Systematic Theology





Charles Hodge

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY

by

CHARLES HODGE, D.D.

VOL. I.

WM. B. EERDMANS PUBLISHING CO.

GRAND RAPIDS, MICH.

1940

Entered according to act of Congress, in the year 1871, by CHARLES SCRIBNER AND COMPANY, in the Office of the Librarian of Congress at Washington

Printed in the United States of America

CARD.

The Messrs. Charles Scribner and Co., of New York, have made an arrangement with the Messrs. Thomas Nelson and Sons, of Edinburgh, Scotland, for the publication of this work in Great Britain. This has been done with the cordial approbation of the author, who feels under obligation to the Messrs. Nelson for the liberal terms on which they have undertaken the publication. The author also desires to acknowledge his indebtedness to his accomplished young friend, Mr. Caspar Ren Gregory, licentiate of the Presbytery of Philadelphia, for his assistance in carrying the work through the press.

PRINCETON, June 2, 1871.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. I

INTRODUCTION

CHAPTER I: ON METHOD

§ 1. Theology a Science.

In every science there are two factors: facts and ideas; or, facts andthe mind. Science is more than knowledge. Knowledge is the persuasion of what is true on adequate evidence. But the facts of astronomy, chemistry, or history do not constitute the science of those departments of knowledge. Nor does the mere orderly arrangement of facts amount to science. Historical facts arranged in chronological order, are mere annals. The philosophy of history supposes those facts to be understood in their causal relations. In every department the man of science is assumed to understand the laws by which the facts of experience are determined; so that he not only knows the past, but can predict the future. The astronomer can foretell the relative position of the heavenly bodies for centuries to come. The chemist can tell with certainty what will be the effect of certain chemical combinations. If, therefore, theology be a science, it must include something more than a mere knowledge of facts. It must embrace an exhibition of the internal relation of those facts, one to another, and each to all. It must be able to show that if one be admitted, others cannot be denied.

The Bible is no more a system of theology, than nature is a system of chemistry or of mechanics. We find in nature the facts which the chemist or the mechanical philosopher has to examine, and from them to ascertain the laws by which they are determined. So the Bible contains the truths which the theologian has to collect, authenticate, arrange, and exhibit in their internal relation to each other. This constitutes the difference between biblical and systematic theology. The office of the former is to ascertain and state the facts of Scripture. The office of the latter is to take those facts, determine their relation to each other and to other cognate truths, as well as to vindicate them and show their harmony and consistency. This is not an easy task, or one of slight importance.

Necessity for System in Theology

It may naturally be asked, why not take the truths as God has seen fit to reveal them, and thus save ourselves the trouble of showing their relation and harmony?

The answer to this question is, in the first place, that it cannot be done. Such is the constitution of the human mind that it cannot help endeavoring to systematize and reconcile the facts which it admits to be true. In no department of knowledge have men been satisfied with the possession of a mass of undigested facts. And the students of the Bible can as little be expected to be thus satisfied. There is a necessity, therefore, for the construction of

systems of theology. Of this the history of the Church affords abundant proof. In all ages and among all denominations, such systems have been produced.

Second, A much higher kind of knowledge is thus obtained, than by the mere accumulation of isolated facts. It is one thing, for example, to know that oceans, continents, islands, mountains, and rivers exist on the face of the earth; and a much higher thing to know the causes which have determined the distribution of land and water on the surface of our globe; the configuration of the earth; the effects of that configuration on climate, on the races of plants and animals, on commerce, civilization, and the destiny of nations. It is by determining these causes that geography has been raised from a collection of facts to a highly important and elevated science. In like manner, without the knowledge of the laws of attraction and motion, astronomy would be a confused and unintelligible collection of facts. What is true of other sciences is true of theology. We cannot know what God has revealed in his Word unless we understand, at least in some good measure, the relation in which the separate truths therein contained stand to each other. It cost the Church centuries of study and controversy to solve the problem concerning the person of Christ; that is, to adjust and bring into harmonious arrangement all the facts which the Bible teaches on that subject.

Third, We have no choice in this matter. If we would discharge our duty as teachers and defenders of the truth, we must endeavor to bring all the facts of revelation into systematic order and mutual relation. It is only thus that we can satisfactorily exhibit their truth, vindicate them from objections, or bring them to bear in their full force on the minds of men.

Fourth, Such is evidently the will of God. He does not teach men astronomy or chemistry, but He gives them the facts out of which those sciences are constructed. Neither does He teach us systematic theology, but He gives us in the Bible the truths which, properly understood and arranged, constitute the science of theology. As the facts of nature are all related and determined by physical laws, so the facts of the Bible are all related and determined by the nature of God and of his creatures. And as He wills that men should study his works and discover their wonderful organic relation and harmonious combination, so it is his will that we should study his Word, and learn that, like the stars, its truths are not isolated points, but systems, cycles, and epicycles, in unending harmony and grandeur. Besides all this, although the Scriptures do not contain a system of theology as a whole, we have in the Epistles of the New Testament, portions of that system wrought out to our hands. These are our authority and guide.

§ 2. Theological Method.

Every science has its own method, determined by its peculiar nature. This is a matter of so much importance that it has been erected into a distinct department. Modern literature abounds in works on Methodology, i.e., on the science of method. They are designed to determine the principles which should control scientific investigations. If a man adopts a false method, he is like one who takes a wrong road which will never lead him to his destination. The two great comprehensive methods are the a priori and the a posteriori. The one argues from cause to effect, the other from effect to cause. The former was for ages applied even to the investigation of nature. Men sought to determine what the facts of nature

must be from the laws of mind or assumed necessary laws. Even in our own day we have had Rational Cosmogonies, which undertake to construct a theory of the universe from the nature of absolute being and its necessary modes of development. Every one knows how much it cost to establish the method of induction on a firm basis, and to secure a general recognition of its authority. According to this method, we begin with collecting well-established facts, and from them infer the general laws which determine their occurrence. From the fact that bodies fall toward the centre of the earth, has been inferred the general law of gravitation, which we are authorized to apply far beyond the limits of actual experience. This inductive method is founded upon two principles: First, That there are laws of nature (forces) which are the proximate causes of natural phenomena. Secondly, That those laws are uniform; so that we are certain that the same causes, under the same circumstances, will produce the same effects. There may be diversity of opinion as to the nature of these laws. They may be assumed to be forces inherent in matter; or, they may be regarded as uniform modes of divine operation; but in any event there must be some cause for the phenomena which we perceive around us, and that cause must be uniform and permanent. On these principles all the inductive sciences are founded; and by them the investigations of natural philosophers are guided.

The same principle applies to metaphysics as to physics; to psychology as well as to natural science. Mind has its laws as well as matter, and those laws, although of a different kind, are as permanent as those of the external world.

The methods which have been applied to the study of theology are too numerous to be separately considered. They may, perhaps, be reduced to three general classes: First, The Speculative; Second, The Mystical; Third, The Inductive. These terms are, indeed, far from being precise. They are used for the want of better to designate the three general methods of theological investigation which have prevailed in the Church.

§ 3. The Speculative Method.

Speculation assumes, in an a priori manner, certain principles, and from them undertakes to determine what is and what must be. It decides on all truth, or determines on what is true from the laws of the mind, or from axioms involved in the constitution of the thinking principle within us. To this head must be referred all those systems which are founded on any a priori philosophical assumptions. There are three general forms in which this speculative method has been applied to theology.

Deistic and Rationalistic Form.

1. The first is that which rejects any other source of knowledge of divine things than what is found in nature and the constitution of the human mind. It assumes certain metaphysical and moral axioms, and from them evolves all the truths which it is willing to admit. To this class belong the Deistical and strictly Rationalistical writers of the past and present generations.

Dogmatic Form.

2. The second is the method adopted by those who admit a a supernatural divine revelation, and concede that such a revelation is contained in the Christian Scriptures, but who reduce all the doctrines thus revealed to the forms of some philosophical system. This

was done by many of the fathers who endeavored to exalt pistis into gnosis i.e., the faith of the common people into philosophy for the learned. This was also to a greater or less degree the method of the schoolmen, and finds an illustration even in the "Cur Deus Homo" of Anselm, the father of scholastic theology. In later times Wolf applied the philosophy of Leibnitz to the explanation and demonstration of the doctrines of revelation. He says, "Scripture serves as an aid to natural theology. It furnishes natural theology with propositions which ought to be demonstrated; consequently the philosopher is bound not to invent but to demonstrate." [1] This method is still in vogue. Men lay down certain principles, called axioms, or first truths of reason, and from them deduce the doctrines of religion by a course of argument as rigid and remorseless as that of Euclid. This is sometimes done to the entire overthrow of the doctrines of the Bible, and of the most intimate moral convictions not only of Christians but of the mass of mankind. Conscience is not allowed to mutter in the presence of the lordly understanding. It is in the spirit of the same method that the old scholastic doctrine of realism is made the basis of the Scriptural doctrines of original sin and redemption. To this method the somewhat ambiguous term Dogmatism has been applied, because it attempts to reconcile the doctrines of Scripture with reason, and to rest their authority on rational evidence. The result of this method has always been to transmute, as far as it succeeded, faith into knowledge, and to attain this end the teachings of the Bible have been indefinitely modified. Men are expected to believe, not on the authority of God, but on that of reason.

Transcendentalists.

3. Thirdly, and pre&#65533;minently, the modern Transcendentalists are addicted to the speculative method. In the wide sense of the word they are Rationalists, as they admit of no higher source of truth other Reason. But as they make reason to be something very different from what it is regarded as being by ordinary Rationalists, the two classes are practically very far apart. The Transcendentalists also differ essentially from the Dogmatists. The latter admit an external, supernatural, and authoritative revelation. They acknowledge that truths not discoverable by human reason are thereby made known. But they maintain that those doctrines when known may be shown to be true on the principles of reason. They undertake to give a demonstration independent of Scripture of the doctrines of the Trinity, the Incarnation, Redemption, as well as of the immortality of the soul and a future state of retribution. Transcendentalists admit of no authoritative revelation other than that which is found in man and in the historical development of the race. All truth is to be discovered and established by a process of thought. If it be conceded that the Bible contains truth, it is only so far as it coincides with the teachings of philosophy. The same concession is freely made concerning the writings of the heathen sages. The theology of Daub, for example, is nothing more than the philosophy of Schelling. That is, it teaches just what that philosophy teaches concerning God, man, sin, redemption, and the future state. Marheinecke and Strauss find Hegelianism in the Bible, and they therefore admit that so far the Bible teaches truth. Rosenkranz, a philosopher of the same school, says Christianity is the absolute religion, because its fundamental principle, namely, the oneness of God and man, is the fundamental principle of his philosophy. In his "Encyklop&#65533;die" (p. 3) he says: "The only religion which conforms to reason is Christianity, because it regards man as the form in which God has revealed himself. Its theology is therefore anthropology, and its anthropology is theology. The idea of (Gottmenschheit) the godhead of man, is the key of Christianity, in which as

Lessing says, lies its rationality."

These are the principal forms of the speculative method in its application to theology. These topics will present themselves for fuller consideration in a subsequent chapter.

[1] Theol. Nat. Prolegg. § 22; Frankf. and Leipz. 1736, vol. i. p. 22.

§ 4. The Mystical Method.

Few words have been used with greater latitude of meaning than mysticism. It is here to be taken in a sense antithetical to speculation. Speculation is a process of thought; mysticism is matter of feeling. The one assumes that the thinking faculty is that by which we attain the knowledge of truth. The other, distrusting reason, teaches that the feelings alone are to be relied upon, at least in the sphere of religion. Although this method has been unduly pressed, and systems of theology have been constructed under its guidance, which are either entirely independent of the Scriptures, or in which the doctrines of the Bible have been modified and perverted, it is not to be denied that great authority is due to our moral nature in matters of religion. It has ever been a great evil in the Church that men have allowed the logical understanding, or what they call their reason, to lead them to conclusions which are not only contrary to Scripture, but which do violence to our moral nature. It is conceded that nothing contrary to reason can be true. But it is no less important to remember that nothing contrary to our moral nature can be true. It is also to be admitted that conscience is much less liable to err than reason; and when they come into conflict, real or apparent, our moral nature is the stronger, and will assert its authority in spite of all we can do. It is rightfully supreme in the soul, although, with the reason and the will, it is in absolute subjection to God, who is infinite reason and infinite moral excellence.

Mysticism as applied to Theology.

Mysticism, in its application to theology, has assumed two principal forms, the supernatural and the natural. According to the former, God, or the Spirit of God, holds direct communion with the soul; and by the excitement of its religious feelings gives it intuitions of truth, and enables it to attain a kind, a degree, and an extent of knowledge, unattainable in any other way. This has been the common theory of Christian mystics in ancient and modern times. If by this were meant merely that the Spirit of God, by his illuminating influence, gives believers a knowledge of the truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures, which is peculiar, certain, and saving, it would be admitted by all evangelical Christians. And it is because such Christians do hold to this inward teaching of the Spirit, that they are often called Mystics by their opponents. This, however, is not what is here meant. The mystical method, in its supernatural form, assumes that God by his immediate intercourse with the soul, reveals through the Feelings and by means, or in the way of intuitions, divine truth independently of the outward teaching of his Word; and that it is this inward light, and not the Scriptures, which we are to follow.

According to the other, or natural form of the mystical method, it is not God, but the natural religious consciousness of men, as excited and influenced by the circumstances of the individual, which becomes the source of religious knowledge. The deeper and purer the religious feelings, the clearer the insight into truth. This illumination or spiritual intuition is a matter of degree. But as all men have a religious nature, they all have more or less clearly

the apprehension of religious truth. The religious consciousness of men in different ages and nations, has been historically developed under diverse influences, and hence we have diverse forms of religion, -- the Pagan, the Mohammedan, and the Christian. These do not stand related as true and false, but as more or less pure. The appearance of Christ, his life, his work, his words, his death, had a wonderful effect on the minds of men. Their religious feelings were more deeply stirred, were more purified and elevated than ever before. Hence the men of his generation, who gave themselves up to his influence, had intuitions of religious truth of a far higher order than mankind had before attained. This influence continues to the present time. All Christians are its subjects. All, therefore, in proportion to the purity and elevation of their religious feelings, have intuitions of divine things, such as the Apostles and other Christians enjoyed. Perfect holiness would secure perfect knowledge.

Consequences of the Mystical Method.

It follows from this theory, -- (1.) That there are no such things as revelation and inspiration, in the established theological meaning of those terms. Revelation is the supernatural objective presentation or communication of truth to the mind, by the Spirit of God. But according to this theory there is, and can be, no such communication of truth. The religious feelings are providentially excited, and by reason of that excitement the mind perceives truth more or less clearly, or more or less imperfectly. Inspiration, in the Scriptural sense, is the supernatural guidance of the Spirit, which renders its subjects infallible in the communicating truth to others. But according to this theory, no man is infallible as a teacher. Revelation and inspiration are in different degrees common to all men. And there is no reason why they should not be as perfect in some believers now as in the days of the Apostles. (2.) The Bible has no infallible authority in matters of doctrine. The doctrinal propositions therein contained are not revelations by the Spirit. They are only the forms under which men of Jewish culture gave expression to their feelings and intuitions. Men of different culture, and under other circumstances, would have used other forms or adopted other doctrinal statements. (3.) Christianity therefore, neither consists in a system of doctrines, nor does it contain any such system. It is a life, an influence, a subjective state; or by whatever term it may be expressed or explained, it is a power within each individual Christian determining his feelings and his views of divine things. (4.) Consequently the duty of a theologian is not to interpret Scripture, but to interpret his own Christian consciousness; to ascertain and exhibit what truths concerning God are implied in his feelings toward God; what truths concerning Christ are involved in his feelings toward Christ; what the feelings teach concerning sin, redemption, eternal life, etc., etc.

This method found its most distinguished and influential advocate in Schleiermacher, whose "Glaubenslehre" is constructed on this principle. By Twesten -- his successor in the chair of Theology in the University of Berlin -- it is held in greater subjection to the normal authority of Scripture. By others, again, of the same school, it has been carried out to its utmost extreme. We are at present, however, concerned only with its principle, and neither with the details of its application, nor with its refutation.

§ 5. The Inductive Method.

It is so called because it agrees in everything essential with the inductive method as applied to the natural sciences.

First, The man of science comes to the study of nature with certain assumptions. (1.) He assumes the trustworthiness of his sense perceptions. Unless he can rely upon the well-authenticated testimony of his senses, he is deprived of all means of prosecuting his investigations. The facts of nature reveal themselves to our faculties of sense, and can be known in no other way. (2.) He must also assume the trustworthiness of his mental operations. He must take for granted that he can perceive, compare, combine, remember, and infer; and that he can safely rely upon these mental faculties in their legitimate exercise. (3.) He must also rely on the certainty of those truths which are not learned from experience, but which are given in the constitution of our nature. That every effect must have a cause; that the same cause under like circumstances, will produce like effects; that a cause is not a mere uniform antecedent, but that which contains within itself the reason why the effect occurs.

Second, The student of nature having this ground on which to stand, and these tools wherewith to work, proceeds to perceive, gather, and combine his facts. These he does not pretend to manufacture, nor presume to modify. He must take them as they are. He is only careful to be sure that they are real, and that he has them all, or, at least all that are necessary to justify any inference which he may draw from them, or any theory which he may build upon them.

Third, From facts thus ascertained and classified, he deduces the laws by which they are determined. That a heavy body falls to the ground is a familiar fact. Observation shows that it is not an isolated fact; but that all matter tends toward all other matter, that this tendency or attraction is in proportion to the quantity of matter; and its intensity decreases in proportion to the square of the distance of the attracting bodies. As all this is found to be universally and constantly the case within the field of observation, the mind is forced to conclude that there is some reason for it; in other words, that it is a law of nature which may be relied upon beyond the limits of actual observation. As this law has always operated in the past, the man of science is sure that it will operate in the future. It is in this way the vast body of modern science has been built up, and the laws which determine the motions of the heavenly bodies; the chemical changes constantly going on around us; the structure, growth, and propagation of plants and animals, have, to a greater or less extent, been ascertained and established. It is to be observed that these laws or general principles are not derived from the mind, and attributed to external objects, but derived or deduced from the objects and impressed upon the mind.

A. The Inductive Method as applied to Theology.

The Bible is to the theologian what nature is to the man of science. It is his store-house of facts; and his method of ascertaining what the Bible teaches, is the same as that which the natural philosopher adopts to ascertain what nature teaches. In the first place, he comes to his task with all the assumptions above mentioned. He must assume the validity of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature. In these laws are included some which have no direct application to the natural sciences. Such, for example, as the essential distinction between right and wrong; that nothing contrary to virtue can be enjoined by God; that it cannot be right to do evil that good may come; that sin deserves punishment, and

other similar first truths, which God has implanted in the constitution of all moral beings, and which no objective revelation can possibly contradict. These first principles, however, are not to be arbitrarily assumed. No man has a right to lay down his own opinions, however firmly held, and call them "first truths of reason," and make them the source or test of Christian doctrines. Nothing can rightfully be included under the category of first truths, or laws of belief, which cannot stand the tests of universality and necessity, to which many add self-evidence. But self-evidence is included in universality and necessity, in so far, that nothing which is not self-evident can be universally believed, and what is self-evident forces itself on the mind of every intelligent creature.

Facts to be collected.

In the second place, the duty of the Christian theologian is to ascertain, collect, and combine all the facts which God has revealed concerning himself and our relation to Him. These facts are all in the Bible. This is true, because everything revealed in nature, and in the constitution of man concerning God and our relation to Him, is contained and authenticated in Scripture. It is in this sense that "the Bible, and the Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants." It may be admitted that the truths which the theologian has to reduce to a science, or, to speak more humbly, which he has to arrange and harmonize, are revealed partly in the external works of God, partly in the constitution of our nature, and partly in the religious experience of believers; yet lest we should err in our inferences from the works of God, we have a clearer revelation of all that nature reveals, in his word; and lest we should misinterpret our own consciousness and the laws of our nature, everything that can be legitimately learned from that source will be found recognized and authenticated in the Scriptures; and lest we should attribute to the teaching of the Spirit the operations of our own natural affections, we find in the Bible the norm and standard of all genuine religious experience. The Scriptures teach not only the truth, but what are the effects of the truth on the heart and conscience, when applied with saving power by the Holy Ghost.

The Theologian to be guided by the same rules as the Man of Science.

In the third place, the theologian must be guided by the same rules in the collection of facts, as govern the man of science.

1. This collection must be made with diligence and care. It is not an easy work. There is in every department of investigation great liability to error. Almost all false theories in science and false doctrines in theology are due in a great degree to mistakes as to matters of fact. A distinguished naturalist said he repeated an experiment a thousand times before he felt authorized to announce the result to the scientific world as an established fact.

2. This collection of facts must not only be carefully conducted, but also comprehensive, and if possible, exhaustive. An imperfect induction of facts led men for ages to believe that the sun moved round the earth, and that the earth was an extended plain. In theology a partial induction of particulars has led to like serious errors. It is a fact that the Scriptures attribute omniscience to Christ. From this it was inferred that He could not have had a finite intelligence, but that the Logos was clothed in Him with a human body with its animal life. But it is also a Scriptural fact that ignorance and intellectual progress, as well as omniscience, are ascribed to our Lord. Both facts, therefore, must be included in our doctrine of his person. We must admit that He had a human, as well as a divine intelligence. It is a fact that everything that can be predicated of a sinless man, is in the

Bible, predicated of Christ; and it is also a fact that everything that is predicated of God is predicated of our Lord; hence it has been inferred that there were two Christs, --two persons, -- the one human, the other divine, and that they dwelt together very much as the Spirit dwells in the believer; or, as evil spirits dwelt in demoniacs. But this theory overlooked the numerous facts which prove the individual personality of Christ. It was the same person who said, "I thirst;" who said, "Before Abraham was I am." The Scriptures teach that Christ's death was designed to reveal the love of God, and to secure the reformation of men. Hence Socinus denied that his death was an expiation for sin, or satisfaction of justice. The latter fact, however, is as clearly revealed as the former; and therefore both must be taken into account in our statement of the doctrine concerning the design of Christ's death.

Necessity of a complete Induction.

Illustrations without end might be given of the necessity of a comprehensive induction of facts to justify our doctrinal conclusions. These facts must not be willfully denied or carelessly overlooked, or unfairly appreciated. We must be honest here, as the true student of nature is honest in his induction. Even scientific men are sometimes led to suppress or to pervert facts which militate against their favorite theories; but the temptation to this form of dishonesty is far less in their case, than in that of the theologian. The truths of religion are far more important than those of natural science. They come home to the heart and conscience. They may alarm the fears or threaten the hopes of men, so that they are under strong temptation to overlook or pervert them. If, however, we really desire to know what God has revealed we must be conscientiously diligent and faithful in collecting the facts which He has made known, and in giving them their due weight. If a geologist should find in a deposit of early date implements of human workmanship, he is not allowed to say they are natural productions. He must either revise his conclusion as to the age of the deposit, or carry back to an earlier period the existence of man. There is no help for it. Science cannot make facts; it must take them as they are. In like manner, if the Bible asserts that Christ's death was a satisfaction to justice, the theologian is not allowed to merge justice into benevolence in order to suit his theory of the atonement. If the Scriptures teach that men are born in sin, we cannot change the nature of sin, and make it a tendency to evil and not really sin, in order to get rid of difficulty. If it be a Scriptural fact that the soul exists in a state of conscious activity between death and the resurrection, we must not deny this fact or reduce this conscious activity to zero, because our anthropology teaches that the soul has no individuality and no activity without a body. We must take the facts of the Bible as they are, and construct our system so as to embrace them all in their integrity.

Principles to be deduced from facts.

In the fourth place, in theology as in natural science, principles are derived from facts, and not impressed upon them. The properties of matter, the laws of motion, of magnetism, of light. etc., are not framed by the mind. They are not laws of thought. They are deductions from facts. The investigator sees, or ascertains by observation, what are the laws which determine material phenomena; he does not invent those laws. His speculations on matters of science unless sustained by facts, are worthless. It is no less unscientific for the theologian to assume a theory as to the nature of virtue, of sin, of liberty, of moral obligation, and then explain the facts of Scripture in accordance with his theories. His only

proper course is to derive his theory of virtue, of sin, of liberty, of obligation, from the facts of the Bible. He should remember that his business is not to set forth his system of truth (that is of no account), but to ascertain and exhibit what is God's system, which is a matter of the greatest moment. If he cannot believe what the facts of the Bible assume to be true, let him say so. Let the sacred writers have their doctrine, while he has his own. To this ground a large class of modern exegetes and theologians, after a long struggle, have actually come. They give what they regard as the doctrines of the Old Testament; then those of the Evangelists: then those of the Apostles; and then their own. This is fair. So long, however, as the binding authority of Scripture is acknowledged, the temptation is very strong to press the facts of the Bible into accordance with our preconceived theories. If a man be persuaded that certainty in acting is inconsistent with liberty of action; that a free agent can always act contrary to any amount of influence (not destructive of his liberty) brought to bear upon him, he will inevitably deny that the Scriptures teach the contrary, and thus be forced to explain away all facts which prove the absolute control of God over the will and volitions of men. If he hold that sinfulness can be predicated only of intelligent, voluntary action in contravention of law, he must deny that men are born in sin, let the Bible teach what it may. If he believes that ability limits obligation, he must believe independently of the Scriptures, or in opposition to them, it matters not which, that men are able to repent, believe, love God perfectly, to live without sin, at any, and all times, without the least assistance from the Spirit of God. If he deny that the innocent may justly suffer penal evil for the guilty, he must deny that Christ bore our sins. If he deny that the merit of one man can be the judicial ground of the pardon and salvation of other men, he must reject the Scriptural doctrine of justification. It is plain that complete havoc must be made of the whole system of revealed truth, unless we consent to derive our philosophy from the Bible, instead of explaining the Bible by our philosophy. If the Scriptures teach that sin is hereditary, we must adopt a theory of sin suited to that fact. If they teach that men cannot repent, believe, or do anything spiritually good, without the supernatural aid of the Holy Spirit, we must make our theory of moral obligation accord with that fact. If the Bible teaches that we bear the guilt of Adam's first sin, that Christ bore our guilt, and endured the penalty of the law in our stead, these are facts with which we must make our principles agree. It would be easy to show that in every department of theology, -- in regard to the nature of God, his relation to the world, the plan of salvation, the person and work of Christ, the nature of sin, the operations of divine grace, men, instead of taking the facts of the Bible, and seeing what principles they imply, what philosophy underlies them, have adopted their philosophy independently of the Bible, to which the facts of the Bible are made to bend. This is utterly unphilosophical. It is the fundamental principle of all sciences, and of theology among the rest, that theory is to be determined by facts, and not facts by theory. As natural science was a chaos until the principle of induction was admitted and faithfully carried out, so theology is a jumble of human speculations, not worth a straw, when men refuse to apply the same principle to the study of the Word of God.

§ 6. The Scriptures contain all the Facts of Theology.

This is perfectly consistent, on the one hand, with the admission of intuitive truths,

both intellectual and moral, due to our constitution as rational and moral beings; and, on the other hand, with the controlling power over our beliefs exercised by the inward teachings of the Spirit, or, in other words, by our religious experience. And that for two reasons: First, All truth must be consistent. God cannot contradict himself. He cannot force us by the constitution of the nature which He has given us to believe one thing, and in his Word command us to believe the opposite. And second, All the truths taught by the constitution of our nature or by religious experience, are recognized and authenticated in the Scriptures. This is a safeguard and a limit. We cannot assume this or that principle to be intuitively true, or this or that conclusion to be demonstrably certain, and make them a standard to which the Bible must conform. What is self-evidently true, must be proved to be so, and is always recognized in the Bible as true. Whole systems of theologies are founded upon intuitions, so called, and if every man is at liberty to exalt his own intuitions, as men are accustomed to call their strong convictions, we should have as many theologies in the world as there are thinkers. The same remark is applicable to religious experience. There is no form of conviction more intimate and irresistible than that which arises from the inward teaching of the Spirit. All saving faith rests on his testimony or demonstrations (1 Cor. ii. 4). Believers have an unction from the Holy One, and they know the truth, and that no lie (or false doctrine) is of the truth. This inward teaching produces a conviction which no sophistries can obscure, and no arguments can shake. It is founded on consciousness, and you might as well argue a man out of a belief of his existence, as out of confidence that what he is thus taught of God is true. Two things, however, are to be borne in mind. First, That this inward teaching or demonstration of the Spirit is confined to truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures. It is given, says the Apostle, in order that we may know things gratuitously given, i.e., revealed to us by God in His Word (1 Cor. ii. 10-16). It is not, therefore, a revelation of new truths, but an illumination of the mind, so that it apprehends the truth, excellence, and glory of things already revealed. And second, This experience is depicted in the Word of God. The Bible gives us not only the facts concerning God, and Christ, ourselves, and our relations to our Maker and Redeemer, but also records the legitimate effects of those truths on the minds of believers. So that we cannot appeal to our own feelings or inward experience, as a ground or guide, unless we can show that it agrees with the experience of holy men as recorded in the Scriptures.

The Teaching of the Spirit.

Although the inward teaching of the Spirit, or religious experience, is no substitute for an external revelation, and is no part of the rule of faith, it is, nevertheless, an invaluable guide in determining what the rule of faith teaches. The distinguishing feature of Augustinianism as taught by Augustin himself, and by the purer theologians of the Latin Church throughout the Middle Ages, which was set forth by the Reformers, and especially by Calvin and the Geneva divines, is that the inward teaching of the Spirit is allowed its proper place in determining our theology. The question is not first and mainly, What is true to the understanding, but what is true to the renewed heart? The effort is not to make the assertions of the Bible harmonize with the speculative reason, but to subject our feeble reason to the mind of God as revealed in his Word, and by his Spirit in our inner life. It might be easy to lead men to the conclusion that they are responsible only for their voluntary acts, if the appeal is made solely to the understanding. But if the appeal be made to every man's, and especially to every Christian's inward experience, the opposite

conclusion is reached. We are convinced of the sinfulness of states of mind as well as of voluntary acts, even when those states are not the effect of our own agency, and are not subject to the power of the will. We are conscious of being sold under sin; of being its slaves; of being possessed by it as a power or law, immanent, innate, and beyond our control. Such is the doctrine of the Bible, and such is the teaching of our religious consciousness when under the influence of the Spirit of God. The true method in theology requires that the facts of religious experience should be accepted as facts, and when duly authenticated by Scripture, be allowed to interpret the doctrinal statements of the Word of God. So legitimate and powerful is this inward teaching of the Spirit, that it is no uncommon thing to find men having two theologies, -- one of the intellect, and another of the heart. The one may find expression in creeds and systems of divinity, the other in their prayers and hymns. It would be safe for a man to resolve to admit into his theology nothing which is not sustained by the devotional writings of true Christians of every denomination. It would be easy to construct from such writings, received and sanctioned by Romanists, Lutherans, Reformed, and Remonstrants, a system of Pauline or Augustinian theology, such as would satisfy any intelligent and devout Calvinist in the world.

The true method of theology is, therefore, the inductive, which assumes that the Bible contains all the facts or truths which form the contents of theology, just as the facts of nature are the contents of the natural sciences. It is also assumed that the relation of these Biblical facts to each other, the principles involved in them, the laws which determine them, are in the facts themselves, and are to be deduced from them, just as the laws of nature are deduced from the facts of nature. In neither case are the principles derived from the mind and imposed upon the facts, but equally in both departments, the principles or laws are deduced from the facts and recognized by the mind.

CHAPTER II: THEOLOGY

§ 1. Its Nature.

If the views presented in the preceding chapter be correct, the question, What is Theology? is already answered. If natural science be concerned with the facts and laws of nature, theology is concerned with the facts and the principles of the Bible. If the object of the one be to arrange and systematize the facts of the external world, and to ascertain the laws by which they are determined; the object of the other is to systematize the facts of the Bible, and ascertain the principles or general truths which those facts involve. And as the order in which the facts of nature are arranged cannot be determined arbitrarily, but by the nature of the facts themselves, so it is with the facts of the Bible. The parts of any organic whole have a natural relation which cannot with impunity be ignored or changed. The parts of a watch, or of any other piece of mechanism, must be normally arranged, or it will be in confusion and worthless. All the parts of a plant or animal are disposed to answer a given end, and are mutually dependent. We cannot put the roots of a tree in the place of the branches, or the teeth of an animal in the place of its feet. So the facts of science arrange themselves. They are not arranged by the naturalist. His business is simply to ascertain what the arrangement given in the nature of the facts is. If he mistake, his system is false, and to a greater or less degree valueless. The same is obviously true with regard to the facts or truths of the Bible. They cannot be held in isolation, nor will they admit of any and every arrangement the theologian may choose to assign them. They bear a natural relation to each other, which cannot be overlooked or perverted wthout the facts themselves being perverted. If the facts of Scripture are what Augustinians believe them to be, then the Augustinian system is the only possible system of theology. If those facts be what Romanists or Remonstrants take them to be, then their system is the only true one. It is important that the theologian should know his place. He is not master of the situation. He can no more construct a system of theology to suit his fancy than the astronomer can adjust the mechanism of the heavens according to his own good pleasure. As the facts of astronomy arrange themselves in a certain order, and will admit of no other, so it is with the facts of theology. Theology, therefore, is the exhibition of the facts of Scripture in their proper order and relation, with the principles or general truths involved in the facts themselves, and which pervade and harmonize the whole.

It follows, also, from this view of the subject, that as the Bible contains one class of facts or truths which are not elsewhere revealed, and another class which, although more clearly made known in the Scriptures than anywhere else, are, nevertheless, so far revealed in nature as to be deducible therefrom, theology is properly distinguished as natural and revealed. The former is concerned with the facts of nature so far as they reveal God and our

relation to him, and the latter with the facts of Scripture. This distinction, which, in one view is important, in another, is of little consequence, inasmuch as all that nature teaches concerning God and our duties, is more fully and more authoritatively revealed in his Word.

Definitions of Theology.

Other definitions of Theology are often given

1. Sometimes the word is restricted to its etymological meaning, "a discourse concerning God." Orpheus and Homer were called theologians among the Greeks, because their poems treated of the nature of the gods. Aristotle classed the sciences under the heads of physics, mathematics, and theology, i.e., those which concern nature, number and quantity, and that which concerns God. The Fathers spoke of the Apostle John as the theologian, because in his gospel and epistles the divinity of Christ is rendered so prominent. The word is still used in this restricted sense when opposed to anthropology, soteriology, ecclesiology, as departments of theology in its wider sense.

2. Theology is sometimes said to be the science of the supernatural. But what is the supernatural? The answer to that question depends on the meaning assigned to the word nature. If by nature is meant the external world as governed by fixed laws, then the souls of men and other spiritual beings are not included under the term. In this use of the word nature, the supernatural is synonymous with the spiritual, and theology, as the science of the supernatural, is synonymous with pneumatology. If this view be adopted, psychology becomes a branch of theology, and the theologian must, as such, teach mental philosophy.

The word nature is, however, often taken in a wider sense, so as to include man. Then we have a natural and a spiritual world. And the supernatural is that which transcends nature in this sense, so that what is supernatural is of necessity also superhuman. But it is not necessarily super-angelic. Again, nature may mean everything out of God; then the supernatural is the divine, and God is the only legitimate subject of theology. In no sense of the word, therefore, is theology the science of the supernatural. Hooker [2] says, "Theology is the science of divine things." If by divine things, or "the things of God," he meant the things which concern God, then theology is restricted to a "discourse concerning God;" if he meant the things revealed by God, according to the analogy of the expression "things of the Spirit," as used by the Apostle in 1 Cor. ii. 14, then the definition amounts to the more definite one given above.

3. A much more common definition of Theology, especially in our day, is that it is the science of religion. The word religion, however, is ambiguous. Its etymology is doubtful. Cicero [3] refers it to relegere, to go over again, to consider. "Religio" is then consideration, devout observance, especially of what pertains to the worship and service of God. "Religens" is devout, conscientious. "Religiosus," in a good sense, is the same as our word religious; in a bad sense, it means scrupulous, superstitious. "Religentem esse oportet, religiosum nefas." [4] Augustin and Lactantius derive the word from religare, to bind back. Augustin [5] says: "Ipse Deus enim fons nostr beatudinis, ipse omnis appetitionis est finis. Hunc eligentes vel potius religentes amiseramus enim negligentes: hunc ergo religentes, unde et religio dicta perhibetur, ad eum dilectione tendimus ut perveniendo quiescamus." And Lactantius, "Vinculo pietatis obstricti, Deo religati sumus, unde ipsa religio nomen accepit, non, ut Cicero interpretatus est, a religendo." [6] According to this religio is the ground of obligation. It is that which binds us to God.

Subjectively, it is the inward necessity of union with God. Commonly the word religion, in its objective sense, means "Modus Deum colendi," as when we speak of the Pagan, the Mohammedan, or the Christian religion. Subjectively, it expresses a state of mind. What that state characteristically is, is very variously stated. Most simply it is said to be the state of mind induced by faith in God, and a due sense of our relation to him. Or as Wegscheider expresses it, "�qualis et constans animi affectio, qua homo, necessitudinem suam eandemque �ternam, qu� ei cum summo omnium rerum auctore ac moderatore sanctissimo intercedit, intimo sensu complexus, cogitationes, voluntates et actiones suas ad eum referre studet." Or, as more concisely expressed by Bretschneider, "Faith in the reality of God, with a state of mind and mode of life in accordance with that faith." Or, more vaguely, "Recognition of the mutual relation between God and the world" (Fischer), or, "The recognition of a superhuman causality in the human soul and life" (Theile). "Faith founded on feeling in the reality of the ideal" (Jacobi). "The feeling of absolute dependence" (Schleiermacher). "The observance of the moral law as a divine institution" (Kant). "Faith in the moral order of the universe" (Fichte). "The union of the finite with the infinite or God's coming to self-consciousness in the world" (Schelling). [7]

This diversity of views as to what religion is, is enough to prove how utterly vague and unsatisfactory must be the definition of theology as "the science of religion." Besides, this definition makes theology entirely independent of the Bible. For, as moral philosophy is the analysis of our moral nature, and the conclusions to which that analysis leads, so theology becomes the analysis of our religious consciousness, together with the truths which that analysis evolves. And even Christian theology is only the analysis of the religious consciousness of the Christian; and the Christian consciousness is not the natural religious consciousness of men as modified and determined by the truths of the Christian Scriptures, but it is something different. Some say it is to be referred to a new life transmitted from Christ. Others refer everything distinctive in the religious state of Christians to the Church, and really merge theology into ecclesiology.

We have, therefore, to restrict theology to its true sphere, as the science of the facts of divine revelation so far as those facts concern the nature of God and our relation to him, as his creatures, as sinners, and as the subjects of redemption. All these facts, as just remarked, are in the Bible. But as some of them are revealed by the works of God, and by the nature of man, there is so far a distinction between natural theology, and theology considered distinctively as a Christian science.

With regard to natural theology, there are two extreme opinions. The one is that the works of nature make no trustworthy revelation of the being and perfections of God; the other, that such revelation is so clear and comprehensive as to preclude the necessity of any supernatural revelation.

[2] Eccles. Pol. iii. 8.

[3] Nat. Deor. ii. 28.

[4] Poet. ap. Gell. iv. 9.

[5] De Civitate Dei, x. 3. Edit. of Benedictines, Paris, 1838.

[6] Instt. Div. iv. 28.

[7] See Hase's Hutterus Redivivus, § 2.

§ 2. The Facts of Nature Reveal God.

Those who deny that natural theology teaches anything reliable concerning God, commonly understand by nature the external, material universe. They pronounce the ontological and teleological arguments derived from the existence of the world, and from the evidences of design which it contains, to be unsatisfactory. The fact that the world is, is a proof that it always has been, in the absence of all evidence to the contrary. And the argument from design, it is said, overlooks the difference between dead mechanism and a living organism, between manufacture and growth. That a locomotive cannot make itself, is no proof that a tree cannot grow. The one is formed ab extra by putting its dead parts together; the other is developed by a living principle within. The one necessitates the assumption of a maker external and anterior to itself, the other excludes, as is said, such assumption. Besides, it is urged that religious truths do not admit of proof. They belong to the same category with aesthetic and moral truths. They are the objects of intuition. To be perceived at all, they must be perceived in their own light. You cannot prove a thing to be beautiful or good to the man who does not perceive its beauty or excellence. Hence, it is further urged, that proof of religious truth is unnecessary. The good do not need proof; the evil cannot appreciate it. All that can be done is to affirm the truth, and let it awaken, if possible, the dormant power of perception.

A. Answer to the above Arguments.

All this is sophistical. For the arguments in support of the truths of natural religion are not drawn exclusively from the external works of God. Those which are the most obvious and the most effective are derived from the constitution of our own nature. Man was made in the image of God, and he reveals his parentage as unmistakably as any class of inferior animals reveal the source from which they sprung. If a horse is born of a horse, the immortal spirit of man, instinct with its moral and religious convictions and aspirations, must be the offspring of the Father of Spirits. This is the argument which Paul on Mars' Hill addressed to the cavilling philosophers of Athens. That the sphere of natural theology is not merely the facts of the material universe is plain from the meaning of the word nature, which, as we have seen, has many legitimate senses. It is not only used to designate the external world, but also for the Forces active in the material universe, as when we speak of the operations and laws of nature, sometimes for all that falls into the chain of cause and effect as distinguished from the acts of free agents; and, as natura is derived from nascor, nature means whatever is produced, and therefore includes everything out of God, so that God and nature include all that is.

2. The second objection to natural theology is that its arguments are inconclusive. This is a point which no man can decide for other men. Every one must judge for himself. An argument which is conclusive for one mind may be powerless for other minds. That the material universe began to be; that it has not the cause of its existence within itself, and therefore must have had an extramundane cause; and that the infinitely numerous manifestations of design which it exhibits show that that cause must be intelligent, are arguments for the being of God, which have satisfied the minds of the great body of intelligent men in all ages of the world. They should not, therefore, be dismissed as unsatisfactory, because all men do not feel their force. Besides, as just remarked, these arguments are only confirmatory of others more direct and powerful derived from our

moral and religious nature.

3. As to the objection that religious truths are the objects of intuition, and that intuitive truths neither need nor admit of proof, it may be answered that in one sense it is true. But self-evident truths may be illustrated; and it may be shown that their denial involves contradictions and absurdities. All geometry is an illustration of the axioms of Euclid; and if any man denies any of those axioms, it may be shown that he must believe impossibilities. In like manner, it may be admitted that the existence of a being on whom we are dependent, and to whom we are responsible, is a matter of intuition; and it may be acknowledged that it is self-evident that we can be responsible only to a person, and yet the existence of a personal God may be shown to be a necessary hypothesis to account for the facts of observation and consciousness, and that the denial of his existence leaves the problem of the universe unsolved and unsolvable. In other words, it may be shown that atheism, polytheism, and pantheism involve absolute impossibilities. This is a valid mode of proving that God is, although if be admitted that his existence after all is a self-evident truth. Theism is not the only self-evident truth that men are wont to deny.

B. Scriptural Argument for Natural Theology.

The Scriptures clearly recognize the fact that the works of God reveal his being and attributes. This they do not only by frequent reference to the works of nature as manifestations of the perfections of God, but by direct assertions. "The heavens declare the glory of God; and the firmament sheweth his handy-work. Day unto day uttereth speech, and night unto night sheweth knowledge. There is no speech nor language, where their voice is not heard. Their line is gone out through all the earth, and their words to the end of the world." (Ps. xix. 1-4.) "The idea of perpetual testimony," says Dr. Addison Alexander, [8] "is conveyed by the figure of one day and night following another as witnesses in unbroken succession. . . . . The absence of articulate language, far from weakening the testimony, makes it stronger. Even without speech or words, the heavens testify of God to all men."

The sacred writers in contending with the heathen appeal to the evidence which the works of God bear to his perfections: "Understand, ye brutish among the people: and ye fools, when will ye be wise? He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see? He that chastiseth the heathen, shall not he correct? He that teacheth man knowledge, shall not he know?" (Ps. xciv. 8-10.) Paul said to the men of Lystra, "Sirs, why do ye these things? We also are men of like passions with you, and preach unto you that ye should turn from these vanities unto the living God, which made heaven and earth, and the sea, and all things that are therein: Who in times past suffered all nations to walk in their own ways. Nevertheless he left not himself without witness, in that he did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." (Acts xiv. 15-17.) To the men of Athens he said: "God that made the world and all things therein, seeing that he is Lord of heaven and earth, dwelleth not in temples made with hands; neither is worshipped with men's hands, as though he needed anything, seeing he giveth to all life and breath, and all things; and hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed, and the bounds of their habitation; that they should seek the Lord, if haply they might feel after him, and find him, though he be not far from every one of us: for in him we live, and move, and have our being; as certain also of your own poets have said, For we are also his

offspring.' Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or stone, graven by art and man's device." (Acts xvii. 24-29.)

Not only the fact of this revelation, but its clearness is distinctly asserted by the Apostle: "That which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath shewed it unto them. For the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead; so that they are without excuse: because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful." (Rom. i. 19-21.)

It cannot, therefore, be reasonably doubted that not only the being of God, but also his eternal power and Godhead, are so revealed in his works, as to lay a stable foundation for natural theology. To the illustration of this subject many important works have been devoted, a few of which are the following: "Wolf de Theologia Naturali," "The Bridgewater Treatises," Butler's "Analogy," Paley's "Natural Theology."

[8] Comm. on Psalms, in loc.

§ 3. Insufficiency of Natural Theology.

The second extreme opinion respecting Natural Theology is, that it precludes the necessity of a supernatural revelation. The question whether the knowledge of God derived from his works, be sufficient to lead fallen men to salvation, is answered affirmatively by Rationalists, but negatively by every historical branch of the Christian Church. On this point the Greek, the Latin, the Lutheran, and the Reformed Churches are unanimous. The two former are more exclusive than the two latter. The Greeks and Latins, in making the sacraments the only channels of saving grace, deny the possibility of the salvation of the unbaptized, whether in heathen or Christian lands. This principle is so essential to the Romish system as to be included in the very definition of the Church, as given by the authoritative writers of the Papal Church. That definition is so framed as to exclude from the hope of salvation not only all unbaptized infants and adults, but all, no matter however enlightened in the knowledge of the Scriptures, and however holy in heart and life, who do not acknowledge the supremacy of the bishop of Rome.

The question as to the sufficiency of natural theology, or of the truths of reason, is to be answered on the authority of the Scriptures. No man can tell a priori what is necessary to salvation. Indeed, it is only by supernatural revelation that we know that any sinner can be saved. It is from the same source alone, we can know what are the conditions of salvation, or who are to be its subjects.

A. What the Scriptures teach as to the Salvation of Men. Salvation of Infants.

What the Scriptures teach on this subject, according to the common doctrine of evangelical Protestants is first: --

1. All who die in infancy are saved. This is inferred from what the Bible teaches of the analogy between Adam and Christ. "As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many (hoi polloi = pantes) were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many (hoi polloi = pantes) be made

righteous." (Rom. v. 18, 19.) We have no right to put any limit on these general terms, except what the Bible itself places upon them. The Scriptures nowhere exclude any class of infants, baptized or unbaptized, born in Christian or in heathen lands, of believing or unbelieving parents, from the benefits of the redemption of Christ. All the descendants of Adam, except Christ, are under condemnation; all the descendants of Adam, except those of whom it is expressly revealed that they cannot inherit the kingdom of God, are saved. This appears to be the clear meaning of the Apostle, and therefore he does not hesitate to say that where sin abounded, grace has much more abounded, that the benefits of redemption far exceed the evils of the fall; that the number of the saved far exceeds the number of the lost.

This is not inconsistent with the declaration of our Lord, in Matthew vii. 14, that only a few enter the gate which leadeth unto life. This is to be understood of adults. What the Bible says is intended for those in all ages, to whom it is addressed. But it is addressed to those who can either read or hear. It tells them what they are to believe and do. It would be an entire perversion of its meaning to make it apply to those to whom and of whom it does not speak. When it is said, "He that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him" (John iii. 36), no one understands this to preclude the possibility of the salvation of infants.

Not only, however, does the comparison, which the Apostle makes between Adam and Christ, lead to the conclusion that as all are condemned for the sin of the one, so all are saved by the righteousness of the other, those only excepted whom the Scriptures except; but the principle assumed throughout the whole discussion teaches the same doctrine. That principle is that it is more congenial with the nature of God to bless than to curse, to save than to destroy. If the race fell in Adam, much more shall it be restored in Christ. If death reigned by one, much more shall grace reign by one. This "much more" is repeated over and over. The Bible everywhere teaches that God delighteth not in the death of the wicked; that judgment is his strange work. It is, therefore, contrary not only to the argument of the Apostle, but to the whole spirit of the passage (Romans v. 12-21), to exclude infants from "the all" who are made alive in Christ.

The conduct and language of our Lord in reference to children are not to be regarded as matters of sentiment, or simply expressive of kindly feeling. He evidently looked upon them as the lambs of the flock for which, as the good Shepherd, He laid down his life, and of whom He said they shall never perish, and no man could pluck them out of his hands. Of such He tells us is the kingdom of heaven, as though heaven was, in great measure, composed of the souls of redeemed infants. It is, therefore, the general belief of Protestants, contrary to the doctrine of Romanists and Romanizers, that all who die in infancy are saved.

B. Rule of Judgment for Adults.

2. Another general fact clearly revealed in Scripture is, that men are to be judged according to their works, and according to the light which they have severally enjoyed. God "will render to every man according to his deeds: to them who, by patient continuance in well doing, seek for glory, and honour, and immortality, eternal life; but unto them that are contentious, and do not obey the truth but obey unrighteousness, indignation, and wrath, tribulation and anguish, upon every soul of man that doeth evil; of the Jew first, and also of the Gentile; but glory, honour, and peace to every man that worketh good; to the Jew first, and also to the Gentile, for there is no respect of persons with God. For as many as have

sinned without law shall also perish without law, and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law." (Rom ii. 6-12.) Our Lord teaches that those who sinned with knowledge of God's will, shall be beaten with many stripes; and that those who sinned without such knowledge shall be beaten with few stripes; and that it will be more tolerable in the day of judgment for the heathen, even for Sodom and Gomorrah, than for those who perish under the light of the gospel. (Matt. x. 15; xi. 20-24.) The Judge of all the earth will do right. No human being will suffer more than he deserves, or more than his own conscience shall recognize as just.

C. All Men under Condemnation.

3. But the Bible tells us, that judged according to their works and according to the light which they have severally enjoyed, all men will be condemned. There is none righteous; no, not one. The whole world is guilty before God. This verdict is confirmed by every man's conscience. The consciousness of guilt and of moral pollution is absolutely universal.

Here it is that natural theology utterly fails. It cannot answer the question, How can man be just with God? or, How can God be just and yet justify the ungodly? Mankind have anxiously pondered this question for ages, and have gained no satisfaction. The ear has been placed on the bosom of humanity, to catch the still, small voice of conscience, and got no answer. It has been directed heavenward, and received no response. Reason, conscience, tradition, history, unite in saying that sin is death; and, therefore, that so far as human wisdom and resources are concerned, the salvation of sinners is as impossible as raising the dead. Every conceivable method of expiation and purification has been tried without success.

4. The Scriptures, therefore, teach that the heathen are "without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God." (Eph. ii. 12.) They are declared to be without excuse, "Because, that when they knew God, they glorified Him not as God, neither were thankful; but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools, and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God, into an image made like unto corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things. Wherefore God also gave them up to uncleanness, through the lusts of their own hearts, to dishonour their own bodies between themselves: who changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator, who is blessed for ever. Amen." (Rom. i. 21-25.) The Apostle says of the Gentiles that they "walk in the vanity of their mind, having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them because of the blindness of thicir heart: who being past feeling have given themselves over unto lascivousness, to work all uncleanness with greediness." (Eph. iv. 17-19.)

5. All men being sinners, justly chargeable with inexcusable impiety and immorality, they cannot be saved by any effort or resource of their own. For we are told that "the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God. Be not deceived; neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners, shall inherit the kingdom of God." (1 Cor. vi. 9.) "For this ye know, that no whoremonger, nor unclean person, nor covetous man, who is an idolater, hath any inheritance in the kingdom of Christ

and of God." (Eph. v. 5.) More than this, the Bible teaches us that a man may be outwardly righteous in the sight of men, and yet be a whitened sepulchre, his heart being the seat of pride, envy, or malice. In other words, he may be moral in his conduct, and by reason of inward evil passions, be in the sight of God the chief of sinners, as was the case with Paul himself. And more even than this, although a man were free from outward sins, and, were it possible, from the sins of the heart, this negative goodness would not suffice. Without holiness "no man shall see the Lord." (Heb. xii. 14.) "Except a man be born again, he cannot see the kingdom of God." (John iii. 3.) "He that loveth not, knoweth not God." (1 John iv. 8.) "If any man love the world, the love of the Father is not in him." (1 John ii. 15.) "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me." (1 John iv. 8.) Who then can be saved? If the Bible excludes from the kingdom of heaven all the immoral; all whose hearts are corrupted by pride, envy, malice, or covetousness; all who love the world; all who are not holy; all in whom the love of God is not the supreme and controlling principle of action, it is evident that, so far as adults are concerned, salvation must be confined to very narrow limits. It is also evident that mere natural religion, the mere objective power of general religious truth, must be as inefficacious in preparing men for the presence of God, as the waters of Syria to heal the leprosy.

D. The necessary Conditions of Salvation.

6. Seeing then that the world by wisdom knows not God; seeing that men when left to themselves inevitably die in their sins; it has "pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." (1 Cor. i. 21.) God has sent his Son into the world to save sinners. Had any other method of salvation been possible, Christ is dead in vain. (Gal. ii. 21; iii. 21.) There is, therefore, no other name whereby men can be saved. (Acts iv. 12.) The knowledge of Christ and faith in Him are declared to be essential to salvation. This is proved: (1.) Because men are declared to be guilty before God. (2.) Because no man can expiate his own guilt and restore himself to the image of God. (3.) Because it is expressly declared that Christ is the only Saviour of men. (4.) Because Christ gave his Church the commission to preach the gospel to every creature under heaven, as the appointed means of salvation. (5.) Because the Apostles in the execution of this commission went everywhere preaching the Word, testifying to all men, Jews and Gentiles, to the wise and the unwise, that they must believe in Christ as the Son of God in order to be saved. Our Lord himself teaching through his forerunner said, "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." (John iii. 36.) (6.) Because faith without knowledge is declared to be impossible. "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved. How then shall they call on him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent?" (Rom. x. 13-15.)

It is, therefore, as before stated, the common faith of the Christian world, that, so far as adults are concerned, there is no salvation without the knowledge of Christ and faith in Him. This has ever been regarded as the ground of the obligation which rests upon the Church to preach the gospel to every creature.

E. Objections.

To the objection that this doctrine is inconsistent with the goodness and justice of God,

it may be answered: (1.) That the doctrine only assumes what the objector, if a Theist, must admit, namely, that God will deal with men according to their character and conduct, and that He will judge them according to the light which they have severally enjoyed. It is because the judge of all the earth must do right that all sinners receive the wages of sin by an inexorable law, unless saved by the miracle of redemption. In teaching, therefore, that there is no salvation for those ignorant of the gospel the Bible only teaches that a just God will punish sin. (2.) The doctrine of the Church on this subject does not go beyond the facts of the case. It only teaches that God will do what we see He actually does. He leaves mankind, in a large measure, to themselves. He allows them to make themselves sinful and miserable. It is no more difficult to reconcile the doctrine than the undeniable fact with the goodness of our God. (3.) In the gift of his Son, the revelation of his Word, the mission of the Spirit, and the institution of the Church, God has made abundant provision for the salvation of the world. That the Church has been so remiss in making known the gospel is her guilt. We must not charge the ignorance and consequent perdition of the heathen upon God. The guilt rests on us. We have kept to ourselves the bread of life, and allowed the nations to perish.

Some of the older Lutheran divines were disposed to meet the objection in question by saying that the plan of salvation was revealed to all mankind at three distinct epochs. First, immediately after the fall, to Adam; second, in the days of Noah; and third, during the age of the Apostles. If that knowledge has been lost it has been by the culpable ignorance of the heathen themselves. This is carrying the doctrine of imputation to its utmost length. It is making the present generation responsible for the apostasy of their ancestors. It leaves the difficulty just where it was.

The Wesleyan Arminians and the Friends, admitting the insufficiency of the light of nature, hold that God gives sufficient grace, or an inward supernatural light, which, if properly cherished and followed, will lead men to salvation. But this is merely an amiable hypothesis. For such universal and sufficient grace there is no promise in the Scripture, and no evidence in experience. Besides, if admitted it does not help the matter. If this sufficient grace does not actually save, if it does not deliver the heathen from those sins upon which the judgment of God is denounced, it only aggavates their condemnation. All we can do is to adhere closelly to the teachings of the Bible, assured that the Judge of all the earth will do right; that although clouds and darkness are round about Him, and his ways past finding out, justice and judgment are the habitation of his throne.

§ 4. Christian Theology.

As science, concerned with the facts of nature, has its several departments, as Mathematics, Chemistry, Astronomy, etc., so Theology having the facts of Scripture for its subject, has its distinct and natural departments. First --

Theology Proper,

Which includes all the Bible teaches of the being and attributes of God; of the threefold personality of the Godhead, or, that the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons, the same in substance and equal in power and glory; the relation of God to the world, or, his decrees and his works of Creation and Providence. Second, --

Anthropology,

Which includes the origin and nature of man; his original state and probation; his fall; the nature of sin; the effect of Adam's first sin upon himself and upon his posterity. Third, --

Soteriology,

Including the purpose or plan of God in reference to the salvation of man; the person and work of the Redeemer; the application of the redemption of Christ to the people of God, in their regeneration, justification, and sanctification; and the means of grace. Fourth, --

Eschatology,

That is, the doctrines which concern the state of the soul after death; the resurrection; the second advent of Christ; the general judgment and end of the world; heaven and hell. And fifth, --

Ecclesiology,

The idea, or nature of the Church; its attributes; its prerogatives; its organization.

It is the suggestive remark of Kliefoth in his "Dogmengeschichte," that to the Greek mind and to the Greek Church, was assigned the task of elaborating the doctrine of the Bible concerning God, i.e., the doctrines of the Trinity and Person of Christ; to the Latin Church the doctrines concerning man; that is, of sin and grace; to the German Church, Soteriology, or the doctrine of justification. Ecclesiology, he says, is reserved for the future, as the doctrine concerning the Church has not been settled by oecumenical authority as have been the doctrines of Theology and Anthropology, and that of justification at least for the Protestant world.

The above classification. although convenient and generally received, is far from being exhaustive. It leaves out of view the law (or at least subordinates it unduly), or rule of moral duty. This is a department in itself; and under the title of Moral Theology, is sometimes, as in the Latin Church, regarded as the most important. Among Protestants it is often regarded as a mere department of Philosophy.

It has been assumed that Theology has to do with the facts or truths of the Bible; in other words, that the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the only infallible rule of faith and practice. This, however, is not a conceded point. Same claim for Reason a paramount, or, at least a coordinate authority in matters of religion. Others assume an internal supernatural light to which they attribute paramount, or coordinate authority. Others rely on the authority of an infallible church. With Protestants, the Bible is the only infallible source of knowledge of divine things. It is necessary, therefore, before entering on our work, briefly to examine these several systems, namely, Rationalism, Mysticism, and Romanism.

CHAPTER III: RATIONALISM.

§ 1. Meaning and Usage of the Word.

By Rationalism is meant the system or theory which assigns undue authority to reason in matters of religion. By reason is not to be understood the Logos as revealed in man, as held by some of the Fathers, and by Cousin and other modern philosophers, nor the intuitional faculty as distinguished from the understanding or the discursive faculty. The word is taken in its ordinary sense for the cognitive faculty, that which perceives, compares, judges, and infers.

Rationalism has appeared under different forms. (1.) The Deistical, which denies either the possibility or the fact of any supernatural revelation, and maintains that reason is both the source and ground of all religious knowledge and conviction. (2.) That which while it admits the possibility and the fact of a supernatural revelation, and that such a revelation is contained in the Christian Scriptures, nevertheless maintains that the truths revealed are the truths of reason; that is, truths which reason can comprehend and demonstrate. (3.) The third form of Rationalism has received the name of Dogmatism, which admits that many of the truths of revelation are undiscoverable by human reason, and that they are to be received upon authority. Nevertheless, it maintains that those truths when revealed admit of being philosophically explained and established and raised from the sphere of faith into that of knowledge.

Rationalism in all its forms proceeds on the ground of Theism, that is, the belief of an extramundane personal God. When, therefore, Monism, which denies all dualism and affirms the identity of God and the world, took possession of the German mind, Rationalism, in its old form, disappeared. There was no longer any room for the distinction between reason and God, between the natural and the supernatural. No class of men, therefore, are more contemptuous in their opposition to the Rationalists, than the advocates of the modern, or, as it perhaps may be more properly designated, the modern pantheistic philosophy of Germany.

Although in a measure banished from its recent home, it continues to prevail in all its forms, variously modified, both in Europe and America. Mansel, in his "Limits of Religious Thought," [9] includes under the head of Rationalism every system which makes the final test of truth to be "the direct assent of the human consciousness, whether in the form of logical deduction, or moral judgment, or religious intuition, by whatever previous process these faculties may have been raised to their assumed dignity as arbitrators." This, however, would include systems radically different in their nature.

[9] Page 47, edit. Boston, 1859.

§ 2. Deistical Rationalism.

A. Possibility of a Supernatural Revelation.

The first point to be determined in the controversy with the Deistical Rationalists, concerns the possibility of a supernatural revelation. This they commonly deny, either on philosophical or moral grounds. It is said to be inconsistent with the nature of God, and with his relation to the world, to suppose that He interferes by his direct agency in the course of events. The true theory of the universe, according to their doctrine, is that God having created the world and endowed his creatures with their attributes and properties, He has done all that is consistent with his nature. He does not interfere by his immediate agency in the production of effects. These belong to the efficiency of second causes. Or if the metaphysical possibility of such intervention be admitted, it is nevertheless morally impossible, because it would imply imperfection in God. If his work needs his constant interference it must be imperfect, and if imperfect, it must be that God is deficient either in wisdom or power.

That this is a wrong theory of God's relation to the world is manifest. (1.) Because it contradicts the testimony of our moral nature. The relation in which we stand to God, as that relation reveals itself in our consciousness, implies that we are constantly in the presence of a God who takes cognizance of our acts, orders our circumstances, and interferes constantly for our correction or protection. He is not to us a God afar off, with whom we have no immediate concern; but a God who is not far from any one of us, in whom we live, move, and have our being, who numbers the hairs of our head, and without whose notice a sparrow does not fall to the ground. (2.) Reason itself teaches that the conception of God as a ruler of the world, having his creatures in his hands, able to control them at pleasure, and to hold communion with them, is a far higher conception and more consistent with the idea of infinite perfection, than that on which this system of Rationalism is founded. (3.) The common consciousness of men is opposed to this doctrine, as is plain from the fact that all nations, the most cultivated and the most barbarous, have been forced to conceive of God as a Being able to take cognizance of human affairs, and to reveal himself to his creatures. (4.) The argument from Scripture, although not admitted by Rationalists, is for Christians conclusive. The Bible reveals a God who is constantly and everywhere present with his works, and who acts upon them, not only mediately, but immediately, when, where, and how He sees fit.

B. Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation.

Admitting, however, the metaphysical possibility of a supernatural revelation, the next question is whether such a revelation is necessary. This question must be answered in the affirmative. (1.) Because every man feels that he needs it. He knows that there are questions concerning the origin, nature, and destiny of man; concerning sin, and the method in which it can be pardoned and conquered, which he cannot answer. They are questions, however, which must be answered. So long as these problems are unsolved, no man can be either good or happy. (2.) He is equally certain that no man answers these questions for his fellow-men. Every one sees intuitively that they relate to matters beyond the reach of human reason. What can reason decide as to the fate of the soul after death? Can he who has been unable to make himself holy or happy here, secure his own well-being in the eternal future? Every man, without a supernatural revelation, no matter how much of a philosopher, knows

that death is the entrance on the unknown. It is the gate into darkness. Men must enter that gate conscious that they have within them an imperishable life combined with all the elements of perdition. Is it not self-evident then that immortal sinners need some one to answer with authority the question, What must I do to be saved? To convince a man that there is no sin, and that sin does not involve misery, is as impossible as to convince a wretch that he is not unhappy. The necessity of a divine revelation, therefore, is a simple matter of fact, of which every man is in his heart convinced. (3.) Admitting that philosophers could solve these great problems to their own satisfaction, What is to become of the mass of mankind? Are they to he left in darkness and despair? (4.) The experience of ages proves that the world by wisdom knows not God. The heathen nations, ancient and modern, civilized and savage, have without exception, failed by the light of nature to solve any of the great problems of humanity. This is the testimony of history as well as of Scripture. (5.) Even where the light of revelation is enjoyed, it is found that those who reject its guidance, are led not only to the most contradictory conclusions, but to the adoption of principles, in most cases, destructive of domestic virtue, social order, and individual worth and happiness. The reason of man has led the great body of those who know no other guide, into what has been well called, "The Hell of Pantheism."

C. The Scriptures contain such a Revelation.

Admitting the possibility and even the necessity of a supernatural revelation, Has such a revelation been actually made? This the Deistical Rationalist denies, and the Christian affirms. He confidently refers to the Bible as containing such a revelation, and maintains that its claims are authenticated by an amount of evidence which renders unbelief unreasonable and criminal.

1. In the first place, its authors claim to be the messengers of God, to speak by his authority and in his name, so that what they teach is to be received not on the authority of the writers themselves, nor on the ground of the inherent evidence in the nature of the truths communicated, but upon the authority of God. It is He who affirms what the sacred writers teach. This claim must be admitted, or the sacred writers must be regarded as fanatics or impostors. It is absolutely certain that they were neither. It would be no more irrational to pronounce Homer and Newton idiots, than to set down Isaiah and Paul as either impostors or fanatics. It is as certain as any self-evident truth, that they were wise, good, sober-minded men. That such men should falsely assume to be the authoritative messengers of God, and to be endowed with supernatural powers in confirmation of their mission, is a contradiction. It is to affirm that wise and good men are foolish and wicked.

2. The Bible contains nothing inconsistent with the claim of its authors to divine authority as teachers. It contains nothing impossible, nothing absurd, nothing immoral, nothing inconsistent with any well-authenticated truth. This itself is well-nigh miraculous, considering the circumstances under which the different portions of the Scriptures were written.

3. More than this, the Bible reveals truths of the highest order, not elsewhere made known. Truths which meet the most urgent necessities of our nature; which solve the problems which reason has never been able to solve. It recognizes and authenticates all the facts of consciousness, all the truths which our moral and religious nature involve, and which we recognize as true as soon as they are presented. It has the same adaptation to the

soul that the atmosphere has to the lungs, or the solar influences to the earth on which we live. And what the earth would be without those influences, is, in point of fact, what the soul is without knowledge of the truths which we derive solely from the Bible.

4. The several books of which the Scriptures are composed were written by some fifty different authors living in the course of fifteen hundred years and yet they are found to be an organic whole, the product of one mind. They are as clearly a development as the oak from the acorn. The gospels and epistles are but the expansion, fulfilment, the culmination of the protevangelium, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpents head," as uttered to our first parents (Gen. iii. 15). All that intervenes is to the New Testament what the roots, stem, branches, and foliage of the tree are to the fruit. No one book of Scripture can be understood by itself, any more than any one part of a tree or member of the body can be understood without reference to the whole of which it is a part. Those who from want of attention do not perceive this organic relation of the different parts of the Bible, cannot appreciate the argument thence derived in favor of its divine origin. They who do perceive it, cannot resist it.

Argument from Prophecy.

5. God bears witness to the divine authority of the Scriptures by signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost. The leading events recorded in the New Testament were predicted in the Old. Of this any man may satisfy himself by a comparison of the two. The coincidence between the prophecies and the fulfilment admits of no rational solution, except that the Bible is the work of God; or, that holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The miracles recorded in the Scriptures are historical events, which are not only entitled to be received on the same testimony which authenticates other facts of history, but they are so implicated with the whole structure of the New Testament, that they cannot be denied without rejecting the whole gospel, which rejection involves the denial of the best authenticated facts in the history of the world.

Argument from the Effects of the Gospel.

Besides this external supernatural testimony, the Bible is everywhere attended by "the demonstration of the Spirit," which gives to its doctrines the clearness of self-evident truths, and the authority of the voice of God; analogous to the authority of the moral law for the natural conscience.

6. The Bible ever has been and still is, a power in the world. It has determined the course of history. It has overthrown false religion wherever it is known. It is the parent of modern civilization. It is the only guarantee of social order, of virtue, and of human rights and liberty. Its effects cannot be rationally accounted for upon any other hypothesis than that it is what it claims to be, "The Word of God."

7. It makes known the person, work, the acts, and words of Christ, who is the clearest revelation of God ever made to man. He is the manifested God. His words were the words of God. His acts were the acts of God. His voice is the voice of God, and He said, "The Scripture cannot be broken" (John x. 35). If any man refuse to recognize him as the Son of God, as the infallible teacher, and only Saviour of men, nothing can be said save what the Apostle says, "If our gospel be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. For God, who commanded the

light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." (2 Cor. iv. 3, 4, 6.)

Deistical Rationalism is in Germany sometimes called Naturalism, as distinguished from Supernaturalism; as the former denies, and the latter affirms, an agency or operation above nature in the conduct of events in this world. More commonly, however, by Naturalism is meant the theory which denies the existence of any higher power than nature, and therefore is only another name for atheism. It is, consequently, not a proper designation of a system which assumes the existence of a personal God.

§ 3. The Second Form of Rationalism.

A. Its Nature.

The more common form of Rationalism admits that the Scriptures contain a supernatural revelation. It teaches, however, that the object of that revelation is to make more generally known, and to authenticate for the masses, the truths of reason, or doctrines of natural religion. These doctrines are received by cultivated minds not on the ground of authority, but of rational evidence. The fundamental principle of this class of Rationalists is, that nothing can be rationally believed which is not understood. "Nil credi posse, quod a ratione capi et intelligi nequeat." If asked, Why he believes in the immortality of the soul? the Rationalist answers, Because the doctrine is reasonable. To his mind, the arguments in its favor outweigh those against it. If asked, Why he does not believe the doctrine of the Trinity? he answers, Because it is unreasonable. The philosophical arguments against it outweigh the arguments from reason, in its favor. That the sacred writers teach the doctrine is not decisive. The Rationalist does not feel bound to believe all that the sacred writers teach. The Bible, he admits, contains a Divine revelation. But this revelation was made to fallible men, men under no supernatural guidance in communicating the truths revealed. They were men whose mode of thinking, and manner of arguing, and of presenting truth, were modified by their culture, and by the modes of thought prevailing during the age in which they lived. The Scriptures, therefore, abound with misapprehensions, with inconclusive arguments, and accommodations to Jewish errors, superstitions, arid popular beliefs. It is the office of reason to sift these incongruous materials, and separate the wheat from the chaff. That is wheat which reason apprehends in its own light to be true; that is to be rejected as chaff which reason cannot understand, and cannot prove to be true. That is, nothing is true to us which we do not see for ourselves to be true.

B. Refutation.

It is sufficient to remark on this form of Rationalism, --

1. That it is founded upon a false principle. It is not necessary to the rational exercise of faith that we should understand the truth believed. The unknown and the impossible cannot be believed; but every man does, and must believe the incomprehensible. Assent to truth is founded on evidence. That evidence may be external or intrinsic. Some things we believe on the testimony of our senses; other things we believe on the testimony of men. Why, then, may we not believe on the testimony of God? A man may believe that paper thrown upon fire will burn, although he does not understand the process of combustion. All men believe that plants grow, and that like begets like; but no man understands the mystery

of reproduction. Even the Positivist who would reduce all belief to zero, is obliged to admit the incomprehensible to be true. And those who will believe neither in God nor spirit because they are invisible and intangible, say that all we know is the unknowable, -- we know only force, but of force we know nothing but that it is, and that it persists. If, therefore, the incomprehensible must be believed in every other department of knowledge, no rational ground can be given why it should be banished from religion.

2. Rationalism assumes that the human intelligence is the measure of all truth. This is an insane presumption on the part of such a creature as man. If a child believes with implicit confidence what it cannot understand, on the testimony of a parent, surely man may believe what he cannot understand, on the testimony of God.

3. Rationalism destroys the distinction between faith and knowledge, which all men and all ages admit. Faith is assent to truth founded on testimony, "credo quod non video." Knowledge is assent founded on the direct or indirect, the intuitive or discursive, apprehension of its object. If there can be no rational faith, if we are to receive as true only what we know and understand, the whole world is beggared. It loses all that sustains, beautifies, and ennobles life.

4. The poor cannot be Rationalists. If we must understand what we believe, even on the principles of the Rationalists, only philosophers can be religious. They alone can comprehend the rational grounds on which the great truths of even natural religion are to be received. Widespread, therefore, as has been the influence of a Rationalistic spirit, it has never taken hold of the people; it has never controlled the creed of any church; because all religion is founded on the incomprehensible and the infinite.

5. The protest, therefore, which our religious nature makes against the narrow, cold, and barren system of Rationalism, is a sufficient proof that it cannot be true, because it cannot meet our most urgent necessities. The object of worship must be infinite, and of necessity incomprehensible.

6. Faith implies knowledge. And if we must understand in order to know, faith and knowledge become alike impossible. The principle, therefore, on which Rationalism is founded, leads to Nihilism, or universal negation. Even the latest form of philosophy, taking the lowest possible ground as to religious faith, admits that we are surrounded on every side by the incomprehensible.

Herbert Spencer, in his "First Principles of a New Philosophy," asserts, p. 45, "the omnipresence of something which passes comprehension." He declares that the ultimate truth in which all forms of religion agree, and in which religion and science are in harmony, is, "That the Power which the universe manifests to us is utterly inscrutable." [10] The inscrutable, the incomprehensible, what we cannot understand, must therefore of necessity be rationally the object of faith. And consequently reason, rational demonstration, or philosophical proof is not the ground of faith. We may rationally believe what we cannot understand. We may be assured of truths which are encompassed with objections which we cannot satisfactorily answer.

C. History.

The modern form of Deistic Rationalism had its rise in England during the latter part of the seventeenth, and the first half of the eighteenth centuries. Lord Herbert, who died as early as 1648, in his work, "De Veritate, prout distinguitur a Revelatione," etc., taught that

all religion consists in the acknowledgment of the following truths: 1. The existence of God. 2. The dependence of man on God, and his obligation to reverence him. 3. Piety consists in the harmony of the human faculties. 4. The essential difference between good and evil. 5. A future state of rewards and punishment. These he held to be intuitive truths, needing no proof, and virtually believed by all men. This may be considered as the confession of Faith of all Deists, and even of those Rationalists who admit a supernatural revelation; for such revelation, they maintain, can only authenticate what reason itself teaches. Other writers quickly followed in the course opened by Lord Herbert; as, Toland in his "Christianity without Mystery," 1696, a work which excited great attention, and drew out numerous refutations. Toland ended by avowing himself a Pantheist. Hobbes was a Materialist. Lord Shaftesbury, who died 1773, in his "Characteristics," "Miscellaneous Treatises," and "Moralist," made ridicule the test of truth. He declared revelation and inspiration to be fanaticism. Collins (died 1729) was a more serious writer. His principal works were, "An Essay on Free-thinking," and "The Grounds and Reasons of Christianity." Lord Bolingbroke, Secretary of State under Queen Anne, "Letters on the Study and Utility of History." Matthew Tindal, "Christianity as Old as the Creation." Tindal, instead of attacking Christianity in detail, attempted to construct a regular system of Deism. He maintained that God could not intend that men should ever be without a religion adequate to all their necessities, and therefore that a revelation can only make known what every man has in his own reason. This internal and universal revelation contains the two truths: 1. The existence of God. 2. That God created man not for his own sake, but for man's. By far the most able and influential of the writers of this class was David Hume. His "Essays" in four volumes contain his theological views. The most important of these are those on the Natural History of Religion, and on Miracles. His "Dialogues on Natural Religion" is regarded as the ablest work ever written in support of the Deistical, or rather, Atheistical system.

From England the spirit of infidelity extended into France. Voltaire, Rousseau, La Mettrie, Holbach, D'Alembert, Diderot, and others, succeeded for a time in overthrowing all religious faith in the governing classes of society.

Rationalism in Germany.

In Germany the Rationalistic defection began with such men as Baumgarten, Ernesti, and John David Michaelis, who did not deny the divine authority of the Scriptures, but explained away their doctrines. These were followed by such men as Semler, Morus, and Eichhorn, who were thoroughly neological. During the latter part of the last, and first part of the present century, most of the leading church historians, exegetes, and theologians of Germany, were Rationalists. The first serious blow given to their system was by Kant. The Rationalists assumed that they were able to demonstrate the truths of natural religion on the principles of reason. Kant, in his "Critic of Pure Reason," undertook to show that reason is incompetent to prove any religious truth. The only foundation for religion he maintained was our moral consciousness. That consciousness involved or implied the three great doctrines of God, liberty, and immortality. His successors, Fichte and Schelling, carried out the principles which Kant adopted to prove that the outward world is an unknown something, to show that there was no such world; that there was no real distinction between the ego and non-ego, the subjective and objective; that both are modes of the manifestation of the absolute. Thus all things were merged into one. This idealistic Pantheism having

displaced Rationalism, has already yielded the philosophic throne to a subtle form of Materialism.

Bretschneiders "Entwickelung aller in der Dogmatik vorkommenden Begriffe," gives a list of fifty-two works on the rationalistic controversy in Germany. The English books written against the Rationalists or Deists of Great Britain, and on the proper office of reason in matters of religion, are scarcely less numerous. Some of the more important of these works are the following: "Boyle on Things above Reason," Butler's "Analogy of Religion and Nature," Conybeare's "Defence of Religion," "Hulsean Lectures," Jackson's "Examination," "Jew's Letters to Voltaire," Lardner's "Credibility of the Gospel History," Leland's "Advantage and Necessity of Revelation," Leslie's "Short and Easy Method with Deists." Warburton's "View of Bolingbroke's Philosophy," and his "Divine Legation of Moses," John Wilson's "Dissertation on Christianity," etc., etc. See St�udlin's "Geschichte des Rationalismus," and a concise and instructive history of theology during the eighteenth century, by Dr. Tholuck in "Biblical Repertory and Princeton Review" for 1828. Leibnitz's "Discours de la Conformit� de la Foi avec la Raison," in the Preface to his "Th�odic�e," and Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought," deserve the careful perusal of the theological student. The most recent works on this general subject are Lecky's "History of Rationalism in Europe, and "History of Rationalism, embracing a survey of the present state of Protestant Theology," by Rev. John F. Hurst, A. M. The latter is the most instructive publication in the English language on modern skepticism.

[10] First Principles of a New Philosophy, p. 42.

4. Dogmatism, or the Third Form of Rationalism.

A. Meaning of the Term.

It was a common objection made in the early age of the Church against Christianity, by the philosophical Greeks, that its doctrines were received upon authority, and not upon rational evidence. Many of the Fathers, specially those of the Alexandrian school, answered that this was true only of the common people. They could not be expected to understand philosophy. They could receive the high spiritual truths of religion only on the ground of authority. But the educated classes were able and were bound to search after the philosophical or rational evidence of the doctrines taught in the Bible, and to receive those doctrines on the ground of that evidence. They made a distinction, therefore, between pistis and gnosis, faith and knowledge. The former was for the common people, the latter for the cultivated. The objects of faith were the doctrinal statements of the Bible in the form in which they are there presented. The ground of faith is simply the testimony of the Scriptures as the Word of God. The objects of knowledge were the speculative or philosophical ideas which underlie the doctrines of the Bible, and the ground on which those ideas or truths are received and incorporated in our system of knowledge, is their own inherent evidence. They are seen to be true by the light of reason. Faith is thus elevated into knowledge, and Christianity exalted into a philosophy. This method was carried out by the Platonizing fathers, and continued to prevail to a great extent among the schoolmen. During the Middle Ages the authority of the Church was paramount, and the freest thinkers did not venture openly to impugn the doctrines which the Church had sanctioned. For the most part they contented themselves with philosophizing about those doctrines, and endeavoring to show that they admitted of a philosophical explanation and proof.

Wolfianism.

As remarked in the preceding chapter, this method was revived and extensively propagated by Wolf (1679-1754, Professor at Halle and Marburg). His principal works were "Theologia Naturalis," 1736, "Philos. Practicalis Universalis," 1738, "Philos. Moralis s. Ethica," 1750, "Vern&#65533;nftige Gedanken von Gott, der Welt und der Seele des Menschen, auch allen Dingen &#65533;berhaupt," 1720. Wolf unduly exalted the importance of natural religion. Although he admitted that the Scriptures revealed doctrines undiscoverable by the unassisted reason of man, he yet insisted that all doctrines, in order to be rationally received as true, should be capable of demonstration on the principles of reason. "He maintained," says Mr. Rose (in his "State of Protestantisin in Germany," p. 39), "that philosophy was indispensable to religion, and that, together with Biblical proofs, a mathematical or strictly demonstrative dogmatical system, according to the principles of reason, was absolutely necessary. His own works carried this theory into practice, and after the first clamors had subsided, his opinions gained more attention, and it was not long before he had a school of vehement admirers, who far outstripped him in the use of his own principles. We find some of them not content with applying demonstration to the truth of the system, but endeavoring to establish each separate dogma, the Trinity, the nature of the Redeemer, the Incarnation, the eternity of punishment, on philosophical, and strange as it may appear, some of these truths on mathematical grounds." The language of Wolf himself on this subject has already been quoted on page 5. He expressly states that the office of revelation is to supplement natural religion, and to present propositions which the philosopher is bound to demonstrate. By demonstration is not meant the adduction of proof that the proposition is sustained the Scriptures, but that the doctrine must be admitted as true on the principles of reason. It is philosophical demonstration that is intended. "Theological Dogmatism," says Mansel, [11] "is an application of reason to the support and defense of pre&#65533;xisting statements of Scripture. . . . . Its end is to produce a coincidence between what we believe and what we think; to remove the boundary which separates the comprehensible from the incomprehensible." [12] It attempts, for example, to demonstrate the doctrine of the Trinity from the nature of an infinite being; the doctrine of the Incarnation from the nature of man and his relation to God, etc. Its grand design is to transmute faith into knowledge, to elevate Christianity as a system of revealed truth into a system of Philosophy.

B. Refutation.

The objections to Dogmatism, as thus understood, are, --

That it is essentially Rationalistic. The Rationalist demands philosophical proof of the doctrines which he receives. He is not willing to believe on the simple authority of Scripture. He requires his reason to be satisfied by a demonstration of the truth independent of the Bible. This demand the Dogmatist admits to be reasonable, and he undertakes to furnish the required proof. In this essential point, therefore, in making the reception of Christian doctrine to rest on reason and not on authority, the Dogmatist and the Rationalist are on common ground. For although the former admits a supernatural revelation, and acknowledges that for the common people faith must rest on authority, yet he maintains that the mysteries of religion admit of rational or philosophical demonstration, and that such demonstration cultivated minds have a right to demand.

2. In thus shifting faith from the foundation of divine testimony, and making it rest on rational demonstration, it is removed from the Rock of Ages to a quicksand. There is all the difference between a conviction founded on the well-authenticated testimony of God, and that founded on so-called philosophical demonstration, that there is between God and man, the divine and human. Let any man read the pretended philosophical demonstrations of the Trinity, the Incarnation, the resurrection of the body, or any other of the great truths of the Bible, and he will feel at liberty to receive or to reject it at pleasure. It has no authority or certainty. It is the product of a mind like his own, and therefore can have no more power than belongs to the fallible human intellect.

3. Dogmatism is, therefore, in its practical effect, destructive of faith. In transmuting Christianity into a philosophy, its whole nature is changed and its power is lost. It takes its place as one of the numberless phases of human speculation, which in the history of human thought succeed each other as the waves of the sea, -- no one ever abides.

4. It proceeds on an essentially false principle. It assumes the competency of reason to judge of things entirely beyond its sphere. God has so constituted our nature, that we are authorized and necessitated to confide in the well-authenticated testimony of our senses, within their appropriate sphere. And in like manner, we are constrained to confide in the operation of our minds and in the conclusions to which they lead, within the sphere which God has assigned to human reason. But the senses cannot sit in judgment on rational truths. We cannot study logic with the microscope or scalpel. It is no less irrational to depend upon reason, or demand rational or philosophical demonstration for truths which become the objects of knowledge only as they are revealed. From the nature of the case the truths concerning the creation, the probation, and apostasy of man, the purpose and plan of redemption, the person of Christ, the state of the soul in the future world, the relation of God to his creatures, etc., not depending on general principles of reason, but in great measure on the purposes of an intelligent, personal Being, can be known only so far as He chooses to reveal them, and must be received simply on his authority.

The Testimony of the Scriptures against Dogmatism.

5. The testimony of the Scriptures is decisive on this subject. From the beginning to the end of the Bible the sacred writers present themselves in the character of witnesses. They demand faith in their teachings and obedience to their commands not on the ground of their own superiority in wisdom or excellence; not on the ground of rational demonstration of the truth of what they taught, but simply as the organs of God, as men appointed by Him to reveal his will. Their first and last, and sufficient reason for faith is, "Thus saith the Lord." The New Testament writers, especially, repudiate all claim to the character of philosophers. They taught that the Gospel was not a system of truth derived from reason or sustained by its authority, but by the testimony of God. They expressly assert that its doctrines were matters of revelation, to be received on divine testimony. "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man the things which God hath prepared for them that love him. But God hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit: for the Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him?" (1 Cor. ii. 9-11.) Such being the nature of the Gospel, if received at all it must be received on authority. It was to be believed or taken on trust, not demonstrated as a philosophical system. Nay, the Bible goes still further. It

teaches that a man must become a fool in order to be wise; he must renounce dependence upon his own reason or wisdom, in order to receive the wisdom of God. Our Lord told his disciples that unless they were converted and became as little children, they could not enter into the kingdom of God. And the Apostle Paul, in his Epistle to the Corinthians, and in those addressed to the Ephesians and Colossians, that is, when writing to those imbued with the Greek and with the oriental philosophy, made it the indispensable condition of their becoming Christians, that they should renounce philosophy as a guide in matters of religion, and receive the Gospel on the testimony of God. Nothing, therefore, can be more opposed to the whole teaching and spirit of the Bible, than this disposition to insist on philosophical proof of the articles of our faith. Our duty, privilege, and security are in believing, not in knowing; in trusting God, and not our own understanding. They are to be pitied who have no more trustworthy teacher than themselves.

6. The instructions of the Bible on this subject are abundantly confirmed by the lessons of experience. From the time of the Gnostics, and of the Platonizing fathers, the attempt has been made in every age to exalt faith into knowledge, to transmute Christianity into philosophy, by demonstrating its doctrines on the principles of reason. These attempts have always failed. They have all proved ephemeral and worthless, -- each successive theorizer viewing with more or less contempt the speculations of his predecessors, yet each imagining that he has the gifts for comprehending the Almighty.

These attempts are not only abortive, they are always evil in their effects upon their authors and upon all who are influenced by them. So far as they succeed to the satisfaction of those who make them, they change the relation of the soul to the truth, and, of course, to God. The reception of the truth is not an act of faith or of trust in God; but of confidence in our own speculations. Self is substituted for God as the ground of confidence. The man's whole inward state is thereby changed. History, moreover, proves that Dogmatism is the predecessor of Rationalism. The natural tendency and the actual consequences of the indulgence of a disposition to demand philosophical demonstration for articles of faith, is a state of mind which revolts at authority, and refuses to admit as true what it cannot comprehend and prove. And this state of mind, as it is incompatible with faith, is the parent of unbelief and of all its consequences. There is no safety for us, therefore, but to remain within the limits which God has assigned us. Let us rely on our senses, within the sphere of our sense perceptions; on our reason within the sphere of rational truths; and on God, and God alone, in all that relates to the things of God. He only truly knows, who consents with the docility of a child to be taught of God.

[11] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 47.

[12] Ibid. p. 50.

§ 5. Proper Office of Reason in Matters of Religion.

A. Reason Necessary for the Reception of a Revelation.

Christians, in repudiating Rationalism in all its forms, do not reject the service of reason in matters of religion. They acknowledge its high prerogatives, and the responsibility involved in their exercise.

In the first place, reason is necessarily presupposed in every revelation. Revelation is

the communication of truth to the mind. But the communication of truth supposes the capacity to receive it. Revelations cannot he made to brutes or to idiots. Truths, to be received as objects of faith, must be intellectually apprehended. A proposition, to which we attach no meaning, however important the truth it may contain, cannot be an object of faith. If it be affirmed that the soul is immortal, or God is a spirit, unless we know the meaning of the words nothing is communicated to the mind, and the mind can affirm or deny nothing on the subject. In other words, knowledge is essential to faith. In believing we affirm the truth of the proposition believed. But we can affirm nothing of that of which we know nothing. The first and indispensable office of reason, therefore, in matters of faith, is the cognition, or intelligent apprehension of the truths proposed for our reception. This is what theologians are accustomed to call the usus organicus, seu, instrumentalis, rationis. About this there can be no dispute.

Difference between Knowing and Understanding.

It is important, however, to bear in mind the difference between knowing and understanding, or comprehending. A child knows what the words "God is a spirit" mean. No created being can comprehend the Almighty unto perfection. We must know the plan of salvation; but no one can comprehend its mysteries. This distinction is recognized in every department. Men know unspeakably more than they understand. We know that plants grow; that the will controls our voluntary muscles; that Jesus Christ is God and man in two distinct natures, and one person forever; but here as everywhere we are surrounded by the incomprehensible. We can rationally believe that a thing is, without knowing how or why it is. It is enough for the true dignity of man as a rational creature, that he is not called upon by his Creator to believe without knowledge, to receive as true propositions which convey no meaning to the mind. This would be not only irrational, but impossible.

B. Reason must judge of the Credibility of a Revelation.

In the second place, it is the prerogative of reason to judge of the credibility of a revelation. The word "credible" is sometimes popularly used to mean, easy of belief, i.e., probable. In its proper sense, it is antithetical to incredible. The incredible is that which cannot be believed. The credible is that which can be believed. Nothing is incredible but the impossible. What may be, may be rationally (i.e., on adequate grounds) believed.

A thing may be strange, unaccountable, unintelligible, and yet perfectly credible. What is strange or unaccountable to one mind may be perfectly familiar and plain to another. For the most limited intellect or experience to make itself the standard of the possible and true, would be as absurd as a man's making his visible horizon the limit of space. Unless a man is willing to believe the incomprehensible, he can believe nothing, and must dwell forever in cuter darkness. The most skeptical form of modern philosophy, which reduces faith and knowledge to a minimum, teaches that the incomprehensible is all we know namely, that force is, and that it is persistent. It is most unreasonable, therefore, to urge as an objection to Christianity that it demands faith in the incomprehensible.

The Impossible cannot be believed.

While this is true and plain, it is no less true that the impossible is incredible, and therefore cannot be an object of faith. Christians concede to reason the judicium contradictionis, that is, the prerogative of deciding whether a thing is possible or impossible. If it is seen to be impossible, no authority, and no amount or kind of evidence

can impose the obligation to receive it as true. Whether, however, a thing be possible or not, is not to be arbitrarily determined. Men are prone to pronounce everything impossible which contradicts their settled convictions, their preconceptions or prejudices, or which is repugnant to their feelings. Men in former times did not hesitate to say that it is impossible that the earth should turn round on its axis and move through space with incredible rapidity, and yet we not perceive it. It was pronounced absolutely impossible that information should be transmitted thousands of miles in the fraction of a second. Of course it would be folly to reject all evidence of such facts as these on the ground of their being impossible. It is no less unreasonable for men to reject the truths of revelation on the assumption that they involve the impossible, when they contradict our previous convictions, or when we cannot see how they can be. Men say that it is impossible that the same person can be both God and man; and yet they admit that man is at once material and immaterial, mortal and immortal, angel and animal. The impossible cannot be true; but reason in pronouncing a thing impossible must act rationally and not capriciously. Its judgments must be guided by principles which commend themselves to the common consciousness of men. Such principles are the following: --

What is Impossible.

(1.) That is impossible which involves a contradiction; as, that a thing is and is not; that right is wrong, and wrong right. (2.) It is impossible that God should do, approve, or command what is morally wrong. (3.) It is impossible that He should require us to believe what contradicts any of the laws of belief which He has impressed upon our nature. (4.) It is impossible that one truth should contradict another. It is impossible, therefore, that God should reveal anything as true which contradicts any well authenticated truth, whether of intuition, experience, or previous revelation.

Men may abuse this prerogative of reason, as they abuse their free agency. But the prerogative itself is not to be denied. We have a right to reject as untrue whatever it is impossible that God should require us to believe. He can no more require us to believe what is absurd than to do what is wrong.

Proof of this Prerogative of Reason.

1. That reason has the prerogative of the judicium contradictionis, is plain, in the first place, from the very nature of the case. Faith includes an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true. But it is a contradiction to say that the mind can affirm that to be true which it sees cannot by possibility be true. This would be to affirm and deny, to believe and disbelieve, at the same time. From the very constitution of our nature, therefore, we are forbidden to believe the impossible. We are, consequently, not only authorized, but required to pronounce anathema an apostle or angel from heaven, who should call upon us to receive as a revelation from God anything absurd, or wicked, or inconsistent with the intellectual or moral nature with which He has endowed us. The subjection of the human intelligence to God is indeed absolute; but it is a subjection to infinite wisdom and goodness. As it is impossible that God should contradict himself, so it is impossible that He should, by an external revelation, declare that to be true which by the laws of our nature He has rendered it impossible we should believe.

2. This prerogative of reason is constantly recognized in Scripture. The prophets called upon the people to reject the doctrines of the heathen, because they could not be true.

They could not be true because they involved contradictions and absurdities; because they were in contradiction to our moral nature, and inconsistent with known truths. Moses taught that nothing was to be believed, no matter what amount of external evidence should be adduced in its support, which contradicted a previous, duly authenticated revelation from God. Paul does the same thing when he calls upon us to pronounce even an angel accursed, who should teach another gospel. He recognized the paramount authority of the intuitive judgments of the mind. He says that the damnation of any man is just who calls upon us to believe that right is wrong, or that men should do evil that good may come.

3. The ultimate ground of faith and knowledge is confidence in God. We can neither believe nor know anything unless we confide in those laws of belief which God has implanted in our nature. If we can be required to believe what contradicts those laws, then the foundations are broken up. All distinction between truth and falsehood, between right and wrong, would disappear. All our ideas of God and virtue would be confounded, and we should become the victims of every adroit deceiver, or minister of Satan, who, by lying wonders, should call upon us to believe a lie. We are to try the spirits. But how can we try them without a standard? and what other standard can there be, except the laws of our nature and the authenticated revelations of God.

C. Reason must judge of the Evidences of a Revelation.

In the third place, reason must judge of the evidence by which a revelation is supported.

On this point it may be remarked, --

1. That as faith involves assent, and assent is conviction produced by evidence, it follows that faith without evidence is either irrational or impossible.

2. This evidence must be appropriate to the nature of the truth believed. Historical truth requires historical evidence; empirical truths, the testimony of experience; mathematical truth, mathematical evidence; moral truth, moral evidence; and "the things of the Spirit," the demonstration of the Spirit. In many cases different kinds of evidence concur in the support of the same truth. That Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God, for example, is sustained by evidence, historical, moral, and spiritual, so abundant that our Lord says of those who reject it, that the wrath of God abideth on them.

3. Evidence must be not only appropriate, but adequate. That is, such as to command assent in every well-constituted mind to which it is presented.

As we cannot believe without evidence, and as that evidence must be appropriate and adequate, it is clearly a prerogative of reason to judge of these several points. This is plain.

1. From the nature of faith, which is not a blind, irrational assent, but an intelligent reception of the truth on adequate grounds.

2. The Scriptures never demand faith except on the ground of adequate evidence. "If I had not done among them," says our Lord, "the works which none other man did, they had not had sin" (John xv. 24); clearly recognizing the principle that faith cannot be required without evidence. The Apostle Paul proves that the heathen are justly liable to condemnation for their idolatry and immorality, because such a revelation of the true God and of the moral law had been made to them, as to leave them without excuse.

3. The Bible regards unbelief as a sin, and the great sin for which men will be

condemned at the bar of God. This presumes that unbelief cannot arise from the want of appropriate and adequate evidence, but is to be referred to the wicked rejection of the truth notwithstanding the proof by which it is attended. The popular misconception that men are not responsible for their faith arises from a confusion of ideas. It is true that men are not blameworthy for not believing in speculative truths, when the cause of their unbelief is ignorance of the fact or of its evidence. It is no sin not to believe that he earth moves round the sun, if one be ignorant of the fact or of the evidence of its truth. But wherever unbelief arises from an evil heart, then it involves all the guilt which belongs to the cause whence it springs. If the wicked hate the good and believe them to be as wicked as themselves, this is only a proof of their wickedness. If a man does not believe in the moral law; if he holds that might is right, that the strong may rob, murder, or oppress the weak, as some philosophers teach, or if he disbelieve in the existence of God, then it is evident to men and angels that he has been given up to a reprobate mind. There is an evidence of beauty to which nothing but want of taste can render one insensible; there is evidence of moral excellence to which nothing but an evil heart can render us blind. Why did the Jews reject Christ, notwithstanding all the evidence presented in his character, in his words, and in his works, that he was the Son of God? "He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." (John iii. 18.) The fact, however, that unbelief is a great sin, and the special ground of the condemnation of men, of necessity supposes that it is inexcusable, that it does not arise from ignorance or want of evidence. "How shall they believe," asks the Apostle, "in him of whom they have not heard." (Rom. x. 14.) And our Lord says, "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil." (John iii. 19.)

4. Another evidence that the Scriptures recognize the necessity of evidence in order to faith, and the right of those to whom a revelation is addressed to judge of that evidence, is found in the frequent command to consider, to examine, to try the spirits, i.e., those who claim to be the organs of the Spirit of God. The duty of judging is enjoined, and the standard of judgment is given. And then men are held responsible for their decision.

Christians, therefore, concede to reason all the prerogatives it can rightfully claim. God requires nothing irrational of his rational creatures. He does not require faith without knowledge, or faith in the impossible, or faith without evidence. Christianity is equally opposed to superstition and Rationalism. The one is faith without appropriate evidence, the other refuses to believe what it does not understand, in despite of evidence which should command belief. The Christian, conscious of his imbecility as a creature, and his ignorance and blindness as a sinner, places himself before God, in the posture of a child, and receives as true everything which a God of infinite intelligence and goodness declares to be worthy of confidence. And in thus submitting to be taught, he acts on the highest principles of reason.

§ 6. Relation of Philosophy and Revelation.

Cicero [13] defines philosophy as "Rerum divinarum et humanarum, causarumque quibus h res continentur, scientia." Peemans [14] says, "Philosophia est scientia rerum per causas primas, recto rationis usu comparata." Or, as Ferrier [15] more concisely

expresses it, "Philosophy is the attainment of truth by the way of reason." These and other definitions are to be found in Fleming's "Vocabulary of Philosophy."

There is, however, a philosophia prima, or first philosophy, which is concerned not so much with what is to be known, as with the faculty of knowledge, which examines the cognitive faculty, determines its laws and its limits. It is the philosophy of philosophy.

Whether we take the word to mean the knowledge of God and nature attained by reason, or the principles which should guide all efforts for the attainment of knowledge, the word is intended to cover the whole domain of human intelligence. Popularly, we distinguish between philosophy and science; the former having for its sphere the spiritual, the latter, the material. Commonly, philosophy is understood as comprising both departments. Hence we speak of natural philosophy as well as of the philosophy of mind. Such being the compass of the domain which philosophers claim as their own, the proper relation between philosophy and theology becomes a question of vital importance. This is, indeed, the great question at issue in the Rationalistic controversy; and therefore, at the conclusion of this chapter, all that remains to be done is to give a concise statement of familiar principles.

Philosophy and Theology occupy Common Ground.

1. Philosophy and Theology occupy common ground. Both assume to teach what is true concerning God, man, the world, and the relation in which God stands to his creatures.

2. While their objects are so far identical, both striving to attain a knowledge of the same truths, their methods are essentially different. Philosophy seeks to attain knowledge by speculation and induction, or by the exercise of our own intellectual faculties. Theology relies upon authority, receiving as truth whatever God in his Word has revealed.

3. Both these methods are legitimate. Christians do not deny that our senses and reason are reliable informants; that they enable us to arrive at certainty as to what lies within their sphere.

4. God is the author of our nature and the maker of heaven and earth, therefore nothing which the laws of our nature or the facts of the external world prove to be true, can contradict the teaching of God's Word. Neither can the Scriptures contradict the truths of philosophy or science.

Philosophers and Theologians should Strive after Unity.

5. As these two great sources of knowledge must be consistent in their valid teachings, it is the duty of all parties to endeavor to exhibit that consistency. Philosophers should not ignore the teachings of the Bible, and theologians should not ignore the teachings of science. Much less should either class needlessly come into collision with the other. It is unreasonable and irreligious for philosophers to adopt and promulgate theories inconsistent with the facts of the Bible, when those theories are sustained by only plausible evidence, which does not command the assent even of the body of scientific men themselves. On the other hand, it is unwise for theologians to insist on an interpretation of Scripture which brings it into collision with the facts of science. Both of these mistakes are often made. The Bible, for example, clearly teaches the unity of the existing races of men, both as to origin and species. Many Naturalists, however, insist that they are diverse, some say, both in origin and kind, and others, in origin if not in species. This is done not only on merely

plausible evidence, being one of several possible ways of accounting for acknowledged diversities, but in opposition to the most decisive proof to the contrary. This proof, so far as it is historical and philological, does not fall within the sphere of natural science, and therefore the mere Naturalist disregards it. Comparative philologists hold up their hands at the obtuseness of men of science, who maintain that races have had different origins, whose languages render it clear to demonstration that they have been derived from a comnion stock. Considering the overwhelming weight of evidence of the divine authority of the Scriptures, and the unspeakable importance of that authority being maintained over the minds and hearts of men, it evinces fearful recklessness on the part of those who wantonly impugn its teachings. On the other hand, it is unwise in theologians to array themselves needlessly against the teachings of science. Romanists and Protestants vainly resisted the adoption of the Copernican theory of our solar system. They interpreted the Bible in a sense contradictory to that theory. So far as in them lay, they staked the authority of the Bible on the correctness of their interpretation. The theory proved to be true, and the received interpretation had to be given up. The Bible, however, has received no injury, although theologians have been taught an important lesson; that is, to let science take its course, assured that the Scriptures will accommodate themselves to all well-authenticated scientific facts in time to come, as they have in time past.

The Authority of Facts.

6. The relation between Revelation and Philosophy (taking the word in its restricted sense) is different from that between Revelation and Science. Or, to express the same idea in different words, the relation between revelation and facts is one thing; and the relation between revelation and theories another thing. Facts do not admit of denial. They are determined by the wisdom and will of God. To deny facts, is to deny what God affirms to be true. This the Bible cannot do. It cannot contradict God. The theologian, therefore, acknowledges that the Scriptures must be interpreted in accordance with established facts. He has a right, however, to demand that those facts should be verified beyond the possibility of doubt. Scientific men in one age or country affirm the truth of facts, which others deny or disprove. It would be a lamentable spectacle to see the Church changing its doctrines, or its interpretation of Scripture, to suit the constantly changing representations of scientific men as to matters of fact.

While acknowledging their obligation to admit undeniable facts, theologians are at liberty to receive or reject the theories deduced from those facts. Such theories are human speculations, and can have no higher authority than their own inherent probability. The facts of light, electricity, magnetism, are permanent. The theories concerning them are constantly changing. The facts of geology are to be admitted; the theories of geologists have no coercive authority. The facts of physiology and comparative anatomy may be received; but no man is bound to receive any of the various conflicting theories of development. Obvious as this distinction between facts and theories is, it is nevertheless often disregarded. Scientific men are disposed to demand for their theories, the authority due only to established facts. And theologians, because at liberty to reject theories, are sometimes led to assert their independence of facts.

The Authority of the Bible higher than that of Philosophy.

7. Philosophy, in its widest sense, being the conclusions of the human intelligence as

to what is true, and the Bible being the declaration of God, as to what is true, it is plain that where the two contradict each other, philosophy must yield to revelation; man must yield to God. It has been admitted that revelation cannot contradict facts; that the Bible must be interpreted in accordance with what God has clearly made known in the constitution of our nature and in the outward world. But the great body of what passes for philosophy or science, is merely human speculation. What is the philosophy of the Orientals, of Brahmins and Buddhists, of the early Gnostics, of the Platonists, of the Scotists in the Middle Ages; of Leibnitz with his monads and pre-established harmony; of Des Cartes and his vortices; of Kant and his categories; of Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, with their different theories of idealistic pantheism? The answer to that question is, that these systems of philosophy are so many forms of human speculation; and consequently that so far as these speculations agree with the Bible they are true; and so far as they differ from it, they are false and worthless. This is the ground which every believer, learned or unlearned, is authorized and bound to take. If the Bible teaches that God is a person, the philosophy that teaches that an infinite being cannot be a person, is false. If the Bible teaches that God creates, controls, regenerates, the philosophy that forbids the assumption that He acts in time, is to be rejected. If the Bible teaches that the soul exists after the dissolution of the body, the philosophy which teaches that man is only the ephemeral manifestation of a generic life in connection with a given corporeal organization, is to be dismissed without further examination. In short, the Bible teaches certain doctrines concerning the nature of God and his relation to the world; concerning the origin, nature, and destiny of man; concerning the nature of virtue, the ground of moral obligation, human liberty and responsibility; what is the rule of duty, what is right and what is wrong in all our relations to God and to our fellow creatures. These are subjects on which philosophy undertakes to speculate and dogmatize; if in any case these speculations come into conflict with what is taught or necessarily implied in the Bible, they are thereby refuted, as by a reductio ad absurdum. And the disposition which refuses to give up these speculations in obedience to the teaching of the Bible, is inconsistent with Christianity. It is the indispensable condition of salvation through the gospel, that we receive as true whatever God has revealed in his Word. We must make our choice between the wisdom of men and the wisdom of God. The wisdom of men is foolishness with God; and the wisdom of God is foolishness to the wise of this world.

The relation, therefore, between philosophy and revelation, as determined by the Scriptures themselves, is what every right-minded man must approve. Everything is conceded to philosophy and science, which they can rightfully demand. It is admitted that they have a large and important sphere of investigation. It is admitted that within that sphere they are entitled to the greatest deference. It is cheerfully conceded that they have accomplished much, not only as means of mental discipline, but in the enlargement of the sphere of human knowledge, and in promoting the refinement and well-being of men. It is admitted that theologians are not infallible, in the interpretation of Scripture. It may, therefore, happen in the future, as it has in the past, that interpretations of the Bible, long confidently received, must be modified or abandoned, to bring revelation into harmony with what God teaches in his works. This change of view as to the true meaning of the Bible may be a painful trial to the Church, but it does not in the least impair the authority of the Scriptures. They remain infallible; we are merely convicted of having mistaken their

meaning.

[13] De Officiis, lib. ii. c. 2.

[14] Introd. ad Philosophiam, sect. 107.

[15] Inst. of Metaphys. p. 2.

§ 7. Office of the Senses in Matters of Faith.

The question, What authority is due to the senses in matters of faith, arose out of the controversy between Romanists and Protestants. The doctrine of transubstantiation, as taught by the Romish Church, contradicts the testimony of our senses of sight, taste, and touch. It was natural for Protestants to appeal to this contradiction as decisive evidence against the doctrine. Romanists reply by denying the competency of the senses to bear testimony in such cases.

Protestants maintain the validity of that testimony on the following grounds: (1.) Confidence in the well-authenticated testimony of our senses, is one of those laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature; from the authority of those laws it is impossible that we should emancipate ourselves. (2.) Confidence in our senses is, therefore, one form of confidence in God. It supposes him to have placed us under the necessity of error, to assume that we cannot safely trust the guides in which, by a law of our nature, he constrains us to confide. (3.) All ground of certainty in matters either of faith or knowledge, is destroyed, if confidence in the laws of our nature be abandoned. Nothing is then possible but absolute skepticism. We, in that case, cannot know that we ourselves exist, or that the world exists, or that there is a God, or a moral law, or any responsibility for character or conduct. (4.) All external supernatural revelation is addressed to the senses. Those who heard Christ had to trust to their sense of hearing; those who read the Bible have to trust to their sense of sight; those who receive the testimony of the Church, receive it through their senses. It is suicidal, therefore, in the Romanists to say that the senses are not to be trusted in matters of faith.

All the arguments derived from the false judgments of men when misled by the senses, are answered by the simple statement of the proposition, that the senses are to be trusted only within their legitimate sphere. The eye may indeed deceive us when the conditions of correct vision are not present; but this does not prove that it is not to be trusted within its appropriate limits.

CHAPTER IV: MYSTICISM.

§ 1. Meaning of the Words Enthusiasm and Mysticism.

In the popular sense of the word, enthusiasm means a high state of mental excitement. In that state all the powers are exalted, the thoughts become more comprehensive and vivid, the feelings more fervid, and the will more determined. It is in these periods of excitement that the greatest works of genius, whether by poets, painters, or warriors, have been accomplished. The ancients referred this exaltation of the inner man to a divine influence. They regarded persons thus excited as possessed, or having a God within them. Hence they were called enthusiasts (entheos). In theology, therefore, those who ignore or reject the guidance of the Scriptures, and assume to be led by an inward divine influence into the knowledge and obedience of the truth, are properly called Enthusiasts. This term, however, has been in a great measure superseded by the word Mystics.

Few words indeed have been used in such a vague, indefinite sense as Mysticism. Its etymology does not determine its meaning. A mustes was one initiated into the knowledge of the Greek mysteries, one to whom secret things had been revealed. Hence in the wide sense of the word, a Mystic is one who claims to see or know what is hidden from other men, whether this knowledge be attained by immediate intuition, or by inward revelation. In most cases these methods were assumed to be identical, as intuition was held to be the immediate vision of God and of divine things. Hence, in the wide sense of the word, Mystics are those who claim to be under the immediate guidance of God or of his Spirit.

A. The Philosophical Use of the Word.

Hence Mysticism, in this sense, includes all those systems of philosophy, which teach either the identity of God and the soul, or the immediate intuition of the infinite. The pantheism of the Brahmins and Buddhists, the theosophy of the Sufis, the Egyptian, and many forms of the Greek philosophy, in this acceptation of the term, are all Mystical. As the same system has been reproduced in modern times, the same designation is applied to the philosophy of Spinoza, and its various modifications. According to Cousin, "Mysticism in philosophy is the belief that God may be known face to face, without anything intermediate. It is a yielding to the sentiment awakened by the idea of the infinite, and a running up of all knowledge and all duty to the contemplation and love of Him." [16]

For the same reason the whole Alexandrian school of theology in the early Church has been called Mystical. They characteristically depreciated the outward authority of the Scriptures, and exalted that of the inward light. It is true they called that light reason, but they regarded it as divine. According to the new Platonic doctrine, the Logos, or impersonal reason of God, is Reason in man; or as Clemens Alexandrinus said, The Logos

was a light common to all men. That, therefore, to which supreme authority was ascribed in the pursuit of truth, was "God within us." This is the doctrine of modern Eclecticism as presented by Cousin. That philosopher says, "Reason is impersonal in its nature. It is not we who make it. It is so far from being individual, that its peculiar characteristics are the opposite of individuality, namely, universality and necessity, since it is to Reason we owe the knowledge of universal and necessary truths, of principles which we all obey, and cannot but obey. . . . . It descends from God, and approaches man. It makes its appearance in the consciousness as a guest, who brings intelligence of an unknown world, of which it at once presents the idea and awakens the want. If reason were personal, it would have no value, no authority beyond the limits of the individual subject. . . . . Reason is a revelation, a necessary and universal revelation which is wanting to no man, and which enlightens every man on his coming into the world. Reason is the necessary mediator between God and man, the Logos of Pythagoras and Plato, the Word made Flesh, which serves as the interpreter of God, and teacher of man, divine and human at the same time. It is not indeed the absolute God in his majestic individuality, but his manifestation in spirit and in truth. It is not the Being of beings, but it is the revealed God of the human race." [17]

Reason, according to this system, is not a faculty of the human soul, but God in man. As electricity and magnetism are (or used to be) regarded as forces diffused through the material world, so the Logos, the divine impersonal reason, is diffused through the world of mind, and reveals itself more or less potentially in the souls of all men. This theory, in one aspect, is a form of Rationalism, as it refers all our higher, and especially our religious knowledge, to a subjective source, which it designates Reason. It has, however, more points of analogy with Mysticism, because, (1.) It assumes that the informing principle, the source of knowledge and guide in duty, is divine, something which does not belong to our nature, but appears as a guest in our consciousness. (2.) The office of this inward principle, or light, is the same in both systems. It is to reveal truth and duty, to elevate and purify the soul. (3.) Its authority is the same; that is, it is paramount if not exclusive. (4.) Its very designations are the same. It is called by philosophers, God, the Logos, the Word; by Christians, Christ within us, or, the Spirit. Thus systems apparently the most diverse (Cousin and George Fox!) run into each other, and reveal themselves as reproductions of heathen philosophy, or of the heresies of the early Church.

Although the Alexandrian theologians had these points of agreement with the Mystics, yet as they were speculative in their whole tendency, and strove to transmute Christianity into a philosophy, they are not properly to be regarded as Mystics in the generally received theological meaning of the term.

B. The Sense in which Evangelical Christians are called Mystics.

As all Evangelical Christians admit a supernatural influence of the Spirit of God upon the soul, and recognize a higher form of knowledge, holiness, and fellowship with God, as the effects of that influence, they are stigmatized as Mystics, by those who discard everything supernatural from Christianity. The definitions of Mysticism given by Rationalists are designedly so framed as to include what all evangelical Christians hold to be true concerning the illumination, teaching, and guidance of the Holy Spirit. Thus Wegscheider [18] says, "Mysticismus est persuasio de singulari anim[illegible] facultate ad immediatum ipsoque sensu percipiendum cum numine aut naturis coelestibus commercium

jam in hac vita perveniendi, quo mens immediate cognitione rerum divinarum ac beatitate perfruatur." And Bretschneider [19] defines Mysticism as a "Belief in a continuous operation of God on the soul, secured by special religious exercise, producing illumination, holiness, and beatitude." Evangelical theologians so far acquiesce in this view, that they say, as Lange, [20] and Nitsch, [21] "that every true believer is a Mystic." The latter writer adds, "That the Christian ideas of illumination, revelation, incarnation, regeneration, the sacraments and the resurrection, are essentially Mystical elements. As often as the religious and church-life recovers itself from formalism and scholastic barrenness, and is truly revived, it always appears as Mystical, and gives rise to the outcry that Mysticism is gaining the ascendency." Some writers, indeed, make a distinction between Mystik and Mysticismus. "Die innerliche Lebendigkeit der Religion ist allezeit Mystik" (The inward vitality of religion is ever Mystik), says Nitsch, but "Mysticismus ist eine einseitige Herrschaft und eine Ausartung der mystischen Richtung." That is, Mysticism is an undue and perverted development of the mystical element which belongs to true religion. This distinction, between Mystik and Mysticismus, is not generally recognized, and cannot be well expressed in English. Lange, instead of using different words, speaks of a true and false Mysticism. But different things should be designated by different words. There has been a religious theory, which has more or less extensively prevailed in the Church, which is distinguished from the Scriptural doctrine by unmistakable characteristics, and which is known in church history as Mysticism, and the word should be restricted to that theory. It is the theory, variously modified, that the knowledge, purity, and blessedness to be derived from communion with God, are not to be attained from the Scriptures and the use of the ordinary means of grace, but by a supernatural and immediate divine influence, which influence (or communication of God to the soul) is to be secured by passivity, a simple yielding the soul without thought or effort to the divine influx.

C. The System which makes the Feelings the Source of Knowledge.

A still wider use of the word Mysticism has to some extent been adopted. Any system, whether in philosophy or religion, which assigns more importance to the feelings than to the intellect, is called Mystical. Cousin, and after him, Morell, arrange the systems of philosophy under the heads of Sensationalism, Idealism, Skepticism, and Mysticism. The first makes the senses the exclusive or predominant source of our knowledge; the second, the self, in its constitution and laws, as understood and apprehended by the intellect; and Mysticism, the feelings. The Mystic assumes that the senses and reason are alike untrustworthy and inadequate, as sources of knowledge; that nothing can be received with confidence as truth, at least in the higher departments of knowledge, in all that relates to our own nature, to God, and our relation to Him, except what is revealed either naturally or supernaturally in the feelings. There are two forms of Mysticism, therefore: the one which assumes the feelings themselves to be the sources of this knowledge; the other that it is through the feelings that God makes the truth known to the soul. [22] "Reason is no longer viewed as the great organ of truth; its decisions are enstamped as uncertain, faulty, and well-nigh valueless, while the inward impulses of our sensibility, developing themselves in the form of faith or of inspiration, are held up as the true and infallible source of human knowledge. The fundamental process, therefore, of all Mysticism, is to reverse the true order of nature, and give the precedence to the emotional instead of the intellectual element of the human mind." [23] This is declared to be "the common ground of all Mysticism."

Schleiermacher's Theory.

If this be a correct view of the nature of Mysticism; if it consists in giving predominant authority to the feelings in matters of religion; and if their impulses, developing themselves in the form of faith, are the true and infallible source of knowledge, then Schleiermacher's system, adopted and expounded by Morell himself in his "Philosophy of Religion," is the most elaborate system of theology ever presented to the Church. It is the fundamental principle of Schleiermacher's theory, that religion resides not in the intelligence, or the will or active powers, but in the sensibility. It is a form of feeling, a sense of absolute dependence. Instead of being, as we seem to be, individual, separate free agents, originating our own acts, we recognize ourselves as a part of a great whole, determined in all things by the great whole, of which we are a part. We find ourselves as finite creatures over against an infinite Being, in relation to whom we are as nothing. The Infinite is everything; and everything is only a manifestation of the Infinite. "Although man," says even Morell, "while in the midst of finite objects, always feels himself to a certain extent free and independent; yet in the presence of that which is self-existent, infinite, and eternal, he may feel the sense of freedom utterly pass away, and become absorbed in the sense of absolute dependence." [24] This is said to be the essential principle of religion in all its forms from Fetichism up to Christianity. It depends mainly on the degree of culture of the individual or community, in what way this sense of dependence shall reveal itself: because the more enlightened and pure the individual is, the more he will be able to apprehend aright what is involved in this sense of dependence upon God. Revelation is not the communication of new truth to the understanding, but the providential influences by which the religious life is awakened in the soul. Inspiration is not the divine influence which controls the mental operations and utterances of its subject, so as to render him infallible in the communication of the truth revealed, but simply the intuition of eternal verities due to the excited state of the religious feelings. Christianity, subjectively considered, is the intuitions of good men, as occasioned and determined by the appearance of Christ. Objectively considered, or, in other words, Christian theology, it is the logical analysis, and scientific arrangement and elucidation of the truths involved in those intuitions. The Scriptures, as a rule of faith, have no authority. They are of value only as means of awakening in us the religious life experienced by the Apostles, and thus enabling us to attain like intuitions of divine things. The source of our religious life, according to this system, is the feelings, and if this be the characteristic feature of Mysticism, the Schleiermaeher doctrine is purely Mystical.

D. Mysticism as known in Church History.

This, however, is not what is meant by Mysticism, as it has appeared in the Christian Church. The Mystics, as already stated, are those who claim an immediate communication of divine knowledge and of divine life from God to the soul, independently of the Scriptures and the use of the ordinary means of grace. "It despairs," says Fleming, "of the regular process of science; it believes that we may attain directly, without the aid of the senses or reason, and by an immediate intuition, the real and absolute principle of all truth, -- God." [25]

Mystics are of two classes; the Theosophists, whose object is knowledge, and with whom the organ of communication with God, is the reason; and the Mystics proper, whose

object is, life, purity, and beatitude; and with whom the organ of communication, or receptivity, is the feelings. They agree, first, in relying on the immediate revelation or communication of God to the soul; and secondly, that these communications are to be attained, in the neglect of outward means, by quiet or passive contemplation. "The Theosophist is one who gives a theory of God, or of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of his own for its basis." [26] "The Theosophists, neither contented with the natural light of reason, nor with the simple doctrines of Scripture understood in their literal sense, have recourse to an internal supernatural light superior to all other illuminations, from which they profess to derive a mysterious and divine philosophy manifested only to the chosen favorites of heaven." [27]

Mysticism not identical with the Doctrine of Spiritual Illumination.

Mysticism, then, is not to he confounded with the doctrine of spiritual illumination as held by all evangelical Christians. The Scriptures clearly teach that the mere outward presentation of the truth in the Word, does not suffice to the conversion or sanctification of men; that the natural, or unrenewed man, does not receive the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them; that in order to any saving knowledge of the truth, i.e., of such knowledge as produces holy affections and secures a holy life, there is need of an inward supernatural teaching of the Spirit, producing what the Scriptures call "spiritual discernment," This supernatural teaching our Lord promised to his disciples when He said that He would send them the Spirit of truth to dwell in them, and to guide them into the knowledge of the truth. For this teaching the sacred writers pray that it may be granted not to themselves only, but to all who heard their words or read their writings. On this they depended exclusively for their success in preaching or teaching. Hence believers were designated as pneumatikoi, a Spiritu Dei illuminati, qui reguntur a Spiritu. And men of the world, unrenewed men, are described as those who have not the Spirit. God, therefore, does hold immediate intercourse with the souls of men. He reveals himself unto his people, as He does not unto the world. He gives them the Spirit of revelation in the knowledge of himself. (Eph. i. 17.) He unfolds to them his glory, and fills them with a joy which passes understanding. All this is admitted; but this is very different from Mysticism. The two things, namely, spiritual illumination and Mysticism, differ, firstly, as to their object. The object of the inward teaching of the Spirit is to enable us to discern the truth and excellence of what is already objectively revealed in the Bible. The illumination claimed by the Mystic communicates truth independently of its objective revelation. It is not intended to enable us to appreciate what we already know, but to communicate new knowledge. It would be one thing to enable man to discern and appreciate the beauty of a work of art placed before his eyes, and quite another thing to give him the intuition of all possible forms of truth and beauty, independent of everything external. So there is a great difference between that influence which enables the soul to discern the things "freely given to us of God" (1 Cor. ii. 12) in his Word, and the immediate revelation to the mind of all the contents of that word, or of their equivalents.

The doctrines of spiritual illumination and of Mysticism differ not only in the object, but secondly, in the manner in which that object is to be attained. The inward teaching of the Spirit is to be sought by prayer, and the diligent use of the appointed means; the intuitions of the Mystic are sought in the neglect of all means, in the suppression of all activity inward

and outward, and in a passive waiting for the influx of God into the soul. They differ, thirdly, in their effects. The effect of spiritual illumination is, that the Word dwells in us "in all wisdom and spiritual understanding" (Col. i. 9). What dwells in the mind of the Mystic are his own imaginings, the character of which depends on his own subjective state; and whatever they are, they are of man and not of God.

It differs from the Doctrine of the "Leading of the Spirit."

Neither is Mysticism to be confounded with the doctrine of spiritual guidance. Evangelical Christians admit that the children of God are led by the Spirit of God; that their convictions as to truth and duty, their inward character and outward conduct, are moulded by his influence. They are children unable to guide themselves, who are led by an ever-present Father of infinite wisdom and love. This guidance is partly providential, ordering their external circumstances; partly through the Word, which is a lamp to their feet; and partly by the inward influence of the Spirit on the mind. This last, however, is also through the Word, making it intelligible and effectual; bringing it suitably to remembrance. God leads his people by the cords of a man, i.e., in accordance with the laws of his nature. This is very different from the doctrine that the soul, by yielding itself passively to God, is filled with all truth and goodness; or, that in special emergencies it is controlled by blind, irrational impulses.

It differs from the Doctrine of "Common Grace."

Finally, Mysticism differs from the doctrine of common graces as held by all Augustinians, and that of sufficient grace as held by Arminians. All Christians believe that as God is everywhere present in the material world, guiding the operation of second causes so that they secure the results which He designs; so his Spirit is everywhere present with the minds of men, exciting to good and restraining from evil, effectually controlling human character and conduct, consistently with the laws of rational beings. According to the Arminian theory this "common grace" is sufficient, if properly cultured and obeyed, to lead men to salvation, whether Pagans, Mohammedans, or Christians. There is little analogy, however, between this doctrine of common, or sufficient grace, and Mysticism as it has revealed itself in the history of the Church. The one assumes an influence of the Spirit on all men analogous to the providential efficiency of God in nature, the other an influence analogous to that granted to prophets and apostles, involving both revelation and inspiration.

[16] Cours de l'Hist. de la Phil. Mod. Prem. Ser. Paris, 1846, vol. ii. le&#65533;. 9, 10. pp. 95, 120.

[17] Specimens of Foreign Standard Literature, edited by George Ripley, vol. i.; Philosophical Miscellanies from Cousin, et al., pp. 125, 149.

[18] Inst. § 5.

[19] Systematische Entwickelung, fourth edit. p. 19.

[20] In Herzog's Encyklop&#65533;die, art. "Mystik."

[21] System der Christlichen Lehre, fifth edit. p. 35.

[22] See Cousin's Cours de l'Histoire de la Philosophie, and Morell's History of Modern Philosophy, p. 556 ff.

[23] Morell, p. 560.

[24] Philosophy of Religion, p. 75.

[25] Word "Mysticism."

[26] Vaughan, Hours with the Mystics, vol. i. p. 45.

[27] Taylor, Elements of Thought. See Fleming, word "Theosophism."

§ 2. Mysticism in the Early Church.

A. Montanism.

The Montanists who arose toward the close of the second century had, in one aspect, some affinity to Mysticism. Montanus taught that as the ancient prophets predicted the coming of the Messiah through whom new revelations were to be made; so Christ predicted the coming of the Paraclete through whom further communications of the mind of God were to be made to his people. Tertullian, by whom this system was reduced to order and commended to the higher class of minds, did indeed maintain that the rule of faith was fixed and immutable; but nevertheless that there was need of a continued supernatural revelation of truth, at least as to matters of duty and discipline. This supernatural revelation was made through the Paraclete; whether, as was perhaps the general idea among the Montanists, by communications granted, from lime to time, to special individuals, who thereby became Christian prophets; or by an influence common to all believers, which however some more than others experienced and improved. The following passage from Tertullian [28] gives clearly the fundamental principle of the system, so far as this point is concerned: "Regula quidem fidei una omnino est, sola immobilis et irreformabilis. . . . . Hac lege fidei manente, cetera jam disciplin&#65533; et conversationis admittunt novitatem correctionis; operante scilicet et proficiente usque in finem gratia Dei. . . . . Propterea Paracletum misit Dominus, ut, quoniam humana mediocritas omnia semel capere non poterat, paulatim dirigeretur et ordinaretur et ad perfectum perduceretur disciplina ab illo vicario Domini Spiritu Sancto. Qu&#65533; est ergo Paracleti administratio nisi h&#65533;c, quod disciplina dirigitur, quod Scriptur&#65533; revelantur, quod intellectus reformatur, quod ad meliora proficitur? . . . . Justitia primo fuit in rudimentis, natura Deum metuens; dehinc per legem et prophetas promovit in infantiam; dehinc per evangelium efferbuit in juventutem; nunc per Paracletum componitur in maturitatem."

The points of analogy between Montanism and Mysticism are that both assume the insufficiency of the Scriptures and the ordinances of the Church for the full development of the Christian life; and both assert the necessity of a continued, supernatural, revelation from the Spirit of God. In other respects the two tendencies were divergent. Mysticism was directed to the inner life; Montanism to the outward. It concerned itself with the reformation of manners and strictness of discipline. It enjoined fasts, and other ascetic practices. As it depended on the supernatural and continued guidance of the Spirit, it was on the one hand opposed to speculation, or the attempt to develop Christianity by philosophy; and on the other to the dominant authority of the bishops. Its denunciatory and exclusive spirit led to its condemnation as heretical. As the Montanists excommunicated the Church, the Church excommunicated them. [29]

B. The so-called Dionysius, the Areopagite.

Mysticism, in the common acceptation of the term, is antagonistic to speculation. And

yet they are often united. There have been speculative or philosophical Mystics. The father indeed of Mysticism in the Christian Church, was a philosopher. About the year A.D. 523, during the Monothelite controversy certain writings were quoted as of authority as being the productions of Dionysius the Areopagite. The total silence respecting them during the preceding centuries; the philosophical views which they express; the allusions to the state of the Church with which they abound, have produced the conviction, universally entertained, that they were the work of some author who lived in the latter part of the fifth century. The most learned investigators, however, confess their inability to fix with certainty or even with probability on any writer to whom they can be referred. Though their authorship is unknown, their influence has been confessedly great. The works which bear the pseudonym of Dionysius are, "The Celestial Hierarchy," "The Terrestrial Hierarchy," "Mystical Theology," and "Twelve Epistles." Their contents show that their author belonged to the school of the New Platonists, and that his object was to propagate the peculiar views of that school in the Christian Church. The writer attempts to show that the real, esoteric doctrines of Christianity are identical with those of his own school of philosophy. In other words, he taught New Platonism, in the terminology of the Church. Christian ideas were entirely excluded, while the language of the Bible was retained. Thus in our day we have had the philosophy of Schelling and Hegel set forth in the formulas of Christian theology.

New Platonism.

The New Platonists taught that the original ground and source of all things was simple being, without life or consciousness; of which absolutely nothing could be known, beyond that it is. They assumed an unknown quantity, of which nothing can be predicated. The pseudo-Dionysius called this original ground of all things God, and taught that God was mere being without attributes of any kind, not only unknowable by man, but of whom there was nothing to be known, as absolute being is in the language of the modern philosophy, -- Nothing; nothing in itself, yet nevertheless the dunamis ton panton.

The universe proceeds from primal being, not by any exercise of conscious power or will, but by a process or emanation. The familiar illustration is derived from the flow of light from the sun. With this difference, however. That the sun emits light, is a proof that it is itself luminous but the fact that intelligent beings emanate from the "ground-being," is not admitted as proof that it is intelligent. The fact that the air produces cheerfulness, say these philosophers, does not prove that the atmosphere experiences joy. We can infer nothing as to the nature of the cause from the nature of the effects.

These emanations are of different orders; decreasing in dignity and excellence as they are distant from the primal source. The first of these emanations is mind, nous, intelligence individualized in different ranks of spiritual beings. The next, proceeding from the first, is soul, which becomes individualized by organic or vital connection with matter. There is, therefore, an intelligence of intelligences, and also a soul of souls; hence their generic unity. Evil arises from the connection of the spiritual with the corporeal, and yet this connection so far as souls are concerned, is necessary to their individuality. Every soul, therefore, is an emanation from the soul of the world, as that is from God, through the Intelligence.

As there is no individual soul without a body, and as evil is the necessary consequence of union with a body, evil is not only necessary or unavoidable, it is a good.

The end of philosophy is the immediate vision of God, which gives the soul supreme blessedness and rest. This union with God is attained by sinking into ourselves; by passivity. As we are a form, or mode of God's existence, we find God in ourselves, and are consciously one with him, when this is really apprehended; or, when we suffer God, as it were, to absorb our individuality.

The primary emanations from the ground of all being, which the heathen called gods (as they had gods many and lords many) the New Platonists, spirits or intelligences; and the Gnostics, ◆ons; the pseudo-Dionysius called angels. These he divided into three triads: (1.) thrones, cherubim, and seraphim; (2.) powers, lordships, authorities; (3.) angels, archangels, principalities. He classified the ordinances and officers and members of the Church into corresponding triads: (1.) The sacraments, -- baptism, communion, anointing, -- these were the means of initiation or consecration ; (2.) The initiators, -- bishops, priests, deacons; (3.) The initiated, -- monks, the baptized, catechumens.

The terms God, sin, redemption, are retained in this system, but the meaning attached to them was entirely inconsistent with the sense they bear in the Bible and in the Christian Church. The pseudo-Dionysius was a heathen philosopher in the vestments of a Christian minister. The philosophy which he taught he claimed to be the true sense of the doctrines of the Church, as that sense had been handed down by a secret tradition. Notwithstanding its heathen origin and character, its influence in the Church was great and long continued. The writings of its author were translated, annotated and paraphrased, centuries after his death. As there is no effect without an adequate cause, there must have been power in this system and an adaptation to the cravings of a large class of minds.

Causes of the Influence of the Writings of the pseudo-Dionysius.

To account for its extensive influence it may be remarked: (1.) That it did not openly shock the faith or prejudices of the Church. It did not denounce any received doctrine or repudiate any established institution or ordinance. It pretended to be Christian. It undertook to give a deeper and more correct insight into the mysteries of religion. (2.) It subordinated the outward to the inward. Some men are satisfied with rites, ceremonies, symbols, which may mean anything or nothing; others, with knowledge or clear views of truth. To others, the inner life of the soul, intercourse with God, is the great thing. To these this system addressed itself. It proposed to satisfy this craving after God, not indeed in a legitimate way, or by means of Gods appointment. Nevertheless it was the high end of union with him that it proposed, and which it professed to secure. (3.) This system was only one form of the doctrine which has such a fascination for the human mind, and which underlies so many forms of religion in every age of the world; the doctrine, namely, that the universe is an efflux of the life of God, -- all things flowing from him, and back again to him from everlasting to everlasting. This doctrine quiets the conscience, as it precludes the idea of sin; it gives the peace which flows from fatalism; and it promises the absolute rest of unconsciousness when the individual is absorbed in the bosom of the Infinite. [30]

[28] De Virgg. Veland c. 1 -- Edit. Basle, 1562, p. 490.

[29] See Neander's Dogmengeschichte, vol. i. Schwegler, F. C. (disciple of Baur) Der Montanismus und die Christliche Kirche des Zweiten Jahrhunderts, Tub. 1841-1848. A concise and clear account of Montanism is given in Mosheim's Commentary on the Affairs of Christians before the Time of Constantine. vol. i. § 66, pp. 497 ff. of Murdock's edition.

[30] See Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. ⁂ 168-172. Ritter's Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 115-135. Herzog's Encyklop⁂die.

§ 3. Mysticism during the Middle Ages.

A. General Characteristics of this Period.

The Middle Ages embrace the period from the close of the sixth century to the Reformation. This period is distinguished by three marked characteristics. First, the great development of the Latin Church in its hierarchy, its worship, and its formulated doctrines, as well as in its superstitions, corruptions, and power. Secondly, the extraordinary intellectual activity awakened in the region of speculation, as manifested in the multiplication of seats of learning, in the number and celebrity of their teachers, and in the great multitude of students by which they were attended, and in the interest taken by all classes in the subjects of learned discussion. Thirdly, by a widespread and variously manifested movement of, so to speak, the inner life of the Church, protesting against the formalism, the corruption, and the tyranny of the external Church. This protest was made partly openly by those whom Protestants are wont to call "Witnesses for the Truth;" and partly within the Church itself. The opposition within the Church manifested itself partly among the people, in the formation of fellowships or societies for benevolent effort and spiritual culture, such as the Beguines, the Beghards, the Lollards, and afterwards, "The Brethren of the Common Lot;" and partly in the schools, or by the teachings of theologians.

It was the avowed aim of the theologians of this period to justify the doctrines of the Church at the bar of reason; to prove that what was received on authority as a matter of faith, was true as a matter of philosophy. It was held to be the duty of the theologian to exalt faith into knowledge. Or, as Anselm [31] expresses it: "rationabili necessitate intelligere, esse oportere omnia illa, qu⁂ nobis fides catholica de Christo credere pr⁂cipit." Richard ⁂ St. Victore still more strongly asserts that we are bound, "quod tenemus ex fide, ratione apprehendere et demonstrativ⁂ certitudinis attestatione firmare."

The First Class of Medi⁂val Theologians.

Of these theologians, however, there were three classes. First, those who avowedly exalted reason above authority, and refused to receive anything on authority which they could not for themselves, on rational grounds, prove to be true. John Scotus Erigena (Eringeborne, Irish-born) may be taken as a representative of this class. He not only held, that reason and revelation, philosophy and religion, are perfectly consistent, but that religion and philosophy are identical. "Conficitur," he says, "inde veram philosophiam esse veram religionem conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam." [32] And on the crucial question, Whether faith precedes science, or science faith, he decided for the latter. Reason, with him, was paramount to authority, the latter having no force except when sustained by the former. "Auctoritas siquidem ex vera ratione processit, ratio vero nequaquam ex auctoritate. Omnis autem auctoritas, qu⁂ vera ratione non approbatur, infirma videtur esse. Vera autem ratio, quum virtutibus suis rata atque immutabilis munitur, nullius auctoritatis adstipulatione roborari indiget." [33] His philosophy as developed in his work, "De Divisione Natur⁂," is purely pantheistic. There is with him but one being, and everything real is thought. His system, therefore, is nearly identical with the idealistic

pantheism of Hegel; yet he had his trinitarianism, his soteriology, and his eschatology, as a theologian.

The Second Class.

The second and more numerous class of the medi&#xfffd;val theologians took the ground that faith in matters of religion precedes science; that truths are revealed to us supernaturally by the Spirit of God, which truths are to be received on the authority of the Scriptures and the testimony of the Church. But being believed, then we should endeavor to comprehend and to prove them; so that our conviction of their truth should rest on rational grounds. It is very evident that everything depends on the spirit with which this principle is applied, and on the extent to which it is carried. In the hands of many of the schoolmen, as of the Fathers, it was merely a form of rationalism. Many taught that while Christianity was to be received by the people on authority as a matter of faith, it was to be received by the cultivated as a matter of knowledge. The human was substituted for the divine, the authority of reason for the testimony of God. With the better class of the schoolmen the principle in question was held with many limitations. Anselm, for example taught: (1.) That holiness of heart is the essential condition of true knowledge. It is only so far as the truths of religion enter into our personal experience, that we are able properly to apprehend them. Faith, therefore, as including spiritual discernment, must precede all true knowledge. "Qui secundum carnem vivit, carnalis sive animalis est, de quo dicitur: animalis homo non percipit ea, qu&#xfffd; sunt Spiritus Dei. . . . . Qui non crediderit, non intelliget, nam qui non crediderit, non experietur, et qui expertus non fuerit, non intelliget." [34] "Neque enim qu&#xfffd;ro intelligere, ut credam, sed credo, ut intelligam. Nam et hoc credo, quia, nisi credidero, non intelligam." [35] (2.) He held that rational proof was not needed as a help to faith. It was as absurd, he said, for us to presume to add authority to the testimony of God by our reasoning, as for a man to prop up Olympus. (3.) He taught that there are doctrines of revelation which transcend our reason, which we cannot rationally pretend to comprehend or prove, and which are to be received on the simple testimony of God. "Nam Christianus per fidem debet ad intellectum proficere, non per intellectum ad fidem accedere, aut si intelligere non valet, a fide recedere. Sed cum ad intellectum valet pertingere, delectatur, cum vero nequit, quod capere non potest, veneratur." [36]

A third class of the schoolmen, while professing to adhere to the doctrines of the Church, consciously or unconsciously, explained them away.

B. Medi&#xfffd;val Mystics..

Mystics were to be found in all these classes, and therefore they have been divided, as by Dr. Shedd, [37] into the heretical, the orthodox, and an intermediate class, which he designates as latitudinarian. Much to the same effect, Neudecker, [38] classifies them as Theosophist, Evangelical, and Separatist. Ullmann [39] makes a somewhat different classification. The characteristic common to these classes, which differed so much from each other, was not that in all there was a protest of the heart against the head, of the feelings against the intellect, a reaction against the subtleties of the scholastic theologians, for some of the leading Mystics were among the most subtle dialecticians. Nor was it a common adherence to the Platonic as opposed to the Aristotelian philosophy, or to realism as opposed to nominalism. But it was the belief, that oneness with God was the great end to be desired and pursued, and that that union was to be sought, not so much through the truth,

or the Church, or ordinances, or Christian fellowship; but by introspection, meditation, intuition. As very different views were entertained of the nature of the "oneness with God," which was to be sought, so the Mystics differed greatly from each other. Some were extreme pantheists; others were devout theists and Christians. From its essential nature, however, the tendency of Mysticism was to pantheism. And accordingly undisguised pantheism was not only taught by some of the most prominent Mystics, but prevailed extensively among the people.

Pantheistic tendency of Mysticism.

It has already been remarked, that the system of the pseudo-Dionysius, as presented in his "Mystical Theology" and other writings, was essentially pantheistic. Those writings were translated by Scotus Erigena, himself the most pronounced pantheist of the Middle Ages. Through the joint influence of these two men, a strong tendency to pantheism was developed to a greater or less degree among the medi&#65533;val Mystics. Even the associations among the people, such as the Beghards and Lollards, although at first exemplary and useful, by adopting a system of mystic pantheism became entirely corrupt. [40] Believing themselves to be modes of the divine existence, all they did God did, and all they felt inclined to do was an impulse from God, and therefore nothing could be wrong. In our own day the same principles have led to the same consequences in one wing of the German school of philosophy.

It was not only among the people and in these secret fellowships that this system was adopted. Men of the highest rank in the schools, and personally exemplary in their deportment, became the advocates of the theory which lay at the foundation of these practical evils. Of these scholastic pantheistical Mystics, the most distinguished and influential was Henry Eckart, whom some modern writers regard "as the deepest thinker of his age, if not of any age." Neither the time nor the place of his birth is known. He first appears in Paris as a Dominican monk and teacher. In 1304 he was Provincial of the Dominicans in Saxony. Soon after he was active in Strasburg as a preacher. His doctrines were condemned as heretical, although he denied that he had in any respect departed from the doctrines of the Church. From the decision of his archbishop and his provincial council, Eckart appealed to the Pope, by whom the sentence of condemnation was confirmed. This decision, however, was not published until 1329, when Eckart was already dead. It is not necessary here to give the details of his system. Suffice it to say, that he held that God is the only being; that the universe is the self-manifestation of God; that the highest destiny of man is to come to the consciousness of his identity with God; that that end is to be accomplished partly by philosophical abstraction and partly by ascetic self renunciation.

"Although union with God is effected mainly by thinking and consciousness, still it also requires a corresponding act of the will, something practical, such as self-denial and privation, by which man rises above all that is finite. Not only must he lay aside all created things, the world and earthly good, and mortify desire, but more than all he must resign his I,' reduce himself to nothing, and become what he was before he issued forth into this temporal state. Nay, man must rise above the chief good, above virtue, piety, blessedness, and God himself, as things external and superior to his spirit, and it is only when he has thus annihilated self, and all that is not God within him, that nothing remains except the pure and simple divine essence, in which all division is brought into absolute unity." [41]

Another distinguished and influential writer of the same class was John Ruysbroek, born 1293, in a village of that name not far from Brussels. Having entered the service of the Church he devoted himself to the duties of a secular priest until his sixtieth year, when he became prior of a newly instituted monastery. He was active and faithful, gentle and devout. Whether he was a theist or a pantheist is a matter of dispute. His speculative views were formed more or less under the influence of the writings of the pseudo-Dionysius and of Eckart. Gerson, himself a Mystic, objected to his doctrines as pantheistic; and every one acknowledges that there are not only forms of expression but also principles to be found in his writings which imply the pantheistic theory. He speaks of God as the super-essential being including all beings. All creatures, he taught, were in God, as thoughts before their creation. "God saw and recognized them in himself, as somehow, but not wholly, different from himself, for what is in God, is God." "In the act of self-depletion, the spirit loses itself in the enjoyment of love, and imbibes directly the brightness of God, yea, becomes the very brightness which it imbibes. All who are raised to the sublimity of this contemplative life are one with deifying (deifica) brightness, and become one and the same light as that which they behold. To such a height is the spirit elevated above itself, and made one with God, in respect that in the oneness of that living original in which, according to its uncreated being, it possesses itself, it enjoys and contemplates boundless treasures in the same manner as God himself." Ullmann, who quotes these and similar passages, still maintains that Ruysbroek was a theist, because, as he says, Ruysbroek "distinctly recognizes not only the immanence of God, but what no pantheist can do, his transcendence." Moreover, he "too frequently and too solicitously avers that, in the oneness of the contemplative man with God, he still recognizes a difference between the two, to permit us to ascribe to him the doctrine of an absolute solution of the individual into the Divine substance." [42] A man may aver a difference between the waves and the ocean, between the leaves and the tree, and yet in both cases assert a substantial unity. It is true that no one can intelligently affirm the transcendence of God, and still hold the extreme form of pantheism which makes the world the existence-form of God, his whole intelligence, power, and life. But he may be a Monist. He may believe that there is but one Being in the universe, that everything is a form of God, and all life the life of God. Pantheism is Protean. Some moderns speak of a Christian Pantheism. But any system which hinders our saying "Thou," to God, is fatal to religion.

Evangelical Mystics.

Bernard of Clairvaux, Hugo and Richard of St. Victor, Gersorn, Thomas  Kempis and others, are commonly referred to the class of evangelical Mystics. These eminent and influential men differed much from each other, but they all held union within God, not in the Scriptural, but in the mystical sense of that term, as the great object of desire. It was not that they held that "the beatific vision of God," the intuition of his glory, which belongs to heaven, is attainable in this world and attainable by abstraction, ecstatic apprehension, or passive reception, but that the soul becomes one with God, if not in substance, yet in life. These men, however, were great blessings to the Church. Their influence was directed to the preservation of the inward life of religion in opposition to the formality and ritualism which then prevailed in the Church; and thus to free the conscience from subjection to human authority. The writings of Bernard are still held in high esteem, and "The Imitation of Christ," by Thomas Kempis, has diffused itself like incense through all the aisles and

alcoves of the Universal Church. [43]

[31] Cur Deus Homo, lib. i. cap. 25.

[32] De Pr&#65533;dest. cap. i. 1, Migne, Patr. vol. cxxii. p. 358, a.

[33] De Div. Nat., i. 69 f., Migne, ut supra, p.513, b.

[34] De Fide Trinitatis, 2; Opera, Paris, 1721, p. 42, B. b. c.

[35] Proslogium, i.; Ibid. p. 30, B. a.

[36] Epistol&#65533;, lib. ii. epis. 41; Opera, Paris, 1721, p. 357, B, a.

[37] History of Christian Doctrine, vol. i. p. 79.

[38] Lexicon, art. "Mystik."

[39] Reformers before the Reformation.

[40] Ullmann, vol. ii. ch. 2.

[41] Ullmann, Translation in Clark's Library, vol. ii. p. 27.

[42] Ibid. p. 47.

[43] See Tholuck, Sufismus seu Theosophia Persarum Pantheistica. C. Schmidt, Essai sur les Mystiques du 14me Si&#65533;cle. This writer is the author of most of the excellent articles in Herzog's Encyklop&#65533;die on the Medi&#65533;val Mystics. Ullmann's Reformers before the Reformation. Poiret, Bibliotheca Mysticorum. Vaughan's Hours with the Mystics. Helfferich's Christliche Mystik. Dorner, Geschichte der Protestantischen Theologie, 48-59.

4. Mysticism at, and after the Reformation.

A. Effect of the Reformation on the Popular Mind.

Such a great and general movement of the public mind as occurred during the sixteenth century, when the old foundations of doctrine and order in the Church, were overturned, could hardly fail to be attended by irregularities and extravagancies in the inward and outward life of the people. There are two principles advanced, both Scriptural and both of the last importance, which are specially liable to abuse in times of popular excitement.

The first is, the right of private judgment. This, as understood by the Reformers, is the right of every man to decide what a revelation made by God to him, requires him to believe. It was a protest against the authority assumed by the Church (i.e. the Bishops), of deciding for the people what they were to believe. It was very natural that the fanatical, in rejecting the authority of the Church, should reject all external authority in matters of religion. They understood by the right of private judgment, the right of every man to determine what he should believe from the operations of his own mind and from his own inward experience, independently of the Scriptures. But as it is palpably absurd to expect, on such a subject as religion, a certainty either satisfactory to ourselves or authoritative for others, from our own reason or feelings, it was inevitable that these subjective convictions should be referred to a supernatural source. Private revelations, an inward light, the testimony of the Spirit, came to be exalted over the authority of the Bible.

Secondly, the Reformers taught that religion is a matter of the heart, that a man's acceptance with God does not depend on his membership in any external society, on obedience to its officers, and on sedulous observance of its rites and ordinances; but on the regeneration of his heart, and his personal faith in the Son of God, manifesting itself in a holy life. This was a protest against the fundamental principle of Romanism, that all within

the external organization which Romanists call the Church, are saved, and all out of it are lost. It is not a matter of surprise that evil men should wrest this principle, as they do all other truths, to their own destruction. Because religion does not consist in externals, many rushed to the conclusion that externals, -- the Church, its ordinances, its officers, its worship, -- were of no account. These principles were soon applied beyond the sphere of religion. Those who regarded them themselves as the organs of God, emancipated from the authority of the Bible and exalted above the Church, came to claim exemption from the authority of the State. To this outbreak the grievous and long-continued oppression of the peasantry greatly contributed, so that this spirit of fanaticism and revolt rapidly spread over all Germany, and into Switzerland and Holland.

The Popular Disorders not the Effects of the Reformation.

The extent to which these disorders spread, and the rapidity with which they diffused themselves, show that they were not the mere outgrowth of the Reformation. The principles avowed by the Reformers, and the relaxation of papal authority occasioned by the Reformation, served but to inflame the elements which had for years been slumbering in the minds of the people. The innumerous associations and fellowships, of which mention was made in the preceding section, had leavened the public mind with the principles of pantheistic Mysticism, which were the prolific source of evil. Men who imagined themselves to be forms in which God existed and acted, were not likely to be subject to any authority human or divine, nor were they apt to regard anything as sinful which they felt inclined to do.

These men also had been brought up under the Papacy. According to the papal theory, especially as it prevailed during the Middle Ages, the Church was a theocracy, whose representatives were the subjects of a constant inspiration rendering them infallible as teachers and absolute as rulers. All who opposed the Church were rebels against God, whom to destroy was a duty both to God and man. These ideas M[illegible]nzer and his followers applied to themselves. They were the true Church. They were inspired. They were entitled to determine what is true in matters of doctrine. They were entitled to rule with absolute authority in church and state. All who opposed them, opposed God, and ought to be exterminated. M[illegible]nzer died upon the scaffold: thus was fulfilled anew our Lord's declaration, "Those who take the sword, shall perish by the sword."

B. Mystics among the Reformers.

Few of the theologians contemporary with Luther took any part in this fanatical movement. To a certain extent this however was done by Carlstadt (Bodenstein), archdeacon and afterwards professor of theology at Wittenberg. At first he cooperated zealously with the great Reformer, but when Storch and St[illegible]bener claiming to be prophets, came to Wittenberg during Luther's confinement at Wartburg, and denounced learning and Church institutions, and taught that all reliance was to be placed on the inward light, or supernatural guidance of the Spirit, Carlstadt gave them his support and exhorted the students to abandon their studies and to betake themselves to manual labor. Great disorder following these movements, Luther left his place of seclusion, appeared upon the scene, and succeeded in allaying the tumult. Carlstadt then withdrew from Wittenberg, and ultimately united himself with Schwenkfeld, a more influential opponent of Luther and who was equally imbued with the spirit of Mysticism.

Sckwenkfeld.

Schwenkfeld, a nobleman born 1490, in the principality of Lignitz, in Lower Silesia, was a man of great energy and force of character, exemplary in his conduct, of extensive learning and indefatigable diligence. He at first took an active part in promoting the Reformation, and was on friendly terms with Luther, Melancthon, and the other leading Reformers. Being a man not only of an independent way of thinking, but confident and zealous in maintaining his peculiar opinions, he soon separated himself from other Protestants and passed his whole life in controversy; condemned by synods and proscribed by the civil authorities, he was driven from city to city, until his death, which occurred in 1561.

That Schwenkfeld differed not only from the Romanists, but from Lutherans and Reformed on all the great doctrines then in controversy, is to be referred to the fact that he held, in common with the great body of the Mystics of the Middle Ages, that union or oneness with God, not in nature or character only, but also in being or substance, was the one great desideratum and essential condition of holiness and felicity. To avoid the pantheistic doctrines into which the majority of the Mystics were led, he held to a form of dualism. Creatures exist out of God, and are due to the exercise of his power. In them there is nothing of the substance of God, and therefore nothing really good. With regard to men, they are made good and blessed by communicating to them the substance of God. This communication is made through Christ. Christ is not, even as to his human nature, a creature. His body and soul were formed out of the substance of God. While on earth, in his state of humiliation, this substantial unity of his humanity with God, was undeveloped and unrevealed. Since his exaltation it is completely deified, or lost in the divine essence. It followed from these principles, First, That the external church, with its ordinances and means of grace, was of little importance. Especially that the Scriptures are not, even instrumentally, the source of the divine life. Faith does not come by hearing, but from the Christ within; i.e. from the living substance of God communicated to the soul. This communication is to be sought by abnegation, renunciation of the creature, by contemplation and prayer. Secondly, as to the sacrament of the supper, which then was the great subject of controversy, Schwenkfeld stood by himself. Not admitting that Christ had any material body or blood, he could not admit that the bread and wine were transubstantiated into his body and blood, as Romanists teach; nor that his body and blood were focally present in the sacrament, in, with, and under the bread and wine, as Luther held; nor could he admit the dynamic presence of Christ's body, as taught by Calvin; nor that the Lord's Supper was merely a significant and commemorative ordinance, as Zwingle taught. He held his own doctrine. He transposed the words of Christ. Instead of "This (bread) is my body," he said, the true meaning and intent of Christ was, "My body is bread;" that is, as bread is the staff and source of life to the body, so my body, formed of the essence of God, is the life of the soul.

A third inference from Schwenkfeld's fundamental principle was that the redemption of the soul is purely subjective; something wrought in the soul itself. He denied justification by faith as Luther taught that doctrine, and which Luther regarded as the life of the Church. He said that we are justified not by what Christ has done for us, but by what He does within us. All we need is the communication of the life or substance of Christ to the soul. With

him, as with Mystics generally, the ideas of guilt and expiation were ignored.

Later Mystics.

The succession of mystical writers was kept up by such men as Paracelsus, Weigel, Jacob Boehmne, and others. The first named was a physician and chemist, who combined natural philosophy and alchemy with his theosophy. He was born in 1493 and died in 1541. Weigel, a pastor, was born in Saxony in 1533, and died in 1588. His views were formed under the influence of Tauler, Schwenkfeld, and Paracelsus. He taught, as his predecessors had done, that the inner word, and not the Scriptures, was the source of true knowledge, that all that God creates is God himself, and that all that is good in man is of the substance of God. The most remarkable writer of this class was Jacob Boehme, who was born near Gorlitz in Silesia, in 1575. His parents were peasants, and he himself a shoemaker. That such a man should write books which have proved a mine of thoughts to Schelling, Hegel, and Coleridge, as well as to a whole class of theologians, is decisive evidence of his extraordinary gifts. In character he was mild, gentle, and devout; and although denounced as a heretic, he constantly professed his allegiance to the faith of the Church. He regarded himself as having received in answer to prayer, on three different occasions. communications of divine light and knowledge which he was impelled to reveal to others. He did not represent the primordial being as without attributes or qualities of which nothing could be predicated, but as the seat of all kinds of forces seeking development. What the Bible teaches of the Trinity, he understood as an account of the development of the universe out of God and its relation to him. He was a theosophist in one sense, in which Vaughan [44] defines the term, "One who gives you a theory of God or of the works of God, which has not reason, but an inspiration of his own for its basis." "The theosophists," says Fleming, [45] "are a school of philosophers who mix enthusiasm with observation, alchemy with theology, metaphysics with medicine, and clothe the whole with a form of mystery and inspiration." [46]

[44] Hours with Mystics, vol. i. p. 45.

[45] Vocabulary of Philosophy.

[46] See Baur's Christliche Gnosis; Dorner's History of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ and his History of Protestant Theology; Hamberger, Die Lehre des Deutschen Philosophen u Boehme, 1844.

§ 5. Quietism.

A. Its general character.

Tholuck [47] says "There is a law of seasons in the spiritual, as well as in the physical world, in virtue of which when the time has come, without apparent connection, similar phenomena reveal themselves in different places. As towards the end of the fifteenth century an ecclesiastical-doctrinal reformatory movement passed over the greater part of Europe, in part without apparent connection; so at the end of the seventeenth a mystical and spiritual tendency was almost as extensively manifested. In Germany, it took the form of Mysticism and Pietism; in England, of Quakerism; in France, of Jansenism and Mysticism; and in Spain and Italy, of Quietism." This movement was in fact what in our day would be called a revival of religion. Not indeed in a form free from grievous errors, but

nevertheless it was a return to the religion of the heart, as opposed to the religion of forms. The Mystics of this period, although they constantly appealed to the medi&#65533;val Mystics, even to the Areopagite, and although they often used the same forms of expression, yet they adhered much more faithfully to Scriptural doctrines and to the faith of the Church. They did not fall into Pantheism, or believe in the absorption of the soul into the substance of God. They held, however, that the end to be attained was union with God. By this was not meant what Christians generally understand by that term; congeniality with God, delight in his perfections, assurance of his love, submission to his will, perfect satisfaction in the enjoyment of his favour. It was something more than all this, something mystical and therefore inexplicable; a matter of feeling not something to be understood or explained; a state in which all thought, all activity was suspended; a state of perfect quietude in which the soul is lost in God, -- an "&#65533;coulement et liquefaction de l'&#65533;me en Dieu," as it is expressed by St. Francis de Sales. This state is reached by few. It is to be attained not by the use of the means of grace or ordinances of the Church. The soul should be raised above the need of all such aids. It rises even above Christ, insomuch that it is not He whom the soul seeks, nor God in him; but God as God; the absolute, infinite God. The importance of the Scriptures, of prayer, of the sacraments, and of the truth concerning Christ, was not denied; but all these were regarded as belonging to the lower stages of the divine life. Nor was this rest and union with God to be attained by meditation; for meditation is discursive. It implies an effort to bring truth before the mind, and fixing the attention upon it. All conscious self-activity must be suspended in order to this perfect rest in God. It is a state in which the soul is out of itself; a state of ecstasy, according to the etymological meaning of the word.

This state is to be reached in the way prescribed by the older Mystics; first, by negation or abstraction; that is, the abstraction of the soul from everything out of God, from the creature, from all interest, concern, or impression from sensible objects. Hence the connection between Mysticism, in this form, and asceticism. Not only must the soul become thus abstracted from the creature, but it must be dead to self. All regard to self must be lost. There can be no prayer, for prayer is asking something for self; no thanksgiving, for thanksgiving implies gratitude for good done to self. Self must be lost. There must be no preference for heaven over hell. One of the points most strenuously insisted upon was a willingness to be damned, if such were the will of God. In the controversy between F&#65533;n&#65533;lon and Bossuet, the main question concerned disinterested love, whether in loving God the soul must be raised above all regard to its own holiness and happiness. This pure or disinterested love justifies, or renders righteous in the sight of God. Although the Mystics of this period were eminently pure as well as devout, they nevertheless sometimes laid down principles, or at least used expressions, which gave their enemies a pretext for charging them with Antinomianism. It was said, that a soul filled with this love, or reduced to this entire negation of self, cannot sin; "sin is not in, but outside of him:" which was made to mean, that nothing was sin to the perfect. It is an instructive psychological fact that when men attempt or pretend to rise above the law of God, they sink below it; that Perfectionism has so generally led to Antinomianism.

B. Leaders of this Movement.

The principal persons engaged in promoting this remarkable religious movement were

Molinos, Madame Guyon, and Archbishop F&#65533;n&#65533;lon. Michael Molinos, born 1640, was a Spanish priest. About 1670 he became a resident of Rome, where he gained a great reputation for piety and mildness, and great influence from his position as confessor to many families of distinction. He enjoyed the friendship of the highest authorities in the Church, including several of tile cardinals, and the Pope, Innocent XI., himself. In 1675 he published his "Spiritual Guide," in which the principles above stated were presented. Molinos did not claim originality, but professed to rely on the Mystics of the Middle Ages, several of whom had already been canonized by the Church. This, however, did not save him from persecution. His first trial indeed before the Inquisition resulted in his acquittal. But subsequently, through the influence of the Jesuits and of the court of Louis XIV., he was, after a year's imprisonment, condemned. Agreeably to his principle of entire subjection to the Church, he retracted his errors, but failed to secure the confidence of his judges. He died in 1697. His principal work, "Manuductio Spiritualis," or Spiritual Guide, was translated into different languages, and won for him many adherents in every part of the Catholic world. When he was imprisoned, it is said, that twenty thousand letters from all quarters, and many of them from persons of distinction, were found among his papers, assuring him of the sympathy of their authors with him in his spirit and views. This is proof that there were at that time thousands in the Romish Church who had not bowed the knee to the Baal of formalism.

Madame Guyon.

The most prominent and influential of the Quietists, as they were called, was Madame Guyon, born 1648 and died 1717. She belonged to a rich and noble family; was educated in a cloister, married at sixteen to a man of rank and wealth and of three times her age; faithful and devoted, but unhappy in her domestic relations; adhering zealously to her Church, she passed a life of incessant labour, and that, too, embittered by persecution. When still in the cloister she came under the influence of the writings of St. Francis de Sales, which determined her subsequent course. Enthusiastic in temperament, endowed with extraordinary gifts, she soon came to regard herself as the recipient of visions, revelations, and inspirations by which she was impelled to write, and, in the first instance, to devote herself to the conversion of Protestants. Failing in this, she considered it her vocation to become the mother of spiritual children, by bringing them to adopt her views of the inner life. To this object she devoted herself with untiring energy and great success, her adherents, secret and avowed, being numbered by thousands, or, as she supposed, by millions. She thus drew upon herself, although devoted to the Church, the displeasure of the authorities, and was imprisoned for seven years in the Bastile and other prisons in France. The latter years of her life she spent in retirement in the house of her daughter, burdened with physical infirmities, hearing mass every day in her private chapel and communicating every other day. Her principal works were, "La Bible avec des Explications et R&#65533;flexions, qui regardent la Vie Int&#65533;rieure," "Moyen court et tr&#65533;s-facile de faire Oraison." This little work excited great attention and great opposition. She was obliged to defend it in an "Apologie du Moyen Court," in 1690, and "Justifications" in 1694, and in 1695 she was forced to retract thirty-five propositions selected therefrom. She published an allegorical poem under the title "Les Torrens." Her minor poetic pieces called "Po&#65533;sies Spirituelles," in four volumes, are greatly admired for the genius which they display.

Archbishop F&#65533;n&#65533;lon, one of the greatest lights of the Gallican Church, espoused the cause of Madame Guyon, and published, 1697, "Explication des Maximes des Saints sur la Vie Int&#65533;rieure." As the title intimates, the principles of this book are derived from the earlier Mystics, and specially from the latest of the saints, St. Francis de Sales, who was canonized in 1665, only thirty-three years after his death. Although F&#65533;n&#65533;lon carefully avoided the extravagances of the Mystics of his own day, and although he taught nothing which men venerated in the Church had not taught before him, his book forfeited for him the favour of the court, and was finally condemned by the authorities at Rome. To this condemnation he submitted with the greatest docility. He not only made no defence, but read the brief of condemnation in his own pulpit, and forbade his book being read within his diocese. To this his conscience constrained him, although he probably did not change his views. As the Pope decided against him he was willing to admit that what he said was wrong, and yet what he intended to say he still held to be right.

[47] Herzog's Encyklop&#65533;die, art. "Molinos."

§ 6. The Quakers or Friends.

This widely extended and highly respected body of professing Christians constitute the most permanent and best organized representatives of the principles of Mysticism which have appeared in the Church. They have existed as an organized society nearly two centuries and a half, and number in Europe and America several hundred thousands.

A. Their Origin and Early History.

They took their origin and name from George Fox, who was born at Drayton, Leicestershire, England, in 1624. He received only the rudiments of an English education, and was by trade a shoemaker. From boyhood he was remarkable for his quiet, secluded habits. He devoted his leisure to the reading of the Scriptures and meditation. The age in which he lived was one of corruption in the Church and agitation in the State. He was so impressed by the evils which he saw around him that he lost confidence in the teachers of religion and in the ordinances of the church. At last he felt himself called of God, by direct revelation and inspiration, to denounce the existing Church, its organization and officers, and to proclaim a new and spiritual dispensation. This dispensation was to be new only relatively to what had long existed. It was designed as a restoration of the apostolic age, when the church was guided and extended by the Spirit, without the intervention of the written Word, or, as Fox and his followers maintained, of a special order of ministers, but every man and every woman spake as the Spirit gave them utterance. [48]

They were called Quakers either because they themselves trembled when under the influence of the Spirit, or because they were in the habit of calling on those whom they addressed to quake in fear of the judgment of God. The designation has long ceased to be appropriate, as they are characteristically quiet in their worship, and gentle toward those who are without. They call themselves Friends because opposed to violence, contention, and especially to war. At first, however, they were chargeable with many irregularities, which, in connection with their refusing to pay tithes, to take oaths, and to perform military service, gave pretext to frequent and long continued persecutions.

The Quakers were at first, as a class, illiterate, but men from the educated classes

soon joined them, and by their influence the irregularities connected with the movement were corrected, and the society reduced to a regularly organized form. The most prominent of these men were George Keith, Samuel Fisher, and William Penn. The last named, the son of a British admiral, proved his sincerity by the sacrifices and sufferings to which his adherence to a sect, then despised and persecuted, subjected him. From the influence which he possessed, as the friend and favorite of James II, he was able to do much for his brethren, and having received a grant from the crown, of what is now Pennsylvania, he transported a colony of them to this country and founded one of the most important States of the American Union. The man, however, who did most to reduce the principles of George Fox to order, and to commend them to the religious and literary public, was Robert Barclay. Barclay was a member of a prominent Scottish family, and received the benefit of an extended and varied education. He was born in 1648, and died in 1690. His principal work, "Theologi\u00e2 Christian\u00e2 Apologia," is an exposition of fifteen theses which he had previously written and printed under the title, "Theses Theologic\u00e2 onnnibus Clericis et pr\u00e2sertim universis Doctoribus, Professoribus et Studiosis Theologi\u00e2 in Academiis Europ\u00e2 versantibus sive Pontificis sive Protestantibus oblat\u00e2."

B. Their Doctrines.

It is impossible to give a satisfactory view of the doctrines of the Quakers. They have no authoritative creed or exposition of doctrine which all who call themselves Quakers acknowledge. Their most prominent writers differ in their views on many important points. The opinions of no one, nor of several authors, can be fairly taken as representing the views of the Society. There are in fact three classes of Quakers.

First. Those who call themselves orthodox, and who differ very little from the great body of evangelical Christians. To this belongs the great majority of the Society both in this country and in Great Britain. This appears from the testimonies repeatedly issued by the "Yearly Meetings," the representative bodies of the Society. This is a much more satisfactory witness of the general faith of the body than the declarations of individual writers, however eminent, for which the Society is not responsible. A very clear and comprehensive summary of the doctrine of Friends is to be found in the "History of Religious Denominations in the United States," compiled by I. Daniel Rupp. The articles in this work were written by eminent men belonging to the several denominations whose views are represented. That which relates to the Quakers was written by the late Thomas Evans, a prominent minister of the Society, and a truly representative man. Without referring to the peculiar doctrines of the Society, the following extracts show how near the orthodox Quakers (i.e., the Society itself, as represented in its yearly meetings) come to the common faith of Protestant churches.

Doctrines of the Orthodox Friends.

1. As to God, it is said, Quakers "Believe in one only wise, omnipotent, and everlasting God, the creator and upholder of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, by whom are all things, the mediator between God and man; and in the Holy Spirit which proceedeth from the Father and the Son; one God blessed forever. In expressing their views relative to the awful and mysterious doctrine of "the Three that bear record in heaven," they have carefully avoided the use of unscriptural terms, invented to define Him who is undefinable, and have scrupulously adhered to the safe and simple

language of Holy Scripture, as contained in Matt. xxviii. 18, 19."

2. As to the person and work of Christ, "They own and believe in Jesus Christ, the beloved and only begotten Son of God, who was conceived of the Holy Ghost, and born of the Virgin Mary. . . . . They believe that He alone is the Redeemer and Saviour of man, the captain of salvation, who saves from sin as well as from hell and the wrath to come, and destroys the works of the devil. He is the seed of the woman that bruises the serpent's head; even Christ Jesus, the Alpha and Omega, the first and last. He is, as the Scriptures of truth say of him, our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, neither is there salvation in any other, for there is no other name under heaven given among men whereby we may be saved."

"The Society of Friends have uniformly declared their belief in the divinity and manhood of the Lord Jesus: that He was both true God and perfect man, and that his sacrifice of himself upon the cross was a propitiation and atonement for the sins of the whole world, and that the remission of sins which any partake of, is only in, and by virtue of, that most satisfactory sacrifice."

3. As to the Holy Ghost, "Friends believe in the Holy Spirit, or Comforter, the promise of the Father, whom Christ declared he would send in his name, to lead and guide his followers, into all truth, to teach them all things, and to bring all things to their remembrance. . . . . They believe that the saving knowledge of God and Christ cannot be attained in any other way than by the revelation of this Spirit; -- for the Apostle says, What man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? Even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God. Now we have received not the spirit of the world, but the Spirit which is of God, that we might know the things which are freely given to us of God.' If, therefore, the things which properly appertain to man cannot be discerned by any lower principle than the spirit of man; those things which properly relate to God and Christ, cannot be known by any power inferior to that of the holy Spirit."

4. As to man, "They believe that man was created in the image of God, capable of understanding the divine law, and of molding communion with his Maker. Through transgression he fell from this blessed state, and lost the heavenly image. His posterity come into the world in the image of the earthly man; and, until renewed by the quickening and regenerating power of the heavenly man, Christ Jesus, manifested in time soul, they are fallen, degenerated, and dead to the divine life in which Adam originally stood, and are subject to the power, nature, and seed of the serpent; and not only their words and deeds, but their imaginations, are evil perpetually in the sight of God. Man, therefore, in this state can know nothing aright concerning God; his thoughts and conceptions of spiritual things, until he is disjoined from this evil seed and united to the divine light, Christ Jesus, are unprofitable to himself and to others."

5. As to the future state, "The Society of Friends believe that there will be a resurrection both of the righteous and the wicked; the one to eternal life and blessedness, and the other to everlasting misery and torment, agreeably to Matt. xxv. 31-46; John v. 25-30; 1 Cor. xv. 12-58. That God will judge the world by that man whom He hath ordained, even Christ Jesus the Lord, who will render unto every man according to his works."

6. As to the Scriptures, "The religious Society of Friends has always believed that the Holy Scriptures were written by divine inspiration, and contain a declaration of all the

fundamental doctrines and principles relating to eternal life and salvation, and that whatsoever doctrine or practice is contrary to them, is to be rejected as false and erroneous; that they are a declaration of the mind and will of God, in and to the several ages in which they were written and are obligatory on us, and are to be read, believed, and fulfilled by the assistance of divine grace. . . . . It looks upon them as the only fit outward judge and test of controversies among Christians, and is very willing that all its doctrines and practices should be tried by them, freely admitting that whatsoever any do, pretending to the Spirit, which is contrary to the Scriptures, be condemned as a delusion of the devil."

It thus appears that the orthodox Friends are in sympathy, on all fundamental doctrines, with the great body of their fellow Christians.

Heterodox Friends.

Secondly. There is a class calling themselves Friends, and retaining the organization of the Society, and its usages as to dress, language, and mode of worship, who are really Deists. They admit of no higher authority, in matters of religion, than the natural reason and conscience of man, and hold little if anything as true beyond the truths of natural religion. This class has been disowned by the Society in its representative capacity.

Thirdly. There is a third class which does not constitute an organized or separate body, but includes men of very different views. As has been already remarked, great diversity of opinion existed among the Quakers, especially during the early period of their history. This diversity related to the common doctrines of Christianity, to the nature of the inward guiding light in which all professed to believe, and to the authority due to the sacred Scriptures. Some explicitly denied the doctrine of the Trinity and the satisfaction of Christ; some seemed to ignore the historical Christ altogether, and to refer everything to the Christ within. Others, while admitting the historical verity of the life of Christ, and of his work on earth, regarded his redemption as altogether subjective. He saves us not by what He has done for us, but exclusively by what He does in us. This, as we have seen, is the characteristic tendency of Mysticism in all its modifications.

C. The Doctrine of Friends as to the Inward Light given to all Men.

Still greater diversity of views prevailed as to the nature of the inward light which constitutes the distinguishing doctrine of the Society. The orthodox Quakers on this subject, in the first place, carefully distinguish this "light" from the natural reason and conscience of men; and also from spiritual discernment, or that inward work of the Spirit, which all Christians acknowledge, by which the soul is enabled to know "the things of the Spirit" as they are revealed in the Scriptures, and without which there can be no saving faith, and no holiness of heart or life. This spiritual illumination is peculiar to the the people of God; the inward light, in which the Quakers believe, is common to all men. The design and effect of the "inward light" are the communication of new truth or of truth not objectively revealed, as well as the spiritual discernment of the truths of Scripture. The design and effect of spiritual illumination are the proper apprehension of truth already speculatively known.

Secondly. By the inner light the orthodox Quakers understand the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit, concerning which they teach,-- (1.) That it is given to all men. (2.) That it not only convinces of sin, and enables the soul to apprehend aright the truths of Scripture, but also communicates a knowledge of "the mysteries of salvation." "A manifestation of this Spirit they believe is given to every man to profit withal; that it

convicts of sin, and, as attended to, gives power to the soul to overcome and forsake it; it opens the mind to the mysteries of salvation, enables it savingly to understand the truths recorded in the Holy Scriptures, and gives it the living, practical, and heartfelt experience of those things which pertain to its everlasting welfare." "He hath communicated a measure of the light of his own Son, a measure of the grace of the Holy Spirit -- by which he invites, calls, exhorts, and strives with every man, in order to save him; which light or grace, as it is received and not resisted, works the salvation of all, even of those who are ignorant of Adam's fall, and of the death and sufferings of Christ; both by bringing them to a sense of their own misery, and to be sharers of the sufferings of Christ, inwardly; and by making them partakers of his resurrection, in becoming holy, pure, and righteous, and recovered out of their sins." [49]

Thirdly. The orthodox Friends teach concerning this inward light, as has been already shown, that it is subordinate to the Holy Scriptures, inasmuch as the Scriptures are the infallible rule of faith and practice, and everything contrary thereto is to be rejected as false and destructive.

Barclay's Views.

While such are the views of the orthodox Friends, it must be admitted that many hold a different doctrine. This is true not only of those whom the Society has disowned, but of many men most prominent in their history. This difference relates both to what this light is, and to its authority. As to the former of these points the language employed is so diverse, and so figurative, that it is difficult to determine its real meaning. Some of the early Quakers spoke as though they adopted the doctrine of the earlier Mystics, that this inward principle was God himself, the divine substance. Others speak of it as Christ, or even the body of Christ, or his life. Others as "a seed," which is declared to be no part of the nature of man; no remains of the image of God in which Adam was created; neither is it the substance of God. Nevertheless, it is declared to be "a spiritual substance," in which the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost are present. This seed comes from Christ, and is communicated to every man. In some it lies as a seed upon a rock, which never shows any sign of life. But when the soul receives a visitation of the Spirit, if his influence be not resisted, that seed is vivified, and develops into holiness of heart and life; by which the soul is purified and justified. We are not justified by our works. Everything is due to Christ. He is both "the giver and the gift." Nevertheless our justification consists in this subjective change. [50] A distinction is made between a twofold redemption; the one "performed and accomplished by Christ for us in his crucified body without us; the other is the redemption wrought by Christ in us. "The first is that whereby a man, as he stands in the fall, is put in a capacity of salvation, and hath conveyed unto him a measure of that power, virtue, spirit, life, and grace that was in Christ Jesus, which, as the free gift of God, is able to counterbalance, overcome, and root out the evil seed, wherewith we are naturally, as in the fall, leavened. The second is that whereby we witness and know this pure and perfect redemption in ourselves, purifying, cleansing, and redeeming us from the power of corruption, and bringing us into unity, favour, and friendship with God." [51]

With regard to the authority of this inward light, while the orthodox make it subordinate to the Scriptures, many of the early Friends made the written, subordinate to the inner, word; and others, as Barclay himself, make the two coordinate. Although in this

matter he is hardly consistent with himself. He expressly denies that the Scriptures are to us "the fountain" of truth; that they are "the principal ground of all truth and knowledge, or yet the adequate primary rule of faith and manners." They are, however, "to be esteemed a secondary role subordinate to the Spirit." Nevertheless, he teaches with equal plainness that what "cannot be proved by Scripture, is no necessary article of faith." [52] Again, he says: We are "willing to admit it as a positive and certain maxim, that whatsoever any do, pretending to the Spirit, which is contrary to the Scriptures, be accounted and reckoned a delusion of the devil." [53] He "freely subscribes to that saying, Let him that preacheth any other gospel than that which hath already been preached by the Apostles, and according to the Scriptures, be accursed." [54] We look on the Scriptures, he says, "as the only fit outward judge of controversies among Christians, and that whatsoever doctrine is contrary unto their testimony, may therefore justly be rejected as false." [55] His whole book, therefore, is an effort to prove from Scripture all the peculiar doctrines of Quakerism.

His theory is, (1.) That all men since the fall are in a state of spiritual death from which they are utterly unable to deliver themselves. He is severe in his denunciation of all Pelagian and semi-Pelagian doctrine. (2.) That God determined, through his Son our Lord Jesus Christ, to make provision for the salvation of all men. (3.) The work of Christ secures the opportunity and means of salvation for every man (4.) Through him and for his sake "a seed" is given to every man which, under the influence of the Spirit, may be developed into righteousness and holiness, restoring the soul to the image and fellowship of God. (5.) To every man is granted "a day of visitation" in which the Spirit comes to him and exerts an influence which, if not resisted, vivifies this divine seed, and thus gives the opportunity of being saved (6.) The measure of this divine influence is not the same in all cases. In some it is irresistible, in others, not. In some it is as abundant as in the prophets and Apostles, rendering its subjects as authoritative as teachers as the original Apostles. (7.) The office of the Spirit is to teach and to guide. It is not merely intended to enlighten the mind in the knowledge of truths contained un the Scriptures. It presents truth objectively to the mind. It does not reveal new doctrines, much less doctrines opposed to those revealed in the Scriptures; but it makes a new and independent revelation of old doctrines. On this point Barclay is very explicit. [56] His discussion of his second and third propositions, -- the one concerning "immediate revelation," and the other, "the Scriptures," -- sets forth this doctrine at length. "We distinguish," he says, "between a revelation of a new gospel and new doctrines, and a new revelation of the good old gospel and doctrines; the last we plead for, but the first we utterly deny." Natural reason reveals certain doctrines, but this is not inconsistent with a new revelation of the same doctrines in the Scriptures. So the fact that the gospel is revealed in the Scriptures is not inconsistent with its immediate objective revelation to the soul by the Spirit.

Besides the great doctrines of salvation, there are many things the Christian needs to know which are not contained in the Scriptures. In these matters he is not left to his own guidance. The Spirit "guides into all truth." "Therefore," says Barclay, "the Spirit of God leadeth, instructeth, and teacheth every true Christian whatsoever is needful for him to know." For example, whether He is to preach; and, if called to preach, when, where, and what he shall preach; where he is to go, and in any emergency what he ought to do. So the Spirit teaches us when and where we are to pray, and what we are to pray for. As the Spirit's guidance extends to everything, it should be sought and obeyed in all things.

Quakerism ignores the distinction between inspired and uninspired men, except as to the measure of the Spirit's influence. He dwells in all believers, and performs the same office in all. As the saints of old, before the giving of the law, were under his instruction and guidance, so they continued to enjoy his teaching after the law was given. All through the Old Testament dispensation the people of God received immediate revelations and directions. When Christ came there was a more copious communication of this influence. These communications were not confined to either sex, or to any class in the Church. They were not peculiar to the Apostles, or to ministers, but to every one was given a manifestation of the Spirit to profit withal. The state of the Church, as set forth in the New Testament as to this matter, continues to the present time, except that the gifts bestowed are not of the same miraculous character now that they were then. But as to his revealing, enlightening, teaching, guiding operations, He is as much present with believers now as during the apostolic age. Then all spake as the Spirit gave them utterance. When Christians assembled together every one had his gift: one a psalm, one a doctrine, another a revelation, another an interpretation. Every one could speak; but it was to be done decently and in order. If anything were revealed to one sitting by, he was to hold his peace until his time came; for God is not the author of confusion. In 1 Cor. xiv. we have the Quaker ideal or model of a Christian assembly. And as the Apostles went hither and thither, not according to their own judgment, but supernaturally guided by the Spirit, so the Spirit guides all believers in the ordinary affairs of life, it they wait for the intimations of his will.

As this doctrine of the Spirit's guidance is the fundamental principle of Quakerism, it is the source of all the peculiarities by which the Society of Friends has ever been distinguished. If every man has within himself an infallible guide as to truth and duty, he does not need external teaching. If it be the office of the Spirit to reveal truth objectively to the mind, and to indicate on all occasions the path of duty; and if his revealing and guiding influence be universal, and immediate, self-evidencing itself as divine, it must of necessity supersede all others; just as the Scriptures supersede reason in matters of religion. The Quakers, therefore, although, as has been shown, acknowledging the divine authority of the Scriptures, make far less of them than other denominations of evangelical Christians. They make very little of the Church and its ordinances; of the Sabbath; of a stated ministry; and nothing of the sacraments as external ordinances and means of grace. In all these respects their influence has been hurtful to the cause of Christ, while it is cheerfully admitted that some of the best Christians of our age belong to the Society of Friends.

[48] One of the most important works of William Penn bears the title Primitive Christianity revived in the Faith and Practice of the People called Quakers.

[49] Evans.

[50] See Barclay's Apology, Philadelphia edition, pp. 152, 153.

[51] Ibid., p. 218.

[52] Barclay's Apology, p. 106.

[53] Ibid., p. 100.

[54] Ibid., p. 105.

[55] Ibid., p. 100.

[56] See pp. 62-64, 105.

§ 7. Objections to the Mystical Theory.

The idea on which Mysticism is founded is Scriptural and true. It is true that God has access to the human soul. It is true that He can, consistently with his own nature and with the laws of our being, supernaturally and immediately reveal truth objectively to the mind, and attend that revelation with evidence which produces an infallible assurance of its truth and of its divine origin. It is also true that such revelations have often been made to the children of men. But these cases of immediate supernatural revelation belong to the category of miracles. They are rare and are to be duly authenticated.

The common doctrine of the Christian Church is, that God has at sundry times and in divers manners spoken to the children of men; that what eye hath not seen, or ear heard, what never could have entered into the heart of man, God has revealed by his Spirit to those whom He selected to be his spokesmen to their fellow-men; that these revelations were authenticated as divine, by their character, their effects, and by signs and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost; that these holy men of old who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, communicated the revelations which they had received not only orally, but in writing, employing not the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; so that we have in the sacred Scriptures the things of the Spirit recorded in the words of the Spirit; which Scriptures, therefore, are the Word of God, -- i.e., what God says to man; what He declares to be true and obligatory, -- and constitute for his Church the only infallible rule of faith and practice.

Romanists, while admitting the infallibility of the written Word, still contend that it is not sufficient; and hold that God continues in a supernatural manner to guide the Church by rendering its bishops infallible teachers in all matters pertaining to truth and duty.

Mystics, making the same admission as to the infallibility of Scripture, claim that the Spirit is given to every man as an inward teacher and guide, whose instructions and influence are the highest rule of faith, and sufficient, even without the Scriptures, to secure the salvation of the soul.

Mysticism has no Foundation in the Scriptures.

The objections to the Romish and Mystical theory are substantially the same.

1. There is no foundation for either in Scriptures. As the Scriptures contain no promise of infallible guidance to bishops, so they contain no promise of the Spirit as the immediate revealer of truth to every man. Under the Old Testament dispensation the Spirit did indeed reveal the mind and purposes of God; but it was to selected persons chosen to be prophets, authenticated as divine messengers, whose instructions the people were bound to receive as coming from God. In like manner, under the new dispensation, our Lord selected twelve men, endowed them with plenary knowledge of the Gospel, rendered them infallible as teachers, and required all men to receive their instructions as the words of God. It is true that during the apostolic age there were occasional communications made to a class of persons called prophets. But this "gift of prophecy," that is, the gift of speaking under the inspiration of the Spirit, was analogous to the gift of miracles. The one has as obviously ceased as the other.

It is true, also, that our Lord promised to send the Spirit, who was to abide with the Church, to dwell in his people, to be their teacher, and to guide them into the knowledge of all truth. But what truth? Not historical or scientific truth, but plainly revealed truth; truth

which He himself had taught, or made known by his authorized messengers. The Spirit is indeed a teacher; and without his instructions there is no saving knowledge of divine things, for the Apostle tells us, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God, for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) Spiritual discernment, therefore, is the design and effect of the Spirit's teaching. And the things discerned are "the things freely given to us of God," i.e., as the context shows, the things revealed to the Apostles and clearly made known in the Scriptures.

The Apostle John tells his readers, "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things" (1 John ii. 20), and again, ver. 27, "The anointing which ye have received of Him abideth in you, and ye need not that any man teach you; but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in Him." These passages teach what all evangelical Christians admit. First, that true knowledge, or spiritual discernment of divine things, is due to the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit; and secondly, that true faith, or the infallible assurance of the truths revealed, is due in like manner to the "demonstration of tine Spirit." (1 Cor. ii. 4.) The Apostle John also says: "He that believeth on the Son of God, hath the witness in himself." (1 John v. 10.) Saving faith does not rest on the testimony of the Church, nor on the outward evidence of miracles and prophecy, but on the inward testimony of the Spirit with and by the truth in our hearts. He who has this inward testimony needs no other. He does not need to be told by other men what is truth; this same anointing teaches him what is truth, and that no lie is of the truth. Christians were not to believe every spirit. They were to try the spirits whether they were of God. And the test or criterion of trial was the external, authenticated revelation of God, as spiritually discerned and demonstrated by the inward operations of the Spirit. So now when errorists come and tell the people there is no God, no sin, no retribution, no need of a Saviour, or of expiation, or of faith; that Jesus of Nazareth is not the Son of God, God manifest in the flesh, the true Christian has no need to be told that these are what the Apostle calls lies. He has an inward witness to the truth of the record which God has given of his Son.

If the Bible gives no support to the Mystical doctrine of the inward, supernatural, objective revelation of truth made by the Spirit to every man, that doctrine is destitute of all foundation, for it is only by the testimony of God that any such doctrine can be established.

Mysticism is contrary to the Scriptures.

2. The doctrine in question is not only destitute of support from Scripture, but it contradicts the Scriptures. It is not only opposed to isolated declarations of the Word of God, but to the whole revealed plan of God's dealing with his people. Everywhere, and under all dispensations, the rule of faith and duty has been the teaching of authenticated messengers of God. The appeal has always been "to the law and testimony." The prophets came saying, "Thus saith the Lord." Men were required to believe and obey what was communicated to them, and not what the Spirit revealed to each individual. It was the outward and not the inward word to which they were to attend. And under the gospel the command of Christ to his disciples, was, "Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved" (Mar. xvi. 15, 16), -- believeth, of course, the gospel which they preached. Faith cometh by hearing. "How," asks

the Apostle, "shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" (Rom. x. 14.) God, he tells us, hath determined to save men by the foolishness of preaching. (1 Cor. i. 21.) It is the preaching of the cross he declares to be the power of God. (Verse 18.) It is the gospel, the external revelation of the plan of salvation through Jesus Christ, he says in Rom. i. 16, which "is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth, to the Jew first, and also to the Greek; for therein is the righteousness of God revealed from faith to faith." This idea runs through the whole New Testament. Christ commissioned his disciples to preach the gospel. He declared that to be the way in which men were to be saved. They accordingly went forth preaching everywhere. This preaching was to continue to the end of the world. Therefore, provision was made for continuing the ministry. Men called and qualified by the Spirit, were to be selected and set apart to this work by divine command. And it is in this way, so far, the world has been converted. In no case do we find the Apostles calling upon the people, whether Jews or Gentiles, to look within themselves, to listen to the inner Word. They were to listen to the outward Word; to believe what they heard, and were to pray for the Holy Spirit to enable them to understand, receive, and obey what was thus externally made known to them.

Contrary to the Facts of Experience.

3. The doctrine in question is no less contrary to fact than it is to Scripture. The doctrine teaches that by the inward revelation of the Spirit saving knowledge of truth and duty is given to every man. But all experience shows that without the written Word, men everywhere and in all ages, are ignorant of divine things, -- without God, without Christ, and without hope in the world. The sun is not more obviously the source of light, than the Bible is the source of divine knowledge. The absence of the one is as clearly indicated as the absence of the other. It is incredible that an inward revelation of saving truth is made to every man by the Holy Spirit, if the appropriate effects of that revelation are nowhere manifested. It is to be remembered that without the knowledge of God, there can be no religion. Without right apprehensions of the Supreme Being, there can be no right affections towards him. Without the knowledge of Christ, there can be no faith in him. Without truth there can be no holiness, any more than there can be vision without light. As right apprehensions of God, and holiness of heart and life, are nowhere found where the Scriptures are unknown, it is plain that the Scriptures, and not an inward light common to all men, are, by the ordinance of God, the only source to us of saving and sanctifying kmnowledge.

There is a sense in which, as all evangelical Christians believe, the Spirit is given to every man. He is present with every human mind exciting to good and restraining from evil. To this the order, and what there is of morality in the world, are due. Without this "common grace," or general influence of the Spirit, there would be no difference between our world and hell; for hell is a place or state in which men are finally given up of God. In like manner, there is a general providential efficiency of God by which He cooperates with second causes, in the productions of the wonderful phenomena of the external world. Without that co[illegible]peration -- the continued guidance of mind -- the cosmos would become chaos. But the fact that this providential efficiency of God is universal, is no proof that He everywhere works miracles, that He constantly operates without the intervention of second

causes. So, also, the fact that the Spirit is present with every human mind, and constantly enforces the truth present to that mind, is no proof that He makes immediate, supernatural revelations to every human being. The fact is, we cannot see without light. We have the sun to give us light. It is vain to say that every man has an inward light sufficient to guide him without the sun. Facts are against the theory.

No Criterion by which to judge of the Source of Inward Suggestions.

4. A fourth objection to the Mystical doctrine is that there is no criterion by which a man can test these inward impulses or revelations, and determine which are from the Spirit of God, and which are from his own heart or from Satan, who often appears and acts as an angel of light. This objection, Barclay says, "Bespeaketh much ignorance in the opposers. . . . . For it is one thing to affirm that the true and undoubted revelation of God's Spirit is certain and infallible; and another thing to affirm that this or that particular person or people is led infallibly by this revelation in what they speak or write, because they affirm themselves to be so led by the inward and immediate revelation of the Spirit." [57] It is admitted that there is an inward and infallible testimony of the Spirit in the hearts of believers to the truths objectively revealed in the Scriptures. It is admitted, also, that there have been immediate revelations of truth to the mind, as in the case of the prophets and Apostles, and that these revelations authenticate themselves, or are attended with an infallible assurance that they come from God. But these admissions do not invalidate the objection as above stated. Granted that a man who receives a true revelation knows that it is from God; how is the man who receives a false revelation to know that it is not from God? Many men honestly believe themselves to be inspired, who are under the influence of some evil spirit, -- their own it may be. The assurance on certainty of conviction may be as strong in one case as in the other. In the one it is well founded, in the other it is a delusion. Irresistible conviction is not enough. It may satisfy the subject of it himself. But it cannot either satisfy others, or be a criterion of truth. Thousands have been, and still are, fully convinced that the false is true, and that what is wrong is right. To tell men, therefore, to look within for an authoritative guide, and to trust to their irresistible convictions, is to give them a guide which will lead them to destruction. When God really makes revelations to the soul, He not only gives an infallible assurance that the revelation is divine, but accompanies it with evidence satisfactory to others as well as to the recipient that it is from God. All his revelations have had the seal both of internal and external evidence. And when the believer is assured, by the testimony of the Spirit, of the truths of Scripture, he has only a new kind of evidence of what is already authenticated beyond all rational contradiction. Our blessed Lord Himself said to the Jews, "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not. But if I do, though ye believe not me, believe the works." (John x. 37, 38.) He even goes so far as to say, "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin." (John xv. 24.) The inward teaching and testimony of the Spirit are Scriptural truths, and truths of inestimable value. But it is ruinous to put them in the place of the divinely authenticated written Word.

The Doctrine productive of Evil.

5. Our Lord says of men, "By their fruits ye shall know them." The same rule of judgment applies to doctrines. Mysticism has always been productive of evil. It has led to the neglect or undervaluing of divine institutions, -- of the Church, of the ministry, of the

sacraments, of the Sabbath, and of the Scriptures. History shows that it has also led to the greatest excesses and social evils. The Society of Friends has in a good degree escaped these evils but it has been by a happy inconsistency. They have not carried out their principle. For, while they teach that the inward revelations of the Spirit present the "formal object" of faith; that they are clear and certain, forcing "the well-disposed understanding to assent, irresistibly moving it thereto;" that they are the primary, immediate, and principal source of divine knowledge; that they are not "to be subjected to the examination either of the outward testimony of the Scriptures, or of the natural reason of man, as to a more noble or certain rule or touchstone;" [58] yet they also teach that nothing not contained in the Scriptures can be an article of faith; that we are bound to believe all the Bible teaches; that everything contrary to its teaching is to be rejected as "a delusion of the devil," no matter from what source it may come; and that the Scriptures are the judge of controversies among Christians; and thus they, as a society, have been preserved from the excesses into which Mystics have generally run. Nevertheless, the Mystical principle of immediate, objective revelation of truth to every man, as his principal and primary rule of faith and practice, has wrought with Friends its legitimate fruit, inasmuch as it has led to comparative neglect of the Scriptures and of the ordinances of the Church.

[57] Barclay's Apology, p. 67.

[58] Barclay's Second Proposition.

CHAPTER V: ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE RULE OF FAITH.

§ 1. Statement of the Doctrine.

1. Romanists reject the doctrine of the Rationalists who make human reason either the source or standard of religious truth. It is one of their principles, that faith is merely human when either its object or ground is human. Faith to be divine must have truth supernaturally revealed as its object, and the evidence on which it rests must be the supernatural testimony of God.

2. They reject the Mystical doctrine that divine truth is revealed to every man by the Spirit. They admit an objective, supernatural revelation.

3. They maintain, however, that this revelation is partly written and partly unwritten, that is, the rule of faith includes both Scripture and tradition. Moreover, as the people cannot certainly know what books are of divine origin, and, therefore, entitled to a place in the canon; and as they are incompetent to decide on the meaning of Scripture, or which among the multitude of traditionary doctrines and usages are divine, and which are human, God has made the Church an infallible teacher by which all these points are determined, whose testimony is the proximate and sufficient ground of faith to the people.

So far as the Romish doctrine concerning the Rule of Faith differs from that of Protestants, it presents the following points for consideration: First, The doctrine of Romanists concerning the Scriptures. Second, Their doctrine concerning tradition. Third, Their doctrine concerning the office and authority of the Church as a teacher.

§ 2. Roman Catholic Doctrine concerning the Scriptures.

On this subject Romanists agree with Protestants, (1.) In teaching the plenary inspiration and consequent infallible authority of the sacred writings. Of these writings the Council of Trent says that God is their author, and that they were written by the dictation of the Holy Spirit ("Spiritu sancto dictante.") (2.) They agree with us in receiving into the sacred canon all the books which we regard as of divine authority.

Romanists differ from Protestants in regard to the Scriptures, --

1. In receiving into the canon certain books which Protestants do not admit to be inspired, namely: Tobit, Judith, Sirach, parts of Esther, the Wisdom of Solomon, First, Second, and Third Books of the Maccabees (the Third Book of Maccabees, however, is not included in the Vulgate), Baruch, the Hymn of the Three Children, Susanna, and Bel and the Dragon. These books are not all included by name in the list given by the Council of Trent.

Several of them are parts of the books there enumerated. Thus, the Hymn of the Three Children, Susanna, and Bel and the Dragon, appear as parts of the book of Daniel. Some modern theologians of the Romish Church refer all the apocryphal books to what they call "The Second Canon," and admit that they are not of equal authority with those belonging to the First Canon. [59] The Council of Trent, however, makes no such distinction.

Incompleteness of the Scriptures.

2. A second point of difference is that Romanists deny, and Protestants affirm, the completeness of the sacred Scriptures. That is, Protestants maintain that all the extant supernatural revelations of God, which constitute the rule of faith to his Church, are contained in his written word. Romanists, on the other hand, hold that some doctrines which all Christians are bound to believe, are only imperfectly revealed in the Scriptures; that others are only obscurely intimated; and that others are not therein contained at all. The Preface to the Romish Catechism (Quest. 12) says, "Omnis doctrin\u0000 ratio, qu\u0000 fidelibus tradenda sit, verbo Dei continetur, quod in scripturam traditionesque distributum est." Bellarmin [60] says expressly, "Nos asserimus, in Scripturis non contineri express\u0000 totam doctrinam necessariam, sive de fide sive de moribus; et proinde praeter verbum Dei scriptum requiri etiam verbum Dei non-scriptum, i.e., divinas et apostolicas traditiones." On this point the Romish theologians are of one mind; but what the doctrines are, which are thus imperfectly revealed in the Scriptures, or merely implied, or entirely omitted, has never been authoritatively decided by the Church of Rome. The theologians of that Church, with more or less unanimity. refer to one or the other of these classes the following doctrines: (1.) The canon of Scripture. (2.) The inspiration of the sacred writers. (3.) The full doctrine of the Trinity. (4.) The personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit. (5.) Infant baptism (6.) The observance of Sunday as the Christian Sabbath. (7.) The threefold orders of the ministry. (8.) The government of the Church by bishops. (9.) The perpetuity of the apostleship. (10.) The grace of orders. (11.) The sacrificial nature of the Eucharist. (12.) The seven sacraments. (13.) Purgatory. It lies in the interests of the advocates of tradition to depreciate the Scriptures, and to show how much the Church would lose if she had no other source of knowledge of divine truth but the written word. On this subject the author of No. 85 of the Oxford Tracts, when speaking even of essential doctrines, says, [61] "It is a near thing that they are in the Scriptures at all. The wonder is that they are all there. Humanly judging they would not be there but for God's interposition; and, therefore, since they are there by a sort of accident, it is not strange they shall be but latent there, and only indirectly producible thence." "The gospel doctrine," says the same writer, "is but indirectly and covertly recorded in Scripture under the surface."

Tradition is always represented by Romanists as not only the interpreter, but the complement of the Scriptures. The Bible, therefore, is, according to the Church of Rome, incomplete. It does not contain all the Church is bound to believe; nor are the doctrines which it does contain, therein fully or clearly made known.

Obscurity of the Scriptures.

3. The third point of difference between Romanists and Protestants relates to the perspicuity of Scripture, and the right of private judgment. Protestants hold that the Bible; being addressed to the people, is sufficiently perspicuous to be understood by them, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit; and that they are entitled and bound to search the Scriptures

and to judge fbr themselves what is its true meaning. Romanists, on the other hand, teach that the Scriptures are so obscure that they need a visible, present, and infallible interpreter; and that the people, being incompetent to understand them, are bound to believe whatever doctrines the Church, through its official organs, declares to be true and divine. On this subject the Council of Trent (Sess. 4), says: "Ad co&#65533;rcenda petulantia ingenia decernit (Synodus), ut nemo, su&#65533; prudenti&#65533; innixus in rebus fidei et morum ad &#65533;dificationem doctrin&#65533; Christiana pertinentium, Sacram Scripturam ad suas sensus contorquens contra eum sensum, quem tenuit et tenet sancta mater Ecclesia, cujus est judicare de vero sensu et interpretatione Scripturarum Sanctarum, aut etiam contra unanimem consensum patrum ipsam scripturam sacram interpretari audeat, etiamsi hujus modi interpretationes nullo unquam tempore in lucem edend&#65533; forent. Qui contravenerint, per ordinarios declarentur et poenis a jure statutis puniantur." Bellarmin [62] says: "Non ignorabat Deus multas in Ecclesia exorituras difficultates circa fidem, debuit igitur judicem aliquem Ecclesi&#65533; providere. At iste judex non potest esse Scriptura, neque Spiritus revelans privatus, neque princeps secularis, igitur princeps ecclesiasticus vel solus vel certe cum consilio et consensu coepiscoporum."

From this view of the obscurity of Scripture it follows that the use of the sacred volume by the people, is discountenanced by the Church of Rome, although its use has never been prohibited by any General Council. Such prohibitions, however, have repeatedly been issued by the Popes; as by Gregory VII., Innocent III., Clemens XI., and Pius IV., who made the liberty to read any vernacular version of the Scriptures, dependent on the permission of the priest. There have been, however, many Romish prelates and theologians who encouraged the general reading of the Bible. The spirit of the Latin Church and the effects of its teaching, are painfully manifested by the fact that the Scriptures are practically inaccessible to the mass of the people in strictly Roman Catholic countries.

The Latin Vulgate.

4. The fourth point of difference concerns the authority due to the Latin Vulgate. On this subject the Council of Trent (Sess. 4), says: "Synodus considerans non parum utilitatis accedere posse Ecclesi&#65533; Dei, si ex omnibus Latinis editionibus qu&#65533; circumferentur, sacrorum librorum, qu&#65533;nam pro authentica habenda sit, innotescat: statuit et declarat, ut h&#65533;c ipsa vetus et vulgata editio, qu&#65533; longo tot seculorum usu in ipsa Ecclesia probata est, in publicis lectionibus, disputationibus, pr&#65533;dicationibus et expositionibus pro authentica habeatur et nemo illam rejicere quovis pr&#65533;textu audeat vel pr&#65533;sumat." The meaning of this decree is a matter of dispute among Romanists themselves. Some of the more modern and liberal of their theologians say that the Council simply intended to determine which among several Latin versions was to be used in the service of the Church. They contend that it was not meant to forbid appeal to the original Scriptures, or to place the Vulgate on a par with them in authority. The earlier and stricter Romanists take the ground that the Synod did intend to forbid an appeal to the Hebrew and Greek Scriptures, and to make the Vulgate the ultimate authority. The language of the Council seems to favor this interpretation. The Vulgate was to be used not only for the ordinary purposes of public instruction, but in all theological discussions, and in all works of exegesis.

[59] See B. Lamy, Apparatus Bibl., lib. ii. c. 5. Jahn's Einleitung, Th. i. § 29; 2d ed. Vienna, 1802, p. 132. M&#65533;hler's Symbolik.

[60] De Verbo Dei, iv. 3, tom. i. p. 163, e. edit, Paris, 1608.

[61] Pages 34 and 35.

[62] De Verbo Dei, iii. 9, tom. i. p. 151, d. ut sup.

§ 3. Tradition.

The word tradition (paradosis) means, (1.) The art of delivering over from one to another. (2.) The thing delivered or communicated. In the New Testament it is used (a.)For instructions delivered from some to others, without reference to the mode of delivery, whether it be orally or by writing; as in 2 Thess. ii. 15, "Hold the traditions which ye have been taught, whether by word, or our epistle;" and iii. 6, "Withdraw yourself from every brother that walketh disorderly, and not after the tradition which he received of us." (b.) For the oral instructions of the fathers handed down from generation to generation, but not contained in the Scriptures, and yet regarded as authoritative. In this sense our Lord so frequently speaks of "the traditions of the Pharisees." (c.) In Gal. i. 14, where Paul speaks of his zeal for the traditions of his fathers, it may include both the written and unwritten instructions which he had received. What he was so zealous about, was the whole system of Judaism as he had been taught it.

In the early Church the word was used in this wide sense. Appeal was constantly made to "the traditions," i.e., the instructions which the churches had received. It was only certain churches at first which had any of the written instructions of the Apostles. And it was not until the end of the first century that the writings of the Evangelists and Apostles were collected, and formed into a canon, or rule of faith. And when the books of the New Testament had been collected, the fathers spoke of them as containing the traditions, i.e., the instructions derived from Christ and his Apostles. They called the Gospels "the evangelical traditions," and the Epistles "the apostolical traditions." In that age of the Church the distinction between the written and unwritten word had not yet been distinctly made. But as controversies arose, and disputants on both sides of all questions appealed to "tradition," i.e., to what they had been taught; and when it was found that these traditions differed, one church saying their teachers had always taught them one thing, and another that theirs had taught them the opposite, it was felt that there should be some common and authoritative standard. Hence the wisest and best of the fathers insisted on abiding by the written word, and receiving nothing as of divine authority not contained therein. In this, however, it must be confessed they were not always consistent. Whenever prescription, usage, or conviction founded on unwritten evidence, was available against an adversary, they did not hesitate to make the most of it. During all the early centuries, therefore, the distinction between Scripture and tradition was not so sharply drawn as it has been since the controversies between Romanists and Protestants, and especially since the decisions of the Council of Trent.

Tridentine Doctrine.

That Council, and the Latin Church as a body, teach on this subject, -- (1.) That Christ and his Apostles taught many things which were not committed to writing, i.e., not recorded in the Sacred Scriptures. (2.) That these instructions have been faithfully transmitted, and preserved in the Church. (3.) That they constitute a part of the rule of faith for all believers.

These particulars are included in the following extracts from the acts of the Council: "Synodus -- perspiciens hanc veritatem et disciplinam contineri in libris scriptis et sine scripto traditionibus, qu&#65533; ex ipsius Christi ore ab apostolis accept&#65533;, aut ab ipsis apostolis, Spiritu Sancto dictante, quasi per manus tradit&#65533;, ad nos usque pervenerunt; orthodoxorum patrum exempla secuta, omnes libros tam Veteris quam Novi Testamenti, cum utriusque unus Deus sit auctor, nec non traditiones ipsas, tum ad fidem tum ad mores pertinentes, tanquam vel ore tenus a Christo, vel a Spiritu Sancto dictatas, et continua successione in Ecclesia Catholica conservatas, pari pietatis affectu et reverentia suscipit et veneratur." [63]

Bellarmin [64] divides traditions into three classes: divine, apostolical, and ecclesiastical. "Divin&#65533; dicuntur qu&#65533; accept&#65533; sunt ab ipso Christo apostolos docente, et nusquam in divinis literis in veniuntur. . . . . Apostolic&#65533; traditiones proprie dicuntur ill&#65533;, qu&#65533; ab apostolis institut&#65533; sunt, non tamen sine assistentia Spiritus Sancti et nihilominus non extant script&#65533; in eorum epistolis. . . . . Ecclesiastic&#65533; traditiones proprie dicuntur consuetudines qu&#65533;dam antiqu&#65533; vel a pr&#65533;latis vel a populis inchoat&#65533;, qu&#65533; paulatim tacito consensu populorum vim legis obtinuerunt. Et quidem traditiones divin&#65533; eandem vim habent, quam divinae pr&#65533;cepta sive divina doctrina scripta in Evangeliis. Et similiter apostolic&#65533; traditiones non script&#65533; eandem vim habent, quam apostolica, traditiones script&#65533;. . . . . Ecclesiastic&#65533; autem traditiones eandem vim habent, quam decreta et constitutiones ecclesiastic&#65533;, script&#65533;."

Petrus &#65533; Soto, quoted by Chemnitz [65] says, "Infallibilis est regula et catholica. Quacunque credit, tenet, et servat Romana Ecclesia, et in Scripturis non habentur, illa ab apostolis esse tradita; item quarum observationum initium, author et origo ignoretur, vel inveniri non potest, illas extra omnem dubitationem ab apostolis tradita esse."

From this it appears, 1. That these traditions are called unwritten because not contained in the Scriptures. They are, for the most part, now to be found written in the works of the Fathers, decisions of councils, ecclesiastical constitutions, and rescripts of the Popes.

2. The office of tradition is to convey a knowledge of doctrines, precepts, and institutions not contained in Scripture; and also to serve as a guide to the proper understanding of what is therein written. Tradition, therefore, in the Church of Rome, is both the supplement and interpretation of the written word.

3. The authority due to tradition is the same as that which belongs to the Scriptures. Both are to be received "pari pietatis affectu et reverentia." Both are derived from the same source; both are received through the same channel; and both are authenticated by the same witness. This authority, however, belongs properly only to traditions regarded as divine or apostolical. Those termed ecclesiastical are of less importance, relating to rites and usages. Still for them is claimed an authority virtually divine, as they are enjoined by a church which claims to have been endowed by Christ with full power to ordain rites and ceremonies.

4. The criteria by which to distinguish between true and false traditions, are either antiquity and catholicity, or the testimony of the extant Church. Sometimes the one, and sometimes the other is urged. The Council of Trent gives the former; so does Bellarmin, and so do the majority of Romish theologians. This is the famous rule established by Vincent of

Lerins in the fifth century, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." On all occasions, however, the ultimate appeal is to the decision of the Church. Whatever the Church declares to be a part of the revelation committed to her, is to be received as of divine authority, at the peril of salvation.

[63] Trent. Sess. iv.

[64] De Verbo Dei, iv. 1.

[65] Examen Concilii Tridentini, p. 85, edit. Frankfort, 1574.

§ 4. The Office of the Church as Teacher.

1. Romanists define the Church to be the company of men professing the same faith, united in the communion of the same sacraments, subject to lawful pastors, and specially to the Pope. By the first clause they exclude from the Church all infidels and heretics; by the second, all the unbaptized; by the third, all who are not subject to bishops having canonical succession; and by the fourth, all who do not acknowledge the Bishop of Rome to be the head of the Church on earth. It is this external, visible society thus constituted, that God has made an authoritative and infallible teacher.

2. The Church is qualified for this office: first, by the communication of all the revelations of God, written and unwritten; and secondly, by the constant presence and guidance of the Holy Spirit preserving it from all error in its instructions. On this point the "Roman Catechism," [66] says: "Quemadmodum h�c una Ecclesia errare non potest in fidei ac morum disciplina tradenda, cum a Spiritu Sancto gubernetur; ita ceteras omnes, qu� sibi ecclesi� nomen arrogant, ut qu� Diaboli spiritu ducantur, in doctrin� et morum perniciosissimis erroribus versari necesse est." And Bellarmin, [67] "Nostra sententia est Ecclesiam absolute non posse errare nec in rebus absolute necessariis nec in aliis, qu� credenda vel facienda nobis proponit, sive habeantur expresse in Scripturis, sive non."

3. The Church, according to these statements, is infallible only as to matters of faith and morals. Its infallibility does not extend over the domains of history, philosophy, or science. Some theologians would even limit the infallibility of the Church, to essential doctrines. But the Church of Rome does not make the distinction, recognised by all Protestants, between essential and non-essential doctrines. With Romanists, that is essential, or necessary, which the Church pronounces to be a part of the revelation of God. Bellarmin -- than whom there is no greater authority among Romish theologians -- says that the Church can err "nec in rebus absolute necessariis nec in aliis," i.e., neither in things in their own nature necessary, nor in those which become necessary when determined and enjoined. It has been disputed among Romanists, whether the Church is infallible in matters of fact as well as in matters of doctrine. By facts, in this discussion, are not meant facts of history or science, but facts involved in doctrinal decisions. When the Pope condemned certain propositions taken from the works of Jansenius, his disciples had to admit that those propositions were erroneous; but they denied that they were contained, in the sense condemned, in the writings of their master. To this the Jesuits replied, that the infallibility of the Church extended in such cases as much to the fact as to the doctrine. This the Jansenists denied.

The Organs of the Church's Infallibility.

4. As to the organs of the Church in its infallible teaching, there are two theories, the Episcopal and Papal, or, as they are designated from their principal advocates, the Gallican and the Transmontane. According to the former, the bishops, in their collective capacity, as the official successors of the Apostles, are infallible as teachers. Individual bishops may err, the body or college of bishops cannot err. Whatever the bishops of any age of the Church unite in teaching, is, for that age, the rule of faith. This concurrence of judgment need not amount to entire unanimity. The greater part, the common judgment of the episcopate, is all that is required. To their decision all dissentients are bound to submit. This general judgment may be pronounced in a council, representing the whole Church, or in any other way in which agreement may be satisfactorily indicated. Acquiescence in the decisions of even a provincial council, or of the Pope, or the several bishops, each in his own diocese, teaching the same doctrine, is sufficient proof of consent.

The Transmontane Theory.

According to the Papal, or Transmontane theory, the Pope is the organ through which the infallible judgment of the Church is pronounced. He is the vicar of Christ. He is not subject to a general council. He is not required to consult other bishops before he gives his decision. This infallibility is not personal, but official. As a man the Pope may be immoral, heretical, or infidel; as Pope, when speaking ex cathedra, he is the organ of the Holy Ghost. The High-Priest among the Jews might be erroneous in faith, or immoral in conduct, but when consulting God in his official capacity, he was the mere organ of divine communication. Such, in few words, is the doctrine of Romanists concerning the Rule of Faith.

In the recent Ecumenical Council, held in the Vatican, after a protracted struggle, the Transmontane doctrine was sanctioned. It is, therefore, now obligatory on all Romanists to believe that the Pope, when speaking ex cathedra, is infallible.

[66] Part I. cap. x. quest. 1a.

[67] De Ecclesia Maitante, c. 14.

§ 5. Examination of the Romish Doctrine.

Hundreds of volumes have been written in the discussion of the various points included in the theory above stated. Only a most cursory view of the controversy can be given in such a work as this. So far as Romanists differ from us on the canon of Scripture, the examination of their views belongs to the department of Biblical literature. What concerns their doctrine of the incompleteness and obscurity of the written word, and the consequent necessity of an infallible, visible interpreter, can better be said under the head of the Protestant doctrine of the Rule of Faith. The two points to be now considered are Tradition and the office of the Church as a teacher. These subjects are so related that it is difficult to keep them distinct. Tradition is the teaching of the Church, and the teaching of the Church is tradition. These subjects are not only thus intimately related, but they are generally included under the same head in the Catholic Symbols. Nevertheless, they are distinct, and involve very different principles. They should, therefore, be considered separately.

§ 6. Examination of the Doctrine of the Church of Rome on Tradition.

A. Difference between Tradition and the Analogy of Faith.

1. The Romish doctrine of tradition differs essentially from the Protestant doctrine of the analogy of faith. Protestants admit that there is a kind of tradition within the limits of the sacred Scriptures themselves. One generation of sacred writers received the whole body of truth taught by those who preceded them. There was a tradition of doctrine, a traditionary usus loquendi, traditionary figures, types, and symbols. The revelation of God in his Word begins in a fountain, and flows in a continuous stream ever increasing in volume. We are governed by this tradition of truth running through the whole sacred volume. All is consistent. One part cannot contradict another. Each part must be interpreted so as to bring it into harmony with the whole. This is only saying that Scripture must explain Scripture.

2. Again, Protestants admit that as there has been an uninterrupted tradition of truth from the protevangelium to the close; of the Apocalypse, so there has been a stream of traditionary teaching flowing through the Christian Church from the day of Pentecost to the present time. This tradition is so far a rule of faith that nothing contrary to it can be true. Christians do not stand isolated, each holding his own creed. They constitute one body, having one common creed. Rejecting that creed, or any of its parts, is the rejection of the fellowship of Christians, incompatible with the communion of saints, or membership in the body of Christ. In other words, Protestants admit that there is a common faith of the Church, which no man is at liberty to reject, and which no man can reject and be a Christian. They acknowledge the authority of this common faith for two reasons. First, because what all the competent readers of a plain book take to be its meaning, must be its meaning. Secondly, because the Holy Spirit is promised to guide the people of God into the knowledge of the truth, and therefore that which they, under the teachings of the Spirit, agree in believing must be true. There are certain fixed doctrines among Christians, as there are among Jews and Mohammedans, which are no longer open questions. The doctrines of the Trinity, of the divinity and incarnation of the eternal Son of God; of the personality and divinity of the Holy Spirit; of the apostasy and sinfulness of the human race; the doctrines of the expiation of sin through the death of Christ and of salvation through his merits; of regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Ghost; of the forgiveness of sins, the resurrection of the body, and of the life everlasting, have always entered into the faith of every recognized, historical church on the face of the earth, and cannot now be legitimately called into question by any pretending to be Christians.

Some of the more philosophical of the Romish theologians would have us believe that this is all they mean by tradition. They insist, they say, only on the authority of common consent. Thus Moehler, Professor of Theology at Munich, in his "Symbolik, oder Darstellung der Dogmatischen Gegenstze," says, "Tradition, in the subjective sense of the word, is the common faith, or consciousness of the Church." [68] "The ever-living word in the hearts of believers." [69] It is, he says, what Eusebius means by by ekklesiastikon phronema; what Vincent of Lerins intends by the ecclesiastica intelligentia, and the Council of Trent by the universus ecelesic sensus. "In the objective sense of the word," Moehler says that "Tradition is the common faith of the Church as presented in external, historical witnesses through all centuries." "In this latter sense," he tells us, "tradition is commonly viewed when spoken of as a guide to the interpretation of the rule of Faith." [70] He admits

that in this sense "Tradition contains nothing beyond what is taught in Scripture; the two as to their content, are one and the same." [71] Nevertheless, he acknowledges that in the Church of Rome many things were handed down from the Apostles which are not contained in the Scriptures. This fact he does not deny. He admits that such additional revelations, or such revelations in addition to those contained in the written word, are of the highest importance. But he soon dismisses the subject, and devotes his strength to the first-mentioned view of the nature and office of tradition, and holds that up as the peculiar doctrine of Romanism as opposed to the Protestant doctrine. Protestants, however, admit the fact and the authority of a common consciousness and a common faith, or common sense of the Church, while they reject the real and peculiar doctrine of Rome on this subject.

B. Points of Difference between the Romish Doctrine and that of Protestants on Common Consent.

The points of difference between the Protestant doctrine concerning the common faith of the Church and the Roman Catholic doctrine of tradition are: --

First. When Protestants speak of common consent of Christians, they understand by Christians the true people of God. Romanists on the other hand, mean the company of those who profess the true faith, and who are subject to the Pope of Rome. There is the greatest possible difference between the authority due to the common faith of truly regenerated, holy men, the temples of the Holy Ghost, and that due to what a society of nominal Christians profess to believe, the great majority of whom may be worldly, immoral, and irreligious.

Secondly. The common consent for which Protestants plead concerns only essential doctrines; that is, doctrines which enter into the very nature of Christianity as a religion, and which are necessary to its subjective existence in the heart, or which if they do not enter essentially into the religious experience of believers, are so connected with vital doctrines as not to admit of separation from them. Romanists, on the contrary, plead the authority of tradition for all kinds of doctrines and precepts, for rites and ceremonies, and ecclesiastical institutions, which have nothing to do with the life of the Church, and are entirely outside of the sphere of the promised guidance of the Spirit. Our Lord, in promising the Spirit to guide his people into the knowledge of truths necessary to their salvation, did not promise to preserve them from error in subordinate matters, or to give them supernatural knowledge of the organization of the Church, the number of the sacraments, or the power of bishops. The two theories, therefore, differ not only as to the class of persons who are guided by the Spirit, but also as to the class of subjects in relation to which that guidance is promised.

Thirdly. A still more important difference is, that the common faith of the Church for which Protestants contend, is faith in doctrines plainly revealed in Scripture. It does not extend beyond those doctrines. It owes its whole authority to the fact that it is a common understanding of the written word, attained and preserved under that teaching of the Spirit, which secures to believers a competent knowledge of the plan of salvation therein revealed. On the other hand, tradition is with the Romanists entirely independent of the Scriptures. They plead for a common consent in doctrines not contained in the Word of God, or which cannot be proved therefrom.

Fourthly. Protestants do not regard "common consent" either as an informant or as a ground of faith. With them the written word is the only source of knowledge of what God

has revealed for our salvation, and his testimony therein is the only ground of our faith. Whereas, with Romanists, tradition is not only an informant of what is to be believed, but the witness on whose testimony faith is to be yielded. It is one thing to say that the fact that all the true people of God, under the guidance of the Spirit, believe that certain doctrines are taught in Scripture, is an unanswerable argument that they are really taught therein, and quite another thing to say that because an external society, composed of all sorts of men, to whom no promise of divine guidance has been given, agree in holding certain doctrines, therefore we are bound to receive those doctrines as part of the revelation of God.

C. Tradition and Development.

The Romish doctrine of tradition is not to be confounded with the modern doctrine of development. All Protestants admit that there has been, in one sense, an uninterrupted development of theology in the Church, from the apostolic age to the present time. All the facts, truths, doctrines, and principles, which enter into Christian theology, are in the Bible. They are there as fully and is clearly at one time as at another; at the beginning as they are now. No addition has been made to their number, and no new explanation has been afforded of their nature or relations. The same is true of the facts of nature. They are now what they have been from the beginning. They are, however, far better known, and more clearly understood now than they were a thousand years ago. The mechanism of the heavens was the same in the days of Pythagoras as it was in those of La Place; and yet the astronomy of the latter was immeasurably in advance of that of the former. The change was effected by a continual and gradual progress. The same progress has taken place in theological knowledge. Every believer is conscious of such progress in his own experience. When he was a child, he thought as a child. As he grew in years, he grew in knowledge of the Bible. He increased not only in the compass, but in the clearness, order, and harmony of his knowledge. This is just as true of the Church collectively as of the individual Christian. It is, in the first place, natural, if not inevitable, that it should be so. The Bible, although so clear and simple in its teaching, that he who runs may read and learn enough to secure his salvation, is still full of the treasures of the wisdom and knowledge of God; full of ta bathe tou theou, the profoundest truths concerning all the great problems which have taxed the intellect of man from the beginning. These truths are not systematically stated, but scattered, so to speak, promiscuously over the sacred pages, just as the facts of science are scattered over the face of nature, or hidden in its depths. Every man knows that there is unspeakably more in the Bible than he has yet learned, as every man of science knows that there is unspeakably more in nature than he has yet discovered, or understands. It stands to reason that such a book, being the subject of devout and laborious study, century after century, by able and faithful men, should come to be better and better understood. And as in matters of science, although one false theory after another, founded on wrong principles or on an imperfect induction of facts, has passed away, yet real progress is made, and the ground once gained is never lost, so we should naturally expect it to be with the study of the Bible. False views, false inferences, misapprehensions, ignoring of some facts, and misinterpretations, might be expected to come and go, in endless succession, but nevertheless a steady progress in the knowledge of what the Bible teaches be accomplished. And we might also expect that here, too, the ground once surely gained would not again be lost.

But, in the second place, what is thus natural and reasonable in itself is a patent historical fact. The Church has thus advanced in theological knowledge. The difference between the confused and discordant representations of the early fathers on all subjects connected with the doctrines of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, and the clearness, precision, and consistency of the views presented after ages of discussion, and the statement of these doctrines by the Councils of Chalcedon and Constantinople, is as great almost as between chaos and cosmos. And this ground has never been lost. The same is true with regard to the doctrines of sin and grace. Before the long-continued discussion of these subjects in the Augustinian period, the greatest confusion and contradiction prevailed in the teachings of the leaders of the Church; during those discussions the views of the Church became clear and settled. There is scarcely a principle or doctrine concerning the fall of man, the nature of sin and guilt, inability, the necessity of the Spirits influence, etc., etc., which now enters into the faith of evangelical Christians, which was not then clearly stated and authoritatively sanctioned by the Church. In like manner, before the Reformation, similar confusion existed with regard to the great doctrine of justification. No clear line of discrimination was drawn between it and sanctification. Indeed, during the Middle Ages, and among the most devout of the schoolmen, the idea of guilt was merged in the general idea of sin, and sin regarded as merely moral defilement. The great object was to secure holiness. Then pardon would come of course. The apostolic, Pauline, deeply Scriptural doctrine, that there can be no holiness until sin be expiated, that pardon, justification, and reconciliation, must precede sanctification, was never clearly apprehended. This was the grand lesson which the Church learned at the Reformation, and which it has never since forgot. It is true then, as an historical fact, that the Church has advanced. It understands the great doctrines of theology, anthropology, and soteriology, far better now, than they were understood in the early post-apostolic age of the Church.

Modern Theory of Development.

Very distinct from the view above presented is the modern theory of the organic development of the Church. This modern theory is avowedly founded on the pantheistic principles of Schelling and Hegel. With them the universe is the self-manifestation and evolution of the absolute Spirit. Dr. Schaff [72] says, that this theory "has left an impression on German science that can never be effaced; and has contributed more than any other influence to diffuse a clear conception of the interior organism of history." In his work on the "Principles of Protestantism," [73] Dr. Schaff says that Schelling and Hegel taught the world to recognize in history "the ever opening sense of eternal thoughts, an always advancing rational development of the idea of humanity, and its relations to God." This theory of historical development was adopted, and partially Christianized by Schleiermacher, from whom it has passed over to Dr. Schaff, as set forth in his work above quoted, as well as to many other equally devout and excellent men. The basis of this modified theory is realism. Humanity is a generic life, an intelligent substance. That life became guilty and polluted in Adam. From him it passed over by a process of natural, organic development (the same numerical life and substance) to all his posterity, who therefore are guilty and polluted. This generic life the Son of God assumed into union with his divine nature, and thus healed it and raised it to a higher power or order. He becomes a new starting-point. The origin of this new form of life in Him is supernatural. The constitution of his person was a miracle. But from Him this life is communicated by a

natural process of development to the Church. Its members are partakers of this new generic life. It is, however, a germ. What ever lives grows. "Whatever is done is dead." This new life is Christianity. Christianity is not a form of doctrine objectively revealed in the Scriptures. Christian theology is not the knowledge, or systematic exhibition of what the Bible teaches. It is the interpretation of this inner life. The intellectual life of a child expressed itself in one way, of a boy in another way, and of a man in another and higher way. In each stage of his progress the man has views, feelings, and modes of thinking, appropriate to that stage. It would not do for a man to have the same views and thoughts as the child. Yet the latter are just as true, as right, and as proper, for the child, as those of the man for the man. It is thus with the Church. It passes through these stages of childhood, youth, and manhood, by a regular process. During the first centuries the Church had the indistinctness, vagueness, and exaggeration of views and doctrines, belonging to a period of infancy. In the Middle Ages it had a higher form. At the Reformation it advanced to the entrance on another stage. The form assumed by Christianity during the medi&#xfffd;val period, was for that period the true and proper, but not the permanent form. We have not reached that form as to doctrine yet. That will be reached in the Church of the future.

Development as held by some Romanists.

There is still another and very different form of the doctrine of development. It does not assume the Mystical doctrine of the indwelling of the substance of Christ, in the soul, the development of which works out its illumination in the knowledge of the truth, and finally its complete redemption. It admits that Christianity is, or includes a system of doctrine, and that those doctrines are in the Scriptures; but holds that many of them are there only in their rudiments. Under the constant guidance and tuition of the Spirit, the Church comes to understand all that these rudiments contain, and to expand them in their fulness. Thus the Lord's Supper has been expanded into the doctrine of transubstantiation and the sacrifice of the mass; anointing the sick, into the sacrament of extreme unction; rules of discipline into the sacrament of penance, of satisfactions, of indulgences, of purgatory, and masses and prayers for the dead; the prominence of Peter, into the supremacy of the Pope. The Old Testament contains the germ of all the doctrines unfolded in the New; and so the New Testament contains the germs of all the doctrines unfolded, under the guidance of the Spirit, in the theology of the medi&#xfffd;val Church.

Although attempts have been made by some Romanists and Anglicans to resolve the doctrine of tradition into one or other of these theories of development, they are essentially different. The only point of analogy between them is, that in both cases, little becomes much. Tradition has made contributions to the faith and institutions of the Christian Church; and development (in the two latter forms of the doctrine above mentioned) provides for a similar expansion.

The Real Question.

The real status qu&#xfffd;stionis, on this subject, as between Romanists and Protestants, is not (1) Whether the Spirit of God leads true believers into the knowledge of the truth; nor (2) whether true Christians agree in all essential matters as to truth and duty; nor (3) whether any man can safely or innocently dissent from this common faith of the people of God; but (4) whether apart from the revelation contained in the Bible, there is another supplementary and explanatory revelation, which has been handed down outside of the

Scriptures, by tradition. In other words, whether there are doctrines, institutions, and ordinances, having no warrant in the Scriptures, which we as Christians are bound to receive and obey on the authority of what is called common consent. This Romanists affirm and Protestants deny.

D. Arguments against the Doctrine of Tradition.

The heads of argument against the Romish doctrine on this subject are the following: --

I. It involves a natural impossibility. It is of course conceded that Christ and his Apostles said and did much that is not recorded in the Scriptures; and it is further admitted that if we had any certain knowledge of such unrecorded instructions, they would be of equal authority with what is written in the Scriptures. But Protestants maintain that they were not intended to constitute a part of the permanent rule of faith to the Church. They were designed for the men of that generation. The showers which fell a thousand years ago, watered the earth and rendered it fruitful for men then living. They cannot now be gathered up and made available for us. They did not constitute a reservoir for the supply of future generations. In like manner the unrecorded teachings of Christ and his Apostles did their work. They were not designed for our instruction. It is as impossible to learn what they were, as it is to gather up the leaves which adorned and enriched the earth when Christ walked in the garden of Gethsemane. This impossibility arises out of the limitations of our nature, as well as its corruption consequent on the fall. Man has not the clearness of perception, the retentiveness of memory, or the power of presentation, to enable him (without supernatural aid) to give a trustworthy account of a discourse once heard, a few years or even months after its delivery. And that this should be done over and over from month to month for thousands of years, is an impossibility. If to this be added the difficulty in the way of this oral transmission, arising from the blindness of men to the things of the Spirit, which prevents their understanding what they hear, and from the disposition to pervert and misrepresent the truth to suit their own prejudices and purposes, it must be acknowledged that tradition cannot be a reliable source of knowledge of religious truth. This is universally acknowledged and acted upon, except by Romanists. No one pretends to determine what Luther and Calvin, Latimer and Cranmer, taught, except from contemporaneous written records. Much less will any sane man pretend to know what Moses and the prophets taught except from their own writings.

Romanists admit the force of this objection. They admit that tradition would not be a trustworthy informant of what Christ and the Apostles taught, without the supernatural intervention of God. Tradition is to be trusted not because it comes down through the hands of fallible men, but because it comes through an infallibly guided Church. This, however, is giving up the question. It is merging the authority of tradition into the authority of the Church. There is no need of the former, if the latter be admitted. Romanists, however, keep these two things distinct. They say that if the Gospels had never been written, they would know by historical tradition the facts of Christ's life; and that if his discourses and the epistles of the Apostles had never been gathered up and recorded, they would by the same means know the truths which they contain. They admit, however, that this could not be without a special divine intervention.

No Promise of Divine Intervention.

2. The second objection of Protestants to this theory is, that it is unphilosophical and

irreligious to assume a supernatural intervention on the part of God, without promise and without proof, merely to suit a purpose, -- Deus ex machina.

Our Lord promised to preserve his Church from fatal apostasy; He promised to send his Spirit to abide with his people, to teach them; He promised that He would be with them to the end of the world. But these promises were not made to any external, visible organization of professing Christians, whether Greek or Latin; nor did they imply that any such Church should be preserved from all error in faith or practice; much less do they imply that instructions not recorded by the dictation of the Spirit, should be preserved and transmitted from generation to generation. There is no such promise in the Word of God, and as such preservation and transmission without divine, supernatural interposition, would be impossible, tradition cannot be a trustworthy informant of what Christ taught.

No Criterion.

3. Romanists again admit that many false traditions have prevailed in different ages and in different parts of the Church. Those who receive them are confident of their genuineness, and zealous in their support. How shall the line be drawn between the true and false? By what criterion can the one be distinguished from the other? Protestants say there is no such criterion, and therefore, if the authority of tradition be admitted, the Church is exposed to a flood of superstition and error. This is their third argument against the Romish doctrine on this subject. Romanists, however say they have a sure criterion in antiquity and universality. They have formulated their rule of judgment in the famous dictum of Vincent of Lerins: "Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus."

Common Consent not a Criterion.

To this Protestants reply, -- First, That they admit the authority of common consent among true Christians as to what is taught in the Scriptures. So far as all the true people of God agree in their interpretation of the Bible, we acknowledge ourselves bound to submit. But this consent is of authority only, (a) So far as it is the consent of true believers; (b) So far as it concerns the meaning of the written word; and, (c) So far as it relates to the practical, experimental, or essential doctrines of Christianity. Such consent as to matters outside of the Bible, or even supposed to be in the Bible, if they do not concern the foundation of our faith, is of no decisive weight. The whole Christian world, without one dissenting voice, believed for ages that the Bible taught that the sun moves round the earth. No man now believes it.

Secondly, Common consent as to Christian doctrine cannot be pleaded except within narrow limits. It is only on the gratuitous and monstrous assumption that Romanists are the only Christians, that the least plausibility can be given to the claim of common consent. The argument is really this: The Church of Rome receives certain doctrines on the authority of tradition. The Church of Rome includes all true Christians. Therefore, the common consent of all Christians may be claimed in favour of those doctrines.

But, thirdly, admitting that the Church of Rome is the whole Church, and admitting that Church to be unanimous in holding certain doctrines, that is no proof that that Church has always held them. The rule requires that a doctrine must be held not only ab omnibus, but semper. It is, however, a historical fact that all the peculiar doctrines of Romanism were not received in the early Church as matters of faith. Such doctrines as the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome; the perpetuity of the apostleship, the grace of orders; transubstantiation;

the propitiatory sacrifice of the Mass; the power of the priests to forgive sins; the seven sacraments; purgatory: the immaculate conception of the Virgin Mary, etc., etc., can all be historically traced in their origin, gradual development, and final adoption. As it would be unjust to determine the theology of Calvin and Beza from the Socinianism of modern Geneva; or that of Luther from the theology of the Germans of our day; so it is utterly unreasonable to infer that because the Latin Church believes all that the Council of Trent pronounced to be true, that such was its faith in the first centuries of its history. It is not to be denied that for the first hundred years after the Reformation the Church of England was Calvinistic; then under Archbishop Laud and the Stuarts it became almost thoroughly Romanized; then it became to a large extent Rationalistic, so that Bishop Burnet said of the men of his day, that Christianity seemed to be regarded as a fable "among all persons of discernment." To this succeeded a general revival of evangelical doctrine and piety, and that has been followed by a like revival of Romanism and Ritualism. Mr. Newman [74] says of the present time: "In the Church of England, we shall hardly find ten or twenty neighboring clergymen who agree together; and that, not in non-essentials of religion, but as to what are its elementary and necessary doctrines; or as to the fact whether there are any necessary doctrines at all, any distinct and definite faith required for salvation." Such is the testimomly of history. In no external, visible Church, has there been a consent to any form of faith, semper et ab omnibus.

The Latin Church is no exception to this remark. It is an undeniable fact of history that Arianism prevailed for years both in the East and West; that it received the sanction of the vast majority of the bishops, of provincial and ecumenical councils, and of the Bishop of Rome. It is no less certain that in the Latin Church, Augustinianism, including all the characteristic doctrines of what is now called Calvinism, was declared to be the true faith by council after council, provincial and general, and by bishops and popes. Soon, however, Augustinianism lost its ascendency. For seven or eight centuries no one form of doctrine concerning sin, grace, and predestination prevailed in the Latin Church. Augustinianism, Semi-Pelagianism, and Mysticism (equally irreconcilable with both), were in constant conflict; and that, too, on questions on which the Church had already pronounced its judgment. It was not until the beginning of the sixteenth century that the Council of Trent, after long conflict within itself, gave its sanction to a modified form of Semi-Pelagianism.

The claim, therefore, for common consent, as understood by Romanists, is contrary to history. It is inconsistent with undeniable facts. This is virtually admitted by Romanists themselves. For with them it is common to say, We believe because the fifth century believed. But this is a virtual admission that their peculiar faith is not historically traceable beyond the fifth century. This admission of a want of all historical evidence of "common consent" is also involved, as before remarked, in their constant appeal to the authority of the Church. What the Church says is a matter of faith, we, the traditionists affirm, are bound to believe, has always been a matter of faith. The passage from "Petrus ◆ Soto," quoted above, puts the case very concisely: "Qu◆cunque credit, tenet et servat Romana ecclesia, et in Scripturis non habentur illa ab Apostolis esse tradita." The argument amounts to this. The Church believes on the ground of common consent. The proof that a thing is a matter of common consent, and always has been, is that the Church now believes it.

Inadequacy of the Evidences of Consent.

The second objection to the argument of Romanists from common consent in support of their traditions, is, that the evidence which they adduce of such consent is altogether inadequate. They appeal to the ancient creeds. But there was no creed generally adopted before the fourth century. No creed adopted before the eighth century contains any of the doctrines peculiar to the Church of Rome. Protestants all receive the doctrinal statements contained in what is called the Apostles' creed, and in those of Chalcedon and of Constantinople, adopted A.D. 681.

They appeal also to the decisions of councils. To this the same reply is made. There were no general councils before the fourth century. The first six ecumenical councils gave no doctrinal decisions from which Protestants dissent. They, therefore, present no evidence of consent in those doctrines which are now peculiar to the Church of Rome.

They appeal again to the writings of the fathers. But to this Protestants object, --

First. That the writings of the apostolic fathers are too few to be taken as trustworthy representatives of the state of opinion in the Church for the first three hundred years. Ten or twenty writers scattered over such a period cannot reasonably be assumed to speak the mind of the whole Church.

Secondly. The consent of these fathers, or of the half of them, cannot be adduced in favour of any doctrine in controversy between Protestants and Romanists.

Thirdly. Almost unanimous consent can be quoted in support of doctrines which Romanists and Protestants unite in rejecting. The Jewish doctrine of the millennium passed over in its grossest form to the early Christian Church. But that doctrine the Church of Rome is specially zealous in denouncing.

Fourthly. The consent of the fathers cannot be proved in support of doctrines which Protestants and Romanists agree in accepting. Not that these doctrines did not then enter into the faith of the Church, but simply that they were not presented.

Fifthly. Such is the diversity of opinion among the fathers themselves, such the vagueness of their doctrinal statements, and such the unsettled usus loquendi as to important words, that the authority of the fathers may be quoted on either side of any disputed doctrine. There is no view, for example, of the nature of the Lord's supper, which has ever been held in the Church, for which the authority of some early father cannot be adduced. And often the same father presents one view at one time, and another at a different time.

Sixthly. The writings of the fathers have been notoriously corrupted. It was a matter of great complaint in the early Church that spurious works were circulated; and that genuine works were recklessly interpolated. Some of the most important works of the Greek fathers are extant only in a Latin translation. This is the case with the greater part of the works of Iran&#xfffd;us, translated by Rufinus, whom Jerome charges with the most shameless adulteration.

Another objection to the argument from consent is, that it is a Procrustean bed which may be extended or shortened at pleasure. In every Catena Patrum prepared to prove this consent in certain doctrines, it will be found that two or more writers in a century are cited as evincing the unanimous opinion of that century, while double or fourfold the number, of equally important writers, belonging to the same period, on the other side, are passed over in silence. There is no rule to guide in the application of this test, and no uniformity in the

manner of its use.

While, therefore, it is admitted that there has been a stream of doctrine flowing down uninterruptedly from the days of the Apostles, it is denied, as a matter of fact, that there has been any uninterrupted or general consent in any doctrine not clearly revealed in the Sacred Scriptures; and not even in reference to such clearly revealed doctrines, beyond the narrow limits of essential truths. And it is, moreover, denied that in any external, visible, organized Church, can the rule, quod semper, quod ab omnibus, be applied even to essential doctrines. The argument, therefore, of Romanists in favor of their peculiar doctrines, derived from general consent, is utterly untenable and fallacious. This is virtually admitted by the most zealous advocates of tradition. "Not only," says Professor Newman, [75] "is the Church Catholic bound to teach the truth, but she is divinely guided to teach it; her witness of the Christian faith is a matter of promise as well as of duty; her discernment of it is secured by a heavenly, as well as by a human rule. She is indefectible in it; and therefore has not only authority to enforce it, but is of authority to declaring it. The Church not only transmits the faith by human means, but has a supernatural gift for that purpose; that doctrine which is true, considered as an historical fact, is true also because she teaches it." The author of the Oxford Tract, No. 85, after saying, "We believe mainly because the Church of the fourth and fifth centuries unanimously believed," [76] adds, "Why should not the Church be divine? The burden of proof surely is on the other side. I will accept her doctrines, and her rites, and her Bible -- not one, and not the other, but all, -- till I have clear proof that she is mistaken. It is I feel God's will that I should do so; and besides, I love these her possessions -- I love her Bible, her doctrines, and her rites; and therefore, I believe." [77] The Romanist then believes because the Church believes. This is the ultimate reason. The Church believes, not because she can historically prove that her doctrines have been received from the Apostles, but because she is supernaturally guided to know the truth. "Common consent," therefore, is practically abandoned, and tradition resolves itself into the present faith of the Church.

Tradition not available by the People.

4. Protestants object to tradition as part of the rule of faith, because it is not adapted to that purpose. A rule of faith to the people must be something which they can apply; a standard by which they can judge. But this unwritten revelation is not contained in any one volume accessible to the people, and intelligible by them. It is scattered through the ecclesiastical records of eighteen centuries. It is absolutely impossible for the people to learn what it teaches. How can they tell whether the Church in all ages has taught the doctrine of transubstantiation, the sacrifice of the Mass, or any other popish doctrine. They must take all such doctrines upon trust, i.e., on the faith of the extant Church. But this is to deny that to them tradition is a rule of faith. They are required to believe, on the peril of their souls, doctrines, the pretended evidence of which it is impossible for them to ascertain or appreciate.

5. Romanists argue that such is the obscurity of the Scriptures, that not only the people, but the Church itself needs the aid of tradition in order to their being properly understood. But if the Bible, a comparatively plain book, in one portable volume, needs to be thus explained, What is to explain the hundreds of folios in which these traditions are recorded? Surely a guide to the interpretation of the latter must be far more needed than one for the

Scriptures.

Tradition destroys the Authority of the Scriptures.

6. Making tradition a part of the rule of faith subverts the authority of the Scriptures. This follows as a natural and unavoidable consequence. If there be two standards of doctrine of equal authority, the one the explanatory, and infallible interpreter of the other, it is of necessity the interpretation which determines the faith of the people. Instead, therefore, of our faith resting on the testimony of God as recorded in his Word, it rests on what poor, fallible, often fanciful, prejudiced, benighted men, tell us is the meaning of that word. Man and his authority take the place of God. As this is the logical consequence of making tradition a rule of faith, so it is an historical fact that the Scriptures have been made of no account wherever the authority of tradition has been admitted. Our Lord said, that the Scribes and Pharisees made the word of God of no effect by their traditions; that they taught for doctrines the commandments of men. This is no less historically true of the Church of Rome. A great mass of doctrines, rites, ordinances, and institutions, of which the Scriptures know nothing, has been imposed on the reason, conscience, and life of the people. The Roman Catholic religion of our day, with its hierarchy, ritual, image and saint worship; with its absolutions, indulgences, and its despotic power over the conscience and the life of the individual, is as little like the religion of the New Testament, as the present religion of the Hindus with its myriad of deities, its cruelties, and abominations, is like the simple religion of their ancient Vedas. In both cases similar causes have produced similar effects. In both there has been a provision for giving divine authority to the rapidly accumulating errors and corruptions of succeeding ages.

7. Tradition teaches error, and therefore cannot be divinely controlled so as to be a rule of faith. The issue is between Scripture and tradition. Both cannot be true. The one contradicts the other. One or the other must be given up. Of this it least no true Protestant has any doubt. All the doctrines peculiar to Romanism, and for which Romanists plead the authority of Scripture, Protestants believe to be anti-scriptural; and therefore they need no other evidence to prove that tradition is not to be trusted either in matters of faith or practice.

The Scriptures not received on the Authority of Tradition.

8. Romanists argue that Protestants concede the authority of tradition, because it is on that authority they receive the New Testament as the word of God. This is not correct. We do not believe the New Testament to be divine on the ground of the testimony of the Church. We receive the books included in the canonical Scriptures on the twofold ground of internal and external evidence. It can be historically proved that those books were written by the men whose names they bear; and it can also be proved that those men were the duly authenticated organs of the Holy Ghost. The historical evidence which determines the authorship of the New Testament is not exclusively that of the Christian fathers. The testimony of heathen writers is, in some respects, of greater weight than that of the fathers themselves. We may believe on the testimony of English history, ecclesiastical and secular, that the Thirty-Nine Articles were framed by the English Reformers, without being traditionists. In like manner we may believe that the books of the New Testament were written by the men whose names they bear without admitting tradition to be a part of the rule of faith.

Besides, external evidence of any kind is a very subordinate part of the ground of a Protestant's faith in the Scripture. That ground is principally the nature of the doctrines therein revealed, and the witness of the Spirit, with and by the truth, to the heart and conscience. We believe the Scriptures for much the same reason that we believe the Decalogue.

The Church is bound to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made it free, and not to be again entangled with the yoke of bondage, -- a bondage not only to human doctrines and institutions, but to soul-destroying errors and superstitions.

[68] Page 356.

[69] Page 357.

[70] Page 358.

[71] Page 373.

[72] What is Church History? p. 75.

[73] Page 150.

[74] Lectures on Prophetic Office of the Church, Lond. 1837, pp. 394, 395.

[75] Lectures, ut supra, pp. 225, 226.

[76] Oxford Tracts, No. 85, p. 102.

[77] Ibid. p. 115.

§ 7. Office of the Church as a Teacher.

A. The Romish Doctrine on this subject.

Romanists teach that the Church, as an external, visible society, consisting of those who profess the Christian religion, united in communion of the same sacraments and subjection to lawful pastors, and especially to the Pope of Rome, is divinely appointed to be the infallible teacher of men in all things pertaining to faith and practice. It is qualified for this office by the plenary revelation of the truth in the written and unwritten word of God, and by the supernatural guidance of the Holy Spirit vouchsafed to the bishops as official successors of the Apostles, or, to the Pope as the successor of Peter in his supremacy over the whole Church, and as vicar of Christ on earth.

There is something simple and grand in this theory. It is wonderfully adapted to the tastes and wants of men. It relieves them of personal responsibility. Everything is decided for them. Their salvation is secured by merely submitting to be saved by an infallible, sin-pardoning, and grace-imparting Church. Many may be inclined to think that it would have been a great blessing had Christ left on earth a visible representative of himself clothed with his authority to teach and govern, and an order of men dispersed through the world endowed with the gifts of the original Apostles, -- men everywhere accessible, to whom we could resort in all times of difficulty and doubt, and whose decisions could be safely received as the decisions of Christ himself. God's thoughts, however, are not as our thoughts. We know that when Christ was on earth, men did not believe or obey Him. We know that when the Apostles were still living, and their authority was still confirmed by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost, the Church was nevertheless distracted by heresies and schisms. If any in their sluggishness are disposed to

think that a perpetual body of infallible teachers would be a blessing, all must admit that the assumption of infallibility by the ignorant, the erring, and the wicked must be an evil inconceivably great. The Romish theory if true might be a blessing; if false it must be an awful curse. That it is false may be demonstrated to the satisfaction of all who do not wish it to be true, and who, unlike the Oxford Tractarian, are not determined to believe it because they love it.

B. The Romish definition of the Church is derived from what the Church of Rome now is.

Before presenting a brief outline of the argument against this theory, it may be well to remark that the Romish definition of the Church is purely empirical. It is not derived from the signification or usage of the word ekklesia in the New Testament; nor from what is there taught concerning the Church. It is merely a statement of what the Church of Rome now is. It is a body professing the same faith, united in the communion of the same sacraments, subject to pastors (i.e., bishops) assumed to be lawful, and to the Pope as the vicar of Christ. Now in this definition it is gratuitously assumed, --

1. That the Church to which the promise of divine guidance is given, is an external, visible organization; and not the people of God as such in their personal and individual relation to Christ. In other words, it is assumed that the Church is a visible society, and not a collective term for the people of God; as when it is said of Paul that he persecuted the Church; and of Christ that He loved the Church and gave himself for it. Christ certainly did not die for any external, visible, organized Society.

2. The Romish theory assumes, not only that the Church is an external organization, but that it must be organized in one definite, prescribed form. But this assumption is not only unreasonable, it is unscriptural, because no one form is prescribed in Scripture as essential to the being of the Church; and because it is contrary to the whole spirit and character of the gospel, that forms of government should be necessary to the spiritual life and salvation of men. Moreover, this assumption is inconsistent with historical facts. The Church in all its parts has never been organized according to one plan.

3. But conceding that the Church is an external society, and that it must be organized according to one plan, it is a gratuitous and untenable presumption, that that plan must be the episcopal. It is a notorious fact that diocesan episcopacy did not exist during the apostolic age. It is equally notorious that that plan of government was gradually introduced. And it is no less notorious that a large part of the Church in which Christ dwells by his presence, and which He in every way acknowledges and honours, has no bishops until the present day. The government of the Church by bishops, Romanists admit is one of the institutions which rest not on Scripture, but on tradition for their authority.

4. But should everything else be conceded, the assumption that subjection to the Pope, as the vicar of Christ, is necessary to the existence of the Church, is utterly unreasonable. This is the climax. There is not the slightest evidence in the New Testament or in the apostolic age, that Peter had any such primacy among the Apostles as Romanists claim. There is not only the absence of all evidence that he exercised any jurisdiction over them, but there is abundant evidence to the contrary. This is clear from Peter, James, and John, being mentioned together as those who appeared to be pillars (Gal. ii. 9), and this distinction was due not to office, but to character. It is moreover clear from the full equality

in gifts and authority which Paul asserted for himself, and proved to the satisfaction of the whole Church that he possessed. It is clear from the subordinate position occupied by Peter in the Council of Jerusalem (Acts xv.), and from the severe reproof he received from Paul at Antioch (Gal. ii. 11-21). It is a plain historical fact, that Paul and John were the master-spirits of the Apostolic Church. But admitting the primacy of Peter in the college of Apostles, there is no evidence that such primacy was intended to be perpetual. There is no command to elect a successor to him in that office; no rules given as to the mode of such election, or the persons by whom the choice was to be made; and no record of such election having actually been made. Everything is made out of the air. But admitting that Peter was constituted the head of the whole Church on earth, and that such headship was intended to be continued, what evidence is there that the Bishop of Rome was to all time entitled to that office? It is very doubtful whether Peter ever was in Rome. The sphere of his labors was in Palestine and the East. It is certain he never was Bishop of the Church in that city. And even if he were, he was Primate, not as Bishop of Rome, but by appointment of Christ. According to the theory, he was Primate before he went to Rome, and not because he went there The simple historical fact is, that as Rome was the seat of the Roman empire, the Bishop of Rome aspired to be the head of the Church, which claim after a long struggle came to be acknowledged, at least in the West.

It is on the four gratuitous and unreasonable assumptions above mentioned, namely, that the Church to which the promise of the Spirit was made is an external, visible organization; that a particular mode of organization is essential to its existence; that that mode is the episcopal; and that it must be papal, i.e., the whole episcopacy be subject to the Bishop of Rome; -- it is on these untenable assumptions that the whole stupendous system of Romanism rests. If any one of them fail, the whole falls to the ground. These assumptions are so entirely destitute of any adequate historical proof, that no reasonable man can accept them on their own evidence. It is only those who have been taught or induced to believe the extant Church to be infallible, who can believe them. And they believe not because these points can be proved, but on the assertion of the Church. The Romish Church says that Christ constituted the Church on the papal system, and thererore, it is to be believed. The thing to be proved is taken for granted. It is a petitio principii from beginning to end.

C. The Romish Doctrine of Infallibility founded on a Wrong Theory of the Church.

The first great argument of Protestants against Romanism concerns the theory of the Church.

God entered into a covenant with Abraham. In that covenant there were certain promises which concerned his natural descendants through Isaac, which promises were suspended on the national obedience of the people. That covenant, however, contained the promise of redemption through Christ. He was the seed in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed. The Jews came to believe that this promise of redemption, i.e., of the blessings of the Messiah's reign, was made to them as a nation; and that it was conditioned on membership in that nation. All who were Jews either by descent or proselytism, and who were circumcised, and adhered to the Law, were saved. All others would certainly perish forever. This is the doctrine which our Lord so pointedly condemned, and against which St. Paul so strenuously argued. When the Jews claimed that they were the children of God, because they were the children of Abraham, Christ told them that they might be the

children of Abraham, and yet the children of the devil (John viii. 33-44); as John, his forerunner, had before said, say not "We have Abraham to our father; for I say unto you, that God is able of these stones to raise up children unto Abraham." (Matt. iii. 9) It is against this doctrine the epistles to the Romans and Galatians are principally directed. The Apostle shows, (1.) That the promise of salvation was not confined to the Jews, or to the members of any external organization. (2.) And therefore that it was not conditioned on descent from Abraham, nor on circumcision, nor on adherence to the Old Testament theocracy. (3) That all believers (hoi ek pisteos) are the sons and, therefore, the heirs of Abraham. (Gal. iii. 7.) (4.) That a man might be a Jew, a Hebrew of the Hebrews, circumcised on the eighth day, and touching the righteousness which is of the law blameless, and yet it avail him nothing. (Phil. iii. 4-6.) (5.) Because he is not a Jew who is one outwardly; and circumcision is of the heart. (Romans ii. 28-29.) (6.) And consequently that God could cast off the Jews as a nations without acting inconsistently with his covenant with Abraham, because the promise was not made to the Israel kata sarka, but to the Israel kata pneuma. (Rom. ix. 6-8.)

Romanists have transferred the whole Jewish theory to the Christian Church; while Protestants adhere to the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles. Romanists teach, (1.) That the Church is essentially an external, organized community, as the commonwealth of Israel. (2.) That to this external society, all the attributes, prerogatives, and promises of the true Church belong. (3.) That membership in that society is the indispensable condition of salvation; as it is only by union with the Church that men are united to Christ, and, through its ministrations, become partakers of his redemption. (4.) That all who die in communion with this external society, although they may, if not perfect at death, suffer for a longer or shorter period in purgatory, shall ultimately be saved (5.) All outside of this external organization perish eternally. There is, therefore, not a single element of the Jewish theory which is not reproduced in the Romish.

Protestant Doctrine of the Nature of the Church.

Protestants, on the other hand, teach on this subject, in exact accordance with the doctrine of Christ and the Apostles: (1.) That the Church as such, or in its essential nature, is not an external organization. (2.) All true believers, in whom the Spirit of God dwells, are members of that Church which is the body of Christ, no matter with what ecclesiastical organization they may be connected, and even although they have no such connection. The thief on the cross was saved, though he was not a member of any external Church. (3.) Therefore, that the attributes, prerogatives, and promises of the Church do not belong to any external society as such, but to the true people of God collectively considered; and to external societies only so far as they consist of true believers, and are controlled by them. This is only saying what every man admits to be true, that the attributes, prerogatives, and promises pertaining to Christians belong exclusively to true Christians, and not to wicked or worldly men who call themselves Christians. (4.) That the condition of membership in the true Church is not union with any organized society, but faith in Jesus Christ. They are the children of God by faith; they are the sons of Abraham, heirs of the promise of redemption made to him by faith; whether they be Jews or Gentiles, bond or free; whether Protestants or Romanists, Presbyterians or Episcopalians; or whether they be so widely scattered, that no two or three of them are able to meet together for worship.

Protestants do not deny that there is a visible Church Catholic on earth, consisting of

all those who profess the true religion, together with their children. But they are not all included in any one external society. They also admit that it is the duty of Christians to unite for the purpose of worship and mutual watch and care. They admit that to such associations and societies certain prerogatives and promises belong; that they have, or ought to have the officers whose qualifications and duties are prescribed in the Scriptures; that there always have been, and probably always will be, such Christian organizations, or visible churches. But they deny that any one of these societies, or all of them collectively, constitute the Church for which Christ died; in which He dwells by his Spirit; to which He has promised perpetuity, catholicity, unity, and divine guidance into the knowledge of the truth. Any one of them, or all of them, one after another, may apostatize from the faith, and all the promises of God to his Church be fulfilled. The Church did not fail, when God reserved to himself only seven thousand in all Israel who had not bowed the knee unto Baal.

Almost all the points of difference between Protestants and Romanists depend on the decision of the question, "What is the Church?" If their theory be correct; if the Church is the external society of professing Christians, subject to apostle-bishops (i.e., to bishops who are apostles), and to the Pope as Christ's vicar on earth; then we are bound to submit to it; and then too beyond the pale of that communion there is no salvation. But if every true believer is, in virtue of his faith, a member of that Church to which Christ promises guidance and salvation, then Romanism falls to the ground.

The Opposing Theories of the Church.

That the two opposing theories of the Church, the Romish and Protestant, are what has been stated above is so generally known and so unquestioned, that it is unnecessary to cite authorities on either side. It is enough, so far as the doctrine of Romanists is concerned, to quote the language of Bellarmin, [78] that the marks of the Church are three: "Professio ver[illegible] fidei, sacramentorum communio, et subjectio ad legitimum pastorem, Romanum Pontificem. -- Atque hoc interest inter sententiam nostram et alias omnes, quod omnes ali[illegible] requirunt internas virtutes ad constituendum aliquem in Ecclesia, et propterea Ecclesiam veram invisibilem faciunt; nos autem credimus in Ecclesia inveniri omnes virtutes, -- tamen ut aliquis aliquo modo dici possit pars ver[illegible] Ecclesi[illegible], -- non putamus requiri ullam internam virtutem, sed tantum externam professionem fidei, et sacramentorum communionem, qu[illegible] sensu ipso percipitur. Ecclesia enim est coetus hominum ita visibilis et palpabilis, ut est coetus Populi Romani, vel regnum Galli[illegible] aut respublica Venetorum." The Lutheran Symbols define the Church as, "Congregatio sanctorum." [79] "Congregatio sanctorum et vere credentium." [80] "Societas fidei et Spiritus Sancti in cordibus." [81] "Congregatio sanctorum, qui habent inter se societatem ejusdem evangelii seu doctrin[illegible], et ejusdem Spiritus Sancti, qui corda eorum renovat, sanctificat et gubernat;" and [82] "Populus spiritualis, non civilibus ritibus distinctus a gentibus, sed verus populus Dei renatus per Spiritum Sanctum." [83]

The Symbols of the Reformed Churches present the same doctrine. [84] The Confessio Helvetica says, "Oportet semper fuisse, nunc esse et ad finem usque seculi futuram esse Ecclesiam, i.e., e mundo evocatum vel collectum coetum fidelium, sanctorum inquam omnium communionem, eorum videlicet, qui Deum verum in Christo servatore per verbum et Spiritum Sanctum vere cognoscunt et rite colunt, denique omnibus bonis per Christum gratuito oblatis fide participant." [85] Confessio Gallicana: "Affirmamus ex Dei verbo,

Ecclesiam esse fidelium coetum, qui in verbo Dei sequendo et pura religione colenda consentiunt, in qua etiam quotidie proficiunt." [86] Confessio Belgica: "Credimus et confitemur unicam Ecclesiam catholicam seu universalem, qu&#65533; est sancta congregatio seu coetus omnium fidelium Christianorum, qui totam suam salutem ab uno Jesu Christo exspectant, abluti ipsius sanguine et per Spiritum ejus sanctificati atque obsignati. H&#65533;c Ecclesia sancta nullo est aut certo loco sita et circumscripta, aut ullis certis personis astricta aut alligata: sed per omnem orbem terrarum sparsa atque diffusa est." [87] The same doctrine is found in the answer to the fifty-fourth question in the Heidelberg Catechism. In the Geneva Catechism to the question, "Quid est Ecclesia?" the answer is, "Corpus ac societas fidelium, quos Deus ad vitam &#65533;ternam pr&#65533;destinavit." [88]

Winer in his "Comparative Darstellung," [89] thus briefly states the two theories concerning the Church. Romanists, he says, "define the Church on earth, as the community of those baptized in the name of Christ, united under his Vicar, the Pope, its visible head. Protestants, on the other hand, as the communion of saints, that is, of those who truly believe on Christ, in which the gospel is purely preached and the sacraments properly administered."

Proof of the Protestant Doctrine of the Church.

This is not the place to enter upon a formal vindication of the Protestant doctrine of the nature of the Church. That belongs to the department of ecclesiology. What follows may suffice for the present purpose.

The question is not whether the word Church is not properly used, and in accordance with the Scriptures, for visible, organized bodies of professing Christians, or for all such Christians collectively considered. Nor is it the question, whether we are to regard as Christians those who, being free from scandal, profess their faith in Christ, or societies of such professors organized for the worship of Christ and the administration of his discipline, as being true churches. But the question is, whether the Church to which the attributes, prerogatives, and promises pertaining to the body of Christ belong, is in its nature a visible, organized community; and specially, whether it is a community organized in some one exclusive form, and most specially on the papal form; or, whether it is a spiritual body consisting of true believers. Whether when the Bible addresses a body of men as "the called of Jesus Christ," "beloved of God," "partakers of the heavenly calling:" as "the children of God, joint heirs with Christ of a heavenly inheritance;" as "elect according to the foreknowledge of God the Father, through sanctification and sprinkling of the blood of Christ;" as "partakers of the like precious faith with the Apostles;" as "those who are washed, and sanctified, and justified in the name of the Lord Jesus and by the Spirit of our God;" as those who being dead in sin, had been "quickened and raised up and made to sit together in heavenly places with Christ Jesus;" it means the members of an external society as such, and because such, or, the true people of God? The question is, whether when to the men thus designated and described, Christ promised to be with them to the end of the world, to give them his Spirit, to guide them unto the knowledge of the truth, to keep them through the power of the Spirit, so that the gates of hell should not prevail against them -- he means his sincere or his nominal disciples, -- believers or unbelievers? These questions admit of but one answer. The attributes ascribed to the Church in Scripture belong to true believers alone. The promises made to the Church are fulfilled only to believers. The

relation in which the Church stands to God and Christ is sustained alone by true believers. They only are the children and heirs of God; they only are the body of Christ in which He dwells by his Spirit; they only are the temple of God, the bride of Christ, the partakers of his glory. The doctrine that a man becomes a child of God and an heir of eternal life by membership in any external society, overturns the very foundations of the gospel, and introduces a new method of salvation. Yet this is the doctrine on which the whole system of Romanism rests. As, therefore, the Apostle shows that the promises made to Israel under the Old Testament, the promise of perpetuity, of extension over the whole earth, of the favour and fellowship of God, and all the blessings of the Messiah's reign, were not made to the external Israel as such, but to the true people of God; so Protestants contend that the promises made to the Church as the body and bride of Christ are not made to the external body of professed Christians, but to those who truly believe on him and obey his gospel.

The absurdities which flow from the substitution of the visible Church for the invisible, from transferring the attributes, prerogatives, and promises which belong to true believers, to an organized body of nominal or professed believers, are so great that Romanists cannot be consistent. They cannot adhere to their own theory. They are forced to admit that the wicked are not really members of the Church. They are "in it" but not "of it." Their connection with it is merely external, as that of the chaff with the wheat. This, however, is the Protestant doctrine. The Romish doctrine is precisely the reverse. Romanists teach that the chaff is the wheat; that the chaff becomes wheat by external connection with the precious grain. Just so certain, therefore, as that chaff is not wheat; that nominal Christians, as such, are not true Christians; just so certain is it that no external society consisting of good and bad, is that Church to which the promise of Christ's presence and salvation is made. It is as Turrettin says, [90] "proton pseudos pontificiorum in tota controversia est, ecclesiam metiri velle ex societatis civilis modulo, ut ejus essentia in externis tantum et in sensus incurrentibus consistat, et sola professio fidei sufficiat ad membrum ecclesi constituendum, nec ipsa fides et pietas interna ad id necessario requirantur."

D. The Doctrine of Infallibility founded on the False Assumption of the Perpetuity of the Apostleship.

As the first argument against the doctrine of Romanists as to the infallibility of the Church is, that it makes the Church of Rome to be the body to which the attributes, prerogatives, and promises of Christ to true believers belong; the second is that it limits the of the teaching of the Spirit, to the bishops as successors of the Apostles. In other words, Romanists falsely assume the perpetuity of the apostleship. If it be true that the prelates of Church of Rome, or of any other church, are apostles, invested the same authority to teach and to rule as the original messengers of Christ, then we must be bound to yield the same faith to their teaching, and the same obedience to their commands, as are due to the inspired writings of the New Testament. And such is the doctrine of the Church of Rome.

Modern Prelates are not Apostles.

To determine whether modern bishops are apostles, it is necessary in the first place to determine thee nature of the Apostleship, and ascertain whether modern prelates have the gifts, qualifications, credentials of the office. Who then were the Apostles? They were a definite number of men selected by Christ to be his witnesses, to testify to his doctrines, to

the facts of his life, to his death, and specially to his resurrection. To qualify them for this office of authoritative witnesses, it was necessary, (1.) That they should have independent and plenary knowledge of the gospel. (2.) That they should have seen Christ after his resurrection. (3.) That they should be inspired, i.e., that they should be individually and severally so guided by the Spirit as to be infallible in all their instructions. (4.) That they should be authenticated as the messengers of Christ, by adherence to the true gospel, by success in preaching (Paul said to the Corinthians that they were the seal of his apostleship, 1 Cor. ix. 2); and by signs and wonders and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. Such were the gifts and qualifications and credentials of the original Apostles; and those who claimed the office without possessirig these gifts and credentials, were pronounced false apostles and messengers of Satan.

When Paul claimed to be an apostle, he felt it necessary to prove, (1.) That he had been appointed not by man nor through men, immediately by Jesus Christ. (Gal. i. 1.) (2.) That he had not been taught the gospel by others, but received his knowledge by immediate revelation. (Gal. i. 12.) (3.) That he had see Christ after his resurrection. (1 Cor. ix. 1 and xv. 8.) (4.) That he was inspired, or infallible as a teacher, so that men were bound to recognize his teachings as the teaching of Christ (1 Cor. xiv. 37.) (5.) That the Lord had authenticated his apostolic mission as fully as he had done that of Peter. (Gal. ii. 8.) (6.) "The sins of an apostle," he tells the Corinthians, "were wrought among you in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds." (2 Cor. xii. 12.)

Modern prelates do not claim to possess any one of these gifts. Nor do they pretend to the credentials which authenticated the mission of the Apostles of Christ. They claim no immediate commission; no independent knowledge derived from immediate revelation; no personal infallibility; no vision of Christ; and no gift of miracles. That is, they claim the authority of the office, but not its reality. It is very plain, therefore, that they are not apostles. They cannot have the authority of the office without having the gifts on which that authority was founded, and from which it emanated. If a man cannot be a prophet without the gift of prophecy; or a miracle-worker without the gift of miracles; or have the gift of tongues without the ability to speak other languages than his own; no man can rightfully claim to be an apostle without possessing the gifts which made the original Apostles what they were. The deaf and dumb might as reasonably claim to have the gift of tongues. The world has never seen or suffered a greater imposture than that weak, ignorant, and often immoral men, should claim the same authority to teach and rule that belonged to men to whom the truth was supernaturally revealed, who were confessedly infallible in its communication, and to whose divine mission God himself bore witness in signs and wonders, and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. The office of the Apostles as described in the New Testament, was, therefore, from its nature incapable of being transmitted, and has not in fact been perpetuated.

