum in general, but either side may change to the

opposite type under different situations and before different audiences. In particular, any leader may turn more aggressive under a high security threat posed by crisis or war.

Jiang and Lee: what kinds of leaders and how stable are their beliefs?

Although both Beijing and Taipei try to show their strength, determination, and will in what they say, whether their leaders' beliefs show the same intended effects is worth studying. Comparing the operational code beliefs of Jiang Zemin and Lee Teng-hui in Table 6.1, we can see that, in general, they differ significantly from the average world leader in all their key beliefs. They are more cooperative in their view of the nature of the political universe (P-1), and regarding their strategic orientations (I-1). They are also more optimistic towards the realization of political values (P-2) compared with the average world leader. Jiang shows lower control over historical development compared with the Taiwan leader whose view of control over historical development is close to the average world leader (P-4). The instrumental beliefs of the two leaders are similar with the exception of their risk orientation; Lee is less predictable (I-3 = .16 vs. .48) with a higher propensity to shift between words and deeds than Jiang (I-4b = .59 vs. .34).

Figure 6.1 shows that, in general, both Jiang and Lee are cooperative Type A leaders whose view of Other is Type C. They are generally Confucian leaders preferring cooperation and peace. Figure 6.1 also illustrates what types of leaders Jiang and Lee were during the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and their belief changes across non-crisis and crisis periods. During the 1996 Taiwan crisis, the mainland launched missile tests close to major Taiwan ports. Beijing wanted to demonstrate its military strength as well as its political resolve. Taiwan's Lee Teng-hui, as one of the candidates for the 1996 election, had given a speech in the US in 1995, specifically referring to the mainland–Taiwan relationship as one of "state to state." The mainland's missile tests were actions against such provocations.

Jiang Zemin was the President of China and Chairman of the Military Central Committee during the pre-crisis period. In a famous speech on Taiwan given in 1995, he laid out China's major policy views on Taiwan, hailed later by the current leaders on the mainland. In this famous "8 Point" speech, Jiang thought that the mainland could achieve settlement with Taiwan even if Taiwan resorted to military means. He further believed that settlement is in the interest of Taiwan as well. The raw scores for Jiang's 1995 speech are I-1 = .25, P-1 = .34, P-4 = .19. Comparing these scores to the norming group's means of I-1 = .33, P-1 = .25, P-4 = .21, SD = .12, indicates that Jiang's operational code in this speech was a realist Type DEF leader in a Confucian Type C world, as his I-1 score dropped below the I-1 score for the average world leader.

Table 6.1 A comparison of the general operational codes of Jiang, Hu, Lee, and Chen with the norming group

		Hu (N = 50)	*Jiang (N = 41)*	*Norming group (N = 255)*[a]	*Chen (N = 32)*	*Lee (N = 27)*
Philosophical beliefs						
P-1	Nature of political universe (conflict/cooperation)	0.55***	0.54***	0.25	0.46***	0.53***
P-2	Realization of political values (optimism/pessimism)	0.38***	0.37***	0.12	0.28***	0.33***
P-3	Political future (unpredictable/predictable)	0.19**	0.16	0.15	0.13	0.11
P-4	Historical development (low control/high control)	0.15**	0.12***	0.21	0.21	0.19
P-5	Role of chance (small role/large role)	0.97	0.98*	0.97	0.97	0.98*
Instrumental beliefs						
I-1	Strategic approach to goals (conflict/cooperation)	0.62***	0.69***	0.33	0.57**	0.62***
I-2	Intensity of tactics (conflict/cooperation)	0.32***	0.34***	0.14	0.27**	0.38***
I-3	Risk orientation (averse/acceptant)	0.37*	0.48***	0.30	0.33	0.16***
I-4	Timing of action					
	a. Conflict/cooperation	0.37**	0.31***	0.51	0.41*	0.38**
	b. Words/deeds	0.47	0.34***	0.53	0.29***	0.59
I-5	Utility of means					
	Reward	0.20	0.16	0.17	0.11*	0.25
	Promise	0.07	0.11*	0.07	0.15**	0.11*
	Appeal	0.55**	0.57***	0.43	0.53**	0.45
	Oppose	0.12	0.09**	0.15	0.13	0.13
	Threaten	0.02*	0.01*	0.05	0.05	0.02*
	Punish	0.05**	0.05**	0.14	0.04**	0.04**

Notes:
* Significant at P < .10 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
** Significant at P < .05 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
*** Significant at P < .001 level (two-tailed) from the norming group
a For P-1, P-2, P-3, P-4, and P-5, the speech number for the norming group is 264. The data are provided by Prof. Mark Schafer from Louisiana State University.



Figure 6.1 The operational codes of Jiang Zemin and Lee Teng-hui

The following abbreviations are used above: JGS = Jiang General Self; JGO = Jiang General Other; LGS = Lee General Self; LGO = Lee General Other; JCS = Jiang Crisis Self; JCO = Jiang Crisis Other; JNCS = Jiang Non-Crisis Self; JNCO = Jiang Non-Crisis Other; LCS = Lee Crisis Self; LCO = Lee Crisis Other; LNCS = Lee Non-Crisis Self; LNCO = Lee Non-Crisis Other. Self scores are in bold.

Jiang's operational code during the 1996 crisis was more cooperative, and he displayed relatively low historical control, perhaps because of US support for Taiwan. Generally, he remained a Type A leader in a Type C world during both non-crisis and crisis periods. However, Taiwan's leader Lee changed his strategic orientation (I-1) to become less cooperative, turning from a Confucian Type A leader in a Type C world during non-crisis periods, to a realist Type DEF leader in a Type C world during the 1996 crisis (see Figure 6.1). Lee's belief in historical control (P-4) also increased somewhat during this serious crisis, perhaps because of his belief in US support.

Jiang's and Lee's subjective games and the 1996 Taiwan crisis

The general subjective games of Jiang and Lee were the same no-conflict game. Both leaders ranked mutual cooperation (CO,CO) as their highest outcome, and TOM's predictions shown below are that they will stay at this initial state as an NME. Jiang's subjective game did not change during the crisis occasioned by the 1996 elections in Taiwan, as he continued to rank settlement as the highest-ranked outcome for both Beijing and Taipei. However, the mainland did send a strong signal during the election that they would not tolerate a departure from the status quo by launching missile tests near major Taiwan ports. What accounts for this kind of threatening behavior?

Jiang's and Lee's general and non-crisis subjective games

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	4,4* ←	1,2
		↓	↑
	CF	2,1 →	"3,3"*

Self's Strategy: Move
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+, =)

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	4,4* →|	1,2
		↑	↓
	CF	2,1 ←	"3,3"*

Other's Strategy: Move
(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)

* The initial state is in quotation marks, and the final state is underlined for each game. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state (Brams 1994). Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

The answer may lie in the logic of Lee's subjective crisis game. His crisis game below also has mutual cooperation as an NME. However, it is a conflict game in which domination rather than settlement is Lee's highest-ranked outcome. It is also a game in which Self (Taiwan) has moving power, that is, the ability in repeated plays of the game to cycle from (3,4) counterclockwise to (4,1), forcing Other (the mainland) to move to (2,3) deadlock perhaps in

the hope that Self will extract concessions from Other in the process of returning to (4,3) through (1,2).[22] Moving power in this game is ineffective, however, unless Self has the capabilities to exercise moving power, that is, is the stronger player in the conflict, which is not the case unless Taiwan can depend on US military support for a move away from the status quo, and unless the mainland does not have the capability to exercise deterrent threat power.

Lee's subjective game during crisis period (27)

		Other				Other	
		CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	"3,4"	← 1,2		CO	"3,4"	→| 1,2
Self		↓	↑	**Self**		↑	↓
	CF	4,1	→ 2,3*		CF	4,1	|← 2,3*
	Self's Strategy: Stay				**Other's Strategy: Stay**		
	(I-1, P-4a) Self (–, =)				(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)		

* Initial states are in quotations and final states are underlined. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state. Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

The mainland's missile tests during the 1996 elections are widely interpreted as an attempt to deter Lee from moving away from the status quo during the campaign. This interpretation is theoretically consistent with the logic of Lee's subjective game, which requires Other (the mainland) to exercise a credible deterrent threat via prior communication in order to maintain settlement (3,4) as an NME. It is also consistent with Jiang's personal distrust of Lee stemming from his 1995 "state to state" speech in the US while at the same time expressing a belief in his own subjective game that Other (Taiwan's citizens) preferred the status quo to the risks associated with any unilateral change by Lee.

Finally, there is a real question as to whether the 1996 crisis was really a serious military confrontation between Beijing and Taipei. During the missile exercises of the PLA in 1995–96, the Taiwan authority already knew that the missiles were not loaded with warheads. This information seriously affected the effectiveness of the deterrent threat presented and expected from the exercises. It might be speculated further that the US decided to send its warships to the strait based on such intelligence as well. A PLA Major-General Liu Liankun, a former department director with the General Logistics Department, and a Senior Colonel Shao Zhengzhong were executed later for spying and providing this information to the Taiwan authority.

Hu and Chen: what kinds of leaders and how stable are their beliefs?

Hu Jintao and Chen Shuibian are the successors of Jiang and Lee on the mainland and Taiwan. Their general operational code beliefs in Table 6.1 show that they are as cooperative as their predecessors in all their major beliefs and are more cooperative than the average world leader. Like Jiang, Hu also exhibits lower control compared to the average world leader. However, the mainland leaders are more cooperation-oriented than the Taiwanese leaders and are more optimistic in general. A closer look at the two current leaders from the mainland and Taiwan in Figure 6.2 shows that Hu is slightly more cooperative than Chen. Hu also shows somewhat lower control of historical development than Chen. However, both leaders are cooperative Type A leaders whose view of Other is Type C. They are generally Confucian leaders preferring cooperation and peace. This general strategic orientation was not affected by crisis situations, as during crisis periods the two leaders remain cooperative Confucian leaders (see Figure 6.2). Hu remains a Type A leader in a Type C world during both non-crisis and crisis periods. Chen turns from a Type C leader in a Type A world during non-crisis periods to a Type A leader in a Type C world during a crisis period.

Chen has been a stronger leader on his policy stands towards the mainland in his second term, as seen from his attitudes towards even the US in carrying out the defensive referendum and constitutional revisions in 2004. Hu is consolidating his power over the state, party, and the PLA. The importance of the Taiwan issue and the accompanying strategic interests leave Hu with little room for maneuver. Besides adhering to the Basic Line and preparing for the worst case, Hu has had to coordinate his moves with the US and take into consideration other states' concerns in the region. These factors may explain his low belief in historical control over the future of Taiwan.

As a major power and a rising state, the Chinese leader is more confident in international affairs compared with the domestic difficulties regarding economic development, political stability, and leadership legitimacy. Hu's appearance and dealings with the US, Japan, and other states' counterparts further demonstrate his personal style of foreign policy: pragmatic and confident. The Taiwan leader shows less confidence internationally because Taiwan's international image depends heavily on the support of the US. However, as a democratically elected official, he appears more confident domestically.

The PRC leader needs international support for power consolidation and domestic stability. On the one hand, Hu has to show that China is recognized internationally as a responsible, highly respected, peacefully rising power. On the other hand, he has to show a strong hand on the issue of Taiwan given particularly the consistent separatist efforts by the Taiwan President Chen. Hu cannot afford to lose Taiwan in his term of office. The CCP's domestic



Figure 6.2 The operational codes of Hu Jintao and Chen Shuibian

The following abbreviations are used above: HGS = Hu General Self; HGO = Hu General Other; CGS = Chen General Self; CGO = Chen General Other; HCS = Hu Crisis Self; HCO = Hu Crisis Other; HNCS = Hu Non-Crisis Self; HNCO = Hu Non-Crisis Other; CCS = Chen Crisis Self; CCO = Chen Crisis Other; CNCS = Chen Non-Crisis Self; CNCO = Chen Non-Crisis Other.. Self scores are in bold.

legitimacy is already under threat, as its domestic political rule is shaky due to corruption of party members. Furthermore, his policies towards Taiwan also depend heavily on US positions, as the US and PRC are cooperating more on the Taiwan issue to avoid unexpected confrontations resulting from misperceptions and missed signals.

Hu and Chen: 2000, 2004, and beyond

The Taiwan elections in 2000 and 2004 both led to diplomatic crises. An analysis of the election crisis games of Hu and Chen reveals that both Hu and Chen preferred to stay at settlement (CO,CO) and believed that the other side shared this preference. Unlike the 1996 election, the subjective games of both leaders remained unchanged during the 2000 and 2004 elections, predicting that neither one will move from the initial state of settlement (CO,CO). This shared definition of the situation as a no-conflict game made it unlikely that a dispute during an election year would escalate into a real military crisis. However, Taiwan's defensive referendum and proposals for constitutional change that Chen initiated following the 2004 elections has raised tensions with the mainland. In order to see the trend of future strategic interactions between the mainland and Taiwan, therefore, I have also chosen Hu's and Chen's New Year speeches in 2005 and 2006 for further analysis and comparison of their subjective games.

Hu's and Chen's subjective games, 2000–04

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	"4,4" ←	1,2
		↓	↑
	CF	2,1	→ 3,3

Self's Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4a) Self (+, =)

		Other	
		CO	CF
Self	CO	"4,4" →|	1,2
		↑	↓
	CF	2,1 ←	3,3

Other's Strategy: Stay
(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)

* Initial states are in quotations and final states are underlined. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state. Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

Talks between the mainland and Taiwan had not yet resumed in January 2005. Therefore, a deadlock state is chosen as the initial state to analyze the subjective games below in the two leaders' statements. Deadlock is a Nash equilibrium in the subjective games of both leaders, which means that each leader will have to risk that Other will choose "stay" in response to Self's

choice of "move" from deadlock. In his 2005 New Year speech, however, Hu's subjective game remains a no-conflict game that predicts mainland China and Taiwan will both move toward (4,4) settlement, deferring a crisis. The raw scores for Hu's New Year speech to the Chinese Political Consultative Conference are: I-1 = 0.56, P-1 = 0.48, P-4 = 0.20; mean scores for the norming group are I-1 = .33, P-1 = .25, P-4 = .21 with SD = .12. Hu's operational code in this statement locates him in the Holsti typology as a Type A Confucian leader in a Type C Confucian world.

In the following paragraph from Hu's New Year speech, he offers accommodative words as well as warnings.

> In the coming year, we will continue to implement the basic principle of "peaceful reunification and one country, two systems" and the eight-point proposal on developing cross-strait relations and advancing the process of the motherland's reunification in the current stage; promote cross-strait personnel, economic and cultural spheres; and maintain stability in the Taiwan Strait region. Here, I would like to reiterate once again that we are ready to display the greatest sincerity and make the greatest effort in striving for the prospect of peaceful reunification; and we are ready to resume cross-strait dialogue and negotiations on the basis of the one China principle. However, we will absolutely not permit anyone to separate Taiwan from China in any form. The Chinese government and the Chinese people will unswervingly defend national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
>
> (New Year CPPCC speech)

Hu's subjective game from New Year 2005 speech

		Taiwan				Taiwan	
		CO	CF			CO	CF
	CO	4,4	← 1,2		CO	4,4	→| 1,2
China		↓	↑	China		↑	↓
	CF	2,1	→ "3,3"		CF	2,1	← "3,3"
	Taiwan's Strategy: Move				**China's Strategy: Move**		
	(I-1, P-4a) Self (+, =)				(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)		

* Initial states are in quotations and final states are underlined. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state. Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

The subjective game in Chen's 2005 New Year speech has an NME of (3,4) settlement with predictions that Taiwan will choose to move to

settlement while mainland China will stay at the initial state of deadlock. The raw scores for Chen Shuibian's New Year speech are I-1 = 0.33, P-1 = 0.42, P-4 = 0.21; mean scores for the norming group are I-1 = .33, P-1 = .25, P-4 = .21 with SD = .12. Chen's operational code in this statement locates him in the Holsti typology on the border between a Confucian Type A and a realist Type DEF leader in a Confucian Type C world. The analysis below of his subjective game specifies him as a realist Type DEF leader.

Chen's subjective game from 2005 New Year speech (27)

		China					China	
		CO		CF			CO	CF
	CO	3,4	←	1,2		CO	3,4	→| 1,2
Taiwan		↓		↑	Taiwan		↑	↓
	CF	4,1	→	"2,3"		CF	4,1	|← "2,3"
	Taiwan's Strategy: Move					**China's Strategy: Stay**		
	(I-1, P-4a) Self (–, =)					(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)		

* Initial states are in quotations and final states are underlined. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state. Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

Hu's and Chen's New Year speeches in 2006 show that, given the development of the strategic situation in the strait and the changing attitude of the US towards Taiwan's Chen Shuibian, both Chen and Hu are playing a no-conflict game in 2006. They both prefer settlement as their highest-ranked outcome. Hu is well aware of the difficulties Chen is having with the US after his action of ceasing the NUC. Despite Chen's provocative actions, Beijing did not send coercive gestures through military exercises. Rather, Beijing has become more cautious, cooperating more with the US, and turning to focus on the post-Chen era in Taiwan. Hu has invited more Pan-Blue camp leaders to visit the mainland and offered pandas as friendly signals.

Although harsh rhetoric has continued from Beijing, it is targeted more on Chen Shuibian personally. For the US and the PRC, there are more urgent business issues besides Taiwan—energy, North Korea, Iran, trade, currency, IPR, and human rights. Taiwan now is a bargaining chip that provides strong leverage for the US in dealing with the rising PRC. While the PRC still regards Taiwan as a top political issue with security implications for US–China relations, it seems assured that neither the US nor the Taiwanese people want to see war despite the DPP efforts. If the status quo continues, it will give more leverage to the mainland over Taiwan due to the increasing economic exchanges, personnel exchanges, and military balances tilting further in favor of the mainland.

Subjective no-conflict game for Hu and Chen in 2006 New Year speeches

		China				China		
		CO		CF		CO		CF
	CO	4,4	←	1,2	CO	4,4	→|	1,2
Taiwan		↓		↑	Taiwan	↑		↓
	CF	2,1	→	"3,3"	CF	2,1	←	"3,3"
	Taiwan's Strategy: Move				**China's Strategy: Move**			
	(I-1, P-4a) Self (+, =)				(I-1, P-4b) Other (+, =)			

* Initial states are in quotations and final states are underlined. The symbols "→" and "→|" indicate the respective strategic choices of "move" or "stay" by the player with the next move given the initial state. Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

Hu's game shows that the mainland wants peace and settlement. He is much more cooperative in his general political beliefs in 2006 than in 2005 (P-1 = .82 vs. .48; I-1 = .89 vs. .56). Although Hu is consolidating his power over the state, the party, and the military by exerting more influence, internationally and domestically, he needs to attend to serious domestic disturbances and problems of uneven development. These problems are, perhaps, reflected in the relatively modest increase in his belief in historical control (P-4 = .18 vs. .20) from 2005 to 2006. Any missed point on the Taiwan issue would be a serious political loss for any CCP leader under these circumstances. Hu needs strong reassurance of support from the US regarding Taiwan, and his visit in April 2006 did not achieve this goal.

Chen's subjective game shows that he also prefers settlement. His general view of historical control has lowered compared to the previous year (P-4 = .14 vs. .21). Compared with his New Year 2005 speech, Chen's view of the political universe is also less friendly (P-1 = .32 vs. .42) while his strategic orientation has become more cooperative (I-1 = .43 vs. .33). The changing US attitude towards Taiwan's Chen has likely affected Chen's beliefs. With his second term in a mess, Chen is trying desperately to get more support from voters for the DPP. Although Chen's personal loss for taking any risk is less because he will not serve a third term in office, as a party chair he needs to win political points for his party in the next election. He cannot afford to raise tensions with the mainland or to irritate the US any further.

From this analysis we can see that although the future of cross-strait relations remains ambiguous and difficult to manipulate for all parties concerned, settlement is not unachievable. The analysis of the subjective games of the mainland and Taiwan leaders demonstrates that a change of leadership on the mainland results in a change in subjective games. Jiang and Hu agreed on what they thought was Taiwan's preference order, but they have

differed somewhat in their strategic preferences for the mainland. Jiang sometimes preferred domination over settlement while Hu has so far preferred settlement over domination. Both of Taiwan's leaders have displayed strategic ambivalence. Lee ranked domination over settlement during the 1996 election crisis while reversing their rankings in non-crisis periods. Chen has imitated Lee by ranking domination over settlement following the 2004 election before changing back to a no-conflict game in 2006.

The Nash equilibrium in all these games is deadlock. The NME in those games that rank domination higher than settlement for Self requires Other to exercise deterrence power in order to be stable in repeated plays of these games. Although Chen proposed ceasing the NUC's functions in his Spring Festival speech, the operational code scores (I-1 = .59, P-1 = .33, P-4 = .15) in his speech locate Self (Type A) and Other (Type C) within the Confucian quadrants of the Holsti typology. However, his statements might be a test of the mainland's resolve and the US support for his possible follow-up actions. His speech was met with severe criticism from both the mainland and the White House. As former US Deputy Secretary of State Zoellick made clear in his hearing to the Congressional Foreign Relations Committee, Taiwan's declaration of independence means war and the loss of US lives.[23]

Retaining the current status quo, in which Taiwan remains a political entity that China claims is a province, it is a Pareto-superior (better) outcome for both sides. Beijing will not have any excuse to take action despite the Anti-secession Law's legitimating action under provocation, and Taiwan will not have to face the fate of conflict with the mainland or problems with Washington. However, it seems that neither party is satisfied with the status quo over the long term. The most preferred outcome by each side, "widely recognized de jure independence" for Taiwan or "reunification of China on the same 'one country, two systems' basis as Hong Kong" for Beijing, is not acceptable as well to the other side.[24] Although both sides continue to undertake precautions, there is still the danger of potential conflict if either side's intentions are misperceived or misunderstood incidentally or purposefully.

As misperception is highly possible with the current level of communications across the strait, it is essential to analyze what decision-makers have in their minds, whether their views are stable, and what may cause them to take actions. As Hu has just assumed the highest command of the PRC while Chen is phasing out, how Hu thinks about the cross-strait relationship is of long-term interest for all relevant parties. With visits to foreign capitals Hu is moving out of the realm of mystery, and his strategic insights are becoming known to the world. Whether his grand strategy of presenting a peaceful China focusing on development and harmonious society can be realized depends significantly on what decisions he will make on important issues such as Taiwan and US–China relations.

Given the current strategic relations and interactions between the mainland and the US, the dynamics of the cross-strait conflict depend importantly on how the US and PRC define their bilateral relationship. Even if Beijing sees Taiwan's actions as provocative and a change to the status quo seriously leading to independence for Taiwan, it will still take into consideration the US reaction or mediation before taking any military punitive decisions. The US–China strategic relationship will continue to exercise leverage over the future of Taiwan. If Chen should initiate constitutional revisions as his legacy on the way out of office, the future of Taiwan may rest on Sino-American relations and the American response to Beijing's attempt to neutralize such a move toward independence.

Will there be war over Taiwan between the US and China?

In 1997, Munro and Bernstein wrote a famous book, *The Coming Conflict with China*,[25] and almost ten years later Ted Carpenter published another book, *America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan*.[26] After the crises over Taiwan in the 1950s, the 1990s, 2000, and 2004, are the US and China closer to an armed clash over Taiwan? Or with increasing economic exchanges and stronger contacts between the mainland and the nationalist party elites, as Taiwan's DPP and Chen have moved further from the US in 2005, is Taiwan becoming "increasingly irrelevant"[27] in US–China relations? In the middle of the second term for both Bush and Chen Shuibian and during the fledging stage of consolidating power for Hu Jintao, is the Taiwan issue going to diminish in significance after Hu's April 2006 visit to the US? How much weight will the Taiwan issue carry in future US–China relations? What will the leaders do?

Beijing sees the US as having heavy leverage in its relationship with Taiwan and, therefore, is really upset over continuous US arms sales to Taiwan. In the case of a military conflict over Taiwan, some draw the conclusion that the PLA cannot prevail over Taiwan should they choose to attack given US military superiority.[28] US policy towards the Taiwan issue had followed strategic ambiguity until George W. Bush stated that the US would use all means to defend Taiwan in an interview in 2001. Now with the focus of the US on anti-terrorism and nuclear proliferation in Northeast Asia, the US and China are cooperating broadly over these issues. Yet there is no denying that America and China continue to disagree over a list of other issues: trade surpluses, the value of Chinese currency, human rights, energy, and Iran. It is difficult to evalute the position of the Taiwan issue on this list.

Despite the problems, the US–China relationship is apparently moving into a new stage after Chinese President Hu's visit in April 2006. Analysts and policy makers differ over the specific achievements that Hu made from his visit. However, through the formal summit meeting with President Bush it is

generally recognized that the PRC's new power position in the international system is now consolidated worldwide. Hu may have achieved more domestically than internationally. The rising China is showing a new image through its formerly mysterious leader. People no longer ask, "Who is Hu" but, rather, "How strong will Hu be?"

Over the issue of Taiwan, Hu has shown both a strong side and a conciliatory side. Because Hu needs to focus on domestic issues, we will not see policy changes over Taiwan for some time unless the PRC is provoked. Hu wants to wait and see how the US will react first. Given Chen's family scandals and his losing Washington's affection, Beijing will probably wait for Chen's term to be over. Beijing is trying to differentiate Chen Shuibian from his party and the Taiwanese people. Beijing is also placing a very high bet on the current Chairman of the GMD, Major Ma Ying-jeou of Taipei. In catering to the voters of the DPP as well as the Medium voters, Ma is changing his position a little from simply pro-reunification to a stated position that does not exclude independence on the voter's choice list. As Carpenter has said, China should not hope for a change of position even after Chen's term and with a potential GMD candidate winning the presidency in 2008. Because Taiwan is a democracy, the people matter if a candidate wants to win the support of voters. Therefore, even if Ma wins, he will consider the general opinion polls of the public, which show that the public does not favor reunification with the mainland.[29] In the meantime, Beijing, particularly the military, also tries to strengthen its military deterrence capabilities against the unpredictable Chen, and meet a possible need for a military showdown over reunification.

The US is disengaging itself from the strait[30] and the disengagement is not of its own choice. Recent US actions towards Taiwan show diminishing patience over the Taiwan president's provocative actions. In both the 2004 presidential election and the 2005 NUC incidents, the US cooperated more closely with the mainland to make it clear that it is against any changes of the status quo. Washington does not want to see any more troublemakers over the Taiwan issue. However, the US has always praised Taiwan as an example of democracy for Asian countries along with Japan, especially comparing them with the authoritarian PRC.

Many scholars claim that China has become a major challenger of US power[31] in the Asia Pacific region, and they see China as a threat to either the US or the region's future. They are mainly concerned with China's increasing defense budget, changing PLA military doctrine and PLA modernization. They posit that these transitions are not indicating a peaceful rise but, rather, disturbances for the region (like Germany in the early twentieth century or Japan before the Pacific War) especially over Taiwan. Thus, the Chinese government needs to reassure the US and its East Asia neighbors[32] by clarifying the level of defense spending for the past several years and by freezing the missiles across Taiwan Strait.

However, these suggestions definitely will not be accepted, nor will they work. They do not take into consideration the accompanying costs for the CCP and the PRC government, which would suffer losses domestically and internationally in reputation and influence. The steps would also seriously damage the credibility of the PLA in terms of its deterrence and coercion capabilities. It would play as well into the hands of the DPP party's political needs and its independence wish. With further changes on the grand chessboard in Asia and the US strategic focus reoriented from Europe to East Asia, the Taiwan issue will constantly be on top of any security agenda between the US and China. However, China's rise in Asia is not necessarily in conflict with America's influence and leadership in Asia, because the Taiwan issue is probably one on which the two countries can cooperate to avoid serious conflict.[33]

In assessing the overall situation and predicting the future of US–China relations, some other key players cannot be neglected. US military allies in Asia are important—Japan and Australia, followed by South Korea and Southeast Asian friends of the US. While US Secretary of State Rice's visit to Australia and her meetings with the Australian government did not bring about the expected support from Australia, Japan's eager support of the US over China and the deteriorating Japan–China relations are affecting the future of US–China relations. In Japan's *East Asia Strategic Review for 2006*[34] "the military balance between China and Taiwan is shifting in China's favor." For Japan, "the murky relations between China and Taiwan and an increase in China's military muscle can be seen as major destabilizing factors in East Asia."[35] Other US allies are refraining from cooperating with the US in the event of a showdown between the US and China over Taiwan (Australia and Republic of Korea, Southeast Asian countries—Singapore), and Sutter attributes it to increasing positive relations with China under China's charm diplomacy.[36] The recent strategic moves by the US into South Asia are another example of how the US is making use of the strategic environment and opportunities in Asia.

Wars cannot be fought in Asia's strategic environment without serious damage to the parties involved. Therefore, the calculations of all state leaders are changing to become much more complicated. The beliefs of these leaders matter more than ever in today's world, making it important to study and analyze these beliefs for understanding and predicting what the future will be. If a Parabellum realpolitik leader appears in either the mainland or Taiwan, what does it imply for US foreign policy makers? If both the mainland and Taiwan have Confucian leaders, what should the US position be? These are important questions for foreign policy makers to consider in addition to looking at the increasing numbers of missiles and soldiers in a rising China.

Conclusion

Will China become a benign great power or a malign one? Many realist theories predict that a rising China will clash with the hegemon—the US—when its material power capability catches up. Some pessimists even prescribe that the two major powers are doomed to fight each other in the coming decades. Cultural realists start from a cultural perspective, arguing that China has an offensive strategic culture resulting in a history of aggressive behavior under an expansive grand strategy generated from its strategic culture. They reach the same conclusion as other realists, that China is a dangerous challenger in the international system. The Chinese are inherently revisionist and will take on other states in the system when the opportunity presents itself. What was once called "*huang huo*"—the yellow disaster—by Napoleon seems still rooted in the minds of the modern West. However, is Chinese strategic culture aggressive? Are Chinese leaders Parabellum realists? Is traditional Confucian thinking non-functional in Chinese decision-making? What kind of cultural underpinning—Confucian or Parabellum—is influencing Chinese leaders' strategic beliefs? These are some of the questions that this book has tried to answer in order to provide a better understanding of Chinese foreign policy decision-making.

This book has focused on leaders and leaders' beliefs in making decisions, as states do not make decisions themselves. It is a state's leaders who make the decisions in different situations. Leaders' beliefs in different situations can make a difference in understanding the motivations behind a rising China. An operational code analysis of six key Chinese leaders' belief systems and their changes across contexts and over time reveals that these Chinese leaders are not simple Parabellum realists. A comparison of these leaders with the average world leader further indicates that (except for Mao) they are either close to the average world leader in their major beliefs about cooperation and conflict (Deng and Zhou) or more cooperative and friendly than the average world leader (Jiang, Hu–Wen). Even Mao's beliefs are neither simple nor static, but are complex and change over time and across situations.

The analysis of strategic choices in war and crisis situations indicates that Mao is a defensive realist who was very ready and willing to use force if provoked. Zhou was simply a defensive realist, and Deng Xiaoping turns out to be more of a Confucian leader although he shared many revolutionary experiences with Mao and Zhou. The choice propensities of the first and second generations of leaders indicate that they preferred general defensive strategies to offensive ones. Contemporary Chinese leaders show a stronger cooperative orientation. They are Confucian leaders who remain generally cooperative in crisis periods by preferring negotiations and diplomatic strategies. These results disconfirm the Parabellum realist argument that Chinese leaders are under the influence of an offensive strategic culture, and the prediction that they will be aggressive in their behavior.

Overall, these findings confirm that there are two strands of strategic culture, Confucian and Parabellum, in Chinese strategic thinking. Within each strand there are two versions: offensive and defensive. It is too simple to conclude that only one strand or one version is influencing Chinese strategic behavior. This book has focused on China's grand strategic decision-making and the leaders' beliefs about the nature of the political universe and effective strategies. The strategic implications are important for understanding Chinese military doctrines; however, the scope of this analysis is not confined to military operations but has addressed as well the general political domain of Chinese decision-making. The implications of this analysis are that leaders matter, as leaders' beliefs play a significant role in understanding the decisions and policies of states. The claim that Chinese foreign policy making and grand strategy is offensive under the influence of a Parabellum strategic culture is too simple for several reasons.

First, leaders differ from each other in their personal experiences and beliefs. Simply focusing on external situations and constraints skews the picture and leads to misunderstandings and misperceptions. Mao, Zhou, and Deng share revolutionary experiences; however, their beliefs differ significantly with Mao at one extreme as almost a Parabellum realist, Zhou in the middle as a peace-oriented diplomat, and Deng on the other end as a Confucian leader once he escaped from Mao's shadow. Mao is definitely an outlier in the group, which has much to do with his strong personality as a revolutionary ideologue.

Second, leaders' beliefs are not static but change over time and situations. Discounting the impact of external factors does not mean one should discard them completely. Although beliefs do have cultural roots, my findings do not support the argument that Chinese leaders operate under the influence of a simple, offensive strategic culture. Beliefs are situational and not a consistent cultural factor. As the research findings show, Chinese leaders are generally defensive in nature, and, except for Mao, they are cooperation-oriented. However, situational and conditional constraints as well as the actions of other states also play significant roles in changing leaders' beliefs, thus affecting their decisions. Mao's case is also complicated when taking into account time and situation factors.

Third, both looking back and to the future, Chinese leaders do not behave like warmongers. They are rational actors, taking seriously into consideration time, context, and situations. Their decisions reflect a preference for defensive rather than offensive strategies. These findings have significant implications for policy makers and analysts in terms of policy choices towards the PRC. Preemption and preponderance strategies may not work in the way expected but, rather, be provocative, that is, the Chinese leaders will respond in kind rather than being coerced to surrender should challenges emerge. On the other hand, a tit-for-tat strategy will work if accommodation or engagement strategies are adopted towards China.

As for the Taiwan issue, speculations about the potential conflict over Taiwan between China and the US run high among politicians and policy makers, particularly after the reelection of Taiwan's Chen Shuibian. Managing US–China relations without misperceptions and misunderstandings calls for a cautious look by both sides at the root of their policy options: rivalry or friendship. As this study shows, current Chinese leaders, Jiang or Hu–Wen, are generally Type A leaders with strong cooperative operational code beliefs who prefer peaceful strategies over conflictual strategies. Up to now, their beliefs do not show change over time and context; however, as the two crisis cases examined between the US and China suggest, the possible scenario of situations around Taiwan might be problematic for both Chinese and US leaders. Even Confucian leaders can turn more aggressive under strong external pressures or threats.

In addition, there is also the possibility that the military might exert a stronger influence under the new leadership, as Hu and Wen do not have a revolutionary or military background. Even as head of the military, how much actual control Hu has is still in question. On the other hand, the Taiwan leaders, particularly Chen, are also provocative. Even the US leaders have warned him to refrain from being so unpredictable in his decisions. Despite the many crises between China and the US over Taiwan in the past, twice during the cold war (1953, 1958), twice after the cold war (1996 and 2000), and once again in the present (2004), all fell short of military conflicts. With Chen Shuibian and G. W. Bush reelected and Chinese President Hu Jintao formally taking over the state, the CCP, and the army, what kind of future scenario might occur regarding the Taiwan Strait continues to be an open question with the answer depending on the beliefs and strategies of these leaders.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

Content analysis and sequential game analysis

Sampling for automated content analysis

Public statements are the major sources for the content analysis in this book. Content analyses of Chinese leaders' operational codes are conducted through the automated computer system Profiler Plus and VICS.[1] The VICS scores for Chinese leaders are compared to the average scores for a norming group of world leaders sampled from a variety of historical eras and regions. In Mao's and Deng's cases, some recently revealed telegrams and interviews are used for balancing the number of speeches in different time periods. Deng's interviews during his visit to the US in early 1979 are essential in understanding his war decision, made in February, to attack Vietnam. A trial test was conducted to compare the operational code beliefs in these different sources for consistency.[2]

Due to constraints on available sources, random sampling was not a practical strategy, so purposeful sampling was conducted. Both general foreign policy speeches and targeted speeches of different leaders were included. The targeted speeches were chosen for the three war cases with a particular "Other" as the focal point for the speaker. Mao's target was the US for the Korean War, the Soviet Union and India for the Sino-Indian War; Deng's targets are the Soviet Union and Vietnam. The public statements for Jiang, Hu, and Wen were extracted from the list of public sources in Chapter 1, including both general speeches and targeted speeches toward the US and Taiwan. Specific sampling steps were followed, which are summarized below.

First, efforts were made to exhaust available sources in order to obtain all relevant speeches. Given the limitations in terms of English translation, digital forms, and censorship, the speeches are not exhaustive in terms of sources and sampled speeches. Some recent publications, which might provide really crucial texts for content analysis, are not yet translated into English. One example is the much discussed and debated recent release of *Jianguo Yilai Mao Zedong Wengao*, which contains 13 volumes of Mao's works not included in the selected works; another is the biography of Marshall Peng

Dehuai who was the commander of the Chinese voluntary people's troops in the Korean War. Further research is desirable after translations of these works are done.