There is no command given in the New Testament to keep up the succession of the Apostles. When Judas had apostatized, Peter said his place must be filled, but the selection was to be confined to those, as he said, "which have companied with us all the time that the Lord Jesus went in and out among us, beginning from the baptism of John unto that same day that He was taken up from us." (Acts i. 21, 22.) The reason assigned for this appointment was not that the Apostleship might be continued, but that the man selected might be "a

witness with us of his resurrection." "And they gave forth their lots; and the lot fell upon Matthias; and he was numbered with the eleven Apostles." And that was the end. We never hear of Matthias afterward. It is very doubtful whether this appointment of Matthias had any validity. What is here recorded (Acts, i. 15-26), took place before the Apostles had been endued with power from on high (Acts i. 8), and, therefore, before they had any authority to act in the premises. Christ in his own time and way completed the number of his witnesses by calling Paul to be an Apostle. But, however this may be, here if ever exceptio probat regulam. It proves that the ranks of the Apostles could be filled, and the succession continued only from the number of those who could bear independent witness of the resurrection and doctrines of Christ.

Besides the fact that there is no command to appoint apostles, there is clear evidence that the office was not designed to be perpetuated. With regard to all the permanent officers of the Church, there is, (1.) Not only a promise to continue the gifts which pertained to the office, and the command to appoint suitable persons to fill it, but also a specification of the qualifications to be sought and demanded; and (2.) a record of the actual appointment of incumbents; and (3.) historical evidence of their continuance in the Church from that day to this. With regard to the Apostleship, all this is wanting. As we have seen, the gifts of the office have not been continued, there is no command to perpetuate the office, no directions to guide the Church in the selection of proper persons to be apostles, no record of their appointment, and no historical evidence of their continuance; on the contrary, they disappear entirely after the death of the original twelve. It might as well be asserted that the Pharaohs of Egypt, or the twelve C&#65533;sars of Rome have been continued, as that the race of apostles has been perpetuated.

It is true that there are a few passages in which persons other than the original twelve seem to be designated as apostles. But from the beginning of the Church until of late, no one has ventured on that account to regard Barnabas, Silas, Timothy, and Titus, as apostles, in the official sense of the word. All the designations given to the officers of the Church in the New Testament, are used in different senses. Thus, "presbyter" or "elder," means, an old man, a Jewish officer, an officer of the Church. The word "deacon," means, a domestic, sometimes a secular officer, sometimes any minister of the Church; sometimes the lowest order of church officers. Because Paul and Peter call themselves "deacons," it does not prove that their office was to serve tables. In like manner the word "apostle" is sometimes used in its etymological sense "a messenger," sometimes in a religious sense, as we use the word "missionary;" and sometimes in its strict official sense, in which it is confined to the immediate messengers of Christ. Nothing can be plainer from the New Testament than that neither Silas nor Timothy, nor any other person, is ever spoken of as the official equal of the twelve Apostles. These constitute a class by themselves. They stand out the New Testament as they do in all Church history, as the authoritative founders of the Christian Church, without peers or colleagues.

If, then, the Apostleship, from its nature and design, was incapable of transmission; if there be this decisive evidence from Scripture and history, that it has not been perpetuated, then the whole theory of the Romanists concerning the Church falls to the ground. That theory is founded on the assumption that prelates are apostles, invested with the same authority to teach and rule, as the original messengers of Christ. If this assumption is

unfounded, then all claim to the infallibility of the Church must be given up; for it is not pretended that the mass of the people is infallible nor the priesthood, but simply the episcopate. And bishops are infallible only on the assumption that they are apostles, in the official sense of the term. This they certainly are not. The Church may make priests, and bishops, and even popes; but Christ alone can make an Apostle. For an Apostle was a man endowed with supernatural knowledge, and with supernatural power.

E. Infallibility founded on a False Interpretation of the Promise of Christ.

The third decisive argument against the infallibility of the Church is, that Christ never promised to preserve it from all error. What is here meant is that Christ never promised the true Church, that is, "the company of true believers," that they should not err in doctrine. He did promise that they should not fatally apostatize From the truth. He did promise that He would, grant his true disciples such a measure of divine guidance by his Spirit, that they should know enough to be saved. He, moreover, promised that He would call men into the ministry, and give them the qualifications of faithful teachers, such as were the presbyters whom the Apostles ordained in every city. But there is no promise of infallibility either to the Church as a whole, or to any class of men in the Church. Christ promised to sanctify his people; but this was not a promise to make them perfectly holy in this life. He promised to give them joy and peace in believing; but this is not a promise to make them perfectly happy in this life, -- that they should have no trials or sorrows. Then, why should the promise to teach be a promise to render infallible. As the Church has gone through the world bathed in tears and blood, so has she gone soiled with sin and error. It is just as manifest that she has never been infallible, as that she has never been penfectly holy. Christ no more promised the one than the other.

F. The Doctrine contradicted by Facts.

The fourth argument is that the Romish doctrine of the infallibility of the Church is contradicted by undeniable historical facts. It therefore cannot be true. The Church has often erred, and therefore it is not infallible.

Protestants believe that the Church, under all dispensations, has been the same. It has always had the same God; the same Redeemer; the same rule of faith and practice (the written Word of God, at least from the time of Moses), the same promise of the presence and guidance of the Spirit, the same pledge of perpetuity and triumph. To them, therefore, the fact that the whole visible Church repeatedly apostatized during the old economy -- and that, not the people only, but all the representatives of the Church, the priests, the Levites, and the elders -- is a decisive proof that the external, visible Church may fatally err in matters of faith. No less decisive is the fact that the whole Jewish Church and people, as a church and nation, rejected Christ. He came to his own, and his own received him not. The vast majority of the people, the chief priests, the scribes and the elders, refused to recognize him as the Messiah. The Sanhedrim, the great representative body of the Church at that time, pronounced him worthy of death, and demanded his crucifixion. This, to Protestants, is overwhelming proof that the Church may err.

Romanists, however, make such a difference between the Church before and after the advent of Christ, that they do not admit the Force of this argument. That the Jewish Church erred, they say, is no proof that the Christian Church can err. It will be necessary, therefore, to show that according to the principles and admissions of Romanists themselves, the

Church has erred. It taught at one time what it condemned at another, and what the Church of Rome now condemns. To prove this, it will suffice to refer to two undeniable examples.

It is to be borne in mind that by the Church, in this connection, Romanists do not mean the true people of God; nor the body of professing Christians; nor the majority of priests, or doctors of divinity, but the episcopate. What the body of bishops of any age teach, all Christians are bound to believe, because these bishops are so guided by the Spirit as to be infallible in their teaching.

The Arian Apostasy.

The first great historical fact inconsistent with this theory is, that the great majority of the bishops, both of the Eastern and Western Church, including the Pope of Rome, taught Arianism, which the whole Church, both before and afterwards, condemned. The decision of three hundred and eighty bishops at the Council of Nice, satisfied by the assent of the great majority of those who did not attend that Council, is fairly taken as proof that the visible Church at that time taught, as Rome now teaches, that the Son is consubstantial within time Father. The fact that some dissented at the time, or that more soon joined in that dissent; or, that in a few years in the East, the dissentients were in the majority, is not considered as invalidating the decision of that Council as the decision of the Church; because a majority of the bishops, as a body, were still in favor of the Nicene doctrine. Then, by parity of reasoning, the decisions of the two contemporary councils, one at Seleucia in the East, the other at Ariminum in the West, including nearly eight hundred bishops, ratified as those decisions were by the great majority of the bishops of the whole Church (including Liberius, the bishop of Rome), must be accepted as the teaching of the visible Church of that age. But those decisions, according to the previous and subsequent judgment of the Church, were heretical. It has been urged that the language adopted by the Council of Arminum admits of an orthodox interpretation. In answer to this, it is enough to say, (1.) That it was drawn up, proposed, and urged by the avowed opponents of the Nicene Creed. (2.) That it was strenuously resisted by the advocates of that creed, and renounced as soon as they gained the ascendency. (3.) That Mr. Palmer himself admits that the Council repudiated the word "consubstantial" as expressing the relation of the Son to the Father. But this was the precise point in dispute between the Orthodox and semi-Arians.

Ancients and moderns unite in testifying to the general prevalence of Arianism at that time. Gregory Nazianzen says, [91] "Nam si perpaucos exceperis, ... omnes (pastores) tempori obsecuti sunt: hoc tantum inter eos discriminis fuit, quod alii citius, alii seri&#65533;s in eam fraudem inciderunt, atque, alii impietatis duces antistitesque se pr&#65533;buerunt." Jerome says: "Ingemuit totus orbis terrarum, et Arianum se esse miratus est." [92] He also says: [93] "Ecclesia non parietibus consistit, sed in dogmatum veritate, Ecclesia ibi est ubi fides vera est. Ceterum ante annos quindecim aut viginti parietes omnes hic ecclesiarum h&#65533;retici (Ariani) possidebant, Ecclesia autem vera illic erat, ubi vera fides erat." It is here asserted that the whole world had become Arian; and that all the churches were in the possession of heretics. These statements must be taken with due allowance. They nevertheless prove that the great majority of the bishops had adopted the Arian, or semi-Arian Creed. To the same effect Athanasius says: "Qu&#65533; nunc ecclesia libere Christum adorat? Si quidem ea, si pia est, periculo subjacet? . . . . Nam si alicubi pii et Christi studiosi (sunt autem ubique tales permulti) illi itidem, ut Prophet&#65533; et magnus ille Elias, absconduntur, ... et in speluncas

et cavernas terr&#65533; sese abstrudunt, aut in solitudine aberrantes commorantur." [94] Vincent of Lerins [95] says: "Arianorum venenum non jam portiunculam quamdam, sed pene orbem totum contaminaverat, adeo ut prope cunctis Latini sermonis episcopis partim vi partim fraude deceptis caligo qu&#65533;dam mentibus effunderetur." To these ancient testimonies any number of authorities from modern theologians might be added. We give only the testimony of Dr. Jackson, one of the most distinguished theologians of the Church of England: "After this defection of the Romish Church in the bishop Liberius, the whole Roman empire was overspread within Arianism." [96]

Whatever doubt may exist as to details, the general fact of this apostasy cannot be doubted. Through defection from the truth, through the arts of the dominant party, through the influence of the emperor, the great majority of the bishops did join in condemnation of Athanasius, and in subscribing a formula of doctrine drawn up in opposition to the Nicene Creed; a formula afterwards renounced and condemned; a formula which the Bishop of Rome was banished for two years for refusing to sign, and restored to his see when he consented to subscribe. If, then, we apply to this case the same rules which are applied to the decisions of the Nicene Council, it must be admitted that the external Church apostastized as truly under Constantius, as it professed the true faith under Constantine. If many signed the Eusebian or Arian formula insincerely, so did many hypocritically assent to the decrees of Nice. If many were overborne by authority and fear in the one case, so they were in the other. If many revoked their assent to Arianism, quite as many withdrew their consent to the Athanasian doctrine.

The Romish Evasion of this Argument.

In dealing within this undeniable fact, Romanists and Romanizers are forced to abandon their principle. Their doctrine is that the external Church cannot err, that the majority of the bishops living at any one time cannot fail to teach the truth. But under the reign of the Emperor Constantius, it is undeniable that the vast majority, including the Bishop of Rome, did renounce the truth. But, says Bellarmin, [97] the Church continued and was conspicuous in Athanasius, Hilary, Eusebius, and others. And Mr. Palmer, of Oxford says, [98] "The truth was preserved under even Arian bishops." But the question is not, whether the truth shall be preserved and confessed by the true children of God, but, whether any external, organized body, and specially the Church of Rome, can err in its teaching. Romanists cannot be allowed, merely to meet an emergency, to avail themselves of the Protestant doctrine that the Church may consist of scattered believers. It is true as Jerome teaches in the passage above quoted, "Ubi fides vera est, ibi Ecclesia est." But that is our doctrine, and not the doctrine of Rome. Protestants say with full confidence, "Ecclesia manet et manebit." But whether in conspicuous glory as in the time of David, or in scattered believers as in the days of Elias, is not essential.

The Church of Rome rejects the Doctrines of Augustine.

A second case in which the external church (and specially the Church of Rome) has departed from what it had itself declared to be true, is in the rejection of the doctrines known in history as Augustinian. That the peculiar doctrines of Augustine, including the doctrine of sinful corruption of nature derived from Adam, which is spiritual death, and involves entire inability on the part of the sinner to convert himself or to cooperate in his own regeneration; the necessity of the certainly efficacious operation of divine grace; the

sovereignty of God in election and reprobation, and the certain perseverance of the saints; were sanctioned by the whole Church, and specially by the Church of Rome, cannot be disputed. The eighteenth chapter of Wiggers' "Augustinianism and Pelagianism," is headed, "The final adoption of the Augustinian system for all Christendom by the third ecumenical council of Ephesus. A.D. 431." It is not denied that many of the eastern bishops, perhaps the majority of them, were secretly opposed to that system in its essential features. All that is insisted upon is that the whole Church, through what Romanists recognize as its official organs, gave its sanction to Augustine's peculiar doctrines; and that so far as the Latin Church is concerned this assent was not only for the time general but cordial. It is no less certain that the Council of Trent, while it condemned Pelagianism, and even the peculiar doctrine of semi-Pelagians, who said that man began the work of conversion, thus denying the necessity of preventing grace (gratia preveniens), nevertheless repudiated the distinguishing doctrines of Augustine and anathematized all who held them.

G. The Church of Rome now teaches Error.

A fifth argument against the infallibility of the Church of Rome, is that, that Church now teaches error. Of this there can be no reasonable doubt, if the Scriptures be admitted as the standard of judgment.

1. It is a monstrous error, contrary to the Bible, to its letter and spirit, and shocking to the common sense of mankind, that the salvation of men should be suspended on their acknowledging the Pope to be the head of the Church in the world, or the vicar of Christ. This makes salvation independent of faith and character. A man may be sincere and intelligent in his faith in God and Christ, and perfectly exemplary in his Christian life, yet if he does not acknowledge the Pope, he must perish forever.

2. It is a grievous error, contrary to the express teachings of the Bible, that the sacraments are the only channels of communicating to men the benefits of redemption. In consequence of this false assumption, Romanists teach that all who die unbaptized, even infants, are lost.

3. It is a great error to teach as the Church of Rome does teach, that the ministers of the gospel are priests; that the people have no access to God or Christ, and cannot obtain the remission of sins or other saving blessings, except through their intervention and by their ministrations; that the priests have the power not only of declarative, but of judicial and effective absolution, so that those and those only whom they absolve stand acquitted at the bar of God. This was the grand reason for the Reformation, which was a rebellion against this priestly domination; a demand or the part of the people for the liberty wherewith Christ had made them free, -- the liberty to go immediately to him with their sins and sorrows, and find relief without the intervention or permission of any man who has no better right of access than themselves.

4. The doctrine of the merit of good works as taught by Romanists is another most prolific error. They hold that works done after regeneration have real merit (meritum condigni), and that they are the ground of the sinners justification before God. They hold that a man may do more than the law requires of him, and perform works of supererogation, and thus obtain more merit than is necessary for his own salvation and beatification. That this superfluous merit goes into the treasury of the Church, and may be dispensed for the benefit of others. On this ground indulgences are granted or sold, to take effect not only in

this life but in the life to come.

5. With this is connected the further error concerning Purgatory. The Church of Rome teaches that those dying in the communion of the Church, who have not in this life made full satisfaction for their sins, or acquired sufficient merit to entitle them to admission into heaven, do at death pass into a state of suffering, there to remain until due satisfaction is made and proper purification is effected. There is no necessary termination to this state of purgatory but the day of judgment or the end of the world. It may last for a thousand or many thousands of years. But Purgatory is under the power of the keys. The sufferings of souls in that state may be alleviated or shortened by the authorized ministers of the Church. There is no limit to the power of men who are believed to hold the keys of heaven in their hand, to shut and no man opens, and open and no man shuts. Of all incredibilities the most incredible is that God would commit such power as this, to weak, ignorant, and often wicked men.

6. The Romish Church teaches grievous error concerning the Lord's Supper. It teaches, (1.) That when consecrated by the priest the whole substance of the bread and the whole substance of the wine are transmuted into the substance of the body and blood of Christ. (2.) That as his body is inseparable from his soul and divinity, where the one is there the other must be. The whole Christ, therefore, body, soul, and divinity, is present in the consecrated wafer, which is to be worshipped as Christ himself is worshipped. This is the reason why the Church of England in her Homilies pronounces the service of the Mass in the Romish Church idolatrous. (3.) That Church further teaches that the body and blood of Christ thus locally and substantially present in the Eucharist are offered as a true propitiatory sacrifice for the forgiveness of sin, the application of which is determined by the intention of the officiating priests.

7. Idolatry consists not only in the worship of false gods, but in the worship of the true God by images. The second Commandment of the Decalogue expressly forbids the bowing down to, or serving the likeness of anything in heaven above or in the earth beneath. In the Hebrew the words used are, hstchvh and tsvd. In the Septuagint the words are, ou proskuneseis autois, oude me latreuseis autois. In the Vulgate it reads, "Non adorabis ea neque coles." The precise thing, therefore, that is forbidden is that which the Church of Rome permits and enjoins, namely, the use of images in religious worship, prostration before them, and doing them reverence.

8. Another great error of the Church of Rome is the worship of saints and angels, and especially of the Virgin Mary. It is not merely that they are regarded as objects of reverence, but that the service rendered them involves the ascription of divine attributes. They are assumed to be everywhere present, able to hear and answer prayer, to help and to save. They become the ground of confidence to the people, and the objects of their religious affections. They are to them precisely what the gods of the heathen were to the Greeks and Romans.

Such are some of the errors taught by the Church of Rome, and they prove that that Church instead of being infallible, is so corrupt that it is the duty of the people of God to come out of it and to renounce its fellowship.

H. The Recognition of an Infallible Church incompatible with either Religious or Civil Liberty.

A church which claims to be infallible, ipso facto, claims to be the mistress of the world; and those who admit its infallibility, thereby admit their entire subjection to its authority. It avails nothing to say that this infallibility is limited to matters of faith and morals, for under those heads is included the whole life of man, religious, moral, domestic, social, and political.

A church which claims the right to decide what is true in doctrine and obligatory in morals, and asserts the power to enforce submission to its decisions on the pain of eternal perdition, leaves no room for any other authority upon earth. In the presence of the authority of God, every other disappears.

With the claim to infallibility is inseparably connected the claim to pardon sin. The Church does not assume merely the right to declare the conditions on which sin will be forgiven at the bar of God, but it asserts that it has the prerogative to grant, or to withhold that forgiveness. "Ego te absolvo," is the formula the Church puts into the mouth of its priesthood. Those who receive that absolution are saved; those whom the Church refuses to absolve must bear the penalty of their offences.

An infallible church is thus the only institute of salvation. All within its pale are saved; all without it perish. Those only are in the Church who believe what it teaches, who do what it commands, and are subject to its officers, and especially its head, the Roman pontiff. Any man, therefore, whom the Church excommunicates is thereby shut out of the kingdom of heaven; any nation placed under its ban is not only deprived of the consolations of religious services, but of the necessary means of salvation.

If the Church be infallible, its authority is no less absolute in the sphere of social and political life. It is immoral to contract or to continue an unlawful marriage, to keep an unlawful oath, to enact unjust laws, to obey a sovereign hostile to the Church. The Church, therefore, has the right to dissolve marriages, to free men from the obligations of their oaths, and citizens from their allegiance, to abrogate civil laws, and to depose sovereigns. These prerogatives have not only been claimed, but time and again exercised by the Church of Rome. They all of right belong to that Church, if it be infallible. As these claims are enforced by penalties involving the loss of the soul, they cannot be resisted by those who admit the Church to be infallible. It is obvious, therefore, that where this doctrine is held there can be no liberty of opinion, no freedom of conscience, no civil or political freedom. As the recent ecumenical Council of the Vatican has decided that this infallibility is vested in the Pope, it is henceforth a matter of faith with Romanists, that the Roman pontiff is the absolute sovereign of the world. All men are bound, on the penalty of eternal death, to believe what he declares to be true, and to do whatever he decides is obligatory.

[78] De Ecclesia Militante, II. Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. ii. p. 108 d.

[79] Augsburg Confession, art. 7.

[80] Ibid. art. 8.

[81] Apol. A. C., art. 4, pp. 144, 145, Hase.

[82] Ibid. p. 146.

[83] See Hase, Libri Symbolici.

[84] See Niemeyer, Coll. Confess.

[85] II. cap. 17, p. 499, Niem.

[86] Art. 27, p. 336, ibid.
[87] Art. 27, p. 379, ibid.
[88] Page 135, ibid.
[89] Page 165.
[90] Locus XVIII. ii. 12.
[91] Orat. xvi. t. i. p. 387, edition Paris, 1609.
[92] Dialogues contra Luciferanos, 19 vol. ii. p. 172 c., edit. Migue, Paris, 1845.
[93] Comment. on Ps. cxxxiii., vol. vii. p. 1223 a, edit. Migne.
[94] "Ad Solitariam Vitam Agentes Epist.," Works, p. 846. edit. Paris, 1627.
[95] Comm. I. iv. p. 642, vol. 1. Migne, Patrol., Paris, 1846.
[96] On the Church, p. 160. Edited by W. Goode. Philadelphia, 1844.
[97] De Ecclesia. lib. iii. c. 16.
[98] On the Church, vol. ii. p. 187.

CHAPTER VI: THE PROTESTANT RULE OF FAITH.

§ 1. Statement of the Doctrine.

All Protestants agree in teaching that "the word of God, as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments, is the only infallible rule of faith and practice."

In the Smalcald Articles, [99] the Lutheran Church says "Ex patrum -- verbis et factis non sunt exstrueudi articuli fidei -- Regulam autem aliam habemus, ut videlicet verbum Dei condat articulos fidei et pr&#65533;terea nemo, ne angelus quidem." In the "Form of Concord," [100] it is said: "Credimus, confitemur et docemus, unicam regulam et normam secundum quam omnia dogmata omnesque doctores &#65533;stimari et judicari oporteat, nullam omnino aliam esse, quam prophetica et apostolica scripta cum V. tum N. Testamenti."

The symbols of the Reformed churches teach the same doctrine. Confessio Helvetica, II. [101] says: "In scriptura sancta habet unversalis Christi Ecclesia plenissime exposita, qu&#65533;cunque pertinent cum ad salvificam fidem, tum ad vitam Deo placentem. [102] Non alium in causa fidei judicem, quam ipsum Deum per Scripturas sacras pronuntiantem, quid verum sit, quid falsum, quid sequendum sit quidne fugiendum. Confessio Gallicana: [103] Quum h&#65533;c (SS.) sit omnis veritatis summa, complectens quidquid ad cultum Dei et salutem nostram requiritur, neque hominibus neque ipsis etiam angelis fas esse dicimus quicquam ei verbo adjicere vel detrahere vel quicquam prorsus in eo immutare." In the Thirty-Nine Articles ot the Church of England, [104] it is said: "Holy Scripture containeth all things necessary to salvation: so that whatsoever is not read therein, nor may be proved thereby, is not to be required of any man, that it should be believed as an article of faith, or be thought requisite or necessary to salvation." The Westminster Confession [105] teaches: "Under the name of Holy Scripture, or the Word of God written, are now contained all the books of the Old and New Testament, which are these: etc. . . . . All which are given by inspiration of God, to be the rule of faith and life. [106] The whole counsel of God concerning all things necessary for his own glory, man's salvation, faith, and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture; unto which nothing at any time is to be added whether by new revelations of the Spirit or traditions of men. [107] All things in Scripture are not alike plain in themselves, nor alike clear unto all; yet those things which are necessary to be known, believed, and observed, for salvation, are so clearly propounded and opened in some place of Scripture or other, that not only the learned, but the unlearned, in a due use of the ordinary means, may attain unto a sufficient understanding of them."

From these statements it appears that Protestants hold, (1.) That the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments are the Word of God, written under the inspiration of the Holy

Spirit, and are therefore infallible, and of divine authority in all things pertaining to faith and practice, and consequently free from all error whether of doctrine, fact, or precept. (2.) That they contain all the extant supernatural revelations of God designed to be a rule of faith and practice to his Church. (3.) That they are sufficiently perspicuous to be understood by the people, in the use of ordinary means and by the aid of the Holy Spirit, in all things necessary to faith or practice, without the need of any infallible interpreter.

The Canon.

Before entering on the consideration of these points, it is necessary to answer the question, What books are entitled to a place in the canon, or rule of faith and practice? Romanists answer this question by saying, that all those which the Church has decided to be divine in their origin, and none others, are to be thus received. Protestants answer it by saying, so far as the Old Testament is concerned, that those books, and those only, which Christ and his Apostles recognized as the written Word of God, are entitled to be regarded as canonical. This recognition was afforded in a twofold manner: First, many of the books of the Old Testament are quoted as the Word of God, as being given by the Spirit; or the Spirit is said to have uttered what is therein recorded. Secondly, Christ and his Apostles refer to the sacred writings of the Jews -- the volume which they regarded as divine -- as being what it claimed to be, the Word of God. When we refer to the Bible as of divine authority, we refer to it as a volume and recognize all the writings which it contains as given by the inspiration of the Spirit. In like manner when Christ or his Apostles quote the "Scriptures," or the "law and the prophets," and speak of the volume then so called, they give their sanction to the divine authority of all the books which that volume contained. All, therefore, that is necessary to determine for Christians the canon of the Old Testament, is to ascertain what books were included in the "Scriptures" recognized by the Jews of that period. This is a point about which there is no reasonable doubt. The Jewish canon of the Old Testament included all the books and no others, which Protestants now recognize as constituting the Old Testament Scriptures. On this ground Protestants reject the so-called apocryphal books. They were not written in Hebrew and were not included in the canon of the Jews. They were, therefore, not recognized by Christ as the Word of God. This reason is of itself sufficient. It is however confirmed by considerations drawn from the character of the books themselves. They abound in errors, and in statements contrary to those found in the undoubtedly canonical books.

The principle on which the canon of the New Testament is determined is equally simple. Those books, and those only which can be proved to have been written by the Apostles, or to have received their sanction, are to be recognized as of divine authority. The reason of this rule is obvious. The Apostles were the duly authenticated messengers of Christ, of whom He said, "He that heareth you, heareth me."

[99] Part ii. 2, 15; Hase Lib. Sym. p. 308.

[100] Page 570, ibid.

[101] C, u, o, 467, ibid.

[102] C. ii. p. 479, ibid.

[103] Art. v. p. 330, ibid.

[104] Art. 6.

[105] Ch. i. § 2.

[106] Ibid. § 6.

[107] Ibid. § 7.

§ 2. The Scriptures are Infallible, i. e., given by Inspiration of God.

The infallibility and divine authority of the Scriptures are due to the fact that they are the word of God; and they are the word of God because they were given by the inspiration of the Holy Ghost.

A. The Nature of Inspiration. Definition.

The nature of inspiration is to be learnt from the Scriptures; from their didactic statements, and from their phenomena. There are certain general facts or principles which underlie the Bible, which are assumed in all its teachings, and which therefore must be assumed in its interpretation. We must, for example, assume, (1.) That God is not the unconscious ground of all things; nor an unintelligent force; nor a name for the moral order of the universe; nor mere causality; but a Spirit, -- a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent, possessing all the attributes of our spirits without limitation, and to an infinite degree. (2.) That He is the creator of the world, and extra-mundane, existing before, and independently of it; not its soul, life, or animating principle; but its maker, preserver, and ruler. (3.) That as a spirit He is everywhere present, and everywhere active, preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions. (4.) That while both in the external world and in the world of mind He generally acts according to fixed laws and through secondary causes, He is free to act, and often does act immediately, or without the intervention of such causes, as in creation, regeneration, and miracles. (5.) That the Bible contains a divine, or supernatural revelation. The present question is not, Whether the Bible is what it claims to be; but, What does it teach as to the nature and effects of the influence under which it was written?

On this subject the common doctrine of the Church is, and ever has been, that inspiration was an influence of the Holy Spirit on the minds of certain select men, which rendered them the organs of God for the infallible communication of his mind and will. They were in such a sense the organs of God, that what they said God said.

B. Inspiration Supernatural.

This definition includes several distinct points. First. Inspiration is a supernatural influence. It is thus distinguished, on the one hand from the providential agency of God, which is everywhere and always in operation; and on the other hand, from the gracious operations of the Spirit on the hearts of his people. According to the Scriptures, and the common views of men, a marked distinction is to be made between those effects which are due to the efficiency of God operating regularly through second causes, and those which are produced by his immediate efficiency without the intervention of such causes. The one class of effects is natural; the other, supernatural. Inspiration belongs to the latter class. It is not a natural effect due to the inward state of its subject, or to the influence of external circumstances.

No less obvious is the distinction which the Bible makes between the gracious operations of the Spirit and those by which extraordinary gifts are bestowed upon

particular persons. Inspiration, therefore, is not to be confounded with spiritual illumination. They differ, first, as to their subjects. The subjects of inspiration are a few selected persons; the subjects of spiritual illumination are all true believers. And, secondly, they differ as to their design. The design of the former is to render certain men infallible as teachers. the design of the latter is to render men holy; and of course they differ as to their effects. Inspiration in itself has no sanctifying influence. Balaam was inspired. Saul was among the prophets. Caiaphas uttered a prediction which "he spake not of himself." (John xi. 51.) In the last day many will be able to say to Christ, "Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works?" To whom he will say: "I never knew you; depart from me, ye that work iniquity." (Matt. vii. 22, 23.)

C. Distinction between Revelation and Inspiration.

Second. The above definition assumes a difference between revelation and inspiration. They differ, first, as to their object. The object of revelation is the communication of knowledge. The object or design of inspiration is to secure infallibility in teaching. Consequently they differ, secondly, in their effects. The effect of revelation was to render its recipient wiser. The effect of inspiration was to preserve him from error in teaching. These two gifts were often enjoyed by the same person at the same time. That is, the Spirit often imparted knowledge, and controlled in its communication orally or in writing to others. This was no doubt the case with the Psalmists, and often with the Prophets and Apostles. Often, however, the revelations were made at one time, and were subsequently, under the guidance of the Spirit, committed to writing. Thus the Apostle Paul tells us that he received his knowledge of the gospel not from man, but by revelation from Jesus Christ; and this knowledge he communicated from time to time in his discourses and epistles. In many cases these gifts were separated. Many of the sacred writers, although inspired, received no revelations. This was probably the fact with the authors of the historical books of the Old Testament. The evangelist Luke does not refer his knowledge of the events which he records to revelation, but says he derived it from those which from the beginning were eyewitnesses, and ministers of the Word." (Luke i. 2.) It is immaterial to us where Moses obtained his knowledge of the events recorded in the book of Genesis; whether from early documents, from tradition, or from direct revelation. No more causes are to be assumed for any effect than are necessary. If the sacred writer had sufficient sources of knowledge in themselves, or in those about them, there is no need to assume any direct revelation. It is enough for us that they were rendered infallible as teachers. This distinction between revelation and inspiration is commonly made by systematic writers. Thus Quenstedt (1685) [108] says: "Distingue inter revelationem et inspirationem. Revelatio vi vocis est manifestatio rerum ignotarum et occultarum, et potest fieri multis et diversis modis. . . . . Inspiratio . . . . est interna conceptum suggestio, seu infusio, sive res concept&#65533; jam ante scriptori fuerint cognit&#65533;, sive occult&#65533;. Illa potuit tempore antecedere scriptionem, h&#65533;c cum scriptione semper fuit conjuncta et in ipsam scriptionem influebat." Often, however, the distinction in question is overlooked. In popular language, inspiration is made to include both the supernatural communication of truth to the mind, and a supernatural control in making known that truth to others. The two gifts, however, differ in their nature, and should therefore be distinguished. Confounding them has sometimes led to serious error. When no revelation was necessary, no inspiration is admitted. Thus Grotius

says: "Vere dixi non omnes libros qui sunt in Hebr&#65533;o Canone dictatos a Spiritu Sancto. Scriptos esse cum pio animi motu, non nego; et hoc est quod judicavit Synagoga Magna, cujus judicio in hac re stant Hebr&#65533;i. Sed a Spiritu Sancto dictari historias nihil fuit opus: satis fuit scriptorem memoria valere circa res spectatas, aut diligentia in describendis veterum commentariis." [109] It is an illogical conclusion, however, to infer that because a historian did not need to have the facts dictated to him, that therefore he needed no control to preserve him from error.

D. Inspired Men the Organs of God.

A third point included in the Church doctrine of inspiration is, that the sacred writers were the organs of God, so that what they taught, God taught. It is to be remembered, however, that when God uses any of his creatures as his instruments, He uses them according to their nature. He uses angels as angels, men as men, the elements as elements. Men are intelligent voluntary agents; and as such were made the organs of God. The sacred writers were not made unconscious or irrational. The spirits of the prophets were subject to the prophets. (1 Cor. xiv. 32.) They were not like calculating machines which grind out logarithms with infallible correctness. The ancients, indeed, were accustomed to say, as some theologians have also said, that the sacred writers were as pens in the hand of the Spirit; or as harps, from which He drew what sounds He pleased. These representations were, however, intended simply to illustrate one point, namely, that the words uttered or recorded by inspired men were the words of God. The Church has never held what has been stigmatized as thc mechanical theory of inspiration. The sacred writers were not machines. Their self-consciousness was not suspended; nor were their intellectual powers superseded. Holy men spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. It was men, not machines; not unconscious instruments, but living, thinking, willing minds, whom the Spirit used as his organs. Moreover, as inspiration did not involve the suspension or suppression of the human faculties, so neither did it interfere with the free exercise of the distinctive mental characteristics of the individual. If a Hebrew was inspired, he spake Hebrew; if a Greek, he spake Greek; if an educated man, he spoke as a man of culture; if uneducated, he spoke as such a man is wont to speak. If his mind was logical, he reasoned, as Paul did; if emotional and contemplative, he wrote as John wrote. All this is involved in the fact that God uses his instruments according to their nature. The sacred writers impressed their peculiarities on their several productions as plainly as though they were the subjects of no extraordinary influence. This is one of the phenomena of the Bible patent to the most cursory reader. It lies in the very nature of inspiration that God spake in the language of men; that He uses men as his organs, each according to his peculiar gifts and endowments. When He ordains praise out of the mouth of babes, they must speak as babes, or the whole power and beauty of the tribute will be lost. There is no reason to believe that the operation of the Spirit in inspiration revealed itself any more in the consciousness of the sacred writers, than his operations in sanctification reveal themselves in the consciousness of the Christian. As the believer seems to himself to act, and in fact does act out of his own nature; so the inspired penmen wrote out of the fulness of their own thoughts and feelings, and employed the language and modes of expression which to them were the most natural and appropriate. Nevertheless, and none the less, they spoke as they were proved by the Holy Ghost, and their words were his words.

E. Proof of the Doctrine.

That this is the Scriptural view of inspiration; that inspired men were the organs of God in such a sense that their words are to be received not as the words of men, but as they are in truth, as the words of God (1 Thess. ii. 13), is proved, --

1. From the signification and usage of the word. It is, of course, admitted that words are to be understood in their historical sense. If it can be shown what idea the men living in the apostolic age attached to the word theopneustos and its equivalents, that is the idea which the Apostles intended to express by them. All nations have entertained the belief not only that God has access to the human mind and can control its operations, but that He at times did take such possession of particular persons as to make them the organs of his communications. Such persons were called by the Greeks theophoroi (those who bore a God within them); or, enthios (those in whom a God dwelt). In the Septuagint the word pneumatophoros used in the same sense. In Josephus, [110] the idea is expressed by the phrase "to theio pneumati kekinemenos;" to which the words of Peter (2 Peter i. 21) exactly answer, hupo pneumatos pheromenoi; and what is written by men under this influence of the Spirit is called graphe theopneustos. (2 Tim. iii. 16.) Gregory of Nyssa, [111] having quoted the words of our Lord in Matt. xxii. 43, "How then doth David in Spirit call him Lord," adds, oukoun te dunamei tou Pneumatos hoi theophoroumenoi ton agion empneontai`, kai dia touto pasa graphe theopneustos legetai, dia to tes theias epneuseos einai didaskalian, that is, "Hence those of the saints who by the power of the Spirit are full of God are inspired, and therefore all Scripture is called theopneustos, because the instruction is by divine inspiration." The idea of inspiration is therefore fixed. It is not to be arbitrarily determined. We must not interpret the word or the fact, according to our theories of the relation of God to the world, but according to the usage of antiquity, sacred and profane, and according to the doctrine which the sacred writers and the men of their generation are known to have entertained on the subject. According to all antiquity, an inspired man was one who was the organ of God in what he said, so that his words were the words of the god of which he was the organ. When, therefore, the sacred writers use the same words and forms of expression which the ancients used to convey that idea, they must in all honesty be assumed to mean the same thing.

Argument from the Meaning of the Word Prophet.

2. That this is the Scriptural idea of inspiration is further proved from the meaning of the word prophet. The sacred writers divide the Scriptures into the "law and the prophets." As the law was written by Moses, and as Moses was the greatest of the prophets, it follows that all the Old Testament was written by prophets. If, therefore, we can determine the Scriptural idea of a prophet, we shall thereby determine the character of their writings and the authority due to them. A prophet, then, in the Scriptural sense of the term, is a spokesman, one who speaks for another, in his name, and by his authority; so that it is not the spokesman but the person for whom he acts, who is responsible for the truth of what is said. In Exodus vii. 1, it is said, "See, I have made thee a god to Pharaoh; and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet," i. e., thy spokesman. This is explained by what is said in Exodus iv. 14-16, "Is not Aaron the Levite thy brother? I know that he can speak well. . . . . Thou shalt speak unto him, and put words into his mouth; and I will be with thy mouth, and with his mouth, and will teach you what ye shall do. And he shall be thy spokesman unto the

people; and he shall be, even he shall be, to thee instead of a mouth, and thou shalt be to him instead of God." (See Jeremiah xxxvi. 17, 18.) This determines definitely, what a prophet is. He is the mouth of God; one through whom God speaks to the people; so that what the prophet says God says. So when a prophet was consecrated, it was said, "Behold, I have put my words in thy mouth." (Jer. i. 9; Is. li. 16.) That this is the Scriptural idea of a prophet is moreover evident from the formulas, constantly recurring, which relate to his duties and mission. He was the messenger of God; he spoke in the name of God; the words, "Thus saith the Lord," were continually in his mouth. "The word of the Lord" is said to have come to this prophet and on that; "the Spirit came upon," "the power," or "hand" of God was upon him; all implying that the prophet was the organ of God, that what he said, he said in God's name and by his authority. It is true, therefore, as Philo [112] says, prophetes gar idion ouden apophthengetai allotria de panta hupechountos hetepou.

This is precisely what the Apostle Peter teaches when he says (2 Peter i. 20, 21), "No prophecy of the Scripture is of any private interpretation. For the prophecy came not in old time by the will of man: but holy men spake as they were moved (pheromenoi, borne along as a ship by the wind) by the Holy Ghost." Prophecy, i. e., what a prophet said, was not human, but divine. It was not the prophet's own interpretation of the mind and will of God. He spoke as the organ of the Holy Ghost.

What the Prophets said God said.

3. It is another decisive proof that the sacred writers were the organs of God in the sense above stated, that whatever they said the Spirit is declared to have said. Christ himself said that David by the Spirit called the Messiah Lord. (Matt. xxii. 43.) David in the 95th Psalm said, "To-day if ye will hear his voice, harden not your heart;" but the Apostle (Heb. iii. 7), says that these were the words of the Holy Ghost. Again, in ch. x. 15, the same Apostle says, "Whereof the Holy Ghost also is a witness to us: for after that he had said before, This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days, saith the Lord." Thus quoting the language of Jeremiah xxxi. 33, as the language of the Holy Ghost. In Acts iv. 25, the assembled Apostles said, "with one accord," "Lord thou art God. . . . . Who by the mouth of thy servant David hast said, Why did the heathen rage?" In Acts xxviii. 25, Paul said to the Jews, "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet unto our fathers." It is in this way that Christ and his Apostles constantly refer to the Scriptures, showing beyond doubt that they believed and taught, that what the sacred writers said the Holy Ghost said.

Inspiration of the New Testament Writers.

This proof bears specially, it is true, only on the writings of the Old Testament. But no Christian puts the inspiration of the Old Testament above that of the New. The tendency, and we may even say the evidence, is directly the other way. If the Scriptures of the old economy were given by inspiration of God, much more were those writings which were penned under the dispensation of the Spirit. Besides, the inspiration of the Apostles is proved, (1.) From the fact that Christ promised them the Holy Spirit, who should bring all things to their remembrance, and render them infallible in teaching. It is not you, He said, that speak, but the Spirit of my Father speaketh in you. He that heareth you heareth me. He forbade them to enter upon their office as teachers until they were endued with power from on high. (2) This promise was fulfilled on the day of Pentecost, when the Spirit descended

upon the Apostles as a mighty rushing wind, and they were filled with the Holy Ghost, and began to speak as the Spirit gave them utterance (dabat eloqui, as the Vulgate more literally renders the words). From this moment they were new men, with new views, with new spirit, and with new power and authority. The change was sudden. It was not a development. It was something altogether supernatural; as when God said, Let there be light, and there was light. Nothing can be more unreasonable than to ascribe this sudden transformation of the Apostles from narrow-minded, bigoted Jews, into enlightened, large-minded, catholic Christians, to mere natural causes. Their Jewish prejudices had resisted all the instructions and influence of Christ for three years, but gave way in a moment when the Spirit came upon them from on high. (3.) After the day of Pentecost the Apostles claimed to be the infallible organs of God in all their teachings They required men to receive what they taught not as the word of man but as the word of God (1 Thess. ii. 13); then declared as Paul does (1 Cor. xiv. 37), that the things which they wrote were the commandments of the Lord. They made the salvation of men to depend on faith in the doctrines which they taught. Paul pronounces anathema even an angel from heaven who should preach any other gospel than that which he had taught. (Gal. i. 8.) John says that whoever did not receive the testimony which he bore concerning Christ, made God a liar, because John's testimony was God's testimony. (1 John v. 10.) "He that knoweth God, heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us." (iv. 6.) This assertion of infallibility, this claim for the divine authority of their teaching, is characteristic of the whole Bible. The sacred writers all, and everywhere, disclaim personal authority; they never rest the obligation to faith in their teachings, on their own knowledge or wisdom; they never rest it on the truth of what they taught as manifest to reason or as capable of being proved by argument. They speak as messengers, as witnesses, as organs. They declare that what they said God said, and, therefore, on his authority it was to be received and obeyed.

The Testimony of Paul.

The Corinthians objected to Paul's preaching that he did not attempt any rational or philosophical proof of the doctrines which he propounded; that his language and whole manner of discourse were not in accordance with rhetorical rules. He answers these objections, -- first, by saying that the doctrines which he taught were not the truths of reason, were not derived from the wisdom of men, but were matters of divine revelation; that he simply taught what God declared to be true; and secondly, that as to the manner of presenting these truths, he was the mere organ of the Spirit of God. In 1 Cor. ii. 7-13, he sets forth this whole subject in the clearest and most concise manner. The things which he taught, which he calls "the wisdom of God," "the things of the Spirit," i. e., the gospel, the system of doctrine taught in the Bible, he says, had never entered into the mind of man. God had revealed those truths by his Spirit; for the Spirit is the only competent source of such knowledge. "For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so, the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." So much for the source of knowledge, and the ground on which the doctrines he taught were to be received. As to the second objection, which concerned his language and mode of presentation, he says, These things of the Spirit, thus revealed, we teach "not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth; but which the Holy Ghost teacheth," pneumatikois pneumatika sunkrinontes, combining spiritual with spiritual, i. e., clothing the truths of the Spirit in the words of the Spirit. There is neither in the Bible nor in the writings of men, a simpler or

clearer statement of the doctrines of revelation and inspiration. Revelation is the act of communicating divine knowledge by the Spirit to the mind. Inspiration is the act of the same Spirit, controlling those who make the truth known to others. The thoughts, the truths made known, and the words in which they are recorded, are declared to be equally from the Spirit. This, from first to last, has been the doctrine of the Church, notwithstanding the endless diversity of speculations in which theologians have indulged on the subject. This then is the ground on which the sacred writers rested their claims. They were the mere organs of God. They were his messengers. Those who heard them, heard God; and those who refused to hear them, refused to hear God. (Matt. x. 40; John xiii. 20.)

4. This claim to infallibility on the part of the Apostles was duly authenticated, not only by the nature of the truths which they communicated, and by the power which those truths have ever exerted over the minds and hearts of men, but also by the inward witness of the Spirit of which St. John speaks, when he says, "He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself" (1 John v. 10); "an unction from the Holy One." (1 John ii. 20.) It was confirmed also by miraculous gifts. As soon as the Apostles were endued with power from on high, they spake in "other tongues;" they healed the sick, restored the lame and the blind, "God also," as the Apostle says (Heb. ii. 4), "bearing them witness, both with signs, and wonders, and with divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, according to his own will." And Paul tells the Corinthians that the signs of an Apostle had been wrought among them "in all patience, in signs, and wonders, and mighty deeds." (2 Cor. xii. 12.) The mere working of miracles was not an evidence of a divine commission as a teacher. But when a man claims to be the organ of God, when he says that God speaks through him, then his working of miracles is the testimony of God to the validity of his claims. And such testimony God gave to the infallibility of the Apostles.

The above considerations are sufficient to show, that according to the Scriptures, inspired men were the organs, or mouth of God, in the sense that what they said and taught has the sanction and authority of God.

F. Inspiration extends equally to all Parts of Scripture.

This is the fourth element of the Church doctrine on this subject. It means, first, that all the books of Scripture are equally inspired. All alike are infallible in what they teach. And secondly, that inspiration extends to all the contents of these several books. It is not confined to moral and religious truths, but extends to the statements of facts, whether scientific, historical, or geographical. It is not confined to those facts the importance of which is obvious, or which are involved in matters of doctrine. It extends to everything which any sacred writer asserts to be true.

This is proved, (1) Because it is involved in, or follows as a necessary consequence from, the proposition that the sacred writers were the organs of God. If what they assert, God asserts, which, as has been shown, is the Scriptural idea of inspiration, their assertions must be free from error. (2.) Because our Lord expressly says, "The Scripture cannot be broken" (John x. 35), i.e., it cannot err. (3.) Because Christ and his Apostles refer to all parts of the Scriptures, or to the whole volume, as the word of God. They make no distinction as to the authority of the Law, the Prophets, or the Hagiographa. They quote the Pentateuch, the historical books, the Psalms, and the Prophets, as all and equally the word of God. (4.) Because Christ and the writers of the New Testament refer to all classes of

facts recorded in the Old Testament as infallibly true. Not only doctrinal facts, such as those of the creation and probation of man; his apostasy; the covenant with Abraham; the giving the law upon Mount Sinai not only great historical facts, as the deluge, the deliverance of the people out of Egypt, the passage of the Red Sea, and the like but incidental circumstances, or facts of apparently minor importance, as e.g. that Satan tempted our first parents in the form of serpent; that Moses lifted up a serpent in the wilderness: that Elijah healed Naaman, the Syrian, and was sent to the widow in Sarepta; that David ate the shew-bread in the temple; and even that great stumbling-block, that Jonah was three days in the whale's belly, are all referred to by our Lord and his Apostles with the sublime simplicity and confidence with which they are received by little children. (5.) It lies in the very idea of the Bible, that God chose some men to write history; some to indite psalms; some to unfold the future; some to teach doctrines. All were equally his organs, and each was infallible in his own sphere. As the principle of vegetable life pervades the whole plant, the root, stem, and flower; as the life of the body belongs as much to the feet as to the head, so the Spirit of God pervades the whole Scripture, and is not more important than in other. Some members of the body are more in one part than in another; and some books of the Bible could be far better spared than others. There may be as great a difference between St. John's Gospel and the Book of Chronicles as between a man's brain and his hair; nevertheless the life of the body is as truly in the hair as in the brain.

G. The Inspiration of the Scriptures extends to the Words.

1. This again is included in the infallibility which our Lord ascribes to the Scriptures. A mere human report or record of a divine revelation must of necessity be not only fallible, but more or less erroneous.

2. The thoughts are in the words. The two are inseparable. If the words, priest, sacrifice, ransom, expiation, propitiation, purification by blood, and the like, have no divine authority, then the doctrine which they embody has no such authority.

3. Christ and his Apostles argue from the very words of Scripture. Our Lord says that David by the Spirit called the Messiah Lord, i.e., David used that word. It was in the use of a particular word, that Christ said (John x. 35), that the Scriptures cannot be broken. "If he call them gods unto whom the word of God came, and the Scripture cannot be broken," etc. The use of that word, therefore, according to Christ's view of the Scripture, was determined by the Spirit of God. Paul, in Gal. iii. 16, lays stress on the fact, that in the promise made to Abraham, a word used is singular and not plural, "seed," "as of one," and not "seeds as of many." Constantly it is the very words of Scripture which are quoted as of divine authority.

4. The very form in which the doctrine of inspiration is taught in the Bible, assumes that the organs of God in the communication of his will were controlled by Him in the words which they used. "I have put my words in thy mouth." (Jer. i. 9.) "It is not ye that speak, but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." (Matt. x. 20.) They spake "as the Spirit gave them utterance." (Acts ii. 4.) "Holy men of God spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost." (2 Pet. i. 21.) All these, and similar modes of expression with which the Scriptures abound, imply that the words uttered were the words of God. This, moreover, is the very idea of inspiration as understood by the ancient world. The words of the oracle were assumed to be the words of the divinity, and not those selected by the organ of communication. And this, too, as has been shown, was the idea attached to the gift of

prophecy. The words of the prophet were the words of God, or he could not be God's spokesman and mouth. It has also been shown that in the most formally didactic passage in the whole Bible on this subject (1 Cor. ii. 10-13), the Apostle expressly asserts that the truths revealed by the Spirit, he communicated in words taught by the Spirit.

Plenary Inspiration.

The view presented above is known as the doctrine of plenary inspiration. Plenary is opposed to partial. The Church doctrine denies that inspiration is confined to parts of the Bible; and affirms that it applies to all the books of the sacred canon. It denies that the sacred writers were merely partially inspired; it asserts that they were fully inspired as to all that they teach, whether of doctrine or fact. This of course does not imply that the sacred writers were infallible except for the special purpose for which they were employed. They were not imbued with plenary knowledge. As to all matters of science, philosophy, and history, they stood on the same level with their contemporaries. They were infallible only as teachers, and when acting as the spokesmen of God. Their inspiration no more made them astronomers than it made them agriculturists. Isaiah was infallible in his predictions, although he shared with his countrymen the views then prevalent as to the mechanism of the universe. Paul could not err in anything he taught, although he could not recollect how many persons he had baptized in Corinth. The sacred writers also, doubtless, differed as to insight into the truths which they taught. The Apostle Peter intimates that the prophets searched diligently into the meaning of their own predictions. When David said God had put "all things" under the feet of man, he probably little thought that "all things" meant the whole universe (Heb. iv. 8.) And Moses, when he recorded the promise that childless Abraham was to be the father "of many nations," little thought that it meant the whole world (Rom. iv. 13). Nor does the Scriptural doctrine on this subject imply that the sacred writers were free from errors in conduct. Their infallibility did not arise from their holiness, nor did inspiration render them holy. Balaam was inspired, and Saul was among the prophets. David committed many crimes, although inspired to write psalms. Peter erred in conduct at Antioch; but this does not prove that he erred in teaching. The influence which preserved him from mistakes in teaching was not designed to preserve him from mistakes in conduct.

H. General Considerations in Support of the Doctrine.

On this point little need be said. If the questions, What is the Scriptural doctrine concerning inspiration? and, What is the true doctrine? be considered different, then after showing what the Scriptures teach on the subject, it would be necessary to prove that what they teach is true. This, however, is not the position of the Christian theologian. It is his business to set forth what the Bible teaches. If the sacred writers assert that they are the organs of God; that what they taught He taught through them; that they spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, so that what they said the Holy Spirit said, then, if we believe their divine mission, we must believe what they teach as to the nature of the influence under which they spoke and wrote. This is the reason why in the earlier period of the Church there was no separate discussion of the doctrine of inspiration. That was regarded as involved in the divine origin of the Scriptures. If they are a revelation from God, they must be received and obeyed; but they cannot be thus received without attributing to them divine authority, and they can not have such authority without being infallible in all they teach.

The organic unity of the Scriptures proves them to be the product of one mind. They

are not only so united that we cannot believe one part without believing the whole; we cannot believe the New Testament without believing the Old; we cannot believe the Prophets without believing the Law; we cannot believe Christ without believing his Apostles; but besides all this they present the regular development, carried on through centuries and millenniums, of the great original promise, "The seed of the woman shall bruise the serpent's head." This development was conducted by some forty independent writers, many of whom understood very little of the plan they were unfolding, but each contributed his part to the progress and completion of the whole.

If the Bible be the work of one mind, that mind must be the mind of God. He only knows the end from the beginning. He only could know what the Bible reveals. No one, says the Apostle, knows the things of God but the Spirit of God. He only could reveal the nature, the thoughts, and purposes of God. He only could tell whether sin can be pardoned. No one knows the Son but the Father. The revelation of the person and work of Christ is as clearly the work of God as are the heavens in all their majesty and glory.

Besides, we have the witness in ourselves. We find that the truths revealed in the Bible have the same adaptation to our souls that the atmosphere has to our bodies. The body cannot live without air, which it receives and appropriates instinctively, with full confidence in its adaptation to the end designed. In like manner the soul receives and appropriates the truths of Scripture as the atmosphere in which alone it can breathe and live. Thus in receiving the Bible as true, we necessarily receive it as divine. In believing it as a supernatural revelation, we believe its plenary inspiration.

This doctrine involves nothing out of analogy with the ordinary operations of God. We believe that He is everywhere present in the material world, and controls the operations of natural causes. We know that He causes the grass to grow, and gives rain and fruitful seasons. We believe that He exercises a like control over the minds of men, turning them as the rivers of water are turned. All religion, natural and revealed, is founded on the assumption of this providential government of God. Besides this, we believe in the gracious operations of his Spirit, by which He works in the hearts of his people to will and to do; we believe that faith, repentance, and holy living are due to the ever-present influence of the Holy Spirit. If, then, this wonder-working God everywhere operates in nature and in grace, why should it be deemed incredible that holy men should speak as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, so that they should say just what He would have them say, so that their words should be his words.

After all Christ is the great object of the Christian's faith. We believe him and we believe everything else on his authority. He hands us the Old Testament and tells us that it is the Word of God; that its authors spoke by the Spirit; that the Scriptures cannot be broken. And we believe on his testimony. His testimony to his Apostles is no less explicit, although given in a different way. He promised to give them a mouth and a wisdom which their adversaries could not gainsay or resist. He told them to take no thought what they should say, "For the Holy Ghost shall teach you in the same hour what ye ought to say." (Luke xii. 12.) "It is not ye that speak but the Spirit of your Father which speaketh in you." He said to them "he that receiveth you receiveth me"; and He prayed for those who should believe on Him through their word. We believe the Scriptures, therefore, because Christ declares them to be the Word of God. Heaven and earth may pass away, but his word cannot pass away.

I. Objections.

A large class of the objections to the doctrine of inspiration, which for many minds are the most effective, arise from the rejection of one or other of the presumptions specified on a preceding page. If a man denies the existence of a personal, extramundane God, he must deny the doctrine of inspiration, but it is not necessary in order to prove that doctrine that we should first prove the being of God. If he denies that God exerts any direct efficiency in the government of the world, and holds that everything is the product of fixed laws, he cannot believe what the Scriptures teach of inspiration. If the supernatural be impossible, inspiration is impossible. It will be found that most of the objections, especially those of recent date, are founded on unscriptural views of the relation of God to the world, or on the peculiar philosophical views of the objectors as to the nature of man or of his free agency.

A still larger class of objections is founded on misconceptions of the doctrine. Such objections are answered by the correct statement of what the Church believes on the subject. Even a man so distinguished for knowledge and ability as Coleridge, speaks with contempt of what he regards as the common theory of inspiration, when he utterly misunderstands the real doctrine which he opposes. He says: "All the miracles which the legends of monk or rabbi contain, can scarcely be put in competition, on the score of complication, inexplicableness, the absence of all intelligible use or purpose, and of circuitous self-frustration, with those that must be assumed by the maintainers of this doctrine, in order to give effect to the series of miracles by which all the nominal composers of the Hebrew nation before the time of Ezra, of whom there are any remains, were successively transformed into automaton compositors," [113] etc. But if the Church doctrine of inspiration no more assumes that the sacred writers "were transformed into automaton compositors," than that every believer is thus transformed in whom God "works to will and to do," then all such objections amount to nothing. If God, without interfering with a man's free agency, can make it infallibly certain that he will repent and believe, He can render it certain that he will not err in teaching. It is in vain to profess to hold the common doctrine of Theism, and yet assert that God cannot control rational creatures without turning them into machines.

Discrepancies and Errors.

But although the theologian may rightfully dismiss all objections founded in the denial of the common principles of natural and revealed religion, there are others which cannot be thus summarily disposed of. The most obvious of these is, that the sacred writers contradict each other, and that they teach error. It is, of course, useless to contend that the sacred writers were infallible, if in point of fact they err. Our views of inspiration must be determined by the phenomena of the Bible as well as from its didactic statements. If in fact the sacred writers retain each his own style and mode of thought, then we must renounce any theory which assumes that inspiration obliterates or suppresses all individual peculiarities. If the Scriptures abound in contradictions and errors, then it is vain to contend that they were written under an influence which precludes all error. The question, therefore, is a question of fact. Do the sacred writers contradict each other? Do the Scriptures teach what from any source can be proved not to be true? The question is not whether the views of the sacred writers were incorrect, but whether they taught error? For example, it is not the question Whether they thought that the earth is the centre of our system? but, Did they

teach that it is?

The objection under consideration, namely, that the Bible contains errors, divides itself into two. The first, that the sacred writers contradict themselves, or one the other. The second, that the Bible teaches what is inconsistent with the facts of history or science.

As to the former of these objections, it would require, not a volume, but volumes to discuss all the cases of alleged discrepancies. All that can be expected here is a few general remarks: (1.) These apparent discrepancies, although numerous, are for the most part trivial; relating in most cases to numbers or dates. (2.) The great majority of them are only apparent, and yield to careful examination. (3.) Many of them may fairly be ascribed to errors of transcribers. (4.) The marvel and the miracle is that there are so few of any real importance. Considering that the different books of the Bible were written not only by different authors, but by men of all degrees of culture, living in the course of fifteen hundred or two thousand years, it is altogether unaccountable that they should agree perfectly, on any other hypothesis than that the writers were under the guidance of the Spirit of God. In this respect, as in all others, the Bible stands alone. It is enough to impress any mind with awe, when it contemplates the Sacred Scriptures filled with the highest truths, speaking with authority in the name of God, and so miraculously free from the soiling touch of human fingers. The errors in matters of fact which skeptics search out bear no proportion to the whole. No sane man would deny that the Parthenon was built of marble, even if here and there a speck of sandstone should be detected in its structure. Not less unreasonable is it to deny the inspiration of such a book as the Bible, because one sacred writer says that on a given occasion twenty-four thousand, and another says that twenty-three thousand, men were slain. Surely a Christian may be allowed to tread such objections under his feet.

Admitting that the Scriptures do contain, in a few instances, discrepancies which with our present means of knowledge, we are unable satisfactorily to explain, they furnish no rational ground for denying their infallibility. "The Scripture cannot be broken." (John x. 35.) This is the whole doctrine of plenary inspiration, taught by the lips of Christ himself. The universe teems with evidences of design, so manifold, so diverse, so wonderful, as to overwhelm the mind with the conviction that it has had an intelligent author. Yet here and there isolated cases of monstrosity appear. It is irrational, because we cannot account for such cases, to deny that the universe is the product of intelligence. So the Christian need not renounce his faith in the plenary inspiration of the Bible, although there may be some things about it in its present state which he cannot account for.

Historical and Scientific Objections.

The second great objection to the plenary inspiration ot the Scripture is that it teaches what is inconsistent with historical and scientific truth.

Here again it is to be remarked, (1.) That we must distinguish between what the sacred writers themselves thought or believed, and what they teach. They may have believed that the sun moves round the earth, but they do not so teach. (2.) The language of the Bible is the language of common life; and the language of common life is founded on apparent, and not upon scientific truth. It would be ridiculous to refuse to speak of the sun rising and setting, because we know that it is not a satellite of our planet. (3.) There is a great distinction between theories and facts. Theories are of men. Facts are of God. The Bible often contradicts the former, never the latter. (4.) There is also a distinction to be made between

the Bible and our interpretation. The latter may come into competition with settled facts; and then it must yield. Science has in many things taught the Church how to understand the Scriptures. The Bible was for ages understood and explained according to the Ptolemaic system of the universe; it is now explained without doing the least violence to its language, according to the Copernican system. Christians have commonly believed that the earth has existed only a few thousands of years. If geologists finally prove that it has existed for myriads of ages, it will be found that the first chapter of Genesis is in full accord with the facts, and that the last results of science are embodied on the first page of the Bible. It may cost the Church a severe struggle to give up one interpretation and adopt another, as it did in the seventeenth century, but no real evil need be apprehended. The Bible has stood, and still stands in the presence of the whole scientific world with its claims unshaken. Men hostile or indifferent to its truths may, on insufficient grounds, or because of their personal opinions, reject its authority; but, even in the judgment of the greatest authorities in science, its teachings cannot fairly be impeached.

It is impossible duly to estimate the importance of this subject. If the Bible be the word of God, all the great questions which for ages have agitated the minds of men are settled with infallible certainty. Human reason has never been able to answer to its own satisfaction, or to the assurance of others, the vital questions, What is God? What is man? What lies beyond the grave? If there be a future state of being, what is it? and How may future blessedness be secured? Without the Bible, we are, on all these subjects, in utter darkness. How endless and unsatisfying have been the answers to the greatest of all questions, What is God? The whole Eastern world answers by saying, "That He is the unconscious ground of being." The Greeks gave the same answer for philosophers, and made all nature God for the people. The moderns have reached no higher doctrine. Fichte says the subjective Ego is God. According to Schelling, God is the eternal movement of the universe, subject becoming object, object becoming subject, the infinite becoming finite, and the finite infinite. Hegel says, Thought is God. Cousin combines all the German answers to form his own. Coleridge refers us to Schelling for an answer to the question, What is God? Carlyle makes force God. A Christian child says: "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." Men and angels veil their faces in the presence of that answer. It is the highest, greatest, and most fruitful truth ever embodied in human language. Without the Bible, we are without God and without hope. The present is a burden, and the future a dread.

[108] Theologia, I. IV. ii. qu. iii. echthesis, 3; edit. Wittenberg, 1685, pp. 68, a.

[109] "Votum pro Pace Ecclesiastica." Opera, Londini, 1679, t. iii. p. 672.

[110] Antiquities iv. 6, 5.

[111] Contra Eunomium Orat. vi. t. ii. p. 187, Paris, 1615.

[112] Opera, t. iv. p. 116, ed. Pfeiff.

[113] "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," Works, Harpers, N.Y., 1853, vol. v. p. 612.

§ 3. Adverse Theories.

Although substantial unanimity as to the doctrine of inspiration has prevailed among the great historical Churches of Christendom, yet there has been no little diversity of

opinion among theologians and philosophical writers. The theories are too numerous to be examined in detail. They may, perhaps, be advantageously referred to the following classes.

A. Naturalistic Doctrine.

There is a large class of writers who deny any supernatural agency in the affairs of men. This general class includes writers who differ essentially in their views.

First. There are those who, although Theists, hold the mechanical theory of the universe. That is, they hold that God having created the world, including all that it contains, organic and inorganic, rational and irrational, and having endowed matter with its properties and minds with their attributes, leaves it to itself. Just as a ship, when launched and equipped, is left to the winds and to its crew. This theory precludes the possibility not only of all miracles, prophecy, and supernatural revelation, but even of all providential government, whether general or special. Those who adopt this view of the relation of God to the world, must regard the Bible from beginning to end as a purely human production. They may rank it as the highest, or as among the lowest of the literary works of men; there is no possibility of its being inspired in any authorized sense of that word.

Secondly. There are those who do not so entirely banish God from his works. They admit that He is everywhere present, and everywhere active; that his providential efficiency and control are exercised in the occurrence of all events. But they maintain that He always acts according to fixed laws; and always in connection and cooperation with second causes. According to this theory also, all miracles and all prophecy, properly speaking, are excluded. A revelation is admitted, or at least, is possible. But it is merely providential. It consists in such an ordering of circumstances, and such a combination of influences as to secure the elevation of certain men to a higher level of religious knowledge than that attained by others. They may also, in a sense, be said to be inspired in so far as that inward, subjective state is purer, and more devout, as well as more intelligent than that of ordinary men. There is no specific difference, however, according to this theory, between inspired and uninspired men. It is only a matter of degrees. One is more and another less purified and enlightened. This theory also makes the Bible a purely human production. It confines revelation to the sphere of human knowledge. No possible degree of culture or development can get anything more than human out of man. According to the Scriptures, and to the faith of the Church, the Bible is a revelation of the things of God; of his thoughts and purposes. But who knoweth the things of God, asks the Apostle, but the Spirit of God? The things which the Bible purports to make known, are precisely those things which lie beyond the ken of the human mind. This theory, therefore, for bread gives us a stone; for the thoughts of God, the thoughts of man.

Schleiermacher's Theory.

Thirdly. There is a theory far more pretentious and philosophical, and which of late years has widely prevailed, which in reality differs very little from the preceding. It agrees with it in the main point in that it denies anything supernatural in the origin or composition of the Bible. Schleiermacher, the author of this theory, was addicted to a philosophy which precluded all intervention of the immediate efficiency of God in the world. He admits, however, of two exceptions: the creation of man, and the constitution of the person of Christ. There was a supernatural intervention in the origin of our race, and in the manifestation of Christ. All else in the history of the world is natural. Of course there is

nothing supernatural in the Bible; nothing in the Old Testament which the Adamic nature was not adequate to produce; and nothing in the New Testament, which Christianity, the life of the Church, a life common to all believers, is not sufficient to account for.

Religion consists in feeling, and specifically in a feeling or absolute dependence (or an absolute feeling of dependence) i.e., the consciousness that the finite is nothing in the presence of the Infinite, -- the individual in the presence of the universal. This consciousness involves the unity of the one and all, of God and man. "This system," says Dr. Ulmann, one of its more moderate and effective advocates, "is not absolutely new. We find it in another form in ancient Mysticism, especially in the German Mystics of the Middle Ages. Within them, too, the ground and central point of Christianity is the oneness of Deity and humanity effected through the incarnation of God, and deification of man." [114]

Christianity, therefore, is not a system of doctrine; it is not, subjectively considered, a form of knowledge. It is a life. It is the life of Christ. Ullmann again says explicitly: "The life of Christ is Christianity." [115] God in becoming man did not take upon himself, "a true body and a reasonable soul," but generic humanity; i.e., humanity as a generic life. The effect of the incarnation was to unite the human and divine as one life. And this life passes over to the Church precisely as the life of Adam passed over to his descendants, by a process of natural development. And this life is Christianity. Participation of this divine-human life makes a man a Christian.

The Christian revelation consists in the providential dispensations connected within the appearance of Christ on the earth. The effect of these dispensations and events was the elevation of the religious consciousness of the men of that generation, and specially of those who came most directly under the influence of Christ. This subjective state, this excitement and elevation of their religious life, gave them intuitions of religious truths, "eternal verities." These intuitions were by the logical understanding clothed in the form of doctrines. This, however, was a gradual process as it was effected only by the Church-life, i.e., by the working of the new divine-human life in the body of believers. [116] Mr. Mormell in expounding this theory, says: [117] "The essential germ of the religious life is concentrated in the absolute feeling of dependence, -- a feeling which implies nothing abject, but, on the contrary, a high and hallowed sense of our being inseparably related to Deity." On the preceding page he had said, "Let the subject become as nothing -- not, indeed, from its intrinsic insignificance or incapacity of moral action, but by virtue of the infinity of the object to which it stands consciously opposed; and the feeling of dependence must become absolute; for all finite power is as nothing in relation to the Infinite."

Christianity, as just stated, is the life of Christ, his human life, which is also divine, and is communicated to us as the life of Adam was communicated to his descendants. Morell, rather more in accordance with English modes of thought, says, [118] "Christianity, like every other religion, consists essentially in a state of man's inner consciousness, which develops itself into a system of thought and activity only in a community of awakened minds; and it was inevitable, therefore, that such a state of consciousness should require time, and intercourse, and mutual sympathy, before it could become moulded into a decided and distinctive form." He represents the Apostles as often meeting together and deliberating on essential points, correcting each other's views; and, after years of such fellowship,

Christianity was at last brought into form.

Revelation is declared to be a communication of truth to our intuitional consciousness. The outward world is a revelation to our sense-intuitions; beauty is a revelation to our esthetic intuitions; and "eternal verities," when intuitively perceived, are said to be revealed; and this intuition is brought about by whatever purifies and exalts our religious feelings. "Revelation," says Morell, "is a process of the intuitional consciousness, gazing upon eternal verities; while theology is the reflection of the understanding upon those vital intuitions, so as to reduce them to a logical and scientific expression." [119]

Inspiration is the inward state of mind which enables us to apprehend the truth. "Revelation and inspiration," says Morell, "indicate one united process, the result of which upon the human mind is, to produce a state of spiritual intuition, whose phenomena are so extraordinary, that we at once separate the agency by which they are produced from any of the ordinary principles of human development. And yet this agency is applied in perfect consistency with the laws and natural operations of our spiritual nature. Inspiration does not imply anything generically new in the actual processes of the human mind; it does not involve any form of intelligence essentially different from what we already possess; it indicates rather the elevation of the religious consciousness, and with it, of course, the power of spiritual vision, to a degree of intensity peculiar to the individuals thus highly favoured of God." [120] The only difference, therefore, between the Apostles and ordinary Christians is as to their relative holiness.

According to this theory there is no specific difference between genius and inspiration. The difference is simply in the objects apprehended and the causes of the inward excitement to which the apprehension is due. "Genius," says Morell, "consists in the possession of a remarkable power of intuition with reference to some particular object, a power which arises from the inward nature of a man being brought into unusual harmony with that object in its reality and its operations." [121] This is precisely his account of inspiration. "Let," he says, "there be a due purification of the moral nature, -- a perfect harmony of the spiritual being with the mind of God, -- a removal of all inward disturbances from the heart, and what is to prevent or disturb this immediate intuition of divine things." [122]

This theory of inspiration, while retaining its essential elements, is variously modified. With those who believe with Schleiermacher, that man "is the form in which God comes to conscious existence on our earth," it has one form. With Realists who define man to be "the manifestation of generic humanity in connection with a given corporeal organization;" and who believe that it was generic humanity which Christ took and united in one life with his divine nature, which life is communicated to the Church as his body, and thereby to all its members; it takes a somewhat different form. With those again who do not adopt either of these anthropological theories, but take the common view as to the constitution of man; it takes still a different, and in some respects, a lower, form. In all, however, inspiration is the intuition of divine truths due to the excitement of the religious nature, whatever that nature may be.

Objections to Schleiermacher's Theory.

To this theory in all its forms it may be objected, -- 1. That it proceeds upon a wrong view of religion in general and of Christianity in particular. It assumes that religion is a

feeling, a life. It denies that it is a form of knowledge, or involves the reception of any particular system of doctrine. In the subjective sense of the word, all religions (i.e., all religious doctrines) are true, as Twesten says, [123] but all are not equally pure, or equally adequate expressions of the inward religious principle. According to the Scriptures, however, and the common conviction of Christians, religion (subjectively considered) is the reception of certain doctrines as true, and a state of heart and course of action in accordance with those doctrines. The Apostles propounded a certain system of doctrines; they pronounced those to be Christians who received those doctrines so as to determine their character and life. They pronounced those who rejected those doctrines, who refused to receive their testimony, as antichristian; as having no part or lot with the people of God. Christ's command was to teach; to convert the world by teaching. On this principle the Apostles acted and the Church has ever acted from that day to this. Those who deny Theism as a doctrine, are atheists. Those who reject Christianity as a system of doctrine, are unbelievers. They are not Christians. The Bible everywhere assumes that without truth there can be no holiness; that all conscious exercises of spiritual life are in view of truth objectively revealed in the Scriptures. And hence the importance everywhere attributed to knowledge, to truth, to sound doctrine, in the Word of God.

2. This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of revelation. According to the Bible, God presents truth objectively to the mind, whether by audible words, by visions, or by the immediate operations of his Spirit. According to this theory, revelation is merely the providential ordering of circumstances which awaken and exalt the religious feelings, and which thus enable the mind intuitively to apprehend the things of God.

3. It avowedly confines these intuitions, and of course revealed truth, to what are called "eternal verities." But the great body of truths revealed in Scripture are not "eternal verities." The fall of man; that all men are sinners; that the Redeemer from sin was to be of the seed of Abraham, and of the house of David; that He was to be born of a virgin, to be a man of sorrows; that He was crucified and buried; that He rose again the third day; that He ascended to heaven; that He is to come again without sin to salvation, although truths on which our salvation depends, are not intuitive truths; they are not truths which any exaltation of the religious consciousness would enable any man to discover of himself.

4. According to this theory the Bible has no normal authority as a rule of faith. It contains no doctrines revealed by God, and to be received as true on his testimony. It contains only the thoughts of holy men; the forms in which their understandings, without supernatural aid, clothed the "intuitions" due to their religious feelings. "The Bible," says Morell, [124] "cannot in strict accuracy of language be termed a revelation, since a revelation always implies an actual process of intelligence in a living mind; but it contains the records in which those minds who enjoyed the preliminary training or the first brighter revelatior of Christianity, have described the scenes which awakened their own religious nature to new life, and the high ideas and aspirations to which that new life gave origin." The Old Testament is the product of "the religious consciousness of men who lived under a rude state of culture; and is of no authority for us. The New Testament is the product of "the religious consciousness of men who had experienced the sanctifying influence of Christ's presence among them. But those men were Jews, they had Jewish modes of thinking. They were familiar with the services of the old dispensation, were accustomed to think of God as

approachable only through a priesthood; as demanding expiation for sin, and regeneration of heart; and promising certain rewards and forms of blessedness in a future state of existence. It was natural for them, therefore, to clothe their "intuitions" in these Jewish modes of thought. We, in this nineteenth century, may clothe ours in very different forms, i.e., in very different doctrines, and yet "the eternal verities" be the same.

Different men carry this theory to very different lengths. Some have such an inward experience that they can find no form for expressing what they feel, so suitable as that given in the Bible, and therefore they believe all its great doctrines. But the ground of their faith is purely subjective. It is not the testimony of God given in his Word, but their own experience. They take what suits that, and reject the rest. Others with less Christian experience, or with no experience distinctively Christian, reject all the distinctive doctrines of Christianity, and adopt a form of religious philosophy which they are willing to call Christianity.

5. That this theory is antiscriptural has already been said. The Bible makes revelation as therein contained to be the communication of doctrines to the understanding by the Spirit of God. It makes those truths or doctrines the immediate source of all right feeling. The feelings come from spiritual apprehension of the truth, and not the knowledge of truth from the feeling. Knowledge is necessary to all conscious holy exercises. Hence the Bible makes truth of the greatest importance. It pronounces those blessed who receive the doctrines which it teaches, and those accursed who reject them. It makes the salvation of men to depend upon their faith. This theory makes the creed of a man or of a people of comparatively little consequence.

In the Church, therefore, Christianity has always been regarded as a system of doctrine. Those who believe these doctrines are Christians; those who reject them, are, in the judgment of the Church, infidels or heretics. If our faith be formal or speculative, so is our Christianity; if it be spiritual and living, so is our religion. But no mistake can be greater than to divorce religion from truth, and make Christianity a spirit or life distinct from the doctrines which the Scriptures present as the objects of faith.

B. Gracious Inspiration.

This theory belongs to the category of natural or supernatural, according to the meaning assigned to those terms. By natural effects are commonly understood those brought about by natural causes under the providential control of God. Then the effects produced by the gracious operations of the Spirit, such as repentance, faith, love, and all other fruits of the Spirit, are supernatural. And consequently the theory which refers inspiration to the gracious influence of the Spirit, belongs to the class of the supernatural. But this word is often used in a more limited sense, to designate events which are produced by the immediate agency or volition of God without the intervention of any second cause. In this limited sense, creation, miracles, immediate revelation, regeneration (in the limited sense of that word), are supernatural. As the sanctification of men is carried on by the Spirit by the use of the means of grace, it is not a supernatural work, in the restricted sense of the term.

There are many theologians who do not adopt either of the philosophical theories of the nature of man and of his relation to God, above mentioned; and who receive the Scriptural doctrine as held by the Church universal, that the Holy Spirit renews, sanctifies,

illuminates, guides, and teaches all the people of God; and yet who regard inspiration to be one of the ordinary fruits of the Spirit. Inspired and uninspired men are not distinguished by any specific difference. The sacred writers were merely holy men under the guidance of the ordinary influence of the Spirit. Some of those who adopt this theory extend it to revelation as well as to inspiration. Others admit a strictly supernatural revelation, but deny that the sacred writers in communicating the truths revealed were under any influence not uncommon to ordinary believers. And as to those parts of the Bible (as the Hagiographa and Gospels), which contain no special revelations, they are to be regarded as the devotional writings or historical narratives of devout but fallible men. Thus Coleridge, who refers inspiration to that "grace and communion with the Spirit which the Church, under all circumstances, and every regenerate member of the Church, in permitted to hope and instructed to pray for;" makes an exception in favour of "the law and the prophets, no jot or tittle of which can pass unfulfilled." [125] The remainder of the Bible, he holds, was written under the impulse and guidance of the gracious influence of the Spirit given to all Christian men. And his friends and followers, Dr. Arnold, Archdeacon Hare, and specially Maurice, ignore this distinction and refer the whole Bible "to an inspiration the same as what every believer enjoys." [126] Thus Maurice says, [127] "We must forego the demand which we make on the conscience of young men, when we compel them to declare that they regard the inspiration of the Bible as generically unlike that which God bestows on His children in this day."

Objections to the Doctrine that Inspiration is common to all Believers.

That this theory is anti-scriptural is obvious. 1. Because the Bible makes a marked distinction between those whom God chose to be his messengers, his prophets, his spokesmen, and other men. This theory ignores that distinction, so far as the people of God is concerned.

2. It is inconsistent with the authority claimed by these special messengers of God. They spoke in his name. God spoke through them. They said, "Thus saith the Lord," in a sense and way in which no ordinary believer dare use those words. It is inconsistent with the authority not only claimed by the sacred writers, but attributed to them by our Lord himself. He declared that the Scripture could not be broken, that it was infallible in all its teachings. The Apostles declare those anathema who did not receive their doctrines. This claim to divine authority in teaching was confirmed by God himself in signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost.

3. It is inconsistent with the whole nature of the Bible, which is and professes to be a revelation of truths not only undiscoverable by human reason, but which no amount of holiness could enable the mind of man to perceive. This is true not only of the strictly prophetic revelations relating to the future, but also of all things, concerning the mind and will of God. The doctrines of the Bible are called musteria, things concealed, unknown and unknowable, except as revealed to the holy Apostles and prophets by the Spirit. (Eph. iii. 5.)

4. It is inconsistent with the faith of the Church universal, which has always made the broadest distinction between the writings of the inspired men and those of ordinary believers. Even Romanists, with all their reverence for the fathers, never presumed to place their writings on a level with the Scriptures. They do not attribute to them any authority but

as witnesses of what the Apostles taught. If the Bible has no more authority than is due to the writings of pious men, then our faith is vain and we are yet in our sins. We have no sure foundation for our hopes of salvation.

C. Partial Inspiration.

Under this head are included several different doctrines.

1. Many hold that only some parts of Scripture are inspired, i.e., that the writers of some books were supernaturally guided by the Spirit, and the writers of others were not. This, as mentioned above, was the doctrine of Coleridge, who admitted the inspiration of the Law and the Prophets, but denied that of the rest of the Bible. Others admit the New Testament to be inspired to an extent to which the Old was not. Others again hold the discourses of Christ to be infallible, but no other part of the sacred volume.

2. Others limit the inspiration of the sacred writers to their doctrinal teaching. The great object of their commission was to give a faithful record of the revealed will and purpose of God, to be a rule of faith and practice to the Church. In this they were under an influence which rendered them infallible as religious and moral teachers. But beyond these limits they were as liable to error as other men. That there should be scientific, historical, geographical mistakes; errors in the citation of passages, or in other unessential matters; or discrepancies as to matters of fact between the sacred writers, leaves their inspiration as religious teachers untouched.

3. Another form of the doctrine of partial, as opposed to plenary inspiration, limits it to the thoughts, as distinguished from the words of Scripture. Verbal inspiration is denied. It is assumed that the sacred writers selected the words they used without any guidance of the Spirit, to prevent their adopting improper or inadequate terms in which to express their thoughts.

4. A fourth form of the doctrine of partial inspiration was early introduced and has been widely adopted. Maimonides, the greatest of the Jewish doctors since the time of Christ, taught as early as the twelfth century that the sacred writers of the Old Testament enjoyed different degrees of divine guidance. He placed the inspiration of the Law much above that of the Prophets; and that of the Prophets higher than that of the Hagiographa. His idea of different degrees of inspiration was adopted by many theologians, and in England for a long time it was the common mode of representation. The idea was that the writers of Kings and Chronicles needed less, and that they received less of the divine assistance than Isaiah or St. John. [128]

In attempting to prove the doctrine of plenary inspiration the arguments which bear against all these forms of partial inspiration were given or suggested. The question is not an open one. It is not what theory is in itself most reasonable or plausible, but simply, What does the Bible teach on the subject? If our Lord and his Apostles declare the Old Testament to be the Word of God; that its authors spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost; that what they said, the Spirit said; if they refer to the facts and to the very words of Scripture as of divine authority; and if the same infallible divine guidance was promised to the writers of the New Testament, and claimed by themselves; and if their claim was authenticated by God himself: then there is no room for, as there is no need of, these theories of partial inspiration. The whole Bible was written under such an influence as preserved its human authors from all error, and makes it for the Church the infallible rule of faith and practice.

[114] Studien und Kritiken, 1845, p. 59.

[115] Studien und Kritiken, January 1845; translated in The Mystical Presence, by Dr. J.W. Nevin.

[116] The English reader may find this theory set forth, in Morell's Philosophy of Religion, in Archdeacon Wilberforce's work on the Incarnation; in Maurice's Theological Essays; in the Mystical Presence, by Dr. John W. Nevin, and in the pages of the Mercersburg Quarterly Review, a journal specially devoted to the defense of Schleiermacher's doctrines and of those of the same general character.

[117] Philosophy of Religion, p. 77

[118] Philosophy of Religion, page 104.

[119] Page 141.

[120] Page 151.

[121] Philosophy of Religion, page 184.

[122] Page 186.

[123] Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 2. "Das Verhltniss des Erkennen zur Religion." Hase's Dogmatik. "Jede Religion als Ergebniss einer Volksbildung ist angemesen oder subj. wahr; wahr an sich ist die, welche der vollendeten Ausbildung der Menschheit entspricht." See also his Hutterus Redivivus.

[124] Philosophy of Religion, ch. 8, p. 143, London ed. 1849.

[125] "Confessions of an Inquiring Spirit," Letter 7. Works, N.Y., 1853, vol. v. p. 619.

[126] See Bannerman, Inspiration of the Scriptures. Edinburg, 1865; pp. 145, 232.

[127] Theological Essays, p. 339, Cambridge, 1853.

[128] This view of different degrees of inspiration was adopted by Lowth: Vindication of the Divine Authority and Inspiration of the Old and New Testaments. Whitby, in the Preface to his Commentary. Doddridge, Dissertation on the Inspiration of the New Testament. Hill, Lectures on Divinity. Dick, Essay on the Inspiration of the Holy Scriptures. Wilson, Evidences of Christianity. Henderson, Divine Inspiration.

§ 4. The Completeness of the Scriptures.

By the completeness of the Scriptures is meant that they contain all the extant revelations of God designed to be a rule of faith and practice to the Church. It is not denied that God reveals himself, even his eternal power and Godhead, by his works, and has done so from the beginning of the world. But all the truths thus revealed are clearly made known in his written Word. Nor is it denied that there may have been, and probably were, books written by inspired men, which are no longer in existence. Much less is it denied that Christ and his Apostles delivered many discourses which were not recorded, and which, could they now be known and authenticated, would be of equal authority with the books now regarded as canonical. All that Protestants insist upon is, that the Bible contains all the extant revelations of God, which He designed to be the rule of faith and practice for his Church; so that nothing can rightfully be imposed on the consciences of men as truth or duty which is not taught directly or by necessary implication in the Holy Scriptures. This excludes all unwritten traditions, not only, but also all decrees of the visible Church; all

resolutions of conventions, or other public bodies, declaring this or that to be right or wrong, true or false. The people of God are bound by nothing but the Word of God. On this subject little need be said. The completeness of Scripture, as a rule of faith, is a corollary of the Protestant doctrine concerning tradition. If that be true, the former must also be true. This Romanists do not deny. They make the Rule of Faith to consist of the written and unwritten word of God, i.e., of Scripture and tradition. If it be proved that tradition is untrustworthy, human, and fallible, then the Scriptures by common consent stand alone in their authority. As the authority of tradition has already been discussed, further discussion of the completeness of the Scriptures becomes unnecessary.

It is well, however, to bear in mind the importance of this doctrine. It is not by Romanists only that it is denied, practically at least, if not theoretically. Nothing is more common among Protestants, especially in our day, than the attempt to coerce the conscience of men by public opinion; to make the opinions of men on questions of morals a rule of duty for the people, and even for the Church. If we would stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free, we must adhere to the principle that in matters of religion and morals the Scriptures alone have authority to bind the conscience.

§ 5. Perspicuity of the Scriptures. The Right of Private Judgment.

The Bible is a plain book. It is intelligible by the people. And they have the right, and are bound to read and interpret it for themselves; so that their faith may rest on the testimony of the Scriptures, and not on that of the Church. Such is the doctrine of Protestants on this subject.

It is not denied that the Scriptures contain many things hard to be understood; that they require diligent study; that all men need the guidance of the Holy Spirit in order to right knowledge and true faith. But it is maintained that in all things necessary to salvation they are sufficiently plain to be understood even by the unlearned.

It is not denied that the people, learned and unlearned, in order to the proper understanding of the Scriptures, should not only compare Scripture with Scripture, and avail themselves of all the means in their power to aid them in their search after the truth, but they should also pay the greatest deference to the faith of the Church. If the Scriptures be a plain book, and the Spirit performs the functions of a teacher to all the children of God, it follows inevitably that they must agree in all essential matters in their interpretation of the Bible. And from that fact it follows that for an individual Christian to dissent from the faith of the universal Church (i.e., the body of true believers), is tantamount to dissenting from the Scriptures themselves.

What Protestants deny on this subject is, that Christ has appointed any officer, or class of officers, in his Church to whose interpretation of the Scriptures the people are bound to submit as of final authority. What they affirm is that He has made it obligatory upon every man to search the Scriptures for himself, and determine on his own discretion what they require him to believe and to do.

The arguments in support of the former of these positions have already been presented in the discussion concerning the infallibility of the Church. The most obvious reasons in support of the right of private judgment are, --

1. That the obligations to faith and obedience are personal. Every man is responsible for his religious faith and his moral conduct. He cannot transfer that responsibility to others; nor can others assume it in his stead. He must answer for himself; and if he must answer for himself, he must judge for himself. It will not avail him in the day of judgment to say that his parents or his Church taught him wrong. He should have listened to God, and obeyed Him rather than men.

2. The Scriptures are everywhere addressed to the people, and not to the officers of the Church either exclusively, or specially. The prophets were sent to the people, and constantly said, "Hear, O Israel," "Hearken, O ye people." Thus, also, the discourses of Christ were addressed to the people, and the people heard him gladly. All the Epistles of the New Testament are addressed to the congregation, to the "called of Jesus Christ;" "to the beloved of God;" to those "called to be saints;" "to the sanctified in Christ Jesus;" "to all who call on the name of Jesus Christ our Lord;" "to the saints which are in (Ephesus), and to the faithful in Jesus Christ;" or "to the saints and faithful brethren which are in (Colosse);" and so in every instance. It is the people who are addressed. To them are directed these profound discussions of Christian doctrine, and these comprehensive expositions of Christian duty. They are everywhere assumed to be competent to understand what is written, and are everywhere required to believe and obey what thus came from the inspired messengers of Christ. They were not referred to any other authority from which they were to learn the true import of these inspired instructions. It is, therefore, not only to deprive the people of a divine right, to forbid the people to read and interpret the Scriptures for themselves; but it is also to interpose between them and God, and to prevent their hearing his voice, that they may listen to the words of men.

The People commanded to search the Scriptures.

3. The Scriptures are not only addressed to the people, but the people were called upon to study them, and to teach them unto their children. It was one of the most frequently recurring injunctions to parents under the old dispensation, to teach the Law unto their children, that they again might teach it unto theirs. The "holy oracles" were committed to the people, to be taught by the people; and taught immediately out of the Scriptures, that the truth might be retained in its purity. Thus our Lord commanded the people to search the Scriptures, saying, "They are they which testify of me." (John v. 39.) He assumed that they were able to understand what the Old Testament said of the Messiah, although its teachings had been misunderstood by the scribes and elders, and by the whole Sanhedrim. Paul rejoiced that Timothy had from his youth known the Holy Scriptures, which were able to make him wise unto salvation. He said to the Galatians (i. 8, 9), "Though we, or an angel from heaven, -- if any man preach any other gospel unto you than that ye have received, let him be accursed." This implies two things, -- first, that the Galatian Christians, the people, had a right to sit in judgment on the teaching of an Apostle, or of an angel from heaven; and secondly, that they had an infallible rule by which that judgment was to be determined, namely, a previous authenticated revelation of God. If, then, the Bible recognizes the right of the people to judge of the teaching of Apostles and angels, they are not to be denied the right of judging of the doctrines of bishops and priests. The principle laid down by the Apostle is precisely that long before given by Moses (Deut. xiii. 1-3), who tells the people that if a prophet should arise, although he worked wonders, they were not to believe or

obey him, if he taught them anything contrary to the Word of God. This again assumes right to judge, and that the people had the ability and the right to judge, and that they had an infallible rule of judgment. It implies, moreover, that their salvation depended upon their judging rightly. For if they allowed these false teachers, robed in sacred vestments, and surrounded by the insignia of authority, to lead them from the truth, they would inevitably perish.

4. It need hardly be remarked that this right of private judgment is the great safeguard of civil and religious liberty. If the Bible be admitted to be the infallible rule of faith and practice in accordance with which men are bound on the peril of their souls, to frame their creed and conduct; and if there be a set of men who have the exclusive right of interpreting the Scripture, and who are authorized to impose their interpretations on the people as of divine authority, then they may impose on them what conditions of salvation they see fit. And the men who have the salvation of the people in their hands are their absolute masters. Both reason and experience fully sustain the dictum of Chillingworth, [129] when he says, "He that would usurp an absolute lordship and tyranny over any people, need not put himself to the trouble and difficulty of abrogating and disannulling the laws, made to maintain the common liberty; for he may frustrate their intent, and compass his own design as well, if he can get the power and authority to interpret them as he pleases, and add to them what he pleases, and to have his interpretations and additions stand for laws; if he can rule his by his lawyers." This is precisely what the Church of Rome has done, and thereby established a tyranny for which there is no parallel in the history of the world. What renders this tyranny the more intolerable, is, that, so far as the mass of the people is concerned, it resolves itself into the authority of the parish priest. He is the arbiter of the faith and morals of his people. No man can believe unless the ground of faith is present to his mind. If the people are to believe that the Scriptures teach certain doctrines, then they must have the evidence that such doctrines are really taught in the Bible. If that evidence be that the Church so interprets the sacred writings, then the people must know what is the Church, i.e., which of the bodies claiming to be the Church, is entitled to be so regarded. How are the people, the uneducated masses, to determine that question? The priest tells them. If they receive his testimony on that point, then how can they tell how the Church interprets the Scriptures? Here again they must take the word of the priest. Thus the authority of the Church as an interpreter, which appears so imposing, resolves itself into the testimony of the priest, who is often wicked, and still oftener ignorant. This cannot be the foundation of the faith of God's elect. That foundation is the testimony of God himself speaking his word, and authenticated as divine by the testimony of the Spirit with and by the truth in the heart of the believer.

[129] Works, p. 105.

§ 6. Rules of interpretation.

If every man has the right, and is bound to read the Scriptures, and to judge for himself what they teach, he must have certain rules to guide him in the exercise of this privilege and duty. These rules are not arbitrary. They are not imposed by human authority. They have no binding force which does not flow from their own intrinsic truth and propriety. They are few and simple.

1. The words of Scripture are to be taken in their plain historical sense. That is, they must be taken in the sense attached to them in the age and by the people to whom they were addressed. This only assumes that the sacred writers were honest, and meant to be understood.

2. If the Scriptures be what they claim to be, the word of God, they are the work of one mind, and that mind divine. From this it follows that Scripture cannot contradict Scripture. God cannot teach in one place anything which is inconsistent with what He teaches in another. Hence Scripture must explain Scripture. If a passage admits of different interpretations, that only can be the true one which agrees with what the Bible teaches elsewhere on the same subject. If the Scriptures teach that the Son is the same in substance and equal in power and glory with the Father, then when the Son says, "The Father is greater than I," the superiority must be understood in a manner consistent with this equality. It must refer either to subordination as to the mode of subsistence and operation, or it must be official. A king's son may say, "My father is greater than I," although personally his father's equal. This rule of interpretation is sometimes called the analogy of Scripture, and sometimes the analogy of faith. There is no material difference in the meaning of the two expressions.

3. The Scriptures are to be interpreted under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, which guidance is to be humbly and earnestly sought. The ground of this rule is twofold: First, the Spirit is promised as a guide and teacher. He was to come to lead the people of God into the knowledge of the truth. And secondly, the Scriptures teach, that "the natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him; neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) The unrenewed mind is naturally blind to spiritual truth. His heart is in opposition to the things of God. Congeniality of mind is necessary to the proper apprehension of divine things. As only those who have a moral nature can discern moral truth, so those only who are spiritually minded can truly receive the things of the Spirit.

The fact that all the true people of God in every age and in every part of the Church, in the exercise of their private judgment, in accordance with the simple rules above stated, agree as to the meaning of Scripture in all things necessary either in faith or practice, is a decisive proof of the perspicuity of the Bible, and of the safety of allowing the people the enjoyment of the divine right of private judgment.

PART I: THEOLOGY PROPER.

CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD.

All men have some knowledge of God. That is, they have the conviction that there is a Being on whom they are dependent, and to whom they are responsible. What is the source of this conviction? In other words, what is the origin of the idea of God? To this question three answers have been given. First, that it is innate. Second, that is a deduction of reason; a conclusion arrived at by a process of generalization. Third, that it is to be referred to a supernatural revelation, preserved by tradition.

§ 1. The Knowledge of God is Innate.

A. What is meant by Innate Knowledge.

By innate knowledge is meant that which is due to our constitution, as sentient, rational, and moral beings. It is opposed to knowledge founded on experience; to that obtained by ab extra instruction; and to that acquired by a process of research and reasoning.

It cannot be doubted that there is such knowledge, i.e., that the soul is so constituted that it sees certain things to be true immediately in their own light. They need no proof. Men need not be told or taught that the things thus perceived are true. These immediate perceptions are called intuitions, primary truths, laws of belief, innate knowledge, or ideas. Provided we understand what is meant, the designation is of minor importance. The doctrine of innate knowledge, or intuitive truths, does not imply that the child is born with knowledge in conscious exercise in the mind. As knowledge is a form or state of the intelligence, and as that is a state of consciousness, knowledge, in the sense of the act of knowing, must be a matter of consciousness; and, therefore, it is said, cannot be innate. The new-born child has no conscious conviction of the existence of God. But the word knowledge is sometimes used in a passive sense. A man knows what lies dormant in his mind. Most of our knowledge is in that state. All the facts of history stored in the memory, are out of the domain of consciousness, until the mind is turned to them. It is not inconceivable, therefore, that the soul as it comes into the world may be stored with these primary truths which lie dormant in the mind, until roused by the due occasion. This, however, is not what is meant by innate knowledge. The word innate simply indicates the source of the knowledge. That source is our nature; that which is born with us. Nor does the doctrine of innate knowledge imply that the mind is born with ideas, in the sense of "patterns, phantasms, or notions," as Locke calls them; nor that it is furnished by nature with a set of abstract principles, or general truths. All that is meant is, that the mind is so constituted that it perceives certain things to be true without proof and without instruction.

These intuitive truths belong to the several departments of the senses, the understanding, and our moral nature. In the first place, all our sense perceptions are intuitions. We apprehend their objects immediately, and have an irresistible conviction of their reality and truth. We may draw erroneous conclusions from our sensations; but our sensations, as far as they go, tell us the truth. When a man feels pain, he may refer it to the wrong place, or to a wrong cause; but he knows that it is pain. If he sees an object, he may be mistaken as to its nature; but he knows that he sees, and that what he sees is the cause of the sensation which he experiences. These are intuitions, because they are immediate perceptions of what is true. The conviction which attends our sensations is due not to instruction but to the constitution of our nature.

In the second place, there are intuitions of the intellect. That is, there are certain truths which the mind perceives to be true immediately, without proof or testimony. Such are the axioms of geometry. No man needs to have it proved to him that the part of a thing is less than the whole; or that a straight line is the shortest distance between two given points. It is an intuitive truth that "nothing" cannot be a cause; that every effect must have a cause. This conviction is not founded on experience, because experience is of necessity limited. And the conviction is not merely that every effect which we or other men have observed has had a cause; but that in the nature of things there can be no effect without an adequate cause. This conviction is said to be an innate truth, not because the child is born with it so that it is included in its infant consciousness, nor because the abstract principle is laid up in the mind, but simply because such is the nature of the mind, that it cannot but see these things to be true. As we are born with the sense of touch and sight, and take cognizance of their appropriate objects as soon as they are presented; so we are born with the intellectual faculty of perceiving these primary truths as soon as they are presented.

In the third place, there are moral truths which the mind intuitively recognizes as true. The essential distinction between right and wrong; the obligation of virtue; responsibility for character and conduct; that sin deserves punishment; are examples of this class of truths. No man needs to be taught them. No one seeks for further evidence of their being truths than that which is found in their nature.

There is another remark to be made in reference to the intuitions of the mind. The power of intuitional perception is capable of being increased. It is in fact greater in one man than in other men. The senses of some persons are far more acute than those of others. The senses of hearing and touch are greatly exalted in the case of the blind. It is the same with the intellect. What is self-evident to one man, has to be proved to another. It is said that all the propositions of the First Book of Euclid were as plain at first sight to Newton as the axioms. The same is true in our moral and religious nature. The more that nature is purified and exalted, the clearer is its vision, and the wider the scope of its intuitions. It is not easy to see, therefore, why Sir William Hamilton should make simplicity a characteristic of intuitive truths. If a proposition be capable of resolution into simpler factors, it may still to a powerful intellect be seen as self-evidently true. What is seen immediately, without the intervention of proof, to be true, is, according to the common mode of expression, said to be seen intuitively.

It is, however, only of the lower exercises of this power that we can avail ourselves in our arguments with our fellow men. Because a truth may be self-evident to one mind, it

does not follow that it must be so to all other minds. But there is a class of truths so plain that they never fail to reveal themselves to the human mind, and to which the mind cannot refuse its assent. Hence the criteria of those truths which are accepted as axioms, and which are assumed in all reasoning, and the denial of which renders all faith and all knowledge impossible, are universality and necessity. What all believe, and what all men must believe, is to be assumed as undeniably true. These criteria indeed include each other. If a truth be universally admitted, it must be because no man can rationally call it to question. And if it be a matter of necessary belief it must be accepted by all who possess the nature out of the constitution of which the necessity arises.

B. Proof that the Knowledge of God is Innate.

The question now is, Whether the existence of God is an intuitive truth? Is it given in the very constitution of our nature? Is it one of those truths which reveal themselves to every human mind, and to which the mind is forced to assent? In other words, has it the characteristics of universality and necessity? It should be remarked that when universality is made a criterion of intuitive truths, it is intended to apply to those truths only which have their foundation or evidence in the constitution of our nature. As to the external world, if ignorance be universal, error may be universal. All men, for example, for ages believed that the sun moves round the earth; but the universality of that belief was no evidence of its truth.

When it is asked, Whether the existence of God is an intuitive truth, the question is equivalent to asking, Whether the belief in his existence is universal and necessary? If it be true that all men do believe there is a God, and that no man can possibly disbelieve his existence, then his existence is an intuitive truth. It is one of those given in the constitution of our nature; or which, our nature being what it is, no man can fail to know and to acknowledge.

Such has been the common opinion in all ages. Cicero [130] says: "Esse Deos, quoniam insitas eorum, vel potius innatas cognitiones habemus." Tertullian [131] says of the heathen of his day, that the common people had a more correct idea of God than the phtilosophers. Calvin [132] says "Hoc quidem recte judicantibus semper constabit, insculptum mentibus humanis esse divinitatis sensum, qui deleri nunquam potest." The whole tendency in our day is, to make the existence of God so entirely a matter of intuition as to lead to the disparagement of all argument in proof of it. This extreme, however, does not justify the denial of a truth so important as that God has not left any human being without a knowledge of his existence and authority.

The word God, however, is used in a very wide sense. In the Christian sense of the word, "God is a spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This sublime idea of God no human mind ever attained either intuitively or discursively, except under the light of a supernatural revelation. On the other hand, some philosophers dignify motion, force, or the vague idea of the infinite, with the name of God. In neither of these senses of the word is the knowledge of God said to be innate, or a matter of intuition. It is in the general sense of a Being on whom we are dependent, and to whom we are responsible, that the idea is asserted to exist universally, and of necessity, in every human mind. It is true that if this idea is analyzed, it will be found to embrace the conviction that God is a person, and that He possesses moral

attributes, and acts as a moral governor. Nothing is asserted as to how far this analysis is made by uneducated and uncivilized men. All that is maintained is that this sense of dependence and accountability to a being higher than themselves exists in the minds of all men.

The Knowledge of God is Universal.

In proof of this doctrine, reference may be made --

1. To the testimony of Scripture. The Bible asserts that the knowledge of God is thus universal. This it does both directly and by necessary implication. The Apostle directly asserts in regard to the heathen as such without limitation, that they have the knowledge of God, and such knowledge as to render their impiety and immorality inexcusable. "Because that when they knew God," he says, "they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful." (Rom. i. 19-21.) He says of the most depraved of men, that they know the righteous judgment of God, that those who commit sin are worthy of death. (Rom. i. 32.) The Scripture everywhere addresses men as sinners; it calls upon them to repent; it threatens them with punishment in case of disobedience: or promises pardon to those who turn from their sins. All this is done without any preliminary demonstration of the being of God. It assumes that men know that there is a God, and that they are subject to his moral government. It is true that the Bible at times speaks of the heathen as not knowing God, and says that they are without God. But this, as explained by the context in which such declarations appear, and by the general teaching of the Scriptures, only means that the heathen are without correct, or saving knowledge of God; that they are without his favour, do not belong to the number of his people, and of course are not partakers of the blessedness of those whose God is the Lord. In teaching the universal sinfulness and condemnation of men: their inexcusableness for idolatry and immorality, and in asserting that even the most degraded are conscious of guilt and just exposure to the divine judgment, the Bible takes for granted that the knowledge of God is universal, that it is written on the heart of every man.

This is still more apparent from what the Bible teaches of the law as written on the heart. The Apostle tells us that those who have a written revelation, shall be judged by that revelation; that those who have no externally revealed law, shall be judged by the law written on the heart. That the heathen have such a law, he proves first, from the fact that "they do by nature the things contained in the law," i. e., they do under the control of their nature the things which the law prescribes; and secondly, from the operations of conscience. When it condemns, it pronounces something done, to be contrary to the moral law; and when it approves, it pronounces something to be conformed to that law. (Rom. ii. 12-16.) The recognition of God, therefore, that is, of a being to whom we are responsible, is involved in the very idea of accountability. Hence every man carries in the very constitution of his being as a moral agent, the evidence of the existence of God. And as this sense of sin and responsibility is absolutely universal, so must also, according to the Bible, be the knowledge of God.

2. The second argument in favor of the universality of this knowledge, is the historical one. History shows that the religious element of our nature is just as universal as the rational or social one. Wherever men exist, in all ages and in all parts of the world, they have some form of religion. The idea of God is impressed on every human language. And

as language is the product and revelation of human consciousness, if all languages have some name for God, it proves that the idea of God, in some form, belongs to every human being.

Objections to the Assumption that the Knowledge of God is Universal.

There are two objections often urged against the doctrine that the knowledge of God results from the very constitution of our nature, and is therefore universal. The one is, that travellers and missionaries report the existence of some tribes so degraded that they could discover in them no traces of this knowledge. Even if the fact be admitted that such tribes have no idea of God, it would not be conclusive. Should a tribe of idiots be discovered, it would not prove that reason is not an attribute of our nature. If any community should come to light in which infanticide was universal, it would not prove that parental love was not one of the instincts of humanity. But the probability is that the fact is not as reported. It is very difficult for foreigners to get acquainted with the interior life of those who differ from themselves so much in their intellectual and moral condition. And besides, Christians attach such an exalted meaning to the word God, that when they see no evidence of the presence of that exalted conception in the minds of the heathen, they are apt to conclude that all knowledge of God is wanting. Unless such people show that they have no sense of right and wrong, no consciousness of responsibility for character and conduct, there is no evidence that they have no knowledge of such a being as God.

The other objection is drawn from the case of the deaf and dumb, who sometimes say that previous to instruction, the idea of God never entered their minds. To this the same answer may be given. The knowledge obtained by Christian instruction so much surpasses that given by intuition, that the latter seems as nothing. It is hardly conceivable that a human soul should exist in any state of development, without a sense of responsibility, and this involves the idea of God. For the responsibility is felt to be not to self, nor to men, but to an invisible Being, higher than self, and higher than man.

The Belief in God Necessary.

But if it be admitted that the knowledge of God is universal among men, is it also a necessary belief? Is it impossible for the mind to dispossess itself of the conviction that there is a God? Necessity, as remarked above, may be considered as involved in universality, at least in such a case as this. There is no satisfactory way of accounting for the universal belief in the existence of God, except that such belief is founded on the very constitution of our nature. Nevertheless, these two criteria of intuitive truths are generally distinguished, and are in some aspects distinct.

The question then is, Is it possible for a sane man to disbelieve in the existence of God? This question is commonly answered in the negative. It is objected, however, that facts prove the contrary. No man has ever been found, who denies that two and two make four, whereas atheists abound in every age and in every part of the world.

There, are, however, different kinds of necessary truths.

1. Those the opposite of which is absolutely unthinkable. That every effect must have a cause, that a part of a given thing is less than the whole, are propositions the opposites of which cannot have any meaning. When a man says that something is nothing, he expresses no thought. He denies what he affirms, and therefore says nothing.

2. There are truths concerning external or material things, which have a power to constrain belief different from that power which pertains to truths concerning the mind. A man cannot deny that he has a body; and he cannot rationally deny that he has a will. The impossibility in both cases may be equal, but they are of different kinds, and affect the mind differently.

3. Again, there are truths which cannot be denied without doing violence to the laws of our nature. In such cases the denial is forced, and can only be temporary. The laws of our nature are sure sooner or later to assert themselves, and constrain an opposite belief. A pendulum when at rest hangs perpendicularly to the horizon. It may by extraneous force be made to hang at any degree of inclination. But as soon as such force is removed, it is sure to swing back to its normal position. Under the control of a metaphysical theory, a man may deny the existence of the external world, or the obligation of the moral law; and his disbelief may be sincere, and for a time persistent; but the moment the speculative reasons for his disbelief are absent from his mind, it of necessity reverts to its original and natural convictions. It is also possible that a man's hand may be so hardened or cauterized as to lose the sense of touch. But that would not prove that the hand in man is not normally the great organ of touch. So it is possible that the moral nature of a man may be so disorganized by vice or by a false philosophy as to have its testimony for the existence of God effectually silenced. This, however, would prove nothing as to what that testimony really is. Besides this, insensibility and the consequent unbelief cannot last. Whatever rouses the moral nature, whether it be danger, or suffering, or the approach of death, banishes unbelief in a moment. Men pass from skepticism to faith, in many cases, instantaneously; not of course by a process of argument, but by the existence of a state of consciousness with which skepticism is irreconcilable, and in the presence of which it cannot exist. This fact is illustrated continually, not only in the case of the uneducated and superstitious, but even in the case of men of the highest culture. The simple fact of Scripture and experience is, that the moral law as written upon the heart is indelible; and the moral law in its nature implies a lawgiver, one from whom that law emanates, and by whom it will be enforced. And, therefore, so long as men are moral creatures, they will and must believe in the existence of a Being on whom they are dependent, and to whom they are responsible for their character and their conduct. To this extent, and in this sense, therefore, it is to be admitted that the knowledge of God is innate and intuitive; that men no more need to be taught that there is a God, than they need to be taught there is such a thing as sin. But as men are ignorant of the nature and extent of sin, while aware of its existence, until instructed by the Word of God, and enlightened by his Spirit; so they greatly need the same sources of instruction to give them any adequate knowledge of the nature of God, and of their relations to him.

[130] De Natura Deorum, i. 17.

[131] Testimonium Anim.

[132] Institutio, 1. iii. 3.

§ 2. The Knowledge of God is not due to a Process of Reasoning.

Those who are unwilling to admit that the idea of God is innate as given in the very constitution of man, generally hold that it is a necessary, or, at least, a natural deduction of

reason. Sometimes it is represented as the last and highest generalization of science. As the law of gravitation is assumed to account for a large class of the phenomena of the universe, and as it not only does account for them, but must be assumed in order to understand them; so the existence of an intelligent first cause is assumed to account for the existence of the universe itself, and for all its phenomena. But as such generalizations are possible only for cultivated minds, this theory of the origin of the idea of God, cannot account for belief in his existence in the minds of all men, even the least educated.

Others, therefore, while regarding this knowledge to be the result of a course of reasoning, make the process far more simple. There are many things which children and illiterate persons learn, and can hardly avoid learning, which need not be referred to the constitution of their nature. Thus the existence of God is so obviously manifested, by everything within and around us, the belief in that existence is so natural, so suited to what we see and what we need, that it comes to be generally adopted. We are surrounded by facts which indicate design; by effects which demand a cause. We have a sense of the infinite which is vague and void, until filled with God. We have a knowledge of ourselves as spiritual beings, which suggests the idea of God, who is a spirit. We have the consciousness of moral qualities, of the distinction between good and evil, and this makes us think of God as a being of moral perfections. All this may be very true, but it is not an adequate account of the facts of the case. It does not give a satisfactory reason for the universality and strength of the conviction of the existence of God. Our own consciousness teaches us that this is not the ground of our own faith. We do not thus reason ourselves into the belief that there is a God; and it is very obvious that it is not by such a process of ratiocination, simple as it is, that the mass of the people are brought to this conclusion.

Moreover, the process above described does not account for the origin of our belief in God, but only gives the method by which that belief is confirmed and developed. Very little is given by intuition in any case, at least to ordinary minds. What is thus discovered needs to be expanded, and its real contents unfolded. If this be true with the intuitions of sense and of the understanding, why should it not be so of our religious nature?

The truth is, that all the faculties and feelings of our minds and bodies have their appropriate objects; and the possession of the faculties supposes the existence of those objects. The senses suppose the existence and reality of the objects of sense. The eye, in its very structure, supposes that there is such an element as light; the sense of hearing would be unaccountable and inconceivable without sound; and the sense of touch would be inconceivable were there no tangible objects. The same is true of our social affections; they necessitate the assumption that there are relations suited to their exercises. Our moral nature supposes that the distinction between right and wrong is not chimerical or imaginary. In like manner, our religious feelings, our sense of dependence, our consciousness of responsibility, our aspirations after fellowship with some Being higher than ourselves, and higher than anything which the world or nature contains, necessitates the belief in the existence of God. It is indeed said that if this belief is intuitive and necessary, there is no virtue in it. This objection overlooks the fact that the moral character of our feelings depends on their nature and not on their origin. They may spring from the constitution of our nature, and yet be good or evil as the case may be. A mother's love for her child is instinctive; the absence of the maternal affection in a mother is something unnatural and

monstrous, the object of universal condemnation. The sense of pity, of justice, the feelings of benevolence, are instinctive, but none the less virtuous. The same is true of our religious feelings, and of the belief which they involve. We cannot help feeling that we are responsible, and it is right that we should feel so. The man who has brought himself to a state of insensibility to all moral obligation, is what the Scriptures call a "reprobate." Adam believed in God the moment he was created, for the same reason that he believed in the external world. His religious nature, unclouded and undefiled, apprehended the one with the same confidence that his senses apprehended the other. It is of great importance that men should know and feel that they are by their very nature bound to believe in God; that they cannot emancipate themselves from that belief, without derationalizing and demoralizing their whole being.

§ 3. Knowledge of God not due exclusively to Tradition.

There are some theologians who are unable to believe that the knowledge of God can be referred either to the constitution of our nature, or to any process of reasoning. Not only the exalted view of the Divine Being presented in the Bible, but the simple and perverted apprehensions of his nature prevailing among the heathen, they say must be referred to an original supernatural revelation. Such a revelation was made to our first parents and from them passed over to their descendants. When the knowledge thus communicated began to die out among men, God again revealed himself to Abraham, and made him and his posterity the depositaries of the truth. Either, therefore, from the remains of the primitive revelation, or by radiation from the chosen people, all the knowledge of God existing in the world has been derived. The attempt is made to show that the more remote any people were from the Jews, the less did they know of God; and the more any nation enjoyed of intercourse with the people to whom God had committed his oracles, the more correct and extended was their knowledge.

This view, although arising from reverence for the Word of God, is evidently extreme. It is true that the further we go back in the history of the world, the nearer we approach the primal revelation, the purer is the knowledge concerning Him. It may also be true, as a general rule, that the more any people were brought under the influence of the truth as held by the chosen people of God, the more enlightened they became. It may further be conceded that those who with the Bible in their hands reject its teachings, and give themselves up to their own speculations, turn, as the Apostle expresses it, "the truth of God into a lie," losing all knowledge of the living and true God. All this, however, does not prove that the knowledge of God is not written on the heart. Our intuitive perceptions need to be cherished, developed, and interpreted. We know from Scripture that the law is written in characters which cannot be obliterated, upon the souls of all men, and yet it has been perverted, misinterpreted, or disregarded by men in every age and in every part of the world.

§ 4. Can the Existence of God be proved?

A large class of theologians and philosophers deny that the existence of God is susceptible of proof. This is done on different grounds.

First. It is said that the knowledge of God being intuitive, it is not a proper subject of proof. This is the position taken by that class of theologians who resolve all religion into feeling, and by the modern school of speculative philosophers, who make such a wide distinction between the reason and the understanding; the former being the intuitional, and the latter the discursive faculty. Eternal and necessary truths belong to the province of the reason; subordinate truths to the sphere of the understanding. It is the understanding that argues and concludes. The reason apprehends by immediate vision. What relates to God, as the eternal, infinite, necessary Being, belongs to the province of reason, and not to that of the understanding. Even such theistic writers as Twesten [133] say that the good need no proof that God is, and that the wicked are not susceptible of conviction. You cannot prove that a thing is beautiful, or that it is good. So neither can you prove that there is a God. The fallacy of this statement is obvious. Beauty and goodness are qualities which must be discerned by the mind, just as the objects of sight are discerned by the eye. As it is true that you cannot prove to a blind man that an object is red, so you cannot prove to a peasant that the "Paradise Lost" is sublime. But the existence of God is an objective fact. It may be shown that it is a fact which cannot be rationally denied. Although all men have feelings and convictions which necessitate the assumption that there is a God; it is, nevertheless, perfectly legitimate to show that there are other facts which necessarily lead to the same conclusion.

Besides, it is to be remembered that theistical arguments are designed to prove not only that there is a necessity for the assumption of all extra-mundane and eternal Being, but mainly, to show what that Being is; that He is a personal Being, self-conscious, intelligent, moral. All this may lie inclosed in the primary intuition, but it needs to be brought out and established.

Secondly. Another class of objections against all theistical arguments, relates to the arguments themselves. They are pronounced fallacious, as involving a petitio principii; or declared to be invalid as derived from false premises; or heading to conclusions other than that intended to be established. Of this every man must judge for himself. They have been regarded as sound and conclusive by the wisest men, from Socrates to the present day. Of course the argument on the principle of causation must be invalid to those who deny that there is any such thing as an efficient cause; and the argument from design can have no force for those who deny the possibility of final causes.

Most of the objections to the conclusiveness of the arguments in question arises from a misapprehension of what they are intended to prove. It is often assumed that each argument must prove the whole doctrine of Theism; whereas one argument may prove one element of that doctrine; and other arguments different elements. The cosmological argument may prove the existence of a necessary and eternal Being; the teleological argument, that that Being is intelligent; the moral argument that He is a possessing moral attributes. The arguments are not designed so much to prove the existence of an unknown being, as to demonstrate that the Being who reveals himself to man in the very constitution of his nature must be all that Theism declares him to be. Such writers as Hume, Kant, Coleridge, and the whole school of transcendental philosophers, have more or less expressly denied the validity of the ordinary arguments for the existence of a personal God.

[133] Vorlesungen.

CHAPTER II: THEISM.

Theism is the doctrine of an extra-mundane, personal God, the creator, preserver, and governor of the world. The design of all arguments on this subject is to show that the facts around us, and the facts of consciousness, necessitate the assumption of the existence of such a Being. The arguments usually urged on this subject are the Ontological, the Cosmological, the Teleological, and the Moral.

§ 1. The Ontological Argument.

This is a metaphysical priori argument. It is designed to show that the real objective existence of God is involved in the very idea of such a Being. It is commonly made to include all arguments which are not posteriori; that is, which do not proceed from effect to cause. It has, therefore, been presented in different forms. The principal of which are the following: --

1. That in which it is presented by Anselm in his "Monologium," and more fully and definitely in his "Proslogium." The argument is substantially this. That which exists in re is greater than that which exists only in the mind. We have an idea of an infinitely perfect Being; but actual existence is included, in infinite perfection. Because, if actual existence be a perfection, and if God is not actually existent, then we can conceive of a Being greater than God. His words [134] are, "Et certe id, quo majus cogitari nequit, non potest esse in intellectu solo. Si enim vel in solo intellectu est, potest cogitari esse et in re, quod majus est. . . . . Existit ergo procul dubio aliquid, quo majus cogitari non valet, et in intellectu et in re." This argument assumes that existence is of the nature of a perfection. It adds, however, nothing to the idea. The idea in itself may be complete, although there be no objective existence to answer to it. Anselm regarded the negation of the existence of God as impossible; for God is the highest truth, the highest being, the highest good, of whom all other truth and good are the manifestations. Necessity of existence is included, according to this doctrine, in the idea or absolute perfection. In other words, it is included in the idea of God. And as every man has the idea of God, he must admit his actual existence; for what is necessary is of course actual. It does not follow from our idea of a man, that he actually exists, because man is not necessarily existent. But it is absurd to say that a necessarily existing Being, does not exist. If this argument has any validity, it is unimportant. It is only saying that what must be actually is. If the idea of God as it exists in every man's mind includes that of actual existence, then so far as the idea goes, he who has the one has the other. But the argument does not show how the ideal implies the real. [135]

Des Cartes' Argument.

2. Des Cartes' argument was in this form. We have the idea of an infinitely perfect

Being. As we are finite, that idea could not have originated with us. As we are conversant only with the finite, it could not have originated from anything around us. It must, therefore, have come from God, whose existence is thus a necessary assumption. "Habemus ideam Dei, hujusque ide\u0000 realitas objectiva nec formaliter nec eminenter in nobis continetur, nec in ullo alio pr\u0000terquam in ipso Deo potest contineri; ergo h\u0000c idea Dei, qu\u0000 in nobis est, requirit Deum pro causa; Deusque proinde existit." [136] It is true we have many ideas or conceptions to which there is no answering existence. But in such cases the ideas are arbitrary, or voluntary creations of our own minds. But the idea of God is necessary; we cannot help having it. And having it, there must be a Being who answers to it. Des Cartes illustrates his argument by saying, that as it is included in our idea of a triangle, that its angles are equal to two right angles, it is so in fact. The cases, however, are not parallel. It is only saying that a triangle is what it is, namely, a three-sided figure, whose angles are equal to two right angles. But the existence of God as a fact is not included in the definition of Him. Kant expresses this in philosophical language, saying that if the predicate be removed, the subject is removed; because an analytic judgment is a mere analysis, or full statement of what is in the subject. The judgment that the angles of a triangle are equal to two right angles, is only an analysis of the subject. It is a simple statement of what a triangle is; and therefore, if you take away the equality of the angles, you take away the triangle. But in a synthetic judgment, there is a synthesis, a putting together. Something is added in the judgment which is not in the subject. In this case that something is actual existence. We may infer from the idea of a perfect being, that he is wise and good; but not that he actually is; because reality is something added to the mere idea.

The only difference between the argument of Des Cartes and that of Anselm, appears to be merely formal. The one infers the existence of God, in order to account for the idea; the other argues that actual existence is included in the idea. The same illustration, therefore, is employed by the advocates of both. The argument of Anselm is the same as that derived from the definition of a triangle. You cannot think of a triangle without thinking of it as having three angles; so you cannot think of God without thinking of Him as actually existent; because actual existence enters as essentially into the idea of God, as "triangularity" enters into that of a triangle. There are, doubtless, minds which are affected by this kind of reasoning; but it has no power over the generality of men.

Dr. Samuel Clarke's Argument.

3. Dr. Samuel Clarke, equally distinguished as a mathematician, as a linguist, and as a metaphysician, published in 1705, his celebrated "Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of God." So far as the Being of God is concerned his argument is \u0000 priori. Nothing, he says, is necessarily existent, the non-existence of which is conceivable. We can conceive of the non-existence of the world; therefore the world is not necessarily existing and eternal. We cannot, however, conceive of the non-existence of space and duration; therefore space and duration are necessary and infinite. Space and duration, however, are not substances; therefore, there must he an eternal and necessary substance (i.e., God), of which they are the accidents. This argument at best gives us only the idea of a necessary and infinite something; which no class of anti-theists are disposed to deny. To determine what this eternal substance is, what attributes belong to it, reference must be made to the phenomenal world, and the argument becomes \u0000 posteriori. It has been objected to Dr.

Clarke's argument that it is not properly a priori. It infers from the existence of the and space the existence of a substantial Being.

Cousin's Argument.

4. Cousin, in his "Elements of Psychology," repeats continually the same argument in a somewhat different form. The idea of the infinite, he says, is given in that of the finite. We cannot have the one without having the other. "These two ideas are logical correlatives; and in the order of their acquisition, that of the finite and imperfect precedes the other; but it scarcely precedes it. It is not possible for the reason, as soon as consciousness furnishes the mind with the idea of the finite and imperfect, not to conceive the idea of the infinite and perfect. Now, the infinite and perfect is God." [137] Here again the argument is, that that is real of which we have an idea. This is not indeed assumed as a general proposition. We can imagine, says Cousin, a gorgon, or centaur, and we can imagine them not to exist; but it is not in our power, when the finite and imperfect are given, not to conceive of the infinite and perfect. This is not a chimera, he says, it is the necessary product of reason; and, therefore, it is a legitimate product. The idea of the finite and imperfect is a primitive idea, given in the consciousness; and therefore, the correlative, idea of the infinite and perfect given by necessity and by the reason, must also be primitive. [138] At other times he presents this subject in a different light. He teaches that, as the mind in perception takes cognizance of the object as a real existence, distinct from itself, so the reason has an apprehension, or immediate cognition of the Infinite, with a necessary conviction of its reality as distinguished (in one sense) from itself. Self, nature, and God are alike and equally involved in the intuitive apprehension of the mind; and they are inseparable. This is very different from the common doctrine of the knowledge of God as innate, or intuitive. The latter doctrine only assumes that such is the nature of the human soul that it is intuitively convinced of its dependence on, and responsibility to a Being other than, and higher than itself. The former assumes, with the German philosophers, especially Schelling, the immediate cognition of the Infinite by the reason.

Admitting with Cousin that the ideas of the finite and infinite are correlative; that we cannot have the one without having the other; and that the mind by a rational necessity is convinced that if there be a finite, there must be an infinite; it remains to be asked. What that Infinite is? With Cousin, the Infinite is the All. Theism therefore gains nothing from these metaphysical arguments.

[134] Proslogium ii. Opera, Paris, 1721, p. 30 b.

[135] On this argument are Ritter's Geschicte der Christlichen Philosophie, vol. iii, pp. 334-340. Sneed's History of Doctrine, i. pp. 229-237. Baur's Dreieinigkeitslehre ii. 374.

[136] Meditationes de Prima Philosophia prop. ii. p 89, edit. Amsterdam, 1685.

[137] Elements of Psychology, p. 375. Translated by Prof. Henry, New York, 1856.

[138] Page 376.

§ 2. The Cosmological Argument.

This is founded on the principle of a sufficient cause. Syllogistically stated, the argument stands thus: Every effect must have an adequate cause. The world is an effect.

Therefore the world must have had a cause outside of itself and adequate to account for its existence.

A. Causation.

The validity and the meaning of this argument, depend on the sense given to the words effect and cause. If an effect be correctly defined to be an event, or product, not due to anything in itself, but produced by something out of itself; and if by cause be understood, an antecedent to whose efficiency the effect is due; then the conclusion is inevitable, that the existence of the world supposes the existence of a cause adequate to its production, provided it can be proved that the world is an effect, i.e., that it is not self-caused or eternal.

It is well known, however, that since Hume propounded his theory, all efficient causes have been discarded by a large class of philosophers. The senses take cognizance of nothing but the sequence of events. One follows another. That which uniformly precedes, we call cause; that which uniformly follows, we call the effect. As sequence is all the senses detect, that is all we have any right to assume. The idea that there is anything in the antecedent which determines the effect to be as it is and no otherwise, is altogether arbitrary. A cause, therefore, is nothing but an invariable antecedent, and an effect an invariable consequent.

Mr. Stuart Mill [139] modified Hume's definition of cause as Dr. Brown of Edinburgh had done before him. The former says, "It is necessary to our using the word cause, that we should believe not only that the antecedent always has been followed by the consequent, but that, as long as the present constitution of things endures, it always will be so." So Dr. Brown [140] says, "A cause in the fullest definition which it philosophically admits of, may be said to be that which immediately precedes any change, and which, existing at any time in similar circumstances, has been always, and will be always immediately followed by a similar change." It is obvious that this definition is not only arbitrary, but that it is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of Hume's philosophy, and that of his followers, namely, that all our knowledge is founded on experience. Experience relates to the past. It cannot guarantee the future. If we believe that a given consequent always will follow a given antecedent, there must be some other ground for that conviction than that it always has done so. Unless there be something in the nature of the antecedent to secure the sequence of the effect, there is no rational ground for the belief that the future must be like the past.

The Common Doctrine on the Subject.

The common doctrine on this subject includes the following points. (1.) A cause is something. It has a real existence. It is not merely a name for a certain relation. It is a real entity, a substance. This is plain because a nonentity cannot act. If that which does not exist can be a cause, then nothing can produce something, which is a contradiction. (2.) A cause must not only be something real, but it must have power or efficiency. There must be something in its nature to account for the effects which it produces. (3.) This efficiency must be adequate; that is, sufficient and appropriate to the effect. That this is a true view of the nature of a cause is plain. (1.) From our own consciousness. We are causes. We can produce effects. And all three of the particulars above mentioned are included in our consciousness of ourselves as cause. We are real existences; we have power; we have

power adequate to the effects which we produce. (2.) We can appeal to the universal consciousness of men. All men attach this meaning to the word cause in their ordinary language. All men assume that every effect has an antecedent to whose efficiency it is due. They never regard mere antecedence, however uniform in the past, or however certain in the future, as constituting a causal relation. The succession of the seasons has been uniform in the past, and we are confident that it will continue uniform in the future; yet no man says that winter is the cause of summer. Every one is conscious that cause expresses an entirely different relation from that of mere antecedence. (3.) This view of the nature of causation is included in the universal and necessary belief, that every effect must have a cause. That belief is not that one thing must always go before another thing; but that nothing can occur, that no change can be produced, without the exercise of power or efficiency somewhere; otherwise something could come out of nothing.

This subject is discussed by all the metaphysicians from Aristotle downwards, and especially since the promulgation of the new doctrine adopted by Hume [141] It is one of the great services rendered by Dr. McCosh to the cause of truth, that he has defended the authority of those primary beliefs which lie at the foundation of all knowledge.

Intuitive Conviction of the Necessity of a Cause.

But admitting a cause to be not merely an invariable antecedent, but that to whose power the effect is due, "Ens quod in se continet rationem, cur aliud existat," [142] as it is defined by Wolf, it remains to be asked, What is the foundation of the universal belief that every effect must have a cause? Hume says it is founded on experience, and therefore is limited by it. We see that every effect within the sphere of our observation is preceded by a cause, and we may reasonably expect that the same is true beyond the sphere of our observation. But of this we know nothing. It would be presumptuous to determine from what takes place on our little globe, what must be the law of the universe. The fact that, as far as we see, every effect has a cause, gives us no right to assume that the universe must have had a cause. Kant says that the law of cause and effect is only in our minds. Men view things in that relation; but they have no assurance that that relation holds in the world outside of themselves.

The common doctrine of the schools is, that it is an intuitive truth, a first, or self-evident principle. That is, that it is something which all men do believe, and which all men must believe. There are no self-evident, intuitive truths, if the fact that they have been denied by one or more speculative philosophers be considered proof that they are not matters of universal and necessary belief. Personal identity, the real existence of the external world, the essential distinction between right and wrong, have all been denied. Nevertheless, all men do, and all men must believe these truths. The denial of them is forced and temporary. Whenever the mind reverts to its normal state, the belief returns. So the principle of causation has been denied; yet every man is forced by the constitution of his nature to admit it, and constantly to act upon it. A man may believe that the universe is eternal; but that it began to be without a cause -- that it sprang out of nothing -- it is impossible to believe.

We are reduced, therefore, to this alternative. The universe is. It therefore either has been from all eternity, or it owes its existence to a cause out of itself, adequate to account for its being what it is The theistical argument is, that the world is an effect; that it has not

the cause of existence in itself, that it is not eternal, and therefore we are necessitated to assume the existence of a great First Cause to whose efficiency the existence of the universe is to be referred.

B. The World is an Effect.

1. The first argument to prove that the world as a whole is not self-existent and eternal, is, that all its parts, everything that enters into its composition, is dependent and mutable. A whole cannot be essentially different from its constituent parts. An infinite number of effects cannot be self-existent. If a chain of three links cannot support itself, much less can a chain of a million of links. Nothing multiplied by infinity is nothing still. If we do not find the cause of our existence in ourselves, nor our parents in themselves, nor their progenitors in themselves, going back ad infinitum is only adding nothing to nothing. What the mind demands is a sufficient cause, and no approach to it is made by going back indefinitely from one effect to another. We are forced, therefore, by the laws of our rational nature, to assume the existence of a self-existent cause, i.e., a Being endued with power adequate to produce this ever-changing phenomenal world. In all ages thinking men have been forced to this conclusion. Plato and Aristotle argued from the existence of motion, that there must be an aeikineton heauto kinoun, an eternal self-moving power, or primum movens, as it was called by the Schoolmen. The validity of this argument is acknowledged by almost all classes of philosophers, at least so far as to admit that we are forced to assume the existence of an eternal and necessary Being. The theistical argument is, that if everything in the world be contingent, this eternal and necessary Being must be an extramundane First Cause.

B. Historical Argument.

2. The second argument is the historical one. That is, we have historical evidence that the race of man, for example, has existed only a few thousand years. That mankind has existed from eternity is absolutely incredible. Even if we adopt the development theory, it affords no relief. It only substitutes millions for thousands of years. Both are equally insignificant when compared to eternity. Darwin's germ-cell as necessarily demands a self-existing cause out of itself, as a fully developed man, or the whole race of man, or the universe itself. We are shut up to the conclusion that the universe sprang out of nothing, or that there is a self-existing, eternal extramundane Being.

Geological Argument.

3. The geological argument is to the same effect. Geologists as a class agree as to the following facts: (1.) That the extant genera of plants and animals inhabiting our earth, began to be within a comparatively short period in the history of our globe. (2.) That neither experience nor science, neither fact nor reason, justify the assumption of spontaneous generation. That is, there is no evidence that any living organism is ever produced by mere physical causes. Every such organism is either immediately created, or is derived from some other organism having life, already existing. (3.) Genera and species are permanent. One never passes into another. A fish never becomes a bird, nor a bird a quadruped. Modern theorists have indeed questioned these facts; but they still are admitted by the great body of scientific men, and the evidence in their favour is overwhelming to the ordinary mind. If these principles be conceded, it follows that all the extant plants and animals on the earth began to be. And if they began to be, they were created, and therefore there must be a

Creator. These considerations are merely collateral. The main argument is the one first mentioned, namely, the absolute impossibility of conceiving either of an infinite succession of contingent events, or of the origin of the universe out of nothing.

C. Objections. Hume's Doctrine.

There are only two objections to this cosmological argument which need be noticed. The one is directed to the principle on which it is founded, and the other to the conclusion drawn from it. Hume begins his "Treatise on Human Nature," by laying down the principle that the perceptions of the human mind resolve themselves into impressions and ideas. By impressions he means "all our sensations, passions, and emotions, as they make their first appearance in the soul." By ideas is meant "the faint images of these in thinking and reasoning." [143] There can, therefore, be no idea which is not derived from some previous impression. This is the fundamental principle of his whole system. From this it follows that all our knowledge is founded on experience. We have certain impressions made by external things, and certain passions and emotions; these are the only sources of our ideas, and therefore of our knowledge. When [144] he comes to apply this principle to the nature and origin of our idea of causation, he says, all we can know on the subject is that one object or event is contiguous and antecedent to another. This is all we perceive; all of which we can have an "impression." We have no impression of power, efficacy, energy, force, or whatever equivalent term we may choose to use. Therefore, there is no such thing. There is no such thing as efficacy or power either in mind or matter. When we use such words we have, he says, "really no distinct meaning." [145] When we see events or changes in uniform sequence, we get the habit, or, as he says, "we feel the determination," [146] to expect the consequent when we see its accustomed antecedent. Necessity, force, power, efficacy, therefore, are nothing but "a determination to carry our thoughts from one object to another." [147] "The necessity of power, which unites causes and effects, lies in the determination of the mind to pass from the one to the other. The efficacy or energy of causes is neither placed in the causes themselves, nor in the Deity, nor in the concurrence of these two principles; but belongs entirely to the soul, which considers the union of two or more objects in all past instances." [148] Hume was fully aware of the paradoxical character of his view of causation and of its far-reaching consequences, although he insisted that his argument in its support was unanswerable. In immediate connection with the preceding quotation, he says: "I am sensible, that of all the paradoxes which I have had, or shall hereafter have, occasion to advance in the course of this treatise, the present one is the most violent, and that 'tis merely by dint of solid proof and reasoning I can ever hope it will have admission, and overcome the inveterate prejudices of mankind" [149] What he calls inveterate prejudices, are really laws of belief which God has impressed on our nature, and which all the sophistry of philosophers can never subvert.

The conclusions which Hume draws from his doctrine show his appreciation of its importance. (1.) It follows, he says, from his principle that there is no difference between causes as efficient, formal, material, exemplary, or final; nor between cause and occasion. (2.) "That the common distinction betwixt moral and physical necessity is without any foundation in nature." "The distinction which we often make betwixt power and the exercise of it, is equally without foundation." (3.) "That the necessity of a cause to every beginning of existence is not founded on any arguments either demonstrative or intuitive."

(4.) "We can never have reason to believe that any object exists, of which we cannot form an idea." [150] By this fourth corollary, he has reference to such things as substance, from which we receive no impression, and consequently of which we can have no idea, and therefore cannot rationally believe to exist. The same may be said of God.

In the beginning of the following section, [151] Hume with a boldness almost unparalleled says: "According to the precedent doctrine, there are no objects which, by the mere survey, without consulting experience, we can determine to be the causes of any other; and no objects which we can certainly determine in the same manner not to be causes. Anything may produce anything. Creation, annihilation, motion, reason, volition, all these may arise from one another, or from any other object we can imagine. Nor will this appear strange if we compare two principles explained above, that the constant conjunction of objects determines their causation; and that, properly speaking, no objects are contrary to each other but existence and non-existence. Where objects are not contrary, nothing hinders them from having that constant conjunction on which the relation of cause and effect totally depends."

If there be any such argument as the reductio ad absurdum, surely this theory of Hume refutes itself. (1.) He admits the trustworthiness of consciousness so far as "impressions" are concerned; then how can he reject the intuitions of sense, reason, and conscience? (2.) If we have no knowledge which is not derived from impressions, and no right to believe in the existence of anything of which we have not an idea derived from an impression, then we cannot believe in substance, soul, or God. (3.) For the same reason we cannot believe that there is any such thing as power or efficiency, or any difference between efficient and final causes, i.e., between the expansive force of steam and the intention of the mechanist who makes a steam-engine. (4.) In like manner, we must believe that something can come out of nothing, that there is no reason that what begins to be should have a cause, even an antecedent; and, therefore, that "anything can produce anything," e.g., a human volition, the universe. (5.) He cannot even state his theory without contradicting himself. He speaks of one thing "producing" another. But according to his doctrine there is no such thing as production, because he denies that there is any such thing as power or efficiency.

It is universally admitted that we have no foundation for knowledge or faith, but the veracity of consciousness. This principle must be kept constantly in view, and must be often reiterated. Any doctrine, therefore, which contradicts the facts of consciousness, or the laws of belief which God has impressed on our nature, must be false. If, therefore, it can be shown that there are certain truths which men are constrained by the constitution of their nature to believe, those truths are to be retained in despite of all the arts of sophistry. If, therefore, it be a fact of consciousness that we ourselves are something, an ens, a substance, and that we have power, that we can produce effects, then it is certain that there is such a thing as power, and efficient cause. If, moreover, it be an intuitive and necessary truth that every effect must have a cause, that ex nihilo nihil fit, then it is absolutely certain that if the world began to be, it had an adequate cause of its existence out of itself. And, therefore, if the arguments to prove that the world is not self-existing and eternal be sound, the cosmological argument is valid and conclusive.

The Second Objection.

The other form of objection is directed not against the premises on which the

cosmological argument is founded, but against the conclusion which Theists draw from them. It is admitted that something now exists; that nonentity cannot be the cause of real existence; therefore, something must have existed from eternity. It is also admitted that a regressus ad infinitum, or an eternal series of effects, is impossible. There must, therefore, be an eternal, self-existing Being. This is all the cosmological argument fairly proves. It does not prove that this necessary Being is extramundane, much less that it is a personal God. It may be an eternal substance of which things mutable are the phenomena. [152]

The cosmological argument is not intended to prove all that Theists hold to be true concerning God. It is enough that it proves that we must admit the existence of an eternal and necessary Being. Other arguments prove that that Being is self-conscious and intelligent. The argument, moreover, fairly proves that this Being is extramundane; for the principle of causation is that everything contingent must have the cause of its existence out of itself.

[139] Logic, p. 203.

[140] Inquiry, p. 17. Edinburgh, 1818.

[141] See Reid's Intellectual Powers; Stewart's Philosophical Essays; Brown's Inquiry, and Essay on Cause and Effect; Sir William Hamilton's Works; Dr. McCosh's Intuitions of the Mind.

[142] See his Ontologia, II. iii. 2. § 881.

[143] Treatise of Human Nature, Part i. § 1; Works, vol. i. Edinburgh, 1826.

[144] In Part iii. § 14.

[145] Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. p. 216.

[146] Page 219.

[147] Page 219.

[148] Page 220.

[149] Page 220.

[150] Treatise of Human Nature, vol. i. pp. 226-228.

[151] § 15.

[152] See Strauss' Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 382.

§ 3. The Teleological Argument.

A. Its Nature.

This argument also admits of being stated in a syllogistic form. Design supposes a designer. The world everywhere exhibits marks of design. Therefore the world owes its existence to an intelligent author.

By design is intended, -- (1.) The selection of an end to be attained. (2.) The choice of suitable means for its attainment. (3.) The actual application of those means for the accomplishment of the proposed end.

Such being the nature of design, it is a self-evident truth, or, even an identical proposition, that design is indicative of intelligence, will, and power. It is simply saying that intelligence in the effect implies intelligence in the cause.

It is moreover true that the intelligence indicated by design is not in the thing designed. It must be in an external agent. The mind indicated in a book is not in the book itself, but in the author and printer. The intelligence revealed by a calculating machine, or any similar work of art, is not in the material employed, but in the inventor and artist. Neither is the mind indicated in the structure of the bodies of plants and animals, in them, but in Him who made them. And in like manner the mind indicated in the world at large must be in an extramundane Being. There is, indeed, this obvious difference between the works of God and the works of man. In every product of human art dead materials are fashioned and united to accomplish a given end; but the organized works of nature are animated by a living principle. They are fashioned as it were from within outward. In other words, they grow; they are not constructed. In this respect there is a great difference between a house and a tree or the human body. But, nevertheless, in both cases, the mind is external to the thing produced; because the end, the thought, is prior to the product. As the thought or idea of a machine must be in the mind of the mechanist, before the machine is made; so the idea or thought of the eye must be anterior to its formation. "It is a simple and pregnant conclusion," says Trendelenburg, [153] "that so far as design is realized in the world, thought as its ground has preceded it." And this thought, he goes on to say, is not dead, as a figure or model, it is connected with will and power. It is, therefore, in the mind of a person who has the ability and purpose to carry it out. He further says, "tiefsinnige Zweckmssigkeit bewustlos und blind," cannot be imagined, i.e., a blind and unconscious adaptation of means to an end is inconceivable.

As the conviction that design implies an intelligent agent is intuitive and necessary, it is not limited to the narrow sphere of our experience. The argument is not, Every house, ship, telescope, or other instrument or machine, we ever saw had an intelligent maker, therefore we may take it for granted that any similar work of art was not formed by chance or by the operation of blind, unconscious forces. The argument rather is, Such is the nature of design, that it of necessity implies an intelligent agent; and, therefore, where ever, or whenever we see evidence of design we are convinced that it is to be referred to the operation of mind. On this ground we not only authorized, but compelled to apply the argument from design far beyond the limits of experience, and to say: It is just as evident that the world had an intelligent creator, as that a book had an author. If a man can believe that a book was written by chance, or by blind, unconscious force, then, and not otherwise, can he rationally deny the validity of the argument from design in proof of the existence of a personal God.

B. Evidences of Design in the World.

This is a boundless subject. One of the most important and valuable of the "Bridgewater Treatises," the volume by Dr. Charles Bell, is devoted to "The Hand, its mechanism and vital endowments as evincing design." Hundreds of volumes would not be sufficient to exhibit the evidence of the intelligent adaptation of means to an end, which the world everywhere affords. In the few pages now at command all that can be attempted, is an indication of the nature of this evidence. [154]

Design in Single Organs.

1. No work of human art can compare with the nicety and completeness of the separate organs of organized bodies for the purpose for which they are designed. In the eye, for

example, there is the most perfect optical instrument constructed in accordance with the hidden laws of light. We find there the only nerve in the body susceptible of the impressions of light and color. That nerve is spread out on the retina. The light is admitted through an orifice in the ball, which opening by the most delicate arrangement of muscles is enlarged or contracted, according to the degree of light which falls on the retina, which enlargement or contraction is not dependent on the will, but on the stimulus of the light itself. Light, however, merely passing through an orifice would make no image of the object from which it was reflected. It is, therefore, made to pass through lenses perfect in form so to refract the rays as to bring them to a proper focus on the retina. If the inner chamber of the eye were white, it would so reflect the rays entering the pupil at every angle as to render vision impossible. That chamber, and that alone, is lined with a black pigment. By a delicate muscular arrangement the eye is enabled to adapt itself to the distance of external objects so that the proper focus may be preserved. These are a small part of the wonders exhibited by this single organ of the body. This organ was fashioned in th darkness of the womb, with a self-evident reference to the nature and properties of light, of which the creature for whose use it was fashioned had neither knowledge or experience. If the eye, therefore, does not indicate the intelligent adaptation of means to an end, no such adaptation can be found in any work of human ingenuity.

The same remarks apply to the ear. In its cavity lies the auditory nerve. A tortuous passage is formed in the bony structure of the skull. The orifice of that passage is covered by a membrane to receive the vibration of the air; on the centre of that membrane rests the termination of a small bone so connected as to convey those vibrations to the only nerve capable of receiving or interpreting them, or of transmitting them to the brain. It is by this organ, constructed according to the recondite principles of acoustics, that our intercourse with our fellow-men is principally kept up; through which the marvels of speech, all the charms of music and eloquence become possible for man.

We cannot live without a constant supply of oxygen, which must every moment be brought to act upon the blood, to vitalize it, and by combining with the carbon it contains fit it for renewed use. The infant, therefore, comes into the world with an apparatus prepared for that purpose. In its formative state, it did not breathe. Yet it had lungs. They were given for a foreseen necessity. Nothing can exceed the intricacy, complication, or beauty of the organ or system of organs thus prepared, for the absolutely necessary and continuous purification of the blood, and for its distribution in an uninterrupted flux and reflux to every part of the body. This process goes on without our supervision. It is as regular during sleep as during our waking hours.

Food is as necessary for our support as air. The unborn infant needs no food. It is included in the circulation of its mother. In the state on which it is soon to enter food will be a necessity. Full provision is made beforehand for its reception and use. Teeth are embedded in the jaw for its mastication; salivary glands to furnish the fluid for its chemical preparation for the stomach; an oesophagus to convey it to the stomach, where it meets with a fluid found nowhere else, capable of dissolving and digesting it. It then comes into contact with a set of absorbent vessels which select from it the elements suited for the wants of the body and reject all the rest. The valuable portion is poured into the blood by which it is distributed, each constituent going to its own place and answering its

predestined purpose; carbon to be consumed to keep up the vital heat, lime to the bones, fibrine to the muscles, phosphorus to the brain and nerves.

The child before birth has no need of organs for locomotion or for apprehending external objects. But it was foreseen that it would need them, and therefore they are prepared beforehand. The bones are grooved for the reception of muscles, and have projections for points of support; joints of all kinds, hinge and ball and socket, for the flexure of the limbs; the instruments for motion, the contractile fibres, arranged and attached, according to the strict laws of mechanics, so as best to secure the two ends of symmetry and power. Thus the body is a perfect marvel of mechanical contrivances. The several organs, therefore, of the animal frame, viewed separately, present the most incontestible evidence of foresight, intelligence, and wisdom. This, however, is only a small part of the evidence of design furnished even by the body.

Design in the Relation of one Organ to Another.

2. Every animal is a complete whole. Each part has a designed and predetermined reference to every other part. The organs of sight, hearing, breathing, nutrition, locomotion, etc., are so arranged and adjusted as to answer a common purpose to the best advantage. Besides, these organs, although common to all animals (at least to all above the lowest), are modified in each genus and species to meet its peculiar necessities. If the animal is to live on the land all its organs are adapted to that condition. If it is to live in the water or move through the air, all is prepared beforehand for that destination. And more than this, if one organ be designed for some special use, all the rest are modified in accordance with that purpose. If the stomach is suited for the digestion of flesh, then the teeth, the limbs, the claws, are all adapted to secure and prepare the proper aliment. So complete is the adaptation that the anatomist can determine from a single bone the genus or species to which the animal belonged. Birds which wade in the water have long legs and long necks. Those which float on the surface, have web feet, and feathers impenetrable by water; two things which have causal relation, and which are united by a kind of intelligence external to the animal itself. Birds which fly in the air are fitted for their destiny by hollow bones, wide-spread wings, and great accumulation of muscles on the breast. Those which climb trees have feet and tail adapted for that purpose, and, as in the case of the wood-pecker, a sharp bill for boring the tree and a barbed tongue to seize its food. These modifications of animal structure are endless, all showing an external intelligence cognizant of the necessities of every distinct species.

The Adaptation of the Organs to the Instinct of Animals

3. There is a correspondence between the organs of every animal and the instincts by which it is endowed. Beasts and birds of prey having the instinct to feed on flesh have all the organs requisite to satisfy this inward craving. Those having an instinct for vegetable food, have teeth and stomachs adapted for that purpose. The bee whose body secretes wax, has the instinct to build cells; the spider furnished with the peculiar viscid matter, and apparatus for spinning it, makes a web and watches for its prey. So it is throughout all animated nature. Here then are two very distinct things: instinct and corporeal organs; the instinct cannot account for the organs nor the organs for the instinct; and yet they are never found the one without the other. They of necessity, therefore, imply an intelligence which implants the instinct and furnishes the appropriate organs.

Argument from Prevision.

4. There cannot be a more decisive proof of intelligence than prevision; preparation for an event in the future. The world is full of evidence of such prevision. It is seen not only in the preparation of the organs of sight, hearing, breathing, nutrition, etc. for necessities still future; but still more strikingly in the provision made for the support of young animals as soon as they are born. In the mammalia before the birth of the offspring, the breast or udder begins to swell; it commences the secretion of milk, so that the moment the young animal enters the world he finds prepared the most nutritious and suitable food the world contains. The egg furnishes a still more instructive illustration. It consists of albumen and the yolk. To the yolk is attached a minute germ or cell. When by heat the germ begins to develop, if nourishment were not provided and at hand, it would of necessity perish. But the yolk is there to supply the needed material out of which the future animal is fashioned. If this does not indicate a foreseeing mind and a providing power, then the most skilful productions of human skill and kindness do not prove the intelligence of man, Where then is this intelligence? Not in the parent bird, for it understands nothing about it. Not in mere blind forces of nature. There may possibly be room for question where to place it; but to deny that these provisions indicate an intelligent agency somewhere, is altogether irrational.

Vegetable Organisms.

5. The vegetable kingdom is as full of the indications of benevolent design as the animal. Plants have their organism and their physiology. Their structure, in their organs for growth and reproduction, is quite as marvellous as that of most species of the animal kingdom. They constitute an essential part in the great system of nature, without which there could be no sentient life on our globe. Animals cannot live on inorganic matter. It is the province of the plant to reduce this matter into such a state as to be fit for the support of animal life. If it were not therefore for the functions of the leaf which transmutes the inorganic into the organic, there could be no sentient life on our earth. Is there no design here? Is there no intelligent adaptation of one part of the great system of nature to another?

From the Adaptations of Nature.

6. This leads to another department of the subject. The evidences of design are not confined to the separate organs of the plant or animal; nor to the relations of these organs to each other, nor, in the case of animals, to the instinct which impels to the proper use of those organs; they are to be found just as abundantly in the adaptation of external nature to the necessities of animal and vegetable life. Neither plants nor animals could exist without light, air, heat, water, and soil, to produce the common food of all living things. Who created the light and heat and diffuses them over the whole earth? Who made the sun from which they radiate? Who constituted the atmosphere with its chemical adjustments, precisely what is necessary for the support of life, everywhere and always the same, and poured it round our globe? How is it that water at a certain temperature evaporates, rises in mist, is gathered into clouds, is carried everywhere by the winds, and falls in rain to fertilize the earth? The eye supposes light, as the lungs suppose air; the appetite of hunger supposes food, and the power of digestion. Food supposes soil, light, heat, and water. Surely this is one great system. There is unity and mutual relation in all its parts. It must have had one author, and He must be infinite in intelligence and goodness.

All living Creatures on the Earth have Organic Relations.

7. The design indicated in nature is, however, not confined to the individual organisms and to their relations to the world around them, but it has in the progress of science been discovered, that the whole vegetable and animal world has been constructed on one comprehensive plan. As there is a relation of one organ of a given plant or animal to all others and to the whole, so the whole race of plants, and the whole race of animals are related. There are certain typical forms of which all the infinite variety of plants are modifications; and certain other types of which the innumerable genera, species, and varieties of animals are only modifications; and these modifications are precisely of the kind to suit each species for its end, and for the circumstances in which it is to live. So obviously is this the case that Professor Agassiz's "Essay on Classification," is, to say the least, as strong an argument for the being of God as any of the "Bridgewater Treatises." And it is so regarded by its illustrious author. On page 10 of his "Contributions to the Natural History of the United States," he says, "I know those who hold it to be very unscientific to believe that thinking is not something inherent in matter, and that there is an essential difference between inorganic and living and thinking beings. I shall not be prevented by any such pretensions of a false philosophy from expressing my conviction that as long as it cannot be shown that matter or physical forces do actually reason, I shall consider any manifestation of thought as evidence of the existence of a thinking Being as the author of such thought, and shall look upon an intelligent and intelligible connection between the facts of nature as direct proof of the existence of a thinking God, as certainly as man exhibits the power of thinking, when he recognizes their natural relation."

Evidence that the Earth was designed for Man.

8. It is not only, however, the living organisms inhabiting our earth, which exhibit such evidence of an intelligent creator, but also the earth itself. If a father, who when he provides a home for his children, fits it up with all the necessities and all the luxuries which they can possibly need, gives indisputable evidence of intelligence and love, then are those attributes to be ascribed to Him who fitted up this world to be the home of his creatures. This is seen, as already intimated, in the constitution of the atmosphere, in the distribution of light and heat, of electricity and magnetism, in the establishment of those laws which secure the regular succession of the seasons, in the preparation of soil by the disintegration of rocks, the falling of rain, the deposition of dew which falls gently with life-giving power on the thirsty earth; in innumerable other provisions and dispositions of the forces of nature without which neither vegetable nor animal life could be sustained. There are many special provisions of this kind which fill the mind with gratitude and wonder. It is a general law that bodies contract as they become colder. Water, however, when it freezes expands and becomes lighter. If it were not for this benevolent exception to the general law, not only would the inhabitants of all our rivers perish, but the greater part of the temperate zone would be uninhabitable. It is no answer to this argument to say that there are a few other exceptions to this law. We may not know the final cause why bismuth should expand on cooling; but this does not prevent our knowing why ice is made lighter than water. Our not understanding one sentence in a book, does not prove that it has no meaning, nor that we cannot understand another sentence.

The whole configuration of the earth, its position in relation to the sun, and the

inclination of its axis, are obviously intended to render it a suitable residence for the creatures by which it is inhabited. Their well-being depends on the distribution of land and water on its surface; on the elevation of its mountain ranges and plateaus, and on the ocean currents which are determined by the configuration of its coasts. If North and South America were not connected by the narrow Isthmus of Darien, Great Britain and the northwestern portions of Europe would be uninhabitable. They owe the moderate temperature which they enjoy to the immense body of warm water, which is prevented by that Isthmus from flowing into the Pacific, being floated in a northeasterly direction across the Atlantic. When we see such benevolent arrangements among men, we refer them instinctively and by a rational necessity to a benevolent and intelligent agent. No rational ground exists for refusing to ascribe like arrangements in nature to a similar source. Is it any more an evidence of prudent or benevolent foresight that a man should store away abundant fuel for himself or others, knowing that winter is approaching, than that God has laid up inexhaustible stores of coal in the bowels of the earth, for the use of his children on the earth?

Cosmical Arrangements.

9. The argument for design founded on cosmical arrangements is so vast a subject that it seems absurd even to refer to it, in a single paragraph. The simple facts are, that our globe is one of eight primary planets which revolve round the sun. The most distant of these planets is some three thousand millions of miles from the central luminary. These planets all move in the same direction, in nearly circular orbits, in nearly the same plane, and with so equable a motion that each performs its revolutions in the proper time. The stability of the system depends on these circumstances. To secure these results matter must attract matter according to its quantity and the square of its distance. The central body must be of such mass as to hold the planets in their course. The centrifugal and centripetal forces must be exactly balanced, to prevent the planets from flying off into space, or falling into the sun. Each planet must have been projected with a precise definite velocity to secure its orbit being nearly a circle, rather than any other curve. The central body alone, in accordance with the evident plan, is luminous and heat-producing. All the others are opaque and cold. These are facts, which Sir Isaac Newton says he is "forced to ascribe to the counsel and contrivance of a voluntary agent." [155] Since the time of Newton, indeed, it has been the commonly received theory that the planets were at one time fluid, highly heated, and luminous; and that they have become opaque in the process of cooling. But this only puts the argument one step back. The fact is that a most wonderful and beneficent result has been accomplished. The question How? is of minor importance. It is the beneficence of the result which indicates mind, and this indication of mind implies a "voluntary agent."

Our solar system itself, therefore, is vast, varied, and well ordered. Our system, however, is one of probably hundreds of millions. At least astronomers assert their knowledge of a hundred million of suns, some of which are incalculably larger than ours. Sirius is calculated to shine with a light equal to two hundred and fifty of our suns; Alcyone with that of twelve thousand suns. The nearest of these stars is separated from the outer planet of our system twenty-one billions of miles. These millions of stars are not scattered equally through space, but are gathered into groups, the members of which bear an obvious relation to each other.

Besides these systems in which planets are assumed to revolve around suns, there are others in which suns revolve around suns, at distances proportioned to their magnitude. The light emanating from these great luminaries is of different colors, white, red, blue.

Then more distant in space float the unresolved nebul&#65533;. Whether these nebul&#65533; are vast continents of stars too distant to be distinguishable, or cosmical matter in a formative state, is still an open question with astronomers. Two thousand have been counted in the northern hemisphere, and one thousand in the southern. They assume every variety of form; some are spherical, some fan-shaped, some spiral, some in circular rings. It is estimated that the light of some of the stars has been many thousand years in reaching our earth, although travelling at the rate of more than ten millions of miles a minute.

Throughout this vast universe order reigns. In the midst of endless variety, there is unity. The same laws of gravitation, of light, and of heat everywhere prevail. Confusion and disorder are the uniform result of chance or blindly operating forces. Order is the sure indication of mind. What mind! what wisdom! what power! what beneficence! does this all but infinite universe display!

"The result of our whole experience," said Sir Gilbert Eliot, writing to Hume himself, "seems to amount to this: -- There are but two ways in which we have ever observed the different parcels of matter to be thrown together, -- either at random, or with design and purpose. By the first, we have never seen produced a regular complicated effect, corresponding to a certain end; by the second, we uniformly have. If, then, the works of nature and the productions of men resemble each other in this one general characteristic, will not even experience sufficiently warrant us to ascribe to both a similar, though proportionable, cause." [156]

This argument from design is constantly urged in the Old Testamcnt, which appeals to the heavens and the earth as revealing the being and perfections of God. The Apostle Paul says that the living God, who made heaven and earth, and the sea and all that is therein, hath not left himself without a witness. (Acts xiv. 15-17.) He demonstrated to the Athenians the nature of God from his works and from our relation to him as his offspring. (Acts xvii. 23-31.) To the Romans he said that the eternal power and Godhead of the Supreme Being, are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made. (Rom. i. 20.) The ancient philosophers drew the same conclusion from the same premises. Anaxagoras argued that nous, mind, must be admitted as controlling everything in the world, because everything indicates design. Socrates constantly dwells on this as the great proof of the being of God. Cicero [157] says that it is as impossible that an ordered world could be formed by the fortuitous concurrence of atoms, as that a book should be composed by the throwing about letters at random. Trendelenburg, [158] after referring to that passage, says: "It is perhaps more difficult to assume, that by the blind combination of chemical and physical elements and forces, any one even of the organs of the body should be formed, -- the eye, for example, so clear, sharp, and all-seeing, -- much less the harmonious union of organs which make up the body, than that a book should be made by chance, by throwing types about."

Philo presents the argument in its simplest syllogistic form. "No work of art is self-made. The world is the most perfect work of art. Therefore, the world was made by a good and most perfect Author. Thus we have the knowledge of the existence of God." [159] All the Christian fathers and subsequent theologians have reasoned in the same way. Even Kant,

although denying its conclusiveness, says that the teleological argument should always be treated with respect. It is, he says, the oldest, the clearest, and the best adapted to the human mind.

[153] Log. Untersuchungen, 2d edit. Leipzig, 1862, vol. ii. p. 28.

[154] It may be well to give the titles of the valuable series of the Bridgewater Treatise devoted to this subject, besides the work of Dr. Bell mentioned in the text. The volumes are, The Adaption of External Nature to the Moral and Intellectual Constituion of Man, by Dr. Thomas Chalmers; On the Adaption of External Nature to the Physical Constitution of Man, by John Kidd; Astronomy and General Physics treated in Reference to Natural Theology, by William Whewell; Animal and Vegetable Physiology considered in Reference to Natural Theology, by Peter Mark Roget; Geology and Mineralogy considered in Reference to Natural Theology, by William Buckland; The Power, Wisdom, and Goodness of God as manifested in the Creation of Animals, by William Kirby; Chemistry, Meteorology, and the Function of Digestion considered in Reference to Natural Theology, by William Prout. The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, by C. Babbage; Footprints of the Creator, by Hugh Miller; Th�ologie de la Nature, by H. Durkheim (1852, 3 vols. 8vo.); Butler's Analogy of Religion and Nature; Paley's Natural Theology; Dr. McCosh's Typical Forms and Special Ends in Creation; Dr. James Buchanan's Faith in God and Modern Atheism compared, 2 vols. 3vo; and Dr. John Tulloch's (Principal of St. Mary's College, St. Andrew's) Theism; The Witness of Reason and Nature to an All-Wise and Beneficient Creator, may also be mentioned.

[155] Newton's First Letter to Bentley, quoted by Tulloch, Theism, edit. N.Y. 1855, p. 109.

[156] Dr. Buchanan's Analogy a Guide to Truth and an Aid to Faith, edit. Edinburgh, 1864, p. 414.

[157] De Natura Deorum, ii. 37.

[158] Logische Untersuchungen, vol. ii. p. 64.

[159] De Monarchia, i. § 4, edit. Leipsig, 1828, vol. iv. p. 290.

§ 4. Objections to the Argument from Design.

A. The Denial of Final Causes.

The doctrine of final causes in nature must stand or fall with the doctrine of a personal God. The one cannot be denied without denying the other. And the admission of the one involves the admission of the other. By final cause is not meant a mere tendency, or the end to which events either actually or apparently tend; but the end contemplated in the use of means adapted to attain it. The contemplation of an end, is a mental act. The selection and use of means adapted to attain such end, are both intelligent and voluntary acts. But an intelligent voluntary agent is a person. [160] In other words, the use of means to accomplish a contemplated end is a function of personality, or at least of intelligent agency.

Such being the nature of final causes, they are of course denied, (1.) By the positivist, who believes nothing but facts of which the senses take cognizance; and who admits of no other causation than regularity of sequence. As efficiency, intention, and mind are not

perceived by the senses, they are not, and cannot be philosophically admitted. (2.) By those who, while they admit such a thing as force, and, therefore, in that sense, a cause, allow of no distinction between physical, vital, and mental causes, or forces; and who maintain that the one can be resolved into either of the others. The advocates of this theory make thought a product of the brain; and have as their watch-word, "Ohne Phosphor kein Gedanke." Of course phosphorus must be before thought, and therefore there can be no final cause in the production of phosphorus, or of anything else. (3.) Final causes are denied by those who regard the universe as the development of the infinite Being under the operation of necessary law. Of that Being no intelligence, consciousness, or will can be predicated. Consequently there can be no preconceived design to be accomplished, either by the universe as a whole, or any of its parts. According to Spinoza, therefore, final causes are "humana figmenta et deliria."

If you should ask a peasant, where a tree or the body of an animal came from, he would probably answer, "Why, it grew." That for him is the final fact. And so it is for all the advocates of the above-named theories. Thus it is that extremes (the peasant's thought and the savant's theory) meet. What more, what deeper thought is found in the words of Stuart Mill than in the peasant's answer, when the logician says: "Sequences entirely physical and material, as soon as they had become sufficiently familiar to the human mind, came to be thought perfectly natural, and were regarded not only as needing no explanation themselves, but as being capable of affording it to others, and even of serving as the ultimate explanation of things in general." [161]

B. Objections of Hume and Kant.

Hume's answer to the argument from design, or final causes, is, that our knowledge is limited by experience. We have often seen houses, ships, engines, and other machines made, and therefore, when we see similar products of human skill we are authorized to infer that they too were constructed by an intelligent author. But the world belongs to an entirely different category; we have never seen a world made; and therefore we have no rational ground for assuming that this world had a maker. "When two species of objects," says Hume, [162] "have always been observed to be conjoined together, I can infer, by custom, the existence of one whenever I see the existence of the other, and this I call an argument from experience. But how this argument can have place, where the objects, as in the present case, are single, individual, without parallel, or specific resemblance, may be difficult to explain. And will any man tell me with a serious countenance, that an orderly universe must arise from some thought and art, like the human, because we have experience of it? To ascertain this reasoning, it were requisite that we had experience of the origin of worlds; and it is not sufficient surely that we have seen ships and cities arise from human art and contrivance." What experience teaches is that design implies intelligence; i.e., that we never see the adaptation of means to an end without having evidence that such adaptation is the work of an intelligent agent. And, therefore, even under the guidance of experience we infer that wherever we see design, whether in nature or in art, there must be an intelligent agent. But experience is not the ground or limit of this conviction. It is an intuitive truth, self-evident from its nature, that design cannot be accounted for on the ground of chance or necessity. Let any man try to persuade himself that a watch is the product of chance, and he will see how futile is the attempt.

Kant presents substantially the same objection as Hume when he says that the concatenation of cause and effect is confined to the external world, and therefore that it is illogical to apply the principle of causation to account for the existence of the external world itself. He further objects that the evidences of design in nature would prove only a demiurgus, or world-builder, and not an extramundane God. It is further urged against the sufficiency of the teleological argument, that even if it proved the author of the world to be distinct from it, it would not prove him to be infinite, because the world is finite, and we cannot infer an infinite cause from a finite effect.

Answer to the Objections.

In answer to these objections it may be remarked that what the argument from design is intended to prove, and what it does prove, is, (1.) That the Author of the universe is an intelligent and voluntary agent. (2.) That He is extramundane and not merely the life, or soul of the world, for the design is shown not simply or chiefly by the moulding of organized bodies by a principle acting from within outward; but by the adaptation of things external to such organisms, to their various necessities; and by the disposition and orderly arrangement of immense bodies of matter, separated by millions, or even billions of miles. (3.) The immensity of the universe through the whole of which design is manifest, proves that its cause must be adequate to the production of such an effect; and if the effect be, as it is to us, incomprehensibly great, the cause must be so also. And incomprehensibly great and infinitely great, are practically equivalent. But besides, the cosmological argument proves that God is not only maker, but creator. And creation implies the possession of infinite power. Not only because the difference between existence and non-existence is infinite, but because in Scripture creation is always represented as the peculiar work of the infinite God. So far as we know all creature power is limited to self-action, or to the more or less limited control of what already exists.

What has already been said may be a sufficient answer to the objection that while design does indeed prove intelligence, yet that intelligence may be in matter itself, or in nature (a vis insita), as in the soul of the world. These points, as they are generally presented, concern more properly the relation of God to the world, than his existence. They involve the admission of the existence of an intelligence somewhere, adequate to account for all the phenomena of the universe. They involve consequently the denial that these phenomena are to be referred either to chance, or the action of mere physical laws. Where that intelligence is placed, is not the question. Wherever placed it must be a person; and not merely an unintelligent force acting according to necessary law. For the evidence of voluntary action and of benevolence is as clear as that of intelligence. And the considerations already urged prove that this voluntary, intelligent Being must be extramundane; a conclusion which is rendered still more evident from our relation to Him as responsible and dependent.

C. Miscellaneous Objections.

1. It is objected that both in the vegetable and animal kingdoms there are malformations, abnormal productions, which are inconsistent with the idea of the control of an infinite intelligence. This is at best merely an argument from our ignorance. Admitting that there are in nature some things which we cannot account for, this does not invalidate the argument drawn from the innumerable cases of benevolent design. If Mr. Babbage's

calculating machine should once in many million of times present the wrong number, this would not prove that there was no intelligence manifested in its construction. It is not necessary even to assume that such apparently irregular action is to be referred to the imperfection of the machine. For what we know, its maker may have a reason for such action, which we cannot discover. In every extended piece of music, discords here and there occur, which pain the ear, and which those unskilled in music cannot account for, but which the competently instructed perceive are taken up and resolved into a higher harmony. If a prince should give us a chest containing millions in coin and jewels, we should not question his kind intention, even should we find among them a spurious dime for whose presence we could not account. It would be insane to reject the Bible with all its sublime and saving truths, because there may be in it a few passages which we cannot understand, and which in themselves seem inconsistent with the perfection of its author. No man refuses to believe in the sun and to rejoice in its light because there are dark spots on its surface for which he cannot account. Ignorance is a very healthful condition of our present state of being.

Useless Organs.

2. A second objection of much the same kind is founded on the fact that we find members in organized bodies for which they have no use. For example, men have mamm&#65533;; the whale has teeth which are never developed and which the animal does not need; animals have bones which they never use; birds and crocodiles have their skulls formed of separate bones as well as viviparous animals, although in their case there seems to be no utility in such arrangement. Even Professor Owen urges this objection. In his work on "Limbs," [163] he says, "I think it will be obvious that the principle of final adaptation fails to satisfy all the conditions of the problem. That every segment and almost every bone which is present in the human hand and arm should exist in the fin of the whale," where they are not needed, does not appear consistent with the principle. Again, in another place, he says, [164] "The cranium of the bird, which is composed in the adult of a single bone, is ossified from the same number of points as in the human embryo, without the possibility of a similar purpose being subserved thereby, in the extrication of the chick from the fractured egg-shell . . . . These, and a hundred such facts force upon the contemplative anatomist the inadequacy of the teleological hypothesis."

On this it may be remarked: (1.) That the objection bears only on the individual organism of plants or animals, whereas the evidences of design are scattered over the whole universe. (2.) This objection also is founded on our ignorance. The argument is that because we cannot see the reason for a certain arrangement, no such reason exists. (3.) It takes the lowest view of utility, namely, that which contemplates the immediate wants of the individual organism. Things which are not needed for its necessities may answer a much higher end. In a great building use is not the only end contemplated; there are symmetry and unity, &#65533;sthetic ends of as much value as mere comfort or convenience. Scientific men have demonstrated that all animals are in their structure only modifications of four typical forms. These forms are preserved in all the genera and species included under these general classes. The presence therefore, of these characteristic features of the type, even where not needed for the individual, serve to indicate the unity of the plan on which the whole animal kingdom is constructed We must remember that what we do not see, cannot disprove the

realty of what we do see.

Instinct.

3. A third objection is sometimes derived from the operations of Instinct. Instinct, according to Dr. Reid, is "a natural blind impulse to certain actions, without having any end in view, without deliberation, and very often without any conception of what we do." [165] Dr. Whately also says: "An instinct is a blind tendency to a mode of action independent of any consideration on the part of the agent, of the end to which the action leads." Paley defines it to be "a propensity prior to experience and independent of instruction." [166] The argument is that as "a blind impulse" contemplating no end, effects all the marvellous contrivances which we see in the works of irrational animals, similar contrivances in nature cannot prove intelligence in the author of nature. The answer to this argument is: --

1. That it is founded on a wrong definition of instinct. It is not a blind impulse. It is that measure of intelligence given to animals which enables them to sustain their lives, to continue their race, and to answer the necessities of their being. Within certain limits this form of intelligence, both in man and in irrational animals, acts blindly. The impulse which leads the young of all animals to seek their nourishment in the appropriate way and in the proper place, is no doubt blind. The same is also probably true of the impulse which leads many animals to make provision in summer for the necessities of winter. Neither can it be supposed that the bee has always and everywhere constructed its cell according to the nicest mathematical principles, under the guidance of an intelligent apprehension of those principles. These operations which are performed without instructions, and always from age to age in the same way, indicate a guidance which may be called blind in so far that those under its influence do not devise the plan on which they act, although they may know the end they have in view. But the intelligence of animals goes far beyond these narrow limits. Not only does the beaver construct his dam according to the nature of the locality and the force of the stream on which he fixes his habitations, but we constantly see it, as well as other animals, varying its mode of operation to suit special emergencies. Instinct, therefore, as designating the principle which controls the action of irrational animals, is not blind, but intelligent. It admits of the contemplation of an end, and of the selection and application of means appropriate for its accomplishment. Even admitting, therefore, that the intelligence manifested in nature is of the same kind as that manifested by animals, yet the difference in degree is infinite.

2. No measure, however, of intellect of the grade or character of instinct is sufficient to account for the phenomena of the universe. Instinct is concerned with the wants of individual organism. But who adapts the organs of an animal to its instincts? Who adapts external nature, air, light, heat, water, food, etc., etc., to its necessities? What relation has instinct to the stellar universe?

3. Moreover, these instincts themselves are among the phenomena to be accounted for. If they are blind impulses, can they be accounted for, in all their variety and in all their accommodation to the nature and wants of animals, by a blind impulse pervading all things? The fact is that the adaptation of external nature to the instincts of the different classes of animals, and of their instincts to external nature, affords one of the most convincing proofs of an intellect exterior to both, and ordering the one in relation to the other.

4. It is to be remembered, although the topic of a separate argument, that the soul of

man with all its wonderful powers and capacities, intellectual, moral, and religious, is one of the facts to be accounted for. To trace the existence of the soul of man to "a blind impulse," is to assume that the effect immeasurably transcends its cause, which is assuming an effect without a cause.

5. All these objections take for granted the eternal existence of matter, and the eternity of physical forces. As these are, they must have existed from eternity, or have begun to be. If they began to be they must have had a cause outside of themselves. That cause cannot be nonentity. It must be a self-existing, eternal substance, having the intelligence, power, will, and benevolence adequate to account for the universe and all that it contains. That is, the cause of the universe must be a personal God.

[160] This is in accordance with the accepted theological definition of a person as a "suprositum intelligens."

[161] Logic, edit. London, 1851, vol. i. pp. 366.

[162] "Dialogues on Natural Religion," Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1826, vol. ii. p. 449.

[163] Page 39.

[164] Homologies, p. 73.

[165] Active Powers, III. i. 2, vol. iv. p. 48: edit. Charlestown, 1815.

[166] Natural Theology, chap. xviii.

§ 5. The Moral, or Anthropological Argument.

A. Nature of the Argument.

As the image of the sun reflected from a mirror, or the smooth surface of a lake, reveals to us that the sun is, and what it is; so the soul of man, just as clearly, and just as certainly, reveals that God is and what He is. The reflection of the sun does not teach us everything that is true concerning that luminary; it does not reveal its internal constitution, nor tell us how its light and heat are maintained from age to age. In like manner the soul, as the image of God, does not reveal all that God is. In both cases, and equally in both cases, what is revealed is true, that is, trustworthy.

It answers to the objective reality. As we know that the sun really is what its reflection represents him as being, so we know that God is what the nature of the human soul declares Him to be. Doubt in the one case is just as unreasonable, and we may say, just as impossible as in the other.

It has been shown in the preceding chapter that every human has in his own nature the evidence of the existence of God, an evidence which never can be obliterated, and which will force conviction on the most unwilling. It is no less true that every man has in himself the same irresistible evidence that God is an extramundane personal Being; that He is intelligent, voluntary, and moral; that He knows; that He has the right to command; and that He can punish and can save.

It may naturally be asked, If this be so; if every man has in his own nature a witness whose competency he cannot question, and whose testimony he cannot ignore, What is the use of arguing about the matter? For three reasons, first, because even self-evident truths are often denied; and secondly, because men, in their present moral state, are under a strong

temptation to deny the existence of a holy and just God; and thirdly, because efforts are constantly made to pervert or contradict the testimony of our nature to the existence and nature of God.

B. Argument from the Existence of the Mind.

Every man has in his own consciousness the evidence of the existence of mind. He knows that he is an intelligent, personal being. He knows that his personality does not reside in his body, but in his soul. It is included in the facts of consciousness that the soul and body are distinct, that they are different substances having not only different but incompatible attributes. That such is the general conviction of men is plain from all languages recognizing the distinction; and from the fact that it is never denied except by speculative or theoretical writers. The common consciousness of men as revealed by their forms of speech, and by their avowals, and by the universal belief, in some form, of a state of conscious existence after death, bears witness to the truth that the soul is something different from, and far superior to the body. How is the existence of this immaterial, thinking, immortal substance which we call self, to be accounted for? That it has not always existed is undeniable. If it began to be, it must have the cause of its existence out of itself. That cause cannot be the soul of the parent, for that also is an effect. It began to be. And it is universally admitted that an infinite series of effects is unthinkable. If the soul cannot be accounted for by derivation in unending series of steps from those who preceded us, neither can it be conceived of as a product of the body, or of physical forces and combinations. It would seem to be a self-evident proposition, that the effect cannot contain in it more than is in its cause; that intelligence cannot be the product of what is unintelligent. This also is confirmed by all experience.

We are conversant in our present state, first, with matter, with its properties and laws or forces; secondly, with vegetable life; thirdly, with animal life; and fourthly, with mind, endowed with a life of a much higher order. These different elements, or kinds of existence, although marvellously combined and intermingled, are distinct. As a fact of experience, mere matter with its physical forces never originates vegetable life; vegetable life of itself never originates or passes over into animal life; and animal life never originates, and is never developed into intellectual or spiritual life. There is an impassable gulf between these several departments of being. As soon as the principle of life leaves a plant or animal, the physical forces belonging to matter work its dissolution. These are facts indelibly impressed on the convictions of the mass of mankind. They are conclusions to which universal experience has led the minds of all men. They are indeed denied by certain scientific men; but the theory on which that denial is founded involves the denial of so many intuitive and necessary truths; it does such violence to the laws of belief impressed upon our nature, and on the validity of which all knowledge depends, that it can never be more than a precarious and temporary belief on the part of those who adopt it, and can never have control over the minds of men. This is not the place to enter upon the discussion of the theory of materialism. We have a right to appeal to the general conviction of mankind that mind cannot be the product of matter. If this be so, as our minds are not self-existent and eternal, it must be true, as even the heathen believed, that our spirits owe their existence to Him who is the Father of spirits.

C. From the Nature of the Soul.

There are two laws, or general facts, which seem to characterize all the works of nature. By nature is here meant all things out of God. The first of these laws is, that whatever capacities, necessities, or desires exist, or are found in any organism, adequate provision is made to meet and satisfy them all. This is obviously true with regard to the vegetable world. Plants have organs for the selection of the materials necessary for their growth and maturity, from the soil; organs for the absorption of carbon from the atmosphere; the capacity of being appropriately affected by light and heat; organs of propagation designed for the continuance of each after its kind. All these necessities are met. Soil, atmosphere, light, heat, and water, are all provided. The same is no less true with regard to the animal world in all its endless variety of forms. Food, light, heat, air, and water, are suited to their several necessities to their organs, and to their instincts. If they have the appetite of hunger, they have organs for the appropriation of their food, and for its digestion; the instinct for its selection, and food suited to each, is ever at hand. So of all the other necessities of their nature.

The second law, or general fact is, that all these living organisms reach perfection, and fully accomplish the end of their being. That is, they become all they are capable of being. All that belongs to their nature is fully developed. All their capacities are fully exercised, and all their wants fully satisfied.

These two things are true of every living creature within the compass of human knowledge, except Man. So far as his body is concerned, they are true in regard to him also. His physical necessities are all met by the present circumstances of his being. His body becomes all that it is capable of being, in this stage of existence. But these things are not true with regard to his soul. It has capacities which are not fully developed in this world, and never can be. It has desires, aspirations, and necessities for which the world does not furnish the appropriate objects. It is, therefore, as evidently designed and adapted for a higher and spiritual state of existence, as his body is adapted to the present order of things. The soul of man has, in the first place, intellectual powers capable of indefinite expansion, which in this world never reach their utmost limit. With these is connected a desire of knowledge which is never satisfied. In the second place, the soul of man has a capacity for happiness which nothing in the world, nor the whole world could it be attained, can by possibility fill. The animal is satisfied. Its capacity for happiness is here fully provided for. In the third place, the soul has aspirations to which nothing in this life corresponds. It longs for fellowship with what is far above itself; what is boundless, and eternal. In the fourth place, with all these powers, desires, and aspirations, it is conscious of its weakness, insufficiency, and dependence. It must have an object to worship, to love, to trust; a Being who can satisfy all its necessities, and under whose guardianship it can be safe from those powers of evil to which it knows that it is on all sides and at all times exposed; a Being whose existence, and whose relation to itself, can explain all the mysteries of its own being, and secure its felicity in the future, on which it knows it must soon enter. Just as certainly as hunger in the animal supposes that there is food adapted to still its cravings, so certainly does this hunger of the soul suppose that there is some Being in the universe to satisfy its necessities. In both cases the craving is natural, universal, and imperative.

It cannot be that man is an exception to the laws above-mentioned; that he alone, of all

that lives, has capacities, desires, necessities, for which no provision has been made. God is the correlative of man, in the sense that the existence of such a creature as man necessitates the assumption of such a Being as God.

D. From the Moral Nature of Man.

The familiar facts of consciousness on this subject are, --

1. That we have, by the constitution of our nature, a sense of right and wrong; we perceive or judge some things to be right, and others to be wrong. This perception is immediate. As the reason perceives some things to be true, and others false; and as the senses take immediate knowledge of their appropriate objects, so the soul takes immediate cognizance of the moral character of feelings and acts. The reason, the senses, and the conscience are alike infallible within certain limits, and liable to error beyond those limits.

2. Our moral perceptions or judgments are sui generis. They have their peculiar, distinctive character, which belongs to no other of our states of consciousness. The right is as distinct from the true, the proper, the agreeable, or the expedient, as these latter are from our sensations. The right is that which we are bound to do and to approve; the wrong is that which we are bound to avoid and to disapprove. Moral obligation, as expressed by the word "ought," is a simple and primary idea. It can be understood only by those who have felt it. And it can be confounded with nothing else.

3. These moral judgments are independent. They are not under the control of the understanding of of the will. No man can will to regard an axiom as false, or think that black is white, or white black. Nor can any sophistry of the understanding lead him to such false judgment. In like manner, no man can will to believe that to be right which his conscience tells him to be wrong; nor can he argue himself into the conviction that he has done right, when his conscience tells him he has done wrong.

4. Our moral judgments, or, in other words, the conscience, has an authority from which we cannot emancipate ourselves. We can neither deny nor ignore it. It has a lordship. It commands, and it forbids. And we are bound to obey. It has power also to enforce its decisions. It can reward and punish. Its rewards are among the greatest blessings we can enjoy. Its punishments are the most intolerable agony the human soul can endure.

5. Our moral judgments involve the idea of law, i.e., of a rule or standard to which we are bound to be conformed. When we judge a thing to be right, we judge it to be conformed to the moral law; when we judge it to be wrong, we judge that is not conformed to that law.

6. This law has an authority which it does not derive from us. It is essentially different from a sense of propriety, or perception of expediency. It is something imposed upon us, and to which we are required to be conformed by an authority out of ourselves.

7. Our moral nature involves, therefore, a sense of responsibility. We must answer for what we are, and for what we do. This responsibility is not to ourselves, not to society, nor to being in general. It must be to a person; that is, to a Being who knows what we are, what we do, and what we ought to be and do; who approves of the right, and disapproves of the wrong; and who has the power and the purpose to reward and punish us according to our character and conduct. Sin, from its very nature, as it reveals itself in our consciousness, involves not only a sense of pollution, or moral degradation, but also a sense of guilt; i.e., a conviction that we deserve punishment, that we ought to be punished, and, therefore, that

punishment is inevitable.

If such be the facts of our moral nature, it is plain that we are under the necessity of assuming the existence of an extramundane, personal God, on whom we are dependent, and to whom we are responsible. This is undoubtedly the ground for the conviction of the being of God, which has universally prevailed among men. Having the idea given in the constitution of their nature, or being under an inward necessity of believing in such a Being, cultivated men have sought and found evidence of his existence in the world without them. But these external proofs have neither been as general nor as operative as those derived from what we ourselves are, and from what we know that we deserve. Such men, therefore, as Kant, and Sir William Hamilton, while denying the validity of all other arguments for the existence of God, admit that our nature forces us to believe that He is, and that He is a person.

Our Moral Feelings not due to Education.

It is indeed objected that these phenomena of our moral nature are due to education or to superstition. To this it is answered, first, that moral truths have a self-evidencing light. They can no more be denied than the intuitions of sense and reason. It may even be said that our moral judgments have greater certainty than any other of our convictions. Men believe absurdities. They believe what contradicts the evidence of their senses. But no man ever has, or ever can believe that malignity is a virtue. In the second place, what is universal cannot be accounted for by peculiarities of culture. All men are moral beings; all have this sense of moral obligation, and of responsibility; and no man can free himself from these convictions. The Apostle, therefore, speaking out of the common consciousness of men, as well as under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, speaks of sinners as "knowing the judgment of God" (Rom i. 32); that is, a sense of sin involves the knowledge of a righteous God.

We then are placed in the midst of a vast universe, of which we constitute a part. We are forced not merely by the desire of knowledge, but from the necessities of our nature, to ask, How did this universe originate? How is it sustained? To what does it tend? What are we? Whence did we come? Whither are we going? These questions must be answered. This complicated problem must be solved. To refer everything to chance, is no solution. It is a frivolous denial that any solution is necessary, that such questions need any answer. To refer everything to necessity, is to say that the existence of things as they are is the ultimate fact. The universe is, and always has been, and always must be. It is the evolution of necessary being by necessary laws. This is all we can know, and all that need be known. This, however, is no solution. It is merely the denial that any solution is possible. Could this theory be accepted with regard to the outward world, it leaves all the phenomena of man's nature -- intellectual, moral, and religious -- unaccounted for. Theism is a solution. It assumes the existence of an eternal and necessary Being; a Spirit, and therefore intelligent, voluntary, self-conscious, and endowed with moral perfections. This hypothesis accounts for the origin of the universe. "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." This is a satisfactory answer to the first question. It accounts for all the universe is, its immensity, its variety, its order, its numberless organisms, the adaptation of external nature to the wants of all living things. It accounts for the nature of man. It gives what that nature demands, -- an infinite object of love, confidence, and adoration. It reveals who it is to whom we are responsible, and on whom we are dependent. We know that this solution is

true, because it is a solution. It meets all the facts of the case. And it so meets them that it cannot fail to be accepted as true, either intelligently or blindly. The God whom all men ignorantly worship, the Scriptures reveal, not only in the certainty of his existence, but in the plenitude of his perfections.

CHAPTER III: ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.

§ 1. What is meant by Anti-Theism.

As Theism is the doctrine of an extramundane, personal God, the creator, preserver, and governor of all things, any doctrine which denies the existence of such a Being is anti-theistic. Not only avowed Atheism, therefore, but Polytheism, Hylozoism, Materialism, and Pantheism, belong to the class of anti-theistic theories.

Atheism.

Atheism does not call for any separate discussion. It is in itself purely negative. It affirms nothing. It simply denies what Theism asserts. The proof of Theism is, therefore, the refutation of Atheism. Atheist is, however, a term of reproach. Few men are willing to call themselves, or to allow others to call them by that name. Hume, we know, resented it. Hence those who are really atheists, according to the etymological and commonly received meaning of the word, repudiate the term. They claim to be believers in God, although they assign to that word a meaning which is entirely unauthorized by usage. Thus Helvetius [167] says, "There is no man of understanding who does not admit an active principle in nature; therefore there is no atheist. He is not an atheist who says that motion is God; because in fact motion is incomprehensible, as we have no clear idea of it, because it only manifests itself by its effects, and by it all things are performed in the universe. Cousin [168] says, "Atheism is impossible, because the existence of God is implied in every affirmation. If a man believes that he exists, he must believe in the power of thought, and that is God." In like manner Herbert Spencer claims to be religious. He does not oppose religion, but dogmas. He acknowledges inscrutable power. He reduces all our knowledge to the two facts, "That force is," and "Force is persistent." Force, however, is perfectly inscrutable and incomprehensible. On this principle he attempts to reconcile religion and science. The ultimate principle of religion, that in which all religions agree, is that there is an inscrutable power which is the cause of all things. This also is the ultimate principle of science. They have therefore a common ground. Nothing can be predicated of this cause; not consciousness; not intelligence; not will; only that it is a force. This is all the God the new philosophy leaves us. [169]

Language, however, has its rights. The meaning of words cannot be changed at the pleasure of individuals. The word God, and its equivalents in other languages, have a definite meaning, from which no man is at liberty to depart. If any one says he believes in God, he says he believes in the existence of a personal, self-conscious being. He does not believe in God, if he only believes in "motion," in "force," in "thought," in "moral order," in "the incomprehensible," or in any other abstraction.

Theists also have their rights. Theism is a definite form of belief. For the expression of that belief, the word Theism is the established and universally recognized term. We have the right to retain it; and we have the right to designate as Atheism, all forms of doctrine which involve the denial of what is universally understood by Theism.

Is Atheism possible?

The question has often been discussed, Whether Atheism is possible? The answer to the question depends on the meaning of the term. If the question be, Whether a man can emancipate himself from the conviction that there is a personal Being to whom he is responsible for his character and conduct, and who will punish him for his sins? it must be answered in the negative. For that would be to emancipate himself from the moral law, which is impossible. If, however, the question means, Whether a man may, by speculation or otherwise, bring himself into such a state as to lose the consciousness of the belief of God as written in his heart, and free himself, for a time, from its power? it must be answered affirmatively. A man may, in this sense, deny his individuality or identity; the real, objective existence of soul or body, mind or matter; the distinction between right and wrong. But this is unnatural, and cannot last. It is like deflecting a spring by force. The moment the force is removed, the spring returns to its normal position. Men, therefore, often pass in a moment from a state of entire skepticism to a state of unquestioning faith; not of course by a process of argument, but by a change in their inward state. This transition from unbelief to faith, though thus sudden, and although not produced by an intellectual process, is perfectly rational. The feelings which rise in the mind contain evidence of the truth which the understanding cannot resist. It is also a familiar psychological fact, that skepticism and faith may, in a certain sense, coexist in the mind. An idealist while abiding by his theory has nevertheless an inward conviction of the reality of the external world. So the speculative atheist lives with the abiding conviction that there is a God to whom he must render an account.

[167] "De l'Homme." Works, edit. Paris, 1793, vol. iii. p.221, note.

[168] Introduction to the General History of Philosophy, vol. i. p. 169.

[169] See First Principles of a New System of Philosophy, by Herbert Spencer.

§ 2. Polytheism.

As the word implies, Polytheism is the theory which assumes the existence of many gods. Monotheism was the original religion of our race. This is evident not only from the teachings of the Scriptures, but also from the fact that the earliest historical form of religious belief is monotheistic. There are monotheistic hymns in the Vedas, the most ancient writings now extant, unless the Pentateuch be an exception.

The first departure from monotheism seems to have been nature worship. As men lost the knowledge of God as creator, they were led to reverence the physical elements with which they were in conflict, whose power they witnessed, and whose beneficent influence they constantly experienced. Hence not only the sun, moon, and stars, the great representatives of nature, but fire, air, and water, became the objects of popular worship. We accordingly find that the Vedas consist largely of hymns addressed to these natural elements.

These powers were personified, and soon it came to be generally believed that a personal being presided over each. And these imaginary beings were the objects of popular worship.

While the mass of the people really believed in beings that were "called gods" (1 Cor. viii. 5), many of the more enlightened were monotheists, and more were pantheists. The early introduction and wide dissemination of pantheism are proved from the fact that it lies at the foundation of Brahminism and Buddhism, the religions of the larger part of the human race for thousands of years.

There can be little doubt that when the Aryan tribes entered India, fifteen hundred or two thousand years before Christ, pantheism was their established belief. The unknown, and "unconditioned" infinite Being, reveals itself according to the Hindu system, as Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, -- that is, as Creator, Preserver, and Restorer. These were not persons, but modes of manifestation. It was in this form that the idea of an endless process of development of the infinite into the finite, and of the return of the finite into the infinite, was expressed. It was from this pantheistic principle that the endless polytheism of the Hindus naturally developed itself; and this determined the character of their whole religion. As all that is, is only a manifestation of God, everything remarkable, and especially the appearance of any remarkable man, was regarded as an "avatar," or incarnation of God, in one or other of his modes of manifestation, as Brahma, Vishnu, or Shiva. And as evil is as actual as good, the one is as much a manifestation, or, modus existendi, of the infinite Being as the other. And hence there are evil gods as well as good. In no part of the world has pantheism had such a field for development as in India, and nowhere has it brought forth its legitimate effects in such a portentous amount of evil. Nowhere has polytheism been carried to such revolting extremes.

Among the Egyptians, Greeks, and Romans polytheism assumed a form determined by the character of the people. The Greeks rendered it bright, beautiful, and sensual; the Romans were more decorous and sedate. Among barbarous nations it has assumed forms much more simple, and in many cases more rational.

In the Bible the gods of the heathen are declared to be "vanity," and "nothing," mere imaginary beings, without power either to hurt or to save. (Jer. ii. 28; Isa. xli. 29; xlii. 17; Ps. cvi. 28.) They arc also represented as daimonia (1 Cor. x. 20). This word may express either an imaginary, or a real existence. The objects of heathen worship are called gods, even when declared to be nonentities. So they may be called "demons," without intending to teach that they are "spirits." As the word, however, generally in the New Testament, does mean "evil spirits," it is perhaps better to take it in that sense when it refers to the objects of heathen worship. This is not inconsistent with the doctrine that the gods of the heathen are "vanities and lies." They are not what men take them to be. They have no divine power. Paul says of the heathen before their conversion, "edouleusate tois phusei me ousi theois" (Gal. iv. 8). The prevalence and persistency of Polytheism show that it must have a strong affinity with fallen human nature. Although, except in pantheism, it has no philosophical basis, it constitutes a formidable obstacle to the progress of true religion in the world.

§ 3. Hylozoism.

Hylozoism, from hule, matter, and zoe, life, is properly the doctrine that matter is endued with life. And this is the form in which the doctrine was held by many of its advocates. All matter, and every particle of matter, besides its physical properties, has a principle of life in itself, which precludes the necessity of assuming any other cause for the phenomena of life exhibited in the world. In this form Hylozoism does not differ from Materialism.

Most commonly, however, the term is used to designate a system which admits a distinction between mind and matter, but considers them as intimately and inseparably united, as the soul and body in man. God, according to this view, is the soul of the world; an intelligent power everywhere present, to which are to be referred all the manifestations of design in the external world, and all the activity of the human soul. The relation, however, of the soul to the body, is a very imperfect illustration of the relation of God to the world according to the hylozoistic system. The soul is really exterior to the body, and independent of it, at least for its existence and activity. It is not the life of the body. It neither fashions nor preserves it. It is not even conscious of the vital activity by which the body is developed and sustained. Whereas according to the hylozoistic theory, the soul of the world is its plastic principle, the inward source of all its organizations and of all its activities.

The leading principles of this theory as developed by the Stoics are, (1.) There are two constituent principles of the universe, one active, the other passive. The passive principle is matter, without form and without properties, i.e., inert. The active principle is mind, dwelling in matter its organizing formative power, i.e., God. (2.) The universe is therefore to be viewed under three aspects: (a.) As the all-forming power; the natura naturans, or, he phusis technike. (b.) The world as formed by this living, inward principle. The living kosmos, or natura naturata. (c.) The identity of the two, as they form one whole. It is only by an act of the mind that the one is distinguished from the other. Therefore the world, as including both, or as the identity of both, is formed with the greatest wisdom, and by a necessary process, for the laws of nature are the laws of reason. Cicero, [170] expounding this system, says, "Natura, non artificiosa solum, sed plane artifex ab eodem Zenone dicitur; consultrix, et provida utilitatum opportunitatumque omnium. Censet [Zeno] enim artis maxime proprium est creare et gignere, quodque in operibus nostrarum artium manus officiet id multo artificiosius naturam officere."

(3.) The universe, therefore (The All-one), of which God is the soul and Nature the body, is living, immortal, rational, and perfect (zoon athanaton, logikon, teleion). God, as the controlling, operative principle in all things, acts according to necessary although rational laws. (4.) The souls of men are of the same nature with the soul of the world, but as individual existences, passing away when the life of the body ceases. (5.) The highest end of life is virtue; and virtue is living according to reason. [171]

This system in one of its forms is nearly identical with Materialism, and in the other with Pantheism. There is no personal God to whom we are responsible, no freedom of the will; therefore, no sin, and no conscious existence after death.

[170] De Natura Deorum, ii. 22, p. 1116, edit. Leipzig, 1850.

[171] See Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. i. sect. 120.

§ 4. Materialism.

Materialism is that system which ignores the distinction between matter and mind, and refers all the phenomena of the world, whether physical, vital, or mental, to the functions of matter.

A. The Doctrine of Epicurus.

Epicurus taught, (1.) That as ex nihilo nihil fit, the universe has always existed, and must continue to exist forever. (2.) That space, and the number of bodies which it contains, are infinite. (3.) These bodies are of two kinds, simple and compound. The simple bodies are atoms possessing form, magnitude, and weight. They are indivisible, unalterable, and indestructible. This is also the doctrine of modern science. Faraday [172] says, "A particle of oxygen is ever a particle of oxygen, -- nothing can in the least wear it. If it enters into combination, and disappears as oxygen; if it pass through a thousand combinations, animal, vegetable, and mineral -- if it lie hid for a thousand years, and then be evolved, it is oxygen with its first qualities, neither more nor less. It has all its original force, and only that; the amount of force which it disengaged when hiding itself, has again to be employed in a reverse direction when it is set at liberty." (4.) These atoms have their peculiar forces, distinct from their mere gravity. This, too, is the doctrine of modern science. It is included in what Faraday says in the passage just quoted. "Molecules," say the scientific men of our day, "have been endowed with forces which give rise to various chemical qualities, and these never change either in their nature or in their amount." [173] (5.) Epicurus taught that the quantity of matter, and of course the amount of force in the world, is always the same. Neither can be increased or diminished. (6.) The atoms, of which the number is infinite, move through space with incredible velocity under the guidance of necessary physical laws. (7.) By the combination of these atoms under the influence of gravity and other physical forces, the universe was formed, and became a cosmos. This is very nearly the nebular hypothesis. (8.) The soul is material; or, in other words, all mental phenomena are due to the properties of matter. This, also, is proclaimed as the last result of modern science. (9.) The soul, of course, ceases to exist when the body dies; i.e., as death is the cessation of the vital, so it is also of the intellectual functions of the individual. The atoms of which the man is composed, with the forces which belong to them, continue to exist, and may enter into the composition of other men. But the man, as an individual, ceases to exist. This, almost in so many words, is the avowed doctrine of many physicists of the present day. (10.) Sensation is for us the only source of knowledge. By remembering former sensations, we form ideas, and by the combination of ideas we form judgments. Almost the very words of Hume, and the doctrine of the whole school of which he is the representative. (11.) As Epicurus held that nothing is incorporeal except a vacuum, he of necessity includes all the forms of existence under the head of matter. As there is no mind or spirit, there is no God, and no moral law. Virtue is only a prudent regard to happiness. In a certain sense he admitted the existence of God's, but they were corporeal beings having no concern with the affairs of men. [174]

A recent German writer, [175] in Herzog's "Encyklop&#65533;die," under the head of Materialismus, says that notwithstanding the great progress of modern science, the Materialists of our day have not advanced a step upon the system of Epicurus. That system, probably owing to the dominant influence of the higher philosophy of Plato and Aristotle,

did not exert much influence on the ancient mind, or on the progress of human thought. It was not until modern times that Materialism gained any great power as a philosophical theory.

B. Materialism in England during the Eighteenth Century.

Hobbes (1588-1679) anticipated the movement towards Materialism which manifested itself in England during the last century "He made sensation the real basis of every mental operations the sole originator of our ideas, the sole medium and test of truth. [176] As, therefore, we can perceive through sensation only what is material, he concluded that matter is the only reality, and that whatever exists to us must accordingly be a part of the material universe. The whole process of scientific investigation was thus reduced to the doctrine of bodies, beyond which, he maintained, there can be no knowledge whatever accessible to the human mind. This knowledge, however, does not refer simply to the existence of bodies, but also to their changes, of all which changes the ultimate principle is motion. The doctrine of bodies, therefore, includes the knowledge of all phenomena in relation to their probable causes; and of all possible causes as known from their observed effects. . . . . The mind itself he viewed as wholly material, the phenomena of consciousness being the direct result of our organization. The one great and fundamental fact of mind is sensation, which is nothing more or less than the effect of material objects around us, exerted by means of pressure or impact upon that material organization which we term the mind." [177] Thus it appears that Hobbes anticipated the great result of modern science, that all force may be resolved into motion.

Locke (1632-1704).

The introduction of Materialism into England during the last century is generally attributed to the influence of Locke's philosophy. Locke himself was far from being a Materialist, and the advocates of his system strenuously insist that his principles have no legitimate tendency to obliterate the distinction between matter and mind. Locke, however, in combating the doctrine of "innate ideas," in the sense of abstract truths, seemed to deny that the mind was so constituted as to apprehend truth intuitively, and beyond the range of experience. He compared the mind to a "tabula rasa." This figure suggests that all our knowledge is from without, as the slate contributes nothing to the matter written upon it. He defined ideas to be "anything with which the mind is immediately occupied when we think." The origin of these ideas, he said, was sensation and reflection. If by reflection he meant the observation of the phenomena of the mind, his theory is one thing. If it mean the process of recalling, combining, analyzing, and otherwise elaborating the impressions upon us from without, his theory is another. Probably Locke himself, and certainly many of his followers, took it in the latter sense; and thus the two sources of ideas, or of knowledge, are reduced to one, and that one is sensation. But as sensation can give us the knowledge only of what is external and material, the theory in this form seemed to leave no room for the higher ideas of eternal and necessary truths. Locke attempts to account for our ideas, of time, space, infinity, cause, and even of right and wrong, from observation, i.e., from observation of what is without, or from impressions made upon our senses. It is a common criticism upon Locke's great work, that in it he does not distinguish between the occasion and the source of our ideas. Our experience furnishes the occasion, and it may be the necessary condition, of waking the mind to the perception not only of the fact experienced, but also of the intuitive

apprehension of the universal and necessary truth which the fact involves. If we did not see effects produced around us, and did not ourselves exercise efficiency, we might never have the idea of causation; but the conviction that every effect must have a cause is an intuitive judgment, which experience can neither produce nor limit. It is not from the observed tendency of some acts to produce happiness, and of others to produce misery, that we get the idea of the essential distinction between right and wrong; but from the constitution of the mind. Although Locke, and many of his disciples, were satisfied with his method of accounting for our ideas of God, of spirit, and of moral and religious truths, yet it is also certain that many of his followers felt justified on his principles to discard them.

Hartley (1705-1757).

Hartley was a physician and a physiologist. Physiology and psychology have intimate relations. It is perhaps natural that those who devote themselves specially to the former, should make little of the latter. It is the marked characteristic of our age, so far as physicists are concerned, that it tries to merge psychology entirely into physiology. Hartley adopted the principles of Locke, and endeavored to show how it is that external things produce sensation and thought. This he did by his theory of vibrations. "The objects of the external world affect in some manner the extreme ends of the nerves, which spread from the brain as centre to every part of the body. This affection produces a vibration, which is continued along the nerve by the agency of an elastic 'ether, until it reaches the brain, where it constitutes the phenomenon we term sensation. When a sensation has been experienced several times, the vibratory movement from which it arises acquires the tendency to repeat itself spontaneously, even when the external object is not present. These repetitions or relics of sensations are ideas, which in their turn possess the property of recalling each other by virtue of mutual association among themselves." [178] This doctrine of association of ideas is the most important part of his system. He insists principally on the following law: "An idea is sometimes associated with another through the medium of a third; but in process of time this intermediate idea may be disregarded, and yet the connection between the first and third may, notwithstanding, remain. Thus the idea of pleasure, which is so indissolubly connected with money, arises from the conveniences which it is able to procure, while in the mind of the miser the conveniences are lost sight of, and the very possession of the money itself is regarded as containing the whole enjoyment. In this way Hartley accounts for almost all the emotions and passions of the human mind. The domestic affections, for instance, arise from the transference of the pleasure derived from parental kindness to the parent itself; the social and patriotic affections from transferring the pleasures of society to the country which affords them; in like manner, also, the moral and religious affections, the love of virtue and the love of God, arise from the pleasures connected with virtuous and pious conduct, being transferred to the law of action, or to the supreme Lawgiver, from whom these pleasures have emanated." [179] The connection of this theory with Materialism is obvious. If vibrations of the brain constitute sensation, and if the relics, or spontaneous repetitions of these vibrations constitute thought and feeling, then all mental and moral acts are mere affections of our material organism. It is also obvious that, according to this theory, there is no more freedom in volition than in sensation. The former is a mode, or relic of the latter. Although this tendency of his system was undeniable, and although his successors drew these conclusions from his principles, Hartley himself was not a Materialist. He was a very religious man. It is not at all

uncommon for a man to hold a speculative theory inconsistent with his faith.

Morell [180] quotes the following criticism of Hartley's doctrine from the "Edinburgh Review": "There may be," says the reviewer, "little shakings in the brain, for anything we know, and there may even be shakings of a different kind accompanying every act of thought or perception; -- but that the shakings themselves are the thought or perception, we are so far from admitting, that we find it absolutely impossible to comprehend what is meant by the assertion. The shakings are certain throbbings, vibrations, or stirrings, in a whitish, half-fluid substance like custard, which we might see perhaps, or feel, if we had eyes and fingers sufficiently small or fine for the office. But what should we see or feel, upon the supposition that we could detect by our senses, everything that actually took place in the brain? We should see the particles of this substance change their place a little, move a little up or down, to the right or the left, round about or zigzag, or in some other course or direction. This is all that we could see, if Dr. Hartley's conjecture were proved by actual observation; because this is all that exists in motion, according to our conception of it, and all that we mean when we say that there is motion in any substance. Is it intelligible, then, to say, that this motion, the whole of which we see and comprehend, is thought and feeling, and that thought and feeling will exist, wherever we can excite a similar motion in a similar substance? -- In our humble apprehension the proposition is not so much false, as utterly unmeaning and incomprehensible." [181]

If history repeats itself, so does philosophy. What the "Edinburgh Review" said of Hartley nearly seventy years ago, Professor Tyndall says of the Materialists of our day. "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable. Granted that a definite thought and a definite molecular action in the brain occur simultaneously; we do not possess the intellectual organ, nor apparently any rudiment of the organ, which would enable us to pass, by a process of reasoning, from the one phenomenon to the other. They appear together, but we do not know why. Were our minds and senses so expanded, strengthened, and illuminated, as to enable us to see and feel the very molecules of the brain; were we capable of following all their motions, all their grouping, all their electric discharges, if such there be; and were we intimately acquainted with the corresponding states of thought and feeling, we should probably be as far as ever from the solution of the problem. How are these physical processes connected with the facts of consciousness? The chasm between the two classes of phenomena would still remain intellectually impassable. Let the consciousness of lose, for example, be associated with a right-handed spiral motion of the molecules of the brain, and the consciousness of hate with a left-handed spiral motion. We should then know when we love that the motion is in one direction, and when we hate that the motion is in the other, but the 'Why?' would still remain unanswered. In affirming that the growth of the body is mechanical, and that thought, as exercised by us, has its correlative in the physics of the brain, I think the position of the 'Materialist' is stated as far as that position is a tenable one. I think the Materialist will be able finally to maintain this position against all attacks; but I do not think, as the human mind is at present constituted, that he can pass beyond it. I do not think he is entitled to say that his molecular grouping and his molecular motions explain everything. In reality they explain nothing." [182]

Priestley (1733-1804).

Priestley owes his permanent reputation to his important discoveries in the department of physical science. He was, however, prominent during his life for the part he took in philosophical and theological controversies. Devoted to science, the senses were for him the great sources of knowledge; all others, except supernaturaI revelation which he admitted, he distrusted. He adopted with enthusiasm the theory of Hartley which resolved thought and feeling into vibrations of the brain. Hartley, he said, had done more for the doctrine of mind than Newton accomplished for the theory of the material universe. He did not hesitate to avow himself a Materialist. "Priestley," says Morell, [183] "rested the truth of Materialism upon two deductions. The first was, that thought and sensation are essentially the same thing -- that the whole variety of our ideas, however abstract and refined they may become, are, nevertheless, but modifications of the sensational faculty. . . . . The second deduction was, that all sensation, and, consequently, all thought, arises from the affections of our material organization, and therefore consists entirely in the motion of the material particles of which the nerves and brain are composed." He was a necessitarian, and in morals a utilitarian. Believing, however, in God and in divine revelation, he admitted a future state of existence. As the Bible teaches the doctrine of the resurrection of the body, Priestley believed that man would be restored to conscious existence when that event occurred. His principal works bearing on this subject are: "Examination of Reid, Beattie, and Oswald," "Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Explained," "Disquisitions relating to Matter and Spirit," and "Hartley's Theory of the Human Mind, with Essays relating to the subject of it."

Hume is regarded as their master by the most advanced physicists of the modern scientific school, so far as their general principles and method of philosophizing are concerned. He was neither a Materialist nor an Idealist, but rather a Nihilist, as his great object was to show that no certainty could be attained in any department of knowledge. He affirmed nothing and denied everything. Such knowledge as we have comes from sensation, therefore, he maintained that as we have no sensation of efficiency, we can have no idea of it, and no evidence of its reality. A cause is not that which produces an effect, but simply that which uniformly precedes it. Consequently, anything can be the cause of anything. Again, as we have no perception by the senses of substance, there can be no such thing. This applies to mind as well as matter. Nothing exists to us but our thoughts and feelings. We are "nothing but a bundle or collection of different perceptions, which succeed each other with an inconceivable rapidity, and are in perpetual flux and movement."

C. Materialism in France during the Eighteenth Century.

The sensational philosophy, as it is called, found a much more congenial soil in France than in England. Locke's "Essay" was translated into the language of that country and made the subject of comments and lectures. His leading principles were adopted without the limitations and qualifications with which he had presented them, and conclusions drawn from them which Locke would have been the first to repudiate.

Condillac, one of the first and most influential of the disciples of Locke, in his first work, "Essai sur l'Origine des Connaissances Humaines," differed comparatively little from the English philosopher. But in his "Trait&#65533; des Sensations," he virtually discarded "reflection" as a source of our ideas, and regarded all thoughts, feelings, and volitions as "transformed sensations." "While he answered the question concerning the relation between

the soul and body, by assuming their identity, he took theistic ground in accounting for the origin of the world. This middle ground was occupied also, at least ostensibly, by Diderot and D'Alembert in the French "Encyclop&#65533;die," who, notwithstanding their sensational theory as to the source of our knowledge, and their making happiness the ground of morals and end of life, not only maintained theistic principles, but insisted on the necessity of a divine revelation. This, however, was probably more a matter of prudence than of conviction." [184]

These, however, were only the first steps. The extreme of materialistic atheism was soon reached and avowed. La Mettrie published his "L'Histoire Naturelle de l'Ame" in 1745, his "L'Homme Machine," the same year, and his "L'Homme Plant&#65533;," in 1749. Helvetius published his work "De l'Esprit" in 1758. His book entitled "De l'Homme" was published after his death. The climax was reached by Baron d'Holbach in his "Syst&#65533;me de la Nature," in which Materialism, fatalism, and atheism were openly avowed. According to this system matter and motion are eternal; thought is an agitation of the nerves; the soul the result of our corporeal organization; the will the strongest sensation; the ground of morals a regard to our own happiness. There is no freedom, no morality, no future existence, no God. When these principles got hold of the popular mind, then came the end.

D. Positivism.

Comte, the author of the "Positive Philosophy," was born in 1798, and died in 1859. The greater part of his life was passed in poverty and neglect. His only occupation was teaching. Ten years were devoted to the preparation of a course of lectures on philosophy which secured him wealth and fame. He called his system "Philosophie Positive," because it purported "to assume nothing beyond the content of observed facts."

The fundamental principle of the "Positive Philosophy" is the one so often referred to, namely, that the senses are the only source of our knowledge, hence nothing exists but matter. There is no mind distinct from matter; no such thing as efficiency; no causes, whether first or final; no God; no future state of existence for man. Theology and psychology are, therefore, banished from the domain of science. Science is solely occupied in the observation of facts, and in deducing from them the laws by which they are determined. These laws, however, are not forces operating in a uniform manner, but simply statements of the actual order in the sequence of events. This sequence is not only uniform but necessary. Our business is simply to ascertain what it is. The only method by which this can be done is observation. This task is much easier in some departments than in others; for in some the facts to be observed are less numerous and less complicated. In mathematics and astronomy the facts are all of one kind; whereas in physiology and sociology they are of very different kinds, and vastly more complicated. The same rule, however, applies to all departments. In all, the sequence of events is uniform and necessary; and if we can only, by a sufficient induction of facts, ascertain what the law of sequence is, we shall be able to predict the future as certainly in one department as in another. The astronomer can tell what will be the position of the stars and planets a century hence. The Positivist will he able to foretell with equal certainty how a man will act in any given circumstances, and what will be the progress and state of society in time to come.

It follows, therefore, according to the Positive Philosophy, (1.) That all our knowledge is confined to physical phenomena. (2.) That all we can know of such phenomena is, that

they are, and the relations in which they stand to each other. (3.) That these relations are all included under the heads of sequence and resemblance. (4.) These relations constitute the laws of nature, and are invariable. (5.) As everything that exists is material, these laws, or "invariable relations of succession and resemblance," control all the phenomena of mind, as we call it, and of social life and of history, as well as those of nature, in the common sense of that word. (6.) As everything is included in the department of physics, everything is controlled by physical laws, and there is no more freedom in human acts than in the motions of the stars; and, therefore, the one can be predicted with the same certainty as the other.

The following quotations from the "Philosophie Positive," "freely translated and condensed by Harriet Martineau," [185] include all the points above mentioned.

"The first characteristic of the Positive Philosophy is that it regards all phenomena as subjected to invariable natural laws. Our business is, -- seeing how vain is any research into what are called causes, whether first or final, -- to pursue an accurate discovery of these laws, with a view to reducing them to the smallest possible number." [186] "Our positive method of connecting phenomena is by one or other of two relations, -- that of similitude or that of succession, -- the mere fact of such resemblance or succession being all that we can pretend to know; and all that we need to know; for this perception comprehends all knowledge which consists in elucidating something by something else, -- in now explaining, and now foreseeing certain phenomena, by means of the resemblance or sequence of other phenomena." [187] "If we regard these functions [of the mind] under their statical aspect,-- that is, if we consider the conditions under which they exist, -- we must determine the organic circumstances of the case, which inquiry involves it with anatomy and physiology. If we look at the dynamic aspect, we have to study simply the exercise and results of the intellectual powers of the human race, which is neither more nor less than the general object of the Positive Philosophy."Vol. i. p. 11. [188]

Comte is obliged to use the word "power," and to speak of its exercise, yet all his philosophy denies the existence of any such thing as efficiency. The laws which determine events are nothing more than facts of uniform sequence. According to the passage just quoted, one department of psychology (the statical) belongs to anatomy and physiology; the other (the dynamic) to the observed sequence of certain facts called intellectual. The sequence is invariable. The intervention of will is necessarily excluded, because philosophy, at least Positivism, is nothing unless it secures the power of prevision. But free acts cannot be foreseen by man. Hence Comte says, "The arbitrary can never be excluded while political phenomena are referred to will, divine or human, instead of being connected with invariable natural laws." [189] "If social events were always exposed to disturbance by the accidental intervention of the legislator, human or divine, no scientific prevision of them would be possible." [190]

Intellectual exercises being regarded as a function of the brain, Comte says, "The positive theory of the intellectual and affective functions is therefore henceforth unchangeably regarded as consisting in the study, both rational and experimental, of the various phenomena of internal sensibility, which are proper to the cerebral ganglia, apart from their external apparatus. It is, therefore, simply a prolongation of animal physiology, properly so called, when this is extended so as to include the fundamental and ultimate

attributes." [191]

Comte, being an ardent phrenologist, founded one of the arguments for his system on the organization of the brain; but his great dependence was upon the law of human development. He admitted no essential difference between man and irrational animals. The superiority of man is only in the degree of his intelligence, which is due to his better physical organization. According to Comte, the whole human race, and every individual man, passes through three distinct stages, which he calls the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. During the first stage all events are referred to supernatural causes. In the first part of this stage of their progress, men were fetich-worshippers; then they gradually became polytheists, and monotheists. This he endeavors to prove historically in regard to the Greeks, the Romans, and the inhabitants of western Europe. As men outgrew the fetich age, so they outgrew the polytheistic and monotheistic forms of belief. That is, they ceased to refer phenomena to the agency of supernatural beings.

During the metaphysical stage, phenomena are referred to unseen causes, to occult powers, or forces, that is, to something which the senses cannot detect. This also has passed away, and men have come to recognize the great fact that there are no spiritual agencies in the universe, no efficient causes, nothing but events to be arranged according to the laws of sequence and resemblance. The order of events is invariable and necessary. What it has been in the past, it will be in the future. As this is the law of the development of the race collectively, so it is of the individual man. Every one, in his progress from infancy to manhood, passes through these several stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive. We first believe in supernatural agencies (witches, ghosts, souls, angels, etc.); then in occult causes; then only in facts discerned by the senses. The history of the race and the experience of the individual man are thus made the broad and sure foundation of the Positive Philosophy.

Remarks.

1. Considering that the advocates of this philosophy are a mere handful; considering that nine hundred and ninety-nine millions of the thousand millions of our race still believe in God, it is a rather violent assumption that mankind have reached the stage of Positivism. It may be readily admitted that the progress of science and of Christianity has banished alchemy, astrology, witchcraft, and necromancy from enlightened portions of our race, but it has had a scarcely discernible effect in banishing belief in mind as distinct from matter, or in efficient causes, or in God. Admitting, therefore, the principle of the argument to be correct, the conclusion arrived at is contradicted by facts.

2. The principle itself, however, is a groundless assumption. There has been no such development of the race, and there is no such development of the individual man, as the argument supposes. Much less is it true, as Comte maintains, that these several methods of dealing with phenomena are antagonistic and mutually exclusive; that if we believe in spiritual agents, we cannot believe in unseen, metaphysical causes; and that if we believe in the latter we cannot believe in the former. The fact is, the great mass of mankind, educated and uneducated, believe in both. They believe in God and mind, as well as in occult causes, such as electricity, magnetism, and other physical forces; which, in Comte's sense of the word, are metaphysical.

With regard to this assumed law of progress, Prof. Huxley, who is as completely

emancipated from the trammels of authority as any man of science now living, says, in the first place, that Comte contradicts himself as to this fundamental principle. In proof he quotes a long passage from the "Philosophie Positive," in which Comte teaches, -- "(a.) As a matter of fact, the human intellect has not been invariably subjected to the law of the three states, and, therefore, the necessity of the law cannot be demonstrable a priori. (b.) Much of our knowledge of all kinds has not passed through the three states, and more particularly, as M. Comte is careful to point out, not through the first. (c.) The positive state has more or less coexisted with the theological, from the dawn of human intelligence. And, by way of completing the series of contradictions, the assertion that the three states are essentially different and even radically opposed,' is met a little lower on the same page by the declaration that 'the metaphysical state is, at bottom, nothing but a simple general modification of the first.'" "Men of science," he adds, "are not in the habit of paying much attention to 'laws' stated in this fashion." [192]

After showing that the individual man does not pass through these several states, Prof. Huxley says, "What is true of the individual is, mutatis mutandis, true of the intellectual development of the species. It is absurd to say of men in a state of primitive savagery, that all their conceptions are in a theological state. Nine tenths of them are eminently realistic, and as 'positive' as ignorance and narrowness can make them." [193]

Besides, it is not true that the race of men now existing on the earth, were in their primitive state fetich-worshippers, or that they gradually rose to polytheism and monotheism. The reverse is true. Not only revelation, but all history and tradition, go to show that the primitive state of our race was its highest state, at least so far as religion is concerned. Monotheism was the earliest form of religion among men. To that succeeded nature-worship and pantheism, and to that polytheism. It is a historical fact that monotheism was not reached by a process of development. Monotheism was first; it gradually perished from among men, except as miraculously preserved among the Hebrews, and from them diffused through the medium of, or rather, in the form of, Christianity. It extends nowhere beyond the influence, direct or indirect, of the supernatural revelation contained in the Bible. This is a fact which scientific men should not overlook in their deductions.

3. Comte was guilty of the unfairness of confining his survey to a small portion of the nations of the earth; and that the portion too which had been brought under the influence of Christianity. If the law which he sought to establish be universal and necessary, it must have operated from the beginning in India and China as well as in Europe. The millions of those regions have not reached the monotheistic, much less the metaphysical, and still less the positive stage of development. India especially furnishes a striking refutation of this theory. The Hindus are a highly intellectual race. Their language and literature are on a par with those of Greece and Rome. Their philosophers, nearly three thousand years ago, anticipated the highest results reached by the Schellings and Hegels of our day. Yet of all the nations of the earth the Hindus are the least materialistic, or positive, in their views of nature. With them the supernatural or spiritual is alone real. The Hindus, therefore, cannot be subject to that universal and necessary law of development which is assumed as the foundation of the Positive Philosophy.

4. It is of course presumptuous and idle to attempt to reason men out of their senses, or to convince them that what their very nature teaches them is true, is utterly false and

untrustworthy. This, however, Comte not only attempts, but his whole system is rounded on the assumption that our nature is a delusion and a lie. That is, it is founded on the assumption that intuitive truths are false. It is intuitively true that we are free agents. This Comte denies. It is intuitively true that there is a specific and essential difference between right and wrong. This is denied. It is intuitively true that every effect has an efficient cause. This too is denied. It is intuitively true that there is a God to whom men are responsible for their character and conduct. This also is denied. Had all the intellect and all the knowledge ever possessed by men and angels been concentrated in the person of Comte, it had still been folly in him to attempt to found a system involving the denial of such truths as these. The Christian is not afraid to say one thing more. It is intuitively true, to all who have eyes to see, that Jesus Christ is the Son of God, and that his gospel is the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation, and that it is absolutely impossible that any theory which is opposed to these divine intuitions can be true.

Another illustration of the presumptuous character of this philosophy is found in what it teaches concerning Sociology. Scientific men of all countries have long been laboriously engaged in making meteorological observations, and yet such are the number and complexity of the causes which determine the state of the weather, that no man is able to predict how the wind will blow forty-eight hours, much less, a year, in advance. The causes which determine human action in the individual and in society, are far more complex and inscrutable than those which determine the state of the weather. Yet Comte assumes to have reduced Sociology to a science, vying with mathematics in certainty. "I will venture to say," is his confident assertion, "that Sociological science, though only established by this book, already rivals mathematical science itself, not in precision and fecundity, but in positivity and rationality." [194]

Practical Applications of Positivism.

The practical applications of this philosophy are very serious. Positivism claims the right of absolute and universal control over all human affairs; over education, politics, social organization, and religion. As the progress of science has banished all liberty of opinion or of action from the departments of mathematics and astronomy, so it must banish it from every other department of human thought and activity. Speaking of liberty of conscience, Comte says: "Negative as we now see this dogma to be, signifying release from old authority, while waiting for the necessity of positive science, the absolute character supposed to reside in it gave it energy to fulfil its revolutionary destination. . . . . This dogma can never be an organic principle; and, moreover, it constitutes an obstacle to reorganization, now that its activity is no longer absorbed by the demolition of the old political order. . . . . Can it be supposed," he asks, "that the most important and the most delicate conceptions, and those which by their complexity are accessible to only a small number of highly prepared understandings, are to be abandoned to the arbitrary and variable decisions of the least competent minds." [195] This argument is conclusive. If social life, the acts of men, are as much and as certainly determined by physical laws as material changes, those who have ascertained these laws are entitled to control all other men. As it would be preposterous to allow men to build our houses or navigate our ships who would not obey the laws of nature, so it would be absurd, on this hypothesis, to allow those ignorant of social laws to govern society. Comte avows his admiration, not of popish

doctrine, but of the papal organization, which in the new order of things he proposes to continue. "Papal infallibility," he says, [196] "was a great intellectual and social advance." Prof. Huxley pithily characterizes Positivism, in this regard, as "Catholicism minus Christianity."

Religion is not excepted from this absolute subjection. The Positive Philosophy, as it denies the existence of the soul and the being of God, would seem to leave no place for religion. Comte placed on the title-page of his "Discours sur l'Ensemble du Positivisime," the announcement that his design was to reorganize society "sans Dieu ni Roi." Nevertheless, as men must have, as they always have had, some religion, a philosophy which aspired to absolute dominion over all the departments of human life, must make some provision for this universal, although imaginary, necessity of our nature. Comte, therefore, published a catechism of religious belief, and a ritual of religious worship. The object of worship was to be the aggregate of humanity formed by the absorption of the successive generations of men. Every great man has two forms of existence: one conscious before death; the other after death, unconscious, in the hearts and intellects of other men. The God of the Positive Philosophy is, therefore, the aggregate of the memories of great men. "Undoubtedly," says Huxley, "Dieu' disappeared, but the Noveau Grand-Être Suprême,' a gigantic fetich, turned out bran-new by M. Comte's own hands, reigned in his stead. Roi' also was not heard of; but in his place I found a minutely-defined social organization, which, if it ever came into practice, would exert a despotic authority such as no sultan has rivalled, and no Puritan presbytery in its palmiest days could hope to excel. While, as for the culte systématique de l'humanité,' I, in my blindness, could not distinguish it from sheer Popery, with M. Comte in the chair of St. Peter, and the names of most of the saints changed." [197]

There are, however, to be two forms of worship, the one private, the other public. The special object of the former is woman, because she is the most perfect representative of humanity. As "Mother, she excites veneration; as wife, affection, and as daughter, kindness. To excite these sentiments, ideal woman is to be worshipped. Humanity, or the memory of great men, is the object for public worship, regarding which minute details are given. The new religion is to have ten sacraments, a peculiar architecture, and an extended hierarchy, under the control of one absolute High Priest. Such is the system which Comte was allowed to believe would supersede the gospel of Jesus Christ. It has already almost passed away. Among the advanced men of science in England there is scarcely one so poor as to do it reverence. [198]

E. Scientific Materialism.

Leading Principles.

The leading principles of the modern scientific form of Materialism are embraced, by some at least, who do not consider themselves Materialists. They, however, adopt the language of the system, and avow principles which, in their generally accepted meaning, constitute what in the history of human thought is known as Materialism.

The most important of these principles are the following, many of which, however, are not peculiar to the system.

1. Matter and force are inseparable. Wherever there is matter there is force, and wherever there is force there is matter. This proposition, at least in the first instance, is to

be understood only of physical force.

2. All physical forces, such as light, heat, chemical affinities, electricity, magnetism, etc., etc., are convertible. Light may be converted into heat, and heat into light; either into electricity, and electricity into either; and so through the whole range. This is what is called the correlation of forces. Count Rumford, in a communication to the Royal Society of London, in 1798, satisfied that the heat generated in boring cannon could not be otherwise accounted for, advanced the doctrine that heat is a peculiar mode of motion. Since then the doctrine has been generalized, and it is now the commonly received opinion that all the physical forces are resolvable into motion. This generalization, however, is not accepted by all scientific men. They find it impossible to conceive how gravitation, which acts instantaneously at all distances, can he motion. It is simply a force which tends to produce motion.

3. This motion, however, is not of a fluid, or ether, or any other imponderable substance peculiar to each particular kind of force. As sound consists in, or rather is produced by the vibrations of the atmosphere, it was natural to assume that light was the undulation of one medium, heat of another, electricity of another. This theory is discarded. The motion intended is motion in the molecules of the matter affected. When iron is heated, nothing is added to it. There is no imponderable substance called caloric. All that occurs is, that the molecules of the iron are agitated in a particular way. If the iron be magnetized, it is only a different kind of motion imparted to its constituent atoms. So of all other kinds of force. When, however, light or heat is radiated from a distant object, the motion which constitutes these forces must be transmitted through some medium. For where there is motion, there must be something that moves. And, therefore, if heat be motion in the molecules of the sun, that heat could not reach us unless there was some material medium between us and the sun.

4. The physical forces are not only convertible one into any of the others, but they are quantitively equivalent; that is, a given amount of heat will produce an amount of light or of electricity, or of any other force, which, if it could be utilized, would reproduce precisely that amount of heat. A cannon-ball, when it impinges on a target, produces heat enough to give it the velocity which it had at the moment of contact. A certain amount of light and heat derived from the sun is expended in the formation of a certain amount of wood or coal; that amount of wood or coal will furnish precisely the amount of light and heat which was expended in its production. Count Rumford experimented to determine the quantitive relation between motion and heat, and arrived at very nearly the same conclusion as that reached by Dr. Joule of Manchester, England, who found that one pound of matter, falling seven hundred and seventy-two feet, will produce heat enough to raise the temperature of a pound of water one degree of Fahrenheit. This is now received as the unit of force.

5. Force is indestructible. It is never increased or diminished What is lost in one form is taken up in another. Forces are, therefore, indestructible, convertible, and imponderable agents. This correlation and conservation of forces is declared by Dr. Carpenter, the eminent physiologist, to be "now amongst the best established generalizations of physical science," and the greatest scientific triumph of the age; "thanks," as he says, "to the labors of Faraday, Grove, Joule, Thomson, and Tyndall, to say nothing of those of Helmholtz and other distinguished continental savans." [199]

Correlation of the Physical and Vital Forces.

So long as this doctrine of the correlation of forces is confined to the department of physics, it is a purely scientific question, in which the theologian has no special interest. Unhappily it has not been thus confined. Dr. Carpenter, in the paper just quoted, says, "Every thoughtful physiologist must desire to see the same course of inquiry thoroughly pursued in regard to the phenomena of living bodies." [200] The first step in that direction, he adds, was taken by Dr. Mayer of Germany, in his remarkable treatise on "Organic Movement in its Relation to Material Changes."

There appear to be three forms of opinion among scientific men, of the "advanced" school, as to the relation between vital and physical forces. First, there are some, of whom Dr. Carpenter is one, who hold that the forces by which vital processes are carried in, are light, heat, electricity, and so forth, but that these are directed or controlled by a force of a different kind, called "a directing agency."

Dr. Carpenter's Theory.

Dr. Carpenter denies that there is any such thing as vitality, or vital force, or nisus formativus, or Bildungstrieb. Two germs may be selected between which neither the microscope nor chemical analysis can detect the slightest difference; yet one develops into a fish, another into a bird. Why is this? Dr. Carpenter answers because of a "directing agency" residing in the germ. His language is: "The prevalent opinion has until lately been, that this power is inherent in the germ; which has been supposed to derive from its parent not merely its material substance, but a nisus formativus, Bildungstrieb, or germ-force, in virtue of which it builds itself up into the likeness of its parent, and maintains itself in that likeness until the force is exhausted, and at the same time imparting a fraction of it to each of its progeny." [201] This opinion he rejects; but adds, "When we look carefully into the question, we find that what the germ really supplies, is not the force, but the directive agency; thus rather resembling the control exercised by the superintendent builder, who is charged with working out the design of the architect, than the bodily force of the workmen who labor under his guidance in the construction of the fabric." [202] The conclusion at which he arrives is "that the correlation between heat and the organizing force of plants is not less intimate than that which exists between heat and motion. The special attribute of the vegetable germ is its power of utilizing, after its own peculiar fashion, the heat which it receives, and of applying a constructive power to the building up of its fabric after its characteristic type." [203]

On this doctrine of Carpenter it may be remarked, (1.) That it seems to be self-contradictory. He denies to the germ a nisas formativus, or, Bildungstrieb, and attributes to it "a constructive power." What is the difference? The English phrase is a literal translation of the German word. (2.) He says that "heat and the organizing force of plants" are correlated, i.e., they are convertible one into the other and are quantitively equivalent; and yet the relation between them is analogous to that between a superintending builder and the strength of the workmen. According to this, the physical strength of the hod man is convertible into the intellect of the builder and is its quantitive equivalent. We do not see how this contradiction is to be avoided, unless he uses the phrases "constructive force," "organizing force," sometimes for the "directing agency" in the germ, and sometimes, for the physical forces which that agency controls. But if he distinguishes between the "directing

agency" and "the organizing force," then there is no correlation between the physical force and "the vital activity of the germ."

3. According not only to the common, but to the latest, opinion of physiologists, the germ supplies something more than "a directing agency" (which must itself be a force). It not only directs, but it effects, or produces changes. It is an operative force, acting not by, but against physical forces or chemical affinities; counteracting them as long as it continues. As soon as the germ or plant or tissue dies, the physical forces obtain ascendency and disintegration takes place. This Dr. Carpenter himself admits. The most marked characteristic, he says, which distinguishes "vital from every kind of physical activity," is, "the fact that a germ endowed with life, develops itself into an organism of a type resembling that of its parent; that this organism is the subject of incessant changes, which all tend, in the first place, to the evolution of its typical form; and subsequently to its maintenance in that form, notwithstanding the antagonism of chemical and physical agencies, which are continually tending to produce its disintegration; but that, as its term of existence is prolonged, its conservative power declines so as to become less and less able to resist these disintegrating forces, to which it finally succumbs, leaving the organism to be resolved by their agency into the components from which its materials were originally drawn." [204] This does not mean that chemical agencies have no part to act in the growth and development of plants and animals, but it certainly does mean that the vital force or life is an agency or power different from any kind of physical force. Life and physical force, therefore, are not identical. They are not correlated. The former is not a mere form of the latter.

On of the most eminent of living physiologists is Dr. John Marshall, and he, although far from belonging to the old school, distinctly takes the ground that there is a vital force which cannot be resolved into any of the physical forces operative in the external, inorganic world. He says: [205] "All the strictly physical processes within the body, whether chemical, mechanical, thermic, electric, or photic, are performed by modifications of the common force which produces similar phenomena in the inorganic world around us. There exists, however, in the living animal, as in the living vegetable organism, a special formative or organizing energy, evolving the perfect animal or plant from the primitive ovum or ovule, developing its various tissues and organs, and conserving them from the commencement to the termination of its individual existence. The influence of this force, moreover, extends from the parent to the offspring, generation after generation." This is the commonly received doctrine, that physical phenomena are to be referred to physical forces; vital phenomena to vital force; and mental phenomena to mind. The new doctrine, however, is that all phenomena are to be referred to physical forces, no other forces being either known or knowable.

The more advanced Opinions.

The second view adopted in reference to the relation of physical to vital force, is, that if there be any difference it cannot be known. Physical forces are known. They can be measured. They can not only be converted one into another, but can be proved to be quantitively equivalent. If any other kind of force be assumed to account for vital phenomena, the assumption is gratuitous. It is taking for granted that something exists of which we know, and can know nothing. It must, therefore, lie beyond the sphere of science

and is of no importance. Even Dr. Carpenter uses such language as this: "Another class of reasoners have cut the knot which they could not untie, by attributing all the actions of living bodies for which physics and chemistry cannot account, to a hypothetical 'vital principle;' a shadowy agency that does everything in its own way, but refuses to be made the subject of scientific examination; like the 'od-force,' or the 'spiritual power' to which the lovers of the marvellous are so fond of attributing the mysterious movements of turning and tilting tables." [206] "If a man asks me," says Prof. Huxley, "what the politics of the inhabitants of the moon are, and I reply, that I do not know; that neither I, nor any one else, have any means of knowing; and that, under these circumstances, I decline to trouble myself about the subject at all, I do not think he has any right to call me a skeptic." [207] It is thus he banishes vitality from the sphere of science, because everything, except matter and its functions, belongs to the region of the unknown and the unknowable. Prof. Tyndall and Herbert Spencer take, at times, the same ground.

But, although such writers as Dr. Carpenter, in apparent contradiction to their own admissions, acknowledge the existence of "a directing agency" in the living germ, the majority of the writers of this school refuse to recognize any such agency or force as a scientific truth. The only difference between the second and third views on this general subject, above referred to, is, that according to the one, the assumption of vital as distinct from physical force, is regarded as gratuitous and unnecessary; according to the other, any such assumption is declared to be unphilosophical, and to be utterly discarded. The same writer sometimes takes one, and sometimes the other of these grounds.

The Argument for the correlation of Physical and Vital Forces.

Thus Prof. Huxley, although a few years since a firm advocate of vital, as distinct from physical force, in his discourse on the "Physical Basis of Life," takes the opposite ground. The argument is this: the elements furnished by the mineral kingdom are taken up by the plant, and, under the influence of light and heat, transformed into organized matter. The products of vegetation, starch, sugar, fibrine, etc., are purely material. This is true even of protoplasm, or living matter, or the physical basis of life, as it is called, which is elaborated by the plant out of the lifeless materials furnished by the soil and the atmosphere. There is indeed a great difference between the products of vegetation and the lifeless elements out of which they are formed. But so there is between the elements of water and water itself. If an electric spark be passed through a volume of oxygen and hydrogen gas, it becomes water, which weighs precisely as much as the volume of the two gases of which it is composed. It is oxygen and hydrogen in combination, and nothing more. Yet the properties of the water are entirely different from those of the oxygen and hydrogen. In like manner there is a great difference between the properties of the carbonic acid, the water, and the ammonia, of which the plant is composed, and the living plant itself. But as it would be unphilosophical to assume the existence of an unknown something called aquosity to account for the difference between water and its elements, it is no less unphilosophical to assume the existence of an unknown something called vitality to account for the difference between it and the lifeless materials of which living matter is composed.

Animal Life.

In like manner all the phenomena of animal life are referred to the physical forces inseparable from the matter which composes the animal structure. It is true the functions of

matter in the animal tissues are higher than in those of the plant. But the advocates of the theory under consideration, endeavor to reduce the difference between animal and vegetable life to a minimum. It is only the upper surface of the leaf which is susceptible of the peculiar effects of light. So it is only the optic nerve that is affected in a way which is necessary to vision. The sensitive plant contracts when touched; and so does the animal muscle when the proper stimulus, nervous or electric, is applied. In short, as all the operations of vegetable life are due to physical forces, so all the phenomena of animal life are due to the same causes.

On this subject Prof. Huxley says: "The matter of life is composed of ordinary matter, differing from it only in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated. It is built up of ordinary matter, and again resolved into ordinary matter when its work is done." [208] By protoplasm, or matter of life, he sometimes means matter which exhibits the phenomena of life; and sometimes, matter which having been elaborated by the plant or animal, is capable of supporting life. Hence he calls boiled mutton protoplasm.

The only difference between inorganic, lifeless matter, and living plants or animals, is in the manner in which their atoms are aggregated. "Carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, are all lifeless bodies. Of these, carbon and oxygen unite, in certain proportions, and under certain conditions, to give rise to carbonic acid; hydrogen and oxygen produce water; nitrogen and hydrogen give rise to ammonia. These new compounds, like the elementary bodies of which they are composed, are lifeless. But when they are brought together, under certain conditions they give rise to the still more complex body, protoplasm, and this protoplasm exhibits the phenomena of life. I see no break in this series of steps in molecular complication, and I am unable to understand why the language which is applicable to any one term of the series may not be used to any of the others. . . . . When hydrogen and oxygen are mimxed in a certain proportion, and an electric spark is passed through them, they disappear, and a quantity of water, equal in weight to the sum of their weights, appears in their place. There is not the slightest parity between the passive and active powers of the water and those of the oxygen and hydrogen which have given rise to it." [209] "What justification is there, then, for the assumption of the existence in the living matter of a something which has no representative, or correlative, in the not living matter which gave rise to it? What better philosophical status has 'vitality' than 'aquosity?' And why should 'vitality' hope for a better fate than the other 'itys' which have disappeared since Martinus Scriblerus accounted for the operation of the meat-jack by its inherent 'meat-roasting quality,' and scorned the materialism of those who explained the turning of the spit by a certain mechanism worked by the draught of the chimney? . . . . If the properties of water may be properly said to result from the nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules." [210]

The doctrine, therefore, is, that carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, lifeless bodies, under certain conditions, become living matter, not in virtue of any new force or principle communicated to them, but solely in virtue of a different arrangement of their molecules. Of this living matter all plants and animals are composed, and to the properties or physical forces inherent in the matter of which they are composed, all the phenomena of vegetable and animal life are to be referred. "Protoplasm," says Prof. Huxley, "is the clay of the

potter: which, bake it and paint it as he will, remains clay, separated by artifice and not by nature, from the commonest brick or sun-dried clod." [211] As the brick, no matter what its shape or color, can have no properties not inherent in the clay, so vegetable or animal organisms can have no properties which do not belong to protoplasm, which, in the last analysis, is nothing but carbonic acid, water, and ammonia.

Professor Huxley is not only a distinguished naturalist, but a popular lecturer and preacher of "Lay Sermons," and thus has become a representative man among the advocates of this new form of Materialism. He is, however, very far from standing alone. "Some of the most distinguished living physicists, chemists, and naturalists, says Dr. Beale, "have accepted this physical theory of life. They have taught that life is but a mode of ordinary force, and that the living thing differs from the non-living thing, not in quality, or essence, or kind, but merely in degree." [212] "So long," says the same writer, "as the advocates of the physical doctrine of life contented themselves with ridiculing 'vitality' as a fiction and a myth, because it could not be made evident to the senses, measured or weighed, or proved scientifically to exist, their position was not easily assailed; but now when they assert dogmatically that vital force is only a form or mode of ordinary motion they are bound to show that the assertion rests upon evidence, or it will be regarded by thoughtful men as one of a large number of fanciful hypotheses, advocated only by those who desire to swell the ranks of the teachers and expounders of dogmatic science, which, although pretentious and authoritative, must ever be intolerant and unprogressive." [213]

Mental Phenomena.

Not only are the operations of vegetable and animal life, according to the new doctrine, due to physical forces, but the same is true of all mental operations. If the argument from analogy is valid in the one case, it is valid in the other. If we must believe that the properties of protoplasm, or living matter, are to be referred to the mode in which its molecules are aggregated, because the properties of water are due to the peculiar aggregation of the atoms of which its elements, hydrogen and oxygen, are composed; then we must believe that all thought and feeling are due to the molecular composition and movements of the brain atoms. Accordingly, Professor Huxley, after saying that "vitality" has no better philosophical standing than "aquosity," warns his readers that they cannot stop with that admission. "I bid you beware," he says, "that in accepting these conclusions, you are placing your feet on the first rung of a ladder, which in most people's estimation is the reverse of Jacob's, and leads to the antipodes of heaven. It may seem a small thing to admit that the dull vital actions of a fungus or a foraminifer are the properties of their protoplasm, and are the direct results of the nature of the matter of which they are composed. But if, as I have endeavored to prove to you, their protoplasm is essentially identical with, and most readily converted into, that of any animal, I can discover no logical halting-place, between the admission that such is the case, and the further concession that all vital action may with equal propriety be said to be the result of the molecular forces of the protoplasm which displays it. And if so, it must be true, in the same sense and to the same extent, that the thoughts to which I am now giving utterance, and your thoughts regarding them, are the expression of molecular changes in that matter of life which is the source of our other vital phenomena." [214] "Further," he says, "I take it to be demonstrable that it is utterly impossible to prove that anything whatever may not be the effect of a material and

necessary cause, and that human logic is equally incompetent to prove that any act is really spontaneous. A really spontaneous act is one which, by the assumption, has no cause [i.e. no material cause, for he admits no other]; and the attempt to prove such a negative as this is, on the face of the matter, absurd. And while it is thus a philosophical impossibility to demonstrate that any given phenomenon is not the effect of a material cause, any one who is acquainted with the history of science will admit that its progress has in all ages meant, and now more than ever means, the extension of the province of what we call matter and causation, and the concomitant gradual banishment from all regions of human thought of what we call spirit and spontaneity." [215] "After all, what do we know of this terrible 'matter,' except as a name for the unknown and hypothetical cause of states of our own consciousness? And what do we know of that 'spirit' over whose threatened extinction by matter a great lamentation is arising, ... except that it is also a name for an unknown and hypothetical cause or condition of states of consciousness? In other words, matter and spirit are but names for the imaginary substrata of groups of natural phenomena." [216] "As surely as every future grows out of past and present, so will the physiology of the future gradually extend the realm of matter and law until it is co-extensive with knowledge, with feeling, and with action." [217] He cites the often-quoted exhortation of Hume, and enforces "the most wise advice" which it contains. "If we take in our hand," says Hume, "any volume of divinity or school-metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact or existence? No. Commit it, then, to the flames; for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion." [218]

The history of human speculation does not furnish a more explicit avowal of Materialism than that contained in the above quotations. All known effects are ascribed to material causes. Spirit is declared to have only an imaginary existence. Spontaneity is pronounced an absurdity. Necessity is affirmed to be inexorable and universal. Yet Huxley says he is no Materialist. This in a sense is true. He is not a Materialist, because he believes in neither matter nor spirit. He avows himself a disciple of Hume, who taught that we know nothing but impressions and ideas. Substance, whether material or spiritual, efficiency, and God, are banished from the sphere of knowledge to that of "sophistry and illusion." He avows his fellowship with Herbert Spencer, the fundamental principle of whose "New Philosophy" is, that all we know, or can know, is, that force is and that it is persistent, while force itself is absolutely inscrutable. This blots the soul and God out of existence, except as those words indicate an unknown force. But as he also holds that all forces are convertible, the distinction between material and mental forces, whether human or divine, is obliterated. He avails himself of the common assumption that his theory does not degrade spirit, but exalts matter. It is the verdict of history, however, as Julius Mller truly says, "That every attempt to spiritualize matter ends in materializing spirit." On this subject Spencer says: "Men who have not risen above that vulgar conception which unites with matter the contemptuous epithets 'gross' and 'brute,' may naturally feel dismay at the proposal to reduce the phenomena of life, of mind, and of society, to a level with those which they think so degraded. . . . . The course proposed does not imply a degradation of the so-called higher, but an elevation of the so-called lower." [219] This at least is an avowal that the phenomena of life, mind, and society are to be referred to material or physical causes. This, indeed, he repeatedly asserts. After insisting on the transformation of

physical forces into chemical, and these into vital, he adds, "Many will be alarmed by the assertion that the forces which we distinguish as mental, come within the same generalization. Yet there is no alternative but to make this concession. [220] . . . . Any hesitation to admit that between the physical forces and the sensations there exists a correlation like that between the physical forces themselves, must disappear on remembering how the one correlation like the other, is not qualitive only, but quantitive." [221] "Various classes of facts unite to prove that the law of metamorphosis, which holds among the physical forces, holds equally between them and the mental forces. . . . . How this metamorphosis takes place -- how a force existing as motion, light, or heat, can become a mode of consciousness," is mysterious; but he adds, it is not a greater mystery "than the transformations of physical forces into each other." [222]

Dr. Maudsley, a distinguished writer of the same school, [223] says, "Few, if any, will now be found to deny that with each display of mental power there are correlative changes in the material substratum; that every phenomenon of mind is the result, as manifest in energy, of some change, molecular, chemical, or vital, in the nervous elements of the brain." Again, he says, [224] "With regard to the manifold phenomena of mind; by observation of them, and abstraction from the particular, we get the general conception, or the essential idea of mind, an idea which has no more existence out of the mind, than any other abstract idea or general term. In virtue, however, of that powerful tendency in the human mind to make the reality conformable to the idea, a tendency which has been at the bottom of so much confusion in philosophy, this general conception has been converted into an objective entity, and allowed to tyrannize over the understanding. A metaphysical abstraction has been made into a spiritual entity and a complete barrier thereby interposed in the way of positive investigation."

The passages quoted above are a fair specimen of the kind of reasoning in which scientific men frequently indulge. In the first quotation, there are two clauses presented as equivalent, which are in fact essentially different; and substituting the one for the other is just a silent and subtle begging of the question. The first says that every mental act is attended by a molecular change in the brain. The other in effect says, the molecular change is the mental act. These two propositions are as different as day and night. The theory is that a certain kind of molecular motion in iron is heat; and a certain kind of molecular motion in the brain is thought. And all the proof, as far as the latter is concerned, is that the one attends the other. But the formation of an image on the retina attends sight, and yet does not prove that the image is our consciousness when we see.

Again, in the second passage, Dr. Maudsley says that "mind is an abstract idea," which has no existence outside "of the mind," i.e., outside of itself. An abstract idea has an abstract idea, which it makes into an objective entity. Men who deny the objective existence of mind, can no more think, speak, or write without recognizing its existence, than an idealist can act without recognizing the existence of the external world. Any theory which involves a denial of the laws of our nature is of necessity absurd.

The German Physicists.

As might be expected, the scientific men of the continent are more outspoken in their Materialism than those of England. A late German writer, Th. Otto Berger, Oberlehrer fur Mathematik and Physik, [225] says: Materialism is the philosophy of the five senses, it

admits nothing but on the testimony of sensation, and therefore denies the existence of the soul, of God, and of everything supersensuous. In its modern form, it teaches that as the material is alone true and real, it is uncreated and eternal. It always has been and always will be. It is indestructible, and, in its elements, unchangeable. Force is inseparable from matter. According to the theory no matter is without force, and no force is without matter. No force exists of itself; and, therefore, there is none to which the creation of matter is to be referred. The universe as it now is, is due to the gradual evolution of the two elements, matter and force; which evolution proceeds under the operation of fixed laws. The lower organisms are first formed; then the higher, until man appears. All life, whether animal, vegetable, or spiritual, is due to the working of physical and chemical forces in matter. As no power exists but in matter, there can be no divine Being with creative power nor any created human soul. Berger quotes Virchow as saying, "The scientific naturalist knows only bodies and the properties of bodies." All that is beyond them he pronounces "transcendental, and the transcendental is the chimerical." He also quotes B. C. Vogt, as saying, "We admit of no creator, either in the beginning, or in the course of the world's history; and regard the idea of a self-conscious, extramundane creator as ridiculous." Man, according to these writers, consists only of a material body; all mental acts and states are of the brain. When the body dies, the man ceases to exist. "The only immortality," says Moleschott, "is, that when the body is disintegrated, its ammonia, carbonic acid, and lime, serve to enrich the earth, and to nourish plants, which feed other generations of men." [226]

F. Refutation.

As Materialism, in its modern form, in all that is essential to the theory, is the same that it was a thousand years ago, the old arguments against it are as available now as they ever were. Its fundamental affirmation is, that all the phenomena of the universe, physical, vital, and mental, are to be referred to unintelligent physical forces; and its fundamental negation is, that there is no such objective entity as mind or spirit. If, therefore, it can be shown that unintelligent force cannot account for all the phenomena of the universe; and that there is such an objective entity or substance, as mind, the theory is refuted. There are two methods of combating any given theory. The one is the scientific, which calls in question the accuracy or the completeness of the data on which it is founded, or the validity of the inferences deduced from them. The other is the shorter and easier method of the reductio ad absurdum. The latter is just as legitimate and valid as the former. It is to be remembered that every theory includes two factors; facts and principles; or, facts and inferences drawn from them. The facts may be admitted, when the principles or inferences may be denied. Thus the facts on which Materialists insist may, for the most part at least, be acknowledged; while the sweeping inferences which they draw from them, in the eye of reason may not be worth a straw. All such inferences must be rejected whenever they conflict with any well-established truth, whether of intuition, experience, or of divine revelation.

Three general theories have been proposed to solve the great problem of the universe: the Materialistic, the Pantheistic, and the Theistic. According to the first all the phenomena of the universe are due to matter and its forces; according to the second, in its most rational form, all power, activity, and life, are the power, activity, and life of the one universal mind. The third, or Theistic theory, assumes the existence of an infinite, extramundane God, who created matter, endowed with forces, and finite minds gifted with intelligence and

will; and that all the ordinary phenomena of the universe are proximately due to these physical and mental forces as constantly upheld and controlled by the omnipresent wisdom and power of God. It may be doubted whether any amount of argument can deepen the conviction that the Theistic solution of this great problem is the true one. It is seen to be true, because it is seen to be a solution. It satisfactorily accounts for all the facts of consciousness and observation. It satisfies the reason, the heart, and the conscience. It is in fact self-evidently true, in the sense that no man to whom it has been once proposed, can ever permanently shake off the conviction of its truth. The other theories are not solutions. They may account for some classes of facts, but not for others. Our present concern, however, is with Materialism.

Materialism contradicts the Facts of Consciousness.

1. The primary principle of all knowledge is the knowledge of self. This must be assumed. Unless we are we cannot know. This knowledge of self is a knowledge that we are something; a real existence; not merely a state or mode of something else; but that the self is a substance, a real, objective entity. It is, moreover, a knowledge not only that we are a substance, but also that we are an individual subsistence, which thinks, feels, and wills. Here, then, is mind, i.e., an individual, intelligent, voluntary agent, necessarily included in the first, and the most essential of all truths. If this be denied, then Hume is right, and we can know nothing. It is, moreover, included in this knowledge of the Self, that the body is not the Ego. Although the body is intimately, and even vitally united to the substance in which our personality resides, it is nevertheless objective to it. It is the organ which the Self uses, and by which it holds communion with the external world. That these are really facts of consciousness, and not merely dicta, or arbitrary assumptions, is clear because they are universally and of necessity recognized. They are imbedded in all human languages; they are involved in all expressions of human thought; they are of necessity assumed by those who theoretically deny them. The Materialist cannot think, or speak, or write, without assuming the existence of mind as distinct from matter, any more than the Idealist can live and act without assuming the existence of the external world.

Our knowledge of mind, therefore, as a thinking substance, is the first, and most certain, and the most indestructible of all forms of knowledge; because it is involved in self-knowledge, or self-consciousness, which is the indispensable condition of all knowledge. That which knows is, in the order of nature, before that which is known. It is impossible, therefore, that the Materialist can have any higher evidence of the existence of matter, or of force, than that which every man has, in his own consciousness, of the existence of mind. To deny the one is as unreasonable as to deny the other. Neither can be denied, except theoretically. As a matter of fact, every man believes in matter, and every man believes in mind. What are our sensations which are relied upon so confidently to give us knowledge of physical phenomena, but states of consciousness? If consciousness is to be trusted in reporting the testimony of the senses, why is it not to be trusted when it reports the facts of our interior life? If it is believed when it says there is something visible and tangible without us, why should it not be believed when it says there is something which thinks and wills within us? If unreliable in the one case, it is unreliable in the other; and if unreliable in either, the whole foundation of knowledge and of all faith is swept away. Confidence in the veracity of consciousness is our only security from the wildest, the most

irrational, and the most degrading skepticism.

It may be said, however, that the Materialist does not deny that there is something within us that thinks and wills. He only says that that something is the brain. This, however, is to ignore one half of the testimony which consciousness really bears. It testifies not only that there are such sensations as those of sight and touch, but that there is a real objective substance which is tangible and visible. That is to say, we believe in virtue of the constitution of our nature, and therefore of necessity, when we see or touch, that the objects of our sense-perceptions have a real, objective existence. This every man believes, and cannot help believing. And in like manner, when he thinks, feels, or wills, he believes, in virtue of the constitution of his nature, and therefore by a like necessity, that he himself is an intelligent, feeling, and voluntary substance. That is, he believes that the Self is mind, or spirit, to which the body is objective, and therefore different front the Self. The belief in mind, therefore, is involved in the belief of self-existence. Consciousness gives us the assurance that the Self is an intelligent, voluntary agent, or spirit.

2. Another fact of consciousness which Materialism denies, either avowedly or by necessary implication, is the fact of free agency. This, indeed, is involved in what has already been said. Nevertheless there are those who admit the existence of mind who deny that man is a free agent. It needs no proof that consciousness attests that men have the power of self-determination. Every man knows this to be true with regard to himself. Every man recognizes the fact with regard to his fellow-men. This again is a conviction which no obduracy of the conscience, and no sophistry of argument can permanently obliterate from the human mind. This, however, Materialism denies. Physical forces act necessarily and uniformly. In referring all mental action to physical forces, Materialism cannot but exclude all freedom of action. There is no spontaneity in chemical affinity, in light, heat, or electricity; yet to these forces all vital and mental phenomena are referred. If thought be a certain kind of molecular motion of the brain, it is no more free than that other kind of molecular motion called heat. And this is the more obviously true, if they are correlative, the one being changed into the other. Accordingly Materialists, as a general thing, are avowed necessitarians. This is not only true of the Positivists, but the doctrine that human action is determined by necessary laws, is the foundation of their whole system of Social Science. And Professor Huxley, as we have seen, pronounces a spontaneous act, from the nature of the case, an absurdity. It is for him a causeless effect. Every man, therefore, who knows that he is a free agent, knows that Materialism cannot be true.

3. Materialism contradicts the facts of our moral and religious Consciousness. Our moral perceptions are the clearest, the most certain, and the most authoritative of all of our cognitions. If a man is shut up to deny either the testimony of his senses or the truths of reason, on the one hand, or the testimony of his moral nature on the other, all experience shows that he will give up sense and reason, and bow to the authority of conscience. He cannot help it. No man can free himself from the sense of sin, or of accountability. These moral convictions involve in them, or, at least, necessitate the belief in a God to whom we must give an account. But Materialism, in banishing all mind in man, leaves nothing to be accountable; and in banishing all mind from the universe, leaves no Being to whom an account can be rendered. To substitute for an intelligent, extramundane, personal God, mere "inscrutable force," is a mockery, an insult. Our whole moral and religious nature declares

any such theory to be false. It cannot be true unless our whole nature be a lie. And our nature cannot be a lie, unless, as Sir William Hamilton says, the whole universe be "a dream of a dream." To call upon men to worship gravitation, and sing hallelujahs to the whirlwind, is to call upon them to derationalize themselves. The attempt is as idle as it is foolish and wicked.

This argument from the facts of consciousness against Materialism, is met by the assertion that consciousness is not to be trusted. Dr. Maudsley devotes the greater part of the first chapter of his book on the "Physiology of the Mind," to the establishment of this point. He argues that self-consciousness is unreliable in the information which it does give, and incompetent to give any account of a large part of our mental activity. lt gives no account of the mental phenomena of the infant, of the uncultivated adult, and of the insane; no account of the bodily conditions which underlie every mental manifestation; no account of the large field of unconscious mental action exhibited, not only in the unconscious assimilation of impressions, but in the registrations of ideas and of their associations, in their latent existence and influence when not active, and their recall into activity; and no account of the influence organically exerted on the brain by other organs of the body. That is, consciousness does not tell us all things, and sometimes tells us wrong. Cannot the same be said of the senses? Can they inform us of everything which goes on in the body? Do they not often deceive us? Are not the sensations of the delirious and the maniac altogether untrustworthy? Does it follow from this that our senses are never to be relied upon? What then becomes of the physical sciences, which are founded on the trustworthiness of the senses. The fact is that if the testimony of consciousness is not to be received as to our mental operations, it cannot be received as to our sensations. If we have no trustworthy evidence of the existence of mind, we have no valid evidence of the existence of matter; and there is no universe, no God. All is nothing.

Happily men cannot emancipate themselves from the laws of their nature. They cannot help believing the well-attested testimony of their senses, and they cannot help believing the testimony of consciousness as to their personal identity, and as to the real, objective existence of the soul as the subject of their thoughts, feelings, and volitions. As no man can refuse to believe that he has a body, so no man can refuse to believe that he has a soul, and that the two are distinct as the Self and the Not-Self.

Materialism contradicts the Truths of Reason.

1. It is intuitively true that every effect must have a cause. This does not mean merely that every effect must have an antecedent; or, as Hume says, that anything may be the cause of anything. Nor does it mean merely that every effect must have an efficient cause. But it means that the antecedent or cause of every effect must have that kind and degree of efficiency which will rationally account for the effect.

There are two general classes of effects with which we are familiar, and which are specifically different, and therefore must have specifically different causes. The one class consists of effects which do not, the other of those which do indicate design. In the latter we see evidence of a purpose, of foresight, of provision for the future, of adaptation, of choice, of spontaneity, as well as of power. In the former all these indications are absent. We see around us innumerable effects belonging to each of these classes. We see water constantly flowing from a higher to a lower level; vapor constantly ascending from the sea; heat

producing expansion, cord contraction, water extinguishing fire, alkalies correcting acidity, etc., etc. On the other hand, the world is crowded with works of human intelligence; with statues, pictures, houses, ships, complicated machines for different purposes, with books, libraries, hospitals prepared for the wants of the sick, with institutions of learning, etc., etc. No man can help believing that these classes of effects are specifically different, nor can he help believing that they are due to causes specifically different. In other words, it is self-evident that an unintelligent cause cannot produce an intelligent effect; it cannot purpose, foresee, organize, or choose. Professor Joule may determine through what space a weight must fall to produce a given amount of heat; but can he tell how far it must fall to write a poem, or produce a Madonna? Such a cause has no tendency to produce such an effect. And to suppose it to operate from eternity, is only to multiply eternally, nothing by nothing, it is nothing still.

If every man recognizes the absurdity of referring all the works of human ingenuity and intellect to unintelligent, physical force, how much greater is the absurdity of referring to blind force the immeasurably more stupendous, complicated, and ordered works of God, everywhere indicative of purpose, foresight, and choice. Of this absurdity Materialism is guilty. It teaches, in its modern form, that to carbonic acid, water, and ammonia, with the molecular forces they contain, is the causal efficiency to which all organisms from the fungus to man, and all vital and mental phenomena, are to be referred. This is the doctrine elaborately proposed and defended in Professor Huxley's paper on the "Physical Basis of Life." That paper is devoted to establishing two propositions. The first is, "That all animal and vegetable organisms are essentially alike in power, in form, and in substance; and the second, That all vital and intellectual functions are the properties of the molecular dispositions and changes of the material basis (protoplasm) of which the various animals and vegetables consist." [227] He even intimates, after referring to a clock which marks the time, and the phases of the moon, as an illustration of the vital and intellectual phenomena of the universe, as produced by molecular motions and combinations, "that the existing world lay potentially in the cosmic vapor; and that a sufficient intelligence could, from a knowledge of the properties of the molecules of that vapor, have predicted, say the state of the Fauna of Britain in 1869, with as much certainty as one can say what will happen to the vapor of the breath in a cold winters day." [228] On this it is obvious to remark, in the first place, that it is not one whit in advance of the theory of Epicurus propounded more than two thousand years ago. As the whole mass of thinking men have turned their backs on that theory from that day to this, it is not probable that the reassertion of it, however confidently made, will have much effect upon men who have either heads or hearts. In the second place, it gives no rational account of the origin of the universe, and of the wonders which it contains. It violates the fundamental intuitive truth that every effect must have an adequate cause, inasmuch as it refers intelligent effects to unintelligent causes; all the libraries in the world, for example, to "the properties of the molecules," of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia.

2. A second truth of Reason which Materialism contradicts is that an infinite succession of effects is as unthinkable as a self-supporting chain of an infinite number of links. The modern doctrine is that lifeless matter never becomes living except when brought into contact with previous living matter. It is the office of the living plant to take up the dead elements of the inorganic world and imbue them with life. The plant, therefore, must

either precede protoplasm, which is impossible, as it is composed of protoplasm; or the protoplasm must precede the plant, which is equally impossible, because the plant alone, in the first instance, can make protoplasm; or there must be an infinite succession. That is, an infinite number of causeless effects, which is no less impossible. The doctrine of spontaneous generation, or of life originating out of dead matter, is repudiated by the most advanced advocates of the modern form of Materialism. Professor Huxley has done the cause of truth good service by his able refutation of that doctrine. [229] Whatever may be the ultimate decision of the question as to the origin of life, it is enough for the present that the modern advocates of Materialism admit that living matter can only come from matter already alive. This admission, it is now urged, is fatal to their theory, as it necessitates the assumption of an eternal effect. If dead matter can only be made alive by previous living matter, there must be a source of life outside of matter, or life never could have begun.

Materialism inconsistent with the Facts of Experience.

It is generally admitted that in nature, i.e., in the external world, there are four distinct spheres, or, as they are sometimes called, planes of existence. First, the common chemical compounds, which constitute the mineral kingdom; second, the vegetable kingdom; third, the irrational animal world; and fourth, Man. It is admitted that all the resources of science are incompetent to raise matter from one of these planes to another. The plant contains ingredients derived from the mineral kingdom, with something specifically different. The animal contains all that is in the plant, with something specifically different. Man contains all that enters into the constitution of the plant and animal, with something specifically different. The lifeless elements of the mineral kingdom, under "the influence of pre&#xfffd;xistent living matter," and not otherwise, become living and life supporting matter in the plant. The products of vegetable life, in like manner, become the matter of animal tissues and organs, but only under the influence of pre&#xfffd;xisting living animal tissues. So, also, the products of the vegetable and animal kingdoms are received into the human system, and become connected with the functions and phenomena of the intellectual and moral life of man, but never otherwise than in the person of a man. This outstanding fact, vouched for by the whole history of our globe, proves that there is something in the plant which is not in lifeless matter; somethiing in the animal which is not in the plant, and something in man which is not in the animal. To assume, with the Materialist, that the organizing life of the plant comes out of lifeless matter; that the sensitive and voluntary life of the animal comes out of the insensible and involuntary life of the plant; or that the rational, moral, and spiritual life of Man comes out of the constituents of the animal, is to assume as a fact something which all experience contradicts. We are not forgetful of the theories which refer these different grades or orders of existence to some process of natural development. We here, however, refer only to the outstanding fact of history, that, in the sphere of human experience, lifeless matter does not become organizing and living, in virtue of its own physical forces; nor the plant an animal; nor the animal a man from anything in the plant or animal, but only in virtue of an ab extra vital influence. It is indeed said that as the same chemical elements combined in one way, have certain properties; and when combined in another way, have other properties; so the same elements combined in one way in lifeless matter and in other ways, in plants, animals, and man, may account for all their distinctive characteristics. But it is to be remembered that the properties of chemical compounds, however varied, are chemical, and nothing more; whereas, in vital organisms the properties

or phenomena are specifically different from mere chemical effects. They have no relation to each other, any more than gravity to beauty; and, therefore, the one cannot account for the other.

Materialism is Atheistic.

Atheism is the denial of an extramundane personal God. In saying that Materialism is Atheism, it is not meant that all Materialists are atheists. Some, as for example, Dr. Priestley, confine the application of their principles to the existing order of things. They admit the being of God to whom they refer the creation of the world. The number, however, of such illogical Materialists is small. Leaving out of view these exceptional cases, the philosophers of this school may be divided into three classes, --

(1.) Avowed atheists. To this class belong the Epicureans; the French skeptics of the last century; the Positivists; and a large part of the physicists of the present generation, especially in Europe. (2.) Those who repudiate the charge of atheism, because they admit the necessary existence of an inscrutable force. But inscrutable force is not God. In rejecting the doctrine of an extramundane Spirit, self-conscious, intelligent, and voluntary, the First Cause of all things, they reject Theism; and the denial of Theism is Atheism. (3.) Those whose principles involve the denial of an extramundane God. To this class belong all those who deny the distinction between matter and mind; who deny the "supersensual," and "supernatural," who affirm that physical force is the only kind of force of which we have any knowledge; and who maintain that thought is in such a sense a product of the brain, that where there is no brain there can be no thought. Bchner, who although an avowed atheist, is, as to this point, a fair representative of the whole school, says that the fundamental principle (der oberste Grundsatz) of our philosophy is, "No matter without force; and no force without matter." "A spirit without a body," he adds, "is as unthinkable as electricity or magnetism without the matter of which they are affections." [230] This he makes the ground of his argument to prove the impossibility of the existence of the soul after death. The principle, if admitted, is equally conclusive against the existence of God. As Materialism leaves us no God to reverence and trust, no Being to whom we are responsible; and as it denies any conscious existence after death, it can be adopted only on the sacrifice of the higher attributes of our nature; and its whole tendency must be to demoralize and degrade.

The Correlation of Physical and Vital and Mental Forces.

Besides the considerations urged above against Materialism as a general theory, it may be proper to say a few words in reference to its modern scientific form. It is admitted that it is the province of scientific men to discuss scientific questions; and that much injury to the cause of truth has followed the attempts of men not devoted to such pursuits, undertaking to adjudicate in such cases. Physicists are wont to take high ground on this subject, and to warn off as intruders all metaphysicians and theologians, all who are devoted to the study of the supersensuous and the supernatural. They are not allowed to be heard on questions of science. The rule must work both ways. If metaphysicians and theologians must be silent on matters of science, then scientific men devoted to the study of the sensuous, are not entitled to be dictatorial in what regards the supersensuous. A man may be so habituated to deal with quantity and number, as to become incapable of appreciating beauty or moral truth. In like manner a man may be so devoted to the

examination of what his senses reveal, as to come to believe that the sensible alone is true and real. The senses have their rights, and so have reason and conscience; and the votaries of sense are not entitled to claim the whole domain of knowledge as exclusively their own.

While, therefore, it is conceded that it belongs specially to scientific men to deal with scientific subjects, yet other classes have some rights which are not to be denied. They have the right to judge for themselves on the validity of the arguments of scientific men; and they have the right to appeal from one scientific man to another, and from the few to the many. So far as the correlation of physical and vital forces is concerned, it is not only a new doctrine, but as yet is adopted only by "advanced thinkers," as they are called, and call themselves. Dr. H. B. Jones, F. R. S., one of the more modest advocates of the doctrine, [231] says, "We are only just entering upon the inquiry how far our ideas of conservation and correlation of energy can be extended to the biological sciences." And certain it is that the leading men of science, both in Europe and America, are firm believers in vital and mental forces, as distinct in kind, from all physical forces operative in the inorganic world.

The Arguments for such Correlation are Invalid.

The Argument from Analogy.

It has already been stated on the authority of the advocates of the theory, that their first and most important argument in its support is from analogy. The physical forces are all correlated; one is convertible into either of the others; all may be resolved into motion. This creates, as it is said, a strong presumption, that all force, whatever its phenomena, is essentially the same thing. If one kind of motion is heat, another electricity, another light, it is fair to infer that vitality is only another kind of motion, and thought and feeling another. As there is no reason for assuming a specific force for light, and another for heat, therefore it is unnecessary, and unphilosophical, to assume a specific kind of force to account for vital or mental phenomena. Prof. Barker of Yale College, says, [232] "Today, as truly as seventy-five years ago when Humboldt wrote, the mysterious and awful phenomena of life, are commonly attributed to some controlling agent residing in the organism -- to some independent presiding deity, holding it in absolute subjection." This presiding agent is called "vital fluid," "materia vit[illegible] diffusa," "vital force." "All these names," he adds, "assume the existence of a material or immaterial something, more or less separable from the material body, and more or less identical with the mind or soul, which is the cause of the phenomena of living beings. But as science moved irresistibly onward, and it became evident that the forces of inorganic nature were neither deities nor imponderable fluids, separable from matter, but were simple affections of it, analogy demanded a like concession in behalf of vital force. From the notion that the effects of heat were due to an imponderable fluid called caloric, discovery passed to the conviction that heat was but a motion of material particles, and hence inseparable from matter; to a like assumption concerning vitality [namely, that it also is but a motion of material particles], it was now but a step. The more advanced thinkers in science of today, therefore, look upon the life of the living form as inseparable from its substance, and believe that the former is purely phenomenal, and only a manifestation of the latter. Denying the existence of a special vital force as such, they retain the term only to express the sum of the phenomena of living beings."

The argument from analogy is presented, as we have seen, in another form, by Huxley

and others. The properties of water are very different from those of the hydrogen and oxygen of which it s composed. Yet no one supposes that those properties are due to anything else than the material composition of the water itself. So also the phenomena of living matter, and of the human brain, are very different from those of the elements which enter into their constitution; but this affords no presumption that there is any "vital force" or "mind" to account for this difference any more than the peculiar properties of water justify the assumption of the existence of anything distinct from its material element. Vitality and mind, we are told, have no better philosophical status than aquosity.

Dr. Stirling [233] states the case thus: "If it is by its mere chemical and physical structure that water exhibits certain properties called aqueous, it is also by its mere chemical and physical structure that protoplasm exhibits certain properties called vital. All that is necessary in either case is, 'under certain conditions,' to bring the chemical constituents together. If water is a molecular complication, protoplasm is equally a molecular complication, and for the description of the one or the other, there is no change of language required. A new substance with new qualities results in precisely the same way here, as a new substance with new qualities there; and the derivative qualities are not more different from the primitive qualities in the one instance, than the derivative qualities are different from the primitive qualities in the other. Lastly, the modus operandi of pre-existent protoplasm is not more unintelligible than that of the electric spark. The conclusion is irresistible, then, that all protoplasm being reciprocally convertible, and consequently identical, the properties it displays, vitality and intellect included, are as much the result of molecular constitution, as those of water itself." This analogy is two-fold; having reference to chemical composition on the one hand, and to the antecedent stimulus which determines it on the other. "As regards chemical composition, we are asked, by virtue of the analogy obtaining, to identify, as equally simple instances of it, protoplasm here and water there; and, as it regards the stimulus in question, we are asked to admit the action of the electric spark in the one case to be quite analogous to the action of pre-xisting protoplasm in the other."

In answer to this argument Dr. Stirling goes on to show that the analogy holds only as to chemical and physical properties. "One step farther and we see not only that protoplasm has, like water, a chemical and physical structure; but that, unlike water, it has also an organized or organic structure. Now this, on the part of protoplasm, is a possession in excess; and with relation to that excess there can be no grounds for analogy." "Living protoplasm, namely, is identical with dead protoplasm," says Dr. Stirling, "only so far as its chemistry is concerned (if even so much as that); and it is quite evident, consequently, that difference between the two cannot depend on that in which they are identical -- cannot depend on the chemistry. Life, then, is no affair of chemical and physical structure, and must find its explanation in something else. It is thus that, lifted high enough, the light of the analogy between water and protoplasm is seen to go out." [234] Water and its elements, hydrogen and oxygen, are as to the kind of power which they exhibit on a level. "But not so protoplasm, where, with preservation of the chemical and physical likeness there is the addition of the unlikeness of life, of organization, and of ideas. But the addition is a new world -- a new and higher world, the world of a self-realizing thought, the world of an entelechy." [235] "There are certainly different states of water, as ice and steam; but the relation of the solid to the liquid, or of either to the vapor, surely offers no analogy to the

relation of protoplasm dead to protoplasm alive. That relation is not an analogy but an antithesis, the antithesis of antitheses. In it, in fact, we are in the presence of the one incommunicable gulf -- the gulf of all gulfs -- that gulf which Mr. Huxley's protoplasm is as powerless to efface as any other material expedient that has ever been suggested since the eyes of men first looked into it -- the mighty gulf between death and life." [236]

"The differences alluded to (they are, in order, organization and life, the objective idea -- design, and the subjective idea -- thought), it may be remarked, are admitted by those very Germans to whom protoplasm, name and thing, is due. They, the most advanced and innovating of them, directly avow that there is present in the cell 'an architectonic principle that has not yet been detected.' In pronouncing protoplasm capable of active or vital movements, they do by that refer, they admit also, to an immaterial force, and they ascribe the processes exhibited by protoplasm -- in so many words -- not to the molecules, but to organization and life." [237]

"Was it molecular powers that invented a respiration -- that perforated the posterior ear to give a balance of air; that compensated the fenestra ovalis by a fenestra rotunda; that placed in the auricular sacs those otolithes, those express stones for hearing? Such machinery! The chord tendine are, to the valves of the heart, exactly adjusted check-strings; and the contractile column carne are set in, under contraction and expansion, to equalize their length to their office. . . . . Are we to conceive such machinery, such apparatus, such contrivances, merely molecular? Are molecules adequate to such things -- molecules in their blind passivity, and dead, dull, insensibility? . . . . Surely in the presence of these manifest ideas, it is impossible to attribute the single peculiar feature of protoplasm -- its vitality, namely -- to mere molecular chemistry. Protoplasm, it is true, breaks up into carbon, hydrogen, oxygen, and nitrogen, as water does into hydrogen and oxygen; but the watch breaks similarly up into mere brass, and steel, and glass. The loose materials of the watch -- even its chemical material if you will -- replace its weight, quite as accurately as the constituents, carbon, etc., replace the weight of the protoplasm. But neither these nor those replace the vanished idea, which was alone the important element." [238] There is, therefore, something in protoplasm which cannot be weighed or otherwise measured, and to which the vital phenomena are to be referred.

If then the argument from analogy fails in its application to vital phenomena, there can be no pretence that it is valid in its application to the phenomena of mind. If we refuse to take the first step, even Professor Huxley cannot require us to take those which follow.

Further Arguments of the Materialists.

Besides the analogical argument, Materialists insist that there is direct evidence of the correlation of physical, with vital, and mental force. Let it be remembered what this means. Correlated forces are such as may be converted, the one into the other, and which are consequently in their nature identical. The thing, therefore, in this case, to be proved is that light, heat, etc., can be changed into life and thought, and that the latter are identical with the former, both classes being resolvable into motion of the molecules of matter.

The proof is substantially this. The animal body generates heat by the combustion of the carbon of the food which it receives, precisely as heat is produced by the combustion of carbon out of the body. And it has been experimentally proved that the quantity of heat produced in the body, is precisely the same due allowances being made, as the same

amount of carbon would produce if burnt out of the body. Vital heat, therefore, is identical with physical heat.

Again, muscular force is produced precisely in the same way as physical force. The potential energy of the fuel moves the steam engine. Its work or power is measured and determined by the amount of power stored in the wood or coal consumed in its production. The source and measure of muscular power, are in like manner to be found in the food we eat. Its potential energy, derived from the sun as is the case with the potential energy of wood and coal, when liberated, produces its due amount, so much and no more, of muscular power. Muscular power, therefore, is as purely physical, produced in the same way, and measured by the same standard, as the power of the steam-engine.

In like manner, "nervous energy, or that form of force, which, on the one hand, stimulates a muscle to contract, and on the other, appears in forms called mental," is merely physical. It comes from the food we eat. It moves. The rate of its motion is determined to be ninety-seven feet in a second. Its effects are analogous to those of electricity. It is, therefore, for these and similar reasons, inferred that "nerve-force is a transmuted potential energy." This is no less true of nerve-force when manifested in the form of thought and feeling. Every external manifestation of thought-force, argues Professor Huxley, is a muscular one, and therefore analogous to other forces producing similar effects. Besides, it has been proved that every exercise of thought or feeling is attended by an evolution of heat, which shows that thought is resolved into heat. "Can we longer doubt, then, that the brain, too, is a machine for the conversion of energy? Can we longer refuse to believe that even thought is, in some mysterious way, correlated to the other natural forces? and this, even in face of the fact that it has never yet been measured?" [239]

To unscientific men of ordinary intelligence, to men not devoted to the study of the sensuous, it is a matter of astonishment that such arguments should be regarded as valid. Admitting all the above facts,what do they prove? Admitting that animal heat is the same in source and nature with heat outside the body; admitting that muscular power is physical in its nature and mode of production; admitting that nerve-force is also physical; what then? Do these facts give any solution of the mysteries of life, of organization, alimentation, or reproduction? Do they in any measure account for the formation of the eye or ear; for the mutual relations and interdependence of the organs of the body? Admitting these forces to be physical; who or what uses them? What guides their operation so as to answer a preconceived design? Admitting muscular power to be physical, what calls it into exercise at one time and not at another; beginning, continuing, or suspending it, at pleasure? It is plain that the facts adduced, are no solution either of vital or of voluntary phenomena. And when we come to thought, admitting that mental action is attended by a development of heat, does that prove that thought and heat are identical? When ashamed we blush, when afraid we become pale; do these facts prove that shame and fear and their bodily effects are one and the same thing? Does concomitancy prove identity? In proving the former, do you establish the latter? Do the facts adduced prove that shame is heat and heat shame, and that the one may be converted into the other? All the world knows that sorrow produces tears; but no one infers from this coincidence that sorrow and salt water are identical. Even Professor Tyndall, one of "the advanced thinkers," tells the Materialists, that when they have proved everything they claim to prove, they have proved nothing. They leave the

connection between mind and body precisely where it was before. [240]

Direct Arguments against the Theory of the Correlation of Physical, and Vital, and Mental Forces

1. They are heterogeneous. All physical forces are alike. They all tend to produce motion. They all tend to equilibrium. They are all measurable, by weight, or velocity, or by their sensible effects. They are all unintelligent. They act by necessity, without choice, without reference to an end. In all these respects mental forces are directly the reverse. They do not produce motion, they only guide and control it. They resist a state of equilibrium. They counteract physical force. As soon as vitality is gone, the chemical forces come into play and the plant or animal decays. They cannot be measured. Forces which do not admit of measurement, do not admit of correlation, for correlation involves sameness in quantity. "Thought," says President Barnard, "cannot be a physical force, because thought admits of no measure. I think it will be conceded without controversy that there is no form of material substance, and no known force of a physical nature (and there are no other forces), of which we cannot in some form definitely express the quantity, by reference to some conventional measuring unit. . . . No such means of measuring mental action has been suggested. No such means can be conceived. . . . . Now, I maintain that a thing which is unsusceptible of measure cannot be a quantity; and that a thing that is not even a quantity, cannot be a force." [241]

Again, vital and mental force act with intelligence, with forethought, with freedom, and with design. Wherever the intelligence may reside, it is perfectly evident that all vital operations are carried on in execution of a purpose. Heat and electricity can no more fashion an eye than brass and steel can make a watch, or pen and paper write a book. Intelligent force, therefore, differs in kind from unintelligent force. They are not only different, but contradictory; the affirmation of the one is the negation of the other.

Professor Joseph Henry.

Prof. Joseph Henry, of the Smithsonian Institute, is admitted to be one of the most eminent naturalists of the age; distinguished not only for the thoroughness of his researches, but for soundness of judgment, and for the rare gift of being able to appreciate different kinds of evidence. He admits the correlation of physical forces, but protests against the obliteration of the distinction between them and vitality and mind. "The body," he says, "has been called 'the house we live in,' but it may be more truly denominated the machine we employ, which, furnished with power, and all the appliances for its use, enables us to execute the intentions of our intelligence, to gratify our moral natures, and to commune with our fellow beings. This view of the nature of the body is the furthest removed possible from Materialism; it requires a separate thinking principle. To illustrate this, let us suppose a locomotive engine equipped with steam, water, fuel, -- in short, with the potential energy necessary to the exhibition of immense mechanical power; the whole remains in a state of dynamic equilibrium, without motion, or signs of life or intelligence. Let the engineer now open a valve which is so poised as to move with the slightest touch, and almost with a volition to let on the power to the piston; the machine now awakes, as it were, into life. It rushes forward with tremendous power; it stops instantly, it returns again, it may be, at the command of the master of the train; in short, it exhibits signs of life and intelligence. Its power is now controlled by mind -- it has, as it were, a soul within it." [242] This

illustration holds just so far as it was intended to hold. The intellect which controls the engine is not in it, nor is it affected by its changes. Nevertheless, in the body, as well as in the engine, the controlling intellect is equally distinct from the physical force, which both so wonderfully exhibit.

In more direct reference to vitality, Professor Henry says: "Vitality gives startling evidence of the immediate presence of a direct, divine, and spiritual essence, operating with the ordinary forces of nature, but being in itself entirely distinct from them. This view of the subject is absolutely necessary in carrying out the mechanical theory of the equivalency of heat and the correlation of the ordinary physical forces. Among the latter vitality has no place, and knows no subjection to the laws by which they are governed." [243]

Dr. Beale.

Dr. Beale [244] is equally explicit. He constantly insists that what acts voluntarily, with choice to accomplish an end, cannot be physical; and that in vital and mental operations there is unquestionable evidence of such voluntary action. He says, "I regard 'vitality' as a power of a peculiar kind, exhibiting no analogy whatever to any known forces. It cannot be a property of matter, because it is in all respects essentially different in its actions from all acknowledged properties of matter. The vital property belongs to a different category altogether." [245] He argues also to prove that organization cannot be referred to physical force. "It cannot be maintained that the atoms arrange themselves, and devise what positions each is to take up, -- and it would be yet more extravagant to attribute to ordinary force or energy, atomic rule and directive agency. We might as well try to make ourselves believe that the laboratory fire made and lighted it self, that the chemical compounds put themselves into the crucible, and the solutions betook themselves to the beakers in the proper order, and in the exact proportions required to form certain definite compounds. But while all will agree that it is absurd to ignore the chemist in the laboratory, many insist upon ignoring the presence of anything representing the chemist in the living matter which they call the 'cell-laboratory.' In the one case the chemist works and guides, but in the other, it is maintained, the lifeless molecules of matter are themselves the active agents in developing vital phenomena. . . . No one has proved, and no one can prove, that mind and life are in any way related to chemistry and mechanics. . . . Neither can it be said that life works with physical and chemical forces, for there is no evidence that this is so. On the other hand it is quite certain that life overcomes, in some very remarkable and unknown manner, the influence of physical forces and chemical affinities." [246] On a former page he had said, "In order to convince people that the actions of living beings are not due to any mysterious vitality or vital force or power, but are in fact physical and chemical in their nature, Professor Huxley gives to matter which is alive, to matter which is dead, and to matter which is completely changed by roasting or boiling, the very same name. The matter of sheep and mutton and man and lobster and egg is the same, and, according to Huxley, one may be transubstantiated into the other. But how? By 'subtle influences,' and 'under sundry circumstances,' answers this authority. And all these things alive, or dead, or roasted, he tells us are made of protoplasm, and this protoplasm is the physical basis of life, or the basis of physical life. But can this discoverer of 'subtle influences' afford to sneer at the fiction of vitality? By calling things which differ from one

another in many qualities by the same name, Huxley seems to think he can annihilate distinctions, enforce identity, and sweep away the difficulties which have impeded the progress of previous philosophers in their search after unity. Plants, and worms, and men are all protoplasm, and protoplasm is albuminous matter, and albuminous matter consists of four elements, and these four elements possess certain properties, by which properties all differences between plants, and worms, and men, are to be accounted for. Although Huxley would probably admit that a worm was not a man, he would tell us that by 'subtle influences' the one thing might be easily converted into the other, and not by such nonsensical fictions as 'vitality,' which can neither be weighed, measured, nor conceived." [247]

In the latter portion of his book Dr. Beale shows that the brain is not a gland to secrete thought as the liver does bile; nor is thought a function of the brain, nor the result of mechanical or chemical action; nor is the brain a voltaic battery giving shocks of thought, as Stuart Mill conjectures; but it is the organ of the mind, not for generating, but for expressing thought.

Mr. Wallace.

To quote only one more authority, we refer to the eminent naturalist Wallace, the friend and associate of Darwin, and the zealous defender of his theory. "If," says he, "a material element, or a combination of a thousand material elements in a molecule, are alike unconscious, it is impossible for us to believe, that the more addition of one, two, or a thousand other material elements to form a more complex molecule, could in any way tend to produce a self-conscious existence. To say that mind is a product or function of protoplasm, or of its molecular changes, is to use words to which we can attach no clear conception. You cannot have, in the whole, what does not exist in any of the parts; . . . . either all matter is conscious, or consciousness is something distinct from matter; and in the latter case, its presence in material forms is a proof of the existence of conscious beings, outside of, and independent of, what we term matter." [248]

Vital and Physical Forces not Convertible.

2. A second argument against the doctrine of the correlation of vital and physical forces is that in fact they are not convertible. Motion and heat are said to be correlated, because one can be changed into the other, measure for measure. But no one has ever changed death into life, dead matter into living matter. This Professor Huxley admits. If the simplest living cell once dies, all the science in the world cannot make it alive. What is dead can be made alive only by being taken up and assimilated by that which is still living. The life, therefore, is not due to the chemical properties of that which is dead. So far as chemistry is concerned, there is no known difference between protoplasm dead and protoplasm alive; and yet there is all the difference between them of life and death. That difference, therefore, is not chemical. Until scientific men can actually change heat and electricity into life, and go about raising the dead, men will be slow to believe that heat and life are identical; and until they can transmute physical force into intelligence and will, they cannot convert "thinkers" into Materialists.

3. Another argument against this theory is the inadequacy of the cause to the assumed effect. The doctrine is that the relation between correlated forces is quantitive; so much of the one will produce so much of the other. But we know that great mental agitation may be

produced by the mere sight of certain objects, and that these mental states may call into action violent muscular force. According to the hypothesis, the impression on the nerves of sight or hearing is first transformed into mental force, and that again into muscular and molar energy. This, President Barnard, who presents this argument, pronounces to be absurd, "since it makes a small force equivalent to a large one." [249]

President Barnard further argues against this theory from the fact that the mental states produced by impressions on the senses are, at least in many cases, obviously due not to the physical impression, but to the idea therewith connected. If you insult a Frenchman in English, it produces no effect; if the insult be expressed in his own language, it rouses him to fury. The meaning of the words is not a physical force, and yet it is to the meaning the effect is due. Dr. Barnard says, "when it is demanded of us to pronounce as physicists that spiritual existence is an absurdity and religion a dream, it seems to me that no choice is left us but to proclaim our dissent, or to be understood by our silence to accept the doctrine as our own. When such is the alternative, for one I feel bound to speak, and to declare my conviction that as physicists we have nothing to do with mental philosophy; and that in endeavouring to reduce the phenomena of mind under the laws of matter, we wander beyond our depth, we establish nothing certain, we bring ridicule upon the name of positive science, and achieve but a single undeniable result, that of unsettling in the minds of multitudes convictions which form the basis of their chief happiness." [250]

4. Physicists cannot carry out their own theory. Even those least susceptible of the force of the supersensuous, are compelled to admit that there is more in mental and vital action than blind physical force can account for. Dr. Carpenter, as we have seen, assumes the presence of "a directive agency;" the Germans of an "architectonic principle" unknown, and uncorrelated, in living matter, to explain undeniable facts for which physical force furnishes no solution. Others, whose spiritual nature is not so entirely subjected to the sensible, break down entirely. Thus Professor Barker, of Yale College, after devoting his whole lecture to prove that vital force and even thought "are correlated to other natural forces" (i.e., identical with them), comes at the end to ask: "Is it only this? Is there not behind this material substance, a higher than molecular power in the thoughts which are immortalized in the poetry of a Milton or a Shakespeare, the art creations of a Michael Angelo or a Titan, the harmonies of a Mozart or a Beethoven? Is there really no immortal portion separable from this brain-tissue, though yet mysteriously united to it? In a word, does this curiously fashioned body inclose a soul, God-given, and to God returning? Here science veils her face, and bows in reverence before the Almighty. We have passed the boundaries by which physical science is inclosed. No crucible, no subtle magnetic needle can answer now our questions. No word but His who formed us can break the awful silence. In the presence of such a revelation science is dumb, and faith comes in joyfully to accept that higher truth which can never be the object of physical demonstration." [251]

It thus appears, after all, that there is in man a soul; that the soul is not the body, nor a function of it; that it is the subject and agent of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. But this is precisely the thing which the lecture is devoted to disproving. Thus Professor Barker's science gives up the ghost at the feet of his religion. It quenches its torch in the fountain of an order of truths higher than those which admit of "physical demonstration." The proton pseudos of the whole theory is, that nothing is true which cannot be physically

demonstrated; that is, which cannot be felt, weighed, or otherwise measured.

Wallace, the Naturalist.

A still more striking illustration of the insufficiency of materialistic principles is furnished by the distinguished naturalist, Alfred Russel Wallace, above quoted. After devoting his whole book to the defence of the doctrine of natural selection, which refers the origin of all species arid genera of plants and animals to the blind operation of physical forces, he comes to the conclusion that there are no such forces; that all is "Mind." Matter has no existence. Matter is force, and force is mind; so that "the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is the WILL of higher intelligences, or one Supreme Intelligence." [252] He holds that instead of admitting the existence of an unknown something called matter, and that mind is "another thing, either a product of this matter and its supposed inherent forces, or distinct from, and co-existent with it;" . . . it is a "far simpler and more consistent belief, that matter, as an entity distinct from force, does not exist; and that force is a product of Mind. Philosophy," he adds, "had long demonstrated our incapacity to prove the existence of matter, as usually conceived, while it admitted the demonstration to each of us of our own self-conscious, ideal existence. Science has now worked its way up to the same result, and this agreement between them should give us some confidence in their combined teaching." [253] Thus, by one step, the gulf between Materialism and idealistic pantheism is passed. This, at least, is a concession that physical forces cannot account for the phenomena of life and mind; and that in conceding that Materialism as a theory is false.

The great mistake of Materialists is that they begin at the wrong end. They begin with blind, lifeless matter; and endeavor to deduce from it and its molecular changes, all the infinite marvels of organization, life, and intelligence which the universe exhibits. This is an attempt to make everything out of nothing. The human mind, in its normal state, always begins with God; who, as the Bible teaches us, is an Infinite Spirit, and therefore self-conscious, intelligent, and voluntary; the creator of all things; of matter with its properties, and of finite minds with their powers; and who controls all things by his ever present wisdom and might; so that all the intelligence indicated in unintelligent forces is only one form of the infinite intelligence of God. This is the solution of the problem of the universe given in the Scriptures; a solution which satisfies our whole nature, rational, moral, and religious.

All works on Psychology, and on the history of Philosophy, contain discussions on the principles of Materialism. Chapter iv. of Dr. Buchanan's able work, "Faith in God and Modern Atheism Compared," is devoted to the history and examination of that theory. See also chapter ii. of the Introduction to Professor Porter's elaborate work, "The Human Intellect." Professor Porter gives, on page 40, a copious account of the literature of the subject. In Herzog's "Real-Encyklop&#65533;die," article Materialismus, an account is given of the principal recent German works against the modern form of the doctrine.

Among the most important works on this subject, besides the writings of Comte and his English disciples, J. Stuart Mill, and H. G. Lewes, are Herbert Spencer's "First Principles of a New System of Philosophy," and his "Biology" in two volumes; Maudsley's "Physiology and Pathology of Mind;" Laycock (Professor in the University of Edinburgh), "Mind and Brain;" Huxley's "Discourse on the Physical Basis of Life;" his "Evidence of

Man's Place in Nature" and "Introduction to the Classification of Animals:" and his "Lay Sermons and Essays;" Professor Tyndall's "Essay on Heat;" "The Correlation and Conservation of Forces: A Series of Expositions, by Professor Grove, Professor Helmholtz, Dr. Mayer, Dr. Faraday, Professor Liebig, and Dr. Carpenter; with an Introduction by Edward L. Youmans, M. D.; "Alexander Bain (Professor of Logic in the University of Aberdeen), "The Senses and the Intellect;" "The Emotions and the Will;" "Mental and Moral Science;" "Kraft und Stoff, von Ludwig B&#65533;chner. Zehnte Auflage. Leipzig, 1869." By the same author, "Die Stellung des Menschen in der Natur in Vergangenheit, Gegenwart und Zukunft. Oder Woher kommen wir? Wer sind wir? Wohin gehen wir? Leipzig, 1869." Also, "Sechs Vorlesungen uber die Darwin'sche Theorie von der Verwandlung der Arten und die erste Entstehung der Organismenwelt. Leipzig, 1868."

[172] See Youman's Conservation and Correlation of Forces, p. 372.

[173] Croonian Lectures on Matter and Force. Given at the Royal College of Physicians, in 1868. By Henry Bruce Jones, A.M., M.D., F.R.S., London, 1868, p. 17.

[174] Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, i. 303-318. Ritter's History of Philosophy, translated by A. J. W. Morrison, iii. 399-447.

[175] F. Fabri.

[176] Leviathan, chap. i.

[177] Morell's History of Modern Philosohy, New York, 1848, pp. 71, 72.

[178] Observations on Man, chap. i. sect. 2, and Morell, p. 98.

[179] Morell, p. 92.

[180] Morell, p. 97.

[181] Edinburgh Review, Oct. 1806, p. 157.

[182] "Address before British Association," Athen&#65533;um, for August 29, 1868. Quoted by Perowne's Hulsean Lectures, for 1868. Appendix. Note A.

[183] Page 102.

[184] F. Fabri in Herzog's Real-Encyclop&#65533;die, art. "Materialismus."

[185] New York, 1855.

[186] Vol. i. p. 5.

[187] Philosophie Positive, vol. ii. p. 515.

[188] Vol. i. p. 11.

[189] Vol. ii. p. 47.

[190] Ibid. p. 73.

[191] See Prof. Porter's Human Intellect, p. 54.

[192] Lay Sermons, pp. 174, 175.

[193] Huxley's Lay Sermons, Addresses, etc., London, 1870, No. VIII. "The Scientific Aspects of Positivism." p. 178.

[194] Philosophie Positive, vol. ii. p. 516.

[195] Philosophie Positive, vol. ii. pp. 14, 15.

[196] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 268.

[197] Lay Sermons, etc., p. 164.

[198] Professor Huxley says: "For these sixteen years, it has been a periodical source of irritation to me to find M. Comte put forward as a representative of scientific thought; and to observe that writers whose philosophy had its legitimate parent in Hume, or in themselves, were labelled Comtists,' or Positives,' by public writers, even in spite of vehement protests to the contrary. It has cost Mr. Mill hard rubbings to get that label off; and I watch Mr. Spencer, as one regards a good man struggling with adversity, still engaged in eluding its adhesiveness, and ready to tear away skin and all, rather than let it stick. My own turn might come next; and, therefore, when an eminent prelate of the other day gave currency and authority to the popular confusion, I took an opportunity of incidentally revindicating Hume's property in the so-called New Philosophy' and at the same time of repudiating Comtism on my own behalf." - Ut supra, p. 165. The mistake complained of as a very natural one, as Comte and Hume have so much in common. Professor Huxley's quotation from Faust is in point here: - "Ungef[illegible]hr sagt das der Pfarrer auch Nur mit ein bischen andern Worten."

[199] See Correlation and Conservation of Forces. A collection of papers by distinguished scientific men. By Edward l. Youmans, M.D. New York, 1865, p. 405.

[200] Ibid. p. 405.

[201] See Correlation and Conservation of Forces, p. 411.

[202] Ibid. p 412.

[203] Ibid. p. 119. Also, New Quarterly Journal of Science for 1864.

[204] Youmans, p. 407.

[205] Outlines of Physiology, Smith's Philadelphia edition, 1868, p. 932.

[206] Youmans, p. 402.

[207] "Physical Basis of Life" in his Lay Sermons, p. 158.

[208] Lay Sermons, p. 144.

[209] Ibid. p. 149.

[210] Lay Sermons, p. 151.

[211] Ibid. p. 142.

[212] Protoplasm; or Life, Matter, and Mind, by Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.B.S. Second edition, London, 1870, p. 3.

[213] Protoplasm, p. 4.

[214] Lay Sermons, pp. 151, 152.

[215] Lay Sermons, pp. 155, 156.

[216] Ibid. p. 157.

[217] Ibid. p. 156.

[218] Hume, Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1826, iv. p. 193.

[219] First Principles, New York, 1869, p. 556.

[220] Ibid. p. 211.

[221] Ibid. p. 212.

[222] Ibid. p. 217.

[223] Physiology and Pathology of Mind, Lond. 1868, p. 42.

[224] Ibid. p. 43.

[225] Evangelischer Glaube, r&#65533;mischer Irrglaube, und weltlicher Unglaube. Gotha, 1870.

[226] See Berger, I. iii. 5; part i. pp. 264 to 271.

[227] As regards Protoplasm in relation to Professor Huxley's Essay on the Physical Basis of Life, by James Hutchison Stirling, F.R.C.S., LL. D. Edit. New Haven, p. 15.

[228] See Life, Matter, and Mind, by Lionel S. Beale, M.B., F.R.S., London, 1870, p. 17. Dr. Beale quotes from a paper by Professor Huxley in the first number of the Academy, p. 13.

[229] See his Address as President of the British Association, reported in the London Athen&#65533;um, September 17th, 1870. The little that is necessary to say on the subject of spontaneous generation in such a work as this, is reserved until the question concerning the origins of man comes up for consideration.

[230] Kraft und Stoff, Zehnte Auflage, Leipzig, 1869, p. 209.

[231] Croonian Lectures, p. 66.

[232] Correlation of Vital and Physical Forces, p. 5.

[233] As Regards Protoplasm in Relation to Professor Huxley's Essay on the Physical Basis of Life, by James Hutchison Stirling, F.R.C.S., LL. D. Edinburgh, Blackwood & Sons. Republished as one of the Yale University series, p. 39. This is considered to us the best refutation of the theory of the correlation of physical and vital force.

[234] As Regards Protoplasm, etc., pp. 41, 42.

[235] Ibid. p. 42.

[236] Ibid. p. 42.

[237] Ibid. p. 43.

[238] As regards Protoplasm, etc., pp. 47, 48.

[239] See Professor Barker's Lecture, above referred to, for a summary of these arguments, page 24.

[240] Athen&#65533;um for August 29, 1868, quoted Hulsean Lectures for 1868; Appendix, Note A.

[241] The Recent Progress of Science, with an Examination of the asserted identity of the Mental Powers with Physical Forces. An Address before the American Association for the Advancement of Science. August, 1868. By Frederick A. P. Barnard, S. T. D., LL. D., pp. 41, 42.

[242] Paper in the Agricultural Report, 1854-1855, p. 448.

[243] Page 441.

[244] Protoplasm; or Life, Matter, and Mind. By Lionel S. Beale, M. B., F. R. S. Second Edition. London, J. Churchill & Sons, 1870. Dr. Beale is an authority in the department of Physiology. His book, How to work with the Microscope, has reached a fourth edition.

[245] Page 103.

[246] Protoplasm, etc., pp. 116, 117.

[247] Ibid. p. 16.

[248] Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection. A series of Essays. By Alfred Russel Wallace, author of The Malay Archipelago, etc., etc. McMillan & Co., London, 1870, p. 365.

[249] Barnard's Address, p. 45.

[250] Ibid. p. 49.

[251] Barker's Lecture, pp. 26, 27.

[252] Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 368.

[253] Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, p. 369.

§ 5. Pantheism.

A. What Pantheism is.

If the etymology of the word Pantheism be allowed to determine its meaning, the answer to the question, What is Pantheism? is easy. The universe is God, and God is the universe. To pan Theos esti. This is not only the signification of the word and the popular idea usually attached to it, but it is the formal definition often given of the term. Thus Wegscheider says, "Pantheismus [est] ea sententia, qua mundum non secretum a numine ac disparatum, sed ad ipsam Dei essentiam pertinere quidam opinati sunt." [254] This, however, is pronounced by the advocates of the doctrine to be a gross misrepresentation. The idea that the universe, as the aggregate of individual things, is God, is, they say, a form of thought, which the earliest philosophy of the East had surmounted. It might as well be said that the contents of a man's consciousness, at any one time, were the man himself; or that the waves of the ocean were the ocean itself. It is because so many Pantheists take the word in the sense above indicated, that they deny that they are Pantheists, and affirm their belief in the being of God. As the system which is properly designated Pantheism, does exclude the popular view of the subject, derived from the etymology of the word; and as it has been held in very different forms, it is not easy to give a concise and satisfactory answer to the question, What is Pantheism? The three principal forms in which the doctrine has been presented, are, (1.) That which ascribes to the Infinite and Universal Being, the attributes (to a certain extent at least) of both mind and matter, namely, thought and extension. (2.) That which ascribes to it only the attributes of matter, Materialistic Pantheism. (3.) That which ascribes to it only the attributes of spirit, Idealistic Pantheism.

General Principles of the System.

For the purpose of theological instruction it is sufficient to state what these several systems unite in denying, and what they substantially agree in affirming.

1. They deny all dualism in the universe. The essential distinction between matter and mind, between soul and body, between God and the world, between the Infinite and the Finite is repudiated. There is but one substance, but one real Being. Hence the doctrine is called Monism, or, the All One doctrine. "The idea," says Cousin, [255] "of the finite, of the infinite, and of their necessary connection as cause and effect, meet in every act of intelligence, nor is it possible to separate them from each other; though distinct, they are

bound together, and constitute at once a triplicity and unity." "The first term (the infinite), though absolute, exists not absolutely in itself, but as an absolute cause which must pass into action, and manifest itself in the second (the finite). The finite cannot exist without the infinite, and the infinite can only be realized by developing itself in the finite."

All philosophy is founded, he says, on the ideas of "unity and multiplicity," "of substance and phenomenon." "Behold," he says, "all the propositions which we had enumerated reduced to a single one, as vast as reason and the possible, to the opposition of unity and plurality, of substance and phenomenon, of being and appearance, of identity and difference." [256] All men, he says, believe, "as it were, in a combination of phenomena which would cease to be at the moment in which the eternal substance should cease to sustain them; they believe, as it were, in the visible manifestation of a concealed principle which speaks to them under this cover, and which they adore in nature and in consciousness." [257] "As God is made known only in so far as he is absolute cause, on this account, in my opinion, he cannot but produce, so that the creation ceases to be unintelligible, and God is no more without a world than a world without God." [258] It is one of the most familiar aphorisms of the German philosophers, "Ohne Welt kein Gott; und ohne Gott keine Welt."

Renan in his "Vie de J&#65533;sus," understands by Pantheism, materialism, or the denial of a living God. This would exclude all the forms of the doctrines held by idealistic pantheists in all ages. Dr. Calderwood pronounces Sir William Hamilton's doctrine of creation pantheistic, because it denies that the sum of existence can either be increased or diminished. Sir William Hamilton teaches that when we say God created the world out of nothing, we can only mean that "He evolves existence out of himself." Although all the forms of Pantheism are monistic, except Hylozoism, which is properly dualistic, yet the mere doctrine of the unity of substance does not constitute Pantheism. However objectionable the doctrine may be that everything that exists, even unorganized matter, is of the substance of God, it has been held by many Christian Theists. This does not necessarily involve the denial of the essential distinction between matter and mind.

2. However they differ as to the nature of the Infinite as such, whether it be matter or spirit; or that of which both thought and extension (potentially) can be predicated; or, whether it be thought itself, or force, or cause, or nothing, i.e., that of which nothing can be affirmed or denied; a simple unknown quantity; they all agree that it has no existence either before or out of the world. The world is, therefore, not only consubstantial, but coeternal with God.

3. This of course precludes the idea of creation; except as an eternal and necessary process.

4. They deny that the Infinite and Absolute Being in itself has either intelligence, consciousness, or will. The Infinite comes into existence in the Finite. The whole life, consciousness, intelligence, and knowledge, at any time, of the former, is the life, consciousness, intelligence, and knowledge of the latter, i.e., of the world. "Omnes (mentes)," says Spinoza, "simul Dei &#65533;ternum et infinitum intellectum constituunt." [259] "God alone is, and out of Him is nothing." [260] "Seine Existenz als Wesen ist unser Denken von ihm; aber seine reale Existenz ist die Natur, zu welcher das einzelne Denkende als moment geh&#65533;rt." [261]

5. Pantheism denies the personality of God. Personality as well as consciousness implies a distinction between the Self and the Not Self; and such distinction is a limitation inconsistent with the nature of the Infinite. God, therefore, is not a person who can say I, and who can be addressed as Thou. As He comes into existence, intelligence, and consciousness only in the world, He is a person only so far as He comprehends all personalities, and the consciousness of the sum of finite creatures constitutes the consciousness of God. "The true doctrine of Hegel on this subject," says Michelet, [262] "is not that God is a person as distinguished from other persons; neither is He simply the universal or absolute substance. He is the movement of the Absolute ever making itself subjective; and in the subjective first comes to objectivity or to true existence." "God," he adds, "according to Hegel, is the only true personal Being." "As God is eternal personality, so He eternally produces his other self, namely, Nature, in order to come to self-consciousness."

It follows of necessity from the doctrine, that God is the substance of which the universe is the phenomenon; that God has no existence but in the world; that the aggregate consciousness and life of the Finite is, for the time being, the whole consciousness and life of the Infinite; that the Infinite cannot be a person distinct from the world, to whom we can say, Thou. On this point Cousin says, "Take away my faculties, and the consciousness that attests them to me, and I am not for myself. It is the same with God; take away nature, and the soul, and every sign of God disappears." [263] What the soul would be without faculties and without consciousness, that is God without the universe. An unconscious God, without life, of whom nothing can be predicated but simple being, is not only not a person, but he is, for us, nothing.

6. Man is not an individual subsistence. He is but a moment in the life of God; a wave on the surface of the sea; a leaf which falls and is renewed year after year.

7. When the body, which makes the distinction of persons among men, perishes, personality ceases with it. There is no conscious existence for man after death. Schleiermacher, in his "Discourses," says, the piety in which he was nurtured in his youth, "remained with me when the God and immortality of my childhood disappeared from my doubting sight." [264] On this avowal, Mr. Hunt, curate of St. Ives, Hunts, comments: "The 'God and immortality' of his childhood disappeared. The personal God whom the Moravians worshipped was exchanged for the impersonal Divinity of philosophy. Nor did this theology seem impious. No, it was the very essence of true religion." There is good reason to believe that with regard to the personal existence of the soul after death, Schleiermacher sacrificed his philosophy, as he certainly did in other points, to his religion. This, however, only the more clearly shows how inconsistent the pantheistic view of the nature of God is with the doctrine of conscious existence after death. The absorption of the soul in God, of the Finite into the Infinite, is the highest destiny that Pantheism can acknowledge for man.

8. As man is only a mode of God's existence, his acts are the acts of God, and as the acts of God are necessary, it follows that there can be no freedom of the will in man. Spinoza says, [265] "Hinc sequitur mentem humanam partem esse infiniti intellectus Dei: ac proinde cum dicimus, mentem humanam hoc vel illud percipere, nihil aliud dicimus, quam quod Deus, non quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per naturam human mentis explicatur,

sive quatenus human mentis essentiam constituit, hanc vel illam habeat ideam." "In mente nulla est absoluta sive libera voluntas. Mens certus et determinatus modus cogitandi est adeoque suarum actionum non potest esse causa libera." [266] "Eodem hoc modo demonstratur, in mente nullam dari facultatem absolutam intelligendi, cupiendi, amandi, etc." [267]

Cousin says, "We are thus arrived then in the analysis of the me, by the way of psychology still, at a new aspect of ontology, at a substantial activity, anterior and superior to all phenomenal activity, which produces all the phenomena of activity, survives them all, and renews them all, immortal and inexhaustible, in the destruction of its temporary manifestations." [268] Thus our activity is only a temporary manifestation of the activity of God. All our acts are his acts. [269]

Mr. Hunt, analyzing Spinoza's system, and using mainly his language on this point, says, "Spinoza ascribed to God a kind of freedom: a free necessity. But to created existences even this kind of freedom is denied. 'There is nothing contingent in the nature of beings; all things on the contrary are determined by the necessity of the Divine nature, to exist and to act, after a certain fashion. 'Nature produced' is determined by 'nature producing. It does not act, it is acted upon. The soul of man is a Spiritual automaton. . . . . There can be nothing arbitrary in the necessary developments of the Divine essence." [270]

As Pantheism makes creation an eternal, necessary, and continuous evolution of the Infinite Being, all liberty of second causes is of necessity excluded. A distinction may be made between the necessity by which a stone falls to the ground, and the necessity by which a mind thinks; but the necessity is as absolute in the one case as in the other. Liberty in man is rational self-determination, that is, spontaneity determined by reason. But reason in man is impersonal, according to Pantheism. It is God as explicated in us. All the acts of the human mind are the acts of God as determined by the necessity of his nature. The same doctrine of fatalism is involved in the idea that history is merely the self-evolution of God. One idea, or phase of the Infinite Being, is exhibited by one age or nation, and a different one by another. But the whole is as much a necessary process of evolution as the growth of a plant.

Sir William Hamilton, therefore, says that Cousin destroys liberty by divorcing it from intelligence, and that his doctrine is inconsistent not only with Theism but with morality, which cannot be founded "on a liberty which at best only escapes necessity by taking refuge with chance." [271] And Morell, a eulogist of Cousin, says, that according to Cousin: "God is the ocean, we are but the waves; the ocean may be one individuality, and each wave another; but still they are essentially one and the same. We see not how Cousin's Theism can possibly be consistent with any idea of moral evil; neither do we see how, starting from such a dogma, he can ever vindicate and uphold his own theory of human liberty. On such Theistic principles, all sin must be simply defect, and all defect must be absolutely fatuitous." [272]

9. Pantheism in making man a mode of God's existence, and in denying all freedom of the will, and in teaching that all "phenomenal activity" is "a transient manifestation" of the activity of God, precludes the possibility of sin. This does not mean that there is in man no sentiment of approbation or disapprobation, no subjective difference between right and wrong. This would be as absurd as to say that there is no difference between pleasure and

pain. But if God be at once God, nature, and humanity; if reason in us be God's reason; his intelligence our intelligence, his activity our activity; if God be the substance of which the world is the phenomenon, if we are only moments in the life of God, then there can be nothing in us which is not in God. Evil is only limitation, or undeveloped good. One tree is larger and finer than another; one mind is more vigorous than another; one mode of action more pleasurable than another; but all alike are modes of God's activity. Water is water, whether in the puddle or in the ocean; and God is God, in Nero or St. John. Hegel says that sin is something unspeakably higher than the law-abiding motion of the planets, or the innocence of plants. That is, it is a higher manifestation of the life of God.

Spinoza teaches that "sin is nothing positive. It exists for us but not for God. The same things which appear hateful in men are regarded with admiration in animals. . . . . It follows then that sin, which only expresses an imperfection, cannot consist in anything which expresses a reality. We speak improperly, applying human language to what is above human language, when we say that we sin against God, or that men offend God." [273]

It is the necessary consequence of the doctrine that God is the universal Being, that the more of being the more of God, and therefore the more of good. And consequently the less of being, the less of good. All limitation, therefore, is evil; and evil is simply limitation of being. Spinoza [274] says, "Quo magis unusquisque -- suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute pr[illegible]ditus est; contra quatenus unusquisque -- suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens." In the demonstration of this proposition, he says, "Virtus est ipsa humana potentia," [275] making power and goodness identical. Professor Baur of T[illegible]bingen, [276] says: "Evil is what is finite; for the finite is negative; the negation of the infinite."

It is only, as just said, another form of this doctrine that power, or strength, is in man the only good. This does not mean the strength to submit to injury; the strength of self-sacrifice; the strength to be humble and to resist evil passion, but the power to carry out our own purposes in opposition to the will, interests, or happiness of others. That is, that might is right. The victor is always right, the vanquished is always wrong. This is only one manifestation of God, suppressing or superseding a less perfect manifestation. Spinoza's doctrine is, "To the pursuit of what is agreeable, and the hatred of the contrary, man is compelled by his nature, for 'every one desires or rejects by necessity, according to the laws of his nature, that which he judges good or bad.' To follow this impulse is not only a necessity but it is the right and the duty of every man, and every one should be reckoned an enemy who wishes to hinder another in the gratification of the impulses of his nature. The measure of every one's right is his power. The best right is that of the strongest; and as the wise man has an absolute right to do all which reason dictates, or the right of living according to the laws of reason, so also the ignorant and foolish man has a right to live according to the laws of appetite." [277] A more immoral and demoralizing principle was never expressed in human language. To say that it is the duty of every man to seek his own gratification, to satisfy the impulses of his nature; that he is an enemy who attempts to hinder that gratification; that the only limit to such gratification is our power; that men have the right, if so inclined, to live according to the laws of appetite, is to say that there is no such thing as moral obligation; no such thing as right or wrong.

Cousin repeats ad nauseam the doctrine that might is right; that the strongest is always

the best. "We usually see in success," he says, "only a triumph of force, ... I hope I have shown that, inasmuch as there always must be a vanquished party, and inasmuch as the vanquished party is always that which ought to be vanquished, to accuse the vanquisher and to take part against victory, is to take part against humanity, and to complain of the progress of civilization. It is necessary to go further; it is necessary to prove that the vanquished party deserves to be vanquished; that the vanquishing party not only serves the cause of civilization, but that it is better, and more moral than the vanquished party." "Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice, are in necessary harmony." "Feebleness is a vice, and, therefore, it is always punished and beaten." "It is time," he says, "that philosophy of history put beneath its feet the declamations of philanthropy." [278] It must, of course, be true, if God is the life of the world, all power his power, every act his act, not only that there can be no sin, but that the most powerful are always morally (if that word has any meaning) the best; and that might is right. This is the theory on which hero worship is founded, not only among the heathen, but among Christians, so called, of our day.

10. Pantheism is self deification. If God comes to existence only in the world, and if everything that is, is a manifestation of God, it Follows that (so far as this earth is concerned, and so far as pantheists allow or acknowledge) the soul of man is the highest form of the existence of God. As the souls of men differ very much one from another, one being much superior to others, the greater the man the more divine he is, i.e., the more does he represent God; the more of the divine essence does he reveal. The highest step of development is reached only by those who come to the consciousness of their identity with God. This is the precise doctrine of the Hindus, who teach that when a man is able to say, "I am Brahm," the moment of his absorption into the infinite Being has arrived. This is the ground on which the pantheistic philosophers rest their claim of preeminence; and the ground on which they concede the preeminence of Christ. He, more than any other man, saw into the depths of his own nature. He was able to say as no other man could say, "I and the Father are one." But the difference between Christ and other men is only one of degree. The human race is the incarnation of God, which is a process from eternity to eternity. "Mankind," says Strauss, "is the Godman; the key of a true Christology is, that the predicates which the Church gives to Christ, as an individual, belong to an idea, a generic whole." [279]

11. There is only one step further, and that is, the deification of evil. That step Pantheists do not hesitate to take; so far as evil exists it is as truly a manifestation of God as good. The wicked are only one form of the self-manifestation of God; sin is only one form of the activity of God. This dreadful doctrine is explicitly avowed.

Rosenkranz says, [280] "Die dritte Consequenz endlich ist die, dass Gott der Sohn auch als identisch gesetzt ist mit dem Subject, in welchem die religi&#65533;se Vorstellung den Ursprung des B&#65533;sen anschaut, mit dem Satan, Phosphoros, Lucifer. Diese Verschmelzung begr&#65533;ndet sich darin, dass der Sohn innerhalb Gottes das Moment der Unterscheidung ist, in dem Unterschied aber die M&#65533;glichkeit der Entgegensetzung und Entzweiung angelegt ist. Der Sohn ist der selbstbewusste Gott." Such a sentence as the foregoing has never been written in English, and, we trust, never will be. The conclusion it avows, however, is unavoidable. If God be everything, and if there be a Satan, God must be Satan. Rosenkranz says, that the mind is horrified at such language, only because it does not recognize the

intimate connection between good and evil; that evil is in good, and good in evil. Without evil there can be no good.

It me because of this deification of evil, that a recent German writer [281] said that this system should be called Pandiabolism instead of Pantheism. He, if we mistake not, is the author of the article in Hengstenberg's "Kirchen-Zeitung," [282] in which it is said. "this is the true positive blasphemy of God -- this veiled blasphemy -- this diabolism of the deceitful angel of light -- this speaking of reckless words, with which the man of sin sets himself in the temple of God, showing himself that he is God. The Atheist cannot blaspheme within such power as this; his blasphemy is merely negative. He merely says: 'There is no God.' It is only out of Pantheism that a blasphemy can proceed, so wild, of such inspired mockery, so devoutly godless, so desperate in its love of the world, -- a blasphemy so seductive, and so offensive that it may well call for the destruction of the world."

Pantheism, however, becomes all things to all men. To the pure it gives scope for a sentimental religious feeling which sees God in every thing and every thing in God. To the proud it is the source of intolerable arrogance and self-conceit. To the sensual it gives authority for every form of indulgence. The body being a mode of God's extension, according to Spinoza's theory, as the mind is a mode of the divine intelligence, the body has its divine rights as well as the soul. Even some of the most reputable of the Pantheistic school, do not hesitate to say in reference to the trammels of morality: "It is well that the rights of our sensual nature should, from time to time, be boldly asserted." [283] This system, therefore, as even the moderate Tholuck says, "comes to the same result with the materialism of French encyclopedists, who mourned over mankind for having sacrificed the real pleasures of time for the imaginary pleasures of eternity, and the protracted enjoyments of life, for the momentary happiness of a peaceful death."

Pantheism, therefore, merges everything into God. The universe is the existence-form of God; that is, the universe is his existence. All reason is his reason; all activity is his activity; the consciousness of creatures, is all the consciousness God has of himself; good and evil, pain and pleasure, are phenomena of God; modes in which God reveals himself, the way in which He passes from Being into Existence. He is not, therefore, a person whom we can worship and in whom we can trust. He is only the substance of which the universe and all that it contains are the ever changing manifestation. Pantheism admits of no freedom, no responsibility, no conscious life after death. Cousin sums up the doctrine in this comprehensive paragraph: "The God of consciousness is not an abstract God, a solitary monarch exiled beyond the limits of creation, upon the desert throne of a silent eternity, and of an absolute existence which resembles even the negation of existence. He is a God at once true and real, at once substance and cause, always substance and always cause, being substance only in so far as He is cause, and cause only so far as He is substance, that is to say, being absolute cause, one and many, eternity and time, space and number, essence and life, indivisibility and totality, principle, end, and centre, at the summit of Being and at its lowest degree, infinite and finite together, triple, in a word, that is to say, at the same time God, nature, and humanity. In fact, if God be not everything, He is nothing." [284]

History of Pantheism.

Pantheism has proved itself to be the most persistent as well as the most wide-spread form of human thought relative to the origin and nature of the universe, and its relation to the

Infinite Being, whose existence in some form seems to be a universal and necessary assumption. Pantheistic ideas underlie almost all the forms of religion which have existed in the world. Polytheism, which has been almost universal, has its origin in nature worship; and nature-worship rests on the assumption that Nature is God, or, the manifestation, or existence form of the infinite unknown. Of course it is only the briefest outline of the different forms of this portentous system of error, that can be given in these pages.

B. Brahminical Pantheism.

Ethnographically the Hindus belong to the same race as the Greeks, Romans, and other great European nations. In prehistoric periods one division of the great Aryan family spread itself westward over the territory which now constitutes Europe. Another division extended south and east and entered India, displacing almost entirely the original inhabitants of that large, diversified, and fertile region.

Long before Greece or Rome became cultivated communities, and when Europe was the home only of uncivilized barbarians, India was covered with rich and populous cities; the arts had reached the highest state of development; a literature and language which, in the judgment of scholars, rival those of Greece and Rome, had been produced, and systems of philosophy as profound, as subtle, and as diversified as the human mind ever elaborated, were already taught in her schools.

The Hindus number nearly two hundred millions of souls. They are now, in the essential principles of their philosophy, their religion, and their social organization, what they were a thousand years before the birth of Christ. Never in the history of the world has a form of religious philosophy been so extensively embraced, so persistently adhered to, or so effective in moulding the character and determining the destiny of a people.

Few questions of the kind, therefore, are of deeper interest than what the true character of the Hindu religion actually is. The decision of that question is not free from difficulty; and it has, therefore, received very different answers. The difficulty in this case arises from various sources.

1. The religious books of the Hindus are not only written in Sanskrit, a language unintelligible, except to a small class of learned men, but they are exceedingly voluminous. The Vedas, the most ancient and authoritative, fill fourteen volumes folio. The Institutes of Menu, the Puranas, and the sacred poems, "Ramayana" and "Mahabhrata," are equally extensive. The former of these poems consists of a hundred thousand verses, and the latter of four hundred thousand, while the ◆neid has only twelve thousand, and the Iliad twenty-four thousand. Sir William Jones said that the student of the Hindu literature and religion, found himself in time presence of infinity.

2. It is not only, however, the voluminousness of the authoritative sacred books, but the character of their contents, which creates the difficulty of getting a clear idea of the system which they teach. The Vedas consist mainly of hymns of various ages, interspersed with brief obscure, philosophical or theological explanations and comments. The Puranas are filled with extravagant legends; which are to be interpreted historically, and which mythically, it is difficult to decide.

3. The spirit of exaggeration is so characteristic of the Hindu mind that statements meant to be understood literally shock the mind by their extravagance. Thus their books make the earth a circular plane one hundred and seventy millions of miles in diameter; they

speak of mountains sixty miles high, and of periods of four thousand millions of millions of years.

The Religion of the Hindus not originally Monotheistic.

It is a common opinion that the Hindu religion was originally and for centuries monotheistic; that out of monotheism gradually rose the present complicated and monstrous polytheism, and that contemporaneously among the philosophical class, were developed the different forms of Pantheism. But this is contrary to well established facts, and is altogether unsatisfactory as a solution of the great problem of Hindu life.

It is indeed true, as we know from the Bible, that monotheism was the earliest form of religion among men. And it is also true in all probability that the Vedas, which are collections of ancient hymns, contain some which belong to the monotheistic period. Most of those, however, which appear to assume the existence of one God, are to be understood in a pantheistic and not in a theistic sense. These recognize one divine Being, but that one includes all the other forms of being. The history of religion shows that when monotheism failed among men because "they did not like to retain God in their knowledge," it was replaced by the worship of nature. This nature-worship assumed two forms. The different elements, as fire, air, and water, were personified, endowed with personal attributes and divine powers, giving rise to polytheism. Or nature as a whole was the object of worship, giving rise to Pantheism.

It is evident that among the highly intellectual Aryans who settled in India, between one and two thousand years before Christ, the pantheistic view had obtained the ascendency, not as a philosophical theory merely, but as a religious doctrine. It became, and has continued until this day, the foundation of the religious, civil, and social life of the Hindu. It is this which gives it its paramount importance. It stands alone in history. In no other case, among no other people, has Pantheism become the controlling form of religious belief among the people, so as to determine their institutions and to mould their character. The Hindus, therefore, have an interest for Christians and for the religious philosopher which attaches to no other heathen nation. They show, and were doubtless intended to show, what are the legitimate effects of Pantheism. That doctrine has had dominant control for millenniums over a highly cultivated and intelligent people, and in their character and state we see its proper fruits.

It was Pantheistic.

That the religion of the Hindus is fundamentally pantheistic, is evident --

1. From what their sacred writings teach of the Supreme Being. It is designated by a word in the neuter gender, Brahm. It is never addressed as a person. It is never worshipped. It has no attributes but such as may be predicated of space. It is said to be eternal, infinite, immutable. It is said to have continued for untold ages in the state of unintelligent, unconscious being. It comes to existence, to consciousness, and life, in the world. It unfolds itself through countless ages in all the forms of finite existence; and then by a like gradual process all things are resolved into unconscious being. The illustrations of the origin of the world commonly employed are sparks issuing from a burning mass; or, better, vapour rising from the ocean, condensing and falling back to the source whence it came. Being as such, or the Infinite, is, therefore, viewed in three aspects: as coming to existence, as developing itself in the world, as receiving everything back into the abyss of simple being. These

different aspects are expressed by the words, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, to which our terms, Creator, Preserver, and Destroyer, answer very imperfectly.

We have here the constantly recurring pantheistic formula, Thesis, Analysis, Synthesis; Being. Development, Restoration. The Infinite, the Finite, and their Identity. The principal difference between the Brahminical system and the theories of the later pantheists, is that the latter make the universe co-eternal with God. The Infinite from eternity to eternity develops itself in the Finite. Whereas, according to the former, there was an inconceivably long period of repose antecedent to the process of development, and that process after millions of millions of ages, is to be followed by a like period of unconsciousness and rest.

Relation of Infinite Being to the World.

2. The relation of God to the world, or rather of the Infinite to the Finite, is the same in the Brahminical, as in other pantheistic systems. That relation has been already intimated. It is that of identity. The world is the existence-form of God. God is every thing, good and evil; and everything is God. But in very different degrees. There is more of Being (i.e., of God) in a plant than in unorganized matter; more in an animal than in the plant more in man than in either; more in one man, or race of men, than in another.

Relation of Pantheism to Polytheism.

3. The vast polytheistic system of the Hindus is founded on Pantheism and is its logical consequence. In the first place, as just remarked, Brahma, Vishnu, and Shiva, commonly called the Hindu Trinity, are not persons, but personifications, or different aspects under which Infinite Being is to be regarded. In the second place, as the Infinite Being manifests itself in different degrees in different persons and things, anything extraordinary in nature, any remarkable man, is regarded as a special manifestation or embodiment of God. Hence the frequent avatars or incarnations of the Hindu mythology. In this way the gods may be, and have been indefinitely multiplied. Any person or thing, or quality, may be deified as a manifestation of infinite Being. In the third place, this accounts for the facts that the Hindu gods are regarded as destitute of moral excellence, and that even evil, as under the name of Kali, the goddess of cruelty and patroness of murderers, may be the special object of reverence. In the fourth place, no god, not even Brahma or Vishnu, is, according to the Hindu system, immortal. All gods and goddesses are at length to be merged in the abyss of infinite, unconscious Being.

Effect of Pantheism on Religion.

4. Pantheism, as it makes being, God, as it recognizes no attribute but power in the objects of worship, divorces morality from religion. It is not in the power of any system, however sincerely embraced, to reverse the laws of our nature. And, therefore, in despite of the prevalence of a doctrine which denies the possibility of either sin or virtue, and makes everything dependent on fate, or the power of arbitrary being, the people in various ways recognize the obligation of the moral law and the excellence of virtue. But this has nothing to do with their religion. The great object of all religious observances was final absorption in God; their proximate object was to propitiate some power by which the worshipper would be raised one or more steps toward the state in which that absorption is possible. On this point Professor Wilson says: [285] "Entire dependence upon Krishna, or any other favorite deity, not only obviates the necessity of virtue, but it sanctifies vice. Conduct is wholly immaterial. It matters not how atrocious a sinner a man may be, if he

paints his face, his breast, his arms with certain sectarial marks; or, which is better, if he brands his skin permanently with them with a hot iron stamp; if he is constantly chanting hymns in honor of Vishnu, or, what is equally efficacious, if he spends hours in the simple reiteration of his name or names; if he die with the word Hari, or R[illegible]ma, or Krishna on his lips, and the thought of him in his mind, he may have lived a monster of iniquity, -- he is certain of heaven." "Certain of heaven," is a Christian form of expression, and conveys an idea foreign to the Hindu mind. What such a worshipper hopes and expects is that when next born into the world it may be in a higher state and so much the nearer his final absorption. As Professor Wilson is not only moderate, but almost apologetic in the account which he gives of the religion of the Hindus, the above quoted statement cannot be suspected of unfairness or exaggeration.

Character of the Hindu Worship.

The two leading characteristics of the Hindu worship are cruelty and indecency. And these are sufficiently accounted for by the Pantheism which underlies the whole system. Pantheism denies the distinction between virtue and vice; it recognizes no attribute but power; it deifies evil; it "sanctifies vice;" passion, sensual or malignant, is as much a mode of divine manifestation as the most heroic virtue. Indeed, there is no room for the idea of moral excellence. Hence the prescriptions of religion have reference almost exclusively to rites and ceremonies. The Brahmin when he rises must bathe in a certain way, stand in a certain posture, extend his fingers in a prescribed manner; he must salute the rising sun, resting on one foot; he must repeat certain words. When he eats, the dish must be placed according to rule; he must make prescribed motions with his hands, and so on through the whole day. Every act is prescribed, everything is religious; everything either defiles or purifies, ceremonially, but of moral defilement or purity there seems to be in their religion no recognition.

The Anthropology of the Hindus.

5. The anthropology of the Hindus proves the pantheistic character of their whole system. Man is only a part of God, a mode of his existence. He is compared to a portion of sea-water inclosed in a bottle and thrown into the ocean. The water in the bottle is the same in nature as that without. As soon as the bottle is broken the water within it is lost in the surrounding ocean. Another illustration of the destiny of the soul is that of a lump of salt thrown into the ocean, which immediately disappears. Its individuality is lost. This absorption of the soul is the highest beatification which Pantheism offers to its votaries. But this, in the case of the vast majority of men, can be attained only after a long process of transmigrations extending, it may be, through millions of years. If a man be faithful and punctilious in his religious observances, he comes into the world after death in a higher state. Thus, a Soudra may become a Brahmin. But if unfaithful, he will be born in a lower form, it may be, in that of a reptile. It is thus, by these alternations, that the wished for absorption in Brahm is ultimately attained. With regard to the sacred, or Brahminical caste, the process may be shorter. A Brahmin's life is divided, according to the Institutes of Menu, into four periods: childhood, student life; life as householder; and finally, the ascetic period. As soon as a Brahmin feels the approach of old age, he is directed to retire from the world; to live as a hermit; to subsist only on herbs; to deny himself all business and enjoyment, that by continued self-negation he may not only destroy the power of the body,

and free himself from the influence of the things seen and temporal, but also lose the consciousness of his individuality, and be able at last to say, "I am Brahm," and then be is lost in the infinite.

The Hindu life is dominated by this doctrine of absorption in God after a long series of transmigrations, and by the division of the people into castes, which has in like manner its foundation in their theory of the relation of God to the world, or, of the Infinite to the Finite. The Brahminical, or sacred class, is a higher manifestation of God than the military class; the military, than the mercantile; the mercantile, than the servile. This is popularly expressed by saying that the first proceeds from the head, the second from the arms, the third from the body, and the fourth from the feet of Brahm. The member of one of the lower castes cannot pass into either of those above him, except that by merit (ritual observances) he may on his next birth into the world be advanced to a higher grade; and one of a higher caste, by neglect of the prescribed rule of living, may at his next birth find himself degraded into a lower caste, or even into a beast or a reptile. Hence the horror of losing caste, which places a man out of the line of advancement, and consigns him to an almost endless state of degradation.

The Effect of Pantheism on the Social Life of the Hindus.

6. The whole religious and social life of the Hindu is controlled by the radical principle that all things are God, or modes of his existence, and all destined to return to Him again. To a Hindu his individual existence is a burden. It is a fall from God. Hence to get back, to be lost in the Infinite, is the one great object of desire and effort. As this end is not to be attained by virtue, but by asceticism, by propitiation of the gods, their religion is simply a round of unmeaning ceremonies, or acts of self-denial, or self-torture. Their religion, therefore, tends to destroy all interest in the present life, which is regarded as a burden and degradation. It cuts the nerves of exertion. It presents no incentive to virtue. it promotes vice. It has all the effects of fatalism. The influence of the worship of deities without moral excellence, some of them monsters of iniquity; the belief that cruelty and obscenity are acceptable to these deities, and secure their favor, cannot be otherwise than debasing. The world, therefore, sees in India the practical working of Pantheism. The system has been in unrestricted operation, not as a philosophy, but as a practical religious belief, for thousands of years, and among a people belonging to the most favored of the various races of men, and the result is before our eyes.

"Greece and India," says Max Mller, [286] "are, indeed, the two opposite poles in the historical development of the Aryan man. To the Greek, existence is full of life and reality; to the Hindu it is a dream, an illusion. . . . . The Hindu enters this world as a stranger; all his thoughts are directed to another world; he takes no part even where he is driven to act; and when he sacrifices his life, it is but to be delivered from it. No wonder that a nation like the Indian cared so little for history; no wonder that social and political virtues were little cultivated, and the ideas of the useful and the beautiful scarcely known to them. With all this, however, they had what the Greek was as little capable of imagining as they were of realizing the elements of Grecian life. They shut their eyes to this world of outward seeming and activity, to open them full on the world of thought and rest. Their life was a yearning after eternity; their activity a struggle to return into that divine essence from which this life seemed to have severed them. Believing as they did in a divine and really

existing eternal Being (to ontos on), they could not believe in the existence of this passing world. If the one existed, the other could only seem to exist; if they lived in the one, they could not live in the other. Their existence on earth was to them a problem, their eternal life a certainty. The highest object of their religion was to restore that bond by which their own self (�tman) was linked to the eternal Self (param�tman); to recover that unity which had been clouded and obscured by the magical illusions of reality, by the so-called Maya of creation."

In order to show "How largely this idea of the Atman, as the Divine Spirit, entered into the early religious and philosophical speculations of the Indians," he quotes from one of the Vedas a Dialogue in which, among other things, one of the speakers says: "Whosoever looks for this world, for the gods, for all beings, for this universe, elsewhere than in the Divine Spirit, should be abandoned by them all. This Brahmahood, this kshatra-power, this world, these gods, these beings, this universe, all is the Divine Spirit." [287] The illustrations used by the speaker to show the relation of the phenomenal universe to God, are derived from the sounds issuing from a drum or a lute, smoke rising from a fire, vapour from the sea. He adds, "It is with us, when we enter into the Divine Spirit, as if a lump of salt was thrown into the sea, it becomes dissolved into the water (from which it was produced), and is not to be taken out again. But wherever you take the water and taste it, it is salt. Thus is this great, endless, and boundless Being but one mass of knowledge. As the water becomes salt, and the salt becomes water again, thus has the Divine Spirit appeared from out the elements and disappears again into them. When we have passed away, there is no longer any name." [288]

There can therefore be no reasonable doubt that Pantheism lies at the foundation of all the religion of India. There is, indeed, the same difference between the present complex and corrupt polytheism of the Hindus and the teachings of the Vedas, that there is between the Roman Catholicism of our day and primitive Christianity. There is, however, this important distinction between the two cases. Popery is a perversion of Christianity by the introduction of incongruous elements derived from Jewish and heathen sources, whereas the religion of modern India is the legitimate and logical result of the principles of the earliest and purest of the Hindu sacred writings.

The most accessible sources of information on the literature and religion of India, are the writings of Sir William Jones; the writings of Colebrooke; the Journal of the Asiatic Society; the works of Prof. Wilson of Oxford, specially his "Essays and Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus"; Max M�ller's work just quoted. Dr. Duff's "India and Indian Missions," and the histories of India, by Macaulay, Elphinstone. et al.

C. Grecian Pantheism.

The remark of Max M�ller, that "Greece and India are the two opposite poles of the development of the Aryan man," is strikingly correct. The Greek believed in, and lived for the present and the visible; the Indian believed in, and lived for the invisible and the future. Nevertheless there was a tendency in the higher minds among the Greeks to adopt the same speculative views as to God and the universe, the Infinite and the Finite, as prevailed in India. With the Greek, however, it was a matter of speculation; with the Hindu, it was a practical religious belief.

Speaking in general terms, the different forms of Grecian philosophy are characterized

by the effort to reduce all the forms of existence to unity; to discover some one substance, principle, or power, to which all modes of manifestation of being could be referred. Sometimes this one substance was assumed to be material; sometimes spiritual; sometimes the obvious incompatibility between the phenomena of mind and those of matter, forced the admission of two eternal principles: the one active, the other passive; the one spiritual, the other material. The fundamental principle or idea, therefore, of the Grecian philosophy was pantheistic, either in its materialistic, spiritualistic, or hylozoistic form.

The Ionic School.

The earliest school among the Greeks was the Ionic, represented by Thales the Milesian, Anaximander and Anaximenes also of Miletus, and Heraclitus of Ephesus. These philosophers flourished from about 600 to 500 B. C. They were all materialistic in their theories. With Thales the one primal universal substance was water; with Anaximenes it was air; with Heraclitus it was fire. "It was the endeavour of this oldest of the Ionic philosophies, to reduce the origin of all things from one simple radical cause, a cosmical substance, in itself unchangeable, but entering into the change of phenomena; and this was why these philosophers had no room in their doctrine for gods, or transmundane beings, fashioning and ruling things at will; and, in fact, Aristotle also remarked of the old physiologists, that they had not distinguished the moving cause from matter." [289] Of Heraclitus, D[illegible]llinger, in his able work "The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ," says he "meant by his 'fire,' an ethereal substance as primal matter, the all-pervading and animating soul of the universe, a matter which he conceived to be not merely actual fire, but caloric, and this being at the same time the only power at work in the world, all-creative and destructive in turns, was, to speak generally, the one real and veritable existence among all things. For everything had its origin only in the constant modification of this eternal and primal fire: the entire world was a fire dying out and rekindling itself in a fixed succession, while the other elements are but fire converted by condensation or rarefaction into a variety of forms. Thus the idea of a permanent being is a delusion; everything is in a state of perpetual flux, an eternal-going to be (Werden), and in this stream spirit is hurried along as well as body, swallowed up and born afresh. . . . . Heraclitus, as any thorough-going Pantheist would, called the common soul of the world, the all-comprehending primal fire, Zeus; and the flux of perpetual change and tendency to be, into which it enters, he termed poetically Zeus playing by himself." [290]

Cousin says, "For the Ionic school in both its stages, there was no other God than nature. Pantheism is inherent in its system. What is Pantheism? It is the conception of the universe, to. pa/n, as alone existing, as self-sufficient, and having its explanation in itself. All nascent philosophy is a philosophy of nature, and thus is inclined to Pantheism. The sensationalism of the Ionians of necessity took that form; and, to speak honestly, Pantheism is nothing but atheism." [291]

Cousin frames the definition of Pantheism so as to exclude his own system. With him the material universe alone is not God. He believes in "God, nature, and humanity." But these three are one. "If God," he says, "be not everything, He is nothing." This, however, is as truly Pantheism (although in a more philosophical form), as the Materialism of the Ionians.

The Eleatic School.

The Eleatic or Italian school, of which Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Zeno, are the principal representatives, was inclined to the other extreme of denying the very existence of matter. Of these philosophers, Cousin says, "They reduced everything to an existence absolute, which approached nearly to Nihilism, or the denial of all existence." [292] Of Xenophanes, born in Colophon 617 B. C., D[illegible]llinger [293] says, "With all his assertions of monotheistic sound, he was still a Pantheist, and, indeed, a material Pantheist, and is universally understood to be such by the ancients. Certainly there was present to his mind the idea of a being, one and spiritual, embracing the whole complement of existence and thought within himself; yet this being was in his view but the general nature-power; the unity of God was to him identical with the unity of the world, and this again but the manifestation of the invisible being, called God, and therefore also he explained it to be uncreate, everlasting, and imperishable." It is hard to see how this differs from the modern pantheistic doctrine, that God is the substance of which the world is the phenomenon; or why Xenophanes should be regarded as a materialist more than Schelling or Cousin.

Parmenides of Elea about 500 B.C. was more of an idealist. He attained to the idea of a pure and simple being in opposition to the material principle of the Ionic school. This "being," however, was not a "pure metaphysical idea, for," says D[illegible]llinger, "he so expressed himself as to seem to represent it at one time as corporeal, and extended in space, at another as thinking. 'To think, and the object of which the thought is, are one and the same, was a saying of his. . . . . There was no bridge for Parmenides that had led from this pure simple 'being' to the world of phenomena, of the manifold, and of motion; and therefore he denied the reality of all we see; the whole world of sense owed its existence only to the illusions of sense and the empty notions of mortal men built thereon." [294] Thus Parmenides anticipated Schelling in teaching the identity of subject and object.

The Stoics.

The Stoics take their origin from Zeno of Cittium, in Cyprus (340-260 B.C.). Their doctrine has already been noticed under the head of Hylozoism. D[illegible]llinger, indeed, says, "The Stoic system is utter Materialism, built upon Heraclitic doctrine. It adopted corporeal causes only, and is only acquainted with two principles -- matter, and an activity resident in matter, from eternity, as power and giving it form. Everything real is body; there are no incorporeal things, as our abstractions, space, time, etc., have merely an existence in our thoughts; so all that really exists can only be known through the senses." [295] This judgment, however, is modified by what he says elsewhere. It is very plain that the later Stoics, especially among the Latins, as Seneca and Marcus Aurelius, regarded the general principle which animated matter as having all the attributes of mind. On this point D[illegible]llinger says, "The two principles, matter and power, are to the Stoics but one and the same thing viewed in different relations. Matter required for its existence a principle of unity to give it form and keep it together; and this, the active element, is inconceivable without matter, as a subject in and on which it exists and dwells, and in which it works and moves. Thus, the positive element is matter; yet conceived without properties; the active one, running through and quickening all, is God in matter. But in truth, God and matter are identical; in other words, the Stoic doctrine is hylozoic Pantheism." "God is, therefore, the world-soul, and the world itself no aggregate of independent elements, but an organized, living being, whose complement and life is a single soul, or primal fire, exhibiting divers

degrees of expansion and heat. . . . . God, then, in his physical aspect, is the world-fire, or vital heat, all-penetrating, the one only cause of all life and all motion, and, at the same time, the necessity that rules in the world: but, on the other side, as the universal cause can only be a soul full of intelligence and wisdom, he is the world-intelligence, a blest being, and the author of the moral law, who is ever occupied with the government of the world, although he is precisely this world itself." [296] "The one substance is God and nature together, of which all that comes into being, and ceases to be, all generation and dissolution, are mere modifications. Seneca explains Zeus or God's being at once the world and the world's soul by pointing to man, who feels himself to be a single being and yet again as one consisting of two substances, body and soul." [297]

The Stoics adopted the Hindu doctrine of the dissolution of all things, and the redevelopment of God in the world, after long successive periods. "In the great conflagration which takes place after the expiration of a world period or great year," all organized beings will be destroyed, all multiplicity and difference be lost in God's unity; which means, all will become ether again. But forthwith, like the phoenix recovering life from his own ashes, the formation of the world begins afresh; God transforms himself once more by a general renovation into a world in which the same events, under similar circumstances, are again to be repeated down to the minutest detail. Many of these great catastrophes have already happened, and the process of burning by fire will follow again upon this regeneration, and so on ad infinitum. [298]

This system as well as every other form of Pantheism, excludes all moral freedom: everything is under the law of absolute necessity. It therefore precludes the idea of sin. "Acts of vice, Chrysippus said, are movements of universal nature, and in conformity with the divine intelligence. In the economy of the great world, evil is like chaff falling, -- as unavoidable and worthless. Evil also was said by this school to do the service of making the good known, and yet at last all must resolve itself into God." [299]

Thus the Ionic, the Eleatic, and the Stoic forms of Grecian philosophy were in their fundamental principles pantheistic. The two great philosophic minds of Greece, and of the world, however, were Plato and Aristotle, the one the philosopher of the ideal world, and the other of the natural. The latter was the disciple of the former, although in most points of doctrine, or at least of method, his antagonist. It is only with the views of these mind-controlling men, concerning the nature of the supreme Being, and of his relation to the phenomenal world, that the theologian as such has anything to do. And this, unfortunately, with regard to both, is the point in regard to which their teachings are the most obscure.

Plato.

Plato united in his comprehensive intellect, and endeavoured to harmonize the elements of the different doctrines of his predecessors in the field of speculation. "The Socratic doctrine of the absolute good and beautiful, and of the Deity revealing himself to man as a kind Providence, formed the basis on which he started. As channels for the Heraclitic doctrine of the perpetual coming into being and flux of all things, together with the Eleatic one of the eternal immutability of the one and only Being, the dogma of Anaxagoras of a world-ruling spirit was serviceable to him, and with it he had the skill to connect the Pythagorean view of the universe, as an animated intelligent whole, in a spiritualized form." [300] These are sufficiently incongruous materials. An intelligent Deity

exercising a providential control over the world; the Heraclitic doctrine which involved the denial of all reality and resolved everything into a perpetual flow of phenomena; the Eleatic doctrine of a one and only Being; and the Pythagorean idea of the universe as an animated and intelligent whole. It was not possible but that first one, and then another of these elements should be made the more prominent, and consequently that the great philosopher should speak sometimes as a Theist and sometimes as a Pantheist. Neither was it possible that these incongruous elements should be moulded into a consistent system. It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise that D[illegible]llinger, one of the greatest admirers of Plato and one of the ablest expounders of his writings, should immediately add to the passage above quoted. "Plato never arrived at a finished system, rounded off and perfect in itself; nevertheless there is unmistakable evidence in his works of a continual progress, an effort after an increasing depth of foundation, and a stronger internal articulation, joined to a wonderful exuberance of ideas, often excessively bold." [301]

Plato was not a Theist, in the ordinary and Christian sense of that word. He did not recognize the existence of an extramundane God, the creator, preserver, and governor of the world, on whom we are dependent and to whom we are responsible. With him God is not a person. As Anselm and the Realists generally admitted the existence of "rationality" as distinct from rational beings; a general principle which became individual and personal in angels and men; so Plato admitted the existence of an universal intelligence, or nous, which becomes individualized in the different orders of intelligent beings, gods, demons, and men. God with him was an Idea; the Idea of the Good; which comprehended and gave unity to all other ideas.

Ideas.

What then were ideas in Plato's sense of the term? They were not mere thoughts, but the only real entities, of which the phenomenal and sensible are the representations or shadows. He illustrated their nature by supposing a man in a dark cave entirely ignorant of the external world, with a bright light shining behind him, while between him and the light there continually passes a procession of men, animals, trees, etc. The moving shadows of these things would be projected on the wall of the cavern, and the man would necessarily suppose that the shadows were the realities. These ideas are immutable and eternal, constituting the essence or real being of all phenomenal existence. "Plato teaches that for as many general signs of our conceptions as we have, there are so many really existing things, or Ideas, in the intelligible world corresponding: to man these are the only solid and worthy objects of thought and knowledge; for they are eternal and immutable, existing only in themselves, but separate from all things and individual, while their manifold copies, the things perceptible by sense, are ever fluctuating and transitory. Independent of time and space, as well as of our intellect and its conceptions, Ideas belong to a world of their own, of another sphere, transcending sense. They are not the thoughts of God, but the objects of his thought; and, according to them, He created the world in matter. They only and God are really existing beings; and therefore earthly things have but the shadow of an existence, and that only derived from a certain participation in the Ideas, their types." [302]

The Relation of Ideas, in Plato's Philosophy, to God

What is the relation of these ideas to God? This is the decisive question so far as the theology of Plato is concerned. Unfortunately it is not a question easily answered. It is a

point about which the commentators differ; some saying that Plato leaves the matter undecided, sometimes identifying ideas with God, and at others representing them as distinct; others say that he clearly identifies ideas with God, or includes them in the divine essence; while others again understand him as making a marked distinction between God and the ideas after which the universe was moulded. It is not easy to reconcile what D[illegible]llinger says on this subject. In the passage above quoted he says that ideas are not the thoughts of God, but the objects of his thought. But on the same page [303] he says, "These Ideas are not to be conceived as beside and external to God. They are founded in God, and God is the all comprehensive Idea, embracing all partial archetypes in an unity." He had before said, that with Plato Ideas and God are the only "really existing beings." If this be so, and if God is "the all comprehensive idea, embracing all others in unity," then God is the only really existing Being; and we have pure Pantheism. According to Cousin, Plato not only gave ideas a real and proper existence, but, "en derni[illegible]re analyse il les place dans la raison divine: c'est la qu' elles existent substantiellement." [304] D[illegible]llinger, in commenting on a passage in the Tim[illegible]us, in which "God is styled the Father, who has begotten the world like a son, as an image of the eternal gods, i.e., ideas," says, "Had Plato ready intended here to explain the idea of procreation as a communication of essence, he would have been a pure Pantheist." [305] Plato, however, he says [306] "is no Pantheist; matter is, with him, entirely distinct from God; still he has a pantheistical bias in his system; for all that there is of intelligence in the world, down even to man, belongs, in his view, to the divine substance." Plato, therefore, escapes Pantheism only by admitting the eternity of matter; but this eternal matter is as near nothing as possible. It is not corporeal. It is "something not yet entity."

As Plato made ideas eternal and immutable; as they were all included in the idea of God, i.e., in God; and as they constitute the only really existing beings, all that is phenomenal or that affects the senses being mere shadows of the real, it can hardly be denied that his system in its essential character is really pantheistical. It is, however, an ideal Pantheism. It does not admit that matter or evil is a manifestation of God, or mode of his existence. Only what is good, is God; but all that really is, is good.

The Cosmogony of Plato.

Plato's cosmogony and anthropology confirm this view of his theology. Nothing has ever been created. All that is, is eternal; not indeed in form, but in substance. Matter, something material, has always existed. This in itself is lifeless, but it has "a soul," an unintelligent force by which chaotic or disorderly agitation or motion is produced. This unintelligent force God endowed with a portion of his own intelligence or nous, and it becomes the world-soul, i.e., the Demiurgus, the formative principle of the world. God is not therefore himself even the framer of the world. This is the work of the Demiurgus. This world-soul pervades the visible universe, and constitutes one living, animated whole. This "world-soul" is individualized in star-gods, demons, and human souls. Thus Plato's system makes room for polytheism.

The Nature of the Soul.

The soul, according to this theory, consists of intelligence which is of the substance of God, and of elements derived from the world-soul as distinguished from the nous which did not originally belong to it. All evil arises from the connection of the divine element in man

with matter. The object of life is to counteract this evil influence by contemplation and communion with the ideal world. Plato taught the pre-existence as well as the immortality of the soul. Its state in the present stage of existence being determined by its course in its previous forms of being. It is, however, according to his common mode of representation, strictly immortal. "Plato's monotheistic conception of God," says D-llinger, [307] "is one of the most refined to which ante-Christian speculation attained; yet he contributed nothing whatever to the knowledge of the perfect, living, personality of God, and its absolute and unconditional liberty." His monotheism, it would seem, consisted in the acknowledgment of a universal intelligence which manifested itself as reason in all rational beings.

Aristotle.

Aristotle, although the disciple, was the great opponent of Plato and his philosophy. He rejected Plato's doctrine of ideas as chimerical, as a hypothesis which was unnecessary and without evidence. In like manner he denied the existence of pre-existent matter out of which the world was fashioned. He believed the world to be eternal both in matter and form. It is, and there is no reason to doubt that it always has been and always will be. He admitted the existence of mind in man; and, therefore, assumed that there is an infinite intelligence, of which reason in man is a manifestation. But this infinite intelligence, which he called God, was pure intelligence, destitute of power and of will; neither the creator nor the framer of the world; unconscious, indeed, that the world exists; as it is occupied exclusively in thought of which it is itself the object. The world and God are coeternal; and yet, in a certain sense, God is the cause of the world. As a magnet acts on matter, or as the mere presence of a friend stirs the mind, so God unconsciously operates on matter, and awakens its dormant powers. As the universe is a cosmos, an ordered system; and as innumerable organized beings, vegetable and animal, exist in the world, Aristotle assumed that there are "forms" inherent in matter, which determine the nature of all such organizations. This is very much what in modern language would be called "vital force," "vitality," "vis formativa," "Bildungstrieb," or Agassiz's "immaterial principle," which is different in every distinct species, and which constitutes the difference between one species and another. The soul is the "forma" of the man. "It is the principle that gives form, motion, and development to the body, the entelecheia of it; i.e., that substance, which only manifests itself in the body which is formed and penetrated by it, and continues energizing in it as the principle of life, determining and mastering matter. Thus, the body is nothing of itself; it is what it is, only through the soul, the nature and being of which it expresses, to which it stands in the relation of a medium in which the object, the soul, is realized; and so it cannot be imagined without the body, nor the body without it; one must be produced contemporaneously with the other." [308] Of course there can be no immortality of the soul. As no plant is immortal, as the vital principle does not exist separately from the plant, so the soul has no existence separate from the body. The two begin and end together. "The really human in the soul, that which has come into being, must also pass away, the understanding even; only the divine reason is immortal; but, as the memory belongs to the sensitive soul, and individual thought depends on the understanding or passive nous only, all self-consciousness must cease with death." [309] "Thus, then, Aristotle's doctrine of the soul shows that his defect, as well as that of Plato, and indeed of all antiquity, was his imperfect acquaintance with the idea of personality; and on that head he cannot be acquitted of a pantheistic tendency." [310] "His God is not a really personal one, or is only an

imperfect personality." [311] "The nous, or reason, allows souls, with their bodies, to sink back into nothingness, from which they severally issued. It alone exists on, ever the same and unalterable, for it is no other than the divine nous in individual existence, the divine intelligence enlightening the night of human understanding, and must be conceived just as much the prime mover of human discursive thought and knowledge, as of his will." [312]

This brief review of the Grecian philosophy in its relation to theology, shows that in all its forms it was more or less pantheistic. This remark will not be recognized as correct by those, who with Cousin, limit the use of the word Pantheism to designate either the doctrine which makes the material universe God; or that which denies the existence of anything but matter and physical force, which is atheism; nor by those who take the word strictly as meaning the theory which admits of only one substance, which is the substance of God; and which consequently makes matter as much a mode of God's existence as mind. Its correctness, however, will be admitted by those who mean by Pantheism the doctrine which makes all the intelligence in the world the intelligence of God, and all intellectual activity modes of the activity of God, and which necessarily precludes the possibility of human liberty and responsibility.

The authorities on this subject are, so far as Plato and Aristotle are concerned, of course their own writings; with regard to those philosophers whose works are not preserved, or of which only fragments are extant, their systems are more or less fully detailed by the ancient writers, as Plutarch and Cicero. The general reader will find the information he needs in one or more of the numerous histories of philosophy; as those of Brucker, Ritter, Tenneman, and Cousin; among the latest and best of which is D[illegible]llinger's "The Gentile and the Jew in the Courts of the Temple of Christ," London, 1862.

D. Medi[illegible]val Pantheism.

The Neo-Platonists.

Pantheism, as it appeared in the Middle Ages, took its form and character from Neo-Platonism. This was an eclectic system in which the Eleatic doctrine of the unity of all being was combined with the Platonic doctrine concerning the phenomenal universe. The philosophers recognized as the representatives of this school are Plotinus (A.D. 205-270), Porphyry (born A.D. 233), Jamblichus in the fourth century, and Proclus in the fifth. Neo-Platonism was monism. It admitted of only one universal Being. This Being considered in itself was inconceivable and indescribable. It was revealed, or self-manifested in the world-soul, and world-reason, which constituted a trinity; one substance in different aspects or modes of manifestation. The world is therefore "the affluence of God," as fire emits heat. The soul of man is a mode of God's existence, a portion of his substance. Its destiny is absorption in the infinite Being. This was not to be attained by thought, or by meditation, but by ecstasy. This constituted the peculiar feature of the Neo-Platonic school. "Union with God" was to be attained by "a mystical self-destruction of the individual person (Ichheit)" in God. [313] Schwegler [314] says: "From the introduction of Christianity monism has been the character and the fundamental tendency of the whole modern philosophy." This remark, coming from an advocate of that theory, must be taken with no small amount of allowance. It is, however, true that almost all the great departures from the simplicity of the truth as revealed in the sacred Scriptures, have assumed more or less distinctly a pantheistic tendency.

John Scotus Erigena.

The most pronounced Pantheist among the schoolmen was John Scotus Erigena. Little is known of his origin or history. From his name Scotus and designation Erigena (son of Erin), it has been generally assumed that he was an Irishman. It is known that he enjoyed the protection and patronage of Charles the Bald of France, and that he taught in Paris and perhaps in England.

His principal work is that "De Divisione Natur&#65533;." By nature he means all being. The fourfold divisions which he makes of nature, are only so many manifestations or aspects under which the one Being is revealed or is to be contemplated. Those divisions are: (1.) That which creates and is not created. (2.) That which creates and is created. (3.) That which does not create but is created. (4.) That which neither creates nor is created. "This division of nature," says Ritter, [315] "is made simply to show that all is God, since the four natures are only revelations of God."

Scotus agreed with most philosophers in making philosophy and religion identical, and in admitting no higher source of knowledge than human reason. "Conficitur," he says, "veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque veram religionem esse veram philosophiam." [316]

The leading principles of his philosophy are the following: (1.) The distinction with him between being and not-being, is not that between something and nothing, between substantial existence and non-existence, but between affirmation and negation. Whatever may be affirmed is; whatever is denied is not. (2.) All being consists in thought. Nothing is but as it exists in the mind and consciousness. (3.) With God, being, thought, and creating are identical. God's being consists in thinking, and his thoughts are things. In other words, the thought of God is the real being of all that is. (4.) Consequently the world is eternal. God and the world are identical. He is the "totum omnium."

His system is, therefore, a form of idealistic Pantheism. Ritter devotes the ninth book of his "Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie," [317] to the exposition of the philosophy of Scotus. The few following passages from the "De Divisione Natur&#65533;," are sufficient to show the correctness of the above statement of his principles.

"Intellectus enim omnium in Deo essentia omnium est. Siquidem id ipsum est Deo cognoscere, priusquam fiunt, qu&#65533; facit, et facere, qu&#65533; cognoscit. Cognoscere ergo et facere Dei unum est." [318] "Maximus ait: Quodcunque intellectus comprehendere potuerit, id ipsum fit." [319] "Intellectus enim rerum veraciter ips&#65533; res sunt, dicente Sancto Dionysio, Cognitio eorum, qu&#65533; sunt, ea, qu&#65533; sunt, est.'" [320] "Homo est notio qu&#65533;dam intellectualis in mente divina &#65533;ternaliter facta. Verissima et probatissima definitio hominis est ista: et non solum hominis, verum etiam omnium qu&#65533; in divina sapientia facta sunt." [321] Omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura Theophania, i.e., divina apparitio potest appelari. [322] "Num negabis creatorem et creaturam unum esse?" [323] "Creation [with Erigena] is nothing else than the Lord of creation; God in some ineffable manner created in the creation." [324]

Scotus translated the works of the so-called St. Dionysius, the Areopagite, and in so doing prepared the way for that form of mystical Pantheism which prevailed through the Church down to the period of the Reformation. The pseudo-Dionysius was a Neo-Platonist. His object was to give the doctrine of Plotinus a Christian aspect. He adopted the principle

of the unity of all being. All creatures are of the essence of God. But instead of placing the self-manifestation of God in nature, in the world-soul, he placed it principally in the hierarchy of rational being, -- cherubim, seraphim, thrones, principalities, and powers, and souls of men. The destiny of all rational creatures, is reunion with God; and this reunion, as the Neo-Platonists taught, was to be attained by ecstasy and the negation of Self. It was this system, which, in common with all other forms of Pantheism, precluded the idea of sin, which was reproduced by the leading mystics of the Middle Ages, and which, when it found its way among the people as it did with the Beghards and Brethren of the Free Spirit, produced, as substantially the same system has done in India, its legitimate fruits of evil. Of the mystical Pantheism of the Middle Ages, however, enough has already been said in the Introduction, in the chapter on Mysticism

E. Modern Pantheism.

Spinoza.

The revival of Pantheism since the Reformation is principally due to Spinoza; he was born at Amsterdam in 1634, and died at Ghent in the forty-fourth year of his age. He was descended from a wealthy Jewish Portuguese family, and enjoyed the advantage of a highly finished education. He early devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and was at first a disciple of Des Cartes. Leibnitz characterizes the system of Spinoza as Cartesianism run wild. Des Cartes distrusted the testimony of the senses. His starting-point was the consciousness of existence, "I think." In that proposition the existence of a thinking substance is necessarily included. The outward world produces impressions on this thinking substance. But after all, these sensations thus produced, are only states of self-consciousness. Self, therefore, and its varying states, are all of which we have direct knowledge. It is not all, however, that Des Cartes believed actually existed. He was a sincere Catholic, and died in communion with the Church. He acknowledged not only the existence of mind, but also of God and of matter. Our knowledge, however, of God and of matter as substances distinct from our minds, was arrived at by a process of reasoning. The validity of that process Spinoza denied. He admitted the existence of only one substance, and gave such a definition of the word as precluded the possibility of there being more substances than one. With him substance is that which exists of itself, of necessity, and is absolutely independent. There is, therefore, but one substance possible. We come, however, everywhere into contact with two classes of phenomena: those of thought and those of extension. Thought and extension, therefore, are the two attributes of the one infinite substance. Individual things are the modes under which the infinite substance is constantly manifested. In Spinoza's system there are the three radical ideas of substance, attribute, and mode. Of these that of substance alone has any reality. The other two are mere appearances. If we look at anything through a glass colored red the object will appear red; if the glass be blue, the object will appear blue; but the color is not really an attribute of the object. Thus substance (the one) appears to us under one aspect as thought and under another as extension. The difference is apparent and not real. The finite has therefore no real existence. The universe is sunk into the Infinite; and the Infinite is a substance of which nothing can be affirmed. Of the Infinite nothing can be denied, and therefore nothing can be affirmed for "omnis determinatio est negatio." The Infinite, therefore, is practically nothing

A sufficient account of modern Pantheism in its general features as represented by

Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, and their successors and disciples, has been given already at the commencement ol this chapter. More detailed information may be found in the numerous recent histories of philosophy, as those of Morell, Schwegler, Michelet, and Rosenkranz, and in Hunt's "History of Pantheism."

F. Conclusion.

The fact that Pantheism has so extensively prevailed in every age and in every part of the world, is a proof of its fascination and power. Apart from a divine revelation, it seems to have been regarded as the most probable solution of the great problem of the universe. Nevertheless it is so unsatisfactory, and does such violence to the laws of our nature, that it has never to any extent taken hold on the hearts of the people. India may be regarded as furnishing an exception to this remark. But even there, although Pantheism was the ground form of the popular religion, it had to resolve itself into polytheism in order to meet the necessities of the people. Men must have a personal god whom they can worship and to whom they can pray.

The most obvious remark to be made of the whole system is that it is a hypothesis. From its very nature it is incapable of proof. It is a mere theory assumed to account for the phenomena of the universe. If it did satisfactorily account for them, and did not contradict the teachings of the Bible, it might be safely admitted. But it is not only inconsistent with all that the Scriptures reveal concerning the nature of God and his relation to the world, but it contradicts the laws of belief which God has impressed on our nature, subverts the very foundation of religion and morality and involves even the deification of sin.

Had we no divine revelation on the subject, Theism merely as a theory could not fail to secure the assent of every devout mind in preference to Pantheism. Theism supposes the existence of a personal, extramundane God, the creator and preserver of the universe; everywhere present in his wisdom and power, directing all events to the accomplishment of his infinitely wise designs. It supposes the material universe to be distinct from God, dependent on his will, upheld by his power, and pregnant with physical forces ever active under his control. It supposes that man is the creature of God, owing his existence to the will of God, created after his image, a free, rational, moral, and accountable agent, capable of knowing, loving, and worshipping God as a Spirit infinite in his being and perfections. Although this theory may have, for the reason, some problems, such as the origin and prevalence of evil, without a satisfactory solution, yet as it meets and satisfies all the demands of our nature, and solves the problem as to the origin and nature of the universe, it commends itself to the reason, the heart, and the conscience with a force which no sophistry of speculation can resist.

Pantheism, on the other hand, does violence to our nature, and contradicts the intuitive convictions of consciousness.

1. We are conscious that we are free agents. This is a truth which no man can deny with regard to himself, and which every man assumes with regard to others. This truth Pantheism denies. It makes our activity only a form of the activity of God, and assumes that his acts are determined by necessity as much as the development of a plant or animal.

2. It is intuitively certain that there is a real distinction between moral good and evil: that the one is that to which man is bound to be conformed, and the other that which he is bound to hate and to avoid; that the one deserves approbation, and that the other deserves

disapprobation, and merits punishment. These are convictions which belong to the rational nature of man; and they cannot be destroyed without destroying his rationality. Pantheism, however, pronounces these convictions delusions; that there is no such thing as sin, in the sense above stated; that what we call sin is mere weakness; imperfect development, as unavoidable as feebleness in an infant. It goes further: it pronounces evil good. It makes the sinful acts and passions of men as much the acts and states of God as holy acts and holy feelings. There is no good but being; and the men of power are the men of being; and, therefore, the strongest are the best; the weak are to be despised; they deserved to be conquered and trodden under foot. Hence where Pantheism has become a religion the deities who represent evil are the most honoured and worshipped.

3. Pantheism not only destroys the foundation of morals, but it renders all rational religion impossible. Religion supposes a personal Being endowed not only with intelligence and power, but with moral excellence; and to be rational, that Being must be infinite in all his perfections. Pantheism, however, denies that an infinite Being can be a person; that it is intelligent, self-conscious, or possessed of moral attributes. It is just as impossible to worship such a Being as it is to worship the atmosphere, or the law of gravitation, or the axioms of Euclid.

4. It is no extravagance to say that Pantheism is the worst form of atheism. For mere atheism is negative. It neither deifies man nor evil. But Pantheism teaches that man, the human soul, is the highest form in which God exists; and that evil is as much a manifestation of God as good; Satan as the ever-blessed and adorable Redeemer. Beyond this it is impossible for the insanity of wickedness to go.

5. Man, according to this system, is no more immortal than the leaves of the forest, or the waves of the sea. We are transient forms of universal Being.

Our nature is indestructible; as it is impossible that we should not believe in our own individual existence, in our free agency, in our moral obligations; in our dependence and responsibility to a Being capable of knowing what we are and what we do, and of rewarding and punishing as He sees fit, so it is impossible that Pantheism should ever be more than a philosophical speculation, where the moral nature of man has once been developed by the knowledge of the living and true God.

[254] Institutiones Theologi, fifth edit., Halle, 1826, p. 215.

[255] Pyschology, by Henry, first edition, p. xviii.

[256] History of Philosophy, translated by Wight, N.Y. 1852, p. 78.

[257] Ibid. p. 121.

[258] Psychology, fourth edition, N.Y. 1856, p. 447.

[259] Ethices, v. xl. schol. edit. Jena, 1803, p. 297.

[260] Von seligen Leben, p. 143, edit. Berlin, 1806.

[261] Strauss, Dogmatik i. p. 517.

[262] Geschichte der letzen Systeme der Philosophie in Deutschland, vol. ii. p. 647.

[263] Lectures on the True, the Beautiful, and the Good, trans. Wight, N.Y. 1854, p. 365.

[264] Hunt's Essay on Pantheism, London, 1866, p. 312.

[265] Ethices, part ii. prop. xi. coroll., vol. ii. p. 87, edit. Jena, 1803.

[266] Ibid. prop. xlviii. Demon. vol. ii. p. 121.

[267] Ibid. Scholium.

[268] Elements of Psychology, translated by Henry, N.Y. 1856, p. 429.

[269] Princeton Review, 1856, p. 368.

[270] Essay on Pantheism, p. 231.

[271] Hamilton's Discussions, p. 43.

[272] History of Modern Philosophy, N.Y. 1848, p. 660.

[273] Hunt, p. 231.

[274] Ethices, iv. prop. xx., vol. ii. p. 217, edit. Jena, 1803.

[275] Ibid.

[276] In the Tbingen Zeitschrift, Drittes Heft, p. 233.

[277] Hunt, p. 233.

[278] Cousin's History of Modern Philosophy, translated by Wight, New York, 1852, vol. i. pp. 186, 187, 189.

[279] Dogmatik, ii. p. 215.

[280] Encyklopdie, p. 51.

[281] Leo, the historian, we believe.

[282] 1836, p. 575.

[283] Bischer, quoted in Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung, 1839, p. 31.

[284] Philosophical Fragments, Preface to First Edition. See History of Modern Philosophy, translated by Wight, N.Y. 1852, vol. i. pp. 112. 113.

[285] Essays and Lectures chiefly on the Religion of the Hindus, vol. ii. p. 75; edit. London, 1862.

[286] A History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, so far as it illustrates the Primitive Religion of the Brahmans, pp. 18, 19.

[287] History of Ancient Sanskrit Literature, etc., p. 23.

[288] Ibid. p. 24.

[289] Dllinger, The Gentile and the Jew, translated by Darnell, London, 1862, vol. i. p. 250.

[290] Ibid. vol. i. p. 252.

[291] Histoire Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1863, vol. i. p. 107.

[292] Historie Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1867, vol. i. p. 116; edit. 1863, p. 111.

[293] The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 260.

[294] Ibid. vol. i. p. 261.

[295] The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 349.

[296] Ibid. pp. 349-350.

[297] Ibid. p. 350.

[298] The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 351.
[299] Ibid. p. 351.
[300] Ibid. p. 307.
[301] The Gentile and the Jew, p. 307.
[302] The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. pp. 308 and 309.
[303] Ibid. p. 309.
[304] Historie Generale de la Philosophie, Paris, 1863, p. 122.
[305] The Gentile and the Jew, vol. i. p. 329.
[306] Ibid. p. 312.
[307] The Gentile and the Jew, p. 329.
[308] The Gentile and the Jew, p. 338.
[309] Ibid. p. 339.
[310] Ibid. p. 340.
[311] Ibid. p. 336.
[312] Ibid. p. 339.
[313] History of Philosophy. Translated from the German by Julius H. Seelye, p. 157.
[314] Ibid. p. 158.
[315] Geshichte der Christlichen Philosophie, vol. iii. p. 224.
[316] De Prdest. cap. i. 1, Migne, Patr. vol. cxxii. p. 358, a
[317] Vol. iii. pp. 206-296.
[318] De Divisione Natur, II. 20; edit. Westphalia, 1838, p. 118.
[319] Ibid. I. 9, p. 9.
[320] Ibid. II. 8, p. 95.
[321] Ibid. IV. 7, p. 330.
[322] Ibid. III. 19, p. 240.
[323] Ibid. II. 2, p. 88.
[324] Ritter, vol. iii. p. 234.

CHAPTER IV: THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD

Having considered the arguments in favor of the doctrine that God is, and also the various systems opposed to Theism, we come now to consider the question, Can God be known? and if so, How? that is, How does the mind proceed in forming its idea of God, and, How do we know that God really is what we believe Him to be?

§ 1. God can be known.

It is the clear doctrine of the Scriptures that God can be known. Our Lord teaches that eternal life consists in the knowledge of God and of Jesus Christ, whom He hath sent. The Psalmist says, "In Judah is God known" (Ps. lxxvi. 1). Isaiah predicts, that "the earth shall be full of the knowledge of the Lord" (Is. xi. 9). Paul says even of the heathen, that they knew God, but did not like to retain that knowledge (Rom. i. 19, 20, 21, 28).

A. State of the Question.

It is, however, important distinctly to understand what is meant when it is said, God can be known.

1. This does not mean that we can know all that is true concerning God. There were some among the ancient philosophers who taught that the nature of God can be as fully understood and determined as any other object of knowledge. The modern speculative school teaches the same doctrine. Among the propositions laid down by Spinoza, we find the following: "Cognitio ♦tern♦ et infinit♦ essenti♦ Dei, quam unaqu♦que idea involvit, est ad♦quata et perfecta." [325] Hegel says, that God is, only so far as He is known. The sin against the Holy Ghost, according to Hegel, is to deny that He can be known. [326] Cousin holds the same doctrine. "God in fact," he says, "exists to us only in so far as He is known." [327]

According to Schelling, God is known in his own nature by direct intuition of the higher reason. He assumes that there is in man a power which transcends the limits of the ordinary consciousness (an Anschauungs Verm♦gen), which takes immediate cognizance of the Infinite. Hegel says that "Man knows God only so far as God knows Himself in man; this knowledge is God's self-consciousness, but likewise a knowledge of the same by man, and this knowledge of God by man is the knowledge of man by God." [328] Cousin finds this knowledge in the common consciousness of men. That consciousness includes the knowledge of the Infinite as well as of the finite. We know the one just as we know the other, and we cannot know the one without knowing the other. These philosophers all admit that we could not thus know God unless we were ourselves God. Self-knowledge, with them, is the knowledge of God. Reason in man, according to Cousin, does not belong to his individuality. It is infinite, impersonal, and divine. Our knowledge of God, therefore, is

only God knowing Himself. Of course it is in no such sense as this that the Scriptures and the Church teach that God can be known.

God Inconceivable.

2. It is not held that God, properly speaking, can be conceived of; that is, we cannot form a mental image of God. "All conception," says Mr. Mansel, [329] "implies imagination." To have a valid conception of a horse, he adds, we must be able "to combine" the attributes which form "the definition of the animal" into "a representative image." Conception is defined by Taylor in the same manner, as "the forming or bringing an image or idea into the mind by an effort of the will." In this sense of the word it must be admitted that the Infinite is not an object of knowledge. We cannot form an image of infinite space, or of infinite duration, or of an infinite whole. To form an image is to limit, to circumscribe. But the infinite is that which is incapable of limitation. It is admitted, therefore, that the infinite God is inconceivable. We can form no representative image of Him in our minds. The word, however, is often, and perhaps commonly, used in a less restricted sense. To conceive is to think. A conception is therefore a thought and not necessarily an image. To say, therefore, that God is conceivable, in common language, is merely to say that He is thinkable. That is, that the thought (or idea) of God involves no contradiction or impossibility. We cannot think of a round square, or that a part is equal to the whole. But we can think that God is infinite and eternal.

God Incomprehensible.

3. When it is said that God can be known, it is not meant that He can be comprehended. To comprehend is to have a complete and exhaustive knowledge of an object. It is to understand its nature and its relations. We cannot comprehend force, and specially vital force. We see its effect, but we cannot understand its nature or the mode in which it acts. It would be strange that we should know more of God than of ourselves, or of the most familiar objects of sense. God is past finding out. We cannot understand the Almighty unto perfection. To comprehend is (1.) To know the essence as well as the attributes of an object. (2.) It is to know not some only, but all of its attributes. (3.) To know the relation in which these attributes stand to each other and to the substance to which they belong. (4.) To know the relation in which the object known stands to all other objects. Such knowledge is clearly impossible in a creature, either of itself or of anything out of itself. It is, however, substantially thus that the transcendentalists claim to know God.

Our Knowledge of God Partial.

4. It is included in what has been said, that our knowledge of God is partial and inadequate. There is infinitely more in God than we have any idea of; and what we do know, we know imperfectly. We know that God knows; but there is much in his mode of knowing, and in its relation to its objects, which we cannot understand. We know that He acts; but we do not know how He acts, or the relation which his activity bears to time, or things out of Himself. We know that He feels; that He loves, pities, is merciful, is gracious; that He hates sin. But this emotional element of the divine nature is covered with an obscurity as great, but no greater, than that which rests over his thoughts or purposes. Here again our ignorance, or rather, the limitation of our knowledge concerning God, finds a parallel in our ignorance of ourself. There are potentialities in our nature of which, in our present state of existence, we have no idea. And even as to what we are now, we know but

little. We know that we perceive, think, and act; we do not know how. It is perfectly inscrutable to us how the mind takes cognizance of matter; how the soul acts on the body, or the body on the mind. But because our knowledge of ourselves is thus partial and imperfect, no sane man would assert that we have no self-knowledge.

The common doctrine on this subject is clearly expressed by Des Cartes: [330] "Sciri potest, Deum esse infinitum et omnipotentem, quanquam anima nostra, utpote finita, id nequeat comprehendere sive concipere; eodem nimirum modo, quo montem manibus tangere possumus, sed non ut arborem, aut aliam quampiam rem brachiis nostris non majorem amplecti: comprehendere enim est cogitatione complecti; ad hoc autem, ut sciamus aliquid, sufficit, ut illud cogitatione attingamus."

Even Spinoza [331] says: "Ad qu[?]stionem tuam, an de Deo tam claram, quam de triangulo habeam ideam, respondeo affirmando. Non dico, me Deum omnino cognoscere; sed me qu[?]dam ejus attributa, non autem omnia, neque maximam intelligere partem, et certum est, plurimorum ignorantiam, quorundam eorum habere notitiam, non impedire. Quum Euclidis elementa addiscerem, primo tres trianguli angulos duobus rectis [?]quari intelligebam; hancque trianguli proprietatem clare percipiebam, licet multarum aliarum ignarus essem."

While, therefore, it is admitted not only that the infinite God is incomprehensible, and that our knowledge of Him is both partial and imperfect; that there is much in God which we do not know at all, and that what we do know, we know very imperfectly; nevertheless our knowledge, as far as it goes, is true knowledge. God really is what we believe Him to be, so far as our idea of Him is determined by the revelation which He has made of Himself in his works, in the constitution of our nature, in his word, and in the person of his Son. To know is simply to have such apprehensions of an object as conform to what that object really is. We know what the word Spirit means. We know what the words infinite, eternal, and immutable, mean. And, therefore, the sublime proposition, pregnant with more truth than was ever compressed in any other sentence, "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and immutable," conveys to the mind as distinct an idea, and as true (i.e., trustworthy) knowledge, as the proposition "The human soul is a finite spirit." In this sense God is an object of knowledge. He is not the unknown God, because He is infinite. Knowledge in Him does not cease to be knowledge because it is omniscience; power does not cease to be power because it is omnipotence; any more than space ceases to be space because it is infinite.

B. How do we know God?

How does the mind proceed in forming its idea of God? The older theologians answered this question by saying that it is by the way of negation, by the way of eminence, and by the way of causality. That is, we deny to God any limitation; we ascribe to Him every excellence in the highest degree; and we refer to Him as the great First Cause every attribute manifested in his works. We are the children of God, and, therefore, we are like Him. We are, therefore, authorized to ascribe to Him all the attributes of our own nature as rational creatures, without limitation, and to an infinite degree. If we are like God, God is like us. This is the fundamental principle of all religion. This is the principle which Paul assumed in his address to the Athenians (Acts xvii. 29): "Forasmuch then as we are the offspring of God, we ought not to think that the Godhead is like unto gold, or silver, or

stone, graven by art and man's device." For the same reason we ought not to think that He is simple being, or a mere abstraction, a name for the moral order of the universe, or the unknown and unknowable cause of all things, -- mere inscrutable force. If we are his children, He is our Father, whose image we bear, and of whose nature we partake. This, in the proper sense of the word, is Anthropomorphism, a word much abused, and often used in a bad sense to express the idea that God is altogether such a one as ourselves, a being of like limitations and passions. In the sense, however, just explained, it expresses the doctrine of the Church and of the great mass of mankind. Jacobi [332] well says: "We confess, therefore, to an Anthropomorphism inseparable from the conviction that man bears the image of God; and maintain that besides this Anthropomorphism, which has always been called Theism, is nothing but atheism or fetichism."

C. Proof that this Method is Trustworthy.

That this method of forming an idea of God is trustworthy, is proved, --

1. Because it is a law of nature. Even in the lowest form of fetichism the life of the worshipper is assumed to belong to the object which he worships. The power dreaded is assumed to possess attributes like our own. In like manner under all the forms of polytheism, the gods of the people have been intelligent personal agents. It is only in the schools of philosophy that we find a different method of forming an idea of the Godhead. They have substituted to hon for ho on, to theion for ho Theos, to agathon for ho agathos. It is here as with regard to the knowledge of the external world. The mass of mankind believe that things are what they perceive them to be. This philosophers deny. They affirm that we do not perceive the things themselves, but certain ideas, species, or images of the things; that we have, and can have, no knowledge of what the things themselves really are. So they say we can have no knowledge of what God is; we only know that we are led to think of Him in a certain way, but we are not only not authorized to believe that our idea corresponds to the reality, but, say they, it is certain that God is not what we take Him to be. As the people are right in the one case, so are they in the other. In other words, our conviction that God is what He has revealed Himself to be, rests on the same foundation as our conviction that the external world is what we take it to be. That foundation is the veracity of consciousness, or the trustworthiness of the laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature. "Invincibility of belief," according to Sir William Hamilton, "is convertible with the truth of belief," [333] although, unhappily, on this subject, he did not adhere to his own principle, "That what is by nature necessarily believed to be, truly is." [334] No man has more nobly or more earnestly vindicated this doctrine, which is the foundation of all science and of all faith. "Consciousness," he says, "once convicted of falsehood, an unconditioned scepticism, in regard to the character of our intellectual being, is the melancholy but only rational result. Any conclusion may now with impunity be drawn against the hopes and the dignity of human nature. Our personality, our immateriality, our moral liberty, have no longer an argument for their defence. Man is the dream of a shadow.' God is the dream of that dream." [335] The only question, therefore, is, Are we invincibly led to think of God as possessing the attributes of our rational nature? This cannot be denied; for universality proves invincibility of belief. And it is a historical fact that men have universally thus thought of God. Even Mr. Mansel [336] exclaims against the transcendentalists, "Fools, to dream that man can escape from himself, that human reason

can draw aught but a human portrait of God." True, he denies the correctness of that portrait; or, at least, he asserts that we cannot know whether it is correct or not. But this is not now the question. He admits that we are forced by the constitution of our nature thus to think of God. And by the fundamental principle of all true philosophy, what we are forced to believe must be true. It is true, therefore, that God really is what we take Him to be, when we ascribe to Him the perfections of our own nature, without limitation, and to an infinite degree.

Our Moral Nature demands this Idea of God.

2. It has already been shown, when speaking of the moral argument for the existence of God, that all men are conscious of their accountability to a being superior to themselves, who knows what they are and what they do, and who has the will and purpose to reward or punish men according to their works. The God, therefore, who is revealed to us in our nature, is a God who knows, and wills, and acts; who rewards and punishes. That is, He is a person; an intelligent, voluntary agent, endowed with moral attributes. This revelation of God must be true. It must make known to us what God really is, or our nature is a lie. All this Mr. Mansel, who holds that God can not be known, admits. He admits that a sense of dependence on a superior power is "a fact of the inner consciousness;" that this superior power is "not an inexorable fate, or immutable law, but a Being having at least so far the attributes of personality, that He can show favour or severity to those dependent upon Him, and can be regarded by them with the feelings of hope, and fear, and reverence, and gratitude." [337] No man, however, is, or can be grateful to the sun, or to the atmosphere, or to unintelligent force. Gratitude is a tribute of a person to a person. Again, the same author admits that "the moral reason, or will, or conscience of man, call it by what name we please, can have no authority save as implanted in him by some higher spiritual Being, as a law emanating from a law-giver." [338] "We are thus compelled," he says, "by the consciousness of moral obligation, to assume the existence of a moral [and of course of a personal] Deity, and to regard the absolute standard of right and wrong as constituted by the nature of that Deity." [339] Our argument from these facts is, that if our moral nature compels us to believe that God is a person, He must be a person, and consequently that we arrive at a true knowledge of God by attributing to Him the perfections of our own nature.

Our Religious Nature makes the same Demand.

3. The argument from our religious, as distinct from our moral nature, is essentially the same. Morality is not all of religion. The one is as much a law and necessity of our nature as the other. To worship, in the religious sense of the word, is to ascribe infinite perfection to its object. It is to express to that object out acknowledgments for the blessings we enjoy, and to seek their continuance; it is to confess, and praise, and pray, and to adore. We cannot worship the law of gravity, or unconscious force, or the mere order of the universe. Our religious nature, in demanding an object of supreme reverence, love, and confidence, demands a personal God, a God clothed with the attributes of a nature like our own; who can hear our confessions, praises, and prayers; who can love, and be loved; who can supply our wants, and fill all our capacities for good. Thus again it appears that unless our whole nature is a contradiction and a falsehood, we arrive at a true knowledge of God when we ascribe to Him the perfections of our own nature.

Mr. Mansel admits that our nature does demand a personal and moral Deity; but, he

says, "the very conception of a moral nature is in itself the conception of a limit, for morality is the compliance with a law; and a law, whether imposed from within or from without, can only be conceived to operate by limiting the range of possible actions." [340] In like manner he says, "The only human conception of personality is that of limitation." Therefore, if God be infinite, he can neither be a person, nor possess moral attributes. This is the argument of Strauss, and of all other pantheists, against the doctrine of a personal God. Mr. Mansel admits the force of the argument, and says we must renounce all hope of knowing what God is, and be content with "regulative knowledge," which teaches not what God really is, but what He wills us to think Him to be. We are thus forbidden to trust to our necessary beliefs. We must not regard as true what God by the constitution of our nature forces us to believe. This is to subvert all philosophy and all religion, and to destroy the difference between the rational and the irrational. Why is this contradiction between reason and conscience, between our rational and moral nature, assumed to exist? Simply because philosophers choose to give such a definition of morality and personality that neither can be predicated of an infinite Being. It is not true that either morality or personality imply any limitation inconsistent with absolute perfection. We do not limit God when we say He cannot be irrational as well as rational, unconscious as well as conscious, finite as well as infinite, evil as well as good. The only limitation admitted is the negation of imperfection. Reason is not limited when we say it cannot be unreason; or spirit, when we say that it is not matter; or light, when we say it is not darkness; or space, when we say it is not time. We do not, therefore, limit the Infinite, when we exalt Him in our conceptions from the unconscious to the conscious, from the unintelligent to the intelligent, from an impersonal something to the absolutely perfect personal Jehovah. All these difficulties arise from confounding the ideas of infinite and all.

4. The fourth argument on this subject is, that if we are not justified in referring to God the attributes of our own nature, then we have no God. The only alternative is anthropomorphism (in this sense) or Atheism. An unknown God, a God of whose nature and of whose relation to us we know nothing, to us is nothing. It is a historical fact that those who reject this method of forming our idea of God, who deny that we are to refer to Him the perfections of our own nature, have become atheists. They take the word "spirit," and strip from it consciousness, intelligence, will, and morality; and the residue, which is blank nothing, they call God. Hamilton and Mansel take refuge from this dreadful conclusion in faith. They say that reason forbids the ascription of these, or of any other attributes, to the Infinite and Absolute, but that faith protests against this conclusion of the reason. Such protest, however, is of no account, unless it be rational. When Kant proved that there was no rational evidence of the existence of God, and fell back from the speculative to the practical reason (i.e., from reason to faith), his followers universally gave up all faith in a personal God. No man can believe in the impossible. And if reason pronounces that it is impossible that the Infinite should be a person, faith in His personality is an impossibility. This Mr. Mansel does not admit. For while he says that it is a contradiction to affirm the Infinite to be a person, or to possess moral attributes, he nevertheless says that, "Anthropomorphism is the indispensable condition of all human theology;" [341] and he quotes from Kant [342] this passage: "We may confidently challenge all natural theology to name a single distinctive attribute of the Deity, whether denoting intelligence or will, which, apart from anthropomorphism, is anything more than a mere word, to which not the

slightest notion can be attached, which can serve to extend our theoretical knowledge." It is greatly to be lamented that men should teach that the only way in which it is possible for us to form an idea of God, leads to no true knowledge. It does not teach us what God is, but what we are forced against reason to think He is.

Argument from the Revelation of God in Nature.

5. A fifth argument is from the fact that the works of God manifest a nature like our own. It is a sound principle that we must refer to a cause the attributes necessary to account for its effects. If the effects manifest intelligence, will, power, and moral excellence, these attributes must belong to the cause. As, therefore, the works of God are a revelation of all these attributes on a most stupendous scale, they must belong to God in an infinite degree. This is only saying that the revelation made of God in the external world agrees with the revelation which He has made of himself in the constitution of our own nature. In other words, it proves that the image of himself which He has enstamped on our nature is a true likeness.

Argument from Scripture.

6. The Scriptures declare God to be just what we are led to think He is, when we ascribe to Him the perfections of our own nature in an infinite degree. We are self-conscious, so is God. We are spirits, so is He. We are voluntary agents, so is God. We have a moral nature, miserably defaced indeed, God has moral excellence in infinite perfection. We are persons, so is God. All this the Scriptures declare to be true. The great primal revelation of God is as the "I am," the personal God. All the names and titles given to Him; all the attributes ascribed to Him; all the works attributed to Him, are revelations of what He truly is. He is the Elohim, the Mighty One, the Holy One, the Omnipresent Spirit; He is the creator, the preserver, the governor of all things. He is our Father. He is the hearer of prayer; the giver of all good. He feeds the young ravens. He clothes the flowers of the field. He is Love. He so loved the world as to give his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him might not perish but have everlasting life. He is merciful, long-suffering, abundant in goodness and truth. He is a present help in every time of need; a refuge, a high tower, an exceeding great reward. The relations in which, according to the Scriptures, we stand to God, are such as we can sustain only to a being who is like ourselves. He is our ruler, and father, with whom we can commune. His favour is our life, his loving-kindness better than life. This sublime revelation of God in his own nature and in his relation to us is not a delusion. It is not mere regulative truth, or it would be a deceit and mockery. It makes God known to us as He really is. We therefore know God, although no creature can understand the Almighty unto perfection.

Argument from the Manifestation of God in Christ.

7. Finally, God has revealed Himself in the person of his Son. No man knoweth the Father but the Son; and he to whom the Son shall reveal Him. Jesus Christ is the true God. The revelation which He made of Himself was the manifestation of God. He and the Father are one. The words of Christ were the words of God. The works of Christ were the works of God. The love, mercy, tenderness, the forgiving grace, as well as the holiness, the severity and power manifested by Christ, were all manifestations of what God truly is. We see, therefore, as with our own eyes, what God is. We know that although infinite and absolute, He can think, act, and will; that He can love and hate; that He can hear prayer and

forgive sins, that we can have fellowship with Him, as one person can commune with another. Philosophy must veil her face in the presence of Jesus Christ, as God manifest in the flesh. She may not presume in that presence to say that God is not, and is not known to be, what Christ himself most clearly was. This doctrine that God is the object of certain and true knowledge lies at the foundation of all religion, and therefore must never be given up.

[325] Ethices, ii. prop. xlvi. edit. Jena, 1803, vol. ii. p. 119.

[326] See Mansel's Limits of Religious Thought, Boston, 1859, p. 301.

[327] Sir William Hamilton's Discussions, p. 16. Princeton Review on Cousin's Philosophy, 1856.

[328] Werke, xii. p. 496, edit. Berlin, 1840.

[329] Prolegomena Logica, edit. Boston, 1860, p. 34.

[330] Epistol�, I., cx., edit. Amsterdam, 1682.

[331] Epistola, lx., vol. i. p. 659, edit. Jena, 1802.

[332] "Von den g�ttlichen Dingen," Werke, iii. pp. 422, 423, edit. Leipzig, 1816.

[333] Philosophy, edit. Wight, New York, 1854, p. 233.

[334] Ibid. p. 226.

[335] Ibid. p. 234.

[336] Limits of Religious Thought, edit. Boston, 1859, pp. 56, 57.

[337] Limits of Religious Thought, etc., p. 120.

[338] Ibid. p. 121.

[339] Ibid. p. 122.

[340] Limits of Religious Thought, etc., p. 127.

[341] Limits of Religious Thought, etc., p. 261.

[342] "Kritik der Praktischen Vernunft." Works, edit. Rosenkranz, vol. viii. p. 282.

§ 2. God cannot be fully known.

The modern German philosophers take the ground that all science, all true philosophy, must be founded on the knowledge of being, and not of phenomena. They reject the authority of the senses and of consciousness, and teach that it is only by the immediate cognition of the Absolute that we arrive at any true or certain knowledge. God, or rather, the Infinite, can be as thoroughly known and comprehended as the simplest object of sense or of consciousness; He is, only so far as He is known.

It would seem impossible that the presumption of men should be so extreme that such a creature as man should pretend to understand the Almighty to perfection, when in fact he cannot understand himself or the simplest objects with which he is in daily contact. The assumption is that being, as such, Infinite and Absolute Being, can be known; that is, that we can determine what it is, and the necessary laws by which it is developed into the phenomenal world. This knowledge is attained � priori; not by any induction or deduction from our own nature or the facts of experience, but by an immediate act of cognition, which transcends all consciousness. The great service rendered by Sir William Hamilton and Mr. Mansel to the cause of truth was to demonstrate the utter futility of this pretended

philosophy of the Infinite, on the principles of its advocates. To the common mind it needed no refutation, being intuitively seen to be impossible and absurd.

Sir William Hamilton's Argument.

Hamilton shows, in the first place, that the immediate intuition of Schelling, which Hegel ridiculed as a mere imagination, the dialectics of Hegel, which Schelling pronounced a mere play of words, and the impersonal reason of Cousin which enters into our consciousness but not into our personality, utterly fail to give us a knowledge of the Infinite. "Existence," he says, "is revealed to us only under specific modifications, and these are known only under the conditions of our faculties of knowledge. Things in themselves, matter, mind, God, all in short that is not finite, relative, and phenomenal, as bearing no analogy to our faculties, is beyond the verge of our our knowledge." [343] In what sense Hamilton places God "beyond the verge of our knowledge" will be seen in the sequel. It is, however, self-evident that our knowledge must be limited by our faculties of knowing. Other animals may have senses which we do not possess. It is utterly impossible that we should have the kind of knowledge due to the exercise of those senses. It is probable that there are faculties dormant in our nature which are not called into activity in our present state of being. It is clear that we cannot now attain the knowledge which those faculties may hereafter enable us to attain. It is just as plain that we cannot cognize the Infinite, in the sense of these philosophers, as that we cannot see a spirit, or guide ourselves in space, as does the carrier-pigeon or the migrating salmon.

Only the Infinite can know the Infinite.

2. In the second place, it is admitted that none but the Infinite can know the Infinite, and to know God in this sense, it is admitted that we must be God. "Schelling claimed for the mind of man, what Kant had demonstrated to be impossible, a faculty of intellectual intuition which is apart from sense, above consciousness, and released from the laws of the understanding, and which comprehends the absolute by becoming the absolute, and thus knows God by being God." [344] This assumption that man is God, shocks the reason and common sense of men as well as outrages their religious and moral convictions.

3. In the third place, Hamilton and Mansel demonstrate that, assuming the definitions of the Absolute and Infinite given by the transcendentalists, the most contradictory conclusions may logically be deduced from them. "There are three terms familiar as household words in the vocabulary of philosophy, which must be taken into account in every system of metaphysical theology. To conceive the Deity as He is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as absolute, and as infinite. By First Cause, is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none. By the Absolute, is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being. By the Infinite, is meant that which is free from all possible limitation; that than which a greater is inconceivable, and which, consequently, can receive no additional attribute or mode of existence which it had not from all eternity." [345]

According to these definitions, in the sense in which they are intended to be taken, it follows: --

1. That the Infinite and Absolute must include the sum of all being. For "that which is conceived as absolute and infinite must be conceived as containing within itself the sum, not only of all actual, but of all possible modes of being. For if any actual mode can be

denied of it, it is related to that mode and limited by it; and if any possible mode can be denied of it, it is capable of becoming more than it now is, and such a capability is a limitation." [346]

2. If the Absolute and Infinite be as above defined, it cannot be the object of knowledge. To know is to limit. It is to distinguish the object of knowledge from other objects. We cannot conceive, says Hamilton, of an absolute whole; i.e., of a whole so great that we cannot conceive of it as a part of a greater whole. We cannot conceive of an infinite line, or of infinite space, or of infinite duration. We may as well think without thought, as to assign any limit beyond which there can be no extension, no space, no duration. "Goad imagination to the utmost, it still sinks paralyzed within the bounds of time." [347] It follows, therefore, from the very nature of knowledge, according to Hamilton, that the Infinite and Absolute cannot be known.

The Infinite cannot Know.

3. It also follows from these premises, that the Infinite cannot know. All knowledge is limitation and difference. It supposes a distinction between subject and object, between the knower and what is known, inconsistent with the idea of the Absolute.

4. It follows also that the Absolute cannot be conscious, for consciousness involves a distinction between the self and the not-self. It is knowledge of ourselves as distinct from what is not ourselves. Even if conscious only of itself; there is the same distinction between subject and object; the self as subject and a mode of the self as the object of consciousness. "The almost unanimous voice of philosophy," says Mansel, "in pronouncing that the Absolute is both one and simple must be accepted as the voice of reason also, so far as reason has any voice in the matter." "The conception of an absolute and infinite consciousness contradicts itself." [348]

The Absolute cannot be Cause.

5. It is equally clear that the Absolute and Infinite cannot be cause. Causation implies relation; the relation of efficiency to the effect. It also implies change; change from inaction to activity. It moreover implies succession, and succession implies existence in time. "A thing existing absolutely (i.e., not under relation)," says Hamilton, "and a thing existing absolutely as a cause, are contradictory." He quotes Schelling [349] as saying, "He would deviate wide as the poles from the idea of the Absolute, who would think of defining its nature by the notion of activity." "But he who would define the Absolute by the notion of a cause," he adds, "would deviate still more widely from its nature, inasmuch as the notion of a cause involves not only the notion of a determination to activity, but of a determination to a particular, nay a dependent, kind of activity." [350] "The three conceptions, the Cause, the Absolute, the Infinite, all equally indispensable, do they not," asks Mr. Mansel, [351] "imply contradiction to each other, when viewed in conjunction, as attributes of one and the same Being? A cause cannot, as such, be absolute: the Absolute cannot, as such, be cause."

6. According to the laws of our reason and consciousness, there can be no duration without succession, but succession as implying change cannot be predicated of the Absolute and Infinite, and yet without succession there can be no thought or consciousness; and, therefore, to say that God is eternal is to deny that He has either thought or consciousness.

7. Again, "Benevolence, holiness, justice, wisdom," says Mansel, "can be conceived by us only as existing in a benevolent and holy and just and wise being, who is not identical

with any one of his attributes, but the common subject of them all; in one word, in a person. But personality, as we conceive it, is essentially a limitation and a relation. -- To speak of an absolute and infinite persons is simply to use language to which, however true it may be in a superhuman sense, no mode of human thought can possibly attach itself." [352]

The Conclusion to which Hamilton's Argument leads.

What then is the result of the whole matter? It is, that if the definitions of the Absolute and Infinite adopted by transcendentalists be admitted, the laws of reason lead us into a labyrinth of contradictions. If their idea of an infinite and absolute Being be correct, then it must include all being actual and possible; it can neither know nor be the object of knowledge; it cannot be conscious, or cause, or a person, or the subject of any moral attribute. Hamilton infers from all this, that a philosophy of the Absolute is a sheer impossibility; that the Absolute, from its nature and from the necessary limits of human thought, is unknowable, and consequently that the stupendous systems of pantheistic atheism which had been erected on the contrary assumption, must fall to the ground. Those systems have indeed already fallen by their own weight. Although only a few years ago they claimed the homage of the intellectual world and boasted of immutability, they have at the present time scarcely a living advocate.

Unhappily, however, Hamilton, like Samson, is involved in the ruin which he created. In overthrowing pantheism he overthrows Theism. All that he says of the Absolute as unknowable, he affirms to be true of God. All the contradictions which attend the assumption of an absolute and infinite being as the ground of philosophy, he says attend the assumption of an infinite God.

[343] Discussions, p. 23.

[344] Progress of Philosophy, by S. Taylor. LL.D., p. 200.

[345] Mansel, p. 75.

[346] Mansel, p. 76.

[347] Hamilton's Discussions, p. 35.

[348] Mansel, pp. 78, 79.

[349] Bruno, p. 171.

[350] Discussions, p. 40.

[351] Mansel, p. 77.

[352] Mansel, pp. 102, 103.

§ 3. Hamilton's Doctrine.

A. God an Object of Faith, but not of Knowledge.

The sense in which Hamilton and his followers represent God as unknowable, has been a matter of dispute. When he says that we can know that God is, but not what He is, he says only what had been said a hundred times before. Plato had said that the search after God was difficult, and that when He is found, it is impossible to declare his nature. Philo still more explicitly teaches that the divine essence is without qualities or attributes, and as we know nothing of any essence but by its distinguishing attributes. God in his own nature is altogether unknowable. [353] This is repeated continually by the Greek and Latin fathers;

who, however, in most cases at least, meant nothing more than that God is incomprehensible. Others again, in asserting the incapacity of man to know God, refer to his spiritual blindness occasioned by sin. Therefore, while they deny that God can be known by the unregenerate, they affirm that He is known by those to whom the Son has revealed Him. In like manner although the Apostle asserts that even the heathen know God, he elsewhere speaks of a kind of knowledge due to the saving illumination of the Holy Spirit. It is in the sense that God is past finding out that the devout Pascal says, [354] "We know there is an infinite, but we are ignorant of its nature. . . . . We may well know that there is a God, without knowing what He is." And even John Owen says, "All the rational conceptions of the minds of men are swallowed up and lost, when they would exercise themselves directly on that which is absolute, immense, eternal, and infinite. When we say it is so, we know not what we say, but only that it is not otherwise. What we deny of God we know in some measure -- but what we affirm we know not; only we declare what we believe and adore." [355] Professor Tyler adds, that while the philosophy of Hamilton "confines our knowledge to the conditioned [the finite], it leaves faith free about the unconditioned [the infinite]; indeed constrains us to believe in it by the highest law of our intelligence."

Although Hamilton often uses the same language when speaking of God as unknowable, as that employed by others, his meaning is very different. He really teaches an ignorance of God destructive of all rational religion, because inconsistent with the possibility of faith.

Different Kinds of Ignorance.

There are different kinds of ignorance. First, there is the ignorance of the idiot, which is blank vacuity. In him the statement of a proposition awakens no mental action whatever. Secondly, there is the ignorance of a blind man, of colour. He does not know what colour is; but he knows there is something which answers to that word and which produces a certain effect on the eyes of those who see. He may even understand the laws by which the production of colour is determined. A blind man has written a treatise on optics. Thirdly, there is the ignorance under which the mind labors when it can prove contradictory propositions concerning the same object, as that the same figure is both square and round And fourthly, there is the ignorance of imperfect knowledge. Paul speaks of knowing what passes knowledge.

Our ignorance of God, according to Hamilton, is neither the ignorance of the idiot nor of imperfect knowledge, but it is analogous to the ignorance of a blind man of colours, and more definitely, the ignorance we labor under with regard to any object of which we can prove contradictions.

Proof that Hamilton Denies that we can Know God.

That this view of his doctrine is correct is proved, (1.) Because he asserts in such broad terms that God cannot be known; that He is not only inconceivable, but incogitable. (2.) Because, he says, that we know that God is not, and cannot be, what we think He is. It is not merely that we cannot determine with certainty that our idea of God is correct, but we know that it is not correct. "To think that God is, as we can think Him to be," he says, "is blasphemy. The last and highest consecration of all true religion, must be an altar, Agnosto Theo, To the unknown and unknowable God.'" [356] (3.) Because both he and Mansel

continually assert that the Infinite cannot be a person; cannot know; cannot be cause; cannot be conscious; cannot be the subject of any moral attributes. To think of God as infinite, and to think of Him as a person is an impossibility. (4.) The illustrations which these writers employ determine clearly their meaning. Our ignorance of God is compared to our incapacity to conceive of two straight lines inclosing a portion of space; or to think "a circular parallelogram." It is not merely that we cannot understand such a figure, but we see that, in the nature of things, any such figure is impossible. So we not only cannot understand how God can be absolute and yet a person, but we see that an absolute person is as much a contradiction as a square circle. (5.) Accordingly Herbert Spencer and others, in carrying out Hamilton's principles, come to the conclusion not only that we cannot know God, but that it is impossible that a personal God should exist. There can be no such being.

Hamilton's Doctrine of God as an object of Faith.

Hamilton and Mansel, however, are not only Theists, but Christians. They believe in God, and they believe in the Scriptures as a divine revelation. They endeavor to avoid what seem to be the inevitable consequences of their doctrine, by adopting two principles: first, that the unthinkable is possible, and, therefore, may be believed. By the unthinkable is meant that which the laws of reason force us to regard as self-contradictory. On this subject Mansel says: "It is our duty to think of God as personal, and it is our duty to believe that He is infinite. It is true that we cannot reconcile these two representations with each other; as our conception of personality involves attributes apparently contradictory to the notion of infinity. But it does not follow that this contradiction exists anywhere but in our own minds: it does not follow that it implies any impossibility in the absolute nature of God. . . . . It proves that there are limits to man's power of thought; and it proves no more." [357] The conclusion is, that as whatever is possible is credible, therefore, as it is possible that God though infinite may be a person, his personality may be rationally believed.

The Unthinkable, or Impossible, cannot be an object of Faith.

On this it may be remarked, --

1. That there is a great difference between the irreconcilable and the self-contradictory. In the one case the difficulty arises, or may arise, out of our ignorance or mental weakness; in the other, it arises out of the nature of the things themselves. Many things are irreconcilable to a child which are not so to a man. Many things are irreconcilable to one man and not to another; to men and not to angels. But the self-contradictory is impossible, and is seen to be so by all orders of mind. That two and two should make twenty, or that the same figure should be a square and a circle, is just as irreconcilable to an angel as to a child. What is self-contradictory cannot possibly be true. Now, according to Hamilton and Mansel, infinity and personality are not only irreconcilable, but contradictory. The one affirms what the other denies. According to their doctrine the Infinite cannot be a person, and a person cannot be infinite, any more than the Infinite can be finite, or the finite infinite. The one of necessity excludes the other. If you affirm the one, you deny the other. There is a great difference between not seeing how a thing is, and clearly seeing that it cannot be. Hamilton and Mansel constantly assert that an absolute person is a contradiction in terms. And so it is, if their definition of the absolute be correct; and if a contradiction, it is impossible.

2. If to our reason the personality of an infinite God be a contradiction, then it is

impossible rationally to believe that He is a person. It is in vain to say that the contradiction is only in our mind. So is faith in our mind. It is impossible for one and the same mind to see a thing to be false, and believe it to be true. For the reason to see that a thing is a contradiction, is to see it to be false; and to see it to be false, and to believe it to be true, is a contradiction in terms. Even if to other and higher minds the contradiction does not exist, so long as it exists in the view of any particular mind, for that mind faith in its truth is an impossibility.

It may be said that a man's reason may convince him that the external world does not really exist, while his senses force him to believe in its reality. So reason may pronounce the personality of God a contradiction, and conscience force us to believe that He is a person. This is to confound consecutive with contemporaneous states of mind. It is possible for a man to be an idealist in his study, and a realist out of doors. But he cannot be an idealist and a realist at one and the same time. The mind is a unit. A man's reason is the man himself; so is his conscience, and so are all his other faculties. It is the one substantive self that thinks and believes. To assume, therefore, that by necessity he must think one way and believe another; that the laws of his reason force him to regard as false what his conscience or senses force him to regard as true, is to destroy his rationality. It is also to impugn the wisdom and goodness of our Creator, for it supposes Him to have put one part of our constitution in conflict with another; to have placed us under guides who alternately force us to move in opposite directions. It even places this contradiction in God himself. For what reason, in its legitimate exercise, says, God says; and what conscience, in its legitimate exercise, says, God says. If, therefore, reason says that God is not a person, and conscience says that He is, then -- with reverence be it spoken -- God contradicts Himself.

Knowledge essential to Faith.

It is one of the distinguishing doctrines of Protestants that knowledge is essential to faith. This is clearly the doctrine of Scripture. How can they believe on Him of whom they have not heard? is the pertinent and instructive query of the Apostle. Faith includes the affirmation of the mind that a thing is true and trustworthy. But it is impossible for the mind to affirm anything of that of which it knows nothing. Romanists indeed say that if a man believes that the Church teaches the truth, then he believes all the Church teaches, although ignorant of its doctrines. It might as well be said that because a child has confidence in his father, therefore he knows all his father knows. Truth must be communicated to the mind, and seen to be possible, before, on any evidence, it can be believed. If, therefore, we cannot know God, we cannot believe in Him.

B. Regulative Knowledge.

The second principle which Hamilton and Mansel adopt to save themselves from scepticism is that of regulative knowledge. We are bound to believe that God is what the Scriptures and our moral nature declare Him to be. This revelation, however, does not teach us what God really is, but merely what He wills us to believe concerning Him. Our senses, they say, tell us that things around us are, but not what they are. We can, however, safely act on the assumption that they really are what they appear to be. Our senses, therefore, give only regulative knowledge; i.e., knowledge sufficient to regulate our active life. So we do not, and cannot, know what God really is; but the representations contained in the Scriptures are sufficient to regulate our moral and religious life. We can safely act on

the assumption that He really is what we are thus led to think Him to be, although we know that such is not the fact.

We must be "content," says Mansel, [358] "with those regulative ideas of the Deity, which are sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect, -- which tell us not what God is in Himself, but how He wills that we should think of Him." "Though this kind of knowledge," says Hampden, [359] "is abundantly instructive to us in point of sentiment and action; teaches us, that is, both how to feel, and how to act towards God; -- for it is the language that we understand, the language formed by our own experience and practice; -- it is altogether inadequate in point of science." Regulative knowledge, therefore, is that which is designed to regulate our character and practice. It need not be true. Nay, it may be, and is demonstrably false, for Hamilton says it is blasphemy to think that God really is what we take Him to be.

Objections to the Doctrine of Regulative Knowledge.

1. The first remark on this doctrine of regulative knowledge is, that it is self-contradictory. Regulative truth is truth designed to accomplish a given end. Design, however, is the intelligent and voluntary adaptation of means to an end; and the intelligent adaptation of means to an end, is a personal act. Unless, therefore, God be really a person, there can be no such thing as regulative knowledge. Mr. Mansel says, we cannot know what God is in Himself, "but only how He wills that we should think of Him." Here "will" is attributed to God; and the personal pronouns are used, and must be used in the very statement of the doctrine. That is, we must assume that God is really (and not merely in our subjective apprehensions) a person, in order to believe in regulative knowledge, which form of knowledge supposes that He is not, or may not be a person. This is a contradiction.

2. Regulative knowledge is, from the nature of the case, powerless, unless its subjects regard it as well founded. Some parents educate their children in the use of fictions and fairy tales; but belief in the truth of these is essential to their effect. So long as the world believed in ghosts and witches, the belief had power. As soon as men were satisfied that there were no such real existences, their power was gone. Had the philosophers convinced the Greeks that their gods were not real persons, there would have been an end to their mythology. And if Hamilton and his disciples can convince the world that the Infinite cannot be a person, the regulative influence of Theism is gone. Men cannot be influenced by representations which they know are not conformed to the truth.

3. This theory is highly derogatory to God. It supposes Him to propose to influence his creatures by false representations; revealing Himself as Father, Governor, and Judge, when there is no objective truth to answer to these representations. And worse than this, as remarked above, it supposes Him to have so constituted our nature as to force us to believe what is not true. We are constrained by the laws of our rational and moral being to think of God as having a nature like our own, and yet we are told it is blasphemy so to regard Him. The theory supposes a conflict between reason and conscience, -- between our rational and moral nature. The latter forcing us to believe that God is a person, and the former declaring personality and deity to be contradictory ideas. We do not forget that Mr. Mansel says that the incogitable may be real, that the contradiction is in our own minds, and not necessarily in the nature of things. But this amounts to nothing; for he says continually that the Absolute cannot be a person, cannot be a cause, cannot be conscious, cannot either know or be

known. He says, "A thing -- an object -- an attribute -- a person -- or any other term signifying one out of many possible objects of consciousness, is by that very relation necessarily declared to be finite." [360] That is, if God be a person, He is of necessity finite. Here the personality of God is said not only to be incogitable, or inconceivable, but impossible. And this is the real doctrine of his book. It must be so. It is intuitively true that the whole cannot be a part of itself; and if the Infinite be "the All," then it cannot be one out of many. If men adopt the principles of pantheists, they cannot consistently avoid their conclusions. Hamilton teaches not merely that God may not be what we think Him to be, but that He cannot so be; that we are ignorant what He is; that He is to us an unknown God. If God, by the laws of our reason, thus forces us to deny his personality, and by the laws of our moral nature makes it not only a duty, but a necessity to believe in his personality, then our nature is chaotic. Man, in that case, is not the noble creature that was formed in the image of God.

4. This doctrine of regulative knowledge destroys the authority of the Scriptures. If all that the Bible teaches concerning the nature of God and concerning his relation to the world, reveals no objective truth, gives us no knowledge of what God really is, then what it teaches concerning the person, offices, and work of Christ, may all be unreal, and there may be no such person and no such Saviour.

C. Objections to the whole Theory.

1. The first and most obvious fallacy in the theory of Hamilton and Mansel, as it appears to us, lies in their definition of the Absolute and Infinite, or in the language of Hamilton, the Unconditioned. By the Absolute they mean that which exists in and of itself, and out of all relation. The Infinite is that, than which nothing greater can be conceived or is possible; which includes all actual and all possible modes of being. Mansel subscribes to the dictum of Hegel that the Absolute must include all modes of being, good as well as evil. In like manner the Infinite must be All. For if any other being exists, the Infinite must of necessity be limited, and, therefore, is no longer infinite.

These definitions determine everything. If the Absolute be that which is incapable of all relation, then it must be alone; nothing but the Absolute can be actual or possible. Then it can neither know nor be known. And if the Infinite be all, then again there can be no finite. Then it is just as certain that the Absolute and Infinite cannot be cause, or conscious, or a person, as that a square cannot be a circle, or the whole a part of itself. When a definition leads to contradictions and absurdities, when it leads to conclusions which are inconsistent with the laws of our nature, and when it subverts all that consciousness, common sense, and the Bible declare to be true, the only rational inference is that the definition is wrong. This inference we have the right to draw in the present case. The very fact that the definitions of the Absolute and Infinite which Hamilton and Mansel have adopted from the transcendentalists, lead to all the fearful conclusions which they draw from them, is proof enough that they must be wrong. They are founded upon purely speculative a priori grounds. They can have no authority. For if, as these philosophers say, the Absolute and Infinite cannot be known, how can it be defined? Neither the etymology nor the usage of the words in question justifies the above given definitions of them. Absolute (ab and solvo) means, free, unrestrained, independent; as when we speak of an absolute monarch or absolute promise; or, unlimited, as when we speak of absolute space.

The word is also used in the sense of finished, or perfect. An absolute being is one that is free, unlimited, independent, and perfect. God is absolute, because He is not dependent for His existence, nature, attributes, or acts, on any other being. He is unlimited, by anything out of Himself or independent of his will. But this does not imply that He is the only being; nor that in order to be absolute He must be dead, unconscious, or without thought or will. Much less does the word infinite, as applied to God, imply that He must include all forms of being. Space may be infinite without being duration, and duration may be infinite without being space. An infinite spirit does not include material forms of existence, any more than an infinite line is an infinite surface or an infinite solid. When it is said that anything is infinite, all that is properly meant is that no limit is assignable or possible to it as such. An infinite line is that to which no limit can be assigned as a line; infinite space is that to which no limit can be assigned as space; an infinite spirit is a spirit which is unlimited in all the attributes of a spirit. It is a great mistake to assume that the infinite must be all. Infinite power is not all power, but simply power to whose efficiency no limitation can be assigned; and infinite knowledge is not all knowledge, but simply knowledge to the extent of which no limit is possible. So too an infinite substance is not all substance, but a substance which is not excluded from any portion of space by other substances, or limited in the manifestation of any of its attributes or functions by anything out of itself. God, therefore, may be a Spirit infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being and perfections, without being matter, and sin, and misery.

It may be said that as infinite space must include all space, so an infinite being must of necessity include all modes of being. This, however, is a mere play on words. Infinite is sometimes inclusive of all, not from the meaning of the word, but from the nature of the subject of which infinitude is predicated. Infinite space must include all space, because space is in its nature one. But an infinite line does not include all lines, because there may be any number of lines; and an infinite being is not all being, because there may be any number of beings.

It must excite the wonder and indignation of ordinary men to see the fundamental truths of religion and morality endangered or subverted out of deference to the assumption that the Absolute must be unrelated.

Wrong Definition of Knowledge.

2. The second fallacy involved in Hamilton's theory concerns his idea of knowledge. When it is said that God is unknowable, everything depends on what is meant by knowledge. With him to know is to understand, to have a distinct conception, or mental image. This is evident from his using interchangeably the words unthinkable, unknowable, and inconceivable. Thus on a single page [361] Mansel uses the phrases that of which "we do not and cannot think," that "which we cannot conceive," and "that which we are unable to comprehend," as meaning one and the same thing. This is also proved from the manner in which other words and phrases are employed; for example, the Infinite, the Absolute, an absolute beginning, an absolute whole, an absolute part, any increase or diminution of the complement of being. The only sense, however, in which these things are unthinkable, is, that we cannot form a mental image of them. A distinguished German professor, when anything was said to which he could not assent, was accustomed to spread out his hands and close his eyes and say, "Ich kann gar keine Anschauung davon machen." I cannot see it

with my minds eye, I cannot make an image of it. This seems to be a materialistic way of looking at things. The same may be said of cause, substance, and soul, of none of which can we frame a mental image; yet they are not unthinkable. A thing is unthinkable only when it is seen to be impossible, or when we can attach no meaning to the words, or proposition, in which it is stated. This impossibility of intelligent thought may arise from our weakness. The problems of the higher mathematics are unthinkable to a child. Or, the impossibility may arise from the nature of the thing itself. That a triangle should have four sides, or a circle be a square, is absolutely unthinkable. But in neither of these senses is the Infinite unthinkable. It is not impossible, for Hamilton and Mansel both admit that God is in fact infinite; nor is that proposition unintelligible. It conveys a perfectly clear and distinct idea to the mind. When the mind affirms to itself that space is infinite, i.e., that it cannot be limited, it knows what it means just as well as when it says that two and two are four. Neither is an absolute beginning unthinkable. If, indeed, by absolute beginning is meant uncaused beginning, the coming into existence of something out of nothing, and produced by nothing, then it is impossible and therefore incogitable. But the dictum is applied to a creation ex nihilo, which is declared to be unthinkable. This, however, is denied. We will to move a limb, and it moves. God said, Let there be light, and light was. The one event is just as intelligible as the other. In neither case can we comprehend the nexus between the antecedent and the consequent, between the volition and the effect; but as facts they are equally thinkable and knowable.

It is not possible to give the evidence scattered through the writings of Hamilton and Mansel, that they use the word "to know" in the sense of comprehending, or, forming a mental image of the object known. Mansel [362] quotes the following sentence from Dr. McCosh's work on the "Method of the Divine Government," namely, "The mind seeks in vain to embrace the infinite in a positive image, but is constrained to believe, when its efforts fail, that there is a something to which no limits can be put." This sentence Mansel says may be accepted "by the most uncompromising adherent" of Sir W. Hamilton's doctrine, that the infinite is unthinkable and unknowable. To know, therefore, according to Hamilton and Mansel, is to form a mental image of; and as we cannot form such an image of God, God cannot be known. Mansel is disposed to think that this reduces the controversy to a matter of words. And Dr. Tyler, in his able exposition of Hamilton's philosophy, says, [363] "So it be admitted, as it must, that all our intelligence of God is by analogy, it matters but little, practically, whether the conviction be called knowledge, belief, or faith." It is, however, very far from being a dispute about words. For Hamilton constantly asserts that God is not, and cannot be, what we think He is. Then we have no God. For what is God as infinite, if as Mansel says, "The Infinite, if it is to be conceived at all, must be conceived as potentially everything and actually nothing." [364]

What is meant by Knowledge.

Knowledge is the perception of truth. Whatever the mind perceives, whether intuitively or discursively, to be true, that it knows. We have immediate knowledge of all the facts of consciousness; and with regard to other matters, some we can demonstrate, some we can prove analogically, some we must admit or involve ourselves in contradictions and absurdities. Whatever process the mind may institute, if it arrives at a clear perception that a thing is, then that thing is an objects of knowledge. It is thus we

know the object with which heaven and earth are crowded. It is thus we know our fellow men. With regard to anything without us, when our ideas, or convictions concerning it, correspond to what the thing really is, then we know it. How do we know that our nearest friend has a soul, and that that soul has intelligence, moral excellence, and power? We cannot see or feel it. We cannot form a mental image of it. It is mysterious and incomprehensible. Yet we know that it is, and what it is, just as certainly as we know that we ourselves are, and what we are. In the same way we know that God is, and what He is. We know that He is a spirit, that He has intelligence, moral excellence, and power to an infinite degree. We know that He can love, pity, and pardon; that He can hear and answer prayer. We know God in the same sense and just as certainly as we know our father or mother. And no man can take this knowledge from us, or persuade us that it is not knowledge, but a mere irrational belief.

Hamilton's Doctrine Leads to Scepticism.

3. The principles on which Hamilton and Mansel deny that God can be known, logically lead to scepticism. Hamilton has indeed rendered invaluable service to the cause of truth by his defence of what is, perhaps, infelicitously called the "Philosophy of Common Sense." The principles of that philosophy are: (1.) That what is given in consciousness is undoubtedly true. (2.) That whatever the laws of our nature force us to believe, must be accepted as true. (3.) That this principle applies to all the elements of our nature, to the senses, the reason, and the conscience. We cannot rationally or consistently with our allegiance to God, deny what our senses, reason, or conscience pronounce to be true. (4.) Neither the individual man, nor the cause of truth, however, is to be left to the mercy of what any one may choose to say reason or conscience teaches. Nothing is to be accepted as the authoritative judgment of either reason or conscience, which does not bear the criteria of universality and necessity.

Hamilton has drawn from the stores of his erudition, in this department perhaps unexampled, proof that these principles have been recognized by the leading philosophic minds in all ages. He himself sustains them with earnestness as the safeguards of truth. He impressively asserts that if consciousness once be convicted of falsehood, all is lost; we have then no resting place for either science or religion; that absolute scepticism follows, if it be denied that necessity and universality of belief are not decisive proof of the truth of what is thus believed. Even Stuart Mill admits that "whatever is known to us by consciousness, is known beyond possibility of question." [365] Mr. Mansel tells us that it is from consciousness we get our idea of substance, of personality, of cause, of right and wrong, in short of everything which lies at the foundation of knowledge and religion; and therefore if consciousness deceive us we have nothing to depend upon. Mansel thus expounds the famous aphorism of Des Cartes, "Cogito ergo sum," i.e., "I, who see, and hear, and think, and feel, am the one continuous self, whose existence gives unity and connection to the whole. Personality comprises all that we know of that which exists; relation to personality comprises all that we know of that which seems to exist." [366] "Consciousness," he says, "gives us the knowledge of substance. We are a substantive existence." [367] "I exist as I am conscious of existing; and conscious self is itself the Ding an sich, the standard by which all representations of personality must be judged, and from which our notion of reality, as distinguished from appearance, is originally derived." [368]

Hamilton and Mansel therefore teach that the veracity of consciousness is the foundation of all knowledge, and that the denial of that veracity inevitably leads to absolute scepticism. Nevertheless they teach that our senses deceive us; that reason deceives us; that conscience deceives us; that is, that our sensuous, rational, and moral consciousness are alike deceptive and unreliable.

Our senses give us the knowledge of the external world. They teach us that things are, and what they are. It is admitted that the universal and irresistible belief of men, as that belief is determined by their sense and consciousness, is that things really are what to our senses they appear to be. Philosophers tell us this is a delusion. Kant says that they certainly are not what we take them to be. Mansel says this is going rather too far. We cannot know, indeed, what they are, but it is possible that they are in fact what they appear to be. In either case they are to us all unknown quantity, and the senses deceive us. They assume to teach more than they have a right to teach, and we are bound to believe them.

Kant teaches that our reason, that the necessary laws of thought which govern our mental operations, lead to absolute contradictions. In this Hamilton and Mansel fully agree with him. They tell us that reason teaches that the Absolute must be all things actual and possible; that there cannot be an absolute or infinite person, or cause; that being and not-being are identical; that the infinite is "potentially all things and actually nothing." These and similar contradictions are said to be inevitable results of all attempts to know God as an Absolute and Infinite Being. "The conception of the Absolute and Infinite, from whatever side we view it, appears encompassed with contradictions. There is a contradiction in supposing such an object to exist, whether alone or in conjunction with others; and there is a contradiction in supposing it not to exist. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as one, and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as many. There is a contradiction in conceiving it as personal; and there is a contradiction in conceiving it as impersonal. It cannot without contradiction be represented as active; nor, without equal contradiction, be represented as inactive. It cannot be conceived as the sum of all existence; nor yet can it be conceived of as a part only of that sum." [369] Yet all this we are called upon to believe; for it is our duty, he says, to believe that God is infinite and absolute. That is, we are bound to believe what our rational consciousness pronounces to be contradictory and impossible.

Conscience, or our moral consciousness, is no less deceptive. Mr. Mansel admits that we are conscious of dependence and of moral obligation; that this involves what he calls "the consciousness of God," i.e., that we stand in the relation to God of one spirit to another spirit, of one person to another person; a person so superior to us as to have rightfully supreme authority over us, and who has all the power and all the moral perfections which enter into our idea of God. But all this is a delusion. It is a delusion, because what our moral consciousness thus teaches involves all the contradictions and absurdities above mentioned; because it is said to teach not what God is, but only what it is desirable that we should think He is; and because we are told that it is blasphemy to think that He is what we take Him to be.

The theory, therefore, of Hamilton and Mansel as to the knowledge of God is suicidal. It is inconsistent with the veracity of consciousness, which is the fundamental principle of their philosophy. The theory is an incongruous combination of sceptical principles with orthodox faith, the anti-theistic principles of Kant with Theism. One or the other must be

given up. We cannot believe in a personal God, if an infinite person be a contradiction and absurdity.

God has not so constituted our nature as to make it of necessity deceptive. The senses, reason, and conscience, within their appropriate spheres, and in their normal exercise, are trustworthy guides. They teach us real, and not merely apparent or regulative truth. Their combined spheres comprehend all the relations in which we, as rational creatures, stand to the external world, to our fellow-men, and to God. Were it not for the disturbing element of sin, we know not that man, in full communion with his Maker, whose Favour is light and life, would have needed any other guides. But man is not in his original and normal state. In apostatizing from God, man fell into a state of darkness and confusion. Reason and conscience are no longer adequate guides as to "the things of God." Of fallen men, the Apostle says: "That when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, but became vain in their imaginations, and their foolish heart was darkened. Professing themselves to be wise, they became fools; and changed the glory of the uncorruptible God into an image made like to corruptible man, and to birds, and four-footed beasts, and creeping things" (Rom. i. 21-23); or, worse yet, into an absolute and infinite being, without consciousness, intelligence, or moral character; a being which is not potentially all things, and actually nothing. It is true, therefore, as the same. Apostle tells us, that the world by wisdom knows not God. It is true in a still higher sense, as the Lord himself says, that no man "knoweth the Father, save the Son, and he to whomsoever the Son will reveal Him." (Matt. xi. 27.)

Necessity of a Supernatural Revelation.

We need, therefore, a divine supernatural revelation. Of this revelation, it is to be remarked, first, that it gives us real knowledge. It teaches us what God really is; what sin is; what the law is; what Christ and the plan of salvation through Him are; and what is to be the state of the soul after death. The knowledge thus communicated is real, in the sense that the ideas which we are thus led to form of the things revealed conform to what those things really are. God and Christ, holiness and sin, heaven and hell, really are what the Bible declares them to be. Sir William Hamilton [370] divides the objects of knowledge into two classes: those derived from within, from the intelligence; and those derived from experience. The latter are of two kinds: what we know from our own experience, and what we know from the experience of others, authenticated to us by adequate testimony. In the generally received sense of the word this is true knowledge. No man hesitates to say that he knows that there was such a man as Washington, or such an event as the American Revolution. If the testimony of men can give us clear and certain knowledge of facts beyond our experience, surely the testimony of God is greater. What He reveals is made known. We apprehend it as it truly is. The conviction that what God reveals is made known in its true nature, is the very essence of faith in the divine testimony. We are certain, therefore, that our ideas of God, founded on the testimony of his Word, correspond to what He really is, and constitute true knowledge. It is also to be remembered that while the testimony of men is to the mind, the testimony of God is not only to, but also within the mind. It illuminates and informs; so that the testimony of God is called the demonstration of the Spirit.

The second remark concerning the revelation contained in the Scriptures is, that while it makes known truths far above the reach of sense or reason, it reveals nothing which

contradicts either. It harmonizes with our whole nature. It supplements all our other knowledge, and authenticates itself by harmonizing the testimony of enlightened consciousness with the testimony of God in his Word.

The conclusion, therefore, of the whole matter is, that we know God in the same sense in which we know ourselves and things out of ourselves. We have the same conviction that God is, and that He is, in Himself, and independently of our thought of Him, what we take Him to be. Our subjective idea corresponds to the objective reality. This knowledge of God is the foundation of all religion; and therefore to deny that God can be known, is really to deny that rational religion is possible. In other words, it makes religion a mere sentiment, or blind feeling, instead of its being what the Apostle declares it to be, a logike latreia, a rational service; the homage of the reason as well as of the heart and life. "Our knowledge of God," says Hase, "developed and enlightened by the Scriptures, answers to what God really is, for He cannot deceive us as to his own nature." [371]

[353] Strauss, Dogmatik, i. p. 527.

[354] Pens�es, partie II. art. iii. 5.

[355] Tyler's Progress of Philosophy, second edit. p. 147.

[356] Discussions, p. 22.

[357] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 106.

[358] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 132.

[359] Bampton Lectures, 1832, p. 54.

[360] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 107.

[361] Page 110.

[362] Page 280.

[363] See Progress of Philosophy, by Samuel Tyler, LL.D., p. 207.

[364] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 94.

[365] Logic, Introduction, p. 4, edit. N.Y. 1846.

[366] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 105.

[367] Ibid. p. 288.

[368] Ibid. p. 291.

[369] Limits of Religious Thought, p. 85.

[370] Lectures on Logic. Lecture 32d.

[371] See on this subject, Sir William Hamilton's Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, Hamilton's Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, edited by Rev. Henry L. Mansel and John Veitch, M.A.; Philosophy of Sir William Hamilton, arranged and edited by O. W. Wight, translator of Cousin's History of Modern Philosophy; The Limits of Religious Thought, eight lectures on the Bampton Foundation, by Henry Longueville Mansel, B. D.; Calderwood's Philosophy of the Infinite; Dr. McCosh's works on the Method of the Divine Government; The Intuitions of the Mind; Defence of Fundamental Truths; Princeton Review, April, 1862, Philosophy of the Absolute, an article by Dr. Charles W. Shields; October, 1861, Review of Dr. Hickok's Rational Psychology, by Dr. Stephen Alexander; and A Philosophical Confession of Faith, by the same writer, a very able and concise statement of

fundamental principles, in the number for July, 1867, of the same journal. See also Mill's Review of Hamilton's Philosophy, and the admirable work of Professor Noah Porter, of New Haven, on the Human Intellect, part fourth, chap. viii.

CHAPTER V: NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD

§ 1. Definitions of God.

THE question whether God can be defined, depends for its answer on what is meant by definition. Cicero [372] says, "Est definitio, earum rerum, qu\u{f} sunt ejus rei propri\u{f}, quam definire volumus, brevis et circumscripta qu\u{f}dam explicatio." In this sense God cannot be defined. No creature, much less man, can know all that is proper to God; and, therefore, no creature can give an exhaustive statement of all that God is.

To define, however, is simply to bound, to separate, or distinguish; so that the thing defined may be discriminated from all other things. This may be done (1.) By stating its characteristics. (2.) By stating its genus and its specific difference. (3.) By analyzing the idea as it lies in our minds. (4.) By an explanation of the term or name by which it is denoted. All these methods amount to much the same thing. When we say we can define God, all that is meant is, that we can analyze the idea of God as it lies in our mind; or, that we can state the class of beings to which He belongs, and the attributes by which He is distinguished from all other beings. Thus, in the simple definition, God is ens perfectissimum, the word ens designates Him as a being, not an idea, but as that which has real, objective existence; and absolute perfection distinguishes Him from all other beings. The objection to this and most other definitions of God is, that they do not bring out with sufficient fulness the contents of the idea. This objection bears against such definitions as the following: Ens absolutum, the self-existent, independent being; and that by Calovius, "Deus est essentia spiritualis infinita;" and Reinhard's [373] "Deus est, Natura necessaria, a mundo diversa, summas complexa perfectiones et ipsius mundi causa;" or Baumgarten's "Spiritus perfectissimus, rationem qui ipsius rerumque contingentium omnium seu mundi continens;" or, that of Morus, "Spiritus perfectissimus, conditor, conservator, et gubernator mundi." Probably the best definition of God ever penned by man, is that given in the "Westminster Catechism": "God is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, in his being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth." This is a true definition; for it states the class of beings to which God is to be referred. He is a Spirit; and He is distinguished from all other spirits in that He is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in his being and perfections. It is also a complete definition, in so far as it is an exhaustive statement of the contents of our idea of God.

In what sense, however, are these terms used? What is meant by the words "being," and "perfections," or "attributes" of God? In what relation do his attributes stand to his essence and to each other? These are questions on which theologians, especially during the scholastic period, expended much time and labor.

Being of God.

By being is here meant that which has a real, substantive existence. It is equivalent to substance, or essence. It is opposed to what is merely thought, and to a mere force or power. We get this idea, in the first place, from consciousness. We are conscious of self as the subject of the thoughts, feelings, and volitions, which are its varying states and acts. This consciousness of substance is involved in that of personal identity. In the second place, a law of our reason constrains us to believe that there is something which underlies the phenomena of matter and mind, of which those phenomena are the manifestation. It is impossible for us to think of thought and feeling, unless there be something that thinks and feels. It is no less impossible to think of action, unless there be something that acts; or of motion, unless there be something that moves. To assume, therefore, that mind is only a series of acts and states, and that matter is nothing but force, is to assume that nothing (nonentity) can produce effects.

God, therefore, is in his nature a substance, or essence, which is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable; the common subject of all divine perfections, and the common agent of all divine acts. This is as far as we can go, or need to go. We have no definite idea of substance, whether of matter or mind, as distinct from its attributes. The two are inseparable. In knowing the one we know the other. We cannot know hardness except as we know something hard. We have, therefore, the same knowledge of the essence of God, as we have of the substance of the soul. All we have to do in reference to the divine essence, as a Spirit, is to deny of it, as we do of our own spiritual essence, what belongs to material substances; and to affirm of it, that in itself and its attributes it is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable. When, therefore, we say there is a God, we do not assert merely that there is in our minds the idea of an infinite Spirit; but that, entirely independent of our idea of Him, such a Being really exists. Augustine [374] says, "Deus est qu�dam substantia; nam quod nulla substantia est, nihil omnino est. Substantia ergo aliquid esse est."

If, therefore, a divine essence, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, exists, this essence existed before and independent of the world. It follows also that the essence of God is distinct from the world The Scriptural doctrine of God is consequently opposed to the several forms of error already mentioned; to Hylozoism, which assumes that God, like man, is a composite being, the world being to Him what the body is to us; to Materialism, which denies the existence of any spiritual substance, and affirms that the material alone is real; to extreme Idealism, which denies not only the reality of the internal world, but all real objective existence, and affirms that the subjective alone is real; to Pantheism, which either makes the world the existence form of God, or, denying the reality of the world, makes God the only real existence. That is, it either makes nature God, or, denying nature, makes God everything.

[372] De Oratore, i. 42, 189, edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. 84.

[373] Dogmatik, p. 92.

[374] Enarratio in Psalmum, lxvii. I. 5, edit. Benedictines, vol. iv. p. 988 c.

§ 2. Divine Attributes.

To the divine essence, which in itself is infinite, eternal, and unchangeable, belong

certain perfections revealed to us in the constitution of our nature and in the word of God. These divine perfections are called attributes as essential to the nature of a divine Being, and necessarily involved in our idea of God. The older theologians distinguished the attributes of God, (1.) From predicates which refer to God in the concrete, and indicate his relation to his creatures, as creator, preserver, ruler, etc. (2.) From properties, which are technically the distinguishing characteristics of the several persons of the Trinity. There are certain acts or relations peculiar or proper to the Father, others to the Son, and others to the Spirit. And (3.) From accidents or qualities which may or may not belong to a substance, which may be acquired or lost. Thus holiness was not an attribute of the nature of Adam, but an accident, something which he might lose and still remain a man; whereas intelligence was an attribute, because the loss of intelligence involves the loss of humanity. The perfections of God, therefore, are attributes, without which He would cease to be God.

Relation of the Attributes to the Essence of God.

In attempting to explain the relation in which the attributes of God stand to his essence and to each other, there are two extremes to be avoided. First, we must not represent God as a composite being, composed of different elements; and, secondly, we must not confound the attributes, making them all mean the same thing, which is equivalent to denying them all together. The Realists of the Middle Ages tended to the former of these extremes, and the Nominalists to the other. Realists held that general terms express not merely thoughts, or abstract conceptions in our minds, but real or substantive, objective existence. And hence they were disposed to represent the divine attributes as differing from each other realiter, as one res or thing differs from another. The Nominalists, on the other hand, said general terms are mere words answering to abstractions formed by the mind. And consequently when we speak of different attributes in God, we only use different words for one and the same thing. Occam, Biel, and other Nominalists, therefore, taught that "Attributa divina nec rei, nec rationis distinctione, inter se aut ab essentia divina distingui; sed omnem distinctionem esse solum in nominibus." The Lutheran and Reformed theologians tended much more to the latter of these extremes than to the former. They generally taught, in the first place, that the unity and simplicity of the divine essence precludes not only all physical composition of constituent elements, or of matter and form, or of subject and accidents; but also all metaphysical distinction as of act and power, essence and existence, nature and personality; and even of logical difference, as genus and specific difference.

In the second place, the theologians were accustomed to say that the attributes of God differ from his essence non re, sed ratione. This is explained by saying that things differ ex natura rei, when they are essentially different as soul and body; while a difference ex ratione is merely a difference in us, i.e., in our conceptions, i.e., "quod distincte solum concipitur, cum in re ipsa distinctum non sit." Hence the divine attributes are defined as "conceptus essenti divin inadequat, ex parte rei ipsam essentiam involventes, eandemque intrinsice denominantes." Aquinas says, "Deus est unus re et plures ratione, quia intellectus noster ita multipliciter apprehendit Deum, sicuti res multipliciter ipsum representant." The language of the Lutheran theologian Quenstedt [375] exhibits the usual mode of representing this subject: "Si proprie et accurate loqui velimus, Deus nullas habet proprietates, sed mera et simplicissima est essentia qu nec realem differentiam nec ullam vel rerum vel modorum admittit compositionem. Quia vero simplicissimam Dei essentiam

uno adequato conceptu adequate concipere non possumus, ideo inadequatis et distinctis conceptibus, inadequate essentiam divinam repr&#65533;sentantibus, eam apprehendimus, quos inadequatos conceptus, qui a parte rei essenti&#65533; divin&#65533; identificantur, et a nobis per modum affectionum apprehenduntur, attributa vocamus." And again, "Attributa divina a parte rei et in se non multa sunt, sed ut ipsa essentia divina, ita et attributa, qu&#65533; cum illa identificantur, simplicissima unitas sunt; multa vero dicuntur (1.) sunkatabatikos, ad nostrum concipiendi modum, ... (2.) energetikos, in ordine ad effecta." [376] The favorite illustration to explain what was meant by this unity of the divine attributes, was drawn from the sun. His ray, by one and the same power (as was then assumed) illuminates, warms, and produces chemical changes, not from any diversity in it, but from diversity in the nature of the objects on which it operates. The force is the same; the effects are different. The meaning of these theologians is further determined by their denying that the relation of attribute and essence in God is analogous to the relation of intelligence and will to the essence of the soul in man; and also by the frequently recurring declaration, borrowed from the schoolmen, that God is actus purus. Schleiermacher goes still further in the same direction. With him the divine attributes are mere Beziehungen, or relations of God to us. He commonly resolves them into mere causality. Thus he defines the holiness of God to be that causality in Him which produces conscience in us.

Divine Attributes.

A third and less objectionable way of representing the matter is adopted by those who say with Hollazius: "Attributa divina ab essentia divina et a se invicem, distinguuntur non nominaliter neque realiter sed formaliter, secundum nostrum concipiendi modum, non sine certo distinctionis fundamento." [377] This is very different from saying that they differ ratione tantum. Turrettin says the attributes are to be distinguished not realiter, but virtualiter; that is, there is a real foundation in the divine nature for the several attributes ascribed to Him.

It is evident that this question of the relation of the divine attributes to the divine essence merges itself into the general question of the relation between attributes and substance. It is also evident that this is a subject about which one man knows just as much as another; because all that can be known about it is given immediately in consciousness.

This subject has already been referred to. We arc conscious of ourselves as a thinking substance. That is, we are conscious that that which is ourselves has identity, continuance, and power. We are further conscious that the substance self thinks, wills, and feels. Intelligence, will, and sensibility, are its functions, or attributes, and consequently the attributes of a spirit. These are the ways in which a spirit acts. Anything which does not thus act, which has not these functions or attributes, is not a spirit. If you take from a spirit its intelligence, will, and sensibility, nothing remains its, substance is gone; at least it ceases to be a spirit. Substance and attributes are inseparable. The one is known in the other. A substance without attributes is nothing, i.e., no real existence. What is true of spiritual substances is true of matter. Matter, without the essential properties of matter, is a contradiction.

We know, therefore, from consciousness, as far as it can be known, the relation between substance and its attributes. And all that can be done, or need be done, is to deny or correct the false representations which are so often made on the subject.

The Divine Attributes do not differ merely in our Conception.

To say, as the schoolmen, and so many even of Protestant theologians, ancient and modern, were accustomed to say, that the divine attributes differ only in name, or in our conceptions, or in their effects, is to destroy all true knowledge of God. Thus even Augustine confounds knowledge and power, when he says, [378] "Nos ista, qu\u2022 fecisti videmus quia sunt: tu autem quia vides ea, sunt." So Scotus Erigena [379] says, "Non aliud est ei videre, aliud facere; sed visio illius voluntas ejus est, et voluntas operatio." Thomas Aquinas [380] says the same thing: "Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere." And again, "Scientia (Dei) causat res; nostra vero causatur rebus et dependat ab eis." Even Mr. Mansel, [381] to aggravate our ignorance of God, speaks of Him as "an intellect whose thought creates its own object." It is obvious that, according to this view, God is simply a force of which we know nothing but its effects. If in God eternity is identical with knowledge, knowledge with power, power with ubiquity, and ubiquity with holiness, we are using words without meaning when we attribute any perfection to God. We must, therefore, either give up the attempt to determine the divine attributes from our speculative idea of an infinite essence, or renounce all knowledge of God, and all faith in the revelation of Himself, which He has made in the constitution of our nature, in the external world, and in his Word. Knowledge is no more identical with power in God than it is in us. Thought in Him is no more creative than is thought in us. Otherwise creation is eternal, and God creates everything -- all the thoughts, feelings, and volitions of his creatures, good and evil; and God is the only real agent, and the only real being in the universe. According to this doctrine, also, there can be no difference between the actual and the possible, for the one as well as the other is always present to the divine mind. It would also follow that the creation must be infinite, or God finite. For if knowledge is causative, God creates all He knows, and you must limit his knowledge if you limit creation. It need hardly be remarked that this doctrine is derogatory to God. It is not only a much higher idea, but one essential to personality, that there should be a real distinction between the divine attributes. That which from its nature and by necessity does all that it can do, is a force, and not a person. It can have no will. The doctrine in question, therefore, is essentially pantheistic. "However much," says Martensen, "we must guard our idea of God from being degraded by anything that is merely human, from all false Anthropomorphism, yet we can find in Nominalism only the denial of God as He is revealed in the Scriptures. It is the denial of the very essence of faith, if it is only in our thoughts that God is holy and righteous, and not in his own nature; if it is we who so address Him, and not He who so reveals Himself. We teach, therefore, with the Realists (of one class), that the attributes of God are objectrvely true as revealed, and therefore have their ground in the divine essence." There is a kind of Realism, as Martensen admits, which is as destructive of the true idea of God as the Nominalism which makes his attributes differ only in name. It grants, indeed, objective reality to our ideas; but these ideas, according to it, have no real subject. "The idea of omnipotence, righteousness, and holiness," he says, "is a mere blind thought, if there be not an omnipotent, righteous, and holy One." [382]

The Divine Attributes not to be resolved into Causality.

It amounts to much the same doctrine, to resolve all the attributes of God into

causality. It was a principle with some of the schoolmen, "Affectus in Deo denotat effectum." This was so applied as to limit our knowledge of God to the fact that God is the cause of certain effects. Thus, when we say God is just, we mean nothing more than that He causes misery to follow sin; when we say He is holy, it only means that He is the cause of conscience in us. As a tree is not sweet, because its fruit is luscious, so God is not holy, he is only the cause of holiness. Against this application of the principle, Aquinas himself protested, declaring, "Cum igitur dicitur, Deus est bonus; non est sensus, Deus est causa bonitatis; vel Deus non est malus. Sed est sensus: Id, quod bonitatem dicimus in creaturis, pr&#65533;existit in Deo; et hoc quidem secundum modum altiorem. Unde ex hoc non sequitur, quod Deo competat esse bonum, in quantum causat bonitatem; sed potius e converso, quia est bonus, bonitatem rebus diffundit." [383] And the Lutheran theologian, Quenstedt, says, "Dicunt nonnulli, ideo Deum dici justum, sanctum, misericordem, veracem, etc., non quod revera sit talis, sed quod duntaxat sanctitatis, justiti&#65533;, misericordi&#65533;, veritatis, etc., causa sit et auctor in aliis. Sed si Deus non est vere misericors, neque vere perfectus, vere sanctus, etc., sed causa tantum misericordi&#65533; et sanctitatis in aliis, ita etiam et nos pariter juberemur esse non vere misericordes, non vere perfecti, etc., sed sanctitatis saltem et misericordi&#65533; in aliis auctores." [384]

The Divine Attributes differ Virtualiter.

Theologians, to avoid the blank ignorance of God which must follow from the extreme view of the simplicity of his essence, which requires us to assume that the divine attributes differ only in our conceptions, or as expressing the diverse effects of the activity of God, made a distinction between the ratio rationantis and the ratio rationat&#65533;. That is, the reason as determining, and the reason as determined. The attributes, they say, differ not re, but ratione; not in our subjective reason only; but there is in God a reason why we think of Him as possessing these diverse perfections. This idea, as before stated, was often expressed by saying that the divine attributes differ neither realiter, nor nominaliter, but virtualiter. If this be understood to mean that the divine perfections are really what the Bible declares them to be; that God truly thinks, feels, and acts; that He is truly wise, just, and good, that He is truly omnipotent, and voluntary, acting or not acting, as He sees fit; that He can hear and answer prayer; it may be admitted. But we are not to give up the conviction that God is really in Himself what He reveals Himself to be, to satisfy any metaphysical speculations as to the difference between essence and attribute in an infinite Being. The attributes of God, therefore, are not merely different conceptions in our minds, but different modes in which God reveals Himself to his creatures (or to Himself); just as our several faculties are different modes in which the inscrutable substance self reveals itself in our consciousness and acts. It is an old saying, "Qualis homo, talis Deus." And Clemens Alexandrinus [385] says, "If any one knows himself, he will know God." And Leibnitz expresses the same great truth when he says, [386] "The perfections of God are those of our own souls, but He possesses them without limit. He is an ocean of which we have only received a few drops. There is in us something of power, something of knowledge, something of goodness; but these attributes are in entireness in Him." There is indeed danger in either extreme, danger of degrading God in our thoughts, by reducing Him to the standard of our nature, and danger of denying Him as He is revealed. In our day, and among educated men, and especially among students of philosophy, the latter danger is by far the greater of the two. We should remember that we lose God, when we lose our confidence in saying Thou! to Him, with the

assurance of being heard and helped.

[375] Theologia, part I. cap. viii. § 2, edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 426.

[376] Ibid. II. cap. viii. § 2, p. 426.

[377] Examen Theologicum, edit. Leipzig, 1763, p. 235.

[378] Confessiones, XIII. xxxviii. 53, edit. Benedictines, vol. i. p. 410 b.

[379] De Divisione Natur, iii. 29, edit. Westphalia, 1838, p. 264.

[380] Summa, I. xiv. 8, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 30.

[381] Limits, p. 195.

[382] Dogmatik, p. 113.

[383] Summa, I. xiii. 2, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 28.

[384] Theologia, I. viii. § ii. 2, p. 481.

[385] Pdagogus, III. i. edit. Cologne, 1688, p. 214 a.

[386] "Thodice" Preface, Works, p. 469, edit. Berlin, 1840.

§ 3. Classification of the Divine Attributes.

On few subjects have greater thought and labor been expended than on this. Perhaps, however, the benefit has not been commensurate with the labor. The object of classification is order, and the object of order is clearness. So far as this end is secured, it is a good. But the great diversity of the methods which have been proposed, is evidence that no one method of arrangement has such advantages as to secure for it general recognition.

1. Some, as has been seen, preclude all necessity of a classification of the attributes, by reducing them all to unity, or regarding them as different phases under which we contemplate the Supreme Being as the ground of all things. With them the whole discussion of the divine attributes is an analysis of the idea of the Infinite and Absolute.

2. Others arrange the attributes according to the mode in which we arrive at the knowledge of them. We form our idea of God, it is said, (1.) By the way of causation; that is, by referring to Him as the great first cause every virtue manifested by the effects which He produces. (2.) By the way of negation; that is, by denying to Him the limitations and imperfections which belong to his creatures. (3.) By the way of eminence, in exalting to an infinite degree or without limit the perfections which belong to an infinite Being. If this is so, the attributes conceived of by one of these methods belong to one class, and those conceived of, or of which we attain the knowledge by another method, belong to another class. This principle of classification is perhaps the one most generally adopted. It gives rise, however, really but to two classes, namely, the positive and negative, i.e., those in which something is affirmed, and those in which something is denied concerning God. To the negative class are commonly referred simplicity, infinity, eternity, immutability; to the positive class, power, knowledge, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Instead of calling the one class negative and the other positive, they are often distinguished as absolute and relative. By an absolute attribute is meant one which belongs to God, considered in Himself, and which implies no relation to other beings; by a relative attribute is meant one which implies relation to an object. They are also distinguished as immanent and transient, as communicable and incommunicable. These terms are used interchangeably. They do not

express different modes of classification, but are different modes of designating the same classification. Negative, absolute, immanent, and incommunicable, are designations of one class; and positive, relative, transitive, and communicable, are designations of the other class.

3. A third principle of classification is derived from the constitution of our own nature. In man there is the substance or essence of the soul, the intellect, and the will. Hence, it is said, we can most naturally arrange the attributes of God under three heads. First, those pertaining to his essence; second, those referring to his intellect; and third, those referring to his will, the word "will" being taken in its most comprehensive sense.

4. Others again seek the principle of classification in the nature of the attributes themselves. Some include the idea of moral excellence, and others do not. Hence they are distinguished as natural and moral. The word natural, however, is ambiguous. Taking it in the sense of what constitutes or pertains to the nature, the holiness and justice of God are as much natural as his power or knowledge. And on the other hand, God is infinite and eternal in his moral perfections, although infinity and eternity are not distinctively moral perfections. In the common and familiar sense of the word natural, the terms natural and moral express a real distinction.

5. Schleiermacher's method is, of course, peculiar. It is based on the characteristic principle of his system, that all religion is founded on a sense of dependence, and all theology consists in what that sense of dependence teaches us. He does not treat of the divine attributes in any one place, but here and there, as they come up according to his plan. Our sense of dependence does not awaken in our consciousness a feeling of opposition to God's eternity, omnipotence, omnipresence, or omniscience. These, therefore, are treated of in one place. But we, as dependent creatures, are conscious of opposition to God's holiness and righteousness. These, therefore, belong to another head. And as this opposition is removed through Christ, we are brought into relation to God's grace or love, and to his wisdom. These form a third class.

That so many different principles of classification have been adopted, and that each of those principles is carried out in so many different ways, shows the uncertainty and difficulty attending the whole subject. It is proposed in what follows to accept the guidance of the answer given in the "Westminster Catechism," to the question, What is God? It is assumed in that answer that God is a self-existent and necessary Being; and it is affirmed of Him, I. That He is a Spirit. II. That as such He is infinite, eternal, and immutable. III. That He is infinite, eternal, and immutable, (1.) In his being. (2.) In all that belongs to his intelligence, namely, in his knowledge and wisdom. (3.) In all that belongs to his will, namely, his power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth. Whatever speculative objections may be made to this plan, it has the advantage of being simple and familiar.

§ 4. Spirituality of God.

A. The Meaning of the Word "Spirit."

The fundamental principle of interpretation of all writings, sacred or profane, is that words are to be understood in their historical sense; that is, in the sense in which it can be historically proved that they were used by their authors and intended to be understood by

those to whom they were addressed. The object of language is the communication of thought. Unless words are taken in the sense in which those who employ them know they will be understood, they fail of their design. The sacred writings being the words of God to man, we are bound to take them in the sense in which those to whom they were originally addressed must inevitably have taken them. What is the meaning of the word "spirit?" or rather, What is the usus loquendi of the Hebrew and Greek words to which our word "spirit" corresponds? In answering this question, we learn what our Lord meant when he said God is a Spirit. Originally the words rvch and pneuma meant the moving air, especially the breath, as in the phrase pneuma biou; then any invisible power; then the human soul. In saying, therefore, that God is a Spirit, our Lord authorizes us to believe that whatever is essential to the idea of a spirit, as learned from our own consciousness, is to be referred to God as determining his nature. On this subject consciousness teaches, and has taught all men, --

1. That the soul is a substance; that our thoughts and feelings have a common ground, of which they are the varying states or acts. Substance is that which has an objective existence, and has permanence and power. Even Kant says: "Wo Handlung, mithin Th\u0000tigkeit und Kraft ist, da ist auch Substanz," where operation, and consequently activity and power are, there is substance. [387] This is not only the common conviction of men, but it is admitted by the vast majority of philosophers. As before remarked, that there should be action without something acting, is as unthinkable as that there should be motion without something moving.

2. Consciousness teaches that the soul is an individual subsistence. This is included in the consciousness of the unity, identity, and permanence of the soul. It is not that we are conscious simply of certain states of the soul, from which we infer its substance and subsistence; but that such are the contents of the knowledge given to us in the consciousness of self. Des Cartes famous aphorism, Cogito ergo sum, is not a syllogism. It does not mean that existence is inferred from the consciousness of thought; but that the consciousness of thought involves the consciousness of existence. Des Cartes himself so understood the matter, for he says: "Cum advertimus nos esse res cogitantes, prima qu\u0000dam notio est qu\u0000 ex nullo syllogismo concluditur; neque etiam cum quis dicit Ego cogito, ergo sum, sive existo,' existentiam ex cogitatione per syllogismum deducit, sed tanquam rem per se notam simplici mentis intuitu agnoscit." [388] Mansel says: "Whatever may be the variety of the phenomena of consciousness, sensations by this or that organ, volitions, thoughts, imaginations, of all we are immediately conscious as affections of one and the same self. It is not by any after-effort of reflection that I combine together sight and hearing, thought and volition, into a factitious unity or compounded whole, in each case I am immediately conscious of myself seeing and hearing, willing and thinking. This self-personality, like all other simple and immediate presentations, is indefinable, but it is so because it is superior to definition." [389] This individual subsistence is thus involved in the consciousness of self, because in self-consciousness we distinguish ourselves from all that is not ourselves.

3. As power of some kind belongs to every substance, the power which belongs to spirit, to the substance self, is that of thought, feeling, and volition. All this is given in the simplest form of consciousness. We are not more certain that we exist, than that we think, feel, and will. We know ourselves only as thus thinking, feeling, and willing, and we

therefore are sure that these powers or faculties are the essential attributes of a spirit, and must belong to every spirit.

4. Consciousness also informs us of the unity or simplicity of the soul. It is not compounded of different elements. It is composed of substance and form. It is a simple substance endowed with certain attributes. It is incapable of separation or division.

5. In being conscious of our individual subsistence, we are conscious of personality. Every individual subsistence is not a person. But every individual subsistence which thinks and feels, and has the power of self-determination, is a person; and, therefore, the consciousness of our subsistence, and of the powers of thought and volition, is the consciousness of personality.

6. We are also conscious of being moral agents, susceptible of moral character, and the subjects of moral obligation.

7. It need not be added that every spirit must possess self-consciousness. This is involved in all that has been said. Without self-consciousness we should be a mere power in nature. This is the very ground of our being, and is necessarily involved in the idea of self as a real existence.

It is impossible, therefore, to overestimate the importance of the truth contained in the simple proposition, God is a Spirit. It is involved in that proposition that God is immaterial. None of the properties of matter can be predicated of Him. He is not extended or divisible, or compounded, or visible, or tangible. He has neither bulk nor form. The Bible everywhere recognizes as true the intuitive convictions of men. One of those convictions is that spirit is not matter, or matter spirit; that different and incompatible attributes cannot belong to the same substance. In revealing, therefore, to us that God is a Spirit, it reveals to us that no attribute of matter can be predicated of the divine essence. The realistic dualism which lies at the bottom of all human convictions, underlies also all the revelations of the Bible.

B. Consequences of the Spirituality of God.

If God be a spirit, it follows of necessity that He is a person -- a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent. As all this is involved in our consciousness of ourselves as spirit, it must all be true of God, or God is of a lower order of being than man.

It follows also that God is a simple Being, not only as not composed of different elements, but also as not admitting of the distinction between substance and accidents. Nothing can either be added to, or taken from God. In this view the simplicity, as well as the other attributes of God, are of a higher order than the corresponding attributes of our spiritual nature. The soul of man is a simple substance; but it is subject to change. It can gain and lose knowledge, holiness, and power. These are in this view accidents in our substance. But in God they are attributes, essential and immutable.

Finally, it follows from God's being a spirit, that He is a moral as well as an intelligent Being. It is involved in the very nature of rational voluntary being, that it should be conformed to the rule of right, which in the case of God is his own infinite reason. These are primary truths, which are not to be sacrificed to any speculative objections. It is vain to tell us that an infinite spirit cannot be a person, because personality implies self-consciousness, and self-consciousness implies the distinction between the self and the not-

self, and this is a limitation. It is equally vain to say that God cannot have moral excellence, because moral goodness implies conformity to law, and conformity to law again is inconsistent with the idea of an absolute Being. These are empty speculations; and even if incapable of a satisfactory solution, would afford no rational ground for rejecting the intuitive truths of reason and conscience. There are mysteries enough in our nature, and yet no sane muan denies his own personal existence and moral accountability. And he is worse than insane who is beguiled by such sophistries into renouncing his faith in God as a personal Spirit and a loving Father.

The Scriptures confirm these Views.

It need hardly be remarked that the Scriptures everywhere represent God as possessing all the above-mentioned attributes of a spirit. On this foundation all religion rests; all intercourse with God, all worship, all prayer, all confidence in God as preserver, benefactor, and redeemer. The God of the Bible is a person. He spoke to Adam. He revealed himself to Noah. He entered into covenant with Abraham. He conversed with Moses, as a friend with friend. He everywhere uses the personal pronouns. He says, "I am," that "is my name." I am the Lord your God. I am merciful and gracious. Call upon me, and I will answer you. Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him. O thou that hearest prayer, to thee shall all flesh come. Our Lord has put into our lips words which reveal that God is a spirit, and all that being a spirit implies, when He teaches us to say: "Our Father who art in heaven. Hallowed be thy name. Thy kingdom come. Thy will be done." Everywhere the God of the Bible is contrasted within the gods of the heathen, as a God who sees, hears, and loves. These are not regulative, they are real truths. God does not mock us when He thus presents Himself to us as a personal Being within whom we can have intercourse, and who is everywhere present to help and save. "To human reason," says Mansel, "the personal and the infinite stand out in apparently irreconcilable antagonism; and the recognition of the one in a religious system almost inevitably involves the sacrifice of the other." [390] This cannot be so. According to the Bible, and according to the dictates of our own nature, of reason as well as of conscience, God is a spirit, and being a spirit is of necessity a person; a Being who can say I, and to whom we can say Thou.

[387] Werke, edit. Leipzig, 1838, vol. ii. p. 173.

[388] Meditationes de Prima Philosophia, Responsio ad Secundas Objectiones, III., edit. Amsterdam, 1685, p. 74.

[389] Prolegomena Logica, Boston, 1860, p. 123. See also McCosh's Intuitions of the Mind, p. 143.

[390] Limits, p. 148.

§ 5. Infinity.

Although God reveals Himself as a personal Being capable of fell worship with man, whom we can worship and love, and to whom we can pray with the assurance of being heard and answered; nevertheless He fills heaven and earth; He is exalted above all we can know or think. He is infinite in his being and perfections. The ideas with which we are most familiar are often those of which we are the least able to give an intelligent account. Space, time, and infinity, are among the most difficult problems of human thought. What is

space? is a question which has never been satisfactorily answered. Some say it is nothing; where nothing is, space is not; it is "negation defined by boundary lines;" others, with Kant and Hamilton, say that it is "a condition of thought," "the subjective condition of sensibility;" others that it is an attribute or accident of God; others that it is that in which real existences can act and move. Notwithstanding these conflicting statements of philosophers, and the real obscurity of the subject, every man knows clearly and definitely what the word "space" means, although no man may be able to define it satisfactorily. It is much the same with the idea of infinity. If men would be content to leave the word in its integrity, as simply expressing what does not admit of limitation, there would be no danger in speculating about its nature. But in all ages wrong views of what the infinite is, have led to fatal errors in philosophy and religion. Without attempting to detail the speculations of philosophers on this subject, we shall simply endeavor to state what is meant when it is said that God is infinite in his being and perfections.

The Idea of Infinity not merely Negative.

Being, in this connection, is that which is or exists. The being of God is his essence or substance, of which his perfections are the essential attributes or modes of manifestation. When it is said that God is infinite as to his being, what is meant is, that no limitation can be assigned to his essence. It is often said that our idea of the infinite is merely negative. There is a sense in which this may be true, but there is a sense in which it is not true. It is true that the form of the proposition is negative when we say that no limit can be assigned to space, or possible duration, or to the being of God. But it implies the affirmation that the object of which infinity is predicated is illimitable. It is as much a positive idea which we express when we say a thing is infinite as when we say that it is finite. We cannot, indeed, form a conception or mental image of an infinite object, but the word nevertheless expresses a positive judgment of the mind. Sir William Hamilton and others, when they say that the infinite is a mere negation, mean that it implies a negation of all thought. That is, we mean nothing when we say that a thing is infinite. As we know nothing of the inhabitants of the other planets of our system, if such there be, or of the mode in which angels and disembodied spirits take cognizance of material objects, our ideas on such subjects are purely negative, or blank ignorance. "The infinite," Mansel says, "is not a positive object of human thought." [391] Every man, however, knows that the propositions "Space is infinite," and "Space is finite," express different and equally definite thoughts. When, therefore, we say that God is infinite, we mean something; we express a great and positive truth.

A. The Infinite not the All.

The infinite, although illimitable and incapable of increase, is not necessarily all. An infinite body must include all bodies, infinite space all portions of space, and infinite duration all periods of duration. Hence Mr. Mansel says that an infinite being must of necessity include within itself all actual and all possible forms or modes of being. So said Spinoza, many of the schoolmen, and even many Christian theologians. The sense in which Spinoza and Mansel make this assertion is the fundamental principle of Pantheism. Mr. Mansel, as we have seen, escapes that conclusion by appealing to faith, and teaching that we are constrained to believe what reason pronounces to be impossible, which itself is an impossibility. The sense in which theologians teach that an infinite being must comprehend within it all being, is, that in the infinite is the cause or ground of all that is actual or

possible. Thus Howe [392] says, "Necessary being must include all being." But he immediately adds, not in the same way, "It comprehends all being, besides what itself is, as having had, within the compass of its productive power, whatsoever hath actually sprung from it; and having within the compass of the same power, whatsoever is still possible to he produced." This, however, is not the proper meaning of the words, nor is it the sense in which they are generally used. What the words mean, and what they are generally intended to mean by those who use them is, that there is only one being in the universe; that the finite is merely the modus existendi, or manifestation of the Infinite. Thus Cousin says, God must be "infinite and finite together, ... at the summit of being and at its humblest degree . . . . ; at once God, nature, and humanity." [393] Even some of the Remonstrants regard this as the necessary consequence of the doctrine of the infinitude of the divine essence. Episcopius [394] says, "Si essentia Dei sic immensa est, tum intelligi non potest quomodo et ubi aliqua creata essentia esse possit. Essentia enim creata non est essentia divina; ergo aut est extra essentiam divinam, aut, si non est extra eam, est ipsa essentia illa, et sic omnia sunt Deus et divina essentia." "God is infinite," says Jacob Bohme, "for God is all." This, says Strauss, [395] is exactly the doctrine of the modern philosophy.

It has already been remarked in a previous chapter, in reference to this mode of reasoning, that it proceeds on a wrong idea of the infinite. A thing may be infinite in its own nature without precluding the possibility of the existence of things of a different nature. An infinite spirit does not forbid the assumption of the existence of matter. There may even be many infinites of the same kind, as we can imagine any number of infinite lines. The infinite, therefore, is not all. An infinite spirit is a spirit to whose attributes as a spirit no limits can be set. It no more precludes the existence of other spirits than infinite goodness precludes the existence of finite goodness, or infinite power the existence of finite power. God is infinite in being because no limit can be assigned to his perfections, and because He is present in all portions of space. A being is said to be present wherever it perceives and acts. As God perceives and acts everywhere, He is everywhere present. This however, does not preclude the presence of other beings. A multitude of men even may perceive and act at the same time and place. Besides, we have very little knowledge of the relation which spirit bears to space. We know that bodies occupy portions of space to the exclusion, of other bodies; but we do not know that spirits may not coexist in the same portion of space. A legion of demons dwelt in one man.

B. Infinitude of God in relation to Space.

The infinitude of God, so far as space is concerned, includes his immensity and his omnipresence. These are not different attributes, but one and the same attribute, viewed under different aspects. His immensity is the infinitude of his being, viewed as belonging to his nature from eternity. He fills immensity with his presence. His omnipresence is the infinitude of his being, viewed in relation to his creatures. He is equally present with all his creatures, at all times, and in all places. He is not far from any one of us. "The Lord is in this place," may be said with equal truth and confidence, everywhere. Theologians are accustomed to distinguish three modes of presence in space. Bodies are in space circumscriptively. They are bounded by it. Spirits are in space definitively. They have an ubi. They are not everywhere, but only somewhere. God is in space repletively. He fills all space. In other words, the limitations of space have no reference to Him. He is not absent

from any portion of space, nor more present in one portion than in another. This of course is not to be understood of extension or diffusion. Extension is a property of matter, and cannot be predicated of God. If extended, He would be capable of division and separation; and part of God would be here, and part elsewhere. Nor is this omnipresence to be understood as a mere presence in knowledge and power. It is an omnipresence of the divine essence. Otherwise the essence of God would be limited. The doctrine, therefore, taught by the older Socinians that the essence of God is confined to heaven (wherever that may be), and that He is elsewhere only as to his knowledge and efficiency, is inconsistent with the divine perfections and with the representations of Scripture. As God acts everywhere, He is present everywhere; for, as the theologians say, a being can no more act where he is not than when he is not.

The older and later theologians agree in this view of the divine immensity and omnipresence. Augustine [396] says God is not to be regarded as everywhere diffused, as the air or the light: "Sed in solo coelo totus, et in sola terra totus, et in coelo et in terra totus, et nullo contentus loco, sed in seipso ubique totus." Thomas Aquinas says, [397] Deus "est in omnibus per potentiam, in quantum omnia ejus potestati subduntur; est per pr<?>sentiam in omnibus, in quantum omnia nuda sunt et aperta oculis ejus. Est in omnibus per essentiam in quantum adest omnibus ut causa essendi sicut dictum est." Quenstedt says, [398] "Est Deus ubique illocaliter, impartibiliter, efficaciter; non definitive ut spiritus, non circumscriptive ut corpora, sed repletive citra sui multiplicationem, extensionem, divisionem, inclusionem, aut commixtionem more modoque divino incomprehensibili." The Bible teaches the infinitude of God, as involving his immensity and omnipresence, in the clearest terms. He is said to fill all in all, i.e., the universe in all its parts. (Eph. i. 23.) "Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith the Lord. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith the Lord." (Jer. xxiii. 23, 24.) "Whither shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence? If I ascend up into heaven, thou art there: if I make my bed in hell, behold, thou art there. If I take the wings of the morning, and dwell in the uttermost parts of the sea; even there shall thy hand lead me, and thy right hand shall hold me." (Ps. cxxxix. 7-12.) It is "in Him we (i.e., all creatures) live, and move, and have our being." (Acts xvii. 28.) Everywhere in the Old and in the New Testament, God is represented as a spiritual Being, without form, invisible, whom no man hath seen or can see; dwelling in the light which no man can approach unto, and full of glory; as not only the creator, and preserver, but as the governor of all things; as everywhere present, and everywhere imparting life, and securing order; present in every blade of grass, yet guiding Arcturus in his course, marshalling the stars as a host, calling them by their names; present also in every human soul, giving it understanding, endowing it with gifts, working in it both to will and to do. The human heart is in his hands and He turneth it even as the rivers of water are turned. Wherever, throughout the universe, there is evidence of mind in material causes, there, according to the Scriptures, is God, controlling and guiding those causes to the accomplishment of his wise designs. He is in all, and over all things; yet essentially different from all, being over all, independent, and infinitely exalted. This immensity and omnipresence of God, therefore, is the ubiquity of the divine essence, and consequently of the divine power, wisdom, and goodness. As the birds in the air and the fish in the sea, so also are we always surrounded and sustained by God. It is thus that He is infinite in his being, without absorbing all created

beings into his own essence, but sustaining all in their individual subsistence, and in the exercise of their own powers.

[391] Prolegomena Logica, Boston, 1860, p. 52.

[392] "Living Temple," Works, London, 1724, vol. i. p. 70.

[393] History of Modern Philosophy, translated by Wight. New York, 1852, vol. i. p. 113.

[394] Institutiones Theologic�, IV. ii. 13, edit. Amsterdam, 1550, vol. i. p. 294.

[395] Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 556.

[396] De Pr�sentia Dei seu Epistola CLXXXVII. iv. 14, edit. Benedictines, vol. ii. p. 1023, d.

[397] Summa, I. viii. 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 16.

[398] Theologia, I. viii. § 1, p. 413.

§ 6. Eternity.

A. Scriptural Doctrine.

The infinitude of God relatively to space, is his immensity or omnipresence; relatively to duration, it is his eternity. As He is free from all the limitations of space, so He is exalted above all the limitations of time. As He is not more in one place than in another, but is everywhere equally present, so He does not exist during one period of duration more than another. With Him there is no distinction between the present, past, and future; but all things are equally and always present to Him. With Him duration is an eternal now. This is the popular and the Scriptural view of God's eternity. "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting thou art God." (Ps. xc. 2.) "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth: and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure: yea, all of them shall wax old like a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed: but thou art the same, and thy years shall have no end." (Ps. cii. 25-27.) He is "The high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity." (Is. lvii. 15.) "I am the first and I am the last; and besides me there is no God." (Is. xliv. 6.) "A thousand years in thy sight are but as yesterday when it is past." (Ps. xc. 4.) "One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day." (2 Pet. iii. 8.) He is "the same yesterday, and today, and forever." (Heb. xiii. 8.) God is He "which is [ever is], and which was, and which is to come." (Rev. i. 4.) Throughout the Bible He is called the eternal or everlasting God; who only hath immortality. The primal revelation of Himself to his covenant people was as the "I am."

What is taught in these and similar passages, is, first, that God is without beginning of years or end of days. He is, and always has been, and always will be; and secondly, that to Him there is neither past nor future; that the past and the future are always and equally present to Him.

B. Philosophical View.

These are Scriptural facts, and necessarily follow from the nature of God as self-existent, infinite, and immutable. With these representations the teaching of theologians for

the most part agrees. Thus Augustine says: "Fuisse et futurum esse non est in ea [scil. vita divina], sed esse solum, quoniam ♦terna est: nam fuisse et futurum esse non est ♦ternum." [399] "Nec tu tempore tempora pr♦cedis, alioquin non omnia tempora pr♦cederes sed pr♦cedis omnia pr♦terita celsitudine semper pr♦sentis ♦ternitatis; et superas omnia futura, quia illa futura sunt et cum venerint pr♦terita erunt; tu autem idem ipse es, et anni tui non deficiunt." [400] Aquinas, to the same effect says, "♦ternitas est tota simul." [401] Or, as the schoolmen generally were accustomed to say, "In ♦ternitate est unicum instans semper pr♦sens et persistens;" or, as they otherwise expressed it, "Eternitas est interminabilis vit♦ simul et perfecta possessio." The same view of this attribute is given by the later theologians. Thus Quenstedt says, "♦ternitas Dei est duratio vel permanentia essenti♦ divin♦ interminabilis, sine principio et fine carens, et indivisibilis, omnem omnino successionem excludens." [402]

The only thing open to question in these statements is, the denial of all succession in the divine consciousness. Our idea of eternity is arrived at from our idea of time. We are conscious of existence in space, and we are conscious of protracted or continuous existence. The ideas of space and duration are necessarily given in the consciousness of continuous existence. We see also that events succeed each other, that their occurrence is separated by a longer or shorter period of duration, just as bodies are separated by a greater or less interval in space. We therefore know, from consciousness or from experience, of no kind of duration which is not successive. Instead of saying, as is commonly done, that time is duration measured by succession, which supposes that duration is antecedent to that by which it is measured, and independent of it, it is maintained by some that duration without succession is inconceivable and impossible. As space is defined to be "negation betwixt the boundary-lines of form," so time is said to be "the negation betwixt the boundary-points of motion." Or, in other words, time is "the interval which a body in motion marks in its transit from one point of space to another." [403] Hence, if there be no bodies having form, there is no space; and if there is no motion, there is no time. "If all things were annihilated, time as well as space must he annihilated; for time is dependent on space. If all things were annihilated, there could be no transition, no succession of one object with respect to another; for there would be no object in being, -- all would be perfect emptiness, nothingness, non-being-ness. Under an entire annihilation, there could be neither space nor time." [404] The same writer [405] elsewhere says, "Were the earth, as well as the other globes of space, annihilated, much more would time be annihilated therewith." [406] All this, however, is to be understood, it is said, of "objective time, that is, of time as dependent upon created material conditions." [407] As objective timelessness follows from the annihilation of material existences, so timelessness as regards thinking personalities is conceivable only on the destruction of thought. "We have seen that there can be a state of timelessness for material creation, only by destroying its operation, that is, its attribute of motion: precisely in analogy therewith, there can be a state of timelessness for intellectual creation, only by destroying the laws of intellect, that is, its operation of thinking." [408] If, therefore, God be a person, or a thinking Being, He cannot be timeless; there must be succession; one thought or state must follow another. To deny this, it is said, is to deny the personality of God. The dictum, therefore, of the schoolmen, and of the theologians, that eternity precludes succession -- that it is a persistent, unmoving Now -- is according to this repudiated.

There are, however, two senses in which succession is denied to God. Time first has reference to external events. They are ever present to the mind of God. He views them in all their relations, whether causal or chronological. He sees how they succeed each other in time, as we see a passing pageant, all of which we may take in in one view. In this there is perhaps nothing which absolutely transcends our comprehension. The second aspect of the subject concerns the relation of succession to the thoughts and acts of God. When we are ignorant, it is wise to be silent. We have no right to affirm or deny, when we cannot know what our affirmation or denial may involve or imply. We know that God is constantly producing new effects, effects which succeed each other in time; but we do not know that these effects are due to successive exercises of the divine efficiency. It is, indeed, incomprehensible to us how it should be otherwise. The miracles of Christ were due to the immediate exercise of the divine efficiency. We utter words to which we can attach no meaning, when we say that these effects were due, not to a contemporaneous act or volition of the divine mind, but to an eternal act, if such a phrase be not a solecism. In like manner we are confounded when we are told that our prayers are not heard and answered in time -- that God is timeless -- that what He does in hearing and answering prayer, and in his daily providence, He does from eternity. It is certain that God is subject to all the limitations of personality, if there be any. But as such limitations are the conditions of his being a person and not a mere involuntary force, they are the conditions of his infinite perfection. As constant thought and activity are involved in the very nature of a spirit, these must belong to God; and so far as thinking and acting involve succession, succession must belong to God. There are mysteries connected with chronological succession, in our nature, which we cannot explain. We know that in dreams months may be compressed into moments, and moments extended to months, so far as our consciousness is concerned. We know that it often happens to those near death, that all the past becomes instantly present. Had God so constituted us that memory was as vivid as present consciousness, there would to us be no past, so far as our personal existence is concerned. It is not impossible that, hereafter, memory may become a consciousness of the past; that all we ever thought, felt, or did, may be ever present to the mind; that everything written on that tablet is indelible. Persons who, by long residence in foreign countries, have entirely lost all knowledge of their native language, have been known to speak it fluently, and understand it perfectly, when they came to die. Still more wonderful is the fact that uneducated persons, hearing passages read in an unknown language (Greek or Hebrew, for example), have, years after, when in an abnormal, nervous state, repeated those passages correctly, without understanding their meaning. If unable to comprehend ourselves, we should not pretend to be able to comprehend God. Whether we can understand how there can be succession in the thoughts of Him who inhabits eternity or not, we are not to deny that God is an intelligent Being, that He actually thinks and feels, in order to get over the difficulty. God is a person, and all that personality implies must be true of Him.

Modern Philosophical Views.

The modern philosophy teaches that "Die Ewigkeit ist die Einheit in dem Unterschiede der Zeitmomente -- Ewigkeit und Zeit verhalten sich wie die Substanz und deren Accidentien." [409] That is, Eternity is the unity underlying the successive moments of time, as substance is the unity underlying the accidents which are its manifestations. Schleiermacher's illustration is borrowed from our consciousness. We are conscious of an

abiding, unchanging self, which is the subject of our ever changing thoughts and feelings. By the eternity of God, therefore, is meant nothing more than that He is the ground-being of which the universe is the ever changing phenomenon. The eternity of God is only one phase of his universal causality. "Unter der Ewigkeit Gottes verstehen wir die mit allem Zeitlichen auch die Zeit selbst bedingende schlechthin zeitlose Ursachlichkeit Gottes." [410] To attain this philosophical view of eternity, we must accept the philosophical view of the nature of God upon which it is founded, namely, that God is merely the designation of that unknown and unknowable something of which all other things are the manifestations. To give up the living, personal God of the Bible and of the heart, is an awful sacrifice to specious, logical consistency. We believe what we cannot understand. We believe what the Bible teaches as facts; that God always is, was, and ever will be, immutably the same; that all things are ever present to his view; that with Him there is neither past nor future; but nevertheless that He is not a stagnant ocean, but ever living, ever thinking, ever acting, and ever suiting his action to the exigencies of his creatures, and to the accomplishment of his infinitely wise designs. Whether we can harmonize these facts or not, is a matter of minor importance. We are constantly called upon to believe that things are, without being able to tell how they are, or even how they can be.

[399] Confessiones, IX. x. 24, edit. Benedictines, vol. i. p. 283, c.

[400] Ibid. XI. xiii. 16, p. 338, a.

[401] Summa, I. x. 4, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 16.

[402] Theologia, I. viii. § I. xvii. p. 413.

[403] Jamieson, p. 199.

[404] Ibid. p. 163.

[405] Rev. George Jamieson, M.A., one of the ministers of the parish of Old Machar, Aberdeen, The Essentials of Philosophy, wherein its constituent Principles are traced throughout the various Departments of Science with analytical Strictures on the Views of some of our leading Philosophers.

[406] Ibid., p. 200.

[407] Ibid.

[408] Ibid.

[409] Strauss, Dogmatik, i. p. 561.

[410] Christliche Glaube, I. § 52, Werke, edit. Berlin, 1842, vol. iii. p. 268.

§ 7. Immutability.

The immutability of God is intimately connected with his immensity and eternity, and is frequently included with them in the Scriptural statements concerning his nature. Thus, when it is said, He is the First and the Last; the Alpha and Omega, the same yesterday, to-day, and forever; or when in contrast with the ever changing and perishing world, it is said: "They shall be changed, but thou art the same;" it is not his eternity more than his immutability that is brought into view. As an infinite and absolute Being, self-existent and absolutely independent, God is exalted above all the causes of and even above the possibility of change. Infinite space and infinite duration cannot change. They must ever be

what they are. So God is absolutely immutable in his essence and attributes. He can neither increase nor decrease. He is subject to no process of development, or of self-evolution. His knowledge and power can never be greater or less. He can never be wiser or holier, or more righteous or more merciful than He ever has been and ever must be. He is no less immutable in his plans and purposes. Infinite in wisdom, there can be no error in their conception; infinite in power, there can be no failure in their accomplishment. He is "the Father of lights, with whom is no variableness, neither shadow of turning." (James i. 17.) "God is not a man that He should lie; neither the son of man that He should repent; hath He said and shall He not do it? or hath he spoken, and shall He not make it good?" (Num. xxiii. 19.) "I am the LORD, I change not." (Mal. iii. 6.) "The counsel of the LORD standeth forever; the thoughts of his heart to all generations." (Ps. xxxiii. 11.) "There are many devices in a man's heart; nevertheless, the counsel of the LORD, that shall stand." (Prov. xix. 21.) "The Lord of Hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand." (Is. xiv. 24.) "I am God, and there is none like me, declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (Is. xlvi. 9, 10.) Those passages of Scripture in which God is said to repent, are to be interpreted on the same principle as those in which He is said to ride upon the wings of the wind, or to walk through the earth. These create no difficulty.

Philosophical Statement.

Theologians, in their attempts to state, in philosophical language, the doctrine of the Bible on the unchangeableness of God, are apt to confound immutability with immobility. In denying that God can change, they seem to deny that He can act. Augustine says, on this subject: "Non invenies in Deo aliquid mutabilitatis; non aliquid, quod aliter nunc sit, aliter paulo ante fuerit. Nam ubi invenis aliter et aliter, facta est ibi qu�dam mors: mors enim est, non esse quod fuit." [411] Quenstedt uses language still more open to objection, when he says that the immutability of God is "Perpetua essenti� divin� et omnium ejus perfectionum identitas, negans omnem omnino motum cum physicum, tum ethicum." [412] Turrettin is more cautious, and yet perhaps goes too far. He says: "Potestas variandi actus suos, non est principium mutabilitatis in se, sed tantum in objectis suis; nisi intelligatur de variatione internorum suorum actuum, quos voluntas perfecta non variat, sed imperfecta tantum." [413] The clause italicized in the above quotation assumes a knowledge of the nature of God to which man has no legitimate claim. It is in vain for us to presume to understand the Almighty to perfection. We know that God is immutable in his being, his perfections, and his purposes; and we know that He is perpetually active. And, therefore, activity and immutability must be compatible; and no explanation of the latter inconsistent with the former ought to be admitted.

The Absolute Attributes of God not inconsistent with Personality.

These attributes of infinity, eternity, and immutability, are freely admitted by the modern philosophy to belong to the absolute Being. But it is maintained that such a Being cannot be a person. Personality implies self-consciousness. Self-consciousness necessarily implies limitation, a distinction between the self and the not-self. Ohne Du kein Ich, -- unless there be something objective and independent to which we stand opposed, as subject and object, there can be no consciousness of self. But nothing can be thus objective and

independent in relation to the Absolute; and, therefore, the Absolute cannot have any consciousness of self, and consequently cannot be a personal Being. We have already seen (chap. iv.) that this objection is founded on an arbitrary definition of the Infinite and Absolute. It assumes that the Infinite must be all, and that the Absolute must be alone, without relation to anything out of itself. It is here only necessary to remark, in reference to the objection, (1.) That it may be admitted as a fact that the slumbering consciousness of self in the human soul is awakened and developed by contact with what is not only external to itself but also independent of it. But God is not subject to that law. He is eternally perfect and immutable; having in Himself the plenitude of life. There is, therefore, no analogy between the cases, and no ground for inferring in this case that what is true in us, who begin life as an undeveloped germ, must be true in relation to God. (2.) In the second place, we have no right to assume that even with regard to a finite intelligence created in the perfection of its being, self-consciousness is dependent on what is independent of itself. Such a being would of necessity be conscious of its own feelings; for thought is a state of consciousness in an intelligent being. If God, therefore, can make an intelligent being in the perfection of its limited nature, it would be self-conscious even were it left alone in the universe. (3.) Admitting it to be true that "without a Thou there can be no I," we know that, according to the Scriptures and the faith of the Church universal, there are in the unity of the Godhead three distinct persons, the Father, the Son, and the Spirit; so that from eternity the Father can say I, and the Son Thou.

We must abide by the teachings of Scripture, and refuse to subordinate their authority and the intuitive convictions of our moral and religious nature to the arbitrary definitions of any philosophical system. The Bible everywhere teaches that God is an absolute Being, in the sense of being self-existent, necessary, independent, immutable, eternal, and without limitation or necessary relation to anything out of Himself. It teaches moreover that He is infinite; not in the sense of including all being, all power, all knowledge in Himself, to the exclusion of all other intelligent agents; but in the sense that no limit can be assigned to his being or perfections, other than that which arises out of his own perfection itself. He would cease to be infinite could He be unwise or untrue. It is to be remembered that God is infinite and absolute as a spirit, and a spirit from its nature is living, active, intelligent, self-conscious, and personal.

[411] In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, xxiii. 9, edit. Benedictines, vol. iii. p. 1952, b, c.

[412] Theologia, I. viii. § I. xx. p. 414.

[413] Locus III. xi. 9, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 186.

§ 8. Knowledge.

A. Its Nature.

By knowledge is meant the intellectual apprehension of truth. It supposes a subject and object; an intelligent subject that apprehends, and something true that is apprehended.

So far as we are concerned, knowledge is either intuitive or discursive. Our senses give us immediate knowledge of their appropriate objects; the understanding perceives intuitively primary truths; our moral and ästhetic nature gives us the immediate cognition

of things right or wrong, and beautiful or deformed. Most of our knowledge, however, is derived ab extra, by instruction, observation, comparison, deduction, etc. In all cases there is the distinction between the mind which perceives and the object which is perceived.

Such being the nature of knowledge, can there be knowledge in God? Can there be this distinction between subject and object in an absolute and infinite Being? Not only are the wicked and the worldly disposed to think that God cannot know; that either He is too exalted to take cognizance of earthly things; or that it is impossible even for an infinite mind to embrace the universe and all its perpetual changes in his mental vision; but the possibility of knowledge, in the ordinary and proper sense of the word, is expressly denied to God by a large class of philosophers, and virtually even by many theologians of the highest rank in the history of the Church.

The Pantheistic Theory precludes the possibility of Knowledge of God

1. As, according to the pantheistic theory, the universe is the existence form of God, as the infinite comes to intelligent consciousness and life only in the finite, there is and can be no knowledge in the infinite as distinguished from the finite. God lives only so far as finite beings live; he thinks and knows only so far as they think and know. Omniscience is only the sum or aggregate of the intelligence of the transient forms of finite beings. All this, as even Hamilton and Mansel admit, necessarily flows from the idea of an absolute Being which precludes the possibility of any such conditions or relations as are involved in consciousness or intelligence. Strauss therefore says: [414] "Not in Himself, but in finite intelligences is God omniscient, which together constitute the fulness or completeness of all the possible forms or degrees of knowledge." And Spinoza says: [415] "Intellectus et voluntas, qui Dei essentiam constituerent, a nostro intellectu et voluntate toto coelo differe deberent, nec in ulla re, pr&#xfffd;terquam in nomine, convenire possent; non aliter scilicet, quam inter se conveniunt canis, signum coeleste, et canis, animal latrans." This subject was considered in the chapter on Pantheism.

Knowledge and Power not to be confounded.

2. The possibility of knowledge in God is virtually denied by those who deny any distinction between knowledge and power. Knowledge, which is power, ceases to be knowledge; and therefore if omniscience is only a different name for omnipotence, it ceases to be a distinct attribute of God. It makes little difference whether we expressly deny a given perfection to God, or whether we so determine it as to make it mean nothing distinctive. It is deeply to be regretted that not only the Fathers, but also the Lutheran and Reformed theologians, after renouncing the authority of the schoolmen, almost immediately yielded themselves to their speculations. Instead of determining the nature of the divine attributes from the representations of Scripture and from the constitution of man as the image of God, and from the necessities of our moral and religious nature, they allowed themselves to be controlled by &#xfffd; priori speculations as to the nature of the infinite and absolute. Even Augustine, as before stated, says: "Nos ista, qu&#xfffd; fecisti videmus, quia sunt: tu autem quia vides ea, sunt." [416] And Scotus Erigena says, [417] "Voluntas illius et visio et essentia anum est." [418] . . . . "Visio Dei totius universitatis est conditio. Non enim aliud est ei videre, aliud facere; sed visio illius voluntas ejus est, et voluntas operatio." Thomas Aquinas also says, [419] "Deus per intellectum suum causat res, cum suum esse sit suum intelligere. Unde necesse est, quod sua scientia sit causa rerum."

The Lutheran and Reformed theologians represent God as simplicissima simplicitas, admitting of no distinction between faculty and act, or between one attribute and another. Thus Gerhard says: "Deus est ipsum esse subsistens, omnibus modis indeterminatum." [420] "Solus Deus summe simplex est, ut nec actus et potenti&#65533;, nec esse et essenti&#65533; compositio ipsi competat." [421] "Essentia, bonitas, potentia, sapientia, justitia, et reliqua attributa omnia sunt in Deo realiter unum." [422] He also says: "In Deo idem est esse et intelligere et velle." In like manner the Reformed theologian Heidegger [423] says: "Voluntas ab intellectu non differt, quia intelligendo vult et volendo intelligit. Intelligere et velle ejus idemque perpetuus indivisus actus." This does not mean simply that in an intelligent being, every act of the will is an intelligent act. He knows while he wills, and knows what he wills. The meaning is, that knowledge and power in God are identical. To know a thing is, and to will it, are the same undivided and perpetual act. From this it would seem to follow, that as God knows from eternity He creates from eternity; and that "all He knows, is." We are thus led, by these speculations, into pantheistical views of the nature of God and of his relation to the world.

This mode of representation is carried still further by the modern philosophical theologians. With Schleiermacher, all the attributes of God are virtually merged into the idea of causality. With him God is ens summum prima causa. [424] He says that God's thinking and willing are the same, and that his omnipotence and omniscience are identical. When we say that He is omnipotent, we only mean that He is the cause of all that is. And when we say that He is omniscient, we only mean that He is an intelligent cause. His power and knowledge are limited to the actual. The possible is nothing; it is the object neither of knowledge nor of power. "Gott," says Schleiermacher, "weiss Alles was ist; und Alles ist, was Gott weiss und dieses beides ist nicht zweierlei sondern einerlei, weil sein Wissen und sein allm&#65533;chtiges Wollen eines und dasselbe ist," i.e., God knows all that is, and all is that God knows. God, therefore, is limited to the world, which is the phenomenon of which He is the substance.

Another philosophical view of this subject, adopted even by those who repudiate the pantheistic system and maintain that God and the world are distinct, is, that as God is immanent in the world, there is in Him no difference between self-consciousness and world-consciousness, as they express it, i.e., between God's knowledge of Himself and his knowledge of the world. They therefore define omniscience by saying, "Insofern Gott gedacht wird als die Welt mit seinem Bewusstseyn umfassend, nennen wir ihn den Allwissenden." [425] That is, "So far as we conceive of God as embracing the world in his consciousness, we call him omniscient." Whatever such language may mean to those who use it, to the ordinary mind it conveys the revolting idea that all the sins of men enter into the consciousness of God.

The Doctrine of the Scriptures on this Subject.

The Scriptural view of this subject, which distinguishes the attributes in God as distinct, and assumes that knowledge in Him, in its essential nature, is what knowledge is in us, does not conflict with the unity and simplicity of God as a spiritual being. There is a sense in which knowledge and power, intellect and will, may be said to be identical in man. They are not different substances. They are different modes in which the life or activity of the soul manifests itself. So in God when we conceive of Him as a spirit, we do

not think of Him as a compound being, but as manifesting his infinite life and activity, in knowing, willing, and doing. What, therefore, we must hold fast to, if we would hold fast to God, is, that knowledge in God is knowledge, and not power or eternity; that it is what knowledge is in us, not indeed in its modes and objects, but in its essential nature. We must remove from our conceptions of the divine attributes all the limitations and imperfections which belong to the corresponding attributes in us; but we are not to destroy their nature. And in determining what is, and what is not, consistent with the nature of God as an infinitely perfect being, we are to be controlled by the teachings of the Scriptures, and by the necessities (or laws) of our moral and religions nature, and not by our speculative notions of the Infinite and Absolute. God, therefore, does and can know in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. He is an ever present eye, to which all things are perfectly revealed. "All things," says the Apostle, "are naked and opened unto the eyes of Him with whom we have to do." (Heb. iv. 13.) "The darkness and the light are both alike" to Him. (Ps. cxxxix. 12.) "He that planted the ear, shall he not hear? He that formed the eye, shall he not see?" (Ps. xciv. 9.) "O Lord thou hast searched me, and known me. Thou knowest my down-sitting and my up-rising, thou understandest my thought afar off." (Ps. cxxxix. 1, 2.) "The eyes of the Lord are in every place, beholding the evil and the good" (Prov. xv. 3.) "Hell and destruction are before the Lord: how much more then the hearts of the children of men?" (Prov. xv. 11.) "Great is our Lord and of great power: his understanding is infinite." (Ps. cxlvii. 5.) "O house of Israel I know the things that come into your mind, every one of them." (Ezek. xi. 5.) "Known unto God are all his works from the beginning of the world." (Acts. xv. 18.) "The very hairs of your head are all numbered." (Matt. x. 30.)

This knowledge of God is not only all-comprehending, but it is intuitive and immutable. He knows all things as they are, being as being, phenomena as phenomena, the possible as possible, the actual as actual, the necessary as necessary, the free as free, the past as past, the present as present, the future as future. Although all things are ever present in his view, yet He sees them as successive in time. The vast procession of events, thoughts, feelings, and acts, stands open to his view.

This infinite knowledge of God is not only clearly and constantly asserted in Scripture, but is also obviously included in the idea of an absolutely perfect being. Such a being cannot be ignorant of anything; his knowledge can neither be increased nor diminished. The omniscience of God follows also from his omnipresence. As God fills heaven and earth, all things are transacted in his presence. He knows our thoughts far better than they are known to ourselves. This plenitude of divine knowledge is taken for granted in all acts of worship. We pray to a God who, we believe, knows our state and wants, who hears what we say, and who is able to meet all our necessities. Unless God were thus omniscient, He could not judge the world in righteousness. Faith in this attribute in its integrity is, therefore, essential even to natural religion.

B. The Objects of Divine Knowledge.

Various distinctions are made by theologians as to the objects of the divine knowledge.

1. God is said to know Himself and all things out of Himself. This is the foundation of the distinction between the scientia necessaria and the scientia libera. God knows Himself by the necessity of his nature; but as everything out of Himself depends for its existence or

occurrence upon his will, his knowledge of each thing as an actual occurrence is suspended on his will, and in that sense is free. Creation not being necessary, it depended on the will of God whether the universe as an object of knowledge should exist or not. This distinction is not of much importance. And it is liable to the objection that it makes the knowledge of God dependent. Being the cause of all things, God knows everything by knowing Himself; all things possible, by the knowledge of his power, and all things actual, by the knowledge of his own purposes.

2. This distinction between the possible and actual, is the foundation of the distinction between the knowledge of simple intelligence and the knowledge of vision. The former is founded on God's power, and the latter upon his will. This only means that, in virtue of his omniscient intelligence, He knows whatever infinite power can effect; and that from the consciousness of his own purposes, He knows what He has determined to effect or to permit to occur. This is a distinction which the modern philosophical theologians ignore. Nothing, according to their philosophy is possible, but the actual. All that can be, either is, or is to be. This follows from the idea of God as mere cause. He produces all that can be; and there is in Him no causality for what does not exist.

The Actual and the Possible.

It seems to be an inconsistency in those orthodox theologians who deny the distinction in God between knowledge and power, to admit, as they all do, the distinction between the actual and possible. For if God creates by thinking or knowing, if in Him, as they say, intelligere et facere idem est, then all he knows must be, and must be as soon as He knows or thinks it, i.e., from eternity. If, however, we retain the Scriptural idea of God as a spirit, who can do more than He does; if we ascribe to Him what we know to be a perfection in ourselves, namely, that our power exceeds our acts, that a faculty and the exercise of that faculty are not identical, then we can understand how God can know the possible as well as the actual. God is not limited to the universe, which of necessity is finite. God has not exhausted Himself in determining to cause the present order of things to be.

C. Scientia Media.

Intermediate between things possible and actual, some theologians assume a third class of events, namely, the conditionally future. They do not actually occur, but they would occur provided something else should occur. Had Christ come a thousand years sooner than the date of his actual advent, the whole history of the world would have been different. This is a popular mode of regarding the concatenation of events. It is constantly said, that if Cromwell had been permitted to leave England; or, if Napoleon had failed to escape from Elba, the state of Europe would have been very different from what it is at present. God, it is assumed, knows what would have been the sequence of events on any or every possible hypothesis. It is therefore said that there must be in God, besides the knowledge of simple intelligence by which He knows the possible, and the knowledge of vision by which He knows the actual, a scientia media, by which He knows the conditionally future. Illustrations of this form of knowledge, it is thought, are found in Scripture. In 1 Samuel xxiii. 11, it is said that David inquired of the Lord whether the men of Keilah would deliver him, should he remain among them, into the hands of Saul; and was answered that they would. Here, it is argued, the event was not merely possible, but conditionally certain. If David remained in Keilah, he certainly would have been delivered up. Thus our Lord said,

that if his mighty works had been done in Tyre and Sidon, the people of those cities would have repented. Here again is declared what would have happened, if something else had happened.

The Origin of this Distinction.

This distinction was introduced into theology by the Jesuit theologians Fonseca and Molina; by the latter in his work "De Concordia Providenti&#65533; et Grati&#65533; Divin&#65533; cum Libero Arbitrio Hominis." Their object was to reconcile the foreordination of God with the freedom of man, and to explain the reason why some, and not others, were elected to eternal life. God foresaw who would repent and believe, if they received the knowledge of the Gospel and the gift of the Spirit, and these He elected to salvation. This theory of a scientia media was, for a like purpose, adopted by the Lutheran and Remonstrant theologians, but was strenuously opposed by the Reformed or Augustinians. (1.) Because all events are included under the categories of the actual and possible; and, therefore, there is no room for such a class as events conditionally future. It is only possible, and not certain, how men would act under certain conditions, if their conduct be not predetermined, either by the purpose of God, or by their own decision already formed. Besides, it is the fundamental principle of the theologians who adopt this theory, or at least of many of them, that a free act must from its nature be uncertain as to its occurrence. A free agent, it is said, can always act contrary to any amount of influence brought to bear upon him, consistent with his free agency. But if free acts must be uncertain, they cannot be foreseen as certain under any conditions. (2.) The futurition of events, according to the Scriptures, depends on the foreordination of God, who foreordains whatever comes to pass. There is no certainty, therefore, which does not depend on the divine purpose. (3.) The kind of knowledge which this theory supposes cannot belong to God, because it is inferential. It is deduced from a consideration of second causes and their influence, and therefore is inconsistent with the perfection of God, whose knowledge is not discursive, but independent and intuitive. (4.) This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of God's providential government, as it assumes that the free acts of men are not under his control. (5.) It is contrary to the Scriptural doctrine, inasmuch as it supposes that election to salvation depends on the foresight of faith and repentance, whereas it depends on the good pleasure of God. (6.) The examples quoted from the Bible do not prove that there is a scientia media in God. The answer of God to David, about the men of Keilah, was simply a revelation of the purpose which they had already formed. Our Lord's declaration concerning Tyre and Sidon was only a figurative mode of stating the fact that the men of his generation were more hardened than the inhabitants of those ancient cities. It is not denied that God knows all events in all possible combinations and connections, but as nothing is certain but what he ordains to effect or permit, there can be no class of events conditionally future, and therefore there can be no scientia media. By conditionally future is meant what is suspended on a condition undetermined by God.

D. Foreknowledge.

Among the objects of the divine knowledge are the free acts of men. The Scriptures abundantly teach that such acts are foreknown. Such knowledge is involved in the prediction of events which either concern the free acts of men, or are dependent on them. If God be ignorant of how free agents will act, his knowledge must be limited, and it must be

constantly increasing, which is altogether inconsistent with the true idea of his nature. His government of the world also, in that case, must be precarious, dependent, as it would then be on the unforeseen conduct of men. The Church, therefore, in obedience to the Scriptures, has, almost with one voice, professed faith in God's foreknowledge of the free acts of his creatures.

The Socinians, however, and some of the Remonstrants, unable to reconcile this foreknowledge with human liberty, deny that free acts can be foreknown. As the omnipotence of God is his ability to do whatever is possible, so his omniscience is his knowledge of everything knowable. But as free acts are in their nature uncertain, as they may or may not be, they cannot be known before they occur. Such is the argument of Socinus. This whole difficulty arises out of the assumption that contingency is essential to free agency. If an act may be certain as to its occurrence, and yet free as to the mode of its occurrence, the difficulty vanishes. That free acts may be absolutely certain, is plain, because they have in a multitude of cases been predicted. It was certain that the acts of Christ would be holy, yet they were free. The continued holiness of the saints in heaven is certain, and yet they are perfectly free. The foreknowledge of God is inconsistent with a false theory of free agency, but not with the true doctrine on that subject.

After Augustine, the common way of meeting the difficulty of reconciling foreknowledge with liberty, was to represent it as merely subjective. The distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge is only in us. There is no such difference in God. "Quid est pr&#xfffd;scientia," asks Augustine, "nisi scientia futurorum? Quid autem futurum est Deo, qui omnia supergreditur tempora? Si enim scientia Dei res ipsas habet, non sunt ei futur&#xfffd;, sed pr&#xfffd;sentes, ac per hoc non jam pr&#xfffd;scientia, sed tantum scientia dicipotest." [426]

E. The Wisdom of God.

Wisdom and knowledge are intimately related. The former is manifested in the selection of proper ends, and of proper means for the accomplishment of those ends. As there is abundant evidence of design in the works of nature, so all the works of God declare his wisdom. They show, from the most minute to the greatest, the most wonderful adaptation of means to accomplish the high end of the good of his creatures and the manifestation of his own glory. So also, in the whole course of history, we see evidence of the controlling power of God making all things work together for the best interests of his people, and the promotion of his kingdom upon earth. It is, however, in the work of redemption that this divine attribute is specially revealed. It is by the Church, that God has determined to manifest, through all ages, to principalities and powers, his manifold wisdom.

Of course those who deny final causes deny that there is any such attribute as wisdom in God. It is also said that the use of means to attain an end is a manifestation of weakness. It is further urged that it is derogatory to God, as it supposes that He needs or desires what He does not possess. Even Schleiermacher says: "Bei Gott ist Allwissenheit und Weisheit so g&#xfffd;nzlich einerlei, dass die Unterscheidung keinen Werth hat, die Weisheit w&#xfffd;re nichts als auch wider absolute Lebendigkeit der Allmacht, also Alwissenheit." Wisdom is omniscience, omniscience is omnipotence, omnipotence is simply causality of all that is. Thus God sinks into the mere cause or ground of all things. It is not thus the Scriptures speak. We are called on to worship, "The only wise God." "O Lord, how manifold are thy

works! in wisdom hast Thou made them all," is the devout exclamation of the Psalmist. (Ps. civ. 24.) And in contemplation of the work of redemption the Apostle exclaims, "O the depth of the riches both of the wisdom and knowledge of God!" (Rom. xi. 33.)

[414] Dogmatik, i. p. 575.

[415] Ethices, I. xvii. Scholium, edit. Jena, 1803, vol. ii. p. 53.

[416] Confessiones, XIII. xxxviii. 53, edit. Benedictines, vol. i, p. 410, b.

[417] De Divisione Natur&#65533;, III, 17, p. 235.

[418] Ibid. 29, p. 264.

[419] Summa, I. xiv. i, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 36.

[420] Tom. i. loc. iii. cap. vi. § 43, p. 106, edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1762.

[421] Ibid. cap. x. § 80, p. 119.

[422] Ibid. chap. vii. § 47, p. 108.

[423] Corpus Theologi&#65533; Christiane Tiguri, 1732.

[424] Christliche Glabue, i. § 55. Werke, edit. Berlin, 1842, vol. iii. p. 295.

[425] Bruch, Die Lehre von den g&#65533;ttlichen Eigenschaften, p. 162.

[426] De Diversis Qu&#65533;stionibus ad Simplicianum, II. ii. 2, edit. Benedictines, vol. vi. p. 195, a. Compare also what he says on this subject, De Civitate Dei, XI. xxi.: Ibid. vol. vii. p. 461.

§ 9. The Will of God.

A. The Meaning of the Term.

If God is a spirit He must possess all the essential attributes of a spirit. Those attributes, according to the classification adopted by the older philosophers and theologians, fall under the heads of intelligence and will. To the former, are referred knowledge and wisdom; to the latter, the power of self-determination, efficiency (in the case of God, omnipotence), and all moral attributes. In this wide sense of the word, the will of God includes: (1.) The will in the narrow sense of the word. (2.) His power. (3.) His love and all his moral perfections. In our day, generally but not always, the word "will" is limited to the faculty of self-determination. And even the older theologians in treating of the will of God treat only of his decrees or purposes. In their definitions, however, they take the word in its wide sense. Thus Calovius [427] says, "Voluntas Dei est, qua Deus tendit in bonum ab intellectu cognitum." And Quenstedt defines it as "ipsa Dei essentia cum, connotatione inclinationis ad bonum concepta." [428] Turrettin says, the object of the intellect is the true; the object of the will, the good. Hence it is said, that God wills Himself necessarily, and all things out of Himself freely. Although the word seems to be taken in different senses in the same sentence, God's willing Himself means that He takes complacency in his own infinite excellence: his willing things out of Himself, means his purpose that they should exist. Although the theologians start with the wide definition of the word, yet in the prosecution of the subject they regard the will as simply the faculty of self-determination, and the determinations themselves. That is, the power to will, and volitions or purposes. It is altogether better to confine the word to this its proper meaning, and not make it include all the forms of feeling involving approbation or delight.

God then as a spirit is a voluntary agent. We are authorized to ascribe to Him the power of self-determination. This the Bible everywhere does. From the beginning to the end, it speaks of the will of God, of his decrees, purposes, counsels, and commands. The will is not only an essential attribute of our spiritual being, but it is the necessary condition of our personality. Without the power of rational self-determination we should be as much a mere force as electricity, or magnetism, or the principle of vegetable life. It is, therefore, to degrade God below the sphere of being which we ourselves occupy, as rational creatures, to deny to Him the power of self-determination; of acting or not acting, according to his own good pleasure.

B. The Freedom of the Divine Will.

The will of God is free in the highest sense of the word. An agent is said to be free, (1.) When he is at liberty to act or not to act, according to his good pleasure. This is liberty in acting. (2.) He is free as to his volitions, when they are determined by his own sense of what is wise, right, or desirable.

Freedom is more than spontaneity. The affections are spontaneous, but are not free. Loving and hating, delighting in and abhorring, do not depend upon the will.

God is free in acting, as in creating and preserving, because these acts do not arise from the necessity of his nature. He was free to create or not create; to continue the universe in existence or to cause it to cease to be. He is free also in keeping his promises, because his purpose so to do is determined by his own infinite goodness. It is indeed inconceivable that God should violate his word. But this only proves that moral certainty may be as inexorable as necessity.

C. The Decretive and Preceptive Will of God.

The decretive will of God concerns his purposes, and relates to the futurition of events. The preceptive will relates to the rule of duty for his rational creatures. He decrees whatever he purposes to effect or to permit. He prescribes, according to his own will, what his creatures should do, or abstain from doing. The decretive and preceptive will of God can never be in conflict. God never decrees to do, or to cause others to do, what He forbids. He may, as we see He does, decree to permit what He forbids. He permits men to sin, although sin is forbidden. This is more scholastically expressed by the theologians by saying, A positive decretive will cannot consist with a negative preceptive will; i.e., God cannot decree to make men sin. But a negative decretive will may consist with an affirmative preceptive will; e.g., God may command men to repent and believe, and yet, for wise reasons, abstain from giving them repentance.

The distinction between voluntas beneplaciti et signi, as those terms are commonly used, is the same as that between the decretive and preceptive will of God. The one referring to his decrees, founded on his good pleasure; the other to his commands, founded on what He approves or disapproves.

By the secret will of God, is meant his purposes, as still hidden in his own mind; by his revealed will, his precepts and his purposes, as far as they are made known to his creatures.

D. Antecedent and Consequent Will.

These terms, as used by Augustinians, have reference to the relation of the decrees to

each other. In the order of nature the end precedes the means, and the purpose of the former is antecedent to the purpose of the latter. Thus it is said, that God by an antecedent will, determined on the manifestation of his glory; and by a consequent will, determined on the creation of the world as a means to that end.

By Lutherans and Remonstrants these terms are used in a very different sense. According to their views, God by an antecedent will determined to save all men; but, foreseeing that all would not repent and believe, by a subsequent will He determined to save those who he foresaw would believe. That is, He first purposed one thing and then another.

E. Absolute and Conditional Will.

These terms, when employed by Augustinians, have reference not so much to the purposes of God, as to the events which are decreed. The event, but not the purpose of God, is conditional. A man reaps, if he sows. He is saved, if he believes. His reaping and salvation are conditional events. But the purpose of God is absolute. If He purposes that a man shall reap, He purposes that he shall sow; if He purposes that he shall be saved, He purposes that he shall believe. Anti-Augustinians, on the other hand, regard the purposes of God as conditional. He purposes the salvation of a man, if he believes. But whether he believes or not, is left undetermined; so that the purpose of God is suspended on a condition not under his control, or, at least, undecided. A father may purpose to give an estate to his son, if he be obedient; but whether the son will fulfil the condition is undetermined, and therefore the purpose of the father is undecided. It is, however, manifestly inconsistent with the perfection of God, that He should first will one thing and then another; nor can his purposes be dependent on the uncertainty of human conduct or events. These are questions, however, which belong to the consideration of the doctrine of decrees. They are mentioned here because these distinctions occur in all discussions concerning the Divine Will, with which the student of theology should be familiar.

In this place it is sufficient to remark, that the Greek word thelo, and the corresponding English verb, to will, sometimes express feeling, and sometimes a purpose. Thus in Matt. xxvii. 48, the words ei thelei auton are correctly rendered, "if he delight in him." Comp. Ps. xxii. 8. It is in this sense the word is used, when it is said that God wills all men to be saved. He cannot be said to purpose or determine upon any event which is not to come to pass. A judge may will the happiness of a man whom he sentences to death. He may will him not to suffer when he wills him to suffer. The infelicity in such forms of expression is that the word "will" is used in different senses. In one part of the sentence it means desire, and in the other purpose. It is perfectly consistent, therefore, that God, as a benevolent Being, should desire the happiness of all men, while he purposes to save only his own people.

F. The Will of God as the Ground of Moral Obligation.

The question on this subject is, Whether things are right or wrong, simply because God commands or forbids them? Or, does He command or forbid them, because they are right or wrong for some other reason than his will? According to some, the only reason that a thing is right, and therefore obligatory, is, that it tends to promote the greatest happiness, or the greatest good of the universe. According to others, a thing is right which tends to promote our own happiness; and for that reason, and for that reason alone, it is obligatory. If vice

would make us happier than virtue, we should be bound to be vicious. It is a more decorous mode of expressing substantially the same theory, to say that the ground of moral obligation is a regard to the dignity of our own nature. It makes little difference whether it be our own dignity of our own happiness, which we are bound to regard. It is self, in either case, to whom our whole allegiance is due. Others, again, place the ground of moral obligation in the fitness of things, which they exalt above God. There is, they affirm, an eternal and necessary difference between right and wrong, to which God, it is said, is as much bound to be conformed as are his rational creatures.

The common doctrine of Christians on this subject is, that the will of God is the ultimate ground of moral obligation to all rational creatures. No higher reason can be assigned why anything is right than that God commands it. This means, (1.) That the divine will is the only rule for deciding what is right and what is wrong. (2.) That his will is that which binds us, or that to which we are bound to be conformed. By the word "will" is not meant any arbitrary purpose, so that it were conceivable that God should will right to be wrong, or wrong right. The will of God is the expression or revelation of his nature, or is determined by it; so that his will, as revealed, makes known to us what infinite wisdom and goodness demand. Sometimes things are right simply because God has commanded them; as circumcision, and other ritual institutions were to the Jews. Other things are right because of the present constitution of things which God has ordained; such as the duties relating to property, and the permanent relations of society. Others, again, are right because they are demanded by the immutable excellence of God. In all cases, however, so far as we are concerned, it is his will that binds us, and constitutes the difference between right and wrong; his will, that is, as the expression of his infinite perfection. So that the ultimate foundation of moral obligation is the nature of God.

[427] Systema Locurum Theologicorum, tom. ii. cap. 9; Wittenburg, 1655, p. 439.

[428] Theologia, I. viii. § 1, xxvii. p. 418.

§ 10. The Power of God.

A. The Nature of Power, or, The Origin of the Idea.

We get the idea of power from our own consciousness. That is, we are conscious of the ability of producing effects. Power in man is confined within very narrow limits. We can change the current of our thoughts, or fix our attention on a particular object and we can move the voluntary muscles of our body. Beyond this our direct power does not extend. It is from this small measure of efficiency that all the stores of human knowledge and all the wonders of human art are derived. It is only our thoughts, volitions, and purposes, together with certain acts of the body, that are immediately subject to the will. For all other effects we must avail ourselves of the use of means. We cannot will a book, a picture, or a house into existence. The production of such effects requires protracted labor and the use of diverse appliances.

B. Omnipotence.

It is by removing all the limitations of power, as it exists in us, that we rise to the idea of the omnipotence of God. We do not thus, however, lose the idea itself. Almighty power does not cease to be power. We can do very little. God can do whatever He wills. We,

beyond very narrow limits, must use means to accomplish our ends. With God means are unnecessary. He wills, and it is done. He said, Let there be light; and there was light. He, by a volition created the heavens and the earth. At the volition of Christ, the winds ceased, and there was a great calm. By an act of the will He healed the sick, opened the eyes of the blind, and raised the dead. This simple idea of the omnipotence of God, that He can do without effort, and by a volition, whatever He wills, is the highest conceivable idea of power, and is that which is clearly presented in the Scriptures. In Gen. xvii. 1, it is said, "I am the Almighty God." The prophet Jeremiah exclaims, "Ah Lord God! behold thou hast made the heavens and the earth by thy great power, and stretched out arm; and there is nothing too hard for thee." (Jer. xxxii. 17.) God is said to have created all things by the breath of his mouth, and to uphold the universe by a word. Our Lord says, "With God all things are possible." (Matt. xix. 26.) The Psalmist long before had said, "Our God is in the heavens; He hath done whatsoever He pleased." (Ps. cxv. 3.) And again, "Whatsoever the Lord pleased, that did He in heaven, and in earth, in the seas, and all deep places." (Ps. cxxxv. 6.) The Lord God omnipotent reigneth, and doeth his pleasure among the armies of heaven and the inhabitants of the earth, is the tribute of adoration which the Scriptures everywhere render unto God, and the truth which they everywhere present as the ground of confidence to his people. This is all we know, and all we need to know on this subject: and here we might rest satisfied, were it not for the vain attempts of theologians to reconcile these simple and sublime truths of the Bible with their philosophical speculations.

C. The Negation of Power.

The sensuous school of philosophers deny that there is any real efficiency or power in existence. Their principle is, that all knowledge is derived from the senses; and consequently, that, as we cannot know anything of which the senses do not take cognizance, it is unphilosophical or unreasonable to admit the existence of anything else. Our senses, however, do not take cognizance of efficiency. It cannot be felt, or seen, or heard, or tasted. Therefore it does not exist. A cause is not that to which an effect is due, but simply that which uniformly precedes it. All we can know, and all we can rationally believe, is the facts which affect our senses, and the order of their sequence; which order, being uniform and necessary, has the character of law. This is the doctrine of causation proposed by Hume, Kant, Brown, Mill, and virtually by Sir William Hamilton; and it is this principle which lies at the foundation of the Positive Philosophy of Comte. Of course, if there be no such thing as power, there is no such attribute in God as omnipotence.

It is sufficient to say, in this connection, in reference to this theory, (1.) That it is contrary to every man's consciousness. We are conscious of power, i.e., of the ability to produce effects. And consciousness has the same authority, to say the least, when it concerns what is within, as when it concerns what affects the senses. We are not more certain that our hand moves, than we are that we have the power to move, or not to move it, at pleasure. (2.) This theory contradicts the intuitive and indestructible convictions of the human mind. No man believes, or can believe really and permanently, that any change or effect can occur without an efficient cause. The fact that one event follows another, is not the ultimate fact. It is intuitively certain that there must be an adequate reason for that sequence. Such is the universal judgment of mankind. (3.) The argument, if valid against the reality of power, is valid against the existence of substance, of mind, and of God. This is

admitted by the consistent advocates of the principle in question. Substance, mind, and God, are as little under the cognizance of the senses as power; and, therefore, if nothing is to be admitted but on the testimony of the senses, the existence of substance, mind, and God, must be denied. This principle, therefore, cannot be admitted without doing violence to our whole rational, moral, and religious nature. In other words, it cannot be admitted at all; for men cannot, permanently, either believe or act contrary to the laws of their nature.

D. Absolute Power.

By absolute power, as understood by the schoolmen and some of the later philosophers, is meant power free from all the restraints of reason and morality. According to this doctrine, contradictions, absurdities, and immoralities, are all within the compass of the divine power. Nay, it is said that God can annihilate Himself. On this subject Des Cartes says, Deus "non voluit tres angulos trianguli ◆quales esse duobus rectis, quia cognovit aliter fieri non posse. Sed contra . . . . quia voluit tres angulos trianguli necessario ◆quales esse duobus rectis, idcirco jam hoc verum est, et fieri aliter non potest, atque ita de reliquis." [429] This "summa indifferentia," he says, "in Deo, summum est ejus omnipotenti◆ argumentam." [430]

It is, however, involved in the very idea of power, that it has reference to the production of possible effects. It is no more a limitation of power that it cannot effect the impossible, than it is of reason that it cannot comprehend the absurd, or of infinite goodness that it cannot do wrong. It is contrary to its nature. Instead of exalting, it degrades God, to suppose that He can be other than He is, or that He can act contrary to infinite wisdom and love. When, therefore, it is said that God is omnipotent because He can do whatever He wills, it is to be remembered that his will is determined by his nature. It is certainly no limitation to perfection to say that it cannot be imperfect.

In this view of the omnipotence of God, the great body of the theologians, especially among the Reformed, agree. Thus Zwingle [431] says: "Summa potentia non est nisi omnia possit, quantum ad legitimum posse attinet: nam malum facere aut se ipsum deponere aut in se converti hostiliter aut sibi ipsi contrarium esse posse impotentia est, non potentia." Musculus, [432] "Deus omnipotens, quia potest qu◆ vult, qu◆que ejus veritati, justiti◆ conveniunt." Keckermann, [433] "Absolute possibilia sunt, qu◆ nec Dei natur◆, nec aliarum rerum extra Deum essenti◆ contradicunt." This scholastic doctrine of absolute power Calvin [434] stigmatizes as profane, "quod . . . . merito detestabile nobis esse debet."

Potentia Absoluta and Potentia Ordinata.

There is a sense of the terms in which absolute power is generally recognized among theologians. A distinction is commonly made between the potentia absoluta and the potentia ordinata of God. By the latter is meant the efficiency of God, as exercised uniformly in the ordered operation of second causes; by the former, his efficiency, as exercised without the intervention of second causes. Creation, miracles, immediate revelation, inspiration, and regeneration, are to be referred to the potentia absoluta of God; all his works of providence to his potentia ordinata. This distinction is important, as it draws the line between the natural and supernatural, between what is due to the operation of natural causes, sustained and guided by the providential efficiency of God, and what is due to the immediate exercise of his power. This distinction, indeed, is rejected by the modern philosophy. God in

creating and sustaining the world, does it as a whole. Nothing is isolated. There is no individual act, but only a general efficiency on the part of God; and, consequently, no particular event can be referred to his absolute power or immediate agency. Everything is natural. There can be no miracle, and no special providence. [435]

E. Confounding Will and Power.

Another perversion of the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that which denies any distinction between will and power, or faculty and act, in God. It is said that it is unphilosophical to say that God can do anything. We use the word "can" only in reference to difficulty to be overcome. When nothing stands in the way, when all opposition is precluded, then we no longer say, we can. It is, therefore, inconsistent with the nature of an absolute Being to say that He is able to do this or that. [436] It is further denied that willing can be ascribed to God, if any difference be assumed between willing and doing. The ordinary definition of omnipotence, Potest quod vult, is to be rejected. It is admitted, that the distinction between will and power is unavoidable, if we determine the nature of God from the analogy of our constitution. As will and power are distinct in us, we are disposed to think they are distinct in Him. But this method of determining the attributes of God heads to the destruction of the true idea of an absolute being. In such a being, no such distinction can be admitted; and therefore, in relation to God there can be no distinction between the actual and the possible. Nothing is possible but the actual; and all that is possible becomes actual. Strauss [437] says, after Schleiermacher, [438] that by the omnipotence of God is to be understood "not only that all that is has its causality in God, but that everything is and occurs for which any causality in God exists." Bruch [439] says, that by the omnipotence of God is meant nothing more than that He is the original ground and cause of all things. He quotes Nitsch [440] as saying, that "The idea of omnipotence is the repetition and application of the idea of God as creator of heaven and earth." Nitsch, however, does not understand the passage in the sense put upon it; for he adds, in his note commenting on the dictum of Abelard, "Deus non potest facere aliquid pr�ter ea qu� facit," that, if this means that the actual exhausts the resources of God, it is to be rejected. The words of Abelard, nevertheless, correctly express the doctrine of the modern German school of theologians on this subject. Schleiermacher's language on this point is explicit and comprehensive. "Alles ist ganz durch die g�ttliche Allmacht und ganz durch den Naturzusammenhang, nicht aber darf die erstere als Erg�nzung der letztern angesehen werden. Die Gesammtheit des endlichen Seins ist als vollkommene Darstellung der Allmacht zu denken, so dass alles wirklich ist und geschieht, wozu eine Productivit�t in Gott ist. Damit f�llt weg die Differenz des Wirklichen und M�glichen, des absoluten und hypothetischen Wollens oder K�nnens Gottes; denn dies f�hrt auf einen wirksamen und unwirksamen Willen und letzterer kann bei Gott unm�glich statt finden; so wenig als K�nnen und Wollen getrennt sein k�nnen." That is, "Everything is entirely through the divine omnipotence, and everything is through the course of nature. The former, however, must not be regarded as supplementary to the latter. The aggregate of finite things is the complete revelation of God's omnipotence, so that everything is and occurs for which there is a productivity in God. Thus the difference between the actual and the possible, between the absolute and hypothetical willing and power of God, disappears, because this implies an operative and inoperative will, but the latter is impossible in God; just as little as willing and power can be separated." [441] This passage is quoted by Schweizer, [442]

who adopts the views which it presents.

This Doctrine Destroys our Knowledge of God.

In reference to this doctrine, it may be remarked, --

1. That it utterly confounds all our ideas of God. It renders all knowledge of Him impossible. If will and power are identical, then those words lose for us their meaning. We cannot know what God is, if this doctrine be true; and if we know not what He is, we cannot rationally worship, love, or trust Him.

2. The doctrine effectually destroys the personality of God. A person is a self-conscious, self-determining being. But in denying will to God, self-determination, and consequently personality, is denied to Him. This consequence is admitted by the advocates of this doctrine. "If in God," says Strauss, "willing and power are identical, then there can be no freedom of the will in God, in the sense of the Church theologians, who hold that it was possible for God not to create the world, or to have created it other than it is. If there be no ability in God to do what He does not do, there can be no freedom of will or power of choice." "Mit diesem K�nnen f�llt auch die Freiheit im Sinne eines Wahlverm�gens hinweg." [443] This, however, it is said, is not the doctrine of fate; for fate supposes an ab extra necessity to which God is subject. If it does not teach fate, it at least teaches inexorable necessity. Spinoza says, "Ea res libera dicetur, qu� ex sola su� natur� necessitate existit et a se sola ad agendum determinatur. Necessaria autem, vel potius coacta qu� ab alio determinatur ad existendum et operandum certa ac determinata ratione." [444] And again, [445] "Deum nullo modo fato subjicio, sed omnia inevitabili necessitate ex Dei natura sequi concipio." In this sense the sun is free in shining. It shines from the necessity of its nature. We think from a like necessity; but we can think of one thing or another, changing the current of our thoughts at pleasure. And thus we are free in exercising the power of thought. This freedom is denied to God. He can think only in one way. And all his thoughts are creative. He does, therefore, what He does, from a necessity of his nature, and does all He is able to do. God, according to this doctrine, is not a personal Being.

3. The Scriptures constantly represent God as able to do whatever He wills. They recognize the distinction between the actual and the possible; between ability and act; between what God does, and what He is able to do. With Him all things are possible. He is able of stones to raise up children unto Abraham. He can send me, says our Lord, twelve legions of angels.

4. As this is the doctrine of the Bible, it is the instinctive judgment of the human mind. It is a perfection in us, that we can do far more than we actually accomplish. With us the actual is not the measure of the possible.

5. It is, therefore, a limitation of God, a denial of his omnipotence, to say that He can do only what He actually brings to pass. There is infinitely more in God than simple causality of the actual.

It is consequently an erroneous definition of omnipotence to call it All-power, meaning thereby that all the efficiency in the universe is the efficiency of God; which is not only a pantheistic doctrine, but it makes the finite the measure of the infinite.

[429] Meditationes. Responsiones Sext�, vi. edit. Amsterdam, 1685, p. 160.

[430] Ibid. p. 181.

[431] De Providentia Dei, Epilogus. Opera, edit. Turici, 1841, vol. iv. p. 138.

[432] See Loci Communes Theologici, edit. Basle, 1573, pp. 402-408.

[433] Systema Theologi&#65533;, lib. I. cap. v. 4; edit. Hanovi&#65533;, 1603, p. 107.

[434] Institutio, III. xxiii. 2, edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 148.

[435] Strauss, i. p. 592; Schleiermacher, I. § 54. Werke, edit. Berlin, 1842, vol. III. p. 285.

[436] Bruch, p. 155.

[437] Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 587.

[438] Glaubenslehre, I. § 54.

[439] Die Lehre von den g&#65533;ttlichen Eigenschaften, p. 154.

[440] Christlichen Lehre, p. 160.

[441] Gess, Uebersicht &#65533;ber das System Schleiermacher's, p. 88.

[442] Glaubenslehre, I. p. 263.

[443] Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 587.

[444] Ethices, i. def. vii. edit. Jena, 1803, vol. ii. p. 36.

[445] Epistola xxiii. Ibid. vol. i. 513.

§ 11. Holiness of God.

This is a general term for the moral excellence of God. In 1 Sam. ii. 2, it is said, "There is none holy as the Lord;" no other Being absolutely pure, and free from all limitation in his moral perfection. "Thou Holy One of Israel," is the form of address which the Spirit puts into the lips of the people of God. "Exalt the Lord our God, and worship at his holy hill; for the Lord our God is Holy." (Ps. xcix. 9.) "Holy and reverend is his name." (Ps. cxi. 9.) "Thou art of purer eyes than to behold evil, and canst not look on iniquity." (Hab. i. 13.) "Who shall not fear thee, O Lord, and glorify thy name? for Thou only art Holy." (Rev. xv. 4.) Holiness, on the one hand, implies entire freedom from moral evil; and, upon the other, absolute moral perfection. Freedom from impurity is the primary idea of the word. To sanctify is to cleanse; to be holy, is to be clean. Infinite purity, even more than infinite knowledge or infinite power, is the object of reverence. Hence the Hebrew word qdvs, as used in Scripture, is often equivalent to venerandus."The Holy One of Israel," is He who is to be feared and adored. Seraphim round about the throne who cry day and night, Holy, Holy, Holy is the Lord of hosts, give expression to the feelings of all unfallen rational creatures in view of the infinite purity of God. They are the representatives of the whole universe, in offering this perpetual homage to the divine holiness. It is because of his holiness, that God is a consuming fire. And it was a view of his holiness which led the prophet to exclaim, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the king, the Lord of hosts." (Is. vi. 5.)

It is in their application to the moral attributes of God, that the two methods of determining his nature come most directly into conflict. If we allow ourselves to be determined in answering the question, What is God? by the teachings of his Word, and the

constitution of our own nature; if we refer to Him, in an infinite degree, every good we find in ourselves, then we can have no hesitation in believing that He is holy, just, and good. But if the philosophical notion of the absolute and infinite is to decide every question concerning the divine nature, then we must give up all confidence in our apprehensions of God, as an object of knowledge. This Strauss, the most candid of the recent philosophical theologians, frankly admits. He says: "The ideas of the absolute and of the holy are incompatible. He who holds to the former must give up the latter, since holiness implies relation; and, on the other hand, he who holds fast the idea of God as holy, must renounce the idea of his being absolute; for the idea of absolute is inconsistent with the slightest possibility of its being other than it is. The impossibility of referring moral attributes to God had been admitted by some of the fathers of the Church." [446]

The Reasons urged for denying Moral Attributes to God.

The grounds on which it is denied that moral attributes can be predicated of God, are such as these : --

1. To assume that God can delight in good, and hate evil, takes for granted that He is susceptible of impression ab extra, which is inconsistent with his nature.

2. It is said that moral excellence implies subjection to a moral law. But an absolute and infinite Being cannot be thus subject to law. It is true that God is not subject to any law out of Himself. He is exlex, absolutely independent. He is a law unto Himself. The conformity of his will to reason is no subjection. It is only the harmony of his nature. God's being holy, implies nothing more than that He is not in conflict with Himself. On this point even the rationalistic theologian Wegscheider says: "Minime Deus cogitandus est tanquam pendens ex lege ethica vel eidem subjectus tanquam potestati cuidam alien&#65533;, sed Deus sanctus ipsa ea lex est, natura quidam hypostatica indutus." [447]

3. It is said that moral excellence must be free. A moral agent, to be holy, must voluntarily do right. But this implies that he is able to do wrong. There must, therefore, be at least a metaphysical possibility of God's being evil, or He cannot be good. But all possibility of the Absolute being other than it is, is inconsistent with its nature. To this it may be answered that the ideas of liberty and necessity are indeed antagonistic; but that liberty and absolute certainty are perfectly compatible. That an infinitely wise Being will not act irrationally, is as absolutely certain as that the self-contradictory cannot be true. The one is as inconceivable as the other. It is just as impossible that an infinitely holy Being should be unholy as that light should be darkness. The impossibility, however, is of a different kind. The former is what Augustine calls the felix necessitas boni, which is the highest idea of freedom.

4. Strauss says that those who attribute moral perfections to God, forget that a purely spiritual Being can have nothing of what we call reason, wisdom, goodness, wrath, righteousness, etc. "Strictly speaking," he adds "the ascription of moral attributes to God supposes that He is material; and the most abstract theological ideas on the subject are really founded on Materialism." This is founded on the assumption that spirit is impersonal, a generic force, which becomes individual and personal only by union with a material organization, just as the Realists define man to be generic humanity, individualized and rendered personal by union with a given corporeal organization.