In the process of selecting sources, I tended to use the original sources, mainly the selected works of leaders, as they are the most popular sources, though they have been edited to reflect the government's preference in terms of content and translation. Other sources include *Beijing Review*, from which speeches were scanned. *People's Daily* online web provides the three volumes of Deng's selected works. Lexis-Nexis Academics Index is another major source. Web pages of the Chinese Foreign Ministry and embassies overseas (mainly in the US and Britain) are another source. These sources are reliable because they are mainly officially maintained or academically trustworthy sources. The selected works are scanned from the publications of the major Chinese foreign language press. Speeches are then selected from the above sources based on two sampling criteria: first, they occurred during the time period from before war/crisis to after war/crisis for these cases: the Korean War 1946–53, Sino-Indian War 1958–65, and Sino-Vietnamese War 1975–84. Second, these are targeted foreign policy speeches with an appropriate length, preferably over 1,000 words.[3]

Following this procedure, I chose 128 foreign policy speeches from Mao's nine volumes of *Selected Works* purposefully during the time span 1946–53, and 1958–65. These were put into the computer Profiler Plus program and yielded results for 68, with 59 valid cases, and nine with too many empty cells (0s). Different errors occurred during the parsing of speeches, mainly from the Chinese translations of some words or phrases in *Pinyin*, which the computer dictionary cannot recognize. The loss of about half of the speeches was random from the computer processor; therefore, it should not significantly affect the results. The same process was conducted in selecting speeches for Deng, Zhou, Jiang, and Hu. Eventually, a total of 44 speeches were selected for Mao during the Korean War (27) and the Sino-Indian War (17); 72 speeches for Deng during the Sino-Indian War (9) and Sino-Vietnamese War (63). For Zhou, (11) speeches were scanned into digital forms for analysis for the Korean War (6) and the Sino-Indian War (5). Forty-one speeches for Jiang, 32 speeches for Hu, and eight speeches for Wen Jiabao constituted their respective samples for the crises during their tenures in office.

To analyze the impact of immediate threat of military conflict on the leaders to see whether their beliefs change from pre-war to war and to post-war, a clear cut-off line is necessary for sampling. For pre-war/post-war time periods for the three wars, one year was chosen as the cut-off line, since clashes had been occurring before the three wars, and the danger for a final showdown of arms was constantly presented. Therefore, a year rather than some lesser number of months was chosen as the cut-off line.[4] Using this selection process

for Mao in the Korean War, nine speeches were chosen for pre-war, seven for war, and six for post-war periods. For Deng in the Sino-Vietnamese War, 11 speeches were chosen for the pre-war period, seven for the war period, and six for the post-war period. For the Sino-Indian War, Mao had two speeches for the pre-war period, one for the war period, and four for the post-war period, and Deng had two speeches for the pre-war period, two for the war period, and two for the post-war period. Zhou had two speeches for the pre-war period, three for the war period, and one for the post-war period for the Korean War, and three speeches for the pre-war period and two for the post-war period for the Sino-Indian War.

These methods of operational code analysis used to test the impact of strategic culture[5] on the belief systems of leaders under varying social and historical contexts carry with them the following assumptions and issues, which I want to acknowledge here.

Assumption 1 Sources for data collection are limited.[6] It is also difficult to evaluate available data, especially data from authoritarian states where public media are under strict control by the central government. The question always raised is how one can tell that public statements are not merely propaganda; thus, how can we be sure that we are measuring true beliefs? To help solve this problem, I look at broad public statements related to foreign policy. The speeches are then classified by different situations (crisis vs. non-crisis); different domains (domestic vs. foreign); and leaders' roles (subordinate vs. head).

Assumption 2 The study of beliefs should involve a detailed analysis of situations, domestic politics and individual leadership personalities as well as cognitive capabilities, cultural and historical influences. Therefore, the resulting model cannot be parsimonious. In my model, actors' (leaders') decisions relate to strategic interactions under different strategic conditions of war and peace. "When actors are uncertain, beliefs are critical to the choice of strategy and the outcome of the interaction and must be included in a complete description of a strategic interaction."[7] "Describing how these beliefs evolve once the interaction has begun is part of analyzing the interaction."[8] To catch these changes, subjective game theory is applied to map out the belief variance. Subjective games can best catch the route of strategic steps taken sequentially by one player after each step taken by the other player. The changes in the direction of moves, tactics, or strategies taken represent the variation of beliefs within a situation.

Assumption 3 Beliefs change. To measure belief changes is difficult and has been criticized for being too simple to be of use, theoretically unsound, and untestable. To address these problems, I am using public statements of political leaders to measure their beliefs. General as well as targeted

public statements of leaders are coded to see if there is consistency between them. If not, then the conditions under which beliefs differ are further specified. The results are largely replicable through the use of automated computerized content analysis, which yields high reliability compared to human coders.

Assumption 4 Single case studies can provide insights generalizable to other countries. Case studies have been questioned regarding their generalizability. As this research employs research methodology used by other scholars on different world leaders, their work can provide insights into generalizability to other regions and countries. Operational code analysis research with the VICS method has been performed for over 50 world leaders. My theoretical argument about the strategic cultural impact on beliefs contributes to this research on state motivation and identity by addressing how to identify a revisionist and a status quo state and where the beliefs of their leaders come from, thereby tackling a broader question in the field of international relations as well as a debate within the realist paradigm between offensive and defensive realists.

Assumption 5 Culture is an elusive variable. Although many scholars acknowledge that Chinese cultural and historical legacies influence the way Chinese leaders define national security interests and worldviews as reflected in their beliefs,[9] how to study scientifically and delineate this cultural impact from the non-cultural (structural and material) effects remains contested.[10] To sort out a particular cultural impact, I borrow from the cognitive research program of operational code analysis and apply its methods to study scientifically the impact of strategic culture.

Backward induction for game theory analysis

The logic for identifying the final outcomes in the sequential games in this book is based on the rules of play specified by Brams (1994) in his TOM, which assume that the players will "think ahead" in making a choice of whether to "stay" or "move" from an initial state in the game matrix. These rules are listed in Chapter 1 and set limits on what a player may choose to do and still act "rationally," that is, attain his or her best available outcome given: (a) the preference rankings assigned to the different outcomes of settlement, domination, deadlock, and submission for Self and Other in the leader's subjective game; and (b) the assumption that each player will make choices that take into account the other player's choices.

The rule of play that sets boundaries on the number of moves in a particular game ending in a final state is Rule 5: "A player will not move from an initial state . . . if this move leads to a less preferred final state or . . . returns play to the initial state,"[11] that is, thinking ahead involves asking the basic question whether the logic of the game's preference rankings for Self and Other will

lead to a sequence of moves ending up back in the cell of the matrix where the sequence has started. If the answer to this question is "yes" for both players, then neither player will move from the initial state. If the answer to this question is "no" for at least one player, then the initial state of the game will not be the final state. Calculating the answer to this question may take several forms in which leaders use cognitive short cuts or make more precise calculations. They may look only one move ahead or up to four moves ahead to reach a myopic or a nonmyopic answer to this question.[12]

While the particular reasoning rules or cognitive heuristics may vary by decision-maker, the "correct" method for answering this question is "thinking ahead" according to the logic of "backward induction," in which a leader looks ahead to the sequence of possible moves by reasoning backward from the final move in this series.[13] A couple of examples from the mixed motive game (27) in Chapter 1, in which a Confucian leader (Self) plays a defensive realist leader (Other), reveal the logic of backward induction. According to the logic of backward induction, this game has only one nonmyopic solution (4,3) for both players, which is settlement (CO,CO). That is: (a) if the initial state is (4,3), both players will choose "stay"; (b) if the initial state is in another cell, then the players will move to (4,3) as the final state.

a *If the initial state for this game is (4,3), neither player will choose to move from this state, making it the final state (outcome) for this game.* In this case the logic of thinking ahead by backward induction is illustrated in the matrix below for Self and Other. Reasoning backward (clockwise), Self calculates that Other will not move from (1,4) to (4,3) because it would mean moving from a state with Other's highest-ranked outcome. In turn, Self will not move from (3,2) to a worse outcome at (1,4); however, Other will move from (2,1) to a better outcome (3,2). Self will not move from (4,3) to a worse outcome (2,1). So Self will choose "stay" at (4,3).

		Other	
		CO	CF
	CO	"<u>4,3</u>"|← <u>1,4</u>	
Self		↓	↑
	CF	2,1 → 3,2*	
	Self's Strategy: "Stay"		

		Other	
		CO	CF
	CO	"<u>4,3</u>"→| 1,4	
Self		↑	↓
	CF	2,1 ← 3,2*	
	Other's Strategy: "Stay"		

The initial state is in quotation marks. The Nash equilibrium is asterisked and the NME is underlined. The logic of backward induction is indicated by an arrow (→) for "move" and a blocked arrow (→|) for "stay." Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

Other will also choose "stay" at (4,3) according to the following logic of backward induction. Reasoning backward (counterclockwise), Self will choose to move from (2,1) to a better outcome (4,3); Other will choose to move from (3,2) to (2,1) with the expectation that Self will then move to (4,3); Self will move to (3,2) from (1,4) with the expectation that Other will move to (2,1) permitting Self to move to (4,3). Thinking ahead four moves, Other calculates that the game will cycle back to the initial state of (4,3). So Other also chooses "stay" at (4,3), which is the final state that is the NME for this game.

b *If the initial state is some other cell in the game matrix, it will be logical for one of the players to move from that cell, leading to a final outcome of (4,3) unless the players employ a myopic calculation rather than a nonmyopic calculation in thinking ahead.* In this case both players may choose "stay" when the initial state is specified as (3,2) in the game matrix below. If they do, it is a myopic solution to this game instead of a nonmyopic solution. This solution is called a Nash equilibrium solution, defined as, "a state—or more properly, the strategies associated with a state—from which no player would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because its departure would immediately lead to a worse, or at least not a better, state."[14] In this example, if Self chooses "move," the immediate outcome is (1,4) or a lower ranked preference for Self. The same is true for Other if this player chooses "move" from (3,2) to (2,1).

		Other					Other	
		CO	CF			CO	CF	
	CO	4,3	← 1,4		CO	4,3	→ 1,4	
Self		↓	↑	Self		↑	↓	
	CF	2,1	→ "3,2"*		CF	2,1	← "3,2"*	
	Self's Strategy: "Stay"				**Other's Strategy: "Move"**			

The initial state is in quotation marks. The Nash equilibrium is asterisked and the NME is underlined. The logic of backward induction is indicated by an arrow (→) for "move" and a blocked arrow (→|) for "stay." Both the final state and the NMEs are underlined and the Nash equilibria are asterisked.

However, if both players think ahead more than one move, the game's nonmyopic solution is (4,3). While Self will choose "stay," Other will choose "move," setting in motion a calculus that will lead each player to move to a final outcome of (4,3). In reasoning backward clockwise, Self calculates that Other will move from (2,1) to a better outcome of (3,2); however, Self will not move from (4,3) to a worse outcome of (2,1) and Other will not move from its best outcome of (1,4) to (4,3). Self will not move from (3,2) to (1,4) if Other will not move to (4,3). So Self will choose "stay" at (3,2) as its strategy.

In reasoning backward counterclockwise, Other calculates that Self will move from its worst outcome of (1,4) to (3,2). However, Other will not move from (4,3) to (1,4), because it calculates that Self will then move to (3,2). Self will move from (2,1) to (4,3) because it calculates that Other will not move from (4,3). Other will move from (3,2) to a worse outcome of (2,1) because it calculates that Self will move on to (4,3). So Other will choose "move" as its strategy, which makes (4,3) the final state and the NME for this game when (3,2) is specified as the initial state.

By extension (4,3) will also be the final state when either (2,1) or (1,4) is specified as the initial state. One of the players has ranked it as the worst outcome in both cases, giving this player an incentive to choose "move" either directly to (4,3) or to (3,2), depending on who has the next move. If the player with the next move can only move to (3,2), it can also threaten to do so unless the other player moves to (4,3). An effective exercise of such "threat" power makes (4,3) the final solution in this case when Other responds by moving from (1,4) to (4,3) in order to avoid (3,2) as a final outcome.

Self's threat to move to (3,2) if Other moves from (4,3) to (1,4) is also why (4,3) is a nonmyopic solution. Threat effectiveness is demonstrated in each contingency either by allowing communication between the players or by repeated plays of the game in which Self or Other actually moves to (3,2), which is a worse outcome than (4,3) for both players. For threat power to explain why (4,3) is a nonmyopic solution, an additional rule of play is required in the form of prior communication between players and at least the possibility of repeated plays of the game in order for threats to be credible.[15]

In the application of Brams' TOM with its rules of play to Chinese decision-making, I assume a single play of the game unless the particular subjective game of a given Chinese leader implies the possibility of repeated play. I also report both the myopic and nonmyopic solutions for a subjective game to assess the fit between TOM's nonmyopic predictions about each player's strategy and the alternative prediction (if there is a Nash solution). In neither case do I assume that China's leaders necessarily "think ahead" by means of backward induction; however, I am sympathetic to Brams' argument that:

> [R]eal players do not painstakingly work backward from the endpoints of a game tree, with many levels and a multitude of branches, to try to determine what they should do at the start of play. Rather, players develop heuristics and use rules of thumb that simplify this process, not because they are short-term thinkers and have abandoned their intelligence but because they have found good approximations to backward induction. *But whence these rules, if not from robust and time-tested simplifications that approximate the calculus of backward induction?*[16]

To sum up, my research examines Chinese decision-making processes in important historical cases. Culture-based misperceptions and misunderstandings between China and the US about the nature of international relations and conflict can be devastating for mutual cooperation and for world peace. Therefore, understanding the process of making decisions can be directly beneficial for peace. It is my hope that content analysis and sequential game analysis provide new angles for building peace by reducing misperception and, therefore, eliminating obstacles to confidence-building and cooperation. Moreover, the results may have implications for other regions with tensions and controversies. By looking at the strategic cultures of particular countries, new paths may be blazed for confidence-building and conflict resolution in the strategic interactions between states.

NOTES

1 CHINA AS A RISING POWER

1 Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder, C and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 55–56; "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post Cold War Period," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999). While Johnston himself no longer appears to hold these views, others in the academic and policy community continue to do so. See Alastair I. Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (March 1, 2003), pp. 5–56.

2 Zeev Maoz, *Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment* (Boston, MA: Unwin Hyman, 1990). Stephen G. Walker, "The Interface between Beliefs and Behavior: Henry Kissinger's Operational Code and the Vietnam War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (1977), pp. 129–168; "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11, No. 2 (1990), pp. 403–418. Zeev Maoz and Ben Mor, *Bound by Struggle: The Strategic Evolution of Enduring International Rivalries* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002). See also Steven J. Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994). Subjective games are applied here because they can best model a decision-making process featuring incomplete information and the strategic interactions of different parties.

3 A Confucian strategic culture for Johnston is one that embodied "the Confucian-Mencian denigration of the role of violence in state security, or Sun Zi's alleged emphasis on non- or minimally violent routes to strategic victory" and a preference for accommodationist grand strategies (Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, xi, 117). Johnston thinks it to be "inaccurate, misleading, or plainly wrong" (xi).

4 Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China".

5 Face validity is the first criterion for selecting items for an index. If you want to measure political conservatism, for example, each of your items should appear on its face to indicate conservatism or its opposite, liberalism. See Earl Babbie, *The Practice of Social Research* (Wadsworth/Thomas Learning Inc., 1995), p. 170. Face validity does not depend on established theories for support. See Arlene Fink, *How to Measure Survey Reliability and Validity* (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications, 1995). My attention was first drawn to some of the translations

Johnston used in the book. For example, in discussing the core notions in Sun Zi, Johnston translates the phrase "*Buzhan Ersheng*" as "not fighting and subduing the enemy" (Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, pp. 102–103). He interprets the phrase as meaning "fighting is still required, violence must still be applied, but is done so minimally (in relative, not absolute terms) since the objective conditions for the enemy's defeat already exist." However, Johnston ignores the presence and significance of "*Zong Heng Jia*" (diplomatic negotiators) during the Spring and Autumn Periods and the Warring States Period. When Sun Zi wrote his book, the Zong Heng Jia's major job was to negotiate for their kings *before crisis to avoid fighting*. Thus, the preferable translation is "to win without fight", that is, the virtues of the kings will win them wars and wars should be avoided whenever possible.

6 Zhang Tiejun, "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 1, 2002), pp. 73–90.

7 In the Korean War, China sent its volunteer forces to support the buffer North Korea not only for ideological reasons but also out of security concerns as the US was approaching the border area close to Northeastern China. In the Sino-Indian War, the Chinese troops withdrew after victory. In the Sino-Vietnamese War, the Chinese leaders sent its troops to "teach the Vietnamese a lesson" and withdrew after victory as well.

8 Stephen Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell, 1987). In his theory, Walt argues that a state will not balance against power but against the most immediate threat calculated from the variables of proximity and intentions as well as power.

9 Offensive and defensive realists differ in their perception of states' motivations and the views of the security dilemma. Defensive realists recognize that there are basically only status quo or positional states, preferring the absolute gains of survival and security; offensive realists emphasize all states are revisionist, looking for relative gains. Defensive realists believe the security dilemma is intractable while offensive realists do not think the security dilemma is a dilemma, as security competition is necessary to become the hegemon, which is also the best defense. Overviews of the defensive and offensive realism debate include Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven E. Miller, "Preface," in Michael E. Brown, Owen M. Cote, Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, eds, *The Perils of Anarchy: Contemporary Realism and International Security* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1995), pp. ix–xii; Benjamin Frankel, "Restating the Realist Case: An Introduction," *Security Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 3, (Spring 1996): xiv–xx; Sean M. Lynn-Jones, "Realism and America's Rise: A Review Essay," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998), pp. 157–182; Robert Jervis, "Realism, Neorealism, and Cooperation," *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 2 (Fall 1998); Jack L. Snyder, *Myths of Empire: Domestic Politics and International Ambition* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fareed Zakaria, "Realism and Domestic Politics," *International Security*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Summer 1992).

10 Dan Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs: Learning, Alliances, and World Wars* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 11.

11 Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, p. 11. See also critiques by Robert O. Keohane, John G. Ruggie, Robert Gilpin, Robert W. Cox, and Richard K. Ashley in Robert O. Keohane ed., *Neorealism and Its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986).

12 Richard Rosecrance and Arthur A. Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Jack J. Snyder, *Myths of Empire*.