It is surely most unreasonable to sacrifice to such speculations all religion, and all

confidence in the intuitive judgments of the human mind, as well as all faith in God and in the Bible.

It is scarcely less destructive of the true doctrine, to define holiness in God as the causality of conscience in us. That we are moral beings is not admitted to be a proof that God has moral attributes. That the sun produces cheerfulness in us is no proof that the sun is cheerful. But if we know nothing of God except that He is the cause of all things, He is to us only an inscrutable force, and not a Father, and not a God.

[446] "So wollen also die Begriffe des Absoluten und des Heiligen nicht zusammengehen; sondern wer das Absolute festh&#65533;lt, der l&#65533;st die Heiligkeit auf, welche nur an einem in Relation gestellten Wesen etwas ist; und wer es umgekehrt mit der Heiligkeit ernstlich nimmt, der tritt der Idee der Absolutheit zu nahe, welche durch den leisesten Schatten der M&#65533;glichkeit, anders zu sein als sie ist, verunreinigt wird. Diese Einsicht in die Unanwendbar keit moralischer Attribute auf Gott hatten schon einzelne Kirchenv&#65533;ter . . . erkanute." -- Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 595.

[447] Institutiones, p. 273.

§ 12. Justice.

A. Meaning of the Word.

The word justice, or righteousness, is used in Scripture sometimes in a wider and sometimes in a more restricted sense. In theology, it is often distinguished as justitia interna, or moral excellence, and justitia externa, or rectitude of conduct. In Hebrew tsdyq means, in a physical sense, straight; and in a moral sense, right, what is as it should be. And tsdqh means rightness, that which satisfies the demands of rectitude or law. The Greek word dikaios has the physical sense of equal; and the moral sense of, conformed to what is right; and dikaiosune is either that which divides equally, i.e., equity in the moral sense, or that which satisfies the demands of right. The Latin justus and justitia are commonly used in the wide sense for what is right, or as it should be. Cicero [448] defines justitia as "animi affectio suum cuique tribuens." This definition he elsewhere amplifies, saying: "Justitia erga Deos religio, erga parentas pietas, creditis in rebus fides, in moderatione animadvertendi lenitas, amicitia in benevolentia nominatur." [449]

When we regard God as the author of our moral nature, we conceive of Him as holy; when we regard Him in his dealings with his rational creatures, we conceive of Him as righteous. He is a righteous ruler; all his laws are holy, just, and good. In his moral government He faithfully adheres to those laws. He is impartial and uniform in their execution. As a judge he renders unto every man according to his works. He neither condemns the innocent, nor clears the guilty; neither does He ever punish with undue severity. Hence the justice of God is distinguished as rectoral, or that which is concerned in the imposition of righteous laws and in their impartial execution; and distributive, or that which is manifested in the righteous distribution of rewards and punishment. The Bible constantly represents God as a righteous ruler and a just judge. These two aspects of his character, or of our relation to Him, are not carefully distinguished. We have the assurance which runs through the Scriptures, that "The judge of all the earth" must "do right." (Gen. xviii. 25.) "God is a righteous judge." (Ps. vii. 11, marginal reading.) "He shall judge the

world with righteousness." (Ps. xcvi. 13.) "Clouds and darkness are round about Him: righteousness and judgment are the habitation of his throne." (Ps. xcvii. 2.) Notwithstanding all the apparent inequalities in the distribution of his favours; notwithstanding the prosperity of the wicked and the afflictions of the righteous, the conviction is everywhere expressed that God is just; that somehow and somewhere He will vindicate his dealings with men, and show that He is righteous in all his ways and holy in all his works.

B. Justice in its Relation to Sin.

As the sense of guilt is universal among men, and as the manifestations of sin are so constant and pervading, it is mainly in its relation to sin that the justice of God is revealed. Hence many theologians define the justice of God as that attribute of his nature which is manifested in the punishment of sin. Goodness, it is said, is manifested in bestowing good, and justice in the infliction of punishment. Schleiermacher says, "Justice is that causality in God which connects suffering with actual sin." [450] Schweizer says, "We know God as just only through the punishment of sin." Hegel says, "The manifestation of the nothingness of the finite as power, is justice." This is the philosophical, statement of the principle that "Might is Right," a principle which underlies the morals and religion of the modern philosophy.

C. The Reformation of the Offender is not the Primary Object of Punishment.

As the justice of God is specially manifested in the punishment of sin, it is of primary importance to determine why sin is punished.

One prevalent theory on this subject is, that the only legitimate end of punishment is the reformation of the offender.

It is of course to be admitted, that the good of the offender is often the ground or reason why evil is inflicted. A father chastises a child in love, and for its good. And God, our heavenly Father, brings suffering upon his children for their edification. But evil inflicted for the benefit of the sufferer, is chastisement, and not punishment. Punishment, properly speaking, is evil inflicted in satisfaction of justice.

That the good of the sufferer is not the primary end of the infliction of punishment, is proved : --

1. Because the punishment of the wicked is always, in the Scriptures, referred to the anger of God, and the chastisement of his people to his love. The cases, therefore, are not analogous. This difference of representation is designed to teach us that the wicked and the good do not stand in the same relation to God, as objects of benevolence; but that the one He punishes to testify his disapprobation and satisfy his justice, and the other He chastises to bring them nearer to Himself.

2. In many cases the nature of the punishment precludes the possibility of the good of the offender being the ground of its infliction. The deluge, the destruction of the cities of the plain, and the overthrow of Jerusalem, were certainly not designed for the benefit of the men who suffered from those desolating inflictions. Much less can it be assumed that the punishment of the fallen angels, and of the finally impenitent, is intended to be reformatory.

3. Scripture and experience both teach that suffering, when of the nature of punishment, has no tendency to reform. When suffering is seen to come from a father's hand, and to be a manifestation of love, it has a sanctifying power; but when it comes from the hand of God,

as a judge and an avenger, and is the expression of displeasure and a proof of our alienation from God, its tendency is to harden and to exasperate. Hence the Apostle says, that so long as men are under condemnation, they bring forth fruit unto sin; and that, only when reconciled to God and assured of his love, do they bring forth fruit unto God. The great New Testament prophet, in his vision of the world of woe, represents the lost as gnawing their tongues with pain and blaspheming God. The denunciation of punishment is addressed to fear, but fear is not the principle of genuine obedience.

4. On this subject, appeal may be fairly made to the common consciousness of men. Such is our moral hebetude that it is only glaring offences which awaken our moral sensibilities, and reveal their true nature. When any great crime is committed, there is an instinctive and universal demand for the punishment of the criminal. No man can pretend that the desire for his reformation is the feeling which prompts that demand. That is not so much as thought of. It is the instinctive judgment of the mind that he ought to suffer. It is not benevolence towards him which calls for the infliction of punishment.

D. The Prevention of Crime is not the Primary End of Punishment.

The doctrine that the only legitimate end of punishment is the prevention of crime, has had great prevalence in the Church and the world. It is the common doctrine of jurists. It is, of course, to be conceded that the good of society and of the moral government of God, is one important end of punishment in all governments, human or divine. It is, however, rather an important collateral effect of the administration of justice, than its immediate design. The doctrine in question merges justice into benevolence. According to this way of thinking, it is only because God has a view to the happiness of his rational creatures, that He visits sin within punishment. This doctrine was adopted by some of the early fathers. In answer to the objection that the Bible represented God as a vindictive being, because it speaks of his anger and of his determination to punish, they said that He punished only out of benevolence. Thus Clemens Alexandrinus [451] says, "Men ask how God can be good and kind if He is angry and punishes? They should remember that punishment is for the good of the offender and for the prevention of evil." And Tertullian [452] says: "Omne hoc justiti&#xfffd; opus procuratio bonitatis est." Origen, [453] also to the same effect, says: "Ex quibus omnibus constat, unum eundemque esse justum et bonum legis et evangeliorum Deum, et benefacere cum justitia et cum bonitate punire."

Many later theologians take the same view. Leibnitz defines justice to be benevolence guided by wisdom. Wolf, who modified the whole system of theology in accordance with the philosophy of Leibnitz, adopted the same view. So did Stapfer, [454] who says: "Quando Deus ejusmodi malum triste ex peccato necessario se quens creatur&#xfffd; accidere sinit, ... dicitur peccatorem punire, et hoc sensu ipsi tribuitur justitia vindicativa. In justitia punitiva bonitas cum sapientia administratur. [455] Notio justitit&#xfffd; resolvitur in notionem sapienti&#xfffd; et bonitatis." Grotius, the jurist, makes this idea of justice the fundamental principle of his great work, "De Satisfactione Christi."

The Optimist Theory.

In this country the same view has been extensively adopted, and made, as it must of necessity be, the controlling principle of those systems of theology in which it is incorporated. It is assumed that happiness is the greatest good; and hence that the purpose and desire to promote happiness is the sum of all virtue. From this it follows, that this

world, the work of a God of infinite benevolence, wisdom, and power, must be the best possible world for the production of happiness; and, therefore, the permission of sin, and its punishment, must be referred to the benevolence of God. They are the necessary means for securing the greatest amount of happiness. If happiness be not the greatest good; if holiness be a higher end than happiness; if expediency be not the ground and measure of moral obligation, it is obvious that this whole structure collapses.

Proof of the Scriptural Doctrine.

It is admitted that happiness is promoted by justice, and therefore that it is contrary to a wise benevolence that men should be allowed to sin with impunity. But justice cannot properly be merged into benevolence. And that the promotion of happiness by the prevention of crime is not the primary end of the infliction of punishment, is evident, --

1. From the testimony of every man's consciousness. Every man knows that benevolence and justice, as revealed in his own consciousness, are different sentiments. The one prompts to the promotion of happiness, the other involves the instinctive judgment, that a criminal ought to suffer for his crime. We do not stop to ask, or to think, what may be the collateral effect on others of the infliction of punishment. Anterior to such reflection, and independent of it, is the intuitive perception, that sin should be punished, for its own sake, or on account of its inherent ill-desert. These instinctive moral judgments are as clear and as trustworthy revelations of the nature of God as can possibly be made. They force conviction in spite of all speculative sophistries. Every man knows the righteous judgment of God, that those who sin are worthy of death. If justice and benevolence are distinct in us, they are distinct in God. If we, in obedience to the nature which He has given us, intuitively perceive or judge that sin ought to be punished for its own sake, and irrespective of the good effect punishment may have on others, then such also is the judgment of God. This is the principle which underlies and determines all our ideas of the Supreme Being. If moral perfection be not in Him what it is in us, then He is to us an unknown something, and we use words without meaning when we speak of Him as holy, just, and good.

Argument from the Religious Experience of Believers.

2. This sense of justice, which is indestructible in the nature of man, and which, in common with reason and conscience, has survived the Fall, is not only revealed in the ordinary experience of men, but still more distinctly in their religious consciousness. What is commonly called "conviction of sin," is only a modification, and higher form, of those inward experiences which are common to all men. All men know that they are sinners. They all know that sin, as related to the justice of God, is guilt, that which ought to be punished; and that, as related to his holiness, it renders us polluted and offensive in his sight. They also know, intuitively, that God is just as well as holy; and, therefore, that his moral perfection calls for the punishment of sin, by the same necessity by which He disapproves of and hates it. Under the pressure of these convictions, and the consciousness of their utter inability either to satisfy divine justice, or to free themselves from the defilement and power of sin, men either tremble in the constant looking for of judgment, or they look out of themselves for help. When, under either the common or saving operations of the Spirit of God, these sentiments are deepened, then their nature is more clearly revealed. A man, when thus convinced of sin, sees that not only would it be right that he should be punished, but that the justice, or moral excellence of God, demands his punishment. It is not that he

ought to suffer for the good of others, or to sustain the moral government of God, but that he, as a sinner and for his sins sought to suffer. Were he the only creature in the universe, this conviction would be the same, both in nature and degree. Such is the experience of men under the conviction of sin, as recorded in the Scriptures and in the history of the Church. In many cases criminals under the pressure of these feelings have delivered themselves to the officers of justice to be punished. More frequently they resort to self-inflicted tortures to satisfy the clamors of conscience. We have, therefore, an inward revelation, which can neither be suppressed nor perverted, that justice is not benevolence.

The Sense of Justice not due to Christian Culture.

3. That this sense of justice is not due to Christian culture, or to the influence of peculiar forms of doctrine, but belongs to the common consciousness of men, is plain. (a.) Because it is impressed upon all human languages as far as known or cultivated. All languages have different words for justice and benevolence. There could not be this difference in the words, if the sentiments themselves were not different. Every one knows that when we say a man is just, we mean one thing; and when we say he is benevolent, we mean another thing. (b.) All history as it records the workings of human nature, reveals this innate sense of justice. We everywhere hear men calling for the punishment of offenders, or denouncing those who allow them to escape with impunity. No mass of men ever witness a flagrant act of cruelty or wrong without an irrepressible manifestation of indignation. The voice of nature, which in such cases is the voice of God, demands the punishment of the wrong-doer. (c.) In all religions which reveal the inward convictions of men, there are expiatory rites. Every sacrifice for sin, the smoke from every altar, which has been going up through all ages and from every part of the world, are so many attestations to the truth of reason and of Scripture, that there is such an attribute as justice in God, distinct from his benevolence.

Argument from the Holiness of God.

4. The truth of this doctrine may also be inferred from the holiness of God. If He is infinitely pure, his nature must be opposed to all sin; and as his acts are determined by his nature, his disapprobation of sin must manifest itself in his acts. But the disfavour of God, the manifestation of his disapprobation, is death, as his favour is life. It cannot be that this essential opposition between holiness and sin should be dependent for its manifestation on the mere ab extra consideration that evil would result from sin being allowed to go unpunished. It might as well be said that we should feel no aversion to pain, unless aware that it weakened our constitution. We do not approve of holiness simply because it tends to produce happiness; neither do we disapprove of sin simply because it tends to produce misery. It is inevitable, therefore, that the perfection of the infinitely holy God should manifest its opposition to sin, without waiting to judge of the consequences of the expression of this divine repugnance.

5. The doctrine that the prevention of crime is the only legitimate end of punishment, or that there is no such attribute in God as justice, as distinguished from benevolence, rests on the assumption, before remarked upon, that all virtue consists in benevolence; which again rests on the assumption that happiness is the highest good; which makes expediency the ground of moral obligation, and the rule of moral conduct. It is indeed a solecism to use the word moral in such connections, for, on this theory, the word has no meaning. A thing

may be wise or unwise, expedient or inexpedient, but in no other sense right or wrong. Wrong becomes right, and right becomes wrong, as the greater amount of happiness flows from the one or from the other. As this utilitarian theory of morals has been banished from the schools of philosophy, it should be banished from systems of theology.

Argument from the Connection between Sin and Misery.

6. The inseparable connection between sin and misery is a revelation of the justice of God. That holiness promotes happiness is a revelation of the relation in which God stands to holiness; and that sin produces misery is no less a revelation of the relation in which He stands to moral evil. This constitution of things depending on the nature and will of God, proves that sin is evil in its own nature, and is punished for its own sake. The law of God which includes a penalty as well as precepts, is in both a revelation of the nature of God. If the precepts manifest his holiness, the penalty as clearly manifests his justice. If the one is immutable, so also is the other. The wages of sin is death. Death is what is due to it in justice, and what without injustice cannot be withheld from it. If the prevention of crime were the primary end of punishment, then if the punishment of the innocent, the execution, for example, of the wife and children of a murderer, would have a greater restraining influence than the punishment of the guilty murderer, their execution would be just. But this would shock the mural sense of men.

Argument from the Scriptural Doctrines of Satisfaction and Justification.

7. The Scriptural doctrines of satisfaction and justification rest on the principle that God is immutably just, i.e., that his moral excellence, in the case of sin, demands punishment, or expiation. The Bible clearly teaches the necessity of satisfaction to justice in order to the forgiveness of sin. Christ was set forth as a propitiation, in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly. This assumes that it would be unjust, i.e., contrary to moral rectitude, to pardon the guilty without such a propitiation. This necessity for a satisfaction is never referred to expediency or to governmental considerations. If sin could have been pardoned, without a satisfaction. the Apostle says, Christ is dead in vain. (Gal. ii. 21.) If there could have been a law which could have given life, salvation would have been by the law (Gal. iii. 21.)

Moreover, if there is no such attribute in God as justice, as distinguished from benevolence, then there can be no such thing as justification. There may be pardon, as the act of a sovereign remitting a penalty and restoring an offender to favour; but no such thing as justification, as an act of a judge proceeding according to law and pronouncing the demands of justice satisfied. The Scriptures, however, according to the almost unanimous judgment of the Church, pronounce that justification is more than an act of executive clemency. Conscience is not satisfied with mere forgiveness. It is essential to peace with God, that the soul should see that justice is satisfied. This is the reason why the death of Christ, why his blood, is so inexpressibly precious in the eyes of his people. All the experience of the saints is a protest against the principle that expiation is unnecessary, that sin can be pardoned without a satisfaction of justice.

Paul's Argument.

The whole argument of the Apostle in his Epistle to the Romans is founded on the principle that justice is a divine attribute distinct from benevolence. His argument is: God is just. All men are sinners. All, therefore, are guilty, i.e., under condemnation. Therefore

no man can be justified, i.e., pronounced not guilty, on the ground of his character or conduct. Sinners cannot satisfy justice. But what they could not do, Christ, the Eternal Son of God, clothed in our nature, has done for them. He has brought in everlasting righteousness, which meets all the demands of the law. All those who renounce their own righteousness, and trust to the righteousness of Christ, God justifies and saves. This is the gospel as preached by Paul. It all rests on the assumption that God is just.

The doctrine of the vindicatory justice, which has this clear evidence of its truth, in the moral nature of man, in the religious experience of believers, and in the teaching and doctrines of the Scriptures, has ever been considered as a turning point in theology.

E. Philosophical Views of the Nature of Justice.

The teachings of the Scriptures, and the faith of the Church, so far as the divine attributes are concerned, are founded on the assumption that God is a personal Being. It is involved in that assumption, not only that He possesses intelligence and moral character, but that he thinks, feels, wills, and acts. It is, moreover, involved in the idea of personality, that thinking, feeling, willing, and acting in God, are, in all that is essential, analogous to what those terms signify in us. The modern philosophy, however, teaches that, if God be an absolute Being, thinking, feeling, willing, and acting are inconsistent with his nature. Hence, --

1. Some teach that God is only the original ground of beings having in Himself no distinctive attributes. What we call the attributes of God are only the attributes of finite creatures having the ground of their being in God. That they are intelligent, moral, voluntary agents, is no proof that the same is true of God. That the sun produces the sensation of heat in us is no proof that it experiences the same sensation. The attributes of God, therefore, are only different aspects of the causality in Him which produces different effects. Justice, then, is not an attribute of God; it is only the causality to which the connection between sin and suffering is to be referred.

2. Others, while insisting that personality, and all that it involves, are incompatible with the idea of an absolute Being, still maintain that we are constrained, and bound, to believe in the personality of God, on the authority of the Bible and of our own moral nature. But the Bible reveals, it is said, not absolute, but only regulative truth; not what He is, but what it is expedient for us to think He is. Justice in God, then, is for us what generosity in a fairy is for nursery children.

3. Others again, while they admit personality in God, make it a personality which precludes all willing, and all acting, except in the form of law, or general, uniform efficiency. Justice in God, therefore, is only a name for one form, or one mode, of the manifestation of the power of God. As it is to be referred to his ordination, or to his nature, that fire burns and acids corrode, so it is to be referred to his general efficiency that sin produces misery. There is no special intervention of God, when fire burns; and there is no special decision, or judgment on his part, when a sinner is punished. Punishment is not the execution of a sentence pronounced by an intelligent being on the merits of the case, but the operation of a general law. Bruch (Professor of Theology in the Theological Seminary in Strasbourg) is a representative of this mode of thinking. He professes Theism, or faith in a personal God, but he teaches that the attributes of God are nothing else (als die Modalitten seiner ewigen Wirksamkeit) "than the modes if his constant efficiency." Since

among men justice is exercised in a succession of special acts, it is erroneously inferred that there is a like succession of acts of the will of God by which He approves or condemns. The great difficulty, he says, arises from judging of God after the analogy of our own nature. He admits that the Bible does this; that it constantly speaks of God as a righteous judge, administering justice according to his will. In this case, however, he adds, it is important to separate the real truth from the imperfection of its Scriptural form. Penalties are not evils inflicted by a special act of the divine will, but the natural consequences of sin, which cannot fail to manifest themselves. There is an organic connection between sin and evil. All the activity or agency of God is in the form of laws having their foundation in his nature. Thus justice is simply that law, or uniform mode of divine operation, by which sin is made its own punishment. [456] Hence there is no distinction between natural and positive inflictions; the deluge was either no punishment, or it was the natural consequence of the sins of the antediluvians. Hence, there is no such thing as forgiveness. The only possible way to remove the suffering is to remove the sin. But how is the sin of theft or murder to be removed? We can understand how pride or envy may be subdued and the suffering they occasion be escaped: but how can a past act be removed? A man hardened in sin suffers little or nothing for a special offence; the morally refined suffer indescribably. Thus, according to this theory, the better a man is, the more severely he is punished for his sin. Strauss is consistent enough to carry the principle out, and discard altogether the ideas of reward and punishment, as belonging to a low form of thought. He quotes and adopts the dictum of Spinoza: "Beatitudo non est virtutis pr&#65533;mium, sed ipsa virtus."

4. Scarcely distinguished from the doctrine last mentioned, is that presented by Dr. John Young. [457] His doctrine is that there are certain eternal and immutable laws arising out of the nature of things, independeimt of the will or nature of God, to which He is as much subject as his creatures. One of these laws is, that virtue produces happiness, and vice misery. The one is, therefore, rewarded, and the other punished, by the necessary and immutable operation of that law, and not by the will of God. God, therefore, ceases to be the ruler of the world. He is Himself subordinate to eternal and necessary laws. That this doctrine is at variance with the whole tenor of the Bible cannot be doubted. It is no less opposed to the dictates of our own moral and religious nature. It is revealed in that nature that we are subject, not to necessary and self-acting laws, but to an intelligent, personal God, to whom we are accountable for our character and conduct, and who rewards and punishes his creatures according to their works.

As a philosophical theory, this doctrine is much below the standard of the German theologians. For they, as far as they are Theists, admit that these immutable laws are determined by the nature of God, and are the uniform modes of his operation. Indeed, as God and his creatures exhaust the whole category of being, the "nature of things," apart from the nature of God and of his creatures, seems to be a phrase without meaning. It is tantamount to the "nature of nonentity."

[448] De Finibus, v. 23, 65, edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. 1042.

[449] Partitiones Oratori&#65533;, 22, 78, edit. ut sup. p. 194.

[450] Christlichen Glaube, § 84, Works, Berlin, 1843, vol. iv. p. 465.

[451] P&#65533;dagogus, I. viii; edit. Cologne, 1688, p. 114, c. and p. 115.

[452] Adversus Marcionem, II. 10; edit. Basel, 1562, p. 179, seu II. 13; edit. Leipzig, 1841, iii. p. 90. Bibliotheca, Gersdorf, vol. vi.

[453] De Principiis, II. v. 3; edit. Paris, 1733, vol. i. p. 88, a.

[454] Institutiones, i. 153; edit. Tiguri, 1743, p. 154.

[455] Ibid. i. p. 154.

[456] See the section on the "Gerechtigkeit Gottes" in Bruch's Lehre von den Gttlichen Eigenschaften, pp. 275-296.

[457] Light and Life of Men.

§ 13. The Goodness of God.

A. The Scriptural Doctrine.

Goodness, in the Scriptural sense of the term, includes benevolence, love, mercy, and grace. By benevolence is meant the disposition to promote happiness; all sensitive creatures are its objects. Love includes complacency, desire, and delight, and has rational beings for its objects. Mercy is kindness exercised towards the miserable, and includes pity, compassion, forbearance, and gentleness, which the Scriptures so abundantly ascribe to God. Grace is love exercised towards the unworthy. The love of a holy God to sinners is the most mysterious attribute of the divine nature. The manifestation of this attribute for the admiration and beatification of all intelligent creatures, is declared to be the special design of redemption. God saves sinners, we are told, "That in the ages to come He might show the exceeding riches of his grace in his kindness toward us, through Christ Jesus." (Eph. ii. 7.) This is the burden of that Epistle.

As all the modifications of goodness above mentioned are found even in our dilapidated nature, and commend themselves to our moral approbation, we know they must exist in God without measure and without end. In him they are infinite, eternal, and immutable.

Benevolence.

The goodness of God in the form of benevolence is revealed in the whole constitution of nature. As the universe teems with life, it teems also with enjoyment. There are no devices in nature for the promotion of pain for its own sake; whereas the manifestations of design for the production of happiness are beyond computation. The manifestation of the goodness of God in the form of love, and specially of love to the undeserving, is, as just stated, the great end of the work of redemption. "God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16.) "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." (1 John iv. 10.) The Apostle prays that believers might be able to comprehend the height and depth, the length and breadth, of that love which passes knowledge. (Eph. iii. 19.)

Love.

Love in us includes complacency and delight in its object, with the desire of possession and communion. The schoolmen, and often the philosophical theologians, tell us that there is no feeling in God. This, they say, would imply passivity, or susceptibility of

impression from without, which it is assumed is incompatible with the nature of God. "We must exclude," says Bruch, [458] "passivity from the idea of love, as it exists in God. For God cannot be the subject of passivity in any form. Besides, if God experienced complacency in intelligent beings, He would be dependent on them; which is inconsistent with his nature as an Absolute Being." Love, therefore, he defines as that attribute of God which secures the development of the rational universe; or, as Schleiermacher expresses it, "It is that attribute in virtue of which God communicates Himself." [459] According to the philosophers, the Infinite develops itself in the finite; this fact, in theological language, is due to love. The only point of analogy between love in us and love in the Absolute and Infinite, is self-communication. Love in us leads to self-revelation and communion; in point of fact the Infinite is revealed and developed in the universe, and specially in humanity. Bruch admits that this doctrine is in real contradiction to the representations of God in the Old Testament, and in apparent contradiction to those of the New Testament. If love in God is only a name for that which accounts for the rational universe; if God is love, simply because He develops himself in thinking and conscious beings, then the word has for us no definite meaning; it reveals to us nothing concerning the real nature of God. Here again we have to choose between a mere philosophical speculation and the clear testimony of the Bible, and of our own moral and religious nature. Love of necessity involves feeling, and if there be no feeling in God, there can be no love. That He produces happiness is no proof of love. The earth does that unconsciously and without design. Men often render others happy from vanity, from fear, or from caprice. Unless the production of happiness can be referred, not only to a conscious intention, but to a purpose dictated by kind feeling, it is no proof of benevolence. And unless the children of God are the objects of his complacency and delight, they are not the objects of his love. He may be cold, insensible, indifferent, or even unconscious; He ceases to be God in the sense of the Bible, and in the sense in which we need a God, unless He can love as well as know and act. The philosophical objection against ascribing feeling to God, bears, as we have seen, within equal force against the ascription to Him of knowledge or will. If that objection be valid, He becomes to us simply an unknown cause, what men of science call force; that to which all phenomena are to be referred, but of which we know nothing. We must adhere to the truth in its Scriptural form, or we lose it altogether. We must believe that God is love in the sense in which that word comes home to every human heart. The Scriptures do not mock us when they say, "Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him." (Ps. ciii. 13.) He meant what He said when He proclaimed Himself as "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering and abundant in goodness and truth." (Ex. xxxiv. 6.) "Beloved," says the Apostle, "let us love one another: for love is of God; and every one that loveth is born of God, and knoweth God. He that loveth not, knoweth not God; for God is love. In this was manifested the love of God toward us, because that God sent his only-begotten Son into the world, that we might live through Him. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation con our sins. Beloved, if God so loved us, we ought also to love one another." (1 John iv. 7-11.) The word love has the same sense throughout this passage. God is love; and love in Him is, in all that is essential to its nature, what love is in us. Herein we do rejoice, yea, and will rejoice.

B. The Existence of Evil.

How can the existence of evil, physical and moral, be reconciled with the

benevolence and holiness of a God infinite in his wisdom and power? This is the question which has exercised the reason and tried the faith of men in all ages of the world. Such is the distance between God and man, such the feebleness of our powers, and such the limited range of our vision, it might seem reasonable to leave this question to be answered by God himself. If a child cannot rationally sit in judgment on the conduct of his parents, nor a peasant comprehend the affairs of an empire, we certainly are not competent to call God to account, or to ask of Him the reason of his ways. We might rest satisfied with the assurance that the Judge of all the earth must do right. These considerations, however, have not availed to prevent speculation on this subject. The existence of evil is constantly brought forward by sceptics as an argument against religion; and it is constantly in the minds of believers as a difficulty and a doubt. While it is our duty to obey the injunction, "Be still and know that I am God," it is no less our duty to protest against those solutions of this great problem which either destroy the nature of sin or the nature of God.

Theories which involve the Denial of Sin.

Most of the theories proposed to account for the existence of evil, come under one or the other of the three following classes: First, those which really or virtually deny the existence of evil in the world. What we call evil is distinguished as physical and moral, pain and sin. There is some plausibility in the argument to prove that pain is not necessarily an evil. It is necessary to the safety of sentient creatures. But pain exists far beyond the bounds of this necessity. Such is the amount and variety of suffering in the world, of the just and of the unjust, of infants and of adults, that no philosophy can smother the conviction that the misery which weighs so heavily on the children of men, is an appalling evil. There is no such trial to our faith, as to see an infant suffering excruciating pain. If, however, pain could be removed from the category of evil, sin is not so easily disposed of. The world lies in wickedness. The history of man is, to a large degree, the history of sin. If God be holy, wise, and omnipotent, how can we account for this widely extended and long-continued prevalence of sin?

One solution is sought in the denial that sin is an evil. In other words, it is denied that there is any such thing as sin. What we so regard is, as some maintain, nothing more than limitation of being. To be free from sin, we must be free from limitation, i.e.. infinite. It is not an evil that one tree is smaller, less beautiful, or less valuable than others; or that a plant has not the sensitive life of an animal; or that all animals have not the rational powers of man. As in a forest, we see trees of every shape and size, perfectly and imperfectly developed, and this diversity is itself a good; so among men there are some more, and some less conformed to the ideal standard of reason and right, but this is not an evil. It is only diversity of development; the manifold forms of an endless life.

Others say that what we call sin is the necessary condition of virtue. There can be no action without reaction; no strength without obstacles to be overcome; no pleasure without pain; and no virtue without vice. Moral goodness is mastery over moral evil. There cannot be one without the other. All would be dead and motionless, a stagnant sea, were it not for this antagonism.

Others again say that sin has only a subjective reality. It is analogous to pain. Some things affect us agreeably, others disagreeably; some excite self-approbation, some disapprobation. But that is simply our own concern. God no more participates in our

judgments than He does in our sensations.

Others do not so expressly deny the existence of sin. They admit that it is not only evil to us, but that it involves guilt in the sight of God, and therefore should be punished. Nevertheless, they represent it as arising necessarily out of the constitution of our nature. All creatures are subject to the law of development -- to a "Werden." Perfection is a goal to be reached by a gradual process. This law controls every sphere of life, vegetable, animal, intellectual, and moral. Every plant is developed from a seed. Our bodies begin in a germ; infancy is feeble and suffering. Our minds are subject to the same law. They are, of necessity, open to error. Our moral life is not an exception to this rule. Moral beings, at least those constituted as we are, cannot avoid sin. It is incident to their nature and condition. It is to be outlived and overcome. If the world be so constituted and so directed that there is a continued progress toward perfection; if all evil, and especially all sin, be eliminated by this progress, the wisdom, goodness, and holiness of God will be thereby vindicated. Bruch [460] asks, "Why has God (der heilige Urgeist) brought men into the world with only the potentiality of freedom (which with him includes perfection), and not with the actuality, but left that perfection to be attained by a long process of development? The only answer to that question," he says, is, "that development lies in the very nature of the finite. It must strive toward perfection by an endless process, without ever reaching it in its fulness. We might as well ask why God has ordained that the tree should be developed from a germ? or why the earth itself has passed through so many periods of change, ever from a lower to a higher state? or why the universe is made up of things finite, and is itself finite?" He adds the further consideration, "that God, with the possibility of sin, has provided redemption by which it is to be overcome, banished, and swallowed up." "The annihilation of sin is the design of the whole work of redemption. The Son of Man is come that He might destroy the works of the devil.' (1 John iii. 8.) Sin, however, will disappear only when not the individual alone, but when the whole race of man has reached the goal of its destination, -- and when," he asks, "will this happen?" [461] That question he leaves unanswered. On a following page, however, he quotes Klaiber [462] as saying: "Divine revelation gives the only possible and satisfactory answer to the question, how the existence of sin can be reconciled with the holiness of God, an answer which satisfies not only our pious feelings, but our anthropological and theological speculations, in that it makes known the truth that God determined on the creation of beings, who, as free agents, were subject to the possibility of sin, and who were through their own fault sunk in evil, in connection with redemption; so that sin is only a transient, vanishing phenomenon in the development of finite beings. This is the great idea which pervades the whole of revelation; yea, which is its essence and its goal."

It is obvious that all theories which make sin a necessary evil, destroy its nature as revealed in Scripture, and in our own consciousness.

Sin considered as the Necessary Means of the Greatest Good.

A much more plausible theory, belonging to the class of those which virtually, although not professedly, destroy the nature of sin, is that which regards it as the necessary means of the greatest good. Sin, in itself; is an evil; relatively, it is a good. The universe is better with it than without it. In itself, it is an evil that the smaller animals should be devoured by the larger; but as this is necessary to prevent the undue development of animal life, and as it

ministers to the higher forms thereof, it becomes a benevolent arrangement. The amputation of a limb is an evil; but if necessary to save life, it is a good. Wars are dreadful evils, yet the world is indebted to wars for the preservation of civil and religious liberty, for which they are a small price. Better have war than lose the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free. Thus, if sin be the necessary means of the greatest good, it ceases to be an evil, on the whole, and it is perfectly consistent with the benevolence of God to permit its occurrence. This has been a favorite method of solving the problem of evil in all ages. This is the idea which Leibnitz wrought out so elaborately in his "Th□odic□e." It has been adopted by many theologians who do not carry it on to its legitimate consequences. Thus Twesten [463] says: "If the world be absolutely dependent on the most perfect Being; if it be the work of the highest love, power, and wisdom; and if it be constantly controlled and governed by God, it must be absolutely perfect." Hence even sin, although like pain an evil in itself, must on the whole be a good. It is a necessary element in a perfect world. Twesten, therefore, says, [464] "If the world, with the sin and misery which it contains, produces a greater amount of good, and reveals the divine power and love more fully than could otherwise be possible, then the consistency of the existence of evil with the universal causality (or government) of God is thereby vindicated." The word good in this connection, according to the common doctrine of optimists, does not mean moral good, but happiness. The principle on which this theory is founded was propounded in a posthumous treatise of President Edwards, in which he taught that virtue consists in the love of being. This principle was adopted and carried out by Drs. Hopkins and Emmons in their systems of theology, which for many years had great influence in this country.

Objections to this Theory.

Plausible as this theory is, it is liable to many objections.

1. In the first place, we have no right to limit the infinite God. To say that this is the best possible world, is to say that God can make nothing greater or better; which, unless the world be infinite, is to say that God is finite. It is enough for us to believe that the world with its finite results, is what God in his wisdom saw fit to call into existence; but that it is the best He could make, is a gratuitous and derogatory assumption.

2. It is unscriptural, and contrary to our moral reason, to make happiness the end of creation. The Bible declares the glory of God, an infinitely higher end, to be the final cause for which all things exist. It is the instinctive judgment of men, that holiness or moral excellence is a greater good than happiness. But, on this theory, holiness has no value except as a means of producing happiness. This cannot be believed, except under a protest from our moral nature. The theory in question, therefore, solves the problem of evil by denying its existence. Nothing is an evil which tends to the greatest happiness. Sin is the necessary means of the greatest good, and therefore is not an evil.

The Doctrine that God cannot prevent Sin in a Moral System.

The second general method of reconciling the existence of sin with the benevolence and holiness of God, is, not to deny that sin, even all things considered, is an evil; but to affirm that God cannot prevent all sin, or even the present amount of sin, in a moral system. It assumes that certainty is inconsistent with free agency. Any kind or degree of influence which renders it certain how a free agent will act, destroys his liberty in acting. He must always be able to act contrary to any degree of influence brought to bear upon him, or he

ceases to be free. God, therefore, of necessity limits Himself when He creates free agents. They are beyond his absolute control. He may argue and persuade, but He cannot govern.

This doctrine that God cannot effectually control the acts of free agents without destroying their liberty, is so contrary to the Scriptures, that it has never been adopted by any organized portion of the Christian Church. Some theologians avail themselves of it for an emergency, when treating of this subject, although it is utterly at variance with their general scheme. Twesten, for example, who, as we have seen, in one place teaches that God voluntarily permits sin as the necessary means of the greatest good, in another place [465] says that He cannot prevent it in a moral system. "Mit der Freiheit," he says, "war die M<unk>glichkeit des Misbrauchs gegeben; ohne jene zu vernichten, konnte Gott diesen nicht verhindern." That is, without destroying liberty, God cannot prevent its abuse. If this be so, then God cannot govern free agents. He cannot secure the accomplishment of his purposes, or the fulfilment of his promises. There is no security for the triumph of good in the universe. Angels and saints in heaven may all sin, and evil become dominant and universal. On this theory, all prayer that God would change our own hearts, or the hearts of others, becomes irrational. All this is so contrary to the teaching of the Bible, which everywhere asserts the sovereignty and supremacy of God, declaring that the hearts of men are in his hand, and that He turns them as the rivers of water; that He makes his people willing in the day of his power, working in them to will and to do, according to his good pleasure; it is so inconsistent with the promise to give repentance and faith, with the assertion of his power to change the heart; it is so incompatible with the hopes and confidence of the believer, that God can keep him from falling; and so subversive of the idea of God as presented in the Bible and revealed in our nature, that the Church has, almost with one accord, preferred to leave the mystery of evil unexplained, rather than to seek its solution in a principle which undermines the foundation of all religion.

The Scriptural Doctrine.

The third method of dealing with this question is to rest satisfied with the simple statements of the Bible. The Scriptures teach, (1.) That the glory of God is the end to which the promotion of holiness, and the production of happiness, and all other ends are subordinate. (2.) That, therefore, the self-manifestation of God, the revelation of his infinite perfection, being the highest conceivable, or possible good, is the ultimate end of all his works in creation, providence, and redemption. (3.) As sentient creatures are necessary for the manifestation of God's benevolence, so there could be no manifestation of his mercy without misery, or of his grace and justice, if there were no sin. As the heavens declare the glory of God, so He has devised the plan of redemption, "To the intent that now unto the principalities and powers in heavenly places, might be known by the Church the manifold wisdom of God." (Eph. iii. 10.) The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is for creatures the highest good. And the promotion of that knowledge, the manifestation of the manifold perfections of the infinite God, is the highest end of all his works. This is declared by the Apostle to be the end contemplated, both in the punishment of sinners and in the salvation of believers. It is an end to which, he says, no man can rationally object. "What if God, willing to show his wrath (or justice), and to make his power known, endured with much long suffering the vessels of wrath fitted to destruction: and that He might make known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy, which He had afore prepared unto glory." (Rom.

ix. 22, 23.) Sin, therefore, according the Scriptures, is permitted, that the justice of God may be known in its punishment, and his grace in its forgiveness. And the universe, without the knowledge of these attributes, would be like the earth without the light of the sun.

The glory of God being the great end of all things, we are not obliged to assume that this is the best possible world for the production of happiness, or even for securing the greatest degree of holiness among rational creatures. It is wisely adapted for the end for which it was designed, namely, the manifestation of the manifold perfections of God. That God, in revealing Himself, does promote the highest good of his creatures, consistent with the promotion of his own glory, may be admitted. But to reverse this order, to make the good of the creature the highest end, is to pervert and subvert the whole scheme; it is to put the means for the end, to subordinate God to the universe, the Infinite to the finite. This putting the creature in the place of the Creator, disturbs our moral and religious sentiments and convictions, as well as our intellectual apprehensions of God, and of his relation to the universe.

The older theologians almost unanimously make the glory of God the ultimate, and the good of the creature the subordinate end of all things. Twesten, indeed, says [466] it makes no difference whether we say God proposes his own glory as the ultimate end, and, for that purpose, determined to produce the highest degree of good; or that He purposed the highest good of his creatures, whence the manifestation of his glory flows as a consequence. It, however, makes all the difference in the world, whether the Creator be subordinate to the creature, or the creature to the Creator; whether the end be the means, or the means the end. There is a great difference whether the earth or the sun be assumed as the centre of our solar system. If we make the earth the centre, our astronomy will be in confusion. And if we make the creature, and not God, the end of all things, our theology and religion will in like manner be perverted. It may, in conclusion, be safely asserted that a universe constructed for the purpose of making God known, is a far better universe than one designed for the production of happiness.

[458] Eigenschaften, page 240.

[459] Christlichen Glaube, § 166; Works, Berlin, 1843, vol. iv. p. 513.

[460] Eigenschaften, p. 266.

[461] Eigenschaften, p. 269, 270.

[462] Von der Snde und Erlsung, p. 21, Stud. der Ev. Geistl. Wrtembergs. vol. ii. part 2, Stuttgart, 1835.

[463] Dogmatik, ii. p. 121.

[464] Ibid. p. 130.

[465] Dogmatik, ii. p. 137.

[466] Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 89.

§ 14. The Truth of God.

Truth, is a word of frequent occurrence and of wide signification in the Bible. The primary meaning of the Greek word aletheia (from a and letho) is openness; what is not concealed. But in the Hebrew, and therefore in the Bible, the primary idea of truth is, that

which sustains, which does not fail, or disappoint our expectations. The true, therefore, is, (1.) That which is real as opposed to that which is fictitious or imaginary. Jehovah is the true God, because He is really God, while the gods of the heathen are vanity and nothing, mere imaginary beings, having neither existence nor attributes. (2.) The true is that which completely comes up to its idea, or to what it purports to be. A true man is a man in whom the idea of manhood is fully realized. The true God is He in whom is found all that Godhead imports. (3.) The true is that in which the reality exactly corresponds to the manifestation. God is true, because He really is what He declares himself to be; because He is what He commands us to believe Him to be; and because all his declarations correspond to what really is. (4.) The true is that which can be depended upon, which does not fail, or change, or disappoint. In this sense also God is true as He is immutable and faithful. His promise cannot fail; his word never disappoints. His word abideth forever. When our Lord says, "Thy word is truth," He says that all that God has revealed may be confided in as exactly corresponding to what really is, or is to be. His word can never fail, though heaven and earth pass away.

The truth of God, therefore, is the foundation of all religion. It is the ground of our assurance, that what He has revealed of Himself and of his will, in his works and in the Scriptures, may be relied upon. He certainly is, and wills, and will do, whatever He has thus made known. It is no less the foundation of all knowledge. That our senses do not deceive us; that consciousness is trustworthy in what it teaches; that anything is what it appears to us to be; that our existence is not a delusive dream, has no other foundation than the truth of God. In this sense, all knowledge is founded on faith, i.e., the belief that God is true.

The theologians are accustomed to say: (1.) "Veritas Dei in essentia, est convenientia omnium eorum, qu ad naturam perfectissimi pertinent eamque totam constituunt; qua ratione Deus verus opponitur fictis et commentitiis." (Jer. x. 8, 10, 11; John v. 20, 21.) (2.) "Veritas Dei in intellectu, est convenientia cogitationum cum objecto." . . . . (Job xi. 7; Acts xv. 18.) (3.) "Veritas Dei in voluntate est convenientia decreti ac propositi efficacis cujusque cum rationibus in intellectu probe cognitis et judicatis." (Rom. xi. 33.) (4.) "Veritas Dei in factis, est convenientia actionum cum proposito." (Ps. xxv. 10) (5.) "Veritas Dei in dictis, qu singulatim vocari solet veracitas, est convenientia verborum omnium cum recta cogitatione animique sententia, et efficaci voluntatis proposito." (Num. xxiii. 19; 1 Sam. xv. 29; Tit. i. 2; Heb. vi. 18.) "Hc cernitur (a). in doctrinis (Is. xvii. 17); (b), in prdictionibus, promissionibus, ut et comminationibus. (Num. xxiii. 19.)" [467]

To the same effect the Reformed theologian Endemann, says, "Veracitas Deo duplici sensu recte adscribitur, (1.) Quatenus nunquam errat, quia est omniscius, nunquam errorem aliis significat, quia id repugnat bonitati ejus. . . . . (2.) Quatenus Deus ea actu sentit, qu verbis vel factis entibus intelligentibus significat. Deus actionibus et sermonibus suis eum intendit finem, ut sibi homines credant, confidant, etc., quem finem everteret si semel a veritate discederet. Scriptura docet idem scil. quod Deus . . . . [est] verax, immunis ab omni errore et mendacio. . . . . Fidelis est Deus, quatenus ingenue aliquid promittit; atque promissum certissimo complet. . . . . Severitatem Deo tribuimus quatenus comminationes suas implet." [468]

The philosophical theologians virtually deny that there is any such attribute in God as

truth. They say that what is intended by that term is only the uniformity of law. The efficiency of God is always exercised in such a way that we may confide in the regular sequence of events. In this respect it may be said that God is true. Bruch [469] admits "That this idea arises necessarily out of our religious consciousness, inasmuch as we embrace with full confidence what we regard as a divine revelation, and are persuaded that God in due time will fulfil whatever He has purposed, promised, or threatened. This confidence is in the strongest terms often expressed in the sacred writings, and is the source of the firm faith by which the Christian receives the revelation made in Christ; and of the unshaken confidence with which he anticipates the fulfillment of the divine promises." Nevertheless, although this idea of the truth of God has its foundation in our own nature, and is so clearly recognized in Scripture, and although it enters so deeply into the religious experience and hopes of the believer, it is a delusion. There is no such attribute in God. It is unphilosophical, and therefore impossible that there should be the distinction, which must then be assumed, between purpose and act in the divine mind. The ascription of truth or veracity to God rests, says Bruch, "on the assumption of a distinction in Him between thought and its manifestation, between his promises and threatenings, and their accomplishment, which not only destroys the unity of the divine essence, but reduces Him to the limitations and changes of time. . . . . As the ascription of veracity to God arises out of what we observe in ourselves, it bears the impress of anthropomorphism, and has no claim to scientific recognition." [470] He further objects to the ascription of truth to God, in the ordinary sense of that term, because God works uniformly according to law, and therefore. "properly speaking, there can be no such thing as promises or threatenings with him." [471] The idea is, that as God has established certain physical laws, and if men comply with them they are well, if they violate them, they suffer for it; so there are laws which determine the well-being of rational creatures: if we observe those laws, we are happy; if we disregard them, we are miserable. God has nothing to do with it, except as He established those laws and carries them out. The philosophical idea, therefore, of the truth of God, is the immutability of law, physical and moral. This view is still more definitely presented by Schweizer. [472] God from the beginning to the end of the world is one and the same causality; this, in reference to the moral world, is his truth, veracitas, fidelitas, in so far as the later revelations, or manifestations of this causality, correspond to what the earlier manifestations would lead us to expect. God, according to this view, is not so much a person, as a name for the moral order of the universe. There is, of course, some truth in this mode of representation. The laws of God, by which He governs his creatures, rational and irrational, are uniform. It is true that a man reaps what he sows; that he receives here and hereafter the natural consequences of his conduct. If he sows to the flesh, he reaps corruption; if he sows to the spirit, he reaps life everlasting. But these laws are administered by a personal God, who, as He controls physical laws so as to produce plenty or famine, health or pestilence, as to Him seems fit, so also He controls all the laws which determine the well-being of the souls of men, so as to accomplish his designs and to secure the fulfilment of his promises and threatenings. The laws of a well-ordered human government are uniform and impartial, but that is not inconsistent with their human administration.

It is a great mercy that, at least in some cases, those whose philosophy forbids their believing in the personality of God, believe in the personality of Christ, whom they regard

as a man invested with all the attributes of the Godhead, and whom they love and worship accordingly.

[467] Hollaz, Examen Theologicum, edit. Leipzig, 1763, pp. 243, 244.

[468] Compendium Theologicum, I. § 33; edit. Hanovi, 1777, pp. 97, 99.

[469] Eigenschaften, p. 250.

[470] Eigenschaften, p. 250.

[471] Ibid. p. 252.

[472] Glaubenslehre, vol. i. p. 443.

§ 15. Sovereignty.

Sovereignty is not a property of the divine nature, but a prerogative arising out of the perfections of the Supreme Being. If God be a Spirit, and therefore a person, infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being and perfections, the Creator and Preserver of the universe, He is of right its absolute sovereign. Infinite wisdom, goodness, and power, with the right of possession, which belongs to God in all his creatures, are the immutable foundation of his dominion. "Our God is in the heavens; He hath done whatsoever He pleased." (Ps. cxv. 8.) "All the inhabitants of the earth are reputed as nothing: and He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth: and none can stay his hand, or say unto him, What doest thou?" (Dan. iv. 35.) "All that is in the heaven and in the earth is thine." (1 Chron. xxix. 11.) "The earth is the Lord's, and the fulness thereof; the world, and they that dwell therein." (Ps. xxiv. 1.) "Thine is the kingdom, O Lord, and thou art exalted as head above all." (1 Chron. xxix. 11.) "Behold, all souls are mine; as the soul of the father, so also the soul of the son is mine." (Ez. xviii. 4.) "Woe unto him that striveth with his Maker! Let the potsherd strive with the potsherds of the earth. Shall the clay say to him that fashioned it, What makest thou? or thy work, He hath no hands?" (Is. xlv. 9.) "Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine own?" (Matt. xx. 15.) He "worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." (Eph. i. 11.) "Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things: to whom be glory forever. Amen." (Rom. xi. 36.)

From these and similar passages of Scriptures it is plain, (1.) That the sovereignty of God is universal. It extends over all his creatures from the highest to the lowest. (2.) That it is absolute. There is no limit to be placed to his authority. He doeth his pleasure in the armies of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth. (3.) It is immutable. It can neither be ignored nor rejected. It binds all creatures, as inexorably as physical laws bind the material universe.

This sovereignty is exercised, (1.) In establishing the laws, physical and moral, by which all creatures are to be governed. (2.) In determining the nature and powers of the different orders of created beings, and in assigning each its appropriate sphere. (3.) In appointing to each individual his position and lot. It is the Lord who fixes the bounds of our habitation. Our times are in his hands. He determines when, where, and under what circumstances each individual of our race is to be born, live, and die. Nations, no less than individuals, are thus in the hands of God, who assigns them their heritage in the earth, and controls their destiny. (4.) God is no less sovereign in the distribution of his favours. He does what He wills with his own. He gives to some riches, to others, honour; to others,

health; while others are poor, unknown, or the victims of disease. To some, the light of the gospel is sent; others are left in darkness. Some are brought through faith unto salvation; others perish in unbelief. To the question, Why is this? the only answer is that given by our Lord. "Even so, Father, for so it seemeth good in thy sight."

Although this sovereignty is thus universal and absolute, it is the sovereignty of wisdom, holiness, and love. The authority of God is limited by nothing out of Himself, but it is controlled, in all its manifestations, by his infinite perfections. If a man is free and exalted, in proportion as he is governed by enlightened reason and a pure conscience, so is he supremely blessed who cheerfully submits to be governed by the infinite reason and holiness of God. This sovereignty of God is the ground of peace and confidence to all his people. They rejoice that the Lord God omnipotent reigneth; that neither necessity, nor chance, nor the folly of man, nor the malice of Satan controls the sequence of events and all their issues. Infinite wisdom, love, and power, belong to Him, our great God and Saviour, into whose hands all power in heaven and earth has been committed.

CHAPTER VI: The Trinity.

§ 1. Preliminary Remarks.

THE doctrine of the Trinity is peculiar to the religion of the Bible. The Triad of the ancient world is only a philosophical statement of the pantheistic theory which underlies all the religion of antiquity. With the Hindus, simple, undeveloped, primal being, without consciousness or attributes, is called Brahm. This being, as unfolding itself in the actual world, is Vishnu; as returning into the abyss of unconscious being, it is Shiva. In Buddhism we find essentially the same ideas, in a more dualistic form. Buddhism makes more of a distinction between God, as the spiritual principle of all things, and nature. The soul of man is a part, or an existence-form, of this spiritual essence, whose destiny is, that it may be freed from nature and lost in the infinite unknown. In Platonism, also, we find a notional Trinity. Simple being (to on) has its logos, the complex of its ideas, the reality in all that is phenomenal and changing. In all these systems, whether ancient or modern, there is a Thesis, Antithesis, and Synthesis; the Infinite becomes finite, and the finite returns to the Infinite. It is obvious, therefore, that these trinitarian formulas have no analogy with the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity, and serve neither to explain nor to confirm it.

The design of all the revelations contained in the Word of God is the salvation of men. Truth is in order to holiness. God does not make known his being and attributes to teach men science, but to bring them to the saving knowledge of Himself. The doctrines of the Bible are, therefore, intimately connected with religion, or the life of God in the soul. They determine the religious experience of believers, and are presupposed in that experience. This is specially true of the doctrine of the Trinity. It is a great mistake to regard that doctrine as a mere speculative or abstract truth, concerning the constitution of the Godhead, with which we have no practical concern, or which we are required to believe simply because it is revealed. On the contrary, it underlies the whole plan of salvation, and determines the character of the religion (in the subjective sense of that word) of all true Christians. It is the unconscious, or unformed faith, even of those of God's people who are unable to understand the term by which it is expressed. They all believe in God, the Creator and Preserver against whom they have sinned, whose justice they know they cannot satisfy, and whose image they cannot restore to their apostate nature. They therefore, as of necessity, believe in a divine Redeemer and a divine Sanctifier. They have, as it were, the factors of the doctrine of the Trinity in their own religious convictions. No mere speculative doctrine, especially no doctrine so mysterious and so out of analogy with all other objects of human knowledge, as that of the Trinity, could ever have held the abiding control over the faith of the Church, which this doctrine has maintained. It is not, therefore, by any arbitrary decision, nor from any bigoted adherence to hereditary beliefs, that the

Church has always refused to recognize as Christians those who reject this doctrine. This judgment is only the expression of the deep conviction that Antitrinitarians must adopt a radically and practically different system of religion from that on which the Church builds her hopes. It is not too much to say with Meyer, [473] that "the Trinity is the point in which all Christian ideas and interests unite; at once the beginning and the end of all insight into Christianity."

This great article of the Christian faith may be regarded under three different aspects: (1.) The Biblical form of the doctrine. (2.) The ecclesiastical form, or the mode in which the statements of the Bible have been explained in the symbols of the Church and the writings of theologians. (3.) Its philosophical form, or the attempts which have been made to illustrate, or to prove, the doctrine on philosophical principles. It is only the doctrine as presented in the Bible, which binds the faith and conscience of the people of God.

[473] Lehre von der Trinitt, vol. i. p. 42.

§ 2. Biblical Form of the Doctrine.

A. What that Form is.

The form in which this doctrine lies in the Bible, and in which it enters into the faith of the Church universal, includes substantially the following particulars.

1. There is one only living and true God, or divine Being. The religion of the Bible stands opposed not only to Atheism, but to all forms of polytheism. The Scriptures everywhere assert that Jehovah alone is God. (Deut. vi. 4.) "The Lord our God is one Lord." "I am the first, and I am the last; and besides me there is no God." (Is. xliv. 6.) "Thou believest that there is one God; thou doest well." (James ii. 19.) The Decalogue, which is the foundation of the moral and religious code of Christianity, as well as of Judaism, has as its first and greatest commandment, "Thou shalt have no other God before me." No doctrine, therefore, can possibly be true which contradicts this primary truth of natural as well as of revealed religion.

2. In the Bible all divine titles and attributes are ascribed equally to the Father, Son, and Spirit. The same divine worship is rendered to them. The one is as much the object of adoration, love, confidence, and devotion as the other. It is not more evident that the Father is God, than that the Son is God; nor is the deity of the Father and Son more clearly revealed than that of the Spirit.

3. The terms Father, Son, and Spirit do not express different relations of God to his creatures. They are not analogous to the terms Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor, which do express such relations. The Scriptural facts are, (a.) The Father says I; the Son says I; the Spirit says I. (b.) The Father says Thou to the Son, and the Son says Thou to the Father; and in like manner the Father and the Son use the pronouns He and Him in reference to the Spirit. (c.) The Father loves the Son; the Son loves the Father; the Spirit testifies of the Son. The Father, Son, and Spirit are severally subject and object. They act and are acted upon, or are the objects of action. Nothing is added to these facts when it is said that the Father, Son, and Spirit are distinct persons; for a person is an intelligent subject who can say I, who can be addressed as Thou, and who can act and can be the object of action. The summation of the above facts is expressed in the proposition, The one divine. Being

subsists in three persons, Father, Son, and Spirit. This proposition adds nothing to the facts themselves; for the facts are, (1.) That there is one divine Being. (2.) The Father, Son, and Spirit are divine. (3.) The Father, Son, and Spirit are, in the sense just stated, distinct persons. (4.) Attributes being inseparable from substance, the Scriptures, in saying that the Father, Son, and Spirit possess the same attributes, say they are the same in substance; and, if the same in substance, they are equal in power and glory.

4. Notwithstanding that the Father, Son, and Spirit are the same in substance, and equal in power and glory, it is no less true according to the Scriptures, (a.) That the Father is first, the Son second, and the Spirit third. (b.) The Son is of the Father (ek theou, the logos, eikon, apaugasma, tou theou); and the Spirit is of the Father and of the Son. (c.) The Father sends the Son, and the Father and Son send the Spirit. (d.) The Father operates through the Son, and the Father and Son operate through the Spirit. The converse of these statements is never found. The Son is never said to send the Father, nor to operate through Him nor is the Spirit ever said to send the Father, or the Son, or to operate through them. The facts contained in this paragraph are summed up in the proposition: In the Holy Trinity there is a subordination of the Persons as to the mode of subsistence and operation. This proposition again adds nothing to the facts themselves.

5. According to the Scriptures, the Father created the world, the Son created the world, and the Spirit created the world. The Father preserves all things; the Son upholds all things; and the Spirit is the source of all life. These facts are expressed by saying that the persons of the Trinity concur in all acts ad extra. Nevertheless there are some acts which are predominantly referred to the Father, others to the Son, and others to the Spirit. The Father creates, elects, and calls; the Son redeems; and the Spirit sanctifies. And, on the other hand, there are certain acts, or conditions, predicated of one person of the Trinity, which are never predicated of either of the others. Thus, generation belongs exclusively to the Father, filiation to the Son, and procession to he Spirit. This is the form in which the doctrine of the Trinity lies in the Bible. The above statement involves no philosophical element. It is simply an arrangement of the clearly revealed facts bearing on this subject. This is the form in which the doctrine has always entered into the faith of the Church, as a part of its religious convictions and experience.

To say that this doctrine is incomprehensible, is to say nothing more than must be admitted of any other great truth, whether of revelation or of science. To say that it is impossible that the one divine substance can subsist in three distinct persons, is certainly unreasonable, when, according to that form of philosophy which has been the most widely diffused, and the most persistent, everything that exists is only one of the innumerable forms in which one and the same infinite substance subsists; and when, according to the Realists, who once controlled the thinking world, all men are the individualized forms of the numerically same substance called generic humanity.

B. Scriptural Proof of the Doctrine.

No such doctrine as that of the Trinity can be adequately proved by any citation of Scriptural passages. Its constituent elements are brought into view, some in one place, and some in another. The unity of the Divine Being; the true and equal divinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit; their distinct personality; the relation in which they stand one to the other, and to the Church and the world, are not presented in a doctrinal formula in the Word of

God, but the several constituent elements of the doctrine are asserted, or assumed, over and over, from the beginning to the end of the Bible. It is, therefore, by proving these elements separately, that the whole doctrine can be most satisfactorily established. All that is here necessary is, a reference to the general teachings of Scripture on the subject, and to some few passages in which everything essential to the doctrine is included.

The Progressive Character of Divine Revelation.

1. The progressive character of divine revelation is recognized in relation to all the great doctrines of the Bible. One of the strongest arguments for the divine origin of the Scriptures is the organic relation of its several parts. They comprise more than sixty books written by different men in different ages, and yet they form one whole; not by mere external historical relations, nor in virtue of the general identity of the subjects of which they treat. but by their internal organic development. All that is in a full-grown tree was potentially in the seed. All that we find unfolded in the fulness of the gospel lies in a rudimental form in the earliest books of the Bible. What at first is only obscurely intimated is gradually unfolded in subsequent parts of the sacred volume, until the truth is revealed in its fulness. This is true of the doctrines of redemption; of the person and work of the Messiah, the promised seed of the woman; of the nature and office of the Holy Spirit; and of a future state beyond the grave. And this is specially true of the doctrine of the Trinity. Even in the book of Genesis there are intimations of the doctrine which receive their true interpretation in later revelations. That the names of God are in the plural form; that the personal pronouns are often in the first person plural ("Let us make man in our image"); that the form of benediction is threefold, and other facts of like nature, may be explained in different ways. But when it becomes plain, from the progress of the revelation, that there are three persons in the Godhead, then such forms of expression can hardly fail to be recognized as having their foundation in that great truth.

2. Much more important, however, is the fact, that not only in Genesis, but also in all the early books of Scripture, we find a distinction made between Jehovah and the angel of Jehovah, who himself is God, to whom all divine titles are given, and divine worship is rendered. As the revelation is unfolded, such distinction becomes more and more manifest. This messenger of God it called the word, the wisdom, the Son of God. His personality and divinity are clearly revealed. He is of old, even from everlasting, the Mighty God, the Adonai, the Lord of David, Jehovah our Righteousness, who was to be born of a virgin, and bear the sins of many.

3. In like manner, even in the first chapter of Genesis, the Spirit of God is represented as the source of all intelligence, order, and life in the created universe; and in the following books of the Old Testament He is represented as inspiring the prophets, giving wisdom, strength, and goodness to statesmen and warriors, and to the people of God. This Spirit is not an agency, but an agent, who teaches and selects; who can be sinned against and grieved; and who, in the New Testament, is unmistakably revealed as a distinct person. When John the Baptist appeared, we find him speaking of the Holy Spirit as of a person with whom his countrymen were familiar, as an object of divine worship and the giver of saving blessings. Our divine Lord also takes this truth for granted, and promised to send the Spirit, as a Paraclete, to take his place; to instruct, comfort, and strengthen them, whom they were to receive and obey. Thus, without any violent transition, the earliest revelations of

this mystery were gradually unfolded, until the Triune God, Father, Son, and Spirit, appears in the New Testament as the universally recognized God of all believers.

The Formula of Baptism.

4. In the formulas of Baptism and of the Apostolic Benediction, provision was made to keep this doctrine constantly before the minds of the people, as a cardinal article of the Christian faith. Every Christian is baptized in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. The personality, the divinity, and consequently the equality of these three subjects, are here taken for granted. The association of the Son and Spirit with the Father, the identity of relation, so far as dependence and obedience are concerned, which we sustain to the Father, Son, and Spirit respectively; the confession and profession involved in the ordinances; all forbid any other interpretation of this formula than that which it has always received in the Church. If the expression, "In the name of the Father," implies the personality of the Father, the same implication is involved when it is used in reference to the Son and Spirit. If we acknowledge our subjection and allegiance to the one, we acknowledge the same subjection and allegiance to the other divine persons here named.

The Apostolic Benediction.

In the apostolic benediction a prayer is addressed to Christ for his grace, to the Father for his love, and to the Spirit for his fellowship. The personality and divinity of each are therefore solemnly recognized every time that this benediction is pronounced and received.

5. In the record of our Lord's baptism, the Father addresses the Son, and the Spirit descends in the form of a dove. In the discourse of Christ, recorded in the 14th, 15th, and 16th chapters of John's Gospel, our Lord speaks to and of the Father, and promises to send the Spirit to teach, guide, and comfort his disciples. In that discourse the personality and divinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit are recognized with equal clearness. In 1 Cor. xii. 4-6, the Apostle speaks of diversity of gifts, but the same Spirit; of diversity of administration, but the same Lord; and of diversities of operations, but the same God.

It is not to be forgotten, however, that the faith of the Church in the doctrine of the Trinity, does not rest exclusively or principally on such arguments as those mentioned above. The great foundation of that faith is what is taught everywhere in the Bible of the unity of the Divine Being; of the personality and divinity of the Father, Son, and Spirit; and of their mutual relations.

§ 3. The Transition Period.

A. The Necessity for a more Definite Statement of the Doctrine.

The Biblical form of the doctrine of the Trinity, as given above, includes everything that is essential to the integrity of the doctrine, and all that is embraced in the faith of ordinary Christians. It is not all, however, that is included in the creeds of the Church. It is characteristic of the Scriptures, that the truths therein presented are exhibited in the form in which they address themselves to our religious consciousness. To this feature of the Word of God, its adaptation to general use is to be attributed. A truth often lies in the mind of the Church as an object of faith, long before it is wrought cut in its doctrinal form; that is, before it is analyzed, its contents clearly ascertained, and its elements stated in due relation to each other. When a doctrine so complex as that of the Trinity is presented as an object of

faith, the mind is forced to reflect upon it, to endeavour to ascertain what it includes, and how its several parts are to be stated, so as to avoid confusion or contradiction. Besides this internal necessity for a definite statement of the doctrine, such statement was forced upon the Church from without. Even among those who honestly intended to receive what the Scriptures taught upon the subject, it was inevitable that there should arise diversity in the mode of statement, and confusion and contradiction in the use of terms. As the Church is one, not externally merely, but really and inwardly, this diversity and confusion are as much an evil, a pain, and an embarrassment, troubling its inward peace, as the like inconsistency and confusion would be in an individual mind. There was, therefore, an inward and outward necessity, in the Church itself, for a clear, comprehensive, and consistent statement of the various elements of this complex doctrine of Christian faith.

B. Conflict with Error.

Besides this necessity for such a statement of the doctrine as would satisfy the minds of those who received it, there was a further necessity of guarding the truth from the evil influence of false or erroneous exhibitions of it. The conviction was deeply settled in the minds of all Christians that Christ is a divine person. The glory which He displayed, the authority which He assumed, the power which He exhibited, the benefits which He conferred, necessitated the recognition of Him as the true God. No less strong, however, was the conviction that there is only one God. The difficulty was, to reconcile these two fundamental articles of the Christian faith. The mode of solving this difficulty, by rejecting one of these articles to save the other, was repudiated by common consent. There were those who denied the divinity of Christ, and endeavoured to satisfy the minds of believers by representing Him as the best of men; as filled with the Spirit of God; as the Son of God, because miraculously begotten; or as animated and controlled by the power of God: but, nevertheless, merely a man. This view of the person of Christ was so universally rejected in the early Church, as hardly to occasion controversy. The errors with which the advocates of the doctrine of the Trinity had to contend were of a higher order. It was of course unavoidable that both parties, the advocates and the opponents of the doctrine, availed themselves of the current philosophies of the age. Consciously or unconsciously, all men are more or less controlled in their modes of thinking on divine subjects by the metaphysical opinions which prevail around them, and in which they have been educated. We accordingly find that Gnosticism and Platonism coloured the views of both the advocates and the opponents of the doctrine of the Trinity during the Ante-Nicene period.

The Gnostics.

The Gnostics held that there was a series of emanations from the primal Being, of different orders or ranks. It was natural that those addicted to this system, and who professed to be Christians, should represent Christ as one of the highest of these emanations, or Eons. This view of his person admitted of his being regarded as consubstantial with God, as divine, as the creator of the world, as a distinct person, and of his having at least an apparent or docetic union with humanity. It therefore suited some of the conditions of the complicated problem to be solved. It, however, represented Christ as one of a series of emanations, and reduced Him to the category of dependent beings, exalted above others of the same class in rank, but not in nature. It moreover involved the denial of his true humanity, which was as essential to the faith of the Church, and as dear to his

people as his divinity. All explanations of the Trinity, therefore, founded on the Gnostic philosophy were rejected as unsatisfactory and heretical.

The Platonizers.

The Platonic system as modified by Philo, and applied by him to the philosophical explanation of the theology of the Old Testament, had far more influence on the speculations of the early Fathers than Gnosticism. According to Plato, God formed, or had in the divine reason, the ideas, types, or models of all things, which ideas became the living, formative principles of all actual existences. The divine reason, with its contents, was the Logos. Philo, therefore, in explaining creation, represents the Logos as the sum of all these types or ideas, which make up the kosmos noetos, or ideal world. In this view the Logos was designated as endiathetos (mente conceptus). In creation, or the self-manifestation of God in nature, this divine reason or Logos is born, sent forth, or or projected; becoming the logos prophorikos, giving life and form to all things. God, as thus manifested in the world, Philo called not only logos, but also uios, eikon, huios monogenes, protogonos, skia, paradeigma, doxa, episteme, theou, and deuteros Theos. In the application of this philosophy to the doctrine of Christ, it was easy to make him the logos prophorikos, to assume and assert his personality, and to represent him as specially manifested or incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. This attempt was made by Justin Martyr, Tatian, and Theophilus. It succeeded so far as it exalted Christ above all creatures; it made him the creator and preserver of all things, the light and life of the world. It did not satisfy the consciousness of the Church, because it represented the divinity of Christ as essentially subordinate; it made his generation antemundane, but not eternal; and especially because the philosophy, from which this theory of the Logos was borrowed, was utterly opposed to the Christian system. The Logos of Plato and Philo was only a collective term for the ideal world, the idea ton ideon; and therefore the real distinction between God and the Logos, was that between God as hidden and God as revealed. God in himself was ho theos; God in nature was the Logos. This is, after all, the old heathen, pantheistic doctrine, which makes the universe the manifestation, or existence form of God.

Origen's Doctrine.

Origen presented the Platonic doctrine of the generation and nature of the Logos in a higher form than that in which it had been exhibited in the speculations of others among the fathers. He not only insisted, in opposition to the Monarchians or Unitarians, upon the distinct personality of the Son, but also upon his eternal, as opposed to his antemundane, generation. Nevertheless, he referred this generation to the will of the Father. The Son was thus reduced to the category of creatures, for according to Origen, creation is from eternity. Another unsatisfactory feature of all these speculations on the Logos-theory was, that it made no provision for the Holy Spirit. The Logos was the Word, or Son of God, begotten before creation in order to create, or, according to Origen, begotten from eternity; but what was the Holy Spirit? He appears in the baptismal service and in the apostolic benediction as a distinct person, but the Logos-theory provided only for a Dyad, and not a Triad. Hence the greatest confusion appears in the utterances of this class of writers concerning the Holy Ghost. Sometimes, He is identified with the Logos; sometimes, He is represented as the substance common to the Father and the Son; sometimes, as the mere power or efficiency of God; sometimes, as a distinct person subordinate to the Logos, and a creature.

The Sabellian Theory.

Another method of solving this great problem and of satisfying the religious convictions of the Church, was that adopted by the Monarchians, Patripassians, or Unitarians, as they were indifferently called. They admitted a modal trinity. They acknowledged the true divinity of Christ, but denied any personal distinctions in the Godhead. The same person is at once Father, Son, and Holy Spirit; these terms expressing the different relations in which God reveals Himself in the world and in the Church. Praxeas, of Asia Minor, who taught this doctrine in Rome, A.D. 200; Noetus, of Smyrna, A.D. 230; Beryll, bishop of Bostra, in Arabia, A.D. 250; and especially Sabellius, a presbyter of Ptolemais, A.D. 250, after whom this doctrine was called Sabellianism, were the principal advocates of this theory. The only point as to which this doctrine satisfied the religious convictions of Christians, was the true divinity of our Lord. But as it denied the distinct personality of the Father and of the Spirit, to whom every believer felt himself to stand in a personal relation, to whom worship and prayers were addressed, it could not be received by the people of God. Its opposition to Scripture was apparent. In the Bible the Father is represented as constantly addressing the Son as "Thou," as loving Him, as sending Him, as rewarding and exalting Him; and the Son as constantly addresses the Father and refers everything to his will, so that their distinct personality is one of the most clearly revealed doctrines of the Word of God. Sabellianism was, therefore, soon almost universally rejected.

Arianism.

Although Origen had insisted on the distinct personality of the Son, and upon his eternal generation, and although he freely called him God, nevertheless he would not admit his equality with God. The Father, alone, according to him was hi theos, the Son was simply theos. The Son was theos ek theou and not auto-theos. And this subordination was not simply as to the mode of subsistence and operation, but as to nature; for Origen taught that the Son was of a different essence from the Father, heteros kat' ousian, and owed his existence to the will of the Father. His disciples carried out his doctrine and avowedly made Christ a creature. This was done by Dionysius of Alexandria, a scholar of Origen, who spoke of the Son as poiema and ktisma, a mode of representation, however, which he subsequently retracted or explained away. It is plain, however, that the principles of Origen were inconsistent with the true divinity of Christ. It was not long, therefore, before Arius, another presbyter of Alexandria, openly maintained that the Son was not eternal, but was posterior to the Father; that He was created not from the substance of God, but ek ouk onton, and therefore was not homoousios with the Father. He admitted that the Son existed before any other creature, and that it was by Him God created the world.

It is to be constantly remembered that these speculations were the business of the theologians. They neither expressed nor affected to express the mind of the Church. The great body of the people drew their faith, then, as now, immediately from the Scriptures and from the services of the sanctuary. They were baptized in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. They addressed themselves to the Father as the creator of heaven and earth, and as their reconciled God and Father, and to Jesus Christ as their Redeemer, and to the Holy Ghost as their sanctifier and comforter. They loved, worshipped, and trusted the one as they did the others. This was the religious belief of the

Church, which remained undisturbed by the speculations and controversies of the theologians, in their attempts to vindicate and explain the common faith. This state of confusion was, however, a great evil, and in order to bring the Church to an agreement as to the manner in which this fundamental doctrine of Christianity should be stated, the Emperor Constantine summoned the First Ecumenical Council, to meet at Nice, in Nicomedia, A.D. 325.

§ 4. The Church Doctrine as presented by the Council of Nice.

A. The Objects for which that Council was convened.

The object for which the Council was called together was three-fold. (1.) To remedy the confusion which prevailed in the use of several important words employed in discussions on the doctrine of the Trinity. (2.) To condemn errors which had been adopted in different parts of the Church. (3.) To frame such a statement of the doctrine as would include all its Scriptural elements, and satisfy the religious convictions of the mass of believers. This was an exceedingly difficult task.

1. Because the usus loquendi of certain important terms was not then determined. The word hupostasis, for example, was used in two opposite senses. It was often taken, in its etymological sense, for substance, and is used by the Council itself as synonymous with ousia. But it had already begun to be used in the sense of person. As it expresses reality, as opposed to what is phenomenal or apparent, or mode of manifestation, it came to be universally used in the Greek Church, in the latter sense, as a safeguard against the idea of a mere modal Trinity. It will be admitted that great confusion must prevail, if one man should say there is only one hupostasis in the Godhead, and another affirm that there are three, when both meant the same thing, the one using the word in the sense of substance, and the other in that of person.

In the Latin Church the same difficulty was experienced in the use of the words substantia and subsistentia. These words were often interchanged as equivalent, and both were used, sometimes in the sense of substance, and sometimes in that of suppositum. Usage finally determined the former to mean substance or essence, and the latter a mode in which substance exists, i.e., suppositum. According to established usage, therefore, there is one substance, and there are three subsistences in the Godhead.

To express the idea of a suppositum intelligens, or self-conscious agent, the Greeks first used the word prosopon. But as that word properly means the face, the aspect, and as it was used by the Sabellians to express their doctrine of the threefold aspect under which the Godhead was revealed, it was rejected, and the word hupostasis adopted. The Latin word persona (from per and sono) properly means a mask worn by an actor and through which he spoke; and then the role or character which the actor sustained. On this account the word had a struggle before it was adopted in the terminology of theology.

The celebrated term homoousios, so long the subject of controversy, was not free from ambiguity. It expressed plainly enough sameness of substance, but whether that sameness was specific or numerical, the usage of the word left undecided. Porphyry is quoted as saying, that the souls of men and of irrational animals are homoousioi, and Aristotle as saying that the stars are homoousioi, and men and brutes are said to be homoousioi as to

their bodies; and in like manner angels, demons, and human souls, are said to be all homoousioi. In this sense, Peter, James, and John are homoousioi, as having the same nature in kind. On this account the use of the word was objected to, as admitting of a Tritheistic interpretation. The Council, however, determined the sense in which it was to be understood in their decisions, by saying that the Son was begotten ek tes housias tou patros, and by denying that He was created. As God is a spirit, and as we are spirits, we are said, in Scripture, to be like Him, and to be his children, to be of the same nature. But with regard to the Son it was declared that He was of the same numerical essence with the Father; He is truly God, possessing the same attributes and entitled to the same homage. Thus explained, the word became an insuperable barrier against the adoption of the Nicene Creed by any who denied the true divinity of the Son of God.

Difference of Opinion among the Members of the Council.

2. A second difficulty with which the Council had to contend was diversity of opinion among its own members. All the conflicting views which had agitated the Church were there represented. The principal parties were, first, the Arians, who held, (1.) That the Son owed his existence to the will of the Father. (2.) That He was not eternal; but that there was a time when He was not. (3.) That He was created ex ouk onton, out of nothing, and was therefore ktisma kai poiema. (4.) That He was not immutable, but treptos phusei. (5.) That his pre&#65533;minence consisted in the fact that He alone was created immediately by God, whereas all other creatures were created by the Son. (6.) He was not God of Himself, but was made God, etheopoiethe; that is, on account of his exalted nature, and the relation in which He stands to all other creatures, as Creator and Governor, He was entitled to divine worship.

One of the passages of Scripture on which the Arians principally relied was Prov. viii. 22, which in the Septuagint is rendered: ektise me archen hodon autou (He created me in the beginning of his ways). As Wisdom, there spoken of, was universally understood to be the Logos, and as the Septuagint was regarded as authoritative, this passage seemed to prove, beyond dispute, that the Logos or Son was created. The Orthodox were forced to explain away this passage by saying that ktizein was here to be taken in the sense of gennan, the word elsewhere used to express the relation between the Father and the Son. Ignorance, or neglect of the Hebrew, prevented their answering the argument of the Arians by showing that the word qnh, here rendered by the Septuagint ektise, means not only to establish, but to possess. The Vulgate, therefore, correetly renders the passage, "Dominus possidet me;" and the English version also reads, "The Lord possessed me." The Arians proper constituted a small minority of the Council.

The Semi-Arians.

The second party included the Semi-Arians and the disciples of Origen. These held with the Arians, (1.) That the Son owed his existence to the will of the Father. (2.) That He was not of the same essence, but heteros kat' ousian. They seemed to hold that there was an essence intermediate between the divine substance and created substances. It was in reference to this form of opinion that Augustine afterwards said, [474] "Unde liquido apparet ipsum factum non esse per quem facta sunt omnia. Et si factus non est, creatura non est: si autem creatura non est, ejusdem cum Patre substanti&#65533; est. Omnis enim substantia qu&#65533; Deus non est, creatura est; et qu&#65533; creatura non est, Deus est."

(3) The Son was, therefore, subordinate to the Father, not merely in rank or mode of subsistence, but in nature. He belonged to a different order of beings. He was not autotheos, ho Theos, or ho alethinos theos; but simply theos, a term which, according to Origen, could be properly applied to the higher orders of intelligent creatures.

(4.) The Son, although thus inferior to the Father, having life in Himself, was the source of life, i.e., the Creator.

(5.) The Holy Spirit, according to most of the Arians and to Origen, was created by the Son, -- the first and highest of the creatures called into being by his power.

The Orthodox.

The third party in the Council were the Orthodox, who constituted the great majority. All Christians were the worshippers of Christ. He was to them the object of supreme love and the ground of their confidence; to Him they were subject in heart and life. They looked to Him for everything. He was their God in the highest sense of the word. He was, moreover, in their apprehension, a distinct person, and not merely another name for the Father. But as the conviction was no less deeply rooted in the minds of Christians, that there is only one God or divine Being, the problem which the Council had to solve was to harmonize these apparently incompatible convictions, namely, that there is only one God, and yet that the Father is God, and the Son, as a distinct person, is God, the same in substance and equal in power and glory. The only thing to be done was, to preserve the essential elements of the doctrine, and yet not make the statement of it self-contradictory. To meet these conditions, the Council framed the following Creed, namely, "We believe in one God, the Father almighty, the maker of all things visible and invisible; and in one Lord Jesus Christ, the Son of God, only begotten, begotten of the Father, that is, of the essence of the Father, God of God, Light of Light, very God of very God, begotten and not made, consubstantial with the Father, by whom all things were made whether in heaven or on earth; who for us men and our salvation came down from heaven; and was incarnate and became man, suffered and rose again on the third day; ascended into heaven, and will come to judge the living and the dead. And we believe in the Holy Ghost. But those who say, that there was a time when He (the Son) was not, that He was not before He was made, or was made out of nothing, or of another or different essence or substance, that He was a creature, or mutable, or susceptible of change, the Holy Catholic Church anathematizes."

B. Council of Constantinople. The so-called Athanasian Creed.

The most obvious deficiency in the Nicene Creed is the omission of any definite statement concerning the Holy Spirit. This is to be accounted for by the fact that the doctrine concerning the Son, and his relation to the Father, was then the absorbing subject of controversy. Athanasius, however, and other expounders and defenders of the Nicene Creed, insisted that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son, and that such was the mind of the Council. As this, however, was disputed, it was distinctly asserted in several provincial Councils, as in that of Alexandria, A.D. 362, and that of Rome, A.D. 375. It was opposition to this doctrine which led to the calling of the Second Ecumenical Council, which met in Constantinople, A.D. 381. In the modification of the Nicene Creed, as issued by that Council, the following words were added to the clause, "We believe in the Holy Ghost," namely: "Who is the Lord and giver of life, who proceedeth from the Father, who with the Father and the Son together is worshipped and glorified, who spoke by the

prophets." Some of the Greek and the great body of the Latin fathers held that the Spirit proceeded from the Son as well as from the Father, and by the Synod of Toledo, A.D. 589, the words filioque were added to the creed. This addition was one of the causes which led to the separation of the Eastern and Western Churches.

The Athanasian Creed.

After the Council of Constantinople, A.D. 381, the controversies which agitated the Church had reference to the constitution of the person of Christ. Before the questions involved in those controversies were authoritatively decided, the so-called Athanasian Creed, an amplification of those of Nice and of Constantinople came to be generally adopted, at least, among the Western Churches. That creed was in these words, namely: "Whoever would be saved, must first of all take care that he hold the Catholic faith, which, except a man preserve whole and inviolate, he shall without doubt perish eternally. But this is the Catholic faith, that we worship one God in trinity, and trinity in unity. Neither confounding the persons nor dividing the substance. For the person of the Father is one; of the Son, another; of the Holy Spirit, another. But the divinity of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Spirit, is one, the glory equal, the majesty equal. Such as is the Father, such also is the Son, and such the Holy Spirit. The Father is uncreated, the Son is uncreated, the Holy Spirit is uncreated. The Father is infinite, the Son is infinite, the Holy Spirit is infinite. The Father is eternal, the Son is eternal, the Holy Spirit is eternal. And yet there are not three eternal Beings, but one eternal Being. As also there are not three uncreated Beings, nor three infinite Beings, but one uncreated and one infinite Being. In like manner, the Father is omnipotent, the Son is omnipotent, and the Holy Spirit is omnipotent. And yet, there are not three omnipotent Beings, but one omnipotent Being. Thus the Father is God, the Son, God, and the Holy Spirit, God. And yet there are not three Gods, but one God only. The Father is Lord, the Son, Lord, and the Holy Spirit, Lord. And yet there are not three Lords, but one Lord only. For as we are compelled by Christian truth to confess each person distinctively to be both God and Lord, we are prohibited by the Catholic religion to say that there are three Gods, or three Lords. The Father is made by none, nor created, nor begotten. The Son is from the Father alone, not made, not created, but begotten. The Holy Spirit is not created by the Father and the Son, nor begotten, but proceeds. Therefore, there is one Father, not three Fathers; one Son, not three Sons; one Holy Spirit, not three Holy Spirits. And in this Trinity there is nothing prior or posterior, nothing greater or less, but all three persons are coeternal, and coequal to themselves. So that through all, as was said above, both unity in trinity, and trinity in unity is to be adored. Whoever would be saved, let him thus think concerning the Trinity."

It is universally agreed that Athanasius was not the author of this creed. It appears only in the Latin language in its original form; and it has modes of expression borrowed from the writings of Augustine, and of Vincent of Lerins. A.D. 434. As it also contains allusions to subsequent controversies concerning the person of Christ, it is naturally referred to some period between the middle of the fifth and the middle of the sixth centuries. Although not issued with the authority of any Council, it was soon universally admitted in the West, and subsequently in the East, and was everywhere regarded as an ecumenical symbol.

The Doctrine of the Trinity as set forth in these three ancient creeds, -- the Nicene, the Constantinopolitan, and Athanasian (so-called), -- is the Church Form of that fundamental

article of the Christian faith. There is no difference, except as to amplification, between these several formulas.

[474] De Trinitate, I. vi. 9, edit. Benedictines, vol. viii. p. 1161, c.

§ 5. Points decided by these Councils.

A. Against Sabellianism.

These Councils decided that the terms Father, Son, and Spirit, were not expressive merely of relations ad extra, analogous to the terms, Creator, Preserver, and Benefactor. This was the doctrine known as Sabellianism, which assumed that the Supreme Being is not only one in essence, but one in person. The Church doctrine asserts that Father, Son, and Spirit express internal, necessary, and eternal relations in the Godhead; that they are personal designations, so that the Father is one person, the Son another person, and the Spirit another person. They differ not as allo kai allo, but as allos kai allos; each says I, and each says Thou, to either of the others. The word used in the Greek Church to express this fact was first prosopon, and afterwards, and by general consent hupostasis; in the Latin Church, "persona," and in English, person. The idea expressed by the word in its application to the distinctions in the Godhead, is just as clear and definite as in its application to men.

B. Against the Arians and Semi-Arians.

The Councils held that the Father, Son, and Spirit are the same in substance, and equal in power and glory. Whatever divine perfection, whether eternity, immutability, infinity, omnipotence, or holiness, justice, goodness, or truth, can be predicated of the one, can in the same sense and measure be predicated of the others. These attributes belonging to the divine essence, and that essence being common to the three persons, the attributes or perfections are in like manner common to each. It is not the Father as such, nor the Son as such, who is self-existent, infinite, and eternal, but the Godhead, or divine essence, which subsists in the three persons. The Greek words used to express that which was common to the three persons of the Trinity were, as we have seen, ousia, phusis, and at first, hupostasis; to which correspond the Latin words substantia, or essentia, and natura; and the English, substance, essence, and nature. The word selected by the Nicene fathers to express the idea of community of substance, was, homoousios. But this word, as we have already seen, may express either specific sameness, or numerical identity. In the former sense, all spirits, whether God, angels, or men, are homoousioi. They are similar in essence, i.e., they are rational intelligences. That the Council intended the word to be taken in the latter sense, as expressing numerical identity, is plain, (1.) Because in its wider sense homoousios does not differ from homoiousios, which word the Council refused to adopt. The Arians were willing to admit that the Father, Son, and Spirit were homoiousioi, but refused to admit that they were homoousioi. This proves that the words were used in radically different senses. (2.) Because this Council declares that the Son was eternal; that He was not created or made, but begotten ek tes ousias tou patros, "of the very essence of the Father." (3.) This is implied in the explanation of "eternal generation" universally adopted by the Nicene fathers, as "the eternal communication of the same numerical essence whole and entire, from the Father to the Son." (4.) If the term homoousios be taken in the sense of specific

sameness, then the Nicene Creed teaches Tritheism. The Father, Son, and Spirit are three Gods in the same sense that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are three men, for all men in that sense of the term are homoousioi. It is the clear doctrine of these Councils that the same numerical, infinite, indivisible essence subsists in the three persons of the Trinity. This is still further evident from the inadequate illustrations of this great mystery which the early fathers sought for in nature; as of the light, heat, and splendor of the sun; the fountain and its streams; and especially from memory, intelligence, and will in man. In all these illustrations, however inadequate, the point of analogy was unity (numerical identity) of essence with triplicity.

C. The Mutual Relation of the Persons of the Trinity.

On this subject the Nicene doctrine includes, --

1. The principle of the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and the Son. But this subordination does not imply inferiority. For as the same divine essence with all its infinite perfections is common to the Father, Son, and Spirit, there can be no inferiority of one person to the other in the Trinity. Neither does it imply posteriority; for the divine essence common to the several persons is self-existent and eternal. The subordination intended is only that which concerns the mode of subsistence and operation, implied in the Scriptural facts that the Son is of the Father, and the Spirit is of the Father and the Son, and that the Father operates through the Son, and the Father and the Son through the Spirit.

2. The several persons of the Trinity are distinguished by a certain "property," as it is called, or characteristic. That characteristic is expressed by their distinctive appellations. The first person is characterized as Father, in his relation to the second person; the second is characterized as Son, in relation to the first person; and the third as Spirit, in relation to the first and second persons. Paternity, therefore, is the distinguishing property of the Father; filiation of the Son; and procession of the Spirit. It will be observed that no attempt at explanation of these relations is given in these ecumenical creeds, namely, the Nicene, that of Constantinople, and the Athanasian. The mere facts as revealed in Scripture are affirmed.

3. The third point decided concerning the relation of the persons of the Trinity, one to the other, relates to their union. As the essence of the Godhead is common to the several persons, they have a common intelligence, will, and power. There are not in God three intelligences, three wills, three efficiencies. The Three are one God, and therefore have one mind and will. This intimate union was expressed in the Greek Church by the word perichoresis, which the Latin words inexistentia, inhabitatio, and intercommunio, were used to explain. These terms were intended to express the Scriptural facts that the Son is in the Father, and the Father in the Son; that where the Father is, there the Son and Spirit are; that what the one does the others do (the Father creates, the Son creates, the Spirit creates), or, as our Lord expresses it, "What things soever" the Father "doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." (John v. 19.) So also what the one knows, the others know. "The Spirit searcheth all things, yea, the deep things of God. For what man knoweth the things of a man, save the spirit of man which is in him? even so the things of God knoweth no man, but the Spirit of God." (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11.) A common knowledge implies a common consciousness. In man the soul and body are distinct, yet, while united, they have a common life. We

distinguish between acts of the intellect, and acts of the will, and yet in every act of the will there is an exercise of the intelligence; as in every act of the affections there is a joint action of the intelligence and will. These are not illustrations of the relations of the persons of the Trinity, which are ineffable, but of the fact that in other and entirely different spheres there is this community of life in different subsistences, -- different subsistences, at least so far as the body and soul are concerned.

This fact -- of the intimate union, communion, and inhabitation of the persons of the Trinity -- is the reason why everywhere in Scripture, and instinctively by all Christians, God as God is addressed as a person, in perfect consistency with the Tripersonality of the Godhead. We can, and do pray to each of the Persons separately; and we pray to God as God; for the three persons are one God; one not only in substance, but in knowledge, will, and power. To expect that we, who cannot understand anything, not even ourselves, should understand these mysteries of the Godhead, is to the last degree unreasonable. But as in every other sphere we must believe what we cannot understand; so we may believe all that God has revealed in his Word concerning Himself, although we cannot understand the Almighty unto perfection.

§ 6. Examination of the Nicene Doctrine.

A. Subordination.

A distinction must be made between the Nicene Creed (as amplified in that of Constantinople) and the doctrine of the Nicene fathers. The creeds are nothing more than a well-ordered arrangement of the facts of Scripture which concern the doctrine of the Trinity. They assert the distinct personality of the Father, Son, and Spirit; their mutual relation as expressed by those terms; their absolute unity as to substance or essence, and their consequent perfect equality; and the subordination of the Son to the Father, and of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, as to the mode of subsistence and operation. These are Scriptural facts, to which the creeds in question add nothing; and it is in this sense they have been accepted by the Church universal.

But the Nicene fathers did undertake, to a greater or less degree, to explain these facts. These explanations relate principally to the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father, and to what is meant by generation, or the relation between the Father and the Son. These two points are so intimately related that they cannot be considered separately. Yet as the former is more comprehensive than the latter, it may be expedient to speak of them in order, although what belongs to the one head, in a good degree belongs also to the other.

The ambiguity of the word homoousios has already been remarked upon. As ousia,a may mean generic nature common to many individuals, not unum in numero, but ens unum in multis, so homoousios (consubstantial) may mean nothing more than sameness of species or kind. It is therefore said, that "the term homoousion, in its strict grammatical sense differs from monoousion or toutoousion, as well as from heteroousion, and signifies not numerical identity, but equality of essence or community of nature among several beings." [475] "The Nicene Creed," Dr. Schaff adds, "does not expressly assert the singleness or numerical unity of the divine essence (unless it be in the first article: we believe in one God'), and the main point with the Nicene fathers was to urge against Arianism the strict divinity and

essential equality of the Son and Holy Ghost with the Father. If we press the difference of homoousion from monoousion, and overlook the many passages in which they assert with equal emphasis the monarchia or numerical unity of the Godhead, we must charge them with tritheism."

Gieseler goes much further, and denies that the Nicene fathers held the numerical identity of essence in the persons of the Trinity. The Father, Son, and Spirit were the same in substance as having the same nature, or same kind of substance. This he infers was their doctrine not only from the general style of their teaching, and from special declarations, but from the illustrations which they habitually employed. The Father and the Son are the same in substance as among men father and son have the same nature; or as Basil says, Father and Son differ in rank, as do the angels, although they are the same in nature. Gieseler says that the numerical sameness of nature in the three divine persons, was first asserted by Augustine. It was he, according to Gieseler, who first excluded all idea of subordination in the Trinity. [476] "Athanasius and Hilary understood the proposition, There is one God' of the Father. Basil the Great and the two Gregories understood by the word God a generic idea (Gattungsbegriff), belonging equally to the Father and the Son. Basil in the Apologia ad C[illegible]sarienses,' says, hemeis hena theon, cu to arithmo, alla te phusei homologoumen, and endeavours to show that there can be no question of number in reference to God, as numerical difference pertains only to material things. Augustine on the contrary expressly excludes the idea of generic unity, [477] and understands the proposition there is one God' not of the Father alone, but of the whole Trinity, [478] and, therefore, taught that there is one God in three persons." This, however, is the precise doctrine of the Nicene Creed itself, which affirms faith "in one God," and not in three. Basil in the place quoted is refuting the charge of Tritheism. His words are, pros de tous epereazontas hemin to tritheon, ekeino legestho hotiper hemeis hena theon, etc. [479] On page 460 reasons have already been given for assuming that the sameness of substance taught by the Nicene fathers was not simply generic but numerical. On this subject Pearson, a thorough advocate of the Nicene Creed, says, "As it (the divine nature) is absolutely immaterial and incorporeal, it is also indivisible; Christ cannot have any part of it only communicated unto Him, but the whole, by which He must be acknowledged co-essential, of the same substance with the Father; as the Council of Nice determined, and the ancient fathers before them taught." [480] If the whole divine essence belongs equally to the several persons of the Trinity, there is an end to the question, whether the sameness be specific or numerical. Accordingly the Bishop says: "The Divine essence being by reason of its simplicity not subject to division, and in respect of its infinity uncapable of multiplication, is so communicated as not to be multiplied; insomuch that He which proceedeth by that communication hath not only the same nature, but is also the same God. The Father God, and the Word God; Abraham man, and Isaac man: but Abraham one man, Isaac another man; not so the Father one God, and the Word another, but the Father and the Word both the same God." [481]

Gieseler says that Augustine effectually excluded all idea of subordination in the Trinity by teaching the numerical sameness of essence in the persons of the Godhead. This does indeed preclude all priority and all superiority as to being and perfection. But it does not preclude subordination as to the mode of subsistence and operation. This is distinctly recognized in Scripture, and was as fully taught by Augustine as by any of the Greek fathers, and is even more distinctly affirmed in the so-called Athanasian Creed, representing the

school of Augustine, than in the Creed of the Council of Nice. There is, therefore, no just ground of objection to the Nicene Creed for what it teaches on that subject. It does not go beyond the facts of Scripture. But the fathers who framed that creed, and those by whom it was defended, did go beyond those facts. They endeavoured to explain what was the nature of that subordination. While denying to the Father any priority or superiority to the other persons of the Trinity, as to being or perfection, they still spoke of the Father as the Monas, as having in order of thought the whole Godhead in Himself; so that He alone was God of Himself (autotheos, in that sense of the word), that He was the fountain, the cause, the root, fons, origo, principium, of the divinity as subsisting in the Son and Spirit; that He was greater than the other divine persons. They understood many passages which speak of the inferiority of the Son to the Father, of the Logos as such; and not of the historical Son of God clothed in our nature. Thus Waterland [482] says of these fathers, "The title of ho Theos, being understood in the same sense with autotheos, was, as it ought to be, generally reserved to the Father, as the distinguishing personal character of the first person of the Holy Trinity. And this amounts to no more than the acknowledgment of the Father's prerogative as Father. But as it might also signify any Person who is truly and essentially God, it might properly be applied to the Son too: and it is so applied sometimes, though not so often as it is to the Father."

Hilary of Poictiers expresses the general idea of the Nicene fathers on this point, when he says: "Et quis non Patrem potiorem confitebitur, ut ingenitum a genito, ut patrem a filio, ut eum qui miserit ab eo qui missus est, ut volentem ab ipso qui obediat? Et ipse nobis erit testis: Pater major me est. H[?]c ita ut sunt, intelligenda sunt, sed cavendum est, ne apud imperitos gloriam Filii honor Patris infirmet." [483]

Bishop Pearson [484] says the pre[?]minence of the Father "undeniably consisteth in this: that He is God not of any other but of Himself, and that there is no other person who is God, but is God of Himself. It is no diminution to the Son, to say He is from another, for his very name imports as much; but it were a diminution to the Father to speak so of Him; and there must be some pre[?]minence, where there is place for derogation. What the Father is, He is from none; what the Son is, He is from Him; what the first is, He giveth; what the second is, He receiveth. The First is Father indeed by reason of his Son, but He is not God by reason of Him; whereas the Son is not so only in regard of the Father, but also God by reason of the same." Among the patristical authorities quoted by Pearson, are the following from Augustine: [485] "Pater de nullo patre, Filius de Deo Patre. Pater quod est, a nullo est: quod autem Pater est, propter Filium est. Filius vero et quod Filius est, propter Patrem est, et quod est, a Patre est." "Filius non hoc tantum habet nascendo, ut Filius sit, sed omnino ut sit. . . . . Filius non tantum ut sit Filius, quod relative dicitur, sed omnino ut sit, ipsam substantiam nascendo habet." [486]

The Reformers themselves were little inclined to enter into these speculations. They were specially repugnant to such a mind as Luther's. He insisted on taking the Scriptural facts as they were, without any attempt at explanation. He says: "We should, like the little children, stammer out what the Scriptures teach: that Christ is truly God, that the Holy Ghost is truly God, and yet that there are not three Gods, or three Beings, as there are three Men, three Angels, three Suns, or three Windows. No, God is not thus divided in his essence; but there is one only divine Being or substance. Therefore, although there are three

persons, God the Father, God the Son, and God the Holy Ghost, yet the Being is not divided or distinguished; since there is but one God in one single, undivided, divine substance." [487]

Calvin also was opposed to going beyond the simple statement of the Scriptures. [488] After saying that Augustine devotes the fifth book on the Trinity to the explanation of the relation between the Father and the Son, he adds: "Longe vero tutius est in ea quam tradit relatione subsistere, quam subtilius penetrando ad sublime mysterium, per multas evanidas speculationes evagari. Ergo quibus cordi erit sobrietas et qui fidei mensura contenti erunt, breviter quod utile est cognitu accipiant: nempe quum profitemur nos credere in unum Deum, sub Dei nomine intelligi unicam et simplicem essentiam, in qua comprehendimus tres personas vel hypostaseis: ideoque quoties Dei nomen indefinite ponitur, non minus Filium et Spiritum, quam Patrem designari: ubi autem adjungitur Filius Patri, tunc in medium venit relatio: atque ita distinguimus inter personas. Quia vero proprietates in personis ordinem secum ferunt, ut in Patre sit principium et origo: quoties mentio sit Patris et Filii simul, vel Spiritus, nomen Dei peculiariter Patri tribuitur. Hoc modo retinetur unitas essenti[illegible] et habetur ratio ordinis, qu[illegible] tamen ex Filii et Spiritus deitate nihil minuit: et certe quum ante visum fuerit Apostolos asserere Filium Dei illum esse, quem Moses et Prophet[illegible] testati sunt esse Jehovam, semper ad unitatem essenti[illegible], venire necesse est." We have here the three essential facts involved in the doctrine of the Trinity, namely, unity of essence, distinction of persons, and subordination without any attempt at explanation.

Calvin was accused by some of his contemporaries of teaching the incompatible doctrines of Sabellianism and Arianism. In a letter to his friend Simon Gryn[illegible]e, rector of the Academy of Basle, dated May, 1537, he says the ground on which the charge of Sabellianism rested, was his having said that Christ was "that Jehovah, who of Himself alone was always self-existent, which charge," he says, "I was quite ready to meet." His answer is: "If the distinction between the Father and the Word be attentively considered, we shall say that the one is from the other. If, however, the essential quality of the Word be considered, in so far as He is one God with the Father, whatever can be said concerning God may also be applied to Him the Second Person in the glorious Trinity. Now, what is the meaning of the name Jehovah? What did that answer imply which was spoken to Moses? I AM THAT I AM. Paul makes Christ the author of this saying." [489] This argument is conclusive. If Christ be Jehovah, and if the name Jehovah implies self-existence, then Christ is self-existent. In other words, self-existence and necessary existence, as well as omnipotence and all other divine attributes, belong to the divine essence common to all the persons of the Trinity, and therefore it is the Triune God who is self-existent, and not one person in distinction from the other persons. That is, self-existence is not to be predicated of the divine essence only, nor of the Father only, but of the Trinity, or of the Godhead as subsisting in three persons. And, therefore, as Calvin says, when the word God is used indefinitely it means the Triune God, and not the Father in distinction from the Son and Spirit.

B. Eternal Generation.

As in reference to the subordination of the Son and Spirit to the Father, as asserted in the ancient creeds, it is not to the fact that exception is taken, but to the explanation of that fact, as given by the Nicene fathers, the same is true with regard to the doctrine of Eternal

Generation. It is no doubt a Scriptural fact that the relation between the First and Second persons of the Trinity is expressed by the relative terms Father and Son. It is also said that the Son is begotten of the Father; He is declared to be the only begotten Son of God. The relation, therefore, of the Second Person to the First is that of filiation or sonship. But what is meant by the term, neither the Bible nor the ancient creeds explain. It may be sameness of nature; as a son is of the same nature as his father. It may be likeness, and the term Son be equivalent to eikon, apaugasma, charakter, or logos, or revealer. It may be derivation of essence, as a son, in one sense, is derived from his father. Or, it may be something altogether inscrutable and to us incomprehensible.

The Nicene fathers, instead of leaving the matter where the Scriptures leave it, undertake to explain what is meant by sonship, and teach that it means derivation of essence. The First Person of the Trinity is Father, because He communicates the essence of the Godhead to the Second Person; and the Second Person is Son, because He derives that essence from the First Person. This is what they mean by Eternal Generation. Concerning which it was taught, --

1. That it was the person not the essence of the Son that was generated. The essence is self-existent and eternal, but the person of the Son is generated (i.e., He becomes a person) by the communication to Him of the divine essence. This point continued to be insisted upon through the later periods of the Church. Thus Turrettin [490] says, "Licet Filius sit a Patre, non minus tamen autotheos dicitur, non ratione Person&#65533;, sed ratione Essenti&#65533;; non relate qua Filius, sic enim est a Patre, sed absolute qua Deus, quatenus habet Essentiam divinam a se existentem, et non divisam vel productam ab alia essentia, non vero qua habens essentiam illam a seipso. Sic Filius est Deus a seipso, licet non sit a seipso Filius."

Again, [491] "Persona bene dicitur generare Personam, quia actiones sunt suppositorum; sed non Essentia Essentiam, quia quod gignit et gignitur necessario multiplicatur, et sic via sterneretur ad Tritheismum. Essentia quidem generando communicatur; sed generatio, ut a Persona fit originaliter, ita ad Personam terminatur." This is the common mode of representation.

2. This generation is said to be eternal. "It is an eternal movement in the divine essence."

3. It is by necessity of nature, and not by the will of the Father.

4. It does not involve any separation or division, as it is not a part, but the whole and complete essence of the Father that is communicated from the Father to the Son.

5. It is without change.

The principal grounds urged in support of this representation, are the nature of sonship among men, and the passage in John v. 26, where it is said, "As the Father hath life in Himself, so hath He given to the Son to have life in Himself."

It is admitted that the relation between the First and Second persons in the Trinity is expressed by the words Father and Son, and therefore while everything in this relation as it exists among men, implying imperfection or change, must be eliminated, yet the essential idea of paternity must be retained. That essential idea is assumed to be the communication of the essence of the parent to his child; and, therefore, it is maintained that there must be a communication of the essence of the Godhead from the Father to the Son in the Holy Trinity.

But, in the first place, it is a gratuitous assumption that, so far as the soul is concerned, there is even among men any communication of the essence of the parent to the child. Traducianism has never been the general doctrine of the Christian Church. As, therefore, it is, to say the least, doubtful, whether there is any communication of the essence of the soul in human paternity, it is unreasonable to assume that such communication is essential to the relation of Father and Son in the Trinity.

In the second place, while it is admitted that the terms Father and Son are used to give us some idea of the mutual relation of the First and Second persons of the Trinity, yet they do not definitely determine what that relation is. It may be equality and likeness. Among men Father and Son belong to the same order of beings. The one is not inferior in nature, although he may be in rank, to the other. And the son is like his father. In the same manner in the Holy Trinity the Second Person is said to be the eikon, the apaugasma, the charakter, the logos, the Word or Revealer of the Father, so that he who hears the Son hears the Father, he who hath seen the one has seen the other. Or the relation may be that of affection. The reciprocal love of father and son is peculiar. It is, so to speak, necessary; it is unchangeable, it is unfathomable; it leads, or has led, to every kind and degree of self-sacrifice. It is not necessary to assume in reference to the Trinity that these relations are all that the relative terms Father and Son are intended to reveal. These may be included, but much more may be implied which we are not now able to comprehend. All that is contended for is, that we are not shut up to the admission that derivation of essence is essential to sonship.

As to the passage in John v. 26, where it is said the Father hath given to the Son to have life in Himself, everything depends on the sense in which the word Son is to be taken. That word is sometimes used as a designation of the logos, the Second Person of the Trinity, to indicate his eternal relation to the First Person as the Father. It is, however, very often used as a designation of the incarnate logos, the Word made flesh. Many things are in Scripture predicated of the Godman, which cannot be predicated of the Second Person of the Trinity as such. If in this passage the Son means the Logos, then it does teach that the First Person of the Trinity communicated life, and therefore the essence in which that life inheres, to the Second Person. But if Son here designates the Theanthropos, then the passage teaches no such doctrine. That it is the historical person, Jesus of Nazareth here spoken of, may be argued not only from the fact that He is elsewhere so frequently called the Son of God, as in the comprehensive confession required of every Christian in the apostolic age, "I believe that Jesus is the Son of God;" but also from the context. Our Lord had healed an impotent man on the Sabbath. For this the Jews accused Him of breaking the Sabbath. He vindicated Himself by saying that He had the same right to work on the Sabbath that God had, because He was the Son of God, and therefore equal with God. That He had power not only to heal but to give life, just as the Father had life in Himself, so had He given to the Son to have life in Himself. He had also given Him authority to execute judgment. He was to be the judge of the quick and dead, because He is the Son of man, i.e., because He had become man for us and for our salvation. His accusers need not be surprised at what He said, because the hour was coming when all who are in the grave shall hear his voice, and shall come forth, they who have done good, unto the resurrection of life, and they who had done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation. The subject of discourse, therefore, in the context, is the historical person who had healed the impotent

man, and who with equal propriety could be called God or man, because He was both God and man. What the passage teaches, therefore, concerns the constitution of Christ's person as He appeared on earth, and not the nature of the relation of the Father and Son in the Godhead.

C. Eternal Sonship.

There is, therefore, a distinction between the speculations of the Nicene fathers, and the decisions of the Nicene Council. The latter have been accepted by the Church universal, but not the former. The Council declared that our Lord is the Eternal Son of God, i.e., that He is from eternity the Son of God. This of course involves the denial that He became the Son of God in time; and, consequently, that the primary and essential reason for his being called Son is not his miraculous birth, nor his incarnation, nor his resurrection, nor his exaltation to the right hand of God. The Council decided that the word Son as applied to Christ, is not a term of office but of nature; that it expresses the relation which the Second Person in the Trinity from eternity bears to the First Person, and that the relation thus indicated is sameness of nature, so that sonship, in the case of Christ, includes equality with God. In other words, God was in such a sense his Father that He was equal with God. And consequently every time the Scriptures call Jesus the Son of God, they assert his true and proper divinity. This does not imply that every time Christ is called the Son of God, what is said of Him is to be understood of his divine nature. The fact is patent, and is admitted that the person of our Lord may be designated from either nature. He may be called the Son of David and the Son of God. And his person may be designated from one nature when what is predicated of Him is true only of the other nature. Thus, on the one hand, the Lord of Glory was crucified; God purchased the Church with his blood; and the Son is said to be ignorant; and, on the other hand, the Son of Man is said to be in heaven when He was on earth. This being admitted it remains true that Christ is called the Son of God as to his divine nature. The Logos, the Second Person of the Trinity as such and because of his relation to the First Person, is the Son of God. Such is the doctrine of the Nicene Council, and that it is no less the doctrine of the Scriptures, is plain from the following considerations : --

1. The terms Father, Son, and Spirit, as applied to the persons of the Trinity, are relative terms. The relations which they express are mutual relations, i.e., relations in which the different persons stand one to another. The First Person is called Father, not because of his relation to his creatures, but because of his relation to the Second Person. The Second Person is called Son, not because of any relation assumed in time, but because of his eternal relation to the First Person. And the Third Person is called Spirit because of his relation to the First and Second.

2. If, as the whole Christian Church believes, the doctrine of the Trinity is a Scriptural doctrine, and if, as is also admitted by all the parties to this discussion, it was the purpose of God to reveal that doctrine to the knowledge and faith of his people, there is a necessity for the use of terms by which the persons of the Trinity should be designated and revealed. But if the terms Father, Son, and Spirit do not apply to the persons of the Trinity as such, and express their mutual relations, there are no such distinctive terms in the Bible by which they can be known and designated.

3. There are numerous passages in the Scriptures which clearly prove that our Lord is called Son, not merely because He is the image of God, or because He is the object of

peculiar affection, nor because of his miraculous conception only; nor because of his exaltation, but because of the eternal relation which He sustains to the First Person of the Trinity. These passages are of two kinds. First, those in which the Logos is called Son, or in which Christ as to his divine nature and before his incarnation is declared to be the Son of God; and secondly, those in which the application of the term Son to Christ involves the ascription of divinity to Him. He is declared to be the Son of God in such a sense as implies equality with God. To the former of these classes belong such passages as the following: Rom. i. 3, 4, where Christ is declared to be kata sarka, the Son of David, and kata pneuma hagiosunes, the Son of God. That pneuma hagiosunes does not here mean the Holy Spirit, much less a pneumatic state, but the higher or divine nature of Christ, is evident from the antithesis. As to his human nature, He is the Son of David; as to his divine nature, He is the Son of God. As to his humanity, He is consubstantial with man; as to his divinity, He is consubstantial with God. If his being the Son of David proves He was a man, his being the Son of God proves that He is God. Hence Christ was called Son before his incarnation, as in Gal. iv. 4, "God sent forth his Son, made of a woman." It was the Logos that was sent, and the Logos was Son. Thus in John i. 1-14, we are taught that the Logos was in the beginning with God, that He was God, that He made all things, that He was the light and life of men, and that He became flesh, and revealed his glory as the Son of God. Here it is plain that the Logos or Word is declared to be the Son. And in the eighteenth verse of that chapter it is said, "No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son, which is in the bosom of the Father (o on eis ton kolpon tou patros, He hath declared Him." Here the present tense, o on, expresses permanent being; He who is, was, and ever shall be, in the bosom of the Father, i.e., most intimately united with Him, so as to know Him, as He knows Himself, is the Son. According to Chrysostom, this language implies the sungeneia kai henotes tes ousias of the Father and the Son, which were not interrupted by his manifestation in the flesh. To the latter class belong such passages as the following: John v. 18-25, where Christ calls God his Father in a sense which implied equality with God. If sonship implies equality with God, it implies participation of the divine essence. It was for claiming to be the Son of God in this sense, that the Jews took up stones to stone Him. Our Lord defended Himself by saying that He had the same power God had, the same authority, the same life-giving energy, and therefore was entitled to the same honour. In John x. 30-38 there is a similar passage, in which Christ says that God is his Father in such a sense that He and the Father are one. In the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is argued that Christ does not belong to the category of creatures; that all angels (i.e., all intelligent creatures higher than man) are subject to Him, and are required to worship Him because He is the Son of God. As Son He is the brightness of the Father's glory, the express image of his person, upholding all things by the word of his power. Because He is the Son of God, He is the God who in the beginning laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of his hands. They are mutable, but He is unchangeable and eternal.

There can, therefore, be no reasonable doubt that according to the Scriptures, the term Son as applied to Christ expresses the relation of the Second to the First Person in the adorable Trinity. In other words, it is not merely an official title, but designates the Logos and not exclusively the Theanthropos.

4. Another argument in proof of this doctrine is derived from the fact that Christ is declared to be "the only-begotten Son of God," "his own Son," i.e., his Son in a peculiar

and proper sense. Angels and men are called the sons of God, because He is the Father of all spirits. Holy men are his sons because partakers of his moral nature, as wicked men are called children of the devil. God's people are his sons and daughters by regeneration and adoption. It is in opposition to all these kinds of sonship that Christ is declared to be God's only Son, the only person in the universe to whom the word can be applied in its full sense as expressing sameness of essence.

Objections to the Doctrine.

The speculative objections to this doctrine of eternal sonship have already been considered. If Christ is Son, if He is God of God, it is said He is not self-existent and independent. But self-existence, independence, etc., are attributes of the divine essence, and not of one person in distinction from the others. It is the Triune God who is self-existent and independent. Subordination as to the mode of subsistence and operation, is a Scriptural fact; and so also is the perfect and equal Godhead of the Father and the Son, and therefore these facts must be consistent. In the consubstantial identity of the human soul there is a subordination of one faculty to another, and so, however incomprehensible to us, there may be a subordination in the Trinity consistent with the identity of essence in the Godhead.

Psalm ii. 7.

More plausible objections are founded on certain passages of the Scriptures. In Ps. ii. 7, it is said, "Thou art my Son; this day have I begotten thee." From this it is argued that Christ or the Messiah was constituted or made the Son of God in time, and therefore was not the Son of God from eternity. To this it may be answered, --

1. That the term Son, as used in the Scriptures, expresses different relations, and therefore may be applied to the same person for different reasons; or, have one meaning, i.e., express one relation in one place, and a different one in another. It may refer or be applied to the Logos, or to the Theanthropos. One ground for the use of the designation does not exclude all the others. God commanded Moses to say unto Pharaoh, "Israel is my son, even my first-born." (Ex. iv. 22.) And He said of Solomon, "I will be his father and he shall be my son." (2 Sam. vii. 14.) The word son here expresses the idea of adoption, the selection of one people or of one man out of many to stand to God in a peculiar relation of intimacy, affection, honour, and dignity. If for these reasons the theocratic people, or a theocratic king, may be called the Son of God, for the same reasons, and preeminently, the Messiah may be so designated. But this is no argument to prove that the Logos may not in a far higher sense be called the Son of God.

2. The passage in question, however, need not be understood of an event which occurred in time. Its essential meaning is, "Thou art my Son, now art thou my Son." The occasion referred to by the words "this day" was the time when the Sonship of the king of Zion should be fully manifested. That time, as we learn from Rom. i. 4, was the day of his resurrection. By his rising again from the dead, He was clearly manifested to be all that He claimed to be, -- the Son of God and the Saviour of the world.

3. There is another interpretation of the passage which is essentially the same as that given by many of the fathers, and is thus presented by Dr. Addison Alexander in his commentary on Acts xiii. 33, "The expression in the Psalm, I have begotten thee,' means, I am He who has begotten thee, i. e., I am thy father. To-day' refers to the date of the decree itself (Jehovah said, Today, etc.); but this, as a divine act, was eternal, and so must be the

Sonship which it affirms."

Acts xiii. 32, 38.

It may be urged, however, that in Acts xiii. 32, 33, this passage is quoted in the proof of the resurrection of Christ, which shows that the Apostle understood the passage to teach that Christ was begotten or made the Son of God when He rose from the dead. The passage in Acts reads thus in our version: "We declare unto you glad tidings, how that the promise which was made unto the fathers, God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that He hath raised up Jesus again (anastesas); as it is also written in the second psalm, Thou art my Son, this day have I begotten thee." Here there is no reference to the resurrection. The glad tidings which the Apostle announced was not the resurrection, but the advent of the Messiah. That was the promise made to the fathers, which God had fulfilled by raising up, i.e., bringing into the world the promised deliverer. Compare Acts ii. 30; iii. 22, 26; vii. 31, in all which passages where the same word is used, the "raising up" refers to the advent of Christ; as when it is said, "A prophet shall the Lord your God raise up unto you of your brethren, like unto me." The word is never used absolutely in reference to the resurrection unless, as in Acts ii. 32, where the resurrection is spoken of in the context. Our translators have obscured the meaning by rendering anastesas "having raised up again," instead of simply "having raised up," as they render it elsewhere.

That this is the true meaning of the passage is clear from the succeeding verses. Paul having said that God had fulfilled his promise to the fathers by raising up Christ, agreeably to Psalm ii. 7, immediately adds as an additional fact, "And as concerning that He raised Him up from the dead, now no more to return to corruption, He said on this wise, I will give you the sure mercies of David. Wherefore he saith also in another psalm, Thou shalt not suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." (Acts xiii. 34, 35.) The Apostle, therefore, does not teach that Christ was made the Son of God by his resurrection. But even, as just remarked, if He did teach that the Theanthropos was in one sense made the Son of God, that would not prove that the Logos was not Son in another and higher sense.

Luke i. 35.

The same remark is applicable to Luke i. 35: "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee; therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." Bishop Pearson, one of the most strenuous defenders of "eternal generation," and of all the peculiarities of the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity, gives four reasons why the Theanthropos or Godman is called the Son of God. (1.) His miraculous conception. (2.) The high office to which he was designated. (John x. 34, 35, 36.) (3.) His resurrection, according to one interpretation of Acts xiii. 33. "The grave," he says, "is as the womb of the earth; Christ, who is raised from thence, is as it were begotten to another life, and God, who raised him, is his Father." [492] (4.) Because after his resurrection He was made the heir of all things. (Heb. i. 2-5.) Having assigned these reasons why the Godman is called Son, he goes on to show why the Logos is called Son. There is nothing, therefore, in the passages cited inconsistent with the Church doctrine of the eternal Sonship of our Lord. The language of the angel addressed to the Virgin Mary, may, however, mean no more than this, namely, that the assumption of humanity by the eternal Son of God was the reason why He should be recognized as a divine person. It was no ordinary child who was to be born of Mary, but one who was, in

the language of the prophets, to be the Wonderful, the Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Son of the Highest. It was because the Eternal Son was made of a woman, that that Holy Thing born of the virgin was to be called the Son of God.

It need hardly be remarked that no valid objection to the doctrine of the eternal Sonship of Christ, or, that He is Son as to his divine nature, can be drawn from such passages as speak of the Son as being less than the Father, or subject to Him, or even ignorant. If Christ can be called the Lord of glory, or God, when his death is spoken of, He may be called Son, when other limitations are ascribed to Him. As He is both God and man, everything that is true either of his humanity or of his divinity, may be predicated of Him as a person; and his person may be denominated from one nature, when the predicate belongs to the other nature. He is called the Son of Man when He is said to be omnipresent; and He is called God when He is said to have purchased the Church with his blood.

D. The Relation of the Spirit to the other Persons of the Trinity.

As the councils of Nice and Constantinople were fully justified by Scripture in teaching the eternal Sonship of Christ, so what they taught of the relation of the Spirit to the Father and the Son, has an adequate Scriptural foundation.

That relation is expressed by the word procession, with regard to which the common Church doctrine is, (1.) That it is incomprehensible, and therefore inexplicable. (2.) That it is eternal (3.) That it is equally from the Father and the Son. At least such is the doctrine of the Latin and all other Western churches. (4.) That this procession concerns the personality and operations of the Spirit, and not his essence.

The Scriptural grounds for expressing this relation by the term procession, are (1.) The signification of the word spirit. It means breath, that which proceeds from, and which gives expression and effect to our thoughts. Since Father and Son, as applied to the First and Second persons of the Trinity, are relative terms, it is to be assumed that the word Spirit as the designation of the Third Person, is also relative. (2.) This is further indicated by the use of the genitive case in the expressions pneuma tou patros, tou huiou, which is explained by the use of the preposition ek, as pneuma ek tou patros. The revealed fact is that the Spirit is of the Father, and the Church in calling the relation, thus indicated, a procession. does not attempt to explain it. (3.) In John xv. 26, where the Spirit is promised by Christ, He is said to proceed from the Father.

That the Latin and Protestant churches, in opposition to the Greek Church, are authorized in teaching that the Spirit proceeds not from the Father only, but from the Father and the Son, is evident, because whatever is said in Scripture of the relation of the Spirit to the Father, is also said of his relation to the Son. He is said to be the "Spirit of the Father," and "Spirit of the Son;" He is given or sent by the Son as well as by the Father; the Son is said to operate through the Spirit. The Spirit is no more said to send or to operate through the Son, than to send or operate through the Father. The relation, so far as revealed, is the same in the one case as in the other.

When we consider the incomprehensible nature of the Godhead, the mysterious character of the doctrine of the Trinity, the exceeding complexity and difficulty of the problem which the Church had to solve in presenting the doctrine that there are three persons and one God, in such a manner as to meet the requirements of Scripture and the convictions of believers, and yet avoid all contradiction, we can hardly fail to refer the

Church creeds on this subject, which have for ages secured assent and consent, not to inspiration, strictly speaking, but to the special guidance of the Holy Spirit.

[475] Schaff's History of the Christian Church, vol. iii. p. 672.

[476] Kirchengeschichte, vol. vi. § 60, p. 323. Bonn, 1855.

[477] De Trinitate, VII. vi. edit. Benedictines, vol. viii. p. 1314, d.

[478] Epistola, CCXXXVIII. iii. 18, vol. ii. p. 1304, a.

[479] Epistola, VIII. edit. Migne, vol. iii. p. 115, e.

[480] Pearson, On Creed, seventh edition, 1701, p. 135.

[481] Pearson, p. 133.

[482] Works, vol. i. p. 315.

[483] De Trinitate, III., Works, Paris, 1631, p. 23, a. See on this point Schaff's History of the Christian Church, vol. iii. § 130. Gieseler's Kirchengeschichte, vol. vi. § 60. Pearson, On the Creed, and especially, Bull's Defence of the Nicene Creed, fourth edition.

[484] Page 35.

[485] In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, xix. 13, edit. Benedictines, vol. iii. p. 1903, a.

[486] De Trinitate, v. xv. 16, vol. viii. p. 1286, c, d.

[487] Die Dritte Predigt a. Tage d. heil. Dreifaltigk, 5; Works, ed. Walch, vol. xiii. p. 1510.

[488] Institutio, I. xiii. 19, 20, edit. Berlin, 1834, part i. pp. 100, 101.

[489] Calvin's Letters, vol. i. pp. 55, 56, edit. Presbyterian Board, Philadelphia.

[490] Locus III. xxviii. 40, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 260.

[491] Ibid. xxix. 6, p. 262.

[492] Pearson on Creed, p. 106.

§ 7. Philosophical Form of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

The philosophical statements of the doctrine of the Trinity have been intended by their authors either to prove it, or to illustrate it, or to explain it away and substitute some speculative theory as to the constitution of the universe for the Scriptural doctrine of the Triune God. The two former of these classes, those designed for proof, and those designed for illustration, need not be discriminated. It may be remarked in reference to them all that they are of little value. They do not serve to make the inconceivable intelligible. The most they can do, is to show that in other spheres and in relation to other subjects, we find a somewhat analogous triplicity in unity. In most cases, however, these illustrations proceed on the assumption that there are mysteries in the Godhead which have no counterpart in the constitution of our nature, or in anything around us in the present state of our existence.

We have already seen that the fathers were accustomed to refer to the union of light, heat, and radiance in the one substance of the sun; to a fountain and its streams; to the root, stem, and flower of a plant; to the intellect, will, and affections in the soul; as examples of at least a certain kind of triplicity in unity, elsewhere than in the Godhead. The last-mentioned analogy, especially, was frequently presented, and that in different forms. Augustine said, that as man was made in the image of the Triune God, we have reason to

expect something in the constitution of our nature answering to the Trinity in the Godhead. He refers to the memory, intelligence, and will, as co-existing in one mind, so that the operations of the one are involved in the operations of the others. Gregory of Nyssa refers for his illustration to the soul, the reason, and the living power, united in one spiritual substance in man. It was admitted, however, that these analogies did not hold as to the main point, for these different powers in man are not different subsistences, but different modes of activity of one and the same personal essence, so that these illustrations lead rather to the Sabellian, than to the Scriptural view of the doctrine of the Trinity.

By far the most common illustration was borrowed from the operations of our consciousness. We conceive of ourselves as objective to ourselves, and are conscious of the identity of the subject and object. We have thus the subjective Ego, the objective Ego, and the identity of the two; the desired Thesis, Analysis, and Synthesis. In one form or another, this illustration has come down from the fathers, through the schoolmen and reformers, to theologians of our own day. Augustine [493] says, "Est qu�dam imago Trinitatis, ipsa mens, et notitia ejus, quod est proles ejus ac de seipsa verbum ejus, et amor tertius, et h�c tria unum atque una substantia." Again, [494] "H�c -- tria, memoria, intelligentia, voluntas, quoniam non sunt tres vit�, sed una vita; nec tres mentes, sed una mens: consequenter utique nec tres substanti� sunt, sed una substantia." And, [495] "Mens igitur quando cogitatione se conspicit, intelligit se et recognoscit: gignit ergo hunc intellectum et cognitionem suam. . . . . H�c autem duo, gignens et genitum, dilectione tertia copulantur, qu� nihil est aliud quam voluntas fruendum aliquid appetens vel tenens." Anselm [496] has the same idea: "Habet mens rationalis, quum se cogitando intelligit, secum imaginem suam ex se natam, id est cogitationem sui ad suam similitudinem, quasi sua impressione formatam, quamvis ipsa se a sua imagine, non nisi ratione sola, separare possit, qu� imago ejus verbum ejus est. Hoc itaque modo, quis neget, summam sapientem, quum se dicendo intelligit, gignere consubstantialem sibi similitudinem suam, id est Verbum suum." Melancthon [497] adopts and carries out the same idea: "Filius dicitur imago et logos: est igitur imago cogitatione Patris genita; quod ut aliquo modo considerari possit, a nostra mente exempla capiamus. Voluit enim Deus in homine conspici vestigia sua. . . . . Mens humana cogitando mox pingit imaginem rei cogitat�, sed nos non transfundimus nostram essentiam in illas imagines, suntque cogitationes ill� subit� et evanescentes actiones. At Pater �ternus sese intuens gignit cogitatonem sui, qu� est imago ipsius, non evanescens, sed subsistens, communicata ipsi essentia. H�c igitur imago est secunda persona. . . . . Ut autem Filius nascitur cogitatione, ita Spiritus Sanctus procedit a voluntate Patris et Filii; voluntatis enim est agitare, diligere, sicut et cor humanam non imagines, sed spiritus seu halitus gignit." Leibnitz, [498] says "Je ne trouve rien dans les cr�atures de plus propre � illustrer ce sujet, que la r�flexion des espirits, lorsqu'un m�me esprit est son propre objet immediat, et agit sur soi-m�me en pensant � soi-m�me et � ce qu'il fait. Car le redoublement donne une image ou ombre de deux substances respectives dans une m�me substance absolue, savoir de celle qui entend, et de celle qui est entendue; l'un et l'autre de ces �tres est substantiel, l'un et l'autre est un concret individu, et ils diff�rent par des r�lations mutuelles, mais ils ne sont qu'une seule et m�me substance individuelle absolue."

Of the theologians of the seventeenth century belonging to the Reformed Church, Keckermann was the most disposed to present the doctrines of the Bible in a philosophical

form. We find, therefore, with him a similar attempt to make the mystery of the Trinity intelligible. He regards the existence of God as consisting in self-conscious thought. As thought is eternal, it must have an eternal, absolute, and perfect object. That object must, therefore, itself be God. The unity of the divine essence demands that this object should be in God himself, and therefore, it eternally returns to Him. [499]

The modern theologians of Germany, who profess allegiance to the Scriptures, have, in many cases, taken the ground that absolute unity in the divine essence would be inconsistent with self-consciousness. We become self-conscious by distinguishing ourselves from what is not ourselves, and especially from other persons of like nature with ourselves. If, therefore, there were no person objective to God, to whom He could say Thou, He could not say I. Thus Martensen [500] says: Although the creature can have no adequate comprehension of the divine nature, we have a semblance of the Trinity in ourselves; as we are formed in the image of God, we have the right to conceive of God according to the analogy of our own nature. As distinction of persons is necessary to self-consciousness in us, so also in God. Therefore, if God be not a Trinity, He cannot be a person. How, he asks, can God from eternity be conscious of Himself as Father, without distinguishing Himself from Himself as Son? In other words, how can God be eternally self-conscious, without being eternally objective to Himself? That with us the objective Ego is merely ideal and not a different person from the subjective Ego, arises from our nature as creatures. With God, thinking and being are the same. In thinking Himself his thought of Himself is Himself in a distinct hypostasis. Dr. Shedd [501] has given a similar exposition, "in proof that the necessary conditions of self-consciousness in the finite spirit, furnish an analogue to the doctrine of the Trinity, and go to prove that trinity in unity is necessary to self-consciousness in the Godhead."

Pantheistic Trinitarianism.

In all that precedes, reference has been made to those who have had for their object to vindicate the doctrine of the Trinity, by showing that it is not out of analogy with other objects of human thought. There are, however, many modern systems which profess to be Trinitarian, which are in fact mere substitutions of the formulas of speculation for the doctrine of the Bible. Men speak of the Trinity, of the Father, Son, and Spirit, when they mean by those terms something which has not the least analogy with the doctrine of the Christian Church. Many by the Trinity do not mean a Trinity of persons in the Godhead, but either three radical forces, as it were, in the divine nature, which manifest themselves in different ways; or three different relations of the same subject; or three different states or stages of existence. Thus with some, the absolute power or efficiency of the Supreme Being considered as creating, upholding, and governing the world, is the Father; as illuminating rational creatures, is the Son; and, as morally educating them, is the Spirit. According to Kant, God as creator is the Father; as the preserver and governor of men, He is the Son; and as the administrator of law, as judge and rewarder, He is the Spirit. With DeWette, God in Himself is the Father; as manifested in the world, the Son; and as operating in nature, the Spirit. Schleiermacher says, God in Himself is the Father; God in Christ is the Son; God in the Church, is the Holy Spirit. The avowed Pantheists also use the language of Trinitarianism. God as the infinite and absolute Being is the Father; as coming to consciousness and existence in the world, He is the Son; as returning to Himself, the Spirit.

Weisse attempts to unite Theism and Pantheism. He pronounces the Nicene doctrine of the Trinity the highest form of philosophical thought. He professes to adopt that doctrine ex animo in its commonly admitted sense. There is a threefold personality (Ichheit) in God necessary to the constitution of his nature. When the world was created the second of these persons became its life, merging his personality in the world and became impersonal, in order to raise the world into union and identity with God. When the curriculum of the world is accomplished, the Son resumes his personality. [502]

[493] De Trinitate, IX. xii. 18, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. viii. p. 1352, b.

[494] Ibid. X. xi. 18, p. 1366, a.

[495] Ibid. XIV. vi. 8, pp. 1443. d. 1444, a.

[496] Monologium, xxxiii., edit. Migne, p. 188, b. See also Thomas Aquinas, I. xxvii. 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 56.

[497] Loci Communes, De Filio, edit. Erlangen, 1828, vol. i, pp.19, 21.

[498] Remarque sur le Livre d'un Antitrinitaire Anglois, edit. Geneva, 1768, vol. i. p. 27.

[499] Opera, edit. Cologne, 1614, vol. ii. Systema Theologi (tract at end of vol.), p. 72, the last of three pages marked 72.

[500] Dogmatik, pp. 129, 130.

[501] History of Christian Doctrine, vol. i. p. 366.

[502] C. H. Weisse, Idee der Gottheit; Dresden, 1833, pp. 257 ff., 273. The Literature of the doctrine of the Trinity would fill a volume. Bull's Defence of the Nicene Creed, Pearson On the Creed, Waterland On the Trinity, Meier's Geschichte der Lehre von der Trinit t, Baur's Geschichte der Lehre Von der Trinit t, Dorner's History of the Person of Christ, in five volumes, one of the series of Clark's Foreign Theological Library, a very valuable collection of important modern works, Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, and the other historical works on the doctrines of the Church, open the whole field to the theological student.

CHAPTER VII: THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.

§ 1. Testimony of the Old Testament.

The doctrine of redemption is the distinguishing doctrine of the Bible. The person and work of the Redeemer is therefore the great theme of the sacred writers. From the nature of the work which He was to accomplish, it was necessary that He should be at once God and man. He must participate in the nature of those whom He came to redeem; and have power to subdue all evil, and dignity to give value to his obedience and sufferings. From the beginning to the end, therefore, of the sacred volume, from Genesis to Revelation, a Godman Redeemer is held up as the object of supreme reverence, love, and confidence to the perishing children of men. It is absolutely impossible to present a tithe of the evidence which the Scriptures contain of the truth of this doctrine. It is to the Bible what the soul is to the body -- its living and all-pervading principle, without which the Scriptures are a cold, lifeless system of history and moral precepts. It seems, therefore, to be a work of supererogation to prove to Christians the divinity of their Redeemer. It is like proving the sun to be the source of light and heat to the system of which it is the centre. Still as there are men, professing to be Christians, who deny this doctrine, as there have been, and still are men, who make the sun a mere satellite of the earth, it is necessary that a part at least of the evidence by which this great truth is proved should be presented, and should be at command to resist the gainsayers.

The Protevangelium.

Immediately after the apostasy of our first parents it was announced that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. The meaning of this promise and prediction is to be determined by subsequent revelations. When interpreted in the light of the Scriptures themselves, it is manifest that the seed of the woman means the Redeemer, and that bruising the serpents head means his final triumph over the powers of darkness. In this protevangelium, as it has ever been called, we have the dawning revelation of the humanity and divinity of the great deliverer. As seed of the woman his humanity is distinctly asserted, and the nature of the triumph which he was to effect, in the subjugation of Satan, proves that he was to be a divine person. In the great conflict between good and evil, between the kingdom of light and the kingdom of darkness, between Christ and Belial, between God and Satan, he that triumphs over Satan, is, and can be nothing less than divine. In the earliest books of Scripture, even in Genesis, we have therefore clear intimations of two great truths; first, that there is a plurality of persons in the Godhead; and secondly, that one of those persons is specially concerned in the salvation of men, -- in their guidance, government, instruction, and ultimate deliverance from all the evils of their apostasy. The language employed in the record of the creation of man, "Let us make man, in our image, after our

likeness," admits of no satisfactory explanation other than that furnished by the doctrine of the Trinity.

Jehovah and the Angel Jehovah.

On this primary and fundamental revelation of this great truth all the subsequent revelations of Scripture are founded. As there is more than one person in the Godhead, we find at once the distinction between Jehovah as the messenger, a mediator, and Jehovah as He who sends, between the Father and the Son, as co-equal, co-eternal persons, which runs through the Bible, with ever-increasing clearness. This is not an arbitrary or unauthorized interpretation of the Old Testament scriptures. In Luke xxiv. 27, it is said of our Lord, that "beginning at Moses, and all the prophets, He expounded unto them in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself." Moses therefore did testify of Christ; and we have a sure ground on which to rest in interpreting the passages of the Old Testament, which set forth the person and work of the great deliverer, as referring to Christ.

He who was promised to Adam as the seed of the woman, it was next declared should be the seed of Abraham. That this does not refer to his descendants collectively, but to Christ individually, we know from the direct assertion of the Apostle (Gal. iii. 16), and from the fulfilment of the promise. It is not through the children of Abraham as a nation, but through Christ, that all the nations of the earth are blessed. And the blessing referred to, the promise to Abraham, which, as the Apostle says, has come upon us, is the promise of redemption. Abraham therefore saw the day of Christ and was glad, and as our Lord said, Before Abraham was I am. This proves that the person predicted as the seed of the woman and as the seed of Abraham, through whom redemption was to be effected, was to be both God and man. He could not be the seed of Abraham unless a man, and he could not be the Saviour of men unless God.

We accordingly find throughout the Old Testament constant mention made of a person distinct from Jehovah, as a person, to whom nevertheless the titles, attributes, and works of Jehovah are ascribed. This person is called the

'lhym ,yhvh ,'lny ml'k yhvh? ,ml'k 'lhym.

He claims divine authority, exercises divine prerogatives, and receives divine homage. If this were a casual matter, if in one or two instances the messenger spoke in the name of him who sent him, we might assume that the person thus designated was an ordinary angel or minister of God. But when this is a pervading representation of the Bible; when we find that these terms are applied, not first to one, and then to another angel indiscriminately, but to one particular angel; that the person so designated is also called the Son of God, the Mighty God; that the work attributed to him is elsewhere attributed to God himself; and that in the New Testament, this manifested Jehovah, who led his people under the Old Testament economy, is declared to be the Son of God, the logos, who was manifested in the flesh, it becomes certain that by the angel of Jehovah in the early books of Scripture, we are to understand a divine person, distinct from the Father.

A. The Book of Genesis.

Thus as early as Gen. xvi. 7, the angel of Jehovah appears to Hagar and says, "I will multiply thy seed exceedingly, that it shall not be numbered for multitude." And Hagar, it is said, "called the name of Jehovah that spake unto her [Attah el Roi] Thou God seest me" (ver. 13). This angel therefore is declared to be Jehovah, and promises what God only

could perform. Again, in Gen. xviii. 1, it is said, Jehovah appeared to Abraham in the plains of Mamre, who promised to him the birth of Isaac. In ver. 18, he is again called Jehovah. Jehovah said, "Is anything too hard for Jehovah? At the time appointed I will return unto thee . . . . and Sarah shall have a son." As the angels turned toward Sodom, one of them, called Jehovah, said, "Shall I hide from Abraham that thing which I do?" and, "Jehovah said, Because the cry of Sodom and Gomorrah is great, and because their sin is very grievous, I will go down now and see," etc., and Abraham, it is added, stood before Jehovah. Through the whole of Abraham's intercession in behalf of the cities of the plain, the angel is addressed as Adonai, a title given only to the true God, and speaks as Jehovah, and assumes the authority of God, to pardon or punish as to him seems fit. When the execution of the sentence pronounced on Sodom is mentioned, it is said, "Jehovah rained . . . . brimstone and fire from Jehovah out of heaven." With regard to this and similar remarkable expressions, the question is not, What may they mean? but, What do they mean? Taken by themselves they may be explained away, but taken in the light of the connected revelations of God on the subject, it becomes apparent that Jehovah is distinguished as a person from Jehovah; and therefore that in the Godhead there is more than one person to whom the name Jehovah belongs. In this case, the words "brimstone and fire" may be connected with the words "from Jehovah," in the sense of "fire of God" as a figurative expression for the lightning. The passage would then mean simply, "Jehovah rained lightning on Sodom and Gomorrah." But this is not only against the authorized punctuation of the passage as indicated by the accents, but also against the analogy of Scripture. That is, it is an unnatural interpretation, and brings this passage into conflict with those in which the distinction between the angel of Jehovah and Jehovah, i.e., between the persons of the Godhead, is clearly indicated.

In Gen. xxii. 2, God commands Abraham to offer up Isaac as a sacrifice. The angel of Jehovah arrests his hand at the moment of immolation, and says (ver. 12), "Now I know that thou fearest God, seeing thou hast not withheld thy son, thine only son, from me." And in ver. 16, the angel of the Lord said, "By myself have I sworn, saith Jehovah . . . . that in blessing I will bless thee, and in multiplying I will multiply thy seed." And Abraham called the name of that place "Jehovah-jireh." Here God, the angel of Jehovah, and Jehovah are names given to the same person, who swears by Himself and promises the blessing of a numerous posterity to Abraham. The angel of Jehovah must therefore be a divine person.

In Jacob's vision, recorded Gen. xxviii. 11-22, he saw a ladder reaching to heaven, "and behold Jehovah stood above it, and said, I am the Lord God of Abraham thy father, and the God of Isaac: the land whereon thou liest, to thee will I give it, and to thy seed. And thy seed shall be as the dust of the earth." Here the person elsewhere called the angel of Jehovah, and who had given the same promise to Abraham, is called the Lord God of Abraham and the God of Israel. In Gen. xxxii. 24-32, Jacob is said to have wrestled with an angel, who blessed him, and in seeing whom Jacob said, "I have seen God face to face." The prophet Hosea, xii. 4, in referring to this event, says, "Jacob had power over the angel, and prevailed: he wept, and made supplication unto him: he found him in Beth-el, and there he spake with us; even Jehovah God of Hosts; Jehovah is his memorial." The angel with whom Jacob wrestled, was the Lord God of Hosts.

B. The other Historical Books of the Old Testament.

In Exodus iii. we have the account of the revelation of God to Moses on Mount Horeb. "The angel of the Lord," it is said, "appeared unto him in a flame of fire out of the midst of a bush." And Moses turned to see this great sight, "and when Jehovah saw that he turned aside to see, God called unto him, out of the midst of the bush . . . . and said, Draw not nigh hither: put off thy shoes from off thy feet, for the place whereon thou standest is holy ground. Moreover he said, I am the God of thy father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. And Moses hid his face; for he was afraid to look upon God." Here the angel of Jehovah is identical with Jehovah, and is declared to be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The personal distinction between Jehovah and the angel of Jehovah (i.e., between the Father and the Son, as these persons are elsewhere, and usually in the later Scriptures, designated), is clearly presented in Ex. xxiii. 20, where it is said, "Behold, I send an angel before thee, to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee into the place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him." The last phrase is equivalent to, "I am in him." By the name of God, is often meant God himself as manifested. Thus it is said of the temple, 1 Kings viii. 29, "My name shall be there," i.e., "There will I dwell." As in the New Testament the Father is said to send the Son, and to be in Him; so here Jehovah is said to send the angel of Jehovah and to be in him. And as the Son of Man had power on earth to forgive sin, so the angel of Jehovah had authority to forgive or punish at his pleasure. Michaelis, in his marginal annotations to his edition of the Hebrew Bible, says in reference to this passage (Ex. xxiii. 20): "Becha&#65533; ex Kabbala docet, hunc angelum non esse ex numero creatorum existentium extra Dei essentiam, sed ex emanationibus, qu&#65533; intra Dei essentiam subsistunt, sic in Tanchuma explicari, quod sit Metatron, Princeps faciei, John vi. 46." That the angel of Jehovah is a divine person, is further manifest from the account given in Exodus xxxii. and xxxiii. of what God said to Moses after the people had sinned in worshipping the golden calf. In punishment of that offence God threatened no longer personally to attend the people. In consequence of this manifestation of the divine displeasure the whole congregation were assembled before the door of the Tabernacle, and humbled themselves before God. And Jehovah descended and spake unto Moses face to face as a man speaketh unto his friend. And Moses interceded for the people and said, If thy presence go not with us carry us not up hence. And Jehovah said, My presence (i.e., I myself) shall go with thee and I will give thee rest. This shows that a divine person, Jehovah, had previously guided the people, and that on their repentance, He promised to continue with them. This person, called the angel of Jehovah, Jehovah himself, is in Is. lxiii. 9, called "the angel of the face of Jehovah," i.e., the angel or the messenger, who is the image of God. It can hardly be doubted, therefore, that this angel was the Son of God, sent by Him and therefore called his angel; who in Is. lxiii. is designated as the Saviour of Israel and the Redeemer of Jacob; who came to reveal God, as He was the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, in whom was his name, or, as it is expressed in the New Testament, the fulness of the Godhead; who in the fulness of time, for us men and for our salvation, became flesh, and revealed his glory as the only begotten Son full of grace and truth.

In subsequent periods of the history of God's people this same divine person appears as the leader and God of Israel. He manifested himself to Joshua (v. 14) as "Prince of the host of the Lord"; to Gideon (Judges vi. 11), as the angel of Jehovah, and spake to him,

saying, i.e., Jehovah said to him, Go in this thy might and thou shalt save Israel from the hand of the Midianites. In verse 16 it is again said, "Jehovah said unto him surely I will be with thee, and thou shalt smite the Midianites as one man." When Gideon became aware who it was that spoke to him he exclaimed, "Alas, O Lord God, for because I have seen the angel of Jehovah face to face. And Jehovah said unto him, Peace be unto thee; fear not: thou shalt not die." The same angel appeared to Manoah and promised him a son, and revealed himself as he had done to Gideon by causing fire to issue from a rock and consume the sacrifice which had been placed upon it. When Manoah knew that it was the angel of Jehovah, he said unto his wife, "We shall surely die, because we have seen God."

C. Different Modes of explaining these Passages.

There are only three methods on which these and similar passages in the Old Testament can with any regard to the divine authority of the Scriptures be explained. The one is that the angel of Jehovah is a created angel, one of the spirits who wait continually on God and do his will. The fact that he assumes divine titles, claims divine prerogatives, and accepts divine homage, is explained on the principle, that the representative has a right to the titles and honours of the Being, or person whom he represents. He speaks as God because God speaks through him. This hypothesis, which was early and extensively adopted, might be admitted if the cases of the kind were few in number, and if the person designated as the angel of Jehovah did not so obviously claim to be himself Jehovah. And what is a more decisive objection to this mode of interpretation, is the authority of the subsequent parts of the Word of God. These passages do not stand alone. The Church might well hesitate on the ground of these early revelations to admit the doctrine of a plurality of persons in the Godhead. If everywhere else in Scripture God were revealed as only one person, almost any degree of violence of interpretation might be allowed to bring these passages into harmony with that revelation. But as the reverse is true; as with ever increasing clearness the existence of three persons in the Godhead is made known in Scripture, it becomes in the highest degree unnatural to explain these passages otherwise than in accordance with that doctrine. Besides this we have the express testimony of the inspired writers of the New Testament, that the angel of the Lord, the manifested Jehovah who led the Israelites through the wilderness, and who dwelt in the temple, was Christ; that is, was the logos, or Eternal Son of God, who became flesh and fulfilled the work which it was predicted the Messiah should accomplish. The Apostles do not hesitate to apply to Christ the language of the Old Testament used to set forth the majesty, the works, or the kingdom of the Jehovah of the Hebrew Scriptures. (John xii. 41; Rom. xiv. 11; 1 Cor. x. 4; Heb. i. 10-13, and often elsewhere.) The New Testament, therefore, clearly identifies the Logos or Son of God with the Angel of Jehovah, or Messenger of the Covenant, of the Old Testament.

The second hypothesis on which these passages have been explained, admits that the angel of the Lord is a really divine person, but denies that he is personally distinguished from Jehovah. It was one and the same person who sent and was sent, was speaker and the one spoken to. But this assumption does such violence to all just rules of interpretation, and is so inconsistent with the subsequent revelations of the Word of God, that it has found little favour in the Church. We are, therefore, shut up to the only other mode of explaining the passages in question, which has been almost universally adopted in the Church, at least

since the Reformation. This assumes the progressive character of divine revelation, and interprets the obscure intimations of the early Scriptures by the clearer light of subsequent communications. The angel, who appeared to Hagar, to Abraham, to Moses, to Joshua, to Gideon, and to Manoah, who was called Jehovah and worshipped as Adonai, who claimed divine homage and exercised divine power, whom the psalmists and prophets set forth as the Son of God, as the Counsellor, the Prince of Peace, the mighty God, and whom they predicted was to be born of a virgin, and to whom every knee should bow and every tongue confess, of things in heaven and things on earth, and things under the earth, is none other than He whom we now recognize and worship as our God and Saviour Jesus Christ. It was the Logos asarkos whom the Israelites worshipped and obeyed; and it is the Logos ensarkos whom we acknowledge as our Lord and God.

It is universally admitted that the Old Testament does predict a Messiah, one who was to appear in the fulness of time to effect the redemption of his people, and through whom the knowledge of the true religion was to be extended throughout the world. While it is clearly revealed that this Redeemer was to be the seed of the woman, the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, and of the house of David, it was no less clearly revealed that He was to be a divine person. He is presented under the different aspects of a triumphant king, a suffering martyr, and a divine person. Sometimes these representations are all combined in the descriptions given of the coming Deliverer; sometimes the one, and sometimes the other view of his character is held up either exclusively or most prominently in the prophetic writings. They, however, are all exhibited in the Hebrew Scriptures, as they all combine and harmonize in the person and work of our Lord and Saviour

D. The Psalms.

In the second Psalm, the heathen are represented as combining against the Messiah, verses 1-3. God derides their efforts, verses 4, 5. He declares his purpose to constitute the Messiah king in Zion, That this Messiah is a divine person is plain: (1.) Because He is called the Son of God, which, as has been shown, implies equality with God. (2.) He is invested with universal and absolute dominion. (3.) He is the Jehovah whom the people are commanded in verse 11 to worship. (4.) Because all are required to acknowledge his authority and do Him homage. (5.) Because those are pronounced blessed who put their trust in Him, whereas the Scriptures declared them to be cursed who put their trust in princes.

In the twenty-second Psalm, a sufferer is described whose words our Lord upon the cross appropriates to Himself, verses 1-19. He prays for deliverance, verses 19-21. The consequences of that deliverance are such as prove that the subject of the psalm must be a divine person. His sufferings render it certain, (1.) That all good men will fear and love God because He rescued this sufferer from his enemies. (2.) That provision will be made for the wants of all men. (3.) That all nations will be converted unto God. (4.) That the blessings which He secures will last forever.

In the forty-fifth Psalm a king is described who must be a divine person. (1.) Because his perfect excellence is the ground of the praise rendered to Him. (2.) Because his kingdom is declared to be righteous and everlasting. (3.) He is addressed as God, "Thy throne O God is forever and ever," which is quoted Heb. i. 8, and applied to Christ for the very purpose of proving that He is entitled to the worship of all intelligent creatures. (4.)

The Church is declared to be his bride, which implies that He is to his people the object of supreme love and confidence.

The seventy-second Psalm contains a description of an exalted king, and of the blessings of his reign. These blessings are of such a nature as to prove that the subject of the psalm must be a divine person. (1.) His kingdom is to be everlasting. (2.) Universal. (3.) It secures perfect peace with God and good-will among men. (4.) All men are to be brought to submit to Him through love. (5.) In Him all the nations of the earth are to be blessed, i.e., as we are distinctly taught in Gal. iii. 16, it is in Him that all the blessings of redemption are to come upon the world. The subject of this psalm, is therefore, the Redeemer of the world.

The hundred and tenth Psalm is repeatedly quoted and expounded in the New Testament, and applied to Christ to set forth the dignity of his person and the nature of his work. (1.) He is David's Lord. But if David's Lord, how can He be David's Son? This was the question which Christ put to the Pharisees, in order to convince them that their ideas of the Messiah fell far below the doctrine of their own Scriptures. He was indeed to be David's Son, as they expected, but at the same time He was to be possessed of a nature which made Him David's Lord. (2.) In virtue of this divine nature He was to sit at God's right hand; that is, to be associated with Him on terms of equality as to glory and dominion. Such is the Apostles exposition of this passage in Heb. i. 13. To no angel, i.e., to no creature, has God ever said, "Sit on my right hand." The subject of this psalm is no creature; and if not a creature, He is the Creator. (3.) This person, who is at once David's Son and David's Lord, is eternally both priest and king. This again is referred to in Heb. vii. 17, to prove that He must be a divine person. It is only because He is possessed of "an endless life," or, as it is elsewhere said, because He has life in Himself even as the Father has life in Himself, that it is possible for Him to be a perpetual priest and king. (4.) In verse 5, He is declared to be the supreme Lord, for He is called Adonai, a title never given to any but the true God.

E. The Prophetical Books.

In Isaiah iv. 2, the appearance of the Branch of Jehovah is predicted, to whose advent such effects are ascribed as prove Him to be a divine person. Those effects are purification, the pardon of sin, and perfect security.

Chapter vi. contains an account of the prophet's vision of Jehovah in his holy temple, surrounded by the hosts of adoring angels, who worship Him day and night. The person thus declared to be Jehovah, the object of angelic worship, the Apostle John tells us, iii. 41, was none other than Christ, whom all Christians and all angels now worship.

In chapters vii.-ix. the birth of a child whose mother was a virgin, is predicted. That this child was the eternal Son of God, equal with the Father, is proved, (1.) From his name Immanuel, which means God with us, i.e., God in our nature. (2.) The land of Israel is said to be his land. (3.) He is called Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, Father of Eternity, and Prince of Peace. (4.) His kingdom is everlasting and universal. (5.) The consequences of his advent and dominion are such as flow only from the dominion of God. In the eleventh chapter we have another description of the perfection of his person and of his kingdom, which is applicable only to the person and kingdom of God. It is only where God reigns that the peace, holiness, and blessedness which attend the coming of the predicted

deliverer, are ever found. The same argument may be drawn from the prophetic account of the Messiah and of his kingdom contained in the latter part of Isaiah, from the fortieth chapter to the sixty-sixth. This Messiah was to effect the redemption of his people, not merely from the Babylonish captivity, but from all evil; to secure for them the pardon of sin, and reconciliation with God; the prevalence of true religion to the ends of the earth; and, finally, the complete triumph of the kingdom of light over the kingdom of darkness. This is a work which none other than a divine person could effect.

The prophet Micah (v. 1-5) predicted that one was to be born in Bethlehem, who was to be, (1.) The Ruler of Israel, i.e., of all the people of God. (2.) Although to be born in time and made of a woman, his "goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting." (3.) He shall rule in the exercise of the strength and majesty of God, i.e., manifest in his government the possession of divine attributes and glory. (4.) His dominion shall be universal; and (5.) Its effects peace; i.e., perfect harmony, order, and blessedness.

The prophet Joel does not bring distinctly into view the person of the Redeemer, unless it be in the doubtful passage in ii. 23. He goes through the usual round of Messianic predictions; foretells the apostasy of the people, reproves them for their sins, threatens divine judgments, and then promises deliverance through a "teacher of righteousness" (according to one interpretation of ii. 23), and then the effusion of the Holy Spirit upon all flesh. The gift of the Holy Ghost is everywhere represented as the characteristic blessing of the Messianic period, because secured by the merit of the Redeemer's death. That He thus gives the Holy Spirit is the highest evidence of his being truly God.

In Jeremiah xxiii., the restoration or redemption of God's people is foretold. This redemption was to be effected by one who as declared to be, (1.) A descendant of David. (2.) He is called the Branch, a designation which connects this prophecy with those of Isaiah in which the Messiah receives the same title. (3.) He was to be a king. (4.) His reign was to be prosperous, Judah and Israel were to be again united; i.e., perfect harmony and peace were to be secured. (5.) This deliverer is called Jehovah, our Righteousness. In the thirty-third chapter, the same deliverance is predicted, and the same name is here given to Jerusalem which in the former passage was given to the Messiah. In the one case it is symbolical, in the other significant.

In Daniel ii. 44, it is foretold that the kingdom of the Messiah is to be everlasting, and is destined to supersede and absorb all other kingdoms. In vii. 9-14, it is said that one like unto the Son of Man was brought unto the Ancient of Days; and a dominion, glory, and kingdom given unto Him; that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him; his dominion is to be an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed. In ix. 24-27, is recorded the prediction concerning the seventy weeks, and the coming and work of the Messiah, which work is truly divine.

The first six chapters of the prophecies of Zechariah are a series of visions, foreshadowing the return of the Jews from Babylon, the restoration of the city, and the rebuilding of the temple; the subsequent apostasy of the people; the advent of the Messiah; the establishment of his kingdom, and the dispersion of the Jews. From the ninth chapter to the end of the book, the same events are predicted in ordinary prophetic language. Jerusalem is called upon to rejoice at the advent of her king. He was to be meek and lowly, unostentatious and peaceful, and his dominion universal. In chapter xi. He is represented as

a shepherd who makes a last attempt to gather his flock. He is to be rejected by those whom He came to save, and sold for thirty pieces of silver. For this enormity the people are to be given up to long desolation; but at last God will pour upon them the Spirit of grace and supplication, and they shall look upon me, saith Jehovah, whom they have pierced, and mourn. This shepherd is declared to be God's fellow, associate, or equal. His kingdom shall triumph, shall become universal, and holiness shall everywhere prevail.

In Malachi iii. 1-4, it is predicted (1.) That a messenger should appear to prepare the way of the Lord. (2.) That the Lord, i.e., Jehovah, the messenger of the covenant, i.e., the Messiah, should come to his temple. (3.) At his advent the wicked shall be destroyed, and the Church saved. [503]

It is plain, even from this cursory review, that the Old Testament clearly predicts the advent of a divine person clothed in our nature, who was to be the Saviour of the world. He was to be the seed of the woman, the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, of the house of David; born of a virgin; a man of sorrows; and to make "his soul an offering for sin." He is, however, no less clearly declared to be the Angel of Jehovah, Jehovah, Elohim, Adonai, the Mighty God, exercising all divine prerogatives, and entitled to divine worship from men and angels. Such is the doctrine of the Old Testament as to what the Messiah was to be; and this is the doctrine of the New Testament, as to what Jesus of Nazareth in fact is.

[503] On this subject see Hengstenberg's Christology; Smith's Messiah; Allix's Juagmen of the Jewish Church.

§ 2. General Characteristics of the New Testament Teaching concerning Christ.

A. The Sense in which Christ is called Lord.

The first argument from the New Testament in proof of the divinity of Christ, is derived from the fact that He is everywhere called Lord; the Lord; our Lord. It is admitted that the Greek word kurios means owner, and one who has the authority of an owner, whether of men or things. The Lord of a vineyard is the owner of the vineyard, and the Lord of slaves is the owner of slaves. It is also admitted that the word is used with all the latitude of the Latin word Dominus, or the English Master or Mister. It is applied as a title of respect, not only to magistrates and princes, but to those who are not invested with any official authority. It is, therefore, not merely the fact that Jesus is called Lord, that proves that He is also God; but that He is called Lord in such a sense and in such a way as is consistent with no other hypothesis. In the first place, Christ is called Lord in the New Testament with the same constancy and with the same preeminence that Jehovah is called Lord in the Old Testament. This was the word which all the readers, whether of the Hebrew or Greek Scriptures, under the old economy were accustomed to use to express their relation to God. They recognized Him as their owner, as their Supreme Sovereign, and as their protector. He was in that sense their Lord. The Lord is on our side. The Lord be with you. The Lord He is God. Blessed is the nation whose God is the Lord. Thou Lord art good. Thou Lord art most high forever. O Lord, there is none like unto thee. I will praise the Lord. Have mercy upon me, O Lord. O Lord, thou art my God. The religious ear of the people was educated in the use of this language from their infancy. The Lord was their God. They worshipped and praised Him, and invoked his aid in calling him Lord. The same feelings of

reverence, adoration, and love, the same sense of dependence and desire of protection are expressed throughout the New Testament in calling Jesus Lord. Lord, if thou wilt, thou canst make me clean. Lord, save me. Joy of thy Lord. Lord, when saw we thee a hungered? He that judgeth me is the Lord. If the Lord will. To be present with the Lord. Them that call on the Lord. Which the Lord shall give me in the last day. Blessed are the dead who die in the Lord. Thou art worthy, O Lord, to receive glory and honour.

Jesus Christ, therefore, is Lord to Christians in the same sense that Jehovah was Lord to the Hebrews. The usage referred to is altogether peculiar; no man -- not Moses, nor Abraham, nor David, nor any of the prophets or Apostles, is ever thus prevailingly addressed or invoked as Lord. We have but one Lord; and Jesus Christ is Lord. This is an argument which addresses itself to the inward experience, rather than to the mere understanding. Every believer knows in what sense he calls Jesus Lord; and he knows that in thus recognizing Him as his owner, as his absolute sovereign, to whom the allegiance of his soul, and not merely of his outward life, is due; and as his protector and Saviour, he is in communion with the Apostles and martyrs. He knows that it is from the New Testament he has been taught to worship Christ in calling him Lord.

But in the second place, Jesus Christ is not only thus called Lord by way of eminence, but He is declared to be the Lord of lords; to be the Lord of glory; the Lord of all; the Lord of the living and the dead; the Lord of all who are in heaven and on earth, and under the earth. All creatures, from the highest to the lowest, must bow the knee to Him, and acknowledge his absolute dominion. He is in such a sense Lord as that no man can truly call Him Lord but by the Holy Ghost. If his Lordship were merely the supremacy which one creature can exercise over other creatures, there would be no necessity for a divine illumination to enable us to recognize his authority. But if He is Lord in the absolute sense in which God alone is Lord; if He has a right in us, and an authority over us, which belong only to our Maker and Redeemer, then it is necessary that the Holy Spirit should so reveal to us the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, as to lead us to prostrate ourselves before Him as our Lord and our God.

In the third place, Christ is called Lord, when that word is used for the incommunicable divine names and titles Jehovah and Adonai. It is well known that the Jews from an early period had a superstitious reverence, which prevented their pronouncing the word Jehovah. They therefore, in their Hebrew Scriptures, gave it the vowel points belonging to the word Adonai, and so pronounced it whenever they read the sacred volume. When they translated their Scriptures into Greek, they uniformly substituted kurios, which answers to Adon, for Jehovah. In like manner, under the influence of the LXX., the Latin Christians in their version used Dominus; and constrained by the same wide spread and long-continued usage, the English translators have, as a general thing, put Lord (in small capitals) where the Hebrew has Jehovah. In very many cases we find passages applied to Christ as the Messiah, in which He is called Lord, when Lord should be Jehovah or Adonai. In Luke i. 76, it is said of John the Baptist, the forerunner of Christ, that he should go before the face of the Lord; but in Malachi iii. 1, of which this passage declares the fulfilment, the person speaking is Jehovah. The day of Christ, in the New Testament, is called "the day of the Lord;" in the Old Testament it is called "the day of Jehovah, the great day." yvm yhvh hgdvl. Romans x. 13, quotes Joel ii. 32, which speaks of

Jehovah, and applies it to Christ, saying, "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord shall be saved." Rom xiv. 10, 11, quotes Isaiah xlv. 23, "We shall all stand before the judgment seat of Christ. For it is written, As I live, saith the Lord (Jehovah), every knee shall bow to me," etc. This is common throughout the New Testament, and therefore Christ is there set forth as Lord in the same sense in which the Supreme God is Lord. The meaning of the word as applied to Christ being thus established, it shows how constant and familiar is the recognition of his divinity by the sacred writers. They acknowledge Him to be God every time they call Him Lord.

B. Christ presented as the Object of our Religious Affections.

Another general feature of the New Testament, intimately connected with the one just mentioned, and consequent upon it, is, that Christ is everywhere recognized as the proper object of all the religious affections. As He is our Lord, in the sense of being our absolute proprietor, our maker, preserver, and redeemer, and our sovereign, having the right to do with us as seems good in his sight, we are called upon to make Him the supreme object of our love, his will the highest rule of duty, and his glory the great end of our being. We are to exercise the same faith and confidence in Him that we do in God; yield Him the same obedience, devotion, and homage. We find, therefore, that such is the case from the beginning to the end of the New Testament writings. Christ is the God of the Apostles and early Christians, in the sense that He is the object of all their religious affections. They regarded Him as the person to whom they specially belonged; to whom they were responsible for their moral conduct; to whom they had to account for their sins; for the use of their time and talents; who was ever present with them, dwelling in them, controlling their inward, as well as their outward life; whose love was the animating principle of their being; in whom they rejoiced as their present joy and as their everlasting portion. This recognition of their relation to Christ as their God, is constant and pervading, so that the evidence of it cannot be gathered up and stated in a polemic or didactic form. But every reader of the New Testament to whom Christ is a mere creature, however exalted, must feel himself to be out of communion with the Apostles and apostolic Christians, who vowed themselves and were universally recognized by others as being worshippers of Christ. They knew that they were to stand before his judgment seat; that every act, thought, and word of theirs, and of every man who shall ever live, was to lie open to his omniscient eye; and that on his decision the destiny of every human soul was to depend. Knowing therefore the terror of the Lord, they persuaded men. They enforced every moral duty, not merely on the grounds of moral obligation, but by considerations drawn from the relation of the soul to Christ. Children are to obey their parents, wives their husbands, servants their masters, not as pleasing men, but as doing the will of Christ. True religion in their view consists not in the love or reverence of God, merely as the infinite Spirit, the creator and preserver of all things, but in the knowledge and love of Christ. Whoever believes that Jesus is the Son of God, i.e., whoever believes that Jesus of Nazareth is God manifested in the flesh, and loves and obeys Him as such, is declared to be born of God. Any one who denies that truth, is declared to be antichrist, denying both the Father and the Son, for the denial of the one is the denial of the other. The same truth is expressed by another Apostle, who says, "If our gospel be hid it is hid to them that are lost, in whom the god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest they should see the glory of God as it shines in the face of Jesus Christ." They are lost, according to this Apostle, who do not see, as well as

believe, Jesus to be God dwelling in the flesh. Hence such effects are ascribed to the knowledge of Christ, and to faith in Him; such hopes are entertained of the glory and blessedness of being with Him, as would be impossible or irrational if Christ were not the true God. He is our life. He that hath the Son hath life. He that believes on Him shall live forever. It is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us. Our life is hid with Christ in God. We are complete in Him, wanting nothing. Though we have not seen Him, yet believing in Him, we rejoice in Him with joy unspeakable. It is because Christ is God, because He is possessed of all divine perfections, and because He loved us and gave Himself for us, and hath redeemed us and made us kings and priests unto God, that the Spirit of God says, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." The denial of the divinity of the Son of God, the refusal to receive, love, trust, worship, and serve Him as such, is the ground of the hopeless condemnation of all who hear and reject the gospel. And to the justice of this condemnation all rational creatures, holy and unholy, justified or condemned, will say, Amen. The divinity of Christ is too plain a fact, and too momentous a truth, to be innocently rejected. Those are saved who truly believe it, and those are already lost who have not eyes to see it. He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him. It is the doctrine of the New Testament, therefore, that the spiritual apprehension and the sincere recognition of the Godhead of the Redeemer constitutes the life of the soul. It is in its own nature eternal life; and the absence or want of this faith and knowledge is spiritual and eternal death. Christ is our life; and therefore he that hath not the Son hath not life.

C. The Relations which Christ bears to hi. People and to the World.

As the relation which believers consciously bear to Christ is that we can sustain to God only, so the relation which he assumes to us, which He claims as belonging to him in virtue of his nature as well as of his work, is that which God only can sustain to rational creatures.

His Authority as a Teacher.

This is plain as to the authority He assumes as a teacher both of truth and duty. Everything which He declared to be true, all Christians have ever felt bound to believe, without examination and all that He commanded them to do or to avoid, they have ever regarded as binding the conscience. His authority is the ultimate and highest ground of faith and moral obligation. As the infinite and absolute reason dwelt in Him bodily, his words were the words of God. He declared himself to be the Truth, and therefore to question what He said was to reject the truth; to disobey Him was to disobey the truth. He was announced as the Logos, the personal and manifested Reason, which was and is the light of the world, -- the source of all reason and of all knowledge to rational creatures. Hence He spake as never man spake. He taught with authority. He did not do as Moses and the prophets did, speak in the name of God, and say, Thus saith the Lord, referring to an authority out of themselves. But He spoke in his own name, and the Apostles in the name of Christ. He was the ultimate authority. He uniformly places Himself in the relation of God to his people. Ye shall be saved "if ye do whatsoever I command you." He that heareth me heareth God. I and the Father are one; He in me and I in Him. Heaven and earth shall pass away, but my words

shall never pass away. Moses said unto you thus and so, but I say unto you. He did not deny the divine mission of Moses, but He assumed the right to modify or repeal the laws which God had given to his people under the old economy. The whole of revealed truth in the Old as well as in the New Testament is referred to Him as its source. For the ancient prophets taught nothing but what "the Spirit of Christ which was in them did signify," which is equivalent to saying that they spake "as they were moved by the Holy Ghost;" or "that all Scripture is given by inspiration of God." And the Apostles presented themselves simply as witnesses of what Christ had taught. Paul declared that he received all his knowledge "by the revelation of Jesus Christ." And in his Epistle to the Corinthians he expresses the same truth by saying negatively, that his knowledge was not derived from human reason (the spirit that is in men), but from the Spirit of God. Nothing is more obvious to the reader of the New Testament than this divine authority as a teacher everywhere claimed by Christ and for Him. To disbelieve Him is to disbelieve God; and to disobey Him is to disobey God. This is entirely different from the authority claimed by the prophets and Apostles. They assumed nothing for themselves. Paul disclaimed all authority over the faith of God's people, except on the ground of the proof which he gave that it was "Christ speaking in" him. (2 Cor. xiii. 3.)

His Control over all Creatures.

The divine authority of Christ is manifest in the control which He claimed over all his people and over all creatures. All power was and is in his hands. His ministers are under his direction; He sends one here and another there. All Paul's labors and journeyings were performed under his continued guidance. This is but an illustration of the universal and absolute control which He constantly exercises over the whole universe. The angels in heaven are his messengers, and the course of human history, as well as the circumstances of every individual man, is determined by Him. So also is the eternal destiny of all men in his hands. I will reward every man, He says, according to his works. (Matt. xvi. 27, and Rev. xxii. 12.) "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity." (Matt. vii. 22, 23.) In the last day, at the "time of harvest, I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn." (Matt. xiii. 30.) And in ver. 41, "The Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall cast them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth." The king in that day will say, "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire prepared for the devil and his angels: for I was a hungered, and ye gave me no meat: I was thirsty, and ye gave me no drink:" for "inasmuch as ye did it not to one of the least of these, ye did it not unto me." It is the attitude, therefore, in which men stand to Christ (provided they have heard his name), which is to determine their destiny in the last day. Sinning against Christ, denying or rejecting Him, is denying or rejecting God. Our Lord therefore uniformly places Himself in the relation of God to the souls of men, claiming the same authority over them, the same right to decide their destiny, and representing all sin as committed against Himself. Thus also He says, that it were better for a man to have a millstone hung about his neck and he cast into the midst of the sea, than to offend one of the little ones who believe on Him. "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him shall the Son of Man also confess before the

angels of God: but he that denieth me before men, shall be denied before the angels of God." (Luke xii. 8, 9.) "He that loveth father or mother . . . . son or daughter more than me is not worthy of me." Such supreme love is due to God alone, and Christ in claiming this love from us, places Himself before us as God.

D. The Nature of his Promises.

The same is plain from the nature of his promises. Christ promises to his people blessings which none but God has either the right or the power to bestow. He promises to forgive sin. It is intuitively certain that God only can forgive sin; He is our moral governor; it is against Him that all sin is committed, and He only has the right to remit its penalty. When therefore Christ says to the soul, Thy sins are forgiven, He exercises a divine prerogative. Even the Man of Sin, who sitteth in the temple of God and exalteth himself above all that is called God, claims no more than the judicial authority of deciding when the conditions of pardon at the bar of God have been fulfilled. He assumes, in relation to the divine law, the relation which a human judge sustains to the law of the land. A judge does not acquit or condemn on his own authority. The authority is in the state or sovereign power. The judge merely determines whether the grounds of condemnation are present or not. But as the sovereign against whom sin is committed, Christ has the right to pardon or to punish. Again, He promises the Holy Spirit. John the Baptist announced his approach as one who was to baptize the people with fire and with the Holy Ghost. And accordingly it is recorded that He did send down on his disciples, especially on the day of Pentecost, power from on high. It had been predicted that God would pour out his Spirit on all flesh; and that prophecy the Apostle Peter teaches was fulfilled when Christ, exalted at the right hand of God, shed forth his gifts on his waiting disciples. In his farewell discourse to the Apostles, He said, I will send you another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth, who shall abide with you forever. All the sanctifying influences, as well as all the gifts of teaching and of miracles which the Church has ever enjoyed, come from the Lord Jesus Christ. He gives the Spirit to every one severally as He will. "Unto every one of us, says Paul, "is given grace according to the measure of the gift of Christ." (Eph. iv. 7.) He promises to hear and answer the prayers of his people in all ages and in all parts of the world. "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, I will do it." "Wherever two or three are gathered together in my name, there am I in the midst of them." "Lo I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world." He thus promises his continued presence to his disciples wherever they may be. He also promises to all who believe on Him, eternal life. He has power to quicken or to give life to as many as He will. "My sheep follow me, and I give unto them eternal life." "I will raise them up at the last day." "To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life." "Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life." "A crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me in that day." "Peace I leave with you, my peace I give unto you: not as the world giveth, give I unto you." "Ye believe in God, believe also in me." "I go to prepare a place for you." "I will come again and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also." "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." It is obvious that the infinite God himself can neither promise nor give anything greater or higher than Christ gives his people. To Him they are taught to look as the source of all blessings, the giver of every good and every perfect gift. There is no more comprehensive prayer in the New Testament than that with which Paul closes his Epistle to the Galatians: "The grace of our Lord Jesus Christ be with your spirit."

His favour is our life, which it could not be if He were not our God.

E. His Control over Nature.

A fourth general feature of the New Testament teaching concerning Christ, relates to the control attributed to Him over the external world. The laws of nature are ordained by God. They can be changed or suspended by Him alone. A miracle, therefore, or any event which involves such change or suspension, is an evidence of the immediate operation of divine power. The efficient agent, therefore, in working a miracle, must possess divine power. When Moses, the prophets, or the Apostles wrought miracles, they expressly disclaimed the idea that it was by their own efficiency. Why look ye on us, says the Apostle Peter, as though by our own power we had made this man whole? When Moses divided the Red Sea, the efficiency by which that effect was produced was no more in him than in the rod with which he smote the waters. Christ, however, wrought miracles by his own inherent power; and it was to his efficiency the Apostles attributed the miracles wrought through them. It was his name, or faith in Him, as Peter taught the people, which effected the instantaneous healing of the lame man. Christ never referred this miraculous power to any source out of Himself; He claimed it as his own prerogative; and He conferred the power upon others. He said of Himself that He had power to lay down his life and power to take it again; that He had life in Himself and could give life to as many as He pleased; I will give you, He said to his disciples, power to tread on serpents and scorpions, and over all the power of the adversary. Every miracle of Christ, therefore, was a visible manifestation of his divinity. When He healed the sick, opened the eyes of the blind, restored the lame, raised the dead, fed thousands with a few loaves of bread, and calmed the raging of the sea, it was by a word, by the effortless exercise of his will. He thus manifested forth his glory, giving ocular demonstration to those who had eyes to see, that He was God in fashion as a man. He therefore appealed directly to his works, "Though ye believe not me, believe the works; that ye may know, and believe, that the Father is in me, and I in Him." "If I do not the works of my Father, believe me not." (John x. 37, 38.) "If I had not done among them the works which none other man did, they had not had sin: but now have they both seen and hated both me and my Father." (John xv. 24.)

It is only a small part of the evidence of the divinity of our Lord that can thus be gathered up from the general teaching of the New Testament. It is important to bear in mind that faith in this doctrine rests not on this or that passage, or on this or that mode of representation, but upon the whole revelation of God concerning his Son. The divinity of the Lord Jesus Christ is wrought into the texture of the Scriptures, and is everywhere asserted or assumed. There are, however, many passages in which the doctrine is so clearly presented, that they should not be passed by in any formal discussion of this subject.

§ 3. Particular Passages which Teach the Divinity of Christ.

A. The Writings of St. John.

John i. 1-14. Why the higher nature of Christ is called ho logos and why John used that designation, are different questions. As the word logos does not occur in Scripture in the sense of reason, it should be taken in its ordinary meaning. The question why the Son is called "The Word" may be answered by saying that the term expresses both his nature and

his office. The word is that which reveals. The Son is the eikon and apaugasma of God, and therefore his word. It is his office to make God known to his creatures. No man hath seen God at any time; the only begotten Son who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him. The Son, therefore, as the revealer of God, is the Word. The reason why John selected this designation of the divine nature of Christ, is not so easy to determine. It may indeed be said that there is ground for the use of the term in the usage of the Old Testament and of the Jews who were contemporaries with the Apostle. In the Hebrew Scriptures the manifested Jehovah is called the Word of God, and to Him individual subsistence and divine perfections are ascribed. (Ps. xxxiii. 6; cxix. 89; Is. xl. 8; Ps. cvii. 20; cxlvii. 18.) This is more frequently done in the apocryphal books and in the Targums. It was not therefore an unusual or unknown term introduced by the Apostle John. Still as he only, of the New Testament writers, thus employs the word, there must have been some special reason for his doing so. That reason may have been to counteract the erroneous views concerning the nature of God and his Word, which had begun to prevail, and which had some support from the doctrines of Philo and other Alexandrian Jews. It is, however, of less importance to determine why John calls the Son logos, than to ascertain what he teaches concerning Him. He does teach (1.) That He is eternal. He was in the beginning; i.e., was before the creation; before the foundation of the world; before the world was. Compare Prov. viii. 23; John xvii. 5, 24; Eph. i. 4. These are all Scriptural forms of expressing the idea of eternity. The Word then was (en), He did not begin to be but already was. The en of ver. 1 stands opposed to egeneto ver. 14. "He was the Word, and became flesh." (2.) The eternal Word existed in intimate union with God. "The Word was with God;" as Wisdom is said to have been with Him in the beginning. (Prov. viii. 30; John i. 18.) (3.) He was God. The word theos clearly the predicate, as it is without the article (compare John iv. 24, pneuma ho theos, God is a Spirit), and because logos is the subject in the whole context. That theos is neither to be taken for theios, nor rendered a God, is plain from what is immediately said of the logos in the following verses, and from the analogy of Scripture, which proves that the logos is theos the highest sense of the word. In this connection ho theos en o logos would be equivalent to saying, "The Son is the Father." Theos without the article occurs frequently in the New Testament when it refers to the supreme God. (4.) The logos is the creator of all things. All things were made by Him. di' autou. The dia. here does not necessarily express subordinate instrumentality. All things are said to be dia theou as well as ek theou. The Father operates through the Son and the Son through the Spirit. All that the preposition indicates is subordination as to the mode of operation, which is elsewhere taught in relation to the persons of the Trinity. That all creatures owe their being to the Word, is made the more prominent by saying, "Without him was not anything made that was made;" pan ho gegonen is through Him. He therefore cannot be a creature. He was not only before all creatures, but everything created was by Him caused to be. (5.) The logos is self-existent. He is underived. "In him was life." This is true only of God. The Godhead subsisting in the Father, Word, and Spirit, alone is self-existent, having life in itself. (6.) The life of the Word "is the light of men." Having life in Himself, the Word is the source of life in all that lives, and especially of the intellectual and spiritual life of man; and therefore He is said to be the light of men; i.e., the source of intellectual life and knowledge in all their forms. (7.) The logos, as the true or real light, shineth in darkness (en te skotia = en tois eskotismenois) in the midst of a world alienated from God. The men of the world, the children of darkness,

do not comprehend the light; they do not recognize the Word as God, the creator of all things, and the source of life and knowledge. To those who do thus recognize Him, He gives power to become the sons of God, that is, He raises them to the dignity and blessedness of God's children. (8.) This Word became flesh that is, became a man. This use of the word flesh is explained by such passages as 1 Tim. iii. 16; Heb. ii. 14; Rom. viii. 3, in connection with Luke i. 35; Gal. iv. 4; Phil. ii. 7. As to the glory of the incarnate logos, the Apostle says of himself and of his fellow disciples, "We beheld his glory, the glory as of the only begotten of the Father"; such as could belong to none other than to Him who is the eternal Son of God, consubstantial with the Father.

Other Passages in St. John's Gospel.

This introduction, which thus unmistakably sets forth the divine nature of Christ, is the key-note of John's Gospel, and of all his other writings. His main object is to convince men that Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, and that the acknowledgment of Him as such is necessary to salvation. This Apostle was, therefore, in the early Church called the Theologos, because he taught so clearly and earnestly that the logos is God. In verse 18 of this chapter he says that the Son alone has the knowledge of God, and is the source of that knowledge to others. He showed Nathanael that He knew his character, being the searcher of hearts. In his discourse with Nicedemus, He spoke with divine authority; revealing the things of heaven, because He came from heaven and was even then in heaven. His coming into the world was the highest evidence of divine love, and the salvation of all men depends on faith in Him; that is, on their believing that He is what He declared Himself to be, and trusting Him and obeying Him accordingly. When the Jews censured Him for healing a lame man on the Sabbath, He defended Himself by saying that God worked on the Sabbath; that He and the Father were one; that He did whatever God did; that He could give life to whom He willed; that all judgment was committed to Him, and that He was entitled to the same honour as the Father. In the sixth chapter He sets Himself forth as the source of life, first under the figure of bread, and then under that of a sacrifice. In the eighth chapter He declares Himself to be the light of the world. "He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness, but shall have the light of life." He alone could give true freedom, freedom from the condemnation and power of sin. He had been the only Saviour from the beginning as He was the object of faith to Abraham, who saw his day, and rejoiced, for he says, "Before Abraham was I am," thereby asserting not only his preexistence, but his eternity, as He declares himself to be the "I am," that is, the self-existing and immutable Jehovah.

In chapter x., under the character of a shepherd, He represents Himself as the head of all God's people, whose voice they hear, whose steps they follow, and in whose care they trust. For them He lays down his life, and takes it again. To them He gives eternal life, and their salvation is certain, for no one is able to pluck them out of his hands; and He and the Father are one. The eleventh chapter contains the history of the resurrection of Lazarus, on which it maybe remarked, (1.) That his disciples had full confidence that Christ could deliver from death whom He pleased. (2.) That He claims to be the resurrection and the life. To all that believe on Him He is the source of spiritual life to the soul, and of a resurrection to the body. (3.) In illustration and proof of his divine power, He called Lazarus from the grave.

Our Lord's Last Discourse.

The discourse recorded in the 14th, 15th, and 16th, and the prayer recorded in the 17th chapter, are the words of God to men. No created being could speak as Christ here speaks. He begins by exhorting his disciples to have the same faith in Him which they had in God. He went to prepare heaven for them, and would return and take them to Himself. The knowledge of Him is the knowledge of God. He who had seen Him had seen the Father also; for He and the Father are one. He promised to send them the Holy Ghost to abide with them permanently; and that He would manifest Himself to them as God manifests Himself to the saints, revealing to them his glory and love, and making them sensible of his presence. He would continue to be to his Church the source of life; union with Him is as necessary as the union of a branch to the vine. The Holy Spirit sent by Him would reveal the things of Christ, rendering the Apostles infallible as teachers, and giving divine illumination to all believers. It was necessary that He should leave them in order to send the Spirit, who would convince the world of the sin of not believing Him to be all He claimed to be; of the righteousness of his assumption to be the Son of God and Saviour of the world, of which his going to the Father (i.e. resurrection) was the decisive proof; and also of the certainty of a future judgment, inasmuch as the prince of this world was already judged. The Spirit was to glorify Christ, i.e., to reveal Him as possessing all divine perfections, for whatsoever the Father hath the Son hath likewise. His intercessory prayer could proceed from the lips of none but a divine person. He speaks as one who had power over all flesh, and who could give eternal life to all whom God the Father had given Him. Eternal life consists in the knowledge of God, and of Him whom God had sent. He prays that He, clothed in our nature, might be glorified with the glory which He had before the foundation of the world; that his people might be sanctified; that they might be one by his dwelling in them, and that they might be made partakers of his glory.

He was condemned by the Jews for claiming to be the Son of God, and by Pilate for claiming to be a king. When He was crucified the heavens were darkened, the earth trembled, the dead arose, and the vail of the temple was rent. By his resurrection his claim to be the Son of God and Saviour of men was authenticated. Thomas, not being present at the first interview between Christ and his disciples, doubted the fact of his resurrection; but when he saw Him he was fully convinced, and owned Him as his Lord and God. (John xx. 28.) That ho kurios mou kai ho theos mou is an address to Christ, and not an exclamation, is evident, (1.) From the words apekrithe kai eipen, he responded and said, which would be out of place before an exclamation. They introduce a reply to what Christ had said. Thomas answered that he was fully satisfied and firmly convinced that Christ was Lord and God. The word eipein never means to exclaim. (2.) Such an exclamation would be abhorrent to a Jew, who had even a superstitious reverence for the name of God, especially for the name Jehovah, and ho kurios ho theos is equivalent to yhvh 'lhym. (3.) The repetition of the pronoun mou also requires the passage to be considered as an address to Christ.

The Epistles of St. John.

In his epistles the Apostle John presents the divinity of Christ with equal prominence. The great design of those epistles was to establish the faith of believers in the midst of the errors which had begun to prevail. The chief of those errors was denial, in some form, of the incarnation of the Son of God. Hence the Apostle not only insists so strenuously on the acknowledgment that Jesus Christ had come in the flesh, but makes that the one great

fundamental doctrine of the gospel. "Whosoever shall confess that Jesus is the Son of God, God dwelleth in him, and he in God." He begins his epistles by reminding his readers that the Apostles had enjoyed the clearest possible evidence that the Logos tes zoes (He who has life and gives life) was manifest in the flesh. They had seen, looked upon, and handled Him. John gave believers this assurance in order that they might have fellowship with God and with his Son Jesus Christ. Many had already apostatized and denied the doctrine of the incarnation. To deny that doctrine, however, was to deny God; for whosoever denies the Son, rejects the Father also. He exhorts them, therefore, to abide in the Son as the only means of abiding in God and attaining eternal life. The tests by which they were to try those who professed to be inspired teachers, were, (1.) Whether they acknowledged the doctrine of the incarnation, i.e., of the true divinity and humanity of Christ. (iv. 2, 3, 15.) (2.) Conformity of doctrine with the teachings of the Apostles. (3.) Love to God, founded on his redeeming love to us, and love to the brethren, springing from this love to God. In chapter v. he tells his readers that the great truth to be believed is that Jesus is the Son of God. This is the faith which overcomes the world. This great truth is established by the testimony of God, both external and internal, for he that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself; he that believeth not this testimony makes God a liar, because he believeth not the record which God has given of his Son. In Him is eternal life, so that he that hath the Son, hath life. He closes his epistle by saying: "We know that the Son of God is come, and hath given us an understanding, that we may know Him that is true (i.e., that we may know the true God); and we are in Him that is true (i.e., the true God), even in his Son Jesus Christ. This (i.e., this person Jesus Christ) is the true God and eternal life." That this passage is to be referred to Christ, is plain. (1.) Because He is the subject of discourse in the context, and throughout the epistle. The great design of the Apostle is to tell us who and what Christ is. (2.) In the immediately preceding clauses he had called Him the true, "we are in Him that is true," even in Jesus Christ. "The true" and "the true God," are used as convertible expressions. (3.) Christ is repeatedly called "eternal life," by this Apostle, and "eternal life" is said to be in Him, which language is not used of God as such, nor of the Father. (4.) Christos is the natural antecedent of houtos, not only because the nearest, but because it is the prominent subject. (5.) This has been the received interpretation in the Church, at least since the Arian controversy; and the objections urged against it are mainly theological, rather than exegetical. It is to be remarked that Christ is here called not merely theos but ho theos, as in John xx. 28.

The Apocalypse.

The Book of Revelation is one continued hymn of praise to Christ, setting forth the glory of his person and the triumph of his kingdom; representing Him as the ground of confidence to his people, and the object of worship to all the inhabitants of heaven. He is declared to be the ruler of the kings of the earth. He has made us kings and priests unto God. He is the First and the Last, language never used but of God, and true of Him alone. Compare Is. xliv. 6. In the epistles to the seven churches, Christ assumes the titles and prerogatives of God. He calls Himself, He who holds the seven stars in his right hand; the First and the Last; He who has the sharp sword and eyes of fire, from which nothing can be hid. He has the seven spirits. He is the Holy and the True. He has the keys of David; He opens and no man shuts, and shuts and no man opens; his decision on the destiny of men admits of no appeal. He is the supreme arbiter; the faithful and true witness; the arche tes

ktiseos tou theou, the principle, i.e., both the head and source, of the whole creation. He reproves the churches for their sins, or praises them for their fidelity, as their moral ruler against whom sin is committed and to whom obedience is rendered. He threatens punishments and promises blessings which God alone can inflict or bestow. In chapter v. the Apostle represents all the inhabitants of heaven as prostrate at the feet of Christ, ascribing blessings and honour and glory and power to Him that sitteth upon the throne and unto the Lamb forever and ever. The New Jerusalem is the seat of his kingdom. He is its light, glory, and blessedness. He again and again declares himself to be the Alpha and Omega, the First and the Last (i.e., the immutable and eternal), the Beginning and the End, for whose second coming the whole Church is in earnest expectation.

B. The Epistles of St. Paul.

In the epistles of Paul, the same exalted exhibition is made of the person and work of Christ. In the Epistle to the Romans, Christ is declared to be the Son of God, the object of faith, the judge of the world, the God of providence, the giver of the Holy Spirit, and what in the Old Testament is said of Jehovah, the Apostle applies to Christ. In chapter ix. 5, He is expressly declared to be "over all, God blessed forever." The text here is beyond dispute. The only method to avoid the force of the passage is by changing the punctuation. Erasmus, who has been followed by many modern interpreters, placed a full stop after kata sarka, or after panton. In the former case the passage would read, "Of whom is Christ concerning the flesh. The God who is over all be blessed forever;" in the latter, "Of whom Christ came concerning the flesh, who is above all," i.e., higher than the patriarchs. It is frankly admitted by the advocates of these interpretations that the reason for adopting them is to avoid making the Apostle assert that Christ is God over all. As they do not admit that doctrine, they are unwilling to admit that the Apostle teaches it. It was universally referred to Christ in the ancient Church, by all the Reformers, by all the older theologians, and by almost all of the modern interpreters who believe in the divinity of Christ. This uniformity of assent is itself a decisive proof that the common interpretation is the natural one. We are bound to take every passage of Scripture in its obvious and natural sense, unless the plainer declarations of the Word of God show that a less obvious meaning must be the true one. That the common interpretation of this passage is correct is plain, --

1. Because Christ is the subject of discourse; God is not mentioned in the context. The Apostle is mentioning the distinguishing blessings of the Jewish nation. To them were given the law, the glory, the covenant, and the promises, and above all, from them "as concerning the flesh (i.e., as far as his humanity is concerned), Christ came, who is over all, God blessed forever." Here everything is natural and to the point. It shows how preeminent was the distinction of the Jews that from them the Messiah, God manifest in the flesh, should be born. Compared to this all the other prerogatives of their nation sink into insignificance.

2. The words kata sarka demand an antithesis. There would be no reason for saying that Christ, as far as He was a man, was descended from the Jews, if He was not more than man, and if there were not a sense in which He was not descended from them. As in Rom. i. 3, 4, it is said that kata sarka He was the Son of David, but kata pneuma the Son of God; so here it is said, that kata sarka He was descended from the patriarchs, but that in his higher nature He is God over all, blessed forever.

3. The usage of the language demands the common interpretation. In all exclamations

and benedictions, in distinction from mere narration, the predicate uniformly stands before the subject, if the copula einai omitted. This usage is strictly observed in the Septuagint, in the Apocrypha, and in the New Testament. We therefore always read in such doxologies eulogetos ho theos, and never ho theos eulogetos. In the Hebrew Scriptures, vrvk occurs forty times in doxologies and formulas of praise before the subject. It is always "Blessed be God," and never "God be blessed." In the Septuagint, Psalm lxviii. 20 (19), kurios ho theos eulogetos is the only apparent exception to this rule. And there the Hebrew adheres to the common form, and the Greek version is a rhetorical paraphrase of the original. The Hebrew is simply vrvk 'dny 'dny for which the LXX. have, Kurios ho theos eulogetos, culogetos kurios. Every consideration, therefore, is in favour of the interpretation which has been accepted by the Church as giving the true meaning of this passage. Christ is God over all, blessed forever.

The Epistles to the Corinthians.

In the Epistles to the Corinthians, Christ is represented, (1.) As the proper object of religious homage. All believers are represented as his worshippers. (1 Cor. i. 2.) (2.) As the source of spiritual life. (1 Cor. i. 4-9, 30, 31.) (3.) As the Lord of all Christians and the Lord of glory. (1 Cor. ii. 8.) (4.) As creator of the universe (1 Cor. viii. 6), di hou ta panta. (5.) As the Jehovah of the Old Testament, who led the Israelites through the wilderness. (1 Cor. x. 1-13.) (6.) As the giver of spiritual gifts. (1 Cor. xii.) (7.) As the Lord from heaven to whom the universe (ta panta) is subject. (1 Cor. xv. 25.) (8.) A life-giving Spirit (pneuma zoopoioun), i.e., a Spirit having life in Himself. and a source of life to others. (1 Cor. xv. 45.) (9.) The proper object of supreme love, whom not to love, justly subjects the soul to eternal death. (1 Cor. xvi. 22.) (10.) The object of prayer (1 Cor. xvi. 23), from whom grace is to be sought. (11.) He gives success in preaching the gospel, causing his ministers to triumph. (2 Cor. ii. 14.) (12.) The vision of his glory transforms the soul into his likeness. (2 Cor. iii. 17, 18.) (13.) In his face is the glory of God, to which those only are blind who are lost. (2 Cor. iv. 3-6.) (14.) His presence, or being with Him, constitutes the believers heaven. (2 Cor. v. 1-8.) (15.) Before his judgment-seat all men are to be arraigned. (2 Cor. v. 10.) (16.) His love is the highest motive to action. (2 Cor. v. 14.)

Galatians.

(1.) Paul says that he was an Apostle not by the will of man, but by Jesus Christ. (i. 1.) (2.) The conversion of the soul is effected by the knowledge of Christ as the Son of God. (ii. 16.) (3.) Spiritual life is maintained by faith of which Christ is the object. (ii. 20, 21.) (4.) Christ lives in us, as God is said to dwell in his people. (ii. 20.) (5.) He was the object of Abraham's faith. (iii. 6-9.) (6.) He was Abraham's seed in whom all nations are blessed. (iii. 16.) (7.) By faith in Him we become the sons of God. (iii. 26.) (8.) The Holy Ghost is the Spirit of Christ. (iv. 6.) (9.) His will is our law. (vi. 2.) (10.) His grace or favour the source of all good. (vi. 18.)

Ephesians.

(1.) In Christ and under Him all the objects of God's redeeming love are to be united in one harmonious whole. (i. 10.) (2.) In Him we have eternal life, or are made the heirs of God. (i. 11-14.) (3.) He is exalted above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, i.e., above all rational creatures. (i. 21.) (4.) In Him we are quickened, or raised from the death of sin, made partakers of spiritual life, and exalted to heaven. (ii. 1-6.) (5.)

In iii. 9, God is said to have created all things by Jesus Christ. (The text, however, in that passage is somewhat doubtful.) (6.) He fills the universe. (i. 23, and iv. 10.) (7.) He is the head of the Church, from whom it derives its life. (iv. 16.) (8.) He sanctifies the Church. (v. 26.) (9.) The discharge of all social duties is enforced by the consideration of the authority of Christ. We are to serve men as doing service to Him. (vi. 1-9.)

Philippians.

In Philippians, besides the usual recognition of Christ as the source and giver of grace and peace, which comprehend all spiritual blessings, and the acknowledgment of Him as the end of our being (i. 21, 22), we have in ii. 6-11 the clearest declaration of the divinity of Christ. It is said, (1.) That He "was (or existed, huparchon) in the form of God," i.e., was God both as to nature and manifestation. He could not be the one without being the other. The word morphe may mean either the mode of manifestation, that which appears, as when it is said "the king of heaven appeared on earth en morphe anthropou;" or the nature or essence (phusis or ousia) itself. The latter view is adopted by most of the fathers. The former, however, is more in accordance with the common usage of the word, and with the immediate context. He who existed in the form of God, took upon Him the form of a servant (morphen doulou), i.e., the real condition of a servant. (2.) He is declared to be equal with God. The isa einai theo he did not, consider as an harpagmon, i.e., an act of robbery, or an unjust assumption. He was fully entitled to claim equality with God. (3.) This truly divine person assumed the fashion of a man, which is explained by saying He was found "in the likeness of men." He appeared in form, carriage, language, mode of thinking, speaking, feeling, and acting, like other men. He was not purus putus homo, a mere man, but "God incarnate," God manifest in the flesh. (4.) This divine person, clothed in man's nature, humbled Himself even unto death, even to the death of the cross. (5.) Therefore He (not God, or the divine nature in Christ, but the Theanthropos), is exalted above every name that is named, "that at the name of Jesus (i.e., the name of the Theanthropos, as it is He as a divine person clothed in the nature of man, who is the object of worship), every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth." This is an exhaustive amplification. It includes the whole rational creation, from the highest archangel to the weakest saint; all, all that have life acknowledge Christ to be what God alone can be, their supreme and absolute Lord. It is because Christ is and has done what is represented, that the Apostle says, in the following chapter, that He counted all things as nothing for the knowledge of Christ, and that his only desire was to be found in Him and clothed in his righteousness. This divine Redeemer is to come again, and "shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body, according to the working whereby He is able even to subdue all things unto Himself. (iii. 21.)

Colossians.

Colossians i. 15-20, is expressly designed to set forth the true Godhead of Christ in opposition to the errors springing from the emanation theory, which had already begun to prevail in the churches of Asia Minor. This passage sets forth the relation of Christ, first to God, and secondly to the universe, and thirdly to the Church. Here, as in so many other places of Scripture, the predicates of the Logos asarkos and of the Logos ensarkos, are mingled together. As in Heb. i. 2, 3, the Son is said to have created all things, and to be the brightness of the Father's glory, and also to have made purification for sin; so here part of

what is said belongs to the Logos as existing from eternity, and part belongs to Him as clothed in our nature. It was the Logos asarkos who is declared to be the image of the invisible God and creator of all things; and it is the Logos ensarkos who is declared to be the head of the Church. The relation of Christ to God, in this passage is expressed, (1.) By the words just quoted, "He is the image of the invisible God." He is so related to God that He reveals what God is, so that those who see Him, see God, those who know Him, know God, and those who hear Him, hear God. He is the brightness of God's glory, and his express image. (2.) His relation to God is also expressed by saying that He is begotten from eternity, or the only begotten Son. The words prototokos pases ktiseos are indeed variously explained. By Socinians they are made to mean that He was the head of the new dispensation; by Arians that He was the first created of all rational creatures; by many orthodox interpreters trwto,tokoj is taken in its secondary sense, of head or chief. They therefore understand the Apostle to say that Christ is the ruler or head over the whole creation. All these interpretations, however, are inconsistent with the proper meaning of the words, with the context, and with the analogy of Scripture. Prototokos means born before. What Christ is said to have been born before, is expressed by pases ktiseos. He was born (or begotten) before any or every creature, i.e., before creation, or from eternity. All the arguments adduced in a preceding chapter in proof of the eternal generation of the Son, are arguments in favour of this interpretation. Besides, the Arian interpretation is inconsistent with the meaning of the words. That interpretation assumes that the genitive pases ktiseos is to be taken partitively so that Christ is said to be a part of the creation, the first of creatures, as He is said to be the first of those who rose from the dead, when He is called prototokos ton nekron. But pasa ktisis does not mean the whole creation, as indicating the class or category to which Christ belongs, but every creature, as indicating a relation or comparison; Christ is the first begotten as to every creature, i.e., begotten before any creature (i.e., eternally, according to the constant usage of Scripture, for what is before creation is eternal.) Besides, the connection requires this interpretation. The Apostle proves that Christ is the image of the invisible God, and the prototokos pases ktiseos by an argument which proves that He cannot be a creature; and therefore the birth of which he speaks must be before time. Secondly, the relation of Christ to the universe is expressed in this passage by saying, (1.) That He is the Creator of all things. This is amplified, as the all things are declared to include all that are in heaven and earth, visible and invisible, rational and irrational, however exalted, even thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers; that is, the whole hierarchy of the spiritual world. (2.) He is not only the author but the end of the creation, for all things were not only created by Him, but for Him. (3.) He upholds all things; by Him all things consist, i.e., are preserved in being, life, and order. Thirdly, Christ is the head of the Church, the source of life and grace to all its members. For in Him "all fulness," the plenitude of divine blessings dwells. In chapter ii. 3, all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge (i.e., all knowledge or omniscience) are said to dwell in Christ; and in ii. 9, that He is filled with "the fulness of the Godhead." This is very different from the pleroma mentioned in i. 19, where the Apostle is speaking of what Beza calls "cumulatissima omnium divinarum rerum copia, ex qua, tanquam inexhausto fonte, omnes grati in corpus pro cujusque membri modulo deriventur;" [504] but here the reference is to the divine being, nature, or essence itself, to pleroma tes theotetos. The word theotes is abstract of theos as theiotes is of theios; the former means Godhead, that which makes God,

God; the latter means divinity, that which renders divine. The entire plenitude of the divine essence (not a mere emanation of that essence as the rising sect of the Gnostics taught), dwells (katoikei permanently abides, it is no transient manifestation) in Him bodily, somatikos, invested with a body. The Godhead in its fulness is incarnate in Christ. He is therefore, not merely theos but ho theos in the highest sense. More than Paul says cannot be said.

The Pastoral Epistles

ln Paul's pastoral epistles to Timothy and Titus, besides the ordinary recognition of the divinity of Christ found in almost every page of the New Testament, there are four passages in which, at least according to the common text and the most natural interpretation, he is directly called God. Even 1 Tim. i. 1, kat' epitagen Theou soteros hemon kai Kuriou Iesou Christou, may be naturally rendered, "according to the command of God our Saviour, even our Lord Jesus Christ." This is in accordance with the parallel passages in Titus i. 3, "according to the commandment of God our Saviour;" and Titus ii. 13, "of the great God our Saviour Jesus Christ." In this latter passage there is no reason, as Winer and De Wette acknowledge, for questioning that Christ is called the great God, except what they regard as the Christology of the New Testament. They do not admit that Christ is the great God according to the doctrine of Paul, and therefore they are unwilling to admit that this passage contains that declaration. But if, as we have seen, and as the whole Church believes, not only Paul but all the Apostles and prophets, abundantly teach that the Messiah is truly God as well as truly man, there is no force in this objection. Violence must be done to the ordinary rules of language if tou megalou theou kai soteros are not referred to the same subject; inasmuch as theou has the article and soteros is without it. The fair meaning of the words is, "The Great God who is our Saviour Jesus Christ." This interpretation is also demanded, (1.) By the context. Jesus Christ is the subject of discourse. Of Him it is said that He is the great God our Saviour, who gave Himself for us. (2.) Because the epiphaneia, appearance (here in reference to the second advent), is repeatedly used in the New Testament of Christ, but never of God as such, or of God the Father. See 2 Tim. i. 10; 2 Thess. ii. 8; 1 Tim. vi. 14; 2 Tim. iv. 1, 8. (3.) The position of the words soteros hemon before Iesou Christou. If "God" and "Saviour" referred to different persons the natural order of the words would be, "The appearance of the great God and Jesus Christ our Saviour;" and not as it is, "The appearance of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ." Great God and Saviour obviously belong to the same person in 1 Tim. i. 1. "The command of God our Saviour," and in Titus i. 3, "God our Saviour;" and in this place (Tit. ii. 13) that God and Saviour is declared to be Jesus Christ.

The most important passage, however, in these pastoral epistles, is 1 Tim. iii. 16. With regard to that passage it may be remarked, (1.) That it admits of two interpretations. According to the ones the Church is declared to be the pillar and ground of truth, according to the other, the pillar and ground of truth is the great mystery of godliness. The latter is greatly to be preferred as equally consistent with the grammatical structure of the passage, and as far more in harmony with the analogy of Scripture. The pillar and ground of truth, the great fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, is often elsewhere declared to be the doctrine of the manifestation of God in the flesh. On this doctrine all our hopes of salvation rest. (2.) Whatever reading be adopted, whether theos, hos, or ho, all of which appear in different

manuscripts, the passage must refer to Christ. He it was who was manifest in the flesh, justified by the Spirit, and received up into glory. (3.) Whatever reading be adopted, the passage assumes or asserts the divinity of our Lord. With the apostolic writers, the doctrine of the incarnation is expressed by saying, that the logos "became flesh" (John i. 14); or, "Christ is come in the flesh" (1 John iv. 2); or, "He who is the brightness of Gods glory "took part of flesh and blood" (Heb. ii. 14); or, He that was "equal with God" was "found in fashion as a man." (Phil. ii. 8.) The same truth, therefore, is expressed, whether we say, "God was manifest in the flesh;" or, "He who was manifest in the flesh;" or, that "the mystery of godliness was manifest in the flesh." (4.) The external authorities are so divided that the most competent editors and critics differ as to what is the original text. For theos we find the great body of the cursive Greek manuscripts and almost all the Greek Fathers. The authority of the Codex Alexandrinus is claimed on both sides. The question there is, whether the letter is Th or O; some say they see distinct traces of the line in the Theta, others say they do not. For hos C, F, G, of the uncial manuscripts, only two of the cursive manuscripts, and the Coptic and Sahidic versions, are quoted. To this must be added the testimony of the very ancient manuscript recently discovered by Tischendorf the text of which has been published under his auspices at St. Petersburg. For ho the uncial manuscript D, the Latin Vulgate and the Latin Fathers are the witnesses. In view of this state of the question, Wetstein, Griesbach, Lachmann, Tischendorf, and Tregelles, among the editors, decide for hos. Mill, Matthies, as well as the older editors Erasmus, Beza, the Complutensian, and the later ones, as Knapp and Hahn, retain theos. [505] (5.) The internal evidence, so far as the perspicuity of the passage and the analogy of Scripture are concerned, are decidedly in favour of the common text. There is something remarkable in the passage; it is brought in apparently as a quotation from a hymn, as some think, or from a confession of faith, as others suppose, at least, as a familiar formula in which the leading truths concerning the manifestation of Christ are concisely stated. (1.) He is God. (2.) He was manifest in the flesh, or became man. (3.) He was justified, i.e., his claims to be regarded as God manifest in the flesh were proved to be just, by the Spirit (i.e., either by the Holy Ghost, or by the pneuma or divine nature revealing itself in Him. Comp. John i. 14). (4.) He was seen of angels. They recognized and served Him. (5.) He was preached unto the Gentiles, as He came to be the Saviour of all men, and not of the Jews only. (6.) He was believed upon as God and Saviour; and (7.) He was received up into glory, where He now lives, reigns, and intercedes.

Epistle to the Hebrews.

The doctrines of the Bible are generally stated with authority; announced as facts to be received on the testimony of God. It is seldom that the sacred writers undertake to prove what they teach. The first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews is an exception to this general rule. The divinity of Christ is here formally proved. As the design of the Apostle was to persuade the Hebrew Christians to adhere to the gospel, and to guard them from the fatal sin of apostatizing to Judaism, he sets before them the immeasurable superiority of the gospel to the Mosaic economy. The first point of that superiority, and that on which all the others depend, is the superior dignity of Christ as a divine person, to Moses and all the prophets. To set forth that superiority, he first asserts that Christ, the Son of God, is the possessor of all things; that through Him God made the world; that He is the brightness of God's glory, the express image of his nature, upholding all things by the word of his power;

and that because He has by Himself made purification for sin, He is now, as the Theanthropos, set down at the right hand of the majesty on high. The true divinity of Christ being thus asserted, the Apostle proceeds to prove that this is the doctrine of the Scriptures. (1.) Because He is in the Bible called the Son of God, a title which cannot be given in its true sense to any creature. Christ, therefore, is higher than the angels; and as the word angels in the Bible includes all intelligent creatures higher than man, Christ is higher than all creatures, and therefore cannot Himself be a creature. He belongs to a different category of being. (2.) All angels (i.e., all the higher intelligences) are commanded to worship Him (i.e., to prostrate themselves before Him). (3.) While the angels are addressed as mere instruments by which God effects his purposes, the Son is addressed as God. "Thy throne O God is for ever and ever." (4.) He laid the foundations of the earth, and the heavens are the work of his hands. (5.) They are mutable, but He is immutable and eternal. (6.) He is associated with God in glory and dominion. On this great truth, thus established, the Apostle grounds all the duties and doctrines which he urges on the faith and obedience of his readers. It is on this ground that there is no escape for those who reject the salvation which He has provided. (ii. 1-5.) It is on this ground also that He has a dominion never granted to angels, all things being made subject to Him. (ii. 5-10.) As it was a divine person, the eternal Son of God, who assumed our nature, and became a high priest for us, his sacrifice is efficacious, and need not be repeated; and He is a perpetual priest, higher than the heavens, who can save to the uttermost all who come unto God by Him. This Saviour is the same yesterday, to-day, and forever. Faith in Him will enable us to overcome the world, as faith in the promises concerning Christ enabled the ancient worthies to witness a good confession under the greatest trials and sufferings.

The other Sacred Writers of the New Testament.

The same testimony to the divinity of our Lord is borne by the Apostles James and Peter. The former calls Him the Lord of glory, the latter in his First Epistle represents Him as the proper object of supreme love. Faith in Him secures salvation. His spirit dwelt in the ancient prophets. He is the foundation of the Church. (ii. 6.) Having suffered the just for the unjust to bring us unto God, He is now exalted at the right hand of God, the whole universe of intelligent creatures being subject to Him. (iii. 18.) In his Second Epistle he speaks of the knowledge of Christ as the source of grace and peace (i. 2.), and of holiness (ver. 8). At death believers enter into his everlasting kingdom (ver. 11). Peter was an eyewitness of his divine majesty when he was with Him in the holy mount. Lord and Saviour, equivalent in the lips of a Jew, to Jehovah Saviour, is his common designation of Christ. True religion, according to this Apostle, consists in the knowledge of Christ as the Son of God, to whom, therefore, he ascribes eternal glory.

Imperfect and unsatisfactory as this survey necessarily is, it is enough to prove not only that the Scriptures teach the divinity of Christ, but that Christianity as a religion consists in the love, worship, and service of the Lord Jesus, whose creatures we are, and to whom we belong by the still dearer relation of those whom He hath purchased with his own precious blood.

[504] In loc. edit. Geneva, 1565, p. 423.

[505] Dr. Henderson has ably vindicated the reading theos in his Critical Examination of the Various Readings in 1 Tim. iii. 16.

CHAPTER VIII: THE HOLY SPIRIT.

§ 1. His Nature.

The words rvh and pneuma are used in different senses, both literal and figurative, in the sacred Scriptures. They properly mean wind, as when our Lord says, "The pneuma bloweth where it listeth;" then any invisible power; then immaterial, invisible agents, as the soul and angels; then God himself, who is said to be a Spirit, to express his nature as an immaterial, intelligent being; and finally, the Third Person of the Trinity is called "The Spirit" by way of eminence, probably, for two reasons. First, because He is the power or efficiency of God, i.e., the person through whom the efficiency of God is directly exercised; and secondly, to express his relation to the other persons of the Trinity. As Father and Son are terms expressive of relation, it is natural to infer that the word Spirit is to be understood in the same way. The Son is called the Word, as the revealer or image of God, and the Third Person is called Spirit as his breath or power. He is also predominantly called the Holy Spirit, to indicate both his nature and operations. He is absolutely holy in his own nature, and the cause of holiness in all creatures. For the same reason He is called the Spirit of Truth, the Spirit of Wisdom, of Peace, of Love, and of Glory.

A. His Personality.

The two points to be considered in reference to this subject, are, first the nature, and second the office or work of the Holy Spirit. With regard to his nature, is He a person or a mere power? and if a person, is He created or divine, finite or infinite? The personality of the Spirit has been the faith of the Church from the beginning. It had few opponents even in the chaotic period of theology and in modern times has been denied by none but Socinians, Arians, and Sabellians. Before considering the direct proof of the Church doctrine that the Holy Spirit is a person, it may be well to remark, that the terms "The Spirit," "The Spirit of God," "The Holy Sprit," and when God speaks, "My Spirit," or, when God is spoken of "His Spirit," occur in all parts of Scripture from Genesis to Revelation. These and equivalent terms are evidently to be understood in the same sense throughout the Scriptures. If the Spirit of God which moved on the face of the waters, which strove with the antediluvians, which came upon Moses, which gave skill to artisans, and which inspired the prophets, is the power of God; then the Spirit which came upon the Apostles, which Christ promised to send as a comforter and advocate, and to which the instruction, sanctification, and guidance of the people of God are referred, must also be the power of God. But if the Spirit is clearly revealed to be a person in the later parts of Scripture, it is plain that the earlier portions must be understood in the same way. One part of the Bible, and much less one or a few passages must not be taken by themselves, and receive any interpretation which the isolated words may bear, but Scripture must interpret Scripture.

Another obvious remark on this subject is, that the Spirit of God is equally prominent in all parts of the word of God. His intervention does not occur on rare occasions, as the appearance of angels, or the Theophanies, of which mention is made here and there in the sacred volume; but He is represented as everywhere present and everywhere operative. We might as well strike from the Bible the name and doctrine of God, as the name and office of the Spirit. In the New Testament alone He is mentioned not far from three hundred times. It is not only, however, merely the frequency with which the Spirit is mentioned, and the prominence given to his person and work, but the multiplied and interesting relations in which He is represented as standing to the people of God, the importance and number of his gifts, and the absolute dependence of the believer and of the Church upon Him for spiritual and eternal life, which render the doctrine of the Holy Ghost absolutely fundamental to the gospel. The work of the Spirit in applying the redemption of Christ is represented to be as essential as that redemption itself. It is therefore indispensable that we should know what the Bible teaches concerning the Holy Ghost, both as to his nature and office.

Proof of his Personality.

The Scriptures clearly teach that He is a person. Personality includes intelligence, will, and individual subsistence. If, therefore, it can be proved that all these are attributed to the Spirit, it is thereby proved that He is a person. It will not be necessary or advisable to separate the proofs of these several points, and cite passages which ascribe to Him intelligence; and then others which attribute to Him will; and still others to prove his individual subsistence, because all these are often included in one and the same passage; and arguments which prove the one, in many cases prove also the others.

1. The first argument for the personality of the Holy Spirit is derived from the use of the personal pronouns in relation to Him. A person is that which, when speaking, says I; when addressed, is called thou; and when spoken of, is called he, or him. It is indeed admitted that there is such a rhetorical figure as personification; that inanimate or irrational beings, or sentiments, or attributes, may be introduced as speaking, or addressed as persons. But this creates no difficulty. The cases of personification are such as do not, except in rare instances, admit of any doubt. The fact that men sometimes apostrophize the heavens, or the elements, gives no pretext for explaining as personification all the passages in which God or Christ is introduced as a person. So also with regard to the Holy Spirit. He is introduced as a person so often, not merely in poetic or excited discourse, but in simple narrative, and in didactic instructions; and his personality is sustained by so many collateral proofs, that to explain the use of the personal pronouns in relation to Him on the principle of personification, is to do violence to all the rules of interpretation. Thus in Acts xiii. 2, "The Holy Ghost said, Separate me Barnabas and Saul, for the work whereunto I have called them." Our Lord says (John xv. 26), "When the Comforter (ho parakletos) is come whom I will send unto you from the Father, even the Spirit of truth (to pneuma tes aletheias) which (ho) proceedeth from the Father, He (ekeinos) shall testify of me." The use of the masculine pronoun He instead of it, shows that the Spirit is a person. It may indeed be said that as parakletos is masculine, the pronoun referring to it must of course be in the same gender. But as the explanatory words to pneuma intervene, to which the neuter ho refers, the following pronoun would naturally be in the neuter, if the subject spoken of, the pneuma, were not a person. In the following chapter (John xvi. 13, 14) there is no ground

for this objection. It is there said, "When He (evkei/noj), the Spirit of truth, is come, He will guide you into all truth: for He shall not speak of Himself; but whatsoever He shall hear, that shall He speak, and He will show you things to come. He shall glorify me (ekeinos eme doxasei): for He shall receive of mine, and shall show it unto you." Here there is no possibility of accounting for the use of the personal pronoun He (ekeinos) on any other ground than the personality of the Spirit.

2. We stand in relations to the Holy Spirit which we can sustain only to a person. He is the object of our faith. We believe on the Holy Ghost. This faith we profess in baptism. We are baptized not only in the name of the Father and of the Son, but also of the Holy Ghost. The very association of the Spirit in such a connection, with the Father and the Son, as they are admitted to be distinct persons, proves that the Spirit also is a person. Besides the use of the word eis to onoma, unto the name, admits of no other explanation. By baptism we profess to acknowledge the Spirit as we acknowledge the Father and the Son, and we bind ourselves to the one as well as to the others. If when the Apostle tells the Corinthians that they were not baptized eis to onoma Paulou, and when he says that the Hebrews were baptized unto Moses, he means that the Corinthians were not, and that the Hebrews were made the disciples, the one of Paul and the others of Moses; then when we are baptized unto the name of the Spirit, the meaning is that in baptism we profess to be his disciples; we bind ourselves to receive his instructions, and to submit to his control. We stand in the same relation to Him as to the Father and to the Son; we acknowledge Him to be a person as distinctly as we acknowledge the personality of the Son, or of the Father. Christians not only profess to believe on the Holy Ghost, but they are also the recipients of his gifts. He is to them an object of prayer. In the apostolic benediction, the grace of Christ, the love of the Father, and the fellowship of the Holy Ghost, are solemnly invoked. We pray to the Spirit for the communication of Himself to us, that He may, according to the promise of our Lord, dwell in us, as we pray to Christ that we may be the objects of his unmerited love. Accordingly we are exhorted not "to sin against," "not to resist," not "to grieve" the Holy Spirit. He is represented, therefore, as a person who can be the object of our acts; whom we may please or offend; with whom we may have communion, i.e., personal intercourse; who can love and be loved; who can say "thou" to us; and whom we can invoke in every time of need.

3. The Spirit also sustains relations to us, and performs offices which none but a person can sustain or perform. He is our teacher, sanctifier, comforter, and guide. He governs every believer who is led by the Spirit, and the whole Church. He calls as He called Barnabas and Saul, to the work of the ministry, or to some special field of labour. Pastors or bishops are made overseers by the Holy Ghost.

4. In the exercise of these and other functions, personal acts are constantly attributed to the Spirit in the Bible; that is, such acts as imply intelligence, will, and activity or power. The Spirit searches, selects, reveals, and reproves. We often read that "The Spirit said." (Acts xiii. 2; xxi. 11; 1 Tim. iv. 1, etc., etc.) This is so constantly done, that the Spirit appears as a personal agent from one end of the Scriptures to the other, so that his personality is beyond dispute. The only possible question is whether He is a distinct person from the Father. But of this there can be no reasonable doubt, as He is said to be the Spirit of God and the Spirit which is of God (ek theou);as He is distinguished from the Father in

the forms of baptism and benediction; as He proceeds from the Father; and as He is promised, sent, and given by the Father. So that to confound the Holy Spirit with God would be to render the Scriptures unintelligible.

5. All the elements of personality, namely, intelligence, will, and individual subsistence, are not only involved in all that is thus revealed concerning the relation in which the Spirit stands to us and that which we sustain to Him, but they are all distinctly attributed to Him. The Spirit is said to know, to will, and to act. He searches, or knows all things, even the deep things of God. No man knoweth the things of God, but the Spirit of God. (1 Cor. ii. 10, 12.) He distributes "to every man severally as he will." (1 Cor. xii. 11.) His individual subsistence is involved in his being an agent, and in his being the object on which the activity of others terminates. If He can be loved, reverenced, and obeyed, or offended and sinned against, He must be a person.

6. The personal manifestations of the Spirit, when He descended on Christ after his baptism, and upon the Apostles at the day of Pentecost, of necessity involve his personal subsistence. It was not any attribute of God, nor his mere efficiency, but God himself, that was manifested in the burning bush, in the fire and clouds on Mount Sinai, in the pillar which guided the Israelites through the wilderness, and in the glory which dwelt in the Tabernacle and in the Temple.

7. The people of God have always regarded the Holy Spirit as a person. They have looked to Him for instruction, sanctification, direction, and comfort. This is part of their religion. Christianity (subjectively considered) would not be what it is without this sense of dependence on the Spirit, and this love and reverence for his person. All the liturgies, prayers, and praises of the Church, are filled with appeals and addresses to the Holy Ghost. This is a fact which admits of no rational solution if the Scriptures do not really teach that the Spirit is a distinct person. The rule Quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus, is held by Protestants as well as by Romanists. It is not to the authority of general consent as an evidence of truth, that Protestants object, but to the applications made of it by the Papal Church, and to the principle on which that authority is made to rest. All Protestants admit that true believers in every age and country have one faith, as well as one God and one Lord.

B. Divinity of the Holy Spirit.

On this subject there has been little dispute in the Church. The Spirit is so prominently presented in the Bible as possessing divine attributes, and exercising divine prerogatives, that since the fourth century his true divinity has never been denied by those who admit his personality.

1. In the Old Testament, all that is said of Jehovah is said of the Spirit of Jehovah; and therefore, if the latter is not a mere periphrase for the former, he must of necessity be divine. The expressions, Jehovah said, and, the Spirit said, are constantly interchanged; and the acts of the Spirit are said to be acts of God.

2. In the New Testament, the language of Jehovah is quoted as the language of the Spirit. In Is. vi. 9, it is written, Jehovah said, "Go and tell this people," etc. This passage is thus quoted by Paul, Acts xxviii. 25, "Well spake the Holy Ghost by Esaias the prophet," etc. In Jeremiah xxxi. 31, 33, 34, it is said, "Behold the days come, saith Jehovah, that I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel;" which is quoted by the Apostle in Heb.

x. 15, saying, "Whereof the Holy Ghost also is a witness to us: for after that He had said before, This is the covenant that I will make with them after those days, saith the Lord; I will put my laws into their hearts," etc. Thus constantly the language of God is quoted as the language of the Holy Ghost. The prophets were the messengers of God; they uttered his words, delivered his commands, pronounced his threatenings, and announced his promises, because they spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. They were the organs of God, because they were the organs of the Spirit. The Spirit, therefore, must be God.

3. In the New Testament the same mode of representation is continued. Believers are the temple of God, because the Spirit dwells in them. Eph. ii. 22: Ye are "a habitation of God through the Spirit." 1 Cor. vi. 19: "Know ye not that your body is the temple of the Holy Ghost which is in you, which ye have of God?" In Rom. viii. 9, 10, the indwelling of Christ is said to be the indwelling of the Spirit of Christ, and that is said to be the indwelling of the Spirit of God. In Acts v. 1-4, Ananias is said to have lied unto God because he lied against the Holy Ghost.

4. Our Lord and his Apostles constantly speak of the Holy Spirit as possessing all divine perfections. Christ says, "All manner of sin and blasphemy shall be forgiven unto men: but the blasphemy against the Holy Ghost shall not be forgiven unto men." (Matt. xii. 31.) The unpardonable sin, then, is speaking against the Holy Ghost. This could not be unless the Holy Ghost were God. The Apostle, in 1 Cor. ii. 10, 11, says that the Spirit knows all things, even the deep things (the most secret purposes) of God. His knowledge is commensurate with the knowledge of God. He knows the things of God as the spirit of a man knows the things of a man. The consciousness of God is the consciousness of the Spirit. The Psalmist teaches us that the Spirit is omnipresent and everywhere efficient. "Whither," he asks, "shall I go from thy Spirit? or whither shall I flee from thy presence?" (Ps. cxxxix. 7.) The presence of the Spirit is the presence of God. The same idea is expressed by the prophet when he says, "Can any hide himself in secret places that I shall not see him? saith Jehovah. Do not I fill heaven and earth? saith Jehovah." (Jer. xxiii. 24.)

5. The works of the Spirit are the works of God. He fashioned the world. (Gen. i. 2.) He regenerates the soul: to be born of the Spirit is to be born of God. He is the source of all knowledge; the giver of inspiration; the teacher, the guide, the sanctifier, and the comforter of the Church in all ages. He fashions our bodies; He formed the body of Christ, as a fit habitation for the fulness of the Godhead; and He is to quicken our mortal bodies. (Rom. viii. 11.)

6. He is therefore presented in the Scriptures as the proper object of worship, not only in the formula of baptism and in the apostolic benediction, which bring the doctrine of the Trinity into constant remembrance as the fundamental truth of our religion, but abo in the constant requirement that we look to Him and depend upon Him for all spiritual good, and reverence and obey Him as our divine teacher and sanctifier.

Relation of the Spirit to the Father and to the Son.

The relation of the Spirit to the other persons of the Trinity has been stated before. (1.) He is the same in substance and equal in power and glory. (2.) He is subordinate to the Father and Son, as to his mode of subsistence and operation, as He is said to be of the Father and of the Son; He is sent by them, and they operate through Him. (3.) He bears the same relation to the Father as to the Son; as He is said to be of the one as well as of the

other, and He is given by the Son as well as by the Father. (4.) His eternal relation to the other persons of the Trinity is indicated by the word Spirit, and by its being said that he is ek toi theou, out of God, i.e., God is the source whence the Spirit is said to proceed.

§ 2. The Office of the Holy Spirit.

A. In Nature.

The general doctrine of the Scriptures on this subject is that the Spirit is the executive of the Godhead. Whatever God does, He does by the Spirit. Hence in the creed of Constantinople, adopted by the Church universal, He is said to be to Pneuma, to kurion, to zoopoion. He is the immediate source of all life. Even in the external world the Spirit is everywhere present and everywhere active. Matter is not intelligent. It has its peculiar properties, which act blindly according to established laws. The intelligence, therefore, manifested in vegetable and animal structures, is not to he referred to matter, but to the omnipresent Spirit of God. It was He who brooded over the waters and reduced chaos into order. It was He who garnished the heavens. It is He that causes the grass to grow. The Psalmist says of all living creatures, "Thou hidest thy face, they are troubled: thou takest away their breath, they die, and return to their dust. Thou sendest forth thy Spirit, they are created: and thou renewest the face of the earth." (Ps. civ. 29, 30.) Compare Is. xxxii. 14, 15. Job, speaking of his corporeal frame, says, "The Spirit of God hath made me." (Job xxxiii. 4.) And the Psalmist, after describing the omnipresence of the Spirit refers to his agency the wonderful mechanism of the human body. "I am fearfully and wonderfully made . . . . my substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them." (Ps. cxxxix. 14-16.) Cyprian (or the author of the Tract "De Spiritu Sancto," included in his works) says, "Hic Spiritus Sanctus ab ipso mundi initio aquis legitur superfusus; non materialibus aquis quasi vehiculo egens, quas potius ipse ferebat et complectentibus firmamentum dabat con gruum motum et limitem pr&#65533;finitum. . . . [Hic est] spiritus vit&#65533; cujus vivificus calor animat omnia et fovet et provehit et foecundat. Hic Spiritus Sanctus omnium viventium anima, ita largitate sua se omnibus abundanter infundit, ut habeant omnia rationabilia et irrationabilia secundum genus suum ex eo quod sunt et quod in suo ordine su&#65533; natur&#65533; competentia agunt. Non quod ipse sit substantialis anima singulis, sed in se singulariter manens, de plenitudine sua distributor magnificus proprias efficientias singulis dividit et largitur; et quasi sol omnia calefaciens, subjecta omnia nutrit, et absque ulla sui diminutione, integritatem suam de inexhausta abundantia, quod satis est, et sufficit omnibus, commodat et impartit." [506]

The Spirit the Source of all Intellectual Life.

The Spirit is also represented as the source of all intellectual life. When man was created it is said God "breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became (nphs chyh) a living soul." (Gen. ii. 7.) Job xxxii. 8, says, The inspiration of the Almighty giveth men understanding, i.e., a rational nature, for it is explained by saying, He "teacheth us more than the beasts of the earth, and maketh us wiser than the fowls of heaven." (Job xxxv. 11.) The Scriptures ascribe in like manner to Him all special or extraordinary gifts. Thus it

is said of Bezaleel, "I have called" him, "and I have filed him with the Spirit of God, in wisdom, in understanding, and in knowledge, and in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning works, to work in gold, and in silver, and in brass." (Ex. xxxi. 2, 3, 4.) By his Spirit God gave Moses the wisdom requisite for his high duties, and when he was commanded to devolve part of his burden upon the seventy elders, it was said, "I will take of the Spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them." (Num. xi. 17.) Joshua was appointed to succeed Moses, because in him was the Spirit. (Num. xxvii. 18.) In like manner the Judges, who from time to time were raised up, as emergency demanded, were qualified by the Spirit for their peculiar work, whether as rulers or as warriors. Of Othniel it is said, "The Spirit of the Lord came upon him, and he judged Israel and went out to war." (Judges iii. 10.) So the Spirit of the Lord is said to have come upon Gideon and on Jephthah and on Samson. When Saul offended God, the Spirit of the Lord is said to have departed from him. (1 Sam. xvi. 14.) When Samuel anointed David, "The Spirit of the Lord came upon" him "from that day forward." (1 Sam. xvi. 13.) In like manner under the new dispensation the Spirit as represented as not only the author of miraculous gifts, but also as the giver of the qualifications to teach and rule in the Church. All these operations are independent of the sanctifying influences of the Spirit. When the Spirit came on Samson or upon Saul, it was not to render them holy, but to endue them with extraordinary physical and intellectual power; and when He is said to have departed from them, it means that those extraordinary endowments were withdrawn.

B. The Spirits Office in the Work of Redemption.

With regard to the office of the Spirit in the work of redemption, the Scriptures teach, --

1. That He fashioned the body, and endued the human soul of Christ with every qualification for his work. To the Virgin Mary it was said, "The Holy Ghost shall come upon thee, and the power of the Highest shall overshadow thee: therefore also that holy thing which shall be born of thee, shall be called the Son of God." (Luke i. 35.) The prophet Isaiah predicted that the Messiah should be replenished with all spiritual gifts. "Behold my servant whom I uphold; mine elect in whom my soul delighteth; I have put my Spirit upon him: he shall bring forth judgment to the Gentiles." (Is. xlii. 1.) "There shall come forth a rod out of the stem of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots: and the Spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, the spirit of wisdom and understanding, the spirit of counsel and might, the spirit of knowledge and of the fear of the Lord." (Is. xi. 1, 2.) When our Lord appeared on earth, it is said that the Spirit without measure was given unto Him. (John iii. 34.) "And John bare record, saying, I saw the Spirit descending from heaven like a dove, and it abode upon him." (John i. 32.) He was, therefore, said to have been full of the Holy Ghost.

2. That the Spirit is the revealer of all divine truth. The doctrines of the Bible are called the things of the Spirit. With regard to the writers of the Old Testament, it is said they spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. The language of Micah is applicable to all the prophets, "Truly I am full of power by the Spirit of the Lord, and of judgment, and of might, to declare unto Jacob his transgression and to Israel his sin." (Micah iii. 8.) What David said, the Holy Ghost is declared to have said. The New Testament writers were in like manner the organs of the Spirit. The doctrines which Paul preached he did not receive

from men "but God," he says, "hath revealed them unto us by his Spirit." (1 Cor. ii. 10.) The Spirit also guided the utterance of those truths; for he adds, "Which things also we speak, not in the words which man's wisdom teacheth, but which the Holy Ghost teacheth; communicating the things of the Spirit in the words of the Spirit" (pneumatikois pneumatika sunkrinontes). The whole Bible, therefore, is to be referred to the Spirit as its author.

3. The Spirit not only thus reveals divine truth, having guided infallibly holy men of old in recording it, but He everywhere attends it by his power. All truth is enforced on the heart and conscience with more or less power by the Holy Spirit, wherever that truth is known. To this all-pervading influence we are indebted for all there is of morality and order in the world. But besides this general influence, which is usually called common grace, the Spirit specially illuminates the minds of the children of God, that they may knew the things freely given (or revealed to them) by God. The natural man does not receive them, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. All believers are therefore called (pneumatikoi) spiritual, because thus enlightened and guided by the Spirit.

4. It is the special office of the Spirit to convince the world of sin; to reveal Christ, to regenerate the soul, to lead men to the exercise of faith and repentance; to dwell in those whom He thus renews, as a principle of a new and divine life. By this indwelling of the Spirit, believers are united to Christ, and to one another, so that they form one body. This is the foundation of the communion of saints, making them one in faith, one in love, one in their inward life, and one in their hopes and final destiny.

5. The Spirit also calls men to office in the Church, and endows them with the qualifications necessary for the successful discharge of its duties. The office of the Church, in this matter, is simply to ascertain and authenticate the call of the Spirit. Thus the Holy Ghost is the immediate author of all truth, of all holiness, of all consolation, of all authority, and of all efficiency in the children of God individually, and in the Church collectively.

[506] Works, edit. Brem, 1690, on p. 61 of the second set in the Opuscula.

§ 3. History of the Doctrine concerning the Holy Spirit.

During the Ante-Nicene period, the Church believed concerning the Holy Ghost what was revealed on the surface of Scripture, and what was involved in the religious experience of all Christians. There is to them one God, the Father, whose favour they had forfeited by sin, and to whom they must be reconciled: one Lord Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, through whom this reconciliation is effected; and one Holy Spirit, by whom they are, through Christ, brought near to God. This all Christians believed, as they professed in their baptism, and in repeating and receiving the apostolic benediction. With this simple faith underlying and sustaining the life of the Church, there coexisted among theologians great obscurity, indistinctness, and inconsistency of statement, especially in reference to the nature and office of the Holy Ghost. This ought not to be a matter of surprise, because in the Scriptures themselves the same work is often ascribed to God and to the Spirit of God, which led some at times to assume that these terms expressed one and the same thing; as the spirit of a man is the man himself. In the Scriptures, also, the terms Word and Breath (or Spirit) are often interchanged; and what in one place is said to be done by the Word, in another is said to be done by the Spirit. The Logos is represented as

the life of the world and the source of all knowledge, and yet the same is said of the Spirit. Paul declares in one place (Gal. i. 12) that he received the doctrines which he taught, by the revelation of Jesus Christ; in another (1 Cor. ii. 10), that he was taught them by the Spirit. Misled by such representation, some of the fathers identified the Son and Spirit. Even Tertullian, in one place says, "Spiritus substantia est Sermonis, et Sermo operatio Spiritus, et duo unum sunt." [507] Finally, as it is plain from the Scripture that the Spirit is of the Son, as the Son is of the Father (the difference between generation and procession being perfectly inscrutable), all the Arians and semi-Arians who taught that the Son was created by the Father, held that the Spirit was created by the Son. This roused so much controversy and agitation, that first the Council of Nice, A.D. 325, and then that of Constantinople, A.D. 381, were called to frame a satisfactory statement of the Scriptural doctrine on this subject. In the Creed of the Apostles, as it is called, which is so ancient that Rufinus and Ambrose referred it to the Apostles themselves, it is simply said, "I believe on the Holy Ghost." The same words without addition are repeated in the Nicene Creed, but in the Creed of Constantinople it is added, "I believe in the Holy Ghost, the divine (to kurion), the life-giving, who proceedeth from the Father, who is to be worshipped and glorified with the Father and the Son, and who spake through the prophets." In the Athanasian Creed (so-called), it is said that the Spirit is consubstantial with the Father and the Son; that He is uncreated, eternal, and omnipotent, equal in majesty and glory, and that He proceeds from the Father and the Son. These creeds are Catholic, adopted by the whole Church. Since they were framed there has been no diversity of faith on this subject among those recognized as Christians.

Those who, since the Council of Constantinople have denied the common Church doctrine, whether Socinians, Arians, or Sabellians, regard the Holy Spirit not as a creature, but as the power of God, i.e., the manifested divine efficiency. The modern philosophical theologians of Germany do not differ essentially from this view. De Wette, for example, says, that the Spirit is God as revealed and operative in nature; Schleiermacher says the term designates God as operative in the Church, i.e., "der Gemeingeist der Kirche." This, however, is only a name. God with Schleiermacher is only the unity of the causality manifested in the world. That causality viewed in Christ we may call Son, and viewed in the Church we may call the Spirit. God is merely cause, and man a fleeting effect. Happily Schleiermacher's theology and Schleiermacher's religion were as different as the speculations and the every day faith of the idealist.

[507] Adversus Praxean, 15, Works, edit. Basle, 1562, p. 426.

CHAPTER IX: THE DECREES OF GOD.

§ 1. The Nature of the Decrees.

It must be remembered that theology is not philosophy. It does not assume to discover truth, or to reconcile what it teaches as true with all other truths. Its province is simply to state what God has revealed in his Word, and to vindicate those statements as far as possible from misconceptions and objections. This limited and humble office of theology it is especially necessary to bear in mind, when we come to speak of the acts and purposes of God. "The things of God knoweth no man; but the Spirit of God." (1 Cor. ii. 11.) In treating, therefore, of the decrees of God, all that is proposed is simply to state what the Spirit has seen fit to reveal on that subject.

"The decrees of God are his eternal purpose, according to the counsel of his will, whereby for his own glory He hath foreordained whatsoever comes to pass." [508] Agreeably to this statement: (1.) The end or final cause contemplated in all God's decrees, is his own glory. (2.) They are all reducible to one eternal purpose. (3.) They are free and sovereign, determined by the counsel of his own will. (4.) They comprehend all events.

A. The Glory of God the Final Cause of all his Decrees.

The final cause of all God's purposes is his own glory. This is frequently declared to be the end of all things. "Thou art worthy," say the heavenly worshippers, "O Lord, to receive glory, and honour, and power: for thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." (Rev. iv. 11.) All things are said to be not only of God and through Him, but for Him. He is the beginning and the end. The heavens declare his glory; that is the purpose for which they were made. God frequently announces his determination to make his glory known. "As truly as I live, all the earth shall be filled with the glory of the Lord." (Num. xiv. 21.) This is said to be the end of all the dispensations of his providence, whether beneficent or punitive. "For mine own sake, even for mine own sake, will I do it; for how should my name be polluted? and I will not give my glory unto another." (Is. xlviii. 11.) "I wrought for my name's sake, that it should not be polluted before the heathen." (Ezek. xx. 9.) In like manner the whole plan of redemption and the dispensations of his grace, are declared to be designed to reveal the glory of God. (1 Cor. i. 26-31; Eph. ii. 8-10.) This is the end which our Lord proposed to Himself. He did everything for the glory of God; and for this end all his followers are required to live and act. As God is infinite, and all creatures are as nothing in comparison with Him, it is plain that the revelation of his nature and perfections must be the highest conceivable end of all things, and the most conducive to secure all other good subordinate ends. Order and truth, however, depend on things being put in their right relations. If we make the good of the creature the ultimate object of all

God's works, then we subordinate God to the creature, and endless confusion and unavoidable error are the consequence. It is characteristic of the Bible that it places God first, and the good of the creation second. This also is the characteristic feature of Augustinianism as distinguished from all other forms of doctrine. And when the Protestants were divided at the time of the Reformation, it was mainly on this point. The Lutheran and Reformed churches are distinguished in all that characterizes their theological systems, by the fact that the latter allow the supremacy and sovereignty of God in the workings of his providence and grace to determine everything for his own glory, while the former lean more or less to the error of restraining God's liberty of action by the assumed powers and prerogatives of man. The Bible, Augustine, and the Reformed, give one answer to all such questions as the following: Why did God create the world? Why did He permit the occurrence of sin? Why was salvation provided for men and not for angels? Why was the knowledge of that salvation so long confined to one people? Why among those who hear the gospel, do some receive, and others reject it? To all these, and similar questions, the answer is, not because the happiness of creatures would be secured in a higher degree by the admission of sin and misery, than by their entire exclusion; some men are saved and others perish not because some of their own will believe and others do not believe, but simply because, Thus it seemed good in the eyes of God. Whatever He does or permits to be done, is done or permitted for the more perfect revelation of his nature and perfections. As the knowledge of God is the ground and sum of all good, it of course follows that the more perfectly God is known, the more fully the highest good (not merely nor necessarily the highest happiness) of the intelligent universe is promoted. But this is a subordinate effect, and not the chief end. It is therefore in accordance with the whole spirit and teachings of the Bible, and with the essential character of Augustinianism, that our standards make the glory of God the end of all his decrees.

B. The Decrees Reducible to one Purpose.

The second point included in this doctrine is, that the decrees of God are all reducible to one purpose. By this is meant that from the indefinite number of systems, or series of possible events, present to the divine mind, God determined on the futurition or actual occurrence of the existing order of things, with all its changes, minute as well as great, from the beginning of time to all eternity. The reason, therefore, why any event occurs, or, that it passes from the category of the possible into that of the actual, is that God has so decreed. The decrees of God, therefore, are not many, but one purpose. They are not successively formed as the emergency arises, but are all parts of one all-comprehending plan. This view of the subject is rendered necessary by the nature of an infinitely perfect Being. It is inconsistent with the idea of absolute perfection, that the purposes of God are successive, or that He ever purposes what He did not originally intend; or that one part of his plan is independent of other parts. It is one scheme, and therefore one purpose. As, however, this one purpose includes an indefinite number of events, and as those events are mutually related, we therefore speak of the decrees of God as many, and as having a certain order. The Scriptures consequently speak of the judgments, counsels or purposes of God, in the plural number, and also of his determining one event because of another. When we look at an extensive building, or a complicated machine, we perceive at once the multiplicity of their parts, and their mutual relations. Our conception of the building or of the machine is one, and yet it comprehends many distinct perceptions, and the apprehension of their

relations. So also in the mind of the architect or mechanist, the whole is one idea, though he intends many things, and one in reference to another. We can, therefore, in a measure, understand how the vast scheme of creation, providence, and redemption, lies in the divine mind as one simple purpose, although including an infinite multiplicity of causes and effects.

C. The Decrees of God are Eternal.

That the decrees of God are eternal, necessarily follows from the perfection of the divine Being. He cannot be supposed to have at one time plans or purposes which He had not at another. He sees the end from the beginning; the distinctions of time have no reference to him who inhabits eternity. The Scriptures therefore always speak of events in time as revelations of a purpose formed in eternity. The salvation of men, for example, is said to be "according to the eternal purpose which He purposed in Christ Jesus." (Eph. iii. 11.) What is revealed in time was hidden for ages, i.e., from eternity in the mind of God. (Eph. iii. 9.) Believers were chosen in Christ before the foundation of the world. (Eph. i. 4.) "Who hath saved us, and called us . . . . according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus, pro chronon aionion, before eternal ages." (2 Tim. i. 9.) Christ as a sacrifice was "foreordained before the foundation of the world, but was manifest in these last times for you, who by Him do believe in God." (1 Pet. i. 20, 21; Rom. xi. 33-36; Acts ii. 23.) This is the constant representation of Scripture. History in all its details, even the most minute, is but the evolution of the eternal purposes of God. It is no objection to this doctrine that the Scriptures often represent one purpose of God as consequent upon another, or that they speak of his purposes as determined by the conduct of men. The language of Scripture is founded on apparent truth; they speak, as men always do, as things appear, not as they themselves know or believe them to be. We speak of the concave heavens, or of the firm foundation of the heavens, although we know that it is not concave, and that it does not rest on any foundation. So the Bible speaks of the decrees of God as they appear to us in their successive revelation and in their mutual relations, and not as they exist from eternity in the divine mind. Neither is there any force in the objection that the agent must be before his acts. The sun is not before his brightness, nor the mind before thought, nor life before consciousness, nor God before his purposes. These objections are founded on the assumption that God is subject to the limitations of time. To Him there is neither past nor future, neither before nor after.

D. The Decrees of God are Immutable.

Change of purpose arises either from the want of wisdom or from, the want of power. As God is infinite in wisdom and power, there can be with Him no unforeseen emergency and no inadequacy of means, and nothing can resist the execution of his original intention. To Him, therefore, the causes of change have no existence. With God there is, as the Scriptures teach, "no variableness, neither shadow of turning." (James i. 17.) "The counsel of the Lord standeth for ever, the thoughts of his heart to all generations. (Ps. xxxiii. 11.) "The Lord of hosts hath sworn, saying, Surely as I have thought, so shall it come to pass; and as I have purposed, so shall it stand." (Is. xiv. 24.) "I am God . . . . declaring the end from the beginning, and from ancient times the things that are not yet done, saying, My counsel shall stand, and I will do all my pleasure." (Is. xlvi. 9, 10.) The uniformity of the laws of nature is a constant revelation of the immutability of God. They are now what they

were at the beginning of time, and they are the same in every part of the universe. No less stable are the laws which regulate the operations of the reason and conscience. The whole government of God, as the God of nature and as moral governor, rests on the immutability of his counsels.

E. The Decrees of God are Free.

This includes three ideas, --

1. They are rational determinations, founded on sufficient reasons. This is opposed to the doctrine of necessity, which assumes that God acts by a mere necessity of nature, and that all that occurs is due to the law of development or of self-manifestation of the divine being. This reduces God to a mere natura naturans, or vis formativa, which acts without design. The true doctrine is opposed also to the idea that the only cause of events is an intellectual force analogous to the instincts of irrational animals. The acts performed under the guidance of instinct are not free acts, for liberty is a libentia rationalis, spontaneity determined by reason. It is therefore involved in the idea of God as a rational and personal being that his decrees are free. He was free to create or not to create; to create such a world as now is, or one entirely different. He is free to act or not act, and when He purposes, it is not from any blind necessity, but according to the counsel of his own will.

2. Our purposes are free, even when formed under the influence of other minds. We may be argued or persuaded into certain courses of action, or induced to form our designs out of regard to the wishes or interests of others. God is infinitely exalted above all ab extra influence. "Who hath known the mind of the Lord? or who hath been his counsellor?" (Rom. xi. 34.) "Behold, God exalteth by his power: who teacheth like Him? Who hath enjoined Him his way?" (Job xxxvi. 22, 23.) "Who hath directed the Spirit of the Lord? or being his counsellor hath taught Him? With whom took He counsel, and who instructed Him, and taught Him in the path of judgment?" (Is. xl. 13, 14.) "Who hath known the mind of the Lord, that he may instruct Him?" (1 Cor. ii. 16.) God adopted the plan of the universe on the grounds of his own good pleasure, for his own glory, and every subordinate part of it in reference to the whole. His decrees are free, therefore, in a far higher sense than that in which the ordinary purposes of men are free. They were formed purely on the counsel of his own will. He purposes and does what seemeth good in his sight.

3. The decrees of God are free in the sense of being absolute or sovereign. The meaning of this proposition is expressed negatively by saying that the decrees of God are in no case conditional. The event decreed is suspended on a condition, but the purpose of God is not. It is inconsistent with the nature of God to assume suspense or indecision on his part. If He has not absolutely determined on what is to occur, but waits until an undetermined condition is or is not fulfilled, then his decrees can neither be eternal nor immutable. He purposes one thing if the condition be fulfilled, and another if it be not fulfilled, and thus everything must be uncertain not only in the divine mind, but also in the event. The Scriptures, therefore, teach that He doeth whatsoever He pleaseth. (Ps. cxv. 3.) He doeth his pleasure in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth. (Dan. iv. 35; Ps. cxxxv. 6.) Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things. (Rom. xi. 36.) It is expressly taught that the purposes of God, even as to the future destiny of men, are founded on his own good pleasure. As all have sinned and come short of the glory of God, He has mercy upon whom He will have mercy. It is not according to our works, but of his grace that He saves

us. It is of Him that we are in Christ Jesus, that those who glory should glory in the Lord. (Matt. xi. 26; Rom. viii. 29, 30; ix. 15-18; Eph. i. 5, etc., etc.)

F. The Decrees of God are certainly Efficacious.

The decrees of God are certainly efficacious, that is, they render certain the occurrence of what He decrees. Whatever God foreordains, must certainly come to pass. The distinction between the efficient (or efficacious) and the permissive decrees of God, although important, has no relation to the certainty of events. All events embraced in the purpose of God are equally certain, whether He has determined to bring them to pass by his own power, or simply to permit their occurrence through the agency of his creatures. It was no less certain from eternity that Satan would tempt our first parents, and that they would fall, than that God would send his Son to die for sinners. The distinction in question has reference only to the relation which events bear to the efficiency of God. Some things He purposes to do, others He decrees to permit to be done. He effects good, He permits evil. He is the author of the one, but not of the other. With this explanation, the proposition that the decrees of God are certainly efficacious, or render certain all events to which they refer, stands good. This is proved, --

1. From the perfection of God, which forbids the ascription to Him of purposes uncertain as to their accomplishment. No man fails to execute what he purposes, except through the want of wisdom or power to secure the end proposed, or through some vacillation in his own mind. It would be to reduce God to the level of his creatures, to assume that what He decrees, should fail to come to pass.

2. From the unity of God's plan. If that plan comprehends all events, all events stand in mutual relation and dependence. If one part fails, the whole may fail or be thrown into confusion.

3. From the evident concatenation of events in the progress of history, which proves that all things are intimately connected, the most important events often depending on the most trivial, which shows that all must be comprehended in the plan of God.

4. From the providential and moral government of God. There could be no certainty in either if the decrees of God were not efficacious. There could be no assurance that any divine prophecy, promise, or threatening, would be accomplished. All ground of confidence in God would thus be lost, and chance and not God would become the arbiter of all events. The Scriptures variously and constantly teach this doctrine, (a.) By all those passages which assert the immutability and sovereignty of the divine decrees. (b.) By those which affirm that He fixes the bounds of our habitations, that our days are all numbered, and that even a hair from our heads cannot perish without his notice. (c.) By those which declare that nothing can counteract his designs. "The Lord of hosts," says the prophet, "hath purposed, who shall disannul it? And his hand is stretched out, and who shall turn it back." (Is. xiv. 27.) "I will work, and who shall let it?" (xliii. 13.) (d.) By those which teach doctrines that necessarily assume the certainty of all God's decrees. The whole plan of redemption rests on that foundation. It is inconceivable that God should devise such a scheme, and not secure its executions and that He should send his Son into the world, and leave the consequences of that infinite condescension undetermined. It is, therefore, the doctrine of reason as well as of Scripture, that God has a plan or end for which the universe was created, that the execution of that plan is not left contingent, and that whatever

is embraced in the decrees of God must certainly come to pass.

G. The Decrees of God relate to all Events.

God foreordains whatsoever comes to pass. Some events are necessary, that is, are brought about by the action of necessary causes; others are contingent or free, or are acts of free agents; some are morally good, others are sinful. The doctrine of the Bible is, that all events, whether necessary or contingent, good or sinful, are included in the purpose of God, and that their futurition or actual occurrence is rendered absolutely certain. This is evident, --

1. From the unity of the divine purposes. That unity supposes that the whole scheme of creation, providence, and redemption, was fixed by the divine decree. It was formed from ages in the divine mind, and is gradually unfolded by the course of events. It is therefore inconsistent with this sublime and Scriptural representation, to suppose that any class of actual events, and especially that class which is most influential and important, should be omitted from the divine purpose. He who purposes a machine, purposes all its parts. The general who plans a campaign, includes all the movements of every corps, division, and brigade in his army, and if his foresight were perfect, and his control of events absolute, his foreordination would extend to every act of every soldier. Whatever is wanting in his foreordination is due to the limitation of human power. As God is infinite in knowledge and resources, his purpose must include all events.

2. It is therefore inconsistent with the perfection of God to suppose either that He could not form a plan comprehending all events, or that He could not carry it into execution, without doing violence to the nature of his creatures.

3. The universality of the decree follows from the universal dominion of God. Whatever He does, He certainly purposed to do. Whatever He permits to occur, He certainly purposed to permit. Nothing can occur that was not foreseen, and if foreseen it must have been intended. As the Scriptures teach that the providential control of God extends to all events, even the most minute, they do thereby teach that his decrees are equally comprehensive.

4. Another argument is derived from the certainty of the divine government. As all events are more or less intimately connected, and as God works by means, if God does not determine the means as well as the event, all certainty as to the event itself would be destroyed. In determining the redemption of man, He thereby determined on the mission, incarnation, sufferings, death, and resurrection of his Son, on the gift of the Spirit, upon the faith, repentance, and perseverance of all his people. The prediction of future events, which often depend on the most fortuitous occurrences, or which include those that appear to us of no account, proves that the certainty of the divine administration rests on the foreordination of God extending to all events both great and small.

The Scriptures in various ways teach that God foreordains whatever comes to pass.

1. They teach that God works all things according to the counsel of his will. There is nothing to limit the words "all things," and therefore they must be taken in the fullest extent.

2. It is expressly declared that fortuitous events, that is, events which depend on causes so subtle and so rapid in their operation as to elude our observation, are predetermined; as the falling of the lot, the flight of an arrow, the falling of a sparrow, the

number of the hairs of our heads.

Free Acts are Foreordained.

3. The Bible especially declares that the free acts of men are decreed beforehand. This is involved in the doctrine of prophecy, which assumes that events involving the free acts of a multitude of men are foreseen and foreordained. God promises to give faith, a new heart, to write his law upon the minds of his people, to work in them to will and to do, to convert the Gentiles, to fill the world with the true worshippers of Christ, to whom every knee is gladly to bow. If God has promised these things, He must of course purpose them, but they all involve the free acts of men.

4. The Scriptures teach that sinful acts, as well as such as are holy, are foreordained. In Acts ii. 23, it is said, "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and by wicked hands have crucified and slain;" iv. 27. "For of a truth against thy holy child Jesus, whom thou hast anointed, both Herod and Pontius Pilate, with the Gentiles and the people of Israel were gathered together, for to do whatsoever thy hand and thy counsel determined before to be done." "Truly the Son of Man goeth as it was determined; but woe unto that man by whom He is betrayed." (Luke xxii. 22.) It was foreordained that He should be betrayed; but woe to him who fulfilled the decree. Here foreordination and responsibility are by our Lord Himself declared to coexist and to be consistent. In Rev. xvii. 17, it is said, "God hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled." The crucifixion of Christ was beyond doubt foreordained of God. It was, however, the greatest crime ever committed. It is therefore beyond all doubt the doctrine of the Bible that sin is foreordained.

5. Besides this, the conquests of Nebuchadnezzar, the destruction of Jerusalem, and many other similar events, were predicted, and therefore predetermined, but they included the commission of innumerable sins, without which the predictions, and consequently the revealed purposes of God, could not have been accomplished.

6. The whole course of history is represented as the development of the plan and purposes of God; and yet human history is little else than the history of sin. No one can read the simple narrative concerning Joseph, as given in the book of Genesis, without seeing that everything in his history occurred in execution of a preconceived purpose of God. The envy of his brethren, their selling him into Egypt, and his unjust imprisonment, were all embraced in God's plan. "God," as Joseph himself said to his brethren, "sent me before you, to preserve you a posterity in the earth, and to save your lives by a great deliverance. So now it was not you that sent me hither, but God." (Gen. xlv. 7, 8.) This is but an illustration. What is true of the history of Joseph, is true of all history. It is the development of the plan of God: God is in history, and although we cannot trace his path step by step, yet it is plain in the general survey of events, through long periods, that they are ordered by God to the accomplishment of his divine purposes. This is obvious enough in the history of the Jewish nation, as recorded in the Scripture, but it is no less true in regard to all history. The acts of the wicked in persecuting the early Church, were ordained of God as the means for the wider and more speedy proclamation of the Gospel. The sufferings of the martyrs were the means not only of extending but of purifying the Church. The apostasy of the man of sin being predicted, was predetermined. The destruction of the Huguenots in France, the

persecution of the Puritans in England, laid the foundation for the planting of North America with a race of godly and energetic men, who were to make this land the land of refuge for the nations, the home of liberty, civil and religious. It would destroy the confidence of God's people could they be persuaded that God does not foreordain whatsoever comes to pass. It is because the Lord reigns, and doeth his pleasure in heaven and on earth, that they repose in perfect security under his guidance and protection.

[508] Westminster Shorter Catechism, 7.

§ 2. Objections to the Doctrine of Divine Decrees.

A. Foreordination inconsistent with Free Agency.

It is urged that the foreordination of all events is inconsistent with the free agency of man. The force of this objection depends on what is meant by a free act. To decide whether two things are inconsistent, the nature of each must be determined. By the decrees of God are to be understood the purpose of God rendering certain the occurrence of future events. By a free act is meant an act of rational self-determination by an intelligent person. If such an act is from its very nature contingent, or uncertain, then it is clear that foreordination is inconsistent with free agency. This theory of liberty has been adopted by a large body of philosophers and theologians, and is for them an insuperable objection to the doctrine of the divine decrees. In answer to the objection, it may be remarked, (1.) That it bears with equal force against foreknowledge. What is foreknown must be certain, as much as what is foreordained. If the one, therefore, be inconsistent with liberty, so also is the other. This is sometimes candidly admitted. Socinus argues that the knowledge of God embraces all that is knowable. Future free actions being uncertain, are not the objects of knowledge, and therefore it is no impeachment of the divine omniscience to say that they cannot be known. But then they cannot he predicted. We find, however, that the Scriptures are filled with such predictions. It is, therefore, evident that the sacred writers fully believed that free acts are foreknown by the divine mind, and therefore are certain as to their occurrence. Besides, if God cannot foreknow how free agents will act, He must be ignorant of the future, and be constantly increasing in knowledge. This is so incompatible with all proper ideas of the infinite mind, that it has been almost universally rejected, both by philosophers and by Christian theologians. A still weaker evasion is that proposed by some Arminian writers, who admit that God's knowledge is not limited by anything out of Himself, but hold that it may be limited by his own will. In creating free agents, He willed not to foreknow how they would act, in order to leave their freedom unimpaired. But this is to suppose that God wills not to be God; that the Infinite wills to be finite. Knowledge with God is not founded on his will, except so far as the knowledge of vision is concerned, i.e., his knowledge of his own purposes, or of what He has decreed shall come to pass. If not founded on his will, it cannot be limited by it. Infinite knowledge must know all things, actual or possible. It may, however, be said that there is a difference between foreknowledge and foreordination, in so far that the former merely assumes the certainty of future events, whereas the latter causes their futurition. But as the certainty of occurrence is the same in both cases, it makes no difference as to the matter in hand. The decree only renders the event certain; and therefore if certainty be not inconsistent with liberty, then foreordination is not. That an event may be free and yet certain, may be easily proved. (1.) It is a matter of consciousness.

We are often absolutely certain how we shall act, so far as we are free to act at all, and conscious that we act freely. A parent may be certain that he will succor a child in distress, and be conscious that his free agency is not thereby impaired. The more certain, in many cases, the more perfectly are we self-controlled. (2.) Free acts have been predicted, and therefore their occurrence was certain. (3) Nothing was more certain than that our Lord would continue holy, harmless, and undefiled, yet his acts were all free. (4.) It is certain that the people of God will repent, believe, and persevere in holiness forever in heaven, yet they do not cease to be free agents. The decrees of God, therefore, which only secure the certainty of events, are not inconsistent with liberty as to the mode of their occurrence. Although his purpose comprehends all things, and is immutable, yet thereby "no violence is offered to the will of the creatures, nor is the liberty or contingency of second causes taken away, but rather established."

B. Foreordination of Sin inconsistent with Holiness.

It is further objected that it is inconsistent with the holiness of God that He should foreordain sin. There are two methods of dealing with this and all similar objections. The one may be called the Scriptural method, as it is the one often adopted by the sacred writers. It consists in showing that the objection bears against the plain declarations of Scripture, or against the facts of experience. In either case, it is for us sufficiently answered. It is vain to argue that a holy and benevolent God cannot permit sin and misery, if sin and misery actually exist. It is vain to say that his impartiality forbids that there should be any diversity in the endowments, advantages, or happiness of his rational creatures. It is vain to insist that a holy God cannot permit children to suffer for the sins of their parents, when we constantly see that they do thus suffer. So it is utterly irrational to contend that God cannot foreordain sin, if He foreordained (as no Christian doubts) the crucifixion of Christ. The occurrence of sin in the plan adopted by God, is a palpable fact; the consistency, therefore, of foreordination with the holiness of God cannot rationally be denied. The second method of dealing with such objections is to show that the principle on which they are founded is unsound. The principle on which the objection under consideration rests, is that an agent is responsible for all the necessary or certain consequences of his acts. The objection is, that a holy God cannot decree the occurrence of sin, because his decree renders that occurrence certain. That is, an agent is responsible for whatever his act renders certain. That principle, however, is utterly untenable. A righteous judge, in pronouncing sentence on a criminal, may be sure that he will cause wicked and bitter feelings in the criminal's mind, or in the hearts of his friends, and yet the judge be guiltless. A father, in excluding a reprobate son from his family, may see that the inevitable consequence of such exclusion will be his greater wickedness, and yet the father may do right. It is the certain consequence of God's leaving the fallen angels and the finally impenitent to themselves, that they will continue in sin, and yet the holiness of God remain untarnished. The Bible clearly teaches that God judicially abandons men to their sins, giving them up to a reprobate mind, and He therein is most just and holy. It is not true, therefore, that an agent is responsible for all the certain consequences of his acts. It may be, and doubtless is, infinitely wise and just in God to permit the occurrence of sin, and to adopt a plan of which sin is a certain consequence or element; yet as he neither causes sin, nor tempts men to its commission, He is neither its author nor approver. He sees and knows that higher ends will be accomplished by its admission than by its exclusion, that a perfect

exhibition of his infinite perfections will be thereby effected and therefore for the highest reason decrees that it shall occur through the free choice of responsible agents. Our great ground of confidence, however, is the assurance that the judge of all the earth must do right. Sin is, and God is; therefore the occurrence of sin must be consistent with his nature; and as its occurrence cannot have been unforeseen or undesigned, God's purpose or decree that it should occur must be consistent with his holiness.

C. The Doctrine of Decrees destroys all Motive to Exertion.

A third objection is, that the doctrine of foreordination, which supposes the certainty of all events, tends to the neglect of all use of means. If everything will happen just as God has predetermined, we need give ourselves no concern, and need make no effort. (1.) This objection supposes that God has determined the end without reference to the means. The reverse, however, is true. The event is determined in connection with the means. If the latter fail, so will the former. God has decreed that men shall live by food. If any man refuses to eat, he will die. He has ordained that men shall be saved through faith. If a man refuses to believe, he will perish. If God has purposed that a man shall live, He has also purposed to preserve him from the suicidal folly of refusing to eat. (2.) There is another fallacy included in this objection. It supposes that the certainty that an event will happen, acts as a motive to neglect the means of its attainment. This is not according to reason or experience. The stronger the hope of success, the greater the motive to exertion. If sure of success in the use of the appropriate means, the incentive to effort becomes as strong as it can be. On the other hand, the less hope, the less disposition there is to exert ourselves; and where there is no hope, there will be no exertion. The rational and Scriptural foundation for the use of means, and the proper motives to avail ourselves of them, are, (1.) The command of God. (2.) Their adaptation to produce the effect. (3.) The divine ordination which makes the means necessary to the attainment of the end. And (4.) The promise of God to give his blessing to those who obediently avail themselves of the means of his appointment.

D. It is Fatalism.

It is objected, in the fourth place, that the doctrine of decrees amounts to the heathen doctrine of fate. There is only one point of agreement between these doctrines. They both assume absolute certainty in the sequence of all events. They differ, however, not only as to the ground of that certainty, the nature of the influence by which it is secured, and the ends therein contemplated, but also in their natural effects on the reason and conscience of men.

The word Fatalism has been applied to different systems, some of which admit, while others deny or ignore the existence of a supreme intelligence. But in common usage it designates the dotrine that all events come to pass under the operation of a blind necessity. This system differs from the Scriptural doctrine of foreordination, (1.) In that it excludes the idea of final causes. There is no end to which all things tend, and for the accomplishment of which they exist. According to the Scriptural doctrine, all things are ordained and controlled to accomplish the highest conceivable or possible good. (2.) In that according to Fatalism the sequence of events is determined by an unintelligent concatenation of causes and effects. According to the doctrine of decrees, that sequence is determined by infinite wisdom and goodness. (3.) Fatalism admits of no distinction between necessary and free causes. The acts of rational agents are as much determined by a necessity out of themselves as the operations of nature. According to the Scriptures, the freedom and responsibility of

man are fully preserved. The two systems differ, therefore, as much as a machine differs from a man; or as the actions of infinite intelligence, power, and love differ from the law of gravitation. (4.) The one system, therefore, leads to the denial of all moral distinctions, and to stolid insensibility or despair. The other to a sedulous regard to the will of an infinitely wise and good ruler, all whose acts are determined by a sufficient reason; and to filial confidence and submission.

CHAPTER X: CREATION.

§ 1. Different Theories concerning the Origin of the Universe.

The question concerning the origin of the universe has forced itself on the minds of men in all ages. That the mutable cannot be eternal, would seem to be self-evident. As everything within the sphere of human observation is constantly changing, men have been constrained to believe that the world as it now is had a beginning. But if it began to be, whence did it come? Without the light of a divine revelation, this question is unanswerable. The data for the solution of the problem do not lie within the sphere either of experience or of reason. All human theories on this subject are nothing more than conjectures more or less ingenious.

Apart from the pantheistic doctrine which makes the universe the existence form, or, as Goethe calls it, "das lebendige Kleid" (the living garment) of God, the most prevalent views on this subject are, First, those theories which exclude mind from the causative origin of the world; Secondly, those which admit of mind, but only as connected with matter; and Thirdly, the Scriptural doctrine which assumes the existence of an infinite extramundane mind to whose power and will the existence of all things out of God is to be referred.

It is a self-evident truth that existence cannot spring spontaneously from non-existence. In this sense ex nihilo nihil fit is an universally admitted axiom. Those, therefore, who deny the existence of an extramundane mind, are forced to admit that as the universe now is, it must have always been. But as it is in a state of perpetual change it has not always been as it now is. There was a primordial state out of which the present order of things has arisen. The question is, How?

The purely Physical Theory.

According to the first hypothesis just mentioned, the primordial condition of the universe was that of universally diffused matter in a highly attenuated state. This matter had the properties, or forces, which it now everywhere exhibits; and under the operation of these forces and in accordance with the laws of heat, motion, etc., not only the great cosmical bodies were formed and arranged themselves in their present harmonious relations, but also all the organisms, vegetable and animal, on this globe and elsewhere, were fashioned and sustained. Every man knows enough of physical laws to be able to predict with certainty that on a cold day in the open air the moisture of his breath will be condensed; so, according to Professor Huxley, on this hypothesis, with adequate knowledge of those laws, it would have been easy from the beginning to predict, not only the mechanism of the heavens, but the fauna and flora of our globe in all the states and stages of

its existence.

The Nebular hypothesis, as first proposed by La Place, was the application of this theory to the explanation of the origin and order of the heavenly bodies. This hypothesis may be thus stated, "Suppose that the matter composing the entire solar system once existed in the condition of a single nebulous mass, extending beyond the orbit of the most remote planet. Suppose that this nebula has a slow rotation upon an axis, and that by radiation it gradually cools, thereby contracting in its dimensions. As it contracts in its dimensions, its velocity of rotation, according to the principles of Mechanics, must necessarily increase, and the centrifugal force thus generated in the exterior portion of the nebula would at length become equal to the attraction of the central mass. This exterior portion would thus become detached, and revolve independently as an immense zone or ring. As the central mass continued to cool and contract in its dimensions, other zones would in the same manner become detached, while the central mass continually decreases in size and increases in density. The zones thus successively detached would generally break up into separate masses revolving independently about the sun; and if their velocities were slightly unequal, the matter of each zone would ultimately collect in a single planetary, but still gaseous, mass, having a spheroidal form, and also a motion of rotation about an axis. As each of these planetary masses became still farther cooled, it would pass through a succession of changes similar to those of the first solar nebula; rings of matter would be formed surrounding the planetary nucleus, and these rings, if they broke up into separate masses, would ultimately form satellites revolving about their primaries." [509] We thus have an ordered universe without the intervention of mind. Every one knows, however, that there is a form in which the nebular hypothesis is held by many Christian theists.

Theories which assume Intelligence in Nature itself.

The obvious impossibility of blind causes acting intelligently, or, of necessary causes being elective in their operation, has led many who deny the existence of an extramundane Mind to hold, that life and intelligence pertain to matter itself in some at least of its combinations. A plant lives. There is something in the seed which secures its development, each after its kind. There is, therefore, something in the plant, which according to this theory is not external to the plant itself, which does the work of mind. That is, it selects or chooses from the earth and air the elements needed for its support and growth. It moulds these elements into organic forms, intended to answer a purpose, and adapted with wonderful skill to accomplish a given object. With regard to this principle of life, this vital force, it is to be remarked that it is in the plant; that it is never manifested, never acts, except in union with the matter of which the plant is composed; when the plant dies, its vitality is extinguished. It ceases to exist in the same sense in which light ceases when darkness takes its place.

What is true of the vegetable, is no less true of the animal world. Every animal starts in an almost imperceptible germ. But that germ has something in it which determines with certainty the genus, species, and variety of the animal. It fashions all his organs; prepares the eye for the light yet to be seen; the ear for sounds yet to be heard; the lungs for air yet to be breathed. Nothing more wonderful than this is furnished by the universe in any of its phenomena.

If, therefore, vegetable and animal life work all these wonders, what need have we to

assume an extramundane mind to account for any of the phenomena of the universe? All that is necessary is, that nature, natura naturans, the vis in rebus insita, should act just as we see that the vital principle does act in plants and animals. This is Hylozoism; the doctrine that matter is imbued with a principle of life.

Another form of this theory is more dualistic. It admits the existence of mind and matter as distinct substances, but always existing in combination, as soul and body in man in our present stage of being. The advocates of this doctrine, therefore, instead of speaking of nature as the organizing force, speak of the soul of the world; the anima mundi, etc.

It is enough to remark concerning these theories, (1.) That they leave the origin of things unaccounted for. Whence came the matter, which the theory in one form assumes? Whence came its physical properties, to which all organization is referred? And as to the other doctrine, it may be asked, Whence came the living germs of plants and animals? To assume that matter in a state of chaos is eternal; or that there has been an endless succession of living germs; or that there has been an eternal succession of cycles in the history of the universe, chaos unfolding itself into cosmos, during immeasurable ages, are all assumptions which shock the reason, and must of necessity be destitute of proof.

(2.) These theories are atheistic. They deny the existence of a personal Being to whom we stand in the relation of creatures and children. The existence of such a Being is an innate, intuitive truth. It cannot be permanently disbelieved. And, therefore, any theory which denies the existence of God must be not only false but short-lived.

The Scriptural Doctrine.

The Scriptural doctrine on this subject is expressed in the first words of the Bible: "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." The heavens and the earth include all things out of God. Of which things the Scriptures teach that they owe their existence to the will and power of God. The Scriptural doctrine therefore is, (1.) That the universe is not eternal. It began to be. (2.) It was not formed out of any pre-existence or substance; but was created ex nihilo. (3.) That creation was not necessary. It was free to God to create or not to create, to create the universe as it is, or any other order and system of things, according to the good pleasure of his will.

The doctrine of an eternal creation has been held in various forms. Origen, although he referred the existence of the universe to the will of God, still held that it was eternal. We speak of the divine decrees as free and yet as from everlasting. So Origen held that this was not the first world God made; that there never was a first, and never will be a last. "Quid ante faciebat Deus," he asks, "quam mundus inciperet? Otiosam enim et immobilem dicere naturam Dei, impium est simul et absurdum, vel putare, quod bonitas aliquando bene non fecerit, et omnipotentia aliquando non egerit potentatum. Hoc nobis objicere solent dicentibus mundum hunc ex certo tempore coepisse, et secundum scriptur- fidem annos quoque -tatis ipsius numerantibus. . . . . Nos vero consequenter respondimus observantes regulam pietatis, quoniam non tunc primum cum visibilem istum mundum fecit Deus, coepit operari, sed sicut post corruptionem hujus erit alius mundus, ita et antequam hic esset, fuisse alios credimus." [510]

Of course those of the schoolmen who made the thoughts of God creative, or identified purpose with act, or who said with Scotus Erigena, "Non aliud Deo esse et velle et facere," must regard the universe as coeternal with God. This was done by Scotus in a pantheistic

sense, but others who regarded the universe as distinct from God and dependent upon Him, still held that the world is eternal. The influence of the modern Monistic philosophy, even upon theologians who believe in an extramundane personal God, has been such as to lead many of them to assume that the relation between God and the world is such that it must have always existed. The common doctrine of the Church has ever been, in accordance with the simple teaching of the Bible, that the world began to be.

The second point included in the Scriptural doctrine of creation is, that the universe was not formed out of any pre-existent matter, nor out of the substance of God. The assumption that any thing existed out of God and independent of his will, has ever been rejected as inconsistent with the perfection and absolute supremacy of God. The other idea, however, namely, that God fashioned the world out of his own substance, has found advocates, more or less numerous, in every age of the Church. Augustine, referring to this opinion, says, "Fecisti coelum et terram; non de te: nam esset equale unigenito tuo, ac per hoc et tibi, ... et aliud prater te non erat, unde faceres ea; . . . . et ideo de nihilo fecisti coelum et terram." [511]

Not only those of the schoolmen and of the modern theologians who are inclined to the Monistic theory, made all things to be modifications of the substance of God, but many Theistic and even Evangelical writers of our day hold the same doctrine. [512] Sir William Hamilton also held that it is impossible to conceive the complement of existence being either increased or diminished. When anything new appears we are forced to regard it as something which had previously existed in another form. "We are unable, on the one hand, to conceive nothing becoming something; or, on the other, something becoming nothing. When God is said to create out of nothing, we construe this to thought by supposing that He evolves existence out of Himself; we view the Creator as the cause of the Universe. Ex nihilo nihil, in nihilum nil posse reverti,' expresses, in its purest form, the whole intellectual phenomenon of causality." [513] To this he elsewhere adds, "In like manner, we conceive annihilation, only by conceiving the Creator to withdraw his creation from actuality into power. . . . The mind is thus compelled to recognize an absolute identity of existence in the effect and in the complement of its causes -- between the causatum and the causa," [514] and therefore, "an absolute identity of existence" between God and the world. This doctrine the fathers, and the Church generally, strenuously resisted as inconsistent with the nature of God. It supposes that the substance of God admits of partition or division; that the attributes of God can be separated from his substance; and that the divine substance can become degraded and polluted.

The third point included in the Scriptural doctrine of creation is, that it was an act of God's free will. He was free to create or not to create. This is opposed to the doctrine of necessary creation, which has been set forth in different forms. Some regard the phenomenal universe as a mere evolution of absolute being by a necessary process, as a plant is developed from a seed. Others, regarding God as a Spirit, make life and thought essential and coeternal with Him, and this life and power are of necessity creative. God's "essence," says Cousin, "consists precisely in his creative power." [515] Again, he says, [516] "He cannot but produce; so that the creation ceases to be unintelligible; and God is no more without a world than a world without God." As, however, thought is spontaneous, Cousin, when called to account for such utterances, maintained that he did not deny that

creation was free.

Some who do not admit that God is under any natural or metaphysical necessity to give existence to the universe, still assert a moral necessity for the creation of sensitive and rational creatures. God, it is said, is love; but it is the nature of love to long to communicate itself, and to hold fellowship with others than itself. Therefore God's nature impels Him to call into existence creatures in whom and over whom He can rejoice. Others say, that God is benevolence, and therefore is under a moral necessity of creating beings whom He can render happy. Thus Leibnitz says "Dieu n'est point n�cessit�, m�taphysiquement parlant, � la cr�ation de ce monde. . . . . Cependant Dieu est oblig�, par une n�cessit� morale, � faire les choses en sorte qu'il ne se puisse rien de mieux." [517]

According to the Scriptures God is self-sufficient. He needs nothing out of Himself for his own well-being or happiness. He is in every respect independent of his creatures; and the creation of the universe was the act of the free will of that God of whom the Apostle says in Rom. xi. 36, "Of Him, and through Him, and to Him are all things."

The common faith of the Church on this subject is clearly and beautifully expressed by Melancthon: [518] "Quod autem res ex nihilo condit� sint, docet h�c sententia: ipse dixit et facta sunt; ipse mandavit, et creata sunt, id est dicente seu jubente Deo, res exort� sunt: non igitur ex materia priore exstruct� sunt, sed Deo dicente, cum res non essent, esse coeperunt; et cum Joannes in quit: Omnia per ipsum facta esse, refutat Stoicam imaginationem, qu� fingit materiam non esse factam."

[509] Loomis, Treatise on Astronomy, New York, 1865, p. 314.

[510] De Principiis, III. 3. Works, edit. Paris, 1733, vol. i. p. 149, c, d.

[511] Confessiones, XII. 7. Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. i. p. 356, c, d.

[512] The writer was dining one day with Tholuck and five or six of his students, when he took up a knife from the table, and asked, "Is this knife of the substance of God?" and they all answered, "Yes."

[513] Lectures on Metaphysics. Boston, edit. 1859, lecture xxxix. p. 533.

[514] Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, etc. By Sir William Hamilton. New York, edit. 1853, p. 575.

[515] Cousin's Psychology, New York, edit. 1856, p. 443.

[516] Ibid. p. 447.

[517] Th�odic�e, II. 201; Works, Berlin, 1840, p. 566.

[518] Loci Communes de Creatione, edit. Erlanger, 1828, p. 48.

§ 2. Mediate and Immediate Creation.

But while it has ever been the doctrine of the Church that God created the universe out of nothing by the word of his power, which creation was instantaneous and immediate, i.e., without the intervention of any second causes; yet it has generally been admitted that this is to be understood only of the original call of matter into existence. Theologians have, therefore, distinguished between a first and second, or immediate and mediate creation. The one was instantaneous, the other gradual; the one precludes the idea of any pre�xisting substance, and of cooperation, the other admits and implies both. There is evident ground

for this distinction in the Mosaic account of the creation. God, we are told, "created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters." Here it is clearly intimated that the universe, when first created, was in a state of chaos, and that by the life-giving, organizing power of the Spirit of God, it was gradually moulded into the wonderful cosmos which we now behold. The whole of the first chapter of Genesis, after the first verse, is an account of the progress of creation; the production of light; the formation of an atmosphere; the separation of land and water; the vegetable productions of the earth; the animals of the sea and air; then the living creatures of the earth; and, last of all, man. In Gen. i. 27, it is said that God created man male and female; in chapter ii. 7, it is said, that "the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground." It thus appears that forming out of pre&#65533;xisting material comes within the Scriptural idea of creating. We all recognize God as the author of our being, as our Creator, as well as our Preserver. He is our Creator, not merely because He is the maker of heaven and earth, and because all they contain owe their origin to his will and power, but also because, as the Psalmist teaches us, He fashions our bodies in secret. "Thine eyes," says the sacred writer, "did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them." (Ps. cxxxix. 16.) And the Bible constantly speaks of God as causing the grass to grow, and as being the real author or maker of all that the earth, air, or water produces. There is, therefore, according to the Scriptures, not only an immediate, instantaneous creation ex nihilo by the simple word of God, but a mediate, progressive creation; the power of God working in union with second causes.

Augustine clearly recognizes this idea. "Sicut in ipso grano invisibiliter erant omnia simul qu&#65533; per tempora in arborem surgerent; ita ipse mundus cogitandus est, cum Deus simul omnia creavit, habuisse simul omnia qu&#65533; in illo et cum illo facta sunt quando factus est dies: non solum coelum cum sole et luna et sideribus, quorum species manet motu rotabili, et terram et abyssos, qu&#65533; velut inconstantes motus patiuntur, atque inferius adjuncta partem alteram mundo conferunt; sed etiam illa qu&#65533; aqua et terra produxit potentialiter atque causaliter, priusquam per temporum moras ita exorirentur, quomodo nobis jam nota sunt in eis operibus, qu&#65533; Deus usque nunc operatur." [519]

Thus far there is little room for diversity of opinion. But when the question is asked, How long was the universe in passing from its chaotic to its ordered state? such diversity is at once manifested. According to the more obvious interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, this work was accomplished in six days. This therefore has been the common belief of Christians. It is a belief founded on a given interpretation of the Mosaic record, which interpretation, however, must be controlled not only by the laws of language, but by facts. This is at present an open question. The facts necessary for its decision have not yet been duly authenticated. The believer may calmly await the result.

The theistical advocates of the Nebular Hypothesis assume that the universe was an indefinitely long period in coming to its present state. God, intending to produce just such a universe as we see around us, instead of by a flat calling the sun, moon, and stars, with all their marshalled hosts, into existence, created simply nebulous matter diffused through space; invested it with certain properties or forces; gave it a rotatory motion, and then allowed these physical laws under his guidance to work out the harmonious system of the

heavens. As He is as truly the maker of the oak evolved from the acorn, according to the laws of vegetable life, as though He had called it into existence in its maturity by a word; so, it is maintained, He is as truly the creator of heaven and earth, on the nebular hypothesis, as on the assumption of instantaneous creation. This, however, is merely a hypothesis which has never commanded general assent among scientific men. It is, therefore, of no authority as a norm for the interpretation of Scripture.

The same theory of gradual, or mediate creation, has been applied to account for all the phenomena of the vegetable and animal kingdoms. This has been done in different forms. According to all these theories there must be something to begin with. There must be matter and its forces. There must even be life, and living organisms. To account for these we are forced to accept of the Scriptural doctrine of an immediate creation ex nihilo by the power of God.

[519] De Genesi ad Literam, v. 45; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. iii. p. 321, d. 422 a.

§ 3. Proof of the Doctrine.

The proof of the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo does not rest on the usage of the words vr' or ktizein, which are interchanged with sh and poiein. God is said to have created the world, and also to be the maker of the heavens and the earth. Plants and animals are said to be created, although formed out of the dust of the earth. That, however, the Scriptures do teach this great doctrine of natural and revealed religion, is plain, --

1. From the fact that no mention is ever made of any pre-existing substance out of which the world was made. The original creation is never represented as a moulding of matter into form and imbuing it with life. Nor do the Scriptures ever represent the world as an emanation from God, proceeding from Him by a necessity of his nature. Much less does the Bible ever identify God and the world. In thus ignoring all other doctrines, the Scriptures leave us under the necessity of believing that God created the world out of nothing.

2. The descriptions of the work of creation given in the Bible, preclude the idea of emanation or mere formation. God said, "Let there be light, and there was light." In Ps. xxxiii. 6, it it said, "By the word of the Lord were the heavens made; and all the host of them by the breath of his mouth." And in verse 9: "He spake and it was done; he commanded and it stood fast." It was, therefore, in the words of Melancthon, already quoted, Dicente seu jubente Deo, that the universe was called into existence. "Nam quid est aliud tota creatura," Luther asks, "quam verbum Dei a Deo prolatum, seu productum foras? . . . . Mundum et omnia creavit facillimo opere, dicendo scilicet, ut non plus negotii Deo sit in creatione, quam nobis in appellatione." [520]

3. The same doctrine is involved in the absolute dependence of all things on God, and in his absolute sovereignty over them. "Thou, even thou, art Jehovah alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their host, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is therein, and thou preservest them all." (Neh. ix. 6.) "By Him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers: all things were created by Him,

and for Him: and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist." (Col. i. 16, 17.) "Thou hast created all things, and for thy pleasure they are and were created." (Rev. iv. 11.) The all things spoken of in these passages is made to include everything out of God. There can, therefore, be no pre&#65533;xisting matter, existing independently of his will. Everything out of God is said to owe its existence to his will.

4. The same doctrine is included in the Scripture doctrine that the universe (ta panta) is ek theou of God; that He is its source, not in the Gnostic sense, but in the sense consistent with other representations of the Bible, which refer the existence of all things to the command of God. The universe, therefore, is "of Him" as its efficient cause.

5. The Apostle in Heb. xi. 3, begins his illustration of the nature and power of faith by referring to the creation as the great fundamental truth of all religion. If there be no creation, there is no God. If the universe was called into being out of nothing, then there must be an extramundane Being to whom it owes its existence. The creation is a fact which we know only by revelation. What the sacred writer here asserts is, First, that the worlds (aiones, all contained in time and space) were created, set in order, and established, by the simple word or command of God. Compare Ps. lxxiv. (lxxiii.) 16, in the Septuagint, su katertiso helion kai selenen. Secondly, this being the case, it follows that the universe was not formed out of any pre&#65533;xisting substance. Thirdly, God is not a mere former, but the creator of the ordered universe. The difference among commentators in the interpretation of this passage does not affect its general sense. The words are eis to me ek phainomenon ta blepomena gegonenai. The first question is whether eis to expresses the design, or simply the consequence. In the former case, the meaning is that God created the worlds by a word in order that; i.e., in order that men might know that the things seen were not made of what already existed. In the latter, it is simply stated as a fact, that as creation was by a word, it was not out of any pre&#65533;xisting substance. The other doubtful point in the passage is the construction of the negative particle me. It may be connected with phainomenon. This passage is then parallel with 2 Macc. vii. 28, ex ouk onton epoiesen auta ho theos; in the Latin, "Peto, nate, ut aspicias ad coelum, et terram, et ad omnia, qu&#65533; in eis sunt; et intelligas, quia ex nihilo fecit illa Deus, et hominum genus." Delitzsch, in his commentary on this Epistle, shows that neither the position of the negative before the preposition, nor the use of me, instead of ou is any valid objection to this interpretation. Others, however, prefer to connect the me, with gegonenai, i.e., "the worlds were not made out of the phenomenal." The sense in either case is substantially the same. But the question arises, What is the implied antithesis to the phenomenal? Some say the real, the ideal, the thoughts of God. Delitzsch says we must supply to me ek phainomenon, all' ek noeton, "and these noeta are the eternal invisible types, out of which, as their ideal ground and source, visible things by the fiat of God have proceeded." This is Platonism, and foreign to the Scriptural mode of thinking and teaching. Whatever is real is phenomenal; that is, every substance, everything which really exists manifests itself somewhere and somehow. The proper antithesis, therefore, to phainomenon is ouk onton. "The worlds were not made out of anything which reveals itself as existing even it the sight of God, but out of nothing."

In Rom. iv. 17, God is described as He "who quickeneth the dead, and calleth those things which be not, as though they were. To call may here be taken in the sense of commanding, controlling by a word. The passage then expresses the highest idea of

omnipotence. The actual and the possible are equally subject to his will; the non-existing, the merely possible, is as much obedient to Him as the actually existing. Or to call may as elsewhere mean, as De Wette explains it, to call into existence. "Der das Nichtseiende als Seiendes hervorruft." Who calls the non-existing into existence;" the hos onta being for hos esomena or for eis to einai hos onta. On this text Bengel says, "Cogita frequens illud yhy Gen. i. exprimitur transitus a non esse ad esse, qui sit vocante Deo. Conf. Ez. xxxvi. 29." [521]

6. The Scriptural doctrine on this subject is confirmed by all those passages which ascribe a beginning to the world. By the world is not meant the kosmos as distinguished from chaos, the form as distinguished from the substance, but both together. According to the Bible there is nothing eternal but God. He, and He alone is The Eternal. This is his distinguishing title, -- He who is and was and ever shall be. As the world therefore began to be, and as the world includes everything out of God, there was nothing of which the world could be made. It was therefore created ex nihilo. This is taught in the first chapter of Genesis, "In the beginning (before anything was) God created the heaven and the earth." In many other parts of Scripture a beginning is ascribed to the world, as in Ps. xc. 2, "Before the mountains were brought forth, or ever thou hadst formed the earth and the world, even from everlasting to everlasting, thou art God." Ps. cii. 25, "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth." In John xvii. 5, our Lord speaks of the glory which lie had with the Father before the world was. The foundation of the world is an epoch. Then time began. What was before the foundation of the world is eternal. The world, therefore, is not eternal, and if not eternal it must have had a beginning, and if all things had a beginning, then there must have been a creation ex nihilo.

7. The doctrine of creation flows from the infinite perfection of God. There can be but one infinite being. If anything exists independent of his will, God is thereby limited. The idea of the absolute dependence of all things on God pervades the Scripture and is involved in our religious consciousness. The God of the Bible is all extramundane God, existing out of, and before the world, absolutely independent of it, its creator, preserver, and governor. So that the doctrine of creation is a necessary consequence of Theism. If we deny that the world owes its existence to the will of God, then Atheism, Hylozoism, or Pantheism would seem to be the logical consequence. Hence, on the one hand, the Scriptures make that doctrine so prominent, presenting it on the first page of the Bible as the foundation of all subsequent revelations concerning the nature of God and his relation to the world, and appointing from the beginning one day in seven to be a perpetual commemoration of the fact that God created the heaven and earth. And, on the other, the advocates of Atheism or Pantheism contend against the doctrine of creation as the primary error of all false philosophy and religion. "Die Annahme einer Sch&#xfffd;pfung ist der Grund-Irrthum aller falschen Metaphysik und Religionslehre, und insbesondere das Ur-Princip des Juden- und Heidenthums." [522]

[520] Genesis, i. 5; Works, Wittenberg edit. 1555 (Latin), vol. vi. leaf 5, p. 2.

[521] Gnomon, edit. T&#xfffd;bingen, 1759, p. 614.

[522] Fichte, v. sel. Leben, p. 160.

§ 4. Objections to the Doctrine.

1. It has in all ages been urged as an objection to the doctrine of creation that it is inconsistent with an axiom, ex nihilo nihil fit. That aphorism may, however, have two meanings. It may mean that no effect can be without a cause, -- that nothing can produce nothing. In that sense it expresses a self-evident truth with which the doctrine of creation is perfectly consistent. That doctrine does not suppose that the world exists without a cause, or comes from nothing. It assigns a perfectly adequate cause for its existence in the will of an Almighty intelligent Being. In the other sense of the phrase it means that a creation ex nihilo is impossible, that God cannot cause matter, or anything else, to begin to be. In this sense it is not a self-evident truth, but an arbitrary assumption, and consequently without force or authority. It is indeed inconceivable; but so also are the ordinary operations of the human will inconceivable. No man can understand how mind acts on matter. As the world actually exists, we must admit either that it began to be, or that it is eternal. But the difficulties connected with this last assumption are, as we saw when arguing for the existence of God, far greater than those which attend the admission of a creation ex nihilo. It was partly the difficulty of conceiving of the non-existing passing into existence, and partly the need for a solution of the question concerning the origin of evil, that led Plato and other Greek philosophers to adopt the theory of the eternity of matter, which they regarded as the source of evil; a theory which passed over to Philo and to the Platonizing fathers. The Scriptural theory, or rather doctrine of the origin of evil, refers it to the free agency of rational creatures, and dispenses with the pre-existence of anything independent of God.

2. A more formidable objection, at least one which has had far more power, is that the doctrine of a creation in time is inconsistent with the true idea of God. This objection is presented in two forms. First, it is said, that the doctrine of creation supposes a distinction between will and power, or efficiency and purpose in the divine mind. Scotus Erigena [523] says, "Non aliud est Deo esse et facere, sed ei esse id ipsum est et facere. Co-ternum igitur est Deo suum facere et coessentiale." This was the common doctrine of the scholastic theology which defined God to be actus purus, and denied any distinction in Him between essence and attributes, power and act. If this view of the nature of God be correct, then the doctrine that supposes that God's eternal purpose did not take effect from eternity, must be false. If God creates by thinking, He formed the world when He purposed it. Secondly, it is said that the doctrine of creation is inconsistent with the nature of God, inasmuch as it assumes a change in Him from inaction to activity. What was God doing, it is asked, from eternity before He created the world? If He is Creator and Lord, He must always have been such, and hence there must always have been a universe over which He ruled. These difficulties have led to different theories designed to avoid them. Origen, as before mentioned, taught that there has been an eternal succession of worlds. Others say that creation is eternal, although due to the will of God. He did from the beginning what the Scriptures say He did in the beginning. A foot from eternity standing in the dust, or a seal from eternity impressed upon wax, would be the cause of the impression, although, the impression would be coeternal with the foot or seal. Pantheists make the world essential to God. He exists only in the world. "Das gottgleiche All ist nicht allein das ausgesprochene Wort Gottes (natura naturata) sondern selbst das sprechende (natura naturans): nicht das erschaffene, sondern das selbst schaffende und sich selbst offenbarende auf unendliche Weise." [524] That is, "The universe is not merely the outspoken word of God, but also that

which speaks; not the created, but the self-creating and self-revealing in unending forms."

Answer to the above Objections.

With regard to the objections above mentioned, it may be remarked, --

1. That they are drawn from a region which is entirely beyond our comprehension. They assume that we can understand the Almighty unto perfection and search out all his ways; whereas it is obvious that with regard to a Being who is eternal and not subject to the limitations of time, we are using words without meaning when we speak of successive duration in reference to Him. If with God there is no past or future, it is vain to ask what He was doing before creation. It was stated, when treating of the attributes of God, that there are two methods of determining our conceptions of the divine nature and operations. The one is to start with the idea of the Absolute and Infinite and make that idea the touchstone; affirming or denying what is assumed to be consistent or inconsistent therewith. Those who adopt this method, refuse to submit to the teachings of their moral nature or the revelations of the Word of God, and make Him either an absolutely unknown cause, or deny to Him all the attributes of a person. The other method is to start with the revelation which God has made of Himself in the constitution of our own nature and in his holy Word. This method leads to the conclusion that God can think and act, that in Him essence and attributes are not identical, that power and wisdom, will and working in Him, are not one and the same, and that the distinction between potentia (inherent power) and act applies to Him as well as to us. In other words, that God is infinitely more than pure activity, and consequently that it is not inconsistent with his nature that He should do at one time what He does not do at another.

2. A second remark to be made on these objections is that they prove too much. If valid against a creation in time, they are valid against all exercise of God's power in time. Then there is no such thing as providential government, or gracious operations of the Spirit, or answering prayer. If whatever God does He does from eternity, then, so far as we are concerned, He does nothing. If we exalt the speculative ideas of the understanding above our moral and religious nature, and above the authority of the Scriptures, we give up all ground both of faith and knowledge, and have nothing before us but absolute skepticism or atheism. These objections, therefore, are simply of our own making. We form an idea of the Absolute Being out of our own heads, and then reject whatever does not agree with it. They have, consequently, no force except for the man who makes them.

3. The scholastic theologians, who themselves were in the trammels of such philosophical speculations, were accustomed to answer these cavils by counter subtleties. Even Augustine says that God did not create the world in time, because before creation time was not. "Si liter\u0000 sacr\u0000 maximeque veraces ita dicunt, in principio fecisse Deum coelum et terram, ut nihil antea fecisse intelligatur, quia hoc potius in principio fecisse diceretur, si quid fecisset ante coetera cuncta qu\u0000 fecit; procul dubio non est mundus factus in tempore, sed cum tempore." [525] This is true enough. If time be duration measured by motion or succession, it is plain that before succession there can be no time. It is hard, however, to see how this relieves the matter. The fact remains that the world is not eternal, and therefore, in our mode of conception, there were infinite ages during which the world was not. Still the difficulty is purely subjective, arising from the limitations of our nature, which forbid our comprehending God, or our understanding the relation of his activity to

the effects produced in time. All we know is that God does work and act, and that the effects of his activity take place successively in time.

4. As to the objection that the doctrine of creation supposes a change in God, the theologians answer that it does not suppose any change in his will or purpose, for he purposed from eternity to create. On this point Augustine [526] says, "Una eademque sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit et ut prius non essent egit, quamdiu non fuerunt, et ut posterius essent, quando esse coeperunt." In other words, God did not purpose to create from eternity; but from eternity he had the purpose to create. As there is no change of purpose involved in creation, so there is no change from inaction to activity involved in the doctrine. God is essentially active. But it does not follow that his activity is always the same, i.e., that it must always produce the same effects. The eternal purpose takes effect just as was intended from the beginning. These objections, however, are mere cobwebs; but they are cobwebs in the eye; the eye of our feeble understanding. They are best got rid of by closing that eye, and opening what the Scriptures call "the eyes of the heart." That is, instead of submitting ourselves to the guidance of the speculative understanding, we should consent to be led by the Spirit as He reveals the things of God in his Word, and in our own moral and religious nature.

[523] De Divisione Natur, i. 74.

[524] Schelling, by Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 658.

[525] De Civitate Dei, XI. 6, edit. Benedictines, vol. vii. p. 444, c, d.

[526] De Civitate Dei, XII. 17, edit. Benedictines, vol. v"ii. p. 508, b.

§ 5. Design of the Creation.

Men have long endeavoured to find a satisfactory answer to the question, Why God created the world? What end was it designed to accomplish? Answers to this question have been sought from the following sources, -- (1.) The nature of God himself. (2.) From the nature of his works and the course of history. (3.) From the declarations of the Scriptures. As to the first source, it is to be remarked that the systems which preclude the admission of final causes, as Materialism and Pantheism in all their forms, of course preclude any question as to the design of the creation. The world is the evolution of an unconscious, unintelligent force, which has no design out of itself. To ask what is the design of the world is, in these systems, equivalent to asking what is the design of the being of God; for God is the world and the world is God. Those who admit the existence of an intelligent extramundane God, and who endeavour from his nature to determine the end for which He created the world, have pursued different courses and come to different conclusions. From the absolute self-sufficiency of God it follows that the creation was not designed to meet or satisfy any necessity on his part. He is neither more perfect nor more happy because of the creation. Again it follows from the nature of an infinite Being that the ground (i.e., both the motive and the end) of the creation must be in Himself. As all things are from Him and through Him, so also they are for Him. Some infer from his holiness that the purpose to create arose, so to speak, from the desire to have a field for the development of moral excellence in rational creatures. By far the most common opinion from the beginning has been that the creation is to be referred to the bonitas, goodness, benevolence, or, as the

modern Germans at least generally express it, the love of God. As God is love, and the nature of love is to communicate itself, as it must have an object to be enjoyed and rendered blessed, so God created the world that He might rejoice in it and render it blessed. From the time of Leibnitz, who made this idea the foundation of his "Th□odic□e," this theory has assumed a more contracted form. He reduced love to mere benevolence, or the desire to promote happiness. Hence the end of the creation was assumed to be the production of happiness. And as God is infinite, not only in benevolence, but also in wisdom and power, this world is necessarily the best possible world for the production of happiness. This theory is very fruitful of consequences. (1.) As all virtue consists in benevolence, happiness must be the highest good. Holiness is good only because it tends to happiness. It has no virtue of its own. (2.) Whatever tends to promote happiness is right. There is no such thing as sin. What we call sin, if a necessary means of the greatest good, becomes virtue. It is evil only so far as it has a contrary tendency. And as under the government of God all sin, past or present, does so cure a greater amount of happiness than would otherwise be possible, there is really no sin in the universe. (3.) This is generalized into the principle that it is right to do evil that good may come. This is the principle on which God acts, according to this theory, and it is the principle on which men are entitled and bound to act; and on which in point of fact they do act. The question which on every occasion their doctrine presents for decision is necessarily, What will be the consequence of a certain act or course of conduct? Will it promote happiness or the reverse? and the answer decides the course to be pursued. The Jesuits have worked out this theory into a science, and are enabled to determine beforehand when murder, perjury, and blasphemy become virtues. As this doctrine revolts the moral sense, its adoption is necessarily degrading. Few principles, therefore, have been so productive of false doctrine and immorality as the principle that all virtue consists in benevolence, that happiness is the highest good, and that whatever promotes happiness is right.

The Scriptural Doctrine as to the Design of Creation.

It is obviously in vain for man to attempt to determine the design of the creation from the nature of God's works and from the course of his providence. That would require a knowledge of the whole universe and of its history to its consummation. The only satisfactory method of determining the question is by appealing to the Scriptures. There it is explicitly taught that the glory of God, the manifestation of his perfections, is the last end of all his works. This is, (1.) The highest possible end. The knowledge of God is eternal life. It is the source of all holiness and all blessedness to rational creatures. (2.) This in the Bible is declared to be the end of the universe as a whole; of the external world or works of nature; of the plan of redemption; of the whole course of history: of the mode in which God administers his providence and dispenses his grace; and of particular events, such as the choice of the Israelites and all the dealings of God with them as a nation. It is the end which all rational creatures are commanded to keep constantly in view; and it comprehends and secures all other right ends. The common objection, that this doctrine represents God as self-seeking, has already been answered. God, as infinitely wise and good, seeks the highest end; and as all creatures are as the dust of the balance compared to Him, it follows that his glory is an infinitely higher end than anything that concerns them exclusively. For a creature to seek his own glory or happiness in preference to that of God, is folly and sin, because he is utterly insignificant. He prefers a trifle to what is of infinite importance. He

sacrifices, or endeavours to sacrifice, an end which involves the highest excellence of all creatures, to his own advantage. He serves the creature more than the Creator. He prefers himself to God. Many theologians endeavour to combine these different views as to the design of the creation. They say that the highest end is the glory of God, and the subordinate end the good of his creatures. Or, they say that the two are the same. God purposes to glorify Himself in the happiness of his creatures; or to promote the happiness of his creatures as a means of manifesting his glory. But this is only to confuse and confound the matter. The end is one thing; the consequences another. The end is the glory of God; the consequences of the attainment of that end are undoubtedly the highest good (not necessarily the greatest amount of happiness), and that highest good may include much sin and much misery so far as individuals are concerned. But the highest good is that God should be known.

§ 6. The Mosaic Account of the Creation.

There are three methods of interpreting this portion of the Bible. (1.) The historical. (2.) The allegorical. (3.) The mythical. The first assumes it to be a veritable history. The second has two forms. Many of the Fathers who allegorized the whole of the Old Testament without denying its historical verity, allegorized in like manner the history of the creation. That is, they sought for a hidden moral or spiritual sense under all historical facts. Others regarded it as purely an allegory without any historical basis, any more than the parables of our Lord. The mythical theory, as the name imports, regards the record of the creation as a mere fable, or fabulous cosmogony, designed to express a theory as to the origin of the universe, of man, and of evil, of no more value than the similar cosmogonies which are found in the early literature of all nations. In favour of the historical character of the record are the following considerations, (1.) It purports to be a veritable history. (2.) It is the appropriate and necessary introduction or an acknowledged history. (3.) It is referred to and quoted in other parts of the Bible as the true account of the creation of the world; especially in the fourth commandment, where, as well as in other parts of Scripture, it is made the foundation of the institution of the Sabbath. (4.) The facts here recorded, including as they do the creation and probation of man, lie at the foundation of the whole revealed plan of redemption. The whole Bible, therefore, rests upon the record here given of the work of creation, and consequently all the evidence which goes to support the divine authority of the Bible, tends to sustain the historical verity of that record.

Objections to the Mosaic Account of the Creation.

The principal objections to the Mosaic account of the creation are either critical, astronomical, or geological. Under the first head it is objected that the account is inconsistent with itself, especially in what is said of the creation of man; and that it is evidently composed of independent documents, in one of which God is called 'lhym, and in the other yhvh. The former of these objections is answered by showing that the two accounts of the creation are not inconsistent; the one is a concise statement of the fact, the other a fuller account of the manner of its occurrence. As to the second objection, it is enough to say that, admitting the fact on which it is founded, it creates no difficulty in the way of acknowledging the historical character of the record. It is of no importance to us whence Moses derived his information, whether from one or more historical documents,

from tradition, or from direct revelation. We receive the account on his authority and on the authority of the Book of which it is a recognized and authentic portion.

The astronomical objections are, (1.) That the whole account evidently assumes that our earth is the centre of the universe, and that the sun, moon, and stars are its satellites. (2.) That light is said to have been created and the alternation between day and night established before the creation of the sun; and (3.) That the visible heavens are represented as a solid expanse. The first of these objections bears with as much force against all the representations of the Bible and the language of common life. Men instinctively form their language according to apparent, and not absolute or scientific truth. They speak of the sun as rising and setting; of its running its course through the heavens, although they know that this is only apparently and not really true. The language of the Bible on this, as well as on all other subjects, is framed in accordance with the common usage of men. The second objection is founded on the assumption that the fourteenth verse speaks of the creation of the sun and other heavenly bodies. This is not its necessary meaning. The sense may be that God then appointed the sun and moon to the service of measuring and regulating times and seasons. But even if the other interpretation be adopted, there need be no conflict between the record and the astronomical fact that the sun is now the source of light to the world. The narrative makes a distinction between the cosmical light mentioned in the earlier part of the chapter, and the light enanating from the sun, specially designed for our globe. The third objection is met by the remark already made. If we speak of the concave heavens, why might not the Hebrews speak of the solid heavens? The word firmament applied to the visible heavens is as familiar to us as it was to them. Calvin well remarks, "Moses vulgi ruditati se accommodans, non alia Dei opera commemorat in historia creationis, nisi qu&#65533; oculis nostris occurrunt." [527]

Geology and the Bible.

The geological objections to the Mosaic record are apparently the most serious. According to the commonly received chronology, our globe has existed only a few thousand years. According to geologists, it must have existed for countless ages. And again, according to the generally received interpretation of the first chapter of Genesis, the process of creation was completed in six days, whereas geology teaches that it must have been in progress through periods of time which cannot be computed.

Admitting the facts to be as geologists would have us to believe, two methods of reconciling the Mosaic account with those facts have been adopted. First, some understand the first verse to refer to the original creation of the matter of the universe in the indefinite past, and what follows to refer to the last reorganizing change in the state of our earth to fit it for the habitation of man. Second, the word day as used throughout the chapter is understood of geological periods of indefinite duration.

In favour of this latter view it is urged that the word day is used in Scripture in many different senses; sometimes for the time the sun is above the horizon; sometimes for a period of twenty-four hours; sometimes for a year, as in Lev. xxv. 29, Judges xvii. 10, and often elsewhere; sometimes for an indefinite period, as in the phrases, "the day of your calamity," "the day of salvation," "the day of the Lord," "the day of judgment." And in this account of the creation it is used for the period of light in antithesis to night; for the separate periods in the progress of creation; and then, ch. ii. 4, for the whole period: "In the day that

the Lord God made the earth and the heavens."

It is of course admitted that, taking this account by itself, it would be most natural to understand the word in its ordinary sense; but if that sense brings the Mosaic account into conflict with facts, and another sense avoids such conflict, then it is obligatory on us to adopt that other. Now it is urged that if the word "day" be taken in the sense of "an indefinite period of time," a sense which it undoubtedly has in other parts of Scripture, there is not only no discrepancy between the Mosaic account of the creation and the assumed facts of geology, but there is a most marvellous coincidence between them.

The cosmogony of modern science teaches that the universe, "the heaven and the earth," was first in a chaotic or gaseous state. The process of its development included the following steps: (1.) "Activity begun, -- light an immediate result. (2.) The earth made an independent sphere. (3.) Outlining of the land and water, determining the earth's general configuration. (4.) The idea of life in the lowest plants, and afterwards, if not contemporaneously, in the lowest or systemless animals, or Protozoans. (5.) The energizing light of the sun shining on the earth -- an essential preliminary to the display of the systems of life. (6.) lntroduction of the systems of life. (7.) Introduction of mammals -- the highest order of the vertebrates, -- the class afterwards to be dignified by including a being of moral and intellectual nature. (8.) Introduction of man." [528]

Professor Dana further says, "The order of events in the Scripture cosmogony corresponds essentially with that which has been given. There was first a void and formless earth: this was literally true of the heavens and the earth, if they were in the condition of a gaseous fluid. The succession is as follows: --

"1. Light.

"2. The dividing of the waters below from the waters above the earth (the word translated waters may mean fluid).

"3. The dividing of the land and water on the earth.

"4. Vegetation; which Moses, appreciating the philosophical characteristic of the new creation distinguishing it from previous inorganic substances, defines as that which had seed in itself.'

"5. The sun, moon, and stars.

"6. The lower animals, those that swarm in the waters, and the creeping and flying species of the land.

"7. Beasts of prey (creeping' here meaning prowling).

"8. Man.

"In this succession, we observe not merely an order of events, like that deduced from science; there is a system in the arrangement, and a far-reaching prophecy, to which philosophy could not nave attained, however instructed.

"The account recognizes in creation two great eras of three days each, -- an Inorganic and an Organic. Each of these eras open with the appearance of light; the first, light cosmical; the second, light from the sun for the special uses of the earth.

"Each era ends in a day' of two great works -- the two shown to be distinct by being severally pronounced good.' On the third day, that closing the Inorganic Era, there was first

the dividing of the land from the waters, and afterwards the creation of vegetation, or the institution of a kingdom of life -- a work widely diverse fromn all that preceded it in the era. So on the sixth day, terminating the Organic Era, there was first the creation of mammals, and then a second far greater work, totally new in its grandest element, the creation of Man.

"The arrangement is, then, as follows: --

"I. The Inorganic Era.

"1st Day. -- Light cosmical.

"2d Day. -- The earth divided from the fluid around it, or indvidualized.

"3d Day. -- {

"1. Outlining of the land and water.

2. Creation of vegetation.

"II. The Organic Era.

"4th Day. -- Light from the sun.

"5th Day. -- Creation of the lower order of animals.

"6th Day. -- {

1. Creation of mammals.

2. Creation of man."

"The record in the Bible," adds Professor Dana, [529] "is therefore profoundly philosophical in the scheme of creation which it presents. It is both true and divine. It is a declaration of authorship, both of creation and the Bible, on the first page of the sacred volume." [530] To the same effect he elsewhere says: "The first thought that strikes the scientific reader [of the Mosaic account of the creation] is the evidence of divinity, not merely in the first verse of the record, and the successive fiats, but in the whole order of creation. There is so much that the most recent readings of science have for the first time explained, that the idea of man as the author becomes utterly incomprehensible. By proving the record true, science pronounces it divine; for who could have correctly narrated the secrets of eternity but God himself?" [531]

The views given in his "Manual of Geology" are more fully elaborated by Professor Dana in two admirable articles in the "Bibliotheca Sacra" (January and July, 1856). He says, in the former of those articles, "The best views we have met with on the harmony between science and the Bible, are those of Professor Arnold Guyot, a philosopher of enlarged comprehension of nature and a truly Christian spirit; and the following interpretations of the sacred record are, in the main, such as we have gathered from personal intercourse with him." [532]

Professor Dana of Yale and Professor Guyot of Princeton, belong to the first rank of scientific naturalists; and the friends of the Bible owe them a debt of gratitude for their able vindication of the sacred record.

As the Bible is of God, it is certain that there can be no conflict between the teachings of the Scriptures and the facts of science. It is not with Facts, but with theories, believers have to contend. Many such theories have, from time to time, been presented, apparently or really inconsistent with the Bible. But these theories have either proved to be false, or to

harmonize with the Word of God, properly interpreted. The Church has been forced more than once to alter her interpretation of the Bible to accommodate the discoveries of science. But this has been done without doing any violence to the Scriptures or in any degree impairing their authority. Such change, however, cannot be effected without a struggle. It is impossible that our mode of understanding the Bible should not be determined by our views of the subjects of which it treats. So long as men believed that the earth was the centre of our system, the sun its satellite, and the stars its ornamentation, they of necessity understood the Bible in accordance with that hypothesis. But when it was discovered that the earth was only one of the smaller satellites of the sun, and that the stars were worlds, then faith, although at first staggered, soon grew strong enough to take it all in, and rejoice to find that the Bible, and the Bible alone of all ancient books, was in full accord with these stupendous revelations of science. And so if it should be proved that the creation was a process continued through countless ages, and that the Bible alone of all the books of antiquity recognized that fact, then, as Professor Dana says, the idea of its being of human origin would become "utterly incomprehensible."

[527] Institutio, I. xiv. 3, edit. Berlin, 1834, p. 112.

[528] Manual of Geology. By James D. Dana, M. A., LL. D., Silliman Professor of Geology and Natural History in Yale College, p. 743.

[529] Page 745.

[530] Page 746.

[531] Bibliotheca Sacra for January, 1856, p. 110.

[532] The views of Professor Guyot are presented at some length by the Rev. J.O. Means, in the numbers of the Bibliotheca Sacra for January and April, 1855.

CHAPTER XI: PROVIDENCE.

§ 1. Preservation.

God's works of providence are his most holy, wise, and powerful preserving and governing all his creatures and all their actions. Providence, therefore, includes preservation and government. By preservation is meant that all things out of God owe the continuance of their existence, with all their properties and powers, to the will of God. This is clearly the doctrine of the Scriptures. The passages relating to this subject are very numerous. They are of different kinds. First, some assert in general terms that God does sustain all things by the word of his power, as Heb. i. 3; Col. i. 17, where it is said, "By Him all things consist," or continue to be. In Nehem. ix. 6, "Thou, even thou art Lord alone; thou hast made heaven, the heaven of heavens, with all their hosts, the earth, and all things that are therein, the seas, and all that is there in, and thou preservest them all." Secondly, those which refer to the regular operations or powers of nature, which are declared to be preserved in their efficiency by the power of God. See Psalms civ. and cxlviii. throughout, and many similar passages. Thirdly, those which relate to irrational animals. And Fourthly, those which relate to rational creatures, who are said to live, move, and to have their being in God. These passages clearly teach, (1.) That the universe as a whole does not continue in being of itself. It would cease to exist if unsupported by his power. (2.) That all creatures, whether plants or animals, in their several genera, species, and individuals, are continued in existence not by any inherent principle of life, but by the will of God. (3.) That this preservation extends not only to the substance but also to the form; not only to the essence, but also to the qualities, properties, and powers of all created things.

The Nature of Preservation.

This doctrine, thus clearly taught in the Scriptures, is so consonant to reason and to the religious nature of man, that is not denied among Christians. The only question is as to the nature of the divine efficiency to which the continued existence of all things is to be referred. On this subject there are three general opinions.

First, That of those who assume that everything is to be referred to the original purpose of God. He created all things and determined that they should continue in being according to the laws which He impressed upon them at the beginning. There is no need, it is said, of supposing his continued intervention for their preservation. It is enough that He does not will that they should cease to be. This is the theory adopted by the Remonstrants and generally by the Deists of modern times. According to this view, God is seated on his throne in the heavens, a mere spectator of the world and of its operations, exerting no direct efficiency in sustaining the things which He has made. Thus Limborch [533] decribes

preservation, as held by many, to be merely an "actus negativus . . . . [quo Deus] essentias, vires ac facultates rerum creatarum non vult destruere; sed eas vigori suo per creationem indito, quoad usque ille perdurare potest relinquere." To this view it is to be objected, --

1. That it is obviously opposed to the representations of the Bible. According to the uniform and pervading teaching of the Scriptures, God is not merely a God afar off. He is not a mere spectator of the universe which He has made, but is everywhere present in his essence, knowledge, and power. To his sustaining hand the continuance of all things is constantly referred; and if He withdraws his presence they cease to be. This is so plainly the doctrine of the Bible that it is admitted so to be by many whose philosophical views constrain them to reject the doctrine for themselves.

2. It is inconsistent with the absolute dependence of all things on God. It supposes creatures to have within themselves a principle of life, derived originally, indeed, from God, but capable of continued being and power without his aid. The God of the Bible is everywhere declared to be the all-sustaining ground of all that is, so that if not upheld by the word of his power, they would cease to be. The Scriptures expressly distinguish the power by which things were created from that by which they are continued. All things were not only created by Him, says the Apostle, but by Him all things consist. (Col. i. 17.) This language clearly teaches that the almighty power of God is as much concerned in the continued existence, as in the original creation of all things.

3. This doctrine does violence to the instinctive religious convictions of all men. Even those the least enlightened live and act under the conviction of absolute dependence. They recognize God as everywhere present and everywhere active. If they do not love and trust Him, they at least fear Him and instinctively deprecate his wrath. They cannot, without doing violence to the constitution of their nature, look upon God as a being who is a mere spectator of the creatures who owe their existence to his will.

Preservation not a Continued Creation.

A second view of the nature of preservation goes to the opposite extreme of confounding creation and preservation. This opinion has been held in different forms, --

1. It is sometimes said that preservation and creation are to be referred to one and the same divine act. So far, therefore, as God is concerned, the two are identical. This ground is taken by many who admit the reality of the world and the efficiency of second causes. They intend by this mode of representation to deny any succession in the acts of God. He cannot be viewed as acting in time, or as doing in time what He has not done from eternity.

2. Others who represent preservation as a continued creation, only mean that the divine efficiency is as really active in the one case as in the other. They wish to deny that anything out of God has the cause of the continuance of its existence in itself; and that its properties or powers are in any such sense inherent as that they preserve their efficiency without the continued agency of God. This is the sense in which most of the Reformed theologians are to be understood when they speak of preservation as a continuous creation. Thus Heidegger [534] says, "Conservatio continuata creatio Dei activa est. Si enim creatio et conservatio du&#65533; actiones distinct&#65533; forent, creatio primo cessaret, ac tum conservatio vel eodem, quo creatio cessavit, vel sequenti momento inciperet." This only means that the world owes its continued existence to the uninterrupted exercise of the divine power. He therefore elsewhere says, "Conservationi annihilatio opponitur. Cessante actione

conservante res in nihilum collabitur." In like manner Alsted [535] says, "Conservatio est qu�dam continuatio. Quemadmodum creatio est prima productio rei ex nihilo, ita est conservatio rei continuatio, ne in nihilum recidat. Deus mundum sustinet." Ryssenius (whose work is principally from Turrettin), [536] says "Providentia bene altera creatio, dicitur. Nam eadem voluntate, qua Deus omnia creavit, omnia conservat, et creatio a conservatione in eo tantum differt, quod quando voluntatem Dei sequitur rerum existentia, dicitur creatio; quando res eadem per eandem voluntatem durat, dicitur conservatio." This amounts only to saying that as God created all things by the word of his power, so also He upholds all things by the word of his power.

3. There is, however, a third form in which this doctrine is held. By continued creation is meant that all efficiency is in God; that all effects are to be referred to his agency. As there was no co�peration in calling the world out of nothing, so there is no co�peration of second causes in its continuance and operations. God creates, as it were, de novo at each instant the universe, as at that moment it actually is.

Objections to the Doctrine of a Continuous Creation.

All these modes of representation, however, are objectionable. Creation, preservation, and government are in fact different, and to identify them leads not only to confusion but to error. Creation and preservation differ, first, as the former is the calling into existence what before did not exist; and the latter is continuing, or causing to continue what already has a being; and secondly, in creation there is and can be no co�peration, but in preservation there is a concursus of the first, with second causes. In the Bible, therefore, the two things are never confounded. God created all things, and by Him all things consist. As to the first mentioned of the three forms of the doctrine of a continued creation, it is enough to remark that it rests on the a priori idea of an absolute Being. It is not only a gratuitous, but an unscriptural assumption which denies all difference between will and efficiency, or between power and act in God. And as to the idea that God's acts are not successive; that He never does in time what He does not do from eternity, it is obvious that such language has for us no meaning. We cannot comprehend the relation which the efficiency of God has to the effects produced successively. We know, however, that God acts; that He does produce successive effects; and that, so far as we are concerned, and so far as the representations of scripture are concerned, our relation to God and the relation of the world to Him, are precisely what they would be if his acts were really successive. It is the height of presumption in man, on the mere ground of our speculative ideas, to depart from the plain representations of Scriptures, and so to conceive of the relation of God to the world as effectually to make Him an unknown Being, merging all his perfections into the general idea of cause.

The objection to the second form of the doctrine is not to the idea meant to be expressed. It is true that the preservation of the world is as much due to the immediate power of God as its creation, but this does not prove that preservation is creation. Creation is the production of something out of nothing. Preservation is the upholding in existence what already is. This form of the doctrine is therefore a false use of terms. A more serious objection, however, is that this mode of expression tends to error. The natural sense of the words is what those who use them admit to be false, and not only false but dangerous.

To the real doctrine of a continuous creation the objections are far more serious, --

1. It destroys all continuity of existence. If God creates any given thing every moment out of nothing, it ceases to be the same thing. It is something new, however similar to what existed before. It is as much disconnected from what preceded it as the world itself when it arose out of nothing, was disconnected from the previous nothingness.

2. This doctrine effectually destroys all evidence of the existence of an external world. What we so regard, the impressions on our senses which we refer to things out of ourselves, are merely inward states of consciousness produced momentarily by the creating energy of God. Idealism is, therefore, the logical, as it has been the historical consequence of the theory in question. If all necessity for the existence of an external world is done away with, that existence must be discarded as an unphilosophical assumption.

3. This theory of course denies the existence of second causes. God becomes the sole agent and the sole cause in the universe. The heavens and earth with all their changes and with all they contain, are but the pulsations of the universal life of God. If preservation be a continued production out of nothing, of everything that exists, then every material existence, all properties of matter so called, every human soul, and every human thought and feeling, is as much the direct product of divine omnipotence as the original creation. There cannot, therefore, be any causation out of God, or any co�peration of any kind any more than when He said, Let there be light, and there was light. In the same manner He constantly now says, Let men exist with all the thoughts, purposes, and feelings, which constitute their nature and character for the time being, and they are.

4. On this theory there can be no responsibility, no sin and no holiness. If sin exist, it must be referred to God as much as holiness, for all is due to his creating energy.

5. Between this system and Pantheism there is scarcely a dividing line. Pantheism merges the universe in God, but not more effectually than the doctrine of a continuous creation. God in the one case as truly as in the other, is all that lives. There is no power, no cause, no real existence but the efficiency and causality of God. This is obvious, and is generally admitted. Hagenbach [537] says, "Creation out of nothing rests on Theism. It becomes deistic if creation and preservation are violently separated and placed in direct opposition to each other; and pantheistic if creation be made a mere moment in preservation." "In creation," says Strauss, "God works all, the creature which is thus first produced, nothing." If, therefore, preservation is only the continuance of the same relation between God and the creature, it follows that God still effects everything and the creature nothing; hence out of God, or other than God, there are no causes, not even occasional. Leibnitz, [538] quotes Bayle as saying, "Il me semble, qu'il en faut conclure, que Dieu fait tout, et qu'il n'y a point dans toutes les cr�atures de causes premi�res, ni secondes, ni m�me occasionelles." And again, "On ne peut dire que Dieu me cr�e premi�rement, et qu' �tant cr�e, il produise avec moi mes mouvemens et mes d�terminations. Cela est insoutenable pour deux raisons: la premi�re est, que quand Dieu me cr�e on me conserve � cet instant, il ne me conserve pas comme un �tre sans forme, comme une esp�ce ou quelque autre des universaux de logique. Je suis un individu; il me cr�e et conserve comme tel, �tant tout ce que je suis dans cet instant avec toutes mes d�pendances." To make preservation, therefore, a continued creation, leads to conclusions opposed to the essential truths of religion, and at variance with our necessary beliefs. We are forced by the constitution of our nature to believe in the external world and in the reality of second

causes. We know from consciousness that we are the responsible authors of our own acts, and that we continue identically the same substance, and consequently are not created out of nothing from moment to moment.

This subject will come up again when treating of President Edwards' theory of identity, and its application to the relation between Adam and his race.

Scriptural Doctrine of the Subject

Between the two extremes of representing preservation as a mere negative act, a not willing to destroy, which denies any continued efficiency of God in the world; and the theory which resolves everything into the immediate agency of God, denying the reality of all second causes, is the plain doctrine of the Scriptures, which teaches that the continuance of the world in existence, the preservation of its substance, properties, and forms, is to be referred to the omnipresent power of God. He upholds as He creates all things, by the word of his power. How He does this it is vain to inquire. So long as we cannot tell how we move our lips, or how mind can operate on matter, or in what way the soul is present and operative in the whole body, it requires little humility to suppress the craving curiosity to know how God sustains the universe with all its hosts in being and activity. The theologians of the seventeenth century endeavoured to explain this by a general concursus, or, as they called it, influx of God into all his creatures. It is said to be an "Actus positivus et directus, quo Deus in genere in causas efficientes rerum conservandas influxu vero et reali influit, ut in natura, proprietatibus et viribus suis persistant ac permaneant." [539] But what do we gain by saying that the soul by "a true and real influx" operates in every part of the body. The fact is clearly revealed that God's agency is always and everywhere exercised in the preservation of his creatures, but the mode in which his efficiency is exerted, further than that it is consistent with the nature of the creatures themselves and with the holiness and goodness of God, is unrevealed and inscrutable. It is best, therefore, to rest satisfied with the simple statement that preservation is that omnipotent energy of God by which all created things, animate and inanimate, are upheld in existence, with all the properties and powers with which He has endowed them.

[533] Theologia Christiana, II. xxv. 7, edit. Amsterdam, 1700, p. 134.

[534] Heidegger, Corpus Theologi, loc. vii. 22, Tiguri, 1732, p. 251.

[535] Alsted, Theol. Didaot. Hanovi, 1627, p. 283.

[536] Summa Theologi, I. 209; Ibid.

[537] Dogmengeschichte, II. Zweite Hlfte, p. 288, edit. Leipzig, 1841.

[538] Thodice, II. 386; Opera, edit. Berlin, 1840, p. 615.

[539] Hollaz, Examen Theologicum, edit. Leipzig, 1763, p. 441.

§ 2. Government.

Statement of the Doctrine.

Providence includes not only preservation, but government. The latter includes the ideas of design and control. It supposes an end to be attained, and the disposition and direction of means for its accomplishment. If God governs the universe He has some great end, including an indefinite number of subordinate ends, towards which it is directed, and

He must control the sequence of all events, so as to render certain the accomplishment of all his purposes. Of this providential government the Scriptures teach, (1.) That it is universal, including all the creatures of God, and all their actions. The external world, rational and irrational creatures, things great and small, ordinary and extraordinary, are equally and always under the control of God. The doctrine of providence excludes both necessity and chance from the universe, substituting for them the intelligent and universal control of an infinite, omnipresent God. (2.) The Scriptures also teach that this government of God is powerful. It is the universal sway of omnipotence which renders certain the accomplishment of his designs, which embrace in their compass everything that occurs. (3.) That it is wise; which means not only that the ends which God has in view are consistent with his infinite wisdom, and that the means employed are wisely adapted to their respective objects, but also that his control is suited to the nature of the creatures over which it is exercised. He governs the material world according to fixed laws which He himself has established; irrational animals by their instincts, and rational creatures agreeably to their nature. (4.) God's providence is holy. That is, there is nothing in the ends proposed, the means adopted, or the agency employed, inconsistent with his infinite holiness, or which the highest moral excellence does not demand. This is all that the Scriptures reveal on this most important and difficult subject. And here it were well could the subject be allowed to rest. It is enough for us to know that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions, and that his government while absolutely efficacious is infinitely wise and good, directed to secure the highest ends, and perfectly consistent with his own perfections and with the nature of his creatures. But men have insisted upon answering the questions, How does God govern the world? What is the relation between his agency and the efficiency of second causes? and especially, How can God's absolute control be reconciled with the liberty of rational agents? These are questions which never can be solved. But as philosophers insist upon answering them, it becomes necessary for theologians to consider those answers, and to show their fallacy when they conflict with the established facts of revelation and experience. Before considering the more important of the theories which have been advanced to explain the nature of God's providential government, and his relation to the world, it will be proper to present a brief outline of the argument, in support of the truth of the doctrine as stated above.

A. Proof of the Doctrine.

This doctrine necessarily flows from the Scriptural idea of God. He is declared to be a personal being, infinite in wisdom, goodness, and power; to be the Father of Spirits. From this it follows not only that He acts intelligently, i.e., with a view to an end, and on sufficient reasons, but that He must be concerned for the good of creatures rational and irrational, great and small. The idea that God would create this vast universe teeming with life in all its forms, and exercise no control over it, to secure it from destruction or from working out nothing but evil, is utterly inconsistent with the nature of God. And to suppose that anything is too great to be comprehended in his control, or anything so minute as to escape his notice; or that the infinitude of particulars can distract his attention, is to forget that God is infinite. It cannot require any effort in Him, the omnipresent and infinite intelligence, to comprehend and to direct all things however complicated, numerous, or minute. The sun diffuses its light through all space as easily as upon any one point. God is as much present everywhere, and with everything, as though He were only in one place, and

had but one object of attention. The common objection to the doctrine of a universal providence, founded on the idea that it is incompatible with the dignity and majesty of the divine Being to suppose that He concerns himself about trifles, assumes that God is a limited being; that because we can attend to only one thing at a time, it must be so with God. The more exalted are our conceptions of the divine Being, the less shall we be troubled with difficulties of this kind.

Proof from the Evidence of the Operation of Mind everywhere.

The whole universe, so far as it can be subjected to our observation, exhibits evidence of God's omnipresent intelligence and control. Mind is everywhere active. There is everywhere manifest the intelligent adaptation of means to an end; as well in the organization of the animalcule which it requires the microscope to reveal, as in the order of the heavenly bodies. This mind is not in matter. It is not a blind vis natur&#65533;. It is, and must be the intelligence of an infinite, omnipresent Being. It is just as much beyond the power of a creature to form an insect, as it is to create the universe. And it is as unreasonable to assume that the organized forms of the vegetable and animal worlds are due to the laws of nature, as it would be to assume that a printing-press could be constructed to compose a poem. There is no adaptation or relation between the means and the end. Wherever there is the intelligent adaptation of means to an end, there is evidence of the presence of mind. And as such evidence of mental activity is found in every part of the universe, we see God ever active and everywhere present in all his works.

Argument from our Religious Nature.

The Scriptural doctrine of a universal providence is demanded by the religious nature of man. It is therefore an instinctive and necessary belief. It is banished from the mind, or overruled only by persistent effort. In the first place, we cannot but regard it as a limitation of God to suppose Him absent either as to knowledge or power from any part of his creation. In the second place, our sense of dependence involves the conviction not only that we owe our existence to his will, but that it is in Him that we and all his creatures live, move, and have our being. In the third place, our sense of responsibility implies that God is cognizant of all our thoughts, words, and actions, and that He controls all our circumstances and our destiny both in this life and in the life to come. This conviction is instinctive and universal. It is found in men of all ages, and under all forms of religion, and in all states of civilization. Men universally believe in the moral government of God; and they universally believe that that moral government is administered at least in part, in this world. They see that God often restrains or punishes the wicked. Did this man sin, or his parents, that he was born blind? was the utterance of a natural feeling; the expression, although erroneous as to its form, of the irrepressible conviction that everything is ordered by God. In the fourth place, our religious nature demands intercourse with God. He must be to us the object of prayer, and the ground of confidence. We must look to Him in trouble and danger; we cannot refrain from calling upon Him for help, or thanking Him for our mercies. Unless the doctrine of a universal providence be true, all this is a delusion. Such, however, is the relation in which the Scripture. and the constitution of our nature assume that we stand to God, and in which He stands to the world. He is ever present, all-controlling, the hearer and answerer of prayer, giving us our daily mercies, and guiding us in all our ways. This doctrine of providence, therefore, is the foundation of all practical religion, and the denial

of it is practically atheism, for we are then without God in the world. It may be said that these religious feelings are due to our education; that men educated in the belief of witches and fairies, or supernatural agencies of any kind, refer events actually due to the operations of nature to the intervention of spiritual beings. To this it may be answered, First, that the sense of dependence, of responsibility, of obligation for mercies received, and of the control of outward events by the power of God, is too universal to be accounted for by any peculiar form of education. These are the generic, or fundamental convictions of the human mind, which are manifested in more or less suitable forms, according to the degree of knowledge which different men possess. And secondly, it is to be considered that the argument is founded on the truth and justness of these feelings, and not on their origin. It is in this case as it is with our moral convictions. Because our knowledge of what is right or wrong, and the opinions of men on that point, may be modified by education and circumstances, this does not prove that our moral nature is due to education; nor does it shake the convictions we entertain of the correctness of our moral judgments. It may be, and doubtless is true that we owe to the Scriptures most of our knowledge of the moral law, but this does not impair our confidence in the authority and truth of our views of duty, and of moral obligation. These religious feelings have a self-evidencing as well as an informing light. We know that they are right, and we know that the doctrine which accords with them and produces them, must be true. It is, therefore, a valid argument for the doctrine of a universal providence that it meets the demands of our moral and religious nature.

Argument from Predictions and Promises.

A fourth general argument on this subject is derived from the predictions, promises, and threatenings recorded in the Word of God. Those predictions are not mere general declarations of the probable or natural consequences of certain courses of action, but specific revelations of the occurrence of events in the future, the futurition of which cannot be secured except in the exercise of an absolutely certain control over causes and agents both natural and moral. God promises to give health, long life and prosperous seasons; or He threatens to inflict severe judgments, the desolations of war, famine, drought, and pestilence. Such promises and threatenings suppose a universal providence, a control over all the creatures of God, and over all their actions. As such promises and threatenings abound in the Word of God; as his people, and as all nations recognize such benefits or calamities as divine dispensations, it is evident that the doctrine of Providence underlies all religion, both natural and revealed.

Argument from Experience.

We may refer confidently on this subject to all experiences. Every man can see that his life has been ordered by an intelligence and will not his own. His whole history has been determined by events over which he had no control, events often in themselves apparently fortuitous, so that he must either assume that the most important events are determined by chance, or admit that the providence of God extends to all events, even the most minute. What is true of individuals is true of nations. The Old Testament is a record of God's providential dealings with the Hebrew people. The calling of Abraham, the history of the patriarchs, of Joseph, of the sojourn of the Israelites in Egypt, of their deliverance and journey through the wilderness, of their conquest of the land of Canaan, and their whole subsequent history, is a continuous record of the control of God over all their

circumstances, -- a control which is represented as extending to all events. In like manner the history of the world reveals to an intelligent eye the all-pervading providence of God, as clearly as the heavens declare his majesty and power.

B. The Scriptures teach God's Providence over Nature.

We find that the Bible asserts that the providential agency of God is exercised over all the operations of nature. This is asserted with regard to the ordinary operations of physical laws: the motion of the heavenly bodies, the succession of the seasons, the growth and decay of the productions of the earth; and the falling of the rain, hail, and snow. It is He who guides Arcturus in his course, who makes the sun to rise, and the grass to grow. These events are represented as due to the omnipresent agency of God and are determined, not by chance, nor by necessity, but by his will. Paul says (Acts xiv. 17), that God "left not himself without witness" even among the heathen, "in that He did good, and gave us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." Our Lord says (Matt. v. 45), God "maketh his sun to rise on the evil and on the good, and sendeth rain on the just and on the unjust." He clothes "the grass of the field, which to-day is, and to-morrow is cast into the oven." (Matt. vi. 30.) In like manner the more unusual and striking operations of natural laws, earthquakes, tempests, and pestilences, are said to be sent, governed, and determined by Him, so that all the effects which they produce are referred to his purpose. He makes the winds his messengers, and the lightnings are his ministering spirits. Even apparently fortuitous events, such as are determined by causes so rapid or so inappreciable as to elude our notice, the falling of the lot; the flight of an arrow; the number of the hairs of our heads, are all controlled by the omnipresent God. "Are not two sparrows sold for a farthing? and one of them shall not fall on the ground without your Father." (Matt. x. 29.)

Providence extends over the Animal World.

The Scriptures teach that irrational animals are the objects of God's providential care. He fashions their bodies, He calls them into the world, sustains them in being, and supplies their wants. In his hand is the life of every living thing. (Job xii. 10.) The Psalmist says (civ. 21), "The young lions roar after their prey, and seek their meat from God." Verses 27, 28, "These wait all upon thee; that thou mayest give them their meat in due season. That thou givest them, they gather: thou openest thy hand, they are filled with good." Matt. vi. 26, "Behold the fowls of the air: for they sow not, neither do they reap, nor gather into barns; yet your heavenly Father feedeth them." Acts xvii. 25, "He giveth to all life and breath, and all things." Such representations are not to be explained away as poetical modes of expressing the idea that the laws of nature, as ordained of God, are so arranged as to meet the necessities of the animal creation, without any special intervention of his providence. It is not the fact, merely, that the world, as created by God, is adapted to meet the wants of his creatures, that is asserted in the Scriptures, but that his creatures depend on the constant exercise of his care. He gives or withholds what they need according to his good pleasure. When our Lord put in the lips of his disciples the petition, "Give us this day our daily bread," He recognized the fact that all living creatures depend on the constant intervention of God for the supply of their daily wants.

Over Nations.

The Bible teaches that the providential government of God extends over nations and

communities of men. Ps. lxvi. 7, "He ruleth by his power forever; his eyes behold the nations: let not the rebellious exalt themselves." Dan. iv. 35, "He doeth according to his will in the army of heaven, and among the inhabitants of the earth." Dan. ii. 21, "He changeth the times and the seasons; He removeth kings and setteth up kings." Dan. iv. 25, "The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men and giveth it to whomsoever He will." Is. x. 5, 6, "O Assyrian, the rod of mine anger, and the staff in their hand is my indignation, I will send him against an hypocritical nation." Verse 7, "Howbeit he meaneth not so, neither doth his heart think so." Verse 15, "Shall the axe boast itself against him that heweth therewith? or shall the saw magnify itself against him that shaketh it? as if the rod should shake itself against them that lift it up, or as if the staff should lift up itself as though it were not wood." The Scriptures are full of this doctrine. God uses the nations with the absolute control that a man uses a rod or a staff. They are in his hands, and He employs them to accomplish his purposes. He breaks them in pieces as a potter's vessel, or He exalts them to greatness, according to his good pleasure.

Over Individual.

The providence of God extends not only over nations, but also over individuals. The circumstances of every man's birth, life, and death, are ordered by God. Whether we are born in a heathen or in a Christian land, in the Church or out of it; whether weak or strong; with many, or with few talents; whether we are prosperous or afflicted; whether we live a longer or a shorter time, are not matters determined by chance, or by the unintelligent sequence of events, but by the will of God. 1 Sam. ii. 6, 7, "The Lord killeth and maketh alive: He bringeth down to the grave, and bringeth up. The Lord maketh poor and maketh rich, He bringeth low and lifteth up." Is. xlv. 5, "I am the Lord (the absolute ruler), and there is none else; there is no God besides me: I girded thee, though thou hast not known me." Prov. xvi. 9, "A man's heart deviseth his way: but the Lord directeth his steps." Ps. lxxv. 6, 7, "Promotion cometh neither from the east, nor from the west, nor from the south. But God is the judge (ruler): he putteth down one, and setteth up another." Ps. xxxi. 15, "My times (the vicissitudes of life) are in thy hands." Acts xvii. 26, God "hath made of one blood all nations of men for to dwell on all the face of the earth, and hath determined the times before appointed (i.e., the turning points in history) and the bounds of their habitation.

God's Providence in relation to Free Acts.

The Bible no less clearly teaches that God exercises a controlling power over the free acts of men, as well as over their external circumstances. This is true of all their acts, good and evil. It is asserted in general terms, that his dominion extends over their whole inward life, and especially over their good acts. Prov. xvi. 1, "The preparations of the heart in man and the answer of the tongue, is from the Lord." Prov. xxi. 1, "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord, as the rivers of water: He turneth it whithersoever He will." Ezra vii. 27, "Blessed be the Lord God of our fathers, which hath put such a thing as this in the king's heart, to beautify the house of the Lord." Ex. iii. 21 "I will give this people favour in the sight of the Egyptians." Ps. cxix. 36, "Incline thy heart unto thy testimonies." Ps. cxiv. 4, "Incline not my heart to any evil thing." A large part of the predictions, promises, and threatenings of the word of God are founded on the assumption of this absolute control over the free acts of his creatures. Without this there can be no government of the world and no certainty as to its issue. The Bible is filled with prayers founded on this same assumption.

All Christians believe that the hearts of men are in the hand of God; that He works in them both to will and to do according to his good pleasure.

The Relation of God's Providence to Sin.

With regard to the sinful acts of men, the Scriptures teach, (1.) That they are so under the control of God that they can occur only by his permission and in execution of his purposes. He so guides them in the exercise of their wickedness that the particular forms of its manifestation are determined by his will. In 1 Chron. x. 4-14 it is said that Saul slew himself but it is elsewhere said that the Lord slew him and turned the kingdom unto David. So also it is said, that he hardened the heart of Pharaoh; that He hardened the spirit of Sihon the king of Heshbon; that He turned the hearts of the heathen to hate his people; that He blinds the eyes of men, and sends them strong delusion that they may believe a lie; that He stirs up the nations to war. "God," it is said, in Rev. xvii. 17, "hath put in their hearts to fulfil his will, and to agree, and give their kingdom unto the beast, until the words of God shall be fulfilled." (2.) The Scriptures teach that the wickedness of men is restrained within prescribed bounds. Ps. lxxvi. 10, "Surely the wrath of man shall praise thee: the remainder of wrath shalt thou restrain." 2 Kings xix. 28, "Because thy rage against me, and thy tumult is come up into mine ears, therefore I will put my hook in thy nose, and my bridle in thy lips, and I will turn thee back by the way by which thou camest." (3.) Wicked actions are overruled for good. The wicked conduct of Joseph's brethren, the obstinacy and disobedience of Pharaoh, the lust of conquest and thirst for plunder by which the heathen rulers were controlled in their invasions of the Holy Land; above all, the crucifixion of Christ, the persecutions of the Church, the revolutions and wars among the nations, have been all so overruled by Him who sitteth as ruler in the heavens, as to fulfil his wise and merciful designs. (4.) The Scriptures teach that God's providence in relation to the sins of men, is such that the sinfulness thereof proceedeth only from the creature and not from God; who neither is nor can be the author or approver of sin. 1 John ii. 16, "All that is in the world, the lust of the flesh, and the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life, is not of the Father (not from Him as its source or author), but is of the world." James i. 13, "Let no man say when he is tempted, I am tempted of God: for God cannot be tempted with evil, neither tempteth he any man." Jer. vii. 9, "Will ye steal, murder, and commit adultery, and swear falsely, and burn incense unto Baal, and walk after other gods whom ye know not; and come and stand before me in this house, which is called by my name, and say, We are delivered to do all these abominations?"

Thus the fact that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions, is clearly revealed in the Scriptures. And that fact is the foundation of all religion. It is the ground of the consolation of his people in all ages; and it may be said to be the intuitive conviction of all men, however inconsistent it may be with their philosophical theories, or with their professions. The fact of this universal providence of God is all the Bible teaches. It nowhere attempts to inform us how it is that God governs all things, or how his effectual control is to be reconciled with the efficiency of second causes. All the attempts of philosophers and theologians to explain that point, may be pronounced failures, and worse than failures, for they not only raise more difficulties than they solve but in almost all instances they include principles or lead to conclusions inconsistent with the plain teachings of the word of God. These theories are all founded on some a priori principle

which is assumed on no higher authority than human reason.

§ 3. Different Theories of the Divine Government.

A. The Deistical Theory of God's Relation to the World.

The first of the general views of God's relation to the world is that which has ever been widely adopted by Rationalists, Deists, and men of the world. It is founded on the assumption that the Supreme Being is too exalted to concern Himself with the trifling concerns of his creatures here on earth. He made the world and impressed upon it certain laws; endowing matter with its properties, and rational beings with the powers of free agency, and having done this, he leaves the world to the guidance of these general laws. According to this view, the relation which God bears to the universe is that of a mechanist to a machine. When an artist has made a watch it goes of itself, without his intervention. He is never called to interfere with its operation, except to remedy some defect. But as no such defect can be assumed in the works of God, there is no call for his intervention, and He does not interfere. All things come to pass in virtue of the operation of causes which He created and set in motion at the beginning. According to this view God in no wise determines the effects of natural causes, nor controls the acts of free agents. The reason that one season is propitious and the earth produces her fruits in abundance, and that another is the reverse; that one year pestilence sweeps over the land, and another year is exempted from such desolation; that of two ships sailing from the same port, the one is wrecked and the other has a prosperous voyage; that the Spanish Armada was dispersed by a storm and Protestant England saved from papal domination; that Cromwell and his companions were arrested and prevented from sailing for America, which decided the fate of religious liberty in Great Britain, -- that all such events are as they are, must, according to this theory, be referred to chance, or the blind operation of natural causes. God has nothing to do with them. He has abandoned the world to the government of physical laws and the affairs of men to their own control. This view of God's relation to the world is so thoroughly anti-Scriptural and irreligious that it never has been, and never can be adopted by any Christian church. So long as even the simple words of our Lord are remembered and believed, so long must this doctrine be rejected with indignation. "Consider the ravens; for they neither sow nor reap; which neither have storehouse nor barn; and God feedeth them: how much more are ye better than the fowls?" "Your Father knoweth that ye have need of these things. But rather seek ye the kingdom of God; and all these things shall be added unto you." Our Lord, therefore, teaches us to confide in the universal providence of God which supplies the wants and controls the destiny of all his creatures, so that a hair does not fall from our heads without his notice.

B. Theory of Entire Dependence.

Another theory, the very opposite of the one just mentioned, is founded on the principle that absolute dependence includes the idea that God is the only cause. This principle has been widely adopted, even in the Church. It has been strenuously advocated by many theists, not only among the schoolmen, but by some of the Reformers, and by a large class of modern theologians. There was a class of the scholastic divines who were virtually pantheistic in their philosophical views. John Scotus Erigena had taught, in the

ninth century, [540] that "omnis visibilis et invisibilis creatura theophania, i.e., divina apparitio recte potest appellari." He had his followers, even in the thirteenth century. [541] Those who did not go the length of asserting that "Deus est essentia omnium creaturarum et esse omnium," still maintained that He so operated in all as to be the only efficient cause. According to Thomas Aquinas, they argued, "Nulla insufficientia est Deo attribuenda. Si igitur Deus operatur in omni operante, sufficienter in quolibet operatur. Superfluum igitur esset quod agens creatum, aliquid operaretur." Again, "Quod Deum operari in quolibet operante, aliqui sic intellexerunt, quod nulla virtus creata aliquid operaretur in rebus, sed solus Deus immediate omnia operaretur: puta quod ignis non calefaceret, sed Deus in igne. Et similiter de omnibus aliis." [542] Of all the Reformers, Zwingle was the most inclined to this extreme view of the dependence of the creature on God. "Omnis virtus," he says, [543] "numinis virtus est, nec enim quicquam est quod non ex illo, in illo et per illud sit, imo illud ipsum sit -- creata inquam virtus dicitur, eo quod in novo subiecto et nova specie, universalis aut generalis ista virtus exhibetur. Deus est causa rerum universarum, reliqua omnia non sunt vere caus&#65533;. [544] Constat causas secundas non rite causas vocari. . . . . Essentiam, virtutem, et operationem habent non suam sed numinis. Instrumenta igitur sunt. [545] Viciniora ista, quibus causarum nomen damus, non jure causas esse sed manus et organa, quibus &#65533;terna mens operatur." [546] Calvin did not go so far, although he uses such language as the following, when speaking of inanimate things, "Sunt nihil aliud quam instrumuenta, quibus Deus assidue instillat quantum vult efficaci&#65533; et pro suo arbitrio ad hanc vel illam actionem flectit et convertit." [547] He admits, however, that matter has its own properties, and second causes a real efficiency. The whole tendency of the Cartesian philosophy, which came into vogue in the seventeenth century, was to merge second causes into the first cause, and it thus led the way to idealism and pantheism. Malebranche admitted, on the testimony of Scripture, which declares that God created the heaven and the earth, that the external world has a real existence. But he denied that it could produce any effects, or that the soul could in any way act upon matter. We see all things in God. That is, when we perceive anything out of ourselves, the perception is not due to the impression made by the external object, but to the immediate agency of God. And the activity of our own minds is only a form of the activity of God. The first fruit of this system was avowed idealism, as all evidence of the existence of an external world was destroyed; and the second was the pantheism of Spinoza, which Leibnitz calls Cartesianism en outre. It must be admitted that the devout desire of the Reformed theologians to vindicate the sovereignty and supremacy of God, in opposition to all forms of Pelagian and semi-Pelagian doctrine, led many of them to go to an extreme in depreciating the efficiency of second causes, and in unduly exalting the omnipresent efficiency of God. Schweizer [548] represents the great body of the Reformed theologians as teaching that the dependence of creatures on the Creator supersedes all efficiency of second causes. "Die schlechthinige Abh&#65533;ngigkeit des Bestehens und Verlaufes der Welt gestattet keinerlei andere Urs&#65533;chlichkeiten als nur die g&#65533;ttliche, so dass Zwischenursachen nur seine Instrumente und Organe sind, er die durch ihre Gesammtheit wie durch alle einzelnen Zwischenursachen allein hindurchwirkende Causalit&#65533;t. Dieses ist er verm&#65533;ge der pr&#65533;sentia essentialis numinis oder doch divin&#65533; virtutis, welche das Sein alles Seins, die Bewegung aller Bewegungen ist." This is Schweizer's own doctrine, as it is that of the whole school of Schleiermacher, to which he belongs; but that it is not the doctrine of the Reformed theologians is plain from their all

teaching the doctrine of concursus, which Schweizer admits to be inconsistent with the assumption that God is the sole cause of all things. It was this false assumption that no creature can act; that dependence on God is absolute; and that all power however manifested is the power of God, which led to the doctrine of a continued creation, as stated when speaking of the efficiency of God in the preservation of the world. It led also to the doctrine of occasional causes; that is, to the theory that what we call second causes have no real efficiency, but are only the occasions on which God manifests his power in a particular way. The world of matter and mind exists indeed, but it is perfectly inert. It is only the instrument or means by which the manifold and everywhere present efficiency of God is manifested. "Consideremus," says Leibnitz, "eorum sententiam, qui rebus creatis veram, et propriam actionem adimunt, ... qui putant non res agere, sed Deum ad rerum prøsentiam, et secundum rerum aptitudem; adeoque res occasiones esse, non causas, et recipere, non efficere aut elicere." [549] The same views of the dependence of creatures on God lies at the foundation of the whole system of Dr. Emmons. He held that if any creature were endowed with activity or power to act, it would be independent of God. "We cannot conceive," he says, "that even Omnipotence itself is able to form independent agents, because this would be to endow them with divinity. And since all men are dependent agents, all their motions, exercises, or actions must originate in a divine efficiency." This is not to be understood as simply asserting the necessity of a divine concursus in order to the operation of second causes, for Emmons expressly teaches that God creates all the volitions of the soul, and effects by his almighty power all changes in the material world.

Objections to this Doctrine of Dependence.

To this whole doctrine, which thus denies the existence of second causes, and refers all action both in the material and spiritual world to God, it is to be objected, (1.) That it is founded on an arbitrary assumption. It starts with the ø priori idea of an absolute and infinite being, and rejects everything inconsistent with that idea. It cannot be proved that it is inconsistent with the nature of God that He should call into existence creatures capable of originating action. It is enough that such creatures should derive all their powers from God, and be subject to his control in all their exercises. (2.) This doctrine contradicts the consciousness of every man. We know, as certainly as we know anything, that we are free agents, and that free agency is the power of self-determination, or of originating our own acts. It contradicts not only our self-consciousness, but the laws of belief which God has impressed upon our nature. It is one of those laws that we should believe in the reality of the objects of our senses; and that belief involves the conviction not only that they really are, but also that they are the causes of the impressions which they make on our sensibility. It is to put philosophy in conflict with common sense, and with the universal convictions of men, to teach that all this is a delusion; that when we see a tree we are mistaken, that God immediately creates that impression in our mind; or that when we will to move the power is not in us, that it is not we that move, but God that moves us; or when we think, that it is God creates the thought. (3.) As has been before remarked, this system naturally leads, and has led to idealism and pantheism, and therefore is utterly inconsistent with all liberty and responsibility, and destroys the possibility of moral distinctions.

C. The Doctrine that there is no Efficiency except in Mind.

According to this view, there are no such things as physical forces. The mind of man is

endowed with the power of producing effects; but apart from mind, divine or created, there is no efficiency in the universe. This doctrine finds its way into many theological, as well as philosophical disquisitions. Thus Principal Tulloch says, a cause is "coincident with an agent." It "therefore implies mind. More definitely, and in its full conception, it implies a rational will." [550] Physical causes are therefore regarded as the ever operating will of God. "The idea of causation," he says, "we found to resolve itself into that of the operation of a rational mind or will in nature." [551] Providence is nothing else than a "continued forth-putting of that [originally creative] efficiency." [552] Dr. Tulloch very correctly assumes that a cause is that which has power to produce effects; and that we get our idea of power, and therefore of the nature of causation, from our own consciousness of efficiency. He hence infers that, as mind is the only cause of which we have immediate knowledge, therefore it is the only one that exists. But this is a non-sequitur. That mind is a cause, is no proof that electricity may not be a cause. The facts, as understood by the mass of men are, First, we are conscious of efficiency, or the power to produce effects. Second, the exercise of this power awakens, or gives occasion to the intuition of the universal and necessary truth that every effect must have an appropriate cause. Thirdly, as we see around us effects of different kinds, it is a law of reason that they should be referred to causes of different kinds. The evidence that this is a law of reason, is the fact that men everywhere assume physical causes to account for physical effects, as uniformly as they assume mind for intelligent effects. The theory, however, which resolves all forces into the everywhere operative will of God has great attractions. It makes a way of escape from many of the difficulties which beset the question of God's relation to the world. Even men devoted to the study of nature get so puzzled by such questions, as, What is matter? or What is force? that they are disposed, in many cases, to merge all things into God. The Duke of Argyle says, "Science, in the modern doctrine of Conservation of Energy and the Convertibility of Forces, is already getting something like a firm hold of the idea that all kinds of Force are but forms or manifestations of some one Central Force issuing from some one Fountain-head of Power. Sir John Herschel has not hesitated to say, that it is but reasonable to regard the Force of Gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or a will existing somewhere.' And even if we cannot certainly identify Force in all its forms with the direct energies of the One Omnipresent and all-pervading Will, it is at least in the highest degree unphilosophical to assume the contrary, -- to speak or to think as if the Forces of Nature were either independent of, or even separate from, the Creator's Power." [553]

It was remarked on a previous page that Wallace still more decidedly adopts the same view. In his book on "Natural Selection," after he had defended Darwin's theory on the origin of species (except in its application to man), he comes in the end to start the question, What is matter? This question he answers by saying, "Matter is essentially force, and nothing but force. Matter, as popularly understood, does not exist, and is, in fact, philosophically inconceivable." [554] The next question is, What is force? The ultimate answer to this is, that it is the will of God. "If," says Mr. Wallace, "we have traced one force, however minute, to an origin in our own Will, while we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it does not seem an improbable conclusion that all force may be will force; and thus the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the Will of higher intelligences or of one Supreme Intelligence." [555]

This theory is substantially the same as that previously mentioned. They differ only as

to the extent of their application. According to the doctrine of "Absolute Dependence," God is the only agent in the universe; according to the doctrine just stated, He is the only agent, or his will is the only energy in the material world. Matter is nothing. "It does not exist." It is nothing but force, and force is God; therefore the external world is God, In other words, all the impressions and sensations made upon us, as we suppose, by things without us, are in fact made by the immediate power of God: there is no earth; there are no stars; no men or women; no fathers or mothers. Men cannot believe this. By the constitution of our nature, which no man can alter, we are forced to believe in the reality of the external world; that matter is, and that it is the proximate cause of the effects which we attribute to its agency.

D. Theory of Pre&#xfffd;stablished Harmony.

Another assumption made by philosophers is, that one substance cannot act upon another substance of a different kind; what is extended cannot act upon what is not extended; matter cannot act on mind, nor mind on matter. It is, however, a fact of consciousness and of daily observation, that, apparently at least, material objects by which we are surrounded are the causes of certain sensations and perceptions, that is, they act upon our minds; and it is no less a matter of consciousness that our minds do act, at least so it seems, upon our bodies. We can move, we can control the action of all our voluntary muscles. This, however, must be a delusion if matter cannot act on mind nor mind on matter. To account for the relation in which mind and matter stand to each other in this world, and for the apparent action of the one on the other, Leibnitz adopted the theory of a pre&#xfffd;stablished harmony. God created two independent worlds, the one of matter, the other of mind; each has its own nature and its own principle of activity. All the changes in matter, all the actions of our bodies, are determined from a source within the matter and within our bodies, and would occur in the same order in which they actually take place if no created mind were in existence. In like manner, all the varying states of the human mind, all its sensations, perceptions, and volitions are determined from within, and would be just what they are though the external world had no existence. We should see the same sights, hear the same sounds, have the same volitions to move this or that muscle, though there were nothing to see, hear or move. These two worlds, thus automatically moved, coexist, and are made to act in harmony by a prearrangement divinely ordered. Hence the sensation of burning arises in the mind, not because fire acts on the body and the body on the mind, but because, by this pre&#xfffd;stablished harmony, these events are made to coincide in time and space. From eternity it was determined that I should have a volition to move my arm at a certain time; and from eternity it was determined that the arm should move at that time. The two events therefore concur as immediate antecedent and consequent, but the volition stands in no causal relation to the motion. The volition would have been formed had there been no arm to move; and the arm would have moved, although the volition had never been formed. Leibnitz's hand would have written all his wonderful books, mathematical and philosophical, and conducted all his controversies with Bayle, Clarke, and Newton, though his soul had never been created. [556]

E. Doctrine of Concursus.

A far more widely adopted and permanently influential principle is that no second cause can act until acted upon. Nothing created can originate action. This principle, carried to a greater or less extent, was adopted by Augustine, by the schoolmen, by the Thomists

and Dominicans in the Latin Church, and by Protestants, whether Lutherans, Reformed, or Remonstrants. It was assumed as a philosophical axiom, to which all theological doctrines should be conformed. "Ad gubernationem concursus pertinet, quo Deus non solum dat vim agendi causis secundis et eam conservat, sed et easdem movet et applicat ad agendum. Pr&#65533;cursus etiam dicitur, nam caus&#65533; secundm non movent nisi mot&#65533;." [557] "Prima causa," says Turrettin, "est primum movens in omni actione, ideo causa secunda non potest movere, nisi moveatur, nec agere, nisi acta a prima; alioqui erit principium sui motus, et sic non amplius esset causa secunda, sed prima." [558] In the production of every effect, therefore, there is the efficiency of two causes, the first and second. But this is not to be considered as involving two operations, as when two horses are attached to the same vehicle, which is drawn partly by the one and partly by the other. The efficiency of the first cause is in the second, and not merely with it. Deus "immediate influit in actionem et effectum creatur&#65533;, ita ut idem effectus non a solo Deo, nec a sola creatura, nec partim a Deo, partim a creatura, sed una eademque efficientia totali simul a Deo et creatura producatur, a Deo videlicet ut causa universali et prima, a creatura ut particulari et secunda." [559] "Non est re ipsa alia actio influxus Dei, alia operatio creatur&#65533;, sed una et indivsibilis actio, utrumque respiciens et ab utroque pendens, a Deo ut causa universali, a creatura ut particulari." [560]

This concursus is represented, first, as general; an influence of the omnipresent power of God not only sustaining creatures and their properties and powers, but exciting each to act according to its nature. It is analogous to the general influence of the sun which affects different objects in different ways. The same solar ray softens wax and hardens clay. It calls the germinating force of all seeds into action, but does not determine the nature of that action. All seeds are thus quickened; but one develops as wheat, another as barley, not because of the solar force, but because of its own peculiar nature. This is all that the Franciscans and Jesuits among the Romanists, and the Remonstrants among the Protestants allow. The Thomists and Dominicans among the former, and the Augustinian theologians generally, insist that, besides this general concursus, there is also a previous, simultaneous, and determining concourse of the first, in all second causes, both in the cause and in the effect; that is, not only exciting to action, but sustaining, guiding, and determining the act; so that its being as it is, and not otherwise, is to be referred to the first, and not to the second cause in every case. On this point, however, the Reformed theologians are not agreed, as Turrettin admits. "Ex nostris," he says, "quidam concursum tantum pr&#65533;vium volunt quoad bona opera grati&#65533;, sed in aliis omnibus simultaneum sufficere existimant." [561] By previous concursus is meant, he says, "Actio Dei, qua in causas earumque principia influendo, creaturas excitat, et agendum pr&#65533;movet, et ad hoc potius quam ad illud agendum applicat. Simultaneus vero est per quam Deus actionem creatur&#65533;, quoad suam entitatem, vel substantiam producit; quo una cum creaturis in earum actiones et effectus influere ponitur, non vero in creaturas ipsas." [562] It is admitted that these do not differ really, "quia concursus simultaneus, nihil aliud est, quam concursus pr&#65533;vius continuatus." This previous concursus is also called predetermining. "Id ipsum etiam nomine Pr&#65533;determinationis, seu Pr&#65533;motionis solet designari, qua Deus ciet et applicat causam secundam ad agendum, adeoque antecedenter ad omnem operationem creatur&#65533;, seu prius natura et ratione quam creatura operetur, eam realiter et efficaciter movet ad agendum in singulis actionibus, adeo ut sine hac pr&#65533;motione causa secunda operari non possit, ea vero

posita impossibile sit in sensu composito causam secundam non illud idem agere ad quod a prima causa pr&#65533;movetur." [563]

Concursus, therefore, assumes, (1.) That God gives to second causes the power of acting. (2.) That He preserves them in being and vigour. (3.) That He excites and determines second causes to act. (4.) That He directs and governs them to the predetermined end. All this, however, was so understood that --

1. The effect produced or the act performed is to be referred to the second, and not to the first cause. When the fire burns, it is to the fire, and not to God that the effect is to be attributed. When a man speaks, it is the man, and not God who utters the words. When the moon raises the tidal wave, and the wave dashes a vessel on the shore, the effect is to be attributed, not to the moon, but to the momentum of the wave. The force of gravity acts uniformly on all ponderable matter, and yet that force may be indefinitely varied in the effects which are produced by intervening causes, whether necessary or free.

2. The doctrine of concursus does not deny the efficiency of second causes. They are real causes, having a principium agendi in themselves.

3. The agency of God neither supersedes, nor in any way interferes with the efficiency of second causes. "Ad providentiam divinam non pertinet, naturam rerum corrumpere, sed servare: unde omnia movet secundum eorum conditionem: ita quod ex causis necessariis per motionem divinam consequuntur effectus ex necessitate; ex causis autem contingentibus sequuntur effectus contingentes. Quia igitur voluntas est activum principium non determinatum ad unum, sed indifferenter se habens ad multa, sic Deus ipsam movet, quod non ex necessitate ad unum determinat, sed remanet motus ejus contingens et non necessarius, nisi in his ad qu&#65533; naturaliter movetur." [564] "Concurrit Deus cum naturalibus ad modum caus&#65533; naturalis, cum causis liberis per modum caus&#65533; liber&#65533;." [565] "Duo sunt causarum genera, ali&#65533; definit&#65533; et generales, qu&#65533; eodem modo semper agunt, ut ignis qui urit, sol qui lucet; ali&#65533; indefinit&#65533; et liber&#65533;, qu&#65533; possunt agere vel non agere, hoc vel illo modo agere: ita Deus naturam earum conservat, et cum illis juxta eam in agendo concurrit; cum definitis, ut ipse eas determinet sine determinatione propria; cum indefinitis vero et liberis, ut ips&#65533; quoque se determinent proprio rationis judicio, et libera voluntatis dispositione, quam Deus non aufert homini, quia sic opus suum destrueret, sed relinquit et confirmat." [566] To the same effect the "Westminster Confession" [567] says: God ordereth events "to fall out according to the nature of second causes, either necessarily, freely, or contingently."

4. From this it follows that the efficiency or agency of God is not the same in relation to all kinds of events. It is one thing in co&#65533;perating with material causes, another in co&#65533;perating with free agents. It is one thing in relation to good acts, and another in relation to evil actions; one thing in nature, and another in grace.

5. The divine concursus is not inconsistent with the liberty of free agents. "Moveri voluntarie est moveri ex se, id est, a principio intrinseco. Sed illud principium intrinsecum potest esse ab alio principio extrinseco. Et sic moveri ex se, non repugnat ei, quod movetur ab alio. -- Illud quod movetur ab altero, dicitur cogi, si moveatur contra inclinationem propriam: sed si moveatur ab alio quod sibi dat propriam inclinationem, non dicitur cogi. Sic igitur Deus movendo voluntatem, non cogit ipsam: quia dat ei ejus propriam inclinationem." [568] This is undoubtedly true. Nothing is more certain from Scripture than

that God is the author of faith and repentance. They are his gifts. They are blessings for which we pray, and which He promises. Yet nothing is more certain from consciousness, than that faith and repentance are our own free acts. Therefore moveri ab alio is not inconsistent with moveri ex se. On this point Turrettin [569] says: "Cum providentia non concurrat cum voluntate humana, vel per coactionem, cogendo voluntatem invitam, vel determinando physice, ut rem brutan et c�cam absque ullo judicio, sed rationaliter, flectendo voluntatem modo ipsi convenienti, ut seipsam determinet, ut causa proxima actionum suarum proprio rationis judicio, et spontanea voluntatis electione; eam libertati nostr� nullam vim inferre, sed illam potius amice fovere."

6. All the advocates of the doctrine of concursus admit that the great difficulty attending it is in reference to sin. The difficulty here is not so much in relation to the responsibility of the sinner. If sin be his own act, and if the divine concursus does not interfere with his freedom, it does not interfere with his responsibility. When God by his grace determines the will of his people to holy acts, the holiness is theirs. It constitutes their character. When God gives a man beauty, he is beautiful. And if his co�peration in the sins of men leaves their freedom in sinning unimpaired, they are as truly sinful as though no such co�peration existed. This is not the difficulty. The real question is, how can God's co�peration in sin be reconciled with his own holiness? We can easily see how God can co�perate in good acts, and rejoice in the goodness which is his gift; but how can He so concur in sinful acts as not only to preserve the sinner in the exercise of his ability to act, but also to excite to action, and determine his act to be what it is, and not otherwise? This difficulty was, as has been remarked, freely acknowledged. It was met by defining sin as mere defect. It is a want of conformity to the moral law. As such it requires not an efficient, but only a deficient cause. God is the source immediately or remotely of all efficiency, but is not the source of mere deficiency. In every sinful act, therefore, there was distinguished the act as an act requiring an efficient cause; and the moral quality of that act, or its want of conformity to law, a mere relation, which is not an ens, and therefore is in no way to be referred to God. This is the answer to this objection given by Augustine, and repeated from his day to this. Aquinas [570] says: "Quicquid est entitatis et actionis in actione mala, reducitur in Deum sicut in causam: sed quod est ibi defectus non causatur a Deo, sed ex causa secunda deficiente." Quenstedt [571] says: "Distinguendum inter effectum et defectum, inter actionem et actionis ataxian. Effectus et actio est a Deo, non vero defectus et ataxia sive inordinatio et exorbitatio actionis. Ad effectum Deus concurrit, vitium non causat, non enim in agendo deficit aut errat, sed causa secunda." Bucan [572] says: "Malorum opera quoque decernit et regit. Tamen non est autor mali, quia mali sic aguntur a Deo, ut sponte, libere et sine coactione et impulsu violento agant. Deinde non infundit malitiam sicut bonitatem, nec impellit aut allicit ad peccandum." To the same effect Turrettin [573] says: "Cum actus qua talis semper bonus sit quoad entitatem suam, Deus ad illum concurrit effective, et physice. . . . . (quoad malitiam) Deus nec causa physica potest ejus dici, quia nec illam inspirat aut infundit, nec facit; nec ethica, qui nec imperat, aut approbat et suadet, sed severissime prohibet et punit." As the same solar influence quickens into life all kinds of plants, whether nutritious or poisonous; as the same current of water may be guided in one channel or another; as the same vital force animates the limbs of the sound man and of the cripple; as the same hand may sweep the keys of an instrument when in tune and when out of tune: so it is urged that the same divine efficiency sustains and

animates all free agents. That they act at all is due to the divine efficiency, but the particular nature of their acts (at least when evil) is to be referred, not to that all-pervading efficiency of God, but to the nature or character of each particular agent. That God controls and governs wicked men, determines their wickedness to take one form, and not another, and guides it to manifestations which will promote good rather than evil, is not inconsistent with the holiness of God. He did not infuse envy and hatred into the hearts of Joseph's brethren, but He guided the exercise of those evil passions, so as to secure the preservation of Jacob and the chosen seed from destruction.

Remarks on the Doctrine of Concursus.

The above statement of the doctrine of concursus is designed merely to give the views generally entertained by Augustinians, as to the nature of God's providential government. Whether those views are correct or not, it is important that they should be understood. It is very evident that there is a broad distinction between this theory of concursus and the theory which resolves all events, whether necessary or free, into the immediate agency of God. The points of difference between the two theories are, (1.) That the one admits and the other denies the reality and efficiency of second causes. (2.) The one makes no distinction between free and necessary events, attributing them equally to the almighty and creative energy of God; the other admits the validity and unspeakable importance of this distinction. (3.) The one asserts and the other denies that the agency of God is the same in sinful acts that it is in good acts. (4.) The one admits that God is the author of sin, the other repudiates that doctrine with abhorrence. The Reformed theologians protested against the aspersion freely made by Romanists, and afterwards by the Remonstrants, that the Augustinian doctrine led by any fair process of reasoning to the conclusion that God is the cause of sin. They quote from their opponents admissions which involve all that they themselves teach in reference to the agency of God in the wicked acts of men. Thus Bellarmin, who freely brings this objection against the Protestants, himself says, [574] "Deus non solum permittit impios agere multa mala, nec solum deserit pios ut cogantur pati qu&#xfffd; ab impiis inferuntur; sed etiam pr&#xfffd;sidet ipsis voluntatibus malis, easque regit et gubernat, torquet ac flectit in eis invisibiliter operando, ut licet vitio proprio mal&#xfffd; sint, tamen a divina providentia ad unum potius malum, quam ad aliud, non positive sed permissive ordinentur." As to this passage, Turrettin says, "Quibus verbis nihil durius apud nostros occurrit." Bellarmin also quotes [575] and adopts the language of Aquinas when he says, "Deum non solum inclinare voluntates malas ad unum potius, quam ad aliud permittendo, ut ferantur in unum, et non permittendo, ut ferantur in aliud, ut Hugo recte docuit, sed etiam positive inclinando in unum et avertendo ab alio." It is of importance, not only as a matter of historical truth, but also for its moral influence, that the fact should be distinctly known and recognized that the Reformed theologians, with all Augustinians before and after the Reformation, earnestly rejected the doctrine that God is the author or the efficient cause of sin.

The objection to the doctrine of concursus is not that it intentionally or really destroys the free agency of man; or that it makes God the author of sin, but (1.) That it is founded on an arbitrary and false assumption. It denies that any creature can originate action. This does not admit of proof. It is an inference from the assumed nature of the dependence of the creature upon the creator; or from the assumed necessity of the principle in question, in order to secure the absolute control of God over created beings. It however contradicts the

consciousness of men. That we are free agents means that we have the power to act freely; and to act freely implies that we originate our own acts. This does not mean that it is inconsistent with our liberty that we should be moved and induced to exert our ability to act by considerations addressed to our reason or inclinations, or by the grace of God; but it does mean that we have the power to act. The power of spontaneous action is essential to the nature of a spirit and God, in creating us in his own nature as spirits, endowed us with the power to originate our own acts. (2.) A second objection to the doctrine is that it is an attempt to explain the inexplicable. Not content with the simple and certain declaration of the Bible, that God does govern all his creatures and all their actions, it undertakes to explain how this is done. From the nature of the case this is impossible. We see that material causes act, but we cannot tell how they act. We are conscious of the power to guide our own thoughts, and to determine our own wills; but how it is we exercise this efficiency, passes our comprehension. We know that the will has power over certain muscles of the body; but the point of connection, the nexus between volition and muscular action, is altogether inscrutable. Why then should we attempt to explain how it is that the efficiency of God controls the efficiency of second causes? The fact is plain, and the fact alone is important; but the mode of Gods action we cannot possibly understand. (3.) A third objection is that this doctrine multiplies difficulties. By attempting to teach how God governs free agents, that He first excites them to act; sustains them in action; determines them to act so, and not otherwise; that He effectually concurs in the entity, but not necessarily in the moral quality of the act, we raise at every step the most subtle and perplexing metaphysical questions, which no man is able to solve. And even admitting the theory of concursus, as expounded by the schoolmen and scholastic theologians, to be true, what does it amount to? What real knowledge does it communicate? All we know, and all we need to know, is, (1.) That God does govern all his creatures; and (2.) That his control over them is consistent with their nature, and with his own infinite purity and excellence.

As this doctrine of Providence involves the question of Gods relation to the world, it is confessedly the most comprehensive and difficult in the compass either of theology or of philosophy. As the world, meaning thereby the universe of created beings, includes the world of matter and the world of mind, the doctrine of providence concerns, first, the relation of God to the external or material universe; and secondly, his relation to the world of mind, or to his rational creatures.

[540] De Divisione Natur&#xfffd;, lib. iii. 19, edit. Monast. Guestphal. 1838, p. 240.

[541] See Rixner's Geschichte der Philosophie, vol. ii. § 40, p. 72.

[542] Summa Theologi&#xfffd;, part I., quest. cv., art. 5, edit. Cologne, 1640, pp. 192, 193.

[543] De Providentia Dei; Works, edit. Turici, 1832, vol. iv. p. 85.

[544] Ibid. Page 95.

[545] Ibid. Page 96.

[546] Zwingle, iv. 97.

[547] Institutio, I. xvi. 2, edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. p. 135.

[548] Glaubenslehre der Reformirten Kirche, p. 318.

[549] De ipsa Natura, 10; Works, edit. Berlin, 1840, p. 157.

[550] Theism; The Witness of Reason and Nature to an All-Wise and Beneficient

Creator, by the Rev. John Tulloch, D. D., Principal and Primarius Professor Theology, St. Mary's College, St. Andrews, edit. New York, 1855, p. 43.

[551] Ibid. p. 47.

[552] Ibid. p. 93.

[553] Reign of Law, 5th ed. London, 1867, p. 123.

[554] Natural Selection, pp. 365, 366.

[555] Contribution to the Theory of Natural Selection, by Alfred Russel Wallace. London, 1870, p. 368.

[556] See his Systeme Nouveau de la Nature; Works, edit. Berlin, 1840, p. 124.

[557] Mares, Collegium Theologicum, loc. iv. 29; Gr□ningen, 1659, p. 42, b.

[558] Locus VI. qu□stio, v. 7, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 455.

[559] Quenstedt, Theologia, cap. XIII. i. 15, edit. Leipzig, 1715, vol. i. p. 760.

[560] Ibid. cap. XIII. ii. 3, vol. i. p. 782.

[561] Locus VI. qu□st. v. 6.

[562] Locus VI. qu□st. v. 5.

[563] Turrettin, locus VI. qu□st. v. 6.

[564] Aquinas, Summa, part II. i. qu□st. x. art. 4, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 22 of second set.

[565] Quenstedt, cap. XIII. i. 15, vol. i. p. 761.

[566] Turrettin, locus VI. qu□st. vi. 6, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 460.

[567] Chap. v. sect. 2.

[568] Aquinas, Summa, part I. qu□st. cv. art. 4. edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 193.

[569] Locus VI. qu□stio v. 7.

[570] Summa, part I. quest. xlix. art. 2, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 95.

[571] Theologia, cap. XIII. i. 15, vol. i. p. 761.

[572] Bucan, Institutiones Theologici, edit. Geneva, 1625, p. 142.

[573] Locus VI. qu□stio vii. 3, 4, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. i. p. 462.

[574] De Amissione Grati□ et Statu Peccati, II. xiii. edit. Paris, 1608, p. 132.

[575] Ibid.

§ 4. Principles involved in the Scriptural Doctrine of Providence.

A. The Providence of God over the Material Universe.

So far as concerns the relation of God to the external world, the following facts appear to be either assumed, or clearly taught in the Bible.

1. There is an external world, or material universe. What we call the world is not a phantom, a delusive show. It is not ourselves, our own varying states, however produced. But matter is a real existence. It is a substance; that which is, and continues, and has identity in all its varying states. This is of course opposed to pantheism, which makes the external world an existence form of God; to idealism; and to the dynamic theory which teaches that

matter is merely force. This latter doctrine is intelligible, if by force be understood the constantly acting will of God, for that is the energy of the divine substance. But in the way in which the doctrine is commonly presented, force is taken as the ultimate fact. Matter is force, it is not a substance, but simply activity, power. But it is self-evident that nothing cannot act, or cannot produce motion, which force does. It is just as plain that there cannot be action without something acting, as that there cannot be motion without something moving, as has been so often said. Force, therefore, does not exist of itself. It of necessity implies a substance of which it is an affection, or manifestation, or property. The real existence of the external world is one of those common sense and Scriptural facts, vouched for by the very constitution of our nature, and which it is utterly useless to deny.

Matter is Active.

2. The second fact or principle recognized by Scripture, is that matter is active. It has properties or forces, which are the proximate causes of the physical changes which we constantly see and experience. This is considered by scientific men almost an axiomatic truth. "No force without matter, and no matter without force." This is also the general conviction of men. When they take a heavy body in their hand, they attribute its weight to the nature of the body and its relation to the earth. When one substance produces the sensation of sweetness, and another the sensation of acidity, they instinctively refer the difference to the substances themselves. So of all other physical effects; they are always and everywhere referred to physical causes. Such is a law of our nature; and therefore the theory which denies that any physical causes exist, and refers all natural effects or changes to the immediate operation of the divine will, contradicts our nature, and cannot be true. Besides, as we have already seen, that theory logically leads to idealism and pantheism. It merges the universe into God.

These physical forces act of necessity, blindly, and uniformly. They are everywhere and always the same. The law of gravitation is in the remotest regions of space what it is here on our earth. It acts always, and always in the same way. The same is true of all other physical forces. Light, heat, electricity, and chemical affinities are everywhere the same in their mode of operations.

Laws of Nature.

The ambiguity of the words, law and nature, has already been remarked upon. The phrase "Laws of Nature" is, however, generally used in one or the other of two senses. It either means an observed regular sequence of events, without any reference to the cause by which that regularity of sequence is determined; or it means a uniformly acting force in nature. In this last sense we speak of the laws of gravitation, light, heat, electricity, etc. That there are such laws, or such physical forces, acting uniformly, which are not to be resolved into "uniform modes of divine operation," is, as we have seen, an important Scriptural fact.

The chief question is, In what relation does God stand to these laws? The answer to that question, as drawn from the Bible, is, First, that He is their author. He endowed matter with these forces, and ordained that they should be uniform. Secondly, He is independent of them. He can change, annihilate, or suspend them at pleasure. He can operate with them or without them. "The Reign of Law" must not be made to extend over Him who made the laws. Thirdly, As the stability of the universe, and the welfare, and even the existence of organized creatures, depend on the uniformity of the laws of nature, God never does

disregard them except for the accomplishment of some high purpose. He, in the ordinary operations of his Providence, operates with and through the laws which He has ordained. He governs the material, as well as the moral world by law.

The relation, therefore, in which God stands to the laws of nature, is, in one important aspect, analogous to that in which we ourselves stand to them. We employ them. Man can do nothing outside of himself without them; yet what marvels of ingenuity, beauty, and utility, has he not accomplished. Dr. Beale, as we have seen, illustrates God's relation to physical forces by a reference to a chemist in his laboratory. The chemicals do not put themselves in the retorts in due proportions, and subject themselves first to one and then to another operation. As mere blind, physical forces, they can accomplish nothing; at least nothing implying purpose or design. The chemical properties of the materials employed have their functions, and the chemist has his, evidently not only different, but diverse; i.e., of a different kind. Professor Henry's illustration was drawn from the relation of the engineer to the engine. The complicated structure of the machine, the composition and combustion of the fuel; the evaporation of the water, are all external to the engineer, and he to them. The locomotive, although instinct with power, stands perfectly still. At a touch of the engineer it starts into life, and yet with all its tremendous energy is perfectly obedient to his will.

These, and any possible illustration, are of necessity very inadequate. The powers of nature of which man avails himself, are not dependent on him, and are only to a very limited extent under his control. He is entirely external to his works. God, however, fills heaven and earth. He is immanent in the world; intimately and always present with every particle of matter. And this presence is not of being only, but also of knowledge and power. It is manifestly inconsistent with the idea of an infinite God, that any part of his works should be absent from Him, out of his view, or independent of his control. Though everywhere thus efficiently present, his efficiency does not supersede that of his creatures. It is by a natural law, or physical force, that vapour arises from the surface of the ocean, is formed into clouds, and condenses and falls in show are upon the earth, yet God so controls the operation of the laws producing these effects, that He sends rain when and where He pleases. The same is true of all the operations of nature, and of all events in the external world. They are due to the efficiency of physical forces; but those forces, which are combined, adjusted, and made to coperate or to counteract each other, in the greatest complexity, are all under the constant guidance of God, and are made to accomplish his purpose. It is perfectly rational, therefore, in a world where blind, natural forces are the proximate cause of everything that occurs, to pray for health, for protection, for success, for fruitful seasons, and for the peace and prosperity of nations, since all these events are determined by the intelligent agency of God.

The providence of God is thus seen to be universal and extending to all his creatures and all their actions. The distinction usually and properly made between the general, special, and extraordinary providence of God, has reference to the effects produced, and not to his agency in their production; for this is the same in all cases. But if the object to be accomplished be a general one, such as the orderly motion of the heavenly bodies, or the support and regular operation of the laws of nature, then the providence of God is spoken of as general. Many men are willing to admit of this general superintendence of the world on

the part of God, who deny his intervention in the production of definite effects. The Bible, however, clearly teaches, and all men instinctively believe in a special providence. That is, that God uses his control over the laws of nature, to bring about special effects. Men in sickness, in danger, or in any distress, pray to God for help. This is not irrational. It supposes God's relation to the world to be precisely what it is declared to be in the Bible. It does not suppose that God sets aside or counteracts the laws of nature; but simply that He controls them and causes them to produce whatever effects He sees fit. The Scriptures and the history of the world, and almost every man's experience, bear abundant evidence to such divine interpositions. We should be as helpless orphans were it not for this constant oversight and protection of our heavenly Father. Sometimes the circumstances attending these divine interventions are so unusual, and the evidences which they afford of divine control are so clear, that men cannot refuse to recognize the hand of God. There is, however, nothing extraordinary in the agency of God. It is only that we witness on these occasions more impressive manifestations of the absolute control, which He constantly exercises over the laws which He has ordained.

The Uniformity of the Laws of Nature consistent with the Doctrine of Providence.

It is obvious that the Scriptural doctrine of providence is not inconsistent with the "Reign of Law" in any proper sense of the words. The Scriptures recognize the fact that the laws of nature are immutable; that they are the ordinances of God; that they are uniform in their operation; and that they cannot be disregarded with impunity. But as man within his sphere can use these fixed laws to accomplish the most diversified purposes, so God in his unlimited sphere has them always and everywhere under his absolute control, so that, without suspending or violating them, they are ever subservient to his will. Certain philosophers do not admit this. To them the control of mind and the reign of law are incompatible; one or the other must be denied. "The fundamental character of all theological philosophy," says Lewes, "is the conceiving of phenomena as subjected to supernatural volition, and consequently as eminently and irregularly variable. Now, these theological conceptions can only be subverted finally by means of these two general processes, whose popular success is infallible in the long run. (1.) The exact and rational prevision of phenomena, and (2.) The possibility of modifying them, so as to promote our own ends and advantages. The former immediately dispels all idea of any directing volition;' and the latter leads to the same result, under another point of view, by making us regard this power as subordinated to our own." [576] If the fact that men can use the laws of nature to their "own ends and advantages" is compatible with the uniformity of those laws, the control of God over them for the accomplishment of his purposes cannot be inconsistent with their stability as laws. God rules the creation in accordance with the laws which He himself has ordained.

God's Providence in Relation to Vital Processes.

Life has ever been regarded as one of the most inscrutable of mysteries. However hard it may be to answer the question, What is life? or however diverse and unsatisfactory may be the answers given to that question, or the explanations proposed of its phenomena, there is little difference as to the facts of the case. (1.) It is admitted that there is a great difference between life and death -- between the living and the dead. No one who has ever looked upon a dead body has failed to be impressed with the fearful change involved in

passing from life to death. (2.) It is very evident that the difference does not consist in anything which can be weighed or measured, or detected by the microscope or by chemical analysis. (3.) Certain processes go on where life is present, and are never seen when it is absent. These processes are organization, growth, and reproduction. (4.) These processes imply the perception of an end; a purpose or will to secure that end; and the intelligent choice and application of means for its attainment. This is the work of mind. If blind physical force can fashion the eye or the ear, and build up the whole animal body, with all its wonderful interdependencies and relations of parts and organs, and its designed adaptations for what is external and future, then there is no evidence of mind in heaven or earth; then all the works of art and of genius with which the world is crowded, may be the productions of dead matter, or of physical forces.

But if life be mind, or, rather, if vital force be mental force, as indicated by the mode in which it acts, where does that mind reside? In the infinitesimally small germ of the plant or animal? or in something exterior to that germ? These are questions which have ever been demanding an answer, and to which different replies have been made. First, some say that nature itself is intelligent. By nature they do not mean the material world, but the vis in rebus insita. The forces which are active in the world, are conceived of as belonging to a substance or animating principle, or anima mundi. Some who believe in an extramundane personal God, believe that He has created and rendered immanent in the world this natura naturans, which they hold to be the seat of all the intelligence manifested in the works of nature. This is the only God some scientific men are willing to admit. Material nature, it is said, gives no evidence of the existence of a personal Being. We see in nature a mind, a universal mind, but still a mind which only operates and expresses itself by law. "Nature only does and only can inform us of mind in nature, the partner and correlative of organized matter." [577] Baden Powell, in his "Order of Nature," says, that the elevated views of a Deity as a personal God, and Omnipotent Creator, etc., are conceptions which "can originate only from some other source than physical philosophy." [578]

Secondly, some assume that there is in the germ of every plant or animal what Agassiz calls "an immaterial principle," to which its organizing power is to be referred. Some connect this with the Platonic doctrine of ideas, as spiritual entities, which are the life and reality of all material organisms.

Thirdly, others refer the intelligence manifested in vital processes to God; not immediately, but remotely. Men can construct machines to do intellectual work, without the machines themselves being intelligent. We have orreries, and calculating and typesetting machines, which, apparently at least, do the work of mind. If man can make a watch or locomotive engine, why may not God make watches and engines with the power of reproduction? The analogy, however, between the products of human ingenuity and living organism is imperfect. No product of human art can think or choose. A type-setting machine may be made, when the proper key is touched, to move an arm in the right direction and to the proper distance to reach the required letter; but it cannot be made of itself to select from a confused mass of type the letters one after another, and arrange them so as to form words and sentences. In other words, matter cannot be made to do the work of mind. It is admitted that everything is possible with God, but the contradictory is not an object of power. It is a contradiction that the extended should be unextended, that the irrational should be rational.

It is, therefore, inconceivable that matter with its blind physical forces should perform the mental work exhibited in the processes of organization and growth.

Fourthly, the intelligence required to account for the processes of vegetable and animal life is assumed to be in the everywhere present and everywhere active mind of God himself. This does not imply that physical or second causes have no efficiency, or that those causes are merged into the efficiency of God. It simply means that God uses the chemical, electric, photic, and other forces of nature, in carrying on organization and other vital processes in the vegetable and animal worlds. In such processes there is a combination of two specifically different forces; physical and mental. The physical are in the matter used; the mental in God who uses the matter and its forces. Examples of this combination of mental and physical force are familiar. All voluntary motion, on the part of animals, all the works of men, are due to such combination. Walking, speaking, and writing, are possible only so far as mind controls our material organization. In writing, for example, the vital functions are going on in the hand, on which its mobility and susceptibility of nervous impression depend; and the numerous voluntary muscles are called into action; but the guiding power is in the mind. It is the mind that determines what letters and sentences the fingers shall form, and what ideas shall be expressed. In like manner, it is the ever-present mind of God that guides the action of physical causes in the processes of animal and vegetable life. And as it would be unreasonable to refer to the physical forces called into activity, when we speak or write, the intelligence indicated in what is uttered or written, so it is unreasonable to refer to the forces of matter the intelligence indicated in the processes of life.

It is because we cannot raise our minds to any proper apprehension of the infinity of God, that we find it so difficult to think of Him as thus everywhere present and everywhere intelligently active. This, however, ceases to be incredible, when we think of the marvellous coperation of the mind and body which takes place in rapid talking, or, more wonderfully still, in a child before a piano, taking in at a glance the whole score, noticing the power and position of every note, striking eight keys of the instrument at the same time, and moving fifty or sixty voluntary muscles with the rapidity of lightning, and each at the right time, and with the right force. If the mere spark of intelligence in a child can do such wonders, why should it be thought incredible that the Infinite Mind should pervade and govern the universe?

In support of the view here given, that the intelligence displayed in all vital processes is the intelligence of the everywhere present and everywhere active mind of God, it may be urged, in the first place, that the principle involved in this doctrine is assumed in time simplest truths of natural religion. If God be not thus everywhere present, and everywhere active in the control of secondary causes, there is no propriety or use in prayer, and no ground of confidence in divine protection. In the second place, it seems to be the only way to account for the facts of the case. That the processes of life in vegetables and animals do manifest intelligence cannot be denied. They manifest foresight, purpose, choice, and controlling power. This intelligence cannot be referred to matter, or to physical forces. The most advanced scientific Materialism does not make mind an attribute, or function, or product of all matter, but only of the highly organized matter of the brain. But there is no brain in the vegetable or animal germ. Brain is as much a product of life (and therefore of

mind) as sinew or bone.

In the third place, the authority of Scripture may be claimed in support of the doctrine in question. The Bible teaches the omnipresence of God; i.e., the omnipresence of mind. The phrase "God fills heaven and earth," means that mind pervades heaven and earth, that there is no portion of space in which mind is not present and active. The Scriptures also teach that all things, even the most minute, as the number of the hairs of our head, the falling of a sparrow, the flight of an arrow, are all under the control of God. He also is said to cause the grass to grow, which means not only that He so orders physical causes that vegetation is the result, but also, as appears from other representations, that the organization and growth of the plant are determined by his agency. This seems to be clearly taught with regard to the bodies of men in Psalm cxxxix. 15, 16, "My substance was not hid from thee, when I was made in secret, and curiously wrought in the lowest parts of the earth. Thine eyes did see my substance, yet being unperfect; and in thy book all my members were written, which in continuance were fashioned, when as yet there was none of them." However doubtful may be the interpretation of the 16th verse in the original, the general meaning of the passage cannot be mistaken. It clearly teaches that the human body is fashioned in the womb by the intelligence of God, and not by undirected physical causes, acting blindly.

B. The Providence of God over Rational Creatures.

God's providence, however, extends over the world of mind, i.e., over rational free agents, as well as over the material universe. The principles involved in the Scriptural doctrine concerning God's providential government of rational creatures are, --

1. That mind is essentially active. It originates its own acts. This is a matter of consciousness. It is essential to liberty and responsibility. It is clearly the doctrine of the Bible which call on men to act, and regards them as the authors of their own acts. This principle, as we have seen, stands opposed, (a.) To the doctrine of a continued creation. (b.) To the doctrine which denies the efficiency of second causes and merges all power into the immediate power of God; and (c.) To the doctrine that free agents are so dependent that they cannot act unless acted upon, or move unless they are moved ab extra.

2. But although free agents have the power to act, and originate their own acts, they are not only upheld in being and efficiency by the power of God, but He controls the use which they make of their ability. (a.) He can, and often does, hinder their action. (b.) He determines their action to be in one way and not in another; so that it is rational to pray that God would incline the hearts of men to show us favour; that He would change the dispositions and purposes of wicked men; and that He would work in us to will as well as to do. No creature, therefore, is independent of God in the exercise of the powers with which He has endowed it. The hearts of men are in his hands, and He controls their action as effectually as He controls the operations of nature. But his agency in the world of spirits no more interferes with the laws of mind, than his agency in the external world interferes with the efficiency of material causes.

Distinction between the Providential Efficiency of God, and the Influences of the Holy Spirit.

3. The providential agency of God in the government of free agents is not to be confounded with the operations of his grace. These two things are constantly represented in

the Bible as distinct. The one is natural, the other supernatural. In the one God acts according to uniform laws, or by his potentia ordinata, in the other, according to the good pleasure of his will, or by his potentia absoluta. The control which God exercises over the ordinary acts of men, and especially over the wicked, is analogous to that which He exercises in the guidance of material causes. whereas his agency in the operations of his grace is more analogous to his mode of action in prophecy, inspiration, and miracles. In the former, or in his providential agency over minds, nothing is effected which transcends the efficiency of second causes. In the latter the effects are such as second causes are utterly inadequate to accomplish. The most obvious points of difference between the two cases are, (1.) In the ordinary operations or acts of free agents, the ability to perform them belongs to the agent and arises out of his nature as a rational creature, and is inseparable from it; whereas the acts of faith, repentance, and other holy affections do not flow from the ability of men in the present condition of their nature, but from a new principle of life supernaturally communicated and maintained. (2.) The ordinary acts of men, and especially their wicked acts, are determined by their own natural inclinations and feelings. God does not awaken, or infuse those feelings or dispositions in order to determine sinners to act wickedly. On the other hand, all gracious or holy affections are thus infused or excited by the Spirit of God. (3.) The providential government of God over free agents is exercised as much in accordance with the laws of mind, as his providential government over the material world is in accordance with the established laws of matter. Both belong to the potentia ordinata, or ordered efficiency of God. This is not the case in the operations of his grace. Holy affections and exercises are not due to the mere moral power of the truth, or its control over our natural affections, but to the indwelling of the Spirit of God. So that it is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us. It is indeed our life, but it is a life divine in its origin, and sustained and guided in all its exercises by a higher influence than the laws of mind, or an influence which operates merely through them, and according to their natural operations. This distinction between nature and grace, between the providential efficiency of God and the workings of his Spirit in the hearts of his people is one of the most important in all theology. It makes all the difference between Augustinianism and Pelagianism, between Rationalism and supernatural, evangelical religion.

Conclusion.

Such are the general principles involved in this most difficult doctrine of Divine Providence. We should be equally on our guard against the extreme which merges all efficiency in God, and which, in denying all second causes, destroys human liberty and responsibility, and makes God not only the author of sin, but in reality the only Being in the universe; and the opposite extreme which banishes God from the world which He has made, and which, by denying that He governs all his creatures and all their actions, destroys the foundation of all religion, and dries up the fountains of piety. If this latter view be correct, there is no God to whom we can look for the supply of our wants, or for protection from evil; whose favour we can seek, or whose displeasure we need dread. We, and all things else, are in the hands of blindly operating causes. Between these equally fatal extremes lies the Scriptural doctrine that God governs all his creatures and all their actions. This doctrine admits the reality and efficiency of second causes, both material and mental, but denies that they are independent of the Creator and Preserver of the universe. It teaches that an infinitely wise, good, and powerful God is everywhere present, controlling all

events great and small, necessary and free, in a way perfectly consistent with the nature of his creatures and with his own infinite excellence, so that everything is ordered by his will and is made to subserve his wise and benevolent designs.

[576] Comte's Philosophy of the Sciences, Lewes, London, 1853, pp. 102, 103.

[577] See this doctrine discussed in the Bampton Lectures for 1865, by Rev. J. B. Moxley, p. 96.

[578] Edit. London, 1859, p. 249.

CHAPTER XII: MIRACLES.

§ 1. Their Nature. Meaning and Usage of the Word.

The word miracle is derived from miror, to wonder, and the refore signifies that which excites wonder. In this etymological sense of the word it may be used to designate any extraordinary event adapted to excite surprise and rouse attention. The words used in the Bible in reference to miraculous events do not inform us of their nature. The most common of these are, (1.) phl', something separated, or singular. (2.) 'vt,signum, portentum, something designed to confirm. (3.) mvpht (of uncertain derivation), used in the sense of tupos, of persons and things held up as a warning, and for remarkable events confirming the authority of prophets. (4.) gvvrh, power, used for any extraordinary manifestation of divine power. (5.) "Works of the Lord." In most cases these terms express the design, rather than the nature of the events to which they are applied.

Such being the indefinite meaning of these Scriptural terms, it is not surprising that the word miracle was used in the Church in a very loose sense. Anything wonderful, anything for which the proximate cause could not be discovered, and anything in which divine agency was specially indicated was called a miracle. Thus Luther says, "Conversion is the greatest of all miracles." "Every day," he says, "witnesses miracle after miracle; that any village adheres to the Gospel when a hundred thousand devils are arrayed against it, or that the truth is maintained in this wicked world, is a continued miracle to which healing the sick or raising the dead is a mere trifle." As neither the etymology nor the usage of the word leads to a definite idea of the nature of a miracle, we can attain that idea only by the examination of some confessedly miraculous event.

Definition of a Miracle.

According to the "Westminster Confession," "God, in ordinary providence making use of means, yet is free to work without, above, or against them at pleasure." In the first place, there are events therefore due to the ordinary operations of second causes, as upheld and guided by God. To this class belong the common processes of nature; the growth of plants and animals, the orderly movements of the heavenly bodies; and the more unusual occurrences, earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and violent agitations and revolutions in human societies. In the second place, there are events due to the influences of the Holy Spirit upon the hearts of men, such as regeneration, sanctification, spiritual illumination, etc. Thirdly, there are events which belong to neither of these classes, and whose distinguishing characteristics are, First, that they take place in the external world, i.e., in the sphere of the observation of the senses; and Secondly, that they are produced or caused by the simple volition of God, without the intervention of any subordinate cause. To this class

belongs the original act of creation, in which all co-operation of second causes was impossible. To the same class belong all events truly miraculous. A miracle, therefore, may be defined to be an event, in the external world, brought about by the immediate efficiency, or simple volition of God.

An examination of any of the great miracles recorded in Scripture will establish the correctness of this definition. The raising of Lazarus from the dead may be taken as an example. This was an event which occurred in the outward world; one which could be seen and verified by the testimony of the senses. It was not brought about either in whole or in part by the efficiency of natural causes. It was due to the simple word, or volition, or immediate agency of God. The same may be said of the restoration to life of the daughter of the ruler of the synagogue, on Christ's pronouncing the words, Talitha cumi; and of his healing the lepers by a word. So when Christ walked upon the sea, when He multiplied the loaves and fishes, when He calmed the winds and the waves by a command; any co-operation of physical causes is not only ignored, but, by clearest intimation, denied.

Objections to this Definition of a Miracle.

It is objected to this definition of a miracle that it assumes that the laws of nature may be violated or set aside. To this many theologians and men of science object, and declare that it is impossible. If the law of nature be the will of God, that of course cannot be set aside, much less directly violated. This is Augustine's objection, who asks, "Quomodo est contra naturam, quod Dei fit voluntate cum voluntas tanti utique conditoris condit- rei cujusque natura sit? Portentum ergo fit, non contra naturam, sed contra quam est nota natura." [579] Baden Powell, in behalf of men of science, protests against being called upon to believe in anything "at variance with nature and law." "The enlarged critical and inductive study of the natural world," he says, "cannot but tend powerfully to evince the inconceivableness of imagined interruptions of natural order or supposed suspensions of the laws of matter, and of that vast series of dependent causation which constitutes the legitimate field for the investigation of science, whose constancy is the sole warrant for its generalizations, while it forms the substantial basis for the grand conclusions of natural theology." [580] The question of miracles, he says, [581] is not one "which can be decided by a few trite and commonplace generalities as to the moral government of the world and the belief in the Divine Omnipotence, or as to the validity of human testimony or the limits of human experience. It involves, and is essentially built upon, those grander conceptions of the order of nature, those comprehensive primary elements of all physical knowledge, those ultimate ideas of universal causation, which can only be familiar to those versed in cosmical philosophy in its widest sense." "It is for the most part hazardous ground for any general moral reasoner to take, to discuss subjects of evidence which essentially involve that higher appreciation of physical truth which can be attained only from an accurate and comprehensive acquaintance with the connected series of the physical and mathematical sciences. Thus, for example, the simple but grand truth of the law of conservation, and the stability of the heavenly motions, now well understood by all sound cosmical philosophers, is but a type of the universal self-sustaining and self-evolving powers which pervade all nature." [582] Professor Powell's conclusion is, "if miracles were, in the estimation of a former age, among the chief supports of Christianity, they are at present among the main difficulties and hinderances to its acceptance." [583] His whole argument is this, miracles,

as usually defined, involve a suspension, or alteration, or violation of the laws of nature; but those laws are absolutely immutable, therefore that definition must be incorrect, or, in other words, miracles in that sense must be impossible.

Answer to the above Objection.

The form in which the objection is presented by those who make nature the will of God, is answered by saying that nature is not the will of God in any other sense than that He ordained the sequence of natural events, and established the laws or physical causes by which that regular sequence is secured. This relation between God and the world, assumes that nature and its laws are subject to Him, and therefore liable at any time to be suspended or counteracted, at his good pleasure.

As to the other form of the objection, which assumes that the laws of nature are in themselves immutable, and therefore that they cannot be suspended, it is enough to say, (1.) That this absolute immutability of natural laws is a gratuitous assumption. That a thing has been is no proof that it must always be. There is no absolute certainty, because no necessity, that the sun will rise to-morrow. We assume with confidence that it will thus rise, but on what ground? What impossibility is there that this night the voice of the angel should be heard, swearing, "That time shall be no longer?" If time began, time may end. If nature began to be, it may cease to be, and all about it must be liable to change. Scientific men have no right to assume that because physical laws are, and, within the limits of our experience, ever have been, regular in their operation, that they are, as Professor Powell says, "self-sustaining and self-evolving." It is a great mistake to suppose that uniformity is inconsistent with voluntary control; that because law reigns, God does not reign. The laws of nature are uniform only because He so wills, and their uniformity continues only so long as He wills.

(2.) It is utterly derogatory to the character of God to assume that He is subject to law, and especially to the laws of matter. If theism be once admitted, then it must be admitted that the whole universe, with all that it contains and all the laws by which it is controlled, must he subject to the will of God. Professor Powell indeed says, that many theists deny the possibility of the suspension or violation of the laws of nature, but then he says that there are many degrees of theism, and he includes under that term theories which others regard as inconsistent with the doctrine of a personal God. It is certain that the objection to the definition of a miracle given above, now under consideration, depends for its validity on the assumption, that God is subject to nature that He cannot control its laws. J. M[illegible]ller well says, "Etiamsi nullus alius miraculorum esset usus, nisi ut absolutam illam divin[illegible] voluntatis libertatem demonstrent, humanamque arrogantiam, immodic[illegible] legis naturalis admirationi junctam, compescant, miracula haud temere essent edita." [584]

(3.) The authority of Scripture is for Christians decisive on this point. The Bible everywhere not only asserts the absolute independence of God of all his works, and his absolute control over them, but is also filled with examples of the actual exercise ef this control. Every miracle recorded in the Scriptures is such an example. When Christ called Lazarus from the grave, the chemical forces which were working the dissolution of his body ceased to operate. When He said to the winds, Be still, the physical causes which produced the storm were arrested in their operation; when He walked on the sea the law of gravitation was counteracted by a stronger force --even the divine will. In 2 Kings vi. 5, 6,

we are told that an "axe head fell into the water," and that the man of God cut a stick and cast it into the water, "and the iron did swim." Here an effect was produced which all known physical laws would tend to prevent. The Scriptures, therefore, by word and deed, teach that God can act, not only with physical causes, but without and against them.

(4.) After all, the suspension or violation of the laws of nature involved in miracles is nothing more than is constantly taking place around us. One force counteracts another; vital force keeps the chemical laws of matter in abeyance; and muscular force can control the action of physical force. When a man raises a weight from the ground, the law of gravity is neither suspended nor violated, but counteracted by a stronger force. The same is true as to the walking of Christ on the water, and the swimming of the iron at the command of the prophet. The simple and grand truth that the universe is not under the exclusive control of physical forces, but that everywhere and always there is above, separate from, and superior to all else, an infinite personal will, not superseding, but directing and controlling all physical causes, acting with or without them. The truth on this subject was beautifully expressed by Sir Isaac Newton, when he said, "Deum esse ens summe perfectum concedunt omnes. Entis autem summe perfecti Idea est ut sit substantia una, simplex, indivisibilis, viva et vivifica, ubique semper necessario existens, summe intelligens omnia, libere volens bona, voluntate efficiens possibilia, effectibus nobilioribus similitudinem propriam quantum fieri potest, communicans, omnia in se continens, tanquam eorum principium et locus, omnia per pr&#65533;sentiam substantialem cernens et regens, et cum rebus omnibus, secundum leges accuratas ut natur&#65533; totius fundamentum et causa constanter co&#65533;perans, nisi ubi aliter agere bonum est." [585] God is the author of nature: He has ordained its laws: He is everywhere present in his works: He governs all things by co&#65533;perating and using the laws which He has ordained, NISI UBI ALITER AGERE BONUM EST. He has left Himself free.

Higher Laws.

A second objection to the usual definition of miracles, is that they should be referred to some higher, occult law of nature and not to the immediate agency of God. This objection is urged by two very different classes of writers. First, those who adopt the mechanical theory of the universe assume that God has given it up to the government of natural laws, and no more interferes with its natural operations than a ship-builder with the navigation of the ships he has constructed. This is the view presented by Babbage in his "Ninth Bridgewater Treatise." He supposes a man placed before his calculating machine, which for millions and millions of times produces square numbers; then for once produces a cube number; and then only squares until the machine wears out. There are two ways of accounting for the extraordinary cube number. The one is that the maker of the machine directly interfered for its production. The other is that he provided for its appearance in the original construction of the machine. The latter explanation gives a far higher idea of the skill and wisdom of the mechanist; and so, Mr. Babbage argues, it is "more consistent with the attributes of the Deity to look upon miracles not as deviations from the laws assigned by the Almighty for the government of matter and of mind; but as the exact fulfilment of much more extensive laws than those we suppose to exist." [586] In like manner Professor Baden Powell, contends that every physical effect must have a physical cause, and therefore that miracles, considered as physical events, must be "referred to physical causes, possibly to

known causes; but, at all events, to some higher cause or law, if at present unknown." [587]

Secondly, this same ground is taken by many who do not thus banish God from his works. They admit that He is everywhere present, and everywhere acting, controlling physical laws so as to accomplish his purposes; but they insist that He never operates immediately, but always acts through the established laws of nature. Thus the Duke of Argyle, whose excellent work on the "Reign of Law" is thoroughly religious, says: [588] "There is nothing in religion incompatible with the belief that all exercises of God's power, whether ordinary or extraordinary, are effected through the instrumentality of means --that is to say, by the instrumentality of natural laws brought out, as it were, and used for a divine purpose." He begins his book with quotations from M. Guizo's work, "L'Eglise et la Soci�t� Chr�tienne en 1861," to the effect that belief in the supernatural is the special difficulty of our time; that the denial of it is the form taken by all modern assaults on Christian faith; and that acceptance of it lies at the root, not only of Christianity, but of all positive religion whatever. By the supernatural, he understood Guizot to mean, what the word does properly and commonly mean, namely, what transcends nature; and by nature is meant all things out of God. A supernatural event, therefore, in this sense, which is Guizot's sense of the word, is an event which transcends the power of nature, and which is due to the immediate agency of God. M. Guizot is undoubtedly correct in saying that the belief in the supernatural, thus explained, is the great difficulty of the age. The tendency, not only of science, but of speculation in all departments, is, at least for the time being, to in merge every thing into nature and to admit of no other causes.

Although the Duke of Argyle is a theist, and admits of the constant operation of the Divine will in nature, he is still urgent in insisting that the power of God in nature is always exercised according to law, and in connection with physical causes. Miracles, therefore, differ from ordinary events only in so far as the law according to which they come to pass, or the physical forces acting in their production are unknown. He quotes with approbation from Locke, the following most unsatisfactory definition: "A miracle, then, I take to be a sensible operation, which, being above the comprehension of the spectator, and, in his opinion, contrary to the established course of nature, is taken by him to be divine." [589] This is the precise view held by Baden Powell, who in the essay repeatedly referred to above, makes a miracle a mere matter of opinion. It is not a matter of fact to be determined by testimony, but a matter of opinion as to the cause of that fact. The fact may be admitted, and one man may say it is due to natural law, known or unknown; and then it is no miracle. Another man says it is due to the immediate power of God. In that case it is a miracle. Which of the two is correct, cannot be decided by testimony. It must be decided by the general views of nature and of God's relation to the world, which men entertain. The doctrine that God works in the external world only through physical force, and even that He can act only in that way, leads, of necessity, to the conclusion that miracles are events in the external world brought about by unknown physical causes. They prove only "the presence of superhuman knowledge and the working of superhuman power." [590]

Objections to the Doctrine of a Higher Law.

(1.) With regard to this theory, it may be remarked in the first place, that it is a perfectly gratuitous hypothesis. It assumes the existence of laws of nature without necessity and without evidence. By laws, in such connections, is usually meant either the ordered

sequence of events, or the power by which that sequence is secured. In either case there is this ordered sequence. But where is the evidence that anywhere in the universe the living of the dead, the recovery of the sick, the stilling of the storm, and the swimming of iron, follow as matters of course on a command? The Church doctrine on miracles gives a simple, rational, and satisfactory account of their occurrence, which renders all assumption of unknown laws unnecessary and unjustifiable. It is utterly impossible to prove, as this theory assumes, that every physical effect must have a physical cause. Our own wills are causes in the sphere of nature; and the omnipotent will of God is not tied to any one mode of operation.

(2.) This hypothesis is not only unnecessary, but it is unsatisfactory. There are miracles which transcend not only all known, but all possible laws of nature. Nature cannot create. It cannot originate life; otherwise it would be God, and nothing beyond nature would be necessary to account for the universe and for all that it contains. As, therefore, there are miracles which cannot be accounted for by "a higher law of nature," it is clear that they are to be referred to the immediate power of God, and not to some unknown physical force. All theists are obliged to acknowledge this immediate agency of God in the original act of creation. Then there were no laws or forces through which his efficiency could be exercised. The fact, therefore, on which the Church doctrine on this subject rests must be admitted.

(3.) The Scriptures not only are silent about any higher law as the cause of miraculous events, but they always refer them to the immediate power of God. Christ said He cast out devils by the finger of God. He never referred to anything but his own will as the efficient antecedent of the effect produced, "I will, be thou clean," He healed by a touch --by a word. When he gave miraculous powers to the Apostles, He did not make them alchemists. They did not claim knowledge of occult laws. Peter, when called to account for the healing of the lame man in the temple, said that it was the name of Christ, faith in his name that had made the man every whit whole. It is moreover plain that, on this theory, miracles must lose their value as proofs of a divine commission. If the Apostles did the wonders which they performed by the knowledge of, or through the efficiency of natural laws, then they are on the level of the experimenter who makes water freeze in a red hot spoon. If God be not the author of the miracle, it does not prove a divine message.

(4.) There is force also in what the Rev. J. B. Mozley says: "To say that the material fact which takes place in a miracle admits of being referred to an unknown natural cause, is not to say that the miracle itself does. A miracle is the material fact as coinciding with an express announcement or with express supernatural pretensions in the agent. It is this correspondence of two facts which constitutes a miracle. If a person says to a blind man, See,' and he sees, it is not the sudden return of sight alone that we have to account for, but its return at that particular moment. For it is morally impossible that this exact agreement of an event with a command or notification could have been by mere chance, or, as we should say, been an extraordinary coincidence, especially if it is repeated in other cases." [591] It is very certain that no one who saw Lazarus rise from the grave, when Jesus said, "Lazarus, come forth," ever thought of any physical law as the cause of that event.

Miracles and Extraordinary Providences.

A third objection urged against the definition above given is, that it is not sufficiently

comprehensive. It does not cover a large class of miracles recorded in the Scriptures. In the sudden rising of a fog which conceals an army and thus saves it from destruction in a storm which disperses a hostile fleet and thus saves a nation, -- any such providential intervention, it is said, we have all the elements included in many of the miracles recorded in the Bible. The events occur in the external world; they are not due to mere physical causes, but to such causes guided by the immediate agency of God, and directed to the accomplishment of a particular end. This is all that can be said of many of the plagues inflicted on the Egyptians; of the flight of quails to supply the wants of the Hebrews in the desert; and of the draught of fishes recorded in the Gospels.

It is true that the strict definition of a miracle does not include events of the kind just mentioned. Such events, therefore, are called by Trench "providential," as distinguished from "absolute miracles." This want of comprehensiveness, however, does not seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting the common definition of a miracle. Because there certainly is a class of events to which that definition strictly applies; and it is important that those events on which such stress is laid in Scripture, should have a designation peculiar to themselves, and which expresses their true nature. The importance of what are called providential miracles, is not lessened by their being thrown into a class by themselves. They continue to be clear evidence of divine intervention. As Mr. Mozley says, it is not exclusively on the nature of the event that its value as evidence depends, but on the attending circumstances. The flocks of locusts, or of the quails, would not, of themselves, have been proof of any special divine intervention; but taken in connection with Moses' threat in the one case, and promise in the other, those events proved as conclusively as the most absolute miracle could have done, that he was the messenger of Him who could control the laws of nature and constrain them to execute his will.

[579] De Civitate Dei, xxi. 8, edit. Benedictines, vol. vii. p. 1006, a.

[580] Recent Inquiries in Theology, or Essays and Reviews. By Eminent English Clergy men, Boston, 1860, p. 124.

[581] Ibid. p. 150.

[582] Ibid. p. 151.

[583] Ibid. p. 158.

[584] De Miracul. J. C. Nat. et Necess. Marburg, 1839, par. i. pp. 41, 42.

[585] Sir David Brewster's Life of Newton, vol. ii, p. 154, edit. Edinburgh, 1855.

[586] The Ninth Bridgewater Treatise. By Charles Babbage, Esq. London, 1838, p. 92.

[587] Essays and Reviews; or Recent Inquiries in Theology, p. 160. Boston, 1860.

[588] Reign of Law. By the Duke of Argyle. Fifth edition, London, p. 22.

[589] Reign of Law, pp. 24, 25.

[590] Reign of Law, p. 16, note.

[591] Eight Lectures on Miracles; by J. B. Mozley, B. D. Bampton Lectures for 1865, London, 1865, p. 148.

§ 2. The Possibility of Miracles.

This is of course denied by all those who do not make any distinction between God and nature. This is done by Spinoza and all his modern disciples. "Existimant," says Spinoza, "Deum tamdiu nihil agere, quamdiu natura solito ordine agit; et contra, potentiam natur&#65533; et causas naturales tamdiu esse oticsas, quam diu Deus agit; duas itaque potentias numero ab invicem distinctas imaginantur, scilicet, potentiam Dei et potentiam rerum naturalium, a Deo tamen certo modo determinatam." [592] As he denies that there is any distinction between the power of God and the power of nature, he of course denies that there is any ground for the distinction between natural and supernatural events. "Leges natur&#65533; universales," he says, "mera esse decreta Dei, qu&#65533; ex necessitate et perfectione natur&#65533; divin&#65533; sequuntur. Si quid igitur in natura contingeret, quod ejus universalibus legibus repugnaret, id decreto et intellectui et natur&#65533; divin&#65533; necessario etiam repugnaret; aut si quis statueret, Deum aliquid contra leges natur&#65533; agere, is simul etiam cogeretur statuere, Deum contra suam naturam agere, quo nihil absurdius. [593] . . . . Ex his -- sequitur, nomen miraculi non nisi respective ad hominum opiniones posse intelligi, et nihil aliud significare quam opus, cujus causam naturalem exemplo alterius rei solit&#65533; explicare non possumus. [594] . . . . Per Dei directionem intelligo fixum illum et immutabilem natur&#65533; ordinem, sive rerum naturalium concatenationem. -- Sive igitur dicamus, omnia secundum leges natur&#65533; fieri, sive ex Dei decreto et directione ordinari, idem dicimus." [595] The Pantheistic theory, therefore, which teaches "that the government of the world is not the determination of events by an extramundane intelligence, but by reason as immanent in the cosmical forces themselves and in their relations," [596] precludes the possibility of a miracle.

It is only a modification of the same general view when it is said that although the world's material and mental have a real existence, there is no causality out of God. Second causes are only the occasions or the modes in which the divine efficiency is exerted. This doctrine effectually excludes all distinction between the natural and the supernatural, between what is due to the immediate power of God and what is due to the efficiency of second causes. The operations of God, when uniform, we call laws, says Bretschneider; when rare or isolated, we call them miracles. The only difference is in our mode of viewing them. A third objection of the same general character is that miracles suppose separate, individual acts of the divine will, which is inconsistent with the nature of an absolute Being. "A God who performs individual acts, it is very clear, may be a person, but cannot be absolute. In turning Himself from one act to another, or now putting forth a certain kind of efficiency (the extraordinary), and then resting again, He does and is at one moment what He does not and is not at another, and thus falls into the category of the changeable, the temporary, and the finite. If we continue to regard Him as absolute, his working is to be conceived as an eternal act, simple and uniform in its nature as it proceeds from God, and only in the phenomenal world revealing its fulness in a series of various and changing divine operations." [597]

This is an objection which has already been repeatedly considered. All that need be said in answer to it at present, is that it proves too much. If valid against miracles, it is valid against the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo, against providence, against revelation, against prophecies, against hearing of prayer, and against all the operations of grace. In all these cases as much as in miracles, there is an assumption of direct agency on the part of God. And if such immediate agency implies separate acts of the divine will in one of these

cases, it must in all the rest. So that if the objection be valid against miracles it is valid against the doctrine of a personal God, and the whole system of natural and revealed religion. Whatever evidence, therefore, we have for the being of God and for the reality of religion, we have also to prove that this objection is sophistical, founded on our ignorance of the mode in which the infinite Being reveals and manifests Himself in the finite. Nothing is more certain than that God does act everywhere and always, and nothing is more inscrutable than the mode of his action.

A fourth objection to miracles is founded on the deistical theory that the relation of God to the world is analogous to that of a mechanist to a machine. A mechanist has no occasion to interfere in the working of an engine which he has made, except to correct its irregularities; so if God interferes in the natural order of events as produced by the secondary causes which He has ordained, it can only be because of the imperfection of his work. As this cannot be rationally admitted, neither can the doctrine of miracles, which supposes such special interference, be admitted. This objection is answered by showing that the relation of God to the world is not that of a mechanist to a machine, but of an everywhere-present, all-controlling, intelligent will. The doctrine of miracles, therefore, is founded on the doctrine of theism, that is, of an extramundane personal God, who, being distinct from the world, upholds and governs it according to his own will. It assumes, moreover, that second causes have a real efficiency to which ordinary events are proximately due; that the divine efficiency does not supersede those causes, but upholds and guides them in their operations. But at the same time this almighty and omnipresent Being is free to act with or without or against those causes, as he sees fit; so that it is just as consistent with his nature and with his relation to the world that the effects of his power should be immediate, i.e., without the intervention of natural causes, as through their instrumentality. That this is the true Scriptural doctrine concerning God and his relation to the world cannot be disputed. It is admitted even by those who deny the truth of the doctrine. "Die ganze christliche Anschauung von dem Verh&#65533;ltniss Gottes zur Welt, von Sch&#65533;pfung, Vorsehung und Wunder bezeugt diess (namely, that the Absolute is a person). Der Pers&#65533;nlichkeit ist freier Wille wesentlich; die Freiheit verwirklicht sich in einzelnen beliebigen Willensacten: durch einen solchen hat Gott die Welt geschaffen, durch eine Reihe von solchen regiert er sie, durch solche Acte greift er auch ausser der Ordnung seiner continuirlichen weltlenkenden Th&#65533;tigkeit in die Weltordnung ein." [598]

[592] De Miraculis, Tractatus Theologico-politicus, cap. iv.; Opera, edit. Jena, 1802, vol. i. p. 233.

[593] Ibid. p. 235.

[594] Ibid. p. 236.

[595] Tractatus Theologico-politicus, cap. iii. ut supra, p. 192.

[596] Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 384.

[597] Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 59.

[598] Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 58.

§ 3. Can a Miracle be known as such?

This is denied on various grounds.

1. It is said, if a miracle be an event which transcends the efficiency of second causes we must have a perfect knowledge of the power of such causes, before we can decide that a particular event is miraculous. But as such perfect knowledge is impossible, it must be impossible for us to decide whether it is a miracle or not. It must be admitted that in many cases the mere nature of an event does not afford a certain criterion of its character as natural or supernatural. To savages many effects which to us are easily accountable as the product of natural causes, appear to be miraculous. An adept in the arts of legerdemain, or a man of science, may do many things entirely unaccountable by the uninitiated, which they therefore cannot distinguish from miracles by anything in the mere nature of the effects themselves. But this objection applies only to a certain class of miracles. There are some events which so evidently transcend the power of nature that there can be no rational doubt as to their supernatural origin. No creature can create or originate life, or work without the intervention of means. A large class of the miracles recorded in Scripture imply the exercise of a power which can belong to God alone. The multiplying a few loaves and fishes so as to satisfy the hunger of thousands of men raising the dead, and giving sight to the blind and hearing to the deaf, not by the appliances of art, but by a command, are clearly effects which imply the exercise of almighty power. Besides, it is to be considered that the nature of the event is not the only criterion by which we are to determine its character. To prove an event in the external world to be miraculous, we have only to prove that it is not the effect of any natural cause, and that it is to be referred to the immediate agency of God. To produce this conviction moral evidence is quite as effective as any other. Such an event may be, as far as we can see, supernatural, either in its nature or in the mode of its occurrence, but that alone would not justify us in referring it to God. Much depends on the character of the agent and the design for which the wonder is wrought. If these be evidently bad, we cannot be convinced that God has wrought a miracle. But if both the character of the agent and the design of his work are good, then we are easily and rationally convinced that the wonder is really a miracle.

Lying Wonders.

2. This remark applies equally to another ground on which it is denied that we can certainly determine any event to be miraculous. An effect may transcend all the powers of all material causes and the power of man, and nevertheless be within the compass of the ability of superhuman intelligences. There are rational creatures superior to man, endowed with far higher capacities. These exalted intelligences have access to our world; they do exercise their powers in producing effects in the realm of nature; and therefore, it is said, we cannot tell whether an event, admitted to be supernatural (in the limited sense of that word), is to be referred to God or to these spiritual beings. Such is the latitude with which the words "signs and wonders" are used in the Scriptures, that they apply not only to works due to God's immediate agency, but to those effected by the power of evil spirits. On this account many theologians regard the latter as true miracles. They are called "lying wonders," says Gerhard, [599] not as to their form (or nature), but as to their end, i.e., because designed to promote error. Trench takes the same view; he says it is not a matter of doubt to him that the Scriptures attribute real wonders to Satan. The question is not, Whether the works of the Egyptian Magicians and the predicted wonders of Antichrist are to be regarded as tricks and juggleries. It may be admitted that they were, or are to be the works of Satan and his angels. But the question is, Are they to be regarded as true

miracles? The answer to this question depends on the meaning of the word. If by a miracle we mean any event transcending the efficiency of physical causes and the power of man, then they are miracles. But if we adhere to the definition above given, which requires that the event be produced by the immediate power of God, they of course are not miracles. They are "lying wonders," not only because intended to sustain the kingdom of lies, but because they falsely profess to be what they are not. Thus Thomas Aquinas says: [600] Demones possunt facere miracula: qu&#65533; scilicet homines mirantur, in quantum eorum facultatem et cognitionem excedunt." They are only wonders in the sight of men.

The difficulty of discriminating between miracles and these lying wonders, i.e., between the works of God and the works of Satan, has been anticipated and provided for by the sacred writers themselves. In Deut. xiii. 1-3, Moses says, "If there arise among you a prophet . . . . and giveth thee a sign or a wonder, and the sign or thine wonder come to pass, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us go after other gods thou shalt not hearken unto the words of that prophet." In Matt. vii. 22, 23, our Lord says, "Many will say to me in that day, Lord, Lord, have we not prophesied in thy name? and in thy name have cast out devils? and in thy name done many wonderful works? And then will I profess unto them, I never knew you: depart from me, ye that work iniquity." Matt. xxiv. 24, "There shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall shew great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect." In 2 Thess. ii. 9, the Apostle teaches us that the coming of the man of sin shall be "after the working of Satan, with all power and signs and lying wonders." These passages teach that supernatural events, i.e., events transcending the power of material causes and the ability of man, may be brought about by the agency of higher intelligences; and that no such supernatural events are to be regarded as of any authority if produced by wicked agents, or for a wicked purpose. It was on this principle our Lord answered the Pharisees who accused Him of casting out devils by Beelzebub the prince of devils. He appealed to the design for which his miracles were wrought to prove that they could not be referred to a Satanic influence. Satan will not co&#65533;perate to confirm the truth or to promote good. God cannot co&#65533;perate to confirm what is false or to promote evil. So that the character of the agent and the design for which a supernatural event is brought about determine whether it is truly a miracle, or whether it is one of the lying wonders of the devil. From the Scriptures this criterion of miracles was adopted by the Church. Luther says, "Against authenticated doctrines, no signs or wonders, however great or numerous, are to be admitted; for we have the command of God, who said from heaven, Hear him,' to listen only unto Christ." Chemnitz [601] says, "Miracula non debent pr&#65533;ferri doctrin&#65533;. . . . neque enim contra doctrinam a Deo revelatam ulla miracula valere debent." Gerhard [602] says, "Miracula, si non habeant doctrin&#65533; veritatem conjunctam nihil probant." Brochmann also says, [603] "Ut opus aliquod sit verum miraculum duo requiruntur. Unum, est veritas rei; alterum, veritas finis."

To this it may be objected, that it is reasoning in a circle to prove the truth of the doctrine from the miracle, and then the truth of the miracle from the doctrine. We answer, however, (1.) That this moral criterion is needed only in the doubtful class of miracles. There are certain events which from their nature can have no other author than God. They transcend not only the powers of matter and of man, but all created power. The efficiency of creatures has known limits, determined, if not by reason, at least by the Word of God. (2.) It is not unusual nor unreasonable that two kinds of evidence should be dependent and yet

mutually confirmatory. In the case of a historian, we may believe his authorities to be what he says they are, on account of his character; and we may believe his statements on account of his authorities. So we may believe a good man, when he says that the wonders which he performs are not tricks, or effects produced by the co�peration of evil spirits, but by the power of God, and we may believe his teachings to be divine because of the wonders. The Bible assumes that men have an intuitive perception of what is good; and it assumes that God is on the side of goodness and Satan on the side of evil. If a wonder, therefore, be wrought in favour of what is good, it is from God; if in support of what is evil, it is from Satan. This is one of the grounds on which Protestants give themselves so little concern about the pretended miracles of the Romish church. They do not feel it to be necessary to disprove them by a critical examination of their nature, or of the circumstances under which they were performed, or of the evidence by which they are supported. Not one in a thousand of them could stand the test of such an examination; most of them, indeed, are barefaced impostures openly justified by the authorities on the ground of pious frauds. It is a sufficient reason for repudiating, prior to any examination, all such pretended miracles, that they are wrought in support of an antichristian system, that they are part of a complicated mass of deceit and evil.

Insufficiency of Human Testimony.

There is still another ground on which the possibility of a miracles being known or proved has been denied. It is said that no evidence is adequate to establish the occurrence of a miraculous event. Our faith in miracles must rest on historical testimony. Historical testimony is only the testimony of men liable to be deceived. All confidence in such testimony is founded on experience. Experience, however, teaches that human testimony is not always reliable; whereas our experience, that the course of nature is uniform, is without exception. It will, therefore, always be more probable that the witnesses were mistaken than that the course of nature has been violated. This is Hume's famous argument, of which Babbage says that it, "divested of its less important adjuncts, never has and never will be refuted." [604] He evidently means that it cannot be refuted except mathematically, through the doctrine of probabilities. For he says on a subsequent page, that those who support the prejudice against mathematical pursuits, "must now be compelled to admit that they have endeavoured to discredit a science which alone can furnish an exact refutation of one of the most celebrated arguments against revelation." [605] He endeavours to prove the reverse of Hume's proposition; that is, that on the doctrine of probabilities, it is unspeakably more probable that there should be a violation of the laws of nature (e. g., that a dead man should come to life) than that six independent witnesses should concur in testifying to the same falsehood. The argument may be valid in the view of mathematicians; but to ordinary men it seems to be a wrong application of the principles of that venerable science. As we cannot determine by the law of probabilities a question in æsthetics or morals, neither can God's relation to the world, and the use of his power, as involved in the doctrine of miracles, be thus determined. It does depend on the validity of human testimony. However uncertain or unreliable such testimony may be, such events as miracles may happen, if consistent with the nature of God, and may be rationally believed. There may be proofs of their reality which no man can disregard. It is, however, as just remarked, a false assumption that human testimony is inadequate to produce absolute certainty. Men do not hesitate on the testimony of even two men to consign a fellow-man to death. In order that human testimony should

command assent it must, (1.) Be given in proof of a possible event. The impossible cannot be proved by any kind of evidence. Professor Powell asks, How much testimony would be required to prove that two and two had, on a given occasion, made five? As no amount of testimony could prove such an impossibility, the argument is that no amount of evidence can prove a miracle. If miracles be impossible, that is an end of the matter. No man is so foolish as to pretend that the impossible can be proved. (2.) The second condition of the credibility of testimony is that the event admit of easy verification. If a man testify that he saw a ghost, it may be true that he saw something which he took to be a ghost; but the fact cannot be verified. The resurrection of Christ, for example, the miracle on the truth of which our salvation depends, was an event which could be authenticated. The identity between the dead and living Jesus could be established beyond the possibility of any reasonable doubt. (3.) The witnesses must have satisfactory knowledge or evidence of the truth of the facts to which they testify. Had the Apostles seen Christ after his resurrection only on one occasion, at a great distance, in an obscure light, and only for a fleeting moment, the value of their testimony would be greatly impaired. But as they saw Him repeatedly during forty days, conversed with Him, ate with Him, and handled Him, it is out of the question that they should have been mistaken. (4.) The witnesses themselves should be sober-minded, intelligent men. (5.) They should be good men. The testimony of other men, under these conditions, may be as coercive as that of our own senses. And it may be so confirmed by collateral evidence, natural and supernatural, by the nature of effects produced, and by signs and wonders and gifts of the Holy Ghost, as to render unbelief a miracle of folly and wickedness.

The fallacy of Hume's argument has often been pointed out. in the first place, it rests on the false assumption that confidence in human testimony is founded on experience, whereas it is founded on a law of our nature. We cannot help confiding in good men. We know that deceit is inconsistent with goodness; and therefore know and are forced to believe, that good men will not intentionally deceive; and, therefore, by a law of our nature we are compelled to receive their testimony as to facts within them personal knowledge. Experience, instead of being the foundation of belief in testimony, corrects our credulity by teaching us the conditions under which alone human testimony can be safely trusted. In the second place, Hume assumes that there is a violent antecedent improbability against the occurrence of a miracle, which only a "miraculous" amount of evidence could counterbalance. It is indeed not only incredible, but inconceivable, that a miracle should be wrought without an adequate reason. But that God, on great occasions and for the highest ends, should intervene with the immediate exercise of his power in the course of events, is what might be confidently anticipated. Theism being granted, the difficulty about miracles disappears, but by theism is not meant the mere admission that something is God, whether nature, force, motion, or moral order; but the doctrine of a personal extramundane Being, the Creator and Governor of all things, who does according to his own will in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth; a God who is untrammelled by cosmical influences or laws.

In the third place, Hume's argument assumes that our faith in miracles rests exclusively on human testimony. This is not the fact. The miracles recorded in the Scriptures are a competent part of the great system of truth therein revealed. The whole stands or falls together. Our faith in miracles, therefore, is sustained by all the evidence which

authenticates the gospel of Christ. And that evidence is not to be even touched by a balance of probabilities.

[599] Loci Theologici, loc. xxiii. cap. ii. § 274, edit. Tbingen, 1774, vol. xii. p. 102.

[600] Summa, part 1, quest. cxlv. art. 4. edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 208.

[601] Loci Theologici, III. edit. Frankfort and Wittenburg, 1653, p. 121.

[602] Ibid. loc. xxiii. cap. 11. § 276, edit. Tbingen, 1774, vol. ii. p. 107.

[603] Theol. System. de Eccles. II. vii. dub. 12, Ulm and Frankf., 1658, vol. ii. p. 276, b.

[604] Ninth Bridgewater Treatise, p.121.

[605] Ibid. 132.

§ 4. The Value of Miracles as a Proof of a Divine Revelation.

On this subject extreme opinions have been held. On the one hand, it has been maintained that miracles are the only satisfactory evidence of a divine revelation; on the other, that they are neither necessary nor available. It is argued by some that, as faith must be rounded on the apprehension of truth as truth, it is impossible that any amount of external evidence can produce faith, or enable us to see that to be true which we could not so apprehend without it. How can a miracle enable us to see a proposition of Euclid to be true, or a landscape to be beautiful? Such reasoning is fallacious. It overlooks the nature of faith as a conviction of things not seen on adequate testimony. What the Bible teaches on this subject is (1.) That the evidence of miracles is important and decisive (2.) That it is, nevertheless, subordinate and inferior to that of the truth itself. Both of these points are abundantly evident from the language of the Bible and from the facts therein contained. (1.) That God has confirmed his revelations, whether made by prophets or Apostles, by these manifestations of his power, is of itself a sufficient proof of their validity and importance as seals of a divine mission. (2.) The sacred writers under both dispensations appealed to these wonders as proofs that they were the messengers of God. In the New Testament it is said that God confirmed the testimony of his Apostles by signs and wonders and divers miracles and gifts of the Holy Ghost. Even our Lord himself, in whom the fulness of the Godhead dwelt bodily, was approved by miracles, signs, and wonders which God did by Him. (Acts ii. 22.) (3.) Christ constantly appealed to his miracles as a decisive proof of his divine mission. "The works," he says, "which the Father hath given me to finish, the same works that I do, bear witness of me, that the Father hath sent me." (John v. 20, 36.) And John x. 25, "The works that I do in my Father's name, they bear witness of me;" and in verse 38, "Though ye believe not me, believe the works." John vii. 17, "If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God, or whether I speak of myself." Undoubtedly the highest evidence of the truth is the truth itself; as the highest evidence of goodness is goodness itself. Christ is his own witness. His glory reveals Him, as the Son of God, to all whose eyes the God of this world has not blinded. The point which miracles are designed to prove is not so much the truth of the doctrines taught as the divine mission of the teacher. The latter, indeed, is in order to the former. What a man teaches may be true, although not divine as to its origin. But when a man presents himself as a messenger of

God, whether he is to be received as such or not depends first on the doctrines which he teaches, and, secondly, upon the works which he performs. If he not only teaches doctrines conformed to the nature of God and consistent with the laws of our own constitution, but also performs works which evince divine power, then we know not only that the doctrines are true, but also that the teacher is sent of God.

CHAPTER XIII: ANGELS.

So much is said in the Scriptures of good and evil angels, and such important functions are ascribed to them both in the providence of God over the world, and especially in the experience of his people and of his Church, that the doctrine of the Bible concerning them should not be overlooked. That there are intelligent creatures higher than man, has been a general belief. It is so consonant with the analogy of nature as to be in the highest degree probable, apart from any direct revelation on the subject. In all departments of nature there is a regular gradation from the lower to the higher forms of life; from the almost invisible vegetable fungus in plants to the cedar of Lebanon; from the minutest animalcule to the gigantic mammoth. In man we meet with the first, and to all appearances the lowest of rational creatures. That he should be the only creature of his order is, a priori, as improbable as that insects should be the only class of irrational animals. There is every reason to presume that the scale of being among rational creatures is as extensive as that in the animal world. The modern philosophy which deifies man leaves no room for any order of beings above him. But if the distance between God and man be infinite, all analogy would prove that the orders of rational creatures between us and God must be inconceivably numerous. As this is in itself probable, it is clearly revealed in the Bible to be true.

§ 1. Their Nature.

As to the nature of angels, they are described, (1.) As pure spirits, i.e., immaterial and incorporeal beings. The Scriptures do not attribute bodies of any kind to them. On the assumption that spirit unconnected with matter cannot act out of itself, that it can neither communicate with other spirits nor operate on the external world, it was maintained by many, and so decided in the council held at Nice, A.D. 784, that angels had bodies composed of ether or light; an opinion which was thought to be favoured by such passages as Matt. xxviii. 8, Luke ii. 9, and other passages in which their luminous appearance and the glory attending ther presence are spoken of. The Council of Lateran, A.D. 1215, decided that they were incorporeal, and this has been the common opinion in the Church. They are declared to be "substanti spirituales, omnis corpore molis expertes." As such, therefore, they are invisible, incorruptible, and immortal. Their relation to space is described as an illocalitas; not ubiquity or omnipresence, as they are always somewhere and not everywhere at any given moment, but they are not confined to space circumscriptively as bodies are, and can move from one portion of space to another. As spirits they are possessed of intelligence, will, and power. With regard to their knowledge, whether as to its modes or objects, nothing special is revealed. All that is clear is that in their intellectual faculties and in the extent of their knowledge they are far superior to man.

Their power also is very great, and extends over mind and matter. They have the power to communicate one with another and with other minds, and to produce effects in the natural world. The greatness of their power is manifest, (a.) From the names and titles given to them, as principalities, powers, dominions, and world-rulers. (b.) From the direct assertions of Scripture, as they are said to "excel in strength;" and (c.) From the effects attributed to their agency. However great their power may be, it is nevertheless subject to all the limitations which belong to creatures. Angels, therefore, cannot create, they cannot change substances, they cannot alter the laws of nature, they cannot perform miracles, they cannot act without means, and they cannot search the heart; for all these are, in Scripture, declared to be prerogatives peculiar to God. The power of angels is, therefore, (1.) Dependent and derived. (2.) It must be exercised in accordance with the laws of the material and spiritual world. (3.) Their intervention is not optional, but permitted or commanded by God, and at his pleasure, and, so far as the external world is concerned, it would seem to be only occasional and exceptional. These limitations are of the greatest practical importance. We are not to regard angels as intervening between us and God, or to attribute to them the effects which the Bible everywhere refers to the providential agency of God.

Wrong Views on the Subject.

This Scriptural doctrine, universally received in the Church, stands opposed, (1.) To the theory that they were transient emanations from the Deity. (2.) To the Gnostic view that they were permanent emanations or ◆ons: and (3.) To the rationalistic view, which denies them any real existence, and refers the Scriptural statements either to popular superstitions adopted by the sacred writers in accommodation to the opinions of the age, or to poetical personifications of the powers of nature. The grounds on which the modern philosophy denies the existence of angels have no force in opposition to the explicit statements of the Bible, which cannot be rejected without rejecting the authority of Scripture altogether, or adopting such principles of interpretation as destroys its value as a rule of faith.

§ 2. Their State.

As to the state of the angels, it is clearly taught that they were all originally holy. It is also plainly to be inferred from the statements of the Bible that they were subjected to a period of probation, and that some kept and some did not keep their first estate. Those who maintained their integrity are represented as confirmed in a state of holiness and glory. This condition, although one of complete security, is one of perfect liberty; for the most absolute freedom in action is, according to the Bible, consistent with absolute certainty as to the character of that action. These holy angels are evidently not all of the same rank. This appears from the terms by which they are designated; terms which imply diversity of order and authority. Some are princes, others potentates, others rulers of the world. Beyond this the Scriptures reveal nothing, and the speculations of schoolmen and theologians as to the hierarchy of the angelic hosts, have neither authority nor value.

§ 3. Their Employments.

The Scriptures teach that the holy angels are employed, (1.) In the worship of God.

(2.) In executing the will of God. (3.) And especially in ministering to the heirs of salvation. They are represented as surrounding Christ, and as ever ready to perform any service in the advancement of his kingdom that may be assigned tc them. Under the Old Testament they repeatedly appeared to the servants of God to reveal to them his will. They smote the Egyptians; were employed in the giving of the law at Mount Sinai; attended the Israelites during their journey; destroyed their enemies; and encamped around the people of God as a defence in hours of danger. They predicted and celebrated the birth of Christ (Matt. i. 20; Luke i. ii); they ministered to Him in his temptation and sufferings (Matt. iv. 11; Luke xxii. 43); and they announced his resurrection and ascension (Matt. xxviii. 2: John xx. 12; Acts i. 10, 11). They are still ministering spirits to believers (Heb. i. 14); they delivered Peter from prison; they watch over children (Matt. xviii. 10); they bear the souls of the departed to Abraham's bosom (Luke xvi. 22); they are to attend Christ at his second coming, and gather his people into his kingdom (Matt. xiii. 39; xvi. 27; xxiv. 31). Such are the general statements of the Scriptures on this subject, and with these we should be content. We know that they are the messengers of God; that they are now and ever have been employed in executing his commissions, but further than this nothing is positively revealed. Whether each individual believer has a guardian angel is not declared with any clearness in the Bible. The expression used in Matt. xviii. 10, in reference to the little children, "whose angels" are said to behold the face of God in heaven, is understood by many to favour this assumption. So also is the passage in Acts xii. 7, where Peter's angel is spoken of (verse 15). This latter passage, however, no more proves that Peter had a guardian angel than if the servant maid had said it was Peter's ghost it would prove the popular superstition on that subject. The language recorded is not of an inspired person, but of an uneducated servant, and can have no didactic authority. It only goes to prove that the Jews of that day believed in spiritual apparitions. The passage in Matthew has more pertinency. It does teach that children have guardian angels; that is, that angels watch over their welfare. But it does not prove that each child, or each believer, has his own guardian angel. In Daniel, ch. x., mention is made of the Prince of Persia, the Prince of Grecia, and, speaking to the Hebrews, of Michael your Prince, in such a way as to lead the great majority of commentators and theologians in all ages of the Church to adopt the opinion that certain angels are intrusted with the special oversight of particular kingdoms. As Michael, who is called the Prince of the Hebrews, was not the uncreated angel of the covenant, nor a human prince, but an archangel, the inference seems natural that the Prince of Persia and the Prince of Grecia were also angels. This opinion, however, has been controverted on various grounds. (1.) On the silence of Scripture elsewhere on the subject. Neither in the Old nor in the New Testament do we find any intimation that the heathen nations have or had either a guardian angel or an evil spirit set over them. (2.) In verse 13 of of the tenth chapter of Daniel the powers who were arrayed against Michael the angel who appeared to the prophet, are called "the kings of Persia;" at least, according to one interpretation of that passage. (3.) In the following chapter earthly sovereigns are introduced in such a way as to show that they, and not angels good or bad, are the contending powers indicated by the prophet. [606] It is certainly unadvisabie to adopt on the authority of a doubtful passage in a single book of Scripture a doctrine unsupported by other parts of the Word of God. While this must be admitted, yet it is nevertheless true that the ordinary interpretation of the language of the prophet is altogether the most natural one; and that there is nothing in the

doctrine thus taught out of analogy with the clear teaching of the Scriptures. It is plain from what is elsewhere taught that spiritual beings higher than man, both good and evil, do exist; that they are exceedingly numerous; that they are very powerful; that they have access to our world, and are occupied in its affairs; that they are of different ranks or orders; and that their names and titles indicate that they exercise dominion and act as rulers. This is true of evil, as well as of good angels; and, being true, there is nothing in the opinion that one particular angel should have special control over one nation, and another over another nation, that is in conflict with the analogy of Scripture.

So far, however, as the good angels are concerned, it is clear, --

1. That they can and do produce effects in the natural or external world. The Scriptures everywhere assume that matter and mind are two distinct substances, and that the one can act upon the other. We know that our minds act upon our bodies, and that our minds are acted upon by material causes. There is nothing, therefore, beyond even the teaching of experience, in the doctrine that spirits may act on the material world. The extent of their agency is limited by the principles above stated; and yet from their exalted nature the effects which they are able to produce may far exceed our comprehension. An angel slew all the first-born of the Egyptians in a single night; the thunder and lightning attending the giving of the law on Mount Sinai were produced by angelic agency. The ancient theologians, in many cases, drew from the admitted fact that angels do thus operate in the external world, the conclusion that all natural effects were produced by their agency, and that the stars were moved in their courses by the power of angels. But this is in violation of two obvious and important principles: First, that no cause for an effect should be assumed without evidence; and Second, that no more causes should be assumed than are necessary to account for the effect. We are not authorized, therefore, to attribute any event to angelic interference except on the authority of Scripture, nor when other causes are adequate to account for it.

2. The angels not only execute the will of God in the natural world, but they also act on the minds of men. They have access to our minds and can influence them for good in accordance with the laws of our nature and in the use of appropriate means. They do not act by that direct operation, which is the peculiar prerogative of God and his Spirit, but by the suggestion of truth and guidance of thought and feeling, much as one man may act upon another. If the angels may communicate one with another, there is no reason why they may not, in like manner, communicate with our spirits. In the Scriptures, therefore, the angels are represented as not only affording general guidance and protection, but also as giving inward strength and consolation. If an angel strengthened our Lord himself after his agony in the garden, his people also may experience the support of angels; and if evil angels tempt to sin, good angels may allure to holiness. Certain it is that a wide influence and operation are attributed to them in Scripture in furthering the welfare of the children of God, and in protecting them from evil and defending them from their enemies. The use which our Lord makes of the promise, "He shall give his angels charge over thee, to keep thee in all thy ways. They shall bear thee up in their hands, lest thou dash thy foot against a stone" (Ps. xci. 11, 12), shows that it is not to be taken as a mere poetic form of promising divine protection. They watch over infants (Matt. xviii. 10); they aid those of mature age (Ps. xxxiv. 7), and are present with the dying (Luke xvi. 22).

3. A special agency is also attributed to them as the servants of Carist in the advancement of his Church. As the law was given through their ministry, as they had charge of the theocratic people under the old economy, so they are spoken of as being still present in the assembly of the saints (1 Cor. xi. 10), and as constantly warring against the dragon and his angels.

This Scriptural doctrine of the ministry of angels is full of consolation fbr the people of God. They may rejoice in the assurance that these holy beings encamp round about them; defending them day and night from unseen enemies and unapprehended dangers. At the same time they must not come between us and God. We are not to look to them nor to invoke their aid. They are in the hands of God and exercise his will; He uses them as He does the winds and the lightning (Heb. i. 7), and we are not to look to the instruments in the one case more than in the other.

[606] See Hvernick on Daniel x. 13.

§ 4. Evil Angels.

The Scriptures inform us that certain of the angels kept not their first estate. They are spoken of as the angels that sinned. They are called evil, or unclean spirits; principalities; powers; rulers of this world; and spiritual wickednesses (i.e., wicked spirits) in high places. The most common designation given to them is daimones, or more commonly daimonia, which our translators unfortunately render devils. The Scriptures make a distinction between diabolos and daimon, which is not observed in the English version. In the spiritual world there is only one diabolos (devil), but there are many daimonia (demons). These evil spirits are represented as belonging to the same order of beings as the good angels. All the names and titles, expressive of their nature and powers, given to the one are also given to the others. Their original condition was holy. When they fell or what was the nature of their sin is not revealed. The general opinion is that it was pride, founded on 1 Tim. iii. 6. A bishop, the Apostle says, must not be "a novice, lest being lifted up with pride he fall into the condemnation of the devil;" which is commonly understood to mean the condemnation which the devil incurred for the same sin. Some have conjectured that Satan was moved to rebel against God and to seduce our race from its allegiance, by the desire to rule over our globe and the race of man. Of this, however, there is no intimation in Scripture. His first appearance in the sacred history is in the character of an apostate angel. That there is one fallen angel exalted in rank and power above all his associates is clearly taught in the Bible. He is called Satan (the adversary), diabolos, the traducer, ho poneros, he evil one; the prince of the power of the air; the prince of darkness; the God of this world; Beelzebub; Belial the tempter; the old serpent, and the dragon. These, and simlar titles set him forth as the great enemy of God and man, the opposer of all that is good and the promoter of all that is evil. He is so constantly represented as a personal being, that the rationalistic notion that he is only a personification of evil, is irreconcilable with the authority of Scripture and inconsistent with the faith of the Church. The opinion that the doctrine of Satan was introduced among the Hebrews after the Exile, and from a heathen source, is no less contrary to the plain teachings of the Bible. He is represented as the tempter of our first parents, and is distinctly mentioned in the book of Job written long before the Babylonish captivity. Besides this representation of Satan in general terms as the

enemy of God, he is specially set forth in Scripture, as the head of the kingdom of darkness, which embraces all evil beings. Man by his apostasy fell under the dominion of Satan, and his salvation consists in his being translated from Satan's kingdom into the kingdom of God's dear Son. That the daimo,nia who are represented as subject to Satan, are not the spirits of wicked men who have departed this life, as some have maintained, is clear. (1.) Because they are distinguished from the elect angels. (2.) From its being said that they kept not their first state (Jude 6). (3.) From the language of 2 Pet. ii 4. where it is said God spared not the angels that sinned. (4.) From the application to them of the titles "principalities" and "powers," which are appropriate only to beings belonging to the order of angels.

Power and Agency of Evil Spirits.

As to the power and agency of these evil spirits, they are represented as being exceedingly numerous, as everywhere efficient, as having access to our world, and as operating in nature and in the minds of men. The same limitations, of course, belong to their agency as belong to that of the holy angels. (1.) They are dependent on God, and can act only under his control and by his permission. (2.) Their operations must be according to the laws of nature, and, (3.) They cannot interfere with the freedom and responsibility of men. Augustine says of Satan: "Consentientes tenet, non invitos cogit." Nevertheless, his power is very great. Men are said to be led captive by him, evil spirits are said to work in the hearts of the disobedient. Christians are warned against their devices, and called upon to resist them, not in their own strength, but in the strength of the Lord and armed with the whole panoply of God.

Great evils, however, have arisen from exaggerated views of the agency of evil spirits. To them have been referred, not only all natural calamities, as storms, conflagrations, pestilences, etc., but what was far more lamentable, they have been regarded as entering into covenant with men. It was thought that any person could enter into a contract with Satan and be invested for a season with supernatural power upon condition that the person thus endowed yielded his soul to perdition. On this foundation rested the numerous prosecutions for witchcraft and sorcery which disgraced the annals of all Christian nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The most enlightened men of Europe yielded themselves to this delusion, under which thousands of men and women, and even children, were put to the most cruel deaths. It is not necessary to go to the opposite extreme and deny all agency of evil spirits in nature or over the bodies and minds of men, in order to free ourselves from such evils. It is enough to adhere to the plain teaching of the Bible. These spirits can only act, as before stated, in accordance with the laws of nature and the free agency of man; and their influence and operations can no more be detected and judicially proved than the influence and operations of holy angels for good. Both classes are efficient; we are to be thankful to God for the unseen and unknowable ministry of the angels of light, and be on our guard and seek divine protection from the machinations of the spirits of evil. But of neither are we directly conscious, and to the agency of neither can we with certainty refer any specific effect, if its occurrence admits of any other explanation.

Demoniacal Possessions.

The most marked exhibition of the power of evil spirits over the bodies and minds of

men, is afforded by the demoniacs so often mentioned in the evangelical history. These demoniacal possessions were of two kinds. First, those in which the soul alone was the subject of the diabolic influence, as in the case of the "damsel possessed with a spirit of divination," mentioned in Acts xvi. 16. Perhaps in some instances false prophets and magicians were examples of the same kind of possession. Secondly, those in which the bodies alone, or as was more frequently the case, both the body and mind were the subjects of this spiritual influence. By possession is meant the inhabitation of an evil spirit in such relation to the body and soul as to exert a controlling influence, producing violent agitations and great suffering, both mental and corporeal. That the demoniacs mentioned in the New Testament were not mere lunatics or the subjects of epilepsy or other analogous diseases, but cases of real possession, is plain, First, because this was the prevailing belief of the Jews at that time; and secondly, because Christ and his Apostles evidently adopted and sanctioned that belief. They not only called those thus affected demoniacs, but addressed the spirits as persons, commanded them, disposed of them, and in every way spoke and acted as they would have done had the popular belief been well founded. It is certain that all who heard Christ thus speak would and did conclude that he regarded the demoniacs as really possessed by evil spirits. This conclusion he nowhere contradicts; but on the contrary, in his most private conferences with the disciples abundantly confirmed. He promised to give them power to cast out demons; and referred to his possession of this power, and his ability to delegate its exercise to his disciples as one of the most convincing proofs of his Messiahship and divinity. He came to destroy the works of the devil; and that He did thus triumph over him and his angels, proved that He was what He claimed to be, the promised almighty king and conqueror, who was to found that kingdom of God of which there is to be no end. To explain all this on the principle of accommodation would destroy the authority of Scripture. On the same principle the doctrine of atonement, inspiration, divine influence, and every other distinctive doctrine of the Bible, may be, and has been explained away. We must take the Scriptures in their plain historical sense -- in that sense in which they were designed to be understood by those to whom they were addressed, or we do thereby reject them as a rule of faith.

There is no special improbability in the doctrine of demoniacal possessions. Evil spirits do exist. They have access to the minds and bodies of men. Why should we refuse to believe, on the authority of Christ, that they were allowed to have special power over some men? The world, since the apostasy, belongs to the kingdom of Satan; and to redeem it from his dominion was the special object of the mission of the Son of God. It is not surprising, therefore, that the time of his advent, was Satan's hour; the time when, to a greater degree than before or after, he manifested his power, thus making the fact of his overthrow the more conspicuous and glorious.

The objections to the common doctrine on this subject are, --

1. That calling certain persons demoniacs no more proves that they were possessed by evil spirits, than calling others lunatics, proves that they were under the influence of the moon. This is true; and if the argument rested only on the use of the word demoniac, it would be altogether insufficient to establish the doctrine. But this is only a collateral and subordinate argument, without force in itself, but deriving force from other sources. If the sacred writers, besides designating the deranged as lunatics, had spoken of the moon as the

source of their derangement, and had referred to its different phases as increasing or lessening the force of their mental disorder, there would be some analogy between the cases. It is readily admitted that the use of a word is often very different from its primary signification, and therefore that its meaning can not always be determined by its etymology. But when its signification is the same with its usage; when those called demoniacs are said to be possessed with evil spirits; when those spirits are addressed as persons, and commnanded to depart; and when this power over them is appealed to as proof of Christ's power over Satan, the prince of these fallen angels; then it is unreasonable to deny that the word is to be understood in its literal and proper sense.

2. A second objection is that the phenomena exhibited by those called demoniacs are those of known bodily or mental diseases, and therefore that no other cause can rationally be assumed to account for them. It is not, however, true that all the phenomena in question can be thus accounted for. Some of the symptoms are those of lunacy and epilepsy, but others are of a different character. These demoniacs often exhibited supernatural power or knowledge. Besides this, the Scriptures teach that evil spirits have power to produce bodily disease. And therefore the presence of such disease is no proof that the agency of evil spirits was not active in its production and its consequences.

3. It is further objected that such cases do not now occur. This is by no means certain. The evil spirits do now work in the children of disobedience, and for what we know they may now work in some men as effectually as in the ancient demoniacs. But admitting the fact to be as assumed, it would prove nothing to the point. There may have been special reasons for allowing such displays of Satanic power when Christ was on earth, which no longer exist. That miracles are not wrought in the Church now, is no proof that they were not wrought during the apostolic age.

We are not to deny what are plainly recorded in the Scriptures as facts on this subject; we have no right to assert that Satan and his angels do not now in any cases produce similar effects; but we should abstain from asserting the fact of Satanic or demoniacal influence or possession in any case where the phenomena can be otherwise accounted for. The difference between believing whatever is possible, and believing only what is certain is strikingly illustrated in the case of Luther and Calvin. The former was disposed to refer all evil to the spirits of darkness; the latter referred nothing to their agency that could not be proved to be actually their work. Luther [607] says: "Die Heiden wissen nicht, woher das Ungl\u00fcck so pl\u00f6tzlich kommt; aber wir wissen es, dass es eitel Teufels Arbeit ist, der hat solche Helleparten, Bleikugeln und B\u00fcchsen, solche Spiesse und Schwerter, damit er unter uns schiesst, wirft und sticht, wenn Gott es ihm erlaubt. Darum zweifle nur Niemand dran, wo ein Feuer aufgehet, dass ein Dorf oder ein Haus abbrennet, da sitzt allewege ein Teufelein dabei, das bl\u00f6set immer in das Feuer, dass es soll grosser werden." "Ein Christ soll das wissen, dass er mitten unter den Teufeln sitze, und dass ihm der Teufel n\u00e4her sei denn sein Rock oder Hemde, ja n\u00e4her denn seine eigene Haut, dass er rings um uns her sei, und wir also stets mit ihm zu Haare liegen und uns mit ihm schlagen m\u00fcssen." [608] "The heathen know not whence evil so suddenly comes. But we know. It is the pure work of the devil; who has fire-brands, bullets, torches, spears, and swords, with which he shoots, casts, or pierces, when God permits. Therefore let no man doubt when a fire breaks out which consumes a village or a house, that a little devil is sitting there blowing the fire to

make it greater." Again, "Let a Christian know that he sits among devils: that the devil is nearer to him than his coat or his shirt, or even his skin; that he is all about us, and that we must always grapple with and fight him." Calvin's view of tbe subject is, [609] "Qu\u00e9 de diabolis Scriptura tradit, eo fere tendunt omnia, ut solliciti simus ad pr\u00e9cavendas corum insidias et molitiones: tum iis armis nos instruamus, qu\u00e9 ad propulsandos potentissimos hostes satis firma sint ac valida." And he asks, [610] "Quid nostra refert vel plura, vel in alium finem de diabolis scire?"

[607] Werke. edit. Walch, vol. xiii. p. 2850. (?)

[608] Edit. Walch, vol. x. p. 1234, edit. Erlangen, 1823, vol. xvii. p. 178.

[609] Institutio, I. xii. 13.

[610] Ibid. 16.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. II

PART II: ANTHROPOLOGY

Having considered the doctrines which concern the nature of God and his relation to the world, we come now to those which concern man; his origin, nature, primitive state, probation, and apostasy; which last subject includes the question as to the nature of sin; and the effects of Adam's first sin upon himself and upon his posterity. These subjects constitute the department of Anthropology.

CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF MAN.

§ 1. Scriptural Doctrine.

The Scriptural account of the origin of man is contained in Genesis i. 26, 27, "And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness: and let them have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over the cattle, and over all the earth, and over every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth. So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created He him; male and female created He them." And Gen. ii. 7, "And the Lord God formed man of the dust of the ground, and breathed into his nostrils the breath of life; and man became a living soul."

Two things are included in this account; first that man's body was formed by the immediate intervention of God. It did not grow; nor was it produced by any process of development. Secondly, the soul was derived from God. He breathed into man "the breath of life," that is, that life which constituted him a man, a living creature bearing the image of God.

Many have inferred from this language that the soul is an emanation from the divine essence; particula spiritus divini in corpore inclusa. This idea was strenuously resisted by the Christian fathers, and rejected by the Church, as inconsistent with the nature of God. It assumes that the divine essence is capable of division; that his essence can be communicated without his attributes, and that it can be degraded as the souls of fallen men are degraded. (See Delitzsch's "Biblical Psychology" in T. and T. Clark's "Foreign Library," and Auberlen in Herzog's "Encyclop﷽die," article "Geist der Menschen.")

§ 2. Anti-Scriptural Theories.

Heathen Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation.

The Scriptural doctrine is opposed to the doctrine held by many of the ancients, that man is a spontaneous production of the earth. Many of them claimed to be gegeneis, autochthenes, terrigena. The earth was assumed to be pregnant with the germs of all living organisms, which were quickened into life under favourable circumstances; or it was regarded as instinct with a productive life to which is to be referred the origin of all the plants and animals living on its surface. To this primitive doctrine of antiquity, modern philosophy and science, in some of their forms, have returned. Those who deny the existence of a personal God, distinct from the world, must of course deny the doctrine of a creation ex nihilo and consequently of the creation of man. The theological view as to the origin of man, says Strauss, "rejects the standpoint of natural philosophy and of science in

general. These do not admit of the immediate intervention of divine causation. God created man, not as such, or, quatenus infinitus est, sed quatenus per elementa nascentis telluris explicatur.' This is the view which the Greek and Roman philosophers, in a very crude form indeed, presented, and against which the fathers of the Christian Church earnestly contended, but which is now the unanimous judgment of natural science as well as of philosophy." [1] To the objection that the earth no longer spontaneously produces men and irrational animals, it is answered that many things happened formerly that do not happen in the present state of the world. To the still more obvious objection that an infant man must have perished without a mother's care, it is answered that the infant floated in the ocean of its birth, enveloped in a covering, until it reached the development of a child two years old; or it is said that philosophy can only establish the general fact as to the way in which the human race originated, but cannot be required to explain all the details.

Modern Doctrine of Spontaneous Generation.

Although Strauss greatly exaggerates when he says that men of science in our day are unanimous in supporting the doctrine of spontaneous generation, it is undoubtedly true that a large class of naturalists, especially on the continent of Europe, are in favour of that doctrine. Professor Huxley, in his discourse on the "Physical Basis of Life," lends to it the whole weight of his authority. He does not indeed expressly teach that dead matter becomes active without being subject to the influence of previous living matter; but his whole paper is designed to show that life is the result of the peculiar arrangement of the molecules of matter. His doctrine is that "the matter of life is composed of ordinary matter, differing from it only in the manner in which its atoms are aggregated." [2] "If the properties of water," he says, "may be properly said to result from the nature and disposition of its component molecules, I can find no intelligible ground for refusing to say that the properties of protoplasm result from the nature and disposition of its molecules." [3] In his address before the British Association, he says that if he could look back far enough into the past he should expect to see "the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter." And although that address is devoted to showing that spontaneous generation, or Abiogenesis, as it is called, has never been proved, he says, "I must carefully guard myself against the supposition that I intend to suggest that no such thing as Abiogenesis has ever taken place in the past or ever will take place in the future. With organic chemistry, molecular physics, and physiology yet in their infancy, and every day making prodigious strides, I think it would be the height of presumption for any man to say that the conditions under which matter assumes the properties we call vital,' may not some day be artificially brought together." [4] All this supposes that life is the product of physical causes; that all that is requisite for its production is "to bring together" the necessary conditions.

Mr. Mivart, while opposing Mr. Darwin's theory, not only maintains that the doctrine of evolution is "far from any necessary opposition to the most orthodox theology," but adds that "the same may be said of spontaneous generation." [5] As chemists have succeeded in producing urea, which is an animal product, he thinks it not unreasonable that they may produce a fish.

But while there is a class of naturalists who maintain the doctrine of spontaneous generation, the great body even of those who are the most advanced admit that omne vivum ex vivo, so far as science yet knows, is an established law of nature. To demonstrate this is

the object of Professor Huxley's important address just referred to, delivered before the British Association in September, 1870. Two hundred years ago, he tells us, it was commonly taken for granted that the insects which made their appearance in decaying animal and vegetable substances were spontaneously produced. Redi, however, an Italian naturalist, about the middle of the seventeenth century, proved that if such decaying matter were protected by a piece of gauze admitting the air but excluding flies, no such insects made their appearance. "Thus, the hypothesis that living matter always arises by the agency of pre-existing living matter, took definite shape; and had henceforward a right to be considered and a claim to be refuted, in each particular case, before the production of living matter in any other way could be admitted by careful reasoners." [6] This conclusion has been more and more definitely settled by all the investigations and experiments which have been prosecuted from that day to this. It has been proved that even the infusorial animalcules, which the most powerful microscopes are necessary to detect, never make their appearance when all pre-existing living germs have been carefully excluded. These experiments, prosecuted on the very verge of nonentity, having for their subject-matter things so minute as to render it doubtful whether they were anything or nothing, and still more uncertain whether they were living or dead, are reviewed in chronological order by Professor Huxley, and the conclusion to which they lead fully established. [7] This is confirmed by daily experience. Meat, vegetables, and fruits are preserved to the extent of hundreds of tons every year. "The matters to be preserved are well boiled in a tin case provided with a small hole, and this hole is soldered up when all the air in the case has been replaced by steam. By this method they may be kept for years, without putrefying, fermenting, or getting mouldy. Now this is not because oxygen is excluded, inasmuch as it is now proved that free oxygen is not necessary for either fermentation or putrefaction. It is not because the tins are exhausted of air, for Vibriones and Bacteria live, as Pasteur has shown, without air or free oxygen. It is not because the boiled meats or vegetables are not putrescible or fermentable, as those who have had the misfortune to be in a ship supplied with unskilfully closed tins well know. What is it, therefore, but the exclusion of germs? I think the Abiogenists are bound to answer this question before they ask us to consider new experiments of precisely the same order." [8]

But admitting that life is always derived from life, the question still remains, Whether one kind of life may not give rise to life of a different kind? It was long supposed that parasites derived their life from the plant or animal in which they live. And what is more to the point, it is a matter of familiar experience "that mere pressure on the skin will give rise to a corn" which seems to have a life of its own; and that tumours are often developed in the body which acquire, as in the ease of cancer, the power of multiplication and reproduction. In the case of vaccination, also, a minute particle of matter is introduced under the skin. The result is a vesicle distended with vaccine matter "in quantity a hundred or a thousand-fold that which was originally inserted." Whence did it come? Professor Huxley tells us that it has been proved that "the active element in the vaccine lymph is non-diffusible, and consists of minute particles not exceeding 1/20000 of an inch in diameter, which are made visible in the lymph by the microscope. Similar experiments have proved that two of the most destructive of epizootic diseases, sheep-pox and glanders, are also dependent for their existence and their propagation upon extremely small living solid particles, to which the title of microzymes is applied." The question, he says, arises whether these particles are the

result of Homogenesis, or of Xenogenesis, i.e., Are they produced by pre-existing living particles of the same kind? or, Are they a modification of the tissues of the bodies in which they are found? The decision of this question has proved to be a matter of vast practical importance. Some years since diseases attacked the grape-vine and the silk-worm in France, which threatened to destroy two of the most productive branches of industry in that country. The direct loss to France from the silk-worm disease alone, in the course of seventeen years, is estimated at two hundred and fifty millions of dollars. It was discovered that these diseases of the vine and worm, which were both infectious and contagious, were due to living organisms, by which they were propagated and extended. It became a matter of the last importance to determine whether these living particles propagated themselves, or whether they were produced by the morbid action of the plant or animal. M. Pasteur the eminent naturalist, sent by the French government to investigate the matter, after laborious research decided that they were independent organisms propagating themselves and multiplying with astonishing rapidity. "Guided by that theory, he has devised a method of extirpating the disease, which has proved to be completely successful wherever it has been properly carried out." [9]

Professor Huxley closes his address by saying that he had invited his audience to follow him "in an attempt to trace the path which has been followed by a scientific idea, in its slow progress from the position of a probable hypothesis to that of an established law of nature." Biogenesis, then, according to Huxley, is an established law of nature. [10]

Professor Tyndall deals with this subject in his lecture delivered in September, 1870, on "The Scientific Uses of the Imagination." He says that the question concerning the origin of life is, Whether it is due to a creative flat, Let life be!' or to a process of evolution. Was it potentially in matter from the beginning? or, Was it inserted at a later period? However the convictions here or there may be influenced, he says, "the process must be slow which commends the hypothesis of natural evolution to the public mind. For what are the core and essence of this hypothesis? Strip it naked, and you stand face to face with the notion that not alone the more ignoble forms of animalcular or animal life, not alone the nobler forms of the horse and lion, not alone the exquisite and wonderful mechanism of the human body, but that the human mind itself -- emotion, intellect, will, and all their phenomena -- were once latent in a fiery cloud. Surely the mere statement of such a notion is more than a refutation. I do not think that any holder of the evolution hypothesis would say that I overstate it or overstrain it in any way. I merely strip it of all vagueness, and bring before you, unclothed and unvarnished, the notions by which it must stand or fall. Surely these notions represent an absurdity too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind." [11] Professor Tyndall, however, as well as Professor Huxley, is on both sides of this question. Materialism, with its doctrine of spontaneous generation, is thus monstrous and absurd, only on the assumption that matter is matter. If you only spiritualize matter until it becomes mind, the absurdity disappears. And so do materialism, and spontaneous generation, and the whole array of scientific doctrines. If matter becomes mind, mind is God, and God is everything. Thus the monster Pantheism swallows up science and its votaries. We do not forget that the naturalist, after spending his life in studying matter, comes to the conclusion that "matter is nothing," that the "Supreme Intelligence" is the universe. [12] Thus it is that those who overstep the limits of human knowledge, or reject the control of primary truths, fall into the abyss of outer darkness.

The way Professor Tyndall puts the matter is this: [13] "These evolution notions are absurd, monstrous, and fit only for the intellectual gibbet in relation to the ideas concerning matter which were drilled into us when young. Spirit and matter have ever been presented to us in the rudest contrast; the one as all-noble, the other as all-vile." If instead of these perverted ideas of material and spirit, we come "to regard them as equally worthy and equally wonderful; to consider them, in fact, as two opposite faces of the same great mystery," as different elements, of "what our mightiest spiritual teacher would call the Eternal Fact of the Universe," then the case would be different. It would no longer be absurd, as Professor Tyndall seems to think, for mind to become matter or matter mind, or for the phenomena of the one to be produced by the forces of the other. The real distinction, in fact, between them would be done away. "Without this total revolution," he says, "of the notions now prevalent, the evolution hypothesis must stand condemned; but in many profoundly thoughtful minds such a revolution has already occurred." We have, then, the judgment of Professor Tyndall, one of the highest authorities in the scientific world, that if matter be what all the world believes it to be, materialism, spontaneous generation, and evolution, or development, are absurdities "too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind."

We can cite his high authority as to another point. Suppose we give up everything; admit that there is no real distinction between matter and mind; that all the phenomena of the universe, vital and mental included, may be referred to physical causes; that a free or spontaneous act is an absurdity; that there can be no intervention of a controlling mind or will in the affairs of men, no personal existence of man after death, -- suppose we thus give up our morals and religion, all that ennobles man and dignifies his existence, what do we gain? According to Professor Tyndall, nothing. [14] "The evolution hypothesis," he tells us, "does not solve -- it does not profess to solve -- the ultimate mystery of this universe. It leaves that mystery untouched. At bottom, it does nothing more than transpose the conception of life's origin to an indefinitely distant past.' Even granting the nebula and its potential life, the question, Whence came they?' would still remain to baffle and bewilder us." If we must admit the agency of will, "caprice," as Professor Tyndall calls it, billions of ages in the past, why should it be unphilosophical to admit it now?

It is very evident, therefore, that the admission of the primary truths of the reason -- truths which, in point of fact, all men do admit -- truths which concern even our sense perceptions, and involve the objective existence of the material world, necessitates the admission of mind, of God, of providence, and of immortality. Professor Tyndall being judge, materialism, spontaneous generation, the evolution of life, thought, feeling, and conscience out of matter, are absurdities "too monstrous to be entertained by any sane mind, unless matter be spiritualized into mind, -- and then everything is God, and God is everything.

Theories of Development.

Lamarck.

Lamarck, a distinguished French naturalist, was the first of modern scientific men who adopted the theory that all vegetables and animals living on the earth, including man, are developed from certain original, simple germs. This doctrine was expounded in his "Zo[illegible]logie Philosophique," published in 1809. Lamarck admitted the existence of God, to

whom he referred the existence of the matter of which the universe is composed. But God having created matter with its properties, does nothing more. Life, organisms, and mind are all the product of unintelligent matter and its forces. All living matter is composed of cellular tissue, consisting of the aggregation of minute cells. These cells are not living in themselves, but are quickened into life by some ethereal fluid pervading space, such as heat and electricity. Life, therefore, according to this theory, originates in spontaneous generation.

Life, living cells or tissues, having thus originated, all the diversified forms of the vegetable and animal kingdoms have been produced by the operation of natural causes; the higher, even the highest, being formed from the lowest by a long-continued process of development.

The principles of Lamarck's theory "are involved in the three following propositions: --

"1. That any considerable and permanent change in the circumstances in which a race of animals is placed, superinduces in them a real change in their wants and requirements.

"2. That this change in their wants necessitates new actions on their part to satisfy those Wants, and that finally new habits are thus engendered.

"3. that these new actions and habits necessitate a greater and more frequent use of particular organs already existing, which thus become strengthened and improved; or the development of new organs when new wants require them; or the neglect of the use of old organs, which may thus gradually decrease and finally disappear." [15]

Vestiges of Creation.

Some thirty years since a work appeared anonymously, entitled "The Vestiges of Creation," in which the theory of Lamarck in essential features was reproduced. The writer agreed with his predecessor in admitting an original creation of matter; in referring the origin of life to physical causes; and in deriving all the general species and varieties of plants and animals by a process of natural development from a common source. These writers differ in the way in which they carry out their common views and as to the grounds which they urge in their support.

The author of the "Vestiges of Creation" assumes the truth of the nebular hypothesis, and argues from analogy that as the complicated and ordered systems of the heavenly bodies are the result of physical laws acting on the original matter pervading space, it is reasonable to infer that the different orders of plants and animals have arisen in the same way. He refers to the gradation observed in the vegetable and animal kingdoms; the simpler everywhere preceding the more complex, and the unity of plan being preserved throughout. He lays great stress also on the foetal development of the higher orders of animals. The human foetus, for example, assuming in succession the peculiarities of structure of the reptile, of the fish, of the bird, and of man. This is supposed to prove that man is only a more perfectly developed reptile; and that the orders of animals differ simply as to the stage they occupy in this unfolding series of life. As the same larva of the bee can be developed into a queen, a drone, or a worker, so the same living cell can be developed into a reptile, a fish, a bird, or a man. There are, however, the author admits, interruptions in the scale; species suddenly appearing without due preparation. This he illustrates by a reference to the calculating machine, which for a million of times will produce numbers in

regular series, and then for once produce a number of a different order; thus the law of species that like shall beget like may hold good for an indefinite period, and then suddenly a new species be begotten. These theories and their authors have fallen into utter disrepute among scientific men, and have no other than a slight historical interest.

Darwin.

The new theory on this subject proposed by Mr. Charles Darwin, has, for the time being, a stronger hold on the public mind. He stands in the first rank of naturalists, and is on all sides respected not only for his knowledge and his skill in observation and description, but for his frankness and fairness. His theory, however, is substantially the same with those already mentioned, inasmuch as he also accounts for the origin of all the varieties of plants and animals by the gradual operation of natural causes. In his work on the "Origin of Species" he says: "I believe that animals are descended from at most only four or five progenitors; and plants from an equal or lesser number." On the same page, [16] however, he goes much further, and says: "Analogy would lead me one step further, namely, to the belief that all animals and plants are descended from some one prototype;" and he adds that "all the organic beings, which have ever lived on this earth, may be descended from some one primordial form." [17] The point of most importance in which Darwin differs from his predecessors is, that he starts with life, they with dead matter. They undertake to account for the origin of life by physical causes; whereas he assumes the existence of living cells or germs. He does not go into the question of their origin. He assumes them to exist; which would seem of necessity to involve the assumption of a Creator. The second important point of difference between the theories in question is, that those before mentioned account for the diversity of species by the inward power of development, a vis a tergo as it were, i.e., a struggle after improvement; whereas Darwin refers the origin of species mainly to the laws of nature operating ab extra, killing off the weak or less perfect, and preserving the stronger or more perfect. The third point of difference, so far as the author of the "Vestiges of Creation" is concerned, is that the latter supposes new species to be formed suddenly; whereas Darwin holds that they arise by a slow process of very minute changes. They all agree, however, in the main point that all the infinite diversities and marvellous organisms of plants and animals, from the lowest to the highest, are due to the operation of unintelligent physical causes.

The Darwinian theory, therefore, includes the following principles: --

First, that like begets like; or the law of heredity, according to which throughout the vegetable and animal world, the offspring is like the parent.

Second, the law of variation; that is, that while in all that is essential the offspring is like the parent, it always differs more or less from its progenitor. These variations are sometimes deteriorations, sometimes indifferent, sometimes improvements; that is, such as enable the plant or animal more advantageously to exercise its functions.

Third, that as plants and animals increase in a geometrical ratio, they tend to outrun enormously the means of support, and this of necessity gives rise to a continued and universal struggle for life.

Fourth, in this struggle the fittest survive; that is, those individuals which have an accidental variation of structure which renders them superior to their fellows in the struggle for existence, survive, and transmit that peculiarity to their offspring. This is "natural

selection;" i.e., nature, without intelligence or purpose, selects the individuals best adapted to continue and to improve the race. It is by the operation of these few principles that in the course of countless ages all the diversified forms of vegetables and animals have been produced.

"It is interesting," says Darwin, "to contemplate a tangled bank, clothed with many plants of many kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately constructed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. These laws, taken in the largest sense, being Growth with Reproduction; Inheritance which is almost implied by reproduction; Variability from the indirect and direct action of the conditions of life, and from use and disuse; a Ratio of Increase so high as to lead to a Struggle for Life, and as a consequence to Natural Selection, entailing Divergence of Character and the Extinction of less improved forms. Thus, from the war of nature, from famine and death, the most exalted object which we are capable of conceiving, namely, the production of the higher animals, directly follows." [18]

Remarks on the Darwinian Theory.

First, it shocks the common sense of unsophisticated men to be told that the whale and the humming-bird, man and the mosquito, are derived from the same source. Not that the whale was developed out of the humming-bird, or man out of the mosquito, but that both are derived by a slow process of variations continued through countless millions of years. Such is the theory with its scientific feathers plucked off. No wonder that at its first promulgation it was received by the scientific world, not only with surprise, but also with indignation. [19] The theory has, indeed, survived this attack. Its essential harmony with the spirit of the age, the real learning of its author and advocates, have secured for it an influence which is widespread, and, for the time, imposing.

A second remark is that the theory in question cannot be true, because it is founded on the assumption of an impossibility. It assumes that matter does the work of mind. This is an impossibility and an absurdity in the judgment of all men except materialists; and materialists are, ever have been, and ever must be, a mere handful among men, whether educated or uneducated. The doctrine of Darwin is, that a primordial germ, with no inherent intelligence, develops, under purely natural influences, into all the infinite variety of vegetable and animal organisms, with all their complicated relations to each other and to the world around them. He not only asserts that all this is due to natural causes; and, moreover, that the lower impulses of vegetable life pass, by insensible gradations, into the instinct of animals and the higher intelligence of man, but he argues against the intervention of mind anywhere in the process. God, says Lamarck, created matter; God, says Darwin, created the unintelligent living cell; both say that, after that first step, all else follows by natural law, without purpose and without design. No man can believe this, who cannot also believe that all the works of art, literature, and science in the world are the products of carbonic acid, water, and ammonia.

The Atheistic Character of the Theory.

Thirdly, the system is thoroughly atheistic, and therefore cannot possibly stand. God has revealed his existence and his government of the world so clearly and so

authoritatively, that any philosophical or scientific speculations inconsistent with those truths are like cobwebs in the track of a tornado. They offer no sensible resistance. The mere naturalist, the man devoted so exclusively to the study of nature as to believe in nothing but natural causes, is not able to understand the strength with which moral and religious convictions take hold of the minds of men. These convictions, however, are the strongest, the most ennobling, and the most dangerous for any class of men to disregard or ignore.

In saying that this system is atheistic, it is not said that Mr. Darwin is an atheist. He expressly acknowledges the existence of God; and seems to feel the necessity of his existence to account for the origin of life. Nor is it meant that every one who adopts the theory does it in an atheistic sense. It has already been remarked that there is a theistic and an atheistic form of the nebular hypothesis as to the origin of the universe; so there may be a theistic interpretation of the Darwinian theory. Men who, as the Duke of Argyle, carry the reign of law into everything, affirming that even creation is by law, may hold, as he does, that God uses everywhere and constantly physical laws, to produce not only the ordinary operations of nature, but to give rise to things specifically new, and therefore to new species in the vegetable and animal worlds. Such species would thus be as truly due to the purpose and power of God as though they had been created by a word. Natural laws are said to be to God what the chisel and the brush are to the artist. Then God is as much the author of species as tile sculptor or painter is the author of the product of his skill. This is a theistic doctrine. That, however, is not Darwin's doctrine. His theory is that hundreds or thousands of millions of years ago God called a living germ, or living germs, into existence, and that since that time God has no more to do with the universe than if He did not exist. This is atheism to all intents and purposes, because it leaves the soul as entirely without God, without a Father, Helper, or Ruler, as the doctrine of Epicurus or of Comte. Darwin, moreover, obliterates all the evidences of the being of God in the world. He refers to physical causes what all theists believe to be due to the operations of the Divine mind. There is no more effectual way of getting rid of a truth than by rejecting the proofs on which it rests. Professor Huxley says that when he first read Darwin's book he regarded it as the death-blow of teleology, i.e., of the doctrine of design and purpose in nature. [20] B[?]chner, to whom the atheistical character of a book is a recommendation, says that Darwin's "theory is the most thoroughly naturalistic that can be imagined, and far more atheistic than that of his despised (verrufenen) predecessor Lamarck, who admitted at least a general law of progress and development; whereas, according to Darwin, the whole development is due to the gradual summation of innumerable minute and accidental natural operations." [21]

Mr. Darwin argues against any divine intervention in the course of nature, and especially in the production of species. He says that the time is coming when the doctrine of special creation, that is, the doctrine that God made the plants and animals each after its kind, will be regarded as "a curious illustration of the blindness of preconceived opinion. These authors," he adds, "seem no more startled at a miraculous act of creation than at an ordinary birth. But do they really believe that at innumerable periods in the earth's history certain elemental atoms have been commanded suddenly to flash into living tissues?" [This is precisely what Darwin professes to believe happened at the beginning. If it happened once, it is not absurd that it should happen often.] "Do they believe that at each supposed

act of creation one individual or many were produced? Were all the infinitely numerous kinds of animals and plants created as eggs or seed, or as full grown? And in the case of mammals, were they created bearing the false marks of nourishment from the mothers womb?" [22]

Mr. Wallace devotes the eighth chapter of his work on "Natural Selection" [23] to answering the objections urged by the Duke of Argyle to the Darwinian theory. He says, "The point on which the Duke lays most stress, is, that proofs of mind everywhere meet us in nature, and are more especially manifest wherever we find contrivance' or beauty.' He maintains that this indicates the constant supervision and direct interference of the Creator, and cannot possibly be explained by the unassisted action of any combination of laws. Now Mr. Darwin's work has for its main object to show, that all the phenomena of living things -- all their wonderful organs and complicated structures; their infinite variety of form, size, and colour; their intricate and involved relations to each other, -- may have been produced by the action of a few general laws of the simplest kind, -- laws which are in most cases mere statements of admitted facts." [24] In opposition to the doctrine that God "applies general laws to produce effects which those laws are not in themselves capable of producing," he says, "I believe, on the contrary, that the universe is so constituted as to be self-regulating; that as long as it contains life, the forms under which that life is manifested have an inherent power of adjustment to each other and to surrounding nature; and that this adjustment necessarily leads to the greatest amount of variety and beauty and enjoyment, because it does depend on general laws, and not on a continual supervision and rearrangement of details." [25]

Dr. Gray [26] endeavours to vindicate Darwin's theory from the charge of atheism. His arguments, however, only go to prove that the doctrine of development, or derivation of species, may be held in a form consistent with theism. This no one denies. They do not prove that Mr. Darwin presents it in that form. Dr. Gray himself admits all that those who regard the Darwinian theory as atheistic contend for. [27] He says, "The proposition that things and events in nature were not designed to be so, if logically carried out, is doubtless tantamount to atheism." Again, [28] he says, "To us, a fortuitous Cosmos is simply inconceivable. The alternative is a designed Cosmos. . . . If Mr. Darwin believes that the events which he supposes to have occurred and the results we behold were undirected and undesigned, or if the physicist believes that the natural forces to which he refers phenomena are uncaused and undirected, no argument is needed to show that such belief is atheistic." No argument, after what has been said above, can be needed to show that Mr. Darwin does teach that natural causes are "undirected," and that they act without design or reference to an end. This is not only explicitly and repeatedly asserted, but argued for, and the opposite view ridiculed and rejected. His book was hailed as the death-blow of teleology. [29] Darwin, therefore, does teach precisely what Dr. Gray pronounces atheism. A man, it seems, may believe in God, and yet teach atheism.

The anti-theistic and materialistic, character of this theory is still further shown by what Mr. Darwin says of our mental powers. "In the distant future," he says, "I see open fields for far more important researches. Psychology will be based on a new foundation, that of the necessary acquirement of each mental power and capacity by gradation. Light will be thrown on the origin of man and his history." [30] Of this prediction he has himself

attempted the verification in his recent work on the "Descent of Man," in which he endeavours to prove that man is a developed ape. The Bible says: Man was created in the image of God.

It is a mere Hypothesis.

A fourth remark on this theory is that it is a mere hypothesis, from its nature incapable of proof. It may take its place beside the nebular hypothesis as an ingenious method of explaining many of the phenomena of nature. We see around us, in the case of domestic animals, numerous varieties produced by the operations of natural causes. In the vegetable world this diversity is still greater. Mr. Darwin's theory would account for all these facts. It accounts, moreover, for the unity of plan on which all animals of the same class or order are constructed; for the undeveloped organs and rudimentally in almost all classes of living creatures; for the different forms through which the embryo passes before it reaches maturity. These and many other phenomena may be accounted for on the assumption of the derivation of species. Admitting all this and much more, this does not amount to a proof of the hypothesis. These facts can be accounted for in other ways; while there are, as Darwin himself admits, many facts for which his theory will not account. Let it be borne in mind what the theory is. It is not that all the species of any extant genus of plants or animals have been derived from a common stock; that all genera and classes of organized beings now living have been thus derived; but that all organisms from the earliest geological periods have, by a process requiring some five hundred million years, been derived from one primordial germ. [31] Nor is this all. It is not only that material organisms have thus been derived by a process of gradation, but also that instincts, mental and moral powers, have been derived and attained by the same process. Nor is even this all. We are called upon to believe that all this has been brought about by the action of unintelligent physical causes. To our apprehension, there is nothing in the Hindu mythology and cosmology more incredible than this.

It is hazarding little to say that such a hypothesis as this cannot be proved. Indeed its advocates do not pretend to give proof. Mr. Wallace, as we have seen, says, "Mr. Darwin's work has for its main object, to show that all the phenomena of living things, -- all their wonderful organs and complicated structures, their infinite variety of form, size, and colour, their intricate and involved relations to each other, -- may have been produced by the action of a few general laws of the simplest kind." May have been. There is no pretence that this account of the origin of species can be demonstrated. All that is claimed is that it is a possible solution. Christians must be very timid to be frightened by a mere "may have been."

Mr. Huxley says, "After much consideration, and with assuredly no bias against Mr. Darwin's views, it is our clear conviction that, as the evidence stands, it is not absolutely proven that a group of animals, having all the characters exhibited by species in Nature, has ever been originated by selection, whether artificial or natural." [32]

In "Frasers Magazine" for June and July, 1860, are two papers on the Darwinian theory, written by William Hopkins F. R. S. In the number for July it is said, "If we allow full weight to all our author's arguments in his chapter on hybridism, we only arrive at the conclusion that natural selection may possibly have produced changes of organization, which may have superinduced the sterility of species; and that, therefore, the above

proposition may, be true, though not a single positive fact be adduced in proof of it. And it must be recollected that this is no proposition of secondary importance -- a mere turret, as it were, in our author's theoretical fabric, -- but the chief corner-stone which supports it. We confess that all the respect which we entertain for the author of these views, has inspired us with no corresponding feeling towards this may be philosophy, which is content to substitute the merely possible for the probable, and which, ignoring the responsibility of any approximation to rigorous demonstration in the establishment of its own theories, complacently assumes them to be right till they are rigorously proved to be wrong. When Newton, in former times, put forth his theory of gravitation he did not call on philosophers to believe it, or else to show that it was wrong, but felt it incumbent on himself to prove that it was right." [33]

Mr. Hopkins' review was written before Mr. Darwin had fully expressed his views as to the origin of man. He says, the great difficulty in any theory of development is "the transition in passing up to man from the animals next beneath him, not to man considered merely as a physical organism, but to man as an intellectual and moral being. Lamarck and the author of the Vestiges' have not hesitated to expose themselves to a charge of gross materialism in deriving mind from matter, and in making all its properties and operations depend on our physical organization. . . . . We believe that man has an immortal soul, and that the beasts of the field have not. If any one deny this, we can have no common ground of argument with him. Now we would ask, at what point of his progressive improvement did man acquire this spiritual part of his being, endowed with the awful attribute of immortality? Was it an accidental variety,' seized upon by the power of natural selection,' and made permanent? Is the step from the finite to the infinite to be regarded as one of the indefinitely small steps in man's continuous progress of development, and effected by the operation of ordinary natural causes ?" [34]

The point now in hand, however, is that Mr. Darwin's theory is incapable of proof. From the nature of the case, what concerns the origin of things cannot be known except by a supernatural revelation. All else must be speculation and conjecture. And no man under the guidance of reason will renounce the teachings of a well-authenticated revelation, in obedience to human speculation, however ingenious. The uncertainty attending all philosophical or scientific theories as to the origin of things, is sufficiently apparent from their number and inconsistencies. Science as soon as she gets past the actual and the extant, is in the region of speculation, and is merged into philosophy, and is subject to all its hallucinations.

Theories of the Universe.

Thus we have, --

1. The purely atheistic theory; which assumes that matter has existed forever, and that all the universe contains and reveals is due to material forces.

2. The theory which admits the creation of matter, but denies any further intervention of God in the world, and refers the origin of life to physical causes. This was the doctrine of Lamarck, and of the author of the "Vestiges of Creation," and is the theory to which Professor Huxley, notwithstanding his denial of spontaneous generation in the existing state of things, seems strongly inclined in his address as President of the British Association for the Promotion of Science, delivered in September, 1870, he said: "Looking back through

the prodigious vista of the past, I find no record of the commencement of life, and therefore I am devoid of any means of forming a definite conclusion as to the conditions of its appearance. Belief, in the scientific sense of the word, is a serious matter, and needs strong foundations. To say, therefore, in the admitted absence of evidence, that I have any belief as to the mode in which the existing forms of life have originated, would be using words in a wrong sense. But expectation is permissible, where belief is not; and if it were given me to look beyond the abyss of genealogically recorded time to the still more remote period when the earth was passing through physical and chemical conditions which it can no more see again than a man may recall his infancy, I should expect to be a witness of the evolution of living protoplasm from not living matter. I should expect to see it appear under forms of great simplicity, endowed, like existing fungi, with the power of determining the formation of new protoplasm from such matters as ammonium carbonates, oxalates and tartrates, alkaline and earthy phosphates, and water, without the aid of light." [35] It had been well for the cause of truth, and well for hundreds who have been perverted by his writings, if Mr. Darwin had recognized this distinction between "scientific belief" needing "strong foundations," and "expectation" founded, as Professor Huxley says in a following sentence, "on analogical reasoning." In the paper already quoted in "Fraser's Magazine," the writer says in reference to Darwin: "We would also further remind him that the philosophical naturalist must not only train the eye to observe accurately, but the mind to think logically; and the latter will often be found the harder task of the two. With respect to all but the exact sciences, it may be said that the highest mental faculty which they call upon us to exert is that by which we separate and appreciate justly the possible, the probable, and the demonstrable." [36]

Darwin.

3. The third speculative view is that of Mr. Darwin and his associates, who admit not only the creation of matter, but of living matter, in the form of one or a few primordial germs from which without any purpose or design, by the slow operation of unintelligent natural causes, and accidental variations, during untold ages, all the orders, classes, genera, species, and varieties of plants and animals, from the lowest to the highest, man included, have been formed. Teleology, and therefore, mind, or God, is expressly banished from the world. In arguing against the idea of God's controlling with design the operation of second causes, Mr. Darwin asks, "Did He ordain that the crop and tail-feathers of the pigeon should vary, in order that the fancier might make his grotesque pouter and fan-tail breeds? Did He cause the frame and mental qualities of the dog to vary in order that a breed might be formed of indomitable ferocity, with jaws fitted to pin down the bull for man's brutal sport? But, if we give up the principle in one case, -- if we do not admit that the variations of the primeval dog were intentionally guided, in order that the greyhound, for instance, that perfect image of symmetry and vigour, might be formed -- no shadow of reason can be assigned for the belief that variations, alike in nature and the result of the same general laws, which have been the groundwork through natural selection of the formation or the most perfectly adapted animals in the world, man included, were intentionally and specially guided. However much we may wish it, we can hardly follow Professor Asa Gray in his belief that variation has been led along certain beneficial lines,' like a stream along definite and useful lines of irrigation.'" [37] In this paragraph man is declared to be an unintended product of nature.

J. J. Murphy.

4. Others again, unable to believe that unintelligent causes can produce effects indicating foresight and design, insist that there must be intelligence engaged in the production of such effects, but they place this intelligence in nature and not in God. This, as remarked above, is a revival of the old idea of a Demiurgus or Anima mundi. Mr. J. J. Murphy, in his work on "Habit and Intelligence," says, I believe "that there is something in organic progress which mere natural selection among spontaneous variations will not account for. Finally, I believe this something is that organizing intelligence which guides the action of the inorganic forces and forms structures which neither natural selection nor any other unintelligent agency could form." [38] What he means by intelligence and where it resides we learn from the preface to the first volume of his book. "The word intelligence," he says, "scarcely needs definition, as I use it in its familiar sense. It will not be questioned by any one that intelligence is found in none but living beings; but it is not so obvious that intelligence is an attribute of all living beings, and coextensive with life itself. When I speak of intelligence, however, I mean not only the conscious intelligence of the mind, but also the organizing intelligence which adapts the eye for seeing, the ear for hearing, and every other part of an organism for its work. The usual belief is, that the organizing intelligence and the mental intelligence are two distinct intelligences. I have stated the reasons for my belief that they are not distinct, but are two separate manifestations of the same intelligence, which is coextensive with life, though it is for the most part unconscious, and only becomes conscious of itself in the brain of man." [39]

Owen.

5. Professor Owen, England's great naturalist, agrees with Darwin in two points: first, in the derivation or gradual evolution of species; and secondly, that this derivation is determined by the operation of natural causes. "I have been led," he says, "to recognize species as exemplifying the continuous operation of natural law, or secondary cause; and that, not only successively, but progressively; from the first embodiment of the vertebrate idea under its old ichthyic vestment until it became arrayed in the glorious garb of the human form." [40] He differs from Darwin in that he does not refer the origin of species to natural selection, i.e., to the law of the survival of the fittest of accidental variations; but to inherent or innate tendencies. "Every species changes, in time, by virtue of inherent tendencies thereto." [41] And in the second place he does not regard these changes as accidental variations, but as designed and carried out in virtue of an original plan. "Species owe as little," he says [42] "to the accidental concurrence of environing circumstances as Kosmos depends on a fortuitous concourse of atoms. A purposive route of development and change, of correlation and interdependence, manifesting intelligent will, is as determinable in the succession of races as in the development and organization of the individual. Generations do not vary accidentally, in any and every direction; but in preordained, definite, and correlated courses." [43]

The Reign of Law Theory.

6. Still another view is that which demands intelligence to account for the wonders of organic life, and finds that intelligence in God, but repudiates the idea of the supernatural. That is, it does not admit that God ever works except through second causes or by the laws of nature. Those who adopt this view are willing to admit the derivation of species; and to

concede that extant species were formed by the modifications of those which preceded them; but maintain that they were thus formed according to the purpose, and by the continued agency, of God; an agency ever operative in guiding the operation of natural laws so that they accomplish the designs of God. The difference between this and Professor Owen's theory is, that he does not seem to admit of this continued intelligent control of God in nature, but refers everything to the original, preordaining purpose or plan of the Divine Being.

7. Finally, without pretending to exhaust the speculations on this subject, we have what may be called the commonly received and Scriptural doctrine. That doctrine teaches, -- (1.) That the universe and all it contains owe their existence to the will and power of God; that matter is not eternal, nor is life self-originating. (2.) God endowed matter with properties or forces, which He upholds, and in accordance with which He works in all the ordinary operations of his providence. That is, He uses them everywhere and constantly, as we use them in our narrow sphere. (3.) That in the beginning He created, or caused to be, every distinct kind of plant and animal: "And God said, Let the earth bring forth grass, the herb yielding seed, and the fruit-tree yielding fruit after his kind, whose seed is in itself, upon the earth: and it was so." "And God said, Let the earth bring forth the living creature after his kind, cattle, and creeping thing, and beast of the earth after his kind: and it was so." This is the Scriptural account of the origin of species. According to this account each species was specially created, not ex nihilo, nor without the intervention of secondary causes, but nevertheless originally, or not derived, evolved, or developed from prexisting species. These distinct species, or kinds of plants and animals thus separately originated, are permanent. They never pass from one into the other. It is, however, to be remembered that species are of two kinds, as naturalists distinguish them, namely, natural and artificial. The former are those which have their foundation in nature; which had a distinct origin, and are capable of indefinite propagation. The latter are such distinctions as naturalists have made for their own convenience. Of course, it is not intended that every one of the so-called species of plants and animals is original and permanent, when the only distinction between one species and another may be the accidental shape of a leaf or colour of a feather. It is only of such species as have their foundation in nature that originality and permanence are asserted. Artificial species, as they are called, are simply varieties. Fertility of offspring is the recognized criterion of sameness of species. If what has been just said be granted, then, if at any time since the original creation, new species have appeared on the earth, they owe their existence to the immediate intervention of God.

Here then are at least seven different views as to the origin of species. How is it possible for science to decide between them? Science has to do with the facts and laws of nature. But here the question concerns the origin of such facts. "Here," says Dr. Gray, "proofs, in the proper sense of the word, are not to be had. We are beyond the region of demonstration, and have only probabilities to consider." [44] Christians have a right to protest against the arraying of probabilities against the clear teachings of Scripture. It is not easy to estimate the evil that is done by eminent men throwing the weight of their authority on the side of unbelief, influenced by a mere balance of probabilities in one department, to the neglect of the most convincing proofs of a different kind. They treat, for example, the question of the unity of the human race, exclusively as a zological question, and ignore the testimony of history, of language, and of Scripture. Thus they often decide against the

Bible on evidence that would not determine an intelligent jury in a suit for twenty shillings.

Admitted Difficulties in the Way of the Darwinian Theory

One of the great excellences of Mr. Darwin is his candor. He acknowledges that there are grave objections against the doctrine which he endeavours to establish. He admits that if one species is derived by slow gradations from another, it would be natural to expect the intermediate steps, or connecting links, to be everywhere visible. But he acknowledges that such are not to be found, that during the whole of the historical period, species have remained unchanged. They are now precisely what they were thousands of years ago. There is not the slightest indication of any one passing into another; or of a lower advancing towards a higher. This is admitted. The only answer to the difficulty thus presented is, that the change of species is so slow a process that no indications can be reasonably expected in the few thousand years embraced within the limits of history. When it is further objected that geology presents the same difficulty, that the genera and species of fossil animals are just as distinct as those now living; that new species appear at certain epochs entirely different from those which preceded; that the most perfect specimens of these species often appear at the beginning of a geologic period and not toward its close; the answer is that the records of geology are too imperfect, to give us full knowledge on this subject: that innumerable intermediate and transitional forms may have passed away and left no trace of their existence. All this amounts to an admission that all history and all geology are against the theory; that they not only do not furnish any facts in its support, but that they do furnish facts which, so far as our knowledge extends, contradict it. In reference to these objections from geology, Mr. Darwin says, "I can answer these questions and objections only on the supposition that the geological record is far more imperfect than most geologists believe. The number of specimens in all our museums is absolutely as nothing compared with the countless generations of countless species which have certainly existed." [45] Nevertheless the record, as far as it goes, is against the theory.

With regard to the more serious objection that the theory assumes that matter does the work of mind, that design is accomplished without any designer, Mr. Darwin is equally candid. "Nothing at first," he says, "can appear more difficult to believe than that the more complex organs and instincts have been perfected, not by means superior to, though analogous with, human reason, but by the accumulation of innumerable slight variations, each good for the individual possessor. Nevertheless, this difficulty, though appearing to our imagination insuperably great, cannot be considered real, if we admit the following propositions, namely, that all parts of the organization and instincts offer at least individual differences, -- that there is a struggle for existence leading to the preservation of profitable deviations of structure or instinct, -- and, lastly, that gradatians in the state of perfection of each organ may have existed, each good of its kind." [46]

Again, he says, "Although the belief that an organ so perfect as the eye could have been formed by natural selection, is more than enough to stagger any one; yet in the case of any organ, if we know of a long series of gradations in complexity, each good for its possessor; then, under changing conditions of life, there is no logical impossibility in the acquirement of any conceivable degree of perfection through natural selection." [47] Mr. Darwin refuses to be staggered by that which he says is enough to stagger any one. Give him a sufficient number of millions of years, and fortuitous complications may accomplish

anything. If a rude piece of flint be found in deposits, it is declared to be the work of man, because it indicates design, while such an organ as the eye may be formed by natural selection acting blindly. This, Dr. Gray says in his apology, is, or would be, a strange contradiction.

Sterility of Hybrids.

The immutability of species is stamped on the very face of nature What the letters of a book would be if all were thrown in confusion, the genera and species of plants and animals would be, if they were, as Darwin's theory assumes, in a state of constant variation, and that in every possible direction. All line-marks would be obliterated, and the thoughts of God, as species have been called, would be obliterated from his works. To prevent this confusion of "kind," it has been established as a law of nature that animals of different "kinds" cannot mingle and produce something different from either parent, to be again mingled and confused with other animals of a still different kind. In other words, it is a law of nature, and therefore a law of God, that hybrids should be sterile. This fact Mr. Darwin does not deny. Neither does he deny the weight of the argument derived from it against his theory. He only, as in the cases already mentioned, endeavours to account for the fact. Connecting links between species are missing; but they may have perished. Hybrids are sterile; but that may be accounted for in some other way without assuming that it was designed to secure the permanence of species. When a great fact in nature is found to secure a most important end in nature, it is fair to infer that it was designed to accomplish that end, and consequently that end is not to be overlooked or denied.

Geographical Distribution.

Mr. Darwin is equally candid in reference to another objection to his doctrine. "Turning to geographical distribution," he says, [48] "the difficulties encountered on the theory of descent with modification are serious enough. All the individuals of the same species, and all the species of the same genus, or even higher group, must save descended from common parents; and therefore, in however distant and isolated parts of the world they may now be found, they must in the course of successive generations have travelled from some one point to all the others." When it is remembered that this is true of the mollusks and crustacea, animals whose power of locomotion is very limited, this almost universal distribution from one centre would seem to be an impossibility. Darwin's answer to this is the same as to the difficulties already mentioned. He throws himself on the possibilities of unlimited duration. Nobody can tell what may have happened during the untold ages of the past. "Looking to geographical distribution," he says, "if we admit that there has been through the long course of ages much migration from one part of the world to another, owing to former climatal and geographical changes and to the many occasional and unknown means of dispersal, then we can understand, on the theory of descent with modification, most of the great leading facts in distribution." [49] Every one must see how inconclusive is all such reasoning. If we admit that many unknown things may have happened in the boundless past, then we can understand most, but not all, of the facts which stand opposed to the theory of the derivation of species. The same remark may be made in reference to the constant appeal to the unknown effects of unlimited durations. "The chief cause," says Mr. Darwin, "of our natural unwillingness to admit that one species has given birth to other and distinct species, is that we are always slow in admitting any great change

of which we do not see the steps. . . . . The mind cannot possibly grasp the full meaning of the term of even ten million years; it cannot add up and perceive the full effects of many slight variations accumulated during an almost infinite number of generations." [50] If we say that the ape during the historic period extending over thousands of years has not made the slightest approximation towards becoming a man, we are told, Ah! but you do not know what he will do in ten millions of years. To which it is a sufficient reply to ask, How much is ten million times nothing?

Ordinary men reject this Darwinian theory with indignation as well as with decision, not only because it calls upon them to accept the possible as demonstrably true, but because it ascribes to blind, unintelligent causes the wonders of purpose and design which the world everywhere exhibits; and because it effectually banishes God from his works. To such men it is a satisfaction to know that the theory is rejected on scientific grounds by the great majority of scientific men. Mr. Darwin himself says, "The several difficulties here discussed, namely -- that, though we find in our geological formations many links between the species which now exist and which formerly existed, we do not find infinitely numerous tine transitional forms closely joining them all together; the sudden manner in which several whole groups of species first appear in our European formations; the almost entire absence, as at present known, of formations rich in fossils beneath the Cambrian strata, -- are all undoubtedly of the most serious nature. We see this in the fact that the most eminent pal�ontologists, namely, Cuvier, Agassiz, Barrande, Pictet, Falconer, E. Forbes, etc., and all our greatest geologists, as Lyell, Murchison, Sedgwick, etc., have unanimously, often vehemently, maintained the immutability of species." [51]

In 1830 there was a prolonged discussion of this subject is the Acad�mie des Sciences in Paris, Cuvier taking the side of the permanence of species, and of creation and organization governed by final purpose; while Geoffroy St. Hilaire took the side of the derivation and mutability of species, and "denied," as Professor Owen says, "evidence of design, and protested against the deduction of a purpose." The decision was almost unanimously in favour of Cuvier; and from 1830 to 1860 there was scarcely a voice raised in opposition to the doctrine which Cuvier advocated. This, as B�chner thinks, was the triumph of empiricism, appealing to facts, over philosophy guided by "Apriorische Speculationen." Professor Agassiz, confessedly the first of living naturalists, thus closes his review of Darwin's book: "Were the transmutation theory true, the geological record should exhibit an uninterrupted succession of types blending gradually into one another. The fact is that throughout all geological times each period is characterized by definite specific types, belonging to definite genera, and these to definite families, referable to definite orders, constituting definite classes and definite branches, built upon definite plans. Until the facts of nature are shown to have been mistaken by those who have collected them, and that they have a different meaning from that now generally assigned to them, I shall therefore consider the transmutation theory as a scientific mistake, untrue in its facts, unscientific in its method, and mischievous in its tendency." [52] If species, then, are immutable, their existence must be due to the agency of God, mediate or immediate, and in either case so exercised as to make them answer a thought and purpose in the divine mind. And, more especially, man does not owe his origin to the gradual development of a lower form of irrational life, but to the energy of his Maker in whose image he was created.

Pangenesis.

Mr. Darwin refers, in the "Origin of Species," [53] to "the hypothesis of Pangenesis," which, he says, he had developed in another work. As this hypothesis is made subservient to the one under consideration, it serves to illustrate its nature and gives an insight into the character of the writer's mind. Mr. Mivart says that the hypothesis of Pangenesis may be stated as follows: "That each living organism is ultimately made up of an almost infinite number of minute particles, or organic atoms, termed gemmules,' each of which has the power of reproducing its kind. Moreover, that these particles circulate freely about the organism which is made up of them, and are derived from all parts of all the organs of the less remote ancestors of each such organism during all the states and stages of such several ancestors' existence; and therefore of the several states of each of such ancestors' organs. That such a complete collection of gemmules is aggregated in each ovum and spermatozoon in most animals, and each part capable of reproducing by gemmation (budding) in the lowest animals and plants. Therefore in many of such lower organisms such a congeries of ancestral grammules must exist in every part of their bodies since in them every part is capable of reproducing by gemmation. Mr. Darwin must evidently admit this, since he says, It has often been said by naturalists that each cell of a plant has the actual or potential capacity of reproducing the whole plant; but it has this power only in virtue of containing gemmules derived from every part.'" [54] These gemmules are organic atoms; they are almost infinite in number; they are derived from all the organs of the less remote ancestors of the plant or animal; they are stored in every ovum or spermatozoon; they are capable of reproduction. But reproduction, as involving the control of physical causes to accomplish a purpose, is a work of intelligence. These inconceivably numerous and minute gemmules are, therefore, the seats of intelligence. Surely this is not science. Any theory which needs the support of such a hypothesis must soon be abandoned. It would be far easier to believe in fairies forming every plant, than in these gemmules.

Finally, it may be noticed that Mr. Wallace, although advocating the doctrine of "Natural Selection," contends that it is not applicable to man; that it will not account for his original or present state; and that it is impossible, on Mr. Darwin's theory, to account for man's physical organization, for his mental powers, or for his moral nature. To this subject the tenth chapter of his work is devoted.

[1] Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 680.

[2] Lay Sermons and Addresses, London, 1870, p. 144.

[3] Ibid. p. 151.

[4] Athenum, September 17, 1870, p. 376.

[5] Genesis of Species, by St. George Mivart, F. R. S. p. 266.

[6] Athenum, September 17, 1870, p. 374.

[7] What Charlton Bastian, who contested the conclusions of Professor Huxley, took to be living organisms, turned out to be nothing but minute follicles of glass.

[8] Huxley's Address, as reported in the London Athenum, September 17, 1870, p. 376.

[9] London Athenum, September 17, 1870, p. 378. In view of the facts stated in the text Professor Huxley asks, "How can we over-estimate the value of that knowledge of the

nature of epidemic and epizootic diseases, and consequently, of the means of checking or eradicating them, the dawn of which has assuredly commenced? Looking back no further than ten years, it is possible to select three (1863, 1864, and 1869) in which the total number of deaths from scarlet fever alone amounted to ninety thousand. That is the return of killed, the maimed and disabled being left out of sight. . . . . The facts which I have placed before you must leave the least sanguine without a doubt that the nature and causes of this scourge will one day be as well understood as those of the P&#65533;brine (the silk-worm disease) and that the long-suffered massacre of our innocents will come to an end."

[10] In quoting Professor Huxley as an authority on both sides of the question of spontaneous generation, no injustice is done that distinguished naturalist. He wishes to believe that doctrine. His principles lead to that conclusion. But, as a question of scientific fact, he is constrained to admit that all the evidence is against it. He, therefore, does not believe it, although he thinks it may be true. Hence Mr. Mivart says that Professor Huxley and Tyndall, while they dissent from Dr. Bastian's conclusions in favour of spontaneous generation, nevertheless, "agree with him in principle, though they limit the evolution of the organic world from the inorganic to a very remote period of the world's history." Genesis of Species, p. 266, note.

[11] Athen&#65533;um, September 24, 1870, p. 409.

[12] Contributions to the Theory of Natural Selection, pp. 363-368. Mr. Wallace thinks that "the highest fact of science, the noblest truth of philosophy," may be found expressed in his following words of an American poetess: --

"God of the Granite and the Rose!
Soul of the Sparrow and the Bee!
The mighty tide of Being flows
Through countless channels, Lord from thee
It leaps to life in grass and flowers,
Through every grade of being runs,
While from Creation's radiant towers
Its glory flames in Stars and Suns."

[13] Athen&#65533;um, September 24, 1870, p. 409.

[14] The London Athen&#65533;um, September 24, 1870, pp. 407-409.

[15] William Hopkins, F. R. S. Fraser's Magazine, June 1860, 151.

[16] The Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life, by Charles Darwin, M. A., F. R. S., etc., fifth edition (tenth thousand). London, 1869, p. 572.

[17] Ibid. p. 573.

[18] Origins of Species, p. 579.

[19] See Proceedings of the Literary and Philosophical Society of Liverpool during the Fiftieth Session, 1860-61. This volume contains a paper on Darwin's theory by the president of the society, the Rev. H. H. Higgins, in which he says that he considered the paper of M. Agassiz, inserted in the Annals and Magazine of Natural History, against Darwin, "to be quite unworthy of so distinguished a naturalist" (p.42). On a subsequent

page he gives a selection from Agassiz's disparaging remarks. The same volume contains a paper from Dr. Collingwood in defence of Agassiz and his criticism. In the review of the argument he says he will pass over Agassiz's "caustic remarks upon the confusion of ideas implied on the general terms, variability of species," and also "his categorical contradictions of many of Darwin's fundamental statements; but never was a theory more solely beset than is that of Darwin by the repeated assaults of such a giant in pal□ontology as Agassiz. Statement after statement, by which the whole theory hangs together, is assailed and impugned, -- stone after stone of the Darwinian structure trembles before the battering-ram of the champion of species. Out of twelve such reiterated attacks, ten of which are purely pal□ntological, and stand unchallenged only one has called for remarks, and that one, perhaps, the least important" (p.87). Agassiz is not a theologian; he opposes the theory as a scientific man and on scientific grounds.

[20] Criticisms on "The Origin of Species;" in his Lay Sermons and Addresses, p. 330. "The teleological argument," he says, "runs thus: An organ or organism is precisely fitted to perform a function or purpose; therefore it was specially constructed to perform that function. In Paley's famous illustration, the adaptation of all the parts of the watch to the function, or purpose, of showing the time, is held to be evidence that the watch was specially contrived to that end; on the ground that the only cause we know, competent to produce such an effect as a watch which shall keep time, is a contriving intelligence adapting the means directly to that ends." Suppose, however, he goes on to say, it could be shown that the watch was the product of a structure which kept time poorly; and that of a structure which was no watch at all, and that of a mere revolving barrel, then "the force of Paley's argument would be gone;" and it would be "demonstrated that an apparatus thoroughly well adapted to a particular purpose might be the result of a method of trial and error worked by unintelligent agents, as well as of the direct application of the means appropriate to that end, by an intelligent agent." This is precisely what he understands Darwin to have accomplished.

[21] Sechs Vorlesungen □ber die Darwin'sche Theorie, etc., by Ludwig B□chner, Zweite Auflage, Leipzig, 1868, p. 125.

[22] Origin of Species, p. 571.

[23] Wallace on Natural Selection, p. 264.

[24] Wallace on Natural Selection, p. 265. When a man speaks of the "actions of law," he must mean by law a permanent, regularly acting force. Yet the laws to which Mr. Wallace refers in the above passages are not forces, but simply rules according to which an agent acts, or, a regular, established sequence of events. The laws intended are the law of multiplication in geometrical progression, the law of limited populations, the law of heredity, the law of variation, the law of unceasing change of physical conditions upon the surface of the earth, the equilibrium or harmony of nature. There is no objection to these being called laws. But there is the strongest objection to using the word law in different senses in the same argument. If law here means the rule according to which an agent (in this case God) acts, the Duke of Argyle could agree with every word Mr. Wallace says; if taken in the sense intended by the writer, the passage teaches the direct reverse, namely, that all the world is or contains is due to unintelligent physical forces.

[25] Ibid. p. 268. Mr. Russel Wallace says that he believes that all the wonders of

animals and vegetable organisms and life can be accounted for by unintelligent, physical laws. The act, however, is, as we have already seen, that he belives no such thing. He does not believe that there is any such thing as matter or unintelligent forces; all force is mind force; and the only power operative in the universe is the will of the Supreme Intelligence.

[26] In the October number of the Atlantic Monthly for 1860.

[27] On page 409.

[28] On page 416.

[29] Three articles in the July, August, and October numbers of the Atlantic Monthly for the year 1860 were reprinted with the name of Dr. Asa Gray as their author.

[30] Origin of Species, p. 577.

[31] Sir William Thompson, of England, had objected to the theory that, according to his calculations, the sun cannot have existed in a solid state longer than five hundred millions of years. To this Mr. Wallace replies, that that period, he thinks long enough to satisfy the demands of the hypothesis. Mr. J. J. Murphy, however, is of a contrary opinion. He says that it is probable that it required at least five hundred years to produce a greyhound -- Mr. Darwin's ideal of symmetry -- out of the original wolf-like dog, and that certainly it would require more than a million times longer to produce an elephant out of a Protozoon, or even a tadpole. Besides, Sir William Thompson allows in fact only one, and not five hundred millions of years for the existence of the earth. In the Transactions of Geological Society of Glasgow, vol. iii., he says: "When, finally, we consider under-ground temperature, we find ourselves driven to the conclusion that the existing state of things on the earth, life on the earth, all geological history showing continuity of life, must be limited within some such period of past time as one hundred million years." See Habit and Intelligence, by J. J. Murphy, London, 1869, vol. i. p. 349.

[32] Lay Sermons and Reviews, p. 323. It is admitted that varieties innumberable have been produced by natural causes, but Professor Huxley says it has not been proved that any one species has ever been thus formed. A fortiori, therefore, it has not been proved that all general and species, with all their attributes of instinct and intelligence have been thus formed.

[33] Frazer's Magazine, July, 1860, p. 80.

[34] Frazer's Magazine, July 1860, p. 88.

[35] Athen&#xfffd;um, London, September 17, 1870, p. 376.

[36] July, 1860, p. 90.

[37] The Variation of Animals and Plants under Domestication, edit. New York, 1868, vol. ii. pp. 515, 516.

[38] Habit and Intelligence, in their connection with the Laws of Matter and Force. A series of Scientific Essays. By Joseph John Murphy. London, 1869, vol. i. p. 348.

[39] Ibid. vol. i. p. vi.

[40] American Journal of Science, 1869, p. 43.

[41] Ibid. p. 52.

[42] Ibid. p. 52.

[43] See Prof. Owen's work on the Anatomy of Vertebrates, the fortieth chapter which

was reprinted in the American Journal of Sciences for January 1869.

[44] Atlantic Monthly, August, 1860, p. 230.

[45] Origin of Species, p. 550.

[46] Ibid., p. 545.

[47] Ibid., p. 251.

[48] Origin of Species, p. 547.

[49] Origin of Species, p. 564.

[50] Ibid., p. 570.

[51] Origin of Species, p. 383. In an earlier edition of his work he included Professor Owen's name in this list, which he now omits, and he also withdraws that of Lyell; adding to the passage above quoted the words, "But Sir Charles Lyell now gives the support of his high authority to the opposite side." Professor Owen, as shown above, although now admitting the mutability of species, is very far from adopting Mr. Darwin's theory. The essential element of that theory is the denial of teleology; the assertion that species owe their origin to the unintelligent operation of natural causes. This Owen distinctly denies. "Assuming, then," he says, "that Pal[?]otherium did ultimately become Equus, I gain no conception of the operation of the effective force by personifying as Nature' the aggregate of beings which compose the universe, or the laws which govern these beings, by giving to my personification an attribute which can properly be predicated only of intelligence, and by saying, Nature has selected the mid-hoof and rejected the others.'" American Journal of Science, second series, vol. xlvii. p. 41. As to Sir Charles Lyell, unless he has become a new man since the publication of the ninth edition of his Principles of Geology in 1853, he is as far as Professor Owen from adopting the Darwinian theory; although he may admit in a certain sense, the derivation of species.

[52] American Journal, July, 1860, p. 154.

[53] Page 196.

[54] Genesis of Species, by St. George Mivart, F. R. S. London, 1871, chap. x. p. 208.

§ 3. Antiquity of Man.

"Anthropologists are now," as we are told, "pretty well agreed that man is not a recent introduction into the earth. All who have studied the question, now admit that his antiquity is very great; and that, though we have to some extent ascertained the minimum of time during which he must have existed, we have made no approximation towards determining that far greater period during which he may have, and probably has, existed. We can with tolerable certainty affirm that man must have inhabited the earth a thousand centuries ago, but we cannot assert that he positively did not exist, or that there is any good evidence against his having existed, for a period of ten thousand centuries." [55]

On this it may be remarked, first, that it is a historical fact that nothing is less reliable than these calculations of time. A volume might be filled with examples of the mistakes of naturalists in this matter. The world has not forgotten the exultation of the enemies of the Bible when the number of successive layers of lava on the sides of Mount Etna was found to be so great as to require, as was said, thousands upon thousands of years for their present

condition. All that has passed away. Mr. Lyell calculated that two hundred and twenty thousand years were necessary to account for changes now going on on the coast of Sweden. Later geologists reduce the time to one tenth of that estimate. A piece of pottery was discovered deeply buried under the deposits at the mouth of the Nile. It was confidently asserted that the deposit could not have been made during the historic period, until it was proved that the article in question was of Roman manufacture. Sober men of science, therefore, have no confidence in these calculations requiring thousands of centuries, or even millions of years, for the production of effects subsequent to the great geological epochs.

The second remark in reference to this great antiquity claimed the human race is that the reasons assigned for it are, in the judgment of the most eminent men of science, unsatisfactory. The facts urged to prove that men have lived for an indefinite number of ages on the earth, are, (1.) The existence of villages built on piles, now submerged in lakes in Switzerland and in some other places, which, it is assumed, are of great antiquity. (2.) The discovery of human remains in a fossil state in deposits to which geologists assign an age counted by tens, or hundreds, of thousands of years. (3) The discovery of utensils of different kinds made of flint, in connection with the remains of extinct animals. (4.) The early separation of men into the distinct races in which they now exist. On this point Sir Charles Lyell says: "Naturalists have long felt that to render probable the received opinion that all the leading varieties of the human family have originally sprung from a single pair (a doctrine against which there appears to me to be no sound objection), a much greater lapse of time is required for the slow and gradual formation of races (such as the Caucasian, Mongolian, and Negro) than is embraced in any of the popular systems of chronology." The Caucasian and the Negro are distinctly marked in the Egyptian monuments to which an antiquity of three thousand years is ascribed. We must, therefore, he argues, allow "for a vast series of antecedent ages" to account for the gradual formation of these distinct races. [56] In addition to all these arguments, it is contended that monuments and records exist which prove the existence of man on the earth long before the period assigned to his creation in the Bible.

Lake Dwellings.

In many of the lakes of Switzerland piles have been discovered worn down to the surface of the mud, or projecting slightly above it, which once supported human habitations. These are so numerous as to render it evident that whole villages were thus sustained over the surface of the water. These villages, "nearly all of them," are "of unknown date, but the most ancient of them "certainly belonged to the age of stone, for hundreds of implements resembling those of the Danish shell-mounds and peat mosses have been dredged up from the mud into which the piles were driven." Numerous bones of no less than fifty-four species of animals have been dug up from these localities, all of which, with one exception, are still living in Europe. The remains of several domesticated animals, as the ox, sheep, goat, and dog, are included in the number. [57]

There is evidently in all this no proof of great antiquity. Even as late as during the last century, similar huts, supported on piles, were to be seen. All the animal remains found are of extant species. There is nothing to show that these lake dwellings were even as old as the time of the Romans. The fact relied upon is the absence of metal, and the presence of

stone implements. Hence, it is inferred that these villages belonged to the "Stone Age." To this succeeded the "Bronze Age," and to that the Age of Iron. Sir Charles Lyell informs us that the Swiss geologists, as represented by M. Monet, assign "to the bronze age a date of between three thousand and four thousand years, and to the stone period an age of five thousand to seven thousand." [58]

It is, however, a mere arbitrary speculation that there ever was a stone age. It is founded on the assumption that the original condition of man was one of barbarism, from which he elevated himself by slow degrees; during the first period of his progress he used only implements of stone; then those of bronze; and then those of iron; and that thousands of years elapsed before the race passed from one of these stages of progress to another. Hence, if remains of men are found anywhere in connection with stone implements, they are referred to the stone age. According to this mode of reasoning, if in an Indian village flint arrow-heads and hatchets should be found, the inference would be that the whole world was in barbarism when those implements were used. Admitting that at the time the lake dwellings were inhabited, the people of Switzerland, and even all the people of Europe, were unacquainted with the use of the metals, that would not prove that civilization was not at its height in Egypt or India. Moreover, the assumption that the original state of man was one of barbarism, is not only contrary to the Bible and to the convictions of the great body of the learned, but, as is believed, to the plainest historical facts.

Fossil Human Remains.

Much more weight in this discussion is attached to the discovery of human remains in the same localities and under the same circumstances with those of animals now extinct. From this it is inferred that man must have lived when those animals still inhabited the earth. These human remains are not found in any of the ancient fossiliferous rocks. The Scriptural fact that man was the last of the living creatures which proceeded from the hand of God, stands unimpeached by any scientific fact. A nearly perfect human skeleton was found imbedded in a limestone rock on the island of Guadaloupe. That rock, however, is of modern origin, and is still in process of formation. The age assigned to this fossil is only about two hundred years. A fragment of conglomerate rock was obtained at the depth of ten feet below the bed of the river Dove, in England, containing silver coins of the reign of Edward the First. This shows that it does not require many years to form rocks, and to bury them deeply under the surface. The remains on which stress is laid are found only in caverns and buried under deposits of peat or of earthy matter. Geologists seem to be agreed as to the fact that human bones have been found in certain caves in France, Belgium, and England intimately associated with the remains of animals now living, and with those of a few of the extinct races.

The fact being admitted, the question is, How is it to be accounted for? This juxtaposition is no certain proof of contemporaneousness. These caverns, once the resort of wild beasts, became to men places of concealment, of defence, of worship, or of sepulture, and, therefore, as Sir Charles Lyell himself admits, "It is not on the evidence of such intermixtures that we ought readily to admit either the high antiquity of the human race, or the recent date of certain lost species of quadrupeds." [59]

In immediate connection with the passage just referred to, Lyell suggests another method by which the remains of animals belonging to very different ages of the world might

become mixed together. That is, "open fissures" which "serve as natural pitfalls." He quotes the following account from Professor Sedgwick of a chasm of enormous but unknown depth, which "is surrounded by grassy shelving banks, and many animals, tempted toward its brink, have fallen down and perished in it. The approach of cattle is now prevented by a strong lofty wall; but there can be no doubt that, during the last two or three thousand years, great masses of bony breccia must have accumulated in the lower parts of the great fissure, which probably descends through the whole thickness of the scar-limestone to the depth of perhaps five or six hundred feet." To this Lyell adds, "When any of these natural pit-falls happen to communicate with lines of subterranean caverns, the bones, earth, and breccia may sink by their own weight, or be washed into the vaults below." [60]

There is a third way in which this intermingling of the bones of animals of different ages may be accounted for. With regard to the remarkable caverns in the province of Liege, Sir Charles Lyell says that Dr. Schmerling, the naturalist, by whom they had been carefully and laboriously examined, did not think they were "dens of wild beasts, but that their organic and inorganic contents had been swept into them by streams communicating with the surface of the country. The bones, he suggested, may often have been rolled in the beds of such streams before they reached their underground destination." [61] It is clear, therefore, that no conclusive argument to prove that man was contemporary with certain extinct animals can be drawn from the fact that their remains have in some rare instances been found in the same localities.

Human Bones found deeply buried.

Still less weight is to be attached to the fact that human bones have been found deeply buried in the earth. Every one knows that great changes have been made in the earths surface within the historic period. Such changes are produced sometimes by the slow operation of the causes which have buried the foundations of such ancient cities as Jerusalem and Rome far beneath the present surface of the ground. At other times they have been brought about by sudden catastrophes. It is not surprising that human remains should be found in peat-bogs, if as Sir Charles Lyell tells us, "All the coins, axes, arms, and other utensils found in British and French mosses, are Roman; so that a considerable portion of the peat in European peat-bogs is evidently not more ancient than the age of Julius Csar." [62]

The data by which the rate of deposits is determined are so uncertain that no dependence can be placed upon them. Sir Charles Lyell says, "the lowest estimate of the time required" for the formation of the existing delta of the Mississippi, is more than one hundred thousand years. [63] According to the careful examination made by gentlemen of the Coast Survey and other United States officers, the time during which the delta has been in progress is four thousand four hundred years. [64] Since the memory of man, or, since fishing-huts have been built on the coasts of Sweden, there has been such a subsidence of the coast that "a fishing-hut having a rude fire-place within, was struck, in digging a canal, at a depth of sixty feet." [65] "At the earthquake in 1819 about the Delta of the Indus, an area of two thousand square miles became an inland sea, and the fort and village of Sindree sunk till the tops of the houses were just above the water. Five and a half miles from Sindree, parallel with this sunken area, a region was elevated ten feet above the delta, fifty miles long and in some parts ten broad." [66] While such changes, secular and paroxysmal,

gradual and sudden, have been in operation for thousands of years, it is evident that the intermingling of the remains of recent with those of extinct races of animals furnishes no proof that the former were contemporaneous with the latter.

Flint Implements.

Quite as much stress has been laid on the discovery of certain implements made of flint under deposits which, it is contended, are of such age as prove that man must have existed on the earth for ages before the time assigned in the Bible for his creation. To this argument the same answer is to be given. First, that the presence of the works of human art in such deposits is no proof that men were contemporaneous with such deposits; in view of the upheavals and displacements which all geologists admit are of frequent occurrence in the history of our globe. And secondly, the facts themselves are disputed, or differently interpreted by men of science of equal authority. This is especially true of the flint arrows, beads, and axes found in the valley of the Somme in France. [67] Lyell is confident that the argument from them is conclusive. Later examinations, however, have led others to a different conclusion. This is a question for scientific men to decide among themselves, and which they alone are competent to decide. So long however, as men of the highest rank as naturalists maintain that science knows of no facts inconsistent with the Scriptural account of the origin of man, the friends of the Bible are under no obligation to depart from the generally received interpretation of the Scriptures on this subject. Professor Guyot, as all who know him or have heard his public lectures, are well aware, teaches that there are no known facts which may not be accounted for on the assumption that man has existed seven or eight thousand years on this earth. It is well known also that this doctrine, until very recently, was universal among scientific men. Cuvier was so convinced on this point that he could hardly be brought to look at what purported to be the fossil remains of man. This conviction on his part, was not a prejudice; nor was it due to a reverence for the Bible. It was a scientific conviction founded on scientific evidence. The proofs from all sources of the recent origin of man were considered such as to preclude the possibility of his being contemporaneous with any of the extinct races of animals. And even those who were led to admit that point, were in many cases disposed to regard the fact as proving not the antiquity of man, but the existence to a much later period than generally supposed, of animals now extinct. The occurrence of human relics with the bones of extinct animals, "does not seem to me," says Prestwich, "to necessitate the carrying of man back in past time, so much as the bringing forward of the extinct animals toward our own time." [68] The fact that the monuments of human art cannot pretend to a higher antiquity than a few thousand years, renders it utterly incredible that man has existed on the earth hundreds of thousands or, as Darwin supposes, millions of years.

Argument from the Races of Men and from Ancient Monuments

Another argument is founded on the assumption that the difference between the Caucasian, Mongolian, and negro races, which is known to have been as distinctly marked two or three thousand years before Christ as it is now, must have required countless ages to develop and establish. To this it is obvious to answer, First, that differences equally great have occurred in domestic animals within the historic period. Secondly, that marked varieties are not unfrequently produced suddenly, and, so to speak, accidentally. Thirdly, that these varieties of race are not the effect of the blind operation of physical causes, but

by those causes as intelligently guided by God for the accomplishment of some wise purpose. Animals living in the arctic regions are not only clothed in fur for their protection from the cold, but the color of their clothing changes with the season. So God fashions the different races of men in their peculiarities to suit them to the regions which they inhabit. Dr. Livingstone, the great African traveller, informs us that the negro type, as it is popularly conceived of, occurs very rarely in Africa, and only in districts where great heat prevails in connection with great moisture. The tribes in the interior of that continent differ greatly, he says, both in hue and contour.

The idea that it must have taken countless ages for men to rise from the lowest barbarism to the state of civilization indicated by the monuments of Egypt, rests on no better assumption. The earliest state of man instead of being his lowest, was in many respects his highest state. And our own experience as a nation shows that it does not require millenniums for a people to accomplish greater works than Egypt or India can boast. Two hundred years ago this country was a wilderness from the Atlantic to the Pacific. What is it now? According to Bunsen it would require a hundred thousand years to erect all these cities, and to build all these railroads and canals.

It is further urged as a proof of the great antiquity of man that the monuments and monumental records of Egypt prove that a nation existed in the highest state of civilization at the time of, or immediately after, the flood. The chronology of the Bible, it is argued, and the chronology of Egypt are thus shown to be irreconcilable.

In reference to this difficulty it may be remarked, that the calculations of Egyptologists are just as precarious, and in many stances just as extravagant as those of geologists. This is proved by their discrepancies. It may be said, however, that even the most moderate students of Egyptian antiquities assign a date to the reign of Manes and the building of the pyramids inconsistent with the chronology of the Bible. To this it may be replied that the chronology of the Bible is very uncertain. The data are for the most part facts incidentally stated; that is, not stated for the purposes of chronology. The views most generally adopted rest mainly on the authority of Archbishop Usher, who adopted the Hebrew text for his guide, and assumed that in the genealogical tables each name marked one generation. A large part, however, of Biblical scholars adopt the Septuagint chronology in preference to the Hebrew; so that instead of four thousand years from the creation to the birth of Christ, we have nearly six thousand years. Besides it is admitted, that the usual method of calculation founded on the genealogical tables is very uncertain. The design of those tables is not to give the regular succession of births in a given line, but simply to mark the descent. This is just as well done if three, four, or more generations be omitted, as if the whole list were complete. That this is the plan on which these genealogical tables are constructed is an admitted fact. "Thus in Genesis xlvi. 18, after recording the sons of Zilpah, her grandsons and her great-grandsons, the writer adds, These are the sons of Zilpah . . . . . and these she bare unto Jacob, even sixteen souls.' The same thing recurs in the case of Bilhah, verse 25, she bare these unto Jacob: all the souls were seven.' Compare, verses 15, 22. No one can pretend that the author of this register did not use the term understandingly of descendants beyond the first generation. In like manner, according to Matthew i. 11, Josias begat his grandson Jechonias, and verse 8, Joram begat his great-great-grandson Ozias. And in Genesis x. 15-18, Canaan, the grand son of Noah, is said to have begotten several whole

nations, the Jebusite, the Amorite, the Girgasite, the Hivite, etc., etc. Nothing can be plainer, therefore, than that in the usage of the Bible, to bear and to beget' are used in a wide sense to indicate descent, without restricting this to the immediate offspring." [69]

The extreme uncertainty attending all attempts to determine the chronology of the Bible is sufficiently evinced by the fact that one hundred and eighty different calculations have been made by Jewish and Christian authors, of the length of the period between Adam and Christ. The longest of these make it six thousand nine hundred and eighty-four, and the shortest three thousand four hundred and eighty-three years. Under these circumstances it is very clear that the friends of the Bible have no occasion for uneasiness. If the facts of science or of history should ultimately make it necessary to admit that eight or ten thousand years have elapsed since the creation of man, there is nothing in the Bible in the way of such concession. The Scriptures do not teach us how long men nave existed on the earth. Their tables of genealogy were intended to prove that Christ was the son of David and of the Seed of Abraham, and not how many years had elapsed between the creation and the advent. [70]

[55] Wallace on Natural Selection, p. 303.