13 Davis B. Bobrow, Steven Chan, and John A. Kringen, *Understanding Foreign Policy Decisions: The Chinese Case* (New York: The Free Press, 1979).
14 Rosecrance and Stein, *The Domestic Bases of Grand Strategy*, p. 10.
15 Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Pub. Co., 1979).
16 Herbert A. Simon, "Human Nature in Politics: The Dialogue of Psychology with Political Science," *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. 79 (1985), pp. 293–304.
17 Ibid., "Human Nature in Politics," p. 294.
18 Ibid.
19 Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976).
20 Stephen Walt, *Origins of Alliances*; Randall Schweller, *Deadly Imbalances* (New York: Columbia, 1998).
21 Reiter, *Crucible of Beliefs*, p. 8.
22 Nathan C. Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo* (New York, Toronto, London: McGraw-Hill Book Company, Inc., 1951); *A Study of Bolshevism* (Glencoe, IL: The Free Press, 1953).
23 Alexander L. George, "The Operational Code," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 13 (1969), pp. 190–222.
24 Ole R. Holsti, "The 'Operational Code' as an Approach to the Analysis of Belief Systems." Final Report to the National Science Foundation, (1977) Grant No. SCO 75–14368. See also, Walker, "The Interface Between Beliefs and Behavior," pp. 129–168; "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 27, No. 2 (June 1983), pp. 179–202; "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis," *Political Psychology*, Vol. 11 (1990), pp. 403–418.
25 Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders," in Jerald M. Post ed., *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders: With Profiles of Saddam Hussein and Bill Clinton* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2003).
26 Jack Snyder, "The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations," RAND Report R-2154-AF (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, September 1977).
27 Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization*, 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 391–425.
28 Another reason to use operational code analysis is that the definition of strategic culture provided by Johnston is very close to the definition of operational code beliefs by George, as I demonstrate in Chapter 2.
29 I chose the Warring States Period first, because major works of the Seven Military Classics Johnston analyzed were written in the Warring States Period; second, by tracing back, I hope to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the variations of strategic culture under different social and historical contexts. Discussions of the qualitative methodology of process-tracing, congruence testing, and case study are in Chapter 2.
30 Brams, *Theory of Moves*. I am adopting the Theory of Moves (TOM) mainly due to the applicability of TOM to ordinal games of strategic preferences with alternating moves by each player. I also think TOM is a good model for understanding and imitating the strategic choices of states under threat/crisis/conflict situations. For a contrary view, see Randall Stone who challenges Steven Brams' TOM by claiming that Brams abuses game theory in international relations, and says it is "backsliding, not progress, in the effort to understand strategic interaction." Randall W. Stone, "The Use and Abuse of Game Theory in

International Relations: The Theory of Moves," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2001): 216–244, p. 243. See also Steven Brams, "Response to Randall Stone," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 45, No. 2 (2001), pp. 245–254.

31 See Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*; *A Study of Bolshevism*.

32 Stephen G. Walker, *Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code Analysis*, (Hilliard, OH: Social Science Automation, 2000) p. 2.

33 George, "The Operational Code," pp. 201–216.

34 George, "The Operational Code"; "The Causal Nexus Between Cognitive Beliefs and Decision-Making Behavior," in Lawrence Falkowski ed., *Psychological Models in International Politics*, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1979) Chapter 5. Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems"; "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis."

35 See Leites, *The Operational Code of the Politburo*, and *A Study of Bolshevism*. Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems" and "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis."

36 Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems."

37 Walker, "The Motivational Foundations of Political Belief Systems," and "The Evolution of Operational Code Analysis."

38 Stephen G. Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, "Systemic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (March 1998), p. 177.

39 Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders," p. 224.

40 Ibid.

41 VICS is a computer software program for content analysis based on verbs in a leader's speeches. The verbs are coded with a dictionary to construct indices of a leader's view of the political universe and preferences for the outcomes of domination, accommodation, submission, or deadlock. See Walker, *Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code Analysis*. Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders." Michael Young, "Building Worldviews with Profiler+," in G. Barnett ed., *Progress in Communication Sciences, Vol. 17: Applications of Computer Content Analysis* (2001), pp. 17–32.

42 Walker, *Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code*. Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders."

43 Brams, *Theory of Moves*.

44 Stephen G. Walker and Mark Schafer (2003) "Operational Code Analysis and Foreign Policy Decision-making," prepared as a chapter for the *Advances in Foreign Policy Analysis Yearbook*, edited by Alex Mintz (Palgrave Press, forthcoming); see also Anatol Rapoport and Melvin Guyer, "A Taxonomy of 2 × 2 Games," *General Systems: Yearbook for the Society of General Systems Research*, 11 (1966), pp. 203–215.

45 James D. Morrow, *Game Theory for Political Scientists* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1994).

46 Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 26.

47 Brams specifies the rules for sequential games in *Theory of Moves* Chapter 1 and Chapter 4.

48 A Nash equilibrium is "a state—or, more properly, the strategies associated with a state—from which no player would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because its departure would immediately lead to a worse, or at least not a better, state" (Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 224).

49 Nonmyopic equilibrium (NME) refers to: "in a two-person game, a nonmyopic equilibrium is a state from which neither player, anticipating all possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a worse, or at least not a better, outcome" (Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 224).
50 Brams, *Theory of Moves*, pp. 23–24, p. 88.
51 Game 27's NME is based on the assumptions of repeated play and the exercise of deterrent power by Ego to keep Alter from defecting to (1,4). See Brams *Theory of Moves*, p. 217.
52 See Brams, *Theory of Moves*, Appendix. There are 78 possible 2 × 2 ordinal games. The games with (4,4) outcomes are no-conflict games with (4,4) as the sole NME.
53 Walker and Schafer, "Operational Code Analysis and Foreign Policy Decision-making." A subjective game does not make the two-sided rationality assumption and, therefore, explains only one actor's choices and not the outcome constructed by the choices of both actors.
54 Walker and Schafer, "Operational Code Analysis and Foreign Policy Decision-making".

2 CHINA'S STRATEGIC CULTURE AND WAR

1 Larry Summers, Professor of Economics at Harvard, former Chief Economist for the World Bank, and immediate past Secretary of the Treasury in President Clinton's Administration.
2 In this chapter, standard mandarin *Pinyin* will be used for most of the names of persons, places and dynasties. However, some names are spelled as they appear in the journals using a different spelling system (as practiced in Hong Kong or Taiwan). For some quotations, original spellings by the authors are used, as in the articles of Tsu Chuo-yun cited later.
3 Many of the studies on the influence of Confucianism take the Qing Dynasty as a cutting point. However, after the Qing Dynasty, the Republic of China under Sun Zhongshan continued to follow many of the Confucian practices. Many of the intellectuals of the PRC obtained their education under the Confucian "*Sishu*" practice where a teacher would lecture students in a private setting on the major works by Confucius. Students learned to recite and copy (for calligraphy as well) those works from a very early age.
4 Hsu Chuo-yun, "War and Peace in Ancient China: The History of Chinese Interstate/International Relations," Oct. 3, 1997, Occasional Paper No. 75, Asia Program, The Woodrow Wilson Center, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC 20560. This conclusion is also shared by other scholars.
5 Luoyang is today's capital city of Henan Province. It is near the Yellow and Luo Rivers. Luoyang was the ancient capital for several dynasties and remains a city of historical interest today.
6 Hsu, "War and Peace in Ancient China," p. 2. See also Richard L. Walker, *The Multi-State System of Ancient China* (Hamden: The Shoe String, 1953), pp. 20–40.
7 Lynn, J. *Battle: A History of Combat and Culture* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2003), p. 34.
8 The civilians had to provide the lords with sacrifices—food, meat, livestock, and even personal services.
9 David Shepherd Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy eds, *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 746.

10 The persuaders' (*Zang Heng Jia*) name has the meaning of those vertical and horizontal coalitions as seen from geography (with or against the state of Qin in the west).
11 Mostly in the state of Qin, Guan Zhong, Lord Shang Yang, Han Fei are the famous leading figures. The Legalist (*fajia*) school's most famous figure is Han Feizi. Some of Han Feizi's writings influenced the Qin King. Legalist philosophers argued for intelligent rulers to conduct administration without interference from selfish advisors. Han Feizi stressed that "a state will come to ruin unless ultimate control of everything is always in the rulers' hands" who delegate authority to officials but should not trust them and use the system of law to control the people (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," pp. 800–801). Rulers should keep an eye on the officials and punish them if they do not perform well. The idea was for the rulers to rule through fear and absolute control of the state.
12 A famous school exemplified by Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi, the impact of which is still largely seen today (*Daodejing*). The Daoist School emphasizes the significance of the *Dao* and the *De*. Lao Zi and Zhuang Zi are the two major figures and *Dao de jing* (also called Laozi) is the major work of Daoists. Daoism speaks of the relativity of concepts, of ideal government as "emptying men's minds and filling their bellies" and "acting without acting" (*wu wei er zhi*), and of the usefulness of what isn't (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 803). Daoism was dialectical. Daoists deplored the harsh government advocated by Legalists. The *Dao* was the Way of Nature. The ruler would be effective if he adopted the *Dao* by "being nonassertive, noncontriving, not even noticed by the people." There is an element of "pacifist resentment against the devastation of war, but also the idea that 'weakness' paradoxically has military value" (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," pp. 803–804). The relativity lies in the argument of how the *Dao* moves by repressing elements that become too prominent. Things would reverse when pushed to the extreme. Daoists argued that "interference with nature is the bane of human life responsible for the deterioration of the human condition" (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 804). Therefore, "one should do nothing, avoid scheming intentional action, and nothing will remain undone" (*wu wei er zhi*). The emphasis on *De* literally means relying on a kind of power without using physical force. It stressed that weakness can be stronger than strength. This idea is close to the Confucian insistence on the superiority of virtue and benevolence over harshness and power emphasized by Legalists.
13 Mojia was founded by Mo Zi (Master Mo), and his work is mainly in the book Mozi. Mojia emphasized moral values that differed from Confucian values. "The basic goods in Mo Zi's consequentialist thinking are three: order (absence of conflict between persons, families, cities, and states), material wealth for the community, and population growth" (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings"). His view was more material based, focusing on the ability of the good man/official to provide social benefits for the society. Mo Zi saw Confucian rituals as wasteful. Mo Zi was against conflict because violence will inhibit the accumulation of wealth and population growth. He was particularly against attacking (*Fei gong*)—he condemned offensive warfare, but considered one of the functions to be defense (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 763). Mo Zi also argued for "universal love" (*Jian Ai*) as the solution to all socially destructive conflict, from quarrels between individuals to wars between states. These two ideas later influenced Mencius. Mo Zi was famous for his utilitarianism but Mojia's influence died out completely by the Han Dynasty (Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 760).
14 Major figures include Sunzi, Sunbin, Wuzi, Wei Liaozi, and their works *The Art of War*, *Sima fa* and *Liutao*. *The Stratagems for the Warring States* (*Zhanguoce*) or *Intrigues* was another important military work.

15 Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 746. See also Hsu, "Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations," *Journal of Ethics and International Affairs*, 5 (March/April, 1991), pp. 15–31. Benjamin I. Schwartz, *The World of Thought in Ancient China* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1985).
16 Nivison, "The Classical Philosophical Writings," p. 770.
17 Major works of Confucius include *Analects*, *Shang shu*, *Shi jing* (classic of poetry), *Yi* (Changes), *Chunqiu* (Spring and Autumn Annals), etc. Secondary works on Chinese philosophy see Fung Yu-lan, *A History of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 2: The Period of Classical Learning*, trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1953). Arthur Waley, *The Analects of Confucius* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1938).
18 Zhang Xiangming, "On Two Chinese Administrative Ideas: Rule of Virtue and Rule by Law," *The Culture Mandala: Bulletin of the Center for East-West Cultural and Economic Studies*, Vol. 5, No. 1 (2002). From the Zhou Dynasty, Chinese rulers saw China as the center of the world with vast borders and unique geographical conditions for the "Mandate from Heaven." To reflect this mandate, rulers have to rule according to the people's will based on virtue and benevolence—*ren* and *li*. The emphasis on *li* (ritual) is a genuine moral philosophy not in form but in essence. To follow *li* is to display the true virtues of *ren* in oneself. Loewe and Shaughnessy, in *The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 BC* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), state:

> rites and sacrifices were a prominent feature of the background civilization. Since social and even political position both qualified one for and required of one such ritual performances, "rite" or "ritual" (*li*), becomes a concept that extended far beyond religious performance, to include the forms that must be observed in all sorts of interpersonal and interrole relationships; these in turn included all of traditional rule-governed political behavior. Therefore, one type of subsequent philosophy—the Confucian—sees a cherishing of ritual as central to the cultivation of character and the maintenance of social order. (p. 749)

The emphasis on *li* helps explain why the Chinese emperors paid so much attention to the rites of *koutou*, or the face factor in understanding the Chinese nationalism. Following *ren* and *li*, you will have *de* (true virtue) and exerting *de* around, you will be able to realize *dao* (the way—the right/just course).
19 Hsu Chuo-yun, "Applying Confucius Ethics to International Relations," *Journal of Ethics and International Affairs*, Vol. 5 (March/April, 1991), pp. 15–31.
20 Ibid., p. 22.
21 "To Mencius, the worst policy adopted by a state would be to interrupt its people from their normal life for the sake of invading other states. Expansion of territory and accumulation of wealth were both tasks that would do just that" (Hsu, ibid., p. 24).
22 Legalism contrasts with Confucianism in its emphasis on authority, law, punishment, and reward. Confucianism emphasizes self-cultivation rather than constraining forces from the government. For Confucius, "If you govern the people legalistically and control them by punishment, they will avoid crime, but have no personal sense of shame. If you govern them by means of virtue and control them with propriety, they will gain their own sense of shame, and thus correct themselves" (Lynn, *Battle*, p. 42).
23 Meaning the son of Heaven. This title was adopted later on by all the emperors.
24 Hui, Victoria Tin-bor, "Why Did Balancing Fail in the Ancient Chinese System, 665–221 BC?" Paper read at the 98th Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, Boston, August 29–September 1, 2002, p. 85.

25 There is a large literature on why Confucianism became the ruling philosophy in China. Here, I will focus more on the inter-state aspect as well as the strategic implications.
26 Hsu, "Applying Confucius Ethics to International Relations," p. 27.
27 Hsu uses this strategic preference to explain the Northern Sung (Song) Dynasty's relationship with the Khitan dynasties in the 1100s because he thinks the Sung Dynasty was weak. However, I think this preference ranking can be generalized to Chinese historical treatment towards its bordering minorities as seen from the Tang Dynasty of the tenth century when China was very strong.
28 Loewe and Shaughnessy, *History of Ancient China*, p. 772.
29 The most famous mission was Zhang Qian's who visited Xi Yu several times. The Tang Emperor—Emperor Taizong married off his daughter—Princess Wencheng to the Tibetan King Songzan Ganbu for friendly relations despite the fact that Tang was probably one of the strongest dynasties in Chinese history. During the Northern Song Dynasty when China was under severe threat from the bordering minorities, wars were fought combined with trade and marriages with the barbarians. Yet Confucianism experienced ups and downs. The Southern Song Dynasty witnessed another high peak in the form of "Neo-Confucianism" with major Confucian scholars holding many major positions in the court. The Southern Song Dynasty was weak, although the Song court aimed to strengthen the central control. Furthermore, even minorities who overwhelmed the Han court in the Yuan Dynasty and the Qing Dynasty resorted to Confucianism. They learned the practices of the Han court and hired Han intellectuals to teach the minority officials the classic works of Confucianism. The continuous influence of Confucianism throughout history shows that the impact of Confucianism cannot be ignored or neglected in understanding Chinese history.
30 I am using the version of *The Art of War* translated by Samuel B. Griffith with a foreword by B. H. Liddell Hart, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War* (London, Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 1963). I am using Sun Zi (Standard Mandarin) and Sun Tzu interchangeably because both are popularly in use in today's Chinese *Pinyin* and in Western language. There were debates from history and at present over whether *The Art of War* was written by Sun Zi, or his disciples or some others. Scholars also dispute when *The Art of War* was written. For those debates see Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War.*
31 Edward O'Dowd and Arthur Waldron, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1991), pp. 25–36. Laure Paquette, "Strategy and Time in Clausewitz's *On War* and in Sun Tzu's *The Art of War*," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 10, No. 1 (1991), pp. 37–51. Mark Burles and Abram N. Shulsky, "Patterns in China's Use of Force: Evidence from History and Doctrinal Writings," (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000).
32 Lynn, *Battle*, p. 30.
33 The Seven Military Classics are a compilation of military writings mainly from the Warring States Period. These include *T'ai Kung's Six Secret Teachings; The Methods of the Ssu-ma*; *The Art of War*; *Wu-tzu*; *Wei Liao-tzu*; *Three Strategies of Huang Shih-kung*, and *Questions and Replies Between Tang Tai-tsung and Li Wei-kung*. See *The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China*, translation and commentary by Ralph D. Sawyer with Mei-chun Sawyer (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1993). This is also the work that was analyzed by Johnston in his book *Cultural Realism*.
34 Lynn, *Battle*, p. 43.
35 Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*.
36 O'Dowd and Waldron, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," p. 27.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., p. 28.

39 A nice classic work to see the confluence of Confucianism and Sun Zi's art of war is Luo Guanzhong's *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* written in the Ming Dynasty. The impact of different strategies and tactics from the art of war is vividly shown in the wisdom of strategists such as Zhuge Liang, Zhou Yu, and others. One interesting episode is "Zhuge Liang Qi Qin Meng Huo" (Seven Catches of Meng Huo). Meng Huo was a minority general who fought against Liu Bei's troops led by Zhuge Liang in Southern China. Zhuge Liang managed to catch Meng seven times using different strategies and tactics, but Meng would not admit failure. So Zhuge Liang let Meng go seven times until Meng was totally persuaded of the superiority of Zhuge Liang in both strategic thinking and morality. Therefore, Meng surrendered his troops without further fighting. This example not only shows the superiority of fighting stratagems but also emphasizes the significance of morality in fighting wars.
40 O'Dowd and Waldron, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," pp. 30–31.
41 Burles and Shulsky, "Patterns in China's Use of Force," pp. 86–92. Burles and Shulsky compared Sun Zi and Clausewitz's views on the role of intelligence (for Sun Zi to know yourself and your enemy before war; for Clausewitz to direct the generals to act forcefully and purposefully even in absence of the information according to their ability), the limits of rationality (for Sun Zi, war can be kept under rational control while not for Clausewitz), and stratagems to use force to win wars (for Sun Zi good generalship depends on the use of stratagem, while for Clausewitz it is the center of gravity of power and movement), and general view on bloodless war (which Sun Zi emphasized while Clasusewitz took as dangerous).
42 Cited in Colin Robert Green, "The Spirit of the Military (Junren Hun): The Tradition and Its Revival in the Republican Period," dissertation for Doctor of Philosophy, Department of History, University of British Columbia, 2003, p. 26. Richard Holmes, *Acts of War: The Behavior of Men in Battle* (New York: The Free Press, 1985), p. 24.
43 Green, "The Spirit of the Military," p. 27.
44 O'Dowd and Waldron, "Sun Tzu for Strategists," p. 34.
45 Griffith, *Sun Tzu: The Art of War*, p. v.
46 Though in his chapter on "The Spring and Autumn Period," in Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy eds, *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, Hsu Chuo-yun gives the duration for the Spring and Autumn Period from 770–481 BC and the following chapter in the same book by Mark Edward Lewis on "Warring States Political History" defines the Warring States Period as from 481–221 BC.
47 Hsu, "War and Peace in Ancient China," p. 7.
48 Hui, "Why Did Balancing Fail?," p. 2.
49 Ibid., p. 3.
50 Lynn, *Battle*, p. 30. Lynn argues for a comparative perspective across continents for a better understanding of warfare in the Western tradition and in Ancient Asia. Therefore, his work studies ancient Greece, Ancient China, India, and Egypt.
51 Hsu noted that in Ancient Chinese war fighting, the winning side would not destroy the enemy totally but instead preferred a temporary truce until another showdown of force under the *Ba* system. The *Ba* system was initiated by Qi until the southern Wu and Yue states were formed. "The Ba system was a process of realigning states, both Zhou and non-Zhou, for the sake of establishing a new multistate order." It set the stage for further interaction and integration in the Warring States Period until the final establishment of the Qin Dynasty (Michael Loewe and Edward L. Shaughnessy eds, *The Cambridge History of Ancient China*, pp. 565–566. The major powers are not completely involved in the division of balance (Qi; Ch'in). The Warring States Period saw multilateral struggles between/among seven major powers and a handful of minor ones fighting for unification of China. There was no constant alliance or stable center of balance of power.

Though during the Warring States Period, "the pattern of inter-state relations was a sheer zero-sum battle," the rulers of each of the seven major states claimed they legitimately inherited the royal title; therefore, they had the Mandate of Heaven with supreme ruling power since "royal authority conferred sole sovereignty". They emphasized the significance of this supreme power through rituals and sacrifices. Hsu, "War and Peace in Ancient China," p. 3. The threat from the northern border where the nomadic empire of Hsiung-nu (*Xiongnu*) controlled a vast area of grassland was mostly dealt with through multiple means including marriage, and "trade interests in the guise of exchange of gifts and granting of trade privileges along its borders" (ibid., p. 6).Although different ruling families (weak or strong) encountered the same threat from the barbarians, war was always the last policy preference. In short, the Han court hoped to exert their superiority through exemplary cultural behavior. Therefore, the tribute system that was practiced with these minorities only represented a symbolic ruling relationship between the Chinese Dynasties and the other states which depended much on their cultural distances from the Chinese court. Although familial relationships prevailed with an emphasis on the Zhou people, and the non-Zhou peoples are referred to as "barbarians," this depiction of the barbarian "other"—and the derivative "we vs. they" distinction were not simply cultural, and the world of the Chou leaders is open and inclusive rather than rigid (ibid., p. 2).

52 Hsu, "Applying Confucian Ethics to International Relations," pp. 15–31.

53 David Graff and Robin Higham, eds, *A Military History of China* (Boulder, CO: Westview, 2002), p. 1. Cited in Green, "The Spirit of the Military" (p. 6). Green also questions if the possibility of the dearth of information on military topics by the original historical recorders in China reflects the anti-military bias of the Chinese scholar-official writers and attributes the same neglect in Western works on Chinese military topics to the modern sinologists' bias (ibid., p. 6). Green also points out that the Chinese soldier was held "in contempt" by the Chinese people and ignored by historians as in the case of studies of Nationalist China and militarism in the Jiang Jieshi (Chiang Kai-shek) era.

54 Graff and Higham, *A Military History of China*, p. 1.

55 Green, "The Spirit of the Military," p. 33.

56 Ibid.

57 Lynn, *Battle*, p. 33.

58 As Green also points out, the famous classic literary work *The Romance of the Three Kingdoms* (*San Guo Yanyi*) opens with "The Empire, long divided, must unite; long united, must divide. Thus it has ever been." Cited in Green, "The Spirit of the Military," p. 34.

59 There have been changes in the understanding of Chinese strategic behavior from earlier times. Formerly sinologists have been criticized for emphasizing too much the pacific nature of Chinese culture; therefore, since the early 1990s there has been an increase in the West emphasizing that China is no different from others in international relations and strategic studies. Furthermore, some argue that the Chinese are more realpolitik in history and in the present with its power growth, and predict that China will be more aggressive in the future. The policy implications by these scholars are mixed, involving containment, engagement, or both based on a hard-line stand. Earlier works on China's pacific culture include John King Fairbank, *China Perceived: Images and Policies in Chinese-American Relations* (New York: Random House, 1974); *The Chinese World Order: Traditional China's Foreign Relations* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1968); *The United States and China*, 4th edn (Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard University Press, 1983). See also Jonathan R. Adelman and Shih Chih-yu, *Symbolic War: The Chinese Use of Force, 1840–1980* (Taiwan: National Chengchi University, 1993) and Wang Guangwu, "The Chinese Way: China's Position in

International Relations" (Scandinavian University Press: Norwegian Nobel Institute Lecture Series, 1995), p. 89. For works questioning this position, see Johnston's works cited earlier, mainly "China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence," *International Security*, Vol. 20, No. 3 (1995/1996), pp. 5–42; "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in P. Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995); "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 5–56; "Prospects for Chinese Nuclear Force Modernization: Limited Deterrence Versus Multilateral Arms Control," *The China Quarterly*, No. 146 (1996): 548–576. See also Thomas J. Christensen, "Causing Problems without Catching Up," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (2001), pp. 5–40; "Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View," *Foreign Affairs*, 75 (1996), pp. 37–52. For China policy debates, see Samuel S. Kim ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1998); Aaron L. Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations," *Survival*, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2002), pp. 33–50; John W. Garver, "The [Former] Coming War with America," *Journal of Contemporary China*, Vol. 12, No. 36 (2003), pp. 575–585; John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York and London: W.W. Norton & Company, 2001); Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (1999); David L. Shambaugh, "China or America: Which Is the Revisionist Power?" *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2001), pp. 25–30, and "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (2000), pp. 97–115. For works on China's history, see Wang Yuan-kang, "Culture and Foreign Policy: What Imperial China Tells Us?" paper presented at the 2002 APSA Annual Conference (with author permission to cite), Boston 2002; Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy: Past, Present, and Future* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2000); Zhang Tiejun, "Chinese Strategic Culture: Traditional and Present Features," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (2002), pp. 73–90; Xiang Lanxin, "Washington's Misguided China Policy," *Survival*, Vol. 43, No. 3 (2001), pp. 7–23.

60 As Deng Xiaoping said during his visit to the United States in 1979, "The Chinese People suffered amply from the miseries of war. We do not wish to fight a war unless it is forced upon us. We are firmly against a new world war . . . we want peace—a genuine peace in which the people of each country may develop and progress as they wish, free from aggression, interference, and bullying" (*Beijing Review*, February 9, 1979).

61 I am putting down the three features as a progressive process with a ranking preference, that is, righteous war will only happen if the first two cannot work. Thus, the righteous war argument is not instrumental, as structural realists will argue. War means two things here: first, all other resorts are exhausted; second, as the old Chinese saying goes, "We will not attack unless we are attacked; if we are attacked, we will certainly counterattack" (*ren bu fan wo, wo bu fan ren, ren ruo fan wo, wo bi fan ren*). This is the traditional maxim reflecting the spirit in Chinese martial art as a defensive practice, that is, only for self-defense. But if attacked, you will not be bullied. I like to call this a "leave me alone mentality." China never seeks to expand to take over other countries' territory or resources, but it will resist other states' efforts to exploit its own as seen from the 150 years of humiliation. Thus, it is necessary to understand this national mentality (though there might be some overseas Chinese scholars who want to ignore this).

62 Jin Dexiang, a famous Chinese scholar, provided an explanation from the perspective of Chinese philosophical thinking for the notion of China as a

peace-loving nation. He pointed out that the Chinese culture is static and agricultural, based on a self-sufficient economy. From this organization emerged a defensive and peaceful national psychology, which had fundamental differences from the nomadic nations such as Genghis Khan's Mongols and some other maritime powers such as the ancient Roman Empire, the British Empire, and Japan.The agriculturally based Confucian culture has traditionally been defensive in nature (Jin Dexiang, "Zhongguo *de Heping Waijiao Chuantong yu Xifang de Huanghuolun* (China's Peaceful Diplomacy Tradition and Western 'Yellow Peril')," *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (World Economy and Politics), No. 11 (1997), p. 13). There have been recent works questioning whether the Han Dynasty under Emperor Wu was not expansionist and also China's relations particularly with Vietnam and with the Xiongnu minority people from the north. China's relationship with Vietnam from the second century until the tenth century is an exception, but I do not count it as an important anomaly for my claim. First, the Danang kingdom in Vietnam existed through raids in the region. I argue that in order to maintain a stable border, the Han Dynasty rulers took Vietnam under its supervision, just as in the wars with the Northern Tartar tribes. Second, Vietnam became part of the tribute system, which represented a close cultural relationship between the two countries when the system was institutionalized. For Vietnam history, see internet source: http://www.lonelyplanet.com/destinations/south_east_asia/vietnam/history.htm. See also Nicola Di Cosmo, *Ancient China and its Enemies: The Rise of Nomadic Power in East Asian History* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

63 Fairbank, *The Chinese World Order*; *China Perceived*; Li Jijun, "Traditional Military Thinking and the Defensive Strategy of China," (Strategic Studies Institute, 1997); Wang Guangwu, "The Chinese Way;" Zhang Tiejun, "Chinese Strategic Culture;" Adelman and Shih, *Symbolic War*.

64 Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 62.

65 Fairbank, *The United States and China*, pp. 68–69.

66 Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, p. 64.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid. p. 66.

69 On the Western views of China's pacific culture, see Green, also see Robin Yates and Krzysztof Gawlikowski, *Science and Civilization in China Volume 5 Part VI: Military technology* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 97–100; Morton Fried, "Military Status in Chinese Society," *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 57 (1951), pp. 347–357. On the place of war in Chinese history, see John Magruder, "The Chinese as a Fighting Man," *Foreign Affairs*, No. 3 (April 1931), pp. 469–476. Johnston provides a detailed literature review in both his book on *Cultural Realism* and an article published in 1998 in *The China Quarterly* (Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, pp. 63–65, 117–123; "China's Military Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949–1992: A First Cut at the Data," *The China Quarterly*, Vol. 1 (1998), pp. 6–7).

70 Fairbank, *China Perceived*; *The Chinese World Order*; *The United States and China*. Frank A. Kierman, Jr and John K. Fairbank eds, *Chinese Ways in Warfare* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1974).

71 Christensen, "Causing Problems without Catching Up." After the terrorist attack on the US, some scholars argue that the cooperation between China and the US in their fight against terror will not fundamentally change Sino-US relations as all the old problems, Taiwan, trade, and human rights, etc. remain unchanged after September 11. See Friedberg, "11 September and the Future of Sino-American Relations." For these scholars, China does not yet possess the capability to challenge or threaten the US, but China can pose major problems to US security by adopting asymmetric strategies. Moreover, in the long run China will become

a competitor if its relative power closes the gap with the US. As a revisionist and rising state, "China matters most for the West because it can make mischief, either by threatening its neighbors or assisting anti-Western forces further afield." Segal, "Does China Matter?" pp. 35–36. Some scholars argue further that China has been, and remains, a threat to the international system, especially given the increasing tensions in the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea disputes. See Paul Dibb, David Hale, and Peter Prince, "Asia's Insecurity," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 5–20. Denny Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 57–78. Richard Weitz, "Meeting the China Challenge: Some Insights from Scenario-Based Planning," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 19–48. Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations." They predict that China is a dissatisfied state with many territorial/border disputes with other states/entities (Taiwan, Japan, Russia, India, Vietnam) and when China has the power, it will seek to change the status quo.

72 Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations."
73 Shambaugh, "China or America: Which is the Revisionist Power?" p. 28.
74 Ibid.
75 Ibid., p. 4.
76 Segal, "Does China Matter?" pp. 35–36.
77 Aaron Friedberg, "Warring States: Theoretical Models of Asia Pacific Security," *Harvard International Review* 18 (Spring 1996).
78 Peter Hays Gries, "Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 155–165.
79 See Shih Chih-yu, *China's Just World: the Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO: Lynn Rienner Publishers, 1993), pp. 40–42; and Fairbank, *The United States and China*.
80 Alastair I. Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 55–56.
81 Alastair I. Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post Cold War Period," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–263.
82 Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 50.
83 Kaori Nakajima Lindeman, "What Makes a Revisionist State Revisionist? – The Role of International Norms in State Identity Formation," paper prepared for presentation at the 43rd Annual International Studies Association Convention, New Orleans, 23–27, March 2002 (obtained from Internet source).
84 Denny Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance."
85 Ibid.
86 David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), p. 63.
87 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 5.
88 Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 66. Kang further states, "East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West." "East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality" (pp. 66–67).
89 See Chapter 1, note 5.
90 One example is how Johnston uses the word, *Parabellum*, which comes from the realpolitician's axiom "si pacem, parabellum" (if you want peace, then prepare for war) as parallel to the Chinese idiom, "*ju an si wei, wu bei you huan*" (while residing in peace, think about dangers; without military preparations there will be calamity). The phrases are translated into similar

meanings. But in the original Chinese phrase, *ju an si wei, wu bei you huan* has two meanings: it might mean, as Johnston argues, to prepare for war and initiate war for peace as offensive means. However, prepare for war does not necessarily mean to initiate war, which Johnston ignores. As in martial arts, the purpose for practicing it is not to beat people up, but when an enemy attacks, you will not be beaten and even be able to teach the attacker a lesson (not through total destruction, but something to remember). A closely related Chinese phrase is "*wei yu chou mou, you bei wu huan*" (prepare your house by adding more dried grasses on your roof for rain before it rains). In Chinese philosophy the concern for security is self-concentrated. People will prepare hand-dried grasses before rain to cover up their own roof, but they will not tear off the other's roof for their own use. Alastair I. Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," p. 217, n.2.

91 There are also some of the interpretations of ancient Chinese language. Ancient Chinese language is different from the modern Chinese language, which leads to quite different interpretations. For example, one character in Chinese can have different pronunciations and can be translated into different meanings. The word "yi" with a third tone can mean firstly "use", or "through means of", or "depending on", etc., much depending on the will of the writer and the context. Also, the punctuation of sentences may mean different things. Misinterpreting some key characters may result in a completely different meaning and understanding. See also Chapter 1.

92 See Huiyun Feng, "The Operational Code of Mao Zedong: Defensive or Offensive Realist?" *Security Studies*, Vol. 14, No. 4 (Oct.–Dec. 2005), pp. 637–662.

93 Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy"; Wang Yuan-kang, "Culture and Foreign Policy: What Imperial China Tells Us?" Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," May 2002, Strategic Studies Institute Occasional papers, http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/culture/culture.htm.

94 Thomas Kane argues for the influence of Legalism which is the realpolitik counterpart of Confucianism. Thomas Kane, "China's Foundations: Guiding Principles of Chinese Foreign Policy," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 20, No. 1 (January 1, 2001), pp. 45–55. He argues that even if China benefits from world markets and the existing balance of power, the Chinese regime will not be satisfied with that balance because China depends on force to protect its wealth through means of arms. The Chinese will want to retain the potential to challenge the existing order by force. See also Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy"; Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik"; and Wang Yuan-kang, "Culture and Foreign Policy: What Imperial China Tells Us?"

95 See Fairbank, *The United States and China*; and Zhang Tiejun, "Chinese Strategic Culture."

96 Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture."

97 Scobell, "The Chinese Cult of Defense," *Issues and Studies*, Vol. 37, No. 5 (2001), pp. 100–127.

98 Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"

99 Ibid.

100 Johnston provides a thorough literature review in his article. See Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" pp. 13–22.

101 Johnston, ibid., pp. 5–6.

102 Ibid., p. 50.

103 Ibid., p. 48.

104 Though in general scholars writing on the topic recognize the significance of the concept and the general origin of strategic culture studies from the work of Snyder and Booth, they differ considerably in the definition and operationalization they offer or follow, or what kind of role they bestow on strategic culture in decision-making or determining policy preferences. See the debate between Alastair I. Johnston and Colin Gray: Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49–69; Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism*; Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1999), pp. 519–523. Gray acknowledges that gathering all scholars working on the topic makes only "a small party." Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context," p. 49, footnote 1.

105 Jack Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation Report R-2154-aF, September 1977). Snyder, "The Concept of Strategic Culture: Caveat Emptor," in Carl Jacobsen ed., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR* (London: Macmillan, 1990).

106 Major works include Peter Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996); Raymond Cohen, *Negotiating Across Cultures: Communication Obstacles in International Diplomacy* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 1990); Robert Rubinstein, "Cultural Aspects of Peacekeeping: Notes on the Substance of Symbols," *Millennium*, Vol. 22, No. 3 (Winter 1993), pp. 547–562; Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism*; Keith R. Krause ed., *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building* (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999); Ken Booth and Russell Trood eds, *Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 1999).

107 Examples are the studies of regionalism and multilateral cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region in the edited book by Ken Booth and Russell Trood, *Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region*. However, in the past and in the recent trend of research on strategic culture, China has always been an interesting and significant case. This consistency can be seen from a series of works by Fairbank, Johnston, and other scholars. Since the 1990s, there has been an increasing interest in China studies especially from a cultural perspective. For earlier works, see John K. Fairbank, *China Perceived*; *The Chinese World Order*; *The United States and China*. Works by Johnston include "Thinking About Strategic Culture," *International Security*, Vol. 19, No. 4 (1995), pp. 32–64; *Cultural Realism*; "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China;" "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy;" "Is China a Status Quo Power?;" "Strategic Cultures Revisited." Johnston and Robert S. Ross, *Engaging China: The Management of an Emerging Power* (London and New York: Routledge, 1999). Stuart Poore, "What is the Context? A Reply to the Gray–Johnston Debate on Strategic Culture," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 29, No. 2 (2003), pp. 279–284. Some recent works on Chinese strategic culture include Jonathan R. Adelman and Chih-yu Shih, *Symbolic War*; Zhang Shu Guang, "China: Traditional and Revolutionary Heritage," in Ken Booth and Russell Trood eds, *Strategic Cultures in Asia-Pacific Region* (New York: St Martin's Press, Inc., 1999); Yuan Jing-dong, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," in Keith R. Krause ed., *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building* (London, Portland, OR: Frank Cass, 1999); Shih Chih-yu, *China's Just World*; Michael D. Swaine and Ashley J. Tellis, *Interpreting China's Grand Strategy*; Andrew Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture;" Scobell, "The Chinese Cult of Defense;" Wang Yuan-kang, "Culture and Foreign Policy: What Imperial China Tells Us?;"

Wang Guangwu, "The Chinese Way"; Zhang Shu Guang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993); Zhang Tiejun, "Chinese Strategic Culture;" and Chapters by Lawrence C. Katzenstein, "Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China," and Rosita Dellios, "'How May the World be at Peace?': Idealism as Realism in Chinese Strategic Culture," in Valerie M. Hudson ed., *Culture and Foreign Policy* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1997). For a general debate in the 1990s of the return of culture to international relations studies, see Josef Lapid and Friedrich Kratochwil, *The Return of Culture and Identity in IR Theory* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1996).