[56] Principles of Geology, by Sir Charles Lyell, F. R. S., ninth edition, Boston, 1853, p. 600. Also, The Geological Evidences of the Antiquity of Man, by the same writer, Philadelphia, 1863, p. 385.

[57] Antiquity of Man, chap. ii. p. 17.

[58] Ibid. p. 28.

[59] Principles of Geology, ninth edition, p. 740.

[60] Ibid. pp. 740, 741.

[61] Antiquity of Man, p. 64.

[62] Principles of Geology, p. 721.

[63] Antiquity of Man, p. 43.

[64] See Report upon the Physics and Hydraulics of the Mississippi River, etc., by Captain A. A. Humphreys and Lieutenant H. L. Abbott, Corps of Topographical Engineers, U. S. Army, 1861, p. 435.

[65] Dana's Manual of Geology, p. 586.

[66] Ibid. p. 588.

[67] To these Lyell devotes the seventh and eight chapters of his work on the Antiquity of Man.

[68] Quoted by Professor Dana, Manual of Geology, p. 582.

[69] The Pentateuch Vindicated from the Aspersions of Bishop Colenso, by William Henry Green, Professor in the Theological Seminary, Princeton, N. J., New York, 1863, p. 132.

[70] Herzog's, Encyklop&#65533;die, article "Zeitrechnung," which quotes the Benedictine work L'Art de v&#65533;rifior les Dates. T. i., pp. xxvii.-xxxvi.

CHAPTER II: NATURE OF MAN.

§ 1. Scripture Doctrine.

The Scriptures teach that God formed the body of man out of the dust of the earth, and breathed into him the breath of life and he became nphs chyh, a living soul. According to this account, man consists of two distinct principles, a body and a soul: the one material, the other immaterial; the one corporeal, the other spiritual. It is involved in this statement, first, that the soul of man is a substance; and, secondly, that it is a substance distinct from the body. So that in the constitution of man two distinct substances are included.

The idea of substance, as has been before remarked, is one of the primary truths of the reason. It is given in the consciousness of every man, and is therefore a part of the universal faith of men. We are conscious of our thoughts, feelings, and volitions. We know that these exercises or phenomena are constantly changing, but that there is something of which they are the exercises and .manifestation. That something is the self which remains unchanged, which is the same identical something, yesterday, to-day, and to-morrow. The soul is, therefore, not a mere series of acts; nor is it a form of the life of God, nor is it a mere unsubstantial force, but a real subsistence. Whatever acts is, and what is is an entity. A nonentity is nothing, and nothing can neither have power nor produce effects. The soul of man, therefore, is an essence or entity or substance, the abiding subject of its varying states and exercises. The second point just mentioned is no less plain. As we call know nothing of substance but from its phenomena, and as we are forced by a law of our nature to believe in the existence of a substance of which the phenomena are the manifestation, so by an equally stringent necessity we are forced to believe that where the phenomena are not only different, but incompatible, there the substances are also different. As, therefore, the phenomena or properties of matter are essentially different from those of mind, we are forced to conclude that matter and mind are two distinct substances; that the soul is not material nor the body spiritual. "To identify matter with mind," says Cousin, in a passage before quoted," or mind with matter; it is necessary to pretend that sensation, thought, volition, are reducible, in the last analysis, to solidity, extension, figure, divisibility, etc.; or that solidity, extension, figure, etc.. are reducible to sensation, thought, will." [71] It may be said, therefore, despite of materialists and idealists, that it is intuitively pertain that matter and mind are two distinct substances; and such has been the faith of the great body of mankind. This view of the nature of man which is presented in the original account of his creation, is sustained by the constant representations of the Bible.

Truths on this Subject assumed in Scripture.

The Scriptures do not formally teach any system of psychology, but there are certain

truths relating both to our physical and mental constitution, which they constantly assume. They assume, as we have seen, that the soul is a substance; that it is a substance distinct from the body; and that there are two, and not more than two, essential elements in the constitution of man. This is evident, (1.) From the distinction everywhere made between soul and body. Thus, in the original account of the creation a clear distinction is made between the body as formed from the dust of the earth, and the soul or principle of life which was breathed into It from God. And in Gen. iii. 19, it is said, "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." As it was only the body that was formed out of the dust, it is only the body that is to return to dust. In Eccles. xii. 7, it is said, "Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was, and the spirit shall return unto God who gave it." Is. x. 18, Shall consume . . . . both soul and body." Daniel says (vii. 15), "I Daniel was grieved in my spirit in the midst of my body." Our Lord (Matt. vi. 25) commands his disciples to take no thought for the body; and, again (Matt. x. 28), "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul: but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. The body and soul are set forth as distinct substances, and the two together as constituting the whole man. (2.) There is a second class of passages equally decisive as to this point. It consists of those in which the body is represented as a garment which is to be laid aside; a tabernacle or house in which the soul dwells, which it may leave and return to. Paul, on a certain occasion, did not know whether he was in the body or out of the body. Peter says he thought it meet as long as he was in this tabernacle to put his brethren in remembrance of the truth, "knowing," as he adds, "that shortly I must put off this my tabernacle." Paul, in 2 Cor. v. 1, says, "If our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved we have a building of God." In the same connection, he speaks of being unclothed and clothed upon with our house which is from heaven; and of being absent from the body and present with the Lord, knowing that while we are at home in the body we are absent from the Lord. To the Philippians (i. 23, 24) he says, "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." (3.) It is the common belief of mankind, the clearly revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the Church universal, that the soul can and does exist and act after death. If this be so, then the body and soul are two distinct substances. The former may be disorganized, reduced to (lust, dispersed, or even annihilated, and the latter retain its conscious life and activity. This doctrine was taught in the Old Testament, where the dead are represented as dwelling in Sheol, whence they occasionally reappeared, as Samuel did to Saul. Our Lord says that as God is not the God of the dead but of the living, his declaring himself to be the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, proves that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are now alive. Moses and Elijah conversed with Christ on the Mount. To the (lying thief our Lord said, "To-day shalt thou" (that in which his personality resided) "be with me in Paradise." Paul, as we have just seen, desired to be absent from the body and present with the Lord. He knew that his conscious personal existence was to be continued after the dissolution of his body. It is unnecessary to dwell on this point, as the continued existence of the soul in full consciousness and activity out of the body and in the interval between death and the resurrection, is not denied by any Christian Church. But if this be so it clearly proves that the soul and body are two distinct substances, so that the former can exist independently of the latter.

Relation of the Soul and Body.

Man, then, according to the Scriptures, is a created spirit in vital union with a material organized body. The relation between these two constituents of our nature is admitted to be mysterious. That is, it is incomprehensible. We do not know how the body acts on the mind, or how the mind acts on the body. These however, are plain, (1.) That the relation between the two is a vital union, in such a sense as that the soul is the source of life to the body. When the soul leaves the body the latter ceases to live. It loses its sensibility and activity, and becomes at once subject to the chemical laws which govern unorganized matter, and by their operation is soon reduced to dust, undistinguishable from the earth whence it was originally taken. (2.) It is a fact of consciousness that certain states of the body produce certain corresponding states of the mind. The mind takes cognizance of, or is conscious of, the impressions made by external objects on the organs of sense belonging to the body. The mind sees, the mind hears, and the mind feels, not directly or immediately (at least in our present and normal state), but through or by means of the appropriate organs of the body. It is also a matter of daily experience that a healthful condition of the body is necessary to a healthful state of the mind; that certain diseases or disorders of the one produce derangement in the operations of the other. Emotions of the mind affect the body; shame suffuses the cheek; joy causes the heart to beat and the eyes to shine. A blow on the head renders the mind unconscious, i.e., it renders the brain unfit to be the organ of its activity; and a diseased condition of the brain may cause irregular action in the mind, as in lunacy. All this is incomprehensible, but it is undeniable. (3.) It is also a fact of consciousness that, while certain operations of the body are independent of the conscious voluntary action of the mind, as the processes, of respiration, digestion, secretion, assimilation, etc., there are certain actions dependent on the will. We can will to move; and we can exert a greater or less degree of muscular force. It is better to admit these simple facts of consciousness and of experience, and to confess that, while they prove an intimate and vital union between the mind and body, they do not enable us to comprehend the nature of that union, than to have recourse to arbitrary and fanciful theories which deny these facts, because we cannot explain them. This is done by the advocates of the doctrine of occasional causes, which denies any action of the mind on the body or of the body on the mind, but refers all to the immediate agency of God. A certain state of the mind is the occasion on which God produces a certain act of the body; and a certain impression made on the body is the occasion on which God produces a certain impression on the mind. Leibnitz's doctrine of a pre-established harmony is equally unsatisfactory. He denied that one substance could act on another of a different kind; that matter could act on mind or mind or matter. He proposed to account for the admitted correspondence between the varying states of the one and those of the other on the assumption of a prearrangement. God had foreordained that the mind should have the perception of a tree whenever the tree was presented to the eye, and that the arm should move whenever the mind had a volition to move. But he denied any causal relation between these two series of events.

Realistic Dualism.

The Scriptural doctrine of the nature of man as a created spirit in vital union with an organized body, consisting, therefore, of two, and only two, distinct elements or substances, matter and mind, is one of great importance. It is intimately connected with some of the

most important doctrines of the Bible; with the constitution of the person of Christ, and consequently with the nature of his redeeming work and of his relation to the children of men; with the doctrine of the fall, original sin, and of regeneration; and with the doctrines of a future state and of the resurrection. It is because of this connection, and not because of its interest as a question in psychology, that the true idea of man demands the careful investigation of the theologian.

The doctrine above stated, as the doctrine of the Scriptures and of the Church, is properly designated as realistic dualism. That is, it asserts the existence of two distinct res, entities, or substances; the one extended, tangible, and divisible, the object of the senses; the other unextended and indivisible, the thinking, feeling, and willing subject in man. This doctrine stands opposed to materialism and idealism, which although antagonistic systems in other respects, agree in denying any dualism of substance. The one makes the mind a function of the body; the other makes the body a form of the mind. But, according to the Scriptures and all sound philosophy, neither is the body, as Delitzsch [72] says, a precipitate of the mind, nor is the mind a sublimate of matter.

The Scriptural doctrine of man is of course opposed to the old heathen doctrine which represents him as the firm in which nature, der Naturgeist, the anima mundi, cones to self-consciousness; and also to the wider pantheist, doctrine according to which men are the highest manifestations of the one universal principle of being and life; and to the doctrine which represents man as the union of the impersonal, universal reason or logos, with a living corporeal organization. According to this last mentioned view, man consists of the body (soma), soul (psuche), and logos, or the impersonal reason. This is very nearly the Apollinarian doctrine as to the constitution of Christ's person, applied to all mankind.

[71] Elements of Psychology, Henry's translation, N. Y. 1856 p. 370.

[72] Biblische Psychologie, p. 64.

§ 2. Trichotomy.

It is of more consequence to remark that the Scriptural doctrine is opposed to Trichotomy, or the doctrine that man consists of three distinct substances, body, soul, and spirit: soma, psuche, and pneuma; corpus, anima, and animus. This view of the nature of man is of the more importance to the theologian because it has not only been held to a greater or less extent in the Church, but also because it has greatly influenced the form in which other doctrines have been presented; and because it has some semblance of support from the Scriptures themselves. The doctrine has been held in different forms. The simplest, the most intelligible, and the one most commonly adopted is, that the body is the material part of our constitution; the soul, or psuche, is the principle of animal life; and the mind, or pneuma, the principle of our rational and immortal life. When a plant dies its material organization is dissolved and the principle of vegetable life which it contained disappears. When a brute dies its body returns to dust, and the or principle of animal life by which it was animated, passes away. When a man dies his body returns to the earth, his psuche ceases to exist, his pneuma alone remains until reunited with the body at the resurrection. To the pneuma, which is peculiar to man, belong reason, will, and conscience. To the psuche which we have in common with the brutes, belong understanding, feeling, and

sensibility, or, the power of sense-perceptions. To the soma belongs what is purely material. [73] According to another view of the subject, the soul is neither the body nor the mind; nor is it a distinct subsistence, but it is the resultant of the union of the pneuma and soma. [74] Or according to Delitzsch, [75] there is a dualism of being in man, but a trichotomy of substance. He distinguishes between being and substance, and maintains, (1.) that spirit and soul (pneuma and psuche) are not verschiedene Wesen, but that they are verschiedene Substanzen. He says that the nphs chyh, mentioned in the history of the creation, is not the compositum resulting from the union of the spirit and body, so that the two constituted man; but it is a tertium quid, a third substance which belongs to the constitution of his nature. (2.) But secondly, this third principle does not pertain to the body; it is net the higher attributes or functions of the body, but it pertains to the spirit and is produced by it. It sustains the same relation to it that breath does to the body, or effulgence does to light. He says that the psuche, (soul) is the apaugasma of the pneuma and the bond of its union with the body.

Trichotomy anti-Scriptural.

In opposition to all the forms of trichotomy, or the doctrine of a threefold substance in the constitution of man, it may be remarked, (1.) That it is opposed to the account of the creation of man as given in Gen. ii. 7. According to that account God formed man out of the dust of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became nphs chyh i.e., a being ('srbv nphs chyh) in whom is a living soul. There is in this account no intimation of anything more than the material body formed of the earth and the living principle derived from God. (2.) This doctrine (trichotomy) is opposed to the uniform usage of Scripture. So far from the nphs, psuche, , anima, or soul, being distinguished from the rvch, pneuma, animus, or mind as either originally different or as derived from it, these words all designate one and the same thing. They are constantly interchanged. The one is substituted for the other, and all that is, or can be predicated of the one, is predicated of the other. The Hebrew nphs, and the Greek psuche, mean breath, life, the living principle; that in which life and the whole life of the subject spoken of resides. The same is true of rvch and pneuma, they also mean breath, life, and living principle. The Scriptures therefore speak of the nphs or psuche not only as that which lives or is the principle of life to the body, but, as that which thinks and feels, which may be saved or lost, which survives the body and is Immortal. The soul is the man himself, that in which his identity and personality reside. It is the Ego. Higher than the soul there is nothing in man. Therefore it is so often used as a synonym for self. Every soul is every man; my soul is I; his soul is he. What shall a man give in exchange for his soul. It is the soul that sins (Lev. iv. 2): it is the soul that loves God. We are commanded to love God, en hole te psuche. Hope is said to be the anchor of the soul, and the word of God is able to save the soul. The end of our faith is said to be (1 Peter i. 9), the salvation of our souls; and John (Rev. vi. 9; xx. 4), saw in heaven the souls of them that were slain for the word of God. From all this it is evident that the word psuche, or soul, does not designate the mere animal part of our nature, and is not a substance different from the pneuma, or spirit. (3.) A third remark on this subject is that all the words above mentioned, rvch ,nphs , and nsmh in Hebrew, psuche and pneuma in Greek, and soul and spirit in English, are used in the Scriptures indiscriminately of men and of irrational animals. If the Bible ascribed only a psuche to brutes, and both psuche and pneuma to man, there would be some ground for assuming that the two are essentially distinct. But such is

not the case. The living principle in the brute is called both nphs and rvch, psuche and pneuma. That principle in the brute creation is irrational and mortal; in man it is rational and immortal. "Who knoweth the spirit of man that goeth upward, and the spirit of the beast that goeth downward to the earth?" Eccles. iii. 21. The soul of the brute is the immaterial principle which constitutes its life, and which is endowed with sensibility, and that measure of intelligence which experience shows the lower animals to possess. The soul in man is a created spirit of a higher order, which has not only the attributes of sensibility, memory, and instinct, but also the higher powers which pertain to our intellectual, moral, and religious life. As in the brutes it is not one substance that feels and another that remembers; so it is not one substance in man that is the subject of sensations, and another substance which has intuitions of necessary truths, and which is endowed with conscience and with the knowledge of God. Philosophers speak of world-consciousness, or the immediate cognizance which we have of what is without us; of self-consciousness, or the knowledge of what is within us; and of God-consciousness, or our knowledge and sense of God. These all belong to one and the same immaterial, rational substance. (4.) It is fair to appeal to the testimony of consciousness on this subject. We are conscious of our bodies and we are conscious of our souls, i.e., of the exercises and states of each; but no man is conscious of the psuche as distinct from the pneuma, of the soul as different from the spirit. In other words consciousness reveals the existence of two substances in the constitution of our nature; but it does not reveal the existence of three substances, and therefore the existence of more than two cannot rationally be assumed.

Doubtful Passages Explained.

(5.) The passages of Scriptures which are cited as favouring the opposite doctrine may all be explained in consistency with the cur-rent representations of Scripture on the subject. When Paul says to the Thessalonians, "I pray God your whole spirit, and soul, and body, be preserved blameless unto the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Thessalonians v. 23). he only uses a periphrasis for the whole man. As when in Luke i. 46, 47, the virgin says, "My soul doth magnify the Lord, and my spirit hath rejoiced in God my Saviour," soul and spirit in this passage do not mean different things. And when we are commanded "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, with all thy strength, and with all thy mind" (Luke x. 27), we have not an enumeration of so many distinct substances. Nor do we distinguish between the mind and heart as separate entities when we pray that both may be enlightened and sanctified; we mean simply the soul in all its aspects or faculties. Again, when in Heb. iv. 12, the Apostle says that the word of God pierces so as to penetrate soul and spirit, and the joints and marrow, he does not assume that soul and spirit are different substances. The joints and marrow are not different substances. They are both material; they are different forms of the same substance; and so soul and spirit are one and the same substance under different aspects or relations. We can say that the word of God reaches not only to the feelings, but also to the conscience, without assuming that the heart and conscience are distinct entities. Much less is any such distinction implied in Phil. i. 27, "Stand fast in one spirit (en heni pneumati), with one mind (mia psuche)." There is more difficulty in explaining 1 Cor. xv. 44. The Apostle there distinguishes between the soma psuchikon and the soma pneumatikon; the former is that in which the psuche is the animating principle; and the latter that in which the pneuma is the principle of life. The one we have here, the other we are to have hereafter. This seems to imply that the psuche exists in this

life, but is not to exist hereafter, and therefore that the two are separable and distinct. In this explanation we might acquiesce if it did not contradict the general representations of the Scriptures. We are constrained, therefore, to seek another explanation which will harmonize with other portions of the word of God. The general meaning of the Apostle is plain. We have now gross, perishable, and dishonorable, or unsightly bodies. Hereafter we are to have glorious bodies, adapted to a higher state of existence. The only question is, why does he call the one psychical, and the other pneumatic? Because the word psuche, although often used for the soul as rational and immortal, is also used for the lower form of life which belongs to irrational animals. Our future bodies are not to be adapted to those principles of our nature which we have in common with the brutes, out to those which are peculiar to us as men, created in the image of God. The same individual human soul has certain susceptibilities and powers which adapt it to the present state of existence, and to the earthly house in which it now dwells. It has animal appetites and necessities. It can hunger and thirst. It needs sleep and rest. But the same soul has higher powers. The earthly body is suited to its earthly state; the heavenly body to its heavenly state. There are not two substances psuche and pneuma, there is but one and the same substance with different susceptibilities and powers. In this same connection Paul says, Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven. Yet our bodies are to inherit that kingdom, and our bodies are flesh and blood. The same material substance now constituted as flesh and blood is to be so changed as to be like Christ's glorious body. As this representation does not prove a substantial difference between the body which now is and that which is to be hereafter, so neither does what the Apostle says of the soma psuchikon and the soma pneumatikon prove that the psuche and pneuma are distinct substances.

This doctrine of a threefold constitution of man being adopted by Plato, was introduced partially into the early Church, but soon came to be regarded as dangerous, if not heretical. It being held by the Gnostics that the pneuma in man was a part of the divine essence, and incapable of sin; and by the Apollinarians that Christ had only a human soma and psuche, but not a human pneuma, the Church rejected the doctrine that the psuche and pneuma were distinct substances, since upon it those heresies were founded. In later times the Semi-Pelagians taught that the soul and body, but not the spirit in man were the subjects of original sin. All Protestants, Lutheran and Reformed, were, therefore, the more zealous in maintaining that the soul and spirit, psuche and pneuma, are one and the same substance and essence. And this, as before remarked, has been the common doctrine of the Church. [76]

[73] August Hahn, Lehrbuch des christlichen Glaubens, p. 324.

[74] Gschel in Herzog's Encyklopdie, Article "Seele."

[75] Biblische Psychologie, § 4, p. 128.

[76] See G. L. Hahn, Theologie des N. T. Olshausen, De Trichotomia Natur Human, e Novi Testamenti Scriptoribus recepta. Ackermann, Studien und Kritiken, 1839, p. 889. R. T. Beck. Umriss d. biblischen Seelenlehre, 1843.

§ 3. Realism.

Its General Character.

There is still another view of the nature of man which, from Its extensive and long-continued influence, demands consideration. According to this view, man is defined to be, The manifestation of the general principle of humanity in union with a given corporeal organization. This view has been held in various forms which cannot here be severally discussed. It is only the theory in its more general features, or in the form in which it has been commonly presented. that our limits permit us to examine. It necessarily assumes that humanity, human nature as a general principle of a form of life, exists antecedently (either chronologically or logically) to individual men. "In the order of nature," says Dr. Shedd, "mankind exists before the generations of mankind; the nature is prior to the individuals produced out of it." [77] It exists, also, independently and outside of them. As magnetism is a force in nature existing antecedently, independently, and outside of any and all individual magnets; and as electricity exists independently of the Leyden jars in which it may be collected or through which it is manifested at present; as galvanism exists independently of any and all galvanic batteries; so humanity exists antecedently to individual men and independently of them. As an individual magnet is a given piece of soft iron in which the magnetic force is present and active, and as a Leyden jar is simply a coated jar in which electricity is present, so an individual man is a given corporeal organization in which humanity as a general life or force is present. To the question what is human nature, or humanity generically considered, there are different answers given. It is said to be a res, an essence, a substance, a real objective existence. It is some-thing which exists in time and space. This is the common mode of statement. The controversy between realists and nominalists, in its original and genuine form, turned upon this point. The question which for ages occupied to so great an extent the attention of all philosophers, was, What are universals? What are genera and species? What are general terms? Are they mere words? Are they thoughts or conceptions existing in the mind? Are the things expressed by general terms real objective existences? Do individuals only exist; so that species and genus are only classes of individuals of the same kind; or are individuals only the revelations or individualizations of a general substance which is the species or genus? According to the early and genuine realists, and according to the modern speculative philosophers, the species or genus is first, independent of and external to the individual. The individual is only "a subsequent modus existendi; the first and antecedent mode [in the case of man] being the generic humanity of which this subsequent serial mode is only another aspect or manifestation." [78]

Precisely, as just stated, as magnetism is antecedent to the magnet. The magnet is only an individual piece of iron in and through which generic magnetism is manifested. Thus the realist says, "Etsi rationalitas non esset in aliquo, tamen in natura remaneret." [79] Cousin quotes the complaint of Anselm against Roscelin and other nominalists, "de ne pas comprendre comment plusieurs hommes ne sont qu'un seul et m�me homme, -- nondum intelliget quomodo plures homines in specie sint unus homo." [80] The doctrine of his "Monologium" and "Proslogium" and "Dialogus de veritate," Cousin says, is "que non-seulement il y a des individus humains, mais qu'il y a en autre le genre humain, l'humanit�, qui est une, comme il admettait qu'il y a un temps absolu que les dur�es particuli�res manifestent sans le constituer, une v�rit� une et subsistante par elle-m�me, un type absolu du bien, que tous les biens particuliers supposent et r�fl�chissent plus ou moins imparfaitement." [81] He quotes Ab�lard as stating the doctrine which he opposed, in the

following words: "Homo qu□dam species est, res una essentialiter, cui adveniunt form□ qu□dam et efficiunt Socratem: illam eamdem essentialiter eodem modo informant form□ facientes Platonem et c□tera individua hominis; nec aliquid est in Socrate, pr□ter illas formas informantes illam materiam ad faciendum Socratem, quin illud idem eodem tempore in Platone informatum sit formis Platonis. Et hoc intelligunt de singulis speciebus ad individua et de generibus ad species." [82] According to one theory, "les individus seuls existent et constituent 1'essence des choses;" according to the other, "1'essence des individus est dans le genre auquel ils se rapportent; en tant qu' individus ils ne sont que des accidents." [83] All this is sufficiently plain. That which constitutes the species or genus is a real objective existence, a substance one and the same numerically as well as specifically. This one general substance exists in every individual belonging to the species, and constitutes their essence. That which is peculiar to the individual, and which distinguishes it from other individuals of the same species, is purely accidental. This one substance of humanity, which is revealed or manifested in all men, and which constitutes them men, "possesses all the attributes of the human individual; for the individual is only a portion and specimen of the nature. Considered as an essence, human nature is an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; and accordingly its agency in Adam partakes of the corresponding qualities." [84] "Agency," however, supposes "an agent; and since original sin is not the product of the individual agent, because it appears at birth, it must be referred to the generic agent, -- i.e., to the human nature in distinction from the human person or individual." [85]

Generic Humanity.

What God created, therefore, was not an individual man, but the species homo, or generic humanity, --an intelligent, rational, and voluntary essence; individual men are the manifestations of this substance numerically and specifically one and the same, in connection with their several corporeal organizations. Their souls are not individual essences, but one common essence revealed and acting in many separate organisms.

This answer to the question proposed above, What is human nature generically considered, which makes it an essence or substance common to all the individuals of the race, is the most common and the most intelligible. Scientific men adopt a somewhat different phraseology. Instead of substances, they speak of forces. Nature is defined to be the sum of the forces operating in the external world. Oxygen is a force; magnetism, electricity, etc., are forces. "A species is . . . . based on a specific amount or condition of concentred force, defined in the act or law of creation." [86] Humanity, or human nature, is the sum of the forces which constitute man what he is. The unity of the race consists in the fact that these forces are numerically as well as specifically the same in all the individuals of which it is composed.

The German theologians, particularly those of the school of Schleiermacher, use the terms life, law, and organic law. Human nature is a generic life, i.e., a form of life manifested in a multitude of individuals of the same kind. In the individual it is not distinct or different from what it is in the genus. It is the same organic law. A single oak may produce ten thousand other oaks; but the whore forest is as much an inward organic unity as any single tree.

These may be convenient formulas to prevent the necessity of circumlocutions, and to

express a class of facts; but they do not convey any definite idea beyond the facts themselves. To say that a whole forest of oaks have the same generic life, that they are as truly one as any individual tree is one, means simply that the nature is the same in all, and that all have been derived from a common source. And to say that mankind are a unit because they have the same generic life, and are all descended from a common parent, either means nothing more than that all men are of the same species, i.e., that humanity is specifically the same in all mat kind or it means all that is intended by those who teach that genera and species are substances of which the individual is the mere modus existendi. As agency implies an agent, so force, which is the manifestation of power, supposes something, a subject or substance in which that power resides. Nothing, a nonentity, can have no power and manifest no force. Force, of necessity, supposes a substance of which it is the manifestation. If, therefore, the forces are numerically the same, the substance must be numerically the same. And, consequently, if humanity be a given amount and kind of concentred force, numerically and not merely specifically the same in all men, then are men homoousioi, partakers of one and the same identical essence. The same remarks apply to the term life. Life is a predicable, not an essence. It supposes a subject of which it is predicable. There can be no life unless something lives. It is not a thing by itself. if, therefore, the generic life of man means anything more than the same kind of life, it must mean that that which lives in all men is identically the same numerical substance.

Objections to Realism.

According to the common doctrine, the soul of every man is an individual subsistence, of the same kind but not of the same numerical substance as the souls of his fellow-men, so that men are homoi-, but not homoousioi. In support of this view and in opposition to the doctrine that "all men are one man," or, that human nature is numerically one and the same essence of which individual men are the modes of manifestation, it may be remarked, --

1. That the latter doctrine is a mere philosophical hypothesis. It is a simple assumption founded on what is possible. It is possible that the doctrine in question may be true. So in itself it is possible that there should be an anima mundi, a principle of life immanent in the world, of which all living organisms are the different manifestations; so that all vegetables, all animals, and man himself, are but different forms of one and the same numerical living substance, just as the multitudinous waves of the sea in all their infinite diversity of size, shape, and hue, are but the heavings of one and the same vast ocean. In like manner it is possible that all the forms of life should be only the various manifestations of the life of God. This is not only possible, but it is such a simple and grand idea that it has fascinated the minds of men in all ages, so that the prevailing hypothesis of philosophers as to the constitution of the universe has been. and still is, pantheistic. Nevertheless, pantheism is demonstrably false, because it contradicts the intuitive convictions of our moral and religious nature. It is not enough, therefore, that a theory be possible or conceivable. It must have the support of positive proof.

2. Such proof the doctrine under consideration does not find in the Bible. It is simply a hypothesis on which certain facts of the Scriptures may be explained. All men are alike; they have the same faculties, the same instincts and passions; and they are all born in sin. These and other similar facts admit of an easy explanation on the assumption that humanity is numerically one and the same substance of which individuals are only so many different

manifestations; just as a thousand different magnets reveal the magnetic force which is the same in all, and therefore all magnets are alike. But as the facts referred to may be explained on divers other assumptions, they afford no proof of this particular theory. It is not pretended that the Bible directly teaches the doctrine in question. Nor does it teach anything which necessitates its adoption. On the contrary, it teaches much that is irreconcilable with it.

Not Supported by Consciousness.

3. The hypothesis under consideration derives no support from consciousness. We are conscious of our own existence. We are (in one sense) conscious of the existence of other men. But we are not conscious of a community of essence in ourselves and all other men. So far from this being the common interpretation which men put on their consciousness, it is diametrically opposed to it. Every man believes his soul to be a distinct, individual substance, as much as he believes his body to be distinct and separate from every other human body. Such is the common judgment of men. And nothing short of the direct assertion of the Bible, or arguments which amount to demonstration, can rationally be admitted to invalidate that judgment. It is inconceivable that anything concerning the constitution of our nature so momentous in its consequences, should be true, which does not in some way reveal itself in the common consciousness of men. There is nothing more characteristic of the Scriptures, and there are few things which more clearly prove its divine origin, than that it takes for granted and authenticates all the facts of consciousness. It declares us to be what we are revealed to ourselves as being in the very constitution and present condition of our nature. It recognizes the soul as rational, free, and responsible. It assumes that it is distinct from the body. All this we know from consciousness. But we do not know that the essence or substance of our soul is numerically the same as the substance of the souls of all men. If the Bible teaches any such doctrine it teaches something outside of the teachings of consciousness, and something to which those teachings, in the judgment of the vast majority of men, even the most enlightened, are directly opposed.

Realism Contrary to the Teachings of Scripture.

4. The Scriptures not only do not teach the doctrine in question, but they also teach what is inconsistent with it. We have already seen that it is a clearly revealed doctrine of the Bible, and part of the faith of the Church universal, that the soul continues to exist after death as a self-conscious, individual person. This fact is inconsistent with the theory in question. A given plant is a material organization, animated by the general principle of vegetable life. If the plant is destroyed the principle of vegetable life no longer exists as to that plant. It may exist in other plants; but that particular plant ceased to exist when the material organization was dissolved. Magnetism continues to exist as a force in nature, but any particular magnet ceases to be when it is melted, or volatilized. In like manner, if a man is the manifestation of a generic life, or of humanity as an essence common to all men, then when his body dies the man ceases to exist. Humanity continues to be, but the individual man no longer exists. This is a difficulty which some of the advocates of this theory endeavour to avoid by giving up what is essential to their own doctrine. Its genuine and consistent advocates admit it in its full force. The anti-Christian portion of them acknowledge that their doctrine is inconsistent with the personal immortality of man. The race, they say, is immortal, but individual men are not. The same conclusion is admitted by

those who hold the analogous pantheistic, or naturalistic doctrines. If a man is only the modus existendi, a form in which a common substance or life reveals itself, it matters not whether that substance be humanity, nature, or God, when the form, the material organism, is destroyed, the man as a man ceases to exist. Those advocates of the doctrine who cling to Christianity, while they admit the difficulty, endeavour to get over it in different ways. Schleiermacher admits that all philosophy is against the doctrine of the personal existence of man in a future state. His whole system leads to the denial of it. But he says that the Christian must admit it on the authority of Christ. Olshausen, in his commentary on the New Testament, says, when explaining 1 Cor. xv. 19, 20, and verses 42-44, that the Bible knows nothing of the immortality of the soul. He pronounces it to be a heathen. idea. A soul without a body loses its individuality. It ceases to be a person, and of course loses self-consciousness and all that is connected with it. As, however, the Scriptures teach that men are to exist hereafter, he says their bodies must also continue to exist, and the only existence of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection, which he admits, is in connection (i.e., vital union) with the disintegrated particles of the body in the grave or scattered to the ends of the earth. This is a conclusion to which his doctrine legitimately leads, and which he is sufficiently candid to admit. Dr. Nevin, a disciple of Schleiermacher, has to grapple with the same difficulty. His book entitled "The Mystical Presence," is the clearest and ablest exposition of the theology of Schleiermacher which has appeared in our language, unless Morell's "Philosophy of Religion" be its equal. He denies [87] all dualism between the soul and body. They are "one life." The one cannot exist without the other. He admits that what the Bible teaches of the separate existence of the soul between death and the resurrection, is a difficulty "which it is not easy, at present, to solve." He does not attempt to solve it. He only says that the difficulty is "not to reconcile Scripture with a psychological theory, but to bring it into harmony with itself." This is no solution. It is a virtual admission that he cannot reconcile the Bible with his psychological theory. The doctrine that man is a modus existendi of a generic humanity, or the manifestation of the general principle of humanity, in connection with a given corporeal organization, is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of the separate existence of the soul, and therefore must be false.

Inconsistent with the Doctrine of the Trinity.

5. This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine of the Trinity. It necessitates the conclusion that the Father, Son, and Spirit are no more one God than Peter, James, and John are one man. The persons of the Trinity are one God, because the Godhead is one essence; but if humanity be one essence numerically the same in all men, then all men are one man in the same sense that the Father, Son, and Spirit are one God. This is a reductio ad absurdum. It is clearly taught in Scripture and universally believed in the Church that the persons of the Trinity are one God in an infinitely higher sense than that in which all men are one man. The precise difference is, that the essence common to the persons of the Godhead is numerically the same whereas the essence common to all men is only specifically the same, i.e., of the same kind, although numerically different. The theory which leads to the opposite conclusion must therefore be false. It cannot be true that all mankind are one essence, substance, or organic life, existing or manifesting itself in a multitude of individual persons. This is a difficulty so obvious and so fatal that it could not fail to arrest the attention of realists in all ages and of every class. The great point of

dispute in the Council of Nice between the Arians and orthodox was, whether the persons of the Trinity are homoi- or homoousioi, of a like or of the same essence. If homoousioi, it was on both sides admitted that they are one God; because if the same in substance they are equal in power and glory. Now it is expressly asserted that all men are not homoi- but homoousioi, and therefore, by parity of reasoning, they must constitute one man in the same sense as there is one God, and all be equal in every attribute of their nature. [88] Of course it is admitted that there is a legitimate sense of the word in which all men may be said to be homoousioi, when by homos (same) is meant similar, or of a like kind. In this sense the Greeks said that the bodies of men and of other animals were consubstantial, as all were made of flesh; and that angels, demons, and human souls, as spiritual beings, are also homoousioi. But this is not the sense in which the word is used by realists, when speaking either of the persons of the Trinity or of men. In both cases the word same means numerical oneness; men are of the same numerical essence in the same sense in which the Father and the Son and the Spirit are the same in substance. The difference, it is said, between the two cases does not relate to identity of essence, which is the same in both, but is found in this, that "the whole nature or essence is in the divine person; but the human person is only a part of the common human nature. Generation in the Godhead admits no abscission or division of substance; but generation in the instance of the creature implies separation or division of essence. A human person is an individualized portion of humanity." [89] It must, however, be remembered that humanity is declared to be a spiritual substance. It is the same in nature with the soul, which is called an individualized portion of human nature, possessing consciousness, reason, and will. But, if spiritual, it is indivisible. Divisibility is one of the primary properties of matter. Whatever is divisible is material. If therefore humanity, as a generic substance, admits of "abscission and division," it must be material. A part of reason, a piece of consciousness, or a fragment of will, are contradictory, or unintelligible forms of expression. If humanity is of the same essence as the soul, it no more admits of division than the soul. One part of a soul cannot be holy and another unholy; one part saved and the other lost. The objection to the theory under consideration, that it makes the relation between individual men identical with that between the persons of the Trinity, remains, therefore, in full force. It is not met by the answer just referred to, which answer supposes mind to be extended and divisible.

Realism Inconsistent with what the Bible teaches of the Person and Work of Christ.

6. It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the doctrine in question with what the Scriptures teach of the person and work of Christ. According to the Bible, the Son of God became man by taking to himself a true body and a reasonable soul. According to the realistic doctrine, he did not assume a reasonable soul, but generic humanity. What is this but the whole of humanity, of which, according to the advocates of this doctrine, individual men are the portions. Human nature as a generic life, humanity as a substance, and a whole substance, was taken into personal union with the Son of God. The Logos became incarnate in the race. This is certainly not the Scriptural doctrine. The Son of God became a man; not all men. He assumed an individual rational soul, not the general principle of humanity. Besides this, it is the doctrine of those who adopt this theory that humanity sinned and fell in Adam. The rational, moral, voluntary substance called human nature, is, or at least was, an agent. The sin of Adam was the sin not of an individual, but of this generic substance, which by that sin became the subject both of guilt and of depravity. By reason of this sin of

human nature, the theory is, that all individual men, in their successive generations, in whom this nature is revealed, or in whom, as they express it, it is individualized, mine into the world in a state of guilt and pollution. We do not now refer to the numerous and serious difficulties connected with this theory as a method of accounting for original sin. We speak of it only in its relation to Christ's person. If human nature, as a generic life, a substance of which all men partake, became both guilty and polluted by the apostasy; and that generic humanity, as distinguished from a newly created and holy rational soul, was assumed by the Son of God, how can we avoid the conclusion that Christ was, in his human nature, personally guilty and sinful? This is a legitimate consequence of this theory. And this consequence being not only false but blasphemous, the theory itself must be false As the principle that humanity is one substance, and all men are homoousioi in the sense of partaking of the same numerical essence, involves consequences destructive of the Scriptural doctrines of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, so it might easily be shown that it overthrows the common faith of the Protestant churches on the doctrines of justification, regeneration, the sacraments, and the Church. It is enough for our present purpose to remark that, as a historical fact, the consistent and thorough-going advocates of this doctrine do teach an entirely different method of salvation. Many men adopt a principle, and do not carry it out to its legitimate consequences. But others, more logical, or more reckless, do not hesitate to embrace all its results. In the works of Morell and of Dr. Nevin, above referred to, the theological student may find a fearless pressing of the genuine principle of realism, to the utter overthrow of the Protestant, and, it may be added, of the Christian faith.

7. Other objections to this theory may be more appropriately considered when we come to speak of the several doctrines to which it is applied. It is sufficient in the conclusion of the present discussion to say that what is said to be true of the genus homo, is assumed to be true of all genera and species in the animal and vegetable worlds. The individual in all cases is assumed to be only the manifestation or modus existendi of the generic substance. Thus there is a bovine, an equine, and a feline substance, having an objective existence of which all oxen, all horses, and all animals of the cat-race, are the manifestations. And so of all species, whether of plants or animals. This is almost inconceivable. Compared to this theory, the assumption of a naturgeist, or anima mundi, or of one universal substance, is simplicity itself. That such a theory should be set forth and made the foundation, or rather the controlling principle of all Christian doctrine, is most unreasonable and dangerous. This realistic doctrine, until recently, has been as much exploded as the eternal ideas of Plato or the forms of Aristotle.

[77] History of Christian Doctrine, vol. ii. p. 77.

[78] Shedd's Essays Boston, 1867, p. 259, note, and his History of Christian Doctrine. vol. ii. p. 77.

[79] Cousin, Fragments Philosophiques, Paris 1840, p. 167.

[80] Cousin's Fragments Philosophiques, Paris, 1840, p. 146.

[81] Ibidem.

[82] Ibid. p. 167.

[83] Ibid. p. 171.

[84] Shedd, History of Christian Doctrine, vol. ii. p. 78.

[85] Ibid. p. 80.

[86] Professor James D. Dana, Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857, p. 861.

[87] Page 171.

[88] 1

[89] 2

§ 4. Another form of the Realistic Theory.

There is, however, another phase of this doctrine, which it is necessary to mention. The doctrine that genera and species are real substances existing prior to individuals, and independent of them, is the old, genuine, and most intelligible form of Realism. It was expressed in the schools by saying that Universalia are ante rem. The other form of the doctrine asserts that the Universalia are in re. That is that the universals exist only in the individuals; and that the individuals alone are real. "L'identit&#65533; des individus," says Cousin [90] in his exposition of this form of the doctrine, "d'un m&#65533;me genre ne vient pas de leur essence m&#65533;me, car cette essence est diff&#65533;rente en chacun d'eux, mais de certains &#65533;l&#65533;ments qui se retrouvent dans tous ces individus sans aucune diff&#65533;rence, indifferenter. Cette nouvelle th&#65533;orie diff&#65533;re de la premi&#65533;re en ce que les universaux ne sont plus 1'essence de 1'&#65533;tre, la substance m--me des choses; mais elle s'en rapproche en ce que les universaux existent r&#65533;ellement, et qu'existant dans plusieurs individus sans diff&#65533;rence, ils forment leur identit&#65533; et par l&#65533; leur genre." Again, [91] he says, "Le principe de la nouvelle th&#65533;orie est que 1'essence de chaque chose est leur individualit&#65533;, que les individus seuls existent, et qu'il n'y a point en dehors des individus d'essence appel&#65533;es les universaux, les esp&#65533;ces et les genres; mais que l'individu lui-m&#65533;me contient tout cela, selon les divers points de vue sous lequels on le consid&#65533;re." [92] Thus Socrates as an individual man has his own essence, which, with its peculiarities, makes him Socrates. Neglect those peculiarities and consider him as rational and mortal, then you have the idea of species; neglect rationality and mortality, and consider him as an animal, then you have the idea of the genus; neglect all these forms ("relictis omnibus formis"), and you have only the idea of substance. According to this view "les esp&#65533;ces et les genres, les plus &#65533;lev&#65533;s comme les plus inf&#65533;rieurs, sont les individus eux-m&#65533;mes, consid&#65533;r&#65533;s sous divers point de vue." [93] This, according to the plain sense of the terms, amounts to the common doctrine. Individuals alone exist. Certain individuals have some distinguishing properties or attributes in common. They constitute a particular species. These and other individuals of different species have other properties common to them all, and they constitute a genus, and so orders, and classes, until we get to the highest category of being, which includes all. But if all beings are assumed to be one substance, which substance with certain added qualities or accidents constitutes a class, with certain other additions, an order, with still further modifications, a genus, a species, an individual, then we have the old theory back again, only extended so as to have a pantheistic aspect.

Some scientific men, instead of defining species as a gi cm' of individuals having certain characteristics in common, say with Professor Dana, that it "corresponds to the specific amount or condition of concentred force, defined in the act or law of creation;" or

with Dr. Morton, that it is "a primordial organic form;" or with Agassiz, that it is an original immaterial principle which determines the form or characteristics of the individuals constituting a distinct group. These are only different modes of accounting for the fact that all the individuals of a given species have certain characteristics or fundamental qualities in common. To such statements there is no objection. But when it is assumed that these original primordial terms, as in the case of humanity, for example, are by the law of propagation transmitted from generation to generation, so as to constitute all the individuals of the species essentially one, that is, one in essence or substance, so that the act of the first individual of the species (of Adam, for example) being the act of the substance numerically the same in all the members of that species, is the act of each individual member, then something essentially new is added to the above given scientific definition of species, and we return to the original and genuine form of Realism in its most offensive features. It would be easy to show, (1st.) that generation or the law of propagation both in plants and in animals is absolutely inscrutable; as much so as the nature of matter, mind, or life, in themselves considered. We can no more tell what generation is, than what matter is, or what mind is. (2d.) That it is therefore unreasonable and dangerous to make a given theory as to the nature of generation or the law of propagation the basis for the explanation of Christian doctrines. (3d.) That whatever may be the secret and inscrutable process of propagation, it does not involve the transmission of the same numerical essence, so that a progenitor and his descendants are one and the same substance. This assumption is liable to all the objections already urged against the original form of the realistic doctrine. The theory is moreover destitute of all evidence either from experience or analogy. There is no conceivable sense in which all the oaks now on the earth are identical as to their substance with the oaks originally created. And there is no conceivable sense in whirl. we and all mankind are identically the same substance with Adam. If a thousand candles are successively lighted from one candle they do not thereby become one candle. There is not a communication of the substance of the first to the second, and of the second to the others in their order, so as to make it in any sense true that the substance of the first is numerically the same with that of all the others. The simple fact is that by the laws of matter ordained by God, the state in which a lighted candle is, produces certain changes or movements in the constituent elements of the wick of another candle when the two are brought into contact. which movements induce other movements in the constituent particles of the surrounding atmosphere, which are connected with the evolution of light and heat. But there is no communication of substance involved in the process. An acorn which falls from an oak to-day, is composed not of the same particles of matter from which the original acorn was formed, but of matter of the same kind, and arranged in the same way. It may be said to be imbued with chemical and vital forces of the same kind with the original acorn, but not with numerically the same forces. So of all plants and animals. We are of the same nature with Adam in the same sense that all animals of one species are the same. The sameness does not consist in numerical identity of essence or of vital forces, or of reason or will, but in the sameness of kind and community of origin.

Besides the origin and the nature of man, there are two other questions, which are more or less involved in what the Scriptures teach concerning mankind, and which demand attention before we turn to the moral and religious condition of the race. The first of these concerns the Origin of the Soul, and the second the Unity of the Race.

[90] Fragments Philosophiques, p. 162.
[91] Ibid., p. 168.
[92] See the exposition by Ablard himself quoted on page 170 of Cousin.
[93] Cousin, Fragments Philosophiques, p. 183.

CHAPTER III: THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.

§ 1. Theory of Pre[?]*xistence.*

Three theories have been advanced as to the origin of the soul First, that of the Pre[?]xistence of the soul; secondly, that o Traduction, or the doctrine that the soul of the child is derived from the soul of the parent; thirdly, that of immediate Creation, or the doctrine that the soul is not derived as the body is, but owes its existence to the creative power of God.

The doctrine of the pre[?]xistence of the soul has been presented in two forms. Plato held that ideas are eternal in the divine mind; that these ideas are not mere thoughts, but living entities; that they constitute the essence and life of all external things; the universe and all it contains are these ideas realized, clothed in matter, and developed in history. There was thus an ideal, or intelligible world, anterior to the world as actually existing in time. What Plato called ideas, Aristotle called forms. He denied that the ideal was anterior to the actual. Matter is eternal, and all things consist of matter and form -- by form being meant that which gives character, or determines the nature of individual things. As in other respects, so also in this, the Platonic, or Aristo-Platonic philosophy, had much influence on Christian Theology. And some of the fathers and of the schoolmen approached more or less nearly to this doctrine of the pre[?]xistence, not only of the soul, but of all things in this ideal world. St. Bernard, in his strenuous opposition to nominalism, adopted the Platonic doctrine of ideas, which he identified with genera and species. These ideas, he taught, were eternal, although posterior to God, as an effect is in the order of nature after its cause. Providence applies the idea to matter, which becomes animated and takes form, and thus ("du monde intelligible est sorti le monde sensible") "ex mundo intelligibili mundus sensibilis perfectus natus est ex perfecto." [94] Among modern writers, Delitzsch comes nearest to this Platonic doctrine. He says, "Es giebt nach der Schrift eine Pr[?]existenz des Menschen und zwar eine ideale; . . . . eine Pr[?]existenz . . . . verm[?]ge welcher Mensch und Menschheit nicht blos ein fernzuk[?]nftiges Object g[?]ttlicher Voraussicht, sondern ein gegenw[?]rtiges Object g[?]ttlicher Anschauung sind im Spiegel der Weisheit. . . . . Nicht bloss Philosophie und falchber[?]hmte Gnosis, sondern auch die Schrift weiss und spricht von einer g[?]ttlichen Idealwelt, zu welcher sich die Zeitwelt wie die geschichtliche Verwirklichung eines ewigen Grundrisses verh[?]lt. [95] That is, "There is according to the Scriptures, an ideal pre[?]xistence of man; a pre[?]xistence in virtue of which man and humanity are contemplated by the divine omniscience not merely as objects lying far off in the future, but as present in the mirror of his wisdom. Not only philosophy and the so called Gnosis, but also the Scriptures recognize and avow a divine ideal world to which the actual world stands related as the historical development of an eternal conception." It is

doubtful, however, whether Delitzsch meant much more by this than that the omniscience of God embraces from eternity the knowledge of all things possible, and that his purpose determined from eternity the futurition of all actual events, so that his decree or plan as existing in the divine mind is realized in the external world and its history. The mechanist has in his mind a clear conception of the machine which he is about to make. But it is only by a figure of speech that the machine can be said to pre&#65533;xist in the artist's mind. This is very different from the Platonic and Realistic theory of pre&#65533;xistence.

Origen's Doctrine.

Pre&#65533;xistence, as taught by Origen, and as adopted here and there by some few philosophers and theologians, is not the Platonic doctrine of an ideal-world. It supposes that the souls of men had a separate, conscious, personal existence in a previous state; that having sinned in that pre&#65533;xistent state, they are condemned to be born into this world in a state of sin and in connection with a material body. This doctrine was connected by Origen with his theory of an eternal creation. The present state of being is only one epoch in the existence of the human soul. It has passed through innumerable other epochs and forms of existence in the past, and is to go through other innumerable such epochs in the future. He held to a metempsychosis very similar to that taught by Orientals both ancient and modern. But even without the encumbrance of this idea of the endless transmutation of the soul, the doctrine itself has never been adopted in the Church. It may be said to have begun and ended with Origen, as it was rejected both by the Greeks and Latins, and has only been advocated by individual writers from that day to this. It does not pretend to be a Scriptural doctrine, and therefore cannot be an object of faith. The Bible never speaks of a creation of men before Adam, or of any apostasy anterior to his fall, and it never refers the sinfulness of our present condition to any higher source than the sin of our first parent. The assumption that all human souls were created at the same time that the soul of Adam was created, and remain in a dormant, unconscious state until united to the bodies for which they were designed, has been adopted by so few as hardly to merit a place in the history of theological opinion.

It is a far more important question, whether the soul of each man is immediately created, or, whether it is generated by the parents. The former is known, in theology, as "Creationism," the latter as "Traducianism." The Greek Church from the first took ground in favour of creationism as alone consistent with the true nature of the soul. Tertullian in the Latin Church was almost a materialist, at least he used the language of materialism, and held that the soul was as much begotten as the body. Jerome opposed that doctrine. Augustine was also very adverse to it; but in his controversy with Pelagius on the propagation of sin, he was tempted to favour the theory of traduction as affording an easier explanation of the fact that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam. He never, however, could bring himself fully to adopt it. Creationism became subsequently the almost universally received doctrine of the Latin, as it had always been of the Greek, Church. At the time of the Reformation the Protestants as a body adhered to the same view. Even the Form of Concord, the authoritative symbol of the Lutheran Church, favours creationism. The body of the Lutheran theologians of the seventeenth century, however, adopted the theory of traduction. Among the Reformed the reverse was true. Calvin, Beza, Turrettin, and the great majority of the Reformed theologians were creationists, only here and there one

adopted the ex traduce theory. In modern times discussion on this point has been renewed. Many of the recent German theologians, and such as are inclined to realism in any form, have become more or less zealously the advocates of traducianism. This, however, is far from being the universal opinion of the Germans. Perhaps the majority of the German philosophers agree with Gnther: [96] "Traducianism has its functions in respect to the animal life of man; on the other hand, the province of Creationism is with the soul; and it would travel out of its province if it extended the immediate creative action of God to that animal life, which is the principle of his body's existence."

[94] Cousin, Fragments Philosophiques, pp. 172 176.

[95] Biblische Psychologie, p. 23.

[96] Vorschule der speculativen Theologie, 2d edit. Vienna. 1846, 1848, 2d part, p. 181.

§ 2. Traducianism.

'What is meant by the term traduction is in general sufficiently clear from the signification of the word. Traducianists on the one hand deny that the soul is created; and on the other hand, they affirm that it is produced by the law of generation, being as truly derived from the parents as the body. The whole man, soul and body, is begotten. The whole man is derived from the substance of his progenitors. Some go further than others in their assertions on this subject. Some affirm that the soul is susceptible of "abscission and division," so that a portion of the soul of the parents is communicated to the child. Others shrink from such expressions, and yet maintain that there is a true derivation of the one from the other. Both classes, however, insist on the numerical identity of essence in Adam and all his posterity both as to soul and as to body. The more enlightened and candid advocates of traducianism admit that the Scriptures are silent on the subject. Augustine had said the same thing a thousand years ago. "De re obscurissima disputatur, non adjuvantibus divinarum scripturarum certis clarisque documentis." The passages cited in support of the doctrine teach nothing decisive on the subject. That Adam begat a son in his own likeness, and after his own image, and called his name Seth, only asserts that Seth was like his father. It sheds no light on the mysterious process of generation, and does not teach how the likeness of the child to the parent is secured by physical causes. When Job asks, "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean?" and when our Lord says, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh," the fact is asserted that like begets like; that a corrupt nature is transmitted from parent to child. But that this can be done only by the transmission of numerically the same substance is a gratuitous assumption. More stress is laid on certain facts of Scripture which are assumed to favour this theory. That in the creation of the woman no mention is made of God's having breathed into her the breath of life, is said to imply that her soul as well as her body was derived from Adam. Silence, however, proves nothing. In Gen. i. 27, it is simply said, God treated man in his own image," just as it is said that He created "every creeping thing that creepeth upon the earth." Nothing is there said of his breathing into man the breath of life, i.e., a principle of rational life. Yet we know that it was done. Its not being expressly mentioned in the case of Eve, therefore, is no proof that it did not occur. Again, it is said, that God's resting on the Sabbath, implies that his creating energy was not

afterwards exerted. This is understood to draw the line between the immediate creation and the production of effects in nature by second causes under the providential control of God. The doctrine of creationism, on the other hand, assumes that God constantly, now as well as at the beginning, exercises his immediate agency in producing something out of nothing. But, in the first place, we do not know how the agency of God is connected with the operation of second causes, how far that agency is mediate, and how far it is immediate; and in the second place, we do know that God has not bound himself to mere providential direction; that his omnipresent power is ever operating through means and without means in the whole sphere of history and of nature. Of all arguments in favor of traducianism the most effective is that derived from the transmission of a sinful nature from Adam to his posterity. It is insisted that this can neither be explained nor justified unless we assume that Adam's sin was our sin and our guilt, and that the identical active, intelligent, voluntary substance which transgressed in him, has been transmitted to us. This is an argument which can be fully considered only when we come to treat of original sin. For the present it is enough to repeat the remark just made, that the fact is one thing and the explanation of the fact is another thing. The fact is admitted that the sin of Adam in a true and important sense is our sin, -- and that we derive from him a corrupt nature; but that this necessitates the adoption of the ex traduce doctrine as to the origin of the soul, is not so clear. It has been denied by the vast majority of the most strenuous defenders of the doctrine of original sin, in all ages of the Church. To call creationism a Pelagian principle is only an evidence of ignorance. Again, it is urged that the doctrine of the incarnation necessarily involves the truth of the ex traduce theory. Christ was born of a woman. He was the seed of the woman. Unless both as to soul and body derived from his human mother, it is said, He cannot truly be of the same race with us. The Lutheran theologians, therefore, say: "Si Christus non assumpsisset animam ab anima Mari&#xfffd;, animam humanam non redemisset." This, however, is a simple non sequitur. All that is necessary is that Christ should be a man, a son of David, in the same sense as any other of the posterity of David, save only his miraculous conception. He was formed ex substantia matris su&#xfffd; in the same sense in which every child born of a woman is born of her substance, but what that sense is, his birth does not determine. The most plausible argument in favour of traducianism is the undeniable fact of the transmission of the ethnical, national, family, and even parental, peculiarities of mind and temper. This seems to evince that there is a derivation not only of the body but also of the soul in which these peculiarities inhere. But even this argument is not conclusive, because it is impossible for us to determine to what proximate cause these peculiarities are due. They may all be referred, for what we know, to something peculiar in the physical constitution. That the mind is greatly influenced by the body cannot be denied. And a body having the physical peculiarities belonging to any race, nation, or family, may determine within certain limits the character of the soul.

§ 3. Creationism.

The common doctrine of the Church, and especially of the Reformed theologians, has ever been that the soul of the child is not generated or derived from the parents, but that it is created by the immediate agency of God. The arguments generally urged in favour of this view are, --

1. That it is more consistent with the prevailing representations of the Scriptures. In the original account of the creation there is a marked distinction made between the body and the soul. The one is from the earth, the other from God. This distinction is kept up throughout the Bible. The body and soul are not only represented as different substances, but also as having different origins. The body shall return to dust, says the wise man, and the spirit to God who gave it. Here the origin of the soul is represented as different flap and higher than that of the body. The former is from God in a sense in which the latter is not. In like manner God is said to form "the spirit of man within him" (Zech. xii. 1) to give "breath unto the people upon" the earth, "and spirit to them that walk therein." (Is. xlii. 5.) This language nearly agrees with the account of the original creation, in which God is said to have breathed into man the breath of life, to indicate that the soul is not earthy or material, but had its origin immediately from God. Hence He is called "God of the spirits of all flesh." (Num. xvi. 22.) It could not well be said that He is God of the bodies of all men. The relation in which the soul stands to God as its God and creator is very different from that in which the body stands to Him. And hence in Heb. xii. 9, it is said, "We have had fathers of our flesh which corrected us, and we gave them reverence: shall we not much rather be in subjection unto the Father of spirits, and live?" The obvious antithesis here presented is between those who are the fathers of our bodies and him who is the Father of our spirits. Our bodies are derived from our earthly parents, our souls are derived from God. This is in accordance with the familiar use of the word flesh, where it is contrasted, either expressly or by implication, with the soul. Paul speaks of those who had not "seen his face in the flesh," of "the life he now lived in the flesh." He tells the Philippians that it was needful for them that he should remain "in the flesh;" he speaks of his "mortal flesh." The Psalmist says of the Messiah, "my flesh shall rest in hope," which the Apostle explains to mean that his flesh should not see corruption. In all these, and in a multitude of similar passages, flesh means the body, and "fathers of our flesh" means fathers of our bodies. So far, therefore, as the Scriptures reveal anything on the subject, their authority is against traducianism and in favour of creationism.

Argument from the Nature of the Soul.

2. The latter doctrine, also, is clearly most consistent with the nature of the soul. The soul is admitted, among Christians, to be immaterial and spiritual. It is indivisible. The traducian doctrine denies this universally acknowledged truth. It asserts that the soul admits of "separation or division of essence." [97] On the same ground that the Church universally rejected the Gnostic doctrine of emanation as inconsistent with the nature of God as a spirit, it has, with nearly the same unanimity, rejected the doctrine that the soul admits of division of substance. This is so serious a difficulty that some of the advocates of the ex traduce doctrine endeavour to avoid it by denying that their theory assumes any such separation Dr division of the substance of the soul. But this denial avails little. They maintain that the same numerical essence which constituted the soul of Adam constitutes our souls. If this be so, then either humanity is a general essence of which individual men are the modes of existence, or what was wholly in Adam is distributively, partitively, and by separation, in the multitude of his descendants. Derivation of essence, therefore, does imply, and is generally admitted to imply, separation or division of essence. And this must be so if numerical identity of essence in all mankind is assumed to be secured by generation or propagation.

3. A third argument in favour of creationism and against traducianism is derived from the Scriptural doctrine as to the person of Christ. He was very man; He had a true human nature; a true body and a rational soul. He was born of a woman. He was, as to his flesh, the son of David. He was descended from the fathers. He was in all points made like as we are, yet without sin. This is admitted on both sides. But, as before remarked in reference to realism, this, on the theory of traducianism, necessitates the conclusion that Christ's human nature was guilty and sinful. We are partakers of Adam's sin both as to guilt and pollution, because the same numerical essence which sinned in him is communicated to us. Sin, it is said, is an accident, and supposes a substance in which it inheres, or to which it pertains. Community in sin supposes, therefore, community of essence. If we were not in Adam as to essence we did not sin in him, and do not derive a corrupt nature from him. But, if we were in him as to essence then his sin was our sin both as to guilt and pollution. This is the argument of traducianists repeated in every form. But they insist that Christ was in Adam as to the substance of his human nature as truly as we were. They say that if his body and soul were not derived from the body and soul of his virgin mother he was no true man, and cannot be the redeemer of men. What is true of other men must, consequently, be true of Him. He must, therefore, be as much involved in the guilt and corruption of the apostasy as other men. It will not do to affirm and deny the same thing. It s a contradiction to say that we are guilty of Adam's sin because we are partakers of his essence, and that Christ is not guilty of his sin nor involved in its pollution, although He is a partaker of his essence. If participation of essence involve community of guilt and depravity in the one case, it must also in the other. As this seems a legitimate conclusion from the traducian doctrine, and as this conclusion is anti-Christian, and false, the doctrine itself cannot be true.

[97] Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, vol. i p. 343, note.

§ 4. Concluding Remarks.

Such are the leading arguments on both sides of this question. In reference to this discussion it may be remarked, --

1. That while it is incumbent on us strenuously to resist any doctrine which assumes the divisibility, and consequent materiality, of the human soul, or which leads to the conclusion that the human nature of our blessed Lord was contaminated with sin, yet it does not become us to be wise above that which is written. We may confess that generation, the production of a new individual of the human race, is an inscrutable mystery. But this must be said of the transmission of life in all its forms. If theologians and philosophers would content themselves with simply denying the creation of the soul ex nihilo, without insisting on the division of the substance of the soul or the identity of essence in all human beings, the evil would not be so great. Some do attempt to be thus moderate, and say, with Frohschammer, [98] "Generare ist nicht ein traducere, sondern ein secund&#65533;res, ein creat&#65533;rliches creare." They avail themselves of the analogy often referred to, "cum flamma accendit flammam, neque tota flamma accendens transit in accensam neque pars ejus in eam descendit: ita anima parentum generat animam filii, ei nihil de cedat." It must be confessed, however, that in this view the theory loses all its value as a means of explaining the propagation of sin.

3. It is obviously most unreasonable and presumptuous, as well as dangerous, to make a theory as to the origin of the soul the ground of a doctrine so fundamental to the Christian system as that of original sin. Yet we see theologians, ancient and modern, boldly asserting that if their doctrine of derivation, and the consequent numerical sameness of substance in all men, be not admitted, then original sin is impossible. That is, that nothing can be true, no matter how plainly taught in the word of God, which they cannot explain. This is done even by those who protest against introducing philosophy into theology, utterly unconscious, as it would seem, that they themselves occupy, quoad hoc, the same ground with the rationalists. They will not believe in hereditary depravity unless they can explain the mode of its transmission. There can be no such thing, they say, as hereditary depravity unless the soul of the child is the same numerical substance as the soul of the parent. That is, the plain assertions of the Scriptures cannot be true unless the most obscure, unintelligible, and self-contradictory, and the least generally received philosophical theory as to the constitution of man and the propagation of the race be adopted. No man has a right to hang the millstone of his philosophy around the neck of the truth of God.

3. There is a third cautionary remark which must not be omitted. The whole theory of traducianism is founded on the assumption that God, since the original creation, operates only through means. Since the "sixth day the Creator has, in this world, exerted no strictly creative energy. He rested from the work of creation upon the seventh day, and still rests." [99] The continued creation of souls is declared by Delitzsch [100] 2 to be inconsistent with God's relation to the world. He now produces only mediately, i.e., through the operation of second causes. This is a near approach to the mechanical theory of the universe, which supposes that God, having created the world and endowed his creatures with certain faculties and properties, leaves it to the operation of these second causes. A continued superintendence of Providence may be admitted, but the direct exercise of the divine efficiency is denied. What, then, becomes of the doctrine of regeneration? The new birth is not the effect of second causes. It is not a natural effect produced by the influence of the truth or the energy of the human will. It is due to the immediate exercise of the almighty power of God. God's relation to the world is not that of a mechanist to a machine, nor such as limits Him to operating only through second causes. He is immanent in the world. He sustains and guides all causes. He works constantly through them, with them, and without them. As in the operations of writing or speaking there is with us the union and combined action of mechanical, chemical, and vital forces, controlled by the presiding power of mind; and as the mind, while thus guiding the operations of the body, constantly exercises its creative energy of thought, so God, as immanent in the world, constantly guides all the operations of second causes, and at the same time exercises uninterruptedly his creative energy. Life is not the product of physical causes. We know not that its origin is in any case due to any cause other than the immediate power of God. If life be the peculiar attribute of immaterial substance, it may be produced agreeably to a fixed plan by the creative energy of God whenever the conditions are present under which He has purposed it should begin to be. The organization of a seed, or of the embryo of an animal, so far as it consists of matter, may be due to the operation of material causes guided by the providential agency of God, while the vital principle itself is due to his creative power. There is nothing in this derogatory to the divine character. There is nothing in it contrary to the Scriptures. There is nothing in it out of analogy with the works and working of God. It is far preferable to the

theory which either entirely banishes God from the world, or restricts his operations to a concursus with second causes. The objection to creationism that it does away with the doctrine of miracles, or that it supposes God to sanction every act with which his creative power is connected, does not seem to have even plausibility. A miracle is not simply an event due to the immediate agency of God, for then every act of conversion would be a miracle. But it is an event, occurring in the external world, which involves the suspension or counteracting of some natural law, and which can be referred to nothing but the immediate power of God. The origination of life, therefore, is neither in nature nor design a miracle, in the proper sense of the word. This exercise of God's creative energy, in connection with the agency of second causes, no more implies approbation than the fact that He gives and sustains the energy of the murderer proves that He sanctions murder.

4. Finally this doctrine of traducianism is held by those who contend for the old realistic doctrine that humanity is a generic substance or life. The two theories, however, do not seem to harmonize, and their combination produces great confusion and obscurity. According to the one theory the soul of the child is derived from the soul of its parents; according to the other theory there is no derivation. One magnet is not, or need not be derived from another; one Leyden jar is not derived from another; nor one galvanic battery from another. There is no derivation in the case. The general forces of magnetism, electricity and galvanism, are manifested in connection with given material combinations. And if a man be the manifestation of the general principle of humanity in connection with a given human body, his human nature is not derived from his immediate progenitors.

The object of this discussion is not to arrive at certainty as to what is not clearly revealed in Scripture, nor to explain what is, on all sides, admitted to be inscrutable, but to guard against the adoption of principles which are in opposition to plain and important doctrines of the word of God. If traducianism teaches that the soul admits of abscission or division; or that the human race are constituted of numerically the same substance; or that the Son of God assumed into personal union with himself the same numerical substance which sinned and fell in Adam; then it is to be rejected as both false and dangerous. But if, without pretending to explain everything, it simply asserts that the human race is propagated in accordance with the general law which secures that like begets like; that the child derives its nature from its parents through the operation of physical laws, attended and controlled by the agency of God, whether directive or creative, as in all other cases of the propagation of living creatures, it may be regarded as an open question, or matter of indifference. Creationism does not necessarily suppose that there is any other exercise of the immediate power of God in the production of the human soul, than such as takes place in the production of life in other cases. It only denies that the soul is capable of division, that all mankind are composed of numerically the same essence and that Christ assumed numerically the same essence that sinned in Adam.

[98] Ueber den Ursprung der Seelen, Munich, 1854, p. 83, note 1.

[99] Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, vol. ii. p. 13.

[100] Delitzsch's Biblische Psychologie, p. 79.

CHAPTER IV: UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.

There is still another question which science has forced on theology, in relation to man, which cannot be overlooked. Have all mankind had a common origin? and have they a common nature? Are they all descended from one pair, and do they constitute one species? These questions are answered affirmatively in the Bible and by the Church universal. They are answered in the negative by a large and increasing class of scientific men. As the unity of the race is not only asserted in the Scriptures but also assumed in all they teach concerning the apostasy and redemption of man, it is a point about which the mind of the theologian should be intelligently convinced. As a mere theologian he may be authorized to rest satisfied with the declarations of the Bible; but as a defender of the faith he should be able to give an answer to those who oppose themselves.

There are two points involved in this question: community of origin, and unity of species All plants and animals derived by propagation from the same original stock are of the same species but those of the same species need not be derived from a common stock. If God saw fit at the beginning, or at any time since, to create plants or animals of the same kind in large numbers and in different parts of the earth, they would be of the same species (or kind) though not of the same origin. The oaks of America and those of Europe are identical in species, even although not derived from one and the same parent oak. It may be admitted that the great majority of plants and animals were originally produced not singly or in pairs, but in groups, the earth bringing forth a multitude of individuals of the same kind. It is therefore in itself possible that all men may be of the same species, although not all descended from Adam. And such is the opinion of some distinguished naturalists. The Scriptural doctrine, however, concerning man is, that the race is not only the same in kind but the same in origin. They are all the children of a common parent, and have a common nature.

§ 1. Meaning of the Word, or the Idea of Species.

It is obviously essential to any intelligent answer to the question whether all the varieties of. men are of one species, that we should be able to tell what a species is. This is a point of very great difficulty. Naturalists not only differ in their definitions of the term, but they differ greatly in classification. Some assume a spot on the wing of a butterfly, or a slight diversity of plumage in a bird, as proof of difference of species. Some therefore divide into six or eight species what others comprehend in one. Nothing there-fore can be done until men come to a common understanding on this subject, and the true idea of species be determined and authenticated.

General Characteristics of Species.

Before considering the various definitions of the term, it is proper to remark that there are certain characteristics of species which at least, until of late, have been generally recognized and admitted. (1.) Originality, i.e., they owe their existence and character to immediate creation. They are not produced by physical causes, nor are they ever derived from other genera or species. They are original forms. This is admitted by naturalists of all classes. Such is the doctrine of Cuvier, Agassiz, Dr. Morton, and of those who hold that the varieties of the human race are so many distinct species. They mean by this that they had different origins, and are not all derived from a common stock. Every species therefore, by general consent, has had a single origin. (2.) Universality, i.e., all the individuals and varieties belonging to the same species have all its essential characteristics. Wherever you find the teeth of a carnivorous animal, you find a stomach able to digest animal food, and claws adapted to seize and hold prey. Wherever you find fins to effect motion in water, you find a breathing apparatus suited to the same element. The species is transmitted whole and entire. It is the same in all individuals belonging to it, and in that sense universal. (3.) Immutability, or permanence. By this is meant first, that one species is never lost or merged in another; and secondly, that two or more species never combine so as to produce a third. The rose cannot be merged into the tulip; nor can the rose and tulip be made to produce a new species, which is neither the one nor the other. The only permanent transmissible forms of organic life, are such as constitute distinct species. Immutability, therefore, or the power to perpetuate itself, is one of the indispensable characteristics of species. This, until recently, has been the universally admitted doctrine of naturalists. And notwithstanding the efforts of the advocates of the different theories of development, it still remains the general faith of the scientific world. The leading arguments in support of this doctrine have already been adverted to, when speaking of the theory of Mr. Darwin on the origin of species. Those arguments are briefly the following. (1.) The historical fact that all known species of plants and animals are now precisely what they were as far back as history reaches. The Bible and the records on the Egyptian monuments carry us back to a point thousands of years before the birth of Christ. During this whole period of five or six thousand years species have remained the same. (2.) If we are to receive the facts of geology as authenticated, it is clear that the same permanence has existed from the very beginning of life on our globe. As long as any species exists at all, it exists unchanged in all that is essential to it. (3.) There is an entire and acknowledged absence of all evidence of transmutation; none of the transition points or links of connection between one species and another is anywhere discoverable. (4.) If species were not thus immutable the animal and vegetable world instead of presenting the beautiful order everywhere visible, would exhibit a perfect chaos of all organic life. (5.) Notwithstanding the ingenious and long continued efforts to render hybrids prolific, such attempts have uniformly failed. The two greatest living authorities on this subject are Dr. Bachman of Charleston, South Carolina, and M. Flourens of the Jardin des Plantes in Paris. "Either hybrids," says the latter, "born of the union of two distinct species, unite and soon become sterile, or they unite with one of the parent stocks and soon return to this type -- they in no case give what may be called a new species, that is to say, an intermediate durable species." "Les esp&#65533;ces ne s'alt&#65533;rent point, ne changent point, ne passent point de l'une &#65533; l'autre; les esp&#65533;ces sont Fixes." [101] There is no natural law better authenticated or more generally admitted than that species are immutable and capable of indefinite propagation.

No group of animals therefore can be regarded as a distinct species which has not existed as distinct from the beginning, and which is not immutable in its essential characteristics, and which is not capable of propagating itself indefinitely. These are important landmarks, but they are not sufficient to guide us in all cases to a satisfactory conclusion as to whether given individuals or varieties are of the same or of different species. (1.) Because the origin of these varieties cannot be historically traced. The Caucasian and the negro have existed with their present distinguishing characteristics for several thousands of years. But this does not prove that they differed from the beginning. (2.) Because certain varieties of the same species when once established become permanent, and are capable of indefinite continuance. Several varieties of dogs depicted on the Egyptian monuments centuries before Christ, are precisely what now exist. Naturalists therefore have sought for some precise definition of species, although these attempts have not been generally successful. Cuvier says: "We are under the necessity of admitting the existence of certain forms which have perpetuated themselves from the beginning of the world, without exceeding the limits first prescribed; all the individuals belonging to one of these forms constitute what is termed a species." De Candolle says: "We write under the designation of species all those individuals who mutually bear such close resemblance to each other as admits of our supposing they have arisen from a single pair." Agassiz [102] says: "Species is founded upon less important distinctions, such as color, size, proportions, sculpture, etc." The objections to these definitions are, (1.) That they do not enable us to distinguish between species and varieties. (2.) They refer almost exclusively to what is external or material, colour, size, proportion, etc., as the criteria, to the neglect of the higher constituents of the animal. Dr. Prichard says, that under the term species are included all those animals which are supposed to have arisen in the first instance from a single pair. And to the same effect Dr. Carpenter says: "When it can be shown that two races have had a separate origin, they are regarded as of different species; and, in the absence of proof; this is inferred when we find some peculiarity of organization characteristic of each, so constantly transmitted From parent to offspring, that the one cannot be supposed to have lost, or the other to have acquired it, through any known operation of physical causes." The objection to this view of the matter is that it makes community of origin, either proved or inferred, the criterion of sameness of species. But, in the first place, this community of origin cannot in a multitude of cases be established; and in the case of man, it is the very thing to be proved. The great question is, are Mongolians, Africans, and Caucasians all derived from a common parent? And in the second place, although community of origin would prove identity of species, diversity of origin would not prove diversity of species. All the varieties of the horse and dog would constitute one species for each class, although they had been created as they now are. Species means kind, and If two animals are of the same kind they are of the same species, no matter what their origin may have been. Had God created one pair of lions in Asia, another in North Africa, another in Senegal, they would all belong to one species. Their identity of kind would be precisely the same as though all were descended from one pair. Dr. Morton's definition of species as "a primordial organic form," has obtained general acceptance. It is, however, liable to objection on the ground of the ambiguity of the word form. If by "form" be understood external structure, the definition is unsatisfactory; if we understand the word in its

scholastic sense of essential and formative principle, it amounts to the same thing which is more distinctly expressed in other terms. Agassiz gives another and much more satisfactory idea of the nature of species, when he refers to an immaterial principle as its essential element, and that to which the sameness of the individuals and varieties embraced within it is to be referred. [103] He says: "Besides the distinctions to be derived from the varied structure of organs, there are others less subject to rigid analysis, but no less decisive, to be drawn from the immaterial principle, with which every animal is endowed. It is this which determines the constancy of species from generation to generation, and which is the source of all the varied exhibitions of instinct and intelligence which we see displayed, from the simple impulse to receive the food which is brought within their reach, as observed in the polyps, through the higher manifestations, in the cunning fox, the sagacious elephant, the faithful dog, and the exalted intellect of man, which is capable of indefinite expansion." Again, he says: [104] "The constancy of species is a phenomenon dependent on the immaterial nature." "All animals," he says, "may be traced back in the embryo to a mere point upon the yolk of an egg, bearing no resemblance whatever to the future animal. But even here an immaterial principle which no external influence can prevent or modify, is present, and determines its future form; so that the egg of a hen can produce only a chicken, and the egg of a codfish only a cod." Professor Dana says: [105] "The units of the inorganic world are the weighed elements and their definite compounds or their molecules. The units of the organic are species, which exhibit themselves in their simplest condition in the germ-cell state. The kingdoms of life in all their magnificent proportions are made from these units." Again, [106] "When individuals multiply from generation to generation, it is but a repetition of the primordial type-idea; and the true notion of the species is not in the resulting group, but in the idea or potential element which is at the basis of every individual of the group." Here we reach solid ground. Unity of species does not consist in unity or sameness of organic structure, in sameness as to size, colour, or anything merely external; but in the sameness of the immaterial principle, or "potential idea," which constitutes and determines the sameness of nature. In the initial point on the yolk of the egg, there is no difference of form, no difference discernible by the microscope, or discoverable by chemical analysis, between one germ and another; between the initial cell of the bird and that of the fish. And yet the whole difference is there. The difference, therefore, cannot exist in what is external (although within certain limits and in further development it is manifested externally), but in what is immaterial. So that where the immaterial principle of Agassiz, or the potential idea of Dana, is the same, the species is the same; where the immaterial principle is different, the species is different.

[101] De la Longevit Humaine, etc., par P. Flourens, Paris, 1855.

[102] Principles of zology, p. XIV.

[103] Principles of zology, p. 9.

[104] Ibid. p 43.

[105] Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857. p. 863.

[106] Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857, p. 861.

§ 2. Evidence of Identity of Species.

Such being the case, the only question is, how can we deter-mine whether the immaterial principle which constitutes and deter-mines the species, be the same or different. Aside from divine revelation, this can be ascertained: (1.) Partly from the organic structure. (2.) Partly from the phusis, or physical nature. (3.) Partly from the psuche, or psychological nature. (4.) Partly from permanence and capability of indefinite propagation.

Organic Structure.

The first evidence of the identity of species is to be sought in the soma, or the organic structure. The evidence of design is impressed won all the organized bodies in the universe, and especially upon the bodies of all animals. Those intended to live on the dry ground, those intended to live in water, and those intended to fly in the air, have their animal frame adapted to these severe, modes or conditions of existence. There is also clear evidence of the unity of this design. That is, it is carried out in all parts of the bodily organization. Those animals intended to live on dry ground have none of the structure, or organs, or members peculiarly suited to aquatic animals. The lion, tiger, ox, horse, etc., have neither the gills, the scales, the fins, nor the rudder-like tail of the fish. All parts of the animal harmonize. They are all related and adapted to one and the same end. The body of the fish is shaped so as to cleave the water with the least resistance; its fins are oars, its tail is adapted both for propulsion and guidance; its breathing apparatus is suited to separate the air from water; its digestive organs are adapted to the assimilation of the kind of food furnished by the element in which it lives. The same thing is obviously true of all terrestrial animals. Besides this general adaptation of animals for living in the air, in the water, and on the dry ground, there are innumerable more specific adaptations suiting the species of fishes, birds, and land animals for the particular modes of life for which they are designed. Some are intended to be carnivorous, and their bodies are harmoniously constructed with a view to that end. Others are intended to live on herbs, and in them we find everything adapted for that purpose. This adaptation refers to numerous and varied purposes. Hence the genera and the species of animals belonging to the different departments, classes, orders, and families into which the animal kingdom is divided, are exceedingly numerous, and each has its distinctive corporeal organization indicative of the specific end it is intended to subserve. So minute, and so fixed is the plan on which each species of animal is constructed, that a skilful naturalist, from the examination of a single bone, can tell not only the family, or genus, but the very species to which it belongs. Agassiz has, from a single scale of a fish, delineated its whole body as accurately as though the living animal had been photographed. And the correctness of his delineation has been afterwards verified by the discovery of a perfect specimen of the species portrayed. Now, the important principle deducible from these admitted facts is, that no diversity of colour, form, proportion, structure, etc., not indicative of design, or not proving a difference in the immaterial principle which determines the nature of the animal, can of itself be admitted as proof of diversity of species. The Italian greyhound and the English mastiff differ in all the respects just mentioned. The Shetland pony, the London dray-horse, and the Arabian or the Barb exhibit similar striking diversities. But when they come to be anatomically examined, it is found that they are constructed on the same plan. The bony structures, the distribution of the nerves, muscles, and blood-vessels, are all expressive of the same general intention. Hence, naturalists refer these varieties to the same species. And the correctness of this conclusion is confirmed by every other criterion of the identity of species. While it is

admitted that such diversities do exist in the varieties belonging to the same species of the lower animals, it is surprising that far less diversities of the same kind among the varieties of the human family should be insisted upon, as evidence of difference of species. The wild dog wherever found is nearly of the same colour, and the same size, with ears, limbs and tail of the same form, and yet how endless are the permanent varieties derived from that original stock. It is well known that such varieties can be artificially produced. By skilful breeding almost any peculiarity of form, colour, or structure within the limits of the original idea of the species, can be produced and perpetuated; as is seen in the different breeds of horses, cattle, and sheep found even in so restricted a field of operation as Great Britain. It is certain, therefore, that no diversity of an external or material character, not indicative of diversity of design, plan, and intention can properly be assumed as indicative of diversity of species. The presence of a skin connecting the toes or claws of a bird, is in itself a comparatively small affair. It is insignificant as to the amount of material expended, and as to the effect on the general appearance compared to the points of difference between the greyhound and the mastiff, and yet it is indicative of design. It indicates that the animal is intended to live in the water; and everything else in its structure and nature is found to correspond with that intention. A small difference of structure indicative of design will prove difference of species, when much greater differences not thus indicative are perfectly consistent with unity of species.

Physiological Argument.

The second method of determining the identity of the immaterial principle in which the idea of species resides, is the examination of its phusis, or its physiology. To this department belongs all that relates to enervation or the distribution of the nerve power; to the circulation of the blood; to respiration; to calorification or production of animal heat; to the distribution of the muscles voluntary and involuntary; to the processes of digestion, assimilation, propagation, etc., etc. As to this point it is to be observed, (1.) That the phusis, or animal nature, is always in accordance with the soma, or corporeal structure. We never find the organs of an aquatic animal with the phusis of a land animal. Everything relating to the physiology of the animal is in harmony with its corporeal organization. (2.) That where in all respects the physical nature of individuals or varieties is the same, there the species is the same; where the phusis is different, the species is different. (3.) That the physiology of an animal is thus as easily ascertained, and is just as uniform and fixed, as its material structure, and in fact much more so. The material structure may, and as we have seen does, differ exceedingly in the different varieties included under the same species, but the phusis is always the same. The physiology of the greyhound is identical with that of the mastiff; and that of the Shetland pony is the same as that of the London dray-horse.

Psychological Argument.

The third criterion of the identity of species is to be sought in the psuche, or the psychological nature of the animal. The psuche is the immaterial principle which belongs to all animals, and is the same in kind in every distinct species. It is that in which the life resides; which is the seat of the instincts, and of that measure of intelligence, be it greater or less, which belongs to the animal. The psuche is the same in all the individuals of the same species, and it is permanent. The instincts and habits of the bee, the wasp, the ant, and the beaver; of the lion, tiger, wolf, fox, horse, dog, and ox; and of all the endless diversities

of beasts, birds, fishes, and insects, are the same in all ages and in all parts of the world. This immaterial principle is of a higher order in some cases than in others, and admits of greater or less degrees of culture, as seen in the trained elephant or well-disciplined pointer. But the main thing is that each species has its own psuche, and that this is a higher element and more decisive evidence of identity than the corporeal structure or even the phusis, or animal nature. Where these three criteria concur, where the corporeal organization, in everything indicative of design, is the same; where the phusis and the psuche, the physical and psychological natures, are the same, there, beyond all reasonable doubt, the species is the same.

The fourth criterion of species is found not only in its permanence but in the capacity of procreation and indefinite propagation which belongs to all the individuals and varieties which it includes. Animals of the same species can propagate their kind. Animals of different species cannot combine and perpetuate a new or mongrel species. This as we have seen is an admitted fact among all classes of naturalists, a few individuals excepted. It is a fact patent to all mankind and verified by the experience of all ages.

§ 3. Application of these Criteria to Man.

When we come to apply these several criteria to the human race, it is found beyond dispute that they all concur in proving that the whole human family are of one and the same species. In the first place the corporeal frame or external structure is the same in all the varieties of the race. There is the same number of bones in the skeleton; their arrangement and disposition are the same. There is the same distribution of the blood-vessels. The brain, the spinal marrow, and the nervous system are the same in all. They all have the same muscles amounting to many thousand in number. The organs for breathing, respiration, digestion, secretion, and assimilation, are the same in all. There are indeed indefinite diversities in size, complexion, and character, and colour of the hair, within the same variety of the race, and between the varieties themselves. Some of these diversities are variable, and some are fixed. The Caucasian, the Mongolian, the African, have each their peculiarities by which the one is easily distinguished from the other, and which descend from generation to generation without alteration. With regard to these peculiarities, however, it is to be remarked, first, that they are less important and less conspicuous than those which distinguish the different varieties of domestic animals all belonging to the same species. No two men, or no men of different races, differ from each other so much as the little Italian greyhound and the powerful mastiff or bull-dog. And secondly, none of these peculiarities are indicative of difference of design, or plan, and therefore they are not indicative of difference in the immaterial principle, which according to the naturalists of the highest class, determines the identity of species and secures its permanence. And thirdly, these peculiarities are all referrible to the differences of climate, diet, and mode of life, and to the effect of propagation in case of acquired peculiarities. The truth of this last statement as to the influence of these several causes in modifying and perpetuating varieties in the same species, is abundantly illustrated and confirmed in the case of all the lower animals. Such is the sameness of all the varieties of mankind as to their corporeal structure, that a system of anatomy written in Europe and founded on the examination of the bodies of Europeans exclusively, would be as applicable in Asia, Africa, America, and Australia, as

in Europe itself.

The second criterion of sameness of species is to be sought in the phusis, or physical nature. In this respect also all mankind are found to agree, so that the physiology of the Caucasian, Mongolian, and African is precisely the same. The laws which regulate the vital processes are the same in all; respiration, digestion, secretion, and propagation, are all conducted in the same way in every variety of the species.

The third criterion is found in the psuche or psychological nature. This, as we have seen, is the highest test, for the psuche or immaterial principle is the most important element in the constitution of every living creature. Where that is the same, the species is the same. There can be no reasonable doubt that the souls of all men are essentially the same. They not only have in common all the appetites, instincts, and passions, which belong to the souls of the lower animals, but they all share in those higher attributes which belong exclusively to man. They all are endowed with reason, conscience, and free agency. They all have the same constitutional principles and affections. They all stand in the same relation to God as spirits possessing a moral and religious nature.

The fourth criterion is permanence, and the ability of indefinite propagation. We have seen that it is a law of nature, recognized by all naturalists (with a few recent exceptions), that animals of different species do not cohabit, and cannot propagate. Where the species are nearly allied, as the horse and the ass, they may produce offspring combining the peculiarities of both parents. But there the process stops. Mules cannot continue the mongrel race. It is however an admitted fact that men of every race, Caucasian, Mongolian, and African, can thus cohabit, and their offspring can be indefinitely propagated and combined. "Were these units [species]," says Professor Dana, [107] capable of blending with one another indefinitely, they would no longer be units, and species could not be recognized. The system of life would be a maze of complexities; and whatever its grandeur to a being that could comprehend the infinite, it would be unintelligible chaos to man. . . . It would be to man the temple of nature fused over its whole surface, and through its structure, without a line the mind could measure or comprehend." As therefore the universe is constructed on a definite plan; as its laws are uniform; and as the constituent elements of the material world are permanent, it would be in strange contradiction with this universal analogy, if in the highest department of nature, in the organic and living world, everything should be unstable, so that species could mingle with species, and chaos take the place of order and uniformity. As therefore the different varieties of men freely unite and produce offspring permanently prolific, all those varieties must belong to one and the same species, or one of the most fixed of the laws of nature, is in their case reversed.

The Evidence of Identity of Race Cumulative.

It is to be observed that the strength of this argument for the unity of the human race does not depend upon any one of the above mentioned particulars separately. It is rather in their combination that the power of the argument lies. It is not simply because the corporeal structure is essentially the same in all men; nor simply because they have all the same physical, or the same psychological nature; or that they are capable of producing permanently prolific offspring; but because all these particulars are true in respect to the whole human family wherever found and through the whole course of its history. It becomes a mere matter of logomachy to dispute whether men are of the same species, if they have the

same material organism, the same phusis and the same psuche. Whether of the same species or not, if these things be admitted which cannot be rationally denied, they are of the same nature, they are beings of the same kind. Naturalists may give what meaning they please to the word species. This cannot alter the facts of the case. All men are of the same blood, of the same race, of the same order of creation.

"That the races of men," says Delitzsch, "are not species of one genus, but varieties of one species, is confirmed by the agreement in the psychological and pathological phenomena in them all, by similarity in the anatomical structure, in the fundamental powers and traits of the mind, in the limits to the duration of life, in the normal temperature of the body and the average rate of pulsation, in the duration of pregnancy, and in the unrestricted fruitfulness of marriages between the various races." [108]

[107] Bibliotheca Sacra, 1857, p. 863.

[108] Commentary on Genesis.

§ 4. Philological and Moral Evidence.

Besides the arguments above mentioned, which are all of a zo[?]logical character, there are others, not less conclusive, of a different kind. It is one of the infelicities which has attended this controversy, that it has been left too much in the hands of naturalists, of men trained to the consideration almost exclusively of what is material, or at most of what falls within the department of natural life. They thus become one-sided, and fail to take in all the aspects of the case, or to estimate duly all the data which enter into the solution of the problem. Thus Agassiz ignores all the facts connected with the languages, with the history, and with the mental, moral, and religious character and condition of man. He therefore comes to conclusions which a due consideration of those data would have rendered impossible.

The science of comparative philology, is founded on laws which are as certain ant, as authoritative as the laws of nature. Language is not a fortuitous production. It is essentially different from instinctive cries, or inarticulate sounds. It is a production of the mind, exceedingly complex and subtle. It is impossible that races, entirely distinct, should have the same language. It is absolutely certain from the character of the French, Spanish, and Italian languages, that those nations are, in large measure, the common descendants of the Latin race. When therefore it can be shown that the languages of different races or varieties of men are radically the same, or derived from a common stock, it is impossible rationally to doubt their descent from a common ancestry. Unity of language, therefore, proves unity of species because it proves unity of origin. Diversity of language, however, does not prove diversity either of species or of origin; because that diversity may be otherwise accounted for; as by the confusion of tongues at Babel, or by the early and long-continued separation of different tribes. The point, however, now to be urged, is this. Such naturalists as Agassiz, on merely zo[?]logical principles, have decided that it is more probable (not that it is necessary or certain, but simply that it is more probable), that the different varieties of men, even down to different nations, have had different origins, and as Agassiz in his later writings maintains, are of different species; when, in many cases at least, it is absolutely certain, from the character of the languages which they speak, that they must have been

derived from a common stock. Agassiz and others represent the Asiatic and European races as distinct in origin and species. But Alexander von Humboldt says, "The comparative study of languages shows us that races now separated by vast tracts of land, are allied together, and have migrated from one common primitive seat. . . . The largest field for such investigations into the ancient condition of language, and consequently into the period when the whole family of mankind was, in the strict sense of the word, to be regarded as one living whole, presents itself to the long chain of Indo-Germanic languages, extending from the Ganges to the Iberian extremity of Europe, and from Sicily to the North Cape." [109] Max M﷽ller says, "The evidence of language is irrefragable, and it is the only evidence worth listening to, with regard to ante-historical periods There is not an English jury nowadays, which, after examining the hoary documents of language, would reject the claim of a common descent and a legitimate relationship between Hindu, Greek, and Teuton." [110] The Chevalier Bunsen says, "The Egyptian language attests an unity of blood with the great Aramaic tribes of Asia, whose languages have been comprised under the general expression of Semitic, of the languages of the family of Shem. It is equally connected by identity of origin with those still more numerous and illustrious tribes which occupy now the greatest part of Europe, and may, perhaps, alone or with other families, have a right to be called the family of Japhet." [111] This family, he says, includes the German nation, the Greeks and Romans, and the Indians and Persians. Two thirds of the human race are thus identified by these two classes of languages which have had a common origin. By the same infallible test Bunsen shows that the Asiatic origin of all the North American Indians, "is as fully proved as the unity of family among themselves." [112] Every day is adding some new language to this affiliated list, and furnishing additional evidence of the unity of mankind. The particular point to be now considered is, that the conclusions of the mere zo﷽logist as to the diversity of species and consequent diversity of origin of the different varieties of our race, are proved to be false by the certain testimony of the common origin of the languages which they speak.

The Spiritual Relationship of Men.

Besides the arguments already mentioned in favour of the unity of mankind, next to the direct assertion of the Bible, that which after all has the greatest force is the one derived from the present condition of our moral and spiritual nature. Wherever we meet a man, no matter of what name or nation, we not only find that he has the same nature with ourselves; that he has the same organs, the same senses, the same instincts, the same feelings, the same faculties, the same understanding, will, and conscience, and the same capacity for religious culture, but that he has the same guilty and polluted nature, and needs the same redemption. Christ died for all men, and we are commanded to prea0h the gospel to every creature under heaven. Accordingly nowhere on the face of the earth are men to he found who do not need the gospel or who are not capable of becoming partakers of the blessings which it offers. The spiritual relationship of men, their common apostasy, and their common interest in the redemption of Christ, demonstrate their common nature and their common origin beyond the possibility of reasonable or excusable doubt.

Our attention has thus far been directed specially to the unity of mankind in species. Little need he said in conclusion as to their unity of origin. (1.) Because in the opinion of the most distinguished naturalists, unity of species is itself decisive proof of the unity of

origin. (2.) Because even if this he denied, it is nevertheless universally admitted that when the species is the same the origin may he the same. If mankind differ as to species they cannot be descended from a common parent, but if identical in species there is no difficulty in admitting their common descent. It is indeed principally for the sake of disproving the Scriptural statement that all men are the children of Adam, and to break up the common brotherhood of man, that diversity of species is insisted upon. If therefore the latter be admitted, the former may he easily conceded. (3.) The common origin of the languages of the vast majority of men, proves, as we have seen, their community of origin, and as an inference their unity as to species. And as this community of origin is proved as to races which the mere zo&#65533;logist is disposed with the greatest confidence to represent as distinct, the insufficiency of the grounds of their classification is thereby demonstrated. (4.) It is, however, the direct testimony of the Scriptures on this subject, with which all known facts are consistent; and the common apostasy of the race, and their common need of redemption, which render it certain to all who believe the Bible or the testimony of their own consciousness as to the universal sinfulness of humanity, that all man are the descendants of one fallen progenitor.

[109] Cosmos, Ott&#65533;'s Translation, edit. London, 1849, vol. ii. pp. 471, 472.

[110] Quoted in Cabell's Unity of Mankind, pp. 228, 229.

[111] Ibid. p. 232.

[112] The Philosophy of Universal History, edit. London, 1854, vol. ii. p. 112.

CHAPTER V: ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.

§ 1. The Scriptural Doctrine.

The Scriptural doctrine on this subject includes the following particulars. First, That man was originally created in a state of maturity and perfection. By this, however, is not meant that humanity in Adam before the fall, existed in the highest state of excellence of which it is susceptible. It is altogether probable that our nature, in virtue of its union with the divine nature in the person of Christ, and in virtue of the union of the redeemed with their exalted Redeemer, shall hereafter be elevated to a dignity and glory far greater than that in which Adam was created or to which he ever could have attained. By the maturity of man as at first created is meant that he was not created in a state of infancy. It is a favourite assumption of sceptics that man at first both as to soul and body, was imbecile and unfurnished; slowly forming for himself an articulate language, and having his moral powers gradually awakened. This, however, is inconsistent not only with the Scriptural account of his creation, but also with the part he was designed to act, and in fact did act. By the perfection of his original state is meant, that he was perfectly adapted to the and for which the was made and to the sphere in which he was designed to move. This perfection as to his body consisted not only in the integrity and due proportion of all its parts, but also in its perfect adaptation to the nature of the soul with which it was united. It is commonly said by theologians that the body way created immortal and impassible. With regard to its immortality it is certain that if man had not sinned he would not have died. But whether the immortality which would then have been they destiny of the body, would have been the result of its original organization, or whether after its period of probation it would have undergone a change to adapt it to its everlasting condition, is a matter to be subsequently considered. By impassibility is not necessarily meant entire freedom from susceptibility to pain, for such susceptibility in our present earthly state, and perhaps in any conceivable earthly state, is a necessary condition of safety. It is a good and not an evil, a perfection and not a defect. All that need he meant by the term is that the body of Adam was free from the seeds of disease and death. There was nothing in its constitution inconsistent with the highest happiness and well-being of man in the state in which he was created, and the conditions under which he was to live.

That the primitive state of our race was not one of barbarism from which men have raised themselves by a slow process of improvement, we know, First, from the authority of Scripture, which represents, as we have seen, the first man as created in the full perfection of his nature. This fact for all Christians is decisive. Secondly, the traditions of all nations treat of a golden age from which men have fallen. These wide-spread traditions cannot rationally be accounted for, except on the assumption that the Scriptural account of the

primitive state of man is correct. Thirdly, the evidence of history is all on the side of the doctrine of the Bible on this subject. Egypt derived its civilization from the East; Greece from Phoenicia and Egypt; Italy from Phoenicia and Greece; the rest of Europe from Italy. Europe is now rapidly extending her civilizing influence over New Zealand, Australia, and the Islands of the Pacific Oceans. The affinity of languages proves that the early civilization of Mexico and South America had its source in Eastern Asia. On the other hand, there is no authentic account of a nation of savages rising by their own efforts from a state of barbarism to a civilized condition. The fact that Sir John Lubbock, and other advocates of the opposite doctrine, are obliged to refer to such obscure and really insignificant facts, as the superior culture of the modern Indians on this continent, is a proof of the dearth of historical evidence in support of the theory of primitive barbarism. Fourthly, the oldest records, written and monumental, give evidence of the existence of nations in a high state of civilization, in the earliest periods of human history. This fact is easily accounted for on the assumption of the truth of the Scriptural doctrine of the primitive state of man, but is unaccountable on the opposite hypothesis. It necessitates the gratuitous assumption of the existence of men for untold ages prior to these earliest historical periods. Fifthly, comparative philology has established the fact of the intimate relation of all of the great divisions of the human race. It has further proved that they all had their origin from a common centre, and that that centre was the seat of the earliest civilization.

The theory that the race of man has passed through a stone, a bronze, and an iron age, stages of progress from barbarism to civilization, is, as before remarked, destitute of scientific foundation. It cannot be proved that the stone age prevailed contemporaneously in all parts of the earth. And unless this is proved it avails nothing to show that there was a period at which the inhabitants of Europe were destitute of a knowledge of the metals. The same may be proved of the Patagonians and of some African tribes of the present day.

It has, therefore, been almost the universal belief that the original state of man was as the Bible teaches, his highest state, from which the nations of the earth have more or less deteriorated. This primitive state, however, was distinguished by the intellectual, moral, and religious superiority of men rather than by superiority in the arts or natural sciences. The Scriptural doctrine, therefore, is consistent with the admitted fact that separate nations, and the human race as a whole, have made great advances in all branches of knowledge and in all the arts of life. Nor is it inconsistent with the belief that the world under the influence of Christianity is constantly improving, and will ultimately attain, under the reign of Christ, millennial perfection and glory. All that is denied is, that men were originally savages in the lowest state of barbarism, from which they have gradually emerged.

The late Archbishop Whately, in his work on "Political Economy," avowed his belief of the common doctrine on the primitive state of man. He says, "We have no reason to believe that any community ever did, or ever can emerge, unassisted by external helps, from a state of barbarism unto anything that can be called civilization." In opposition to this doctrine, Sir John Lubbock tries to show "That there are indications of progress even among savages," and, "That among the most civilized nations there are traces of original barbarism." [113] Before adducing proof of either of those propositions, he argues against the theory that any tribe has sunk from a higher to a lower condition, on the ground that there are certain arts which are so simple and so useful, that if once known, they could never be

lost. If men had once been herdsmen and agriculturists, they would never become mere hurters; if acquainted with the use of metals, or the art of making earthenware, these acquisitions could not be lost. If once possessed of religious knowledge, that knowledge could never perish. As however, there are tribes now extant which have, as he says, no religion, and no knowledge of the arts, or of agriculture, he argues that they must have been barbarians from the beginning, and that barbarism must have been the original condition of man.

To prove that savages may by their own exertions become civilized he refers to such facts as the following: The Australians had formerly bark-canoes, which they have abandoned for others, hollowed out of the trunk of a tree, "which they buy from the Malays." The Peruvians had domesticated the llama; the Polynesians made bark-cloth. "Another very strong case," he says, "is the boomerang of the Australians. This weapon is known to no other race of men," and therefore, he argues, cannot be a relic of a higher state of civilization. He lays great stress on the case of the Cherokees who have become agriculturists, having ploughs, horses, black-cattle, etc., ignoring the fact that they were surrounded by civilized Americans and had enjoyed for years the faithful teaching of Christian missionaries who instructed them in all the useful arts.

He finds indications of the original barbarism of the race in the fact that flint implements are found not only in Europe, but also in Asia, the cradle of mankind; and in the gradual improvement of the relation between the sexes. [114] His book is designed to "describe the social and mental condition of savages, their art, their systems of marriage and of relationship, their religions, language, moral character and laws." This he does by a very copious collection of particulars under these several heads; and thence draws the following conclusions. "That existing savages are not the descendants of civilized ancestors. That the primitive condition of man was one of utter barbarism. That from this condition several races have independently raised themselves." [115] How these conclusion's follow from the facts detailed, it is impossible to see; especially as hey are in opposition not only to the Bible, but to all the teachings of history. That the lowest savage tribes have low ideas of God, is no proof that our first parents were fetich worshippers, when all history proves that the earliest religion of our race was pure Theism. As men lost the knowledge of the true God, they became more and more degraded in every other respect. And those who were driven away from the centres of civilization into inhospitable regions, torrid or arctic, sunk lower and lower in the scale of being. Certain it is that there is nothing in Sir John Lubbock's book that can shake the faith of a Christian child in the doctrine of the Bible as to the primitive state of man.

[113] The Origin of Civilization and the Primitive Condtion of Man. By Sir John Lubbock, Bart. M. P., F. R. S., London, 1870, p. 329.

[114] On page 66, he says, "Assuming that the communal marriage system shown in the preceding pages to prevail, or have prevailed so widely among races in a low state of civilization, represents the primitive and earliest social condition of man, we now come to consider the various ways in which it may have been broken up and replaced by individual marriage."

[115] Ibid. p. 323.

§ 2. Man Created in the Image of God.

Secondly. Other animals, however, besides man, were created in maturity and perfection, each according to its kind. It was the distinguishing characteristic of man, that he was created in the image and likeness of God. Many of the early writers assumed that the word "image" had reference to the body, which they thought by its beauty, intelligence of aspect, and erect stature, was an adumbration of God, and that the word "likeness "referred to the intellectual and moral nature of man. According to Augustine, image relates to the cognitio veritatis, and likeness to the amor virtutis; the former to the intellectual, and the latter to the moral faculties. This was the foundation of the scholastic doctrine that the image of God includes the natural attributes of the soul; and the likeness our moral conformity to the divine Being. This distinction was introduced into the Romish theology. Bellarmin [116] says, "Imaginem in natura, similitudinem in probitate et justitia sitam esse." He also says, [117] "Ex his tot patrum testimoniis cogimur admittere, non esse omnino idem imaginem et similitudinem, sed imaginem ad naturam, similitudinem ad virtutes pertinere; proinde Adamum peccando non imaginem Dei, sed similitudinem perdidisse." Others again somewhat modified this view by making the image of God to consist in what was natural and concreated, and the likeness in what was acquired. Man was created in the image of God and fashioned himself into his likeness. That is, he so used his natural endowments as to become like God in character. All these distinctions, however, rest on a false interpretation of Gen. i. 26. The words tslm and dmvt are simply explanatory one of the other. Image and likeness, means an image which is like. The simple declaration of the Scripture is that man at his creation was like sod. Wherein that likeness consisted has been a matter of dispute. According to the Reformed theologians and the majority of the theologians of other divisions of the Church, man's likeness to God included the following points: --

His intellectual and moral nature. God is a Spirit, the human soul is a spirit. The essential attributes of a spirit are reason, conscience, and will. A spirit is a rational, moral, and therefore also, a free agent. In making man after his own image, therefore, God endowed him with those attributes which belong to his own nature as a spirit. Man is thereby distinguished from all other inhabitants of this world, and raised immeasurably above them. He belongs to the same order of being as God Himself, and is therefore capable of communion with his Maker. This conformity of nature between man and God, is not only the distinguishing prerogative of humanity, so tar as earthly creatures are concerned, but it is also the necessary condition of our capacity to know God, and therefore the foundation of our religious nature. If we were not like God, we could not know Him. We should be as the beasts which perish. The Scriptures in declaring that God is the Father of spirits, and that we are his offspring, teach us that we are partakers of his nature as a spiritual being, and that an es3ential element of that likeness to God in which man was originally created consists in our rational or spiritual nature. On this subject, however, there have been two extreme opinions. The Greek theologians made the image of God in which man was created to consist exclusively in his rational nature. The majority of them taught that the eikon was en logike psuche; or as John of Damascus [118] expresses it: to kat' eikona, to noeron deloi kai autexousion. And Iren[illegible]us [119] says: "Homo vero rationabilis et secundum hoc similis Deo." The Remonstrants and Socinians were disposed to confine the image of God in which man was created to his dominion. Thus Limborch

[120] says: "Illa imago aliud nihil est, quam eximia, qu□dam qualitas et excellentia, qua homo Deum speciatim refert: h□c autem est potestas et dominium, quod Deus homini dedit in omnia a se creata. . . . . Hoc enim dominio Deum proprie refert, estque quasi visibilis Deus in terra super omnes Dei creaturas constitutus." This dominion, however, was founded on man's rational nature, and therefore Limborch adds, that Adam's likeness to God pertained to his soul, "quatenus ratione instructa est, cujus ministerio, veluti sceptro quodam, omnia sibi subjicere potest." These views agree in excluding man's moral conformity to God from the idea of the divine image in which he was created.

The Lutheran theologians were, in general, inclined to go to the apposite extreme. The image of God, according to them, was that which was lost by the fall, and which is restored by redemption. Thus Luther says: "So ist nun hier so viel gesagt, dass der Mensch am Anfang geschaffen ist ein Bild, das Gott □hnlich war, voll Weisheit, Tugend, Liebe and kurzum gleich wie Gott, also dass er voll Gottes war." And: "Das ist Gottes Bild, das eben also wie Gott gesinnet ist und sich immer nach ihm ahmet." [121] Calovius and other Lutheran theologians say expressly: "Anima ipsa rationalis non est imago divina, aut imaginis pars, quia anima non est amissa, at imago amissa est." And again: "Unde patet, conformitatem, qu□ in substantia anim□ reperitur aut corporis, ad imaginem Dei, stylo biblico descriptam, non pertinere, quia substantia anim□ aut corporis per lapsum non est perdita, nec per renovationem restauratur." This, however, is rather a dispute about the Scriptural use of the phrase "image of God," as applied to man in his original estate, than about the fact itself; for the Lutherans did not deny that the soul as to its nature or substance is like God. Hollazius admits that "Ipsa substantia anim□ human□ qu□dam theia seu divina exprimit, et exemplar divinitatis refert. Nam Deus est spiritus immaterialis, intelligens, voluntate libera agens, etc., etc. Qu□ pr□dicata de anima humana certo modo affirmari possunt." [122]

The Reformed theologians take the middle ground between the extremes of making the image of God to consist exclusively in man's rational nature, or exclusively in his moral conformity to his Maker. They distinctly include both. Calvin [123] says, Imago Dei est "integra natur□ human□ pr□stantia, qu□ refulsit in Adam ante defectionem postea sic vitiata et prope deleta, ut nihil ex ruina nisi confusum, mutilum, labeque infectum supersit." H. □ Diest [124] is more explicit: "Imago Dei fuit partim inamissibilis, partim amissibilis; inamissibilis, qu□ post lapsum integra permansit, veluti anim□ substantia spiritualis, immortalis, rationalis, cum potentiis intelligendi et libere volendi; amissibilis, qu□ partim plane periit, partim corrupta est, manentibus tantum exiguis ejusdem reliquiis; veluti in intellectu insignis sapientia, in voluntate et affectibus vera justitia et sanctitas, in corpore immortalitas, sanitas, f'ortitudo, pulchritudo, dominium in animalia, copia omnium bonorum et jus utendi creaturis." Maresius [125] says: "Imago Dei spectavit, (1.) Anim□ essentiam et conditionem spiritualem, intelligentem et volentem, quod contra Lutheranos pertendimus, quum post lapsum etiam rudera imaginis Dei adsint. (2.) Eluxit in accidentali anim□ perfectione, mentis lumine, voluntatis sanctitate, sensuum et affectuum harmonia atque ad bonum promptitudine; (3.) conspicua fuit in dominio in omnia animalia." While, therefore, the Scriptures make the original moral perfection of man the most prominent element of that likeness to God in which he was created, it is no less true that they recognize man as a child of God in virtue of his rational nature. He is the image of God, and bears and reflects the divine likeness among the inhabitants of the earth, because he is a spirit, an intelligent,

voluntary agent; and as such he is rightfully invested with universal dominion. This is what the Reformed theologians were accustomed to call the essential image of God, as distinguished from the accidental. The one consisting in the very nature of the soul, the other in its accidental endowments, that is, such as might be lost without the loss of humanity itself.

[116] De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I. 6. Disputationes, Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 402, a.

[117] De Gratia Primi Hominis, 2. Ibid. p. 8, d.

[118] II. 12; Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. i. p. 690.

[119] IV. iv. 3; Works, edit. Leipzig, 1853, vol. i. p. 569.

[120] Theologia Christiana, II. xxiv. 2, edit. Amsterdam, 1715, pp. 133, 134.

[121] Sermons on Genesis, edit. Erlangen, 1843, vol. xxxiii. pp. 55, 67.

[122] Examen, Leipzig, 1763, p. 463.

[123] Institutio, lib. i. xv. 4, edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. p. 130.

[124] Theologia Biblica, Daventri&#65533;, 1644, pp. 73, 74.

[125] Collegium Theologicum, loc. v. 52, 53, 54, edit. Gr&#65533;ningen, 1659, p. 60.

§ 3. Original Righteousness.

In the moral image of God, or original righteousness, are included, --

1. The perfect harmony and due subordination of all that constituted man. His reason was subject to God; his will was subject to his reason; his affections and appetites to his will; the body was the obedient organ of the soul. There was neither rebellion of the sensuous part of his nature against the rational, nor was there any disproportion between them needing to be controlled or balanced by ab extra gifts or influence.

2. But besides this equilibrium and harmony in the original constitution of man, his moral perfection in which he resembled God, included knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. The two passages of the New Testament in which these elements of the divine image in which man was created, are distinctly mentioned, are Col. iii. 10, and Eph. iv. 24. In the former it is said, Ye "have put on the new man, which is renewed in knowledge after the image of him that created him:" endusamenoi ton neon, ton anakainoumenon eis epignosin kat' eikona tou ktisantos auton. New man (neon), agreeably to the ordinary distinction between neos and kainos, means recent, newly made, as opposed to (palaios) old. The moral quality or excellence of this recently formed man is expressed in the word anakainoumenon; as in Scriptural usage what is kainos is pure. This renovation is said to be eis epignosin, not in knowledge, much less by knowledge, but unto knowledge, so that he knows. Knowledge is the effect of the renovation spoken of. The word epignosin may be connected with the words which immediately follow (kat' eikona), knowledge according to the image of God, i.e. Knowledge like that which God possesses. It is more common and natural to take epignosin by itself; and connect kat' eikona with the preceding participle, "renewed after the image of God." The knowledge here intended is not mere cognition. It is full, accurate, living, or practical knowledge; such knowledge as is eternal life, so that this word here includes what in Eph. iv. 24 is expressed by righteousness and holiness. Whether the word ktisantos refers to God as the author of the original creation, or of the new

creation of which the Apostle is here speaking, is matter of doubt. In the firmer case, the meaning would be, the believer is renewed after the image of his Creator. In the latter, the sense is that the renovation is after the image of the creator of the new man. According to the one mode of explanation the idea is more clearly expressed that man, as originally created, was endowed with true knowledge. According to the other interpretation this may be implied, but is not asserted. All that the Apostle in that case affirms is that the regenerated man is made like God in knowledge. But as the original man was also like God, and as knowledge is included in that likeness, the passage still proves that Adam was created in the possession of the knowledge of which the Apostle here speaks. As the word ktizein in the New Testament always refers to the original creation, unless some explanatory term be added, as new creation, or, unless the context forbids such reference; and as ktisantos does not express the continuous process of transformation, but the momentary act of creation as already past, it is more natural to understand the Apostle as speaking of the original likeness to God in which man was created, arid to which the believer is restored. The amen, therefore, is not to be understood of ton geon, but of anthropon; -- after the image of Him who created man. This is the old interpretation as given by Calovius and adopted by De Wette, R&#65533;ckert. and other modern interpreters. Calovius says: "Per imaginem ejus, qui creavit ipsum, imago Dei, qu&#65533; in prima creatione nobis concessa vel concreata est, intelligitur, qu&#65533;que in nobis reparatur per Spiritum Sanctum, qu&#65533; ratione intellectus consistebat in cognitione Dei, ut ratione voluntatis in justitia et sanctitate, Eph. iv. 24. Per verbum itaque tou ktisantos non nova creatio, sed vetus illa et prim&#65533;va intelligitur, quia in Adamo conditi omnes sumus ad imaginem Dei in cognitione Dei."

Ephesians iv. 24.

The other passage above referred to is Eph. iv. 24: "Put on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." The new man, ton kainon anthropon, is said to be kata theon, i.e., after the image of God; and that image or likeness to God is said to consist in righteousness and holiness. These words when used in combination are intended to be exhaustive; i.e., to include all moral excellence. Either term may be used in this comprehensive sense, but, when distinguished, dikaiosune means rectitude, the being and doing right, what justice demands; hosiotes, purity, holiness, the state of mind produced when the soul is full of God. Instead of true holiness, the words of the Apostle should be rendered "righteousness and holiness of the truth;" that is, the righteousness and holiness which are the effects or manifestations of the truth. By truth here, as opposed to the deceit (apate) mentioned in the twenty-second verse, is meant what in Col. iii. 10 is called knowledge. It is the divine light in the understanding, of which the Spirit of truth is the author, and from which, as their proximate cause, all right affections and holy acts proceed.

It is plain from these passages that knowledge, righteousness, and holiness are elements of the image of God in which man was originally created. By knowledge is not meant merely the faculty of cognition, the ability to acquire knowledge, but the contents of that faculty. As knowledge may be innate, so it may be concreated. Adam, as soon as he began to be had self-knowledge; he was conscious of his own being, faculties, and states. He had also the knowledge of what was out of himself, or he had what the modern philosophy calls world-consciousness. He not only perceived the various material objects

by which he was surrounded, but he apprehended aright their nature. How far this knowledge extended we are unable to determine. Some have supposed that our first parent had a more thorough knowledge of the external world, of its laws, and of the nature of its various productions, than human science has ever since attained. It is certain that he was able to give appropriate names to all classes of animals which passed in review before him, which supposes a due apprehension of their distinctive characteristics. On this point we know nothing beyond what the Bible teaches us. It is more important to remark that Adam knew God; whom to know is life eternal. Knowledge, of course, differs as to its objects. The cognition of mere speculative truths, as those of science and history, is a mere act of the understanding; the cognition of the beautiful involves the exercise of our ✓sthetic nature; of moral truths the exercise of our moral nature; and the knowledge of God the exercise of our spiritual and religious nature, The natural man, says the Apostle, receives not the things of the Spirit, neither can he k tow them. What is asserted of Adam is that, as he came from the hands of his Maker, his mind was imbued with this spiritual or divine knowledge.

All that has been said with regard to the original state of man is involved in the account of the creation, which declares that he was made like God; and that he was pronounced to be good, good exceedingly. What the goodness is which belongs to man as a rational, immortal, and religious being, and which is necessary to fit him for the sphere in which he was to move, and the destiny for. which he was created, we learn partly from the express declarations of the Scriptures, partly from the nature of the case, and partly from what is involved in humanity as restored by Christ. From all these sources it is plain that the Protestant doctrine concerning the image of God and the original righteousness in which and with which Adam was created includes not only his rational nature, but also knowledge, righteousness, and holiness.

§ 4. Dominion over the Creatures.

The third particular which enters into the dignity of man's original state, and into the image of God with which he was invested, was his dominion over the creatures. This arose from the powers with which he was invested, and from the express appointment of God. God constituted him ruler over the earth. He placed, as the Psalmist said, all things under his feet. In 1 Cor. xi. 7, the Apostle says that the man is the image and glory of God; but the woman is the glory of the man. This he gives as the reason why the man should do nothing which implied the denial of his right to rule. It was therefore as a ruler that he bore God's image, or represented Him on earth. What is the extent of the dominion granted to man, or to which our race was destined, it is not easy to determine. Judging from the account given in Genesis, or even from the stronger language used in the eighth Psalm, we should conclude that his authority was to extend only over the inferior animals belonging to this earth. But the Apostle, in his exposition of the words of the Psalmist, teaches us that far more was intended. In 1 Cor. xv. 27, he says, "When he saith, All things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him." And in Heb. ii. 8, he says, "In that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him." It was therefore an absolutely universal dominion, so far as creatures are concerned, with which man was to be invested. This universal dominion, as we learn from the Scriptures, has been

realized and attained only by the incarnation and exaltation of the Son of God. But as God sees the end from the beginning, as his plan is immutable and all comprehending, this supreme exaltation of humanity was designed from the beginning, and included in the dominion with which man was invested.

§ 5. The Doctrine of the Romish Church.

The doctrine of Romanists as to the original state of man agrees with that of Protestants, except in one important particular. They hold that man before the fall, was in a state of relative perfection; that is, not only free from any defect or infirmity of body, but endowed with all the attributes of a spirit, and imbued with knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and invested with dominion over the creatures. Protestants include all this under the image of God; the Romanists understand by the image of God only the rational, and especially the voluntary nature of man, or the freedom of the will. They distinguish, therefore, between the image of God and original righteousness. The latter they say is lost, the former retained. Protestants, on the other hand, hold that it is the divine image in its most important constituents, that man forfeited by his apostasy. This, however, may be considered only a difference as to words. The important point of difference is, that the Protestants hold that original righteousness, so far as it consisted in the moral excellence of Adam, was natural, while the Romanists maintain that it was supernatural. According to their theory, God created man soul and body. These two constituents of his nature are naturally in conflict. To preserve the harmony between them, and the due subjection of the flesh to the spirit, God gave man the supernatural gift of original righteousness. It was this gift that man lost by his fall; so that since the apostasy he is in the state in which Adam was before he was invested with this supernatural endowment. In opposition to this doctrine, Protestants maintain that original righteousness was concreated and natural. Original righteousness, says Luther, [126] "Non fuisse quoddam donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatum a natura hominis. Sed fuisse vere naturalem, ita ut natura Adø esset, diligere Deum, credere Deo, agnoscere Deum, etc. Høc tam naturalia fuere in Adamo, quam naturale est, quod oculi lumen recipiunt." The Council of Trent does not speak explicitly on this point, but the language of the Roman Catechism is clearly in accordance with the more direct teachings of the theologians of the Church of Rome, to the effect that original righteousness is a supernatural gift. In describing the original state of man that Catechism says, [127] "Quod ad animam pertinet, eum ad imaginem et similitudinem suam formavit, liberumque ei arbitrium tribuit: omnes prøterea motus animi atque appetitiones ita in eo temperavit, ut rationis imperio nunquam non parerent. Tum originalis justitiø admirabile donum addidit, ac deinde cøteris animantibus prøesse voluit." Bellarmin [128] states this doctrine in clearer terms: "Integritas illa, cum qua primus homo conditus fuit et sine qua post ejus lapsum homines omnes nascuntur, non fuit naturalis ejus conditio, sed supernaturalis evectio. . . . . [129] Sciendum est primo, hominem naturaliter constare ex carne, et spiritu, et ideo partim cum bestiis, partim cum angelis communicare naturam, et quidem ratione carnis, et communionis cum bestiis, habere propensionem quandam ad bonum corporale, et sensibile, in quod fertur per sensum et appetitum: ratione spiritus et communionis cum angelis, habere propensionem ad bonum spirituale et intelligibile, in quod fertur per intelligentiam, et voluntatem. Ex his autem diversis, vel contrariis

propensionibus existere in uno eodemque homine pugnam quandam, et ex ea pugna ingentem bene agendi difficultatem, dum una propensio alteram impedit. Sciendum secundo, divinam providentiam initio creationis, ut remedium adhiberet huic morbo seu languori natur&#65533; human&#65533;, qui ex conditione materi&#65533; oriebatur, addidisse homini donum quoddam insigne, justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam fr&#65533;no pars inferior parti superiori, et pars superior Deo facile subjecta contineretur."

The question whether original righteousness was natural or supernatural cannot be answered until the meaning of the words be determined. The word natural is often used to designate that which constitutes nature. Reason is in such a sense natural to man that without it he ceases to be a man. Sometimes it designates what of necessity flows from the constitution of nature; as when we say it is natural for man to desire his own happiness; sometimes it designates what is concreated or innate as opposed to what is adventitious, accessory, or acquired; in this use of the word the sense of justice, pity, and the social affections, are natural to men. Original righteousness is asserted by Protestants to be natural, first, with the view of denying that human nature as at first constituted involved the conflicting principles of flesh and spirit as represented by Bellarmin, and that the pura naturalia, or simple principles of nature as they existed in Adam, were without moral character; and. secondly, to assert that the nature of man as created was good, that his reason was enlightened and his will and feelings were conformed to the moral image of God. It was natural in Adam to love God in the same sense as it was natural for him to love himself. It was as natural for him to apprehend the glory of God as it was for him to apprehend the beauties of creation. He was so constituted, so created, that in virtue of the nature which God gave him, and without any accessory ab extra gift, he was suited to fulfil the end of his being, namely, to glorify God and to enjoy Him forever.

Objections to the Romish Doctrine.

The obvious objections to the Romish doctrine that original righteousness was a supernatural gift, are, (1.) That it supposes a degrading view of the original constitution of our nature. According to this doctrine the seeds of evil were implanted in the nature of man as it came from the hands of God. It was disordered or diseased, there was about it what Bellarmin calls a morbus or languor, which needed a remedy. But this is derogatory to the justice and goodness of God, and to the express declarations of Scripture, that man, humanity, human nature, was good. (2.) This doctrine is evidently founded on the Manichean principle of the inherent evil of matter. It is because man has a material body, that this conflict between the flesh and spirit, between good and evil, is said to be unavoidable. But this is opposed to the word of God and the faith of the Church. Matter is not evil. And there is no necessary tendency to evil from the union of the soul and body which requires to be supernaturally corrected. (3.) This doctrine as to original righteousness arose out of the Semi-Pelagianism of the Church of Rome, and was designed to sustain it. The two doctrines are so related that they stand or fall together. According to the theory in question, original sin is the simple loss of original righteousness. Humanity since the fall is precisely what it was before the fall, and before the addition of the supernatural gift of righteousness. Bellarmin [130] says: "Non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Ad&#65533; a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantia et

infirmitate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio naturø non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus malø qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Adø peccatum amissione profluxit." The conflict between the flesh and spirit is normal and original, and therefore not sinful. Concupiscence, the theological term for this rebellion of the lower against the higher elements of our nature, is not of the nature of sin, Andradius [131] (the Romish theologian against whom Chemnitz directed his Examen of the Council of Trent) lays down the principle, "quod nihil habeat rationem peccati, nisi fiat a volente et sciente," which of course excludes concupiscence, whether in the renewed or unrenewed, from the category of sin. Hence, Bellarmin says: [132] "Reatus est omnino inseparabilis ab eo, quod natura sua est dignum øterna damnatione, qualem esse volunt concupiscentiam adversarii." This concupiscence remains after baptism, or regeneration, which Romanists say, removes all sin; and therefore, not being evil in its own nature, does not detract from the merit of good works, nor render perfect obedience, and even works of supererogation on the part of the faithful, impossible. This doctrine of the supernatural character of original righteousness as held by Romanists, is therefore intimately connected with their whole theological system; and is incompatible with the Scriptural doctrines not only of the original state of man, but also of sin and redemption. It will, however, appear in the sequel, that neither the standards of the Church of Rome nor the Romish theologians are consistent in their views of original sin and its relation to the loss of original righteousness.

[126] In Genesis, cap. iii.; Works, edit. Wittenberg, 1555 (Latin), vol. vi., leaf 42, page 2.

[127] Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici Ecclesiø Catholicøe, vol. i. p. 127.

[128] De Gratia Primi Hominis 2. Disputationes, vol. iv. p. 7, c.

[129] Ibid. 5 -- p. 15, c. d.

[130] De Gratia Primi Hominis c. 5. Disputationes, vol. iv. p. 16, d. e.

[131] Baur, Katholicismus und Protestantismus, Tøbingen, 1836, p. 85, note.

[132] De Amissione Gratiø et Statu Peccati, v. 7; Disputationes, vol. iv. p. 287 a.

§ 6. Pelagian and Rationalistic Doctrine.

According to Pelagians and Rationalists man was created a rational free agent, but without moral character. He was neither righteous nor unrighteous, holy nor unholy. He had simply the capacity of becoming either. Being endowed with reason and free will, his character depended upon the use which he made of those endowments. If he acted right, he became righteous; if he acted wrong, he became unrighteous. There can be, according to their system, no such thing as concreated moral character, and therefore they reject the doctrine of original righteousness as irrational. This view of man's original state is the necessary consequence of the assumption that moral character can be predicated only of acts of the will or of the subjective consequences of such acts. This principle which precludes the possibility of original righteousness in Adam, precludes also the possibility of innate, hereditary depravity, commonly called original sin; and also the possibility of indwelling sin, and of habits of grace. It is a principle therefore which necessarily works an entire change in the whole system of Christian doctrine. It is not, however, an ultimate

principle. It is itself an inference from the primary assumption that ability limits obligation; that a man can be neither praised nor blamed, neither rewarded nor condemned, except for his own acts and self-acquired character, which acts must be within the compass of his ability. What is either concreated or innate, inherent or infused, is clearly not within the power of the will, and therefore cannot have any moral character. As this principle is thus far-reaching it ought to be definitively settled.

Consciousness proves that Dispositions as distinguished from Acts may have Moral Character.

By the mere moral philosopher, and by theologians whose theology is a philosophy, it is assumed as an axiom, or intuitive truth, that a man is responsible only for what he has full power to do or to avoid. Plausible as this principle is, it is, --

1. Opposed to the testimony of consciousness. It is a fact of consciousness that we do attribute moral character to principles which precede all voluntary action and which are entirely independent of the power of the will. And it is a fact capable of the clearest demonstration that such is not only the dictate of our own individual consciousness, but also the conviction of all men. If we examine our own consciousness as to the judgment which we pass upon ourselves, we shall find that we hold ourselves responsible not only for the deliberate acts of the will, that is, for acts of deliberate self-determination, which suppose both knowledge and volition, but also for emotional, impulsive acts, which precede all deliberation; and not only for such impulsive acts, but also for the principles, dispositions, or immanent states of the mind, by which its acts whether impulsive or deliberate, are determined. When a man is convinced of sin, it is not so much for specific acts of transgression that his conscience condemns him, as for the permanent states of his mind; his selfishness, worldliness, and maliciousness; his ingratitude, unbelief, and hardness of heart; his want of right affections, of love to God, of zeal for the Redeemer, and of benevolence towards men. These are not acts. They are not states of mind under the control of the will; and yet in the judgment of conscience, which we cannot silence or pervert, they constitute our character and are just ground of condemnation. In like manner whatever If right dispositions or principles we discover within ourselves, whatever there is of love to God, to Christ, or to his people; whatever of humility, meekness, forbearance, or of any other virtue the testimony of consciousness is, that these dispositions, which are neither the acts nor products of the will, as far as they exist within us, constitute our character in the sight of God and man. Such is not only the testimony of consciousness with regard to our judgments of ourselves, but also as to our judgments of other men. When we pronounce a man either good or bad, the judgment is not founded upon his acts, but upon his character as revealed by his acts. The terms good and bad, as applied to men, are not used to express the character of particular actions which they perform, but the character of the abiding principles, dispositions, or states of mind which determine their acts, and give assurance of what they will be in future. We may look on a good man and know that there is something in him which constitutes his character, and which renders it certain that he will not blaspheme, lie, or steal; but, on the contrary, that he will endeavour in all things to serve God and do good to men. In like manner we may contemplate a wicked man in the bosom of his family, when every evil passion is hushed, and when only kindly feelings are in exercise, and yet we know him to be wicked. That is, we not only know that he has perpetrated wicked

actions, but that he is inherently wicked; that there is in him an evil nature, or abiding state of the mind, which constitutes his real character and determines his acts. When we say that a man is a miser, we do not mean simply that he hoards money, or grinds the face of the poor, but we mean that he has a disposition which in time past has led to such acts and which will continue to produce them so long as it rules in his heart. The Pelagian doctrine, therefore, that moral character can be predicated only of voluntary acts, is contrary to the testimony of consciousness.

Argument from the General Judgment of Men.

2. It may, however, be said that our consciousness or moral judgments are influenced by our Christian education. It is there-fore important to observe, in the second place, that this judgment of our individual consciousness is confirmed by the universal judgment of our fellow-men. This is plain from the fact that in all known languages there are words to distinguish between dispositions, principles, or habits, as permanent states of the mind, and voluntary acts. And these dispositions are universally recognized as being either good or bad. Language is the product of the common consciousness of men. There could not be such terms as benevolence, justice, integrity, and fidelity, expressing principles which determine acts, and which are not themselves acts, if men did not intuitively recognize the fact that principles as well as acts may have moral character.

The Moral Character of Acts determined by the Principles whence they flow.

3. So far from its being true that in the judgment of men the voluntary act alone constitutes character, the very opposite is true. The character of the act is decided by the nature of the principle by which it is determined. If a man gives alms, or worships God from a selfish principle, under the control of a disposition to secure the applause of men, those acts instead of being good are instinctively recognized as evil. Indeed, if this Pelagian or Rationalistic principle were true, there could be no such thing as character; not only because individual acts have no moral quality except such as is derived from the principle whence they flow, but also because character necessarily supposes something permanent and controlling. A man without character is a man without principles; i.e., in whom there is nothing which gives security as to what his acts will be.

Argument from Scripture.

4. The Scriptures in this, as in all cases, recognize the validity of the intuitive and universal judgments of the mind. They everywhere distinguish between principles and acts, and everywhere attribute moral character to the former, and to acts only sc far as they proceed from principles. This is the doctrine of our Lord when he says, "Either make the tree good, and his fruit good; or else make the tree corrupt, and his fruit corrupt: for a tree is known by his fruit." (Matt. xii. 33.) "A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." (Matt. vii. 18.) It is the inward, abiding character of the tree that determines the character of the fruit. The fruit reveals, but does not constitute, the nature of the tree. So it is, he tells us, with the human heart. "How can ye, being evil, speak good things? For out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaketh. A good man out of the good treasure of the heart, bringeth forth good things: and an evil man, out of the evil treasure, bringeth forth evil things." (Matt. xii. 34, 35.) A good man, therefore, is one who is inwardly good: who has a good heart, or nature, something within him which being good in itself, produces good acts. And an evil man is one, whose heart, that is, the abiding,

controlling state of has mind, being in itself evil, habitually does evil. It is out of the heart proceed evil thoughts, murders, adulteries, fornications, thefts, false witness, and blasphemies. These terms include all voluntary acts, not only in the sense of deliberate self-determination, but also in the sense of spontaneous acts. They moreover include all conscious states of the mind. It is, therefore, expressly asserted by our Lord, that moral character attaches to what lies deeper than any acts of the will, in the widest sense of those words, but also to that which lies lower than consciousness. As the greater part of our knowledge is treasured up where consciousness does not reach, so the greater part of what constitutes our character as good or evil, is lower not only than the will but even than consciousness itself. It is not only however by direct assertion that this doctrine is taught in the Bible. It is constantly assumed, and is involved in some of the most important doctrines of the word of God. It is taken for granted in what is taught of the moral condition in which men are born into this world. They are said to be conceived in sin. They are children of wrath by nature. That which is born of the flesh is flesh, i.e., carnal, morally corrupt. The Bible also speaks of indwelling sin; of sin as a principle which brings forth fruit unto death. It represents regeneration not as an act of the soul, but as the production of a new nature, or holy principle, in the heart. The denial, therefore, that dispositions or principles as distinguished from acts, can have a moral character, subverts some of the most plainly revealed doctrines of the sacred Scriptures.

The Faith of the Church on this Subject.

5. It is fair on this subject to appeal to the universal faith of the Church. Even the Greek Church, which has the lowest form of doctrine of any of the great historical Christian communities, teaches that men need regeneration as soon as they are born, and that by regeneration a change of nature is effected, or a new principle of life is infused into the soul. So also the Latin Church, however inconsistently, recognizes the truth of the doctrine in question in all her teachings. All who die unbaptized, according to Romanists, perish; and by baptism not Only the guilt, but also the pollution of sin is removed, and new habits of grace are infused into the soul. It is needless to remark that the Lutheran and Reformed churches agree in holding this important doctrine, that moral character does not belong exclusively to voluntary acts, but extends to dispositions, principles, or habits of the mind. This is involved in all their authoritative decisions concerning original righteousness, original sin, regeneration, and sanctification.

The Moral Character of Dispositions depends on their Nature and not on their Origin.

The second great principle involved in the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that the moral character of dispositions or habits depends on their nature and not on their origin. There are some who endeavour to take a middle ground between the rationalistic and the evangelical doctrines. They admit that moral character may be predicated of dispositions as distinguished from voluntary acts, but they insist that this can only be done when such dispositions have been self-acquired. They acknowledge that the frequent repetition of certain acts has a tendency to produce an abiding disposition to perform them. This is acknowledged to be true not only in regard to the indulgence of sensual appetites, but also in regard to purely mental acts. Not only does the frequent use of intoxicating liquors produce an inordinate craving for them, but the frequent exercise of pride or indulgence of vanity, confirms and strengthens a proud and vainglorious spirit, or state of mind; which

state of mind, when thus produced, it is admitted, goes to determine or constitute the man's moral character. But they deny that a man can be responsible for any disposition, or state of mind, which is not the result of his own voluntary agency. In opposition to this doctrine, and in favour of the position that the moral character of dispositions, or principles, does not depend upon their origin, that whether concreated, innate, infused, or self-acquired they are good or bad according to their nature, the arguments are the same in kind as those presented under the preceding head.

1. The first is derived from our consciousness. In our judgments of ourselves the question is what we are, and not how we became what we know ourselves to be. If conscious that we do not love God as we ought; that we are worldly, selfish, proud, or suspicious, it is no relief to the consciousness, that such has been our character from the beginning. We may know that we were born with these evil dispositions, but they are not on that account less evil in the sight of conscience. We groan under the burden of hereditary, or of indwelling sin, as deeply and as intelligently as under the pressure of our self-acquired evil dispositions. So also in our instinctive judgments of other men. if a man be addicted to frivolous pursuits, we pronounce him a frivolous man, without sopping to inquire whether his disposition be innate, derived by inheritance from his ancestors, or whether it was acquired. On the contrary, if he manifests from his youth a disposition for the acquisition of knowledge, he is an object of respect, no matter whence that disposition was derived. The same is true with regard to amiable or unamiable dispositions. It cannot be denied that there is a great difference in men in this respect. Some are morose, irritable, and unsocial in their dispositions, others are directly the reverse. The one class is attractive, the other repulsive; the one the object of affection; the other, of dislike. The instinctive judgment of the mind is the same with regard to dispositions more clearly moral in their nature. One man is selfish, another generous; one is malicious, another benevolent; one is upright and honourable, another deceitful and mean. They may be born with these distinctive traits of character, and such traits beyond doubt are in numerous cases innate and often hereditary, and yet we are conscious that our judgment regarding them and those to whom they belong is entirely independent of the question whether such dispositions are natural or acquired. It is admitted that nations as well as tribes and families, have their distinctive characteristics, and that these characteristics are not only physical and mental, but also social and moral. Some tribes are treacherous and cruel. Some are mild and confiding. Some are addicted to gain, others to war. Some are sensual, some intellectual. We instinctively judge of each according to its character; we like or dislike, approve or disapprove, without asking ourselves any questions as to the origin of these distinguishing characteristics. And if we do raise that question, although we are forced to answer it by admitting that these dispositions are innate and hereditary, and that they are not self-acquired by the individual whose character they constitute, we nevertheless, and none the less, approve or condemn them according to their nature. This is the instinctive and necessary, and therefore the correct, judgment of the mind.

This the Common Rule of Judgment.

2. As in water face answereth to face, so the heart of man to man. What we find revealed in our own consciousness we find manifested as the consciousness of our fellow men. It is the Instinctive or intuitive judgment of all men that moral dispositions derive their

character from their nature, and not from their origin. In the ordinary language of men, to say that a man is naturally proud or malicious is not an extenuation, but an aggravation. The more deeply these evil principles are seated in his nature, and the less they depend upon circumstances or voluntary action, the more profound is our abhorrence and the more severe is our condemnation. The Irish people have always been remarkable for their fidelity; the English for honesty; the Germans for truthfulness. These national traits, as revealed in individuals, are not the effect of self-discipline. They are innate, hereditary dispositions, as obviously as the physical, mental, or emotional peculiarities by which one people is distinguished from another. And yet by the common judgment of men this fact in no degree detracts from the moral character of these dispositions.

The Testimony of Scripture.

3. This also is the plain doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures teach that God made man upright; that the angels were created holy, for the unholy angels are those which kept not their first estate; that since the fall men are born in sin; that by the power of God, and not by the power of the will, the heart is changed, and new dispositions are implanted in our nature; and yet the Bible always speaks of the sinful as sinful and worthy of condemnation, whether, as in the case of Adam, that sinfulness was self-acquired, or, as in the case of his posterity, it is a hereditary evil. It always speaks of the holy as holy, whether so created as were the angels, or made so by the supernatural power of the Spirit in regeneration and sanctification. And in so doing the Bible, as we have seen, does not contradict the intuitive judgment of the human mind, but sanctions and confirms that judgment.

The Faith of the Church.

4. It need hardly be added that such also is the faith of the Church universal. All Christian churches receive the doctrines of original in and regeneration in a form which involves not only the principle that dispositions, as distinguished from acts, may have a moral character, but also that such character belongs to them whether they be innate, acquired, or infused. It is, therefore, most unreasonable to assume the ground that a man can be responsible only for his voluntary acts, or for their subjective effects, when our own consciousness, the universal judgment of men, the word of God, and the Church universal, so distinctly assert the contrary. It is a matter of surprise how subtle is the poison of the principle which has now been considered. It is not only the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, but it is often asserted by orthodox theologians who do not carry it out to its legitimate results, but who, nevertheless, allow it injuriously to modify their views of some of the most important doctrines of the Bible. On the assumption that no man can be judged, can be either justified or condemned except on to ground of his self-acquired personal character, they teach that there can be no immediate imputation of the sin of Adam or of the righteousness of Christ; that the only ground of condemnation must be our self-acquired sinfulness, and the only ground of justification our subjective righteousness; thus subverting two of the main pillars of evangelical truth.

Objections Considered.

The difficulty on this subject arises in great measure from con-founding two distinct things. It is one thing that a creature should be treated according to his character; and quite another thing to account for his having that character. If a creature is holy he will be regarded and treated as holy. If he is sinful, he will be regarded and treated as sinful. If

God created Adam holy He could not treat him as unholy. If He created Satan sinful, He would regard him as sinful; and if men are born in sin they cannot be regarded as free from sin. The difficulty is not in God's treating his creatures according to their true character, but in reconciling with his holiness and justice that a sinful character should be acquired without the creature's personal agency. If God had created Satan sinful he would be sinful, but we should not know how to reconcile it with the character of God that he should be so created. And if men are born in sin the difficulty is not in their being regarded and treated as sinful, but in their being thus born. The Bible teaches us the solution of this difficulty. It reveals to us the principle of representation, on the ground of which the penalty of Adam's sin has come upon his posterity as the reward of Christ's righteousness comes upon his people. In the one case the penalty brings subjective sinfulness, and in the other the reward brings subjective holiness.

It is a common objection to the doctrine that holiness can be concreated and sinfulness hereditary, that it makes sin and holiness substances. There is nothing in the soul, it is said, but its substance and its acts. If sin or holiness be predicated of anything but the acts of the soul it must be predicated of its substance; and thus we have the doctrine of physical holiness and physical depravity. The assumption on which this objection rests is not only an arbitrary one, but it is obviously erroneous. There are in the soul, (1.) Its substance. (2.) Its essential properties or attributes, as reason, sensibility, and will, without which it ceases to be a human soul. (3.) Its constitutional dispositions, or natural tendencies to exercise certain feelings and volitions, such as self-love, the sense of justice, the social principle, parental and filial affection. These, although not essential to man, are nevertheless found in all men, before and after the tall. (4.) The peculiar dispositions of individual men, which are accidental, that is, they do not belong to humanity as such. They may be present or absent; they may be innate or acquired. Such are the taste for music, painting, or poetry; and the skill of the artist or the mechanist; such also are covetousness, pride, vanity, and the like; and such, too, are the graces of the Spirit, humility, meekness, gentleness, faith, love, etc. As the taste for music is neither an act nor a substance, so pride is neither the one nor the other. Nor is the maternal instinct an act; nor is benevolence or covetousness. These are immanent, abiding states of the mind. They belong to the man, whether they are active or dormant, whether he is awake or asleep. There is something in the sleeping artist which renders it certain that he will enjoy and execute what other men can neither perceive nor do. And that something is neither the essence of his soul nor an act. It is a natural or acquired taste and skill. So there is something in the sleeping saint which is neither essence nor act, which renders it certain that he will love and serve God. As therefore there are in the soul dispositions, principles, habits, and tastes which cannot be regarded as mere acts, and yet do not belong to the essence of the soul, it is plain that the doctrine of original or concreated righteousness is not liable to the objection of making moral character a substance.

Pelagians teach that Man was created Mortal.

The second distinguishing feature of the Pelagian or Rationalistic doctrine as to man's original state, is that man was created mortal. By this it is meant to deny that death is the consequence or penalty of transgression; and to affirm that Adam was liable to death, and certainly would have died in virtue of the original constitution of his nature. The arguments

urged in support of this doctrine are, (1.) That the corporeal organization of Adam was not adapted to last forever. It was in its very nature perishable. It required to be constantly refreshed by sleep and renewed by food, and would by a natural and inevitable process have grown old and decayed. (2.) That all other animals living on the earth evince in their constitution and structure that they were not intended by their Creator to live on indefinitely. They were created male and female, designed to propagate their race. This proves that a succession of individuals, and not the continued existence of the same individuals, was the plan of the Creator. As this is true of man as well as of other animals, it is evident, they say, that man also was from the beginning, and irrespective of sin, destined to die. (3.) An argument is drawn from what the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. xv. 42-50. It is there said that the first man is of the earth earthy; that he had a natural body (a soma psuchikon) as opposed to a spiritual body (the soma pneumatikon); that the former is not adapted to immortality, that flesh and blood, i.e., the soma psuchikon, such as Adam had when created, cannot inherit the kingdom of heaven. From this account it is inferred that Adam was not created for immortality, but was originally invested with a body from its nature destined to decay.

Answer to the Pelagian Arguments.

With regard to this subject it is to be remarked that there are two distinct points to be considered. First, whether Adam would have died had he not sinned; and second, whether his body as originally formed was adapted to an immortal state of existence. As to the former there can be no doubt. It is expressly asserted in Scripture that death is the wages of sin. In the threatening, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die," it is plainly implied that if he did not eat he should not die. It is clear therefore from the Scriptures that death is the penal consequence of sin and would not have been inflicted, had not our first parents transgressed. The second point is much less clear, and less important. According to one view adopted by many of the fathers, Adam was to pass his probation in the earthly paradise, and if obedient, was to be translated to the heavenly paradise, of which the earthly was the type. According to Luther, the effect of the fruit of the tree of life of which our first parents would have been permitted to eat had they not sinned, would have been to preserve their bodies in perpetual youth. According to others, the body of Adam and the bodies of his posterity, had he maintained his integrity, would have undergone a change analogous to that which, the Apostle teaches us, awaits those who shall be alive at the second coming of Christ. They shall not die, but they all shall be changed; the corruptible shall put on incorruption, and the mortal shall put on immortality. Two things are certain, first, that if Adam had not sinned he would not have died; and secondly, that if the Apostle, when he says we have borne the image of the earthly, means that our present bodies are like the body of Adam as originally constituted, then his body no less than ours, required to be changed to fit it for immortality.

CHAPTER VI: COVENANT OF WORKS.

God having created man after his own image ut knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, entered into a covenant of life with him, upon condition of perfect obedience, forbidding him to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil upon the pain of death.

According to this statement, (1.) God entered into a covenant with Adam. (2.) The promise annexed to that covenant was life. (3.) The condition was perfect obedience. (4.) Its penalty was death.

§ 1. God entered into Covenant with Adam.

This statement does not rest upon any express declaration of the Scriptures. It is, however, a concise and correct mode of asserting a plain Scriptural fact, namely, that God made to Adam a promise suspended upon a condition, and attached to disobedience a certain penalty. This is what in Scriptural language is meant by a covenant, and this is all that is meant by the term as here used. Although the word covenant is not used in Genesis, and does not elsewhere, in any clear passage, occur in reference to the transaction there recorded, yet inasmuch as the plan of salvation is constantly represented as a New Covenant, new, not merely in antithesis to that made at Sinai, but new in reference to all legal covenants whatever, it is plain that the Bible does represent the arrangement made with Adam as a truly federal transaction. The Scriptures know nothing of any other than two methods of attaining eternal life: the one that which demands perfect obedience, and the other that which demands faith. If the latter is called a covenant, the former is declared to be of the same nature. It is of great importance that the Scriptural form of presenting truth should be retained. Rationalism was introduced into the Church under the guise of a philosophical statement of the truths of the Bible free from the mere outward form in which the sacred writers, trained in Judaism, had presented them. On this ground the federal system, as it was called, was discarded. On the same ground the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices of Christ were pronounced a cumbrous and unsatisfactory form under which to set forth his work as our Redeemer. And then the sacrificial character of his death, and all idea of atonement were rejected as mere Jewish drapery. Thus, by the theory of accommodation, every distinctive doctrine of the Scriptures was set aside, and Christianity reduced to Deism. It is, therefore, far more than a mere matter of method that is involved in adhering to the Scriptural form of presenting Scriptural truths.

God then did enter into a covenant with Adam. That covenant is sometimes called a covenant of life, because life was promised as the reward of obedience. Sometimes it is called the covenant of works, because works were the condition on which that promise was suspended, and because it is thus distinguished from the new covenant which promises life on condition of faith.

§ 2. The Promise.

The reward promised to Adam on condition of his obedience, was life. (1.) This is involved in the threatening: "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." It is plain that this involved the assurance that he should not die, if he did not eat. (2.) This is confirmed by innumerable passages and by the general drift of Scripture, in which it is so plainly and so variously taught, that life was, by the ordinance of God, connected with obedience. "This do and thou shalt live." "The man that doeth them shall live by them." This is the uniform mode in which the Bible speaks of that law or covenant under which man by the constitution of his nature and by the ordinance of God, was placed. (3.) As the Scriptures everywhere present God as a judge or moral ruler, it follows of necessity from that representation, that his rational creatures will be dealt with according to the principles of justice. If there be no transgression there will be no punishment. And those who continue holy thereby continue in the favour and fellowship of him whose favour is life, and whose loving kindness is better than life. (4.) And finally, holiness, or as the Apostle expresses it, to be spiritually minded, is life. There can therefore be no doubt, that had Adam continued in holiness, he would have enjoyed that life which flows from the favour of God.

The life thus promised included the happy, holy, and immortal existence of the soul and body. This is plain. (1.) Because time life promised was that suited to the being to whom the promise was made. But the life suited to man as a moral and intelligent being, composed of soul and body, includes tile happy, holy, and immortal existence of his whole nature. (2.) The life of which the Scriptures everywhere speak as connected with obedience, is that which, as just stated, flows from the favour and fellowship of God, and includes glory, honour, and immortality, as the Apostle teaches us in Romans ii. 7. (3.) The life secured by Christ for his people was the life forfeited by sin. But the life which the believer derives from Christ is spiritual and eternal life, the exaltation and complete blessedness of his whole nature, both soul and body.

§ 3. Condition of the Covenant.

The condition of the covenant made with Adam is said in this symbols of our church to be perfect obedience. That that statement is correct may be inferred (1.) From the nature of the case and from the general principles clearly revealed in the word of God. Such is the nature of God, and such the relation which He sustains to his moral creatures, that sin, the transgression of the divine law, must involve the destruction of the fellowship between man and his Creator, and the manifestation of the divine displeasure. The Apostle therefore says, that he who offends in one point, who breaks one precept of the law of God, is guilty of the whole. (2.) It is everywhere assumed in the Bible, that the condition of acceptance under the law is perfect obedience. "Cursed is every one who continueth not in all things written in the book of the law to do them." This is not a peculiarity of the Mosaic economy, but a declaration of a principle which applies to all divine laws. (3.) The whole argument of the Apostle in his epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians, is founded on the assumption that the law demands perfect obedience. If that be not granted, his whole argument falls to the ground.

The specific command to Adam not to eat of a certain tree, was therefore not the only command he was required to obey. It was given simply to be the outward and visible test to determine whether he was willing to obey God in all things. Created holy, with all his affections pure, there was the more reason that the test of his obedience should be an outward and positive command; something wrong simply because it was forbidden, and not evil in its own nature. It would thus be seen that Adam obeyed for the sake of obeying. His obedience was more directly to God, and not to his own reason.

The question whether perpetual, as well as perfect obedience was the condition of the covenant made with Adam, is probably to be answered in the negative. It seems to be reasonable in itself and plainly implied in the Scriptures that all rational creatures have a definite period of probation. If faithful during that period they are confirmed in their integrity, and no longer exposed to the danger of apostasy. Thus we read of the angels who kept not their first estate, and of those who did. Those who remained faithful have continued in holiness and in the favour of God. It is therefore to be inferred that had Adam continued obedient during the period allotted to his probation, neither he nor any of his posterity would have been ever exposed to the danger of sinning.

§ 4. The Penalty.

The penalty attached to the covenant is expressed by the comprehensive term death. "In the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die." That this does not refer to the mere dissolution of the body, is plain. (1.) Because the word death, as used in Scripture in reference to the consequences of transgression, includes all penal evil. The wages of sin is death. The soul that sinneth, it shall die. Any and every form of evil, therefore, which is inflicted as the punishment of sin, is comprehended under the word death (2.) The death threatened was the opposite of the life promised But the life promised, as we have seen, includes all that is involved in the happy, holy, and immortal existence of the soul and body; and therefore death must include not only all the miseries of this life and the dissolution of the body, but also all that is meant by spiritual and eternal death. (3.) God is the life of the soul. His favour and fellowship with him, are essential to its holiness and happiness. If his favour be forfeited, the inevitable consequences are the death of the soul, i.e., its loss of spiritual life, and unending sinfulness and misery. (4.) The nature of the penalty threatened is .earned from its infliction. The consequences of Adam's sin were the loss of the image and favour of God and all the evils which flowed from that loss. (5.) Finally, the death which was incurred by the sin of our first parents, is that from which we are redeemed by Christ. Christ, however, does not merely deliver the body from the grave, he saves the soul from spiritual and eternal death; and therefore spiritual and eternal death, together with the dissolution of the body and all the miseries of this life, were included in the penalty originally attached to the covenant of works. In the day in which Adam ate the forbidden fruit he did die. The penalty threatened was not a momentary infliction but permanent subjection to all the evils which flow from the righteous displeasure of God.

§ 5. The Parties to the Covenant of Works.

It lies in the nature of a covenant that there must be two of more parties. A covenant is

not of one. The parties to the original covenant were God and Adam. Adam, however, acted not in his individual capacity but as the head and representative of his whole race. This is plain. (1.) Because everything said to him had as much reference to his posterity as to Adam himself. Everything granted to him was granted to them. Everything promised to him was promised to them. And everything threatened against him, in case of transgression, was threatened against them. God did not give the earth to Adam for him alone, but as the heritage of his race. The dominion over the lower animals with which he was invested belonged equally to his descendants. The promise of life embraced them as well as him; and the threatening of death concerned them as well as him. (2.) In the second place, it is an outstanding undeniable fact, that the penalty which Adam incurred has fallen upon his whole race. The earth is cursed to them as it was to him. They must earn their bread by the sweat of their brows. The pains of childbirth are the common heritage of all the daughters of Eve. All men are subject to disease and death. All are born in sin, destitute of the moral image of God. There is not an evil consequent on the sin of Adam which does not affect his race as much as it affected him. (3.) Not only did the ancient Jews infer the representative character of Adam from the record given in Genesis, but the inspired writers of the New Testament give this doctrine the sanction of divine authority. In Adam, says the Apostle, all died. The sentence of condemnation, he teaches us, passed on all men for one offence. By the offence of one all were made sinners. (4.) This great fact is made the ground on which the whole plan of redemption is founded. As we full in Adam, we are saved in Christ. To deny the principle in the one case, is to deny it in the other; for the two are inseparably united in the representations of Scripture. (5.) The principle involved in the headship of Adam underlies all the religious institutions ever ordained by God for men; all his providential dealings with our race; and even the distributions of the saving influences of his Spirit. It is therefore one of the fundamental principles both of natural and of revealed religion. (6.) What is thus clearly revealed in the word and providence of God, finds a response in the very constitution of our nature. All men are led as it were instinctively to recognize the validity of this principle of representation. Rulers represent their people; parents their children, guardians their wards. All these considerations are in place here, when the nature of the covenant of works, and the parties to that covenant are under discussion, although of course they must come up again to be more fully examined, when we have to speak of the effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity. Men may dispute as to the grounds of the headship of Adam, but the fact itself can hardly be questioned by those who recognize the authority of the Scriptures. It has therefore entered into the faith of all Christian churches, and is more or less clearly presented in all their authorized symbols.

§ 6. Perpetuity of the Covenant of Works.

If Adam acted not only for himself but also for his posterity, that fact determines the question, Whether the covenant of works be still in force. In the obvious sense of the terms, to say that men are still under that covenant, is to say that they are still on probation; that the race did not fall when Adam fell. But if Adam acted as the head of the whole race, then all men stood their probation in him, and fell with him in his first transgression. The Scriptures, therefore, teach that we come into the world under condemnation. We are by nature, i.e., as we were born, the children of wrath. This fact is assumed in all the

provisions of the gospel and in all the institutions of our religion. Children are required to be baptized for the remission of sin. But while the Pelagian doctrine is to be rejected, which teaches that each man comes into the world free from sin and free from condemnation, and stands his probation in his own person, it is nevertheless true that where there is no sin there is no condemnation. Hence our Lord said to the young man, "This do and thou shalt live." And hence the Apostle in the second chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, says that God will reward every man according to his works. To those who are good, He will give eternal life; to those who are evil, indignation and wrath. This is only saying that the eternal principles of justice are still in force. If any man can present himself before the bar of God and prove that he is free from sin, either imputed or personal, either original or actual, he will not be condemned. But the fact is that the whole world lies in wickedness. Man is an apostate race. Men are all involved in the penal and natural consequences of Adam's transgression. They stood their probation in him, and do not stand each man for himself.

CHAPTER VII: THE FALL.

The Scriptural Account.

The Scriptural account of the Fall, as given in the look of Genesis, is, That God placed Adam in "the garden of Eden to dress it and to keep it. And the Lord God commanded the man, saying, Of every tree of the garden thou mayest freely eat: but of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it: for in the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die Now the serpent was more subtile than any beast of the field which the Lord God had made. And he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the garden? And the woman said unto the serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden: but of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not eat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die. And the serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die. For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eyes shall be opened; and ye shall be as gods (as God), knowing good and evil. And when the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was pleasant to the eyes, and a tree to be desired to make wise; she took of the fruit thereof, and did eat; and gave also unto her husband with her, and he did eat."

The consequences of this act of disobedience were, (1.) An immediate sense of guilt and shame. (2.) The desire and effort to hide themselves from the face of God. (3.) The denunciation and immediate execution of the righteous judgment of God upon the serpent, upon the man, and upon the woman. (4.) Expulsion from the garden of Eden and prohibition of access to the Tree of Life.

That this account of the probation and fall of man is neither an allegory nor a myth, but a true history, is evident, (1.) From internal evidence. When contrasted with the mythological accounts of the creation and origin of man as found in the records of early heathen nations, whether Oriental, Grecian, or Etruscan, the difference is at once apparent. The latter are evidently the product of rude speculation, the Scriptural account is simple, intelligible, and pregnant with the highest truths. (2.) From the fact not only that it is presented as a matter of history in a book which all Christians recognize as of divine authority, but that it also forms an integral part of the book of Genesis, which is confessedly historical. It is the first of the ten divisions into which that book, in its internal structure, is divided, and belongs essentially to its plan. (3.) It is no only an essential part of the book of Genesis, but it is also an essential part of Scriptural history as a whole, which treats of the origin, apostasy, and development of the human race, as connected with the plan of redemption. (4.) We accordingly find that both in the Old and New Testaments the facts here recorded are assumed, and referred to as matters of history. (5.) And finally, these facts underlie the whole doctrinal system revealed in the Scriptures Our Lord and his Apostles refer to them not only as true, but as furnishing the ground of all the subsequent revelations

and dispensations of God. It was because Satan tempted man and led him into disobedience that he became the head of the kingdom of darkness; whose power Christ came to destroy, and from whose dominion he redeemed his people. It was because we died in Adam that we must be made alive in Christ. So that the Church universal has felt bound to receive the record of Adam's temptation and fall as a true historical account.

There are many who, while admitting the historical character of this account, still regard it as in a great measure figurative. They understand it as a statement not so much of external events as of an internal process of thought; explaining how it was that Eve came to eat of the forbidden tree and to induce Adam to join in her transgression. They do not admit that a serpent was the tempter, or that he spoke to Eve, but assume that she was attracted by the beauty of the forbidden object, and began to question in her own mind either the fact or the justice of the prohibition. But there is not only no valid reason for departing from the literal interpretation of the passage, but that interpretation is supported by the authority of time writers of the New Testament. They recognize the serpent as present, and as the agent in the temptation and fall of our first parents.

The Tree of Life.

According to the sacred narrative, there were two trees standing side by side in the garden of Eden which had a peculiar symbolical or sacramental character. The one was called the Tree of Life, the other the Tree of Knowledge. The former was the symbol of life, and its fruit was not to be eaten except on the condition of man's retaining his integrity. Whether the fruit of that tree had inherent virtue to impart life, i.e., to sustain the body of man in its youthful vigour and beauty, or gradually to refine it until it should become like to what the glorified body of Christ now is, or whether the connection between eating its fruit and immortality was simply conventional and sacramental, we cannot determine. It is enough to know that partaking of that tree secured in some way the enjoyment of eternal life. That this was the fact is plain, not only because man after his transgression was driven from paradise "lest he put forth his hand, and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live forever" (Gen. iii. 22); but also because Christ is called the Tree of Life. He is so called because that tree was typical of Him, and the analogy is, that as He is the source of life, spiritual and eternal, to his people, so that tree was appointed to be the source of life to the first parents of our race and to all their descendants, had they not rebelled against God. Our Lord promises (Rev. ii. 7) to give to them who overcome, to eat of the tree of life which is in the midst of the paradise of God. In heaven there is said (Rev. xxii. 2) to be a tree of life, whose leaves are for the healing of the nations; and again (verse 14), "Blessed are they that do his commandments, that they may have right to the tree of life, and may enter in through the gates into the city." The symbolical and typical import of the tree of life is thus clear. As paradise was the type of heaven, so the tree which would have secured immortal life to obedient Adam in that terrestrial paradise is the type of Him who is the source of spiritual and eternal life to his people in the paradise above.

The Tree of Knowledge.

The nature and significancy of the tree of knowledge of good and evil are not so clear. By the tree of knowledge, indeed, it is altogether probable, we are to understand a tree the fruit of which would impart knowledge. This may be inferred, (1.) From analogy As the tree of life sustained or imparted life, so the tree of knowledge was appointed to

communicate knowledge. (2.) From the suggestion of the tempter, who assured the woman that eating of the fruit of that tree would open her eyes. (3.) She so understood the designation, for she regarded the tree as desirable to render wise. (4.) The effect of eating of the forbidden fruit was that the eyes of the transgressors were opened. And (5.), in the twenty-second verse, we read that God said of fallen man, "Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good and evil." Unless this be understood ironically, which in this connection seems altogether unnatural, it must mean that Adam had, by eating the forbidden fruit, attained a knowledge in some respects analogous to the knowledge of God, however different in its nature and effects. This, therefore, seems plain from the whole narrative, that the tree of knowledge was a tree the fruit of which imparted knowledge. Not indeed from any inherent virtue, it may be, in the tree itself, but from the appointment of God. It is not necessary to suppose that the forbidden fruit had the power to corrupt either the corporeal or moral nature of man, and thus produce the experimental knowledge of good and evil. All that the text requires is that knowledge followed the eating of that fruit.

The words "good and evil" in this connection admit of three interpretations. In the first place, in Scripture, the ignorance of infancy is sometimes expressed by saying that a child cannot tell its right hand from its left; sometimes by saying, that he cannot discern between the evil and the good. Thus in Deut. i. 39, it is said, "Your children . . . had no knowledge between good and evil," and in Is. vii. 16, "Before the child shall know to refuse the evil and choose the good." On the other hand maturity, whether in intellectual or spiritual knowledge, is expressed by saying that one has power to distinguish between good and evil. Thus the perfect or mature believer has his "senses exercised to discern both good and evil," Heb. v. 14. Agreeably to the analogy of these passages, the tree of knowledge of good and evil, is simply the tree of knowledge. The one expression is fully equivalent to the other. This interpretation relieves the passage of many difficulties. It is sustained also by the language of Eve, who said it was a tree desirable to make wise. Before he sinned, Adam had the ignorance of happiness and innocence. The happy do not know what sorrow is, and the innocent do not know what sin is. When he ate of the forbidden tree he attained a knowledge he never had before. But, in the second place the words, "good and evil" may be taken in a moral sense. If this is so, the meaning cannot be that the fruit of that tree was to lead Adam to a knowledge of the distinction between right and wrong, and thus awaken his dormant moral nature. That knowledge he must have had from the beginning, and was a good not to be prohibited. Some suppose that by the knowledge of good and evil is meant the knowledge of what things are good and what are evil. This is a point determined for us by the revealed will of God. Whatever He commands is good, and what. ever He forbids is evil. The question is determined by authority. We cannot answer it from the nature of things, nor by considerations of expediency. Instead of submitting to the authority or Jew of God as the rule of duty, it is assumed that Adam aspired to know for himself what was good and what evil. It was emancipation from the trammels of authority that he sought. To this however, it may be objected that this was not the knowledge which he attained by eating the forbidden fruit. He was told that his eyed should be opened, that he should know good and evil; and his eyes were opened; the promised knowledge was attained. That knowledge, however, was not the ability to determine for himself between right and wrong. He had less of that knowledge after than before his fall. In the third place, "good and evil" may be taken in a physical sense, for happiness and misery. Eating of the forbidden tree was to determine

the question of Adam's being happy or miserable. It led to an experimental knowledge of the difference. God knew the nature and effects of evil from his omniscience. Adam could know them only from experience, and that knowledge he gained when he sinned. Whichever of these particular interpretations be adopted, they all are included in the general statement that the tree of knowledge gave Adam a knowledge which he had not before; he came to an experimental knowledge of the difference between good and evil.

The Serpent.

It may be inferred from the narrative, that Adam was present with Eve during the temptation. In Gen. iii. 6, it is said the woman gave of the fruit of the tree to her husband who was "with her." He was therefore a party to the whole transaction. When it is said that a serpent addressed Eve, we are bound to take the words in their literal sense. The serpent is neither a figurative designation of Satan; nor did Satan assume the form of a serpent. A real serpent was the agent of the temptation, as it is plain from what is said of the natural characteristics of the serpent in the first verse of the chapter, and from the curse pronounced upon the animal itself, and the enmity which was declared should subsist between it and man through all time. But that Satan was the real tempter, and that he used the serpent merely as his organ or instrument, is evident, -- (1.) From the nature of the transaction. What is here attributed to the serpent far transcends the power of any irrational creature. The serpent maybe the most subtile of all the beasts of the field, but he has not the high intellectual faculties which the tempter here displays. (2.) In the New Testament it is both directly asserted, and in various forms assumed, that Satan seduced our first parents into sin. In Rev. xii. 9, it is said, "The great dragon was cast out, that old serpent, called the Devil, and Satan, which deceiveth the whole world." And in xx. 2, "He laid hold on the dragon, that old serpent, which is the Devil, and Satan." In 2 Cor. xi. 3, Paul says, "I fear lest . . . . as the serpent beguiled Eve through his subtilty, so also your minds should be corrupted from the simplicity that is in Christ." But that by the serpent he understood Satan, is plain from v. 14, where he speaks of Satan as the great deceiver; and what is said in Rom. xvi. 20, "The God of peace shall bruise Satan under your feet," is in obvious allusion to Gen. iii. 15. In John viii. 44, our Lord calls the devil a murderer from the beginning, and the father of lies, because through him sin and death were introduced into the world. Such was also the faith of the Jewish Church. In the Book of Wisdom ii. 24, it is said, that "Through the envy of Satan came death into the world." In the later Jewish writings this idea is often presented. [133]

As to the serpent's speaking there is no more difficulty than in the utterance of articulate words from Sinai, or the sounding of a voice from heaven at the baptism of our Lord, or in the speaking of Balaam's ass. The words uttered were produced by the power of Satan, and of such effects produced by angelic beings good and evil there are numerous instances in the Bible.

The Nature of the Temptation.

The first address of the tempter to Eve was designed to awaken distrust in the goodness of God, and doubt as to the truth of the prohibition. "Hath God indeed said, ye shall net eat of every tree of the garden?" or, rather, as the words probably mean, "Has God said, ye shall not eat of any tree of the garden?" The next address was a direct assault upon her faith. "Ye shall not surely die;" but on the contrary, become as God himself in

knowledge. To this temptation she yielded, and Adam joined in the transgression. From this account it appears that doubt, unbelief, and pride were the principles which led to this fatal act of disobedience. Eve doubted God's goodness; she disbelieved his threatening; she aspired after forbidden knowledge.

The Effects of the First Sin.

The effects of sin upon our first parents themselves, were, (1.) Shame, a sense of degradation and pollution. (2.) Dread of the displeasure of God; or, a sense of guilt, and the consequent desire to hide from his presence. These effects were unavoidable. They prove the loss not only of innocence but of original righteousness, and with it of the favour and fellowship of God. The state therefore to which Adam was reduced by his disobedience, so far as his subjective condition is concerned, was analogous to that of the fallen angels. He was entirely and absolutely ruined. It is said that no man becomes thoroughly depraved by one transgression. In one sense this is true. But one transgression by incurring the wrath and curse of God and the loss of fellowship with Him, as effectually involves spiritual death, as one perforation of the heart causes the death of the body; or one puncture of the eyes involves us in perpetual darkness. The other forms of evil consequent on Adam's disobedience were merely subordinate. They were but the expressions of the divine displeasure and the consequences of that spiritual death in which the threatened penalty essentially consisted.

[133] See Eisenmenger, Endecktes Judenthum, edit. Knigsberg, 1711; I. p. 822.

CHAPTER VIII: SIN.

§ 1. The Nature of the Question to be Considered.

Our first parents, we are told, fell from the estate wherein they were created by sinning against God. This presents the question, which is one of the most difficult and comprehensive whether in morals or in theology, What is sin? The existence of sin is an undeniable fact. No man can examine his own nature, or observe the conduct of his fellow men, without having the conviction forced upon him that there is such an evil as sin. This is not a purely moral or theological question. It falls also within the province of philosophy, which assumes to explain all the phenomena of human nature as well as of the external world. Philosophers, therefore, of every age and of every school, have been compelled to discuss this subject. The philosophical theories, as to the nature of sin, are as numerous as the different schools of philosophy. This great question comes under the consideration of the Christian theologian with certain limitations. He assumes the existence of a personal God of infinite perfection, and he assumes the responsibility of man. No theory of the nature or origin of sin which conflicts with either of these fundamental principles, can for him be true. Before entering upon the statement of any of the theories which have been more or less extensively adopted, it is important to ascertain the data on which the answer to the question, What is sin? is to be determined; or the premises from which that answer is to be deduced. These are simply the declarations of the word of God and the facts of our own moral nature. Ignoring either wholly or in part these two sources of knowledge, many philosophers and even theologians, have recourse to the reason, or rather to the speculative understanding, for the decision of the question. This method, however, is unreasonable, and is sure to lead to false conclusions. In determining the nature of sensation we cannot adopt the priori method, and argue from the nature of a thing how it ought to affect our organs of sense. We must assume the facts of sense consciousness as the phenomena to be explained. We cannot say that such is the nature of light that it cannot cause the phenomena of vision; or of acids that they cannot affect the organs of taste; or that our sensations are deceptive which lead ns to refer them to such causes. Nor can we determine philosophically the principles of beauty, and decide what men must admire and what they must dislike. All that philosophy can do is take the facts of our sthetic nature and from them deduce the laws or principles of beauty. In like manner the facts of our moral consciousness must he assumed as true and trustworthy. We cannot argue that such is the constitution of the universe, such the relation of the individual to the whole, that there can be no such thing as sin, nothing for which we should feel remorse or on the ground of which we should apprehend punishment. Nor can we adopt such a theory of moral obligation as forbids our recognizing as sin what the conscience forces us to condemn. Any man who

should adopt such a theory of the sublime and beautiful, as would demonstrate that Niagara and the Alps were not sublime objects in nature; or that the Madonna del Sisti or the Transfiguration by Raphael are not beautiful productions of art; or that the "Iliad" and "Paradise Lost" are not worthy of the admiration of ages, would lose his labour. And thus the man who ignores the facts of our moral nature in his theories of the origin and nature of sin, must labour in vain. This, however, is constantly done. It will be found that all the anti-theistic and antichristian views of this subject are purely arbitrary speculations, at war with the simplest and most undeniable facts of consciousness.

With regard to the nature of sin, it is to be remarked that there are two aspects in which the subject may be viewed. The first concerns its metaphysical, and the second, its moral nature. What is that which we call sin? Is it a substance, a principle, or an act? Is it privation, negation, or defect? Is it antagonism between mind and matter, between soul and body? Is it selfishness as a feeling, or as a purpose? All these are questions which concern the metaphysical nature of sin, what it is as a res in natura. Whereas such questions as the following concern rather its moral nature, namely, What gives sin its character as moral evil? How does it stand related to law? What law is it to which sin is related? What is its relation to the justice of God? What is its relation to his holiness? What has, or can have the relation of sin to law; is it acts of deliberation only, or also impulsive acts and affections, emotions and principles, or dispositions? It is obvious that these are moral, rather than metaphysical questions. In some of the theories on the nature of sin it is viewed exclusively in one of these aspects; and in some, exclusively in the other; and in some both views are combined. It is not proposed to attempt to keep these views distinct as both are of necessity involved in the theological discussion of the subject.

§ 2. Philosophical Theories of the Nature of Sin.

The first theory in the order of time, apart from the primitive doctrine of the Bible, as to the origin and nature of sin, is the dualistic, or that which assumes the existence of an eternal principle of evil. This doctrine was widely disseminated throughout the East, and in different forms was partially introduced into the Christian church. According to the doctrine of the Parsis this original principle was a personal being; according to the Gnostics, Marcionites, and Manicheans, it was a substance, an eternal hule or matter. Augustine says, "Iste [Manes] duo principia inter se diversa atque adversa, eademque ◆terna et co◆terna, hoc est semper fuisse, composuit: duasque naturas atque substantias, boni scilicet et mali, sequens alios antiquos h◆reticos, opinatus est." [134] These two principles are in perpetual conflict. In the actual world they are intermingled. Both enter into the constitution of man. He has a spirit (pneuma) derived from the kingdom of light; and a body with its animal life (soma and psuche) derived from the kingdom of darkness. Sin is thus a physical evil; the defilement of the spirit by its union with a material body; and is to be overcome by physical means, i.e., by means adapted to destroy the influence of the body on the soul. Hence the efficacy of abstinence and austerities. [135]

This theory obviously is: (1.) Inconsistent with Theism, in making something out of God eternal and independent of his will. He ceases to be an infinite Being and an absolute sovereign. He is everywhere limited by a coeternal power which He cannot control. (2.) It destroys the nature of sin as a moral evil, in making it a substance, and in representing it as

inseparable from the nature of man as a creature composed of matter and spirit. (3.) It destroys, of course, human responsibility, not only by making moral evil necessary from the very constitution of man, and by referring its origin to a source, eternal and necessarily operative; but by making it a substance, which destroys its nature as This theory is so thoroughly anti-theistic and anti-Christian, that although long prevailing as a heresy in the Church, it never entered into any living connection with Christian doctrine.

Sin regarded as a mere Limitation of Being.

The second anti-Christian theory of the nature of sin is that which makes it a mere negation, or limitation of being. Being, substance, is good. "Omne quod est, in quantum aliqua substantia est, et bonum [est]," [136] says Augustine. God as the absolute substance is the supreme good. The absolute evil would be nothing. Therefore the less of being, the less of good; and all negation, or limitation of being is evil, or sin. Spinoza [137] says, "Quo magis unusquisque, suum utile qu�rere, hoc est suum esse conservare conatur et potest, eo magis virtute pr�ditus est; contra quatenus unusquisque suum utile, hoc est suum esse conservare negligit, eatenus est impotens." In his demonstration of that proposition he makes power and goodness identical, potentia and virtus are the same. Hence the want of virtue, or evil, is weakness, or limitation of being. Still more distinctly, does Professor Baur of T�bingen, present this view of the nature of sin. [138] He says, "Evil is what is finite; for the finite is negative; the negation of the infinite. Everything finite is relatively nothing; a negativity which, in the constant distinction of plus and minus of reality, appears in different forms." Again, "If freedom from sin is the removal of all limitation, so is it clear, that only an endless series of gradations can bring us to the point where sin is reduced to a vanishing minimum. If this minimum should entirely disappear, then the being, thus entirely free from sin, becomes one with God, for God only is absolutely sinless. But if other beings than God are to exist, there must be in them, so far as they are not infinite as God is, for that very reason, a minimum of evil." The distinction between good and evil, is, therefore, merely quantitative, a distinction between more or less. Being is good, the limitation of being is evil. This idea of sin lies in the nature of the Pantheistic system. If God be the only substance, the only life, the only agent, then He is the sum of all that is, or, rather all that is, is the manifestation of God; the form of his existence. Consequently, if evil exists it is as much a form of the existence of God as good; and can be nothing but imperfect development, or mere limitation of being.

This theory, it is clear, (1.) ignores the difference between the malum metaphysicum and the malum morale, between the physical and the moral between a stunted tree and a wicked man. Instead of explaining sin, it denies its existence. It is therefore in conflict with the clearest of intuitive truths and the strongest of our instinctive convictions. There is nothing of which we are more sure, not even our own existence, than we are of the difference between sin and limitation of being, between what is morally wrong and what is a mere negation of power. (2.) This theory assumes the truth of the pantheistic system of the universe, and therefore is at variance with our religious nature, which demands and assumes the existence of a personal God. (3.) In destroying the idea of sin, it destroys all sense of moral obligation, and gives unrestrained liberty to all evil passions. It not only teaches that all that is, is right; that everything that exists or happens has a right to be, but that the only standard of virtue is power. The strongest is the best. As Cousin says, the

victor is always right; the victim is always wrong. The conqueror is always more moral than the vanquished. Virtue and prosperity, misfortune and vice, he says, are in necessary harmony. Feebleness is a vice (i.e., sin), and therefore is always punished and beaten. [139] This principle is adopted by all such writers as Carlyle, who in their hero worship, make the strong always the good; and represent the murderer, the pirate, and the persecutor, as always more moral and more worthy of admiration than their victims. Satan is far more worthy of homage than the best of men, as in him there is more of being and power, and he is the seducer of angels and the destroyer of men. A more thoroughly demoniacal system than this, the mind of man has never conceived. Yet this system has not only its philosophical advocates, and its practical disciples, but it percolates through much of the popular literature both of Europe and America.

Leibnitz's Theory of Privation.

Nearly allied in terms, but very different in spirit and purpose from this doctrine of Spinoza and his successors, is the theory of Leibnitz, who also resolves sin into privation, and refers it to the necessary limitation of being. Leibnitz, however, was a theist, and his object in his "Th□odic□e" was to vindicate God by proving that the existence of sin is consistent with his divine perfections. His work is religious in its spirit and object, however erroneous and dangerous in some of its principles. He assumed that this is the best possible world. As sin exists in the world, it must be necessary or unavoidable. It is not to be referred to the agency of God. But as God is the universal agent according to Leibnitz's philosophy, sill must be a simple negation or privation for which no efficient cause is needed. These are the two points to be established, First, that sin is unavoidable; and secondly, that it is not due to the agency of God. It is unavoidable, because it arises out of the necessary limitation of the creature. The creature cannot be absolutely perfect. His knowledge and power must be limited. But if limited, they must not only be liable to error, but error or wrong action is unavoidable, or you would have absolutely perfect action from a less than absolutely perfect agent; the effect would transcend the power of the cause. Evil, therefore, according to Leibnitz, arises "par la supr□me necessit□ des v□rit□s □ternelles." [140] "Le franc-arbitre va au bien, et s'il rencontre le mal, c'est par accident, c'est que le mal est cach□ sous le bien et comme masqu□." The origin of evil is thus indeed referred to the will, but the will is unavoidably, or of necessity led into error, by the limitations inseparable from the nature of a creature. If, therefore, God created a world at all, He must create one from which sin could not be excluded. Such being the origin and nature of sin, it follows that God is not its author. Providence, according to Leibnitz, is a continued creation (at least this is the view presented in some parts of his "Th□odic□e" [141]), therefore all that is positive and real must be due to his agency. But sill being merely negation, or privation, is nothing positive, and therefore does not need an efficient, but simply a deficient cause to account for its existence. The similarity in mode of statement between this doctrine and the Augustinian doctrine which makes all sin defect, and which reconciles its existence with the holiness of God on the same principle as that adopted by Leibnitz, is obvious to all. It is however merely a similarity in the mode of expression. The two doctrines are essentially different, as we shall see when the Augustinian theory comes to be considered. With Augustine, defect is the absence of a moral good which the creature should possess; with Leibnitz, negation is the necessary limitation of the powers of the creature.

The objections to this theory which makes sin mere privation, and refers it to the nature of creatures as finite beings, are substantially the same as those already presented as bearing against the other theories before mentioned. (1.) In the first place, it makes sin a necessary evil. Creatures are of necessity imperfect or finite; and if sin be the unavoidable consequence of such imperfection, or limitation of being, sin also becomes a necessary evil. (2.) It makes God after all the author of sin in so far as it throws upon Him the responsibility for its existence. For even admitting that it is a mere negation, requiring no efficient cause, nevertheless God is the author of the limitation in the creature whence sin of necessity flows. He has so constituted the works of his hand, that they cannot but sin, just as the child cannot but err in its judgments. Reason is so feeble even in the adult man that mistakes as to the nature and causes of things are absolutely unavoidable. And if sin be equally unavoidable from the very constitution of the creature, God, who is the author of that constitution, becomes responsible for its existence. This is not only derogatory to the character of God, but directly opposed to the teachings of his Word. The Bible never refers the origin of sin, whether in angels or in men, to the necessary limitations of their being as creatures, but to the perverted and inexcusable use of their own free agency. The fallen angels kept not their first estate; and man, being left to the freedom of his own will, fell from the estate in which he was created. (3.) This theory tends to obliterate the distinction between moral and physical evil. If sin be mere privation, or if it be the necessary consequence of the feebleness of the creature, it is the object of pity rather than of abhorrence. In the writings of the advocates of this theory the two senses of the words good and evil, the moral and the physical, are constantly interchanged and confounded; because evil according to their views is really little more than a misfortune, an unavoidable mistake as to what is really good. The distinction, however, between virtue and vice, holiness and sin, as revealed in our consciousness and in the word of God, is absolute and entire. Both are simple ideas. We know what pain is from experience; we know what sin is from the same source. We know that the two are as different as day and night, as light and sound. Any theory, therefore, which tends to confound them, must be false. Accordingly, in the Scriptures while mere suffering is always presented as an object of commiseration, sin is presented as an object of abhorrence and condemnation. The wrath and curse of God are denounced against all sin as its just desert. (4.) This doctrine, therefore, necessarily tends not only to lessen our sense of the evil or pollution of sin, but also to destroy the sense of guilt. Our sins are our misfortunes, our infirmities. They are not what conscience pronounces them to be, crimes calling for condign punishment. Sin, however, reveals itself in our consciousness not as a weakness, but as a power. It is greatest in the strongest. It is not the feeble-minded who are the worst of men; but those great in intellect have been, in many cases, the greatest in iniquity. Satan, the worst of created beings, is the most powerful of creatures. (5.) If this theory be correct, sin must be everlasting. As we can never be free from the limitations of our being, we can never be free from sin to which those limitations unavoidably give rise. The soul, therefore, as has been said, is the asymptote of God, forever approaching but never reaching the state of absolute sinlessness.

Sin necessary Antagonism.

Still another theory obviously inconsistent with the facts of consciousness and the teachings of the Bible, is that which accounts for sin on the law of necessary opposition, or antagonism. All life, it is said, implies action and reaction. Even in the material universe

the same law prevails. The heavenly bodies are kept in their orbits by the balance of centrifugal and centripetal forces There is polarity in light, and in magnetism and electricity. All chemical changes are produced by attraction and repulsion. Thus in the animal world there is no strength without obstacles to be overcome; no rest without fatigue; no life without death. So also the mind is developed by continual struggles, by constant conflict with what is within and without. The same law, it is urged, must prevail in the moral world. There can be no good without evil. Good is the resistance or the overcoming of evil. What the material universe would be, had matter but one property; if everything were oxygen or everything carbon; what life would be without action and reaction; what the mind would he without the struggle with error and search after truth; such, it is said, the moral world would be without sin; a stagnant, lifeless pool. So far as creatures are concerned, it is maintained, that it is a law of their constitution, that they should be developed by antagonism, by the action of contrary forces, or opposing principles; so that a moral world without sin is an impossibility. Sin is the necessary condition of the existence of virtue.

This general theory is of early origin and wide dissemination In its latest form, as presented by Blasche and Rosenkranz, the universe itself, as a product of the self-development of the infinite and absolute Being, involving a separation or difference from the pure and simple one in which was no distinction, is evil. It comes into existence by a fall or apostasy. Thus, as Professor Mller in his work on "Sin," says, Instead of Pantheism we have a system which nearly approaches Pansatanism. Apart however from this dreadful extreme of the doctrine, in any form it destroys the very nature of sin. What is so called is the universal law of all finite existence. There cannot be action without reaction. There cannot be life without diversity and antagonism of operations. And if good cannot exist without evil, evil ceases to be something to be abhorred and condemned. Men cease to be responsible for what is inseparable from their very nature as creatures, and therefore there is nothing which the conscience can condemn or which God can punish. Our whole moral nature, on this theory, is a delusion, and all the denunciations of Scripture against sin are the ravings of fanaticism.

Schleiermacher's Theory of Sin.

Schleiermacher's doctrine of sin is so related to his whole philosophical and theological system that one cannot be understood without some knowledge of the other. His philosophy is pantheistic. His theology is simply the interpretation of human consciousness in accordance with the fundamental principles of his philosophy. It is called Christian theology because it is the interpretation of the religious consciousness of Christians; i.e., of those who know and believe the facts recorded concerning Christ. The leading principles of his system are the following:

1. God is the absolute Infinity (die einfache and absolute Unendlichkeit), not a person, but simple being with the single attribute of omnipotence. Other attributes which we ascribe to the Infinite Being express not what is in Him (or rather in It), but the effects produced in us. Wisdom, goodness, holiness in God, mean simply the causality in Him which produces those attributes in us.

Absolute power means all power. God, or the absolutely powerful being, is the only cause. Everything that is and everything that occurs are due to his efficiency.

3. This infinite power produces the world. Whatever the relation between the two, whether it is the substance of which the world is the phenomenon, or whether the world is the substance of which God is the life, the world in some sense is. There is a finite as well as an infinite.

4. Man, as an integral part of the world, consists of two elements, or stands related both to the finite and infinite, God and nature. There is in man self-consciousness, or a consciousness which is affected by the world. He is in the world and of the world, and is acted upon by the world. On the other hand, he has what Schleiermacher calls Gottesbewusstseyn, or God-consciousness. This is not merely a consciousness of God, but is God in us in the form of consciousness.

5. The normal, or ideal, state of man consists in the absolute and uninterrupted control of the God-consciousness, or of God in us. These two principles he sometimes distinguishes as flesh and spirit. But by flesh he does not mean the body; nor what St. Paul commonly means by it, our corrupt fallen nature; but our whole nature so far as it stands related to the world. It is tantamount, in the terminology of Schleiermacher, to self-consciousness. And by spirit he does not mean the reason, nor what the Bible means by the spirit in man, i.e., the Holy Ghost, but the (Gottesbewusstseyn) God-consciousness, or God in us.

6. Religion consists in the feeling of absolute dependence. That is, in the recognition of the fact that God, or the absolute Being, is the only cause, and that we are merely the form in which his causality is revealed or exercised.

7. The original state of man was not a normal or ideal state. That is, the God-consciousness or divine principle was not strong enough absolutely to control the self-consciousness. That was a state to be reached by progress or development.

8. The feeling which arises from the want of this absolute control of the higher principle is the sense of sin; and the conviction that the higher principle ought to rule is the sense of guilt. With this feeling of sin and guilt arises the sense of the need of redemption.

9. This redemption consists in giving to the God-consciousness complete control; and is effected through Christ, who is the normal or ideal man. That is, He is the man in whom the God-consciousness, the divine nature, God (these, in this system, are interchangeable terms), was from the beginning completely dominant. We become like Him, i.e., are redeemed, partly by the recognition of his true character as sinless, and partly by communion with Him through his Church.

It is plain that this system precludes the possibility of sin in the true Scriptural sense of the term, --

1. Because it precludes the idea of a personal God. If sin be want of conformity to law, there must be a lawgiver, one who prescribes the rule of duty to his creatures. But in this system there is no self-conscious, personal ruler who is the moral governor of men.

2. Because the system denies all efficiency, and of course all liberty to the creature. If the Infinite Being is the only agent, then all that is, is due to his direct efficiency; and sin, therefore, is either his work or it is a mere negation.

3. Because what, according to this theory, is called sin is absolutely universal and absolutely necessary. It is the unavoidable consequence or condition of the existence of

such a being as man. That is, of a being with a self-consciousness and a God-consciousness, in such proportions and relation that the dominance of the latter can be attained only gradually.

4. Because what are called sin and guilt are only such in our consciousness, or in our subjective apprehension of them. Certain things produce in us the sense of pain, others the feeling of pleasure; some the feeling of approbation, others of disapprobation; and that by the ordinance, so to speak, of God. But pain and pleasure, right and wrong, are merely subjective states. They have no objective reality. We are sinful and guilty only in our own feelings, not in the sight or judgment of God. [142] How entirely this view of the subject destroys all true sense of sin; how inconsistent it is with all responsibility; how it conflicts with the testimony of our own consciousness and with the teachings of Scripture, must be apparent to all who have not yielded themselves to the control of the pantheistic principles on which this whole system is founded.

The Sensuous Theory.

A sixth theory places the source and seat of sin in the sensuous nature of man. We are composed of body and spirit. Whatever may be the relation of the two, they cannot fail to be recognized as in some sense distinct elements of our nature. All attempts to identify them not only lead to the contradiction of self-evident truths, but to the degradation of the spiritual. If the mind be the product of the body, or the highest function of matter, or if the body be the product of the mind, or the external form in which mind exists, in either way the mind is materialized. "It is," says M[illegible]ller, [143] "the undeniable teaching of history that the obliterating the. distinction between spirit and nature always ends in naturalizing spirit, and never in spiritualizing nature." It is a fact of consciousness and of common consent that man consists of soul and body. It is no less certain that by the body he is connected with the external world or nature, and by the soul with the spiritual world and God; that he has wants, desires, appetites, and affections, which find their objects in the material world, and that he has other instincts, affections, and powers which find their objects in the spiritual world. It is self-evident that the latter are higher and ought to be uniformly and always dominant; it is a fact of experience that the reverse is the case; that the lower prevail over the higher; that men are universally to a greater or less extent, and always to an extent that is degrading and sinful, governed by their sensuous nature. They prefer the seen and temporal to the unseen and eternal. They seek the gratification which is to be found in material objects, rather than the blessedness which is to be found in the things of the Spirit. Herein, according to this theory, consists the source and essence of sin. This doctrine, which has prevailed in every age of the Church, has existed in different forms, (1.) In that of the Manich[illegible]an system, which teaches the essential evil of matter. (2.) In that of the later Romanism, which teaches that man as originally created was so constituted that the soul was subject to the body, his higher powers being subordinate to his lower or sensuous nature. This original evil in his constitution was, in the case of Adam, according to the Romanists, corrected by the supernatural gift of original righteousness. When that righteousness was lost by the fall, the sensuous element in man's nature became ascendent. Therein consists his habitual sinfulness, and this is the source of all actual transgressions. (3.) The more common form of this theory is essentially the same with the Romish doctrine, except that it does not refer the predominance of the body aver the soul to the loss of

original righteousness. The fact that men are governed by the lower rather than by the higher elements of their nature, as a matter of experience, is accounted for in different ways. (1.) Some say it arises from the relative weakness of the higher powers. This amounts to the Leibnitzian doctrine that sin is due to the limitations of our nature, or the feebleness and liability to error belonging to our constitution as creatures. (2.) Others appeal to the liberty of the will. Man as a free agent has the power either to resist or to submit to the enticements of the flesh. If he submits, it is his own fault and sin. There is no necessity and no coercion in the case. But if this submission is universal and uniform it must have a universal and adequate cause. That cause is not found in the mere liberty of man, or in his ability to submit. It must be that the cause is uniform and abiding, and such a cause can only be found in the very constitution of man, at least in his present state, which renders the sensuous element in man more powerful than the spiritual. (3.) Others again, while not denying the plenary ability of man to resist the allurements of sense, account for the universal ascendency of the lower powers by a reference to the order of development of our nature. We are so constituted, or we come into the world in such a state that the lower or sensuous part of our nature invariably and of necessity attains strength before the development of the higher powers. The animal propensities of the child are strong, while reason and con science are weak. Hence the lower gain such an ascendency over the higher that it is ever afterwards maintained.

It is obvious, however, that this theory in any of its forms fails to bring out the real nature of sin, or satisfactorily to account for its origin.

1. Sin is not essentially the state or act of a sensuous nature. The creatures presented in Scripture as the most sinful are the fallen spirits, who have no bodies and no sensual appetites.

2. In the second place, the sins which are the most offensive in man, and which most degrade him, and most burden his conscience, have nothing to do with the body. Pride, malice, envy, ambition, and, above all, unbelief and enmity to God, are spiritual sins. They may not only exist in beings who have no material organization, but in the soul when separated from the body, and when its sensuous nature is extinct.

3. This theory tends to lower our sense of sin and guilt. All moral evil becomes mere weakness, the yielding of the feebler powers of the spirit to the stronger forces of the flesh. If sin invariably, and by a law which controls men in their present state of existence, arises from the very constitution of their nature as sentient beings, then the responsibility for sin must be greatly lessened, if not entirely destroyed.

4. If the body be the seat and source of sin, then whatever tends to weaken the body or to reduce the force of its desires must render men more pure and virtuous. If this be so then monkery and asceticism have a foundation in truth. They are wisely adapted to the elevation of the soul above the influence of the flesh and of the world, and of all forms of evil. All experience, however, proves the reverse. Even when those who thus seclude themselves from the world, and macerate the body, are sincere, and faithfully adhere to their principles, the whole tendency of their discipline is evil. It nourishes pride, self-righteousness, formality, and false religion. The Pharisees, in the judgment of Christ, with all their strictness of living and constant fasting, were further from the kingdom of heaven than publicans and harlots.

5. On the assumption involved in this theory, the old should be good. In them the lusts of the flesh become extinct. They lose the power to enjoy what pleases the eyes or pampers the tastes of the young. The world to them has lost its attractions. The body becomes a burden. It is in the state to which the youthful ascetic endeavours to reduce his corporeal frame by abstinence and austerity; and yet the older the man, unless renewed by the grace of God, the worse the sinner. The soul is more dead, more insensible to all that is elevating and spiritual, and more completely alienated from God; less grateful for his mercies, less afraid of his wrath, and less affected by all the manifestations of his glory and love. It is not the body, therefore, that is the cause of sin.

6. This theory is opposed to the doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures do indeed refer a large class of sins to the sensual nature of man; and they represent the flesh (or sarx) as the seat of sin and the source of all its manifestations in our present state. They moreover, use the word sarkikos, carnal, as synonymous with corrupt or sinful. All this, however, does not prove that they teach that man's animal or sensuous nature is the seat and source of his sinfulness. All depends on the sense in which the sacred writers use the words sarx and sarkikos as antithetical to pneuma and pneumatikos. According to one interpretation, sarx means the body with its animal life, its instincts and appetites. Or as Bretschneider defines it: [144] "Natura visibilis seu animalis tanquam appetituum naturalium fons et sedes, et quidem in malam partem, quatenus h�c natura animalis, legi divin� non adstricta, appetit contra legem, igiturque cupiditatum et peccatorum est mater." If such be the meaning of sarx, then sarkikos is means animal and psuchikos sensuous. On the other hand, according to this view, pneuma means reason, and pneumatikos, the reasonable, that is, one governed by the reason. According to this view, the sarkikoi are those who are controlled by their senses and animal nature; and the pneumatikoi, those who are governed by their reason and higher powers. According to the other interpretation of these terms, sarx means the fallen nature of man, his nature as it now is; and pneuma the Holy Ghost. Then the sarkikoi are the unrenewed or natural men, i.e., those destitute of the grace of God, and the pneumatikoi, are those in whom the Holy Spirit dwells. It is of course admitted that the word sarx is often used in Scripture and especially in St. Paul's writings, for the body; then for what is external and ritual; then for what is perishing. Mankind when designated as flesh are presented as earthly, feeble, and transient. Besides these common and admitted meanings of the word, it is also used in a moral sense. It designates man, or humanity, or human nature as apostate from God. The works of the flesh, therefore, are not merely sensual works, but sinful works, everything in man that is evil. Everything that is a manifestation of his nature as fallen, is included under the works of the flesh. Hence to this class are referred envy, malice, pride, and contentions; as well as rioting and drunkenness, Gal. v. 19-21. To walk after the flesh; to be carnally minded; to be in the flesh, etc., etc. (see Rom. viii. 1-13), are all Scriptural modes of expressing the state, conduct, and life of the men of the world of every class. The meaning of flesh, however, as used in Paul's writings, is most clearly determined by its antithesis to Spirit. That the pneuma of which he speaks is the Holy Spirit, is abundantly clear. He calls it the Spirit of Christ, the Spirit of God, the Spirit which is to quicken our mortal bodies; which witnesses with our spirits that we are the children of God; whose dwelling in believers makes them the temple of God. The pneumatikoi, or spiritual, are those in whom the Holy Spirit dwells as the controlling principle of their lives. The Scriptures, therefore, are directly opposed to the theory which

makes the body or the sensuous nature of man the source of sin, and its essence to consist in yielding to our appetites and worldly affections, instead of obeying the reason and conscience.

The Theory that all Sin consists in Selfishness.

There is another doctrine of the nature of sin which belongs to the philosophical, rather than to the theological theories on the subject. It makes all sin to consist in selfishness. Selfishness is not to be confounded with self-love. The latter is a natural and original principle of our nature and of the nature of all sentient creatures, whether rational or irrational. Belonging to their original constitution, and necessary to their preservation and well-being, it cannot be sinful. It is simply the desire of happiness which is inseparable from the nature of a sentient being. Selfishness, therefore, is net mere self-love, but the undue preference of our own happiness to the happiness or welfare of other. According to some, this preference is of the nature of a desire or feeling; according to others, it is of the nature of a purpose. In the latter view, all sin consists in the purpose to seek our own happiness rather than the general good, or happiness, as it is commonly expressed, of the universe. In either view, sin is the undue preference of ourselves.

This theory is founded on the following principles, or is an essential element in the following system of doctrine: (1.) Happiness is the greatest good. Whatever tends to promote the greatest amount of happiness is for that reason good, and whatever has the opposite tendency is evil. (2.) As happiness is the only and ultimate good, benevolence, or the disposition or purpose to promote happiness, must be the essence and sum of virtue. (3.) As God is infinite, He must be infinitely benevolent, and therefore it must be his desire and purpose to produce the greatest possible amount of happiness. (4.) The universe being the work of God must be designed and adapted to secure that end, and is therefore the best possible world or system of things. (5.) As sin exists in the actual world, it must be the necessary means of the greatest good, and therefore it is consistent, as some say, with the holiness of God to permit and ordain its existence; or, as others say, to create it. (6.) There is no more sin in the world than is necessary to secure the greatest happiness of the universe.

The first and most obvious objection to this whole theory has already been presented, namely, that it destroys the very idea of moral good. It confounds the right with the expedient. It thus contradicts the consciousness and intuitive judgments of the mind. It is intuitively true that the right is right in its own nature, independently of its tendency to promote happiness. To make holiness only a means to an end; to exalt enjoyment above moral excellence, is not only a perversion and a degradation of the higher to the lower, but it is the utter destruction of the principle. This is a matter which, properly speaking, does not admit of proof. Axioms cannot be proved. They can only be affirmed. Should a man deny that sweet and bitter differ, it would be impossible to prove that there is a difference between them. We can only appeal to our own consciousness and affirm that we perceive the difference. And we can appeal to the testimony of all other men, who also affirm the same thing. But after all this is only an assertion of a fact first by the individual, and then by the mass of mankind. In like manner if any man says that there is no difference between the good and the expedient, that a thing is good simply because it is expedient; or, if he should say that there is no difference between holiness and sin, we can only refer to our own

consciousness and to the common consciousness of men, as contradicting his assertion. We know, therefore, from the very constitution of our nature that the right and the expedient are not identical ideas; that the difference is essential and immutable. And we know from the same source, and with, equal assurance or certainty, that happiness is not the highest good; but on the contrary, that holiness is as much higher than happiness, as heaven is higher than the earth, or Christ than Epicurus. (2.) This theory is as much opposed to our religious, as it is to our moral nature. Our dependence is upon God; our allegiance is to Him; we are bound to do His will irrespective of all consequences; and we are exalted and purified just in proportion as we are lost in Him, adoring his divine perfections, seeking to promote his glory, and recognizing that in fact and of right all things are by Him, through Him, and for Him. According to this theory, however, our allegiance is to the universe of sentient beings. We are bound to promote their happiness. This is our highest and our only obligation. There can therefore be no religion in the proper sense of the word. Religion is the homage and allegiance of the soul to an infinitely perfect personal Being, to whom we owe our existence, who is the source of all good, and for whom all things consist. To substitute the universe for this Being, and to resolve all duty into the obligation to promote the happiness of the universe, is really to render all religion impossible. The universe is not our God. It is not the universe that we love; it is not the universe that we adore; it is not the universe that we fear. It is not the favour of the universe that .s our life, nor is its disapprobation our death. (3.) As this theory is thus opposed to our moral and religious nature, it is evil in its practical effects. It is a proverb, a maxim founded on the nature of things and on universal experience, that the world is governed by ideas. It is doubtful whether history furnishes any more striking illustration of the truth of this maxim than that furnished by the operation of the theory that all virtue is founded in expediency that holiness is that which tends to produce happiness. When the individual man adopts that principle, his whole inward and outward life is determined by it. Every question which comes up for decision, is answered, not by a reference to the law of God, or to the instincts of his moral nature, but by the calculations of expediency. And when a people come under the control of this theory they invariably and of necessity become calculating. If happiness be the greatest good, and whatever seems to us adapted to promote happiness is right, then God and the moral law are lost sight of. Our own happiness is apt to become the chief good for us, as it is for the universe. (4.) It need hardly be remarked that we are incompetent to determine what course of conduct will issue in the greatest amount of physical good, and therefore can never tell what is right and what is wrong. It may be said that we are not left to our own sagacity to decide that question. The law of God as revealed in his word, is a divine rule by which we can learn what tends to happiness and what to misery. But this not only degrades the moral law into a series of wise maxims, but it changes the motive of obedience. We obey not out of regard to the authority of God, but because He knows better than we what will promote the greatest good. Besides this, in the questions which daily present them. selves for decision, we are forced to judge for ourselves what is right and wrong, in the light of conscience and of the general principles contained in the Scriptures. And if these principles all resolve themselves into the one maxim, that that is right which promotes happiness, we are obliged to resort to the calculations of expediency, for which in our short-sighted wisdom we are utterly incompetent. (5.) Besides all this, the theory assumes that sin, and the present awful amount of sin, are the necessary means of the greatest good. What then

becomes of the distinction between good and evil? If that is good which tends to promote the greatest happiness, and if sin is necessary to secure the greatest happiness, then sin ceases to be sin, and becomes a good. Then also it must be right to do evil that good may come. How, asks the Apostle, on this principle, can God judge the world? If the sins of men not only in fact promote the highest end, but if a man in sinning has the purpose and desire to co﷿perate with God in producing the greatest amount of happiness, how can he be condemned? If virtue or holiness is right simply because it tends to produce the greatest happiness, and if sin also tends to the same result, then the man who sins with a view to the greatest good is just as virtuous as the man who practices holiness with the same end in view. It may be said that it is a contradiction to say that a man sins with a truly benevolent purpose; for the essence of virtue is to purpose the greatest good, and therefore whatever is done in the execution of that purpose, is virtuous. Exactly so. The objection itself shows that right becomes wrong and wrong right, according to the design with which it is committed or performed. And therefore, if a man lies, steals, or murders with a design to promote the good of society, of the church, or of the universe, he is a virtuous man. It was principally for the adoption of, and the carrying into practice this doctrine, that the Jesuits became an abomination in the sight of Christendom and were banished from all civilised countries. Jesuits were however, unhappily not its only advocates. The principle has been widely disseminated in books on morals, and has been adopted by theologians as the foundation of their whole system of Christian doctrine. (6.) If happiness be not the highest good, then benevolence is not the sum of all excellence, and selfishness as the opposite of benevolence, cannot be the essence of sin. On this point, again, appeal may be safely made to our own consciousness and to the common consciousness of men. Our moral nature teaches us, on the one hand, that all virtue cannot be resolved into benevolence: justice, fidelity, humility, forbearance, patience, constancy, spiritual mindedness, the love of God, gratitude to Christ, anti zeal for his glory, do not reveal themselves in consciousness as forms of benevolence. They are as distinct to the moral sense, as red, blue, and green are distinct to the eye. On the other hand, unbelief, hardness of heart, ingratitude, impenitence, malice, and enmity towards God, are not modifications of selfishness. These attempts at simplification are not only unphilosophical, but also dangerous; as they lead to confounding things which differ, and, as we have seen, to denying the essential nature of moral distinctions.

The doctrine which makes all sin to consist in selfishness, as it has been generally held, especially in this country, considers selfishness as the opposite of benevolence agreeably to the theory which has just been considered. There are others, however, that mean by it the opposite to the love of God. As God is the proper centre of the soul and the sum of all perfection, apostasy from Him is the essence of sin; apostasy from God involves, it is said, a falling back into ourselves, and making self the centre of our being. Thus M﷿ller, [145] Tholuck, [146] and many others, make alienation from God the primary principle of sin. But dethroning God necessitates the putting an idol in his place. That idol, Augustine and after him numerous writers of different schools, say, is the creature; as the Apostle concisely describes the wickedness of men, by saying, that they "worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator." But M﷿ller argues that as it is self the sinner seeks in the creature, the real principle of sin consists in putting self in the place of God, and making it the highest end of life and its gratification or satisfaction the great object of

pursuit. It of course is not denied, that selfishness, it some of its forms, includes a large class of the sins of which men are guilty. What is objected to is, the making selfishness the essence of all sin, or the attempt to reduce all the manifestations of moral evil to this one principle. This, cannot be done. There is disinterested sin as well as disinterested benevolence. A man may as truly and as deliberately sacrifice himself in sinning, as in doing good. Many parents have violated the law of God not for their own benefit, but for the benefit of their children. It may be said that this is only a form of selfishness, because the happiness of their children is their happiness, and the sin is committed for the gratification of their parental feelings. To this, however, it may be answered, first, that it is contradictory to say that what is done for another is done for ourselves. When a mother sacrifices wealth and life for her child, although she acts under the impulse of the maternal instinct, she acts disinterestedly. The sacrifice consists in preferring her child to herself. In the second place, if an act ceases to be virtuous when its performance meets and satisfies some demand of our nature, then no act can be virtuous. When a man does any good work, he satisfies his conscience. If lie does an act of kindness to the poor, if he devotes himself to the relief of the sick or the prisoner, he gratifies his benevolent feelings. If he seeks the favour and fellowship of God, and consecrates himself to his service, he gratifies the noblest principles of his nature, and experiences the highest enjoyment of which he is susceptible. It is not necessary therefore, in order that an act, whether right or wrong, should be disinterested, that it should not minister to our gratification. All depends on the motive for which it is done. If that motive be the happiness of another and not our own, the act is disinterested. It is contrary, therefore, to the testimony of every man's consciousness to say that selfishness is the essential element of sin. There is no selfishness in malice, nor in enmity to God. These are far higher forms of evil than mere selfishness. The true nature of sin is alienation from God and opposition to his character and will. it is the opposite of holiness and does not admit of being reduced to any one principle, either the love of the creature or the love of self.

[134] Liber Hresibus, XLVI.; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. viii. p. 48, d.

[135] Baur's Manichean System. Neander's Church History, edit. Boston, 1849, vol. i. pp. 478-506. Mller's Lehre von der Snde, vol. i. pp. 504-518.

[136] De Genesi ad Literam, XI. xiii. 17, Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. iii. p. 450, d.

[137] Ethices, Par. IV. propos. xx.; Works, edit. Jena, 1803, vol. ii. p. 217.

[138] In the Tbingen Zeitschrift, 1834, Drittes Heft.

[139] History of Modern Philosophy, translation by Wight, New York, 1852, vol. i. pp. 182-187.

[140] Thodice, I. 25, Works, edit. Berlin, 1840, p. 511.

[141] Thodice, I. 27, and III. 381.

[142] Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre. Dr. Gess's Uebersicht ber das theologische System Schleiermachers. Mller's Lehre Von der Snde, vol. i. pp. 412-437. Bretschneider's Dogmatik, pp. 14-38 of Appendix to vol. i. Morell's Philosophy of Religion.

[143] Vol. i. p 363.

[144] Lexicon in Novum Testamentum, sub voce.

[145] Lehre von der Snde, vol. i. pp. 134-158.

[146] Von der Snde und vom Vershner, p. 32.

§ 3. The Doctrine of the Early Church.

The theories already considered are called philosophical, either because they concern the metaphysical nature of sin, or because they are founded on some philosophical principle. The moral at theological doctrines on the subject are so designated because they are founded on what are assumed to be the teachings of our moral nature or of the word of God. So far as the early Church is concerned, the doctrine respecting sin was stated only in general terms. In almost all cases the explicit and discriminating doctrinal affirmations received their form as counter statements to erroneous views, So long as the truth was not denied the Church was content to hold and state it in the simple form in which it is presented in the Bible. But when positions were assumed which were inconsistent with the revealed doctrine, or when one truth was so stated as to contradict some other truth, it became necessary to be more explicit, and to frame such an expression of the doctrine as should comprehend all that God had revealed on the subject. This process in the determination, or rather in the definition of doctrines was of necessity a gradual one. It was only as one error after another arose in the Church, that the truth came to be distinguished from them severally by more explicit and guarded statements. As the earliest heresies were those of Gnosticism and Manicheism in which, in different forms, sin was represented as a necessary evil having its origin in a cause independent of God and beyond the control of the creature, the Church was called upon to deny those errors, and to assert that sin was neither necessary nor eternal, but had its origin in the free will of rational creatures. In the struggle with Manicheism the whole tendency of the Church was to exalt the liberty and ability of man, in order to maintain the essential doctrine, then so variously assailed, that sin is a moral evil for which man is to be condemned, and not a calamity for which he is to be pitied. It was the unavoidable consequence of the unsettled state of doctrinal formulas, that conflicting statements should be made even by those who meant to be the advocates of the truth, -- not only different writers, but the same writer, would on different occasions, present inconsistent statements. In the midst of these inconsistencies the following points were constantly insisted upon. (1.) That all men in their present state are sinners. (2.) That this universal sinfulness of men had its historical and causal origin in the voluntary apostasy of Adam. (3.) That such is the present state of human nature that salvation can be attained in no other way than through Christ, and by the assistance of his Spirit. (4.) That even infants as soon as born need regeneration and redemption, and can be saved only through the merit of Christ, These great truths, which lie at the foundation of the gospel, entered into the general faith of the Church before they were so strenuously asserted by Augustine in his controversy with Pelagius. It is true that many assertions may be quoted from the Greek fathers inconsistent with some of the prepositions above stated. But the same writers in other passages avow their faith in these primary Scriptural truths; and they are implied in the prayers and ordinances of the Church, and were incorporated at a later period, in the public confessions of the Greeks, as well as of the Latins. Clemens Alexandrinus [147] says: to gar examartanein pasin emphuton kai koinon. Justin says, [148] To genos ton anthropon apo tou Adam hupo thanaton kai planen ten tou opheos epeptokei,

although he adds, para ten idian aitian ekastou auton ponereusamenou. Origen says, [149] "Si Levi . . . . in lumbis Abrah\u00e2 fuisse perhibetur, multo magis omnes homines qui in hoc mundo nascuntur et nati sunt, in lumbis erant Ad\u00e2, cum adhuc esset in Paradiso; et omnes homines cum ipso vel in ipso expulsi sunt de Paradiso." Athanasius says, [150] Pantes oun oi ex Adam genomenoi en hamartiais sullambanontai te tou propatoros katadike -- deiknusin hos ex arches he anrthropon phusis upo ten amartian peptoken hupo tes en Eua para baseos, kai hupo kataran he gennesis gegonen. Ambrose says, [151] "Manifestum itaque in Adam omnes peccasse quasi in massa: ipse enim per peccatum corruptus, quos genuit omnes nati sunt sub peccato. Ex eo igitur cuncti peccatores, quia ex ipso sumus omnes." Cyprian says: [152] "Si . . . . baptismo atque a gratia nemo prohibetur; quanto magis prohiberi non debet infans, qui recens natus nihil peccavit, nisi quod secundum Adam carnaliter natus, contagium mortis antiqu\u00e2 prima nativitate contraxit? qui ad remissam peccatorum accipiendam hoc ipso facilius accedit, quod illi remittuntur non propria, sed aliena peccata." Again he says: "Fuerant et ante Christum viri insignes, sed in peccatis concepti et nati, nec originali nec personali caruere delicto." These writers, says Gieseler, [153] taught that through Christ and his obedience on the tree was healed the original disobedience of man in reference to the tree of knowledge; that as we offended God in the first Adam by transgression, so through the second Adam we are reconciled to God; that Christ has freed us from the power of the devil to which we were subjected by the sin of Adam; that Christ has regained for us life and immortality. [154] It is not maintained that the Greek fathers held the doctrine of original sin in the form in which it was afterwards developed by Augustine, but they nevertheless taught that the race fell in Adam, that they all need redemption, and that redemption can only be obtained through the Lord Jesus Christ. [155]

[147] P\u00e2dagogus, III. 12; Works, edit. Paris, 1641, p. 262, c.

[148] Dialogus cum Tryphone Jud\u00e2o, 88; Works, edit. Cologne, 1636, p. 316, a.

[149] In Epistolam ad Romanos, lib. v. § 1; Works, edit. Wirceburgi, 1794, vol. xv. p. 219.

[150] Expos. in Psalmos; on Ps. l. (li.), 7.

[151] In Epistolam ad Romanos, v. 12; Works, Paris, 1661, vol. iii. p. 269, a.

[152] Epistola, lxiv. edit. Bremen, 1690, p. 161, of third set.

[153] Kirchengeschichte, edit. Bonn, 1855, vol. vi. p. 180.

[154] Iren\u00e2us, V. xvi. 3; Works, edit. Leipzig, 1853; vol. i. p. 762. "Obediens factus est ad mortem autem crucis, Phil. ii. 8: eam qu\u00e2 in ligno facta fuerat inobedientiam, per eam qu\u00e2 in ligno fuerat obedientiam sanans . . . . In primo quidem Adam offendimus, non facientes ejus pr\u00e2ceptum; in secundo autem Adam reconciliati sumus, obedientes usque ad mortem facti." And again, Ibid. V. xxiii. 1, p. 546: "Quotiam Deus invictus et magnanimis est, magnanimem quidem se exhibuit ad correptionem hominis, et probationem omnium. . . . . ; per secundum autem hominem alligavit fortem et diripuit ejus vasa et evacuavit mortem, vivificans eum hominem, qui fuerit mortificatus."

[155] J .G. Walch: De Pelagianismo ante Pelagium. J. Hern: De Sententiis eorum Patrum quorum auctoritas ante Augustinum plurimum valuit. Neander's Church History, vol. i. Gieseler's Kirchengeschichte, vol. vi. Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine. Also

M□nscher's, Meyer's, and Klee's Dogmengeschichte.

§ 4. Pelagian Theory.

In the early part of the fifth century, Pelagius, Coelestius, and Julian, introduced a new theory as to the nature of sin and the state of man since the fall, and of our relation to Adam. That their doctrine was an innovation is proved by the fact that it was universally rejected and condemned as soon as it was fully understood. They were all men of culture, ability, and exemplary character. Pelagius was a Briton, whether a native of Brittany or of what is now called Great Britain, is a matter of doubt. He was by profession a monk, although a layman. Coelestius was a teacher and jurist; Julian an Italian bishop. The radical principle of the Pelagian theory is, that ability limits obligation. "If I ought, I can," is the aphorism on which the whole system rests. Augustine's celebrated prayer, "Da quod jubes, et jube quod vis," was pronounced by Pelagius an absurdity, because it assumed that God can demand more than man render, and what man must receive as a gift. In opposition to this assumption he laid down the principle that man must have plenary ability to do and to be whatever can be righteously required of him. "Iterum qu□rendum est, peccatum voluntatis an necessitatis est? Si necessitatis est, peccatum non est; si voluntatis, vitari potest. Iterum qu□rendum est, utrumne debeat homo sine peccato esse? Procul dubio debet. Si debet potest; si non potest, ergo non debet. Et si non debet homo esse sine peccato, debet ergo cum peccato esse, et jam peccatum non erit, si illud deberi constiterit." [156]

The intimate conviction that men can be responsible for nothing which is not in their power, led, in the first place, to the Pelagian doctrine of the freedom of the will. It was not enough to constitute free agency that the agent should be self-determined, or that all his volitions should be determined by his own inward states. It was required that he should have power over those states. Liberty of the will, according to the Pelagians, is plenary power, at all times and at every moment, of choosing between good and evil, and of being either holy or unholy. Whatever does not thus fall within the imperative power of the will can have no moral character. "Omne bonum ac malum, quo vel laudabiles vel vituperabiles sumus, non nobiscum oritur, sed agitur a nobis: capaces enim utriusque rei, non pleni nascimur, et ut sine virtute, ita et sine vitio procreamur: atque ante actionem propri□ voluntatis, id solum in homine est, quod Deus condidit." [157] Again, "Volens namque Deus rationabilem creaturam voluntarii boni munere et liberi arbitrii potestate donare, utriusque partis possibilitatem homini inserendo proprium ejus fecit, esse quod velit; ut boni ac mali capax, natural iter utrumque posset, et ad alterumque voluntatem deflecteret."

2. Sin, therefore, consists only in the deliberate choice of evil. It presupposes knowledge of what is evil, as well as the full power of choosing or rejecting it. Of course it follows, --

3. That there can be no such thing as original sin, or inherent hereditary corruption. Men are born, as stated in the foregoing quotation, ut sine virtute, ita sine vitio. In other words men are born into the world since the fall in the same state in which Adam was created. Julian says: [158] "Nihil est peccati in homine, si nihil est propri□ voluntatis, vel assensionis. Tu autem concedis nihil fuisse in parvulis propri□ voluntatis: non ego, sed ratio concludit; nihil igitur in eis esse peccati." This was the point on which the Pelagians

principally insisted, that it was contrary to the nature of sin that it should be transmitted or Inherited. If nature was sinful, then God as the author of nature must be the author of sin. Julian [159] therefore says: "Nemo naturaliter malus est; sed quicunque reus est, moribus, non exordiis accusatur."

4. Consequently Adam's sin injured only himself. This was one of the formal charges presented against the Pelagians in the Synod of Diospolis. Pelagius endeavored to answer it, by saying that the sin of Adam exerted the influence of a bad example, and in that sense, and to that degree, injured his posterity. But he denied that there is any causal relation between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of his race, or that death is a penal evil. Adam would have died from the constitution of his nature, whether he had sinned or not; and his posterity, whether infant or adult, die from like necessity of nature. As Adam was in no sense the representative of his race, as they did not stand their probation in him, each man stands a probation for himself; and is justified or condemned solely on the ground of his own individual personal acts.

5. As men come into the world without the contamination of original sin, and as they have plenary power to do all that God requires, they may, and in many cases do, live without sin; or if at any time they transgress, they may turn unto God and perfectly obey all his commandments. Hence Pelagius taught that some men had no need for themselves to repeat the petition in the Lord's prayer, "Forgive us our trespasses." Before the Synod of Carthage one of the grounds on which he was charged with heresy was, that he taught, "et ante adventum Domini fuerunt homines impeccabiles, id est, sine peccato."

6. Another consequence of his principles which Pelagius unavoidably drew was that men could be saved without the gospel. As free will in the sense of plenary ability, belongs essentially to man as much as reason, men whether Heathen, Jews, or Christians, may fully obey the law of God and attain eternal life. The only difference is that under the light of the Gospel, this perfect obedience is rendered more easy. One of his doctrines, therefore, was that "lex sic mittit ad regnum coelorum, quomodo et evangelium."

7. The Pelagian system denies the necessity of grace in the sense of the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. As the Scriptures, however, speak so fully and constantly of the grace of God as manifested and exercised in the salvation of men, Pelagius could not avoid acknowledging that fact. By grace, however, he understood everything which we derive from the goodness of God. Our natural faculties of reason and free will, the revelation of the truth whether in his works or his word, all the providential blessings and advantages which men enjoy, fall under the Pelagian idea of grace. Augustine says, Pelagius represented grace to be the natural endowments of men, which inasmuch as they are the gift of God are grace. "Ille (Pelagius) Dei gratiam non appellat nisi naturam, qua libero arbitrio conditi sumus." [160] And Julian, he says, includes under the term all the gifts of God. "Ipsi grati&#65533;, beneficiorum qu&#65533; nobis pr&#65533;stare non desinit, augmenta reputamus." [161]

8. As infants are destitute of moral character, baptism in their case cannot either symbolize or effect the remission of sin. It is, according to Pelagius, only a sign of their consecration to God. He believed that none but the baptized were at death admitted into the kingdom of heaven, in the Christian sense of that term, but held that unbaptized infants were nevertheless partakers of eternal life. By that term was meant what was afterwards called by the schoolmen, limbos infantum. This was described as that mesos topos kolaseos kai

paradeisou, eis hon kai ta abaptista brephe metat themena zen makarios. [162] Pelagius and his doctrines were condemned by a council at Carthage, A.D. 412. He was exonerated at the Synods of Jerusalem and Diospolis, in 415; but condemned a second time in a synod of sixty bishops at Carthage in 416. Zosimus, bishop of Rome, at first sided with the Pelagians and censured the action of the African bishops; but when their decision was confirmed by the general council of Carthage in 418, at which two hundred bishops were present, he joined in the condemnation and declared Pelagius and his friends excommunicated. In 431 the Eastern Church joined in this condemnation of the Pelagians, in the General Synod held at Ephesus. [163]

Arguments against the Pelagian Doctrine.

The objections to the Pelagian views of the nature of sin will of necessity come under consideration, when the Scriptural and Protestant doctrine comes to be presented. It is sufficient for the present to state, --

1. That the fundamental principle on which the whole system is founded contradicts the common consciousness of men. It is not true, as our own conscience teaches us, that our obligation is limited by our ability. Every man knows that he is bound to be better than he is, and better than he can make himself by any exertion of his We are bound to love God perfectly, but we know that such perfect love is beyond our power. We recognize the obligation to be free from all sin, and absolutely conformed to the perfect law of God. Yet no man is so infatuated or so blinded to his real character as really to believe that he either is thus perfect, or has the power to make himself so. It is the daily and hourly prayer or aspiration of every saint and of every sinner to be delivered from the bondage of evil. The proud and malignant would gladly be humble and benevolent; the covetous would rejoice to be liberal; the infidel longs for faith, and the hardened sinner for repentance. Sin is in its own nature a burden and a torment, and although loved and cherished, as the cups of the drunkard are cherished, yet, if emancipation could be effected by an act of the will, sin would cease to reign in any rational creature. There is no truth, therefore, of which men are more intimately convinced than that they are the slaves of sin; that they cannot do the good they would; and that they cannot alter their character at will. There is no principle, therefore, more at variance with the common consciousness of men than the fundamental principle of Pelagianism that our ability limits our obligation, that we are not bound to be better than we can make ourselves by a volition.

2. It is no less revolting to the moral nature of man to assert, as Pelagianism teaches, that nothing is sinful but the deliberate transgression of known law; that there is no moral character in feelings and emotions; that love and hatred, malice and benevolence, considered as affections of the mind, are alike indifferent; that the command to love God is an absurdity, because love is not under the control of the will. All our moral judgments must be perverted before we can assent to a system involving such consequences.

3. In the third place, the Pelagian doctrine, which confounds freedom with ability, or which makes the liberty of a free agent to consist in the power to determine his character by a volition, is contrary to every man's consciousness. We feel, and cannot but acknowledge, that we are free when we are self determined; while at the same time we are conscious that the controlling states of the mind are not under the power of the will, or, in other words, are not under our own power. A theory which is founded on identifying things which are

essentially different, as liberty and ability, must be false.

4. The Pelagian system leaves the universal sinfulness of men, a fact which cannot be denied, altogether unaccounted for. To refer it to the mere free agency of man is to say that a thing always is simply because it may be.

5. This system fails to satisfy the deepest and most universal necessities of our nature. In making man independent of God by assuming that God cannot control free agents without destroying their liberty, it makes all prayer for the controlling grace of God over ourselves and others a mockery, and throws man back completely on his own resources to grapple with sin and the powers of darkness without hope of deliverance.

6. It makes redemption (in the sense of a deliverance from sin) unnecessary or impossible. It is unnecessary that there should be a redeemer for a race which has not fallen, and which has full ability to avoid all sin or to recover itself from its power. And it is impossible, if free agents are independent of the control of God.

7. It need hardly be said that a system which asserts, that Adam's sin injured only himself; that men are born into the world in the state in which Adam was created; that men may, and often do, live without sin; that we have no need of divine assistance in order to be holy; and that Christianity has no essential superiority over heathenism or natural religion, is altogether at variance with the word of God. The opposition indeed between Pelagianism and the gospel is so open and so radical that the former has never been regarded as a form of Christianity at all. It has, in other words, never been the faith of any organized Christian church. It is little more than a form of Rationalism.

[156] Gieseler, vol. i.

[157] Pelagius, Apud Augustinum de Peccato Originali, 14; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. x. p. 573, a. b.

[158] Apud Augustinum Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum, I. 60; Works, vol. x. p. 1511, d.

[159] Ibid.

[160] Epistola, clxxix. 3; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. ii. pp. 941, d, 942, a.

[161]

[162] On the distinction between vita [illegible]terna and regnum coelorum see Pelagius Apud Augustinum de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissione, I. 58; Works, vol. x. p. 231. Conc. Carth. 415.

[163] Wigger's Augustinism and Pelagianism. Guericke's Church History, §§ 91-93. Ritter's Geschichte der Christliche Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 337-443; and all the church histories and histories of doctrine.

§ 5. Augustinian Doctrine.

The Philosophical Element of Augustine's Doctrine.

There are two elements in Augustine's doctrine of sin: the one metaphysical or philosophical, the other moral or religious. The one a speculation of the understanding, the other derived from his religious experience and the teaching of the Holy Spirit. The one has passed away, leaving little more trace on the history of doctrine than other speculations,

whether Aristotelian or Platonic. The other remains, and has given form to Christian doctrine from that day to this. This is not to be wondered at. Nothing is more uncertain and unsatisfactory than the speculations of the understanding or philosophical theories. Whereas nothing is more certain and universal than the moral consciousness of men and the truths which it reveals. And as the Scriptures, being the work of God, do and must conform their teachings to what God teaches in the constitution of our nature, doctrines founded on the twofold teaching of the Spirit, in his word and in the hearts of his people, remain unchanged from generation to generation, while the speculations of philosophy or of philosophical theologians pass away as the leaves of the forest. No man now concerns himself about the philosophy of Origen, or of the new Platonists, or of Augustine, while the language of David in the fifty-first Psalm is used to express the experience and convictions of all the people of God in all ages and in all parts of the world.

The metaphysical element in Augustine's doctrine of sin arose from his controversy with the Manicheans. Manes taught that in was a substance. This Augustine denied. With him it was a maxim that "Omne esse bonum est." But if esse (being) is good, and if evil is the opposite of good, then evil must be the opposite of being, or nothing, i.e., the negation or privation of being. Thus he was led to adopt the language of the new Platonists and of Origen, who, by a different process, were brought to define evil as the negation of being, as Plotinus calls it, steresis tou ontos; and Origen says, pasa he kakia ouden estin, and evil itself he says is esteresthai tou ontos. In thus making being good and the negation of being evil, Augustine seems to have made the same mistake which other philosophers have so often made, -- of confounding physical and moral good. When God at the beginning declared all things, material and immaterial, which He had made, to be very good, He simply declared them to be suited to the ends for which they were severally made. He did not intend to teach us that moral goodness could be predicated of matter or of an irrational animal. In other cases the word good means agreeable, or adapted to give pleasure. In others again, it means morally right. To infer from time fact that everything which God made is good, or that every esse is bonum, that therefore moral evil being the negation of good must be the negation of being, is as illogical as to argue that because honey is good (in the sense of being agreeable to the taste) therefore worm-wood is bad, in the sense of being sinful. Although Augustine held the language of those philosophers who, both before and since, destroy the very nature of sin in making it mere limitation of being, yet he was very far from holding the same system. (1.) They made sin necessary, as arising from the very nature of a creature. He made it voluntary. (2.) They made it purely physical. He made it moral. With him it includes pollution and guilt. With them it included neither. (3.) With Augustine this negation was not merely passive, it was not the simple want of being, it was such privation as tended to destruction. (4.) Evil with Augustine, therefore, as was more fully and clearly taught by his followers, was not mere privation, nor simply defect. That a stone cannot see, involves the negation of the power of vision. But it is not a defect, because the power of vision does not belong to stones. Blindness is a defect in an animal, but not sin. The absence of love to God in a rational creature is sin, because it is the absence of something which belongs to such a creature, and which he ought to have. In the true Augustinian sense, therefore, sin is negation only as it is the privation of moral good, -- the privatio boni, or as it was afterwards generally expressed, a want of conformity to the law or standard of good.

Augustine's Reasons for making Sin a Negation.

In thus making sin negation, Augustine had principally two ends in view. (1.) To show that sin is not necessary. If it were something existing of itself, or something created by the power of God, it was beyond the power of man. He was its victim, not its author. (2.) He desired to show that it was not due to the divine efficiency. According to his theory of God's relation to the world, not only all that is, every substance, is created and upheld by l rod, but all activity or power, all energy by which positive effects are produced, is the energy of God. If sin, therefore, was anything in itself, anything more than a defect, or a want of conformity to a rule, God must be its author. He, therefore, took such a view of the psychological nature of sin, that it did not require an efficient, but as he often said only a deficient cause. If a man, to use the old Augustinian illustration, strike the cords of an untuned harp, he is the cause of the sound but not of the discord. So God is the cause of the sinner's activity but not of the discordance between his acts and the laws of eternal truth and right. [164]

The Moral Element of His Doctrine.

The true Augustinian doctrine of sin was that which the illustrious father drew from his own religious experience, as guided and determined by the Spirit of God. He was, (1.) Conscious of sin. He recognized himself as guilty and polluted, as amenable to the justice of God and offensive to his holiness. (2.) He felt himself to be thus guilty and polluted not only because of deliberate acts of transgression, but also for his affections, feelings, and emotions. This sense of sin attached not only to these positive and consciously active states of mind, but also to the mere absence of right affections, to hardness of heart, to the want of love, humility, faith, and other Christian virtues, or to their feebleness and inconstancy. (3.) He recognized the fact that he had always been a sinner. As far back as consciousness extended it was the consciousness of sin. (4.) He was deeply convinced that he had no power to change his moral nature or to make himself holy; that whatever liberty he possessed, however free he was in sinning, or (after regeneration) in holy acting, he had not the liberty of ability which Pelagians claimed as an essential prerogative of humanity. (5.) It was involved in this consciousness of sin as including guilt or just liability to punishment, as well as pollution, that it could not be a necessary evil, but must have its origin in the free act of man, and be therefore voluntary. Voluntary: (a.) In having its origin in an act of the will; (b.) In having its seat in the will; (c.) In consisting in the determination of the will to evil: the word will being here, as by Augustine generally, taken in its widest sense for everything in man that does not fall under the category of the understanding. (6.) What consciousness taught him to be true with regard to himself he saw to be true in regard to others. All men showed themselves to be sinners. They all gave evidence of sinfulness as soon as they gave evidence of reason. They all appeared not only as transgressors of the law of God, but as spiritually dead, devoid of all evidence of spiritual life. They were the willing slaves of sin, entirely unable to deliver themselves from their bondage to corruption. No man had ever given proof of possessing the power of self-regeneration. All who gave evidence of being regenerated, with one voice ascribed the work not to themselves, but to the grace of God. From these facts of consciousness and experience Augustine drew the inevitable conclusion, (1.) That if men are saved it cannot be by their own merit, but solely through the undeserved love of God. (2.) That the regeneration of the

soul must be the exclusive and supernatural work of the Holy Ghost; that the sinner could neither effect the work nor co-operate in its production. In other words, that grace is certainly efficacious or irresistible. (3.) That salvation is of grace or of the sovereign mercy of God, (a.) In that God might justly have left men to perish in their apostasy without any provision for their redemption. (b.) In that men, being destitute of the power of doing anything holy or meritorious, their justification cannot be by works, but must be a matter of favour. (c.) In that it depends not on the will of the persons saved, but on the good pleasure of God, who are to be made partakers of the redemption or Christ. In other words, election to eternal life must be founded In the sovereign pleasure of God, and not on the foresight of good works. (4.) A fourth inference from the principles of Augustine was the perseverance of the saints. If God of his own good pleasure elects some to eternal life, they cannot fail of salvation. It thus appears that as all the distinguishing doctrines of the Pelagians are the logical consequences of their principle of plenary ability as the ground and limit of obligation, so the distinguishing doctrines of Augustine are the logical consequences of his principle of the entire inability of fallen man to do anything spiritually good.

Taught by his own experience that he was from his birth guilty and polluted, and that he had no power to change his own nature, and seeing that all men are involved in the same sinfulness and helplessness, he accepted the Scriptural solution of these facts of consciousness and observation, and therefore held, (1.) That God created man originally in his own image and likeness in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, immortal, and invested with dominion over the creatures. He held also that Adam was endowed with perfect liberty of the will, not only with spontaneity and the power of self-determination, but with the power of choosing good or evil, and thus of determining his own character. (2.) That being left to the freedom of his own will, Adam, under the temptation of the Devil, voluntarily sinned against God, and thus fell from the estate in which he was created. (3.) That the consequences of this sin upon Adam were the loss of the divine image, and the corruption of his whole nature, so that he became spiritually dead, and thus indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all spiritual good. Besides this spiritual death, he became mortal, liable to all the miseries of this life, and to eternal death. (4.) Such was the union between Adam and his descendants, that the same consequences of his transgression came on them that fell upon him. They are born the children of wrath, i.e., in a state of condemnation, destitute of the image of God, and morally depraved. (5.) This inherent, hereditary depravity is truly and properly of the nature of sin, involving both guilt and corruption. In its formal nature it consists in the privation of original righteousness and (concupiscence) inordinatio natur, disorder of the whole nature. It is of the nature of a habitus as distinguished from an act, activity or agency. It is voluntary, in the sense mentioned above, especially in that it did not arise from necessity of nature, or from the efficiency of God, but from the free agency of Adam. (6.) That the loss of original righteousness and the corruption of nature consequent on the fall of Adam are penal inflictions, being the punishment of his first sin. (7.) That regeneration, or effectual calling, is a supernatural act of the Holy Spirit, in which the soul is the subject and not the agent; that it is sovereign, granted or withheld according to the good pleasure of God; and consequently that salvation is entirely of grace.

This is the Augustinian system in all that is essential. It is this which has remained, and been the abiding form of doctrine among the great body of evangelical Christians from that

day to this. It is of course admitted that Augustine held much connected with the several points above mentioned, which was peculiar to the man or to the age in which he lived, but which does not belong to Augustinianism as a system of doctrine. As Lutheranism does not include all the individual opinions of Luther, and as Calvinism does not include all the personal views of Calvin, so there is much taught by Augustine which does not belong to Augustinianism. He taught that all sin is the negation of being; that liberty is ability, so that in denying to fallen man ability to change his own heart, he denies to him freedom of the will; that concupiscence (in the lower sense of the word), as an instinctive feeling, is sinful; that a sinful nature is propagated by the very law of generation; that baptism removes the guilt of original sin; and that all unbaptized infants (as Romanists still teach and almost all Protestants deny) are lost. These, and other similar points are not integral parts of his system, and did not receive the sanction of the Church when it pronounced in favour of his doctrine as opposed to that of the Pelagians. In like manner it is a matter of minor importance how he understood the nature of the union between Adam and his posterity; whether he held the representative, or the realistic theory; or whether he ultimately sided for Traducianism as against Creationism, or for the latter as against the former. On these points his language is confused and undecided. It is enough that he held that such was the union between Adam and his race, that the whole human family stood their probation in him and fell with him in his first transgression, so that all the evils which are the consequences of that transgression, including physical and spiritual death, are the punishment of that sin. On this point he is perfectly explicit. When it was objected by Julian that sin cannot be the punishment of sin, he replied that we must distinguish three things, that we must know, "aliud esse peccatum, aliud poenam, peccati, aliud utrumque, id est, ita peccatum, ut ipsum sit etiam poena peccati, ... pertinet originale peccatum ad hoc genus tertium, ubi sic peccatum est, ut ipsum sit et poena peccati." [165] Again he says: "Est [peccatum] . . . . non solum voluntarium atque possibile unde liberum est abstinere; verum etiam necessarium peccatum, unde abstinere liberum non est, quod jam non solum peccatum, sed etiam poena peccati est." [166] Spiritual death (i.e., original sin or inherent corruption), says Wiggers, is, according to Augustine, the special and principal penalty of Adam's first transgression, which penalty has passed on all men. [167] This is in exact accordance with the doctrine of the Apostle, who says: "In Adam all die," 1 Cor. xv. 22; and that a sentence of condemnation (krima eis katakrima) for one offence passed on all men, Rom. v. 16, 17. This Augustine clung to as a Scriptural doctrine, and as a historical tact. This, however, is a doctrine which men have ever found it hard to believe, and a fact which they have ever been slow to admit. Pelagius said: [168] "Nulla ratione concedi ut Deus, qui propria peccata remittit, imputet aliena." And Julian vehemently exclaims, "Amolire te itaque cum tali Deo tuo de Ecclesiarum medio: non est ipse, cui Patriarch&#65533;, cui Prophet&#65533;, cui Apostoli crediderunt, in quo speravit et sperat Ecclesia primitivorum, qu&#65533; conscripta est in coelis; non est ipse quem credit judicem rationabilis creatura; quem Spiritus sanctus juste judicaturum esse denuntiat. Nemo prudentium, pro tali Domino suum unquam sanguinem fudisset: nec enim merebatur dilectionis affectum, ut suscipiend&#65533; pro se onus imponeret passionis. Postremo iste quem inducis, si esset uspiam, reus convinceretur esse non Deus; judicandus a vero Deo meo, non judicaturus pro Deo." [169] To this great objection Augustine gives different answers. (1.) He refers to Scriptural examples in which men have been punished for the sins of others. (2.) He appeals to the fact that God visits the

sins of parents upon their children. (3.) Sometimes he says we should rest satisfied with the assurance that the judge of all the earth must do right, whether we can see the justice of his ways or not. (4.) At others he seems to adopt the realistic doctrine that all men were in Adam, and that his sin was their sin, being the act of generic humanity. As Levi was in the loins of Abraham, and was tithed in him, so we were in this loins of Adam, and sinned in him. (5.) And, finally, he urges that as we are justified by the righteousness of Christ, it is not incongruous that we should be condemned for the sin of Adam. [170] It will be observed that some of these grounds are inconsistent with others. If one be valid, the others are invalid. If we reconcile the condemnation of men on account of the sin of Adam, on the ground that he was our representative, or that he sustained the relation which all parents bear to their children, we renounce the ground of a realistic union. If the latter theory be true, then Adam's sin was our act as truly as it was his. If we adopt the representative theory, his act was not our act in any other sense than that in which a representative acts for his constituents. From this it is plain, (1.) That Augustine had no clear and settled conviction as to the nature of the union between Adam and his race which is the ground of the imputation of his sin to his posterity, any more than he had about the origin of the soul; and (2.) That no particular theory on that point, whether the representative or realistic, can properly be made an element of Augustinianism, as a historical and church form of doctrine.

[164] See, on Augustine's theory, Mller, Lehre von der Snde, vol. i. pp. 338-349. Ritter's, Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie, vol. ii. pp. 337-425.

[165] Opus Imperfectum, I. 47; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. x., pp. 1495, d, and 1496, d.

[166] Opus Imperfectum, V. 59, Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. x., p. 2026, b.

[167] Augustinismus und Pelagianismus, edit. Hamburg, 1833, vol. i. p. 104.

[168] Apud Augustinum de Peccatorum Meritis et Remissionie, III. iii. 5; Works, vol. x., p. 289, a.

[169] Opus Imperfectum contra Julianum, I. 50; Works, vol. x. p. 1501, a, b.

[170] See Mnscher's Dogmengeschichte, vol. iv., p. 195.

§ 6. Doctrine of the Church of Rome.

This is a point very difficult to decide. Romanists themselves are as much at variance as to what their Church teaches concerning original sin as those who do not belong to their communion. The sources of this difficulty are, (1.) First, the great diversity of opinions on this subject prevailing in the Latin Church before the authoritative decisions of the Council of Trent and of the Romish Catechism. (2.) The ambiguity and want of precision or fulness in the decisions of that council. (3.) The different interpretations given by prominent theologians of the true meaning of the Tridentine canons.

Diversity of Sentiment in the Latin Church.

As to the first of these points it may be remarked that there were mainly three conflicting elements in the Latin Church before the Reformation, in relation to the whole subject of sin. (1.) The doctrine of Augustine. (2.) That of the Semi-Pelagians, and (3.) That

of those of the schoolmen who endeavoured to find a middle ground between the other two systems. The doctrine of Augustine, as exhibited above, was sanctioned by the Latin Church, and pronounced to be the true orthodox faith. But even during the lifetime of Augustine, and to a greater extent in the following century, serious departures from his system began to prevail. These departures related to all the intimately connected doctrines of sin, grace, and predestination. Pelagianism was universally disclaimed and condemned. It was admitted that the race of man fell in Adam; that his sin affected injuriously his posterity as well as himself; that men are born in s state of alienation from God; that they need the power of the Holy Spirit in order to their restoration to holiness. But what is the nature of original sin, or of that depravity or deterioration of our nature derived from Adam? And, What are the remains of the divine image which are still preserved, or what is the power fur good which fallen men still possess? And What is to be understood by the grace of God and the extent of its influence? And What is the ground on which God brings some and not others to the enjoyment of eternal life? These were questions which received very different answers. Augustine, as we have seen, answered the first of these questions by saying that original sin consists not only in the loss of original righteousness, but also in concupiscence, or disorder, or corruption of nature, which is truly and properly sin, including both guilt and pollution. The second question he answered by saying that fallen man has no power to effect what is spiritually good; he ran neither regenerate himself, prepare himself for regeneration, nor co-perate with the grace of God in that work. These principles necessarily lead to the doctrines of efficacious or irresistible grace and of sovereign election, as was seen and universally admitted. It was these necessary consequences, rattler than the principles themselves, which awakened opposition. But to get rid of the consequences it was necessary that the principles should be refuted. This opposition to, Augustinianism arose with the monks and prevailed principally among them. This, as Gieseler [171] says, was very natural. Augustine taught that man could do nothing good of himself, and could acquire no merit in the sight of God. The monks believed that they could do not only all, but more than all that God required of them. Else why submit to their vows of celibacy, poverty, and obedience? The party thus formed against the orthodox or established doctrine was called Semi-Pelagian, because it held a middle ground between Pelagius and Augustine.

The Semi-Pelagians.

The principal leaders of this party were John Cassianus, an Eastern monk and disciple of Chrysostom; Vincentius Lerinensis, and Faustus of Rhegium. The most important work of Cassian was entitled "Collationes Patrum," which is a collection of dialogues on various subjects. He was a devout rather than a speculative writer, relying on the authority of Scripture for the support of his doctrine. Educated in the Greek Church and trained in a monastery, all his prepossessions were adverse to Augustinianism. And when he transferred his residence to Marseilles in the south of France, and found himself in the midst of churches who bowed to the authority of Augustine, he set himself to modify and soften, but not directly to oppose the distinguishing doctrines of that father. [172] Vincent of Lerins was a man of a different spirit and of higher powers. His reliance was on tradition. He held the highest doctrine concerning the Church, and taught that communion with her in faith and ordinances was the one essential condition of salvation. He was the author of the celebrated formula as to the rule of faith, quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus

creditum est. His principal work is entitled "Commonitorium," or Remembrancer, a collection mainly of extracts. This work was long considered a standard among Romanists, and has been held in high repute by many Protestants for the ability which it displays. It was intended as a guard against heresy, by exhibiting what the leaders of the Church had taught against heretics, and to determine the principle on which the authority of the fathers was to be admitted. A single father, even though a bishop, confessor, or martyr, might err, and his teachings be properly disregarded, but when he concurred with the general drift of ecclesiastical teaching, i.e., with tradition, he was to be fully believed. [173]

The ablest and most influential of the leaders of the Semi-Pelagian party was Faustus of Rhegium, who secured the condemnation of Lucidus, an extreme advocate of the Augustinian doctrine, in the Synod of Arles, 475, A.D.; and who was called upon by the council to write the work "De gratia Dei et human mentis libero arbitrio," which attained great celebrity and authority. The Semi-Pelagians, however, were far from agreeing among themselves either as to sin or as to grace. Cassian taught that the effects of Adam's sin on his posterity were, (1.) That they became mortal, and subject to the physical infirmities of this life. (2.) That the knowledge of nature and of the divine law which Adam originally possessed, was in a great measure preserved until the sons of Seth intermarried with the daughters of Cain, when the race became greatly deteriorated. (3.) That the moral effects of the fall were to weaken the soul in all its power for good, so that men constantly need the assistance of divine grace. (4.) What that grace was, whether the supernatural influence of the Spirit, the providential efficiency of God, or his various gifts of faculties and of knowledge, he nowhere distinctly explains. He admitted that men could not save themselves; but held that they were not spiritually dead; they were sick; and constantly needed the aid of the Great Physician. He taught that man sometimes began the work of conversion; sometimes God; and sometimes, in a certain sense, God saves the unwilling. [174] Vincent evidently regarded the Augustinian doctrine of original sin as making God the author of evil; for, he says, it assumes that God has created a nature, which acting according to its own laws and under the impulse of an enslaved will, can do nothing but sin. [175] And he pronounces heretical those who teach that grace saves those who do not ask, seek, or knock, in evident allusion to the doctrine of Augustine that it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God who showeth mercy. Faustus admitted a moral corruption of nature as the consequence of the fall of Adam, which he called original sin (originale delictum). In his letter to Lucidus he anathematizes the doctrine of Pelagius that man is born "without sin." [176] From this deteriorated, infirm state, no man can deliver himself. He needs the grace of God. But what that grace was is doubtful. From some passages of his writings there would seem to be meant by it only, or principally, the moral influence of the truth as revealed by the Spirit in the Scriptures. He says God draws men to him, but "Quid est attrahere nisi pr dicare, nisi scripturarum consolationibus excitare, increpationibus deterrere, desideranda proponere, intentare metuenda, judicium comminari, pr mium polliceri?" [177] Semi-Pelagians agreed, however, in rejecting the Pelagian doctrine that Adam's sin injured only himself; they admitted that the effects of that sin passed on all men, affecting both the soul and body. It rendered the body mortal, and liable to disease and suffering; and the soul it weakened, so that it became prone to evil and incapable, without divine assistance, of doing anything spiritually good. But as against Augustine they held, at least according to the statements of Prosper and Hilary, the

advocates of Augustinianism in the south of France, (1.) That the beginning of salvation is with man. Man begins to seek God, and then God aids him. (2.) That this incipient turning of the soul towards God is something good, and in one sense meritorious. (3.) That the soul, in virtue of its liberty of will or ability for good, co-operates with the grace of God in regeneration as well as in sanctification. That these charges were well founded may be inferred from the decisions of the councils of Orange and Valence, A.D. 529, in which the doctrines of Augustine were again sanctioned. As the decisions of those councils were ratified by the Pope they were, according to the papal theory, declared to be the faith of the Church. Among the points thus pronounced to be included in the true Scriptural doctrine, are, (1.) That the consequence of Adam's sin is not confined to the body, or to the lower faculties of the soul, but involves the loss of ability to spiritual good. (2.) The sin derived from Adam is spiritual death. (3.) Grace is granted not because men seek it, but the disposition to seek is a work of grace and the gift of God. (1.) The beginning of faith and the disposition to believe is not from the human will, but from the grace of God. (5.) Believing, willing, desiring, seeking, asking, knocking at the door of mercy, are all to be referred to the work of the Spirit and not to the good which belongs to the nature of fallen man. The two great points, therefore, in dispute between the Augustinians and Semi-Pelagians were decided in favour of the former. Those points were (1.) That original sin, or the corruption of nature derived from Adam, was not simply a weakening of our power for good, but was spiritual death; really sin, incapacitating the soul for ally spiritual good. And (2.) That in the work of conversion it is not man that begins, but the Spirit of God. The sinner has no power to turn himself unto God, but is turned or renewed by divine grace before he can do anything spiritually good. [178]

The decisions of the councils of Orange and Valence in favour of Augustinianism, did not arrest the controversy. The Semi-Pelagian party still continued numerous and active, and so far gained the ascendency, that in the ninth century Gottschalk was condemned for teaching the doctrine of predestination in the sense of Augustine. From this period to the time of the Reformation and the decisions of the Council of Trent, great diversity of opinion prevailed in the Latin Church on all the questions relating to sin, grace, and predestination. It having come to be generally admitted that original righteousness was a supernatural gift, it was also generally held that the effect of Adam's sin upon himself and upon his posterity was the loss of that righteousness. This was its only subjective effect. The soul, therefore, is left in the state in which it was originally created, and in which it existed, some said a longer, others a shorter, period, or no perceptible period at all, before the receipt of the supernatural endowment. It is in this state that met are born into the world since the apostasy of Adam.

The Doctrine of Anselm.

This loss of original righteousness was universally regarded as a penal evil. It was the punishment of the first sin of Adam which came equally upon him and upon all his descendants. The question now is, What is the moral state of a soul destitute of original righteousness considered as a supernatural gift? It was the different views taken as to the answer to that question, which gave rise to the conflicting views of the nature and consequences of original sin.

1. Some said that this negative state was itself sinful. Admitting that original sin is

simply the loss of original righteousness, it was nevertheless truly and properly sin. This was the ground taken by Anselm, the father of the scholastic philosophy and theology. In his work, "De Conceptu Virginali et Originali Peccato," he says of children, [179] "Quod in illis non est justitia, quam debent habere, non hoc fecit illorum, voluntas personalis, sicut in Adam, sed egestas naturalis, quam ipsa natura accepit ab Adam -- facit natura personas infantium peccatrices. Nullam infantibus injustitiam super pr&#65533;dictam nuditatem justiti&#65533;. [180] Peccatum originale aliud intelligere nequeo, nisi ipsam--factam per inobedientiam Ad&#65533; justiti&#65533; debit&#65533; nuditatem." [181] This original sin, however, even in infants, although purely negative, is nevertheless truly and properly sin. Anselm says, "Omne peccatum est injustitia, et originale peccatum est absolute peccatum, unde sequitur quod est injustitia. Item si Deus non damnat nisi propter injustitiam; damnat autem aliquem propter originale peccatum, ergo non est aliud originale peccatum quam injustitia. Quod si ita est, originale peccatum non est aliud quam injustitia, i.e., absentia debit&#65533; justiti&#65533;." [182]

Doctrine of Abelard.

2. The ground taken by others of the schoolmen was that the loss of original righteousness left Adam precisely in the state in which he was created, and therefore in puris naturalibus (i.e., in the simple essential attributes of his nature). And as his descendants share his fate, they are born in the same state. There is no inherent hereditary corruption, no moral character either goon or bad. The want of a supernatural gift not belonging to the nature of man, and which must be bestowed as a favour, cannot be accounted to men as sin. Original sin, therefore, in the posterity of Adam can consist in nothing but the imputation to them of his first transgression. They suffer the punishment of that sin, which punishment is the loss of original righteousness. According to this view, original sin is poena but not culpa. It is true that the inevitable consequence of this privation of righteousness is that the lower powers of man's nature gain the ascendency over the higher, and that he grows up in sin. Nevertheless there is no inherent or subjective sin in the new-born infant. There is a natural proneness to sin arising out of the original and normal constitution of cur nature, and the absence of original righteousness which was a frenum, or check by which the lower powers were to be kept in subjection. But this being the condition in which Adam came from the hands of his Creator, it cannot be in itself sinful. Sin consists in assent and purpose. And, therefore, until the soul assents to this dominion of its lower nature and deliberately acts in accordance with it, it cannot be chargeable with any personal, inherent sin. There is therefore no sin of nature, as distinguished from actual sin. It is true, as the advocates of this theory taught, in obedience to the universal faith of the Church and the clear doctrine of the Bible, that men are born in sin. But this is the guilt of Adam's first sin, and not their own inherent corruption. They admitted the correctness of the Latin version of Romans v. 12, which makes the Apostle say that all men sinned in Adam (in quo omnes peccaverunt). But they understood that passage to teach nothing more than the imputation of Adam's first sin, and not any hereditary inherent corruption of nature. This was the theory of original sin adopted by Abelard, who held that nothing was properly of the nature of sin but an act performed with an evil intention. As there can be no such intention in infants there can be, properly speaking, no sin in them. There is a proneness to sin which he calls vitium; but sin consists in consent to this inclination, and not in the inclination itself. "Vitium itaque est, quo ad peccandum proni efficimur, hoc est inclinamur ad consentiendum ei, quod non convenit, ut illud scilicet faciamus aut dimittamus. Hunc

vero consensum proprie peccatum nominamus, hoc est culpam anim&#65533;, qua damnationem meretur." [183] He admitted original sin as a punishment, or as the guilt of Adam's sin, but this was external and not inherent. [184] This view of the subject was strenuously maintained by some of the theologians of the Roman Church at the time of the Reformation, especially by Catharinus and Pighius. The latter, according to Chemnitz, [185] thus states his doctrine: "Quod nec carentia justiti&#65533; originalis, nec concupiscentia habeat rationem peccati, sive in parvulis, sive adultis, sive ante, sive post baptismum. Has enim affectiones non esse vitia, sed natur&#65533; conditiones in nobis. Peccatum igitur originis non esse defectum, non vitium aliquod non depravationem aliquam, non habitum corruptum, non qualitatem vitiosam h&#65533;rentem in nostra substantia, ut qu&#65533; sit sine omni vitio et depravatione, sed hoc tantum esse peccatum originis, quod actualis transgressio Ad&#65533; reatu, tantum et poena transmissa et propagata sit ad posteros sine vitio aliquo et pravitate h&#65533;rente in ipsorum substantia: et reatum hunc esse; quod propter Ad&#65533; peccatum extorres facti sumus regni coelorum, subjecti regno mortis et &#65533;tern&#65533; damnationi, et omnibus human&#65533; natur&#65533; miseriis involuti. Sicut ex servis, qui proprio vitio libertatem amiserunt, nascuntur servi: non suo, sed parentum vitio. Et sicut filius scorti, sustinet infamiam matris, sine proprio aliquo in se h&#65533;rente vitio." [186]

Doctrine of Thomas Aquinas.

3. The third form of doctrine which prevailed during this period was that proposed by Thomas Aquinas (A.D. 1224-74) a Dominican monk, the Doctor Angelicus of the schoolmen, and by far the most influential theologian in the Latin Church since the days of Augustine. His "Summa Theologi&#65533;" was long regarded as a standard work among Romanists, and is still referred to as an authority both by Romanists and Protestants. Thomas approached much nearer to Augustine than the other theologians of his age. He taught (1.) That original righteousness was to Adam a supernatural gift. (2.) That by his transgression he forfeited that gift for himself and his posterity. (3.) That original righteousness consisted essentially in the fixed bias of the will towards God, or the subjection of the will to God. (4.) That the inevitable consequence or adjunct of the loss of this original righteousness, this conversion of the will towards God, is the aversion of the will from God. (5.) That original sin, therefore, consists in two things, first, the loss of original righteousness and second, the disorder of the whole nature. The one he called the formale the other the materiale of original sin. To use his own illustration, a knife is iron; the iron is the material, the form is that which makes the material a knife. So in original sin this aversion of the will from God (as a habit), is the substance of original sin, it owes its existence and nature to the loss of original righteousness. (6.) The soul, therefore, after the loss of its primal rectitude, does not remain in puris naturalibus, but is in a state of corruption and sin. This state he sometimes calls inordinatio virium anim&#65533;; sometimes a deordinatio; sometimes aversio voluntatis a bono incommunicabili; sometimes a corrupt disposition, as when he says, [187] "Causa hujus corrupt&#65533; dispositionis, qu&#65533; dicitur originale peccatum, est una tantum, scilicet privatio originalis justiti&#65533;, per quam sublata est subjectio human&#65533; mentis ad Deum." Most frequently, in accordance with the usus loquendi of his own and of subsequent periods, this positive part of original sin is called concupiscence. This is a word which it is very important to understand, because it is used in such different senses even in relation to the same subject. Some by concupiscence mean simply the sexual instinct; others, what belongs to our sensuous nature in general; others,

everything in man which has the seen and temporal for its object; and others still, for the wrong bias of the soul, by which, being averse to God, it turns to the creature and to evil. Everything depends therefore on the sense in which the word is taken, when it is said that original sin consists, positively considered, in concupiscence. If by concupiscence is meant merely our sensuous nature, then original sin is seated mainly in the body and in the animal affections, and the higher powers of the soul are unaffected by its contamination. By Thomas Aquinas the word is taken in its widest sense, as is obvious from its equivalents just mentioned, aversion from God, corrupt disposition, disorder, or deformity, of the powers of the soul. It is in this sense, he says, "Originale peccatum concupiscentia dicitur." (7.) As to the constituent elements of this original corruption, or as he expresses it, the wounds under which our fallen nature is suffering, he says, they include, (a.) Ignorance and want of the right knowledge of God in the intelligence. (b.) An aversion in the will from the highest good. (c.) In the feelings or affections, or rather in that department of our nature of which the feelings are the manifestations, a tendency to delight in created things. The seat of original sin, therefore, with him is the whole soul. (8.) This concupiscence or inherent corruption, is not an act, or agency, or activity, but a habit, i.e., an immanent inherent disposition of the mind. [188] (9.) Finally original sin is a penal evil. The loss of original righteousness and the consequent disorder of our nature, are the penalty of Adam's first transgression. So far the doctrine of Thomas is in strict accordance with that of Augustine. His discussion of the subject might be framed into an exposition of the answer in the "Westminster Catechism" which declares the sinfulness of that estate into which men fell, to consist in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature. The point of difference relates to the degree of injury received from the apostasy of Adam, or the depth of that corruption of nature derived from him. This Thomas calls a languor or weakness. Men in consequence of the fall are utterly unable to save themselves, or to do anything really good in the sight of God without the aid of divine grace. But they still have the power to coperate with that grace. They cannot, as the Semi-Pelagians taught, begin the work of turning unto God, and therefore need preventing grace (gratia prveniens), but with that grace they are enabled to coperate. This makes the difference between the effectual (irresistible) grace of Augustine, and the synergism which enters into all other systems.

Doctrine of the Scotists.

4. Duns Scotus, a Franciscan, Professor of Theology at Oxford, Paris, and Cologne, where he died A.D. 1308, was the great opponent of Thomas Aquinas. So far as the subject of original sin is concerned, he sided with the Semi-Pelagians. He made original sin to consist solely in the loss of original righteousness, and as this was purely a. supernatural gift, not pertaining to the nature of man, its loss left Adam and his posterity after him, precisely in tile state in which man was originally created. Whatever of disorder is consequent on this loss of righteousness is not of the nature of sin. "Peccatum originale," he says, "non potest esse aliud quam ista privatio [justiti originalis]. Non enim est concupiscentia: tum quia illa est naturalis, tum quia ipsa est in parte sensitiva, ubi non est peccatum." [189] Men, therefore, are born into the world in puris naturalibus, not in the Pelagian sense, as Pelagians do not admit any supernatural gift of righteousness to Adam, but in the sense that they possess all the essential attributes of their nature uninjured and uncontaminated. As free will, i.e., the ability to do and to be whatever is required of man

by his Maker, belongs essentially to his nature, this also remains since the fall. It is indeed weakened and beset with difficulties, as the balance wheel of our nature, original righteousness, is gone, but still it exists. Man needs divine assistance. He cannot do good, or make himself good without the grace of God. But the dependence of which Scotus speaks is rather that of the creature upon the creator, than that of the sinner upon the Spirit of God. His endeavour seems to have been to reduce the supernatural to the natural; to confound the distinction constantly made in the Bible and by the Church, between the providential efficiency of God everywhere present and always operating in and with natural causes, and the efficiency of the Holy Ghost in the regeneration and sanctification of the soul. [190]

The Dominicans and Franciscans became, and long continued the two most powerful orders of monks in the Roman Church. As they were antagonistic on so many other points, they were also opposed in doctrine. The Dominicans, as the disciples of Thomas Aquinas, were called Thomists, and the Franciscans, as followers of Duns Scotus, were called Scotists. The opposition between these parties, among other doctrinal points, embraced as we have seen, that of original sin. The Thomists were inclined to moderate Augustinianism, the Scotists to Semi-Pelagianism. All the theories however above mentioned, variously modified, had their zealous advocates in the Latin Church, when the Council of Trent was assembled to determine authoritatively the true doctrine and to erect a barrier to the increasing power of the Reformation.

Tridentine Doctrine on Original Sin.

The Council of Trent had a very difficult task to perform. In the first place, it was necessary to condemn the doctrines of the Reformers. But the Protestants, as well Lutheran as Reformed, had proclaimed their adherence to the Augustinian system in its purity and fulness; and that system had received the sanction of councils and popes and could not be directly impugned. This difficulty was surmounted by grossly misrepresenting the Protestant doctrine, and making it appear inconsistent with the doctrine of Augustine. This method has been persevered in to the present day. Moehler in his "Symbolik" represents the doctrine of the Protestants, and especially that of Luther, on original sin, as a form of Manicheism. The other, and more serious difficulty, was the great diversity of opinion existing in the Church and in the Council it self. Some were Augustinians; some held that original sin consisted simply in the want of original righteousness, but that that want is sin. Others admitted no original sin, but the imputation of Adam's first transgression. Others, with the Dominicans, insisted that the disorder of all the powers consequent on the loss of original righteousness, i.e., concupiscence, is truly and properly sin. This the Franciscans denied. Under these circumstances the pontifical legates, who attended the Council, exhorted the assembled fathers, that they should decide nothing as to the nature of original sin, reminding them that they were not called together o teach doctrines, but to condemn errors. [191] This advice the Council endeavoured to follow, and hence its decisions are expressed in very general terms.

1. The Synod pronounces an anathema on those who do not confess that Adam, when he transgressed in paradise the commandment of God, did immediately lose the holiness and righteousness in which he had been constituted (constitutus fuerat, or positus erat); and that by that offence he incurred the wrath and indignation of God, and thus also death and subjection to him who has the power of death, that is, the devil; and that the whole Adam by

the offence of his transgression was as to the body and the soul. changed for the worst.

The effects of Adam's first sin upon himself therefore was: (1.) The loss of original righteousness. (2.) Death and captivity to Satan. (3.) The deterioration of his whole nature both soul and body.

2. The Synod also anathematizes those who say that the sin of Adam injured himself only, and not his posterity; or that he lost the holiness and righteousness which he received from God, for himself only and not also for us, or that he transmitted to the whole human race only death and corporeal pains (poenas corporis), and not sin, which is the death of the soul.

It is here taught that the effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity are: (1.) The loss of original righteousness. (2.) Death and the miseries of this life; and (3.) Sin, or spiritual death (peccatum, quod est mors anim). This is a distinct condemnation of Pelagianism, and the clear assertion of original sin, as something transmitted to all men. The nature of that however, is not further stated than that it is the death of the soul, which may be differently explained.

3. Those also are condemned who say that this sin of Adam, which is conveyed to all (omnibus transfusum), and inheres in every one as his own sin (inest unicuique proprium), can be removed by the powers of human nature, or by any other remedy than the merit of our one Mediator, the Lord Jesus Christ, who hath reconciled us to God by his blood, and who is made unto us righteousness, sanctification, and redemption.

It is here asserted: (1.) That original sin is conveyed by propagation and not, as the Pelagians say, by imitation. (2.) That it belongs to every man and inheres in him. (3.) That it cannot be removed by any other means than the blood of Christ.

4. The Synod condemns all who teach that new-born children should not be baptized; or, that although baptized for the remission of sins, they derive nothing of original sin from Adam, which needs to be expiated in the laver of regeneration in order to attain eternal life, so that baptism, in their case, would not be true but false. Children, therefore, who cannot have committed sin, in their own persons, are truly baptized for the remission of sins, that what they had contracted in generation, may be purged away in regeneration.

From this it appears that according to the Council of Trent there is sin in new-born infants which needs to be remitted and washed away by regeneration.

5. The fifth canon asserts that through the grace of our Lord Jesus Christ conferred in baptism, the guilt of original sin is remitted, and everything is removed which has the true and proper nature of sin. It is admitted that concupiscence (vel fomes) remains in the baptized, against which believers are to contend, but it is declared that this concupiscence, although sometimes (as is admitted) called sin by the Apostle, is not truly and properly sin in the regenerated.

This is all that the Council teaches under the caption of original sin, except to say that they do not intend their decisions to apply to the Virgin Mary. Whether she was the subject of original sin, as the Dominicans, after Thomas Aquinas, maintained, or whether she was immaculately conceived, as zealously asserted by the Franciscans after Duns Scotus, the Synod leaves undecided.

In the sixth session when treating of justification (i.e., regeneration and sanctification),

the Council decides several points, which go to determine the view its members took of the nature of original sin. In the canons adopted in that session, it is among other things, declared: (1.) That men cannot without divine grace through Jesus Christ, by their own works, i.e., works performed in their own strength, be justified before God. (2.) That grace is not given simply to render good works more easy. (3.) That men cannot believe, hope, love, or repent so as to secure regenerating grace without the preventing grace of God (sine pr&#65533;venienti Spiritus inspiratione, atque ejus adjutorio). (4.) Men can co&#65533;perate with this preventing grace, can assent to, or reject it. (5.) Men have not lost their liberum arbitrium, ability to good or evil by the fall. (6.) All works done before regeneration are not sinful.

From all this it appears that while the Council of Trent rejected the Pelagian doctrine of man's plenary ability since the fall, and the Semi-Pelagian doctrine that men can begin the work of reformation and conversion; it no less clearly condemns the Augustinian doctrine of the entire inability of man to do anything spiritually good, whereby he may prepare or dispose himself for conversion, or merit the regenerating grace of God.

The True Doctrine of the Church of Rome.

What was the true doctrine of the Church of Rome as to original sin, remained as much in doubt after the decisions of this Council as it had been before. Each party interpreted its canons according to their own views. The Synod declares that all men are born infected with original sin; but whether that sin consisted simply in the guilt of Adam's first sin; or in the want of original righteousness; or in concupiscence, is left undecided. And therefore all these views continued to be maintained by the theologians of the Romish Church. The older Protestants generally regarded the canons of the Council of Trent as designed to obscure the subject, and held that the real Doctrine of the Church involved the denial of any original sin in the sense of sin, subjective or inherent. In this view, many, if not the majority of modern theologians concur. Winer (in his "Comparative Darstellung,") Guericke (in his "Symbolik"), Koellner (in his "Symbolik"), Baur (in his "Answer to Moehler"), and Dr. Shedd, in his "History of Christian Doctrine," all represent the Church of Rome as teaching that original sin is merely negative, the want of original righteousness, and is denying that there is anything subjective in the state of human nature as men are born into the world, which has the proper nature of sin. The reasons which favour this view of the subject, are, --

1. The prevailing doctrine of the schoolmen and of the Romish theologians as to the nature of sin. According to Protestants, "Quidquid a norma justiti&#65533; in Deo dissidet, et cum ea pugnat, habet rationem peccati." [192] To this the Romanists oppose from Andradius the definition: "Quod nihil habeat rationem peccati nisi fiat a volente et sciente." If this be so, then it is impossible that there should be any inherent or innate sin. As infants are not "knowing and willing," in the sense of moral agents, they cannot have sin. Bellarmin [193] says: "Non satis est ad culpam, ut aliquid sit voluntarium habituali voluntate, sed requiritur, ut processerit ab actu etiam voluntario: Alioqui voluntarium illud, habituale voluntate, naturale esset, et misericordia non reprehensione dignum." He says, that if a man were created in puris naturalibus, without grace, and with this opposition of the flesh to the reason, he would not be a sinner. With the loss of original righteousness there is unavoidably connected this rebellion of the lower against the higher nature of man. With the loss of the bias of the will toward God, is of necessity connected aversion to God. This

obliquity of the will which attends original sin, is not sin in itself, yet it is sin in us. For Bellarmin says, there is a "perversio voluntatis et obliquitas unicuique inh&#65533;rens, per quam peccatores proprie et formaliter dicimur, cum primum homines esse incipimus." This certainly appears contradictory. The perversion of the will, or concupiscence, consequent on the loss of original righteousness, is not itself sinful. Nevertheless, it constitutes us properly and formally sinners, as soon as we begin to exist. Nothing is of the nature of sin but voluntary action, or what proceeds from it, and yet infants are sinners from their birth. He attempts to reconcile these contradictions by saying: "Peccatum in Adamo actuale et personale in nobis originaliter dicitur. Solus enim ipse actuali voluntate illud commisit, nobis vero communicatur per generationem eo modo, quo communicari potest id, quod transiit, nimirum per imputationem. Omnibus enim imputatur, qui ex Adamo nascuntur, quoniam omnes in lumbis Adami existentes in eo et per eum peccavimus, cum ipse peccavit." That is, the voluntary act of Adam was at the same time the act of the will of all his descendants. Thus original sin is sin in us, although nothing is sin in any creature which does not consist in an act of his own will, or which does not flow from such act. To this, however, Baur properly remarks: "What is an act of a non-existing will, an act to which the nature of sin is attributed, although it lies entirely out. side of the individual consciousness? Can any meaning be attached to such a representation? Does it not destroy the idea of guilt and sin, that it is imputed only because it is transmitted in ordinary generation?" [194] If a man or a church hold a theory of the nature of sin which is incompatible with the doctrine of original sin, it is argued, the existence of any such sin is thereby denied. (2.) Another reason urged in favour of the position that the Church of Rome denies original sin, is drawn from what that Church teaches of original righteousness. If original righteousness be a supernatural gift not belonging to the integrity of man's nature, its loss leaves him in the state in which he came from the hands of his Maker. And that state cannot be sinful unless God be the author of sin. Even Bellarmin, who contends for original sin, in a certain sense, still says that man since the fall is in the same state that Adam was as he was created. "Non magis differt status hominis post lapsum Ad&#65533; a statu ejusdem in puris naturalibus, quam differat spoliatus a nudo, neque deterior est humana natura, si culpam originalem detrahas, neque magis ignorantia et infirmitate laborat, quam esset et laboraret in puris naturalibus condita. Proinde corruptio natur&#65533; non ex alicujus doni naturalis carentia, neque ex alicujus mal&#65533; qualitatis accessu, sed ex sola doni supernaturalis ob Ad&#65533; peccatum amissione profluxit. [195] (3.) The Council of Trent expressly declares that concupiscence in the baptized, i.e., the regenerated, is not of the nature of sin. Then it cannot be in the unbaptized; for its nature is not changed by baptism.

On the other hand, however, it may be urged, (1.) That the Council of Trent expressly declares against the Pelagian doctrine, that Adam's sin injured only himself, and asserts that our whole nature, soul, and body, was thereby changed for the worse. (2.) They assert that we derived from Adam not merely a mortal nature, but sin which is the death of the soul. (3.) That new-born infants need baptism for the remission of sin, and that what is removed in the baptism of infants, veram et propriam peccati rationem habet. (4.) The Roman Catechism teaches [196] that "we are born in sin," that we are oppressed with corruption of nature (natur&#65533; vitio premimur) and, [197] that we nihil simus, nisi putida caro; that the virus of sin penetrates to the very bones, i.e., rationem, et voluntatem, qu&#65533; maxime solid&#65533; sunt anim&#65533; partes. This last passage does not refer expressly to original sin, but to the state

of men generally as sinners. Nevertheless, it indicates the view taken by the Roman Church as to the present condition of human nature. (5.) Bellarmin, who is often quoted to prove that Romanists make original sin merely the loss of original righteousness, says: "Si privationem justiti\u00f4 originalis ita velit esse effectum peccati, ut non sit etiam ipsa vere proprieque peccatum, Concilio Tridentino manifeste repugnat, neque distingui potest a sententia Catharini" (who made original sin to consist solely in the imputation of Adam's first sin).

From all this it appears that although the doctrine of the Roman Church is neither logical nor self-consistent, it is nevertheless true that that Church does teach the doctrine of original sin, in the sense of a sinful corruption of nature, or of innate, hereditary sinfulness. It is also to be observed that all parties in the Roman Church, before and after the Council of Trent, however much they differed in other points, united in teaching the imputation of Adam's sin; i.e., that for that sin the sentence of condemnation passed upon all men.

[171] Kirchengeschichte, vol. vi. p. 350.

[172] See below, vol. iii., p. 449.

[173] Sacr. Bibl. Sanc. Pat., 2d. edit. Paris, 1589, tom. iv. pp. 62-91.

[174] Magna Bib. Vet. Pat., Cologne, 1618, tom. v. par. ii., p. 90 ff.

[175] Wiggers, ut supra, vol. ii., p. 214.

[176] Sac. Bibl. Sanc. Pat., 2d. edit. Paris, 1589, tom. iv. pp. 875, 876.

[177] De Lib. Arbit. I. xvii.: Ibid. p. 906.

[178] Binius, Concilia, Cologne, 1618, t. ii. par. i. p. 638.

[179] Cap. xxiii.; Opera, Paris, 1721, p. 104, B, d.

[180] Cap. xxiv.; Ibid. p. 105, A, c.

[181] Cap. xxvii.; Ibid. p. 106, A, b.

[182] Cap. iii.; Ibid. p. 98, A, e, B, a.

[183] Ethica seu liber dictus: scito se ipsum, cap. iii.; Opera, Paris, 1859, vol. ii. p. 596.

[184] In Epistolam ad Romanos, lib. ii.; Ibid. vol. ii. p. 238.

[185] Examen Concilii Tridentini, de Peccato Originale, edit. Frankfort, 1674, part i., p. 100.

[186] See also K\u00f4llner's, Symbolik, vol. ii. p. 285.

[187] Summa, II. i. lxxxii. art. ii. edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 144 of second set.

[188] Ibid. art. i.

[189] In Lib. IV Sentent., lib. II. dist. xxx. qu. 2; Venice, 1506, 2d part, fol. 83, p. 2, b.

[190] Ritter's Geschichte der christlichen Philosophie, vol. iv. pp. 354-472.

[191] Moehler's Symbolik, 6th edition, p. 57.

[192] Chemnitz, Examen Concilii Tridentini, I. iv. edit. Frankfort, 1674, p. 116.

[193] De Amissione Gratia et Statu Peccati, V. xviii., Disputationes, vol. iv. p. 333, d.

[194] Katholicismus und Protestantismus, T\u00f4bingen, 1836; second edit. p. 92, note.

[195] De Gratia Primi Hominis, cap. v.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p.

16, d, e.

[196] P. iii. c. 10, qu. 4; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici Ecclesi□ Catholic□, vol. i. p. 579.

[197] P. iv. c. 14, qu. 5; Ibid. pp. 675, 676.

§ 7. Protestant Doctrine of Sin.

The Protestant Churches at the time of the Reformation did not attempt to determine the nature of sin philosophically. They regarded it neither as a necessary limitation; not as a negation of being; nor as the indispensable condition of virtue; nor as having its seat in man's sensuous nature; nor as consisting in selfishness alone; nor as being, like pain, a mere state of consciousness, and not an evil in the sight of God. Founding their doctrine on their moral and religious consciousness and upon the Word of God, they declared sin to be the transgression of, or want of conformity to the divine law. In this definition all classes of theologians, Lutheran and Reformed, agree. According to Melancthon, "Peccatum recte definitur anomia, seu discrepantia a lege Dei, h. e., defectus natur□ et actionum pugnans cum lege Dei, easdemque ex ordine justiti□ divin□ ad poenam obligans." Gerhard says: [198] "Peccatum" seu "anomia" est "aberratio a lege, sive non congruentia cum lege, sive ea in ipsa natura h□rat, sive in dictis, factis ac concupiscenti□ motibus, inveniatur." Baier says: [199] "Carentia conformitatis cum lege." Vitringa says: [200] "Forma peccati est disconvenientia actus habitus, aut status hominis cum divina lege."

It is included in these definitions, (1.) That sin is a specific evil, differing from all other forms of evil. (2.) That sin stands related to law. The two are correlative, so that where there is no law, there can be no sin. (3.) That the law to which sin is thus related, is not merely the law of reason, or of conscience, or of expediency, but the law of God. (4.) That sin consists essentially in the want of conformity on the part of a rational creature, to the nature or law of God. (5.) That it includes guilt and moral pollution.

Sin is a Specific Evil.

Sin is a specific evil. This we know from our own consciousness. None but a sentient being can know what feeling is. We can neither determine □ priori what the nature of a sensation is, nor can we convey the idea to any one destitute of the organs of sense. Unless we had felt pain or pleasure, we should not be able to understand what those words mean. If born blind, we cannot know light. If born deaf, we can have no idea of what hearing is. None but a rational creature can know what is meant by folly. Only creatures with an □sthetic nature can have the perception of beauty or of deformity. In like manner only moral beings can know what sin or holiness is. Knowledge in all these cases is given immediately in the consciousness. It would be in vain to attempt to determine □ priori, what pain, pleasure, sight, and hearing are; much less to prove that there are no such sensations; or that they do not differ from each other and from every other form of our experience. Every man in virtue of his being a moral creature, and because he is a sinner, has therefore in his own consciousness the knowledge of sin, he knows that when he is not what he ought to be, when he does what he ought not to do, or omits what he ought to do, he is chargeable with sin. He knows that sin is not simply limitation of his nature; not merely a subjective state of his own mind, having no character in the sight of God; that it is not only

something which is unwise, or derogatory to his own dignity; or simply inexpedient because hurtful to his own interests, or injurious to the welfare of others. He knows that it has a specific character of its own, and that it includes both guilt and pollution.

Sin has Relation to Law.

A second truth included in our consciousness of sin is, that it has relation to law. As moral and rational beings we are of necessity subject to the law of right. This is included in the consciousness of obligation. The word ought would otherwise have no meaning. To say we ought, is to say we are bound; that we are under authority of some kind. The word law, in relation to moral and religious subjects, is used in two senses. First, it sometimes means a controlling power, as when the Apostle says that he had a law in his members warring against the law of his mind. Secondly, it means, that which binds, a command of one in authority. This is the common sense of the term in the New Testament. As the rule which binds the conscience of men, and prescribes what they are to do and not to do, has been variously revealed in the constitution of our nature, in the Decalogue, in the Mosaic institutions, and in the whole Scriptures, the word is sometimes used in a sense to include all these forms of revelation; sometimes in reference exclusively to one of them, and sometimes exclusively in reference to another. In all cases the general idea is retained. The law is that which binds the conscience.

Sin is Related to the Law of God.

The great question is, What is that law which prescribes to man what he ought to be and to do? (1.) Some say it is our own reason, or the higher powers of the soul. Those powers have the prerogative to rule. Man is autonomic. He is responsible to himself. He is bound to subject his life, and especially his lower powers, to his reason and conscience. Regard to his own dignity is the comprehensive obligation under which he lies, and he fulfills all his duties when he lives worthily of himself. To this theory it is obvious to object, (a.) That law is something outside of ourselves and over us; entirely independent of our will or reason. We can neither make nor alter it. If our reason and conscience are perverted, and determine that to be right which is in its nature wrong, it does not alter the case. The law remains unchanged in its demands and in its authority. (b.) On this theory there could be no sense of guilt. When a man acts against the dictates of his reason, or in a manner derogatory to the dignity of his nature, he may feel ashamed, or degraded, but not guilty. There can be no conviction that he is amenable to justice, nor any of that fearful looking for of judgment, which the Apostle says is inseparable from the commission of sin. (2.) Others say the law is to be found in the moral order of the universe, or in the eternal fitness of things. These however are mere abstractions. They can impose no obligation, and inflict no penalty on transgression. This theory again leaves out of view, and entirely unaccounted for, some of the plainest facts of the universal consciousness of men. (3.) Others again say that an enlightened regard to the happiness of the universe is the only law to which rational creatures are subject. (4.) Others take a still lower view, and say that it is an enlightened regard to our own happiness which alone has authority over men. It is evident, however, that these theories deny the specific character of moral obligation. There is no such thing as sin, as distinguished from the unwise or the inexpedient. There can be no sense of guilt, no responsibility to justice, except for violations of rules of expediency. (5.) It is clear from the very constitution of our nature that we are subject to the authority of a

rational and moral being, a Spirit, whom we know to be infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being and perfections. All men, in every age and in every part of time world, under all forms of religion, and of every degree of culture, have felt and acknowledged that they were subject to a personal being higher than themselves. No forms of speculative philosophy, however plausible or however widely diffused or confidently held in the schools or in the closet, have ever availed to invalidate this instinctive or intuitive judgment of the mind. Men ignorant of the true God have fashioned for themselves imaginary gods, whose wrath they have deprecated and whose favour they have endeavoured to propitiate. But when the Scriptural idea of God, as an infinitely perfect personal Being, has been once presented to the mind, it can never be discarded. It commends itself to the reason and the conscience. It solves all the enigmas of our nature. It satisfies all our desires and aspirations; and to this Being, to him and to his will, we feel ourselves bound to be conformed, and know ourselves to be responsible for our character and conduct. This allegiance we cannot possibly throw off. The law of gravitation no more inexorably binds the earth to its orbit than our moral nature binds us to our allegiance and responsibility to God. It would be as unreasonable to deny the one as the other, and as useless to argue against the one as against the other. This is clearly the doctrine of the Apostle in the passage just referred to. He was speaking of the most debased and vicious of the heathen world, men whom God had given up to a reprobate mind; and yet he asserts that they not only knew God, but knew his righteous judgment; that they who commit sin were worthy of death; that is, that they were rightfully subject to the authority, and inevitably exposed to the wrath and indignation, of moral ruler. This is a fact therefore given in the universal consciousness of men. Sin is related to law, and that law is not one of our own enacting, it is not a mere idea or abstraction, it is not mere truth or reason, or the fitness of things, but the nature and will of God. Law, as it reveals itself in the conscience, implies a law-giver, a being of whose will it is the expression, and who has the power and the purpose to enforce all its demands. And not only this, but one who, from the very perfection of his nature, must enforce them. He can no more pass by transgression than he can love evil. It is in vain to argue against these convictions. It is in vain to say, There is no God, no Being on whom we are dependent, and to whom we are responsible for our character and conduct.

The Extent of the Law's Demands.

The next question is, What does this law demand? This is the point on which there has been most diversity of opinion, and systems of theology as well as of morals are founded on the different answers which it has received. The answer given by the unsophisticated and enlightened conscience of men, and by the word of God, is that the law demands complete perfection, or the entire conformity of the moral nature and conduct of a rational creature with the nature and will of God. We are commanded to love God with all the heart, with all the soul, with all the strength, and with all the mind, and our neighbour as ourselves. This implies entire congeniality with God; the unreserved consecration of all our powers to his service, and absolute submission to his will. Nothing more than this can be required of any creature. No angel or glorified saint can be or do more than this, and this is what the law demands of every rational creature, at all times, and in every state of his being. In one sense this obligation is limited by the capacity (not the ability, in the modern theological sense of that term) of the creature. The capacity of a child is less than that of an

adult Christian or of an angel. He can know less. He can contain less. He is on a lower stage of being. But it is the absolute moral perfection of the child, of the adult, or of the angel that the law demands. And this perfection includes the entire absence of all sin, and the entire conformity of nature to the image and will of God. As this is the doctrine of the Bible. so also it is the teaching of conscience. Every man, at least every Christian, feels that he sins or is sinful whenever and howsoever he comes short of full conformity to the image of God. He feels that languor, coldness of affection, defect of zeal, and the want of due humility, gratitude, meekness, forbearance, and benevolence are in him of the nature of sin. The old maxim, omne minus bonum habet rationem mali, authenticates itself in the conscience of every unsophistical believer. This was the doctrine of Augustine, who in his letter to Jerome, [201] says: "Plenissima (caritas) qu jam non possit augeri, quamdiu hic homo vivit, est in nemine; quamdiu autem augeri potest, profecto illud, quod minus est quam debet, ex vitio est." The Lutheran and Reformed theologians assert the same principle. [202] If this principle be correct, if the law demands entire conformity to the nature and will of God, it follows: --

1. That there can be no perfection in this life. Every form of perfectionism which has ever prevailed in the Church is founded either on the assumption that the law does not demand entire freedom from moral evil, or upon the denial that anything is of the nature of sin, but acts of the will. But if the law is so extensive in its demands as to pronounce all defect in any duty, all coming short in the purity, ardour, or constancy of holy affections, sinful, then there is an end to the presumption that any mere maim since the fall has ever attained perfection.

2. It follows also from this principle that there can never be any merit of good works attributable to men in this world. By merit, according to the Scriptural sense of that word, is meant the claim upon reward as a matter of justice, founded on the complete satisfaction of the demands of the law. But if those demands never have been perfectly fulfilled by any fallen man, no such man can either be justified for his works, or have, as the Apostle expresses it, any kauchema, any claim founded on merit in the sight of God. He must always depend on mercy and expect eternal life as a free gift of God.

3. Still more obviously does it follow from the principle in question that there can be no such thing as works of supererogation. If no man in this life can perfectly keep the commandments of God, it is very plain that no man can do more than the law demands. The Romanists regard the law as a series of specific enactments. Besides these commands which bind all men there are certain things which they call precepts, which are not thus universally binding, such as celibacy, poverty, and monastic obedience, and the like. These go beyond the law. By adding to the fulfilment of the commands of God, the observance of these precepts, a man may do more than required of him, and thus acquire an amount of merit greater than he needs for himself, and which in virtue of the communion of saints, belongs to the Church, and may be dispensed, through the power of the keys, for the benefit of others. The whole foundation of this theory is of course removed, if the law demands absolute perfection, to which, even according to their doctrine, no man evem attains in this life. He always is burdened with venial sins, which God in mercy does not impute as real sins, but which nevertheless are imperfections.

Sin not Confined to Acts of the Will.

4. Another conclusion drawn from the Scriptural doctrine as to the extent of the divine law, as held by all Augustinians, is that sin is not confined to acts of the will. There are three senses in which the word voluntary is used in connection with this subject. The first and strictest sense makes nothing an act of the will but an act of deliberate self-determination, something that is performed, sciente et volente. Secondly, all spontaneous, impulsive exercises of the feelings and affections are in a sense voluntary. And, thirdly, whatever inheres in the will as a habit or disposition, is called voluntary as belonging to the will. The doctrine of the Romish Church on these points, as shown in the preceding section, is a matter of dispute among Romanists themselves. The majority of the schoolmen and of the Roman theologians deny that anything is of the nature of sin, but voluntary acts in the first sense of the word voluntary above mentioned. How they endeavour to reconcile the doctrine of hereditary, inherent corruption, or original sin, with that principle has already been stated. Holding that principle, however, they strenuously deny that mere impulses, the motus primo primi, as they are called, of evil dispositions are of the nature of sin. To this doctrine they are forced by their view of baptism. In that ordinance, according to their theory, everything of the nature of sin is removed. But concupiscence with its motions remains. These, however, if not deliberately assented to and indulged, are not sinful. Whether they are or not, of course depends on the extent of the law. Nothing is sinful but what is contrary to the divine law. If that law demands perfect conformity to the image of God, then these impulses of evil are clearly sinful. But if the law takes cognizance only of deliberate acts they are not. The Protestant doctrine which pronounces these impulsive acts to be of the nature of sin is confirmed by the consciousness of the believer. He recognizes as evil in their own nature the first risings of malice, envy, pride, or cupidity. He knows that they spring from an evil or imperfectly sanctified nature They constitute part of the burden of corruption which he hopes to lay down in the grave; and he knows that as he shall be free from them in heaven, they never disturbed the perfectly holy soul of his blessed Lord, to whose image he is even now bound to be conformed.

5. It follows from the principle that the law condemns all want of conformity to the nature of God, that it condemns evil dispositions or habits, as well as all voluntary sins, whether deliberate or impulsive. According to the Bible and the dictates of conscience there is a sinfulness as well as sins; there is such a thing as character as distinguished from transient acts by which it is revealed; that is, a sinful state, abiding, inherent, immanent forms of evil, which are truly and properly of the nature of sin. All sin, therefore, is not an agency, activity, or act; it may be and is also a condition or state of the mind. This distinction between habitual and actual sin has been recognized and admitted in the Church from the beginning. Our Lord teaches us this distinction when He speaks of an evil heart as distinguished from evil exercises, which are as distinct as a tree and its fruits. The Apostle speaks of sin as a law, or controlling principle regulating or determining his acts even in despite of his better nature. He says sin dwells in him. He complains of it as a burden too heavy to be borne, from which he groans to be delivered. And his experience in this matter is the experience (we do not say the theory) of all the people of God. They know there is more in them of the nature of sin than mere acts and exercises; that their heart is not right in the sight of God; that the fountain from which the waters flow is itself bitter; that the tree is known by its fruits.

Sin is Want of Conformity to the Law of God.

Protestants teach not only that sin is a specific evil, that it has relation to law, that that law is the nature and will of God, and that it takes cognizance of and condemns all forms and degrees of moral evil or want of moral excellence, but also that the formal nature of sin is the want of conformity to the divine law or standard of excellence. This want of conformity is not a mere negation, such as may be predicated of a stone or of a brute, of whom it may be said they are not conformed to the image of God. The want of conformity to the divine law which constitutes sin is the want of congeniality of one moral nature with another; of the dependent and created nature with the infinitely holy nature, which of necessity is not only the sum but the standard of all excellence. Herein is sin that we are not like God. As the opposite of reason is unreason, the opposite of wisdom is folly, and the opposite of good is evil; so the opposite of the divine holiness is sin. It matters not of what exercises or states in the nature of a moral being this opposition may be predicated; of deliberate acts, of merely impulsive acts, or of dispositions or habits; if opposed to the divine nature it is sin, hateful in itself and worthy of condemnation. There is a positive element, therefore, in all sin. That is, it is not merely the privation of righteousness, but it is positive unrighteousness. Because the absence of the one in a moral nature is the other. The want of congeniality with God is alienation from God, and, as the Scriptures say, enmity towards Him. The Protestant symbols and theologians, therefore, in defining sin, not merely as selfishness or the love of the creature or the love of the world, which are only modes of its manifestation, but as the want of conformity of an act, habit, or state of a man with the divine law, which is the revelation of the divine nature, have in their support both reason and conscience. This doctrine of the nature of sin is fully sustained by the authority of Scripture. The Apostle John says that all want of conformity to law is sin. The two ideas hamartia and anomia are coextensive. Whatever is the one, is the other. It seems that some in the Apostle's day were disposed to limit the demands of the divine law, and regard certain things not specifically forbidden as lawful. In opposition to this, the Apostle tells them that everything evil is unlawful; for the very nature of evil is want of conformity to law: pas ho poion ten hamartian kai ten anomian poiei, he who commits sin commits anomia, for he hamartia estin he anomia, for all want of conformity to law is sin. (1 John iii. 4.) With this agree also all the representations of Scripture. The words there used for sin in all its forms, express the idea of non-conformity to a standard. And besides this the Bible everywhere teaches that God is the source and standard of all good. His favour is the life of the soul. Congeniality with Him, conformity to his will and nature, is the idea and perfection of all excellence; and the opposite state, the want of this congeniality and conformity, is the sum and essence of all evil.

Sin includes Guilt and Pollution.

Sin includes guilt and pollution; the one expresses its relation to the justice, the other to the holiness of God. These two elements of sin are revealed in the conscience of every sinner. He knows himself to be amenable to the justice of God and offensive in his holy eyes. He is to himself even, hateful and degraded and self-condemned. There are, however, two things included in guilt. The one we express by the words criminality, demerit, and blame worthiness; the other is the obligation to suffer the punishment due to our offences. These are evidently distinct, although expressed by the same word. The guilt of our sins is said to have been laid upon Christ, that is, the obligation to satisfy the demands of justice on account of them. But He did not assume the criminality, the demerit, or blameworthiness

of our transgressions. When the believer is justified, his guilt, but not his demerit, is removed. He remains in fact, and in his own eyes, the same unworthy, hell-deserving creature, in himself considered, that he was before. A man condemned at a human tribunal for any offence against the community, when he has endured the penalty which the law prescribes, is no less unworthy, his demerit as much exists as it did from the beginning; but his liability to justice or obligation to the penalty of the law, in other words, his guilt in that sense of the word, is removed. It would be unjust to punish him a second time for that offence. This distinction theologians are accustomed to express by the terms reatus culp and reatus poen. Culpa is (strafw rdiger Zustand) blameworthiness; and reatus culp is guilt in the form of inherent ill-desert: whereas the reatus poen is the debt we owe to justice. That guilt, in the comprehensive sense of the word, and pollution enter into the nature of sin, or are inseparable from it, is not only revealed in our own consciousness, but is everywhere assumed in Scripture. The Bible constantly declares that sin and all sin, everything which bears its nature, is not only hateful in the sight of a holy God, but is the object of his wrath and indignation, the just ground for the infliction of punishment.

This is admitted, and cannot be denied. The only question is, What is necessary in order to the sense of guilt as it exists in the conscience? Or, What is required to constitute anything a just ground of punishment in the sight of God? Is it sufficient that the thing itself should be sinful? Or, Is it necessary that it should be due to our own voluntary act? This latter ground is taken not only by Pelagians, and by all who define sin to be the voluntary transgression of known law, but also by many who hold to habitual, as distinguished from actual sin, and who even acknowledge that men are born in sin. They still insist that even evil innate, inherent sin, must be referrible to our own voluntary agency, or it cannot be guilt in us. But this is, --

1. Contrary to our own consciousness. The existence of sin in the heart, the presence of evil dispositions, without regard to their origin, is unavoidably attended by a sense of pollution an guilt. These dispositions being evil in their own nature must include whatever is essential to that nature. And, as has been acknowledged, guilt is essential to the nature of sin. Nothing is sinful which does not involve guilt. The consciousness, or the conviction of sin, must therefore include the conviction of guilt. And consequently if we are convinced from the declarations of Scripture and from the state of our nature that we are born in sin we must be convinced that guilt attaches to innate corruption of nature. Besides this, habitual or indwelling sin is not voluntary in the sense of being designed or intended, or in the sense of being under the power of the will, and yet all Christians admit that such indwelling sin is a dreadful load of guilt; a load more burdensome to the heart and conscience than all our actual transgressions.

2. The principle in question is no less opposed to the common judgments of men. All men instinctively judge a man for what he is. If he is good they so regard him. If he is bad, they pronounce him to be bad. This judgment is just as inevitable or necessary as that he is tall or short, learned or unlearned. The question as to the origin of the man's character does not enter into the grounds of this judgment. If born good, if he made himself good, or if he received his goodness as a gift from God, does not materially affect the case. He is good, and must be so regarded and treated. In like manner all that is necessary in order to justify and necessitate the judgment that a man is bad is that he should be so. This is the principle

on which we judge ourselves, and on which men universally judge each other. The principle, therefore, must be sound.

3. The doctrine that sin in order to include guilt must be referrible to our own voluntary action, is contrary to analogy. It is not so with holiness. Adam was created holy. His holiness as truly constituted his character as though it had been self-acquired, and had it been retained, it would have continued to be, and so long as it was retained it was an object of complacency and the ground of reward in the sight of God. Habitual grace, as it is called, or the new principle of spiritual life, imparted to the soul in regeneration, is not self-produced. It is due to the supernatural power of the Holy Spirit, nevertheless it constitutes the believer's character. The only reason why it is not meritorious, is that it is so imperfect, and because it cannot cancel the debt we already owe to the justice of God. The soul, however, if perfectly sanctified by the Holy Ghost is just as pure, just as much an object of approbation and delight in the sight of God as an unfallen angel.

4. The doctrine in question contradicts the faith of the Church Universal. A distinction must be made between the faith of the Church and the speculations (or even the doctrines) of theologians. These are often divergent. The former is determined by the Scriptures and the inward teachings of the Spirit; the latter are greatly modified by the current philosophy of the age in which those theologians lived, and by the idiosyncrasies of their own minds. During the Middle Ages, for example, the speculations of the schoolmen and the faith of the Church, had very little in common. The faith of the Church is to be found in its creeds, prayers, and forms of devotion generally. In all these, through every age, the Church has shown that she regards all men as burdened with original sin, as belonging to a polluted and guilty race, polluted and guilty from the first moment of existence. It cannot be said that the Church believed original sin to be due to the agency of each individual man, or to the act of generic humanity. These are thoughts foreign to the minds of common believers. The conviction therefore must have existed in the Church always and everywhere that guilt may be present which does not attach to the voluntary agency of the guilty. Infants have always been baptized for the remission of sin, and men have ever been regarded by the Church as born in sin.

5. The explanation given of the undeniable fact of innate pollution and guilt, by those who admit the fact, and yet maintain that this original sin is referrible to our own agency, is altogether unsatisfactory. That explanation is that we acted thousands of years before we existed, that is, that the substance which constitutes our individual souls, committed, in the person of Adam, the sin of disobeying God in paradise. This explanation of course presupposes the fact to be explained. The fact remains whatever becomes of the explanation. Men are born in a state of guilt and pollution All that follows from the rejection of the explanation is, that sin may exist, which is not referrible to the voluntary agency of those in whom it inheres. This consequence is far easier of admission, in the judgment of the vast majority of men, than the doctrine that we are personally chargeable with eating the forbidden fruit as our own act.

6. The Bible in everywhere teaching that men are born in sin, that they come into the world the children of wrath, does thereby teach that there can be, and that there is sin (pollution and guilt) which is inherited and derived, which is inherent and innate, and therefore not referrible to our own agency. As the Scriptures nowhere teach that we actually

sinned before we existed, they assert the fact which enters into the common faith of the Church, that guilt attaches to all sin however that sin originates.

[198] Loci Theologici, XI. i. 3; edit Tbingen, 1766, vol. v. p. 2, b.

[199] Compendium Theologi, edit. Frankfort, 1739, p. 346.

[200] Doctrina Christian Religionis, x. 7; edit. Lyons, 1762, vol. ii. pp. 285, 286.

[201] Epistola, CLXVII. iv. 15; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. ii. p. 897, a.

[202] See Chemnitz, Examen Concilii Tridentini, I. De Justificatione, edit. Frankfort, 1674, p. 165, f. De Bonis Operibus, qu. 3, p. 205, a. Gerhard, Loci Theologici, XI. x. 42-45, v. p. 21-24. Quenstedt, Theologia, P. II. cap. ii. § 2, q. 3, edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 967.

§ 8. The Effects of Adam's Sin upon his Posterity.

That the sin of Adam injured not himself only but also all descending from him by ordinary generation, is part of the faith of the whole Christian world. The nature and extent of the evil thus entailed upon his race, and the ground or reason of the descendants of Adam being involved in the evil consequences of his transgression, have ever been matter of diversity and discussion. As to both of these points the common Augustinian doctrine is briefly stated in the Symbols of our Church. According to our standards, "the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell consists in the guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature, which is commonly called original sin, together within all actual transgressions which proceed from it." This corruption of nature is in the Confession of Faith declared to be "both in itself and in all motions thereof, truly and properly sin." And in virtue of this original corruption men are "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil." As to the ground of these evils, we are taught that "the covenant being made with Adam not only for himself, but for his posterity, all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, sinned in him, and fell with him in his first transgression." Or, as it is expressed in the Confession, "Our first parents, being the root of all mankind, the guilt of their sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature were conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation."

In this view of the relation of mankind to Adam, and of the consequences of his apostasy, the three leading subjects included, are the imputation of Adam's first sin; the corruption of nature derived from him; and the inability of fallen man to any spiritual good.

§ 9. Immediate Imputation.

It being admitted that the race of man participates in the evil consequences of the fall of our first parent, that fact is accounted for on different theories.

1. That which is adopted by Protestants generally, as well Lutherans as Reformed, and also by the great body of the Latin Church is, that in virtue of the union, federal and natural, between Adam and his posterity, his sin, although not their act, is so imputed to them that it is the judicial ground of the penalty threatened against him coming also upon them. This is the doctrine of immediate imputation.

2. Others, while they admit that a corrupt nature is derived from Adam by all his

ordinary posterity, yet deny, first, that this corruption or spiritual death is a penal infliction for his sin; and second, that there is any imputation to Adam's descendants of the guilt of his first sin. All that is really imputed to them is their own inherent, hereditary depravity. This is the doctrine of mediate imputation.

3. Others discarcd entirely the idea of imputation, so far as Adam's sin is concerned, and refer the hereditary corruption of men to the geneinal law of propagation. Throughout the vegetable and animal kingdoms, like begets like. Man is not an exception to that law. Adam having lost his original righteousness and corrupted his nature by his apostasy, transmits that despoiled and deterioinated nature to all his descendants. To what extent man's nature is injured by the fall, is left undetermined by this theory. According to some it is so deteriorated as to be in the true Scriptural sense of the term, spiritually dead, while according to others, the injury is little if anything more than a physical infirmity, an impaired constitution which the first parent has transmitted to his children.

4. Others again adopt the realistic theory, and teach that as generic humanity existed whole and entire in the persons of Adam and Eve, their sin was the sin of the entire race. The same numerical rational and voluntary substance which acted in our first parents, having been communicated to us, their act was as truly and properly our act, being the act of our reason and will, as it was their act. It is imputed to us therefore not as his, but as our own. We literally sinned in Adam, and consequently the guilt of that sin is our personal guilt and the consequent corruption of nature is the effect of our own voluntary act.

5. Others, finally, deny any causal relation, whether logical or natural, whether judicial or physical, between the sin of Adam and the sinfulness of his race. Some who take this ground say that it was a divine constitution, that, if Adam sinned, all men should sin. The one event was connected with the other only in the divine purpose. Others say that there is no necessity to account for the fact that all men are sinners, further than by referring no their liberty of will. Adam sinned, and other men sin. That is all. The one fact us as easily accounted for as the other.

Statement of the Doctrine of Immediate Imputation.

The first of the above mentioned doctrines is that presented in the Symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, and by the great body of the theologians of those great historical branches of the Protestant community. [203] What that doctrine is may be stated in few woids. To impute is simply to attribute to, as we are said to impute good or bad motives to anyone. In the juridical and theological sense of the word, to impute is to attribute anything to a person or persons, upon adequate grounds, as the judicial or meritorious reason of reward or punishment, i.e., of the bestowment of good or the infliction of evil. The most elaborate discussion of the Hebrew word chsv and the Greek logizomai, used in Scripture in relation to this subject, gives nothing beyond the simple result above mentioned.

1. To impute is to reckon to, or to lay to one's account. So far as the meaning of the word is concerned, it makes no difference whether the thing imputed be sin or righteousness; whether it is our own personally, or the sin or righteousness of another.

2. To impute sin, in Scriptural and theological language, is to impute the guilt of sin. And by guilt is meant not criminality or moral ill-desert, or demerit, much less moral pollution, but the judicial obligation to satisfy justice. Hence the evil consequent on the

imputation is not an arbitrary infliction; not merely a misfortune or calamity; not a chastisement in the proper sense of that word, but a punishment, i.e., an evil inflicted in execution of the penalty of law and for the satisfaction of justice.

3. A third remark in elucidation of what is meant by the imputation of Adam's sin is, that by all theologians, Reformed and Lutheran, it is admitted, that in the imputation of Adam's sin to us, of our sins to Christ, and of Christ's righteousness to believers, the nature of imputation is the same, so that the one case illustrates the others. When it is said that our sins were imputed to Christ, or that He bore our sins, it is not meant that he actually committed our sins, or that He was morally criminal on account of them, or that the demerit of them rested upon Him. All that is meant is that He assumed, in the language of the older theologians, "our law-place." He undertook to answer the demands of justice for the sins of men, or, as it is expressed by the Apostle, to be made a curse for them. In like manner, when it is said that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers, it does not mean that they wrought out that righteousness, that they were the agents of the acts of Christ in obeying the law; nor that the merit of his righteousness is their personal merit; nor that it constitutes their moral character; it simply means that his righteousness, having been wrought out by Christ for the benefit of his people, in their name, by Him as their representative, it is laid to their account, so that God can be just in justifying the ungodly. Much of the difficulty on this subject arises from the ambiguity of language. The words righteous and unrighteous have two distinct meanings. Sometimes they express moral character. A righteous man is an upright or good man. At other times, these words do not express moral character, but simply relation to justice. In this sense a righteous man is one with regard to whom the demands of justice are satisfied. He may be personally unrighteous (or ungodly) and legally righteous. If this were not so, no sinner could be saved. There is not a believer on earth who does not feel and acknowledge himself to be personally unrighteous, ill-deserving, meriting the wrath and curse of God. Nevertheless he rejoices in the assurance that the infinitely meritorious righteousness of Christ, his full atonement for all sin, constitutes Him legally, not morally, righteous in the sight of divine justice. When, therefore, God pronounces the unrighteous to be righteous, He does not declare them to be what they are not. He simply declares that their debt to justice has been paid by another. And when it is said that the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity, it is not meant that they committed his sin, or were the agents of his act, nor is it meant that they are morally criminal for his transgression; that it is for them the ground of remorse and self-reproach; but simply that in virtue of the union between him and his descendants, his sin is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race, precisely as the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of his people. So much for the statement of the question.

It is no less a doctrine of Scripture than a fact of experience that mankind are a fallen race. Men universally, under all the circumstances of their being in this world, are sinful, and exposed to innumerable evils. Many of these, and that in many instances the most appalling, come upon the children of men in early infancy anterior to any possible transgressions of their own. This is a fact which cannot be denied; and for which the human mind has tortured itself to find a solution. The Scriptural solution of this fearful problem is, that God constituted our first parent the federal head and representative of his race, and placed him on probation not only for himself, but also for all his posterity. Had he retained his integrity, he and all his descendants would have been confirmed in a state of holiness

and happiness forever. As he fell from the estate in which he was created, they fell with him in his first transgression, so that the penalty of that sin came upon them as well as upon him. Men therefore stood their probation in Adam. As he sinned, his posterity come into the world in a state of sin and condemnation. They are by nature the children of wrath. The evils which they suffer are not arbitrary impositions, nor simply the natural consequences of his apostasy, but judicial inflictions. The loss of original righteousness, and death spiritual and temporal under which they commence their existence, are the penalty of Adam's first sin. We do not say that this solution of the problem of man's sinfulness and misery, is without its difficulties; for the ways of God are past finding out. But it may be confidently asserted, first, that it is the Scriptural solution of that problem; and secondly, that it is far more satisfactory to the reason, the heart, and the conscience, than any other solution which the ingenuity of man has ever suggested. This is proved by its general acceptance in the Christian Church.

The Ground of the Imputation of Adam's Sin.

The ground of the imputation of Adam's sin, or the reason why the penalty of his sin has come upon all his posterity, according to the doctrine above stated, is the union between us and Adam. There could of course be no propriety in imputing the sin of one man to another unless there were some connection between them to explain and justify such imputation. The Scriptures never speak of the imputation of the sins of angels either to men or to Christ, or of his righteousness to them; because there is no such relation between men and angels, or between angels and Christ, as to involve the one in the judicial consequences of the sin or righteousness of the other. The union between Adam and his posterity which is the ground of the imputation of his sin to them, is both natural and federal. He was their natural head. Such is the relation between parent and child, not only in the case of Adam and his descendants, but in all other cases, that the character and conduct of the one, of necessity to a greater or less degree affect the other. No fact in history is plainer than that children bear the iniquities of their fathers. They suffer for their sins. There must be a reason for this; and a reason founded in the very constitution of our nature. But there was something peculiar in the case of Adam. Over and beyond this natural relation which exists between a man and his posterity, there was a special divine constitution by which he was appointed the head and representative of his whole race.

Adam the Federal Head of his Race.

1. The first argument, therefore, in favour of the doctrine of imputation is that the Scriptures present Adam as not only the natural, but also the federal head of his posterity. This is plain, as already remarked, from the narrative given in Genesis. Everything there said to Adam was said to him in his representative capacity. The promise of life was for him and for his seed after him. The dominion within which he was invested, belonged to his posterity as well as to himself. All the evils threatened against him in case of transgression, included them, and have in fact come upon them. They are mortal; they have to earn their bread by the sweat of their brows; they are subject to all the inconveniences and sufferings arising from the banishment of our first parents from paradise and from the curse pronounced for man's sake upon the earth. They no less obviously are born into the world destitute of original righteousness and subject to spiritual death. The full penalty, therefore, threatened against Adam, has been inflicted upon them. It was death with the promise of

redemption. Now that these evils are penal in our case as well as in his, is plain, because punishment is suffering inflicted in execution of a threatenimig, and for the satisfaction of justice. It matters not what that suffering may be. Its character as penalty depends not on its nature, but upon the design of its infliction. One man, as before remarked, may be shut up in a prison to protect him from popular violence; another, in execution of a legal sentence. In one case the imprisonment is a favour, in the other, it is a punishment. As therefore, the evils which men suffer on account of the sin of Adam, are inflicted in execution of the penalty threatened against him, they are as truly penal in our case as they were in his; and he was consequently treated as the federal head and representative of his race. Besides the plain assumption of the truth of this federal relation, it is expressly asserted in the Word of God. Tha parallel drawn by the Apostle between Adam and Christ relates precisely to this point. Adam was the type of Him who was to come, because as the one was the representative of his race, so the other is the representative of his people. And the consequences of the relation are shown to be in like manner analogous. It was because Adam was the representative of his race, that his sin is the judicial ground of their condemnation; and it is because Christ is the representative of his people, that his righteousness is the judicial ground of the justification of believers.

The Representative Principle in the Scriptures.

2. This representative principle pervades the whole Scriptures. The imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity is not an isolated fact. It is only an illustration of a general principle which characterizes the dispensations of God from the beginning of the world. God declared himself to Moses to be, "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity amid transgression, and sin, and that will by no means clear the guilty; visiting the iniquity of the fathers upon the children, and upon the children's children unto the third and to the fourth generation." (Ex. xxxiv. 6, 7.) Jeremiah says: "Thou showest loving-kindness unto thousands. and recompensest the iniquities of the fathers into the bosom of their children after them. The Great, the Mighty God, the Lord of Hosts, is his name." (Jer. xxxii. 18.) The curse pronounced on Canaan fell upon his posterity. Esau's selling his birthright, shut out his descendants from the covenant of promise. The children of Moab and Ammon were excluded from the congregation of the Lord forever, because their ancestors opposed the Israelites when they came out of Egypt. In the case of Dathan and Abiram, as in that of Achan, "their wives, and their sons, and their little children" perished for the sins of their parents. God said to Eli that the iniquity of his house should not be purged with sacrifice and offering forever. To David it was said, "The sword shall never depart from thy house; because thou hast despised me, and mast taken the wife of Uriah the Hittite to be thy wife." To the disobedient Gehazi it was said: "The leprosy of Naaman shall cleave unto thee and unto thy seed forever." The sin of Jereboam and of the men of his generation determined the destiny of the ten tribes for all time. The imprecation of the Jews, when they demanded the crucifixion of Christ. "His blood be on us and on our children," still weighs down the scattered people of Israel. Our Lord himself said to the Jews of his generation that they built the sepulchres of the prophets whom their fathers had slain, and thus acknowledged themselves to be the children of murderers, and that therefore the blood of those prophets should be required at their hands. This principle runs through the whole Scriptures. When God entered into covenant with Abraham, it was not for himself only but also for his

posterity. They were bound by all the stipulations of that covenant. They shared its promises and its threatenings, and in hundreds of cases the penalty of disobedience came upon those who had no personal part in the transgressions. Children suffered equally with adults in the judgments, whether famine, pestilence, or war, which came upon the people for their sins. In like manner, when God renewed and enlarged the Abrahamic covenant at Mount Sinai, it was made with the adults of that generation as representing their descendants to the remotest generations. And the Jews to this day are suffering the penalty of the sins of their fathers for their rejection of Him of whom Moses and the prophets spoke. The whole plan of redemption rests on this same principle. Christ is the representative of his people, and on this ground their sins are imputed to Him and his righteousness to them. In like manner, in the baptismal covenant, the parent acts for the child, and binds him without the child's consent, and the destiny of the child is, as a general rule, suspended on the fidelity of the parent. No man who believes the Bible, can shut his eyes to the fact that it everywhere recognizes the representative character of parents, and that the dispensations of God have from the beginning been founded on the principle that children bear the iniquities of their fathers. This is one of the reasons which infidels assign for rejecting the divine origin of the Scriptures. But infidelity furnishes no relief. History is as full of this doctrine as the Bible is. The punishment of the felon involves his family in his disgrace and misery. The spendthrift and drunkard entail poverty and wretchedness upon all connected within them. There is no nation now existing on the face of the earth, whose condition for weal or woe is not largely determined by the character and conduct of their ancestors. If, unable to solve the mysteries of Providence, we plunge into Atheism, we only increase a thousand fold the darkness by which we are surrounded. It is easier to believe that all things are guided by infinite reason and goodness, and are certain to result in the highest glory of God, and in the highest blessedness of the universe, than to believe that this vast aggregate of sin and misery is the working of blind force without purpose and without end.

If the fact be admitted that we bear the consequences of Adam's sin, and that children suffer for the iniquities of their fathers, it may be said that this is not to be referred to the justice of God, but to the undesigned working of a general law, which in despite of incidental evil, is on the whole beneficent. The difficulty on that assumption instead of being lessened, is only increased. On either theory the nature and the degree of suffering are the same. Thc innocence of the sufferers is the same. The only difference relates to the question, Why they suffer for offences of which they are not personally guilty? The Bible says these sufferings are judicial; they are inflicted as punishment for the support of law. Others say, they are merely natural consequences, or arbitrary inflictions of a sovereign. If a king should put the children of a rebel to death, would it relieve his conduct from reproach to say that it was an act of arbitrary sovereignty? If the prevention of crime be one important end of punishment (although not its primary end), would it not be a relief to say, that the death of the children was designed to prevent other parents from rebelling? That the execution of the children of a criminal by a human sovereign would be a cruel and unjust punishment, may be admitted, while it is, and must be denied, that it is unjust in God that he should visit the iniquities of the fathers upon their children. In the first place no human sovereign has the right over his subjects which belongs to God over his creatures as their Creator. And in the second place, no human sovereign has the power and wisdom to secure

the highest good from the penalties which he attaches to the violations of law. We cannot infer that because a course of action would be wrong in man, therefore it must be unjust in God. No man could rightfully send pestilence or famine through a land, but God does send such visitations not only righteously, but to the manifestation of his own glory and to the good of his creatures.

The same Principle involved in other Doctrines.

That the sin of Adam is imputed to his posterity is proved not only (1.) From the fact that he was their natural head and representative; and (2.) From the fact that this principle of representation pervades the Scriptures; and (3.) From the fact that it is the ground on which the providence of God is administered. (4.) From the fact that evils consequent on the apostasy of Adam are expressly declared in Scripture to be penal inflictions put also (5.) From the fact that the principle of imputation is involved in other great doctrines of the Bible. The assumption that one man cannot righteously, under the government of God, be punished for the sins of another, is not only contrary, as we have seen to the express declarations of Scripture and to the administration of the divine government from the beginning, but it is subversive of the doctrines of atonement and justification. The idea ot the transfer of guilt or of vicarious punishment lies at the foundation of all the expiatory offerings under the Old Testament, and of the great atonement under the new dispensation. To bear sin, is in Scriptural language to bear the penalty of sin. The victim bore the sin of the offerer. Hands were imposed upon the head of the animal about to be slaughtered, to express the transfer of guilt. That animal must be free from all defect or blemish to make it the more apparent that its blood was shed not for its own deficiencies but for the sin of another. All this was symbolical and typical. There could be no real transfer of guilt made to an irrational animal, and no real atonement made by its blood. But these services were significant. They were intended to teach these great truths: (1.) That the penalty of sin was death. (2.) That sin could not be pardoned without an atonement. (3.) That atonement consists in vicarious punishment. The innocent takes the place of the guilty and bears the penalty in his stead. This is the idea attached to expiatory offerings in all ages and among all nations. This is the idea inculcated in every part of the Bible. And this is what the Scriptures teach concerning the atonement of Christ. He bore our sins; He was made a curse for us; He suffered the penalty of the law in our stead. All this proceeds on the ground that the sins of one man can be justly, on some adequate ground, imputed to another. In justification the same radical idea is included. Justification is not a subjective change in the moral state of the sinner; it is not mere pardon; it is not simply pardon and restoration to favour, as when a rebel is forgiven and restored to the enjoyment of his civil rights. It is a declaration that the demands of justice have been satisfied. It proceeds on the assumption that the righteousness which the law requires belongs either personally and inherently, or by imputation, to the person who is justified, or declared to be just. There is a logical connection, therefore, between the denial of the imputation of Adam's sin, and the denial of the Scriptural doctrines of atonement and justification. The objections urged against the former bear equally against the latter doctrines. And it is a matter of history that hose who reject the one, reject also the others.

Argument from Romans v. 12-21.

The Apostle in Romans v. 12-21 teaches this doctrine in the most formal and explicit

manner. The design of that passage is to illustrate the method of salvation. The Apostle had taught that all men are sinners, and the whole world guilty before God. All men being under the condemnation of the law, it is impossible that they should be justified by the law. The same law cannot both justify and condemn the same persons. As therefore no flesh can be justified by the works of the law, God sent his Son for our salvation. He assumed our nature, took our place, and obeyed and suffered in our stead, and thus wrought out for us a perfect and infinitely meritorious righteousness. On the ground of that righteousness, God can now be just in justifying the ungodly, if, renouncing their own righteousness, they receive and trust upon this righteousness of God, freely offered to them in the Gospel. The fundamental doctrine of the Epistle to the Romans, as it is the fundamental doctrine of the Gospel, is, therefore, that the righteousness of one man, even Christ, can be and is so imputed to believers as to be the meritorious ground of their justification at the bar of God. To make this doctrine the more plain to his readers, the Apostle refers to the analogous case of the condemnation of the human race for the sin of Adam; and shows that as the sin of Adam is the judicial ground of the condemnation of all who were in him, i.e., of all represented by him, so the obedience of Christ is the judicial ground of the justification of all who are in Him. In the prosecution of his plan he first asserts the imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. He then proves it. He then comments upon it. He then applies it; and finally draws inferences from it. Thus in every possible way, as it would seem, he sets forth the doctrine as part of the revelation of God. The assertion of the doctrine is contained in the twelfth verse of the chapter. It was by one man, He says, that sin and death passed upon all men; because all sinned. They sinned through, or in, that one man. His sin was the sin of all in virtue of the union between them and him. The proof of this doctrine is contained in verses thirteen and fourteen. The Apostle argues thus: Punishment supposes sin; sin supposes law; for sin is not imputed where there is no law. All men are punished; they are all subject to penal evils. They are, therefore, all chargeable with sin, and consequently are all guilty of violation of law. That law cannot be the law of Moses, for men died (i.e., were subject to the penalty of the law) before that law was given. It cannot be the law as written on the heart; for those die who have never committed any personal sin. There are penal evils, therefore, which come upon all mankind prior to anything in their state or conduct to merit such infliction. The ground of that infliction must therefore be sought out of themselves, i.e., in the sin of their first parent. Hence Adam is the type of Christ. As the one is the head and representative of his race, so the other is the head and representative of his people. As the sin of the one is the ground of the condemnation of his posterity, so the righteousness of the other is the ground of the justification of all who are in him. But although there is this grand analogy between the fall and the redemption of man, there are nevertheless certain points of difference, all in favour of the scheme of redemption. If we die for the offence of one man, much more shall grace abound unto many through one man. If for one offence the sentence of condemnation passed on all, the free justification is from many offences. If condemned for a sin in which we had no personal and voluntary participation, how much more shall we live on account of a righteousness, which we cordially receive. Wherefore, continues the Apostle, in the application of his illustration, if all men (in union with Adam) are condemned by the offence of one man, so also all (in union with Christ) shall be justified on the ground of the righteousness of one man. As one man's disobedience constituted us sinners, so the obedience of one man constitutes us

righteous, (verses 18 and 19). From these premises the Apostle draws two conclusions: First, that the law was not designed for justification, but that sin might abound in the knowledge and consciousness of men; and secondly, that where sin hath abounded grace shall much more abound. The benefits and blessings of redemption shall far exceed all the evils of the apostasy.

Whatever may be thought of the details of this exposition, there can hardly he a doubt that it expresses the main idea of the passage. Few can doubt, and few ever have doubted, that the Apostle does here clearly teach that the sin of Adam is the judicial ground of the condemnation of his race. With this agrees not only, as we have already seen, the Scriptural account of the fall, but also what the Apostle teaches in 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22. "For since by man came death, by man came also the resurrection of the dead. For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." Union with Adam is the cause of death; union with Christ is the cause of life.

Argument from General Consent.

The imputation of Adam's sin has been the doctrine of the Church universal in all ages. It was the doctrine of the Jews, derived from the plain teaching of the Old Testament Scriptures. It was and is the doctrine of the Greek, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. Its denial is a novelty. It is only since the rise of Arminianism that any considerable body of Christians have ventured to set themselves in opposition to a doctrine so clearly taught in the Bible, and sustained by so many facts of history and experience. The points of diversity in reference to this subject do not relate to the fact that Adam's sin is imputed to his posterity, but either to the grounds of that imputation or to its consequences. In the Greek Church the lowest views prevalent among Christians were adopted. The theologians of that church generally held that natural death, and a deterioration of our nature, and a change for the worse in the whole state of the world, were the only penal evils which the race of mankind suffer on account of Adam's sin. In the Latin Church during the Middle Ages, as we have already seen, great diversity of opinion obtained as to the nature and extent of the evils brought upon the world by the apostasy of our first parent. The Council of Trent declared those evils to be death, the loss of original righteousness, and sin which is pronounced to be the death of the soul. The Lutherans and Reformed held the same doctrine with more consistency and earnestness. But in all this diversity it was universally admitted, first, that certain evils are inflicted upon all mankind on account of Adam's sin; and, secondly, that those evils are penal. Men were universally, so far as the Church was concerned, held to bear in a greater or less degree the punishment of the sin of their first parent.

Objections to the Doctrine.

The great objection to this doctrine, that it is manifestly unjust that one man should be punished for the sin of another, has already been incidentally referred to. What is punishment? It is evil on suffering inflicted in support of law. Wherein is the injustice that one man should, on the ground of the union between them, be punished for the sin of another? If there be injustice in the case it must be in the infliction of suffering anterior to or irrespective of personal ill desert. It does not consist in the motive of the infliction. The infliction of suffering to gratify malice or revenge is of course a crime. To inflict it in mere caprice is no less obviously wrong. To inflict it for the attainment of some right and

desirable end may be not only just but benevolent. Is not the support of the divine law such an end? The fact that all mankind do suffer on account of Adam's sin no believer in the Bible can or does deny. It cannot be denied that these sufferings were designed. They arc included in the threatenings made in the beginning. They were expressly declared to be penal in the Bible. The sentence of condemnation is said to have passed on all men for the offence of one man. A part of the penalty threatened against sin in the great progenitor of the race was that his posterity should suffer the consequences of his transgression. They do thus suffer. It is vain, therefore, to deny the fact, and no relief is obtained by denying that those sufferings are inflicted in execution of the penalty of the law and for the infinitely important object of sustaining its authority.

[203] As at the time of the Reformation an influential party in the Romish Church held, after some of the schoolmen, that original sin consists solely in the imputation of Adam's first sin, and as the Confessions of the Reformers were designed not only as an exhibition of the truth but as a protest against the errors of the Church of Rome, it will be observed that the Protestants frequently assert that original sin is not only the imputation of Adam's sin but also hereditary corruption of nature; and the Reformed theologians often made the latter more prominent than the former, because the one was admitted by their adversaries, but the other denied.

§ 10. Mediate Imputation.

About the middle of the seventeenth century Amyraut, Cappel, and La Place (or Plac&#65533;us), three distinguished professors in the French theological school at Saumur, introduced several modifications of the Augustinian or Reformed doctrine on the decrees, election, the atonement, and the imputation of Adam's sin. La Place taught that we derive a corrupt nature from Adam, and that that corrupt nature, and not Adam's sin, is the ground of the condemnation which has come upon all mankind. When it was objected to this statement of the case that it left out of view the guilt of Adam's first sin, he answered that he did not deny the imputation of that sin, but simply made it dependent on our participation of his corrupted nature. We are inherently depraved, and therefore we are involved in the guilt of Adam's sin. There is no direct or immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, but only an indirect or mediate imputation of it, founded on the fact that we share his moral character. These views were first presented by La Place in a disputation, "De statu hominis lapsi ante gratiam," published in the "Theses Salmurienses," and afterwards more elaborately in a treatise, "De imputatione primi peccati Adami." This doctrine was formally condemned by the National Synod of France in 1644-45; [204] by the Swiss churches in the "Formula Consensus;" and by the theologians of Holland. J&#65533;ger, a Lutheran divine, in his "Ecclesiastical History," [205] is justified in saying, "Contra doctrinam Plact&#65533;i -- tota Gallia reformata, quin et Theologi reformati in Hollandi&#65533; surrex&#65533;re." The decree of the French Synod of Charenton on this subject is as follows: "Cum relatum esset ad Synodum, scripta qu&#65533;dam . . . . prodisse, qu&#65533; totam rationem peccati originalis sol&#65533; corruptione h&#65533;reditari&#65533; in omnibus hominibus inh&#65533;rente definiunt, et primi peccati Adami imputationem negant: Damnavit Synodus doctrinam ejusmodi, quatenus peccati originalis naturam ad corruptionem h&#65533;reditariam posterum Ad&#65533; ita restringit, ut imputationem excludat primi illius peccati, quo lapsus est Adam: Adeoque censuris

omnibus ecclesiasticis subjiciendos censuit pastores, professores, et quoscunque alios, qui in hujus qu&#65533;stionis disceptatione a communi sententia recesserit Ecclesiarum Protestantium, qu&#65533; omnes hactenus et corruptionem illam, et imputationem hanc in omnes Adami posteros descendentem agnoverunt."

It was to evade the force of this decision that Plac&#65533;us proposed the distinction between mediate and immediate imputation. He said he did not deny the imputation of Adam's sin, but only that it preceded the view of hereditary corruption. But this is the very thing which the Synod asserted. Hereditary corruption, or spiritual death is the penalty, or, as expressed by the Lutheran confessions, by Calvin, and by the Protestants generally, it was an evil inflicted by "the just judgment of God, on account of Adam's sin (propter peccatum Adami)." The Formula Consensus Ecclesiarum Helveticarum was set forth 1675, in opposition to the doctrine of Amyraut on universal grace, to the doctrine of Plac&#65533;us on mediate imputation, and to that of others concerning the active obedience of Christ. [206] In that Formula it is said: "Censemus igitur (i.e., because the covenant of works was made not only with Adam, but also in him, with the whole human race) peccatum Adami omnibus ejus posteris, judicio Dei arcano et justo, imputari. Testatur quippe Apostolus in Adamo omnes peccasse:' Unius hominis inobedientia peccatores multos constitui;' in eodem omnes mori.' Neque vero ratio apparet, quemadmodum h&#65533;reditaria corruptio, tanquam mors spiritualis, in universum genus humanum justo Dei judicio cadere possit, nisi ejusdem generis humani delictum aliquod, mortis illius reatum inducens, pr&#65533;cesserit. Cum Deus justissimus totius terr&#65533; judex nonnisi sontem puniat." [207]

Rivet, one of the professors of the University of Leyden, published a treatise in support of the decision of the French Synod, entitled "Decretum Synodi Nationalis Ecclesiarum Reformatarum Galli&#65533; initio anni 1645, de Imputatione primi Peccati omnibus Adami posteris, cum Ecclesiarum et Doctorum Protestantium consensu, ex scriptis eorum ab Andrea Riveto collecto." This treatise is contained in the third volume of the folio edition of his works. His colleagues in the University published their formal endorsement of his work, and earnestly commended it as an antidote to the new doctrine of Plac&#65533;us. The theologians of the other universities of Holland joined in this condemnation of the doctrine of mediate imputation. They call it the heurema Imputationis Mediat&#65533; a "ficulneum nuditatis indecentis tegumentum," and insist that the imputation of Adam's sin is no more founded on our inherent corruption than the imputation of Christ's righteousness is founded on our inherent holiness. "Quomodo et justitia Christi electis imputatur, non mediate per renovationem et obedientiam horum propriam, sed immediate, ad quam h&#65533;c ipsa propria eorum obedientia demum subsequitur." [208] These two great doctrines were regarded as inseparably united. The Protestant theologians agree in holding that "Imputatio justiti&#65533; Christi et culp&#65533; Adami pari passu ambulant, et vel utraque ruit, vel utraque agnosci debet." [209]

Mediate Imputation outside of the French Church.

Although the doctrine of mediate imputation was thus generally condemned both by the Reformed and Lutheran Churches, it found some distinguished advocates beyond the pale of the French Church. The younger Vitringa, Venema, and Stapfer, in his "Polemical Theology," gave it their sanction. From the last named author it was adopted by President Edwards, in one chapter of his work on "Original Sin." It appears there, however, merely

as an excrescence. It was not adopted into his system so as to qualify his theological views on other doctrines. Although President Edwards does clearly commit himself to the doctrine of Plac&#65533;us, as he says, [210] "that the evil disposition is first, and the charge of guilt consequent," nevertheless he expressly teaches the doctrine of immediate imputation formally and at length in other portions of that work. (1.) He argues through a whole section to prove the federal headship of Adam. (2.) He holds that the threatening of death made to Adam included the loss of original righteousness and spiritual death. (3.) That that threatening included his posterity, and that the evils which they suffer in consequence of his sin are truly penal. If this be so, if the loss of original righteousness and inherent depravity are penal, they suppose antecedent guilt. That is, a guilt antecedent, and not consequent to the existence and view of the depravity. (4.) In his exposition of Rom. v. 12-21, he expressly teaches the common doctrine, and says, "As this place in general is very full and plain, so the doctrine of the corruption of nature, as derived from Adam, and also the imputation of his first sin, are both clearly taught in it. The imputation of Adam's one transgression, is indeed most directly and frequently asserted. We are here assured that by one man's sin death passed on all; all being adjudged to this punishment as having sinned (so it is implied) in that one man's sin. And it is repeated, over and over, that all are condemned, many are dead, many made sinners, etc., by one man's offence, by the disobedience of one, and by one offence." [211] As guilt precedes punishment, if, as Edwards says, depravity or spiritual death is a punishment, then the imputation of the guilt of Adam's first sin precedes depravity, and is not consequent upon it. This is the current representation throughout the work on Original Sin. It is only when in answer to the objection that it is unjust that we should be punished for the sin of Adam, that he enters on an abstruse metaphysical discussion on the nature of oneness or identity, and tries to prove [212] that Adam and his posterity are one, and not distinct agents. It is, therefore. after all, realism, rather than mediate imputation, that Edwards for the the adopted. Plac&#65533;us and his associates, in order to defend the ground which they had taken, appealed to many passages in the writings of earlier theologians which seemed to ignore the immediate imputation of Adam's sin, and to place the condemnation of the race mainly, if not exclusively, upon the hereditary depravity derived from our first parent. Such passages were easily to be found, and they are easily accounted for without assuming, contrary to the clearest evidence, that the direct imputation of Adam's sin was either doubted or denied. Before Arius arose with the direct denial of the true divinity of Christ and of the doctrine of the Trinity, the language of ecclesiastical writers was confused and contradictory. In like manner, even in the Latin Church, and in the writings of Augustine himself, much may be found, before the rise of the Pelagian controversy, which it is hard to reconcile with the Augustinian system. Augustine was obliged to publish a volume of retractions, and in many cases where he had nothing to retract, he found much to modify and explain, It is not wonderful, therefore, that before anyone openly denied the doctrine of immediate imputation, and especially when the equally important doctrine of hereditary depravity was openly rejected by an influential party in the Romish Church, the Protestant theologians should apparently ignore a doctrine which no one denied, and devote their attention principally to the points which were then in controversy. Rivet, however, clearly shows that although not rendered prominent, the immediate imputation of Adam's sin as universally assumed. This is plain from the fact that all the evil consequences of Adam's apostasy, mortality, the loss of original righteousness,

corruption of nature or spiritual death, etc., etc., were of the nature of punishment. What the Reformers were anxious to maintain was, that original hereditary depravity (concupiscence, in the language of the Latin Church) was of the nature of sin, and consequently that men do not perish eternally solely propter peccatum alienum, but also propter peccatum proprium. This was specially the case with Calvin. In the Confession of Faith which he drew up for the school in Geneva, it is said, "Singuli nascuntur originali peccato infecti . . . et a Deo damnati, non propter alienum delictum duntaxat, sed propter improbitatem, qu&#65533; intra eos est." And elsewhere he says: "Dicimus Deum justo judicio nobis in Adamo maledixisse, ac voluisse nos ob illius peccatum corruptos nasci, ut in Christo instauremur." Again: "Peccavit unus, omnes ad poenam trahuntur, neque id modo, sed ex unius vitio, contagionem omnes contrahunt." Again: "Si qu&#65533;ratur causa maledictionis, qu&#65533; incumbit omnibus posteris Ad&#65533;, dicitur esse alienum peccatum, et cujusque proprium." To the same effect, Beza says: [213] "Tria sunt qu&#65533; hominem reum constitunut coram Deo, (1.) Culpa promanans ex eo quod omnes peccavimus in proto lapso (Rom. v. 12). (2.) Corruptio qu&#65533; est p&#65533;na istius culp&#65533;, impositam tam Adamo, quam posteris. (3.) Peccata qu&#65533; perpetrant homines adulti." [214] Principal Cunningham [215] calls attention to the fact that the doctrine of immediate imputation of Adam's sin is much more explicitly stated in the Westminster Larger and Shorter Catechisms than in the Confession of Faith. This he very naturally accounts for by the supposition that the denial of that doctrine by Plac&#65533;us had not attracted attention in England when the Confession was framed (1646), but did become known before the Catechisms were completed.

Objections to the Doctrine of Mediate Imputation.

The leading objections against the doctrine of mediate imputation are, --

1. That it denies what the Scriptures assert. The Scriptures assert that the sentence of condemnation has passed upon all men for the sin of one man. This the doctrine of mediate imputation denies, and affirms that the ground of that condemnation is inherent depravity. We are accounted partakers of Adam's sin only because we derive a corrupt nature from him. According to the Scriptures, however, the reason why we are depraved is, that we are regarded as partakers of his sin, or because the guilt of that sin is imputed to us. The guilt in the order of nature and fact precedes the spiritual death which is its penal consequent.

2. This doctrine denies the penal character of the hereditary corruption in which all men are born. According to the Scriptures and to the faith of the church universal, mortality, the loss of original righteousness, and hereditary corruption are inflicted upon mankind in execution of the threatening made against Adam, and are included in the comprehensive word, death, by which the threatened penalty was expressed. This is as emphatically taught by President Edwards as by any other of the Reformed theologians. He devotes a section of his work to prove that the death mentioned in Genesis, and of which the Apostle speaks in Rom. v. 12, included spiritual death, and that the posterity of Adam were included in that penalty. He says: "The calamities which come upon them in consequence of his sin, are brought on them as punishments." [216] He moreover says, it destroys the whole scope of the Apostle's argument "to suppose that the death of which he here speaks as coming on mankind by Adams sin, comes not as a punishment." [217] And again: "I do not suppose the natural depravity of the posterity of Adam is owing to the course of nature only; it is also owing to the just judgment of God." [218] But punishment supposes guilt; if the loss of

righteousness and the consequent corruption of nature are punishments, they suppose the antecedent imputation of guilt; and therefore imputation is immediate and not mediate; it is antecedent and not consequent to or upon inherent depravity. The view which the Reformed theologians uniformly present on this subject is, that God constituted Adam the head and representative of his race. The penalty attached to the covenant made with him, and which included his posterity, was the loss of the divine favour and fellowship. The consequences of the forfeiture of the divine favour in the case of Adam were, (1.) The loss of original righteousness; (2.) The consequent corruption of his whole nature; and, (3.) Exposure to eternal death. These consequences come on his posterity in the same order: first, the loss or rather destitution of original righteousness; and secondly, corruption of nature; and thirdly, exposure to eternal death; so that no child of Adam is exposed to eternal death irrespective of his own personal sinfulness and ill-desert. On this point Turrettin says: "Poena quam peccatum Adami in nos accersit, vel est privativa, vel positiva. Prior est carentia et privatio justiti&#xfffd; originalis; posterior est mors tum temporalis, tum &#xfffd;terna, et in genere mala omnia, qu&#xfffd; peccatoribus immittuntur. Etsi secunda necessario sequitur primam ex natura rei, nisi intercedat Dei misericordia, non debet tamen cum ea confundi. Quoad primam dicimus Adami peccatum nobis imputari immediate ad poenam privativam, quia est causa privationis justiti&#xfffd; originalis, et sic corruptionem antecedere debet saltem ordine natur&#xfffd;; sed quoad posteriorem potest dici imputari mediate quoad poenam positivam, quia isti poen&#xfffd; obnoxii non sumus, nisi postquam nati et corrupti sumus." [219] Vogelsang [220] says: "Certe neminem sempiterna subire supplicia propter inobedientiam protoplasti, nisi mediante cognata perversitate." And Mark [221] says that if Plac&#xfffd;us and others meant nothing more by mediate imputation than that "hominum natorum actualem punitionem ulteriorem non fieri nudo intuitur Adamic&#xfffd; transgressionis absque interveniente etiam propria corruptione et fluentibus hinc sceleribus variis, neminem orthodoxum possent habere obloquentem." But he adds, they obviously meant much more. They deny the imputation of the first sin of Adam as the cause of this inherent corruption. As Adam by his apostasy became subject to eternal death, but through the intervention of redeeming grace was doubtless saved from it, so also although all his posterity become liable to the same dreadful penalty through their own inherent corruption, yet we have every reason to believe and hope that no human being ever actually perishes who does not personally incur the penalty of the law by his actual transgression. This however is through the redemption of Christ. All who die in infancy are doubtless saved, but they are saved by grace. It is nevertheless important that the real views of the Reformed Churches, on the doctrine of immediate imputation, should be clearly understood. Those churches do not teach that the first sin of Adam is the single and immediate ground of the condemnation of his posterity to eternal death, but that it is the ground of their forfeiture of the divine favour from which flows the loss of original righteousness and corruption of our whole nature, which in their turn become the proximate ground of exposure to final perdition, from which, however, as almost all Protestants believe, all are saved who have no other sins to answer for.

Mediate Imputation increases the Difficulties to be accounted for.

3. It is a further objection to the doctrine of mediate imputation that it increases instead of relieving the difficulty of the case. It denies that a covenant was made with Adam. It denies that mankind ever had a probation. It assumes that in virtue of a natural law of propagation when Adam lost the image of God and became sinful, his children inherit his

character, and on the ground of that character are subject to the wrath and curse of God. All the evils therefore which the Scriptural and Church doctrine represent as coming upon the posterity of Adam as the judicial punishment of his first sin, the doctrine of mediate imputation represents as sovereign inflictions, or mere natural consequences. What the Scriptures declare to be a righteous judgment, Plac&#65533;us makes to be an arbitrary dispensation.

Inconsistent with the Apostle's Argument in Rom. v. 12-21.

4. It is a still more serious objection that this doctrine destroys the parallel between Adam and Christ on which the Apostle lays so much stress in his Epistle to the Romans. The great point which he there labours to teach and to illustrate, and which he represents as a cardinal element of the method of salvation, is that men are justified for a righteousness which is not personally their own. To illustrate and confirm this great fundamental doctrine, he refers to the fact that men have been condemned for a sin which is not personally their own. He over and over insists that it was for the sin of Adam, and not for our own sin or sinfulness, that the sentence of death (the forfeiture of the divine favour) passed upon all men. It is on this ground he urges men the more confidently to rely upon the promise of justification on the ground a righteousness which is not inherently ours. This parallel destroyed, the doctrine and argument of the Apostle are overturned, if it be denied that the sin of Adam, as antecedent to any sin or sinfulness of our own is the ground of our condemnation. If we are partakers of the penal consequences of Adam's sin only because of the corrupt nature derived by a law of nature from him, then we are justified only on the ground of our own inherent holiness derived by a law of grace from Christ. We have thus the doctrine of subjective justification, which overthrows the great doctrine of the Reformation, and the great ground of the peace and confidence of the people of God, namely, that a righteousness not within us but wrought out for us, -- the righteousness of another, even the eternal Son of God, and therefore an infinitely meritorious righteousness, -- is the ground of our justification before God. Any doctrine which tends to invalidate or to weaken the Scriptural evidence of this fundamental article of our faith is fraught with evil greater than belongs to it in itself considered. This is the reason why the Reformed theologians so strenuously opposed the doctrine of La Place. They saw and said that on his principles the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness antecedent to our santification could not be defended.

The Doctrine founded on a False Principle.

5. Perhaps, however, the most serious objection against the doctrine of mediate imputation is drawn from the principle on which it rests, and the arguments of its advocates in its support. The great principle insisted upon in support of this doctrine is that one man cannot justly be punished for the sin of another. If this be so then it is unjust in God to visit the iniquities of the fathers upon their children. Then it was unjust in Christ to declare that the blood of the prophets slain from the beginning should come upon the men of his generation. Then it is unjust that the Jews of the present day, and ever since the crucifixion of our Lord, should be scattered and peeled, according to the predictions of the prophets, for the rejection of the Messiah. Then, also, were the deluge sent in wrath upon the world, and the destruction of Sodom and Gomorrah, and the extermination of the Canaanites, in which thousands of children perished innocent of the offences for which those judgments

were inflicted, all acts of stupendous injustice. If this principle be sound, then the administration of the divine government over the world, God's dealings with nations and with the Church, admit of no defence. He has from the beginning and through all time held children responsible for the conduct of parents, included them without their consent in the covenants made with their fathers, and visited upon them the consequences of the violations of such covenants of which they were not personally guilty, as well as bestowed upon them rich blessings secured by the fidelity of their progenitors without anything meritorious on their part. Moreover, if the principle in question be valid, then the whole Scriptural doctrine of sacrifice and expiation is a delusion. And then, also, we must adopt the Socinian theory which makes the death of Christ instead of a penal satisfaction for sin, a mere symbolical inculcation of a truth -- a didactic and not an expiatory service. The Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century expressed their deep regret that men professing orthodoxy should adopt from Pelagianis et Pelagianizantibus, against the doctrine of immediate imputation, "exceptiones" et "objectiones . . . . petitas a Dei justitia et veritate, ab actus et person Adamic singularitate, ex sceleris longe ante nos pr terito tempore, ex posterum nulla scientia vel consensione in illud, ex non imputatis aliis omnibus factis et fatis Adami, etc.," which had so often been answered in the controversies with the Socinians and Remonstrants. [222] It is very clear that if no such constitution can be righteously established between men, even by God, that one man may justly bear the iniquity of another, then the Bible and Providence become alike unintelligible, and the great doctrines of the Christian faith are overthrown.

The Theory of Propagation.

The theory of those who deny all imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity, whether mediate or immediate, and who account for the corruption of the race consequent on his apostasy, on the general law of propagation, that like begets like, differs only in terms from the doctrine of La Place. All he meant by mediate imputation was that the descendants of Adam, derived from him a corrupt nature, have the same moral character, and therefore are adjudged worthy of the same condemnation. This the advocates of the theory just mentioned are willing to admit. Their doctrine therefore is liable to all the objections which bear against the doctrine of mediate imputation, and therefore does not call forth a separate consideration.

[204] See Quick's Synodicon, London, 1692.

[205] Tom. i. lib. ix. cap. v.

[206] Niemeyer's Collectio Confessionum, p. lxxxi.

[207] Art. x.; Niemeyer, p. 733.

[208] De Moor, Commentarius in Marckii Compendium, cap. xv. § 32, vol. iii. p. 280.

[209] Ibid. vol. iii. p. 255.

[210] Original Sin, IV. iii.; Works, edit. N. Y. 1829, vol. ii. p. 544.

[211] Original Sin, III. i.; Works, vol. ii. p. 512.

[212] Ibid. p. 546.

[213] Apolog. pro Justificatione.

[214] See Turrettin, locus. ix. qu s. 9, and De Moor's Commentarius in Johannis Marckin Compendium, caput XXV. § 32, vol. iii. 260 ff., where an extended account of this

controversy may be found.

[215] The Reformers and the Theology of the Reformation, second edition, p. 383.

[216] Original Sin, II. i; Works, vol. ii. p. 432.

[217] Ibid. II. iv. ut supra, p. 481.

[218] Ibid. IV. ii. ut supra, p. 540.

[219] Loc. IX. qust. ix. 14, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, p. 558.

[220] Quoted by De Moor, Commentarius, vol. iii. p. 275.

[221] Ibid. p. 278.

[222] De Moor, Coommentarius in Johannis Marckii Compendium, vol. iii. p. 279.

§ 11. Prexistence.

The principle that a man can be justly held responsible or regarded as guilty only for his own voluntary acts and for then subjective consequences, is so plausible that to many minds it has the authority of an intuitive truth. It is, however, so clearly the doctrine of the Bible and the testimony of experience that men are born in sin, that they come into the world in a state of guilt and of moral pollution, that a necessity arises of reconciling this fact with what they regard as self-evidently true. Two theories have been proposed to effect this reconciliation. The first is that of preexistence. Origen, and after him here and there one in the history of the Church, down to the present day, assumed that men existed in another state of being before their birth in this world, and having voluntarily sinned against God in that previous state of being, they come into this world burdened with the guilt and pollution due to their own voluntary act. This view of the subject never having been adopted by any Christian church, it does not properly belong to Christian theology. It is sufficient to remark concerning it: --

1. That it does not pretend to be taught in the Scriptures, and therefore cannot be an article of faith. Protestants unite in teaching that "The whole counsel of God, concerning all things necessary for his own glory, and man's salvation, faith and life, is either expressly set down in Scripture, or by good and necessary consequence may be deduced from Scripture, unto which nothing at any time is to be added, whether by new revelations of the Spirit, or the traditions of men." As the doctrine of the preexistence of souls is neither expressly set down in the Bible, nor deducible from it, as is admitted, it cannot be received as one of the formative principles of Christian doctrine. All that its Christian advocates claim is that it is not contradicted in Scripture, and therefore that they are free to hold it.

2. But even this cannot be conceded. It is expressly contrary to the plain teachings of the Word of God. According to the history of the creation, man was formed in the image of God. His body was fashioned out of the dust of the earth, and his soul was derived immediately from God, and was pronounced by him "very good." This is utterly inconsistent with the idea that Adam was a fallen spirit. The Bible also teaches that Adam was created in the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, and fell from that state here in this life, and not in a previous and higher state of being. The Scriptures also, as we have seen, say that it was by one man that sin entered into the world, and death by sin, because all sinned in that one man. There is a causal relation between the sin of

Adam and the condemnation and sinfulness of his posterity. This contradicts the theory which refers the present sinfulness of men, not to the act of Adam, but to the voluntary act of each individual man, in a previous state of existence.

3. This doctrine is as destitute of all support from the testimony of consciousness as from the authority of Scripture. No man has any reminiscences of a previous existence. There is nothing in his present state which connects him with a former state of being. It is a simple, pure assumption, without the slightest evidence from any known facts.

4. The theory, if true, affords no relief. Sins of which we know nothing; which were committed by us before we were born; which cannot be brought home to the conscience as our own sins, can never be the righteous grounds of punishment, any more than the acts of an idiot. It is unnecessary however to pursue this subject further, as the objections against the realistic theory, in most instances, bear with equal force against the theory of preexistence.

§ 12. Realistic Theory.

Those who reject the untenable doctrine of preexistence and yet hold to the principle that guilt can attach only to what is due to our agency, are driven to assume that Adam and his race are in such a sense one, that his act of disobedience was literally the act of all mankind. And consequently that they are as truly personally guilty on account of it, as Adam himself was; and that the inherent corruption flowing from that act, belongs to us in the same sense and in the same way, that it belonged to him. His sin, it is therefore said, "Is ours not because it is imputed to us; but it is imputed to us, because it is truly and properly our own." We have constantly to contend with the ambiguity of terms. There is a sense in which the above proposition is perfectly true, and there is a sense in which it is not true. It is true that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to us because it is ours according to the terms of the covenant of grace; because it was wrought out for us by our great head and representative, who obeyed and suffered in our stead. But it is not true that it is ours in the sense that we were the agents by whom that righteousness was effected, or the persons in whom it inheres. In like manner, Adam's sin may be said to be imputed to us because it is ours, inasmuch as it is the sin of the divinely constituted head and representative of our race. But it is not ours in the same sense in which it was his. It was not our act, i.e., an act in which our reason, will, and conscience were exercised. There is a sense in which the act of an agent is the act of the principal. It binds him in law, as effectually as he could bind himself. But he is not, on that account, the efficient agent of the act. The sense in which many assert that the act of Adam was our act, is, that the same numerical nature or substance, the same reason and will which existed and acted in Adam, belong to us; so that we were truly and properly the agents of his act of apostasy.

President Edwards' Theory of Identity.

The assumption which President Edwards undertakes to controvert, is, "That Adam and his posterity are not one, but entirely distinct agents." [223] The theory on which he endeavours to prove that Adam and his posterity were one agent, is not exactly the old realistic theory, it is rather a theory of his own, and depends on his seculiar views of oneness or identity. According to him, all oneness depends upon "the arbitrary constitution

of God." The only reason why a full grown tree is the same with its first germ; or that the body of an adult man is the same with his infant frame; is that God so wills to regard them. No creature is one and the same in the different periods of its existence, because it is numerically one and the same substance, or life, or organism; but simply because God "treats them as one, by communicating to them like properties, relations, and circumstances; and so leads us to regard and treat them as one." [224] "If the existence," he says, "of created substance, in each successive moment, be wholly the effect of God's immediate power in that moment, without any dependence on prior existence, as much as the first creation out of nothing, then what exists at this moment, by this power, is a new effect; and simply and absolutely considered, not the same with any past existence, though it be like it, and follows it according to a certain established method. And there is no identity or oneness in the case, but what depends on the arbitrary constitution of the Creator; who, by his wise and sovereign establishment so unites successive new effects, that he treats them as one." [225] He uses two illustrations which make his meaning perfectly plain. The brightness of the moon seems to us a permanent thing, but is really a new effect produced every moment. It ceases, and is renewed, in every successive point of time, and so becomes altogether a new effect at each instant. It is no more numerically the same thing with that which existed in the preceding moment, than the sound of the wind that blows now, is individually the same sound of the wind which blew just before. What is the of the brightness of the moon, he says, must be true also of its solidity, and of everything else belonging to its substance. Again, images of things placed before a mirror seem to remain precisely the same, with a continuing perfect identity. But it is known to be otherwise. These images are constantly renewed by the impression and reflection of new rays of light. The image which exists this moment is not at all derived from the image which existed the last preceding moment. It is no more numerically the same, than if painted anew by an artist with colours which vanish as soon as they are put on. The obvious fallacy of these illustrations is, that the cases are apparently, but not really alike. The brightness of the moon and the image on a mirror, are not substances having continued existence; they are mere effects on our visual organs. Whereas the substances which produce those effects are objective existences or entities, and not subjective states of our sensibility. Edwards, however, says that what is true of the images, must be true of the bodies themselves. "They cannot be the same, with an absolute identity, but must be wholly renewed every moment, if the case be as has been proved, that their present existence is not, strictly speaking, at all the effect of their past existence; but is wholly, every instant, the effect of a new agency or exertion of the powerful cause of their existence." [226] As therefore, there is no such thing as numerical identity of substance in created things, and as all oneness depends on "the arbitrary constitution of God," and things are one only because God so regards and treats them, there is "no solid reason," Edwards contends, why the posterity of Adam should not be "treated as one with him for the derivation . . . . of the loss of righteousness, and consequent corruption and guilt." [227] According to this doctrine of identity, everything that exists, even the soul of man, is, and remains one, not because of any continuity of life and substance, but as a series of new effects produced in every successive moment by the renewed efficiency of God. The whole theory resolves itself into the doctrine that preservation is continued creation. The argument of Edwards in proof of that point is, that "the existence of every created substance, is a dependent existence, and therefore is an

effect and must have some cause; and the cause must be one of these two; either the antecedent existence of the same substance, or else the power of the Creator." It cannot be the antecedent existence of the same substance, and therefore must be the power of God. His conclusion is that God's upholding of created substance "is altogether equivalent to an immediate production out of nothing, at each moment." [228]

Objections to the Edwardian Theory.

The fatal consequences of this view of the nature of preservation were presented under the head of Providence. All that need be here remarked, is, --

1. That it proceeds upon the assumption that we can understand the relation of the efficiency of God to the effects produced in time. Because every new effect which we produce is due to a new exercise of our efficiency, it is assumed that such must be the case with God. He, however, inhabits eternity. With him there is no distinction between the past and future. All things are equally present to Him. As we exist in time and space, all our modes of thinking are conditioned by these circumstances of our being. But as God is not subject to the limitations of time or space, we have no right to transfer these limitations to Him. This only proves that we cannot understand how God produces successive effects. We do not know that it is by successive acts, and therefore it is most unreasonable and presumptuous to make that assumption the ground of explaining great Scriptural doctrines. It is surely just as conceivable or intelligible that God should will the continuous existence of the things which He creates, as that He should create them anew at every successive moment.

2. This doctrine of a continued creation destroys the Scriptural and common sense distinction between creation and preservation. The two are constantly presented as different, and they are regarded as different by the common judgment of mankind. By creation, God calls things into existence, and by preservation He upholds them in being. The two ideas are essentially distinct. Any theory, therefore, which confounds them must be fallacious. God wills that the things which He has created shall continue to be; and to deny that He can cause continuous existence is to deny his omnipotence.

3. This doctrine denies the existence of substance. The idea of substance is a primitive idea. It is given in the constitution of our nature. It is an intuitive truth, as is proved by its universality and necessity. One of the essential elements of that idea is uninterrupted continuity of being. Substance is that which stands; which remains unchanged under all the phenomenal mutations to which it is subjected. According to the theory of continued creation there is and can be no created substance. God is the only substance in the universe. Everything out of God is a series of new effects; there is nothing which has continuous existence, and therefore there is no substance.

4. It necessarily follows that if God is the only substance He is the only agent in the universe. All things out of God being every moment called into being out of nothing, are resolved into modes of God's efficiency. If He creates the soul every successive instant, He creates all its states. thoughts, feelings, and volitions. The soul is only a series of divine acts. And therefore there can be no free agency, no sin, no responsibility, no individual existence. The universe is only the self-manifestation of God. This doctrine, therefore, in its consequences, is essentially pantheistic.

5. In resolving all identity into an "arbitrary constitution of God," it denies that there is

any real identity in any created things. Edwards expressly says, They are not numerically the same. They cannot be the same with an absolute identity. They are one only because God so regards them, and because they are alike, so that we look upon them as the same. This being the case, there seems to be no foundation even for guilt and pollution in the individual soul as flowing from its own acts, because there is nothing but an apparent, not a real connection between the present and the past in the life of the soul. It is not the same soul that is guilty today of the sin committed yesterday. Much less can such an arbitrary or assumed and merely apparent identity between Adam and his race be a just ground of their bearing the guilt of his first sin. In short, this doctrine subverts all our ideas. It assumes that things which, as the human soul, are really one, are not one in the sense of numerical sameness; and that things which are not identical, as Adam and his posterity, are one in the same sense that the soul of a man is one, or that identity can be predicated of any creature. This doctrine, therefore, which would account for the guilt and native depravity of men on the assumption of an arbitrary divine constitution of God, by which beings which are really distinct subsistences are declared to be one, is not only contrary to the Scriptures and to the intuitive convictions of men, but it affords no satisfactory solution of the facts which it is intended to explain. It does not bring home to any human conscience that the sin of Adam was his sin in the sense in which our sins of yesterday are our guilt of today.

The Proper Realistic Theory.

The strange doctrine of Edwards, above stated, agrees with the realistic theory so far as that he and the realists unite in saying that Adam and his race are one in the same sense in which a tree is one during its whole progress from the germ to maturity, or in which the human soul is one during all the different periods of its existence. It essentially differs, however, in that Edwards denies numerical sameness in any case. Identity, according to him, does not in any creature include the continued existence of one and the same substance. The realistic doctrine, on the contrary, makes the numerical sameness of substance the essence of identity. Every genus or species of plants or animals is one because all the individuals of those genera and species are partakers of one and the same substance. In every species there is but one substance of which the individuals are the modes of manifestation. According to this theory humanity is numerically one and the same substance in Adam and in all the individuals of his race. The sin of Adam was, therefore, the sin of all mankind, because committed by numerically the same rational and voluntary substance which constitutes us men. It was our sin in the same sense that it was sin, because it was our act (the act of our reason and will) as much as it was his. There are two classes of objections to this theory which might here properly come under consideration. First, those which bear against realism as a theory; and, secondly, those which relate to its application to the relation of the union between us and Adam as a solution of the problems of original sin.

Recapitulation of the Objections to the Realistic Theory.

The objections to the realistic doctrine were presented when the nature of man was under consideration. It was then stated, (1.) That realism is a mere hypothesis; one out of many possible assumptions. Possibility is all that can be claimed for it. It cannot be said to be probable, much less certain; and therefore cannot legitimately be made the basis of other doctrines. (2.) That it has no support from the Scriptures. The Bible indeed does say that

Adam and his race are one; but it also says that Christ and his people are one; that all the multitudes of believers of all ages and in heaven and earth are one. So in common life we speak of every organized community as one. The visible Church is one. Every separate state or kingdom is one. Everything depends on the nature of this oneness. And that is to be determined by the nature of the thing spoken of, and the usus loquendi of the Bible and of ordinary life. As no man infers from the fact that the Scriptures declare Christ and his people to be one, that they are numerically the same substance; or from the unity predicated of believers as distinguished from the rest of mankind, that they are one substance and the rest of men of a different substance; so we have no right to infer from the fact that the Bible says that Adam and his posterity are one that they are numerically the same substance. Neither do the Scriptures so describe the nature and effects of the union between us and Adam as to necessitate or justify the realistic doctrine. The nature and effects of our oneness with Adam are declared in all essential points to be analogous to the nature and effects of our oneness with Christ. As the latter is not a oneness of substance, so neither is the other. (3.) It was shown that realism has no support from the consciousness of men, but on the contrary, that it contradicts the teachings of consciousness as interpreted by the vast majority of our race, learned and unlearned. Every man is revealed to himself as an individual substance. (4.) Realism, as argued above, contradicts the doctrine of the Scriptures in so far that it is irreconcilable with the Scriptural doctrine of the separate existence of the soul. (5.) It subverts the doctrine of the Trinity in so far that it makes the Father, Son, and Spirit one God only in the sense in which all men are one man. The persons of the Trinity are one God, because they are one in essence or substance; and all men are one man because they are one in essence. The answers which Trinitarian realists give to this objection are unsatisfactory, because they assume the divisibility, and consequently the materiality of Spirit. (6.) It is difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile the realistic theory with the sinlessness of Christ. If the one numerical essence of humanity became guilty and polluted in Adam, and if we are guilty and polluted because we are partakers of that fallen substance, how can Christ's human nature have been free from sin if He took upon Him the same numerical essence which sinned in Adam. (7.) The above objections are theological or Scriptural; others of a philosophical character have availed to banish the doctrine of realism from all modern schools of philosophy, except so far as it has been merged in the higher forms of pantheistic monism.

Realism no Solution of the Problem of Original Sin.

The objections which bear against this theory as a solution of the problems of original sin are no less decisive. There are two things which realism proposes to explain. First, the fact that we are punished for the sin of Adam; and, secondly, that hereditary depravity is in us truly and properly sin, involving guilt as well as pollution. The former is accounted for on the ground that Adam's sin was our own act; and the latter on the ground that native depravity is the consequence of our own voluntary action. As a man is responsible for his character or permanent state of mind produced by his actual transgressions, so we are responsible for the character with which we come into the world, because it is the result of our voluntary apostasy from God. To this it is an obvious objection, --

1. That admitting realism to be true; admitting that humanity is numerically one and the same substance, of which individual men are the modes of manifestation; and admitting that

this generic humanity sinned in Adam, this affords no satisfactory solution of either of the facts above stated. Two things are necessary in order to vindicate the infliction of punishment for actual sin on the ground of personal responsibility. First, that the sin be an act of conscious self-determination. Otherwise it cannot be brought home upon the conscience so as to produce the sense of criminality. And suffering without the sense of criminality or blameworthiness, so far as the sufferer is concerned, is not punishment, but wanton cruelty. And, secondly, to vindicate punishment in the eye of justice, in the case supposed, there must be personal criminality manifest to all intelligent beings cognizant of the case. If a man should commit an offence in a state of somnambulism or of insanity, when he did not know what he did, and all recognition of which on his restoration to a normal condition is impossible, it is plain that such an offence could not justly be the ground of punishment. Suffering inflicted on such ground would not be punishment in the view of the sufferer, or righteous in the view of others. It is no less plain that if a man should commit a crime in a sound state of mind, and afterwards become insane, he could not justly be punished so long as he continued insane. The execution of a maniac or idiot for any offence committed prior to the insanity or idiocy would be an outrage. If these principles are correct then it is plain that, even admitting all that realists claim, it affords no relief. It gives no satisfactory solution either of our being punished for Adam's sin or for the guilt which attaches to our inherent hereditary depravity. A sin of which it is impossible that we should be conscious as our voluntary act, can no more be the ground of punishment as our act, than the sin of an idiot, of a madman, or of a corpse. When the body of Cromwell was exhumed and gibbeted, Cromwell was not punished; and the act was, in the sight of all mankind, merely a manifestation of impotent revenge.

2. But the realistic theory cannot be admitted. The assumption that we acted thousands of years before we were born, so as to be personally responsible for such act, is a monstrous assumption. It is, as Baur says, an unthinkable proposition; that is, one to which no intelligible meaning can be attached. We can understand how it may be said that we died in Christ and rose with Him; that his death was our death and his resurrection our resurrection, in the sense that He acted for us as our substitute, head, and representative. But to say that we actually and really died and rose in Him; that we were the agents of his acts, conveys no idea to the mind. In like manner we can understand how it may be said that we sinned in Adam and fell with him in so far as he was the divinely appointed head and representative of his race. But the proposition that we performed his act of disobedience is to our ears a sound without any meaning. It is just as much an impossibility as that a nonentity should act. We did not then exist. We had no being before our existence in this world; and that we should have acted before we existed is an absolute impossibility. It is to be remembered that an act implies an agent; and the agent of a responsible voluntary act must be a person. Before the existence of the personality of a man that man cannot perform any voluntary action. Actual sin is an act of voluntary self-determination; and therefore before the existence of the self, such determination is an impossibility. The stuff or substance out of which a man is made may have existed before he came into being, but not the man himself. Admitting that the souls of men are formed out of the generic substance of humanity, that substance is no more the man than the dust of the earth out of which the body of Adam was fashioned was his body. Voluntary agency, responsible action, moral character, and guilt can be predicated only of persons, and cannot by possibility be

predicable of them, or really belong to them before they exist. The doctrine, therefore, which supposes that we are personally guilty of the sin of Adam on the ground that we were the agents of that act, that our will and reason were so exercised in that action as to make us personally responsible for it and for its consequences, is absolutely inconceivable.

3. It is a further objection to this theory that it assigns no reason why we are responsible for Adam's first sin and not for his subsequent transgressions. If his sin is ours because the whole of humanity, as a generic nature, acted in him, this reason applies as well to all his other sins as to his first act of disobedience, at least prior to the birth of his children. The genus was no more individualized and concentrated in Adam when he was in the garden, than after he was expelled from it. Besides, why is it the sin of Adam rather than, or more than the sin of Eve for which we are responsible? That mankind do bear a relation to the sin of Adam which they do not sustain to the sin of Eve is a plain Scriptural fact. We are said to bear the guilt of his sin, but never to bear the guilt of hers. The reason is that Adam was our representative. The covenant was made with him; just as in after generations the covenant was made with Abraham and not with Sarah. On this ground there is an intelligible reason why the guilt of Adam's sin should be imputed to us, which does not apply to the sin of Eve. But on the realistic theory the reverse is the case. Eve sinned first. Generic humanity as individualized in her, apostatized from God, before Adam had offended; and therefore it was her sin rather than his, or more than his, which ruined our common nature. But such is not the representation of Scripture.

4. The objection urged against the doctrine of mediate imputation, that it is inconsistent with the Apostle's doctrine of justification, and incompatible with his argument in Rom. v. 12-21, bears with equal force against the realistic theory. What the Apostle teaches, what he most strenuously insists upon, and what is the foundation of every believer's hope, is that we are justified for acts which were not our own; of which we were not the agents, and the merit of which does not attach to us personally and does not constitute our moral character. This he tells us is analogous to the case of Adam. We were not the agents of his act. His sin was not our sin. Its guilt does not belong to us personally. It is imputed to us as something not our own, a peccatum alienum, and the penalty of it, the forfeiture of the divine favour, the loss of original righteousness, and spiritual death, are its sad consequences. Just as the righteousness of Christ is not our own but is imputed to us, and we have a title in justice on the ground of that righteousness, if we accept and trust it, to all the benefits of redemption. This, which is clearly the doctrine of the Apostle and of the Protestant churches, the realistic doctrine denies. That is, it denies that the sin of Adam as the sin of another is the ground of our condemnation; and in consistency it must also deny (as in fact the great body of Realists do deny) that the righteousness of Christ, as the righteousness of another, is the ground of our justification. What makes this objection the more serious, is that the reasons assigned for denying that Adam's sin, if not our own, can justly be imputed to us, bear with like force against the imputation of a righteousness which is not personally our own. The great principle which is at the foundation of the realistic, as of other false theories concerning original sin, is, that a man can be responsible only for his own acts and for his self-acquired character. If this be so, then, according to the Apostle, unless we can perfectly fulfill the law, and restore our nature to the image of God, by our own agency, we must perish forever.

5. Finally, the solution presented by Realists to explain our relation to Adam and to solve the problems of original sin, ought to be rejected, because Realism is a purely philosophical theory. It is indeed often said that the doctrine of our covenant relation to Adam, and of the immediate imputation of his sin to his posterity, is a theory. But this is not correct. It is not a theory, but the simple statement of a plain Scriptural fact. The Bible says, that Adam's sin was the cause of the condemnation of his race. It tells us that it is not the mere occasional cause, but the judicial ground of that condemnation; that it was for, or on account of, his sin, that the sentence of condemnation was pronounced upon all men. This is the whole doctrine of immediate imputation. It is all that that doctrine includes. Nothing is added to the simple Scriptural statement. Realism, however, is a philosophical theory outside of the Scriptures, intended to account for the fact that Adam's sin is the ground of the condemnation of our race. It introduces a doctrine of universals, of the relation of individuals to genera and species, concerning which the Scriptures teach nothing, and it makes that philosophical theory an integral part of Scripture doctrine. This is adding to the word of God. It is making the truth of Scriptural doctrines to depend on the correctness of philosophical speculations. It is important to bear in mind the relation which philosophy properly sustains to theology. (1.) The relation is intimate and necessary. The two sciences embrace nearly the same spheres and are conversant with the same subjects. (2.) There is a philosophy which underlies all Scriptural doctrines; or which the Scriptures assume in all their teachings. (3.) As the doctrines of the Bible are from God, and therefore infallible and absolutely true, no philosophical principle can be admitted as sound, which does not accord within those doctrines. (4.) Therefore the true office and sphere of Christian philosophy, or of philosophy in the hands of a Christian, is to ascertain and teach those facts and principles concerning God, man, and nature, which are in accordance with the divine word. A Christian cannot assume a certain theory of human freedom and by that theory determine what the Bible teaches of foreordination and providence; but on the contrary, he should allow the teachings of the Bible to determine his theory of liberty. And so of all other doctrines; and this may be done in full assurance that the philosophy which we are thus led to adopt, will be found to authenticate itself as true at the bar of enlightened reason. The objection to Realism is, that it inverts this order. It assumes to control Scripture, instead of being controlled by it. The Bible says we are condemned for Adam's sin. Realism denies this, and says no man is or can be condemned except for his own sin.

[223] Original Sin, IV. iii.; Works, edit. N. Y. 1829, vol. ii. p. 546.

[224] Ibid. p. 556.

[225] Ibid. pp. 555, 556.

[226] Original Sin, IV. iii.; Works, vol. ii., p. 555, note.

[227] Ibid. p. 557.

[228] Ibid. p. 554.

§ 13. Original Sin.

The effects of Adam's sin upon his posterity are declared in our standards to be, (1.) The guilt of his first sin. (2.) The loss of original righteousness. (3.) The corruption of our whole nature, which (i.e., which corruption), is commonly called original sin. Commonly,

but not always. Not unfrequently by original sin is meant all the subjective evil consequences of the apostasy of our first parent, and it therefore includes all three of the particulars just mentioned. The National Synod of France, therefore, condemned the doctrine of Plac&#65533;us, because he made original sin to consist of inherent, hereditary depravity, to the exclusion of the guilt of Adam's first sin.

This inherent corruption in which all men since the fall are born, is properly called original sin, (1.) Because it is truly of the nature of sin. (2.) Because it flows from our first parents as the origin of our race. (3.) Because it is the origin of all other sins; and (4.) Because it is in its nature distinguished from actual sins.

The Nature of Original Sin.

As to the nature of this hereditary corruption, although the faith of the Church Catholic, at least of the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches, has been, in all that is essential, uniform, yet diversity of opinion has prevailed among theologians. (1.) According to many of the Greek fathers, and in later times, of the extreme Remonstrants or Arminians, it is a physical, rather than a moral evil. Adam's physical condition was deteriorated by his apostasy, and that deteriorated natural constitution has descended to his posterity. (2.) According to others, concupiscence, or native corruption, is such an ascendency of man's sensuous, or animal nature over his higher attributes of reason and conscience, as involves a great proneness to sin, but is not itself sinful. Some of the Romish theologians distinctly avow this doctrine, and some Protestants, as we have seen, maintain that this is the symbolical doctrine of the Roman Church itself. The same view has been advocated by some divines of our own age and country. (3.) Others hold a doctrine nearly allied to that just mentioned. They speak of inherent depravity; and admit that it is of the nature of a moral corruption, but nevertheless deny that it brings guilt upon the soul, until it is exercised, assented to, and cherished. (4.) The doctrine of the Reformed and Lutheran churches upon this subject is thus presented in their authorized Confessions: --

The "Augsburg Confession." [229] "Docent quod post lapsum Ad&#65533; omnes homines, secundum naturam propagati, nascantur cum peccato, hoc est, sine metu Dei, sine fiducia erga Deum, et cum concupiscentia."

"Articuli Smalcaldici." [230] "Peccatum h&#65533;reditarium tam profunda et tetra est corruptio natur&#65533;, ut nullius hominis ratione intelligi possit, sed ex Scriptur&#65533; patefactione agnoscenda, et credenda sit."

"Formula Corcordi&#65533;." [231] "Credendum est . . . . quod sit per omnia totalis carentia, defectus seu privatio concreat&#65533; in Paradiso justiti&#65533; originalis seu imaginis Dei, ad quam homo initio in veritate, sanctitate atque justitia creatus fuerat, et quod simul etiam sit impotentia et inaptitudo, adunamia et stupiditas, qua homo ad omnia divina seu spiritualia sit prorsus ineptus. . . . . Pr&#65533;terea, quod peccatum originale in humana natura non tantummodo sit ejusmodi totalis carentia, seu defectus omnium bonorum in rebus spiritualibus ad Deum pertinentibus: sed quod sit etiam, loco imaginis Dei amiss&#65533; in homine, intima, pessima, profundissima (instar cujusdam abyssi), inscrutabilis et ineffabilis corruptio totius natur&#65533; et omnium virium, imprimis vero superiorum et principalium anim&#65533; facultatum, in mente, intellectu, corde et voluntate."

"Constat Christianos non tantum actualia delicta . . . peccata esse agnoscere et definire debere, sed etiam . . . h&#65533;reditarium morbum . . . imprimis pro horribili peccato, et quidem

pro principio et capite omnium peccatorum (e quo reliqu&#65533; transgressiones, tanquam e radice nascantur . . .) omnino habendum esse." [232]

"Confessio Helvetica II." [233] "Qualis (homo Adam) factus est a lapsu, tales sunt omnes, qui ex ipso prognati sunt, peccato inquam, morti, variisque obnoxii calamitatibus. Peccatum autem intelligimus esse nativam illam hominis corruptionem ex primis illis nostris parentibus in nos omnes derivatam vel propagatam, qua concupiscentiis pravis immersi et a bono aversi, ad omne vero malum propensi, pleni omni nequitia, diffidentia, contemptu et odio Dei, nihil boni ex nobis ipsis facere, imo ne cogitare quidem possumus."

"Confessio Gallicana." [234] "Credimus hoc vitium (ex propagatione manans) esse vere peccatum."

"Articuli XXXIX." [235] "Peccatum originis . . . est vitium et depravatio natur&#65533; cujuslibet hominis ex Adamo naturaliter propagati, qua fit ut ab originali justitia quam longissime distet; ad malum sua natura propendeat et caro semper adversus spiritum concupiscat, unde in unoquoque nascentium iram Dei atque damnationem meretur."

"Confessio Belgica." [236] "Peccatum originis est corruptio totius natur&#65533; et vitium h&#65533;reditarium, quo et ipsi infantes in matris utero polluti sunt: quodque veluti noxia qu&#65533;dam radix genus omne peccatorum in homine producit, estque tam foedum atque execrabile coram Deo, ut ad universi generis humani condemnationem sufficiat."

"Catechesis Heidelbergensis." (Pravitas human&#65533; natur&#65533; existit) "ex lapsu et inobedientia primorum parentum Adami et Ev&#65533;. Hinc natura nostra ita est depravata, ut omnes in peccatis concipiamur et nascamur." [237]

By nature in these Confessions it is expressly taught, we are not to understand essence or substance (as was held by Matthias Flacius, and by him only at the time of the Reformation). On this point the Form of Concord says: That although original sin corrupts our whole nature, yet the essence or substance of the soul is one thing, and original sin is another. "Discrimen igitur retinendum est inter naturam nostram, qualis a Deo creata est, hodieque conservatur, in qua peccatum originale habitat, et inter ipsum peccatum originis, quod in natura habitat. H&#65533;c enim duo secundum sacr&#65533; Scriptur&#65533; regulam distincte considerari, doceri et credi debent et possunt." [238]

"The Westminster Confession." [239] "By this sin they (our first parents) fell from their original righteousness and communion with God, and so became dead in sin, and wholly defiled in all the faculties and parts of soul and body. They being the root of all mankind, the guilt of this sin was imputed, and the same death in sin and corrupted nature conveyed to all their posterity, descending from them by ordinary generation. From this original corruption, whereby we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil, do proceed all actual transgressions. This corruption of nature, during this life, doth remain in those that are regenerated; and although it be through Christ pardoned and mortified, yet both itself, and all the motions thereof, are truly and properly sin."

Statement of the Protestant Doctrine.

From the above statements it appears that, according to the doctrine of the Protestant churches, original sin, or corruption of nature derived front Adam, is not, (1.) A corruption of the substance or essence of the soul. (2.) Neither is it an essential element infused into

the soul as poison is mixed with wine. The Forum of Concord, for example, denies that the evil dispositions of our fallen nature are "conditiones, seu concreat[illegible] essentiales natur[illegible] proprietates." Original sin is declared to be an "accidens, i.e., quod non per se subsistit, sed in aliqua substantia est, et ab ea discerni potest." The affirmative statements on this subject are (1.) That this corruption of nature affects the whole soul. (2.) That it consists in the loss or absence of original righteousness, and consequent entire moral depravity of our nature, including or manifesting itself in an aversion from all spiritual good, or from God, and an inclination to all evil. (3.) That it is truly and properly of the nature of sin, involving both guilt and pollution. (4.) That it retains its character as sin even in the regenerated. (5.) That it renders the soul spiritually dead, so that the natural, or unrenewed man, is entirely unable of himself to do anything good in the sight of God.

This doctrine therefore stands opposed, --

1. To that which teaches that the race of man is uninjured by the fall of Adam.

2. To that which teaches that the evils consequent on the fall are merely physical.

3. To the doctrine which makes original sin entirely negative, consisting in the want of original righteousness.

4. To the doctrine which admits a hereditary depravity of nature, and makes it consist in an inclination to sin, but denies that it is itself sinful. Some of the orthodox theologians made a distinction between vitium and peccatum. The latter term they wished to confine to actual sin, while the former was used to designate indwelling and hereditary sinfulness. There are serious objections to this distinction: first, that vitium, as thus understood, is really sin; it includes both guilt and pollution, and is so defined by Vitringa and others who make the distinction. Secondly, it is opposed to established theological usage. Depravity, or inherent hereditary corruption, has always been designated peccatum, and therefore to say that it is not peccatum, but merely vitium, produces confusion and leads to error. Thirdly, it is contrary to Scripture for the Bible undeniably designates indwelling or hereditary corruption, or vitium, as hamartia. This is acknowledged by Romanists who deny that such concupiscence after regeneration is of the nature of sin. [240]

5. The fifth form of doctrine to which the Protestant faith stands opposed, is that which admits a moral deterioration of our nature, which deserves the displeasure of God, and which is therefore truly sin, and yet denies that the evil is so great as to amount to spiritual death, and to involve the entire inability of the natural man to what is spiritually good.

6. And the doctrine of the Protestant churches is opposed to the teachings of those who deny that original sin affects the whole man, and assert that it has its seat exclusively in the affections or the heart, while the understanding and reason are uninjured or uninfluenced.

In order to sustain the Augustinian (or Protestant) doctrine of original sin, therefore, three points are to be established:I. That all mankind descending from Adam by ordinary generation are born destitute of original righteousness, and the subjects of a corruption of nature which is truly and properly sin.II. That this original corruption affects the whole man; not the body only to the exclusion of the soul; not the lower faculties of the soul to the exclusion of the higher; and not the heart to the exclusion of the intellectual powers.III. That it is of such a nature as that before regeneration fallen men are "utterly indisposed, disabled, and opposed to all good."

Proof of the Doctrine of Original Sin.

First Argument from the Universality of Sin.

The first argument in proof of this doctrine is drawn from the universal sinfulness of men. All men are sinners. This is undeniably the doctrine of the Scriptures. It is asserted, assumed, and proved. The assertions of this fact are too numerous to be quoted. In 1 Kings viii. 46, it is said, "There is no man that sinneth not." Eccl. vii. 20, "There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not." Is. liii. 6, "All we like sheep have gone astray; we have turned every one to his own way." lxiv. 6, "We are all as an unclean thing, and all our righteousnesses are as filthy rags." Ps. cxxx. 3, "If thou, Lord, shouldest mark iniquities, O Lord, who shall stand?" Ps. cxliii. 2, "In thy sight shall no man living be justified." Rom. iii. 19, "The whole world (pas ho kosmos) is guilty before God." Verses 22, 23, "There is no difference: for all have sinned and come short of the glory of God." Gal. iii. 22, "The Scripture hath concluded all under sin;" i.e., hath declared all men to be under the power and condemnation of sin. James iii. 2, "In many things we offend all." 1 John i. 8, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." Verse 10, "If we say that we have not sinned, we make him a liar, and his word is not in us. 1 John v. 19, "The whole world lieth in wickedness." Such are only a few of the assertions of the universal sinfulness of men with which the Scriptures abound.

But in the second place, this melancholy fact is constantly assumed in the Word of God. The Bible everywhere addresses men as sinners. The religion which it reveals is a religion for sinners. All the institutions of the Old Testament, and all the doctrines of the New, take it for granted that men universally are under the power and condemnation of sin. "The world," as used in Scripture, designates the mass of mankind, as distinguished from the church, or the regenerated people of God, and always involves in its application the idea of sin. The world hateth you. I am not of the world. I have chosen you out of the world. All the exhortations of the Scriptures addressed to men indiscriminately, calling them to repentance, of necessity assume the universality of sin. The same is true of the general threatenings and promises of the Word of God. In short, if all men are not sinners, the Bible is not adapted to their real character and state.

But the Scriptures not only directly assert and everywhere assume the universality of sin among men, but this is a point which perhaps more than any other is made the subject of a formal and protracted argument. The Apostle, especially in his Epistle to the Romans, begins with a regular process of proof, that all, whether Jews or Gentiles, are under sin. Until this fact is admitted and acknowledged, there is no place for and no need of the Gospel, which is God's method of saving sinners. Paul therefore begins by asserting God's purpose to punish all sin. He then shows that the Gentiles are universally chargeable with the sin of impiety; that although knowing God, they neither worship him as God, nor are thankful. The natural, judicial, and therefore the unavoidable consequence of impiety, according to the Apostle's doctrine, is immorality. Those who abandon Him, God gives up to the unrestrained dominion of evil. The whole Gentile world therefore was sunk in sin. With the Jews, he tells us, the case was no better. They had more correct knowledge of God and of his law, and many institutions of divine appointment, so that their advantages were great every way. Nevertheless they were as truly and as universally sinful as the Gentiles. Their own Scriptures, which of course were addressed to them, expressly declare, There is

none righteous, no not one. There is none that understandeth, there is none that seeketh after God. They are all gone out of the way, they are together become unprofitable; there is none that doeth good, no not one. Therefore, he concludes, The whole world is guilty before God. Jews and Gentiles are all under sin. Therefore by the deeds of the law shall no flesh be justified. This is the foundation of the Apostle's whole doctrinal system, and of the religion of the Bible. Jesus Christ came to save his people from their sins. If men are not sinners Christ is not the Salvator Hominum.

What the Scriptures so clearly teach is taught no less clearly by experience and history. Every man knows that he himself is a sinner. He knows that every human being whom he ever saw, is in the same state of apostasy from God. History contains the record of no sinless man, save the Man Christ Jesus, who, by being sinless, is distinguished from all other men. We have no account of any family, tribe, or nation free from the contamination of sin. The universality of sin among men is therefore one of the most undeniable doctrines of Scripture, and one of the most certain facts of experience.

Second Argument from the Entire Sinfulness of Men.

This universal depravity of men is no slight evil. The whole human race, by their apostasy from God, are totally depraved. By total depravity, is not meant that all men are equally wicked; nor that any man is as thoroughly corrupt as it is possible for a man to be; nor that men are destitute of all moral virtues. The Scriptures recognize the fact, which experience abundantly confirms, that men, to a greater or less degree, are honest in dealings, kind in their feelings, and beneficent in their conduct. Even the heathen, the Apostle teaches us, do by nature the things of the law. They are more or less under the dominion of conscience, which approves or disapproves their moral conduct. All this is perfectly consistent with the Scriptural doctrine of total depravity, which includes the entire absence of holiness; the want of due apprehensions of the divine perfections, and of our relation to God as our Creator, Preserver, Benefactor, Governor, and Redeemer. There is common to all men a total alienation of the soul from God so that no unrenewed man either understands or seeks after God; no such man ever makes God his portion, or God's glory the end of his being. The apostasy from God is total or complete. All men worship and serve the creature rather than, and more than the Creator. They are all therefore declared in Scripture to be spiritually dead. They are destitute of any principle of spiritual life. The dreadful extent and depth of this corruption of our nature are proved, --

1. By its fruits; by the fearful prevalence of the sins of the flesh, of sins of violence, of the sins of the heart, as pride, envy, and malice; of the sins of the tongue, as slander and deceit; of the sins of irreligion, of ingratitude, profanity, and blasphemy; which have marked the whole history of our race, and which still distinguish the state of the whole world.

2. By the consideration that the claims of God on our supreme reverence, love, and obedience, which are habitually and universally disregarded by unrenewed men, are infinitely great. That is, they are so great that they cannot be imagined to be greater. These claims are not only ignored in times of excitement and passion, but habitually and constantly. Men live without God. They are, says the Apostle, Atheists. This alienation from God is so great and so universal, that the Scriptures say that men are the enemies of God; that the carnal mind, i.e., that state of mind which belongs to all men in their natural

state, is enmity against God. This is proved not only by neglect and disobedience, but also by direct rebellion against his authority, when in his providence he takes away our idols; or when his law, with its inexorable demands and its fearful penalty, is sent home upon the conscience, and God is seen to be a consuming fire.

3. A third proof of the dreadful evil of this hereditary corruption is seen in the universal rejection of Christ by those whom He came to save. He is in himself the chief among ten thousand, and altogether lovely; uniting in his own person all the perfections of the Godhead, and all the excellences of humanity. His mission was one of love, of a love utterly incomprehensible, unmerited, immutable, and infinite. Through love He not only humbled himself to be born of a woman, and to be made under the law, but to live a life of poverty, sorrow, and persecution; to endure inconceivably great sufferings for our sakes, and finally to bear our sins in his own body on the tree. He has rendered it possible for God to be just and yet justify the ungodly. He therefore offers blessings of infinite value, without money and without price, to all who will accept them. He has secured, and offers to us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption; to make us kings and priests unto God, and to exalt us to an unending state of inconceivable glory and blessedness. Notwithstanding all this; notwithstanding the divine excellence of his person, the greatness of his love, the depth of his sufferings, and the value of the blessings which He has provided, and without which we must perish eternally, men universally, when left to themselves, reject Him. He came to his own and his own received Him not. The world hated, and still hates Him; will not recognize Him as their God and Saviour; will not accept of his offers; will neither love nor serve Him. The conduct of men towards Christ is the clearest proof of the apostasy of our race, and of the depth of the depravity into which they are sunk; and, so far as the hearers of the gospel are concerned, is the great ground of their condemnation. All other grounds seem merged into this, for our Lord says, that men are condemned because they do not believe in the only begotten Son of God. And the Holy Spirit, by the mouth of the Apostle, says, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ let him be anathema maranatha;" a sentence which will be ratified in the day of judgment by every rational creature, fallen and unfallen, in the universe.

The Sinfulness of Men Incorrigible.

4. Another proof of the point under consideration is found in the incorrigible nature of original sin. It is, so far as we are concerned, an incurable malady. Men are not so besotted even by the fall as to lose their moral nature. They know that sin is an evil, and that it exposes them to the righteous judgment of God. From the beginning of the world, therefore, they have tried not only to expiate, but also to destroy it. They have resorted to all means possible to them for this purpose. They have tried the resources of philosophy and of moral culture. They have withdrawn from the contaminating society of their fellow-men. They have summoned all the energies of their nature, and all the powers of their will. They have subjected themselves to the most painful acts of self-denial, to ascetic observances in all their forms. The only result of these efforts has been that these anchorites have become like whitened sepulchres, which appear outwardly beautiful, while within they are filled with dead men's bones and all uncleanness. Men have been slow to learn what our Lord teaches, that it is impossible to make the fruit good until the tree is good. And evil, however, which is so indestructible must be very great.

Argument from the Experience of God's People.

5. We may appeal on this subject to the experience of God's people in every age and in every part of the world. In no one respect has that experience been more uniform, than in the conviction of their depravity in the sight of an infinitely Holy God. The patriarch Job, represented as the best man of his generation, placed his hand upon his mouth, and his mouth in the dust before God, and declared that he abhorred himself, and repented in dust and ashes. David's Penitential Psalms are filled not only with the confessions of sin, but also with the avowals of his deep depravity in the sight of God. Isaiah cried out, Woe is me! I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell among a people of unclean lips. The ancient prophets, even when sanctified from the womb, pronounced their own righteousnesses as filthy rags. What is said of the body politic is everywhere represented as true of the individual man. The whole head is sick, and the whole heart faint. From the sole of the foot, even unto the head, there is no soundness in it; but wounds, and bruises, and putrefying sores. In the New Testament the sacred writers evince the same deep sense of their own sinfulness, and strong conviction of the sinfulness of the race to which they belong. Paul speaks of himself as the chief of sinners. He complains that he was carnal, sold under sin. He groans under the burden of an evil nature, saying, O, wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death? From the days of the Apostles to the present time, there has been no diversity as to this point in the experience of Christians. There is no disposition ever evinced by them to palliate or excuse their sinfulness before God. They uniformly and everywhere, and just in proportion to their holiness, humble themselves under a sense of their guilt and pollution, and abhor themselves repenting in dust and ashes. This is not an irrational, nor is it an exaggerated experience. It is the natural effect of the apprehension of the truth; of even a partial discernment of the holiness of God, of the spirituality of the law, and of the want of conformity to that divine standard. There is always connected with this experience of sin, the conviction that our sense of its evil and its power over us, and consequently of our guilt and pollution, is altogether inadequate. It is always a part of the believer's burden, that he feels less than his reason and conscience enlightened by the Scriptures, teach him he ought to feel of his moral corruption and degradation.

6. It need scarcely be added, that what the Scriptures so manifestly teach indirectly of the depth of the corruption of our fallen nature, they teach also by direct assertion. The human heart is pronounced deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked. Even in the beginning (Gen. vi. 5, 6), it was said, "God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of the thoughts of his heart was only evil continually." Job xv. 14-16, "What is man, that he should be clean? And he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous? Behold, he putteth no trust in his saints; yea, the heavens are not clean in his sight. How much more abominable and filthy is man, which drinketh iniquity like water." Eccl. ix. 3, "The heart of the sons of men is full of evil, and madness is in their heart while they live, and after that they go to the dead." With such passages the Word of God is filled. It in the most explicit terms pronounces the degradation and moral corruption of man consequent on the fall, to be a total apostasy from God; a state of spiritual death, as implying the entire absence of any true holiness.

Third Argument from the early Manifestation of Sin.

A third great fact of Scripture and experience on this subject is the early manifestation of sin. As soon as a child is capable of moral action, it gives evidence of a perverted moral character. We not only see the manifestations of anger, malice, selfishness, envy, pride, and other evil dispositions, but the whole development of the soul is toward the world. The soul of a child turns by an inward law from God to the creature, from the things that are unseen and eternal to the things that are seen and temporal. It is in its earliest manifestations, worldly, of the earth, earthy. As this is the testimony of universal experience, so also it is the doctrine of the Bible. Job xi. 12, "Man" is "born like a wild ass's colt." Ps. lviii. 3, "The wicked are estranged from the womb; they go astray as soon as they be born, speaking lies." Prov. xxii. 15, "Foolishness (moral evil) is bound in the heart of a child."

These three undeniable facts, the universality of sin among men, its controlling power, and its early manifestation, are clear proof of the corruption of our common nature. It is a principle of judgment universally recognized and acted upon, that a course of action in any creature, rational or irrational, which is universal and controlling, and which is adopted uniformly from the beginning of its being, determines and reveals its nature. That all individuals of certain species of animals live on prey; that all the individuals of another species live on herbs; that some are amphibious, and others live only on the land; some are gregarious, others solitary; some mild and docile, others ferocious and untamable; not under certain circumstances and conditions, but always and everywhere, under all the different circumstances of their being, is regarded as proof of their natural constitution. It shows what they are by nature, as distinguished from what they are, or may be made by external circumstances and culture. The same principle is applied to our judgments of men. Whatever is variable and limited in its manifestations; whatever is found in some men and not in others, we attribute to peculiar and limited causes, but what is universal and controlling is uniformly referred to the nature of man. Some of these universally manifested modes of action among men are referrible to the essential attributes of their nature, as reason and conscience. The fact that all men perform rational actions is a clear proof that they are rational creatures; and the fact that they perform moral actions is proof that they have a moral nature. Other universal modes of action are referred not to the essential attributes of human nature, but to its present abiding state. That all men seek ease and self-indulgence and prefer themselves to others, is not to be attributed to our nature as men, but to our present state. As the fact that all men perform moral actions is proof that they have a moral nature, so the fact that such moral action is always evil, or that all men sin from the earliest development of their powers, is a proof that their moral nature is depraved. It is utterly inconsistent with all just ideas of God that He created man with a nature which with absolute uniformity leads him to sin and destruction; or that He placed him in circumstances which inevitably secure his ruin. The present state of human nature cannot therefore be its normal and original condition. We are a fallen race. Our nature has become corrupted by our apostasy from God, and therefore every imagination (i.e., every exercise) of the thoughts of man's heart is only evil continually. See also Gen. viii. 21. This is the Scriptural and the only rational solution of the undeniable fact of the deep, universal, and early manifested sinfulness of men in all ages, of every class, and in every part of the world.

Evasions of the Foregoing Arguments.

The methods adopted by those who deny the doctrine of original sin, to account for the universality of sin, are in the highest degree unsatisfactory.

1. It is not necessary here to refer to the theories which get over this great difficulty either by denying the existence of sin, or by extenuating its evil nature, so that the difficulty ceases to exist. If there be really no such evil as sin, there is no sin to account for. But the fact of the existence of sin, of its universality and of its power, is too palpable and too much a matter of consciousness to admit of being denied or ignored.

2. Others contend that we have in the free agency of man a sufficient solution of the universality of sin. Men can sin; they choose to sin, and no further reason for the fact need be demanded. If Adam sinned without an antecedent corrupt nature, why, it is asked, must corruption of nature be assumed to account for the fact that other men sin? A uniform effect, however, demands a uniform cause. That a man can walk is no adequate reason why he always walks in one direction. A man may exercise his faculties to attain one object or another; the fact that he does devote them through a long life to the acquisition of wealth is not accounted for by saying that he is a free agent. The question is, Why his free agency is always exercised in one particular direction. The fact, therefore, that men are free agents is no solution for the universal sinfulness and total apostasy of our race from God.

3. Others seek in the order of development of the constituent elements of our nature, an explanation of the fact in question. We are so constituted that the sensuous faculties are called into exercise before the higher powers of reason and conscience. The former therefore attain an undue ascendency, and lead the child and the man to obey the lower instincts of his nature, when he should be guided by his higher faculties. But, in the first place, this is altogether an inadequate conception of our hereditary depravity. It does not consist exclusively or principally in the ascendency of the flesh (in the limited sense of that word) over the Spirit. It is a far deeper and more radical evil. It is spiritual death, according to the express declarations of the Scriptures. And, in the second place, it cannot be the normal condition of man that his natural faculties should develop in such order as inevitably and universally to lead to his moral degradation and ruin. And, in the third place, this theory relieves no difficulties while it accounts for no facts. It is as hard to reconcile with the justice and goodness of God that men should be born with a nature so constituted as certainly to lead them to sin, as that they should be born in a state of sin. It denies any fair probation to the race. According to the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, mankind had not only a fair but a favourable probation in Adam, who stood for them in the maturity and full perfection of his nature; and with every facility, motive and consideration adapted to secure his fidelity. This is far easier of belief than the assumption that God places the child in the first dawn of reason on its probation for eternity, with a nature already perverted, and under circumstances which in every case infallibly lead to its destruction. The only solution therefore which at all meets the case is the Scriptural doctrine that all mankind fell in Adam's first transgression, and bearing the penalty of his sin, they come into the world in a state of spiritual death, the evidence of which is seen and felt in the universality, the controlling power, and the early manifestation of sin.

The Scriptures expressly Teach the Doctrine.

The Scriptures not only indirectly teach the doctrine of original sin, or of the hereditary, sinful corruption of our nature as derived from Adam, by teaching, as we have

seen, the universal and total depravity of our race, but they directly assert the doctrine. They not only teach expressly that men sin universally and from the first dawn of their being, but they also assert that the heart of man is evil. It is declared to be "Deceitful above all things, and desperately wicked: Who can know it?" (Jer. xvii. 9.) "The heart of the sons of men is fully set in them to do evil." (Eccl. viii. 11.) Every imagination of the thoughts of his (man's) heart is only evil." (Gen. vi. 5); or as it is in Gen. viii. 21, "The imagination of man's heart is evil from his youth." By heart in Scriptural language is meant the man himself; the soul; that which is the seat and source of life. It is that which thinks, feels, desires, and wills. It is that out of which good or evil thoughts, desires, and purposes proceed. It never signifies a mere act, or a transient state of the soul. It is that which is abiding, which determines character. It bears the same relation to acts that the soil does to its productions. As a good soil brings forth herbs suited for man and beast, and an evil soil brings forth briars and thorns, so we are told that the human heart (human nature in its present state), is proved to be evil by the prolific crop of sins which it everywhere and always produces. Still more distinctly is this doctrine taught in Matt. vii. 16-19, where our Lord says that men are known by their fruits. "Do men gather grapes or thorns, or figs of thistles? Even so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit; but a corrupt tree bringeth forth evil fruit. A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, neither can a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit." And again, in Matt. xii. 33, "Either make the tree good and his fruit good, or else make the tree corrupt and his fruit corrupt: for the tree is known by his fruit." The very pith and point of these instructions is, that moral acts are a revelation of moral character. They do not constitute it, but simply manifest what it is. The fruit of a tree reveals the nature of the tree. It does not make that nature, but simply proves what it is. So in the case of man, his moral exercises, his thoughts and feelings, as well as his external acts, are determined by an internal cause. There is something in the nature of the man distinct from his acts and anterior to them, which determines his conduct (i.e., all his conscious exercises), to be either good or evil. If men are universally sinful, it is, according to our Lord's doctrine, proof positive that their nature is evil; as much so as corrupt fruit proves the tree to be corrupt. When therefore the Scriptures assert that the heart of man is "desperately wicked," they assert precisely what the Church means when she asserts our nature to be depraved. Neither the word, heart, nor nature, in such connections means substance or essence, but natural disposition. The words express a quality as distinguished from an essential attribute or property. Even when we speak of the nature of a tree, we do not mean its essence, but its quality; something which can be modified or changed without a change of substance. Thus our Lord speaks of making a tree good, or making it evil. The explanation of the Scriptural meaning of the word heart given above is confirmed by analogous and synonymous forums of expression used in the Bible. What is sometimes designated as an evil heart is called "the old man," "a law of sin in our members," "the flesh," "the carnal mind," etc. And on the other hand, what is called "a new heart," is called "the new man," "a new creature" (or nature), "the law of the Spirit," "the spiritual mind," etc. All these terms and phrases designate what is inherent, immanent, and abiding, as opposed to what is transient and voluntary. The former class of terms is used to describe the nature of man before it is regenerated, and the other to describe the change consequent on regeneration. The Scriptures, therefore, in declaring the heart of man to be deceitful and desperately wicked, and its imaginations or exercises to be only evil continually, assert in direct terms the

Church doctrine of original sin.

The Psalmist also directly asserts this doctrine when he says (Ps. li. 5), "Behold I was shapen in iniquity, and in sin did my mother conceive me." In the preceding verses he had confessed his actual sins; and he here humbles himself still more completely before God by acknowledging his innate, hereditary depravity; a depravity which he did not regard as a mere weakness, or inclination to evil, but which he pronounces iniquity and sin. To this inherent, hereditary corruption he refers in the subsequent parts of the Psalm as his chief burden from which he most earnestly desired to be delivered. "Behold, thou desirest truth in the inward parts; and in the hidden part shalt thou make me to know wisdom. Purge me with hyssop, and I shall be clean; wash me, and I shall be whiter than snow. . . . . Create in me a clean heart, O God, and renew a right spirit within me." It was his inward parts, his interior nature, which had been shapen in iniquity and conceived in sin, which he prayed might be purified and renewed. The whole spirit of this Psalm and the connection in which the words of the fifth verse occur, have constrained the great majority of commentators and readers of the Scripture to recognize in this passage a direct affirmation of the doctrine of original sin. Of course no doctrine rests on any one isolated passage. What is taught in one place is sure to be assumed or asserted in other places. What David says of himself as born in sin is confirmed by other representations of Scripture, which show that what was true of him is no less true of all mankind. Thus (Job xiv. 4), "Who can bring a clean thing out of an unclean." (xv. 14), "What is man that he should be clean? and he which is born of a woman, that he should be righteous?" Thus also our Lord says (John iii. 6), "That which is born of the flesh is flesh." This clearly means that, That which is born of corrupt parents is itself corrupt; and is corrupt in virtue of its descent or derivation. This is plain, (1.) From the common usage of the word flesh in a religious sense in the Scriptures. Besides the primary and secondary meanings of the word it is familiarly used in the Bible to designate our fallen and corrupt nature. Hence to be "in the flesh" is to be in a natural, unrenewed state; the works of the flesh, are works springing from a corrupt nature; to walk after the flesh, is to live under the controlling influence of a sinful nature. Hence to be carnal, or carnally minded, is to be corrupt, or, as Paul explains it, sold under, a slave to sin. (2.) Because the flesh is here opposed to the Spirit. "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." As the latter member of this verse undoubtedly means that, That which is derived from the Holy Spirit is holy, or conformed to the nature of the Holy Spirit; the former member must mean that, That which is derived from an evil source is itself evil. A child born of fallen parents derives from them a fallen, corrupt nature. (3.) This interpretation is demanded by the context. Our Lord is assigning the reason for the necessity of regeneration or spiritual birth. That reason is, the derivation of a corrupt nature by our natural birth. It is because we are born in sin that the renewing of the Holy Ghost is universally and absolutely necessary to our salvation.

Another passage equally decisive is Eph. ii. 3: "We also" (i.e., we Jews as well as the Gentiles) "were by nature the children of wrath, even as others." Children of wrath, according to a familiar Hebrew idiom, means the objects of wrath. We, says the Apostle, as well as other men, are the objects of the divine wrath. That is, under condemnation, justly exposed to his displeasure. This exposure to the wrath of God, as He teaches, is not due exclusively to our sinful conduct, it is the condition in which we were born. We are by nature the children of wrath. The word nature in such forms of speech always stands

opposed to what is acquired, or superinduced, or to what is due to ab extra influence or inward development. Paul says that he and Peter were by nature Jews, i.e., they were Jews by birth, not by proselytism. He says the Gentiles do by nature the things of the law; i.e., in virtue of their internal constitution, not by external instruction. The gods of the heathen, he says, are by nature no gods. They are such only in the opinions of men. In classic literature as in ordinary language, to say that men are by nature proud, or cruel, or just, always means that the predicate is due to them in virtue of their natural constitution or condition, and not simply on account of their conduct or acquired character. The dative phusei in this passage does not mean on account of, because phusis means simply nature, whether good or bad. Paul does not say directly that it is "on account of our (corrupt) nature we are the children of wrath," which interpretation requires the idea expressed by the word corrupt to be introduced into the text. He simply asserts that we are the children of wrath by nature; that is, as we were born. We are born in a state of sin and condemnation. And this is the Church doctrine of original sin. Our natural condition is not merely a condition of physical weakness, or of proneness to sin, or of subjection to evil dispositions, which, if cherished, become sinful; but we are born in a state of sin. Rueckert, a rationalistic commentator, says in reference to this passage: [241] "It is perfectly evident, from Rom. v. 12-20, that Paul was far from being opposed to the view expressed in Ps. li. 7, that men are born sinners; and as we interpret for no system, so we will not attempt to deny that the thought, We were born children of wrath,' i.e.. such as we were from our birth we were exposed to the divine wrath, is the true sense of these words."

The Bible Represents Men as Spiritually Dead.

Another way in which the Scriptures clearly teach the doctrine of original sin is to be found in the passages in which they describe the natural state of man since the fall. Men, all men, men of every nation, of every age, and of every condition, are represented as spiritually dead. The natural man, man as he is by nature, is destitute of the life of God, i.e., of spiritual life. His understanding is darkness, so that he does not know or receive the things of God. He is not susceptible of impression from the realities of the spiritual world. He is as insensible to them as a dead man to the things of this world. He is alienated from God, and utterly unable to deliver himself from this state of corruption and misery. Those, and those only, are represented as delivered from this state in which men are born, who are renewed by the Holy Ghost; who are quickened, or made alive by the power of God, and who are therefore called spiritual as governed and actuated by a higher principle than any which belongs to our fallen nature. "The natural man," says the Apostle (that is, man as he is by nature), "receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them; because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) "You hath he quickened who were dead in trespasses and sins;" and not only you Gentiles, but "even us," when dead in sins, hath God "quickened together with Christ." (Eph. ii. 1, 5.) The state of all men, Jews and Gentiles, prior to regeneration, is declared to be a state of spiritual death. In Eph. iv. 17, 18, this natural state of man is described by saying of the heathen that they "walk in the vanity of their mind (i.e., in sin), having the understanding darkened, being alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their heart." Man's natural state is one of darkness, of which the proximate effect is ignorance and obduracy, and consequent alienation from God. It is true this is said of the heathen, but the Apostle constantly teaches that what is true of the heathen

is no less true of the Jews; for there is no difference, since all have sinned and come short of the glory of God. With these few passages the whole tenour of the word of God agrees. Human nature in its present state is always and everywhere described as thus darkened and corrupted.

Argument from the Necessity of Redemption.

Another argument in support of the doctrine of original sin is that the Bible everywhere teaches that all men need redemption through the blood of Christ. The Scriptures know nothing of the salvation of any of the human family otherwise than through the redemption which is in Christ Jesus. This is so plainly the doctrine of the Bible that it never has been questioned in the Christian Church. Infants need redemption as well as adults, for they also are included in the covenant of grace. But redemption, in the Christian sense of the term, is deliverance through the blood of Christ, from the power and consequences of sin. Christ came to save sinners. He saves none but sinners. If He saves infants, infants must be in a state of sin. There is no possibility of avoiding this conclusion, except by denying one or the other of the premises from which it is drawn. We must either deny that infants are saved through Christ, which is such a thoroughly anti-Christian sentiment, that it has scarcely ever been avowed within the pale of the Church; or we must deny that redemption, in the Christian sense of the term, includes deliverance from sin. This is the ground taken by those who deny the doctrine of original sin, and yet admit that infants are saved through Christ. They hold that in their case redemption is merely preservation from sin. For Christ's sake, or through his intervention, they are transferred to a state of being in which their nature develops in holiness. In answer to this evasion it is enough to remark, (1.) That it is contrary to the plain and universally received doctrine of the Bible as to the nature of the work of Christ. (2.) That this view supersedes the necessity of redemption at all. The Bible, however, clearly teaches that the death of Christ is absolutely necessary; that if there had been any other way in which men could be saved Christ is dead in vain. (Gal. ii. 21; iii. 21.) But, according to the doctrine in question, there is no necessity for his death. If men are an unfallen, uncorrupted race, and if they can be preserved from sin by a mere change of their circumstances, why should there be the costly array of remedial means, the incarnation, the sufferings and death of the Eternal Son of God, for their salvation. It is perfectly plain that the whole Scriptural plan of redemption is founded in the apostasy of the whole human race from God. It assumed that men, all men, infants as well as adults, are in a state of sin and misery, from which none but a divine Saviour can deliver them.

Argument from the Necessity of Regeneration.

This is still further plain from what the Scriptures teach concerning the necessity of regeneration. By regeneration is meant both in Scripture and in the language of the Church, the renewing of the Holy Ghost; the change of heart or of nature effected by the power of the Spirit, by which the soul passes from a state of spiritual death into a state of spiritual life. It is that change from sin to holiness, which our Lord pronounces absolutely essential to salvation. Sinners only need regeneration. Infants need regeneration. Therefore infants are in a state of sin. The only point in this argument which requires to be proved, is that infants need regeneration in the sense above explained. This, however, hardly admits of doubt. (1.) It is proved by the language of the Scriptures which assert that all men must be born of the

Spirit, in order to enter the Kingdom of God. The expression used, is absolutely universal. It means every human being descended from Adam by ordinary generation. No exception of class, tribe, character, or age is made; and we are not authorized to make any such exception. But besides, as remarked above, the reason assigned for this necessity of the new birth, applies to infants as well as to adults. All who are born of the flesh, and because they are thus born, our Lord says, must be born again (2.) Infants always have been included with their parents in every revelation or enactment of the covenant of grace. The promise to our first parents of a Redeemer, concerned their children as well as themselves. The covenant with Abraham was not only with him, but also with his posterity, infant and adult. The covenant at Mount Sinai, which as Paul teaches, included the covenant of grace, was solemnly ratified with the people and with their "little ones." The Scriptures, therefore, always contemplate children from their birth as needing to be saved, and as interested in the plan of salvation which it is the great design of the Bible to reveal. (3.) This is still further evident from the fact that the sign and seal of the covenant of grace, circumcision under the Old dispensation, and baptism under the New, was applied to new-born infants. Circumcision was indeed a sign and seal of the national covenant between God and the Hebrews as a nation. That is, it was a seal of those promises made to Abraham, and afterwards through Moses, which related to the external theocracy or Commonwealth of Israel. But nevertheless, it is plain, that besides these national promises, there was also the promise of redemption made to Abraham, which promise, the Apostle expressly says, has come upon us. (Gal. iii. 14) That is, we (all believers) are included in the covenant made with Abraham. It is no less plain that circumcision was the sign and seal of that covenant. This is clear, because the Apostle teaches that Abraham received circumcision as a seal of the righteousness of faith. That is, it was the seal of that covenant which promised and secured righteousness on the condition of faith. It is also plain because the Scriptures teach that circumcision had a spiritual import. It signified inward purification. It was administered in order to teach men that those who received the rite, needed such purification, and that this great blessing was promised to those faithful to the covenant, of which circumcision was the seal. Hence, the Scriptures speak of the circumcision of the heart; of an inward circumcision effected by the Spirit as distinguished from that which was outward in the flesh. Compare Deut. x. 16; xxx. 6; Ezek. xliv. 7; Acts vii. 51; Rom. ii. 28. From all this it is clear that circumcision could not be administered according to its divinely constituted design to any who did not need the circumcision or regeneration of heart, to fit them for the presence and service of God. And as it was by divine command administered to infants when eight days old, the conclusion is inevitable that in the sight of God such infants need regeneration, and therefore are born in sin.

The same argument obviously applies to infant baptism. Baptism is an ordinance instituted by Christ, to signify and seal the purification of the soul, by the sprinkling of his blood, and its regeneration by the Holy Ghost. It can therefore be properly administered only to those who are in a state of guilt and pollution. It is, however, administered to infants, and therefore infants are assumed to need pardon and sanctification. This is the argument which Pelagius and his followers, more than all others, found it most difficult to answer. They could not deny the import of the rite. They could not deny that it was properly administered to infants, and yet they refused to admit the unavoidable conclusion, that infants are born in sin. They were therefore driven to the unnatural evasion, that baptism

was administered to infants, not on the ground of their present state, but on the assumption of their probable future condition. They were not sinners, but would probably become such, and thus need the benefits of which baptism is the sign and pledge. Even the Council of Trent found it necessary to protest against such a manifest perversion of a solemn sacrament, which reduced it to a mockery. The form of baptism as prescribed by Christ, and universally adopted by the Church, supposes that those to whom the sacrament is administered are sinners and need the remission of sin and the renewal of the Holy Ghost. Thus the doctrine of original sin is inwrought into the very texture of Christianity, and lies at the foundation of the institutions of the gospel.

Argument from the Universality of Death.

Another decisive argument on this subject, is drawn from the universality of death. Death, according to the Scriptures, is a penal evil. It presupposes sin. No rational moral creature is subject to death except on account of sin. Infants die, therefore infants are the subjects of sin. The only way to evade this argument is to deny that death is a penal evil. This is the ground taken by those who reject the doctrine of original sin. They assert that it is a natural evil, flowing from the original constitution of our nature, and that it is therefore no more a proof that all men are sinners, than the death of brutes is a proof that they are sinners. In answer to this objection, it is obvious to remark that men are not brutes. That irrational animals, incapable of sin, are subject to death, is therefore no evidence that moral creatures may be justly subject to the same evil, although free from sin. But, in the second place, what is of far more weight, the objection is in direct opposition to the declarations of the Word of God. According to the Bible, death in the case of man is a punishment. It was threatened against Adam as the penalty of transgression. If he had not sinned, neither had he died. The Apostle expressly declares that death is the wages (or punishment) of sin; and death is on account of sin. (Rom. vi. 23 and v. 12.) He not only asserts this as a fact, but assumes it as a principle, and makes it the foundation of his whole argument in Rom. v. 12-20. His doctrine as there stated is, where there is no law there is no sin. And where there is no sin there is no punishment. All men are punished, therefore all men are sinners. That all men are punished, he proves from the fact that all men die. Death is punishment. Death, he says, reigned from Adam to Moses. It reigns even over those who had not sinned in their own persons, by voluntary transgression, as Adam did. It reigns over infants. It has passed absolutely on all men because all are sinners. It cannot be questioned that such is the argument of the Apostle; neither can it be questioned that this argument is founded on the assumption that death, in the case of man, is a penal evil, and its infliction an undeniable proof of guilt. We must, therefore, either reject the authority of the Scriptures, or we must admit that the death of infants is a proof of their sinfulness.

Although the Apostle's argument as above stated is a direct proof of original sin (or inherent, hereditary corruption), it is no less a proof, as urged on another occasion, of the imputation of Adam's sin. Paul does argue, in Rom. v. 12-20, to prove that as in our justification the righteousness on the ground of which we are accepted is not subjectively ours, but the righteousness of another, even Christ; so the primary ground of our condemnation to death is the sin of Adam, something outside of ourselves, and not personally ours. But it is to be borne in mind that the death of which he speaks in accordance with the uniform usage of Scripture, in such connections, is the death of a man;

a death appropriate to his nature as a moral being formed in the image of God. The death threatened to Adam was not the mere dissolution of his body, but spiritual death, the loss of the life of God. The physical death of infants is a patent proof that they are subject to the penalty which came on men (which entered the world and passed on all men) on account of one man, or by one man's disobedience. And as that penalty was death spiritual as well as the dissolution of the body, the death of infants is a Scriptural and decisive proof of their being born destitute of original righteousness and infected with a sinful corruption of nature. Their physical death is proof that they are involved in the penalty the principal element of which is the spiritual death of the soul. It was by the disobedience of one man that all are constituted sinners, not only by imputation (which is true and most important), but also by inherent depravity; as it is by the obedience of one that all are constituted righteous, not only by imputation (which also is true and vitally important), but also by the consequent renewing of their nature flowing from their reconciliation to God.

Argument from the Common Consent of Christians.

Finally, it is fair, on this subject, to appeal to the faith of the Church universal. Protestants, in rejecting the doctrine of tradition, and in asserting that the Word of God as contained in the Scriptures of the Old and New Testaments is the only infallible rule of faith and practice, do not reject the authority of the Church as a teacher. They do not isolate themselves from the great company of the faithful in all ages, and set up a new faith. They hold that Christ promised the Holy Spirit to lead his people into the knowledge of the truth; that the Spirit does dwell as a teacher in all the children of God, and that those who are born of God are thus led to the knowledge and belief of the truth. There is therefore to the true Church, or the true people of God, but one faith, as there is but one Lord and one God the Father of all. Any doctrine, therefore, which can be proved to be a part of the faith (not of the external and visible Church, but) of the true children of God in all ages of the world, must be true. It is to be received not because it is thus universally believed, but because its being universally believed by true Christians is a proof that it is taught by the Spirit both in his Word and in the hearts of his people. This is a sound principle recognized by all Protestants. This universal faith of the Church is not to be sought so much in the decisions of ecclesiastical councils, as in the formulas of devotion which have prevailed among the people. It is, as often remarked, in the players, in the hymnology, in the devotional writings which true believers make the channel of their communion with God, and the medium through which they express their most intimate religious convictions, that we must look for the universal faith. From the faith of God's people no man can separate himself without forfeiting the communion of saints, and placing himself outside of the pale of true believers. If these things be admitted we must admit the doctrine of original sin. That doctrine has indeed been variously explained, and in many cases explained away by theologians and by councils, but it is indelibly impressed on the faith of the true Church. It pervades the prayers, the worship, and the institutions of the Church. All true Christians are convinced of sin; they are convinced not only of individual transgressions, but also of the depravity of their heart and nature. They recognize this depravity as innate and controlling. They groan under it as a grievous burden. They know that they are by nature the children of wrath. Parents bring their children to Christ to be washed by his blood and renewed by his Spirit, as anxiously as mothers crowded around our Lord when on earth, with their suffering infants that they might be healed by his grace and power. Whatever difficulties, therefore,

may attend the doctrine of original sin, we must accept it as clearly taught in the Scriptures, confirmed by the testimony of consciousness and history, and sustained by the faith of the Church universal.

Objections.

The objections to this doctrine, it must be admitted, are many and serious. But this is true of all the great doctrines of religion, whether natural or revealed. Nor are such difficulties confined to the sphere of religion. Our knowledge in every department is limited, and in a great measure confined to isolated facts. We know that a stone falls to the ground, that a seed germinates and produces a plant after its own kind; but it is absolutely impossible for us to understand how these familiar effects are accomplished. We know that God is, and that He governs all his creatures, but we do not know how his effectual controlling agency is consistent with the free agency of rational beings. We know that sin and misery exist in the world, and we know that God is infinite in power, holiness, and benevolence. How to reconcile the prevalence of sin with the character of God we know not. These are familiar and universally admitted facts as well in philosophy as in religion. A thing may be, and often certainly is true, against which objections may be urged which no man is able to answer. There are two important practical principles which follow from the facts just mentioned. First, that it is not a sufficient or a rational ground for rejecting any well authenticated truth that we are not able to free it from objections or difficulties. And, secondly, any objection against a religious doctrine is to be regarded as sufficiently answered if it can be shown to bear with equal force against an undeniable fact. If the objection is not a rational reason for denying the fact it is not a rational reason for rejecting the doctrine. This is the method which the sacred writers adopt in vindicating truth.

It will be seen that almost all the objections against the doctrine of original sin are in conflict with one or the other of the principles just mentioned. Either they are addressed not to the evidences of the truth of the doctrine whether derived from Scripture or from experience, but to the difficulty of reconciling it with other truths; or these objections are insisted upon as fatal to the doctrine when they obviously are as valid against the facts of providence as they are against the teachings of Scripture.

The Objection that Men are Responsible only for their Voluntary Acts.

1. The most obvious objection to the doctrine of original sin is rounded on the assumption that nothing can have moral character except voluntary acts and the states of mind resulting from or produced by our voluntary agency, and which are subject to the power of the will. This objection rests on a principle which has already been considered. It reaches very far. If it be sound, then there can be no such thing as concreated holiness, or habitual grace, or innate, inherent, or indwelling sin. But we have already seen, when treating of the nature of sin, that according to the Scriptures, the testimony of consciousness, and the universal judgment of men) the moral character of dispositions depends on their nature and not on their origin. Adam was holy, although so created. Saints are holy, although regenerated and sanctified by the almighty power of God. And therefore the soul is truly sinful if the subject of sinful dispositions, although those dispositions should be innate and entirely beyond the control of the will. Here it will be seen that the objection is not against the Scriptural evidence of the doctrine that men are born in sin, nor against the testimony of facts to the truth of that doctrine; but it is founded on the difficulty of reconciling the

doctrine of innate sin with certain assumed principles as to the nature and grounds of moral obligation. Whether we can refute those principles or not, does not affect the truth of the doctrine. We might as well deny all prophecy and all providence, because we cannot reconcile the absolute control of free agents with their liberty. If the assumed moral axiom that a man can be responsible only for his own acts, conflicts with the facts of experience and the teachings of Scriptures, the rational course is to deny the pretended axiom, and not to reject the facts with which it is in conflict. The Bible, the Church, the mass of mankind, and the conscience, hold a man responsible for his character, no matter how that character was formed or whence it was derived; and, therefore, the doctrine of original sin is not in conflict with intuitive moral truths.

Objection Founded on the Justice of God.

2. It is objected that it is inconsistent with the justice of God that men should come into the world in a state of sin. In answer to this objection it may be remarked, (1.) That whatever God does must be right. If He permits men to be born in sin, that fact must be consistent with his divine perfection. (2.) It is a fact of experience no less than a doctrine of Scripture that men are either, as the Church teaches, born in a state of sin and condemnation, or, as all men must admit, in a state which inevitably leads to their becoming sinful and miserable. The objection, therefore, bears against a providential fact as much as against a Scriptural doctrine. We must either deny God or admit that the existence and universality of sin among men is compatible with his nature and with his government of the world. (3.) The Bible, as often before remarked, accounts for and vindicates the corruption of our race on the ground that mankind had a full and fair probation in Adam, and that the spiritual death in which they are born is part of the judicial penalty of his transgression. If we reject this solution of the fact, we cannot deny the fact itself, and, being a fact, it must be consistent with the character of God.

The Doctrine represents God as the Author of Sin.

3. A third objection often and confidently urged is, that the Church doctrine on this subject makes God the author of sin. God is the author of our nature, If our nature be sinful, God must be the author of sin. The obvious fallacy of this syllogism is, that the word nature is used in one sense in the major proposition, and in a different sense in the minor. In the one it means substance or essence; in the other, natural disposition. It is true that God is the author of our essence. But our essence is not sinful. God is indeed our Creator. He made us, and not we ourselves. We are the work of his hands. He is the Father of the spirits of all men. But He is not the author of the evil dispositions with which that nature is infected at birth. The doctrine of original sin attributes no efficiency to God in the production of evil. It simply supposes that He judicially abandons our apostate race, and withholds from the descendants of Adam the manifestations of his favour and love, which are the life of the soul. That the inevitable consequence of this judicial abandonment is spiritual death, no more makes God the author of sin, than the immorality and desperate and unchanging wickedness of the reprobate, from whom God withholds his Spirit, are to be referred to the infinitely Holy One as their author. It is moreover a historical fact universally admitted, that character, within certain limits, is transmissible from parents to children. Every nation, separate tribe, and even every extended family of men, has its physical, mental, social, and moral peculiarities which are propagated from generation to generation. No process of

discipline or culture can transmute a Tartar into an Englishman, or an Irishman into a Frenchman. The Bourbons, the Hapsburgs, and other historical families, have retained and transmitted their peculiarities for ages. We may be unable to explain thus, but we cannot deny it. No one is born an absolute man, with nothing but generic humanity belonging to him. Everyone is born a man in a definite state, with all those characteristics physical, mental, and moral, which make up his individuality. There is nothing therefore in the doctrine of hereditary depravity out of analogy with providential facts.

It is said to destroy the Free Agency of Men.

4. It is further objected to this doctrine that it destroys the free agency of man. If we are born with a corrupt nature by which we are inevitably determined to sinful acts, we cease to be free in performing those acts, and consequently are not responsible for them. This objection is founded on a particular theory of liberty, and must stand or fall with it. The same objection is urged against the doctrines of decrees, of efficacious grace, of the perseverance of the saints, and all other doctrines which assume that a free act can be absolutely certain as to its occurrence. It is enough here to remark that the doctrine of original sin supposes men to have the same kind and degree of liberty in sinning under the influence of a corrupt nature, that saints and angels have in acting rightly under the influence of a holy nature. To act according to its nature is the only liberty which belongs to any created being.

[229] I. ii. 1; Hase, Libre Symbolici, p. 9.

[230] III. i. 3; Ibid. p. 317.

[231] I. 10. 11; Ibid. p. 640, the second of that number.

[232] I. 5; Ibid. p. 640, the first of that number.

[233] VIII.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 477.

[234] XI.; Ibid. p. 332.

[235] IX.; Niemeyer, p. 603.

[236] XV.; Ibid. p. 370.

[237] VII.; Ibid. p. 431.

[238] I. 33; Hase, p. 645.

[239] Chapter VI. §§ 2-5.

[240] See above, pp. 178, 179.

[241] Der Brief Pauli an die Epheser. Leipzig, 1834, p. 88.

§ 14. The Seat of Original Sin.

Having considered the nature of original sin, the next question concerns its seat. According to one theory it is in the body. The only evil effect of Adam's sin upon his posterity, which some theologians admit, is the disorder of his physical nature, whereby undue influence is secured to bodily appetites and passions. Scarcely distinguishable from this theory is the doctrine that the sensuous nature of man, as distinguished from the reason and conscience, is alone affected by our hereditary depravity. A third doctrine is, that the heart, considered as the seat of the affections as distinguished from the understanding, is the

seat of natural depravity. This doctrine is connected with the idea that all sin and holiness are forms of feeling or states of the affections. And it is made the ground on which the nature of regeneration and conversion, the relation between repentance and faith, and other points of practical theology are explained. Everything is made to depend on the inclinations or state of the feelings. Instead of the affections following the understanding, the understanding it is said, follows the affections. A man understands and receives the truth only when he loves it. Regeneration is simply a change in time state of the affections, and the only inability under which sinners labour as to the things of God, is disinclination. In opposition to all these doctrines Augustinianism, as held by the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, teaches that the whole man, soul and body, the higher as well as the lower, the intellectual as well as the emotional faculties of the soul, is affected by the corruption of our nature derived from our first parents.

As the Scriptures speak of the body being sanctified in two senses, first, as being consecrated to the service of God; and secondly, as being in a normal condition in all its relations to our spiritual nature, so as to be a fit instrument unto righteousness; and also as a partaker of the benefits of redemption; so also they represent the body as affected by the apostasy of our race. It is not only employed in the service of sin or as an instrument to unrighteousness; but it is in every respect deteriorated. It is inordinate in its cravings, rebellious, and hard to restrain. It is as the Apostle says, the opposite of the glorious, spiritual body with which the believer is hereafter to be invested.

The Whole Soul the Seat of Original Sin.

The theory that the affections (or, the heart in the limited sense of that word), to the exclusion of the rational faculties, are alone affected by original sin, is unscriptural, and the opposite doctrine which makes the whole soul the subject of inherent corruption, is the doctrine of the Bible, as appears, --

1. Because the Scriptures do not make the broad distinction between the understanding and the heart, which is commonly made in our philosophy. They speak of "the thoughts of the heart," of "the intents of the heart," and of "the eyes of the heart," as well as of its emotions and affections. The whole immaterial principle is in the Bible designated as the soul, the spirit, the mind, the heart. And therefore when it speaks of the heart, it means the man, the self, that in which personal individuality resides. If the heart be corrupt the whole soul in all its powers is corrupt.

2. The opposite doctrine assumes that there is nothing moral in our cognitions or judgments; that all knowledge is purely speculative. Whereas, according to the Scripture the chief sins of men consist in their wrong judgments, in thinking and believing evil to be good, and good to be evil. This in its highest form, as our Lord teaches us, is the unpardonable sin, or blasphemy against the Holy Ghost. It was because the Pharisees thought that Christ was evil, that his works were the works of Satan, that He declared that they could never be forgiven. It was because Paul could see no beauty in Christ that he should desire Him, and because he verily thought he was doing God service in persecuting believers, that he was, and declared himself to be, the chief of sinners. It is, as the Bible clearly reveals, because men are ignorant of God, and blind to the manifestation of his glory in the person of his Son, that they are lost. On the other hand the highest form of moral excellence consists in knowledge. To know God is eternal life. To know Christ is to be like

Christ. The world, He says, hath not known me, but these (believers) have known me. True religion consists in the knowledge of the Lord, and its universal prevalence among men is predicted by saying, "All shall know Him from the least unto the greatest." Throughout the Scriptures wisdom is piety, the wise are the good; folly is sin, and the foolish are the wicked. Nothing can be more repugnant to the philosophy of the Bible than the dissociation of moral character from knowledge; and nothing can be more at variance with our own consciousness. We know that every affection in a rational creature includes an exercise of the cognitive faculties; and every exercise of our cognitive faculties, in relation to moral and religious subjects, includes the exercise of our moral nature.

3. A third argument on this subject is drawn from the fact that the Bible represents the natural or unrenewed man as blind or ignorant as to the things of the Spirit. It declares that he cannot know them. And the fallen condition of human nature is represented as consisting primarily in this mental blindness. Men are corrupt, says the Apostle, through the ignorance that is in them.

4. Conversion is said to consist in a translation from darkness to light. God is said to open the eyes. The eyes of the understanding (or heart) are said to be enlightened. All believers are declared to be the subjects of a spiritual illumination. Paul describes his own conversion by saying that, "God revealed his Son in him." He opened his eyes to enable him to see that Jesus was the Son of God, or God manifest in the flesh. He thereby became a new creature, and his whole life was thenceforth devoted to the service of Him, whom before he hated and persecuted.

5. Knowledge is said to be the effect of regeneration. Men are renewed so as to know. They are brought to the knowledge of the truth; and they are sanctified by the truth. From all these considerations it is evident that the whole man is the subject of original sin; that our cognitive, as well as our emotional nature is involved in the depravity consequent on our apostasy from God that in knowing as well as in loving or in willing, we are under the influence and dominion of sin.

§ 15. Inability.

The third great point included in the Scriptural doctrine of original sin, is the inability of fallen man in his natural state, of himself to do anything spiritually good. This is necessarily included in the idea of spiritual death. On this subject it is proposed: (1.) To state the doctrine as presented in the symbols of the Protestant churches. (2.) To explain the nature of the inability under which the sinner is said to labour. (3.) To exhibit the Scriptural proofs of the doctrine; and (4.) To answer the objections usually urged against it.

The Doctrine as stated in Protestant Symbols.

There have been three general views as to the ability of fallen man, which have prevailed in the Church. The first, the Pelagian doctrine, which asserts the plenary ability of sinners to do all that God requires of them. The second is the Semi-Pelagian doctrine (taking the word Semi-Pelagian in its wide and popular sense), which admits the powers of man to have been weakened by the fall of the race, but denies that he lost all ability to perform what is spiritually good. And thirdly, the Augustinian or Protestant doctrine which teaches that such is the nature of inherent, hereditary depravity that men since the fall are

utterly unable to turn themselves unto God, or to do anything truly good in his sight. With these three views of the ability of fallen men are connected corresponding views of grace, or the influence and operations of the Holy Spirit in man's regeneration and conversion. Pelagians deny the necessity of any supernatural influence of the Spirit in the regeneration and sanctification of men. Semi-Pelagians admit the necessity of such divine influence to assist the enfeebled powers of man in the work of turning unto God, but claim that the sinner co�perates in that work and that upon his voluntary co�peration the issue depends. Augustinians and Protestants ascribe the whole work of regeneration to the Spirit of God, the soul being passive therein, the subject, and not the agent of the change; although active and co�perating in all the exercises of the divine life of which it has been made the recipient.

The doctrine of the sinner's inability is thus stated in the symbols of the Lutheran Church. The "Augsburg Confession" [242] says: "Humana voluntas habet aliquam libertatem ad efficiendam civilem justitiam et deligendas res rationi subjectas. Sed non habet vim sine Spiritu Sancto efficiend� justiti� Dei, seu justiti� spiritualis, quia animalis homo non percepit ea qu� sunt Spiritus Dei (1 Cor. ii. 14); sed h�c fit in cordibus, cum per verbum Spiritus Sanctus concipitur. H�c totidem verbis dicit Augustinus; [243] est, fatemur, liberum arbitrium omnibus hominibus; habens quidem judicium rationis, non per quod sit idoneum, qu� ad Deum pertinent, sine Deo aut inchoare aut certe peragere: sed tantum in operibus vit� presentis, tam bonis, quam etiam malis."

"Formula Concordi�:" [244] "Etsi humana ratio seu naturalis intellectus hominis, obscuram aliquam notiti� illius scintillulam reliquam habet, quod sit Deus, et particulam aliquam legis tenet: tamen adeo ignorans, coeca, et perversa est ratio illa, ut ingeniosissimi homines in hoc mundo evangelium de Filio Dei et promissiones divinas de �terna salute legant vel audiant, tamen ea propriis viribus percipere, intelligere, credere et vera esse, statuere nequeant. Quin potius quanto diligentius in ea re elaborant, ut spirituales res istas su� rationis acumine indagent et comprehendant, tanto minus intelligunt et credunt, et ea omnia pro stultitia et meris nugis et fabulis habent, priusquam a Spiritu Sancto illuminentur et doceantur." Again, [245] "Natura corrupta viribus suis coram Deo nihil aliud, nisi peccare possit."

"Sacr� liter� hominis non renati cor duro lapidi, qui ad tactum non cedat, sed resistat, idem rudi trunco, interdum etiam fer� in domit� comparant, non quod homo post lapsum non amplius sit rationalis creatura, aut quod absque auditu et meditatione verbi divini ad Deum convertatur, aut quod in rebus externis et civilibus nihil boni aut mali intelligere possit, aut libere aliquid agere vel omittere queat." [246]

"Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese, et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus spiritualibus, et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam nihil inchoare, operari, aut co�perari potest, nec plus, quam lapis, truncus, aut limus." [247]

The doctrine of the Reformed churches is to the same effect. [248] "Confessio Helvetica II.:" "Non sublatus est quidem homini intellectus, non erepta ei voluntas, et prorsus in lapidem vel truncum est commutatus: c�terum illa ita sunt immutata et inminuta in homine, ut non possint amplius, quod potuerunt ante lapsum. Intellectus enim obscuratus est: voluntas vero ex libera, facta est voluntas serva. Nam servit peccato, non nolens, sed

volens. Etenim voluntas, non noluntas dicitur. . . . .

"Quantum vero ad bonum et ad virtutes, intellectus hominis, non recte judicat de divinis ex semetipso. . . . Constat vero mentem vel intellectum ducem esse voluntatis, cum autem coecus sit dux, claret quousque et voluntas pertingat. Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum, nondum renato; vires null&#65533; ad perficiendum bonum. . . . . [249] C&#65533;terum nemo negat in externis, et regenitos et non regenitos habere liberum arbitrium. . . . . Damnamus in hac causa Manich&#65533;os, qui negant homini bono, ex libero arbitrio fuisse initium mali. Damnamus etiam Pelagianos, qui dicunt hominem malum sufficienter habere liberum arbitrium, ad faciendum pr&#65533;ceptum bonum."

"Confessio Gallicana:" "Etsi enim nonnullam habet boni et mali discretionem: affirmamus tamen quicquid habet lucis mox fieri tenebras, cum de qu&#65533;rendo Deo agitur, adeo ut sua intelligentia et ratione nullo modo possit ad eum accedere: item quamvis voluntate sit pr&#65533;ditus, qua ad hoc vel illud movetur, tamen quum ea sit penitus sub peccato captiva, nullam prorsus habet ad bonum appetendum libertatem, nisi quam ex gratia et Dei dono acceperit." [250]

"Articuli XXXIX:" "Ea est hominis post lapsum Ad&#65533; conditio, ut sese naturalibus suis viribus et bonis operibus ad fidem et invocationem Dei convertere ac pr&#65533;parare non possit. Quare absque gratia Dei qu&#65533; per Christum est nos pr&#65533;veniente, ut velimus et cooperante dum volumus, ad pietatis opera facienda, qu&#65533; Deo grata sunt ac accepta, nihil valemus." [251]

"Opera qu&#65533; fiunt ante gratiam Christi, et Spiritus ejus afflatum, cum ex fide Christi non prodeant minime Deo grata sunt. . . . . Immo, cum non sint facta ut Deus illa fieri voluit et pr&#65533;cepit, peccati rationem habere non dubitamus." [252]

"Canones Dordrechtan&#65533;," [253] "Omnes homines in peccato concipiuntur, et filii ir&#65533; nascuntur, inepti ad omne bonum salutare, propensi ad malum, in peccatis mortui, et peccati servi; et absque Spiritus Sancti regenerantis gratia, ad Deum redire, naturam depravatam corrigere, vel ad ejus correctionem se disponere nec volunt, nec possunt."

"Residuum quidem est post lapsum in homine lumen aliquod natur&#65533;, cujus beneficio ille notitias quasdam de Deo, de rebus naturalibus, de discrimine honestorum et turpium retinet, et aliquod virtutis ac disciplin&#65533; extern&#65533; studium ostendit: sed tantum abest, ut hoc natur&#65533; lumine ad salutarem Dei cognitionem pervenire, et ad eum se convertere possit, ut ne quidem eo in naturalibus ac civilibus recte utatur, quinimo qualecumque id demum sit, id totum variis modis contaminet atque in injustitia detineat, quod dum facit, coram Deo inexcusabilis redditur." [254]

"Westminster Confession." [255] Original sin is declared in sections second and third to include the loss of original righteousness, and a corrupted nature; "whereby," in section fourth, it is declared, "we are utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good, and wholly inclined to all evil."

"Their (believers') ability to do good works is not at all of themselves, but wholly from the Spirit of Christ." [256]

Effectual calling "is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered

and conveyed in it." [257]

The Nature of the Sinner's Inability.

It appears from the authoritative statements of this doctrine, as given in the standards of the Lutheran and Reformed churches, that the inability under which man, since the fall, is said to labour, does not arise: --

Inability does not arise from the Loss of any Faculty of the Soul.

1. From the loss of any faculty of his mind or of any original, essential attribute of his nature. He retains his reason, will, and conscience. He has the intellectual power of cognition, the power of self-determination, and the faculty of discerning between moral good and evil. His conscience, as the Apostle says, approves or disapproves of his moral acts.

Nor from the Loss of Free-agency.

2 The doctrine of man's inability, therefore, does not assume that man has ceased to be a free moral agent. He is free because he determines his own acts. Every volition is an act of free self-determination. He is a moral agent because he has the consciousness of moral obligation, and whenever he sins he acts freely against the convictions of conscience or the precepts of the moral law. That a man is in such a state that he uniformly prefers and chooses evil instead of good, as do the fallen angels, is no more inconsistent with his free moral agency than his being in such a state as that he prefers and chooses good with the same uniformity that the holy angels do.

Inability not mere Disinclination.

3. The inability of sinners, according to the above statement of the doctrine, is not mere disinclination or aversion to what is good. This disinclination exists, but it is not the ultimate fact. There must be some cause or reason for it. As God and Christ are infinitely lovely, the fact that sinners do not love them is not accounted for by saying that they are not inclined to delight in infinite excellence. That is only stating the same thing in different words. If a man does not perceive the beauty of a work of art, or of a literary production, it is no solution of the fact to say that he has no inclination for such forms of beauty. Why is it that what is beautiful in itself, and in the judgment of all competent judges, is without form or comeliness in his eyes? Why is it that the supreme excellence of God, and all that makes Christ the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely in the sight of saints and angels, awaken no corresponding feelings in the unrenewed heart? The inability of the sinner, therefore, neither consists in his disinclination to good nor does it arise exclusively from that source.

It Arises from the Want of Spiritual Discernment.

4. According to the Scriptures and to the standards of doctrine above quoted, it consists in the want of power rightly to discern spiritual things, and the consequent want of all right affections toward them. And this want of power of spiritual discernment arises from the corruption of our whole nature, by which the reason or understanding is blinded, and the taste and feelings are perverted. And as this state of mind is innate, as it is a state or condition of our nature, it lies below the will, and is beyond its power, controlling both our affections and our volitions. It is indeed a familiar fact of experience that a man's judgments as to what is true or false, right or wrong, are in many cases determined by his interests or

feelings. Some have, in their philosophy, generalized this fact into a law, and teach that as to all ✠sthetic and moral subjects the judgments and apprehensions of the understanding are determined by the state of the feelings. In applying this law to the matters of religion they insist that the affections only are the subject of moral corruption, and that if these be purified or renewed, the understanding then apprehends and judges rightly as a matter of course. It would be easy to show that this, as a philosophical theory, is altogether unsatisfactory. The affections suppose an object. They can be excited only in view of an object. If we love we must love something. Love is complacency and delight in the thing loved, and of necessity supposes the apprehension of it as good and desirable. It is clearly impossible that we should love God unless we apprehend his nature and perfections; and therefore to call love into exercise it is necessary that the mind should apprehend God as He really is. Otherwise the affection would be neither rational nor holy. This, however, is of subordinate moment. The philosophy of one man has no authority for other men. It is only the philosophy of the Bible, that which is assumed or presupposed in the doctrinal statements of the Word of God, to which we are called upon unhesitatingly to submit. Everywhere in the Scriptures it is asserted or assumed that the feelings follow the understanding, that the illumination of the mind in the due apprehension of spiritual objects is the necessary preliminary condition of all right feeling and conduct. We must know God in order to love Him. This is distinctly asserted by the Apostle in 1 Cor. ii. 14. He there says, (1.) That the natural or unrenewed man does not receive the things of the Spirit. (2.) The reason why he does not receive them is declared to be that they are foolishness unto him, or that he cannot know them. (3.) And the reason why he cannot know them is that they are spiritually discerned. It is ignorance, the want of discernment of the beauty, excellence, and suitableness of the things of the Spirit (i.e., of the truths which the Spirit has revealed), that is the reason or cause of unbelief. So also in Eph. iv. 18, he says, The heathen (unconverted men) are "alienated from the life of God, through the ignorance that is in them." Hence his frequent prayers for the illumination of his readers; and the supplication of the Psalmist that his eyes might be opened. Hence, also, true conversion is said to be effected by a revelation. Paul was instantaneously changed from a persecutor to a worshipper of Christ, when it pleased God to reveal his Son in him. Those who perish are lost because the god of this world has blinded their eyes so that they fail to see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. It is in accordance with this principle that knowledge is essential to holiness, that true religion and life everlasting are said to consist in the knowledge of God (John xvii. 3); and that men are said to be saved and sanctified by the truth. It is therefore the clear doctrine of the Bible that the inability of men does not consist in mere disinclination or opposition of feeling to the things of God, but that this disinclination or alienation, as the Apostle calls it, arises from the blindness of their minds. We are not, however, to go to the opposite extreme, and adopt what has been called the "light system," which teaches that men are regenerated by light or knowledge, and that all that is needed is that the eyes of the understanding should be opened. As the whole soul is the subject of original sin the whole soul is the subject of regeneration. A blind man cannot possibly rejoice in the beauties of nature or art until his sight is restored. But, if uncultivated, the mere restoration of sight will not give him the perception of beauty. His whole nature must be refined and elevated. So also the whole nature of apostate man must be renewed by the Holy Ghost; then his eyes being opened to the glory of God in Christ, he

will rejoice in Him with joy unspeakable and full of glory. But the illumination of the mind is indispensable to holy feelings, and is their proximate cause. This being the doctrine of the Bible, it follows that the sinner's disability does not consist in mere disinclination to holiness.

Inability Asserted only in Reference to the "Things of the Spirit."

5. This inability is asserted only in reference to "the things of the Spirit." It is admitted in all the Confessions above quoted that man since the fall has not only the liberty of choice of self-determination, but also is able to perform moral acts, good as well as evil. He can be kind and just, and fulfil his social duties in a mariner to secure the approbation of his fellow-men. It is not meant that the state of mind in which these acts are performed, or the motives by which they are determined, are such as to meet the approbation of an infinitely holy God; but simply that these acts, as to the matter of them, are prescribed by the moral law. Theologians, as we have seen, designate the class of acts as to which fallen man retains his ability as "justitia civilis," or "things external." And the class as to which his inability is asserted is designated as "the things of God," "the things of the Spirit," "things connected with salvation." The difference between these two classes of acts, although it may not be easy to state it in words, as universally recognized. There is an obvious difference between morality and religion; and between those religious affections of reverence and gratitude which all men more or less experience, and true piety. The difference lies in the state of mind, the motives, and the apprehension of the objects of these affections. It is the difference between holiness and mere natural feeling. What the Bible and all the Confessions of the churches of the Reformation assert is, that man, since the fall, cannot change his own heart he cannot regenerate his soul; he cannot repent with godly sorrow, or exercise that faith which is unto salvation. He cannot, in short, put forth any holy exercise or perform any act in such a way as to merit the approbation of God. Sin cleaves to all he does, and from the dominion of sin he cannot free himself.

In one Sense this Inability is Natural.

6. This inability is natural in one familiar and important sense of the word. It is not natural in the same sense that reason, will, and conscience are natural. These constitute our nature, and without them or any one of them, we should cease to be men. In the second place, it is not natural as arising from the necessary limitations of our nature and belonging to our original and normal condition. It arises out of the nature of man as a creature that he cannot create, and cannot produce any effect out of himself by a mere volition. Adam in the state of perfection could not will a stone to move, or a plant to grow. It is obvious that an inability arising from either of the sources above mentioned, i.e., from the want of any of the essential faculties of our nature, or from the original and normal limitations of our being, involves freedom from obligation. In this sense nothing is more true than that ability limits obligation. No creature can justly be required to do what surpasses his powers as a creature.

On the other hand, although the inability of sinners is not natural in either of the senses above stated, it is natural in the sense that it arises out of the present state of his nature. It is natural in the same sense as selfishness, pride, and worldly mindedness are natural. It is not acquired, or super-induced by any ab extra influence, but flows from the condition in which human nature exists since the fall of Adam.

In another Sense it is Moral.

7. This inability, although natural in the sense just stated, is nevertheless moral, inasmuch as it arises out of the moral state of the soul, as it relates to moral action, and as it is removed by a moral change, that is, by regeneration.

Objections to the Popular Distinction between Natural and Moral Ability.

In this country much stress has been laid upon the distinction between moral and natural ability. It has been regarded as one of the great American improvements in theology, and as marking an important advance in the science. It is asserted that man since the fall has natural ability to do all that is required of him, and on this ground his responsibility is made to rest; but it is admitted that he is morally unable to turn unto God, or perfectly keep his commandments. By this distinction, it is thought, we may save the great principle that ability limits obligation, that a man cannot be bound to do what he cannot do, and at the same time hold fast the Scriptural doctrine which teaches that the sinner cannot of himself repent or change his own heart. With regard to this distinction as it is commonly and popularly presented, it may be remarked: --

1. That the terms natural and moral are not antithetical. A thing may be at once natural and moral. The inability of the sinner, as above remarked, although moral, is in a most important sense natural. And, therefore, it is erroneous to say, that it is simply moral and not natural.

2. The terms are objectionable not only because they lack precision, but also because they are ambiguous. One man means by natural ability nothing more than the possession of the attributes of reason, will, and conscience. Another means plenary power, all that is requisite to produce a given effect. And this is the proper meaning of the words. Ability is the power to do. If a man has the natural ability to love God, he has full power to love Him. And if He has the power to love Him, he has all that is requisite to call that love into exercise. As this is the proper meaning of the terms, it is the meaning commonly attached to them. Those who insist on the natural ability of the sinner, generally assert that he has full power, without divine assistance, to do all that is required of him: to love God with all his soul and mind and strength, and his neighbour as himself. All that stands in the way of his thus doing is not an inability, but simply disinclination, or the want of will. An ability which is not adequate to the end contemplated, is no ability. It is therefore a serious objection to the use of this distinction, as commonly made, that it involves a great error. It asserts that the sinner is able to do what in fact he cannot do.

3. It is a further objection to this mode of stating the doctrine that it tends to embarrass or to deceive. It must embarrass the people to be told that they can and cannot repent and believe. One or the other of the two propositions, in the ordinary and proper sense of the terms, must be false. And and esoteric or metaphysical sense in which the theologian may attempt to reconcile them, the people will neither appreciate nor respect. It is a much more serious objection that it tends to deceive men to tell them that they can change their own hearts, can repent, and can believe. This is not true, and every man's consciousness tells him that it is untrue. It is of no avail for the preacher to say that all he means by ability is that men have all the faculties of rational beings, and that those are the only faculties to be exercised in turning to God or in doing his will. We might as reasonably tell an uneducated man that he can understand and appreciate the Iliad, because he has all the faculties which

the scholar possesses. Still less does it avail to say that the only difficulty is in the will. And therefore when we say that men can love God, we mean that they can love Him if they will. If the word will, be here taken in its ordinary sense for the power of self-determination, the proposition that a man can love God if he will, is not true; for it is notorious that the affections are not under the power of the will. If the word be taken in a wide sense as including the affections, the proposition is a truism. It amounts to saying, that we can love God if we do love Him.

4. The distinction between natural and moral ability, as commonly made, is unscriptural. It has already been admitted that there is an obvious and very important distinction between an inability arising out of the limitations of our being as creatures, and an inability arising out of the apostate state of our nature since the Fall of Adam. But this is not what is commonly meant by those who assert the natural ability of men to do all that God requires of them. They mean and expressly assert that man, as his nature now is, is perfectly able to change his own heart, to repent and lead a holy life; that the only difficulty in the way of his so doing is the want of inclination, controllable by his own power. It is this representation which is unscriptural. The Scriptures never thus address fallen men and assure them of their ability to deliver themselves from the power of sin.

5. The whole tendency and effect of this mode of statement are injurious and dangerous. If a sinner must be convinced of his guilt before he can trust in the righteousness of Christ for his justification, he must be convinced of his helplessness before he can look to God for deliverance. Those who are made to believe that they can save themselves, are, in the divine administration, commonly left to their own resources.

In opposition therefore to the Pelagian doctrine of the sinner's plenary ability, to the Semi-Pelagian or Arminian doctrine of what is called "a gracious ability," that is, an ability granted to all who hear the gospel by the common and sufficient grace of the Holy Spirit, and to the doctrine that the only inability of the sinner is his disinclination to good, Augustinians have ever taught that this inability is absolute and entire. It is natural as well as moral. It is as complete, although different in kind, as the inability of the blind to see, of the deaf to hear, or of the dead to restore themselves to life.

Proof of the Doctrine.

1. The first and most obvious argument in support of the Augustinian or Orthodox argument on this subject is the negative one. That is, the fact that the Scriptures nowhere attribute to fallen men ability to change their own hearts or to turn themselves unto God. As their salvation depends on their regeneration, if that work was within the compass of their own powers, it is incredible that the Bible should never rest the obligation of effecting it upon the sinner's ability. If he had the power to regenerate himself, we should expect to find the Scriptures affirming his possession of this ability, and calling upon him to exercise it. It may indeed be said that the very command to repent and believe implies the possession of everything that is requisite to obedience to the command. It does imply that those to whom it is addressed are rational creatures, capable of moral obligation, and that they are free moral agents. It implies nothing more. The command is nothing more than the authoritative declaration of what is obligatory upon those to whom it is addressed. We are required to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. The obligation is imperative and constant. Yet no sane man can assert his own ability to make himself thus perfect. Notwithstanding therefore

the repeated commands given in the Bible to sinners to love God with all the heart, to repent and believe the gospel, and live without sin, it remains true that the Scriptures nowhere assert or recognize the ability of fallen man to fulfil these requisitions of duty.

Express Declarations of the Scriptures.

2. Besides this negative testimony of the Scriptures, we have the repeated and explicit declarations of the Word of God on this subject. Our Lord compares the relation between himself and his people to that which exists between the vine and its branches. The point of analogy is the absolute dependence common to both relations. "As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine; no more can ye, except ye abide in me Without me ye can do nothing." (John xv. 4, 5.) We are here taught that Christ is the only source of spiritual life; that those out of Him are destitute of that life and of all ability to produce its appropriate fruits; and even with regard to those who are in Him, this ability is not of themselves, it is derived entirely from Him. In like manner the Apostle asserts his insufficiency (or inability) to do anything of himself. Our "sufficiency," he says, "is of God." (2 Cor. iii. 5.) Christ tells the Jews (John vi. 44), "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him." This is not weakened or explained away by his saying in another place, "Ye will not come to me that ye might have life." The penitent and believing soul comes to Christ willingly. He wills to come. But this does not imply that he can of himself produce that willingness. The sinner wills not to come; but that does not prove that coming is in the power of his will. He cannot have the will to come to the saving of his soul unless he has a true sense of sin, and a proper apprehension of the person, the character and the work of Christ, and right affections towards Him. How is he to get these? Are all these complex states of mind, this knowledge, these apprehensions, and these affections subject to the imperative power of the will? In Rom. viii. 7, the Apostle says, "The carnal mind is enmity against God; for it is not subject to the law of God, neither indeed can be. So then they that are in the flesh cannot please God." Those who are "in the flesh, are distinguished from those who are "in the Spirit." The former are the unrenewed, men who are in a state of nature, and of them it is affirmed that they cannot please God. Faith is declared to be the gift of God, and yet without faith, we are told it is impossible that we should please God. (Heb. xi. 6.) In 1 Cor. ii. 14, it is said, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." The natural man is distinguished from the spiritual man. The latter is one in whom the Holy Spirit is the principle of life and activity, or, who is under the control of the Spirit, the former is one who is under the control of his own fallen nature, in whom there is no principle of life and action but what belongs to him as a fallen creature. Of such a man the Apostle asserts, first, that he does not receive the things of the Spirit, that is, the truths which the Spirit has revealed; secondly, that they are foolishness to him; thirdly, that he cannot know them; and fourthly, that the reason of this inability is the want of spiritual discernment, that is, of that apprehension of the nature and truth of divine things which is due to the inward teaching or illumination of the Holy Ghost. This passage therefore not only asserts the fact of the sinner's inability, but teaches the ground or source of it. It is no mere aversion or disinclination, but the want of true knowledge. No man can see the beauty of a work of art without æsthetic discernment; and no man, according to the Apostle, can see the truth and beauty of spiritual things without spiritual discernment. Such is the constant representation of Scripture. Men are everywhere

spoken of and regarded not only as guilty and polluted, but also as helpless.

Involved in the Doctrine of Original Sin.

3. The doctrine of the sinner's inability is involved in the Scriptural doctrine of original sin. By the apostasy of man from God he not only lost the divine image and favour, but sunk into a state of spiritual death. The Bible and reason alike teach that God is the life of the soul; his favour, and communion with Hun, are essential not only to happiness but also to holiness. Those who are under his wrath and curse and are banished from his presence, are in outer darkness. They have no true knowledge, no desire after fellowship with a Being who to them is a consuming fire. To the Apostle it appears as the greatest absurdity and impossibility that a soul out of favour with God should be holy. This is the fundamental idea of his doctrine of sanctification. Those who are under the law are under the curse, and those who are under the curse are absolutely ruined. It is essential, therefore, to holiness that we should be delivered from the law and restored to the favour of God before any exercise of love or any act of true obedience can he performed or experienced on our part. We are free from sin only because we are not under the law, put under grace. The whole of the sixth and seventh chapters of the Epistle to the Romans is devoted to the development of this principle. To the Apostle the doctrine that the sinner has ability of himself to return to God, to restore to his soul the image of God, and live a holy life, must have appeared as thorough a rejection of his theory of salvation as the doctrine that we are justified by works. His whole system is founded on the two principles that, being guilty, we are condemned, and can be justified only on the ground of the righteousness of Christ; and, being spiritually dead, no objective presentation of the truth, no authoritative declarations of the law, no effort of our own can originate spiritual life, or call forth any spiritual exercise. Being justified freely and restored to the divine favour, we are then, and only then, able to bring forth fruit unto God. "Ye are become dead to the law by the body of Christ: that ye should be married to another, even to him who is raised from the dead, that we should bring forth fruit unto God. For when we were in the flesh, the motions of sins, which were by the law, did work in our members, to bring forth fruit unto death. But now we are delivered from the law, that being dead wherein we were held; that we should serve in newness of spirit, and not in the oldness of the letter." (Rom. vii. 4-6.) This view of the matter necessarily implies that the natural state of fallen men is one of entire helplessness and inability. They are "utterly indisposed, disabled, and made opposite to all good." The Bible, therefore, as we have already seen, uniformly represents men in their natural state since the fall as blind, deaf, and spiritually dead; from which state they can no more deliver themselves than one born blind can open his own eyes, or one corrupting in the grave can restore himself to life.

The Necessity of the Spirit's influence.

4. The next argument on this subject is derived from what the Scriptures teach of the necessity and nature of the Spirit's influence in regeneration and sanctification. If any man will take a Greek Concordance of the New Testament, and see how often the words Pneuma and To Pneuma to hagion are used by the sacred writers, he will learn how prominent a part the Holy Spirit takes in saving men, and how hopeless is the case of those who are left to themselves. What the Scriptures clearly teach as to this point is, (1.) That the Holy Spirit is the source of spiritual life and all its exercises; that without his supernatural influence we

can no more perform holy acts than a dead branch, or a branch separated from the vine can produce fruit. (2.) That in the first instance (that is, in regeneration) the soul is the subject and not the agent of the change produced. The Spirit gives life, and then excites and guides all its operations; just as in the natural world God gives sight to the blind, and then light by which to see, and objects to be seen, and guides and sustains all the exercises of the power of vision which He has bestowed. (3.) That the nature of the influence by which regeneration, which must precede all holy exercises, is produced, precludes the possibility of preparation or co-operation on the part of the sinner. Some effects are produced by natural causes, others by the simple volition or immediate efficiency of God. To this latter class belong creation, miracles, and regeneration. (4.) Hence the effect produced is called a new creature, a resurrection, a new birth. These representations are designed to teach the utter impotence and entire dependence of the sinner. Salvation is not of him that wills nor of him who runs, but of God who showeth mercy, and who works in us to will and to do according to his own good pleasure. These are all points to be more fully discussed hereafter. It is enough in this argument to say that the doctrines of the Bible concerning the absolute necessity of grace, or the supernatural influence of the Spirit, and of the nature and effects of that influence, are entirely inconsistent with the doctrine that the sinner is able of himself to perform any holy act.

The Argument from Experience.

5. This is a practical question. What a man is able to do is best determined not by a priori reasoning, or by logical deductions from the nature of his faculties, but by putting his ability to the test. The thing to be done is to turn from sin to holiness; to love God perfectly and our neighbour as ourselves; to perform every duty without defect or omission, and keep ourselves from all sin of thought, word, or deed, of heart or life. Can any man do this? Does any man need argument to convince him that he cannot do it? He knows two things as clearly and as surely as he knows his own existence: first, that he is bound to be morally perfect, to keep all God's commands, to have all right feelings in constant exercise as the occasion calls for them, and to avoid all sin in feeling as well as in act; and, secondly, that he can no more do this than he can raise the dead. The metaphysician may endeavour to prove to the people that there is no external world, that matter is thought; and the metaphysician may believe it, but the people, whose faith is determined by the instincts and divinely constituted laws of their nature, will retain their own intuitive convictions. In like manner the metaphysical theologian may tell sinners that they can regenerate themselves, can repent and believe, and love God perfectly, and the theologian may, by a figure of speech, be said to believe it but the poor sinners know that it is not true. They have tried a thousand times, and would give a thousand worlds could they accomplish the work, and make themselves saints and heirs of glory by a volition, or by the exercise of their own powers, whether transient or protracted.

It is universally admitted, because a universal fact of consciousness, that the feelings and affections are not under the control of the will. No man can love what is hateful to him, or hate what he delights in, by any exercise of his self-determining power. Hence the philosophers, with Kant, pronounce the command to love, an absurdity, as sceptics declare the command to believe, absurd. But the foolishness of men is the wisdom of God. It is right that we should be required to love God and believe his Word, whether the exercise of love

and faith be under the control of our will or not. The only way by which this argument from the common consciousness of men can be evaded, is by denying that feeling has any moral character; or by assuming that the demands of the law are accommodated to the ability of the agent. If he cannot love holiness, he is not bound to love it. If he cannot believe all the gospel, he is required to believe only what he can believe, what he can see to be true in the light of his own reason. Both these assumptions, however, are contrary to the intuitive convictions of all men, and to the express declarations of the Word of God. All men know that moral character attaches to feelings as well as to purposes or volitions; that benevolence as a feeling is right and malice as a feeling is wrong. They know with equal certainty that the demands of right are immutable, that the law of God cannot lower itself to the measure of the power of fallen creatures. It demands of them nothing that exceeds the limitations of their nature as creatures; but it does require the full and constant, and therefore perfect, exercise of those powers in the service of God and in accordance with his will. And this is precisely what every fallen rational human being is fully persuaded he cannot do. The conviction of inability, therefore, is as universal and as indestructible as the belief of existence, and all the sophisms of metaphysical theologians are as impotent as the subtleties of the idealist or pantheist. Any man or set of men, any system of philosophy or of theology which attempts to stem the great stream of human consciousness is certain to be swept down into the abyss of oblivion or destruction.

Conviction of Sin.

There is another aspect of this argument which deserves to be considered. What is conviction of sin? What are the experiences of those whom the Spirit of God brings under that conviction? The answer to these questions may be drawn from the Bible, as for example time seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, from the records of the inward life of the people of God in all ages, and from every believer's own religious experience. From all these sources it may be proved that every soul truly convinced of sin is brought to feel and acknowledge, (1.) That he is guilty in the sight of God, and justly exposed to the sentence of his violated law. (2.) That he is utterly polluted and defiled by sin; that his thoughts, feelings, and acts are not what conscience or the divine law can approve; and that it is not separate, transient acts only by which he is thus polluted, but also that his heart is not right, that sin exists in him as a power or a law working in him all manner of evil. And, (3.) That he can make no atonement for his guilt, and that he cannot free himself from the power of sin; so that he is forced to cry out, O wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death! This sense of utter helplessness, of absolute inability, is as much and as universally an element of genuine conviction as a sense of guilt or the consciousness of defilement. It is a great mercy that the theology of the heart is often better than the theology of the head.

6. The testimony of every man's consciousness is confirmed by the common consciousness of the Church and by the whole history of our race. Appeal may be made with all confidence to the prayers, hymns, and other devotional writings of the people of God for proof that no conviction is more deeply impressed on the hearts of all true Christians than that of their utter helplessness and entire dependence upon the grace of God. They deplore their inability to love their Redeemer, to keep themselves from sin, to live a holy life in any degree adequate to their own convictions of their obligations. Under this

inability they humble themselves, they never plead it as an excuse or palliation; they recognize it as the fruit and evidence of the corruption of their nature derived as a sad inheritance from their first parents. They refer with one voice, whatever there is of good in them, not to their own ability, but to the Holy Spirit. Everyone adopts as expressing the inmost conviction of his heart, the language of the Apostle, "Not I, but the grace of God which was with me." As this is the testimony of the Church so also it is the testimony of all history. The world furnishes no example of a self-regenerated man. No such man exists or ever has existed; and no man ever believed himself to be regenerated by his own power. If what men can do is to be determined by what men have done, it may safely be assumed that no man can change his own heart, or bring himself to repentance toward God and faith in the Lord Jesus Christ. An ability which has never in the thousands of millions of our race accomplished the desired end, even if it existed, would not be worth contending for. There is scarcely a single doctrine of the Scriptures either more clearly taught or more abundantly confirmed by the common consciousness of men, whether saints or sinners, than the doctrine that fallen man is destitute of all ability to convert himself or to perform any holy act until renewed by the almighty power of the Spirit of God.

Objections.

1. The most obvious and plausible objection to this doctrine is the old one so often considered already, namely, that it is inconsistent with moral obligation. A man, it is said, cannot be justly required to do any thing for which he has not the requisite ability. The fallacy of this objection lies in the application of this principle. It is self-evidently true in one sphere, but utterly untrue in another. It is true that the blind cannot justly be required to see, or the deaf to hear. A child cannot be required to understand the calculus, or an uneducated man to read the classics. These things belong to the sphere of nature. The inability which thus limits obligation arises out of the limitations which God has imposed on our nature. The principle in question does not apply in the sphere cf morals and religion, when the inability arises not out of the limitation, but out of the moral corruption of our nature. Even in the sphere of religion there is a bound set to obligation by the capacity of the agent. An infant cannot be expected or required to have the measure of holy affections which fills the souls of the just made perfect. It is only when inability arises from sin and is removed by the removal of sin, that it is consistent with continued obligation. And as it has been shown from Scripture that the inability of the sinner to repent and believe, to love God and to lead a holy life, does not arise from the limitation of his nature as a creature (as is the case with idiots or brutes); nor from the want of the requisite faculties or capacity, but simply from the corruption of our nature, it follows that it does not exonerate him from the obligation to be and to do all that God requires. This, as shown above, is the doctrine of the Bible and is confirmed by the universal consciousness of men, and especially by the experience of all the people of God. They with one voice deplore their helplessness and their perfect inability to live without sin, and yet acknowledge their obligation to be perfectly holy.

We are responsible for external acts, because they depend on our volitions. We are responsible for our volitions because they depend on our principles and feelings; and we are responsible for our feelings and for those states of mind which constitute character, because (within the sphere of morals and religion) they are right or wrong in their own

nature. The fact that the affections and permanent and even immanent states of the mind are beyond the power of the will does not (as has been repeatedly shown in these pages), remove them out of the sphere of moral obligation. As this is attested by Scripture and by the general judgment of men, the assumed axiom that ability limits obligation in the sphere of morals cannot be admitted.

Moral obligation being founded upon the possession of the attributes of a moral agent, reason, conscience, and will, it remains unimpaired so long as these attributes remain. If reason be lost all responsibility for character or conduct ceases. If the consciousness of the difference between right and wrong, the capacity to perceive moral distinctions does not exist in a creature or does not belong to its nature, that creature is not the subject of moral obligation, and in like manner if he is not an agent, is not invested with the faculty of spontaneous activity as a personal being, he ceases, so far as his conscious states are concerned, to be responsible for what he is or does. Since the Scriptural and Augustinian doctrine admits that man since the fall retains his reason, conscience, and will, it leaves the grounds of responsibility for character and conduct unimpaired.

It does not weaken the Motives to Exertion.

2. Another popular objection to the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that it destroys all rational grounds on which rests the use of the means of grace. If we cannot accomplish a given end, why should we use the means for its accomplishment? So the farmer might say, If I cannot secure a harvest, why should I cultivate my fields? In every department of human activity the result depends on the co﷿peration of causes over which man has no control. He is expected to use the means adapted to the desired end and trust for the co﷿peration of other agencies without which his own efforts are of no avail. The Scriptural grounds on which we are bound to use the means of grace are, (1.) The command of God. This of itself is enough. If there were no apparent adaptation of the means to the end, and no connection which we could discover between them, the command of God would be a sufficient reason and motive for their diligent use. There was no natural adaptation in the waters of the Jordan to heal the leprosy, or in those of the pool of Siloam to restore sight to the blind. It had, however, been fatal folly on the part of Naaman to refuse on that account to obey the command to bathe himself seven times; and in the blind man to refuse to wash in the pool as Jesus directed. (2.) If the command of God is enough even when there is no apparent connection between the means and the end, much more is it enough when the means have a natural adaptation to the end. We can see such adaptation in the department of nature, and it is no less apparent in that of grace. There is an intimate connection between truth and holiness, as between sowing the grain and reaping the harvest. Man sows but God gives the increase in the one case as well as in the other. (3.) There is not only this natural adaptation of the means of grace to the end to be accomplished, but in all ordinary cases, the end is not attained otherwise than through the use of those means. Men are not saved without the truth. Those who do not seek fail to find. Those who refuse to ask do not receive. This is as much the ordinary course of the divine administration in the kingdom of grace, as in the kingdom of nature. (4.) There is not only this visible connection between the means of grace and the salvation of the soul, as a fact of experience, but the express promise of God that those who seek shall find, that those who ask shall receive, and that to those who knock it shall be opened. More than this cannot be

rationally demanded. It is more than is given to the men of the world to stimulate them in their exertions to secure wealth or knowledge. The doctrine of inability, therefore, does not impair the force of any of the motives which should determine sinners to use all diligence in seeking their own salvation in the way which God has appointed.

The Doctrine does not encourage Delay.

3. Still another objection is everywhere urged against this doctrine. It is said that it encourages delay. If a man believes that he cannot change his heart, cannot repent and believe the gospel, he will say, "I must wait God's time. As He gives men a new heart, as faith and repentance are his gifts I must wait until He is pleased to bestow those gifts on me." No doubt Satan does tempt men thus to argue and thus to act, as he tempts them in other ways to egregious folly. The natural tendency of the doctrine in question, however, is directly the reverse. When a man is convinced that the attainment of a desirable end is beyond the compass of his own powers, he instinctively seeks help out of himself. If ill, if he knows he cannot cure himself, he sends for a physician. If persuaded that the disease is entirely under his own control, and especially if any metaphysician could persuade him that all illness is an idea, which can be banished by a volition, then it would be folly in him to seek aid from abroad. The blind, the deaf, the leprous, and the maimed who were on earth when Christ was present in the flesh, knew that they could not heal themselves, and therefore they went to Him for help. No more soul-destroying doctrine could well be devised than the doctrine that sinners can regenerate themselves, and repent and believe just when they please. Those who really embrace such a doctrine would never apply to the only source whence these blessings can in fact be obtained. They would be led to defer to the last moment of life a work which was entirely in their own hands and which could be accomplished in a moment. A miser on his death-bed may by a volition give away all his wealth. If a sinner could as easily change his own heart, he would be apt to cleave to the world as the miser to his wealth, till the last moment. All truth tends to godliness; all error to sin and death. As it is a truth both of Scripture and of experience that the unrenewed man can do nothing of himself to secure his salvation, it is essential that he should be brought to a practical conviction of that truth. When thus convinced, and not before, he seeks help from the only source whence it can be obtained.

[242] I. xviii.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, pp. 14, 15.

[243] Hypomnesticon, seu Hypognosticon, lib. III. iv. 5; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. x. p. 2209, a.

[244] II. 9; Hase, p. 657.

[245] I. 25; Ibid. p. 643.

[246] II. 19; Ibid. p. 661.

[247] II. 24; Ibid. p. 662.

[248] IX.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 479.

[249] Niemeyer, p. 481.

[250] ix.; Ibid. p. 331.

[251] x.; Ibid. p. 603.

[252] xiii.; Ibid. p. 604.

[253] III. iii.; Ibid. p. 709.
[254] III. iv.; Niemeyer.
[255] Chapter vi.
[256] Ibid. ch. XV. i. § 3.
[257] Ibid. ch. x. § 2.

CHAPTER IX: FREE AGENCY.

§ 3. Certainty Consistent with Liberty.

In all discussions concerning sin and grace, the question concerning the nature and necessary conditions of free agency is of necessity involved. This is one of the points in which theology and psychology come into immediate contact. There is a theory of free agency with which the doctrines of original sin and of efficacious grace are utterly irreconcilable, and there is another theory with which those doctrines are perfectly consistent. In all ages of the Church, therefore, those who have adopted the former of these theories, reject those doctrines; and, on the other hand, those who are constrained to believe those doctrines, are no less constrained to adopt the other and congenial theory of free agency. Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, and Remonstrants are not more notoriously at variance with Augustinians, Lutherans, and Calvinists, on the doctrines of sin and grace, than they are on the metaphysical and moral question of human liberty. In every system of theology, therefore, there is a chapter De libero arbitrio. This is a question which every theologian finds in his path, and which he must dispose of; and on the manner in which it is determined depends his theology, and of course his religion, so far as his theology is to him a truth and reality.

It may seem preposterous to attempt, in the compass of a few pages, the discussion of a question on which so many volumes have been written. There is, however, this important difference between all subjects which relate to the soul, or the world within, and those which relate to the external world: with regard to the former, all the materials of knowledge being facts of consciousness, are already in our possession; whereas, in regard to the latter, the facts have first to be collected. In questions, therefore, which relate to the mind, a mere statement of the case is often all that is required, and all that can be given. If that statement be correct, the facts of consciousness spontaneously arrange themselves in order around it; if it be incorrect, they obstinately refuse to be thus marshalled. If this be so, why is it that men differ so much about these questions? To this it may be answered, --

1. That they do not differ so much as they appear to. When the mind is left undisturbed, and allowed to act according to its own laws, men, in the great majority of cases, think alike on all the great questions about which philosophers are divided. It is only when they stir up the placid lake, and attempt to sound its depths, to analyze its waters, to determine the laws of its currents, and to ascertain its contents, that they see and think so differently. However men may differ in their speculative opinions as to the ultimate nature of matter, they all practically feel and act in the same way in everything which concerns its application and use. And however they may differ as to the question of liberty or necessity, they agree in regarding themselves and others as responsible agents.

2. On no subject is the ambiguity of language a more serious impediment, in the way of conscious agreement, than in reference to this whole department, and especially in regard to the question of free agency. The same statement often appears true to one mind and false to another, because it is understood differently. This ambiguity arises partly from the inherent imperfection of human language. Words have, and must have more than one use; and although we may define our terms, and state in which its several senses we use a given word, yet the exigencies of language, or inattention, almost unavoidably lead to its being employed in some other of its legitimate meanings. Besides, the states of mind which these terms are employed to designate, are themselves so complex that no words can accurately represent them. We have terms to express the operations of the intellect, others to designate the feelings, and others again for acts of the will; but thousands of our acts include the exercise of the intellect, the sensibility, and the will, and it is absolutely impossible to find words for all these complex and varying states of mind. It is not wonderful, therefore, that men should misunderstand each other, fail in their most strenuous efforts to express what they mean so that others shall attach precisely the same sense to the words which they use.

3. There is another reason for the diversity of opinion which has ever prevailed on all subjects connected with free agency. Although the facts which should determine the questions discussed are facts of consciousness common to all men, yet they are so numerous and of such different kinds, that it is hard to allow each its place and importance. From habit, or mental training, or from the moral state of mind, some men allow too much weight to one class of these facts, and too little to another. Some are governed by their understanding, others by their moral feelings. In some the moral sensibilities are much more lively and informing than in others. Some adopt certain principles as axioms to which they force all their judgments to conform. It is vain to hope, therefore, that we shall ever find all men of one mind, on even the plainest and most important questions relating to the constitution and laws of their own nature. There is but one sure guide, and but one path to either truth or unity, the Spirit and word of God; and happy are those who submit to be led by that guide, and to walk in that path.

§ 1. Different Theories of the Will.

All the different theories of the will may be included under the three classes of Necessity, Contingency, and Certainty.

Necessity.

To the first of these classes belong: --

1. The doctrine of Fatalism, which teaches that all events are determined by a blind necessity. This necessity does not arise from the will of an intelligent Being governing all his creatures and all their acts according to their nature, and for purposes of wisdom and goodness; but from a law of sequence to which God (or rather the gods) as well as men is subject. It precludes the idea of foresight or plan, or of the voluntary selection of an end, and the adoption of means for its accomplishment. Things are as they are, and must be as they are, and are to be, without any rational cause. This theory ignores any distinction between physical laws and free agency. The acts of men and the operations of nature are determined by a necessity of the same kind. Events are like a mighty stream borne onward

by a resistless force, -- a force outside of themselves, which cannot be controlled or modified. All we have to do is to acquiesce in being thus carried on. Whether we acquiesce or not makes no difference. A man falling from a precipice cannot by an act of will counteract the force of gravity; neither can he in any way control or modify the action of fate. His outward circumstances and inward acts are all equally determined by an inexorable law or influence residing out of himself. This at least is one form of fatalism. This view of the doctrine of necessity may rest on the assumption that the universe has the ground of its existence in itself, and is governed in all its operations by fixed laws, which determine the sequence of all events in the mineral, vegetable, and animal kingdom, by a like necessity. Or it may admit that the world owed its existence to an intelligent first cause, but assume that its author never designed to create free agents, but determined to set in operation certain causes which should work out given results.. However fatalists may differ as to the cause of the necessity which governs all events, they agree as to its nature. It may arise from the influence of the stars, as the ancient Chaldeans held; or from the operation of second causes, or from the original constitutions of things; or from the decree of God. It avowedly precludes all liberty of action, and reduces the acts of men to the same category with those of irrational animals. Properly speaking, however, fatalism refers this necessity to fate, an unintelligent cause.

2. A second form of the doctrine of necessity, is the mechanical theory. This denies that man is the efficient cause of his own acts. It represents him as passive, or as endued with no higher form of activity than spontaneity. It avowedly precludes the idea of responsibility. It assumes that the inward state of man, and consequently his acts, are determined by his outward circumstances. This doctrine as connected with the materialism of Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, and especially as fully developed by the French Encyclop&#65533;dists, supposes that from the constitution of our nature, some things give us pain, others pleasure: some excite desire, and others aversion; and that this susceptibility of being acted upon is all the activity which belongs to man, who is as purely a piece of living mechanism as the irrational animals. A certain external object produces a corresponding impression on the nerves, that is transmitted to the brain, and an answering impulse is sent back to the muscles; or the effect is spent on the brain itself in the form of thought or feeling thereby excited or evolved. The general features of this theory are the same so far as its advocates ignore any distinction between physical and moral necessity, and reject the doctrine of free agency and responsibility, however much they may differ on other points.

3. A third form of necessity includes all those theories which supersede the efficiency of second causes, by referring all events to the immediate agency of the first cause. This of course is done by Pantheism in all its forms, whether it merely makes God the soul of the world, and refers all the operations of nature and all the actions of men to his immediate agency; or whether it regards the world itself as God; or whether it makes God the only substance of which nature and mind are the phenomena. According to all these views, God is the only agent; all activity is but different modes in which the activity of God manifests itself.

The theory of occasional causes leads to the same result. According to this doctrine, all efficiency is in God. Second causes are only the occasions on which that efficiency is exerted. Although this system allows a real existence to matter and mind, and admits that

they are endowed with certain qualities and attributes, yet these are nothing more than susceptibilities, or receptivities for the manifestation of the divine efficiency. They furnish the occasions for the exercise of the all-pervading power of God. Matter and mind are alike passive: all the changes in the one, and all the appearance of activity in the other, are due to God's immediate operation.

Under the same head belongs the doctrine that the agency of God in the preservation of the world is a continuous creation. This mode of representation is indeed often adopted as a figure of speech by orthodox theologians; but if taken literally it implies the absolute inefficiency of all second causes. If God creates the outward world at every successive moment, He must be the immediate author of all its changes. There is no connection between what precedes and what follows, between antecedent and consequent, cause and effect, but succession in time; and when applied to the inward world, or the soul, the same consequence of necessity follows. The soul, at any given moment, exists only in a certain state; if in that state it is created, then the creative energy is the immediate cause of all its feelings, cognitions, and acts. The soul is not an agent; it is only something which God creates in a given form. All continuity of being, all identity, and all efficiency are lost; and the universe of matter and mind becomes nothing more than the continued pulsation of the life of God.

Nearly allied with the doctrine of a continued creation is the "exercise scheme." According to this theory the soul is a series of exercises created by God. There is no such thing as the soul, no self, but only certain perceptions which succeed each other with amazing rapidity. Hume denies any real cause. All we know is that these perceptions exist, and exist in succession. Emmons says, God creates them. It is of course in vain to speak of the liberty of man in producing the creative acts of God. If He creates our volitions in view of motives, they are his acts and not ours. The difference between this system and Pantheism is little more than nominal.

Contingency.

Directly opposed to all these schemes of necessity, is the doctrine of contingency, which has been held under different names and variously modified. Sometimes it is called the liberty of indifference; by which is meant, that the will, at the moment of decision, is self-poised among conflicting motives, and decides one way or the other, not because of the greater influence of one motive over others, but because it is indifferent or undetermined, able to act in accordance with the weaker against the stronger motive, or even without any motive at all. Sometimes this doctrine is expressed by the phrase, self-determining power of the will. By this it is intended to deny that the will is determined by motives, and to affirm that the reason of its decisions is to be sought in itself. It is a cause and not an effect, and therefore requires nothing out of itself to account for its acts. Sometimes this doctrine is called the power of contrary choice; that is, that in every volition there is and must be power to the contrary. Even supposing all antecedents external and internal to have been precisely the same, the decision might have been the reverse of what it actually was. Contingence is therefore necessary to liberty. This is the essential idea of this theory in all its forms. A contingent event is one which may or may not happen. Contingence, therefore, is opposed not merely to necessity, but also to certainty. If a man may act in opposition to all motives, external and internal, and in despite of all influence which can be exerted on

him, short of destroying his liberty, then it must forever remain uncertain how he will act. The advocates of this theory of liberty, therefore, maintain, that the will is independent of reason, of feeling, and of God. There is no middle ground, they say, between contingency (i.e., uncertainty), and fatalism; between the independence of the will and of the agent, and the denial of all free agency.

Although the advocates of the liberty of contingency generally direct their arguments against the doctrine of necessity, yet it is apparent that they regard certainty no less than necessity to be inconsistent with liberty. This is plain, (1.) From the designations which they give their theory, as liberty of indifference, self-determining power of the will, power to the contrary. (2.) From their formal definition of liberty, as the power to decide for or against, or without motives; or it is power of "willing what we will." "If," says Reid, "in every voluntary action, the determination of his will be the necessary consequence of something involuntary in the state of his mind, or of something in the external circumstances of the agent, he is not free." [258] Cousin says, "The will is mine, and I dispose absolutely of it within the limits of the spiritual world." [259] The Scotists of the Middle Ages, Molina and the Jesuits as a class, and all the opponents of Augustinianism, define liberty as consisting in indifference, or in the independence of the will of the preceding state of the mind, and make it to exclude certainty no less than necessity. (3.) From the arguments by which they endeavour to sustain their theory, which are directed as often against certainty as against necessity. (4.) From their answers to opposing arguments, and especially to that derived from the foreknowledge of God. As the foreknowledge of an act supposes the certainty of its occurrence, if free acts are known, they must be certain. To this the advocates of the theory in question make such answers as show that certainty is what they are contending against. They say that we have no right to argue on this subject from the attributes of God; it is a simple matter of consciousness; or they say, that God's foreknowledge may be limited, just as his power is limited by impossibilities. If it be impossible to foreknow free acts, they are not the objects of knowledge, and, therefore, not to foreknow them is not a limitation of the divine knowledge. From these and other considerations, it is plain that the theory of contingency in all its forms, is opposed to the doctrine of certainty no less than to that of necessity, in the proper sense of that term. By this, however, it is not meant that the advocates of contingency are consistent as to this point. Arguing against necessity, they frequently do not discriminate between physical and moral necessity. They class Hobbes, Hartley, Priestley, Belsham, Collins, Edwards, the French Encyclop&#65533;dists, and all who use the word necessity, under the same category; and yet they cannot avoid admitting, that in many cases free acts may be certain. They very often say that particular arguments prove certainty but not necessity; when certainty is precisely the thing contended for, and which they themselves deny. This is one of the unavoidable inconsistencies of error. No one, however, notwithstanding these admissions, will dispute that the theory of contingence, whether called indifference, self-determining power of the will, power of contrary choice, or by any other name, is in fact, and is intended to be, antagonistic to that of certainty.

Certainty.

The third general theory on this subject is separated by an equal distance from the doctrine of necessity on the one hand, and from that of contingency on the other. It teaches

that a man is free not only when his outward acts are determined by his will, but when his volitions are truly and properly his own, determined by nothing out of himself but proceeding from his own views, feelings, and immanent dispositions, so that they are the real, intelligent, and conscious expression of his character, or of what is in his mind.

This theory is often called the theory of moral or philosophical, as distinguished from physical, necessity. This is a most unfortunate and unsuitable designation. (1.) Because liberty and necessity are directly opposed. It is a contradiction to say that an act is free and yet necessary; that man is a free agent, and yet that all his acts are determined by a law of necessity. As all the advocates of the theory in question profess to believe in the freedom of the human will, or that man is a free agent, it is certainly to be regretted that they should use language which in its ordinary and proper sense teaches directly the reverse. (2.) Certainty and necessity are not the same, and therefore they should not be expressed by the same word. The necessity with which a stone falls to the ground, and the certainty with which a perfectly holy being confirmed in a state of grace will act holily, are as different as day and night. Applying the same term to express things essentially distinct tends to confound the things themselves. A man may be forced to do a thing against his will, but to say he can be forced to will against his will is a contradiction. A necessary volition is no volition, anymore than white is black. Because in popular language we often speak of a thing as necessary when it is absolutely certain, and although the Scriptures, written in the language of ordinary life, often do the same thing, is no reason why in philosophical discussions the word should be so used as unavoidably to mislead. (3.) Using the word necessity to express the idea of certainty brings the truth into reproach. It clothes it in the garb of error. It makes Edwards use the language of Hobbes. It puts Luther into the category with Spinoza; all Augustinians into the same class with the French materialists. They all use the same language, though their meaning is as diverse as possible. They all say that the acts of men are necessary. When they come to explain themselves, the one class says they are truly and properly necessary in such a sense that they are not free, and that they preclude the possibility of moral character or responsibility. The other class say that they are necessary, but in such a sense as to be nevertheless free and perfectly consistent with the moral responsibility of the agent. It is certainly a great evil that theories diametrically opposed to each other, that the doctrine of saints, and the doctrine of evils (to use Paul's language) should be expressed in the same words. We accordingly find the most respectable writers, as Reid and Stewart, arguing against Edwards as though he held the doctrine of Belsham.

By the old Latin writers the theory of moral certainty is commonly designated Lubentia Rationalis, or Rational Spontaneity. This is a much more appropriate designation. It implies that in every volition there are the elements of rationality and spontaneous action. In brutes there is a spontaneity but no reason, and therefore they are not free agents in such a sense as to be the objects ot approbation or disapprobation. In maniacs also there is self-determination, but it is irrational, and therefore not free. But wherever reason and the power of self-determination or spontaneity are combined in an agent, he is free and responsible for his outward acts and for his volitions. This representation would satisfy Reid, who says, "We see evidently that, as reason without active power can do nothing, so active power without reason has no guide to direct it to any end. These two conjoined make moral liberty." [260]

The old writers, in developing their doctrine of rational spontaneity were accustomed to say, the will is determined by the last judgment of the understanding. This is true or false as the language is interpreted. If by the last judgment of the understanding be meant the intellectual apprehension and conviction of the reasonableness and excellence of the object of choice, then none but the perfectly reasonable and good are always thus determined. Men in a multitude of cases choose that which their understanding condemns as wicked, trifling, or destructive. Or if the meaning be that every free act is the result of conscious deliberation, and consequent decision of the mind as to the desirableness of a given act, then again it cannot be said that the will follows the last dictate of the understanding. It is in reference probably to one or both of these interpretations of the language in question that Leibnitz says: "Non semper sequimur judicium ultimum intellectus practici, dum ad volendum nos determinamus; at ubi volumus, semper sequimur collectionem omnium inclinationum, tam a parte rationum, tam passionum, profectarum; id quod s[illegible]penumero sine expresso intellectus judicio contingit." [261] But what is really meant by this expression is that the views or feelings which determine the will are themselves determined by the understanding. If I desire anything, it is because I apprehend it as suitable to satisfy some craving of my nature. If I will anything because it is right, its being right is something for the understanding to discern. In other words, all the desires, affections, or feelings which determine the will to act must have an object, and that object by which the feeling is excited and towards which it tends, must be discerned by the understanding. It is this that gives them their rational character, and renders the determinations of the will rational. Any volition which does not follow the last dictate of the understanding, in this sense of the words, is the act of an idiot. It may be spontaneous, just as the acts of brutes are, but it cannot be free in the sense of being the act of an accountable person.

Another form under which this doctrine is often expressed is, that the will is as the greatest apparent good. This is a very common mode of stating the doctrine, derived from Leibnitz, the father of optimism, whose whole "Theodic[illegible]e" is founded on the assumption that sin is the necessary means of the greatest good. By "good," writers of this class generally mean "adapted to produce happiness," which is regarded as the summum bonum. Their doctrine is that the will always decides in favour of what promises the greatest happiness. It is not the greatest real, but the greatest apparent good which is said to determine the volition. A single draught from the bowl may appear to the drunkard, in the intensity of his craving, a greater good, i.e., as better suited to relieve and satisfy him, than the welfare of himself or family for life. This whole theory is founded on the assumption that happiness is the highest end, and that the desire of happiness is the ultimate spring of all voluntary action. As both of these principles are abhorrent to the great mass of cultivated, and especially of Christian minds; as men act from other and higher motives than a desire to promote their own happiness, there are few who, in our day, will adopt the doctrine that the will is as the greatest apparent good, as thus expounded. If, however, the word good be taken in a more comprehensive sense, including everything that is desirable, whether as right, becoming, or useful, as well as suited to give happiness, then the doctrine is no doubt true. The will in point of fact always is determined in favour of that which under some aspect, or for some reason, is regarded as good. Otherwise men might choose evil as evil, which would violate a fundamental law of all rational and sensuous natures.

It is still more common, at least in this country, to say that the will is always

determined by the strongest motive. To this mode of statement there are two obvious objections. (1.) The ambiguity of the word motive. If that word be taken in one sense, the statement is true; if taken in another, it is false. (2.) The impossibility of establishing any test of the relative strength of motives. If you make vivacity of feeling the test, then it is not true that the strongest motive always prevails. If you make the effect the test, then you say that the strongest motive is that which determines the will, -- which amounts to saying that the will is determined by that which determines it.

It is better to abide by the general statement. The will is not determined by any law of necessity; it is not independent, indifferent, or self-determined, but is always determined by the preceding state of mind; so that a man is free so long as his volitions are the conscious expression of his own mind; or so long as his activity is determined and controlled by his reason and feelings.

[258] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 1; Works, p. 599, Sir. W. Hamilton's edition, Edinburgh, 1849.

[259] Elements of Psychology, p. 357, Henry's translation. 4th edit., New York, 1856.

[260] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 5; Works, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 615.

[261] Works, edit. Geneva, 1768, vol. i. p. 156.

§ 2. Definition of Terms.

Before proceeding to give an outline of the usual arguments in support of this doctrine, it is important to state the meaning of the words employed. No one in the least conversant with discussions of this nature can have failed to remark how much difficulty arises from the ambiguity of the terms employed, and how often men appear to differ in doctrine, when in fact they only differ in language.

The Will.

First, the word will itself is one of those ambiguous terms. Ii is sometimes used in a wide sense, so as to include all the desires, affections, and even emotions. It has this comprehensive sense when all the faculties of the soul are said to be included under the two categories of understanding and will. Everything, therefore, pertaining to the soul, that does not belong to the former, is said to belong to the latter. All liking and disliking, all preferring, all inclination and disinclination, are in this sense acts of the will. At other times, the word is used for the power of self-determination, or for that faculty by which we decide on our acts. In this sense only purposes and imperative volitions are acts of the will. It is obvious that if a writer affirms the liberty of the will in the latter sense, and his reader takes the word in the former, the one can never understand the other. Or if the same writer sometimes uses the word in its wide and sometimes in its narrow sense, he will inevitably mislead himself and others. To say that we have power over our volitions, and to say that we have power over our desires are entirely different things. One of these propositions may be affirmed and the other denied; but if will and desire are confounded the distinction between these propositions is obliterated. It has often been remarked that the confusion of these two meanings of the word will is the great defect of President Edwards's celebrated work. He starts with a definition of the term, which makes it include all preferring, choosing, being pleased or displeased with, liking and disliking, and advocates a theory

which is true, and applicable only to the will in the restricted sense of the word.

Motive.

Secondly, The word motive is often taken in different senses. It is defined to be anything which has a tendency to move the mind. Any object adapted to awaken desire or affection; any truth or conception which is suited to influence a rational and sensitive being to a decision, is said to be a motive. This is what is called the objective sense of the word. In this sense it is very far from being true that the will is always determined by the strongest motive. The most important truths, the most weighty considerations, the most alluring objects, are often powerless, so far as the internal state of the mind is concerned. The word, however, is often used in a subjective sense, for those inward convictions, feelings, inclinations, and principles which are in the mind itself, and which impel or influence the man to decide one way rather than another. It is only in this sense of the term that the will is determined by the strongest motive. But even then it must be admitted, as before remarked, that we have no criterion or standard by which to determine the relative strength of motives, other than their actual effect. So that to say that the will is determined by the strongest motive, only means that it is not self-determined, but that in every rational volition the man is influenced to decide one way rather than another, by something within him, so that the volition is a revelation of what he himself is.

Cause.

Thirdly, The word cause is no less ambiguous. It sometimes means the mere occasion; sometimes the instrument by which something is accomplished; sometimes the efficiency to which the effect is due; sometimes the end for which a thing is done, as when we speak of final causes; sometimes the ground or reason why the effect or action of the efficient cause is so rather than otherwise. To say that motives are the occasional causes of volition, is consistent with any theory of agency, whether of necessity or indifference; to say that they are efficient causes, is to transfer the efficiency of the agent to the motives; but to say that they are the ground or reason why the volitions are what they are, is only to say that every rational being, in every voluntary act, must have a reason, good or bad, for acting as he does. Most of the arguments against the statement that motives are the cause of volitions, are founded on the assumption that they are affirmed to be producing causes, and that it is intended to deny that the agent is the efficient cause of his own acts; whereas, the meaning simply is that motives are the reasons which determine the agent to assert his efficiency in one way rather than another. They are, however, truly causes, in so far as they determine the effect to be thus, and not otherwise. Parental love may induce a mother to watch by a sick child, and in this sense is the cause of her devotion, but she is none the less the efficient cause of all her acts of tenderness. Reid says, "either the man is the cause of the action. and then it is a free action, and is justly imputed to him, or it must have another cause, and cannot justly be imputed to the man." [262] This supposes that the word cause has but one sense. In the case just supposed, the mother is the efficient, her love the rational cause or reason of her acts. Is it a denial of her free agency to say that her love determined her will in favour of attention instead of neglect?

Liberty.

Fourthly, No little ambiguity arises from confounding liberty of the will with liberty of the agent. These forms of expression are often used as equivalent. The same thing is

perhaps commonly intended by saying, "The will is free," and "The agent is free." It is admitted that the same thought may be properly expressed by these phrases. As we speak of freedom of conscience, when we mean to say that the man is free as to his conscience; so we may speak of freedom of the will, when all we mean is, that the man is free in willing. The usage, however, which makes these expressions synonymous is liable to the following objections: (1.) Predicating liberty of the will is apt to lead to our conceiving of the will as separated from the agent; as a distinct self-acting power in the soul. Or, if this extreme be avoided, which is not always the case, the will is regarded as too much detached from the other faculties of the soul, and as out of sympathy with it in its varying stales. The will is only the soul willing. The soul is of course a unit. A self-determination is a determination of the will, and whatever leads to a self-decision leads to a decision of the will. (2.) A second objection to confounding these expressions is, that they are not really equivalent. The man may be free, when his will is in bondage. It is a correct and established usage of language, expressive of a real fact of consciousness, to speak of an enslaved will in a free agent. This is not a mere metaphor, but a philosophical truth. He that commits sin is the servant of sin. Long-continued mental or bodily habits may bring the will into bondage, while the man continues a free agent. A man who has been for years a miser, has his will in a state of slavery, yet the man is perfectly free. He is self-controlled, self-determined. His avarice is himself. It is his own darling, cherished feeling. (3.) There is no use to have two expressions for the same thing; the one appropriate, the other ambiguous. What we really mean is, that the agent is free. That is the only point to which any interest is attached. The man is the responsible subject. If he be free so as to be justly account able for his character and conduct, it matters not what are the laws which determine the operations of his reason, conscience, or will; or whether liberty can be predicated of either of those faculties separately considered. We maintain that the man is free; but we deny that the will is free in the sense of being independent of reason, conscience, and feeling. In other words, a man cannot be independent of himself, or any one of his faculties independent of all the rest.

Liberty and Ability.

Fifthly, Another fruitful source of confusion on this subject, is confounding liberty with ability. The usage which attaches the same meaning to these terms is very ancient. Augustine denied free will to man since the fall. Pelagius affirmed freedom of will to be essential to our nature. The former intended simply to deny to fallen man the power to turn himself unto God. The latter defined liberty to be the ability at any moment to determine himself either for good or evil. The controversy between Luther and Erasmus was really about ability, nominally it was about free-will. Luther's book is entitled "De Servo Arbitrio," that of Erasmus, "De Libero Arbitrio." This usage pervades all the symbols of the Reformation, and was followed by the theologians of the sixteenth century. They all ascribe free agency to man in the true sense of the words, but deny to him freedom of will. To a great extent this confusion is still kept up. Many of the prevalent definitions of liberty are definitions of liberty are definitions of ability; and much that is commonly advanced to prove the liberty of the will, is really intended, and is of force only as in support of the doctrine of ability. Jacobi denies liberty to be the power to decide in favour of the dictates of reason in opposition to the solicitations of sense. Bretschneider says it is the power to decide according to reason. Augustine, and after him most Augustinians distinguished, (1.) The liberty of man before the fall, which was an ability either to sin or not to sin. (2.) The

state of man since the fall, when he has liberty to sin, but not to good. (3.) The state of man in heaven when he has liberty to good, but not to evil. This last is the highest form of liberty, a felix necessitas boni. This is the liberty which belongs to God. In the popular mind perhaps the common idea of liberty is, the power to decide for good or evil, sin or holiness. This idea pervades more or less all the disquisitions in favour of the liberty of indifference, or of power to the contrary. The essence of liberty in a moral accountable being, according to Reid, is the power to do what he is accountable for. So Cousin, Jouffroy, Tappan, and this whole class of writers, make liberty and ability synonymous. The last-mentioned author, when speaking of the distinction between natural and moral inability, says, "when we have denied liberty in denying a self-determining power, these definitions, in order to make out a quasi liberty and ability, are nothing but ingenious folly and plausible deception." [263] Here liberty and ability are avowedly used as convertible terms.

Other writers who do not ignore the distinction between liberty and ability, yet distinguish them only as different forms of liberty. This is the case with many of the German authors. As for example with Mller, who distinguishes the Formale Freiheit, or ability, from the Reale Freiheit, or liberty as it actually exists. The former is only necessary as the condition of the latter. That is, he admits, that if a man's acts are certainly determined by his character, he is really free. But in order to render him justly responsible for his character, it must be self-acquired. [264] This is confounding things which are not only distinct, but which are admitted to be distinct. It is admitted by this class of writers, and, indeed, by the whole Christian world, that men since the fall have not power to make themselves holy; much less to effect this transformation by a volition. It is admitted that saints in glory are infallibly determined by their character to holiness, yet fallen men and saints are admitted to be free. Ability may be lost, yet liberty remain. The former is lost since the fall. Restored by grace, as they say, it is to be again lost in that liberty to good which is identical with necessity. If liberty and ability are thus distinct, why should they be confounded? We are conscious of liberty. We know ourselves to be free in all our volitions. They reveal themselves to our inmost consciousness as acts of self-determination. We cannot disown them, or escape responsibility on account of them, even if we try; and yet no man is conscious of ability to change his own heart. Free agency belongs to God, to angels, to saints in glory, to fallen men, and to Satan; and it is the same in all. Yet in the strictest sense of the words, God cannot do evil; neither can Satan recover, by a volition, his lost inheritance of holiness. It is a great evil thus to confound things essentially distinct. It produces endless confusion. Augustine says, man is not free since the fall, because he cannot but sin; saints are free because they cannot sin. Inability in the one case destroys freedom; inability in the other is the perfection of freedom! Necessity is the very opposite of liberty, and yet they are said to be identical. One man in asserting the freedom of the will, means to assert free agency, while he denies ability; another means by it full ability. It is certainly important that the same words should not be used to express antagonistic ideas.

Confusion of thought and language, however, is not the principal evil which arises from making liberty and ability identical. It necessarily brings us into conflict with the truth, and with the moral judgments of men. There are three truths of which every man is convinced from the very constitution of his nature. (1.) That he is a free agent. (2.) That none but free agents can be accountable for their character or conduct. (3.) That he does not possess ability to change his moral state by an act of the will. Now, if in order to express

the fact of his inability, we say, that he is not a free agent, we contradict his consciousness; or, if he believe what we say, we destroy his sense of responsibility. Or it we tell him that because he is a free agent, he has power to change his heart at will, we again bring ourselves into conflict with his convictions. He knows he is a free agent, and yet he knows that he has not the power to make himself holy. Free agency is the power to decide according to our character; ability is the power to change our character by a volition. The former, the Bible and consciousness affirm belongs to man in every condition of his being the latter, the Bible and consciousness teach with equal explicitness does not belong to fallen man. The two things, therefore, ought not to be confounded.

Self-determination and Self-determination of the Will.

Sixthly, Another source of confusion is not discriminating between self-determination and self-determination of the will. Those who use the latter expression, say they intend to deny that the will is determined by the antecedent state of the mind, and to affirm that it has a self-determining power, independent of anything preexisting or co<?>xisting. They say that those who teach that when the state of the mind is the same, the volition will inevitably be the same, teach necessity and fatalism, and reduce the will to a machine. "I know," says Reid, "nothing more that can be desired to establish fatalism throughout the universe. When it is proved that, through all nature, the same consequences invariably result from the same circumstances, the doctrine of liberty must be given up." [265] The opposite doctrine is, that the will is "self-moved; it makes its nisus of itself, and of itself it forbears to make it, and within the sphere of its activity, and in relation to its objects, it has the power of selecting, by a mere arbitrary act, any particular object. It is a cause all whose acts, as well as any particular act, considered as phenomena demanding a cause, are accounted for in itself alone." [266] Thus, if it be asked why the will decides one way rather than another, the reason is to be sought in its self-determining power. It can by an arbitrary act, choose or not choose, choose one way or another, without a motive or with a motive, for or against any or all influences brought to bear upon it. But when these writers come to prove their case, it turns out that this is not at all what they mean. It is not the self-determining power of the will, but the self-determining power of the agent that they are contending for. Reid says that all that is involved in free agency is that man is an agent, the author of his own acts or that we are "efficient causes in our deliberate and voluntary actions." [267] "To say that man is a free agent, is no more than to say that, in some instances, he is truly an agent and a cause, and is not merely acted upon as a passive instrument." [268] Dr. Samuel Clarke, in his controversy with Leibnitz, says, "the power of self-motion or action, which, in all animate agents, is spontaneity, is, in moral or rational agents, what we properly call liberty." Again, he says, "the true definition of liberty is the power to act." Now, as all the advocates of the doctrine of moral certainty admit self-determination of the agent, and deny the self-determining power of the will, the greatest confusion must follow from confounding these two things; and, besides this, undue advantage is thereby secured for the doctrine of the self-determining power of the will, by arguments which prove only self-determination, which every man admits. On the other hand unfair prejudice is created against the truth by representing it as denying the power of self-determination, when it only denies the self-determining power of the will. Thus President Edwards is constantly represented as denying that volitions are self-determinations, or that the mind is the efficient cause of its own acts, or that man is an agent, because he wrote against the self-determining power of

the will as taught by Clarke and Whitby. These two things ought not to be confounded, because they are really distinct. When we say that an agent is self-determined, we say two things. (1.) That he is the author or efficient cause of his own act. (2.) That the grounds or reasons of his determination are within himself. He is determined by what constitutes him at the moment a particular individual, his feelings, principles, character, dispositions; and not by any ab extra or coercive influence. But when we say that the will is self-determined, we separate it from the other constituents of the man, as an independent power, and on the one hand, deny that it is determined by anything in the man; and on the other, affirm that it determines itself by an inherent self-moving, arbitrary power. In this case the volition ceases to be a decision of the agent, for it may be contrary to that agent's whole character, principles, inclinations, feelings, convictions, or whatever else makes him what he is.

[262] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. ix.; Works, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 625.

[263] Review of Edwards, edit. New York, 1839, pp. 164, 165.

[264] "Frei ist ein Wesen inwiefern die innere Mitte seines Lebens aus der heraus es wirkt und th□tig ist, durch Selbstbestimmung bedingt ist." Lehre von der S□nde, vol. ii. p. 72. He elsewhere defines liberty to be the power of self-development. "Freiheit ist Macht aus sich zu werden." p. 62.

[265] It may be well to remark, in passing, how uniformly writers of the school to which Reid belongs, identify certainty and necessity, so long as they argue against an opponent. In the passage above quoted, it is not that the will is determined by necessity, or by a cause out of the mind, but simply that the same decisions "invariably" occur in the same circumstances, that is declared to be fatalism.

[266] Tappan's Review of Edwards, edit. New York, 1839, p. 223.

[267] Active Powers, Essay v. ch. 2; Works, Edinburgh, 1849, p. 603.

[268] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 3; Works, p. 607.

§ 3. Certainty Consistent with Liberty.

Although the doctrine of necessity subverts the foundation of all morality and religion, our present concern is with the doctrine of contingency. We wish simply to state the case as between certainty and uncertainty. The doctrine of necessity, in the proper sense of the word, is antichristian; but the Christian world is, and ever has been divided between the advocates and opponents of the doctrine of contingency. All Augustinians maintain that a free act may be inevitably certain as to its occurrence.. All Anti-Augustinians, whether Pelagians, Semi-Pelagians, or Arminians, and most moral philosophers and metaphysicians, take the opposite ground. They teach that as the will has a self-determining power it may decide against all motives internal or external, against all influences divine or human, so that its decisions cannot be rendered inevitable without destroying their liberty. The very essence of liberty, they say, is power to the contrary. In other words, a free act is one performed with the consciousness that under precisely the same circumstances, that is, in the same internal as well as external state of the mind, it might have been the opposite. According to the one doctrine, the will is determined; according to the other, it determines itself. In the one case, our acts are or may be inevitably certain and yet be free. In the other, in order to be free, they must be uncertain. We have already proved that this is a fair

statement of the case; that the advocates of moral necessity mean thereby certainty; and that the advocates of contingency mean thereby uncertainty. We have admitted that the use of the word necessity, even when qualified by saying negatively, that it is not "absolute, physical, or mechanical," and that it is merely philosophical or moral, is unfortunate and inappropriate. And if any opponent of Augustine or Edwards say that all he denies is an absolute or physical necessity, and that he has no objection to the doctrine of certainty, then the difference between him and Edwards is merely verbal. But the real controversy lies deeper. It is not the word, but the thing that is opposed. There is a real difference as to the nature of free agency; and that difference concerns this very point: may the acts of free agents be rendered inevitably certain without destroying their liberty?

Points of Agreement.

It may be well before proceeding further, to state the points as to which the parties to this controversy are agreed.

1. They are agreed that man is a free agent, in such a sense as to be responsible for his character and acts. The dispute is not about the fact, but the nature of free agency. If any one denied that men are responsible moral agents, then he belongs to the school of necessity, and is not a party to the discussion now under consideration.

2. It is agreed as to the nature of free agency that it supposes both reason and active power. Mere spontaneity does not constitute free agency, because that is found in brutes, in idiots, and in maniacs. There is no dispute as to what is meant by reason as one of the elements of free agency; and so for as active power, which is its second element, is concerned, it is agreed that it means or includes efficiency. In other words, it is agreed that a free agent is the efficient cause of his own acts.

3. It is admitted, on both sides, that in all important cases, men act under the influence of motives. Reid, indeed, endeavours to show that in many cases the will decides without any motive. When there is no ground of preference, he says this must be the case; as when a man decides which of fifty shillings he shall give away. He admits, however, that these arbitrary decisions relate only to trifles. Others of the same school acknowledge that no rational volition is ever arrived at except under the influence of motives.

4. It is further agreed that the will is not determined with certainty by external motives. All Augustinians deny that the internal state of the mind which determines the will, is itself necessarily or certainly determined by anything external to the mind itself.

5. It may be assumed, also, that the parties are agreed that the word will is to be taken in its proper, restricted sense. The question is not, whether men have power over their affections, their likes and dislikes. No one carries the power of the will so far as to maintain that we can, by a volition, change our feelings. The question concerns our volitions alone. It is the ground or reason of acts of self-determination that is in dispute. And, therefore, it is the will considered as the faculty of self-determination, and not as the seat of the affections, that comes into view. The question, why one man is led to love God, or Christ, or his fellow men, or truth and goodness; and another to love the world, or sin, is very different from the question, what determines him to do this or that particular act. The will is that faculty by which we determine to do something which we conceive to be in our power. The question, whether a man has power to change his own character at any moment, to give himself, in the language of Scripture, a new heart, concerns the extent of his power.

That is, it is a question concerning the ability or inability of the sinner; and it is a most important question: but it should not be confounded with the question of free agency, which is the one now under consideration.

The whole question therefore is, whether, when a man decides to do a certain thing, his will is determined by the previous state of his mind. Or, whether, with precisely the same views and feelings, his decision may be one way at one time, and another at an other. That is, whether the will, or rather the agent, in order to be free, must be undetermined.

Argument that Certainty suits all Free Agents.

It is certainly a strong argument in favour of that view of free agency, which makes it consistent with certainty, or which supposes that an agent may be determined with inevitable certainty as to his acts, and yet those acts remain free, that it suits all classes or conditions of free agents. To deny free agency to God, would be to deny Him personality, and to reduce Him to a mere power or principle. And yet, in all the universe, is there anything so certain as that God will do right? But if it be said that the conditions of existence in an infinite being are so different from what they are in creatures, that it is not fair to argue from the one to the other, we may refer to the case of our blessed Lord. He had a true body and a reasonable soul. He had a human will; a mind regulated by the same laws as those which determine the intellectual and voluntary acts of ordinary men. In his case, however, although there may have been the metaphysical possibility of evil (though even that is a painful hypothesis), still it was more certain that He would be without sin than that the sun or moon should endure. No conceivable physical law could be more certain in the production of its effects than his will in always deciding for the right. But if it be objected even to this case, that the union of the divine and human natures in the person of our Lord places Him in a different category from ourselves, and renders it unfair to assume that what was true in his case must be true in ours; without admitting the force of the objection, we may refer to the condition of the saints in heaven. They, beyond doubt, continue to be free agents; and yet their acts are, and to everlasting will be, determined with absolute and inevitable certainty to good. Certainty, therefore, must be consistent with free agency. What can any Christian say to this? Does he deny that the saints in glory are free, or does he deny the absolute certainty of their perseverance in holiness? Would his conception of the blessedness of heaven be thereby exalted? Or would it raise his ideas of the dignity of the redeemed to believe it to be uncertain whether they will be sinful or holy? We may, however, come down to our present state of existence. Without assuming anything as to the corruption of our nature, or taking for granted anything which Pelagius would deny, it is a certain fact that all men sin. There has never existed a mere man on the face of the earth who did not sin. When we look on a new-born infant we know that whatever may be uncertain in its future, it is absolutely, inevitably certain that, should it live, it will sin. In every aspect, therefore, in which we can contemplate free agency, whether in God, in the human nature of Christ, in the redeemed in heaven, or in man here on earth, we find that it is compatible with absolute certainty.

Arguments from Scripture.

A second argument on this subject is derived from those doctrines of Scripture which necessarily suppose that free acts may be certain as to their occurrence.

1. The first and most obvious of these doctrines is the foreknowledge of God.

Whatever metaphysical explanation may be given of this divine attribute; however we may ignore the distinction between knowledge and foreknowledge, or however we may contend that because God inhabits eternity, and is in no wise subject to the limitations of time, and that to Him nothing is successive, still the fact remains that we exist in time, and that to us there is a future as well as a present. It remains, therefore, a fact that human acts are known before they occur in time, and consequently are foreknown. But if foreknown as future, they must be certain; not because foreknowledge renders their occurrence certain, but because it supposes it to be so. It is a contradiction in terms to say that an uncertain event can be foreknown as certain. To deny foreknowledge to God, to say that free acts, because necessarily uncertain as to their occurrence, are not the objects of foreknowledge any more than sounds are the objects of sight, or mathematical truths of the affections, is to destroy the very idea of God. The future must be as dark to Him as to us; and He must every moment be receiving vast accessions of knowledge. He cannot be an eternal being, pervading all duration with a simultaneous existence, much less an omniscient Being, to whom there is nothing new. It is impossible, therefore, to believe in God as He is revealed in the Bible, unless we believe that all things are known unto Him from the beginning. But if all things are known, all things, whether fortuitous or free, are certain; consequently certainty must be consistent with freedom. We are not more assured of our existence than we are of our free agency. To say that this is a delusion is to deny the veracity of consciousness, which of necessity not only involves a denial of the veracity of God, but also subverts the foundation of all knowledge, and plunges us into absolute scepticism. We may just as well say that our existence is a delusion as that any other fact of consciousness is delusive. We have no more and no higher evidence for one such fact than for another. Men may speculate as they please, they must believe and act according to the laws impressed on our nature by ur Creator. We must believe, therefore, in our existence and in our free agency; and as by a necessity scarcely less imperative we must believe that all things are known to God from eternity, and that if foreknown their occurrence is certain, we cannot deny that certainty is consistent with free agency without involving ourselves in palpable contradictions. This argument is so conclusive that most theistical advocates of the doctrine of contingency, when they come to deal with it, give the matter up, and acknowledge that an act may be certain as to its occurrence and yet free. They content themselves for the time being with denying that it is necessary, although it may be certain. But they forget that by "moral necessity" nothing more than certainty is intended, and that certainty is precisely the thing which, on other occasions, they affirm to be contrary to liberty. If from all eternity it is fixed how every man will act; if the same consequences follow invariably from the same antecedents; if the acts of men are inevitable, this is declared to be fatalism. If, however, it be indeed true that the advocates of indifference, self-determining power of the will, power of contrary choice, or by whatever other name the theory of contingency may be called, really do not intend to oppose the doctrine of certainty, but are simply combating fatalism or physical necessity, then the controversy is ended. What more could Leibnitz or Edwards ask than Reid concedes in the following passage: "It must be granted, that, as whatever was, certainly was, and whatever is, certainly is, so whatever shall be, certainly shall be. These are identical propositions, and cannot be doubted by those who conceive them distinctly. But I know no rule of reasoning by which it can be inferred that because an event certainly shall be, therefore its production

must be necessary. The manner of its production, whether free or necessary, cannot be concluded from the time of its production, whether it be past, present, or future. That it shall be, no more implies that it shall be necessarily than that it shall be freely produced; for neither present, past, nor future, have any more connection with necessity than they have with freedom. I grant, therefore, that from events being foreseen, it may be justly concluded, that, they are certainly future; but from their being certainly future it does not follow that they are necessary." [269] As all things are foreseen all things are inevitably certain as to their occurrence. This is granting all any Augustinian need demand.

2. Another doctrine held by a large part of the Christian world in all ages which of necessity precludes the doctrine of contingency, is that of the foreordination of future events. Those who believe that God foreordains whatever comes to pass must believe that the occurrence of all events is determined with unalterable certainty. It is not our object to prove any of these doctrines, but simply to argue from them as true. It may, however, be remarked that there is no difficulty attending the doctrine of foreordination which does not attach to that of foreknowledge. The latter supposes the certainty of free acts, and the former secures their certainty. If their being certain be consistent with liberty, their being rendered certain cannot be incompatible with it. All that foreordination does is to render it certain that free acts shall occur. The whole difficulty is in their being certain, and that must be admitted by every consistent theist. The point now in hand is, that those who believe that the Bible teaches the doctrine of foreordination are shut up to the conclusion that an event may be free and yet certain, and therefore that the theory of contingency which supposes that an act to be free must be uncertain, is unscriptural and false.

3. The doctrine of divine providence involves the same conclusion. That doctrine teaches that God governs all his creatures and all their actions. That is, that He so conducts the administration of his government as to accomplish all his purposes. Here again the difficulty is the same, and is no greater than before. Foreknowledge supposes certainty; foreordination determines it; and providence effects it. The last does no more than the first of necessity presupposes. If certainty be compatible with freedom, providence which only secures certainty cannot be inconsistent with it. Who for any metaphysical difficulty -- who, because he is not able to comprehend how God can effectually govern free agents without destroying their nature, would give up the doctrine of providence? Who would wish to see the reins of universal empire fall from the hands of infinite wisdom and love, to be seized by chance or fate? Who would not rather be governed by a Father than by a tornado? If God cannot effectually control the acts of free agents there can be no prophecy, no prayer, no thanksgiving, no promises, no security of salvation, no certainty whether in the end God or Satan is to be triumphant, whether heaven or hell is to be the consummation. Give us certainty -- the secure conviction that a sparrow cannot fall, or a sinner move a finger, but as God permits and ordains. We must have either God or Satan to rule. And if God has a providence He must be able to render the free acts of his creatures certain; and therefore certainty must be consistent with liberty. Was it not certain that Christ should, according to the Scriptures, be by wicked hands crucified and slain, and yet were not his murderers free in all they did? Let it be remembered that in all these doctrines of providence, foreordination, and foreknowledge nothing is assumed beyond what Reid, one of the most able opponents of Leibnitz and Edwards, readily admits. He grants the prescience of future events; he grants that prescience supposes certainty, and that is all that either foreordination

or providence secures. If an act may be free, although certainly foreknown, it may be free although foreordained and secured by the great scheme of providence.

4. The whole Christian world believes that God can convert men. They believe that He can effectually lead them to repentance and faith; and that He can secure them in heaven from ever falling into sin. That is, they believe that He can render their free acts absolutely certain. When we say that this is the faith of the whole Christian world we do not mean that no individual Christian or Christian theologian has ever denied this doctrine of grace; but we do mean that the doctrine, to the extent above stated, is included in the Confessions of all the great historical churches of Christendom in all ages. It is just as much a part of the established faith of Christians as the divinity of our Redeemer. This being the fact, the doctrine that contingency is necessary to liberty cannot be reconciled with Christian doctrine. It has, indeed, been extensively held by Christians; but our object is to show that it is in conflict within doctrines which they themselves as Christians must admit. If God can fulfil his promise to give men a new heart; if He can translate them from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of his dear Son; if He can give them repentance unto life; if there be no impropriety in praying that He would preserve them from falling, and give them the secure possession of eternal life, then He can control their free acts. He can, by his grace, without violating their freedom, make it absolutely certain that they will repent and believe, and persevere in holiness. If these things are so, then it is evident that any theory which makes contingency or uncertainty essential to liberty must be irreconcilable with some of the plainest and most precious doctrines of the Scriptures.

The Argument from Consciousness.

A third argument on this subject is derived from consciousness. It is conceded that every man is conscious of liberty in his voluntary acts. It is conceded further that this consciousness proves the fact of free agency. The validity of this argument urged by the advocates of contingency against the doctrine of necessity in any such form as involves a denial of this fact of consciousness, we fully admit. The doctrine opposed by Reid and Stewart, as well as by many continental writers, was really a doctrine which denied both the liberty and responsibility of man. This is not the Augustinian or Edwardean doctrine, although unhappily both are expressed by the same terms. The one is the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity; the other that of certainty. As between the advocates of the latter theory and the defenders of contingency, it is agreed that man is a free agent; it is further agreed that it is included in the consciousness of free agency, that we are efficient and responsible authors of our own acts, that we had the power to perform or not to perform any voluntary act of which we were the authors. But we maintain that we are none the less conscious that this intimate conviction that we had power not to perform an act, is conditional. That is, we are conscious that the act might have been otherwise had other views or feelings been present to our minds, or been allowed their due weight. No man is conscious of a power to will against his will; that is, the will, in the narrow sense of the word, cannot be against the will in the wide sense of the term. This is only saying, that a man cannot prefer against his preference or choose against his choice. A volition is a preference resulting in a decision. A man may have one preference at one time and another at another. He may have various conflicting feelings or principles in action at the same time; but he cannot have co&#65533;xisting opposite preferences. What consciousness teaches on

this subject seems to be simply this: that in every voluntary act we had some reason for acting as we did; that in the absence of that reason, or in the presence of others, which others we may feel ought to have been present, we should or could have acted differently. Under the reasons for an act are included all that is meant by the word motives, in the subjective sense of the term; i.e., principles, inclinations, feelings, etc. We cannot conceive that a man can be conscious that, with his principles, feelings, and inclinations being one way, his will may be another way. A man filled with the fear of God, or with the love of Christ, cannot will to blaspheme his God or Saviour. That fear or love constitutes for the time being the man. He is a man existing in that state, and if his acts do not express that state they are not his.

Argument from the Moral Character of Volition.

This suggests a fourth argument on this subject. Unless the will be determined by the previous state of the mind, in opposition to being self-determined, there can be no morality in our acts. A man is responsible for his external acts, because they are decided by his will; he is responsible for his volitions, because they are determined by his principles and feelings; he is responsible for his principles and feelings, because of their inherent nature as good or bad, and because they are his own, and constitute his character. If you detach the outward act from the will it ceases to have any moral character. If I kill a man, unless the act was intentional, i.e., the result of a volition to kill or injure, there is no morality in the act. If I willed to kill, then the character of the act depends on the motives which determined the volition. If those motives were a regard to the authority of God, or of the demands of justice legally expressed, the volition was right. If the motive was malice or cupidity, the volition and consequent act were wrong. It is obvious that if the will be self-determined, independent of the previous state of the mind, it has no more character than the outward act detached from the volition, -- it does not reveal or express anything in the mind. If a man when filled with pious feeling can will the most impious acts; or, when filled with enmity to God, have the volitions of a saint, then his volitions and acts have nothing to do with the man himself. They do not express his character and he cannot be responsible for them.

Argument from the Rational Nature of Man.

The doctrine that the will is determined and not self-determined, is moreover involved in the rational character of our acts. A rational act is not merely an act performed by a rational being, but one performed for a reason, whether good or bad. An act performed without a reason, without intention or object, for which no reason be assigned beyond the mere power of acting, is as irrational as the actions of a brute or of an idiot. If the will therefore ever acts independently of the understanding and of the feelings, its volitions are not the acts of a rational being any further than they would be if reason were entirely dethroned. The only true idea of liberty is that of a being acting in accordance with the laws of its nature. So long as an animal is allowed to act under the control of its own nature, determined in all it does by what is within itself, it has all the liberty of which it is capable. And so long as a man is determined in his volitions and acts by his own reason and feelings he has all the liberty of which he is capable. But if you detach the acts of an animal from its inward state its liberty is gone. It becomes possessed. And if the acts of a man are not determined by his reason and feelings he is a puppet or a maniac.

The doctrine that the will acts independently of the previous state of the mind supposes that our volitions are isolated atoms, springing up from the abyss of the capricious self-determination of the will, from a source beyond the control or ken of reason. They are purely casual, arbitrary, or capricious. They have no connection with the past, and give no promise of the future. On this hypothesis there can be no such thing as character. It is, however, a fact of experience universally admitted, that there are such things as principles or dispositions which control the will. We feel assured that an honest man will act honestly, and that a benevolent man will act benevolently. We are moreover assured that these principles may be so strong and fixed as to render the volitions absolutely certain. "Rational beings," says Reid, "in proportion as they are wise and good, will act according to the best motives; and every rational being who does otherwise, abuses his liberty. The most perfect being, in everything where there is a right and a wrong, a better and a worse, always infallibly acts according to the best motives. This, indeed, is little else than an identical proposition; for it is a contradiction to say, that a perfect being does what is wrong or unreasonable. But to say that he does not act freely, because he always does what is best, is to say, that the proper use of liberty destroys liberty, and that liberty consists only in its abuse." [270] That is, the character determines the act; and to say that the infallible certainty of acts destroys their freedom is to make "liberty destroy liberty." Though Reid and Stewart wrote against Leibnitz and Edwards as well as against Hobbes and Belsham, the sentences above quoted contain the whole doctrine of the two former distinguished men, and of their innumerable predecessors, associates, and followers. It is the doctrine that infallible certainty is consistent with liberty. This conviction is so wrought into the minds of men that they uniformly, unconsciously as well as consciously, act upon it. They assume that a man's volitions are determined by motives. They take for granted that there is such a thing as character; and therefore they endeavour to mould the character of those under their influence, assured that if they make the tree good the fruit will be good. They do not act on the principle that the acts of men are capricious, that the will is self-determined, acting without or against motives as well as with them; so that it must always and forever remain uncertain how it will decide.

Argument from the Doctrine of a Sufficient Cause.

The axiom that every effect must have a cause, or the doctrine of a sufficient reason, applies to the internal as well as to the external world. It governs the whole sphere of our experience, inward and outward. Every volition is an effect, and therefore must have a cause. There must have been some sufficient reason why it was so, rather than otherwise. That reason was not the mere power of the agent to act; for that only accounts for his acting, not for his acting one way rather than another. The force of gravity accounts for a stone falling to the earth, but not for its falling here instead of there. The power to walk accounts for a man's walking, but not for his walking east rather than west. Yet we are told even by the most distinguished writers, that the efficiency of the agent is all that is required to satisfy the instinctive demand which we make for a sufficient reason, in the case of our volitions. Reid, as quoted above, asks, "Was there a cause of the action? Undoubtedly there was. Of every event there must be a cause that had power sufficient to produce it, and that exerted that power for the purpose. In the present case, either the man was the cause of the action, and then it was a free action, and is justly imputed to him; or it must have had another cause, and cannot justly be imputed to the man. In this sense, therefore, it is granted

that there was a sufficient reason for the action; but the question about liberty, is not in the least affected by this concession." [271] Again, he asks, "Why may not an efficient cause be defined to be a being that had power and will to produce the effect? The production of an effect requires active power, and active power, being a quality, must be in a being endowed with that power. Power without will produces no effect; but, where these are conjoined, the effect must be produced." [272] Sir William Hamilton's annotation on the former of these passages is, "that of a hyper-physical as well as of a physical event, we must, by a necessary mental law, always suppose a sufficient reason why it is, and is as it is." The efficiency of the agent, therefore, is not a sufficient reason for the volition being as it is. It is inconceivable that an undetermined cause should act one way rather than another; and if it does act thus without a sufficient reason, its action can be neither rational nor moral.

Another common method of answering this argument is to assume that because the advocates of certainty say that the will is determined by motives, and therefore, that the motives are the cause why the volition is as it is, they mean that the efficiency to which the volition is due is in the motives, and not in the agent. Thus Stewart says, "The question is not concerning the influence of motives, but concerning the nature of that influence. The advocates for necessity [certainty] represent it as the influence of a cause in producing its effect. The advocates for liberty acknowledge that the motive is the occasion for acting, or the reason for acting, but contend that it is so far from being the efficient cause of it, that it supposes the efficiency to reside elsewhere, namely, in the mind of the agent." [273] This representation has been sufficiently answered above. Motives are not the efficient cause of the volition; that efficiency resides in the agent; but what we, "by a necessary mental law," must demand, is a sufficient reason why the agent exerts his efficiency in one way rather than another. To refer us simply to his efficiency, is to leave the demand for a sufficient reason entirely unsatisfied; in other words, it is to assume that there may be an effect without a cause; which is impossible.

The doctrine of free agency, therefore, which underlies the Bible, which is involved in the consciousness of every rational being, and which is assumed and acted on by all men, is at an equal remove, on the one hand, from the doctrine of physical or mechanical necessity, which precludes the possibility of liberty and responsibility; and, on the other, from the doctrine of contingency, which assumes that an act in order to be free must be uncertain; or that the will is self determined, acting independently of the reason, conscience, inclinations and feelings. It teaches that a man is a free and responsible agent, because he is author of his own acts, and because he is determined to act by nothing out of himself, but by his own views, convictions inclinations, feelings, and dispositions, so that his acts are the true products of the man, and really represent or reveal what he is. The profoundest of modern authors admit that this is the true theory of liberty; but some of them, as for example Mller, in his elaborate work on "Sin," maintain that in order to render man justly responsible for the acts which are thus determined by their internal state or character, that state must itself be self-produced. This doctrine has already been sufficiently discussed when treating of original sin. It may, however, be here remarked, in conclusion of the present discussion, that the principle assumed is contrary to the common judgment of men. That judgment is that the dispositions and feelings which constitute character derive their morality or immorality from their nature, and not from their origin. Malignity is evil and love is good, whether concreated, innate, acquired, or infused. It may be difficult to

reconcile the doctrine of innate evil dispositions with the justice and goodness of God, but that is a difficulty which does not pertain to this subject. A malignant being is an evil being, if endowed with reason, whether he was so made or so born. And a benevolent rational being is good in the universal judgment of men, whether he was so created or so born. We admit that it is repugnant to our moral judgments that God should create an evil being; or that any being should be born in a state of sin, unless his being so born is the consequence of a just judgment. But this has nothing to do with the question whether moral dispositions do not owe their character to their nature. The common judgment of men is that they do. If a man is really humble, benevolent, and holy, he is so regarded, irrespective of all inquiry how he became so.

A second remark on the principle above stated, is, that it is not only opposed to the common judgment of men, but that it is also contrary to the faith of the whole Christian Church. We trust that this language will not be attributed to a self-confident or dogmatic spirit. We recognize no higher standard of truth apart from the infallible word of God, than the teachings of the Holy Spirit as revealed in the faith of the people of God. It is beyond dispute the doctrine of the Church universal, that Adam was created holy; that his moral character was not self-acquired. It is no less the doctrine of the universal Church, that men, since the fall, are born unholy; and it is also included in the faith of all Christian Churches. that in regeneration men are made holy, not by their own act, but by the act of God. In other words, the doctrines of original righteousness, of original sin, and of regeneration by the Spirit of God, are, and ever have been the avowed doctrines of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant Churches: and if these doctrines are, as these Churches all believe, contained in the word of God, then it cannot be true that moral character, in order to be the object of approbation or disapprobation, must be self-acquired. A man, therefore, may be justly accountable for acts which are determined by his character, whether that character or inward state be inherited, acquired, or induced by the grace of God.

[269] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 10; Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1849, p. 629.

[270] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 4; Works, p. 609.

[271] Active Powers, Essay iv. ch. 9; Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1849, p. 625.

[272] Ibid. p. 627.

[273] Philosophy of the Moral Powers, II. Appendix (§ 4); Works, Hamilton's edition, Edinburgh, 1855, vol. vi. p. 370.

PART III: SOTERIOLOGY.

Under this head are included God s purpose and plan in relation to the salvation of men; the person and work of the Redeemer; and the application of that work by the Holy Spirit to the actual salvation of the people of God.

CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF SALVATION.

§ 1. God has such a Plan.

The Scriptures speak of an Economy of Redemption; the plan or purpose of God in relation to the salvation of men. They call it in reference to its full revelation at the time of the advent, the oikonomia tou pleromatos ton kairon, "The economy of the fulness of times." It is declared to be the plan of God in relation to his gathering into one harmonious body, all the objects of redemption, whether in heaven or earth, in Christ. Eph. i. 10. It is also called the oikonomia tou musteriou, the mysterious purpose or plan which had been hidden for ages in God, which it was the great design of the gospel to reveal, and which was intended to make known to principalities and powers, by the Church, the manifold wisdom of God. Eph. iii. 9.

A plan supposes: (1.) The selection of some definite end or object to be accomplished. (2.) The choice of appropriate means. (3.) At least in the case of God, the effectual application and control of those means to the accomplishment of the contemplated end.

As God works on a definite plan in the external world, it is fair to infer that the same is true in reference to the moral and spiritual world. To the eye of an uneducated man the heavens are a chaos of stars. The astronomer sees order and system in this confusion; all those bright and distant luminaries have their appointed places and fixed orbits; all are so arranged that no one interferes with any other, but each is directed according to one comprehensive and magnificent conception. The innumerable forms of vegetable life, are not a confused mass, but to the eye of science arrange themselves into regular classes, orders, genera, and species, exhibiting a unity of design pervading the whole. The zoologist sees in the hundreds of thousands of animals which inhabit our globe, four, and only four original typical forms, of which all the others are the development in an ascending order, no one ever passing into the other, but all presenting one great comprehensive system carried out in all its details. At the head of these innumerable lower forms of animal life, stands man, endowed with powers which elevate him above the class of mere animals and bring him into fellowship with angels and with God himself. As in all these lower departments of his works, God acts according to a preconceived plan, it is not to be supposed that in the higher sphere of his operations, which concerns the destiny of men, everything is left to chance and allowed to take its undirected course to an undetermined end. We accordingly find that the Scriptures distinctly assert in reference to the dispensations of grace not only that God sees the end from the beginning, but that He works all things according to the counsel of his own will, or, according to his eternal purpose.

The Importance of a Knowledge of this Plan.

If there be such a plan concerning the redemption of man, it is obviously of the greatest importance that it should be known and correctly apprehended. If in looking at a complicated machine we are ignorant of the object it is designed to accomplish, or of the relation of its several parts, we must be unable to understand or usefully to apply it. In like manner if we are ignorant of the great end aimed at in the scheme of redemption, or of the relation of the several parts of that scheme; or if we misconceive that end and that relation, all our views must be confused or erroneous. We shall be unable either to exhibit it to others or to apply it to ourselves. If the end of redemption as well as of creation and of providence, is the production of the greatest amount of happiness, then Christianity is one thing; if the end be the glory of God, then Christianity is another thing. The whole character of our theology and religion depends on the answer to that question. In like manner, if the special and proximate design of redemption is to render certain the salvation of the people of God, then the whole Augustinian system follows by a logical necessity; if its design is simply to render the salvation of all men possible, the opposite system must be received as true. The order of the divine decrees, or in other words, the relation in which the several parts of the divine plan stand to each other, is therefore very far from being a matter of idle speculation. It must determine our theology, and our theology determines our religion.

How the Plan of God can be known.

If there be such a preconceived divine scheme relating to the salvation of men; and if the proper comprehension of that scheme be thus important, the next question is, How can it be ascertained? The first answer to this question is that in every system of facts which are really related to each other, the relation is revealed in the nature of the facts. The astronomer, the geologist, and the zoologist very soon discover that the facts of their several sciences stand in a certain relation to each other, and admit of no other. If the relation be not admitted the facts themselves must be denied or distorted. The only source of mistake is either an incomplete induction of the facts, or failing to allow them their due relative importance. One system of astronomy has given place to another, only because the earlier astronomers were not acquainted with facts which their successors discovered. The science has at last attained a state which commands the assent of all competent minds, and which cannot be hereafter seriously modified. The same, to a greater or less extent, is true in all departments of natural science. It must be no less true in theology. What the facts of nature are to the naturalist, the facts of the Bible and of our moral and religious consciousness, are to the theologian. If, for example, the Bible and experience teach the fact of the entire inability of fallen men to anything spiritually good, that fact stubbornly refuses to harmonize with any system which denies efficacious grace or sovereign election. It of itself determines the relation in which the eternal purpose of God stands to the salvation of the individual sinner. So of all other great Scriptural facts. They arrange themselves in a certain order by an inward law, just as certainly and as clearly as the particles of matter in the process of crystallization, or in the organic unity of the body of an animal. It is true here as in natural science, that it is only by an imperfect induction of facts, or by denying or perverting them, that their relative position in the scheme of salvation can be a matter of doubt or of diversity of opinion. But secondly, we have in theology a guide which the man of science does not possess. We have in the Scriptures not only the revelation of the grand

design of God in all his works of creation, providence, and redemption, which is declared to be his own glory, but we have, in many cases, the relation which one part of this scheme bears to other parts expressly stated. Thus, for example, it is said, that Christ died in order that He might save his people from their sins. We are elected to holiness. Therefore election precedes sanctification. We are chosen to be made holy, and not because we are holy. These revelations concerning the relation of the subordinate parts of the scheme of redemption, of necessity determine the nature of the whole plan. This will become plain from what follows.

As men differ in their understanding of the facts of Scripture, and as some are more careful than others to gather all the facts which are to be considered, or more faithful in submitting to their authority, so they differ in their views of the plan which God has devised for the salvation of men. The more important of the views which have been adopted on this subject are, --

§ 2. Supralapsarianism.

First, the supralapsarian scheme. According to this view, God in order to manifest his grace and justice selected from creatable men (i.e., from men to be created) a certain number to be vessels of mercy, and certain others to be vessels of wrath. In the order of thought, election and reprobation precede the purpose to create and to permit the fall. Creation is in order to redemption. God creates some to be saved, and others to be lost.