108 See Yitzhak Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," *Comparative Strategy*, Vol. 10, 1991, pp. 3–23. Yuan Jing-Dong, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," p. 87; Johnston, *Cultural Realism*. In this book, I am adopting Johnston's definition, which I think is more comprehensive than the other definitions in structuring the concept and pointing out a way of measurement.

109 Klein, "A Theory of Strategic Culture," p. 11.

110 Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context"; Johnston, *Cultural Realism*; Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray."

111 Poore, "What is the Context?" p. 279.

112 Ibid., p. 283.

113 Ibid.

114 Ibid., p. 284.

115 Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, pp. 112–113.

116 Ibid.

3 MAO ZEDONG AND ZHOU ENLAI IN THE KOREAN WAR

1 Omar Bradley, quoted in Joseph C. Goulden, *Korea: the Untold Story of the War* (New York: Times Books, 1982). This chapter is based heavily on recent works on the Korean War. See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994). Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996). Sergei Goncharov, John Lewis, and Xue Litai, *Uncertain Partners: Stalin, Mao and the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1993). Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited," *The China Quarterly*, 121 (1990), pp. 94–115. Shen Zhihua, "Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation," in Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact: China and the Warsaw Pact, 2002. Willian Stueck, *The Korean War: An International History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Zhang Shuguang, *Mao's Military Romanticism: China and the Korean War* (Lawrence, KS: University of Kansas Press, 1995). Zhang Shuguang, *Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations, 1949–1958* (Ithaca, NY and London: Cornell University Press, 1993). See also the new evidence provided in the Cold War International History Project *Bulletins* and Working Paper series at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.home.

2 Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950–June 1951," *Political Science Quarterly*, Vol. 107, No. 3 (1992), pp. 453–478.

3 Bajanov argues that Stalin did not consult Mao in advance about the North Korean invasion plan "because he wanted to work out the plans for the Korean War himself without Chinese interference and objections and then present Beijing with a fait accompli when Mao would have no choice but to agree with the invasion and assist it." See Evgueni Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51," *Cold War International History Project Bulletins* b6–75q (1995). During Mao's visit to Moscow in 1950, Mao wanted to liberate Taiwan but Stalin opposed the idea.

4 The North Korean nuclear crisis can be seen as a continuation of the unsettled Korean War. Despite the efforts of the six party negotiations involving the United States, North Korea, South Korea, Russia, Japan and China, North Korea launched missile tests in 1998 and in October 2006 conducted nuclear test. Although North Korea agreed to return to negotiations, the future over non-proliferation and arms control darkened for Asia and the world.

5 Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*, Chapter 4, pp. 92–124.

6 Chen Jian reported that Mao wanted to liberate Taiwan in the shortest time (ibid., p. 26, p. 89, and p. 94).

7 Ibid. Chapter 5 "Beijing's Response to the Outbreak of the Korean War," p. 130.

8 Chen Jian states that Mao and his fellow CCP leaders realized that by adding their strength to the North Koreans, they could contribute to the creation of a new international order in East Asia more favorable to revolutionary China. Therefore, Korea became the focus of Chinese security against America (Chen, ibid., p. 150). It must also be noted that although China and Korea were both socialist countries, and even Kim Il Sung, the North Korean leader, was trained in northeast China during the Chinese war against Japan, the Korean leader maintained vigilance against Chinese influence, especially given his internal politics struggle with those "Chinese sections." Therefore, as Chen reports, Beijing and Pyongyang shared a very sensitive relationship. Kim did not inform Mao and the CCP of his specific plan and timing of attack until three days after the attack (June 27). Even during the war, Kim did not inform the Chinese of developments until he encountered severe resistance and counterattacks from the US/UN forces. The differences continued when China sent Chinese People's Volunteers (CPV) under Peng. Peng often ran into conflict with Korean officers and Kim himself. The Chinese troops also encountered many difficulties as a result of uncoordinated cooperation from the North Korean military and civilians (ibid., pp. 134–135).

9 Stalin wanted the Chinese to get involved, but Mao did not agree due to his priority of unification with Taiwan. Mao was misled by Kim as well in the latter's miscalculation of American involvement. Mao warned of American military intervention and the potential landing at Inchon, but this information was ignored by the North Korean leadership who neglected the Chinese throughout the war in favor of Soviet opinions, Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 129–130.

10 Clashes between the North and the South were constant along the 38th Parallel initiated by both sides. Stalin wanted the North to refrain from provocative actions along the 38th Parallel to avoid direct war with the Americans in 1949. The South started a battle along the 38th Parallel in May 1949 to fight the North Korean guerrillas. Evgueni Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51." www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea.htm.

11 Until the end of 1949, Stalin did not plan any aggression against South Korea but worried about an attack from the South. Stalin did not want to fight a war right then with Washington though the Soviets had acquired nuclear power and the Chinese Communist Revolution had just succeeded, adding triumphs to the international Communist movement. Stalin was also worried about the North Korean military capability in carrying out the mission of military reunification due to its lack of trained military personnel, adequate ammunition and logistic

support. See Michael H. Hunt, "Beijing and the Korean Crisis, June 1950–June 1951;" Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51."

12 www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/korea.htm.

13 See telegrams between Stalin and Kim from late 1949 to early 1950 in Kathryn Weathersby, "To Attack, or Not to Attack? Stalin, Kim Il Sung, and the Prelude to War," Cold War International History Project Bulletins, 1995. Kathryn Weathersby (translation and commentary), "New Findings on the Korean War," Cold War International History Project (CWIHP), 1993. Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51."

14 Hao Yufan and Zhai Zhihai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War."

15 Chen Jian reports in *Mao's China and the Cold War*:

> Although the North Korean Communists might not have informed the Beijing leadership of the exact date and specific details of their plans to invade the South, extensive exchanges existed between Beijing and Pyongyang before the outbreak of the Korean War. Beijing leaders knew that the Korean Communists were determined to use military means to 'liberate' the South. Beijing leaders, and Mao in particular, did take into account the possibility of American intervention in the wake of such invasion, but the Chinese military planners did not believe that the Americans had the intention or capacity to engage in a major military intervention in Asia at that time.
>
> (Chen Jian, Mao's China and the Cold War (Chapel Hill, NC and London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2001) Chapter 4, En. 4, p. 314)

16 When the Civil War ended with the GMD troops fleeing to Taiwan, the Chinese domestic economic situation was devastated after continuous wars; first with the Japanese then with Jiang Jieshi. China was not prepared to fight another war though unifying Taiwan was top on the Chinese military agenda. Mao was not prepared to fight America in Korea. Although Beijing knew that the North Korean leadership wanted to reunify with the South, Beijing was not informed of the exact time for the invasion nor was Mao prepared for supporting North Korea's military actions. First, the PLA started to demobilize in early 1950 and Premier Zhou was in charge of demobilizing 1.4 million of the PLA (the total number was then 5.4 million) starting June 20, 1950, five days before the North Korean attack. Second, the Chinese Embassy was not established and the Chinese ambassador was not in his post until August 1950; therefore, communication between the North and the Chinese Communist Party was limited. Third, the Chinese stationed only the 42nd Army of the Fourth Field Corps along the Yalu river border when the war started, which was engaged with domestic agricultural production. The troops later sent to Korea were shifted from other regions, therefore not logistically prepared for fighting in Korea especially in winter. The armies at that time were helping out mainly in domestic production and economic reconstruction. Some of the troops shifted to the northeast were originally stationed in the coastal area to liberate Taiwan (9th and 10th Field Corps). Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited." Hao and Zhai's analysis is based on a large amount of new Chinese resources, mainly memoirs by Chinese generals directly involved in the war decision-making process, military analysts' recent publications and interviews. See also Zhang Xiaoming, "China and the Air War in Korea, 1950–1953," *The Journal of Military History*, Vol. 62, No. 2 (1998), pp. 335–370.

17 Mao was aware that Stalin might have considered stopping the Chinese from taking Taiwan. Stalin did not want to see the unification of China. China's emergence as a communist giant in Asia was not in the Soviet interest. Mao had his security agenda set on Taiwan and domestic consolidation. Therefore, China did not want to get involved so quickly in a conflict with America. The question

of Chinese awareness of the North Korean attack was under debate for some time until the recent release of Mao, Kim, and Stalin's exchange of telegrams by the former Soviet Union archives. The new evidence challenges some of the claims that China was forced completely into the Korean War for security reasons. However, Mao was not completely aware of the military plans of Kim or the details of the attack. Kim only reported this information to Stalin directly, which indicated the closeness of the Korean leadership with the Soviets rather than the Chinese, as Kim believed that only the Soviet Union could provide the kind of support he needed. Recent Chinese sources confirmed that "the Chinese leaders had no intention at all of intervening in the war at its beginning, and they provided only moral support for Kim Il-Sung" (Hao and Zhai, p. 100). However, as the war turned out later, the Soviet Union was not as enthusiastic as Kim expected. There were also discussions over Mao's calculation about getting involved in the Korean War. Mao saw a confrontation with the Americans as inevitable but speculated three possible places: Taiwan, Korea, or Vietnam. Mao decided that Korea was the best choice to confront the US due to its geographical location, inevitable Soviet support, and strategic importance. Hao, Yufan, and Zhihai Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War: History Revisited."

18 This date was disputed (see n. 21 below). Some state that the Chinese troops were in Korea long before November. One account by Chen Jian states that Oct. 19, 1950 was the date the Chinese forces entered Korea. There was no denying that some Chinese troops were already in Korea before Nov. 25; however, the deployment of a large number of forces after formally declaring Chinese involvement was on Nov. 25. Therefore, I am using that date as the official entry date here.

19 Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1960). There was a debate among the Chinese leadership; on the one hand, China did not want to directly get into a war with the US, therefore, the troops should not be formal military troops. On the other hand, the Chinese leadership firmly believed that they were entering for a just cause to help fight against imperialists. The CPV represented the aspiration of the Chinese people to fight a righteous war to help save the Korean people voluntarily for an anti-imperialism cause. This term was coined by a Chinese official for this special purpose.

20 The phrase was quite popular in the Chinese media, see *People's Daily* and *Beijing Review* during the time.

21 Historians debate when the Chinese forces entered the war. Some argue that Chinese troops were already inside North Korea fighting with Kim's forces early on and Chinese troops were long prepared to enter. New evidence shows that China did transfer some troops from the south to the northeastern border. However, the major force along the northeastern border was Lin Biao's Fourth Field Army, which was the major force fighting in Korea later under Peng Dehuai's command.

22 Chen Jian argues that Mao's China in many key respects was not a peripheral actor but a central one during the cold war. See Chen Jian, *Mao's China and The Cold War*, p. 2.

23 Evgueni Bajanov, "Assessing the Politics of the Korean War, 1949–51."

24 Ibid. See also Chen Jian, *China's Road to Korea*.

25 Mao's son Mao Anying died in the Korean War.

26 It was not until 1951 that the Soviet airforce started patrolling and engaged the US airforces disguised as Chinese or North Korean pilots. Stalin still did not want to fight the US directly especially given the possibility of a nuclear showdown between the two superpowers. Zhang Xiaoming, "China and the Air War in Korea, 1950–1953."

27 Hong Xuezhi, *Nie Rongzhen memoirs* (in Chinese).
28 Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*. Zhang Shuguang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*. Christensen argues that Mao saw the "status quo" as "even more risky" because "Mao believed that America's blocking of the Taiwan Straits and crossing of the 38th Parallel meant that war was inevitable," and "Mao would not have settled for the status quo if American troops had remained anywhere in North Korea." Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, p. 170.
29 On Oct. 4, 1950, Mao called an urgent meeting of the Central Committee to discuss sending troops to rescue the North Koreans, where he obtained Marshall Peng's support in his decision and agreement to command the troops in Korea. Mao's first choice was Lin Biao whose troops were deployed in the northeastern border area already, but Lin excused himself for being sick and needing medical treatment in Moscow. Mao's second choice was Marshall Su Yu who was preparing the attack on Taiwan in the southeast. Su was also seriously ill at that time, so was unfit for commanding troops in Korea. Marshall Peng who was commander of the first Field Army was the third choice. Peng was called and flew to Beijing immediately before the Oct. 4 meeting. Peng agreed to command, and Mao sent his son (who died in Korea) under Peng's command. Chen, *China's Road to the Korean War*, pp. 172–175.
30 Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*. Whiting stressed that Beijing's decision to enter the Korean War was a reluctant reaction to the imminent threats to the security of Chinese territory as Beijing certainly did not welcome a war when facing severe economic conditions, political consolidation, and reunification. In other words, China would not have intervened if American forces had not crossed the 38th Parallel, rendering an increasingly immediate threat to the PRC. Whatever the motivation of the Chinese, a thorough study of the combined effect of Chinese security concerns, communist ideology and the leaders' beliefs is necessary. Given the particular domestic and international situations, China preferred not to become entrapped in the quagmire in Korea in 1950. However, the American forces at the Yalu River formed a severe threat to Chinese national security.
31 Chen Jian, *Mao's China and the Cold War*.
32 Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*.
33 Thomas Christensen, *Useful Adversaries*, p. 151. Christensen stresses that it was a failure of mutual deterrence of both the Chinese and the US.
34 I do not include military officials mainly due to the limitation on the number of English digital sources (public statements) available for analysis.
35 In the MANOVA design of leader vs. situation, there were no significant results for interaction effects. See Huiyun Feng, *A Dragon on Defense: China's Strategic Culture and War*, PhD Dissertation, Arizona State University, May 2005.
36 Arguably, the period before 1950 was not so peaceful for Mao and Zhou as leaders and for China as a nation. After the Anti-Japanese War, the civil war started between the Communist and Jiang Jieshi's GMD. Even after the People's Republic was founded, the domestic situation was by no means stable. But compared to the Korean War, these domestic sources of instability did not pose as serious a threat to the survival of the nation and communist leadership.
37 Traditionally, Whiting argued that China crossed the Yalu River out of concern for national security. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu*. In his recent study, Chen Jian challenges this hypothesis and argues that Mao's strong ideology and personality, and China's domestic situation were the major driving force in China's decision to enter Korea. Furthermore, drawing on recently released documents, Chen argues that the Chinese leadership was aware of the plan of the North Korean leadership to invade the South although the specific details were not released to the Chinese leaders until after the North attacked the South. Recent evidence from Soviet sources also shows that Stalin had a significant role in pushing

the Chinese into Korea. The PRC preferred more attention to recovering Taiwan to finalize its unification than getting involved with a superpower as indicated by its troop deployment in southeastern China prior to the Korean War (see Whiting). While there is no denying that Mao was preparing to fight a war with the Americans in his strategic planning, in Korea it would be a defensive realist's war of safety not an offensive realist's war of gain. See Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*; *Mao's China and the Cold War*. Zhang Shu Guang, *Mao's Military Romanticism*. For a Chinese perspective, see Hao, Yufan, and Zhihai Zhai, "China's Decision to Enter the Korean War"; Shen Zhihua, "Sino-Soviet Relations and the Origins of the Korean War: Stalin's Strategic Goals in the Far East," *Journal of Cold War Studies*, Vol. 2, No. 2 (2000), pp. 44–68.

38 Stephen Walker, Mark Schafer, and Michael Young, "Systematic Procedures for Operational Code Analysis," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 42 (1998), pp. 175–190; Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Presidential Operational Codes and the Management of Foreign Policy Conflicts in the Post-Cold War World," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 43 (1999), pp. 610–625.

39 David Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era", *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (Summer 1992), p. 89.

40 Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy," p. 90.

41 See Chapter 1 for a brief discussion of the expanded Theory of Inference about Preferences (TIP). The expanded version of TIP is listed here for immediate reference:

1 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, <), then Settle > Deadlock > Submit > Dominate: Appeasement Strategy
2 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, =), then Settle > Deadlock > Dominate > Submit: Reward/Deter Strategy
3 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (+, >), then Settle > Dominate > Deadlock > Submit: Exploit Strategy
4 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, <), then Dominate > Settle > Submit > Deadlock: Bluff Strategy
5 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, =), then Dominate > Settle > Deadlock > Submit: Compel/Punish Strategy
6 If (I-1, P-4a) or (P-1, P-4b) is (–, >), then Dominate > Deadlock > Settle > Submit: Bully Strategy

42 Chen Jian, *China's Road to the Korean War*. Shen Zhihua, "Khrushchev, Mao and the Unrealized Sino-Soviet Military Cooperation." See also the new evidence provided in the Cold War International History Project *Bulletins* and Working Paper series at http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?topic_id=1409&fuseaction=topics.home.

43 Brams discusses the recurrence of a game may make it rational for a player possessing threat power to threaten and, if necessary, carry out its threat—even if it results in a worse pay-off for both players before the game is played again. Brams, *Theory of Moves*, pp. 138–148.

4 CHINA AS A REGIONAL POWER

1 The major literature informing my narrative includes "The Sino-Indian Boundary Question" (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 1962). Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel eds, *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75* (The Strategic Studies Institute, US Army War College, 2003). Andrew Dapondes, *The Cuban Crisis and the Chinese-Indian Border War* (New York: Vantage Press, 1969). Steven A. Hoffman, *India and the China Crisis* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990). Liu Xuecheng,

The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations (New York: University Press of America, 1994). Neville Maxwell, *India's China War* (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1972). D. K. Palit, *War in High Himalaya: The Indian Army in Crisis, 1962* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1991). Shi Bo Bian, *1962, Zhong Yin Da Zhan Ji Shi* (Beijing: Zhongguo Dadi Chubanshe, 1993). Shanti Prasad Varma, *Struggle for the Himalayas: A Study in Sino-Indian Relations* (Jullundur University Publishers, 1965). Yaacov Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking: The Sino-Indian Conflict, 1959–1962* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1984). Recently there has been new evidence on this war, but official documents from China and India are still limited due to security and secrecy reasons. However, the Indian defense department did release a document on the 1962 border war which can be downloaded from the web URL at: http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LAND-FORCES/Army/History/1962War/PDF/index.html.

2 John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962." From web page: http//www.people.fas.harvard.edu/~johnston/garver.pdf. Garver notes in this article that the 1962 war with India was long China's forgotten war, as little was published in China regarding the decision to fight the war. He also points out that the situation began to change during the 1990s. The Indian side published its long-classified official history in 2002. These new publications provide new evidence on the study of this war.

3 The Sino-Indian boundary altogether is 2,000 kilometers long. The eastern sector is about 650 kilometers long, and runs from the juncture of the borders of China, India, and Bhutan to the juncture of the borders of China, India, and Burma (Myanmar), with southeastern Tibet on the Chinese side and Arunachal Pradesh Province on the Indian side. The middle sector is about 450 kilometers. The western sector of about 600 kilometers overlaps areas of Xinjiang and western Tibet on the Chinese side, and the Ladakh Range region of Kashmir on the Indian side. See Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, "PLA Operational Principles and Limited War: The Sino-Indian War of 1962," in Mark A. Ryan, David M. Finkelstein, and Michael A. McDevitt eds, *Chinese Warfighting: The PLA Experience since 1949* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2003), p. 174. The Sino-Indian border dispute was a historical legacy. The border consists of three parts, the west, the middle and the east. Dispute over the eastern sector of the border resulted from the British colonialist era when British Foreign Secretary McMahon drew the infamous McMahon line at the Simla Conference in 1914. Parties attending the Simla Conference include British India, Tibet, and China (then the Republic under GMD rule). The conference was to settle the Tibet issue. The British clearly attempted to undermine both Chinese sovereignty and Chinese rule in Tibet as the Republic of China was very weak at that time. The Chinese government declared that the Chinese representative never signed the conference treaty though the Tibetan representative did. Traditionally, the boundary had never been formally stipulated. After the founding of the PRC, India and China were on good terms. The Indian government was one of the first to recognize the new China, and India played a significant role in mediation during the Korean War. Friendly trade relations prevailed for some time along the border by the two peoples until the British colonial intervention. Thereafter, India declared that the international treaty delineated the India–China border while the Chinese kept on disputing it. The exchange of notes between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Nehru showed that India admitted in 1959 the boundary had not been stipulated and remained ambiguous. See Cheng Feng and Larry M. Wortzel, pp. 174–176. Clashes along the borderline increased in the 1950s until a final showdown in 1962. Liu Xuecheng, a Chinese scholar, claims that global structure has conditioned the Sino-Indian relationship. The key to the dispute lies in the alliances and their reversal within the cold war framework. Liu's perspective is that the positions of

China and India were not affected by the cold war. There were no formally delimited, delineated, or demarcated boundaries between the two pairs of countries except the colonial treaty based on the McMahon Line signed at the Simla Agreement of 1914 between the British colonial government, China, and Tibet. British India and China as two expanding powers were bound to come into conflict. He thinks that naturally such conflicts would have arisen, because India inherited the legal claims of the British. The Indian position was inflexible, aggravated by the Indian policy of staking claims to the territory it claimed by establishing check-posts that led the Chinese to attack India. Liu Xuecheng, *The Sino-Indian Border Dispute and Sino-Indian Relations*. The boundary issue remained unresolved through the 1990s.

4 Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence* (Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press, 1975). Maxwell, *India's China War*.

5 Reported in Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*. The document acknowledged the fault of the Indian government and army in provoking the war.

6 Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*.

7 Donald S. Zagoria, *The Sino-Soviet Conflict, 1956–1961* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1962).

8 John W. Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962." From web page: http://www.people.fas.harvard.edu/%7Ejohnston/garver.pdf (accessed June 23, 2006).

9 In fact, it was the US who was providing help to the Tibetans. See John Garver, "China's Decision for War with India in 1962."

10 Neville Maxwell, *India's China War.*

11 Ibid.

12 Garver, John W. "China's Decision for War with India in 1962."

13 See Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*; Maxwell, *India's China War*.

14 Mao thought China was betrayed when the Soviets declared in the late 1950s a neutral position over Sino-Indian disputes, as China and the Soviets were in the Communist camp while India belonged to the non-aligned group. China had felt certain it would obtain Soviet support in its relationship with India. The change in the Soviet position to favor China in 1962 betrayed India.

15 In Nehru's calculation the Chinese PLA were really not so strong (Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, p. 48) and the Chinese had many of their own troubles. These included internal disorders due to food shortage, floods, and political stability of the regime. Therefore, India's strong position seen from the forward policy would meet no serious risk in terms of Chinese resistance. The successful recovery of Goa in mid-December by India over Portugal, the better weather, and improved Indian logistic capability in the spring of 1962, as well as Nehru's election need to recover Indian territory from China, contributed to Nehru's misperception and miscalculation. See Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking*.

16 Maxwell, *India's China War*. Vertzberger, *Misperceptions in Foreign Policymaking*.

17 For details, see the discussions of the international, domestic, and leadership situations of the PRC in the early 1960s presented above.

18 A cell in a 2 × 2 ordinal game contains a Nash equilibrium when the pay-offs for both players in the cell are such that neither player can move from the cell without immediately generating a worse pay-off for itself. A Nash equilibrium is a myopic equilibrium because it is based on looking ahead only one cell from the initial cell in the game.

19 According to TOM, pre-play communication becomes credible in the context of repeated plays of the same game, making (3,3) an NME for the prisoner's dilemma game. See Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 124–130, 138–148.

20 Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 224; see also pp. 92–94 regarding moving power in Game 41. When cycling is a possibility for one or both players, he is willing to relax Rule 5 (the termination rule) to allow further analysis of the dynamics between the players in these conflict games (see Brams, ibid., pp. 88–102).
21 Ron Christman, "How Beijing Evaluates Military Campaigns: An Initial Assessment," p. 256 in *The Lessons of History: The Chinese People's Liberation Army at 75*, edited by Larry Wortzel and Andrew Scobell. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, accessed March 2005, available at www.strategic studiesinstitute.army.mi/pdffiles/PUB52.pdf.
22 King C. Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979: Issues, Decisions, and Implications* (Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 1987).
23 Ibid.
24 *Beijing Review*, Feb. 19, 1979.
25 My narrative of the Sino-Vietnamese War is based mainly on the following works: Laurie Burkitt, Andrew Scobell, and Larry M. Wortzel eds, *The Lessons of History*. Nayan Chanda, *Brother Enemy: The War after the War* (San Diego, CA: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1986). Chang Pao-min, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute* (New York: Praeger, 1986). King C. Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*. Vietnam Courier, "Chinese Aggression against Vietnam: Dossier" (Hanoi: *Vietnam Courier*, 1979). William J. Duiker, *China and Vietnam: The Roots of Conflict* (Berkeley, CA: University of California, Institute of East Asian Studies, 1986). Anne Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979* (Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, 1992). Steven J. Hood, *Dragons Entangled: Indochina and the China-Vietnam War* (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1992). Robert S. Ross, *The Indochina Tangle: China's Vietnam Policy, 1975–1979* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1988). Odd Arne Westad, Chen Jian, Stein Tonnesson, Nguyen Vu Tung, and James G. Hershberg, "77 Conversations between Chinese and Foreign Leaders on the Wars in Indochina, 1964–1977," in *CWIHP Working Paper*, (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1998). Zhai Qiang, "Beijing and the Vietnam Peace Talks, 1965–68: New Evidence from Chinese Sources," in *CWIHP Working Paper*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington DC, 1997; and *China and the Vietnam Wars* (Chapel Hill, NC and London: University of North Carolina Press, 2000).
26 On several occasions, Chinese leaders also hinted to this effect. See interviews of Wang Zhen, Huang Hua. The Vietnamese were aware of the danger of war as well. In their major media, lines such as "Leave Vietnam Alone" were all over the place. In addition, Vietnamese leaders were drawing the analogy from Chinese action against India when India turned to the Soviets in 1962.
27 Duiker, *China and Vietnam*, points out that the Sino-Vietnamese conflict was caused more by such modern issues as ideology, power politics, and territorial disputes than any historical legacy.
28 Gilks thinks that dynamic factors were the converging and conflicting interests from the beginning in the Sino-Vietnamese case, thus the 1979 war was a logical result of the gradual degeneration of bilateral relations that had begun in 1970 (Anne Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979*).
29 Duiker, *China and Vietnam*. Anne Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979*.
30 Duiker pointed out that in terms of revolutionary ideas, the Vietnamese (ideology) version was closer to the Soviet's. Ho Chi Minh was closer to Mao, but Ho was dead in 1979. Therefore, many scholars agree, that if Ho were alive, probably there would not have been war between the two brothers. See William Duiker, *China and Vietnam*; Anne Gilks, *The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance, 1970–1979*; Chen King, *China's war with Vietnam, 1979*.

31 Chen King stresses the condescending paternalism of Chinese leaders toward Vietnam as a major contributing factor in the conflict. Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*.
32 Duiker, *China and Vietnam*, p. 16.
33 Duiker sees the later 1950s as the beginning of an irreconcilable divergence between China and Vietnam. By the mid-1960s, Vietnam realized China would not intervene to deter the US in its war against the US. In 1971 Kissinger visited China and the tension between China and the US relaxed. China's goal was to balance the USSR which, in turn, made Hanoi conclude that it had to lean to Moscow. The strategic interests of Beijing and Hanoi further diverged since the early 1970s.
34 Duiker, *China and Vietnam*, p. 31.
35 Ibid.
36 Duiker reported, "Deng Xiaoping allegedly informed Le Duan that, with the war over, China needed a 'breathing space' and could no longer provide large amounts of technical assistance to Vietnam . . . there would be no increase in Chinese aid, to the evident disappointment of the Vietnamese" (ibid., p. 64).
37 Chinese media criticized this effort as imperialism and hegemonism.
38 Chang states that

> The five years of 1970 to 1975 therefore witnessed intensive behind the scene maneuvering by all three parties in the precarious triangular alliance, with Hanoi attempting to regain its dominant position in the Khmer revolution, the Khmers playing China off against Vietnam, and China striving to preserve both a united front and the separate identity of Kampuchea.
>
> (Chang Pao-min, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute*, p. 7)

39 Chang, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute*, p. 9, states this would constitute too humiliating a blow to China's stature and credibility.
40 The Vietnamese Chinese issue was economic in nature. The Vietnam government accused the bourgeois Chinese who had control over the South's economy of being anti-Vietnam and pro-China. With a deteriorating Sino-Vietnamese relationship, the Vietnamese government started to force repatriation of the Chinese by taking away their businesses, their properties and even food rations. By the end of 1978, 200,000 Chinese either fled or were pushed across the border. Vietnam's treatment of the Chinese in Vietnam was an indicator of the relationship between China and Vietnam. The two had reached an agreement in 1955 for settling the status of Vietnam's Chinese. But negotiations in the late 1970s were futile. China made some efforts by sending two ships to help the Vietnamese Chinese repatriate to China, but their effort was not successful. Chang states that: "The futile negotiations, the endless flow of people, and the sheer chaos that prevailed along the land border finally led China to resort to large-scale military action in February 1979 to retaliate against Vietnam's policy of expulsion and end the refugee crisis." For details, see Chang Pao-min, *The Sino-Vietnamese Territorial Dispute*, pp. 2–6.
41 Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 73. Chen King reports the struggle between Hua and Deng as the following: "Whereas Hua tried hard, in a mediocre way, to enhance his power and prestige by glorifying Mao unceasingly, Deng quietly but dynamically worked for military and party support" (Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 72).
42 While Hua Guofeng and his followers advocated the dogmatic following of Mao's thought, Deng's pragmatic and flexible interpretations of Mao won out given the new international and domestic situations. Chen discusses in detail the ideological debate and the institutional support and impact it had on China. However, there was no denying Deng was the winner. The significance of winning this debate was

reported by Chen King, "Ever since 1949, it has become a Chinese political custom for a political debate to be won before a new policy can be established." Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 75. However, a compromise was made by Deng later in order to ensure support from Hua of his policy and war against Vietnam.

43 Although Defense Modernization was the last one of the four modernizations initiated by Deng, in the late 1970s, Deng clearly realized the backwardness of the military and the necessity to reform the PLA according to the new situation.

44 For details of the military modernization issue see Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, pp. 98–100.

45 Ibid., p. 76. Here it must be noted that revisionist means reformist, and is different from revisionist during the 1950s.

46 Adding to it was the smooth process of normalization of China–US relations (ibid., p. 87).

47 Ibid., p. 77.

48 Ibid., p. 80.

49 Ibid., p. 83. "In fact, he [Deng] was the man who masterminded Beijing's policy for Vietnam at the time, and Deng was gaining influence in foreign policy decision-making."

50 This part depends heavily on Chen King's narrations in his book. See Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, pp. 83–95.

51 Chen King cited Geng Biao, p. 86, fn 58.

52 Ibid., p. 88. This point shows clearly Deng was well aware of the military situation and wanted to make use of the war to push forward military reforms in the struggle against the moderates.

53 Ibid.

54 Chen King cited *Renmin Ribao*, December 25, 1978; the title of the article was "There Is a Limit to China's Forbearance." In this article China made it clear that:

> China . . . will never attack unless it is attacked. But if it is attacked, it will certainly counterattack. China means what it says. We wish to warn the Vietnamese authorities that if they count on Moscow's support to seek a foot after gaining an inch and continue to act in an unbridled fashion, they will decidedly meet with the punishment they deserve. We are telling you this now. Don't complain later that we've not given you a clear warning in advance.

The reason that I am citing this again, as Chen King did, is to draw the attention of the reader. I think this is a typical way of Chinese thinking. Do not push too hard. Enough warning is given and if the situation continues, there is no other choice but to fight back. See also Chapter 3. Chen King puts it that in late December it was still possible to settle the hostility between China and Vietnam through negotiations should a third party intervene (US, USSR, or ASEAN).

55 China's decision to send troops into Vietnam in February 1979 was a response to a collection of provocative actions and policies on Hanoi's part. *Beijing Review* reported the frequency of the occurrence of Vietnam's mistreatment of ethnic Chinese (Hoa) living in Vietnam, its practice of hegemonic imperialism in Southeast Asia and constant provocations on the Sino-Vietnamese border disturbing people's lives and killing civilians and PLA border guards. See *Beijing Review*, January–February, 1979. Vietnam also blamed China for encroaching upon its territory. The Spratly Islands and the Tonkin Strait (Qiongzhou Haixia in Chinese) were two other issues in dispute. William Duiker points out "it is doubtful that either Hanoi or Beijing deliberately wished to provoke a breakdown in relations between the two countries" as both countries were faced with serious domestic and international problems. Duiker, *China and Vietnam*, p. 63.

56 *Beijing Review*'s coverage was filled with these notices and diplomatic exchanges.
57 Whiting, *The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence*, p. xvi.
58 The Eastern Wing was under the command of Xu Shiyou with five armies and two divisions, and the Western Wing was under the command of Yang Dezhi with three armies and four divisions.
59 Lang Son was strategically important for Hanoi's defense. Therefore, taking over Lang Son would be a severe blow to the Vietnamese.
60 Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 109.
61 According to Chen King, this announcement served several purposes. Internationally, it addressed the concerns of the US who called for a withdrawal and dissuaded the Soviet Union from intervening; and other states' concern about a larger war. Domestically, it served to calm down opponents to war (Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 109).
62 Chen King reported that Vietnam called for a national mobilization the same day (ibid., p. 111).
63 Ibid., p. 98.
64 Gerald Segal in his book *Defending China* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985) stated, "China failed to force a Vietnamese withdrawal from [Cambodia], failed to end border clashes, failed to cast doubt on the strength of the Soviet power, failed to dispel the image of China as a paper tiger, and failed to draw the United States into an anti-Soviet coalition."
65 "The Punitive War was representative of Beijing's foreign policy since 1949." Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, p. 95.
66 Chen King cited fn. 87. p. 113.
67 "What is important in this decision-making process, however, is the quality of prudence and restraint" which is both a result of principle (restrained policy) and limited capabilities. Chen, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*, pp. 93–95.
68 Ibid., p. 93.
69 An ANOVA test conducted on the three leaders further demonstrates that Mao, Deng, and Zhou differ from one another in major beliefs (I-1, I-2, I-4A, I-4B, I-5RE, I-5AP, I-5PU, P-1, and P-2). Mao shows a preference for conflictual means towards goals (Oppose, Threaten, and Punishment) and is less likely to use cooperative means (Reward, Promise, Appeal) based on his view of the nature of the political universe (conflictual) and his pessimism in realizing political values. These results indicate that Mao is not as cooperative as the norming group of world leaders, while Deng is more cooperative. Mao displays characteristics of a conflict-oriented leader while Deng is definitely cooperatively oriented. See Huiyun Feng, "A Dragon on Defense."
70 An ANOVA test on the audience effect was also conducted, which shows that Deng is in general cooperative in front of both international and domestic audiences. Deng displayed higher control over historical development during the Sino-Vietnamese War in front of an international audience. Deng also used more promises as expressions in front of international audiences compared to domestic audiences. However, except when facing an international audience (P-1), Deng's major belief scores (I-1/P-1) are above the norming group means about conflict and cooperation. His belief in historical control (P-4) is below the norming group facing a domestic audience. Although there are changes for some beliefs in front of different audiences, they do not appear to be substantively significant to support the revisionist worry that Chinese leaders will conceal revisionist intentions before an international audience. See Huiyun Feng, "A Dragon on Defense."
71 The ideological debate between the Deng group and Hua Guofeng's group was still going on, but by the late 1970s, Deng had triumphed and taken control. Chen King, *China's War with Vietnam, 1979*.

72 Mel Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, *China's Security: The New Roles of the Military* (Boulder, CO and London: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 59.
73 Tang Jiaxuan, "New China's Diplomacy Over the Past Fifty Years," at www.fmprc.gov.cn (2000 accessed).
74 Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy," p. 91.
75 "China's National Defense" (1998) at www.peopledaily.com.cn.
76 Allen S.Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950–56, and Taiwan," *International Security*, Vol. 26, No. 2 (Fall 2001), pp. 103–131.
77 The border disputes all resulted from colonial rule. The British governor of India, McMahon, drew an ambiguous line for the Sino-Indian border leaving the two parties fighting over how to demarcate. The French did the same for China and the Vietnam border, especially the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea where disputes continue up to now.
78 Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950–96, and Taiwan."
79 Ibid., p. 110. However, Segal was very pessimistic, "Until a new defense policy emerges, if at all, past experience and doctrines will remain valid. Furthermore, certain fundamental determinants of Chinese defense (geography and topography, climate, demography, borders and neighbors) will never change in any meaningful way and will always shape China's strategic thinking and military behavior" (Gerald Segal, *Defending China* (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)).

5 POST-COLD WAR CHINA UNDER NEW LEADERS

1 Alastair I. Johnston and Robert S. Ross ed., *Engaging China: The Management of An Emerging Power* (London and New York: Routlege, 1999). Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue: Major Arguments," *Asian Survey*, Vol. 36, No. 8 (August 1996). David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China: Calculating Beijing's Responses," *International Security*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (Fall 1996), pp. 180–209.
2 John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). Thomas J. Christensen, "Causing Problems without Catching Up," *International Security*, Vol. 25, No. 4 (Spring 2001), pp. 5–40. Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999). Thomas J. Christensen, "Chinese Realpolitik: Reading Beijing's World-View," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75 (September/October 1996), pp. 37–52; Paul Dibb, David Hale, and Peter Prince, "Asia's Insecurity," *Survival*, Vol. 41, No. 3 (Autumn 1999), pp. 5–20; David L. Shambaugh, "Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competitors," *Survival*, Vol. 42, No. 1 (Spring 2000), pp. 97–115; and Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World," *International Security*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (Winter 1999/2000), pp. 52–79.
3 Alastair I. Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in Peter Katzenstein ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996). Johnston, "Realism(s) and Chinese Security Policy in the Post Cold War Period," in Ethan B. Kapstein and Michael Mastanduno eds, *Unipolar Politics: Realism and State Strategies after the Cold War* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), pp. 261–263. Johnston, "International Structures and Chinese Foreign Policy," in Samuel S. Kim ed., *China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New Millennium* (Boulder, CO and Oxford: Westview Press, 1998), pp. 55–56.
4 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (2003), pp. 5–56, p. 50.

5 In Chinese *zonghe guoli*. This is the major phrase the Chinese use when referring to capability.
6 No state wants to see China fall into an economic trap like North Korea. Then the world would need to worry much more. As to Chinese military development, it seems only normal that the PLA aspires to benefit from the information and technology revolution like every other state's military forces. The PLA advocacy of revolution in military affairs is also aimed at building a more quality-based military rather than quantity-based. China has also actually taken steps to reduce the size of its military since the 1980s. See Li Nan, "The PLA's Evolving Warfighting Doctrine, Strategy and Tactics, 1985–1995: A Chinese Perspective," *The China Quarterly*, No. 146 (1996), pp. 443–463. Li Nan, "Organizational Changes of the PLA 1985–1997," *The China Quarterly*, No. 158 (1999), pp. 314–349.
7 David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security*, Vol. 27, No. 4 (Spring 2003), pp. 57–85, p. 58.
8 Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 50.
9 Denny Roy, "China's Reaction to American Predominance," *Survival*, Vol. 45, No. 3 (Autumn 2003), pp. 57–78.
10 Richard Weitz, "Meeting the China Challenge: Some Insights from Scenario-Based Planning," *The Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No. 3 (September 2001), pp. 19–48.
11 Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong," p. 66. Kang further states (pp. 66–67) "East Asian regional relations have historically been hierarchic, more peaceful, and more stable than those in the West . . . East Asian international relations emphasized formal hierarchy among nations while allowing considerable informal equality."
12 Ibid., p. 63.
13 Alastair Iain Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?" p. 5.
14 Wen Jiabao, "Turning Your Eyes to China," speech by H. E. Mr Wen Jiabao, Premier of the State Council of the People's Republic of China at Harvard, December 10, 2003. For the full speech, see www.fmprc.gov.cn/topics/wen visituscaeth/t56076.htm.
15 Yan Xuetong, *Zhongguo Jueqi-Guoji Huanjing Pinggu*, [International Environment for China's Rise], Tianjin Renmin Chubanshe, 1998, pp. 191–192.
16 Mel Gurtov and Hwang Byong-Moo, *China's Security* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998), p. 59.
17 Ibid., p. 70.
18 Robert R. Ross ed., *After the Cold War-Domestic Factors and U.S.–China Relations* (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998), p. 8.
19 Ibid., p. 9. Although in the most recent US–Japan joint security statement, Japan formally supports the status quo and peaceful resolution of Taiwan for the first time, the PRC remains deeply concerned with any involvement of Japan in the Taiwan situation. The US and Japan stated in February 2005 that "Taiwan was one of their mutual concerns." This kind of statement is firmly opposed by the Chinese government. http://www.japantimes.com/cgi-bin/geted.pl5?eo20050307 fc.htm.
20 James C. F. Wang, *Contemporary Chinese Politics: An Introduction*, Seventh edn (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, 2002), p. 57.
21 David L. Shambaugh, "China's Security Policy in the Post-Cold War Era," *Survival*, Vol. 34, No. 2 (1992), pp. 88–106, p. 92.
22 David Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World," p. 67.
23 Yan Xuetong, Zhongguo yu Yatai Anquan [*China & Asia-Pacific Security*], *Shishi Chubanshe* (1999), pp. 20–23.
24 Shambaugh, "China's Military Views the World," p. 67.

25 Before formally putting forward this New Security Concept at the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1997, China had been practicing diplomatic relations in cultivating good security relations with surrounding countries. In 1996, China reached a friendship treaty with India to solve their border disputes by signing the "Agreement on Maintaining Peace and Tranquility in the China-India Border Areas Along the Line of Actual Control" and the "Agreement on Confidence-Building Measures in the Military Fields Along the Line of Actual Control in the China-India Border Areas." Following the signing of the 1994 joint declaration on non-first use of nuclear weapons and non-targeting of the strategic nuclear weapons at each other, China and Russia announced in April 1996 the establishment of "a strategic cooperative partnership based on equality and trust orientated to the 21st century." The two sides committed themselves to creating a peaceful and friendly border, and most border issues left over from history have been solved. In April 1997, China signed a five-state treaty (including China, Russia, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan) that will reduce the risk of war through such measures as reductions of border forces and anti-aircraft defense, mutual inspections of military exercises, and exchanges of military information. This initiative was institutionalized into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) that holds regular summit meetings among the members. More states are thinking about joining the SCO. Besides bilateral security treaties, China also actively participated in official and non-official multilateral security dialogues, such as ASEAN Regional Forum, the Four Party Talks for the Korean Peninsula and the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Recently, China has been the major party in bringing North Korea to the multilateral talks to solve the nuclear crisis.

26 Some scholars state that the NSC was to weaken the US alliance system by arguing that bilateral security treaties are the cold war relics, because China does not have military treaties and would like to see American alliance dismantled—except possibly with Japan. However, Chinese views toward the US role in the Asia-Pacific have changed from suspicion to acceptance. The PRC now acknowledges that the US presence contributes to regional security, not only reining in Japan.

27 Quote from You Ji, "The Revolution in Military Affairs and the Evolution of China's Strategic Thinking," *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 21, No. 3, December 1999, p. 353.

28 Robert R. Ross, Chapter 1, "The Strategic and Bilateral Context of Policy-Making in China and the United States: Why Domestic Factors Matter," pp. 3–39, in Ross ed., *After the Cold War*, p. 28.

29 Ibid., p. 29.

30 Ibid.

31 Denny Roy, "The China Threat Issue."

32 Wen Jiabao's general profile also turns out to be a Confucian leader just like the other two leaders. Due to the small size of his speech sample, I will not focus further on him in this chapter.

33 Huiyun Feng, "A Dragon on Defense: China's Strategic Culture and War," PhD Dissertation, Arizona State University, May 2005.

34 Although Hu appears more likely to use punishment after crises, his I-5PU scores are generally much lower than the average world leader's (.138). However, there are very few speeches for the crisis time period, Hu's score (.000) for crisis period indicates that there is no mentioning of punishment. See Huiyun Feng, "A Dragon on Defense."

35 Ibid.

36 Ibid.

37 See Feng Huiyun, "The Operational Codes of Four Generations of Chinese Leaders: Is China a Revisionist Power?" paper presented at the 2005 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association Meeting.

38 An NME is "a state from which neither player, anticipating all possible rational moves and countermoves from the initial state, would have an incentive to depart unilaterally because the departure would eventually lead to a worse, or at least not a better, outcome." Steven J. Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 224.
39 Prior communication (PC) occurs when a player with threat power, in making a compellent or a deterrent threat, communicates its willingness and ability to move to and stay, if necessary, at a Pareto-inferior state. Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 225. A Pareto-inferior state is one in which another state is better for both players or at least better for one player and no worse for the other (ibid., pp. 224–225).
40 Johnston, "Is China a Status Quo Power?"
41 Jervis defines a security dilemma as a situation in which any state's efforts to increase its security necessarily decreases the security of others. In this situation one side's efforts to reduce its insecurity through an arms build-up or through the conquest of strategic territory will inevitably trigger similar behavior by other security-conscious actors. Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 30, No. 2 (January 1978), pp. 167–214. See also John Herz, "Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma," *World Politics*, Vol. 2 (1950).

6 TAIWAN AND THE FUTURE OF SINO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

1 The Chinese side insisted it was a state visit while the US refused to agree. As a result, Hu was given a 21-gun salute as a head of state (although some dispute how many shots were actually fired), but was treated to a working luncheon and not a state dinner. These differences reflect to some extent the differences between the US and China over the bilateral relationship.
2 Joseph Nye, Jr, "Assessing China's Power," *Boston Globe*, April 19, 2006. http://www.boston.com/news/globe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2006/04/19/assessing_chinas_power/ (accessed April 22, 2006).
3 David A. Shlapak, David T. Orletsky, and Barry A. Wilson, "Dire Strait? Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Confrontation and Options for U.S. Policy," 2000, RAND Corporation.
4 Michael Brecher defines a foreign policy crisis as a situation in which three conditions, deriving from a change in a state's external or internal environment, are perceived by the highest-level decision-makers of the state: (1) a threat to basic values; (2) an awareness of a finite time for response to the external threat to basic values; and (3) a high probability of involvement in military hostilities. Michael Brecher, "Toward a Theory of International Crisis Behavior: A Preliminary Report," *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (March 1977), pp. 39–74.
5 The five nos are: no declaration of independence; no change in the "national title"; no "state-to-state description in the Constitution"; no referendum to change the status quo; no abolition of the National Unification Council nor the Guidelines for National Unification.
6 On March 20, the day of the election, Chen's administration held a "defensive referendum" under the legislature's referendum law to decide if the island's sovereignty was under imminent threat from the mainland's military threat, that is, its increasing defense budget, and increasing numbers of missiles deployed opposite Taiwan. Therefore, the referendum is "anti-missile" and "anti-war." Chen claims that it is also to raise the awareness of the Taiwanese to the magnitude of the threat, and gain a consensus on self-defense.

7 It bumped back up into the 30 percent range after Chen's notorious diplomatic effort to transit in the US was refused. However, Chen's public support dropped soon afterward when his wife and son-in-law were found to be involved in scandals.
8 Mulvenon, James "Anticipation is Making Me Wait: The Inevitability of War and Deadlines in Cross-Strait Relations," *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 12 (Fall 2004).
9 Some scholars had thought 2005 was crucial and some believed 2006 was the year that the mainland would consider using force, while others predicted that the year 2008 might be more dangerous. Wendell Minnick "The year to fear for Taiwan: 2006" *Asia Times* online version, April 10, 2004. http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/FD10Ad02.html. By the end of 2006, the Taiwanese leaders are entangled in the internal political scandals leading to a relaxed but still cautious look for the future of Taiwan.
10 David Lampton, "Cross-Strait Relations, the Present and Near Term, A Washington View," speech presented at the Finnish Institute of International Studies, Helsinki, Finland, May 12, 2004. http://www.nixoncenter.org/publications/LamptonSpeech.pdf.
11 Ibid.
12 "Taiwan's Elections, seen from the Mainland," *The Economist*, March 18, 2004.
13 David M. Lampton, Remarks at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs, May 12, 2004 "Cross-Strait Relations: The Present and Near Term: A Washington View."
14 Http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/3545361.stm.
15 "Taiwan relations still top security concerns in Northeast Asia," from www.cato.org/foreignpolicy/east-asia.html.
16 Scobell, "China and Strategic Culture," Strategic Studies Institute occasional paper (May 2002). http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi/pubs/2002/culture/culture.htm, p. 31. A message released by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress in 1979 named "A Message to Taiwan Compatriots," first states the basic lines for cross-strait relations that Deng Xiaoping said indicates "the sincere, fair and reasonable" attitude of the mainland. www.chinataiwan.org/web/webportal/W5023254/ (accessed Dec. 12, 2004).
17 In the 2004 Defense White Paper released in December 2004, it is emphasized that "The Chinese Government continues to adhere to the basic principles of 'peaceful reunification' and 'one country, two systems' along with the eight-point proposal on developing cross-Strait relations and advancing the process of peaceful reunification of the motherland at the current stage." The 2004 Defense White Paper can be downloaded from Lexus-Nexus Internet Index.
18 Divergent views exist over what is the one-China policy/principle: Beijing stressed that there is only one China and Taiwan is a province of China. In Cheney's speech during his 2003 visit to Beijing, the US put it in a way that a one-China policy is based on the three joint communiqués and the TRA.
19 At the March 2005 National People's Congress, an Anti-secession Law was passed by the Chinese legislature. However, views differ over the impact of this law. The DPP felt threatened by the law, while the KMD felt assured by the Chinese gesture toward peace as some members visited or planned to visit the mainland.
20 Robert L. Suettinger, "Leadership Policy toward Taiwan and the United States in the Wake of Chen Shui-Bian's Reelection," *China Leadership Monitor*, No. 11 (2004).
21 To what extent the US role is a mediator is under discussion between the Chinese and American governments.
22 Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 88–98. He also argues that moving power is irrelevant if the outcome

induced by one player is better for both players, which is the case for this game (Game 27).

23 Zoellick, May 2006 hearing, web, accessed May 26, 2006.
24 "Taiwan Strait IV: How an Ultimate Political Settlement Might Look." Feb. 26, 2004. International Crisis Group, *ICG Asia Report*, No. 75.
25 Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, *The Coming Conflict with China* (New York: A.A. Knopf: Distributed by Random House, 1997).
26 Ted Galen Carpenter, *America's Coming War with China: A Collision Course over Taiwan* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).
27 Robert Ross, "Taiwan's Fading Independence Movement," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 85, No. 2 (March/April 2006), pp. 141–148.
28 Council on Foreign Relations, *Chinese Military Power* (New York: 2003). David Shambaugh's excellent monograph, *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2002). Allen Whiting, "China versus Taiwan: Balance of Power or of Will?" http://www.international.ucla.edu/article.asp?parentid=6671.
29 Ted Galen Carpenter, "Tougher Than It Looks," *Wall Street Journal Asia*, April 12, 2006. www.cato.org, (accessed April 18, 2006).
30 Craig Meer, "Strait Talk: Washington Increasingly Opts Out" *Asia Times*, April 15, 2006. www.atimes.com (accessed April 15, 2006).
31 Robert Sutter, *China's Rise in Asia*, East West Center studies series, 21.
32 Ted Galen Carpenter, "How China Reassure Neighbors, U.S.," the article appeared in Foxnews.com on March 17, 2006 and was accessed March 23, 2006 from www.cato.org/pub_display.php?pub_id=6033&print=Y.
33 Sutter, "China's Rise," p. 8.
34 *East Asia Strategic Review for 2006* "Executive Summary", p. 3. March 2006, The National Institute for Defense Studies, Japan. http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/east-asian/pdf/east-asian_e2006s.pdf (accessed March 31, 2006).
35 Ibid.
36 Robert G. Sutter, "China's Rise: Implications for US Leadership in Asia," *Policy Studies*, 21, East-West Center, Washington, DC, p. 6.

METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX

1 VICS is a computer software program for content analysis based on verbs in a leader's speeches. The verbs are coded with a dictionary to construct indices of a leader's view of the political universe and preferences for the outcomes of domination, accommodation, submission or deadlock. See Walker, *Forecasting the Political Behavior of Leaders with the Verbs in Context System of Operational Code Analysis* (Hilliard, OH: Social Science Automation, 2000). Walker, Schafer, and Young, "Profiling the Operational Codes of Political Leaders," in Jerrold M. Post ed., *The Psychological Assessment of Political Leaders*. Michael Young, "Building Worldviews with Profiler+," in G. Barnett ed., *Applications of Computer Content Analysis*, *Progress in Communication Sciences*, Vol. 17 (2001), pp. 17–32.
2 The results showed that the operational codes are consistent across different kinds of sources for these leaders. Therefore, I am using combined data of public speeches and interviews, and telegrams.
3 The length requirement is for statistical purposes. Short speeches may not produce sufficient results for analysis. If there are too few references to "Self" or "Other" in the speech, it may result in too many 0 values thus no results for the instrumental or philosophical beliefs. However, using aggregate data helps to relieve this problem. Another solution that was applied in some cases, for example, Deng's speeches during the Sino-Vietnamese War, short paragraphs of foreign policy

speeches are cut out from different speeches and put together to form a long one for that time period. Doing so does not hurt the validity of the results as the speeches are targeting the same "Other" during the same wartime period.

4 Schafer, Mark and Crichlow, Scott, "The Process-outcome Connection in Foreign Policy Decision-making: A Quantitative Study Building on Groupthink", *International Studies Quarterly* 46: 45–68.

5 Culture is a very difficult concept to define. Overall, culture provides a social context, which affects decision-makers and society in general. Johnston puts culture in terms of shared beliefs and norms held by individuals. Based on his definition and operationalization (Johnston, *Cultural Realism*, 32–33), I define culture as shared beliefs. Key decision-makers embody the major beliefs of the time and the circumstance when a decision was made. By tracing how a decision was made, I claim that the revealed beliefs and norms reflect the strategic culture of the state's decision-makers.

6 It remains true almost 40 years later that, "Hard data on the influence of psychological variables in foreign policy are, so far, not abundant, and the obstacles to be surmounted in collecting such data are often formidable" (James N. Rosenau ed., *Domestic Sources of Foreign Policy* (Conference on Public Opinion and Foreign Policy, 1965: Princeton, NJ), (New York: Free Press, 1967), pp. 56–57.

7 David A. Lake and Robert Powell, *Strategic Choice and International Relations* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), p. 11.

8 Ibid., p. 11, note 11.

9 Jing-Dong Yuan, "Culture Matters: Chinese Approaches to Arms Control and Disarmament," in Keith R. Krause ed., *Culture and Security: Multilateralism, Arms Control and Security Building* (London and Portland, OR: F. Cass, 1999), pp. 85–128.

10 Lisa Wedeen, "Conceptualizing Culture: Possibilities for Political Science," *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 96, No. 4 (December 2002), pp. 713–728. In this article, Wedeen shows how culture as semiotic practices can be applied as a causal variable. See also Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Culture as Context: The First Generation of Theory Strikes Back," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 1 (1999), pp. 49–69. Alastair Iain Johnston, "Strategic Cultures Revisited: Reply to Colin Gray," *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1999), pp. 519–523.

11 Steven Brams, *Theory of Moves* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), p. 27.

12 Steven Brams, "Game Theory in Practice: Problems and Prospects in Applying it to International Relations," in Michael Brecher and Frank Harvey eds, *Millennial Reflections on International Studies* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2002), especially pp. 393–395.

13 Ibid.; see also Brams, *Theory of Moves*, especially pp. 217–234.

14 Brams, *Theory of Moves*, p. 224.

15 Ibid., pp. 138–148.

16 Brams, "Game Theory in Practice," p. 395. The italics in the quote are mine. See also Robert Aumann, "Backward Induction and Common Knowledge of Rationality," *Games and Economic Behavior*, 8 (1995), pp. 6–19.

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