This scheme is called supralapsarian because it supposes that men as unfallen, or before the fall, are the objects of election to eternal life, and foreordination to eternal death. This view was introduced among a certain class of Augustinians even before the Reformation, but has not been generally received. Augustine himself, and after him the great body of those who adopt his system of doctrine, were, and are, infralapsarians. That is, they hold that it is from the mass of fallen men that some were elected to eternal life, and some for the just punishment of their sins, foreordained to eternal death. The position of Calvin himself as to this point has been disputed. As it was not in his day a special matter of discussion, certain passages may be quoted from his writings which favour the supralapsarian and other passages which favour the infralapsarian view. In the "Consensus Genevensis," written by him, there is an explicit assertion of the infralapsarian doctrine After saying that there was little benefit in speculating on the foreordination of the fall of man, he adds, "Quod ex damnata Ad[illegible] sobole Deus quos visum est eligit, quos vult reprobat, sicuti ad fidem exercendam longe aptior est, ita majore fructu tractatur." [274]

In the "Formula Consensus Helvetica," drawn up as the testimony of the Swiss churches in 1675, whose principal authors were Heidegger and Turrettin, there is a formal repudiation of the supralapsarian view. In the Synod of Dort, which embraced delegates from all the Reformed churches on the Continent and in Great Britain, a large majority of the members were infralapsarians, Gomarus and Voetius being the prominent advocates of the opposite view. The canons of that synod, while avoiding any extreme statements, were so framed as to give a symbolical authority to the infralapsarian doctrine. They say: [275] "Cum omnes homines in Adamo peccaverint et rei sint facti maledictionis et mortis [illegible]tetern[illegible], Deus nemini fecisset injuriam, si universum genus humanum in peccato et

maledictione relinquere, ac propter peccatum damnare voluisset." The same remark applies to the Westminster Assembly. Twiss, the Prolocutor of that venerable body, was a zealous supralapsarian; the great majority of its members, however, were on the other side. The symbols of that Assembly, while they clearly imply the infralapsarian view, were yet so framed as to avoid offence to those who adopted the supralapsarian theory. In the "Westminster Confession," [276] it is said that God appointed the elect unto eternal life, and "the rest of mankind, God was pleased, according to the unsearchable counsel of his own will, whereby He extendeth or withholdeth mercy as He pleaseth, for the glory of his sovereign power over his creatures, to pass by, and to ordain them to dishonour and wrath for their sin, to the praise of his glorious justice." It is here taught that those whom God passes by are "the rest of mankind;" not the rest of ideal or possible men, but the rest of those human beings who constitute mankind, or the human race. In the second place, the passage quoted teaches that the non-elect are passed by and ordained to wrath "for their sin." This implies that they were contemplated as sinful before this foreordination to judgment. The infralapsarian view is still more obviously assumed in the answers to the 19th and 20th questions in the "Shorter Catechism." It is there taught that all mankind by the fall lost communion with God, and are under his wrath and curse, and that God out of his mere good pleasure elected some (some of those under his wrath and curse), unto everlasting life. Such has been the doctrine of the great body of Augustinians from the time of Augustine to the present day.

Objections to Supralapsarianism.

The most obvious objections to the supralapsarian theory are, (1.) That it seems to involve a contradiction. Of a Non Ens, as Turrettin says, nothing can be determined. The purpose to save or condemn, of necessity must, in the order of thought, follow the purpose to create. The latter is presupposed in the former, (2.) It is a clearly revealed Scriptural principle that where there is no sin there is no condemnation. Therefore there can be no foreordination to death which does not contemplate its objects as already sinful. (3.) It seems plain from the whole argument of the Apostle in Rom. ix. 9-21, that the "mass" out of which some are chosen and others left, is the mass of fallen men. The design of the sacred writer is to vindicate the sovereignty of God in the dispensation of his grace. He has mercy upon one and not on another, according to his own good pleasure, because all are equally unworthy and guilty. The vindication is drawn, not only from the relation of God to his creatures as their Creator, but also from his relation to them as a sovereign whose laws they have violated. This representation pervades the whole Scriptures. Believers are said to be chosen "out of the world;" that is, out of the mass of fallen men. And everywhere, as in Rom. i. 24, 26, 28, reprobation is declared to be judicial, founded upon the sinfulness of its objects. Otherwise it could not be a manifestation of the justice of God. (4.) Creation is never in the Bible represented as a means of executing the purpose of election and reprobation. This, as just remarked, cannot be so. The objects of election are definite individuals, as in this controversy is admitted. But the only thing which distinguishes between merely possible or "creatable" men and definite individuals, certain to be created and saved or lost, is the divine purpose that they shall be created. So that the purpose to create of necessity, in the order of nature, precedes the purpose to redeem. Accordingly, in Rom. viii 29, 30, prognosis is declared to precede proorismos. "Whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate." But foreknowledge implies the certain existence of its objects; and

certainty of existence supposes on the part of God the purpose to create. Nothing is or is to be but in virtue of the decree of Him who foreordains whatever comes to pass. All futurition, therefore, depends on foreordination; and foreknowledge supposes futurition. We have, therefore, the express authority of the Apostle for saying that foreknowledge, founded on the purpose to create, precedes predestination. And, therefore, creation is not a means to execute the purpose of predestination, for the end must precede the means; and, according to Paul, the purpose to create precedes the purpose to redeem, and therefore cannot be a means to that end. Our Lord, we are told, was delivered to death "by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God." But his death, of necessity, supposed his incarnation, and therefore in the order of thought, or in the plan of God, the purpose to prepare Him a body preceded the purpose to deliver Him to the death of the cross. The only passage of the Bible which appears to teach explicitly that creation is a means for the execution of the purpose of predestination is Eph. iii. 9, 10. There, according to some it is said that God created all things in order that (hina) his manifold wisdom might be known through the Church. If this be the relation between the several clauses of these verses the Apostle does teach that the universe was created in order that through redeemed men (the Church) the glory of God should be revealed to all rational creatures. In this sense and in this case creation is declared to be a means to redemption; and therefore the purpose to redeem must precede the purpose to create. Such, however, is not the logical connection of the clauses in this passage. Paul does not say that God created all things in order that. He is not speaking of the design of creation, but of the design of the gospel and of his own call to the apostleship. To me, he says, is this grace given that I should preach among the Gentiles the unsearchable riches of Christ, and to enlighten all men in the knowledge of the mystery (of redemption, i.e., the gospel) in order that by the Church should be made known the manifold wisdom of God. Such is the natural connection of the passage, and such is the interpretation adopted by modern commentators entirely irrespective of the bearing of the passage on the supralapsarian controversy. (5.) It is a further objection to the supralapsarian scheme that it is not consistent with the Scriptural exhibition of the character of God. He is declared to be a God of mercy and justice. But it is not compatible with these divine attributes that men should be foreordained to misery and eternal death as innocent, that is, before they had apostatized from God. If passed by and foreordained to death for their sins, it must be that in predestination they are contemplated as guilty and fallen creatures.

[274] Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 269.

[275] Caput I. art. 1; Acta Synodi, edit. Dort., 1620, p. 241.

[276] Chapter iii. sections §§ 6, 7.

§ 3. Infralapsarianism.

According to the infralapsarian doctrine, God, with the design to reveal his own glory, that is, the perfections of his own nature, determined to create the world, secondly, to permit the fall of man; thirdly, to elect from the mass of fallen men a multitude whom no man could number as "vessels of mercy;" fourthly, to send his Son for their redemption; and, fifthly, to leave the residue of mankind, as He left the fallen angels, to suffer the just punishment of their sins.

The arguments in favour of this view of the divine plan have already been presented in the form of objections to the supralapsarian theory. It may, however, be further remarked, --

1. That this view is self-consistent and harmonious. As all the decrees of God are one comprehensive purpose, no view of the relation of the details embraced in that purpose which does not admit of their being reduced to unity can be admitted. In every great mechanism, whatever the number or complexity of its parts, there must be unity of design. Every part bears a given relation to every other part, and the perception of that relation is necessary to a proper understanding of the whole. Again, as the decrees of God are eternal and immutable, no view of his plan of operation which supposes Him to purpose first one thing and then another can ho consistent with their nature. And as God is absolutely sovereign and independent, all his purposes must be determined from within or according to the counsel of his own will. They cannot be sup.. posed to he contingent or suspended on the action of his creatures, or upon anything out of Himself. The infralapsarian scheme, as held by most Augustinians, fulfils all these conditions. All the particulars form one comprehensive whole. All follow in an order which supposes no change of purpose; and all depend on the infinitely wise, holy, and righteous will of God. The final end is the glory of God. For that end He creates the world, allows the fall; from among fallen men He elects some to everlasting life, and leaves the rest to the just recompense of their sins. Whom He elects He calls, justifies, and glorifies. This is the golden chain the links of which cannot be separated or transposed. This is the form in which the scheme of redemption lay in the Apostle's mind as he teaches us in Rom. viii. 29, 30.

Different Meanings assigned the Word Predestination.

2. There is an ambiguity in the word predestination. It may be used, first, in the general sense of foreordination. In this sense it has equal reference to all events; for God foreordains whatever comes to pass. Secondly, it may refer to the general purpose of redemption without reference to particular individuals. God predetermined to reveal his attributes in redeeming sinners, as He predetermined to create the heavens and the earth to manifest his power, wisdom, and benevolence. Thirdly, it is used in theology generally to express the purpose of God in relation to the salvation of individual men. It includes the selection of one portion of the race to be saved, and the leaving the rest to perish in sin. It is in this sense used by supralapsarians, who teach that God selected a certain number of individual men to be created in order to salvation, and a certain number to be created to be vessels of wrath. It is in this way they subordinate creation to predestination as a means to an end. It is to this that infralapsarians object as inconceivable, repugnant to the nature of God, and unscriptural. Taking the word predestination, however, in the second of the senses above mentioned, it may be admitted that it precedes in the order of thought the purpose to create. This view is perfectly consistent with the doctrine which makes man as created and fallen the object of predestination in the third and commonly received meaning of the word. The Apostle teaches in Col. i. 16, that all things visible and invisible were created by and for Him who is the image of the invisible God, who is before all things, by whom all things consist, and who is the head of the body, the Church. The end of creation, therefore, is not merely the glory of God, but the special manifestation of that glory in the person and work of Christ. As He is the Alpha, so also is He the Omega; the beginning and the end. Having this great end in view, the revelation of Himself in the person and work of his Son, He

purposed to create, to permit the fall, to elect some to be the subjects of his grace and to leave others in their sin. This view, as it seems, agrees with the representations of the Scriptures, and avoids the difficulties connected with the strict supralapsarian doctrine. It is to be borne in mind that the object of these speculations is not to pry into the operation of the divine mind, but simply to ascertain and exhibit the relation in which the several truths revealed in Scripture concerning the plan of redemption bear to each other.

§ 4. Hypothetical Redemption.

According to the common doctrine of Augustinians, as expressed an the Westminster Catechism, "God, having . . . . elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer." In opposition to this view some of the Reformed theologians of the seventeenth century introduced the scheme which is known in the history of theology as the doctrine of hypothetical redemption. The principal advocate of this doctrine was Amyraut (died 1664), Professor in the French Protestant Seminary at Saumur. He taught, (1.) That the motive impelling God to redeem men was benevolence, or love to men in general. (2.) From this motive He sent His Son to make the salvation of all men possible. (3.) God, in virtue of a decretum universale hypotheticum, offers salvation to all men if they believe in Christ. (4.) All men have a natural ability to repent and believe. (5.) But as this natural ability was counteracted by a moral inability, God determined to give his efficacious grace to a certain number of the human race, and thus to secure their salvation.

This scheme is sometimes designated as "universalismus hypotheticus." It was designed to take a middle ground between Augustinianism and Arminianism. It is liable to the objections which press on both systems. It does not remove the peculiar difficulties of Augustinianism, as it asserts the sovereignty of God in election. Besides, it leaves the case of the heathen out of view. They, having no knowledge of Christ, could not avail themselves of this decretum hypotheticum, and therefore must be considered as passed over by a decretum absolutum. It was against this doctrine of Amyraut and other departures from the standards of the Reformed Church that, in 1675, the "Formula Consensus Helvetica" was adopted by the churches of Switzerland. This theory of the French theologians soon passed away as far as the Reformed churches in Europe were concerned. Its advocates either returned to the old doctrine, or passed on to the more advanced system of the Arminians. In this country it has been revived and extensively adopted.

At first view it might seem a small matter whether we say that election precedes redemption or that redemption precedes election. In fact, however, it is a question of great importance. The relation of the truths of the Bible is determined by their nature. If you change their relation you must change their nature. If you regard the sun as a planet instead of as the centre of our system you must believe it to be something very different in its constitution from what it actually is. So in a scheme of thought, if you make the final cause a means, or a means the final cause, nothing but confusion can be the result. As the relation of election to redemption depends on the nature of redemption the full consideration of this question must be reserved until the work of Christ has been considered. For the present it is sufficient to say that the scheme proposed by the French theologians is liable to the following objections.

Arguments against this Scheme.

1. It supposes mutability in the divine purposes; or that the purpose of God may fail of accomplishment. According to this scheme, God, out of benevolence or philanthropy, purposed the salvation of all men, and sent his Son for their redemption. But seeing that such purpose could not be carried out, He determined by his efficacious grace to secure the salvation of a certain portion of the human race. This difficulty the scheme involves, however it may be stated. It cannot however be supposed that God intends what is never accomplished; that He purposes what He does not intend to effect; that He adopts means for an end which is never to be attained. This cannot be affirmed of any rational being who has the wisdom and power to secure the execution of his purposes. Much less can it be said of Him whose power and wisdom are infinite. If all men are not saved, God never purposed their salvation, and never devised and put into operation means designed to accomplish that end. We must assume that the result is the interpretation of the purposes of God. If He foreordains whatsoever comes to pass, then events correspond to his purposes; and it is against reason and Scripture to suppose that there is any contradiction or want of correspondence between what He intended and what actually occurs. The theory, therefore, which assumes that God purposed the salvation of all men, and sent his Son to die as a means to accomplish that end, and then seeing, or foreseeing that such end could not or would not be attained, elected a part of the race to be the subjects of efficacious grace, cannot be admitted as Scriptural.

2. The Bible clearly teaches that the work of Christ is certainly efficacious. It renders certain the attainment of the end it was designed to accomplish. It was intended to save his people, and not merely to make the salvation of all men possible. It was a real satisfaction to justice, and therefore necessarily frees from condemnation. It was a ransom paid and accepted, and therefore certainly redeems. If, therefore, equally designed for all men, it must secure the salvation of all. If designed specially for the elect, it renders their salvation certain, and therefore election precedes redemption. God, as the Westminster Catechism teaches, having elected some to eternal life, sent his Son to redeem them.

3. The Scriptures further teach that the gift of Christ secures the gift of all other saving blessings. "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things?" (Rom. vii 32.) Hence they are certainly saved for whom God delivered up his Son. The elect only are saved, and therefore He was delivered up specially for them, and consequently election must precede redemption. The relation, therefore, of redemption to election is as clearly determined by the nature of redemption as the relation of the sun to the planets is determined by the nature of the sun.

4. The Bible in numerous passages directly asserts that Christ came to redeem his people; to save them from their sins; and to bring them to God. He gave Himself for his Church; He laid down his life for his sheep. As the end precedes the means, if God sent his Son to save his people, if Christ gave Himself for his Church, then his people were selected and present to the divine mind, in the order of thought, prior to the gift of Christ.

5. If, as Paul teaches (Rom. viii. 29, 30), foreknowledge precedes predestination, and if the mission of Christ is the means of accomplishing the end of predestination, then of necessity predestination to eternal life precedes the gift of Christ. Having, as we are taught in Eph. i. 4, 5, predestinated us to the adoption of sons, God chose us before the foundation

of the world, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. This is the order of the divine purposes, or the mutual relation of the truths of redemption as presented in the Scriptures.

6. The motive (so to speak) of God in sending his Son is not, as this theory assumes, general benevolence or that love of which all men are equally the objects, but that peculiar, mysterious, infinite love in which God, in giving his Son, gives Himself and all conceivable and possible good. All these points, however, as before remarked, ask for further consideration when we come to treat of the nature and design of Christ's work.

§ 5. The Lutheran Doctrine as to the Plan of Salvation.

It is not easy to give the Lutheran doctrine on this subject, because it is stated in one way in the early symbolical books of that Church, and in a somewhat different way in the "Form of Concord," and in the writings of the standard Lutheran theologians. Luther himself taught the strict Augustinian doctrine, as did also Melancthon in the first edition of his "Loci Communes." In the later editions of that work Melancthon taught that men coperate with the grace of God in conversion, and that the reason why one man is regenerated and another not is to be found in that coperation. This gave rise to the protracted and vehement synergistic controversy, which for a long time seriously disturbed the peace of the Lutheran Church. This controversy was for a time authoritatively settled by the "Form of Concord," which was adopted and enjoined as a standard of orthodoxy by the Lutherans. In this document both the doctrine of coperation and that of absolute predestination were rejected. It taught the entire inability of the natural man for anything spiritually good; and therefore denied that he could either prepare himself for regeneration or coperate with the grace of God in that work. It refers the regeneration of the sinner exclusively to the supernatural agency of the Holy Spirit. It is the work of God, and in no sense or degree the work of man. But it teaches that the grace of God may be effectually resisted, and that the reason why all who hear the gospel are not saved is that some do thus resist the influence which is brought to bear upon them, and others do not. While, therefore, regeneration is exclusively the work of the Spirit, the failure of salvation is to be referred to the voluntary resistance of offered grace. As this system was illogical and contrary to the clear declarations of Scripture, it did not long maintain its ground. Non-resistance to the grace of God, passively yielding to its power, is something good. It is something by which one class is favourably distinguished from another; and therefore the reason why they, rather than others, are saved, is to be referred to themselves and not to God, who gives the same grace to all. The later Lutheran theologians, therefore, have abandoned the ground of the "Form of Concord," and teach that the objects of election are those whom God foresaw would believe and persevere in faith unto the end.

According to this scheme, God, (1.) From general benevolence or love to the fallen race of man, wills their salvation by a sincere purpose and intention. "Benevolentia Dei universalis," says Hollaz, "non est inane votum, non sterilis velleitas, non otiosa complacentia, qua quis rem, qu sibi placet, et quam in se amat, non cupit efficere aut consequi adeoque mediis ad hunc finem ducentibus non vult uti; sed est voluntas efficax, qua Deus salutem hominum, ardentissime amatam, etiam efficere atque per media sufficientia et efficacia consequi serio intendit." [277] (2.) Te give effect to this general

purpose of benevolence and mercy towards men indiscriminately, God determined to send his Son to make a full satisfaction for their sins. (3.) To this follows (in the order of thought) the purpose to give to all men the means of salvation and the power to avail themselves of the offered mercy. This is described as a "destinatio mediorum, quibus tum ☐terna salus satisfactione Christi parta, turn vires credendi omnibus hominibus offeruntur, ut satisfactionem Christi ad salutem acceptare et sibi applicare queant." [278] (4.) Besides this, voluntas generalis (as relating to all men) and antecedens, as going before any contemplated action of men, there is a voluntas specialis, as relating to certain individual men, and consequens, as following the foresight of their action. This voluntas specialis is defined as that "qu☐ peccatores oblata salutis media amplectentes ☐terna salute donare constituit." [279] So Hutter [280] says, "Quia (Deus) pr☐vidit ac pr☐scivit maximam mundi partem mediis salutis locum minime relicturam ac proinde in Christum non credituram, ideo Deus de illis tantum salvandis fecit decretum, quos actu in Christum credituros pr☐vidit." Hollaz expresses the same view: [281] "Electio hominum, peccato corruptorum, ad vitam ☐ternam a Deo misericordissimo facta est intuitu fidei in Christum ad finem usque vit☐ perseverantis." Again: "Simpliciter quippe et categorice decrevit Deus hunc, ilium, istum hominem salvare, quia perseverantem ipsius in Christum fidem certo pr☐vidit." [282]

The Lutheran doctrine, therefore, answers the question, Why one man is saved and another not? by saying, Because the one believes and the other does not. The question, Why God elects some and not others, and predestinates them to eternal life? is answered by saying, Because He foresees that some will believe unto the end, and others will not. If asked, Why one believes and another not? the answer is, Not that one co☐perates with the grace of God and the other does not; but that some resist and reject the grace offered to all, and others do not. The difficulty arising from the Lutheran doctrine of the entire corruption of our fallen nature, and the entire inability of the sinner to do anything spiritually good, is met by saying, that the sinner has power to use the means of grace, he can hear the word and receive the sacraments, and as these means of grace are imbued with a divine supernatural power1 they produce a saving effect upon all who do not voluntarily and persistently resist their influence. Baptism, in the case of infants, is attended by the regeneration of the soul; and therefore all who are baptized in infancy have a principle of grace implanted in them, which, if cherished, or, if not voluntarily quenched, secures their salvation. Predestination in the Lutheran system is confined to the elect. God predestinates those who He foresees will persevere in faith unto salvation. There is no predestination of unbelievers unto death.

[277] Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum, Leipzig, 1763, p. 599.

[278] Hollaz, Examen, III.; cap. i. qu. 6; ed. Teller, Holmi☐ et Lipsi☐, 1750, p. 589.

[279] Ibid. III. i. 1, 3; p. 586.

[280] Hutter, Loci Communes, Tract. Artic. Pr☐scient Prov. Decr., etc., vii.; Wittenburg, 1619, p. 793, b.

[281] Hollaz, Examen, ed. 1750, ut supra, p. 619.

[282] Hollaz, Ibid. III. i. 2, 12, prob. c.; ut supra, p. 631.

§ 6. The Remonstrant Doctrine.

In the early part of the seventeenth century Arminius introduced a new system of doctrine in the Reformed churches of Holland, which was formally condemned by the Synod of Dort which sat from November 1618 to May 1619. Against the decisions of that Synod the advocates of the new doctrine presented a Remonstrance, and hence they were at first called Remonstrants, but in after years their more common designation has been Arminians. Arminianism is a much lower form of doctrine than Lutheranism. In all the points included under Anthropology and Soteriology it is a much more serious departure from the system of Augustinianism which in all ages has been the life of the church. The Arminians taught, --

1. That all men derive from Adam a corrupt nature by which they are inclined to sin. But they deny that this corruption is of the nature of sin. Men are responsible only for their own voluntary acts and the consequences of such acts. "Peccatum originale nec habent (Remonstrantes) pro peccato proprie dicto . . . . nec pro malo, quod per modum proprie dict poen ab Adamo in posteros dimanet, sed pro malo infirmitate." [283] Limborch [284] says, "Atqui illa physica est impuritas (namely, the deterioration of our nature derived from Adam), non moralis: et tantum abest ut sit vere ac proprie dictum peccatum."

2. They deny that man by his fall has lost his ability to good. Such ability, or liberty as they call it, is essential to our nature, and cannot be lost without the loss of humanity. "Innatam arbitrii humani libertatem (i.e., ability) olim semel in creatione datam, nunquam . . . . tollit (Deus)." [285]

3. This ability, however, is not of itself sufficient to secure the return of the soul to God. Men need the preventing, exciting, and assisting grace of God in order to their conversion and holy living. "Gratiam Dei statuimus esse principium, progressum et complementum omnis boni: adeo ut ne ipse quidem regenitus absque pr cedente ista, sive pr veniente, excitante, prosequente et co perante gratia, bonum ullum salutare cogitare, velle, aut peragere possit." [286]

4. This divine grace is afforded to all men in sufficient measure to enable them to repent, believe, and keep all the commandments of God. "Gratia efficax vocatur ex eventu. Ut statuatur gratia habere ex se sufficientem vim, ad producendum consensum in voluntate, sed quia vis illa partialis est, non posse exire in actum sive effectum sortiri sine co peratione liber voluntatis human, ac proinde ut effectum habeat, ... pendere a libera voluntate." [287] This grace, says Limborch, "incitat, exstimulat, adjuvat et cerroborat, quantum satis est, ut homo reipsa Deo obediat et ad fineni in obedientia perseveret." And again: [288] "Sufficiens vocatio, quando per co perationem liberi arbitrii sortitur suum effectum, vocatur efficax."

5. Those who of their own free will, and in the exercise of that ability which belongs to them since the fall, co perate with this divine grace, are converted and saved. "Etsi vero maxima est grati disparitas, pro liberrima scilicet voluntatis divin dispensatione tamen Spiritus Sanctus omnibus et singulis, quibus verbum fidei ordinarie pr dicatur, tantum grati confert, aut saltem conferre paratus est, quantum ad fidem ingenerandum, et ad promovendum suis gradibus salutarem ipsorum conversionem sufficit." [289] The Apology for the Remonstrance, and especially the Remonstrant Theologians, as Episcopius and Limborch, go farther than this. Instead of limiting this sufficient grace to those who hear the gospel, they extend it to all mankind.

6. Those who thus believe are predestinated to eternal life, not however as individuals, but as a class. The decree of election does not concern persons, it is simply the purpose of God to save believers. "Decretum vocant Remonstrantes decretum pr&#65533;destinationis ad salutem, quia eo decernitur, qua ratione et conditione Deus peccatores saluti destinet. Enunciatur autem hoc decretum Dei hac formula: Deus decrevit salvare credentes, non quasi credentes quidam re ipsa jam sint, qui objiciantur Deo salvare volenti, sive pr&#65533;destinanti; nihil minus; sed, ut quid in iis, circa quos Deus pr&#65533;destinans versatur, requiratur, ista enunciatione clare significetur. Tantundem enim valet atqui si diceres, Deus decrevit homines salvare sub conditione fidei. . . . . Etiamsi hujusmodi pr&#65533;destinatio non sit pr&#65533;destinatio certarum personarum, est tamen omnium hominum pr&#65533;destinatio, si modo credant et in virtute pr&#65533;destinatio certarum personarum, qu&#65533; et quando credunt." [290]

[283] Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantum, edit. Leyden, 1630, p. 84.

[284] Theologia Christiana, V. xv. 15, edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 439.

[285] Confessio Remonstratum, vi. 6; Episcopii Opera, edit. Rotterdam, 1665, vol. ii. part 2, p. 80.

[286] Ibid. xvii. 6; ut supra, p. 88.

[287] Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium, p. 162.

[288] Theologia, IV. xii. 8; p. 352.

[289] Confessio Remonstrantium, xvii. 8; p. 89.

[290] Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium, p. 102.

§ 7. Wesleyan Arminianism.

The Arminian system received such modifications in the hands of Wesley and his associates and followers, that they give it the designation of Evangelical Arminianism, and claim for it originality and completeness. It differs from the system of the Remonstrants, --

1. In admitting that man since the fall is in a state of absolute or entire pollution and depravity. Original sin is not a mere physical deterioration of our nature, but entire moral depravity.

2. In denying that men in this state of nature have any power to co&#65533;perate with the grace of God. The advocates of this system regard this doctrine of natural ability, or the ability of the natural man to co&#65533;perate with the grace of God as Semi-pelagian, and the doctrine that men have the power by nature perfectly to keep the commandments of God, as pure Pelagianism. [291]

3. In asserting that the guilt brought upon all men by the sin of Adam is removed by the justification which has come upon all men by the righteousness of Christ.

4. That the ability of man even to co&#65533;perate with the Spirit of God, is due not to anything belonging to his natural state as fallen, but to the universal influence of the redemption of Christ. Every infant, therefore, comes into the world free from condemnation on the ground of the righteousness of Christ and with a seed of divine grace, or a principle of a new life implanted in his heart. "That by the offence of one," says Wesley, [292] "judgment came upon all men (all born into the world) unto condemnation, is an undoubted

truth, and affects every infant, as well as every adult person. But it is equally true, that by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men (all born into the world -- infants and adults) unto justification." And Fletcher, [293] says, "As Adam brought a general condemnation and a universal seed of death upon all infants, so Christ brings upon them a general justification and a universal seed of life." "Every human being," says Warren, "has a measure of grace (unless he has cast it away), and those who faithfully use this gracious gift, will be accepted of God in the day of judgment, whether Jew or Greek, Christian or Heathen. In virtue of the mediation of Jesus Christ, between God and our fallen race, all men since the promise Gen. iii. 15, are under an economy of grace, and the only difference between them as subjects of the moral government of God, is that while all have grace and light enough to attain salvation, some, over and above this, have more and others less." [294] Wesley says, "No man living is without some preventing grace, and every degree of grace is a degree of life. And in another place, "I assert that there is a measure of free will supernaturally restored to every man, together with that supernatural light which enlightens every man that cometh into the world." [295]

According to this view of the plan of God, he decreed or purposed, (1.) To permit the fall of man. (2.) To send his Son to make a full satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. (3.) On the ground of that satisfaction to remit the guilt of Adam's first transgression and of original sin, and to impart such a measure of grace and light to all and every man as to enable all to attain eternal life. (4.) Those who duly improve that grace, and persevere to the end, are ordained to be saved; God purposes from eternity, to save those who He foresees will thus persevere in faith and holy living.

It is plain that the main point of difference between the later Lutheran, the Arminian, and the Wesleyan schemes, and that of Augustinians is, that according to the latter, God, and according to the former, man, determines who are to be saved. Augustine taught that out of the fallen family of men, all of whom might have been justly left to perish in their apostasy, God, out of his mere good mercy, elected some to everlasting life, sent his Son for their redemption, and gives to them the Holy Spirit to secure their repentance, faith, and holy living unto the end. "Cur autem non omnibus detur [donum fidei], fidelem movere non debet, qui credit ex uno omnes isse in condemnationem, sine dubio justissimam: ita ut nulla Dei esset justa reprehensio, etiamsi nullus inde liberaretur. Unde constat, magnam esse gratiam, quod plurimi liberantur." [296] It is God, therefore, and not man, who determines who are to be saved. Although this may be said to be the turning point between these great systems, which have divided the Church in all ages, yet that point of necessity involves all the other matters of difference; namely, the nature of original sin; the motive of God in providing redemption; the nature and design of the work of Christ and the nature of divine grace, or the work of the Holy Spirit. Thus, in a great measure, the whole system of theology, and of necessity the character of our religion, depend upon the views taken of this particular question. It is, therefore, a question of the highest practical importance, and not a matter of idle speculation.

[291] W. F. Warren, System. Theologie. Erste Lieferung, Hamburg, p. 145.

[292] Works, vii. p. 97.

[293] Works, pp. 284, 285.

[294] Warren, p. 146.

[295] Works, vii. p. 97; vi. p. 42. Fletcher, i. p. 137, ff. etc.

[296] Augustine, De Pr&#65533;destinatione Sanctorum, VIII. 16; Works, edit. Benedictines, vol. ii. p. 1861, c.

§ 8. The Augustinian Scheme.

Preliminary Remarks.

It is to be remembered that the question is not which view of the plan of God is the freest from difficulties, the most agreeable to our natural feelings, and therefore the most plausible to the human mind. It may be admitted that it would appear to us more consistent with the character of God that provision should be made for the salvation of all men, and that sufficient knowledge and grace should be granted to every human being to secure his salvation. So it would be more consistent with the natural understanding and feelings, if like provision had been made for the fallen angels; or if God had prevented the entrance of sin and misery into the universe; or if, when they had entered, He had provided for their ultimate elimination from the system, so that all rational creatures should be perfectly holy and happy for eternity. There would be no end to such plans if each one were at liberty to construct a scheme of divine operation according to his own views of what would be wisest and best. We are shut up to facts: the facts of providence, of the Bible, and of religious experience. These facts must determine our theory. We cannot say that the goodness of God forbids the permission of sin and misery, if sin and misery actually exist. We cannot say that justice requires that all rational creatures should be treated alike, have the same advantages, and the same opportunity to secure knowledge, holiness, and happiness, if, under the government of a God of infinite justice, the greatest disparity actually exists. Among all Christians certain principles are admitted, according to which the facts of history and of the Scriptures must be interpreted.

1. It is admitted that God reigns; that his providence extends to all events great and small, so that nothing does or can occur contrary to his will, or which He does not either effect by his own power, or permit to be done by other agents. This is a truth of natural religion as well as of revelation. It is (practically) universally recognized. The prayers and thanksgivings which men by a law of their nature address to God, assume that He controls all events. War, pestilence and famine, are deprecated as manifestations of his displeasure. To Him all men turn for deliverance from these evils. Peace, health, and plenty, are universally recognized as his gifts. This truth lies at the foundation of all religion, and cannot be questioned by any Theist, much less by any Christian.

2. No less clear and universally admitted is the principle that God can control the free acts of rational creatures without destroying either their liberty or their responsibility. Men universally pray for deliverance from the wrath of their enemies, that their enmity may be turned aside, or that the state of their minds may be changed. All Christians pray that God would change the hearts of men, give them repentance and faith, and so control their acts that his glory and the good of others may be promoted. This again is one of those simple, profound, and far-reaching truths, which men take for granted, and on which they act and cannot avoid acting, whatever may be the doubts of philosophers, or the speculative difficulties with which such truths are attended.

3. All Christians admit that God has a plan or purpose in the government of the world. There is an end to be accomplished. It is inconceivable that an infinitely wise Being should create, sustain, and control the universe, without contemplating any end to be attained by this wonderful manifestation of his power and resources. The Bible, therefore, teaches us that God works all things after the counsel of his own will. And this truth is incorporated in all the systems of faith adopted among Christians, and is assumed in all religious worship and experience.

4. It is a necessary corollary from the foregoing principles that the facts of history are the interpretation of the eternal purposes of God. Whatever actually occurs entered into his purpose. We can, therefore, learn the design or intention of God from the evolution or development of his plan in the history of the world, and of every individual man. Whatever occurs, He for wise reasons permits to occur. He can prevent whatever He sees fit to prevent. If, therefore, sin occurs, it was God's design that it should occur. If misery follows in the train of sin, such was God's purpose. If some men only are saved, while others perish, such must have entered into the all comprehending purpose of God. It is not possible for any finite mind to comprehend the designs of God, or to see the reasons of his dispensations. But we cannot, on that account, deny that He governs all things, or that He rules according to the counsel of his own will.

The Augustinian system of doctrine is nothing more than the application of these general and almost universally recognized principles to the special case of the salvation of man.

Statement of the Doctrine.

The Augustinian scheme includes the following points: (1.) That the glory of God, or the manifestation of his perfections, is the highest and ultimate end of all things. (2.) For that end God purposed the creation of the universe, and the whole plan of providence and redemption. (3.) That He placed man in a state of probation, making Adam, their first parent, their head and representative. (4.) That the fall of Adam brought all his posterity into a state of condemnation, sin, and misery, from which they are utterly unable to deliver themselves. (5.) From the mass of fallen men God elected a number innumerable to eternal life, and left the rest of mankind to the just recompense of their sins. (6.) That the ground of this election is not the foresight of anything in the one class to distinguish them favourably from the members of the other class, but the good pleasure of God. (7.) That for the salvation of those thus chosen to eternal life, God gave his own Son, to become man, and to obey and suffer for his people, thus making a full satisfaction for sin and bringing in everlasting righteousness, rendering the ultimate salvation of the elect absolutely certain. (8.) That while the Holy Spirit, in his common operations, is present with every man, so long as he lives, restraining evil and exciting good, his certainly efficacious and saving power is exercised only in behalf of the elect. (9.) That all those whom God has thus chosen to life, and for whom Christ specially save Himself in the covenant of redemption, shall certainly (unless they die in infancy), be brought to the knowledge of the truth, to the exercise of faith, and to perseverance in holy living unto the end.

Such is the great scheme of doctrine known in history as the Pauline, Augustinian, or Calvinistic, taught, as we believe, in the Scriptures, developed by Augustine, formally sanctioned by the Latin Church, adhered to by the witnesses of the truth during the Middle

Ages, repudiated by the Church of Rome in the Council of Trent, revived in that Church by the Jansenists, adopted by all the Reformers, incorporated in the creeds of the Protestant Churches of Switzerland, of the Palatinate, of France, Holland, England, and Scotland, and unfolded in the Standards framed by the Westminster Assembly, the common representative of Presbyterians in Europe and America.

It is a historical fact that this scheme of doctrine has been the moving power in the Church; that largely to it are to be referred the intellectual vigour and spiritual life of the heroes and confessors who have been raised up in the course of ages; that it has been the fruitful source of good works, of civil and religious liberty, and of human progress. Its truth may be evinced from many different sources.

Proof of the Doctrine.

In the first place, it is a simple, harmonious, self-consistent scheme. It supposes no conflicting purposes in the divine mind; no willing first one thing, and then another; no purposing ends which are never accomplished; and no assertion of principles in conflict with others which cannot be denied. All the parts of this vast plan admit of being reduced to one comprehensive purpose as it was hid for ages in the divine mind. The purpose to create, to permit the fall, to elect some to everlasting life, while others are left, to send his Son to redeem his people, and to give the Spirit to apply that redemption, are purposes which harmonize one with all the others, and form one consistent plan. The parts of this scheme are not only harmonious, but they are also connected in such a way that the one involves the others, so that if one be proved it involves the truth of all the rest. If Christ was given for the redemption of his people, then their redemption is rendered certain, and then the operations of the Spirit must, in their case, be certainly efficacious; and if such be the design of the work of Christ, and the nature of the Spirit's influence, then those who are the objects of the one, and the subjects of the other, must persevere in holiness unto the end. Or if we begin with any other of the principles aforesaid, the same result follows. If it be proved or conceded that the fall brought mankind into an estate of helpless sin and misery, then it follows that salvation must be of grace; that it is of God and not of us, that we are in Christ; that vocation is effectual; that election is of the good pleasure of God; that the sacrifice of Christ renders certain the salvation of his people; and that they cannot fatally fall away from God. So of all the rest. Admit that the death of Christ renders certain the salvation of his people, and all the rest follows. Admit that election is not of works, and the whole plan must be admitted as true. Admit that nothing happens contrary to God's purposes, then again the whole Augustinian scheme must be admitted. There can scarcely be a clearer proof that we understand a complicated machine than that we can put together its several parts, so that each exactly fits its place; no one admitting of being transferred or substituted for another; and the whole being complete and unimpeded in its action. Such is the order of God's working, that if you give a naturalist a single bone, he can construct the whole skeleton of which it is a part; and such is the order of his plan of redemption, that if one of the great truths which it includes be admitted, all the rest must be accepted. This is the first great argument in support of the Pauline or Augustinian scheme of doctrine.

Argument from the Facts of Providence.

In the second place, this scheme alone is consistent with the facts of God's providence. Obvious as the truth is, it needs to be constantly repeated, that it is useless to contend

against facts. If a thing is, it is vain to ignore it, or to deny its significance. We must conform our theories to facts, and not make the facts conform to our theories. That view of divine truth, therefore, is correct which accords with the facts of God's providence; and that view of doctrine must be false which conflicts with those facts. Another principle no less plain, and no less apt to be forgotten, is the one assumed above as admitted by all Christians, namely, that God has a plan and that the events of his providence correspond with that plan. In other words, that whatever happens, God intended should happen; that to Him nothing can be unexpected, and nothing contrary to his purposes. If this be so, then we can learn with certainty what God's plan is, what He intended to do or to permit, from what actually comes to pass. If one portion of the inhabitants of a given country die in infancy, and another portion live to mature age; such was, for wise reasons, the purpose of God. If some are prosperous, and others miserable, such also is in accordance with his holy will. If one season is abundant, another the reverse, it is so in virtue of his appointment. This is a dictate even of natural religion. As much as this even the heathen believe.

It can hardly be doubted that if these simple principles be granted, the truth of the Augustinian scheme must be admitted. It is a fact that God created man; it is a fact that the fall of Adam involved our whole race in sin and misery; it is a fact that of this fallen family, some are saved and others perish; it is a fact that the salvation of those who actually attain eternal life, is secured by the mediation of Christ, and the work of the Holy Spirit. These are providential facts admitted by all Christians. All that Augustinianism teaches is, that these facts were not unexpected by the divine mind, but that God foreknew they would occur, and intended that they should come to pass. This is all. What actually does happen, God intended should happen. Although his purposes or intentions cannot fail, He uses no influence to secure their accomplishment, which is incompatible with the perfect liberty and entire responsibility of rational creatures. As God is infinite in power and wisdom, He can control all events, and therefore the course of events must be in accordance with his will, because He can mould or direct that course at pleasure. It is, therefore, evident, first, that events must be the interpretation of his purposes, i.e., of what He intends shall happen; and secondly, that no objection can bear against the purpose or decrees of God, which does not bear equally against his providence. If it be right that God should permit an event to happen, it must be right that He should purpose to permit it, i.e., that He should decree its occurrence. We may suppose the Deistic or Rationalistic view of God's relation to the world to be true: that God created men, and left them without any providential guidance, or any supernatural influence, to the unrestrained exercise of their own faculties, and to the operation of the laws of nature and of society. If this were so, a certain course of events in regular succession, and in every variety of combination, would as a matter of fact, actually occur. In this case there could be no pretence that God was responsible for the issue. He had created man, endowed him with all the faculties, and surrounded him by all the circumstances necessary for his highest welfare. If he chose to abuse his faculties, and neglect his opportunities, it would be his own fault. He could bring no just complaint against his maker. We may further suppose that God, overlooking and foreseeing how men left to themselves would act, and what would be the issue of a universe conducted on this plan, should determine, for wise reasons, that it should become actual that just such a world and just such a series of events should really occur. Would this be wrong? Or, would it make any difference, if God's purpose as to the futurition of such a world, instead of

following the foresight of it, should precede it? In either case God would purpose precisely the same world, and the same course of events. Augustinianism supposes that God for his own glory, and therefore for the highest and most beneficent of all ends, did purpose such a world and such a series of events as would have occurred on the Deistical hypothesis, with two important exceptions. First, He interposes to restrain and guide the wickedness of men so as to prevent its producing unmitigated evil, and to cause it to minister to the production of good. And secondly, He intervenes by his providence, and by the work of Christ and of the Holy Spirit, to save innumerable souls from the deluge of destruction. The Augustinian system, therefore, is nothing but the assumption that God intended in eternity what He actually does in time. That system, therefore, is in accordance with all the facts of divine providence, and thus is founded on an immovable basis.

Sovereignty of God in the Dispensations of his Providence.

There is, however, another view which must be taken of this subject. Augustinianism is founded on the assumption of the sovereignty of God. It supposes that it belongs to Him, in virtue of his own perfection, in virtue of his relation to the universe as its creator and preserver, and of his relation to the world of sinners as their ruler and judge, to deal with them according to his own good pleasure; that He can rightfully pardon some and condemn others; can rightfully give his saving grace to one and not to another; and, therefore, that it is of Him, and not of man, that one and not another is made a partaker of eternal life. On the other hand, all anti-Augustinian systems assume that God is bound to provide salvation for all; to give sufficient grace to all; and to leave the question of salvation and perdition to be determined by each man for himself. We are not condemned criminals of whom the sovereign may rightfully pardon some and not others; but rational creatures, having all an equal and valid claim on our Maker to receive all that is necessary for our salvation. The question is not which of these theories is the more agreeable, but which is true. And to decide that question one method is to ascertain which accords best with providential facts. Does God in his providential dealings with men act on the principles of sovereignty, distributing his favours according to the good pleasure of his will; or on the principle of impartial justice, dealing with all men alike? This question admits of but one answer. We may make as little as we please of mere external circumstances, and magnify as much as we can the compensations of providence which tend to equalize the condition of men. We may press to the extreme the principle that much shall be required of those who receive much, and less of those who receive less. Notwithstanding these qualifications and limitations, the fact is patent that the greatest inequalities do exist among men; that God deals far more favourably with some than with others; that He distributes his providential blessings, which include not only temporal good but also religious advantages and opportunities, as an absolute sovereign according to his own good pleasure, and not as an impartial judge. The time for judgment is not yet.

This sovereignty of God in the dispensation of his providence is evinced in his dealings both with nations and with individuals. It cannot be believed that the lot of the Laplanders is as favourable as that of the inhabitants of the temperate zone; that the Hottentots are in as desirable a position as Europeans; that the people of Tartary are as well off as those of the United States. The inequality is too glaring to be denied; nor can it be doubted that the rule which God adopts in determining the lot of nations is his own good

pleasure, and not the relative claims of the people affected by his providence. The same fact is no less obvious as concerns individuals. Some are happy, others are miserable. Some have uninterrupted health; others are the victims of disease and suffering. Some have all their faculties, others are born blind or deaf. Some are rich, others sunk in the misery and degradation of abject poverty. Some are born in the midst of civilized society and in the bosom of virtuous families, others are from the beginning of their being surrounded by vice and wretchedness. These are facts which cannot be denied. Nor can it be denied that the lot of each individual is determined by the sovereign pleasure of God.

The same principle is carried out with regard to the communication of religious knowledge and advantages. God chose the Jews from among all time families of the earth to be the recipients of his oracles and of the divinely instituted ordinances of religion. The rest of the world was left for centuries in utter darkness. We may say that it will be more tolerable in the judgment for the heathen than for the unfaithful Jews; and that God did not leave even the Gentiles without a witness. All this may be admitted, and yet what the Apostle says stands true: The advantages of the Jews were great every way. It would be infatuation and ingratitude for the inhabitants of Christendom not to recognize their position as unspeakably more desirable than that of Pagans. No American Christian can persuade himself that it would have been as well had he been born in Africa; nor can he give any answer to the question, Why was I born here and not there? other than, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight."

It is therefore vain to adopt a theory which does not accord with these facts. It is vain for us to deny that God is a sovereign in the distribution of his favours if in his providence it is undeniable that He acts as a sovereign. Augustinianism accords with these facts of providence, and therefore must be true. It only assumes that God acts in the dispensation of his grace precisely as He acts in the distribution of his other favours; and all anti-Augustinian systems which are founded on the principle that this sovereignty of God is inconsistent with his justice and his parental relation to the children of men are in obvious conflict with the facts of his providence.

Argument from the Facts of Scripture.

The third source of proof on this subject is found in the facts of the Bible, or in the truths therein plainly revealed. Augustinianism is the only system consistent with those facts or truths.

1. This appears first from the clear revelation which the Scriptures make of God as infinitely exalted above all his creatures, and as the final end as well as the source of all things. It is because He is infinitely great and good that his glory is the end of all things; and his good pleasure the highest reason for whatever comes to pass. What is man that he should contend with God; or presume that his interests rather than God's glory should be made the final end? The Scriptures not only assert the absolute sovereignty of God, but they teach that it is founded, first, on his infinite superiority to all creatures; secondly, upon his relation to the world and all it contains, as creator and preserver, and therefore absolute proprietor; and, thirdly, so far as we men are concerned, upon our entire forfeiture of all claim on his mercy by our apostasy. The argument is that Augustinianism is the only system which accords with the character of God and with his relation to his creatures as revealed in the Bible.

2. It is a fact that men are a fallen race; that by their alienation from God they are involved in a state of guilt and pollution, from which they cannot deliver themselves. They have by their guilt forfeited all claim on God's justice; they might in justice be left to perish; and by their depravity they have rendered themselves unable to turn unto God, or to do anything spiritually good. These are facts already proved. The sense of guilt is universal and indestructible. All sinners know the righteous judgment of God, that they are worthy of death. The inability of sinners is not only clearly and repeatedly asserted in the Scriptures, but is proved by all experience, by the common consciousness of men, and, of course, by the consciousness of every individual man, and especially of every man who has ever been or who is truly convinced of sin. But if men are thus unable to change their own hearts, to prepare themselves for that change, or to co-operate in its productions then all those systems which assume the ability of the sinner and rest the distinction between one man and another as to their being saved or lost, upon the use made of that ability, must be false. They are contrary to facts. They are inconsistent with what every man, in the depth of his own heart, knows to be true. The point intended to be illustrated when the Scriptures compare sinners to men dead, and even to dry bones, is their entire helplessness. In this respect they are all alike. Should Christ pass through a graveyard, and bid one here and another there to come forth, the reason why one was restored to life, and another left in his grave could be sought only in his good pleasure. From the nature of the case it could not be found in the dead themselves. Therefore if the Scriptures, observation, and consciousness teach that men are unable to restore themselves to spiritual life, their being quickened must be referred to the good pleasure of God.

From the Work of the Spirit.

3. This is confirmed by another obvious fact or truth of Scripture. The regeneration of the human heart; the conversion of a sinner to God is the work, not of the subject of that change, but of the Spirit of God. This is plain, first, because the Bible always attributes it to the Holy Ghost. We are said to be born, not of the will of man, but of God; to be born of the Spirit; to be the subjects of the renewing of the Holy Ghost; to be quickened, or raised from the dead by the Spirit of the Lord; the dry bones live only when the Spirit blows upon them. Such is the representation which pervades the Scriptures from beginning to end. Secondly, the Church, therefore, in her collective capacity, and every living member of that Church recognizes this truth in their prayers for the renewing power of the Holy Ghost. In the most ancient and universally recognized creeds of the Church the Spirit is designated as to zoopoion, the life-giving; the author of all spiritual life. The sovereignty involved in this regenerating influence of the Holy Spirit is necessarily implied in the nature of the power exerted. It is declared to be the mighty power of God; the exceeding greatness of his power; the power which wrought in Christ when it raised Him from the dead. It is represented as analogous to the power by which the blind were made to see, the deaf to hear, and lepers were cleansed. It is very true the Spirit illuminates, teaches, convinces, persuades, and, in a word, governs the soul according to its nature as a rational creature But all this relates to what is done in the case of the children of God after their regeneration. Imparting spiritual life is one thing; sustaining, controlling, and cherishing that life is another. If the Bible teaches that regeneration, or spiritual resurrection, is the work of the almighty power of God, analogous to that which was exercised by Christ when He said, "I will, be thou clean;" then it of necessity follows that regeneration is an act of sovereignty. It depends on

God the giver of life and not on those spiritually dead, who are to live, and who are to remain in their sins. The intimate conviction of the people of God in all ages has been and is that regeneration, or the infusion of spiritual life, is an act of God's power exercised according to his good pleasure, and therefore it is the gift for which the Church specially prays. But this fact involves the truth of Augustinianism, which simply teaches that the reason why one man is regenerated and another not, and consequently one saved and another not, is the good pleasure of God. He has mercy upon whom He will have mercy. It is true that He commands all men to seek his grace, and promises that those who seek shall find. But why does one seek and another not? Why is one impressed with the importance of salvation while others remain indifferent? If it be true that not only regeneration, but all right thoughts and just [u poses come from God, it is of Him, and not of us, that we seek and find his favour.

Election is to Holiness.

4. Another plainly revealed fact is, that we are chosen to holiness; that we are created unto good works; in other words, that all good in us is the fruit, and, therefore, cannot by possibility be the ground of election. In Eph. i. 3-6, the Apostle says: "Blessed be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ, who hath blessed us with all spiritual blessings in heavenly places in Christ: according as He hath chosen us in Him, before the foundation of the world, that we should be holy and without blame before Him in love: having predestinated us unto the adoption of children by Jesus Christ to himself, according to the good pleasure of his will, to the praise of the glory of his grace, wherein He hath made us accepted in the Beloved." In this passage the Augustinian doctrine of election is stated as clearly and as comprehensively as it has ever been presented in human language. The Apostle teaches, (1.) That the end or design of the whole scheme of redemption is the praise of the glory of the grace of God, i.e., to exhibit to the admiration of intelligent creatures the glorious attribute of divine grace, or the love of an infinitely holy and just God towards guilty and polluted sinners. (2.) To this end, of his mere good pleasure, He predestinated those who were the objects of this love to the high dignity of being the children of God. (3.) That, to prepare them for this exalted state, He chose them, before the foundation of the world, to be holy and without blame in love. (4.) That in consequence of his choice, or in execution of this purpose, He confers upon them all spiritual blessings, regeneration, faith, repentance, and the indwelling of the Spirit. It is utterly incompatible within this fact that the foresight of faith and repentance should be the ground of election. Men, according to the Apostle, repent and believe, because they are elected; God has chosen them to be holy, and therefore their holiness or their goodness in any form or measure cannot be the reason why He chose them. In like manner the Apostle Peter says, believers are elect "unto obedience and sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." (1 Pet. i. 2.) Such is the clear doctrine of the Bible, men are chosen to be holy. The fact that God has predestinated them to salvation is the reason why they are brought to repentance and a holy life. "God," says Paul to the Thessalonians (2 Thess. ii. 13), "hath from the beginning chosen you to salvation through (not on account of) sanctification of the Spirit and belief of the truth." "We give thanks to God always for you all, making mention of you in our prayers; remembering without ceasing your work of faith, and labour of love, and patience of hope in our Lord Jesus Christ, in the sight of God and our Father; knowing, brethren beloved, your election of God." (1 Thess. i. 2-4.) He recognizes their election as the source of their

faith and love.

From the Gratuitous Nature of Salvation.

5. Another decisive fact is that salvation is of grace. The two ideas of grace and works; of gift and debt; of undeserved favour and what is merited; of what is to be referred to the good pleasure of the giver, and what to the character or state of the receiver, are antithetical. The one excludes the other. "If by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace. But if it be of works, then is it no more grace: otherwise work is no more work." Rom. xi. 6. Nothing concerning the plan of salvation is more plainly revealed, or more strenuously insisted upon than its gratuitousness, from beginning to end. "Ye are saved by grace, is engraved upon almost every page of the Bible, and in the hearts of all believers. (1.) It was a matter of grace that a plan of salvation was devised for fallen man and not for fallen angels. (2.) It was a matter of grace that that plan was revealed to some portions A our race and not to others. (3.) The acceptance, or justification of every individual heir of salvation is a matter of grace. (4.) The work of sanctification is a work of grace, i.e., a work carried on by the unmerited, supernatural power of the Holy Spirit. (5.) It is a matter of grace that of those who hear the gospel some accept the offered mercy, while others reject it. All these points are so clearly taught in the Bible that they are practically acknowledged by all Christians. Although denied to satisfy the understanding, they are conceded by the heart, as is evident from the prayers and praises of the Church in all ages and in all its divisions. That the vocation or regeneration of the believer is of grace, i.e., that the fact of his vocation is to be referred to God, and not to anything in himself is specially insisted upon by the Apostle Paul in almost all his epistles. For example, in 1 Cor. i. 17-31. It had been objected to him that he did not preach "with the wisdom of words." He vindicated himself by showing, first, that the wisdom of men had not availed to secure the saving knowledge of God; and secondly, that when the gospel of salvation was revealed, it was not the wise who accepted it. In proof of this latter point, he appealed to their own experience. He referred to the fact that of their number God had not chosen the wise, the great, or the noble; but the foolish, the weak, and the despised. God had done this. It was He who decided who should be brought to accept the Gospel, and who should be left to themselves. He had a purpose in this, and that purpose was that those who glory should glory in the Lord, i.e., that no man should be able to refer his salvation (the fact that he was saved while another was not saved) to himself. For, adds the Apostle, it is of Him that we are in Christ Jesus. Our union with Christ, the fact that we are believers, is to be referred to Him, and not to ourselves.

The Apostle's Argument in Romans ix.

This also is the purpose of the Apostle in the whole of the ninth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. He had asserted agreeably to the predictions of time ancient prophets, that the Jews as a nation were to be cast off, and the blessings of the true religion were to be extended to the Gentiles. To establish this point, he first shows that God was not bound by his promise to Abraham to save all the natural descendants of that patriarch. On the contrary, that it was a prerogative which God, as sovereign, claimed and exercised to have mercy on whom He would, and to reject whom He would. He chose Isaac and not Ishmael, Jacob and not Esau, and, in that case, to show that the choice was perfectly sovereign, it was announced before the birth of the children, before they had done good or evil. Pharaoh

He had hardened. He left him to himself to be a monument of justice. This right, which God both claims and exercises, to choose whom He will to be the recipients of his mercy, involves, the Apostle teaches us, no injustice. It is a right of sovereignty which belongs to God as Creator and as moral Governor. No one had a right to complain if, for the manifestation of his mercy, he saved some of the guilty family of men; and to show his justice, allowed others to bear the just recompense of their sins. On these principles God, as Paul tells us, dealt with the Jews. The nation as a nation was cast off, but a remnant was saved. And this remnant was an "election of grace," i.e., men chosen gratuitously. Paul himself was an illustration of this election, and a proof of its entirely gratuitous nature. He was a persecutor and a blasphemer, and while in the very exercise of his malignant opposition, was suddenly and miraculously converted. Here, if in no other case, the election was of grace. There was nothing in Paul to distinguish him favourably from other unbelieving Pharisees. It could not be the foresight of his faith and repentance which was the ground of his election, because he was brought to faith and repentance by the sovereign and irresistible intervention of God. What, however, was true of Paul is true of every other believer. Every man who is brought to Christ is so brought that it is revealed to his own consciousness, and openly confessed by the mouth, that his conversion is of God and not of himself; that he is a monument of the election of grace; that he, at least, was not chosen because of his deserts.

Argument from Experience.

The whole history of the Church, and the daily observation of Christians, prove the sovereignty of God in the dispensation of saving blessings, for which Augustinians contend. It is true, indeed, first, that God is a covenant keeping God, and that his promise is to his people and to their seed after them to the third and fourth generations. It is, therefore, true that his grace is dispensed, although not exclusively, yet conspicuously, in the line of their descendants. Secondly, it is also true that God has promised his blessing to attend faithful instruction. He commands parents to bring up their children in the nurture and admonition of the Lord; and promises that if thus trained in the way in which they should go, when they are old they will not depart from it. But it is not true that regeneration is the product of culture. Men cannot be educated into Christians, as they may be trained in knowledge or morals. Conversion is not the result of the development of a germ of spiritual life communicated in baptism or derived by descent from pious parents. Everything is in the hands of God. As Christ when on earth healed one and another by a word, so now by his Spirit, He quickens whom He will. This fact is proved by all history. Some periods of the Church have been remarkable for these displays of his powers, while others have passed with only here and there a manifestation of his saving grace. In the Apostolic age thousands were converted; many were daily added to the Church of such as were to be saved. Then in the Augustinian age there was a wide diffusion of the saving influences of the Spirit. Still more conspicuously was this the case at the Reformation. After a long decline in Great Britain came the wonderful revival of true religion under Wesley and Whitefield. Contemporaneously the great awakening occurred throughout this country. And thus from time to time, and in all parts of the Church, we see these evidences of the special and sovereign interventions of God. The sovereignty of these dispensations is just as manifest as that displayed in the seven years of plenty and the seven years of dearth in the time of Moses. Every pastor, almost every parent, can bear witness to the same truth. They pray

and labour long apparently without success; and then, often when they look not for it, comes the outpouring of the Spirit. Changes are effected in the state and character of men, which no man can produce in another; and which no man can effect in himself; changes which must be referred to the immediate agency of the Spirit of God. These are facts. They cannot be reasonably denied. They cannot be explained away. They demonstrate that God acts as a sovereign in the distribution of his grace. With this fact no other scheme than the Augustinian can be reconciled. If salvation is of grace, as the Scriptures so clearly teach, then it is not of works whether actual or foreseen.

Express Declarations of Scripture.

6. The Scriptures clearly assert that God has mercy on whom He will have mercy, and compassion on him on whom He will have compassion. They teach negatively, that election to salvation is not of works; that it does not depend on the character or efforts of its objects; and affirmatively, that it does depend on God. It is referred to his good pleasure. It is declared to be of Him; to be of grace. Passages in which these negative and affirmative statements are made, have already been quoted. In Rom. ix. it is said that election is "not of works, but of Him that calleth." "So then, it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy." As in the time of Elias and the general apostasy, God said, "I have left me seven thousand in Israel, all the knees which have not bowed the knee unto Baal. (1 Kings, xix. 18.) "So then," says the Apostle, "there is a remnant according to the election of grace. And if by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace." (Rom. xi. 5, 6.) So in Rom. viii. 30, it is said, "Whom He did predestinate, them He also called," i.e., He regenerated and sanctified. Regeneration follows predestination to life, and is the gift of God. Paul said of himself, "It pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace, to reveal his Son in me." (Gal. i. 15, 16.) To the Ephesians he says that those obtain the inheritance, who were "predestinated according to the purpose of Him who worketh all things after the counsel of his own will." (Eph. i. 12.) In 2 Tim. i. 9, he says, we are saved "according to his own purpose and grace, which was given us in Christ Jesus before the world began." The Apostle James, i. 18, says, "Of his own will begat He us with the word of truth, that we should be a kind of first-fruits of his creatures." The Apostle Peter speaks of those who "stumble at the word, being disobedient: whereunto also they were appointed." (1 Pet. ii. 8.) And Jude speaks of certain men who had "crept in unawares, who were before of old ordained to this condemnation." (Jude 4.) This foreordination to condemnation is indeed a judicial act, as is taught in Rom. ix. 22. God condemns no man, and foreordains no man to condemnation, except on account of his sin. But the preterition of such men, leaving them, rather than others equally guilty, to suffer the penalty of their sins, is distinctly declared to be a sovereign act.

The Words of Jesus.

Of all the teachers sent by God to reveal his will, no one more frequently asserts the divine sovereignty than our blessed Lord himself. He speaks of those whom the Father had "given Him." (John xvii. 2.) To these He gives eternal life. (John xvii. 2, 24.) For these He prays; for them He sanctified Himself (John xvii. 19.) Of them He says, it is the Father's will that He should lose none, but raise them up at the last day. (John vi. 39.) They are, therefore, perfectly safe. "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them, and they follow me:

and I give unto them eternal life; they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand. My Father, which gave them me, is greater than all; and no man is able to pluck them out of my Father's hand." (John x. 27-29.) As the sheep of Christ are chosen out of the world, and given to Him, God is the chooser. They do not choose Him, but He chooses them. No one can be added to their number, and that number shall certainly be completed. "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out." (John vi. 37.) "No man can come to me, except the Father which hath sent me draw him: and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 44.) "Every man therefore that hath heard, and learned of the Father, cometh unto me." (Verse 45.) "No man can come unto me, except it were given unto him of my Father." (Verse 65.) With God it rests who shall be brought to the saving knowledge of the truth. "It is given unto you to know the mysteries of the kingdom of heaven, but to them it is not given." (Matt. xiii. 11.) "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." (Matt. xi. 25.) In Acts xiii. 48, it is said, "As many as were ordained to eternal life believed." The Scriptures, therefore, say that repentance, faith, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost are gifts of God. Christ was exalted at the right hand of God to give repentance and remission of sins. But if faith and repentance are the gifts of God they must be the fruits of election They cannot possibly be its ground.

If the office of the theologian, as is so generally admitted, be to take the facts of Scripture as the man of science does those of nature, and found upon them his doctrines, instead of deducing his doctrines from the principles or primary truths of his philosophy, it seems impossible to resist the conclusion that the doctrine of Augustine is the doctrine of the Bible. According to that doctrine God is an absolute sovereign. He does what seems good in his sight. He sends the truth to one nation and not to another. He gives that truth saving power in one mind and not in another. It is of him, and not of us, that any man is in Christ Jesus, and is an heir of eternal life.

This, as has been shown, is asserted in express terms, with great frequency and clearness in the Scriptures. It is sustained by all the facts of providence and of revelation. It attributes to God nothing but what is proved, by his actual government of the world, to be his rightful prerogative. It only teaches that God purposes what, with our own eyes, we see He actually does, and ever has done, in the dispensations of his providence. The consistent opponent of this doctrine must, therefore, reject the truths even of natural religion. As Augustinianism agrees with the facts of providence it of course agrees with the facts of Scripture. The Bible declares that the salvation of sinful men is a matter of grace; and that the great design of the whole scheme of redemption is to display the glory of that divine attribute, -- to exhibit to the admiration, and for the edification of the intelligent universe, God's unmerited love and boundless beneficence to guilty and polluted creatures. Accordingly, men are represented as being sunk into a state of sin and misery; from this state they cannot deliver themselves; for their redemption God sent his own eternal Son to assume their nature, obey, and suffer in their place; and his Holy Spirit to apply the redemption purchased by the Son. To introduce the element of merit into any part of this scheme vitiates its nature and frustrates its design. Unless our salvation from beginning to end be of grace it is not an exhibition of grace. The Bible, however, teaches that it was a matter of grace that salvation was provided; that it was revealed to one nation and not to

another; and that it was applied to one person and not to another. It teaches that all goodness in man is due to the influence of the Holy Spirit, and that all spiritual blessings are the fruits of election; that we are chosen to holiness, and created unto good works, because predestinated to be the children of God. With these facts of Scripture the experience of Christians agrees. It is the intimate conviction of every believer, founded upon the testimony of his own consciousness, as well as upon the Scriptures, that his salvation is of God; that it is of Him, and not of himself, that he has been brought to the exercise of faith and repentance. So long as he looks within the believer is satisfied of the truth of these doctrines. It is only when he looks outward, and attempts to reconcile these truths with the dictates of his own understanding that he becomes confused and sceptical. But as our faith is not founded on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God, as the foolishness of God is wiser than men, the part of wisdom, as well as the path of duty and safety, is to receive as true what God has revealed, whether we can comprehend his ways unto perfection or not.

§ 9. Objections to the Augustinian Scheme.

That there are formidable objections to the Augustinian doctrine of divine sovereignty cannot be denied. They address themselves even more powerfully to the feelings and to the imagination than they do to the understanding. They are therefore often arrayed in such distorted and exaggerated forms as to produce the strongest revulsion and abhorrence. This, however, is due partly to the distortion of the truth and partly to the opposition of our imperfectly or utterly unsanctified nature, to the things of the Spirit, of which the Apostle speaks in 1 Cor. ii. 14.

Of these objections, however, it may be remarked in general, in the first place, that they do not bear exclusively on this doctrine. It is one of the unfair devices of controversy to represent difficulties which press with equal force against some admitted doctrine as valid only against the doctrine which the objector rejects. Thus the objections against Augustinianism, on which special reliance is placed, bear with their full force against the decrees of God in general; or if these be denied, against the divine foreknowledge; against the permission of sin and misery, and especially against the doctrine of the unending sinfulness and misery of many of God's intelligent creatures. These are doctrines which all Christians admit, and which are arrayed by infidels and atheists in colours as shocking to the imagination and feelings as any which Anti-Augustinians have employed in depicting the sovereignty of God. It is just as difficult to reconcile to our natural ideas of God that He, with absolute control over all creatures, should allow so many of them to perish eternally as that He should save some and not others. The difficulty is in both cases the same. God does not prevent the perdition of those whom, beyond doubt, He has power to save. If those who admit God's providence say that He has wise reasons for permitting so many of our race to perish, the advocates of his sovereignty say that He has adequate reasons for saving some and not others. It is unreasonable and unjust, therefore, to press difficulties which bear against admitted truths as fatal to doctrines which are matters of controversy. When an objection is shown to prove too much it is rationally refuted.

The same objections bear against the Providence of God.

A second general remark respecting these objections is, that they hear against the

providence of God. This has already been shown. It is useless and irrational to argue against facts. It can avail nothing to say that it is unjust in God to deal more favourably with one nation than with another, with one individual than with another, if in point of fact He acts as a sovereign in the distribution of his favours. That He does so act is undeniable so far as providential blessings and religious advantages are concerned. And this is all that Augustinianism asserts in regard to the dispensations of his grace. If, therefore, the principle on which these objections are founded is proved to be false by the actual facts of providence the objections cannot be valid against the Augustinian scheme.

Founded on our Ignorance.

A third obvious remark is that these objections are subjective; i.e., they derive all their force from the limitation of our powers and from the narrowness of our views. They assume that we are competent to sit in judgment on God's government of the universe; that we can ascertain the end which He has in view, and estimate aright the wisdom and justice of the means adopted for its accomplishment. This is clearly a preposterous assumption, not only because of our utter incapacity to comprehend the ways of God, but also because we must of necessity judge before the consummation of his plan, and must also judge from appearances. It is but right in judging of the plans even of a fellow mortal, that we should wait until they are fully developed, and also right that we should not judge without being certain that we can see his real intentions, and the connection between his means and end.

Besides all this, it is to be observed that these difficulties arise from our contemplating, so to speak, only one aspect of the case. We look only on the sovereignty of God and the absolute nature of his control over his creatures. We leave out of view, or are incapable of understanding the perfect consistency of that sovereignty and control, with the free agency and responsibility of his rational creatures. It is perfectly true, in one aspect, that God determines according to his own good pleasure the destiny of every human being; and it is equally true, in another aspect, that every man determines his own destiny. These truths can both be established on the firmest grounds. Their consistency, therefore, must be admitted as a fact, even though we may not be able to discover it. Of the multitudes who start in the pursuit of fame, wealth, or power, some succeed while others fail. Success and failure, in every case, are determined by the Lord. This is distinctly asserted in the Bible. "God," saith the Psalmist, "putteth down one and setteth up another." (Ps. lxxv. 7.) "The Lord maketh poor, and maketh rich: He bringeth low, and lifteth up." (1 Sam. ii. 7) "The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away; blessed be the name of the Lord." (Job i. 21.) "It is He that giveth thee power to get wealth." (Deut. viii. 18.) "He giveth wisdom unto the wise, and knowledge to them that know understanding." (Dan ii. 21.) "The Most High ruleth in the kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever He will." (Dan. iv. 17.) This is a truth of natural religion. All men, whether Christians or not, pray for the success of their enterprises. They recognize the providential control of God over all the affairs of men. Nevertheless they are fully aware of the consistency of this control with their own free agency and responsibility. Every man who makes the acquisition of wealth his object in life, is conscious that he does it of his own free choice. He lays his own plans; adopts his own means; and acts as freely, and as entirely according to the dictates of his own will, as though there were no such thing as providence. This is not a delusion. He is perfectly free. His character expresses itself in the choice which he makes of the end which he desires to

secure. He cannot help recognizing his responsibility for that choice, and for all the means which he adopts to carry it into effect. All this is true in the sphere of religion. God places life and death before every man who hears the gospel. He warns him of the consequences of a wrong choice. He presents and urges all the considerations which should lead to a right determination. He assures the sinner that if he forsakes his sin, and returns unto the Lord, he shall be pardoned and accepted. He promises that if lie asks, he shall receive; if he seeks he shall find. He assures him that He is more willing to give the Holy Spirit, than parents are to give bread unto their children. If, notwithstanding all this, he deliberately prefers the world, refuses to seek the salvation of his soul in the appointed way, and finally perishes, he is as completely responsible for his character and conduct, and for the perdition of his soul, as the man of the world is responsible for the pursuit of wealth. In both cases, and equally in both cases, the sovereign disposition of God is consistent with the freedom and responsibility of the agents. It is, therefore, by looking at only one half of the whole truth, that the difficulties in question are magnified into such importance. Men act as freely in religion as they do in any department of life; and when they perish it is the work of their own hands.

These Objections were urged against the Teachings of the Apostle.

Another remark respecting these objections should not be overlooked. They were urged by the Jews against the doctrine of the Apostle. This at least proves that his doctrine is our doctrine. Had he not taught what all Augustinians hold to be true, there would have been no room for such objections. Had he denied that God dispenses salvation according to his own good pleasure, having mercy on whom He will have mercy, why should the Jews urge that God was unjust and that the responsibility of man was destroyed? What appearance of injustice could there have been had Paul taught that God elects those whom He foresees will repent and believe, and because of that foresight? It is only because he clearly asserts the sovereignty of God that the objections have any place. The answers which Paul gives to these difficulties should satisfy us for two reasons; first, because they are the answers dictated by the Spirit of God; and secondly, because they are in themselves satisfactory to every rightly constituted mind.

The first of these objections is that it is inconsistent with the justice of God to save one and not another, according to his own good pleasure. To this Paul answers, (1.) That God claims this prerogative. (2.) That He actually exercises it. It is useless to deny facts, or to say that what God really does is inconsistent with his nature. (3.) That it is a rightful prerogative, founded not only on the infinite superiority of God and in his proprietorship in all his creatures; but also in his relation as moral governor to the race of sinful men. If even a human sovereign is entitled to exercise his discretion in pardoning one criminal and not another, surely this prerogative cannot reasonably be denied to God. There can be no injustice in allowing the sentence of a just law to be executed upon an offender. And this is all that God does in regard to sinners.

The further difficulty connected with this subject arising from the foreordination of sin, belongs to the subject of decrees, and has already been considered. The same remark applies to the objection that the doctrine in question destroys all motive to exertion and to the use of means of grace; and reduces the doctrine of the Scriptures to a purely fatalistic system.

The practical tendency of any doctrine is to be decided from its nature, and from its effects. The natural effect of the conviction that we have forfeited all claims on God's justice, that we are at his mercy, and that He may rightfully leave us to perish in our sins, is to lead us to seek that mercy with earnestness and importunity. And the experience of the Church in all ages proves that such is the actual effect of the doctrine in question. It has not led to neglect, to stolid unconcern, or to rebellious opposition to God, but to submission, to the acknowledgment of the truth, and to sure trust in Christ as the appointed Saviour of those who deserve to perish.

CHAPTER II: THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

§ 1. The Plan of Salvation is a Covenant.

The plan of salvation is presented under the form of a covenant. This is evident, --

First, from the constant use of the words bryt and diatheke in reference to it. With regard to the former of these words, although it is sometimes used for a law, disposition, or arrangement in general, where the elements of a covenant strictly speaking are absent, yet there can be no doubt that according to its prevailing usage in the Old Testament, it means a mutual contract between two or more parties. It is very often used of compacts between individuals, and especially between kings and rulers. Abraham and Abimelech made a covenant. (Gen. xxi. 27.) Joshua made a covenant with the people. (Josh. xxiv. 25.) Jonathan and David made a covenant. (1 Sam. xviii. 3) Jonathan made a covenant with the house of David. (1 Sam. xx. 16.) Ahab made a covenant with Benhadad. (1 Kings xx. 34.) So we find it constantly. There is therefore no room to doubt that the word bryt when used of transactions between man and man means a mutual compact. We have no right to give it any other sense when used of transactions between God and man. Repeated mention is made of the covenant of God with Abraham, as in Gen. xv. 18; xvii. 13, and afterwards with Isaac and Jacob. Then with the Israelites at Mount Sinai. The Old Testament is founded on this idea of a covenant relation between God and the theocratic people.

The meaning of the word diatheke in the Greek Scriptures is just as certain and uniform. It is derived from the verb diatithemi, to arrange, and, therefore, in ordinary Greek is used for any arrangement, or disposition. In the Scriptures it is almost uniformly used in the sense of a covenant. In the Septuagint it is the translation of bryt in all the cases above referred to. It is the term always used in the New Testament to designate the covenant with Abraham, with the Israelites, and with believers. The old covenant and the new are presented in contrast. Both were covenants. If the word has this meaning when applied to the transaction with Abraham and with the Hebrews, it must have the same meaning when applied to the plan of salvation revealed in the gospel.

Secondly, that the plan of salvation is presented in the Bible under the form of a covenant is proved not only from the signification and usage of the words above mentioned, but also and more decisively from the fact that the elements of a covenant are included in this plan. There are parties, mutual promises or stipulations, and conditions. So that it is in fact a covenant, whatever it may be called. As this is the Scriptural mode of representation, it is of great importance that it should be retained in theology. Our only security for retaining the truths of the Bible, is to adhere to the Scriptures as closely as possible in our mode of presenting the doctrines therein revealed.

§ 2. Different Views of the Nature of this Covenant.

It is assumed by many that the parties to the covenant of grace are God and fallen man. Man by his apostasy having forfeited the favour of God, lost the divine image, and involved himself in sin and misery, must have perished in this state, had not God provided a plan of salvation. Moved by compassion for his fallen creatures, God determined to send his Son into the world, to assume their nature, and to do and suffer whatever was requisite for their salvation. On the ground of this redeeming work of Christ, God promises salvation to all who will comply with the terms on which it is offered. This general statement embraces forms of opinion which differ very much one from the others.

1. It includes even the Pelagian view of the plan of salvation, which assumes that there is no difference between the covenant of works under which Adam was placed, and the covenant of grace, under which men are now, except as to the extent of the obedience required. God promised life to Adam on the condition of perfect obedience, because he was in a condition to render such obedience. He promises salvation to men now on the condition of ouch obedience as they are able to render, whether Jews, Pagans, or Christians. According to this view the parties to the covenant are God and man; the promise is life; the condition is obedience, such as man in the use of his natural powers is able to render.

2. The Remonstrant system does not differ essentially from the Pelagian, so far as the parties, the promise and the condition of the covenant are concerned. The Remonstrants also make God and man the parties, life the promise, and obedience the condition. But they regard fallen men as in a state of sin by nature, as needing supernatural grace which is furnished to all, and the obedience required is the obedience of faith, or fides obsequiosa, faith as including and securing evangelical obedience. Salvation under the gospel is as truly by works as under the law; but the obedience required is not the perfect righteousness demanded of Adam, but such as fallen man, by the aid of the Spirit, is now able to perform.

3. Wesleyan Arminianism greatly exalts the work of Christ, the importance of the Spirit's influence, and the grace of the gospel above the standard adopted by the Remonstrants. The two systems, however, are essentially the same. The work of Christ has equal reference to all men. It secures for all the promise of salvation on the condition of evangelical obedience; and it obtains for all, Jews and Gentiles, enough measures of divine grace to render such obedience practicable. The salvation of each individual man depends on the use which he makes of this sufficient grace.

4. The Lutherans also hold that God had the serious purpose to save all men; that Christ died equally for all; that salvation is offered to all who hear the gospel, on the condition, not of works or of evangelical obedience, but of faith alone; faith, however, is the gift of God; men have not the power to believe, but they have the power of effectual resistance; and those, and those only, under the gospel, who wilfully resist, perish, and for that reason. According to all these views, which were more fully stated in the receding chapter, the covenant of grace is a compact between God and fallen man, in which God promises salvation on condition of a compliance with the demands of the gospel. What those demands are, as we have seen, is differently explained.

The essential distinctions between the above-mentioned views of the plan of salvation, or covenant of grace, and the Augustinian system, are, (1.) That, according to the

former, its provisions have equal reference to all mankind, whereas according to the latter they have special reference to that portion of our race who are actually saved; and (2.) That Augustinianism says that it is God and not man who determines who are to be saved. As has been already frequently remarked, the question which of these systems is true is not to be decided by ascertaining which is the more agreeable to our feelings or the more plausible to our understanding, but which is consistent with the doctrines of the Bible and the facts of experience. This point has already been discussed. Our present object is simply to state what Angustinians mean by the covenant of grace.

The word grace is used in Scripture and in ordinary religious writings in three senses. (1.) For unmerited love; i.e., love exercised towards the undeserving. (2.) For any unmerited favour, especially for spiritual blessings. Hence, all the fruits of the Spirit in believers are called graces, or unmerited gifts of God. (3.) The word grace often means the supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost. This is preminently grace, being the great gift secured by the work of Christ, and without which his redemption would not avail to our salvation. In all these senses of the word the plan of salvation is properly called a covenant of grace. It is of grace because it originated in the mysterious love of God for sinners who deserved only his wrath and curse. Secondly, because it promises salvation, not on the condition of works or anything meritorious on our part, but as an unmerited gift. And, thirdly, because its benefits are secured and applied not in the course of nature, or in the exercise of the natural powers of the sinner, but by the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit, granted to him as an unmerited gift.

§ 3. Parties to the Covenant.

At first view there appears to be some confusion in the statements of the Scriptures as to the parties to this covenant. Sometimes Christ is presented as one of the parties; at others He is represented not as a party, but as the mediator and surety of the covenant; while the parties are represented to be God and his people. As the old covenant was made between God and the Hebrews, and Moses acted as mediator, so the new covenant is commonly represented in the Bible as formed between God and his people, Christ acting as mediator. He is, therefore, called the mediator of a better covenant founded on better promises.

Some theologians propose to reconcile these modes of representation by saying that as the covenant of works was formed with Adam as the representative of his race, and therefore in him with all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation; so the covenant of grace was formed with Christ as the head and representative of his people, and in Him with all those given to Him by the Father. This simplifies the matter, and agrees with the parallel which the Apostle traces between Adam and Christ in Rom. v. 12-21, and 1 Cor. xv. 21, 22, 47-49. Still it does not remove the incongruity of Christ's being represented as at once a party and a mediator of the same covenant. There are in fact two covenants relating to the salvation of fallen man, the one between God and Christ, the other between God and his people. These covenants differ not only in their parties, but also in their promises and conditions. Both are so clearly presented in the Bible that they should not be confounded. The latter, the covenant of grace, is founded on the former, the covenant of redemption. Of the one Christ is the mediator and surety; of the other He is one of the contracting parties.

This is a matter which concerns only perspicuity of statement. There is no doctrinal difference between those who prefer the one statement and those who prefer the other; between those who comprise all the facts of Scripture relating to the subject under one covenant between God and Christ as the representative of his people, and those who distribute them under two. The Westminster standards seem to adopt sometimes the one and sometimes the other mode of representation. In the Confession of Faith [297] it is said, "Man, by his fall, having made himself incapable of life by that covenant [i.e., by the covenant of works], the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the covenant of grace; wherein He freely offereth unto sinners life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in Him, that they may be saved, and promising to give unto all those that are ordained unto life, his Holy Spirit, to make them willing and able to believe." Here the implication is that God and his people are the parties; for in a covenant the promises are made to one of the parties, and here it is said that life and salvation are promised to sinners, and that faith is demanded of them. The same view is presented in the Shorter Catechism, according to the natural interpretation of the answer to the twentieth question. It is there said, "God having out of his mere good pleasure, from all eternity, elected some to everlasting life, did enter into a covenant of grace, to deliver them out of the estate of sin and misery, and to bring them into an estate of salvation by a Redeemer." In the Larger Catechism, however, the other view is expressly adopted. In the answer to the question, [298] "With whom was the covenant of grace made?" it is said, "The covenant of grace was made with Christ as the second Adam, and in Him with all the elect as his seed."

Two Covenants to be Distinguished.

This confusion is avoided by distinguishing between the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son, and the covenant of grace between God and his people. The latter supposes the former, and is founded upon it. The two, however, ought not to be confounded, as both are clearly revealed in Scripture, and moreover they differ as to the parties, as to the promises, and as to the conditions. On this subject Turrettin says, [299] "Atque hic superfluum videtur qu&#65533;rere, An foedus hoc contractum fuerit cum Christo, tanquam altera parte contrahente, et in ipso cum toto ejus semine, ut primum foedus cum Adamo pactum fuerat, et in Adamo cum tota ejus posteritate: quod non paucis placet, quia promissiones ipsi dicuntur fact&#65533;, Gal. iii. 16, et quia, ut Caput et Princeps populi sui, in omnibus primas tenet, ut nihil nisi in ipso et ab ipso obtineri possit: An vero foedus contractum sit in Christo cum toto semine, ut non tam habeat rationem partis contrahentis, quam partis medi&#65533;, qu&#65533; inter dissidentes stat ad eos reconciliandos, ut aliis satius videtur. Superfiuum, inquam, est de eo disceptare, quia res eodem redit; et certum est duplex hic pactum necessario attendendum esse, vel unius ejusdem pacti duas partes et gradus. Prius pactum est, quod inter Patrem et Filium intercedit, ad opus redemptionis exequendum. Posterius est, quod Deus cum electis in Christo contrahit, de illis per et propter Christum salvandis sub conditione fidei et resipiscenti&#65533;. Prius fit cum Sponsore et capite ad salutem membrorum: Posterius fit cum membris in capite et sponsore."

The same view is taken by Witsius: [300] "Ut Foederis grati&#65533; natura penitius perspecta sit, duo imprimis distincte consideranda sunt. (1.) Pactum, quod inter Deum Patrem et mediatorem Christum intercedit. (2.) Testamentaria illa dispositio, qua Deus electis salutem &#65533;ternam, et omnia eo pertinentia, immutabili foedere addicit. Prior

conventio Dei cum mediatore est: posterior Dei cum electis. H&#65533;c illam supponit, et in illa fundatur."

[297] Chap. vii. § 3.

[298] Ques. 31.

[299] XII. ii. 12; edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 157, 158.

[300] De OEconomia Foederum, lib. II. ii. 1, edit. 1712, p. 130.

§ 4. Covenant of Redemption.

By this is meant the covenant between the Father and the Son in reference to the salvation of man. This is a subject which, from its nature, is entirely beyond our comprehension. We must receive the teachings of the Scriptures in relation to it without presuming to penetrate the mystery which naturally belongs to it. There is only one God, one divine Being, to whom all the attributes of divinity belong. But in the Godhead there are three persons, the same in substance, and equal in power and glory. It lies in the nature of personality, that one person is objective to another. If therefore, the Father and the Son are distinct persons the one be the object of the acts of the other. The one may love, address, and commune with the other. The Father may send the Son, may give Him a work to do, and promise Him a recompense. All this is indeed incomprehensible to us, but being clearly taught in Scripture, it must enter into the Christian's faith.

In order to prove that there is a covenant between the Father and the Son, formed in eternity, and revealed in time, it is not necessary that we should adduce passages of the Scriptures in which this truth is expressly asserted. There are indeed passages which are equivalent to such direct assertions. This is implied in the frequently recurring statements of the Scripture that the plan of God respecting the salvation of men was of the nature of a covenant, and was formed in eternity. Paul says that it was hidden for ages in the divine mind; that it was before the foundation of the world. Christ speaks of promises made to Him before his advent; and that He came into the world in execution of a commission which He had received from the Father. The parallel so distinctly drawn between Adam and Christ is also a proof of the point in question. As Adam was the head and representative of his posterity, so Christ is the head and representative of his people. And as God entered into covenant with Adam so He entered into covenant with Christ. This, in Rom. v. 12-21, is set forth as the fundamental idea of all God's dealings with men, both in their fall and in their redemption.

The proof of the doctrine has, however, a much wider foundation. When one person assigns a stipulated work to another person with the promise of a reward upon the condition of the performance of that work, there is a covenant. Nothing can be plainer than that all this is true in relation to the Father and the Son. The Father gave the Son a work to do; He sent Him into the world to perform it, and promised Him a great reward when the work was accomplished. Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. We have, therefore, the contracting parties, the promise, and the condition. These are the essential elements of a covenant. Such being the representation of Scripture, such must be the truth to which we are bound to adhere. It is not a mere figure, but a real transaction, and should be regarded and treated as such if we would understand aright the plan of salvation. In the

fortieth Psalm. expounded by the Apostle as referring to the Messiah, it is said, "Lo, I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, I delight to do thy will." i.e. to execute thy purpose, to carry on thy plan. "By the which will," says the Apostle (Heb. x. 10), "we are sanctified (i.e., cleansed from the guilt of sin), through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." Christ came, therefore, in execution of a purpose of God, to fulfil a work which had been assigned Him. He, therefore, in John xvii. 4, says, "I have finished the work which thou gavest me to do." This was said at the close of his earthly course. At its beginning, when yet a child, He said to his parents, "Wist ye not that I must be about my Father's business?" (Luke ii. 49.) Our Lord speaks of Himself, and is spoken of as sent into the world. He says that as the Father had sent Him into the world, even so had He sent his disciples into the world. (John xvii. 18.) "When the fulness of the time was come, God sent forth his Son, made of a woman." (Gal. iv. 4.) "God sent his only begotten Son into the world." (1 John iv. 9.) God "sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." (Verse 10.)

It is plain, therefore, that Christ came to execute a work, that He was sent of the Father to fulfil a plan, or preconceived design. It is no less plain that special promises were made by the Father to the Son, suspended upon the accomplishment of the work assigned Him. This may appear as an anthropological mode of representing a transaction between the persons of the adorable Trinity. But it must be received as substantial truth. The Father did give the Son a work to do, and He did promise to him a reward upon its accomplishment. The transaction was, therefore, of the nature of a covenant. An obligation was assumed by the Son to accomplish the work assigned Him; and an obligation was assumed by the Father to grant Him the stipulated reward. The infinitude of God does not prevent these things being possible.

As the exhibition of the work of Christ in the redemption of man constitutes a large part of the task of the theologian, all that is proper in this place is a simple reference to the Scriptural statements on the subject.

The Work assigned to the Redeemer.

(1) He was to assume our nature, humbling Himself to be born of a woman, and to be found in fashion as a man. This was to be a real incarnation, not a mere theophany such as occurred repeatedly under the old dispensation. He was to become flesh: to take part of flesh and body; to be bone of our bone and flesh of our flesh, made in all things like unto his brethren, yet without sin, that He might be touched with a sense of our infirmities, and able to sympathize with those who are tempted, being Himself also tempted. (2.) He was to be made under the law, voluntarily undertaking to fulfil all righteousness by obeying the law of God perfectly in all the forms in which it had been made obligatory on man. (3.) He was to bear our sins, to be a curse for us, offering Himself as a sacrifice, or propitiation to God in expiation of the sins of men. This involved his whole life of humiliation, sorrow, and suffering, and his ignominious death upon the cross under the hiding of his Father's countenance. What He was to do after this pertains to his exaltation and reward.

The Promises made to the Redeemer.

Such, in general terms, was the work which the Son of God undertook to perform. The promises of the Father to the Son conditioned on the accomplishment of that work, were, (1.) That He would prepare Him a body, fit up a tabernacle for Him, formed as was the body of Adam by the immediate agency of God, uncontaminated and without spot or

blemish. (2.) That He would give the Spirit to Him without measure, that his whole human nature should be replenished with grace and strength, and so adorned with the beauty of holiness that He should be altogether lovely. (3.) That He would be ever at his right hand to support and comfort Him in the darkest hours of his conflict with the powers of darkness, and that He would ultimately bruise Satan under his feet. (4.) That He would deliver Him from the power of death, and exalt Him to his own right hand in heaven; and that all power in heaven and earth should be committed to Him. (5.) That He, as the Theanthropos and head of the Church, should have the Holy Spirit to send to whom He willed, to renew their hearts, to satisfy and comfort them, and to qualify them for his service and kingdom. (6.) That all given to Him by the Father should come to Him, and be kept by Him, so that none of them should be lost. (7.) That a multitude whom no man can number should thus be made partakers of his redemption, and that ultimately the kingdom of the Messiah should embrace all the nations of the earth. (8.) That through Christ, in Him, and in his ransomed Church, there should be made the highest manifestation of the divine perfections to all orders of holy intelligences throughout eternity. The Son of God was thus to see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied.

§ 5. The Covenant of Grace.

In virtue of what the Son of God covenanted to perform, and what in the fulness of time He actually accomplished, agreeably to the stipulations of the compact with thu Father, two things follow. First, salvation is offered to all men on the condition of faith in Christ. Our Lord commanded his disciples to go into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature. The gospel, however, is the offer of salvation upon the conditions of the covenant of grace. In this sense, the covenant of grace is formed with all mankind. And, therefore, Turrettin [301] says, "Foedus hoc grati est pactum gratuitum inter Deum offensum et hominem offendentem in Christo initum, in quo Deus homini gratis propter Christum remissionem peccatorum et salutem pollicetur, homo vero eadem gratia fretus pollicetur fidem et obedientiam." And the Westminster Confession [302] says, "Man, by his fall, having made himself incapable of life by that covenant [namely, by the covenant of works], the Lord was pleased to make a second, commonly called the covenant of grace: wherein He freely offereth unto sinners [and all sinners] life and salvation by Jesus Christ, requiring of them faith in Him, that they may be saved, and promising to give unto all those that are ordained unto life, his Holy Spirit, to make them able and willing to believe." If this, therefore, were all that is meant by those who make the parties to the covenant of grace, God and mankind in general and all mankind equally, there would be no objection to the doctrine. For it is undoubtedly true that God offers to all and every man eternal life on condition of faith in Jesus Christ. But as it is no less true that the whole scheme of redemption has special reference to those given by the Father to the Son, and of whom our Lord says, "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out" (John vi. 37), it follows, secondly, from the nature of the covenant between the Father and the Son, that the covenant of grace has also special reference to the elect. To them God has promised to give his Spirit in order that they may believe; and to them alone all the promises made to believers belong. Those who ignore the distinction between the covenants of redemption and of grace, merging the latter in the former, of

course represent the parties to the covenant to be God and Christ as the head and representative of his own people. And therefore mankind, as such, are in no sense parties. All that is important is, that we should adopt such a mode of representation as will comprehend the various facts recognized in the Scriptures. It is one of those facts that salvation is offered to all men on the condition of faith in Christ. And therefore to that extent, or, in a sense which accounts for that fact, the covenant of grace is made with all men. The great sin of those who hear the gospel is that they refuse to accept of that covenant and therefore place themselves without its pale.

Christ as Mediator of the Covenant.

As Christ is a party to the covenant of redemption, so He is constantly represented as the mediator of the covenant of grace; not only in the sense of an internuncius, as Moses was a mediator between God and the people of Israel, but in the sense, (1.) That it was through his intervention, and solely on the ground of what He had done, or promised to do, that God entered into this new covenant with fallen men. And, (2.) in the sense of a surety. He guarantees the fulfilment of all the promises and conditions of the covenant. His blood was the blood of the covenant. That is, his death had all the effects of a federal sacrifice, it not only bound the parties to the contract, but it also secured the fulfilment of all its provisions. Hence He is called not only Mesites, but also Enguos (Heb. vii. 22), a sponsor, or surety. By fulfilling the conditions on which the promises of the covenant of redemption were suspended, the veracity and justice of God are pledged to secure the salvation of his people; and this secures the fidelity of his people. So that Christ answers both for God and man. His work renders certain the gifts of God's grace, and the perseverance of his people in faith and obedience. He is therefore, in every sense, our salvation.

The Condition of the Covenant.

The condition of the covenant of grace, so far as adults are concerned, is faith in Christ. That is, in order to partake of the benefits of this covenant we must receive the Lord Jesus Christ as the Son of God in whom and for whose sake its blessings are vouchsafed to the children of men. Until we thus believe we are aliens and strangers from the covenant of promise, without God and without Christ. We must acquiesce in this covenant, renouncing all other methods of salvation, and consenting to be saved on the terms which it proposes, before we are made partakers of its benefits. The word "condition," however, is used in two senses. Sometimes it means the meritorious consideration on the ground of which certain benefits are bestowed. In this sense perfect obedience was the condition of the covenant originally made with Adam. Had he retained his integrity he would have merited the promised blessing. For to him that worketh the reward is not of grace but of debt. In the same sense the work of Christ is the condition of the covenant of redemption. It was the meritorious ground, laying a foundation in justice for the fulfilment of the promises made to Him by the Father. But in other cases, by condition we merely mean a sine qua non. A blessing may be promised on condition that it is asked for; or that there is a willingness to receive it. There is no merit in the asking or in the willingness, which is the ground of the gift. It remains a gratuitous favour; but it is, nevertheless, suspended upon the act of asking. It is in this last sense only that faith is the condition of the covenant of grace. There is no merit in believing. It is only the act of receiving a proffered favour. In either case the necessity is equally absolute. Without the work of Christ there would be no salvation; and

without faith there is no salvation. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life. He that believeth not, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him.

The Promises of the Covenant.

The promises of this covenant are all included in the comprehensive formula, so often occurring in the Scriptures, "I will be your God, and ye shall be my people." This involves the complete restoration of our normal relation to God. All ground of alienation, every bar to fellowship is removed. He communicates Himself in his fulness to his people; and they become his by entire conformity to his will and devotion to his service, and are the special objects of his favour.

God is said to be our God, not only because He is the God whom we acknowledge and profess to worship and obey, as He was the God of the Hebrews in distinction from the Gentiles who did not acknowledge his existence or profess to be his worshippers, but He is our God, -- our infinite portion; the source to us of all that God is to those who are the objects of his love. His perfections are revealed to us as the highest knowledge; they are all pledged for our protection, blessedness, and glory. His being our God implies also that He assures us of his love, and admits us to communion with Himself. As his favour is life, and his loving kindness better than life; as the vision of God, the enjoyment of his love and fellowship with Him secure the highest possible exaltation and beatification of his creatures, it is plain that the promise to be our God, in the Scriptural sense of the term, includes all conceivable and all possible good.

When it is said that we are to be his people it means, (1.) That we are his peculiar possession. His delights are with the children of men. From the various orders of rational creatures. He has chosen man to be the special object of his favour, and the special medium through which and by which to manifest his glory. And from the mass of fallen men He has, of his own good pleasure, chosen an innumerable multitude to be his portion, as He condescends to call them; on whom He lavishes the plenitude of his grace, and in whom He reveals his glory to the admiration of all holy intelligences. (2.) That being thus selected for the special love of God and for the highest manifestation of his glory, they are in all things fitted for this high destiny. They are justified, sanctified, and glorified. They are rendered perfectly conformed to his image, devoted to his service, and obedient to his will.

[301] XII. ii. 5, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 156.

[302] Chap. vii. § 3.

§ 6. The Identity of the Covenant of Grace under all Dispensations.

By this is meant that the plan of salvation has, under all dispensations, the Patriarchal, the Mosaic, and the Christian, been the same. On this subject much diversity of opinion, and still more of mode of statement has prevailed. Socinians say that under the old economy, there was no promise of eternal life; and that the condition of salvation was not faith in Christ. The Remonstrants admitted that the patriarchs were saved, and that they were saved through Christ, i.e., in virtue of the work which the Redeemer was to accomplish; but they also questioned whether any direct promise of eternal life was given in the Old Testament, or whether faith in the Redeemer was the condition of acceptance with God. On this subject the "Apology for the Confession of the Remonstrants" says [303] concerning faith in Jesus

Christ, "Et certum esse locum nullum esse unde appareat fidem istam sub V. T. pr&#65533;ceptam fuisse, aut viguisse." And Episcopius [304] says, "Ex his facile colligere est, quid statuendum sit de qu&#65533;stione illa famosa, An vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533; promissio etiam in Veteri foedere locum habuerit, vel potius in foedere ipso comprehensa fuerit. Si enim speciales promissiones in foedere ipso veteri express&#65533; videantur, fatendum est, nullam vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533; promissionem disertam in illis reperiri. Si quis contra sentiat, ejus est locum dare ubi illa exstat: quod puto impossibile esse. Sed vero, si promissiones Dei generales videantur, fatendum ex altera parte est, eas tales esse, ut promissio vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533; non subesse tantum videatur, sed ex Dei intentione eam eis subfuisse etiam credidebeat."

The Baptists, especially those of the time of the Reformation, do not hold the common doctrine on this subject. The Anabaptists not only spoke in very disparaging terms of the old economy and of the state of the Jews under that dispensation, but it was necessary to their peculiar system, that they should deny that the covenant made with Abraham included the covenant of grace. Baptists hold that infants cannot be church members, and that the sign of such membership cannot properly be administered to any who have not knowledge and faith. But it cannot be denied that infants were included in the covenant made with Abraham, and that they received circumcision, its appointed seal and sign. It is therefore essential to their theory that the Abrahamic covenant should be regarded as a merely national covenant entirely distinct from the covenant of grace.

The Romanists assuming that saving grace is communicated through the sacraments, and seeing that the mass of the ancient Israelites, on many occasions at least, were rejected of God, notwithstanding their participation of the sacraments then ordained, were driven to assume a radical difference between the sacraments of the Old Testament and those of the New. The former only signified grace, the latter actually conveyed it. From this it follows that those living before the institution of the Christian sacraments were not actually saved. Their sins were not remitted, but pretermitted, passed over. At death they were not admitted into heaven, but passed into a place and state called the limbus patrum, where they remained in a negative condition until the coming of Christ, who after his death descended to hell, sheol, for their deliverance.

In opposition to these different views the common doctrine of the Church has ever been, that the plan of salvation has been the same from the beginning. There is the same promise of deliverance from the evils of the apostasy, the same Redeemer, the same condition required for participation. in the blessings of redemption, and the same complete salvation for all who embrace the offers of divine mercy.

In determining the degree of knowledge possessed by the ancient people of God, we are not to be governed by our own capacity of discovering from the Old Testament Scriptures the doctrines of grace. What amount of supplementary instruction the people received from the prophets, or what degree of divine illumination was granted to them we cannot tell. It is, however, clear from the writings of the New Testament, that the knowledge of the plan of salvation current among the Jews at the time of the advent, was much greater than we should deem possible from the mere perusal of the Old Testament. They not only generally and confidently expected the Messiah, who was to be a teacher as well as a deliverer, but the devout Jews waited for the salvation of Israel. They spoke as familiarly of the Holy Spirit and of the baptism which He was to effect, as Christians now do. It is,

principally, from the assertions of the New Testament writers and from their expositions of the ancient Scriptures, that we learn the amount of truth revealed to those who lived before the coming of Christ.

From the Scriptures, therefore, as a whole, from the New Testament, and from the Old as interpreted by infallible authority in the New, we learn that the plan of salvation has always been one and the same; having the same promise, the same Saviour, the same condition, and the same salvation.

The Promise of Eternal Life made before the Advent.

That the promise was the same to those who lived before the advent that it is to us, is plain. Immediately after the fall God gave to Adam the promise of redemption. That promise was contained in the prediction that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. In this passage it is clear that the serpent is Satan. He was the tempter, and on him the curse pronounced was designed to fall. Bruising his head implies fatal injury or overthrow. The prince of darkness who had triumphed over our first parents, was to be cast down, and despoiled of his victory. This overthrow was to be accomplished by the seed of the woman. This phrase might mean the posterity of the woman, and in this sense would convey an important truth; man was to triumph over Satan. But it evidently had a more specific reference. It refers to one individual, who in a sense peculiar to himself, was to be the seed of the woman. This is clear from the analogy of prophecy. When it was promised to Abraham that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed; it would be very natural to understand by seed his posterity, the Hebrew people. But we know certainly, from the direct assertion of the Apostle (Gal. iii. 10), that one individual, namely, Christ, was intended. So when Isaiah predicts that the "servant of the Lord" was to suffer, to triumph, and to be the source of blessings to all people, many understood, and many still understand him to speak of the Jewish nation, as God so often speaks of his servant Israel. Yet the servant intended was the Messiah, and the people were no further included in the prediction than when it is said that "salvation is of the Jews." In all these and similar cases we have two guides as to the real meaning of the Spirit. The one is found in subsequent and explanatory declarations of the Scriptures, the other is in the fulfilment of the predictions. We know from the event who the seed of the woman; who the seed of Abraham; who the Shiloh; who the Son of David; who the servant of the Lord were; for in Christ and by Him was fulfilled all that was predicted of them. The seed of the woman was to bruise the serpent's head. But it was Christ, and Christ alone, who came into the world to destroy the works of the Devil. This he declared to be the purpose of his mission. Satan was the strong man armed whom Christ came to dispossess and to deliver from him those who were led captive by him at his will. We have, then, the promise of redemption made to our first parents immediately after the fall, to be by them communicated to their descendants to be kept in perpetual remembrance. This promise was repeated and amplified from time to time, until the Redeemer actually came. In these additional and fuller predictions, the nature of this redemption was set forth with ever increasing clearness. This general promise included many specific promises. Thus we find God promising to his faithful people the forgiveness of their sins, restoration to his favour, the renewing of their hearts, and the gift of his Spirit. No higher blessings than these are offered under the Christian dispensation. And for these blessings the ancient people of God earnestly longed and prayed. The Old

Testament, and especially the Psalms and other devotional parts of the early Scriptures, are filled with the record of such prayers and longings. Nothing can be plainer than that pardon and the favour of God were promised holy men before the coming of Christ, and these are the blessings which are now promised to us.

The Apostle in Heb. xi. teaches that the hopes of the patriarchs were not confined to the present life, but were fixed on a future state of existence. Such a state, therefore, must have been revealed to them, and eternal life must have been promised to them. Thus he says (chapter xi. 10), that Abraham "looked for the city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." That this was heaven is plain from verse 16, where it is said, "They desire a better country, that is, an heavenly: wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God; for He hath prepared for them a city." He tells us that these ancient worthies gladly sacrificed all earthly good, and even life itself, "not accepting deliverance; that they might obtain a better resurrection." That this was the common faith of the Jews long before the coming of Christ appears from 2 Macc. vii. 9, where the dying martyr says to his tormentor, "Thou like a fury takest us out of this present life, but the King of the world shall raise us up, who have died for his laws, unto everlasting life." Our Lord teaches us that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are still alive; and that where Abraham is, is heaven. His bosom was the resting-place of the faithful.

Christ, the Redeemer, under both Dispensations.

This is a very imperfect exhibition of the evidence which the Scriptures afford that the promise of redemption, and of all that redemption includes, pardon, sanctification, the favour of God, and eternal life, was made to the people of God from the beginning. It is no less clear that the Redeemer is the same under all dispensations. He who was predicted as the seed of the woman, as the seed of Abraham, the Son of David, the Branch, the Servant of the Lord, the Prince of Peace, is our Lord, Jesus Christ, the Son of God, God manifest in the flesh. He, therefore, from the beginning has been held up as the hope of the world, the Salvator hominum. He was set forth in all his offices, as Prophet, Priest, and King. His work was described as a sacrifice, as well as a redemption. All this is so obvious, and so generally admitted, as to render the citation of proof texts unnecessary. It is enough to refer to the general declarations of the New Testament on this subject. Our Lord commanded the Jews to search their Scriptures, because they testified of Him. He said that Moses and the prophets wrote of Him. Beginning at Moses and all the prophets, He expounded to the disciples in all the Scriptures the things concerning Himself. The Apostles when they began to preach the gospel, not only everywhere proved from the Scriptures that Jesus was the Christ, but they referred to them continually in support of everything which they taught concerning his person and his work. It is from the Old Testament they prove his divinity; his incarnation; the sacrificial nature of his death; that He was truly a Priest to make reconciliation for the people, as well as a Prophet and a King; and that He was to die, to rise again on the third day, to ascend into heaven, and to be invested with absolute authority over all the earth, and aver all orders of created beings. There is not a doctrine concerning Christ, taught in the New Testament, which the Apostles do not affirm to have been revealed under former dispensations. They therefore distinctly assert that it was through Him and the efficacy of his death that men were saved before, as well as after his advent. The Apostle Paul says (Rom. iii. 25), that Christ was set forth as a propitiation for the

remission of sins, not only en to nun kairo but also of the sins committed before the present time, during the forbearance of God. And in Heb. ix. 15, it is still more explicitly asserted that He died for the forgiveness of sin under the first covenant. He was, therefore, as said in Rev. xiii. 8, the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world. This is at least the common and most natural interpretation of that passage.

Such a revelation of the Messiah was undoubtedly made in the Old Testament as to turn the eyes of the whole Jewish nation in hope and faith. What the two disciples on the way to Emmaus said, "We trusted it had been He who should have redeemed Israel," reveals what was the general expectation and desire of the people. Paul repeatedly speaks of the Messiah as the hope of Israel. The promise of redemption through Christ, he declared to be the great object of the people's hope. When arraigned before the tribunals of the Jews, and before Agrippa, he uniformly declared that in preaching Christ and the resurrection, he had not departed from the religion of the fathers, but adhered to it, while his enemies had deserted it. "Now I stand, and am judged," he says, "for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers." (Acts xxvi. 6.) Again he said to the Jews in Rome, Acts xxviii. 20, "For the hope of Israel I am bound with this chain." See, also, xxiii. 6; xxiv. 15. In Eph. i. 12, he designates the Jews as hoi proelpikotes en to Christo, those who hoped in the Messiah before his advent. In Acts xiii. 7, he says the rulers of the Jews rejected Christ because they knew not "the voices of the prophets which are read every Sabbath day," which they "fulfilled in condemning Him." In Him was "the promise which was made unto the fathers," he tells us (verses 32, 33), of which he says, "God hath fulfilled the same unto us their children, in that He hath raised up (or brought into view) Jesus," the long-expected Saviour. It is needless to dwell upon this point, because the doctrine of a personal Messiah who was to redeem the people of God, not only pervades the Old Testament, but is everywhere in the New Testament declared to be the great promise which is fulfilled in the advent and work of our Lord Jesus Christ.

Faith the Condition of Salvation from the Beginning.

As the same promise was made to those who lived before the advent which is now made to us in the gospel, as the same Redeemer was revealed to them who is presented as the object of faith to us, it of necessity follows that the condition, or terms of salvation, was the same then as now. It was not mere faith or trust in God, or simply piety, which was required, but faith in the promised Redeemer, or faith in the promise of redemption through the Messiah.

This is plain not only from the considerations just mentioned, but also further, (1.) From the fact that the Apostle teaches that faith, not works, was before as well as after Christ the condition of salvation. This, in his Epistle to the Romans, he not only asserts, but proves. He argues that from the nature of the case the justification of sinners by works is a contradiction. If sinners, they are under condemnation for their works, and therefore cannot be justified by them. Moreover he proves that the Old Testament everywhere speaks of gratuitous forgiveness and acceptance of men with God; but if gratuitous, it cannot be meritorious. He further argues from the case of Abraham, who, according to the express declaration of the Scriptures, was justified by faith; and he quotes from the old prophets the great principle, true then as now, that the "just shall live by faith." (2.) In the second place, he proves that the faith intended was faith in a promise and not merely general piety or

confidence toward God. Abraham, he says, "staggered not at the promise of God through unbelief; but was strong in faith, giving glory to God; and being fully persuaded that what He had promised He was able also to perform." (Rom. iv. 20, 21.) (3.) The Apostle proves that the specific promise which was the object of the faith of the patriarch was the promise of redemption through Christ. That promise they were required to believe; and that the true people of God did believe. The mass of the people mistook the nature of the redemption promised; but even in their case it was the promise of redemption which was the object of their faith. Those taught by the Spirit knew that it was a redemption from the guilt and power of sin and from the consequent alienation from God. In Gal. iii. 14, the Apostle therefore says that the blessing promised to Abraham has come upon the Gentiles. That blessing, therefore was that which through the gospel is now offered to all men.

Not only, therefore, from these explicit declarations that faith in the promised Redeemer was required from the beginning, but from the admitted fact that the Old Testament is full of the doctrine of redemption by the Messiah, it follows that those who received the religion of the Old Testament received that doctrine, and exercised faith in the promise of God concerning his Son. The Epistle to the Hebrews is designed in great part to show that the whole of the Old dispensation was an adumbration of the New, and that it loses all its value and import if its reference to Christ be ignored. To deny, therefore, that the faith of the Old Testament saints was a faith in the Messiah and his redemption, is to deny that they had any knowledge of the import of the revelations and promises of which they were the recipients.

Paul, in Rom. iii. 21, says that the method of salvation revealed in the gospel had been already revealed in the law and the prophets; and his definite object, in Gal. iii. 13-28, is to prove that the covenant under which we live and according to the terms of which we are to be saved, is the identical covenant made with Abraham, in which the promise of redemption was made on the condition of faith in Him in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed This is a covenant anterior to the Mosaic law, and which that law could not set aside or invalidate.

The covenant of grace, or plan of salvation, being the same in all its elements from the beginning, it follows, first, in opposition to the Anabaptists, that the people of God before Christ constituted a Church, and that the Church has been one and the same under all dispensations. It has always had the same promise, the same Redeemer, and the same condition of membership, namely, faith in the Son of God as the Saviour of the world.

It follows from the same premises, in opposition to the Romanists, that the salvation of the people of God who died before the coming of Christ, was complete. They were truly pardoned, sanctified, and, at death, admitted to that state into which those dying in the Christian faith are now received. This is confirmed by what our Lord and the Apostles teach. The salvation promised us is that on which the Old Testament saints have already entered. The Gentile believers are to sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The bosom of Abraham was the place of rest for all the faithful. All that Paul claims for believers under the gospel is, that they are the sons of Abraham, and partakers of his inheritance. If this is so, then the whole ritual theory which assumes that grace and salvation are communicated only through Christian sacraments must be false.

[303] Edit. Leyden, 1630, p. 91.

[304] Institutiones Theologic, III. iv. 1; Works, Amsterdam, 1650, vol. i. p. 156.

§ 7. Different Dispensations.

First, from Adam to Abraham.

Although the covenant of grace has always been the same, the dispensations of that covenant have changed. The first dispensation extended from Adam to Abraham. Of this period we have so few records, that we cannot determine how far the truth was revealed, or what measures were adopted for its preservation. All we know is, that the original promises concerning the seed of the woman, as the Redeemer of our race, had been given; and that the worship of God by sacrifices had been instituted. That sacrifices were a divine institution, and designed to teach the method of salvation, may be inferred, (1.) From the fact that it is the method which the common consciousness of men has everywhere led them to adopt. It is that which their relation to God as sinners demanded. It is the dictate of conscience that guilt requires expiation; and that expiation is made by the shedding of blood. Sacrifices, therefore, not being an arbitrary institution, but one having its foundation in our real relation to God as sinners, we may infer that it was by his command, direct or indirect, that such sacrifices were offered. (2.) This may also be inferred from God's approving them, adopting them, and incorporating them in the religious observances subsequently enjoined. (3.) The fact that man was to be saved by the sacrifice of Christ, and that this was the great event to which the institutions of the earlier dispensations refer, renders it clear that this reference was designed, and that it was founded upon the institution of God.

The Second Dispensation.

The second dispensation extended from Abraham to Moses. This was distinguished from the former, (1.) By the selection of the descendants of Abraham to be the peculiar people of God. They were chosen in order to preserve the knowledge of the true religion in the midst of the general apostasy of mankind. To this end special revelations were made to them, and God entered into a covenant with them, promising that He would be their God, and that they should be his people. (2.) Besides thus gathering his Church out of the world, and making its members a peculiar people, distinguished by circumcision from the Gentiles around them, the promise of redemption was made more definite. The Redeemer was to be of the seed of Abraham. He was to be one person. The salvation He was to effect should pertain to all nations. (3.) Subsequently it was made known that the Deliverer was to be of the tribe of Judah.

The Third Dispensation.

The third dispensation of this covenant was from Moses to Christ. All that belonged to the previous periods was taken up and included in this. A multitude of new ordinances of polity, worship, and religion were enjoined. A priesthood and a complicated system of sacrifices were introduced. The promises were rendered more definite, setting forth more clearly by the instructions of the prophets the person and work of the coming Redeemer as the prophet, priest, and king of his people. The nature of the redemption He was to effect and the nature of the kingdom He was to establish were thus more and more clearly revealed. We have the direct authority of the New Testament for believing that the covenant

of grace, or plan of salvation, thus underlay the whole of the institutions of the Mosaic period, and that their principal design was to teach through types and symbols what is now taught in explicit terms in the gospel. Moses, we are told (Heb. iii. 5), was faithful as a servant to testify concerning the things which were to be spoken after.

Besides this evangelical character which unquestionably belongs to the Mosaic covenant, it is presented in two other aspects in the Word of God. First, it was a national covenant with the Hebrew people. In this view the parties were God and the people of Israel; the promise was national security and prosperity; the condition was the obedience of the people as a nation to the Mosaic law; and the mediator was Moses. In this aspect it was a legal covenant. It said. "Do this and live." Secondly, it contained, as does also the New Testament, a renewed proclamation of the original covenant of works. It is as true now as in the days of Adam, it always has been and always must be true, that rational creatures who perfectly obey the law of God are blessed in the enjoyment of his favour; and that those who sin are subject to his wrath and curse. Our Lord assured the young man who came to Him for instruction that if he kept the commandments he should live. And Paul says (Rom. ii. 6) that God will render to every man according to his deeds; tribulation and anguish upon every soul of man that doeth evil; but glory, honour, and peace to every man who worketh good. This arises from the relation of intelligent creatures to God. It is in fact nothing but a declaration of the eternal and immutable principles of justice. If a man rejects or neglects the gospel, these are the principles, as Paul teaches in the opening chapters of his Epistle to the Romans, according to which he will be judged. If he will not be under grace, if he will not accede to the method of salvation by grace, he is of necessity under the law.

These different aspects under which the Mosaic economy is presented account for the apparently inconsistent way in which it in spoken of in the New Testament. (1.) When viewed in relation to the people of God before the advent, it is represented as divine and obligatory. (2.) When viewed in relation to the state of the Church after the advent, it is declared to be obsolete. It is represented as the lifeless husk from which the living kernel and germ have been extracted, a body from which the soul has departed. (3.) When viewed according to its true import and design as a preparatory dispensation of the covenant of grace, it is spoken of as teaching the same gospel, the same method of salvation as that which the Apostles themselves preached. (4.) When viewed, in the light in which it was regarded by those who rejected the gospel, as a mere legal system, it was declared to be a ministration of death and condemnation. (2 Cor. iii. 6-18.) (5.) And when contrasted with the new or Christian economy, as a different mode of revealing the same covenant, it is spoken of as a state of tutelage and bondage, far different from the freedom and filial spirit of the dispensation under which we now live.

The Gospel Dispensation.

The gospel dispensation is called new in reference to the Mosaic economy, which was old, and about to vanish away. It is distinguished from the old economy, --

1. In being catholic, confined to no one people, but designed and adapted to all nations and to all classes of men.

2. It is more spiritual, not only in that the types and ceremonies of the Old Testament are done away, but also in that the revelation itself is more inward and spiritual. What was

then made known objectively, is now, to a greater extent, written on the heart. (Heb. viii. 8-11.) It is incomparably more clear and explicit in its teachings.

4. It is more purely evangelical. Even the New Testament, as we have seen, contains a legal element, it reveals the law still as a covenant of works binding on those who reject the gospel; but in the New Testament the gospel greatly predominates over the law. Whereas, under the Old Testament, the law predominated over the gospel.

5. The Christian economy is specially the dispensation of the Spirit. The great blessing promised of old, as consequent on the coming of Christ, was the effusion of the Spirit on all flesh, i.e., on all nations and on all classes of men. This was so distinguishing a characteristic of the Messianic period that the evangelist says, "The Holy Ghost was not yet given, because that Jesus was not yet glorified." (John vii. 39.) Our Lord promised that after his death and ascension He would send the Comforter, the Spirit of truth, to abide with his people, to guide them into the knowledge of the truth, and to convince the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment to come. He charged the Apostles to remain at Jerusalem until they had received this power from on high. And in explanation of the events of the day of Pentecost, the Apostle Peter said, "This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses. Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the promise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear." (Acts ii. 32, 33.)

6. The old dispensation was temporary and preparatory; the new is permanent and final. In sending forth his disciples to preach the gospel, and in promising them the gift of the Spirit, He assured them that He would be with them in that work unto the end of the world. This dispensation is, therefore, the last before the restoration of all things; the last, that is, designed for the conversion of men and the ingathering of the elect. Afterwards comes the end; the resurrection and the final judgment. In the Old Testament there are frequent intimations of another and a better economy, to which the Mosaic institutions were merely preparatory. But we have no intimation in Scripture that the dispensation of the Spirit is to give way for a new and better dispensation for the conversion of the nations. When the gospel is fully preached, then comes the end.

CHAPTER III: PERSON OF CHRIST.

§ 1. Preliminary Remarks.

1. The most mysterious and the most familiar fact of consciousness and experience is the union of soul and body in the constitution of our nature. According to the common faith of mankind and of the Church, man consists of two distinct substances, soul and body. By substance is meant that which is. It is the entity in which properties, attributes, and qualities inhere, and of which they are the manifestations. It is therefore something more than mere force. It is something more than a collective name for a certain number of properties which appear in combination. It is that which continues, and remains unchanged under all the varying phenomena of which it may be the subject. The substance which we designate the soul, is immaterial, that is, it has none of the properties of matter. It is spiritual, i.e., it has all the properties of a spirit. It is a self-conscious, intelligent, voluntary agent. The substance which we call the body, on the other hand, is material. That is, it has all the properties of matter and none of the properties of mind or spirit. This is the first fact universally admitted concerning the constitution of our nature.

2. The second fact concerns the nature of the union between the soul and body. It is, (a.) A personal union. Soul and body constitute one individual man, or human person. There is but one consciousness. It is the man or person who is conscious of sensations and of thoughts, of affections of the body and of the acts of the mind. (b.) It is a union without mixture or confusion. The soul remains spirit, and the body remains matter. Copper and zinc combined form brass. The constituent elements lose their distinctive characteristics, and produce a third substance. There is no such mixture in the union of the soul and body. The two remain distinct. Neither is there a transfer of any of the properties of the one to the other. No property of the mind is transferred to the body; and no property of the body is transferred to the mind. (c.) Nevertheless the union is not a mere inhabitation, a union of contact or in space. The soul does not dwell in the body as a man dwells in a house or in his garments. The body is part of himself, and is necessary to his completeness as a man. He is in every part of it, and is conscious of the slightest change in the state of even the least important of its members.

3. Thirdly, the consequences of this union of the soul and body are, (a.) A koinonia idiomaton, or communion of attributes. That is, the person is the possessor of all the attributes both of the soul and of the body. We may predicate of the man whatever may be predicated of his body; and we may predicate of him whatever may be predicated of his soul. We say of the man that he is tall or short; that he is sick or well; that he is handsome or deformed. In like manner, we may say that he is judicious, wise, good, benevolent, or learned. Whatever is true of either element of his constitution is true of the man. What is

true of the one, however, is not true of the other. When the body is wounded or burnt it is not the soul that is the subject of these accidents; and when the soul is penitent or believing, or enlightened and informed, the body is not the subject spoken of. Each has its properties and changes, but the person or man is the subject of them all. (b.) Hence, inconsistent, or apparently contradictory affirmations may be made of the same person. We may say that he is weak and that he is strong; that he is mortal and immortal; that he is a spirit, and that he is dust and ashes. (c.) We may designate the man from one element of his nature when what we predicate of him is true only of the other element. We may call him a spirit and yet say that he hungers and thirsts. We may call him a worm of the dust when we speak of him as the subject of regeneration. That is, the person may be designated from either nature when the predicate belongs to the other. (d.) As in virtue of the personal union of the soul and body all the properties of either are properties of the man, so all the acts of either are the acts of the man. Some of our acts are purely mental, as thinking, repenting, and believing; some are purely bodily, as the processes of digestion, assimilation, and the circulation of the blood; some are mixed, as all voluntary acts, as walking, speaking, and writing. In these there is a direct concurrence or cooperation of the mind and body. These several classes of acts are acts of the man. It is the man who thinks; it is the man who speaks and writes; and the man who digests and assimilates his food. (e.) A fifth consequence of this hypostatic union is the exaltation of the body. The reason why the body of a man and its life are so immeasurably exalted above those of a brute is that it is in personal union with a rational and immortal soul. It is this also which gives the body its dignity and beauty. The gorgeous plumage of the bird, or the graceful symmetry of the antelope, are as nothing compared to the erect figure and intellectual beauty of man. The mind irradiates the body, and imparts to it a dignity and value which no configuration of mere matter could possess. At the same time the soul is not degraded by its union with the body. It was so arrayed before the fall, and is to be clothed with a body in its glorified state in heaven.

The union of soul and body in the constitution of man is the analogue of the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ. No analogy is expected to answer in all points. There is in this case enough of resemblance to sustain faith and rebuke unbelief. There is nothing in the one more mysterious or inscrutable than in the other. And as the difficulties to the understanding in the union of two distinct substances, matter and mind, in the person of man have induced many to deny the plainest facts of consciousness, so the difficulties of the same kind attending the doctrine of the union of two natures, the one human and the other divine in the person of Christ, have led many to reject the plainest facts of Scripture.

§ 2. The Scriptural Facts concerning the Person of Christ.

The facts which the Bible teaches concerning the person of Christ are, first, that He was truly man, i.e., He had a perfect or complete human nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of man (that is, of man as man, and not of man as fallen) can be predicated of Christ. Secondly, He was truly God, or had a perfect divine nature. Hence everything that can be predicated of God can be predicated of Christ. Thirdly, He was one person. The same person, self, or Ego, who said, "I thirst," said, "Before Abraham was, I am." This is the whole doctrine of the incarnation as it lies in the Scriptures and in the faith of the

Church.

Proof of the Doctrine.

The proof of this doctrine includes three distinct classes of passages of Scripture, or may be presented in three different forms. First, the proof of the several elements of the doctrine separately. Secondly, the current language of the Scriptures which speak of Christ, from beginning to end, sometimes as man and sometimes as God; and combine the two modes of statement, or pass from the one to the other as naturally and as easily as they do where speaking of man as mortal and immortal, or as corporeal and as spiritual. Thirdly, there are certain passages of Scripture in which the doctrine of the incarnation is formally presented and dogmatically asserted.

First Argument, all the Elements of the Doctrine separately taught.

First, the Scriptures teach that Christ was truly man, or had a complete human nature. That is, He had a true body and a rational soul.

Christ had a True Body.

By a true body is meant a material body, composed of flesh and blood, in everything essential like the bodies of ordinary men. It was not a phantasm, or mere semblance of a body. Nor was it fashioned out of any heavenly or ethereal substance. This is plain because He was born of a woman. He was conceived in the womb of the Virgin Mary, nourished of her substance so as to be consubstantial with her. His body increased in stature, passing through the ordinary process of development from infancy to manhood. It was subject to all the affections of a human body. It was subject to pain, pleasure, hunger, thirst, fatigue, suffering, and death. It could be seen, felt, and handled. The Scriptures declare it to have been flesh and blood. "Forasmuch then as the children are partakers of flesh and blood, he also himself likewise took part of the same." (Hebrews ii. 14.) Our Lord said to his terrified disciples, "A spirit hath not flesh and bones, as ye see me have." (Luke xxiv. 39.) He was predicted in the Old Testament as the seed of the woman; the seed of Abraham; the Son of David. He was declared to be a man; a man of sorrows; the man Christ Jesus; and He called Himself the Son of Man. This designation occurs some eighty times in the Gospel. Nothing, therefore, is revealed concerning Christ more distinctly than that He had a true body.

Christ had a Rational Soul.

It is no less plain that He had a rational soul. He thought, reasoned, and felt; was joyful and sorrowful; He increased in wisdom; He was ignorant of the time when the day of judgment should come. He must, therefore, have had a finite human intelligence. These two elements, a true body and a rational soul, constitute a perfect or complete human nature, which is thus proved to have entered into the composition of Christ's person.

Christ is truly God.

Secondly, the Scriptures, with equal clearness, declare that Christ was truly God. This has been already proved at length. All divine names and titles are applied to Him. He is called God, the mighty God, the great God, God over all; Jehovah; Lord; the Lord of lords and the King of kings. All divine attributes are ascribed to Him. He is declared to be omnipresent, omniscient, almighty, and immutable, the same yesterday, today, and forever. He is set forth as the creator and upholder and ruler of the universe. All things were created

by Him and for Him; and by Him all things consist. He is the object of worship to all intelligent creatures, even the highest; all the angels (i.e., all creatures between man and God) are commanded to prostrate themselves before Him. He is the object of all the religious sentiments; of reverence, love, faith, and devotion. To Him men and angels are responsible for their character and conduct. He required that men should honour Him as they honoured the Father; that they should exercise the same faith in Him that they do in God. He declares that He and the Father are one; that those who had seen Him had seen the Father also. He calls all men unto him; promises to forgive their sins; to send them the Holy Spirit; to give them rest and peace; to raise them up at the last day; and to give them eternal life. God is not more, and cannot promise more, or do more than Christ is said to be, to promise, and to do. He has, therefore, been the Christian's God from the beginning, in all ages and in all places.

Christ One Person.

Thirdly, He was, nevertheless, although perfect man and perfect God, but one person. There is, in the first place, the absence of all evidence of a twofold personality in Christ. The Scriptures reveal the Father, Son, and Spirit as distinct persons in the Godhead, because they use the personal pronouns in reference to each other. The Father says Thou to the Son, and the Son says Thou to the Father. The Father says to the Son, "I will give thee; and the Son says, "Lo, I come to do thy will." Moreover the one is objective to the other. The Father loves and sends the Son; the Son loves and obeys the Father. The same is true of the Spirit. There is nothing analogous to this in the case of Christ. The one nature is never distinguished from the other as a distinct person. The Son of God never addresses the Son of Man as a different person from Himself. The Scriptures reveal but one Christ. In the second place, besides this negative proof, the Bible affords all the evidence of the individual personality of our Lord that the case admits of. He always says I, me, mine. He is always addressed as Thou, thee, thine. He is always spoken of as He, his, him. It was the same person to whom it was said, "Thou art not yet fifty years old;" and "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the earth, and the heavens are the works of thine hands." The individual personality of Christ is set forth as clearly and as variously as that of any other personage of whose history the Scriptures give us the record. In teaching that Christ had a perfect human and a perfect divine nature, and is one person, the Bible teaches the whole doctrine of the incarnation as it has entered into the faith of the Church from the beginning.

Second Argument, from the Current Representations of Scripture.

The current language of Scripture concerning Christ proves that He was at once divine and human. In the Old Testament, He is set forth as the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah anti the family of David; as to be born of a virgin in the town of Bethlehem; as a man of sorrows; as meek and lowly; as bearing the chastisement of our sins, and pouring out his soul unto death. He is everywhere represented as a man. At the same time He is everywhere represented as God; He is called the Son of God, Immanuel, the Mighty God, Jehovah our righteousness; and He is spoken of as from everlasting; as enthroned in heaven and receiving the adoration of angels.

In the New Testament, the same mode of representation is continued. Our Lord, in speaking of Himself, and the Apostles when speaking of Him, uniformly speak of Him as a

man. The New Testament gives his genealogy to prove that He was of the house and lineage of David. It records his birth, life, and death. It calls Him the Son of Man, the man Christ Jesus. But with like uniformity our Lord assumes, and the Apostles attribute to Him a divine nature. He declares Himself to be the Son of God, existing from eternity, having all power in heaven and in earth, entitled to all the reverence, love, and obedience due to God. The Apostles worship Him; they call Him the great God and Saviour; they acknowledge their dependence upon Him and responsibility to Him; and they look to Him for pardon, sanctification, and eternal life. These conflicting representations, this constant setting forth the same person as man and also as God, admits of no solution but in the doctrine of the incarnation. This is the key to the whole Bible. If this doctrine be denied all is confusion and contradiction. If it be admitted all is light, harmony, and power. Christ is both God and man, in two distinct natures, and one person forever. This is the great mystery of Godliness. God manifest in the flesh is the distinguishing doctrine of the religion of the Bible, without which it is a cold and lifeless corpse.

Third Argument, from Particular Passages of Scriptures.

Although, as appears from what has already been said, the doctrine of the incarnation does not rest on isolated proof-texts, but upon the broad basis of the whole revelation of God concerning the person and work of his Son, yet there are some passages in which this doctrine is so clearly stated in all its elements, that they cannot be properly overlooked in treating of this subject.

To this class of passages belongs, --

1. The first chapter of John, verses 1-14. It is here taught concerning the Logos, (1.) That He existed in eternity. (2.) That He was in intimate relation to God. (3.) That He was God. (4.) That He was the Creator of all things. (5.) In Him was life. Having life in himself, He is the source of life to all that live. That is, He is the source of natural, of intellectual, and of spiritual life. (6.) And, therefore, He is the true light; that is, the fountain of all knowledge and all holiness. (7.) He came into the world, and the world although made by Him, did not recognize Him. (8.) He came to his own people, and even they did not receive Him. (9.) He became flesh, i.e., He assumed our nature, so that He dwelt among us as a man. (10.) And, says the Apostle, we saw his glory, a glory which revealed Him to be the only begotten of the Father. It is here taught that a truly divine person, the eternal Word, the Creator of the world, became man, dwelt among men, and revealed Himself to those who had eyes to see, as the eternal Son of God. Here is the whole doctrine of the incarnation, taught in the most explicit terms.

2. A second passage to the same effect is found in 1 John i. 1-3. It is there taught that what was in the beginning, what was with God, what was eternal, what was essentially life, appeared on earth, so as to be seen, heard, looked upon, and handled. Here, again, a divine, invisible, eternal person, is said to have assumed our nature, a real body and a rational soul. He could be seen and touched as well as heard. This is the main idea of this epistle. The incarnation is declared to be the characteristic and essential doctrine of the gospel. "Every spirit that confesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God: and every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world."

3. In Romans i. 2-5, the Apostle says that the gospel concerns the Son of God, who is our Lord Jesus Christ, who, as to his human nature, kata sarka, is the Son of David, but as to his divine nature, kata pneuma, is the Son of God. Here also the two natures and one person of the Redeemer are clearly asserted. The parallel passage to this is Romans ix. 5, where Christ is said kata sarka to be descended from the fathers, but at the same time to be God over all and blessed forever. The same person is declared to be the supreme God and a child of Abraham, a member of the Hebrew nation by natural descent.

4. In 1 Timothy iii. 16, we are taught that God was "manifest in the flesh, justified in the Spirit, seen of angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed on in the world, received up into glory." In this passage the reading is indeed doubtful. The common text which has Theos has the support of almost all the cursive, and of some of the uncial manuscripts, of several of the versions, and of many of the Greek fathers. But whether we read Theos or hos, the meaning is substantially the same. Two things are plain: first, that all the predicates in this verse belong to one subject; and secondly, that that subject is Christ. He, his person, is the great mystery of Godliness. He was manifested in the flesh (i.e., in our nature); He, as thus manifested, the Theanthropos, was justified, i.e., proved to be just, i.e., to be what He claimed to be (namely, the Son of God), by the Spirit, either by the divine nature or majesty dwelling in Him, or by the Holy Ghost, whose office it is to take the things of Christ and reveal them unto us. He, this incarnate God, was seen, i.e., recognized and served by angels; preached among the Gentiles as the Son of God and Saviour of men; believed upon as such; and finally received up into glory. All that the Church teaches concerning the person of Christ, is here taught by the Apostle.

5. No passage, however, is more full and explicit on this subject than Philippians ii. 6-11. Of one and the same subject or person, it is here taught, (1.) That He was God, or existed in the form of God. The form of a thing is the mode in which it reveals itself; and that is determined by its nature. It is not necessary to assume that morphe has here, as it appears to have in some other cases, the sense of phusis; the latter is implied in the former. No one can appear, or exist in view of others in the form of God, i.e., manifesting all divine perfections, who is not God. (2.) Hence it is asserted that the person spoken of was equal to God. (3.) He became a man like other men, and assumed the form of a servant, i.e., appeared among men as a servant. (4.) He submitted to die upon the cross. (5.) He has been exalted above all created beings, and invested with universal and absolute authority. Christ, therefore, of whom this passage treats, has a divine nature, and a human nature, and is one person.

6. In Hebrews ii. 14, the same doctrine concerning the person of Christ is clearly taught. In the first chapter of that Epistle the Son is declared to be the brightness of the Father's glory and the express image of his substance (i.e., of what the Father is). By Him the worlds were made. He upholds all things by the word of his power. He is higher than the angels, i.e., than all intelligent creatures. They are bound to worship Him. They are addressed as mere instruments; but the Son as God. He made the heavens and laid the foundations of the earth. He is eternal and immutable. He is associated with God in glory and dominion. He, the person of whom all this is said in the first chapter, in the second chapter is declared to be a man. In Him was fulfilled as the sacred writer in the eighth Psalm had taught concerning the universal dominion assigned to man. Men are declared to

be his brethren, because He and they are of one nature. As they are partakers of flesh and blood, He also took part in the same, in order that He might die, and by death redeem his people from all the evils of sin.

Nothing can be plainer than that the Scriptures do teach that Christ is truly God, that He is truly man, and that He is one person. They assert of Him whatever may be said of God, and everything that can be said of a sinless man. They enter into no explanations. They assume it as a certain fact that Christ is God and man in one person, just as they assume that a man is a soul and body in one person.

Here the subject might be left. All the ends of the spiritual life of the believer, are answered by this simple statement of the doctrine concerning Christ's person as it is presented in the Scriptures. False explanations, however, create the necessity for a correct one. Errorists in all ages have so explained the facts recorded concerning Christ, as either to deny the truth concerning his divine nature, or the integrity of his human nature, or the unity of his person. Hence the Church has been constrained to teach what the Bible doctrine involves: first, as to the nature of the union of the two natures in Christ; and secondly, as to the consequences of that union.

§ 3. The Hypostatical Union.

Two Natures in Christ.

There is a union. The elements united are the divine and human nature. By nature, in this connection is meant substance. In Greek the corresponding words are phosis and ousia; in Latin, natura and substantia. The idea of substance is a necessary one. We are constrained to believe that where we see the manifestation of force, there is something, an objective entity which acts, and of which such force is the manifestation. It is self-evident that a non-ens cannot act. It may be well here to call to mind a few admitted principles which have already been repeatedly adverted to. (1.) It is intuitively certain that attributes, properties, and power or force, necessarily imply a substance of which they are manifestations. Of nothing, nothing can be predicated. That of which we can predicate the attributes either of matter or mind, must of necessity be a reality. (2.) It is no less certain that where the attributes are incompatible, the substances must be different and distinct. That which is extended cannot be unextended. That which is divisible cannot be indivisible. That which is incapable of thought cannot think. That which is finite cannot be infinite. (3.) Equally certain is it that attributes cannot exist distinct and separate from substance. There cannot be accidentia sine subjecto; otherwise there might be extension without anything extended, and thought without anything that thinks. (4.) Again, it is intuitively certain that the attributes of one substance cannot be transferred to another. Matter cannot be endowed with the attributes of mind; for then it would cease to be matter. Mind cannot be invested with the properties of matter, for then it would cease to be mind, neither can humanity be possessed of the attributes of divinity, for then it would cease to be humanity. This is only saying that the finite cannot be infinite. Speaking in general terms, in the whole history of human thought, these principles have been recognized as axiomatic; and their denial puts an end to discussion.

If the above mentioned principles be admitted, then it follows that in setting forth his

Son as clothed in all the attributes of humanity, with a body that was born of a woman, which increased an stature, which was seen, felt, and handled; and with a soul that was troubled, joyful, and sorrowful, that increased in wisdom and was ignorant of certain things, God intends and requires that we should believe that He was a true man, -- not a phantom, not an abstraction, -- not the complex of properties without the substance of humanity, but a true or real man, like other men, yet without sin. In like manner when He is declared to be God over all, to be omniscient, almighty, and eternal, it is no less evident that He has a truly divine nature; that the substance of God in Him is the subject in which these divine attributes inhere. This being so, we are taught that the elements combined in the constitution of his person, namely, humanity and divinity, are two distinct natures, or substances. Such has been the faith of the Church universal. In those ancient creeds which are adopted by the Greek, Latin and Protestant Churches, it is declared that Christ as to his humanity is consubstantial with us, and as to his divinity, consubstantial with the Father. In the Council of Chalcedon, the Church declared our Lord to be, [305] Theon alethos kai anthropon alethos ton auton ek psuches logikes kai somatos, omoousion to patri kata ten theoteta kai homoousion ton auton hemin kata ten anthropoteta.

Thomas Aquinas says, [306] "Humana natura in Christo quamvis sit substantia particularis: qui tamen venit in unionem cujusdam completi, scilicet totius Christi, prout est Deus et homo, non potest dici hypostasis vel suppositum: Sed illum completum ad quod concurrit, dicitur esse hypostasis vel suppositum." In all the creeds of the Reformation the same doctrine is presented. In the "Augsburg Confession" [307] it is said, "Filius Dei assumpsit humanam naturam in utero beat[illegible] Mari[illegible] virginis, ut sint du[illegible] natur[illegible], divina et humana, in unitate person[illegible] inseparabiliter conjunct[illegible], unus Christus, vere Deus et vere homo." "Natura (phusis, ousia) in Christo est substantia vel divinitatis vel humanitatis. Persona (hupostasis, prosopon) Christi est individuum ex utraque natura et divina et humana, conjuncta, non mixta, concretum." [308] In the "Second Helvetic Confession" [309] it is said, "Agnoscimus in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo, duas naturas (for natura, substantia is used in other parts of the chapter), divinam et humanam. . . . . In una persona unit[illegible] vel conjunct[illegible] [sunt]: ita ut unum Christum Dominum, non duos veneremur: unum inquam verum Deum, et hominem, juxta divinam naturam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto." Therefore the theologians teach, [310] "Natura divina est essentia divina, qua Christus Patri et Spiritui Sancto coessentialis est. Natura humana est essentia seu substantia humana, qua Christus nobis hominibus coessentialis est." Or as stated in the ancient creeds, Christ is not allos kai allos (one person and another person), but allo kai allo (one substance and another substance).

The Two Natures are united but not mingled or confounded.

We have seen that the first important point concerning the person of Christ is, that the elements united or combined in his person are two distinct substances, humanity and divinity; that He has in his constitution the same essence or substance which constitutes us men, and the same substance which makes God infinite, eternal, and immutable in all his perfections. The second point is, that this union is not by mixture so that a new, third substance is produced, which is neither humanity nor divinity but possessing the properties of both. This is an impossibility, because the properties in question are incompatible. We

cannot mingle mind and matter so as to make a substance which is neither mind nor matter, but spiritual matter, for that would be a contradiction. It would amount to unextended extension, tangible intangibility, or visible invisibility. Neither is it possible that the divine and human natures should be so mingled as to result in a third, which is neither purely human nor purely divine, but theanthropic. Christ's person is theanthropic, but not his nature; for that would make the finite infinite, and the infinite finite. Christ would be neither God nor man; but the Scriptures constantly declare Him to be both God and man. In all Christian creeds therefore, it is declared that the two natures in Christ retain each its own properties and attributes. They all teach that the natures are not confounded, "Sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus in una persona unit&#65533; vel conjunct&#65533;."

As therefore the human body retains all its properties as matter, and the soul all its attributes as spirit in their union in our persons; so humanity and divinity retain each its peculiar properties in their union in the person of Christ. And as intelligence, sensibility, and will are the properties of the human soul, without which it ceases to be a soul, it follows that the human soul of Christ retained its intelligence, sensibility, and will. But intelligence and will are no less the essential properties of the divine nature, and therefore were retained after its union with the human nature in Christ. In teaching, therefore, that Christ was truly man and truly God, the Scriptures teach that He had a finite intelligence and will, and also an infinite intelligence. In Him, therefore, as the Church has ever maintained, there were and are two wills, two energeiai or operations. His human intellect increased, his divine intelligence was, and is infinite. His human will had only human power, his divine will was, and is almighty. Mysterious and inscrutable as all this is, it is not more so than the union of the discordant elements of mind and matter in our own constitution.

There is no Transfer of the Attributes of one Nature to the Other.

The third point in relation to the person of Christ, is that no attribute of the one nature is transferred to the other, This is virtually included in what has already been said. There are those, however, who admit that the two natures in Christ are not mixed or confounded, who yet maintain that the attributes of the one are transferred to the other. But the properties or attributes of a substance constitute its essence, so that if they be removed or if others of a different nature be added to them, the substance itself is changed. If you take rationality from mind it ceases to be mind. If you add rationality to matter it ceases to be matter. If you make that extended which in itself is incapable of extension the identity of the thing is lost. If therefore infinity be conferred in the finite, it ceases to be finite. If divine attributes be conferred on man, he ceases to be man; and if human attributes be transferred to God, he ceases to be God. The Scriptures teach that the human nature of Christ remained in its integrity after the incarnation; and that the divine nature remained divine. The Bible never requires us to receive as true anything which the constitution of our nature given to us by God himself, forces us to believe to be false or impossible.

The Union is a Personal Union.

Thc union of the two natures in Christ is a personal or hypostatic union. By this is meant, in the first place, that it is not a mere indwelling of the divine nature analogous to the indwelling of the Spirit of God in his people. Much less is it a mere moral or sympathetic union; or a temporary and mutable relation between the two. In the second place, it is

intended to affirm that the union is such that Christ is but one person. As the union of the soul and body constitutes a man one person, so the union of the Son of God with our nature constitutes Him one person. And as in man the personality is in the soul and not in the body, so the personality of Christ is in the divine nature. Both of these points are abundantly evident from Scripture. The former, or the unity of Christ's person, has already been proved; and the latter is proved by the fact that the Logos, or Son, was from all eternity a distinct person in the Godhead. It was a divine person, not merely a divine nature, that assumed humanity, or became incarnate. Hence it follows that the human nature of Christ, separately considered, is impersonal. To this, indeed, it is objected that intelligence and will constitute personality, and as these belong to Christ's human nature personality cannot be denied to it. A person, however, is a suppositum intelligens, but the human nature of Christ is not a suppositum or subsistence. To personality both rational substance and distinct subsistence are essential. The latter the human nature of Christ never possessed. The Son of God did not unite Himself with a human person, but with a human nature. The proof of this is that Christ is but one person. The possibility of such a union cannot rationally be denied. Realists believe that generic humanity, although intelligent and voluntary, is impersonal, existing personally only in individual men. Although realism may not be a correct philosophy, the fact of its wide and long continued prevalence may be taken as a proof that it does not involve any palpable contradiction. Human nature, therefore, although endowed with intelligence and will, may be, and in fact is, in the person of Christ impersonal. That it is so is the plain doctrine of Scripture, for the Son of God, a divine person, assumed a perfect human nature, and, nevertheless, remains one person.

The facts, therefore, revealed in Scripture concerning Christ constrain us to believe, (1.) That in his person two natures, the divine and the human, are inseparably united; and the word nature in this connection means substance. (2.) That these two natures or substances are not mixed or confounded so as to form a third, which is neither the one nor the other. Each nature retains all its own properties unchanged; so that in Christ there is a finite intelligence and infinite intelligence, a finite will or energy, and an infinite will. (3.) That no property of the divine nature is transferred to the human, and much less is any property of the human transferred to the divine. Humanity in Christ is not deified, nor is the divinity reduced to the limitations of humanity. (4.) The union of the natures is not mere contact or occupancy of the same portion of space. It is not an indwelling, or a simple control of the divine nature over the operations of the human, but a personal union; such a union that its result is that Christ is one person with two distinct natures forever; at once God and man.

[305] Actio Quinta, Binius, Concilia Generalia, vol. ii. part 1, p. 253, e.

[306] Summa, III. qu[illegible]st. ii. art 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 5 of fourth set.

[307] III.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 10.

[308] Hase's Hutterus Redivivus, sixth edition, p. 224.

[309] Cap. XI.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 484.

[310] Polanus, Syntagma Theologi[illegible], vi. 12, Hanovi[illegible], 1625, p. 362, a, b.

§ 4. Consequences of the Hypostatical Union.

Communion of Attributes.

The first and most obvious of these consequences is, the koinonia idiomaton, or communion of attributes. By this is not meant that the one nature participates in the attributes of the other, but simply that the person is the koinonos, or partaker of the attributes of both natures; so that whatever may be affirmed of either nature may be affirmed of the person. As of a man can be affirmed whatever is true of his body and whatever is true of his soul, so of Christ may be affirmed whatever is true of his human nature and whatever is true of his divinity; as we can say of a man that he is mortal and immortal; that he is a creature of the dust and the child of God: so we may say of Christ that He is finite and infinite; that He is ignorant and omniscient; that He is less than God and equal with God; that He existed from eternity and that He was born in time; that He created all things and that He was a man of sorrows. It is on this principle, that what is true of either nature is true of the person, that a multitude of passages of Scripture are to be explained. These passages are of different kinds.

1. Those in which the predicate belongs to the whole person. This is the most numerous class. Thus when Christ is called our Redeemer, our Lord, our King, Prophet, or Priest, our Shepherd, etc., all these things are true of Him not as the Logos, or Son, nor as the man Christ Jesus, but as the Theanthropos, the God-man. And in like manner, when He is said to have been humbled, to have given Himself for us, to be the head of the Church, to be our life, and to be our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption, this is true of Christ as a person. The same may be said with regard to those passages in which He is said to be exalted above all principalities and powers; to sit at the right hand of God; and to come to judge the world.

2. There are many passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate is true only of the divine nature, or of the Logos. As when our Lord said, "Before Abraham was I am;" "The glory which I had with thee before the foundation of the world; or when it is said, "Thou, Lord, in the beginning hast laid the foundation of the world, and the heavens are the work of thine hands."

3. Passages in which the person is the subject, but the predicate is true only of the human nature. As when Christ said, "I thirst;" "My soul is sorrowful even unto death." And when we read that "Jesus wept." So all those passages which speak of our Lord as walking, eating, and sleeping; and as being seen, touched, and handled. There are two classes of passages under this general head which are of special interest. First, those in which the person is designated from the divine nature when the predicate is true only of the human nature. "The Church of God which He purchased with his blood." "The Lord of glory was crucified." The Son knows not the time when the final judgment is to come. (Mark xiii. 32.) The forms of expression, therefore, long prevalent in the Church, "the blood of God," "God the mighty maker died," etc., are in accordance with Scriptural usage. And if it be right to say "God died," it is right to say "He was born." The person born of the Virgin Mary was a divine person. He was the Son of God. It is, therefore, correct to say that Mary was the mother of God. For, as we have seen, the person of Christ is in Scripture often designated from the divine nature, when the predicate is true only of the human nature. On this particular form of expression, which, from its abuse, is generally offensive to Protestant ears, Turrettin remarks: "Maria potest dici vere theotokos seu Mater Dei, Deipara, si vox

Dei sumatur concrete pro toto personali Christi, quod constat ex persona Logou et natura humana, quo sensu vocatur Mater Domini Luc. i. 43, sed non precise et abstracte ratione Deitatis." [311] The second class of passages under this head are of the opposite kind, namely, those in which the person is denominated from the human nature when the predicate is true only of the divine nature. Thus Christ is called the Son of man who is in heaven. Here the denomination "Son of man" is from the human, while the predicate (ubiquity) is true only of the divine nature. So our Lord says, "What and if ye shall see the Son of man ascend up where He was before?" (John vi. 62.) In Romans ix. 5, He who was of the fathers (the seed of Abraham and son of David) is declared to be God over all and blessed forever.

4. There is a fourth class of passages which come under the first general head mentioned above, but have the peculiarity that the denomination is derived from the divine nature, when the predicate is not true of the divine nature itself, but only of the Theanthropos. Thus it is said, "The Son also himself shall be subject to him who put all things under him." Here the designation Son is from the divine nature, but the subjection predicated is not of the Son as such, or of the Logos, nor is it simply of the human nature, but officially of the God-man. So our Lord says, "The Father is greater than I." The Father is not greater than the Son, for they are the same in substance and equal in power and glory. It is as God-man that He is economically subject to the Father. Perhaps the passage in John v. 26 may belong to this class. "As the Father hath life in himself; so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." This may be understood of the eternal communication of life from the first to the second person of the Trinity (i.e., of eternal generation); or it may refer to the constitution of Christ's person. And then the term Son would designate, not the Logos, but the Theanthropos, and the communication of life would not be from the Father to the Son, but from God to the Theanthropos. It pleased the Father that Christ should have a divine nature possessed of inherent life in order that He might be the source of life to his people.

It is instructive to notice here how easily and naturally the sacred writers predicate of our Lord the attributes of humanity and those of divinity, however his person may be denominated. They call Him Lord, or Son, and attribute to Him, often in the same sentence, what is true of Him only as God, what is true only of his humanity, and what is true of Him only as the God-man. Thus in the beginning of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said, God hath spoken unto us by his Son. Here Son means the incarnate Logos. In the next clause, "By whom he made the world," what is said is true only of the eternal Son. So also what immediately follows, Who is "the brightness of his glory and the express image of his person, and upholding all things (the universe) by the word of his power." But in the next clause, "When he had by himself (i.e., by his sacrificial death) purged away our sins," the reference is to his human nature, as the body only died. And then it is added, He "sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high," which is true of the God-man.

The Acts of Christ.

The second consequence of the hypostatical union relates to the acts of Christ. As a man is one person, and because he is one person all his acts are the acts of that person, so all the acts of Christ are the acts of his whole person. But, as was before remarked, the acts of a man are of three classes: such as are purely mental, as thought; such as belong

exclusively to the body, as digestion and assimilation; and such as are mixed, i.e., both mental and corporeal, as all voluntary acts, as speaking, writing, etc. Yet all are equally the acts of the man. It is the man who thinks who digests his food, and who speaks. So of the acts of Christ. Some are purely divine, as creation and preservation; some are purely human, as eating, drinking, and sleeping; some are theanthropic, i.e., those in which both natures concur, as in the work of redemption. Yet all these acts are the acts of Christ, of one and the same person. It was Christ who created the world. It was Christ who ate and drank. And it is Christ who redeems us from the power of darkness.

Here also, as in the case of the attributes of Christ, his person may be denominated from one nature when the act ascribed to Him belongs to the other nature. He is called God, the Son of God, the Lord of glory, when his delivering Himself unto death is spoken of. And He is called man, or the Son of man, when the acts ascribed to Him involve the exercise of divine power or authority. It is the Son of man who forgives sins; who is Lord of the Sabbath; who raises the dead; and who is to send forth his angels to gather his elect.

Such being the Scriptural doctrine concerning the person of Christ, it follows that although the divine nature is immutable and impassible, and therefore neither the obedience nor the suffering of Christ was the obedience or suffering of the divine nature, yet they were none the less the obedience and suffering of a divine person. The soul of man cannot be wounded or burnt, but when the body is injured it is the man who suffers. In like manner the obedience of Christ was the righteousness of God, and the blood of Christ was the blood of God. It is to this fact that the infinite merit and efficiency of his work are due. This is distinctly asserted in the Scriptures. It is impossible, says the Apostle, that the blood of bulls and of goats could take away sin. It was because Christ was possessed of an eternal Spirit that He by the one offering of Himself hath perfected forever them who are sanctified. This is the main idea insisted upon in the Epistle to the Hebrews. This is the reason given why the sacrifice of Christ need never be repeated, and why it is infinitely more efficacious than those of the old dispensation. This truth has been graven on the hearts of believers in all ages. Every such believer says from his heart, "Jesus, my God, thy blood alone has power sufficient to atone."

The Man Christ Jesus the object of Worship.

Another obvious inference from this doctrine is that the man Christ Jesus is the object of religious worship. To worship, in the religious sense of the word, is to ascribe divine perfections to its object. The possession of those perfections, is, therefore, the only proper ground for such worship. The humanity of Christ, consequently, is not the ground of worship, but it enters into the constitution of that person who, being God over all and blessed forever, is the object of adoration to saints and angels. We accordingly find that it was He whom they saw, felt, and handled, that the Apostles worshipped as their Lord and God; whom they loved supremely, and to whom they consecrated themselves as a living sacrifice.

Christ can sympathize with his People.

A third inference which the Apostles drew from this doctrine is. that Christ is a merciful and faithful high-priest. He is just the Saviour we need. God as God, the eternal Logos, could neither be nor do what our necessities demand. Much less could any mere man, however wise, holy, or benevolent, meet the wants of our souls. It is only a Saviour

who is both God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever, who is all we need and all we can desire. As God He is ever present, almighty and infinite in all his resources to save and bless; and as man, or being also a man, He can be touched with a sense of our infirmities, was tempted as we are, was subject to the law which we violated, and endured the penalty which we had incurred. In Him dwells all the fulness of the Godhead, in a bodily form, in fashion as a man, so as to be accessible to us, and so that from his fulness we can all partake. We are therefore complete in Him, wanting nothing.

The Incarnate Logos the Source of Life.

The Scriptures teach that the Logos is everlasting life, having life in Himself, and the source of life, physical, intellectual, and spiritual. They further teach that his incarnation was the necessary condition of the communication of spiritual life to the children of men. He, therefore, is the only Saviour, the only source of life to us. We become partakers of this life, by union with Him. This union is partly federal established in the councils of eternity partly vital by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; and partly voluntary and conscious by faith. It is to those who believe, to those who receive Him as God manifest in the flesh, that He becomes eternal life. For it is not they who live, but Christ who liveth in them. (Gal. ii. 20.) The life of the believer is not a corporate life, conditioned on union with any outward organization, called the Church, for whosoever calls on the name of the Lord, that is, whosoever religiously worships Him and looks to Him as his God and Saviour, shall be saved, whether in a dungeon or alone in a desert.

The Exaltation of the Human Nature of Christ.

Another consequence of the hypostatical union is the exaltation of the humanity of Christ. As the human body in virtue of its vital union with an immortal soul, is immeasurably exalted above any mere material organization in the universe (so far as known or revealed), so the humanity of Christ in virtue of its union with his divine nature is immeasurably exalted in dignity and worth, and even power over all intelligent creatures. The human body, however, is not now, and will not be, even when made like to Christ's glorious body, so exalted as to cease to be material. In like manner the humanity of Christ is not so exalted by its union with his divine nature as to cease to be human. This would break the bond of sympathy between Hun and us. It has been the pious fault of some Christians that they merge his humanity in his Godhead. This is as real, if not so fatal an error, as merging his Godhead in his humanity. We must hold fast to both. "The Man Christ Jesus," and "The God over all blessed forever," is the one undivided inseparable object of the adoration, love, and confidence of the people of God; who can each say, --

"Jesus, my God, I know his name,

His name is all my trust;

Nor will He put my soul to shame,

Nor let my hope be lost."

[311] Locus XVIII. qust. v. 18, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 273, 274.

§ 5. Erroneous and Heretical Doctrines on the Person of Christ.

Plainly as all the truths above mentioned concerning the person of Christ, seem now to

us to be revealed in the Holy Scriptures, it was not until after the conflict of six centuries that they came to be fully stated so as to secure the general assent of the Church. We must indeed always bear in mind the difference between the speculations of theologians and the faith of the great body of the people if God. It is a false assumption that the doctrines taught by the ecclesiastical writers of a particular age, constituted the faith of believers of that age. The doctrines of theologians are largely determined by their antecedents and by the current philosophy of the day in which they live. This is unavoidable. The faith of the common people is determined by the Word of God, by the worship of the sanctuary, and by the teachings of the Spirit. They remain in a great measure ignorant of, or indifferent to, the speculations of theologians. It cannot be doubted that the great body of the people from the beginning believed that Christ was truly a man, was truly God, and is one person. They could not read and believe the Scriptures without having these truths engraved on their hearts. All the records of their confessions, hymns, and prayers, prove them to have been the worshippers of Him who died for their sins. And in this light they were regarded and described by all contemporary heathen writers. But while the people thus rested in these essential facts, the theologians were forced from without and from within, to ask, How can these things be? How can the same person be both God and man? How does the Godhead in the person of Christ stand related to his humanity? It was in the answers given to these questions that difficulty and controversy occurred. To avoid the great and obvious difficulties connected with the doctrine of the incarnation of God, some denied his true divinity; others denied the reality or completeness of his human nature; others so explained the nature and effects of the union as to interfere either with the integrity of the divine or of the human nature of Christ or with the unity of his person.

The Ebionites.

The errors which disturbed the peace of the early Church on this, as on other subjects, arose either from Judaism or from heathen philosophy. The Jews who professed themselves Christians, were not able, in many instances, as we learn from the New Testament itself, to emancipate themselves from their former opinions and prejudices. They had by the misinterpretation of their Scriptures been led to expect a Messiah who was to be the head of their nation as David and Solomon had been. They, therefore, as a body, rejected Christ, who came as a man of sorrows, not having anywhere to lay his head. And of those who were constrained by his doctrines and miracles to acknowledge Him as the promised Messiah, many believed Him to be a mere man, the son of Joseph and Mary, distinguished from other men only by his holiness and his extraordinary endowments. This was the case with the sect known as Ebionites. Why so called is a matter of doubt. Although as a body, and characteristically, they entertained this low, humanitarian view of the person of Christ, yet it appears from the fragmentary records of the ancient writers, that they differed much among themselves, and were divided into different classes. Some had mingled with their Jewish opinions more or less of the elements of the Gnostic philosophy. This was the more natural, as many of the teachers of Gnosticism were Jews. The fathers, therefore, speak both of Jewish, and of Gnostic Ebionites. So far as their views of Christ's person were modified by Gnosticism, they ceased to be distinctly the views of the Ebionites as a body.

Another class of nominal Jewish Christians is known as Nazarenes. They differed but little from the Jewish Ebionites. Both insisted on the continued obligation of the Mosaic

law, and both regarded Christ as a mere man. But the Nazarenes acknowledged his miraculous conception, and thus elevated Him above all other men, and regarded Him as the Son of God in a peculiar sense. The acknowledgment of the divinity of Christ, and the ability and willingness to unite in worship of which He was the object, was from the beginning the one indispensable condition of Christian fellowship. These Jewish sects, therefore, who denied his divinity, existed outside of the Church, and were not recognized as Christians.

The Gnostics.

As the Ebionites denied the divinity, so the Gnostics in different ways denied his humanity. They were led to this denial by their views of the origin of evil. God is the source only of good. As evil exists it must have its origin not only outside of Him, but independently of Him. He is, however, the source of all spiritual existences. By emanation from his substance spiritual beings are produced; from them other emanations proceed, and from those still others in ever increasing deterioration according to their distance from the primal fountain. Evil arises from matter. The world was created, not by God, but by an inferior spirit, the Demiourgos, whom some sects of the Gnostics regarded as the God of the Jews. Man consists of a spirit derived from God combined with a material body and an animal soul. By this union of the spiritual with the material, the spirit is defiled and enslaved. Its redemption consists in its emancipation from the body, so as to enable it to reenter the sphere of pure spirits, or to be lost in God. To effect this redemption, Christ, one of the highest emanations from God (or ons), came into the world. It was necessary that He should appear "in fashion as a man," but it was impossible He should become a man, without subjecting Himself to the pollution and bondage from which He came to deliver men. To meet this difficulty various theories were adopted. Some held that Christ had no real body or human soul. His earthly manifestation is human form was a phantasm, a mere appearance without substance or reality. Hence they were called Docet, from the Greek verb dokeo, which means to appear, to seem to be. According to this class of the Gnostics, Christ's whole earthly life was an illusion. He was not born, nor did he suffer or die. Others admitted that he had a real body, but denied that it was material. They taught that it was formed of some ethereal or celestial substance, and brought by Christ into the world. Although born of the virgin Mary, it was not of her substance, but only through her as the mould in which this ethereal substance was cast. Hence in the ancient creeds it is said that Christ was born, not per, but ex Maria virgine, which is explained to mean ex substantia matris su. It was also in opposition to this Gnostic heresy that the ancient creeds emphasized the declaration that Christ, as to his human nature, is consubstantial with us. Others, as the Cerinthians, held that Jesus and Christ were distinct. Jesus was an ordinary man, the son of Joseph and Mary. Christ was a spirit or power which descended on Jesus at his baptism, and became his guide and guardian, and enabled Him to work miracles. At the time of his passion, the Christ departed, returning into heaven, leaving the man Jesus to suffer alone. As nothing is more distinctly revealed in Scripture, and nothing is more essential to Christ's being the Saviour of men, than that he should be truly a man, all these Gnostic theories were rejected as heretical.

The Apollinarian Doctrine.

As the Gnostic doctrine which denied entirely the human nature of Christ was rejected,

the next attempt was directed against the integrity of that nature. Many of the early fathers, especially of the Alexandrian school, had presented views of this element of Christ's person, which removed Him more or less from the class of ordinary men. They nevertheless maintained that He was truly a man. The Apollinarians, so called from Apollinaris, a distinguished bishop of Laodicea, adopting the Platonic distinction between the soma, psuche, and pneuma, as three distinct subjects or principles in the constitution of man, admitted that Christ had a true body (soma) and animal soul (psuche), but not a rational spirit, or mind (pneuma or nous). In Him the eternal Son, or Logos, supplied the place of the human intelligence. The Apollinarians were led to the adoption of this theory partly from the difficulty of conceiving how two complete natures can be united in one life and consciousness. If Christ be God, or the divine Logos, He must have an infinite intelligence and an almighty will. If a perfect man, He must have a finite intelligence and a human will. How then can He be one person? This is indeed incomprehensible; but it involves no contradiction. Apollinaris admitted that the psuche, and pneuma in ordinary men, although two distinct principles, are united in one life and consciousness. The psuche, has its own life and intelligence, and so has the pneuma, and yet the two are one. But a second and strong inducement to adopting the Apollinarian theory, was the doctrine then held, by many, at least, of the Platonizing fathers, that reason in man is part of the divine Logos or universal reason. So that the difference between man and God, so far as man's intelligence is concerned, is merely quantitive. If this be so, it is indeed difficult to conceive how there should be in Christ both a part of the Logos and the entire Logos. The part would be necessarily superseded by the whole, or comprehended in it. But notwithstanding the force of this ad hominem argument as directed against some of his opponents, the conviction of the Church was so strong that Christ was a perfect man, possessing within Himself all the elements of our nature, that the Apollinarian doctrine was condemned in the general council held in Constantinople, A.D. 381, and soon disappeared.

Nestorianism.

The integrity of the two natures in Christ having been thus asserted and declared to be the faith of the Church, the next question which arose concerned the relations of the two natures, the one to the other, in the one person of Christ. Nestorianism is the designation adopted in church history, for the doctrine which either affirms, or implies a twofold personality in our Lord. The divine Logos was represented as dwelling in the man Christ Jesus, so that the union between the two natures was somewhat analogous to the indwelling of the Spirit. The true divinity of Christ was thus endangered. He was distinguished from other men in whom God dwelt, only by the plenitude of the divine presence, and the absolute control of the divine over the human. This was not the avowed or real doctrine of Nestorius, but it was the doctrine charged upon him, and was the conclusion to which his principles were supposed to lead. Nestorius was a man of great excellence and eminence; first a presbyter in Antioch, and afterwards Patriarch of Constantinople. The controversy on this subject arose from his defending one of his presbyters who denied that the Virgin Mary could properly be called the Mother of God. As this designation of the blessed Virgin had already received the sanction of the Church, and was familiar and dear to the people, Nestorius's objection to its use excited general and violent opposition. He was on this account alone accused of heresy. As, however, there is a sense in which Mary was the Mother of God, and a sense in which such a designation is blasphemous, everything

depends on the real meaning attached to the terms. What Nestorius meant, according to his own statement, was simply that God, the divine nature, could neither be born nor die. In his third letter to Coelestin, Bishop of Rome, he said, "Ego autem ad hanc quidem vocem, qu\u0000 est theotokos, nisi secundum Apollinaris et Arii furorem ad confusionem naturarum proferatur, volentibus dicere non resisto; nec tamen ambigo quia h\u0000c vox theotokos illi voci cedat, qu\u0000 est christotokos, tanquam prolat\u0000 ab Angelis et evangelistis." What he asserted was, "Non peperit creatura creatorem, sed peperit hominem deitatis instrumentum. . . . . Spiritus sanctus . . . Deo Verbo templum fabricatus est, quod habitaret, ex virgine." Nevertheless, he obviously carried the distinction of natures too far, for neither he nor his followers could bring themselves to use the Scriptural language, "The Church of God which he purchased with his blood." The Syriac version used by the Nestorians, reads Christos instead of Theos in Acts xx. 28. The principal opponent of Nestorius was Cyril of Alexandria, who secured his condemnation by violent means in the Synod of Ephesus in A.D. 431. This irregular decision was resisted by the Greek and Syrian bishops, so that the controversy, for a time at least, was a conflict between these two sections of the Church. Ultimately Nestorius was deposed and banished, and died A.D. 440. His followers removed eastward to Persia, and organized themselves into a separate communion, which continues until this day.

Eutychianism.

As Nestorius so divided the two natures in Christ as almost to necessitate the assumption of two persons, his opponents were led to the opposite extreme. Instead of two, they insisted that there was but one nature in Christ. Cyril himself had taught what clearly implied this idea. According to Cyril there is but one nature in Christ because by the incarnation, or hypostatical union the human was changed into the divine. [312] With the extreme Alexandrian theologians, the humanity of Christ was ignored. It was the Logos who was born, the Logos who suffered and died. All about Christ was divine, even his body. [313] The opposition between the Syrian and Egyptian bishops (Antioch and Alexandria) became so pronounced, that any distinction of natures in Christ was by the latter denounced as Nestorianism. It was Eutyches, however, a presbyter of Constantinople, one of the most strenuous advocates of the views of Cyril and an opponent of Nestorius, who became the representative of this doctrine which has since gone by his name. He was accused of heresy on this account, and condemned in a Council called by the Patriarch of Constantinople. Eutyches admitted that before the incarnation there were. two natures, but afterwards only one. Homologo ek duo phuseon gegennesthai ton kurion hemon pro tes henoseos, meta de ten henosin, mian phusin homologo. But what was that nature which resulted from the union of the two? The human might be exalted into the divine, or lost in it, as a drop of vinegar (to use one of the illustrations then employed) in the ocean. Then Christ ceased to be a man. And as the union of the two natures commenced from the beginning, the whole of Christ's human earthly life became an illusion, or empty show. Where then are his redeeming work, and his bond of union or sympathy with us? Or the effect of the union might be to merge the divine into the human, so that the one nature was after all only the nature of man. Then the true divinity of Christ was denied, and we have only a human saviour. Or the effect of the union of the two natures was the production of a third, which was neither human nor divine, but theanthropic, as in chemical combinations an acid and an alkali when united, produce a substance which is no longer either acid or alkaline. Then Christ instead of being God and

man, is neither God nor man. This being contrary to the Scriptures, and placing Christ out of the range of human sympathies, was opposed to the intimate convictions of the Church.

The condemnation of Eutyches at Constantinople greatly incensed Dioscurus, bishop of Alexandria, and his associates. Through his influence a general synod was convened at Ephesus in 449 A.D., from which the opposers of Eutyches were forcibly excluded, and his doctrine of one nature in Christ formally sanctioned. The Council proceeded to excommunicate those who taught a contrary doctrine, and Eutyches was restored to office. The doctrines of the Council (known in history as "the robber council") were sanctioned by the emperor Theodosius. But as he died in the following year, his successor being hostile to Dioscurus, summoned another general synod, which met at Chalcedon, A.D. 451. Here Dioscurus was deposed, and the letter of Leo of Rome to Flavian of Constantinople was adopted as a true exposition of the faith of the Church. Agreeably to the distinctions contained in that letter the Council framed its confession, in which it is said, [314] "We teach that Jesus Christ is perfect as respects Godhead, and perfect as respects manhood; that He is truly God, and truly a man consisting of a rational soul and a body; that He is consubstantial with the Father as to his divinity, and consubstantial with us as to his humanity, and like us in all respects, sin excepted. He was begotten of the Father before creation (pro aionon) as to his deity; but in these last days He, for us, and for our salvation, was born of Mary the Virgin, the mother of God as to his humanity. He is one and the same Christ, Lord, only begotten, existing in two natures without mixture, without change, without division, without separation; the diversity of the two natures not being at all destroyed by their union in the one person, but rather the peculiar property of each nature being preserved, and concurring to one person, and one subsistence." This was one of the six general Councils in whose doctrinal decisions all Protestants, at the time of the Reformation, professed their agreement. The Latin Church received this confession of the Council of Chalcedon cheerfully, but it met with great opposition in some parts, and especially in Palestine and Egypt, and therefore did not bring the controversy on this subject to an end. This conflict resulted in great disorders and bloodshed in Palestine and Egypt, and in Constantinople even in revolution; one Emperor was deposed, and another enthroned. After nearly two centuries of controversy, the Emperor Heraclius endeavoured to effect a reconciliation by getting both parties to admit that there are two natures in Christ, but only one will and operation, mia theandrike energeia. This effort was so far successful that a portion of the Monophysites assented to this modification of the creed of the Council of Chalcedon; but the more determined of that party and the great body of the orthodox refused. The controversy turned after this specially on the question whether there is one only, or two wills in Christ. If only one, then, as the orthodox asserted, there could be but one nature, for will is one of the essential elements or faculties of a rational nature. To deny Christ a human will, was to deny that He had a human nature, or was truly a man. Besides, it precluded the possibility of his having been tempted, and therefore contradicted the Scriptures, and separated Him so far from his people that He could not sympathize with them in their temptations. The effort of Heraclius therefore proved abortive, and the controversy continued with unabated acrimony, until finally the sixth general council held at Constantinople, A.D. 681, authoritatively decided in favour of the doctrine that in the one person of Christ, as there are two distinct natures, human and divine, there are of necessity two intelligences and two wills, the one fallible and finite, the other immutable and infinite.

Christ was tempted, and there was, therefore, the metaphysical possibility that He should have yielded. According to this Council the person of Christ was not only formed, [315] ek duo phuseon, but consists since the hypostatic union ek duo phusesi, and it says in the name of the Church that there are duo phusikas theleseis etoi thelemata en auto, kai duo phusikas energeias adiairetos, atrettos, ameristos, asunchutos kata ten ton hagion pateron didaskalian hosautos keruttomen. The Monothelites being thus condemned were persecuted and driven eastward, where they have perpetuated themselves in the sect of the Maronites.

With this council the conflict on this doctrine so far ceased that there has since been no further modification of the Church doctrine. The decision against Nestorius, in which the unity of Christ's person was asserted; that against Eutyches, affirming the distinction of natures; and that against the Monothelites, declaring that the possession of a human nature involves of necessity the possession of a human will, have been received as the true faith by the Church universal, the Greek, Latin, and Protestant.

During the Middle Ages, although the person of Christ was the subject of diverse speculations on the part of individual writers, there was no open or organized opposition to the decisions of the above named councils.

[312] See Dorner, Hagenbach, and M&#65533;nscher, on this controversy.

[313] Neander, Dogmengeschichte, vol. i. p. 349.

[314] Acta Quinta, Binius. Concilia Generalia, vol. ii. part I. p. 253, e. f.

[315] Binius, Concilia Generalia, 1618, vol. iii. part I. sect. i. pp. 230, 231.

§ 6. Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.

At the time of the Reformation the Reformed adhered strictly to the doctrine of the early Church. This is apparent from the different Confessions adopted by the several Reformed bodies, especially from the Second Helvetic Confession, which, as will be seen, reviews and rejects all the ancient heresies on this subjects and repeats and adopts the language of the ancient creeds. In this Confession it is said: [316] "Credimus pr&#65533;terea et docemus filium Dei Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum ab &#65533;terno pr&#65533;destinatum vel pr&#65533;ordinatum esse, a Patre, salvatorem mundi: credimusque hunc esse genitum, non tantum, cum ex virgine Maria carnem assumsit, nec tantum ante jacta fundamenta mundi, sed ante omnem &#65533;ternitatem, et quidem, a Patre, ineffabiliter. . . . . Proinde Filius est Patri juxta divinitatem co&#65533;qualis et consubstantialis, Deus verus non nuncupatione, aut adoptione, aut ulla dignatione, sed substantia atque natura. . . . . Abominamur ergo Arii et omnium Arianorum impiam contra filium Dei doctrinam. . . . . Eundem quoque &#65533;terni Dei &#65533;ternum filium credimus et docemus hominis factum esse filium, ex semine Abrah&#65533; atque Davidis, non ex viri coitu, quod Hebion dixit, sed conceptum purissime ex Spiritn Sancto, et natum ex Maria semper virgine: . . . . Caro ergo Christi, nec phantastica fuit, nec coelitus allata, sicuti Valentinus et Martion somniabant. Pr&#65533;terea anima fuit Domino nostro non absque sensu et ratione, ut Apollinaris sentiebat, neque caro absque anima, ut Eunomius docebat, sed anima cum ratione sua, et caro cum sensibus suis, per quos sensus, veros dolores tempore passionis su&#65533; sustinuit. . . . . Agnoscimus ergo in uno atque eodem Domino nostro Jesu Christo, duas naturas [vel substantias, as it is in several editions], divinam et humanam: et has ita dicimus conjunctas et unitas esse, ut absorpt&#65533;, aut

confus&#65533;, aut immixt&#65533; non sint: sed salvis potius et permanentibus naturarum proprietatibus, in una persona, unit&#65533; et conjunct&#65533;: ita ut unum Christum Dominum, non duos veneremur: unum inquam verum Deum et hominem, juxta divinam naturam Patri, juxta humanam vero nobis hominibus consubstantialem, et per omnia similem, peccato excepto. Etenim, ut Nestorianum dogma ex uno Christo duos faciens, et unionem person&#65533; dissolvens, abominamur: ita Eutychetis et Monothelitarum vel Monophysicorum vesaniam, expungentem natur&#65533; human&#65533; proprietatem execramur penitus. Ergo minime docemus naturam in Christo divinam passam esse, aut Christum secundum humanam naturam adhuc esse in hoc mundo, adeoque esse ubique. Neque enim vel sentimus, vel docemus veritatem corporis Christi a clarificatione desiisse, aut deificatam, adeoque sic deificatam esse, ut suas proprietates, quoad corpus et animam, deposuerit, ac prorsus in naturam divinam abierat, unaque duntaxat substantia esse coeperit. . . . . Pr&#65533;terea credimus Dominum nostrum Jesum Christum, vere passum et mortuum esse pro nobis. . . . . Interim non negamus et Dominum glori&#65533;, juxta verba Pauli, crucifixum esse pro nobis. Nam communicationem idiomatum, ex scripturis petitam, et ab universa vetustate in explicandis componendisque scripturarum locis in speciem pugnantibus usurpatam, religiose et reverenter recipimus et usurpamus."

It thus appears that the Reformed distinctly rejected all the errors concerning the person of Christ, condemned in the early Church; the Arian, the Ebionitic, the Gnostic, the Apollinarian, the Nestorian, the Eutychian, and the Monothelite, as well as the peculiar Lutheran doctrine introduced at the time of the Reformation. The Reformed taught what the first six general councils taught, and what the Church universal received, -- neither more nor less. With this agrees the beautifully clear and precise statement of the Westminster Confession: "The Son of God, the second person in the Trinity, being very and eternal God, of one substance, and equal with the Father, did, when the fulness of time was come, take upon Him man's nature, and all the essential properties and common infirmities thereof, yet without sin: being conceived by the power of the Holy Ghost in the womb of the Virgin Mary, of her substance. So that two whole, perfect, and distinct natures, the Godhead and the manhood, were inseparably joined together in one person, without conversion, composition, or confusion. Which person is very God and very man, yet one Christ, the only mediator between God and man." [317]

[316] XI.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, pp. 483-485.

[317] Chap. viii. § 2.

§ 7. Lutheran Doctrine.

The Lutherans in their symbols adopt all the doctrinal decisions of the early Church respecting the person of Christ. They therefore hold, (1.) That Christ is very God and very man. (2.) That He has two distinct natures, a human and divine; that as to the latter He is consubstantial with the Father, and as to the former He is consubstantial with men. (3.) That He is one person. There is one Christ and not two. (4.) That the two natures are intimately united, but without confusion or change. Each nature retains its own peculiar properties. Nevertheless they hold that the attributes of the one nature were communicated to the other. They admit a "communio idiomatum" in the sense that whatever is true of either nature is

true of the person. But beyond this they insist upon a "communicatio naturarum." And by nature, in this connection, they mean essence. In their symbols and writings the formula "natura, seu substantia, seu essentia" is of frequent occurrence. The divine essence is communicated to the human. The one interpenetrates the other. They "are mixed" (commiscentur). They do not become one essence, but remain two; yet where the one is the other is; what the one does the ether does. The human is as truly divine as the eternal essence of the Godhead, except that it is not divine ex se, but by communication. (5.) As however it would be derogatory to the divine nature to suppose it to be subject to the limitations and infirmities of humanity, this communication of attributes is said to be confined to the human nature. It receives divine perfections; but the divine receives nothing from the human. (6.) The human nature of Christ, therefore, is almighty, omniscient, and everywhere present both as to soul and body. (7.) As this transfer of divine attributes from the divine to the human nature is the consequence of the incarnation, or rather constitutes it, it began when the incarnation began, and consequently in the womb of the Virgin Mary. (8.) The humiliation of Christ consisted mainly in the hiding or not using the divine perfections of his human nature while here on earth; and his exaltation in the manifestation of the divine glory of his humanity. On this subject the "Form of Concord" [318] says, "Eamque Majestatem, ratione unionis personalis, semper Christus habuit: sed in statu su[illegible] humiliationis sese exinanivit; qua de causa revera [illegible]tate, sapientia et gratia apud Deum atque homines profecit. Quare majestatem illam non semper, sed quoties ipsi visum fuit, exseruit, donec formam servi, non autem naturam humanam, post resurrectionem plene et prorsus deponeret, ut in plenariam usurpationem, manifestationem et declarationem divin[illegible] majestatis collocaretur, et hoc modo in gloriam suam ingrederetur." (9.) Nevertheless Christ while here on earth, and even when in the womb of the Virgin, was as to his soul and body everywhere present.

The above statement is believed to be a correct exhibition of the doctrine of the Lutheran Church as presented in the eighth chapter of the "Form of Concord." There is, however, no little difficulty in determining what the Lutheran doctrine really is. The Christology of Luther, although very clear and pronounced on certain points, was indefinite and doubtful in others. His successors differed seriously among themselves. It was one of the principal objects of the "Form of Concord" to settle the matters in dispute. This was done by compromise. Both parties made concessions, and yet both insisted upon the assertion of their peculiar views in one part or other of that document. It is, therefore, difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile some portions of the "Form of Concord" with others. It did not in fact put an end to the divisions which it was designed to heal.

Different Views among the Lutherans.

The principal points of difference among the Lutheran divines concerning the person of Christ were the following: The nature and effects of the union of natures in Christ; the ground of that union; and the time of its occurrence. The Reformed Church in adhering to the doctrine as it had been settled in the Council of Chalcedon, maintained that there is such an essential difference between the divine and human natures that the one could not become the other, and that the one was not capable of receiving the attributes of the other. If God became the subject of the limitations of humanity He would cease to be God; and if man received the attributes of God he would cease to be man. This was regarded as a self-

evident truth. The "communion of attributes" which the Reformed, in accordance with the common faith of the Church, admitted, concerned only the person and not the natures of Christ. Christ possessed all the attributes of humanity and of divinity, but the two natures remained distinct; just as a man is the subject of all that can be predicated of his body and of his soul, although the attributes of the one are not predicable of the other. The Lutherans maintained that, according to this view, the two natures were as separate as duo asseres agglutinatos. This they pronounced to be no real incarnation. The Reformed acknowledged that Jesus Christ the son of the Virgin Mary is a divine person, but denied that his human nature was divine. The Lutherans maintained that man became God, and that the human did become divine. Otherwise, Christ as clothed in our nature, could not be an object of divine worship. As though we could not reverence a man unless we believed that the attributes of his mind were transferred to his body.

Although the Lutheran theologians agree as to the fact that the man Christ Jesus became God, they differ as to the mode in which this was accomplished. Their language as to the fact is as strong as it can be made. Thus Brentius, the friend of Luther and the Reformer of W&#65533;rtemberg, in his work "De Personali Unione," says, If the Logos "did not intend to remain either personally or with his nature outside of Christ, but purposed to become man, He must needs exalt the humanity into his own majesty. Therein, in fact, consists the incarnation, that the man Christ not merely never existed or worked without the Logos, but also that the Logos never existed or worked without the man, whom He had assumed; and is this was only possible though the elevation of the humanity to equal dignity with the Logos, the incarnation consists precisely in this elevation, -- the one is identical with the other." [319] "According to the philosophy of Zwingli, there is no proportion between the finite and the infinite; but in the philosophy of God, finite humanity also may become infinite." [320] The human nature of Christ, therefore, possesses all divine attributes. It fills heaven and earth. It is omniscient and almighty. In the "Form of Concord" [321] it is said, "Itaque non tantum ut Deus, verum etiam ut homo, omnia novit, omnia potest, omnibus creaturis pr&#65533;sens est, et omnia, qu&#65533; in coelis, in terris et sub terra sunt, sub pedibus suis et in manu sua habet." And again, [322] "Non in Christo sunt du&#65533; separat&#65533; person&#65533;, sed unica tantum est persona. Ubicunque ea est, ibi est unica tantum et indivisa persona. Et ubicunque recte dixeris: hic est Deus, ibi fateri oportet, et dicere, ergo etiam Christus homo adest." This being the case, it being admitted that man becomes God, that the human becomes divine, the finite infinite, the question arises, How can this be? How is divinity thus communicated to humanity? It is in the answer to these questions that the diversities and inconsistencies in the views not only of theologians but also of the symbolical books, appear. It was a principle with the Wittenberg school of the Lutheran theologians that human nature is not capable of divinity. This is true also of Chemnitz, the greatest of the divines of the age after the Reformation. In his work "De Duabus Naturis in Christo, de Hypostatica Earum Unione, de Communicatione Idiomatum," etc., says Dorner, "he controverts in the most vigorous manner, a physica, naturalis communicatio,' or transfusio idiomatum;' and no less earnestly does he deny the capacitas' of a natura finita' for the infinitum,' if it signify more than that the divine can dwell and work in man." [323] As to the ubiquity of Christ's body, the dissent was still more decided. [324] Yet this idea of the capacity of human nature for divinity became the formative idea in the Lutheran doctrine of the person of Christ.

No less diversity appears in the answer to the question, What is meant by the

communication of natures? Sometimes it is said to be a communication of the essence of God to the human nature of Christ; sometimes a communication of divine attributes; and sometimes it is said to mean nothing more than that the human is made the organ of the divine. [325] The first has symbolical authority in its favour, and is the most consistent with the theory. It is the proper meaning of the words, for as natura in the "Form of Concord" is constantly in this connection explained by the words substantia and essentia, a communication of nature is a communication of essence. The one is not changed into the other, but they are intermingled and mixed without being confounded. [326]

The favorite illustration of this union of two natures was derived from heated iron. In that case (according to the theory of heat then in vogue) two substances are united. The one interpenetrates the other. The iron receives the attributes of the caloric. It glows and burns. Where the iron is, there the caloric is. Yet the one is not changed into the other. The iron remains iron, and the heat remains heat. This is very ingenious; but, as is often the case, the analogy fails in the very point to be illustrated. The fact to be explained is how man becomes God and God man; how the human becomes divine, and the finite becomes infinite. In the illustration the heat does not become iron nor the iron heat. The only relation between the two is juxtaposition in space. But in the doctrine the human does become divine; man does become God.

A second and minor point of difference was that some referred the communion of the attributes of the two natures to the hypostatical union, while others held that that union was the result of the communication of the divine nature to the human.

The main difficulty, however, and the principal source of diversity related to the time and manner of the union of the two natures. We have already seen that one party held that this union took place at the moment of the "miraculous conception." The conception was the ascension. As the union of the divine with the human nature rendered the human divine, it became instanter omnipresent, almighty, and infinitely exalted. The effect of the incarnation was that the logos no longer existed extra carnem, neither was the caro extra logon. Whatever the one is the other is; whatever the one knows the other knows; whatever the one does the other does; and whatever majesty, glory, or blessedness the one has the other also has. "So certainly as the act of incarnation communicates the divine essence to humanity, even so certainly must this actual omnipresence, and not merely its potence, which does not exist, be communicated to the flesh of Christ." [327] The "Form of Concord" teaches the same doctrine; [328] it says, "Ex eodem etiam fundamento credimus, docemus et confitemur, Filium hominis ad dexteram omnipotentis majestatis et virtutis Dei, realiter, hoc est, vere et reipsa, secundum humanam suam naturam, esse exaltatum, cum homo ille in Deum assumptus fuerit, quamprimum in utero matris a Spiritu Sancto est confectus, ejusque humanitas jam tum cum Filio Dei altissimi personaliter fuerit unita." This, however, supposes the whole earthly life of Christ to be an illusion. There could be no growth or development of his human nature. He was omniscient and omnipotent when an unborn infant. The Bible says He increased in knowledge; this theory says that He knew all things from the beginning; that He was the ruler of the universe cooperating in all the activity of the Logos when in the womb of the Virgin; that He was supremely blessed as to his human nature when in the garden and upon the cross; and that as to soul and body He was living while lying in the grave. If this be so He never suffered or died, and there has been no

redemption through his blood.

To avoid these fatal consequences of their theory, the Lutherans were driven to different and conflicting subtle explanations. According to some there was no actual communication of the divine essence and attributes to the human nature until after his resurrection. The Logos was in Him only potentially. There was on the part of the divine nature a retractio, or hesuchazein, or quiescence, so that it was as though it were not there. According to others, there was a voluntary krupsis or veiling of itself or of its divine glory on the part of the humanity of Christ. According to others, this humiliation was rather the act of the Godman, who only occasionally revealed the fact that the human nature was divine. No explanation could meet the difficulties of the case, because they are inseparable from the assumption that the human nature of Christ was replete with divine attributes from the moment of its miraculous conception. It is a contradiction to say that the same individual mind was omniscient and yet was ignorant and increased in knowledge; that the same rational soul was supremely happy and exceeding sorrowful, at the same time; that the same body was potentially alive and yet actually dead. From the nature of the case there can be no difference between the ktesis and chresis of such divine attributes as omniscience and omnipresence. It would require a volume to give the details of the controversies between the different schools of the Lutheran divines on these and kindred points. This general outline is all that can here be expected. [329]

Remarks on the Lutheran Doctrine.

1. The first remark which suggests itself on this Lutheran doctrine is its contrast with the simplicity of the gospel. The New Testament predicates of our Lord Jesus Christ all that can be predicated of a sinless man, and all that can be predicated of a divine person. It is only stating this fact in another form to say that the Bible teaches that the eternal Son of God became man taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was, and continues to be, God and man, in two entire distinct natures and one person forever. Whatever is beyond this, is mere speculation. Not content with admitting the fact that two natures are united in the one person of Christ, the Lutheran theologians insist on explaining that fact. They are willing to acknowledge that two natures or substances, soul and body, are united in the one person in man, without pretending to explain the essential nature of the union. Why then can they not receive the fact that two natures are united in Christ without philosophizing about it? The first objection, therefore, is that the Lutheran doctrine is an attempt to explain the inscrutable.

2. A second objection is that the character of the explanation was determined by the peculiar views of Luther as to the Lord's Supper. He believed that the body and blood of Christ are really and locally present in the Eucharist. And when asked, How can the body of Christ which is in heaven be in many different places at the same time? He answered that the body of Christ is everywhere. And when asked, How can that be? His only answer was, That in virtue of the incarnation the attributes of the divine nature were communicated to the human, so that wherever the Logos is there the soul and body of Christ must be.

There are two things specially prominent in Luther as a theologian. The one is his entire subjection to the authority of Scripture, as he understood it. He seemed, moreover, never to doubt the correctness of his interpretations, nor was he willing to tolerate doubt in others. As to matters not clearly determined in the Bible, according to his view, he was

exceedingly tolerant and liberal. But with regard to points which he believed to be taught in the Word of God, he allowed neither hesitation nor dissent. The other marked trait in his character was his power of faith. He could believe not only what was repugnant to his feelings, but what was directly opposed to his system, and even what was in its own nature impossible. His cardinal doctrine was "justification by faith alone," as he translated Romans iii. 28. He constantly taught not only that no man could be saved without faith in Christ, but that faith alone was necessary. Yet as he understood our Lord in John iii. 5, to teach that baptism is essential to salvation, he asserted its absolute necessity, although sorely against his will. To reconcile this with his doctrine of the necessity and sufficiency of faith, he held that new-born infants, when baptized, exercised faith although he meant by faith the intelligent, voluntary, and cordial reception of Christ as He is offered in the gospel. In like manner he hated the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation, and was bitterly opposed to all the subtleties of scholasticism. Yet as he understood our Lord's words, "This is my body," literally, he adopted all the subtleties, inconsistencies, and, we may say, impossibilities, involved in the doctrine of the ubiquity of Christ's body. Body includes the idea of form as well as of substance. A man's body is not the water, ammonia, and lime of which it is composed. It is certainly a strong objection to any doctrine that it owes its existence mainly to the desire to support a false interpretation of Scripture.

Lutherans, indeed, deny that their doctrine concerning the person of Christ is thus subordinate to their views of the Lord's Supper. Even Dorner, in one place, seems to take the same ground. Elsewhere, however, he fully admits the fact. Thus when speaking of Luther, he says that he "did not develop his deep and full Christological intuitions in a connected doctrinal form. His controversy with the Swiss, on the contrary, had led him, as we have shown, to the adoption of single divergent principles, which aided in reducing Christology to the rank of a follower in the train of another doctrine, instead of conceding to it an independent life and sphere of its own." [330] And on the next page he says, "Even the champions of peace between the evangelical parties put their Christology in a position of dependence on the doctrine of the Eucharist, which almost involved the entire loss of the grand features of Luther's doctrine."

3. It is to be objected to the Lutheran doctrine, not only that it undertakes to explain what is an inscrutable mystery, and that the explanation derives its character from Luther's views of the Eucharist, but also that the explanation itself is utterly unsatisfactory. In the first place, it is one sided. It insists on a communication of natures and a communion of attributes. Lutherans maintain that God became man as truly, and in the same sense that man became God. Yet they deny that the divine nature received anything from the human, or that God was in any way subject to the limitations of humanity. Nevertheless, such limitation appears to be involved in the Lutheran doctrine of Christ's humiliation. The idea is that after the incarnation the Logos is not extra carnem, that all his activity is with and through the activity of his humanity; and yet it is affirmed that the humanity did not exercise, while on earth, except occasionally, its divine perfections. This seems of necessity to involve the admission that the Logos did not exercise those perfections during the period of the humiliation. That is, while Christ was on earth, the knowledge and power of the Logos were measured and circumscribed by the knowledge and power of the human soul of Christ. This is the modern doctrine of kenosis which Luther rejected. He refused, says Dorner, "to purchase an actual growth of the divine-human vital unity at the price of a

depotentiation or self-emptying of the Logos." [331]

In the second place, the doctrine in question is destitute of any Scriptural support. Almost all the arguments derived from the Scriptures, urged by Lutherans, are founded on passages in which the person of Christ is denominated from his human nature when divine attributes or prerogatives are ascribed to Him; whence it is inferred that those attributes and prerogatives belong to his humanity. Thus because it is said, "The Son of Man is in heaven," it is inferred that the human nature, i.e., the soul and body of Christ, were in heaven while He was on earth. But they do not carry out the principle, and argue that because Christ is denominated from his divine nature when the limitations of humanity are ascribed to Him, that therefore his divine nature is limited. But if his being called God when He is said to have purchased the Church with his blood, does not prove that the divine nature suffered death, neither does his being called the Son of Man when He is said to be in heaven, prove the ubiquity of his humanity. Still less force is due to the argument from passages in which the Theanthropos is the subject to which divine perfections and prerogatives are ascribed. That our Lord said, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth," no more proves that his human nature is almighty, than his saying, "Before Abraham was I am," proves that his humanity is eternal. If saying that man is a rational creature does not imply that his body thinks, saying that Jesus Christ is God, does not imply that his human nature is divine. If the personal union between the soul and body in man, does not imply that the attributes of the soul are communicated to the body, then the personal union of the two natures in Christ does not imply that the divine attributes are communicated to his humanity.

In the third place, the Lutheran doctrine destroys the integrity of the human nature of Christ. A body which fills immensity is not a human body. A soul which is omniscient, omnipresent, and almighty, is not a human soul. The Christ of the Bible and of the human heart is lost if this doctrine be true.

In the fourth place, the Lutheran doctrine is contrary to the entire drift of the teaching of the Word of God, and of the whole Church. If anything is plainly revealed in the Scriptures concerning our Lord, and if there is anything to which the heart of the believer instinctively clings, it is that although He is God over all and blessed forever, He is nevertheless a man like ourselves; bone of our bone, and flesh of our flesh; one who can be touched with a sense of our infirmities; and who knows from his own experience and present consciousness, what a weak and infirm thing human nature is. He became and continues a man that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest in things pertaining to God. But a man whose body and soul fill immensity, who "as man" is omniscient and omnipotent, as just said, ceases to be a man. His humanity is merged into divinity, and He becomes not God and man, but simply God, and we have lost our Saviour, the Jesus of the Bible, who was a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief, who was one with us in his humanity, and therefore can sympathize with us and save us.

Finally, it is a fatal objection to the doctrine under consideration that it involves the physical impossibility that attributes are separable from the substances of which they are the manifestation. This is the same kind of impossibility as action without something acting; or, motion without something moving. It is an objection urged by Lutherans as well as others against the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation that it supposes the accidents, or

attributes of the bread and wine in the Eucharist, to continue when their substance no longer exists. In like manner, according to the Lutheran doctrine, the attributes of the divine nature or essence are transferred to another essence. If there be no such transfer or communication, then the human nature of Christ is no more omniscient or almighty, than the worker of a miracle is omnipotent. If the divine nature only exercises its omnipotence in connection with the activity of the humanity, then the humanity is the mere organ or instrument of the divine nature. This idea, however, the Lutherans repudiate. They admit that for God to exercise his power, when Peter said the lame man, "Rise up and walk," was something entirely different from rendering Peter omnipotent. Besides, omnipresence and omniscience are not attributes of which a creature can be made the organ. Knowledge is something subjective. If a mind knows everything, then that mind, and not another in connection with it, is omniscient, If Christ's body is everywhere present, then it is the substance of that body, and not the essence of God that is omnipresent. The Lutheran doctrine is, however, that the essential attributes or properties of the two natures remain unchanged after the hypostatical union. The properties of the divine essence do not become the properties of the human. Then the humanity of Christ has the attributes of his divinity without its essence, and yet those attributes or, properties do not inhere in his human substance. [332]

It seems a plain contradiction in terms, to say that the human becomes divine, that the finite becomes infinite; and no less a contradiction to say that the humanity of Christ has infinite attributes and yet itself is not infinite.

The Lutheran doctrine of the Person of Christ has never been disconnected from the Lutheran doctrine of he Lord's Supper. Both are peculiar to that Church and form no part of Catholic Christianity.

[318] VIII. 16; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 608.

[319] History of the Development of the Doctrine of the Person of Christ, by Dr. J. A. Dorner. Translated by Rev. D. W. Simon. Edinburgh, T. and T. Clark, 1862. Division II. vol. ii. p. 180.

[320] Ibid. p. 183.

[321] VIII. 16; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 608.

[322] VIII. 82; Ibid. p. 784.

[323] Dorner, Div. II. vol. ii. p. 200.

[324] On this point, Dorner, on page 240, note, says, "Selnekker designates the Ubiquitas absoluta figmentum Sathan&#65533;' (Chemnitz, a monstrum' and portentum'), and yet subscribed the Bergian formula which included Luther's words, -- omnia in universum plena esse Christi etiam juxta humanam naturam,' -- which repeatedly says, Whoso believeth not that where the Logos is there also is the humanity of Christ, divideth the person; and which assumes Luther's doctrine of the three modes of existence of the body of Christ, -- that also according to which Christi corpus repletive, absolute ut Deus, in omnibus creaturis sit.'"

[325] Dorner says of Chemnitz, "In his highest Christological utterances, the Son of man is nothing more than a God-moved organ: -- a representation to which even the Wittenbergers objected." Person of Christ, div. II. vol. ii. p. 203, note.

[326] The Form of Concord (VIII. 17-19; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 765) says,

"Catholica Christi ecclesia semper, omnibusque temporibus simplicissime credidit et sensit, humanam et divinam naturam in persona Christi eo modo unitas esse, ut veram inter se communicationem habeant. Neque tamen ideo natur&#65533; in unam essentiam, sed ut D. Lutherus loquitur, in unam personam conveniunt et commiscentur. Et propter hanc hypostaticam unionem et communicationem veteres orthodoxi ecclesi&#65533; doctores s&#65533;pe admodum, non modo ante, verum etiamest, Chalcedonense concilium, vocabulo (mixtionis), in pia tamen sententia et vero discrimine, usi sunt. . . . . Et quidem erudita antiquitas unionem hypostaticam et naturarum communicationem similitudine anim&#65533; et corporis, item ferri candentis, aliquo modo declarvit. Anima enim et corpus (quemadmodum etiam ignis et ferrum) non tantum per phrasin aut modum loquendi, aut verbaliter, sed vere et realiter communicationem inter se habent: neque tamen hoc modo confusio aut naturarum ex&#65533;quatio introducitur, qualis fieri solet, cum ex melle et aqua mulsum conficitur; talis enim potus non amplius aut aqua est mera, aut mel merum sed mixtus quidam ex utroque potus. Longe certe aliter se res mulla divin&#65533; et human&#65533; natur&#65533; unione (in persona Christi) habent: longe enim sublimior est, et plane ineffabilis communicatio et unio divin&#65533; et human&#65533; natur&#65533;, in persona Christi, propter quam unionem et communicationem Deus homo est, et homo Deus. Nec tames hac unione et communicatione naturam vel ips&#65533; natur&#65533;, vel harum proprietates confunduntur: sed utraque natura essentiam et proprietates suas retinet."

[327] Dorner, div. II. vol. ii. p. 284. Dorner makes the remark quoted in the text, in special reference to the doctrine of the T&#65533;bingen divines. It applies, however, to every form of the Lutheran theory.

[328] VIII. x.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 608.

[329] These details may be found at length in the larger work of Dorner on the Person of Christ, already frequently referred to, and in the work entitled Christi Person und Werk, Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus Von G. Thomasius D. und ord. Professor der Theologie an der Universit&#65533;t Erlangen. In two volumes, 1853, and 1857. See also The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, as represented in the Augsburg Confession, and in the History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Norton Professor of Theology in the Evangelical Lutheran Theological Seminary, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania. Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871, 8 vo, pp. 840. This is a very able and instructive book, and presents the Lutheran doctrine in the most plausible form of which it admits.

[330] Dorner's History of the Doctrine on the Person of Christ, div. II. vol. ii, p. 172.

[331] Dorner's History of the Doctrine on the Person of Christ, div. II. vol ii. p. 97.

[332] The Form of Concord, chap. viii. sections 6 and 7, Epitome; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 606, says "Credimus, docemus et confitemur, divinam et humanam naturas non in unam substantiam commixtas, nec unam in alteram mutatam esse, sed utramque naturam retinere suas proprietates essentiales, ut qu&#65533; alterius natur&#65533; proprietates fiere nequeant. "Proprietates divin&#65533; natur&#65533; sunt: esse omnipotentem, &#65533;ternam, infinitam, et secundum natur&#65533; naturalisque su&#65533; essenti&#65533; proprietatem, per se, ubique presentem esse, omnis novices, etc. H&#65533;c omnia neque sunt neque unquam fiunt human&#65533; natur&#65533; proprietates."

§ 8. Later Forms of the Doctrine.

During the period between the Reformation and the present time, the doctrine concerning the Person of Christ was constantly under discussion. The views advanced however were, for the most part, referrible to the one or other of the forms of the doctrine already considered. The only theories calling for special notice are Socinianism and that of the Pre�xistent Humanity of Christ.

Socinianism.

Socinus was an Italian, born of a noble family at Siena, in 1539. The earlier part of his life was not devoted to learning. Being a favourite of the Grand Duke, he passed twelve years at his court, and then removed to Basel that he might prosecute his theological studies, in which he had become deeply interested. After a few years he removed to Poland and settled at Cracow. There and in its vicinity he passed the greater part of his active life. He died in 1604.

The early Socinians erected a college at Racovia, in Lesser Poland, which attained so high a reputation that it attracted students from among Protestants and Romanists. It was however suppressed by the government in 1658, and the followers of Socinus, after having suffered a protracted persecution, were expelled from the kingdom.

Socinus and his followers admitted the divine authority of the Scriptures. The sacred writers, they said, wrote, divino Spiritu impulsi eoque dictante. They admitted that the Bible contained doctrines above, but not contrary to reason. Of this contrariety reason was to judge. On this ground they rejected many doctrines held by the Church universal, especially the doctrines of the Trinity and of the Atonement. Socinus said that as there is but one divine essence there can be but one divine person. He denied that there is any such thing as natural religion or natural theology. Supernatural revelation he regarded as the only source of our knowledge of God and of divine things. The only religion was the Christian, which he defined to be "Via divinitus proposita et patefacta perveniendi ad immortalitatem, seu �ternam vitam." [333] This is the answer to the first question of the "Brevissima Institutio," of which Socinus was the author.

All men having sinned they became subject to the penalty of eternal death, which Socinus understood to be annihilation. To deliver men from this penalty God sent Christ into the world, and it is only through Him that immortality can be secured. Concerning Christ, he taught that He was in Himself and by nature a mere man, having had no existence prior to his being born of the Virgin Mary. He was, however, distinguished from all other men, --

1. By his miraculous conception. [334]

2. Although peccable and liable to be tempted, He was entirely free from sin.

3. He received a special baptism of the Holy Ghost, that is, of the divine efficiency.

4. Some time before entering upon his public ministry He was taken up into heaven that He might see God and be instructed immediately by Him. There are two passages which speak of Christ's having been in heaven (John iii. 13, and John vi. 62). "In priore loco," says Socinus, "ex Gr�co ita verba Christi legi possunt, ut dicat, filium hominis non quidem esse in coelo, sed fuisse. Vox enim Gr�ca ?on qu� per pr�sens tempus reddita fuit, potest, ut doctissimi aliqui interpretes annotarunt (Erasmus et Beza), reddi per

pr&#65533;teritum imperfectum; ut legatur non qui est, sed, qui erat in coelo." [335] As no pre&#65533;xistence of Christ was admitted, these passages were regarded as direct assertions of his being taken up into heaven during his earthly life.

5. The great distinction of Christ is that since his resurrection and ascension all power in heaven and in earth has been committed to Him. He is exalted above all creatures, and constituted God's viceroy over the whole universe. The question is asked, "Quid tamen istud ejus divinum imperium nominatim complectitur?" To which the answer is, "Propter id quod jam dictum est, nempe quod hoc potestatem complectitur plenissimam et absolutissimam in verum Dei populum, hinc necessario sequitur, eodem divino imperio contineri potestatem et dominationem in omnes angelos et spiritus tam malos, quam bonos." [336] And again: "Nonne ex eadem tua ratiocinatione sequitur, Jesum Christum in omnes homines plenum dominatum habere? Sine dubio; nec solum in omnes homines sed pr&#65533;ter ipsum unum Deum 1 Cor. xv. 27, prorsus in alia omnia, quemadmodum divina testimonia nos diserte docent." [337]

6. On account of this exaltation and authority Christ is properly called God, and is to be worshipped. Socinus would recognize no man as a Christian who was not a worshipper of Christ. The answer to Question 246 in the Racovian Catechism, declares those "qui Christum non invocant nec adorandum censent," to be no Christians, because in fact they have no Christ. [338]

7. Socinus acknowledges that men owe their salvation to Christ. He saves them not only in his character of prophet by teaching them the truth; not only in his character of priest by interceding for them; but especially in virtue of his kingly office. He exercises the divine and absolute power and authority granted to Him for their protection and assistance. He operates not only over them and for them, but also within them, so that it is through Him that immortality or eternal life is secured.

From all this it appears that Socinus and his early followers held much more exalted views of Christ than those who in Great Britain and America are called Socinians, by whom our Lord is regarded as an ordinary man. The term Unitarian, especially in this country, is used in a sense which includes all who deny the doctrine of the Trinity and retain the name of Christians. It therefore includes Arians, Semi-Arians, genuine Socinians, and Humanitarians.

Pre&#65533;xistence of Christ's Humanity.

Swedenborg.

This theory has been held in different forms. The doctrine of Swedenborg is so mystical that it is very difficult to be clearly understood, and it has been modified in a greater or less degree by his recognized disciples. Swedenborg was the son of a Swedish bishop. He was born in January, 1688, and died in March, 1772. He enjoyed every advantage of early education. He manifested extraordinary precocity, and made such attainments in every branch of learning as to gain the highest rank among the literati of that day. He wrote numerous works in all the departments of science before he turned his attention to matters of religion. Believing that the existing Church in all its forms had failed to arrive at the true sense of Scripture, he regarded himself as called by God, in an extraordinary or miraculous manner, to reveal the hidden meaning of the Word of God and found a new Church.

1. Concerning God, he taught that He was not only essence but form, and that that form was human. He called God "the eternal God-man." There are two kinds of bodies, material and spiritual. Every man, besides his external material body has another which is internal and spiritual. The latter has all the organs of the former, so that it can see, hear, and feel. At death the outer body is laid aside, and the soul thereafter acts through the ethereal or spiritual vestment. This is the only resurrection which Swedenborg admitted. There is no rising again of the bodies laid in the grave. As however the spiritual corresponds to the material, those who know each other in this world will enjoy mutual recognition in the world to come. This feature of his anthropology is connected with his doctrine concerning God. For as the soul from its nature forms for itself a body for action ad extra, so the essence of God forms for itself a spiritual body for external manifestation.

As there is but one divine essence, Swedenborg maintained that there can be but one divine person. The Church doctrine of the Trinity he regarded as Tritheistic. He admitted a Trinity of principles, but not of persons. As soul and body in man are one person, and from them proceeds the activity which operates without, so in God the divine and human are the Father and the Son, as one person, and the Holy Spirit is their efficiency or sanctifying influence.

2. Concerning man, Swedenborg taught that he was created in the image of God, and was a creature of a very exalted nature. The Scriptural account of the fall he understood allegorically of the apostasy of the Church. Men, however, he admits, are sinful, and are even born with a bias to evil, but they have not lost their ability to do good. They consequently need redemption. They are susceptible of being delivered from evil not only because they retain their moral liberty, but also because in virtue of the inward spiritual body they are capable of intercourse with spiritual beings. As man by means of his material body is conversant with the world of sense, so in virtue of his spiritual body he is capable of intercourse with the inhabitants of the spiritual world. Swedenborg reports many instances in which he conversed with God and angels, good and bad. By angels, however, he meant men who had departed this life. He did not admit the existence of any created intelligence other than man.

3. Christ he held to be Jehovah, the only living and true God, the creator, preserver, and ruler of the world. As this divine person was God and man from eternity, his incarnation, or manifestation in the flesh, consisted in his assuming a material body with its psychical life in the womb of the Virgin Mary. This was the body which grew, suffered, and died. In the case of ordinary men the material body is left forever in the grave, but in the case of Christ the outward body was gradually refined and glorified until it was lost in that which is spiritual and eternal. This idea of a twofold body in Christ is not by any means peculiar to Swedenborg. Barclay, the representative theologian of the Quakers, says: "As there was the outward visible body and temple of Jesus Christ, which took its origin from the Virgin Mary: there is also the spiritual body of Christ, by and through which He that was the Word in the beginning with God, and was and is God, did reveal Himself to the sons of men in all ages, and whereby men in all ages come to be made partakers of eternal life, and to have communion and fellowship with God and Christ." [339] And again, P. Poiret, of Amsterdam, teaches that "La Majest&#65533; divine voulut couvrir son corps glorieux de notre chair mortelle, qu'il voulut prendre dans le sein d'une Vierge." "Le corps de J&#65533;sus

Christ, se rev&#65533;tant de la chair et du sang de la bien heureuse Vierge, fera aussi peu un compos&#65533; de deux corps diff&#65533;rents, qu'un habit blanc et lumineux plong&#65533; dans un vase de couleur charg&#65533;e et obscure, ou il se charge de la mati&#65533;re, qui produit cette opacit&#65533;, ne devient pour cela un habit double ou deux habits, au lieu d'un." [340]

4. Christ's redemptive work does not consist in his bearing our sins upon the tree, or in making satisfaction to the justice of God for our offences. All idea of such satisfaction Swedenborg rejects. The work of salvation is entirely subjective. Justification is pardon granted on repentance. The people of God are made inwardly righteous, and being thus holy are admitted to the presence of God and holy spirits in heaven. His peculiar views of the state of the departed, or of Heaven and Hell, do not call for consideration in this place. [341]

Isaac Watts.

No one familiar with Dr. Watts' "Psalms and Hymns," can doubt his being a devout worshipper of our Lord Jesus Christ, or call in question his belief in the doctrine of the Trinity. Yet on account of his peculiar views on the person of Christ, there is a vague impression that he had in some way departed from the faith of the Church. It is, indeed, often said that he was Arian. In his works, [342] however, there is a dissertation on "The Christian Doctrine of the Trinity: or, Father, Son, and Spirit, three persons and one God, asserted and proved, with their divine Rights and Honors vindicated, by plain evidence of Scripture, without the aid or incumbrance of human Schemes. Written chiefly for the use of private Christians." In that dissertation the common Church doctrine is presented in the usual form, and sustained by the common arguments, with singular perspicuity and force.

His peculiar views on the person of Christ are brought out in three discourses on "The Glory of Christ as God-man," [343] published in 1746. In the first of these he refers to the "visible appearances of Christ, as God before his incarnation," and brings into view all the texts in which He is called Jehovah, God, and Lord, and those in which divine attributes and prerogatives are ascribed to Him.

In the second, he treats of the "extensive powers of the human nature of Christ in its present glorified state." In a previous essay he took the position that the "human soul of Christ is the first, the greatest, the wisest, the holiest, and the best of all created spirits." [344] He argues this point from all those passages of Scripture which speak of the exaltation of Christ and of the gift to Him of absolutely universal dominion. As the divine nature of Christ does not admit of exaltation or of receiving anything as a gift, he inferred that these passages must be understood of his human nature, and therefore that Christ as a man must be regarded as exalted over all created beings. To the objection, "How is it possible that a human spirit should be endued with powers of so vast an extent?" he answers, first, that the power in question is not infinite; and secondly, that if the doctrine of the infinite divisibility of matter be true, we cannot fix the minimum of smallness, and how then can we determine the maximum of greatness. "Why," he asks, "may not the human soul of Christ be as well appointed to govern the world, as the soul of man is appointed to govern his body, when it is evident the soul of man does not know one thousandth part of the fine branchings of the muscles and nerves, and the more refined vapour or animal spirits which are parts of this body?" [345] Thirdly, we can hardly set a limit even to our own capacity; and yet the "soul of Christ may be reasonably supposed in its own nature to

transcend the powers of all other souls as far as an angel exceeds an idiot, and yet be but a human soul still, for gradus non mutant speciem." [346] Fourthly, if the powers of the soul of Christ were not in his state of humiliation sufficient for the purposes of government and judgment, that does not prove that they are not now sufficient in his glorified estate. "Who knows what amazing enlargement may attend all the natural powers of man when advanced to a state of glory?" [347] Fifthly and mainly, this supreme exaltation of the power of the human soul of Christ is due to its union with the divine nature. It was because of this union that when the soul of Christ, while here on earth, willed to perform a miracle, the effect immediately followed. So "the man Christ may give forth all the commands of God whereby the world is governed." [348] "Upon this representation of things," he adds, "the various language of Scripture appears to be true, and is made very intelligible. Christ says He can do nothing of himself, He knew not the day of judgment' when He was here on earth, etc., and yet He is said to know the hearts of men, and to know all things'; for as fast as the divine mind united to Him was pleased to communicate all these ideas, so fast was his human nature capable of receiving them." [349]

The third discourse is devoted to proving the pre&#65533;xistence of the human soul of Christ. He argues from the fact that there are many expressions in the Bible, which seem to imply that He had a dependent nature before He came into this world. He is called the angel or messenger of God, and is represented as sent to execute his will. He urges also the fact that He is said to be the image of God. But the divine essence or nature cannot be the image of itself. That term can only apply to a created nature united to the divine, so that the "complex person" thus constituted, should reveal what God is. An argument is also drawn from all those passages in which Christ is said to have humbled Himself, to have become poor, to have made Himself of no reputation. All this cannot, he says, be properly understood of the divine nature, but is perfectly intelligible and full of meaning if referred to the human soul of our Lord. It was an act of unspeakable condescension for the highest intelligent creature to "empty Himself" and become as ignorant and feeble as an infant, and to submit not only to grow in wisdom, but to subject Himself to the infirmities and sufferings of our mortal state. If asked how so exalted an intellect can be reduced to the condition or state of an infant, he answers, that something analogous to this not unfrequently occurs, even in human experience. Men of mature age and of extensive learning have lost all their knowledge, and have been reduced to the necessity of learning it all over again, though in some cases it has returned suddenly. It was the same nature that emptied itself that was afterwards filled with glory as a recompense. Another argument for the pre&#65533;xistence of the soul of Christ, he says, may be drawn from the fact that his incarnation "is always expressed in some corporeal language, such as denotes his taking on Him animal nature, or body, or flesh, without the least mention of taking a soul.'" [350]

Again, [351] "The covenant betwixt God the Father and his Son Jesus Christ for the redemption of mankind, is represented in Scripture as being made and agreed upon from or before the foundation of the world. Is it not then most proper that both real parties should be actually present, and that this should not be transacted merely within the divine essence by such sort of distinct personalities as have no distinct mind and will? The essence of God is generally agreed by our Protestant divines to be the same single numerical essence in all three personalities, and therefore it can be but one conscious mind or spirit. Now can one single understanding and will make such a covenant as Scripture represents? I grant the

divine nature which is in Christ from eternity contrived and agreed all the parts of this covenant. But does it not add a lustre and glory, and more conspicuous equity, to this covenant, to suppose the man Christ Jesus who is most properly the mediator according to 1 Tim. ii. 5, to be also present before the world was made, to be chosen and appointed as the redeemer or reconciler of mankind, to be then ordained the head of his future people, to receive promises, grace, and blessings in their name, and to accept the solemn and weighty trust from the hand of his Father, that is, to take care of millions of souls?"

He also argues from what the Bible teaches of the Sonship of Christ. "When He is called a Son, a begotten Son, this seems to imply derivation and dependency; and perhaps the Sonship of Christ, and his being the only begotten of the Father, may be better explained by attributing it to his human soul, existing by some peculiar and immediate manner of creation, formation, or derivation from the Father, before other creatures were formed; especially if we include in the same idea of Sonship his union to the divine nature, and if we add also his exaltation to the office of the Messiah, as King and Lord of all." [352]

Dr. Watts explains clearly what he means by the pre-existence of the humanity of Christ, when he says: [353] "All the idea which I have of a human soul is this, namely, a created mind or spirit which hath understanding and will, and rational powers, and which is fit to be united to a human body, in such a manner as to exert the powers of a man, to feel the appetites and sensibilities and passions of a man, as to receive impressions or sensations, whether pleasant or painful, by the means of that body, and is also able to actuate and influence all the animal powers of that body in a way agreeable to human nature."

The above is very far from being a full exposition of the considerations urged by Dr. Watts in support of his theory. It is simply a selection of the more plausible of his arguments presented in order that his doctrine may be properly understood.

It appears that he believed in the eternal Godhead of the Logos as the second person of the Trinity; and that God, before any other creatures were called into existence, created a human soul in personal union with the Logos of such exalted powers as to render him the greatest of all created spirits; that the incarnation consisted in this complex person assuming a material human body with its animal life; that the humiliation of Christ consisted in his human soul thus exalted in its own nature, emptying itself of its knowledge, power, and glory, and submitting not only to the gradual development of his humanity, but also to all that made our Lord while here on earth a man of sorrows. His exaltation consisted in the enlargement of the powers of his soul during his state of humiliation, and in his resurrection and ascension to the right hand of God.

Objections.

The more obvious objections to this theory are, --

1. That it is contrary to the common faith of the Church, and, therefore, to the obvious sense of Scripture. The Bible in teaching that the Son of God became man, thereby teaches that He assumed a true body and a rational soul. For neither a soul without a body, nor a body without a soul, is a man in the Scriptural sense of the term. It was the Logos which became man; and not a God-man that assumed a material body.

2. The passages of Scripture cited in its support are interpreted, for the most part, in violation of the recognized principle that whatever is true of either nature in Christ, may be

predicated of his person. As Christ could say, "I thirst," without implying that his divine nature was subject to the wants of a material body; so He could say, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth," without teaching that such power vests in his humanity.

3. The doctrine that Christ's human soul was the first and most exalted of created spirits, raises Him beyond the reach of human sympathies. He is, as man, farther from us than the angel Gabriel. We need, and the Bible reveals to us a, so to speak, more circumscribed Saviour, one who, although true God, is nevertheless a man like unto his brethren, whom we can embrace in the arms of our faith and love. [354]

[333] Christian□ Religionis brevissima Institutio per Interrogationes et Responsiones, quam Cathechismum vulgo vocant. Scripta a Fausto Socino Senensi. Irenopoli, Post annum 1656. It makes a part of the first volume of the works of Faustus Socinus, as published in the Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, pp. 651-676.

[334] On this point, Socinus, in the Brevissima Institutio, says, "De Christi essentia ita statuo illum esse hominem Rom. v. 15, in Virginis utero et sic sine viri ope, divini Spiritus vi conceptum ac formatum, Matt. i. 20-23; Luc. i. 35, indeque genitum, primum quidem patibilem ac mortalem 2 Cor. xiii. 4 donec scilicet munus sibi a Deo demandatum hic in terris obivit; deinde vero postquam in coelum ascendit, impatibilem et immortalem tactum Rom. vi. 9." Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Fausti Socini Opera, vol. i. p. 654.

[335] Bibliotheca Fratrum Polonorum, Fausti Socini Opera, vol. i. p. 674.

[336] Ibid. vol. i. p. 656.

[337] Ibid.

[338] In answer to this question, "Numquid human□ natur□ in Christo exaltationem recta percipere non prorsus necessariam esse statuis?" the Brevissima Institutio answers (Ibid. p. 655). "Eatenus rectam cognitionem istam prorsus necessariam esse statuo, quatenus quis sine illa non esset Christo Jesu divinum cultum exhibiturus, ob eam causam, quam antes dixi: nimirum, quod Deus ut id a nobis fiat, omnino requirit." Socinus also says that they are not Christians who deny that Christ understands our thoughts when we pray. Ibid, 656.

[339] An Apology for the True Christian Divinity. Prop. XIII. 2; edit. Philadelphia, 1805, p. 463.

[340] OEconomie du R□tablissement apr□s l'Incarnation de J□sus Christ, chap. ii. §§ 11, 12. Quoted by Dorner, Person of Christ, div. II. vol. ii., p. 328.

[341] Swedenborg's doctrines are most clearly and concisely presented in his book, Vera Christiana Religio. Amsterdam, 1771. It has been frequently translated. An English version was published in Boston in 1833, in one volume, 8 vo. pp. 576. As an illustration of the way in which Swedenborg speaks of his intercourse with the spirit-world, a few sentences may be quoted from the thirtieth page of the work just mentioned. He says that when he was astonished at the multitude of persons who merged God into nature, an angel stood at his side and said, "What are you meditating about?' and I replied, About the multitude of such persons as believe that nature is of itself, and thus the creator of the universe.' And the angel said to me, All hell is of such, and they are called there satans and devils: satans, who have confirmed themselves in favour of nature, and thence have denied God; devils, who have lived wickedly, and thus have rejected from their hearts all

acknowledgement of God.'"

[342] Watts' Works, edit. London, 1753, vol. vi. pp. 413-492.

[343] Watts, Works, ut supra, vol. vi. pp. 721-855.

[344] Ibid. p. 706.

[345] Ibid. p. 786.

[346] Ibid. p. 787.

[347] Ibid. p. 789.

[348] Watts, Works, ut supra, vol. vi. p. 795.

[349] Ibid. p. 796.

[350] Watts, Works, vol. vi. p. 820.

[351] Ibid. p. 819.

[352] Ibid. p. 825.

[353] Ibid. p. 844.

[354] Dr. Watts, vol. vi. pp. 853, 854, refers to several distinguished writers and theologians as agreeing with him as to his doctrine of the pre-existence of the soul of Christ. Among them are Dr. Henry More, Mystery of Godliness; Dr. Edward Fowler, Bishop of Gloucester, in his Discourse of the descent of the man Christ Jesus from Heaven; Dr. Francis Gastrell, Bishop of Chester, in his Remarks on Dr. Clarke's Scripture Doctrine of the Trinity; Dr. Thomas Burnet, of the Charter House, in his book, De Statu Mortuorum et Resurgentium.

§ 9. Modern Forms of the Doctrine.

Dorner, in the first edition of his work on the "Person of Christ," says that the Lutheran theology carried the attempt to preserve the unity of Christ's person, on the Church assumption that He possessed two distinct natures, to the utmost extreme. If that attempt be a failure, nothing more remains. He holds it to be a failure not only because it involves the impossible assumption of a transfer of attributes without a change of substance, but also because it is one-sided. It refuses to admit of the communication of human attributes to the divine nature, whilst it insists on the transfer of divine perfections to the human nature. And moreover, he urges, that admitting all the Lutheran theory claims, the union of the two natures remains just as unreal as it is on the Church doctrine. Any distinction of natures, in the ordinary sense of the words, must, he says, be given up. It is on this assumption that the modern views of the person of Christ are founded. These views may be divided into two classes, the Pantheistical and the Theistical. These two classes, however, have a good deal in common. Both are founded on the principle of the oneness of God and man. This is admitted on all sides. "The characteristic feature of all recent Christologies," says Dorner, "is the endeavour to point out the essential unity of the divine and human." [355] The heading of the section in which this admission occurs, is, "The Foundations of the New Christology laid by Schelling, Hegel, Schleiermacher." This is equivalent to saying that the New Christology is founded on the principles of the pantheistic philosophy. Baur [356] says the same thing. He entitles the last division of his work on the Trinity, "Die gegenseitige Durchdringung der Philosophie und der Theologie," i.e., The mutual

interpenetration of Philosophy and Theology. The latter is merged into the former. Dr. Ullmann says, the doctrine of the oneness of God and man, which he represents as the fundamental idea of Schleiermacher's theology and of Christianity itself, is not entirely new. It was inculcated by the German Mystics of the Middle Ages. [357] Hegel says that what the Bible teaches of Christ is not true of an individual, but only of mankind as a whole; and Hegel's Christological ideas, Dr. John Nevin of Mercersburg, says, "are very significant and full of instruction." [358] The objection that these principles are pantheistical, he pronounces "a mere sound without any force whatever," and adds that we need a Christian pantheism to oppose the antichristian pantheism of the day. Schleiermacher says that a pantheism which holds to the formula "One and All" ("the all-one-doctrine") is perfectly consistent with religion, and differs little in its effects from Monotheism! Similar avowals might be adduced without number. Theologians of this class deny that God and man are essentially different. They repeat, almost with every breath, that God and man are one, and they make this the fundamental idea of Christianity, and especially of Christology

Pantheistical Christology.

As Christian theology purports to be an exhibition of the theology of the Bible, every theory which involves the denial of a personal God, properly lies beyond its sphere. In modern systems, however, there is such a blending of pantheistic principles with theistic doctrines, that the two cannot be kept entirely separate. Pantheistical and theistical theologians, of the modern school, unite in asserting "the oneness of God and man." They understand that doctrine, however, in different senses. With the former it is understood to mean identity, so that man is only the highest existence-form of God; with the others, it often means nothing more than that "natura humana capax est natur&#65533; divin&#65533;." The human is capable of receiving the attributes of the divine. Man may become God.

It follows, in the first place, from the doctrine, that God is the only real Being of which the world is the ever changing phenomenon, that "die Menschwerdung Gottes ist eine Menschwerdung von Ewigkeit." The incarnation of God is from eternity. And, in the second place, that this process is continuous, complete in no one instance, but only in the whole. Every man is a form of the life of God, but the infinite is never fully realized or revealed in any one manifestation. Some of these philosophers were willing to say that God was more fully manifested in Christ than in any other individual of our race, but the difference between Him and other men is only one of degree. Others say that the peculiar distinction of Christ was that He had a clearer view and a deeper conviction of the identity of God and man than any other man. It all amounts to the summation of the doctrine as given by Strauss. [359] "If," says he, "the idea of the oneness of the divine and human natures, of God and man, be a reality, does it follow that this reality is effected or manifested once for all in a single individual, as never before and never after him? . . . . An idea is never exhibited in all its fulness in a single exemplar; and in all others only imperfectly. An idea is always realized in a variety and multiplicity of exemplars, which complement each other; its richness being diffused by the constant change of individuals, one succeeding or supplanting another. . . . . Mankind, the human race, is the God-man. The key to a true Christology is that the predicates which the Church applies to Christ, as an individual, belong to an idea, or to a generic whole." So Blasche [360] says, "We understand by God's becoming man, not the revelation of Himself in one or more of the most perfect of men, but

the manifestation of Himself in the race of men (in der ganzen Menschheit)."

Theistical Christology.

We have the authority of Dorner for saying that the modern speculations on Christology are founded on the two principles that there is but one nature in Christ, and that human nature is capax natur[illegible] divin[illegible], is capable of being made divine. To this must be added a third, although Dorner himself does not hold it, that the divine is capable of becoming human.

The advocates of these principles agree, First, in admitting that there was a true growth of the man Christ Jesus. When an infant He was as feeble, as ignorant, and as unconscious of moral character as other infants. When a child He had no more intellectual or physical strength than other children. There is, however, a difference in their mode of statement as to what Christ was during the maturity of his earthly life. According to some, He had no superhuman knowledge or power. All He knew was communicated to Him, some say by the Father, others say by the Logos. The miracles which He wrought were not by his own power, but by the power of God. At the grave of Lazarus He prayed for power to restore his friend to life, or rather that God would raise him from the dead; and He gave thanks that his prayer was heard.

Secondly, they agree that the development of the humanity of our Lord was without sin. He was from the beginning holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. Nevertheless He had to contend with all the infirmities of our nature, and to resist all the temptations arising from the flesh, the world, and the devil, with which his people have to contend. He was liable to sin. As He was subject to hunger, thirst, weariness, and pain, as He had feelings capable of being wounded by ingratitude and insult, He was liable to the impatience and resentment which suffering or injury is adapted to produce. As He was susceptible of pleasure from the love and admiration of others, He was exposed to the temptation of seeking the honour which comes from men. In all things, however, He was without sin.

Thirdly, they agree that it was only gradually that Christ came to the knowledge that He was a divine person, and into the possession and use of divine attributes. Communications of knowledge and power were made to Him from time to time from on high, so that both the knowledge of what He was and the consciousness of the possession of divine perfections came to Him by degrees. Christ's exaltation, therefore, began and was carried on while He was here on earth, but it was not until his resurrection and ascension that He became truly and forever divine.

Fourthly, since his ascension and session at the right hand of God, He is still a man, and only a man. Nevertheless He is an infinite man. A man with all the characteristics of a human soul possessed of all the perfections of the Godhead. Since his ascension, as Gess expresses it, a man has been taken into the adorable Trinity. "As the glorified Son remains man, a man is thus received into the trinitarian life of the Deity from and by the glorification of the Son." [361] Thomasius says the same thing. "Die immanente Lebensbewegung der drei Personen ist nunmehr gewissermassen eine g[illegible]ttlich-menschhiche geworden; . . . . So tief ist in der Person Christi die Menschheit in den Kreis der Trinit[illegible]t hereingenommen -- und zwar nicht auf vor[illegible]bergehende Weise, sondern f[illegible]r immer. Denn der Sohn bleibt ewig Mensch." [362] That is: The immanent life movement of the three persons has now become

in a measure divine-human; . . . . so deep has humanity in the person of Christ been taken into the sphere of the Trinity, -- and that not in a temporary manner, but forever. For the Son remains man eternally. On the following page he says that humanity, or manhood (Menschsein), has become the permanent existence-form of God the Son. And again [363] he says that humanity (das menschliche Geschlecht) is "exalted to full equality with God" (schlecht Gott selbst gleichgesetzt). This would be absolutely impossible were not human nature in its original constitution capable of receiving all divine perfections and of becoming absolutely divine. Accordingly, in this connection, Thomasius says that man is of all creatures the nearest to God. [364] "He must from his nature be capable of full participation in the divine glory; he must be the organ into which the entire fulness of the divine love can be poured, and through which it can adequately act, otherwise we cannot understand how God could appropriate human nature as his own permanent form of existence."

The result of the incarnation, therefore, is that God becomes man in such a sense that the Son of God has no life or activity, no knowledge, presence, or power outside of or apart from his humanity. In Christ there is but one life, one activity, one consciousness. Every act of the incarnate Logos is a human act, and every experience of the humanity of Christ, all his sorrows, infirmities, and pains, were the experience of the Logos. "The absolute life, which is the being of God, exists in the narrow limits of an earthly-human life; absolute holiness and truth, the essential attributes of God, develop themselves in the form of human thinking and willing; absolute love has assumed a human form, it lives as human feeling, as human sensibility in the heart of this man; absolute freedom has the form of human self-determination. The Son of God has not reserved for Himself a special existence form (ein besonderes F�rsichseyn), a special consciousness, a special sphere or power of action; He does not exist anywhere outside of the flesh (nec Verbum extra carnem nec caro extra Verbum). He has in the totality of his being become man, his existence-and-life-form is that of a corporeal-spiritual man subject to the limitations of time and space. The other side of this relation is that the human nature is taken up entirely into the divine, and is pervaded by it. It has neither a special human consciousness nor a special human activity of the will for itself in distinction from that of the Logos, just as the latter has nothing which does not belong to the former; in the human thinking, willing, and acting, the Logos thinks, wills, and acts. All dualism of a divine and human existence-form, of a divine and human consciousness, of a concomitancy of divine and human action, is of necessity excluded; as is also any successive communication (Hineinbildung) of one to the other; it is an identical living, activity, sensibility, and development, because it is one Ego, one divine human personality (unio, communio, communicatio, naturarum)." [365]

As to the manner in which this complete identification of the human and divine in the person of Christ is effected, there are, as above intimated, two opinions. According to Dorner there is a human soul to begin with, to which the Eternal Logos, without subjecting Himself to any change, from time to time communicates his divinity, as the human becomes more and more capable of receiving the perfections of God, until at last it becomes completely divine. With this Dorner connected a philosophical theory concerning the relation of Christ to the universe, and especially to the whole spiritual world. [366]

The other view of the subject is, that the Eternal Logos, by a process of self-limitation,

divested Himself of all his divine attributes. He ceased to be omnipresent, omniscient, and omnipotent. He reduced Himself, so to speak, to the dimensions of a man. While an infant, as before said, He had no knowledge or power which does not belong to any other human infant. He went through the regular process of growth and development, and had all the experiences of ordinary men, yet without sin. But as the substance of the Logos was the substance of the infant born of the Virgin, it continued to develop not only until it reached a height of excellence and glory to which no other man ever attained, but until it ultimately culminated in full equality with God.

On this point Thomasius says, First, that if the Eternal Son, after the assumption of humanity, retained his divine perfections and prerogatives, He did not become man, nor did He unite Himself with humanity. He hovered over it; and included it as a larger circle does a smaller. But there was no real contact or communication. Secondly, if at the moment of the incarnation the divine nature in the fulness of its being and perfection was communicated to the humanity, then Christ could not have had a human existence. The historical life is gone; and all bond of relationship and sympathy with us is destroyed. Thirdly, the only way in which the great end in view could be answered was that God Himself by a process of depotentiation, or self-limitation, should become man; that He should take upon Himself a form of existence subject to the limitations of time and space, and pass through the ordinary and regular process of human development, and take part in all the sinless experiences of a human life and death. [367]

Ebrard.

Ebrard puts the doctrine in a somewhat different form. He molds that the Logos reduced Himself to the dimensions of a man; but at the same time retained and exercised his divine perfections as the second person of the Trinity. In answer to the question, How human and divine attributes can be united in the same person, he says the solution of the difficulty is to be found in the original constitution and destiny of humanity. Man was designed for this supreme dominion, perfect holiness, and boundless knowledge. "The glorification of God as Son in time is identical with the acme of the normal development of man." It is held by many, not by all of the advocates of this theory, that the incarnation would have taken place had men never sinned. It entered into the divine purpose in reference to man that he should thus attain oneness with Himself.

As to the still more difficult question, How can the Son as the second person of the Trinity retain his divine perfections (as Ebrard holds that He does), and yet, as revealed on earth, lay them aside? "The one is world-ruling and omniscient, and the other is not," he says we must understand the problem. It is not that two natures become one nature. "Two natures as two things (St�cken) are out of the question." The Logos is not one nature, and the incarnate Son of God, Jesus, another; but the incarnate Son possesses the properties of both natures. The question only is, How can the incarnate Logos, since He has not the one nature, the divine, in the form of God (in der Ewigkeitsform), be one with the world-governing Logos who is in the form of God? This question, which is equivalent to asking, How the same individual mind can be finite and infinite at the same time, he answers by saying, first, that the continuity of existence does not depend upon continuity of consciousness. A man in a swoon or in a state of magnetic sleep, is the same person, although his consciousness be suspended or abnormal. That is true, but the question is, How

the same mind can be conscious and unconscious at the same time, How th same individual Logos can be a feeble infant and at the same time the intelligently active world-governing God. Secondly, he admits that the above answer does not fully meet the case, and therefore adds that the whole difficulty disappears when we remember (dass die Ewigkeit nicht eine der Zeit parallellaufende Linie ist), that Eternity and Time are not parallel lines. But, thirdly, seeing that this is not enough, he says that the Eternal Logos overlooks his human form of existence with one glance (mit einem Schlage), whereas the incarnate Logos does not, but with true human consciousness, looks forward and backward. All this avails nothing. The contradiction remains. The theory assumes that the same individual mind can be conscious and unconscious, finite and infinite, ignorant and omniscient, at the same time. [368]

Gess.

Gess admits the contradiction involved in the doctrine as presented by Ebrard, and therefore adopts the common form of the theory. He holds that the Eternal Son at the incarnation laid aside the Godhead and became a man. The substance of the Logos remained; but that substance was in the form of an infant, and had nothing beyond an infant's knowledge or power. In the Trinity, the Father is God of Himself; the Son is God by the communication of the divine life from the Father. During the earthly career of the Logos the communication of the divine life was suspended. The Logos reduced to the limitations of manhood, received from the Father such communications of supernatural power as He needed. When He ascended and sat down at the right hand of God, He received the divine life in all its fulness as He had possessed it before He came into the world. "The same substance," he says, "slumbered in the womb of the Virgin, without self-consciousness, which thirty-four years after yielded itself a sacrifice, without blemish and spot, to the Father, having previously revealed to mankind the truth, which it had perfectly comprehended. At the time of this slumber there already existed in this substance that indestructible life by virtue of which it had a accomplished our redemption (Heb. vii. 16), as well as the power to know the Father as no other knows Him (Matt. xi. 27), but it was unconscious life. Moreover, the same substance which now slumbered in unconsciousness, had before existed with the Father as the Logos, by whom the Father had created, governed, and preserved the world, but it was no longer aware of this." [369] On the opposite page, it is said, that it is the self-conscious will of a man that calls all his powers into action. "When this sinks into slumber, all the powers of the soul fall asleep. It was the substance of the Logos which in itself had the power to call the world into existence, to uphold and enlighten it; but when the Logos sank into the slumber of unconsciousness, his eternal holiness, his omniscience, his omnipresence, and all his really divine attributes were gone; it being the self-conscious will of the Logos through which all the divine powers abiding in Him had been called into action. They were gone, i.e., suspended, -- existing still, but only potentially. Further, a man when he awakes from sleep is at once in full possession of all his powers and faculties; but when consciousness burst upon Jesus it was not that of the eternal Logos, but a really human self-consciousness, which develops by degrees and preserves its identity only through constant changes. . . . . It was this human form of self-conscious existence which the Logos chose in his act of self-divestiture. Hence it plainly appears that omniscience, which sees and knows all things at once, and from one central point, and the unchangeable merging of the will into the Father's, or divine holiness, are not

to be attributed to Jesus while on earth; and the same with the unchangeable bliss of the divine life. Nor was it only eternal self-consciousness which the Son laid aside, but He also went out from the Father.' We are not to understand that the indwelling of the Father, Son, and Spirit in each other had been dissolved, but that the Father's giving the Son to have life in Himself, as the Father has, was suspended. Having laid aside his self-consciousness and activity, He lost with this the capacity of receiving into Himself the stream of life from the Father, and sending it forth again; in other words, He was no longer omnipotent. Equally lost, or laid aside, was his omnipresence, which must not, at all events, be considered as universally diffused, but as dependent on the self-conscious will." [370]

Remarks.

1. The first remark to be made on this theory in all its forms is that it is a departure from the faith of the Church. This objection turns up first on every occasion, because that is its proper place. If the Bible be the only infallible rule of faith and practice; and if the Bible be a plain book, and if the Spirit guides the people of God (not the external church, or body of mere professing Christians) into the knowledge of the truth, then the presumption is invincible that what all true Christians believe to be the sense of Scripture is its sense. The whole Christian world has believed, and still does believe, that Christ was a true man; that He had a real body and a human soul. The Council of Chalcedon in formulating this article of the common faith, declared that Christ was, and is, God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever; that according to the one nature He is consubstantial (homoousios) within us, and according to the other He is consubstantial with the Father. There is no dispute as to the sense in which the Council used the word nature, because it has an established meaning in theology, and because it is explained by the use of the Latin word consubstantial, and the Greek word homoousios. Nor is it questioned that the decisions of that Council have been accepted by the whole Church. This doctrine of two natures in Christ the new theory rejects. This, as we have seen, Dorner expressly asserts. We have seen, also, that Ebrard says, that the idea of two natures in the sense of two substances (Stcke, concrete existences) is out of the question. The Logos did not assume human nature, but human attributes; He appeared in the fashion of a man. Gess, in his luminous book, teaches over and over, that it was the substance of the Logos that was the human soul of Christ. He speaks of his "Logos-nature;" of the "Logos being the life, or life-principle" of his humanity. He says, in so many words, [371] that the soul of Jesus was "not like that of other men, a soul created by God and for God, but the Logos in the form of human existence." It is consonant, he says, "to the nature of Christ's soul, as being the Logos existing in human form, that God should take possession of it in a peculiar manner." This idea is the very essence of the doctrine. For if the Logos "emptied" Himself, if He laid aside his omnipresence and omnipotence, and became a human soul, what need or what possibility remains of another newly created soul?

This is not Apollinarianism; for Apollinaris taught that the Logos supplied the place of a rational soul in the person of Christ. He did not become such a soul, but, retaining in actu as well as in potentia, the fulness of the divine perfections, took its place. Nor is it exactly Eutychianism. For Eutyches said that there were two natures before the union, and only one after it. The two were so united as to become one. This the theory before us denies, and affirms that from the beginning the Logos was the sole rational element in the constitution of

the person of our Lord. It agrees, however, with both these ancient and Church-rejected errors in their essential principles. It agrees with the Apollinarians in saying that the Logos was the rational element in Christ; and it agrees with the Eutychians in saying that Christ had but one nature.

The doctrine is in still more obvious contradiction to the decisions of the Council of Constantinople on the Monothelite controversy. That Council decided that as there were two natures in Christ, there were of necessity two wills. The new theory in asserting the oneness of Christ's nature, denies that He had two wills. The acts, emotions, and sufferings of his earthly life, were the acts, emotions, and sufferings of the Logos. So far as Christian interest in the doctrine is concerned, it was to get at this conclusion the theory was adopted if not devised. It was to explain how that more than human value belongs to the sufferings of Christ, and more than human efficacy to his life, that so many Christian men were led to embrace the new doctrine. The Church doctrine. however, does not consider either the sufferings or the life of Christ as those of a mere man. He was a divine person, God manifest in the flesh; and his sufferings and life were those of that person. Christians can say, and always have said, with an intelligent and cordial faith, that God purchased the Church with his blood. It was because the person who died was possessed of an Eternal Spirit that his blood cleanses from all sin.

2. The arguments from Scripture in support of the theory are for the most part founded on the neglect of the principle so often referred to, that anything can be predicated of the person of Christ that can be predicated either of his human or of his divine nature. That the one person is said to be born and to suffer and die, no more proves that the Logos as such was born and suffered and died, than saying of a man that he is sick or wounded proves that his soul is diseased or injured. The same remark, of course, applies to the exaltation and dominion of the risen Redeemer. It is the one person who is the object of the worship of all created intelligences, and to whom their obedience is due; but this does not prove that Christ's human nature is possessed of divine attributes. Indeed, according to the modern doctrine of Kenosis, He has no human nature, as already proved.

3. The theory in question is inconsistent with the clear doctrine both of revealed and natural religion concerning the nature of God. He is a Spirit infinite, eternal, and immutable. Any theory, therefore, which assumes that God lays aside his omnipotence, omniscience, and omnipresence, and becomes as feeble, ignorant, and circumscribed as an infant, contradicts the first principle of all religion, and, if it be pardonable to say so, shocks the common sense of men.

4. Instead of removing any difficulties attending the doctrine of the incarnation, it greatly increases them. According to Dorner's view we are called upon to believe that a human soul receives gradually increasing measures of the divine fulness, until at last it becomes infinite. This is equivalent to saying that it ceases to exist. It is only on the assumption that Dorner, when he says that the essential nature of God is love, and that the communication of the Godhead is the communication of the fulness of the divine love, means that God is purely ethical, an attribute, but not a substance, that we can attach any definite meaning to his doctrine. According to Ebrard we are required to believe that the one divine and infinite substance of the Logos was finite and infinite; conscious and unconscious; omnipresent, and confined within narrow limits in space; and that it was

active in the exercise of omnipotence, and as feeble as an infant at one and the same time. According to the more common view of the subject, we are called upon to believe that the infinite God, in the person of his Son, can become ignorant and feeble, and then omniscient and almighty; that He can cease to be God, and then again become God. Gess says that God is not omnipotent unless He has power over Himself, power, that is, to cease to be God. If this be true of the Son it must be true of the Father and of the Spirit; that is, it must be true that the Triune Jehovah can annihilate Himself. And, then, what follows?

5. This doctrine destroys the humanity of Christ. He is not and never was a man. He never had a human soul or a human heart. It was the substance of the Logos invested with a human body that was born of the Virgin, and not a human soul. A being without a human soul is not a man. The Saviour which this theory offers us is the Infinite God with a spiritual body. In thus exalting the humanity of Christ to infinitude it is dissipated and lost.

Schleiermacher.

The prevalent Christology among a numerous and distinguished class of modern theologians, though not professedly pantheistic, is nevertheless founded on the assumption of the essential oneness of God and man. This class includes the school of Schleiermacher in all its modifications not only in Germany, but also in England and America. Schleiermacher is regarded as the most interesting as well as the most influential theologian of modern times. He was not and could not be self-consistent, as he attempted the reconciliation of contradictory doctrines. There are three things in his antecedents and circumstances necessary to be considered, in order to any just appreciation of the man or of his system. First, he passed the early part of his life among the Moravians, and imbibed something of their spirit, and especially of their reverence for Christ, who to the Moravians is almost the exclusive object of worship. This reverence for Christ, Schleiermacher retained all his life. In one of the discourses pronounced on the occasion of his death, it was said, "He gave up everything that he might save Christ." His philosophy, his historical criticism, everything, he was willing to make bend to the great aim of preserving to himself that cherished object of reverence and love. [372] Secondly, his academic culture led him to adopt a philosophical system whose principles and tendencies were decidedly pantheistic. And, thirdly, he succumbed to the attacks which rationalistic criticism had made against faith in the Bible. He could not receive it as a supernatural revelation from God. He did not regard it as containing doctrines which we are bound to believe on the authority of the sacred writers. Deprived, therefore, of the historical Christ, or at least deprived of the ordinary historical basis for faith in Christ, he determined to construct a Christology and a whole system of Christian theology from within; to weave it out of the materials furnished by his own religious consciousness. He said to the Rationalists that they might expunge what they pleased from the evangelical records; they might demolish the whole edifice of Church theology, he had a Christ and a Christianity in his own bosom. In the prosecution of the novel and difficult task of constructing a system of Christian theology out of the facts of Christian experience, he designed to secure for it a position unassailable by philosophy. Philosophy being a matter of knowledge, and religion a matter of feeling, the two belonged to distinct spheres, and therefore there need be no collision between them.

Schleiermacher's Christology.

He assumed, (1.) That religion in general, and Christianity in particular, was not a

doctrine or system of doctrine; not a cultus, or a discipline; but a life, an inward spiritual power or force. (2.) That the true Christian is conscious of being the recipient of this new life. (3.) That he knows that it did not originate in himself, nor in the Church to which he belongs, because humanity neither in the individual nor in any of its organizations is capable of producing what is specifically new and higher and better than itself. (4.) This necessitates the assumption of a source, or author of this life, outside of the race of ordinary men or of humanity in its regular development. (5.) Hence he assumed the actual historical existence of a new, sinless, and absolutely perfect man by a new creative act. (6.) That man was Christ, from whom every Christian is conscious that he derives the new life of which he is the subject. (7.) Christ is the Urbild, or Ideal Man, in whom the idea of humanity is fully realized. (8.) He is nevertheless divine, or God in fashion as a man, because man is the modus existendi of God on the earth. In ordinary men, even in Adam, God, so to speak, was and is imperfectly developed. The God-consciousness, or God within, is overborne by our world-consciousness, or our consciousness as determined by things seen and temporal. (9.) In Christ this was not the case. In Him, without struggle or opposition, the God-consciousness, or God within, controlled his whole inward and outward life. (10.) Christ's preminence over other men consisted in his absolute sinlessness and freedom from error. Of Him it is to be said, not simply potest non peccare, but non potest peccare. He could not be tempted for temptation supposes the possibility of sin, and the possibility of sin supposes less than perfection. (11.) The redeeming work and worth of Christ consists not in what He taught or in what He did, but in what He was. What He taught and what He did may be explained in different ways, or even explained away, but what He was, remains, and is the one all important fact. (12.) As He was thus perfect, thus the ideal and miraculously produced man, He is the source of life to others. He awakens the dormant God-consciousness in men, and gives it ascendency over the sensibility, or sensuous element of our nature, so that believers come to be, in the same sense, although ever in a less degree, what Christ was, God manifest in the flesh. This being the work of Christ, and this redeeming process being due to what He was, his resurrection, ascension, session at the right hand of God, etc., etc., may all be dispensed with. They may be admitted on historical grounds, good men having testified to them as facts, but they have no religious import or power. (13.) The new life of which Christ is the author, which in this country is commonly denominated "his human divine life," is the animating and constituting principle of the Church, and it is by union with the Church that this life passes over to individual believers.

Objections to this Theory.

This is a meagre outline of Schleiermacher's Christology. His doctrine concerning Christ is so implicated with his peculiar views on anthropology, on theology, and on the relation of God to the world, that it can neither be fully presented nor properly appreciated except as an integral part of his whole system.

Gladly as Schleiermacher's theory was embraced as a refuge by those who had been constrained to give up Christianity as a doctrine, and great as have been its popularity and influence, it was assailed from very different quarters and judged from many different standpoints. Here it can only be viewed from the position of Christian theology. It should be remembered that as the idealist does not feel and act according to his theory, so the inward

life of a theologian may not be determined by his speculative doctrines. This does not render error less objectionable or less dangerous. It is nevertheless a fact, and enables us to condemn a system without wounding our charity for its author. Schleiermacher, however, was an exceptional case. As a general rule, a man's faith is the expression of his inward life.

1. The first objection to Schleiermacher's theory is that it is not and does not pretend to be Biblical. It is not founded upon the objective teachings of the Word of God. It assumes, indeed, that the religious experience of the Apostles and early Christians was substantially the same, and therefore involved the same truths, as the experience of Christians of the present day. Schleiermacher even admits that their experience was so pure and distinctly marked as to have the authority of a standard by which other believers are to judge of their own. But he denies that the interpretation which they gave of their experience has normal authority for us, that is, he says that we are not bound to believe what the Apostles believed. His appeals to the Scriptures in support of his peculiar doctrines are extremely rare, and merely incidental. He professes to build up a system independent of the Bible, founded on what Christians now find in the contents of their own consciousness.

2. The system is not what it purports to be. Schleiermacher professed to discard speculation from the province of religion. He undertook to construct a theory of Christianity with which philosophy should have nothing to do, and therefore one against which it could have no right to object. In point of fact his system is a matter of speculation from beginning to end. It could never have existed except as the product of a mind imbued with the principles of German philosophy. It has no coherence, no force, and indeed no meaning, unless you take for granted the correctness of his views of the nature of God, of the nature of man, and of the relation of God to the world. This objection was urged against his system by all parties in Germany. The supernaturalists, who believed in the Bible, charged him with substituting the conclusions of his own philosophy for the dictates of Christian consciousness. And the philosophers said he was true neither to his philosophy nor to his religion. He changed from one ground to the other just as it suited his purpose. On this subject Strauss [373] says that Schleiermacher first betrayed philosophy to theology, and then theology to philosophy; and that this half-and-halfness is characteristic of his whole position. Although this was said in a spirit of unkindness, it is nevertheless true. His speculative opinions, i.e., the conclusions at which he arrives by the way of speculation, are the basis of his whole system; and therefore those who adopt it receive it on this authority of reason, and not on that of revelation. It is a philosophical theory and nothing more. This will become apparent as we proceed.

Founded on Pantheistic Principles.

3. A third objection is that the system is essentially pantheistic. This is, indeed, an ambiguous term. It is here used, however, in its ordinary and proper sense. It is not meant that Schleiermacher held that the universe is God, or God the universe, but that he denied any proper dualism between God and the world, and between God and man. He held such views of God as were inconsistent with Theism in the true and accepted meaning of the word. That is, he did not admit the existence of a personal, extramundane God. This is a charge brought against his system from the beginning, even by avowed pantheists themselves. They say that while denying the existence of a personal God he nevertheless

teaches doctrines inconsistent with that denial, i.e., with what they regard as the true view of the relation of the infinite to the finite. Theists brought the same objection. Dr. Braniss [374] says, "Die Annahme eines pers﷿nlichen Gottes ist in diesem System unm﷿glich," i.e., "The admission of a personal God is, in this system, impossible." [375] This he proves, among other ways, by a reference to what Schleiermacher teaches of the attributes of God, which with him are not predicates of a subject; they tell us nothing as to what God is, they are only forms or states of our own consciousness, as determined by our relation to the system of things in their causal relation. Strauss, from another standpoint, says that Schleiermacher could never reconcile himself to the acknowledgment of a personal, extra-mundane God. Christ was the only God he had; and this, alas! was little more than an ideal God; one who had been; but whether He still is, he leaves undetermined, at least theoretically. Baur presents the inconsistency of Schleiermacher in different points of view. In one place he says that he swung to and fro between the idealism of Kant and Fichte, and the pantheism of Spinoza and Schelling, which he regarded only as the different poles of the same system (derselben Weltanschauung). [376] Again he says that the essential element of Schleiermacher's doctrine of God is the same immanence of God in the world that Spinoza taught. [377] He endorses the criticism of Strauss, that all the main positions of the first part of Schleiermacher's Glaubenslehre are intelligible only when translated into the formulas of Spinoza, whence they were derived; and adds that he made no greater difference between God and the world than Spinoza made between the natura naturans and the natura naturata. [378] A Schleiermacher wrote at the time when the dispute between the Rationalists and Supernaturalists was at its height. The one referred all events to natural causes; the other contended for the possibility of miracles and of a supernatural revelation. Both parties being Theists, the Rationalists had no ground to stand on. For if the existence of an extramundane, personal God, the creator of the world, be admitted, it is utterly unreasonable to deny that He may intervene with his immediate agency in the sequence of events. Schleiermacher cut the knot by denying the difference between the natural and supernatural. There is really no extramundane God, no other sphere of divine activity than the world, and no other law of his action than necessity. [379]

Involves the Rejection of the Doctrine of the Trinity.

4. Schleiermacher's system ignores the doctrine of the Trinity. With him God in the world, is the Father; God in Christ, the Son; God in the Church, the Spirit. All personal pre﷿xistence of Christ is thus necessarily excluded. The Scriptures and the Church teach that the eternal Son of God, who was with the Father from eternity; who made the worlds; who could say, "Before Abraham was I am," became man, being born of a woman, yet without sin. This Schleiermacher denies. There was no Son of God, before the birth of Christ in Bethlehem. Then only, Christ began to be as a distinct person; He had no pre﷿xistence beyond that which is common to all men.

5. This system makes Christ a mere man. He is constantly represented as the Ideal man, Urbild, a perfect man. In Him the idea of humanity is said to be fully realized. His life is said to be one; and that one a true human life. There was in Him but one nature, and that nature human. Now it matters little that with these representations Christ is said to be divine, and his life a divine life; for this is said on the ground that the divine is human, and the human divine. God and man are one. The difference between Christ and other men is

simply one of degree. He is perfect, we are imperfect. He is, as Baur said, simply primus inter pares. Christ is the Urbild or archetypal man. But "the actuality of the archetypal does not go beyond our nature." [380] Even in the modified form in which his doctrine has been adopted in this country, this feature of the system has been retained. Dr. Nevin in his "Mystical Presence" is abundant in his assertion of the simple humanity of Christ. He says He had not one life of the body and another of the soul; nor one life of his humanity and another of his divinity. It is one life throughout, and it "is in all respects a true human life." [381] "Christ is the archetypal man in whom the true idea of humanity is brought to view." He "is the ideal man." Our nature is said to be complete only in Him. This also is the staple of the "Mercersburg Review" in all its articles relating either to Anthropology or Soteriology. It is everywhere assumed that God and man are one; that divinity is the completed development of humanity. "The glorification of Christ was the full advancement of our human nature itself to the power of a divine life." There is nothing in Christ which does not belong to humanity. Steudel therefore says of the Christology of Schleiermacher that it makes Christ only "a finished man." Knapp says, that he deifies the human and renders human the divine. [382] Dorner says, "He believed the perfect being of God to be in Christ; and for this reason regarded Him as the complete man. And so, vice versa, because He is the complete man, the consciousness of God has become a being of God in Him." [383] That is, because He is a perfect man, He is God. And Strauss says, that according to Schleiermacher the creation of man imperfect in Adam was completed in Christ; and as Christ did not assume a true body and a reasonable soul, but generic humanity, human nature as a generic life is raised to the power of divinity, not in Him only but also in the Church. The incarnation of God is not a unique manifestation in the flesh, in the person of Christ, appearing on earth for thirty-three years and then transferred to heaven. This, it is said, would have been only "a sublime avatar, fantastically paraded thus long before men," without any further effect. On the contrary, it is the introduction of the life of God into humanity rendering it divine. It is natural that those who thus deify themselves, should look upon those who regard themselves as "worms of the dust," as very poor creatures. [384] The objection, however, to this system now in hand is not so much that it deifies man, as that it makes Christ nothing more than an ideal man. It is therefore utterly at variance with the teachings of Scripture, the faith of the Church, and the intimate convictions of the people of God.

Schleiermacher's Anthropology.

6. As the system under consideration is unscriptural in what it teaches concerning the nature of God, and the person of Christ, it is no less contrary to the Scriptures in what it teaches concerning man. Indeed, the theology and anthropology of the system are so related that they cannot be separately held. According to the Bible and the common faith both of the Church and of the world, man is a being created by the word of God's power, consisting of a material body and an immaterial soul. There are, therefore, in the constitution of his person, two distinct subjects or substances, each with its own properties; so that although intimately united in the present state of being, the soul is capable of conscious existence and activity, out of the body, or separated from it. The soul of man is therefore a distinct individual subsistence, and not the form, or modus existendi of a general life. According to Schleiermacher, "Man as such, or in himself, is the knowing (das Erkennen) of the earth in its eternal substance (Seyn) and in its ever changing development. Or the Spirit (der Geist,

God) in the way or form in which it comes to self-consciousness in our earth." Der Mensch an sich ist das Erkennen der Erde in Seinem ewigen Seyn und in seinem immer wechselnden Werden: oder der Geist, der nach Art und Weise unserer Erde zum Selbstbewusstseyn sich gestaltet. [385] By the Mercersburg writers the idea is set forth in rather different terms but substantially to the same effect. [386] Thus it is said, "The world in its lower view is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is set to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the widest of its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life, which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." And [387] "The world is an organic whole which completes itself in man; and humanity is regarded throughout as a single grand fact which is brought to pass, not at once, but in the way of history, unfolding always more its true interior sense, and reaching on to its final consummation." Again, "It is a universal property of life to unfold itself from within, by a self-organizing power, towards a certain end, which end is its own realization, or in other words, the actual exhibition and actualization in outward form of all the elements, functions, powers, and capacities which potentially it includes. Thus life may be said to be all at its commencement which it can become in the end."

The theory is that there is an infinite, absolute, and universal something, spirit, life, life-power, substance, God, Urwesen, or whatever it may be called, which develops itself by an inward force, in all the forms of actual existence. Of these forms man is the highest. This development is by a necessary process, as much so as the growth of a plant or of an animal. The stem of the tree, its branches, foliage, and fruit, are not formed by sudden, creative acts, accomplishing the effect, by way of miracle. All is regular, a law-work, an uninterrupted force acting according to its internal nature. So in the self-evolution of the spirit, or principle of life, there is no room for special intervention, or creative acts. All goes on in the way of history, and by regular organic development. Here there is a fault in Schleiermacher's doctrine. He admitted a creative, supernatural act at the creation. And as the quantum of life, or spirit, communicated to man at first was insufficient to carry on his development to perfection, i.e., until it realized, or actualized all that is in that life of which he is the manifestation (i.e., in God), there was a necessity for a new creative act, by which in the person of Christ, a perfect man was produced. From Him, and after Him, the process goes on naturally, by regular development. [388] The life-power, the spirit, is quantitively increased and henceforth develops itself historically in the form of the Church. The Church, therefore, consists of those to whom this elevated principle of life has been communicated, and in whom it develops itself until it realizes all it includes. That is, until the essential oneness of God and man is in the Church fully realized.

There is another mode of representation current with the disciples of Schleiermacher, especially in this country. its advocates speak of humanity as a generic life. They define man to be the manifestation of this generic life in connection with a special corporeal organization, by which it is individualized and becomes personal. It was this generic humanity which sinned in Adam, and thenceforth was corrupt in all the individual men in whom it was manifested. It was this generic humanity that Christ assumed into personal union with his divinity, not as two distinct substances, but so united as to become one generic human life. This purified humanity now develops itself, by an inward force in the Church, just as from Adam generic humanity was developed in his posterity. All this,

however, differs only in words from Schleiermacher's simpler and more philosophic statement. For it is still assumed as the fundamental idea of the gospel, that God and man are one. This generic humanity is only a form of the life of God. And as to its sinning in Adam, and being thenceforth corrupt, sin and corruption are only imperfect development. God, the universal life principle, as Dr. Nevin calls it, so variously manifested in the different existences in this world, is imperfectly or insufficiently manifested in man generally, but perfectly in Christ, and through Hun ultimately in like perfection in his people. Christ, therefore, according to Dorner, is a universal person. He comprises in Himself the whole of humanity. All that is separately revealed in others is summed up in Him. In this system "Der Mittelpunkt," says Schwarz, "christlicher Wahrheit, der christologische Kern der ganzen Dogmatik ist die G&#65533;schel-Dorner'sche monstr&#65533;se Vorstellung von der Allpers&#65533;nlichkeit Christi, die ihm als dem Urmenschen zukommt. Es ist die Zusammenfassung des ganzen gegliederten Systems der nat&#65533;rlichen Gaben der Menschheit." [389] "The middle point of Christian truth, the kernel of dogmatic theology is Goschel's and Dorner's monstrous idea of the All-personality of Christ which belongs to Him as the Urmensch or archetypal man. He comprehends within Himself all the diversified forms or systems of the natural gifts of mankind." G&#65533;schel and Dorner, adds Schwarz, were driven to this view because they conceded to their opponent Strauss, that the Absolute could only reveal itself in the totality of individuals; and therefore as the Absolute was in Christ, he must embrace all individuals, because (the Gattungsbegriff) the true and total idea of humanity, the ideal man, or Urmensch, was revealed in Christ. The objection is constantly urged by his German critics, as Baur, Strauss, and Schwarz, that Schleiermacher admits that the Absolute is revealed in perfection in the totality of individuals, and yet is revealed perfectly in Christ, which according to Schleiermacher's own philosophy they pronounce to be a contradiction or impossibility. [390]

The design of the preceding paragraphs is simply to show the unscriptural character of Schleiermacher's Christology in all its modifications, because it is founded on a view of the nature of man entirely at variance with the Word of God. It assumes the oneness of God and man. It takes for granted that fully developed humanity is divine; that Christ in being the ideal, or perfect man, is God.

Schleiermacher's Theory perverts the Plan of Salvation.

7. It need hardly be remarked that the plan of salvation according to Schleiermacher's doctrine is entirely different from that revealed in the Bible and cherished by the Church in all ages. It is, in Germany at least, regarded as a rejection of the Church system, and as a substitute for it, and only in some of its forms as a reconciliation of the two, as to what is deemed absolutely essential. The system in all its forms rejects the doctrines of atonement or satisfaction to the justice of God; of regeneration and sanctification by the Holy Spirit; of justification as a judicial or forensic act; of faith in Christ, as a trusting to what He has done for us, as distinguished from what He does in us; in short, of all the great distinctive doctrines not merely of the Reformation but of the Catholic faith. By many of the followers of Schleiermacher these doctrines are rejected in so many words; by others the terms are more or less retained, but not in their received and established meaning. For the Scriptural system of salvation, another is substituted. Christ saves us not by what He teaches, or by what He does, but by what He is. He infuses a new principle of life into the Church and into

the world. The universal life as communicated to, or revealed in Adam, has been struggling on, imperfectly developed in all his descendants. In Christ a new influx of this life is communicated to, or infused into the veins of humanity. From this as a new starting point, humanity enters on another stage of development, which is to issue in the full actualization of the divine life in the form of humanity. As from Adam human nature was developed from within by an inward force in a regular historical process; so from Christ, there is the same historical development from within. All is natural. There is nothing supernatural but the initial point; the first impulse, or the first infusion of the divine life. There is no place in the system for the work of the Holy Spirit. Indeed, the very existence of the Holy Spirit as a personal being is by Schleiermacher expressly denied. By the Spirit he means the common life of the Church, that is, the divine life, or God as revealed in the Church. As we derive from Adam a quantitively deficient, and in that sense corrupt, nature, and have nothing more to do with him; so from Christ we receive a larger measure of life, spirit, or divine nature, and have nothing more to do with Him. His whole redeeming work is in the new leaven he has introduced into humanity, which diffuses itself in the way of natural development. This, as Baur says, comes after all to little more than the impression which his character has made on the world. He draws a parallel between Schleiermacher and Kant, between the "Glaubenslehre" of the former, and "Die Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der blossen Vernunft" of the latter; the clear rationalism of the one and the mystical obscurity of the other. Both admit that there is a good and a bad principle. Both say that man's redemption consists in the triumph of the good principle. Both say that the deliverance from evil or the work of redemption, is a purely natural process. Both refer the success of the struggle to the influence of Christ. The one says that He imparts to men a new life, the other says that He awakens the dormant good that is already in man's nature. Everything admits of a simple and of a mystical explanation. [391] In every great epoch some one man not only impresses his character and infuses his spirit into the men of his generation, but also transmits his influence from age to age. The whole body of Lutherans are what they are because Luther was what he was. The spirit of Ignatius Loyola is just as active in the Jesuits of our day as it was in his own person. The Scotch are what they are because of John Knox; and the Wesleyans owe not only their doctrines and discipline but their whole animus and character to John Wesley. To this category do the merciless German critics of Schleiermacher reduce his theory of the redemption of man by Jesus Christ. It is a matter of personal influence like that of other great men. This will be regarded by his disciples as a most degrading and unjust view of his doctrine. And it doubtless is unjust. For whatever may be true of his mere speculative system, he unquestionably in his heart regarded Christ as infinitely exalted above other men, and as the proper object of adoration and trust.

This Vermittelungstheologie (the mediating-theology), as it is called in Germany, is confessedly an attempt to combine the conclusions of modern speculation with Christian doctrine, or rather with Christianity. It is an attempt to mix incongruous elements which refuse to enter into combination. The modern speculative philosophy in all its forms insists on the denial of all real dualism; God and the world are correlata, the one supposes the other; without the world there is no God; creation is the self-evolution or self-manifestation of God: and is therefore necessary and eternal. God can no more be without the world, than mind without thought. The preservation, progress, and consummation of the world is by a necessary process of development, as in all the forms of life. There is no possibility of

special intervention, on the part of God. Miracles whether spiritual or physical are an absurdity and an impossibility. [392] So is any agency of God in time, or otherwise than as a general life-power. This precludes the efficacy of prayer except as to its subjective influence. Schleiermacher shared in this horror of the supernatural, and this rejection of all miracles. In the case of Christ, he was forced to admit "a new creative act." But he apologized for this admission by representing it as only the completion of the original act of creation, and by saying that it was only for a moment, and that all thenceforth was natural.

Schwarz, himself a great admirer, although not a disciple of Schleiermacher, characterizes this "mediating theology" as an utter failure. It is neither one thing nor the other. It is neither true to its speculative principles, nor true to Christianity. It virtually rejects the Church system, yet endeavours to save Christianity by adopting at least its phraseology. Schwarz says it is a system of "phrases;" which endeavours to heal the wounds of orthodoxy by words which seem to mean much, but which may be made to mean much or little as the reader pleases. It speaks constantly of Christianity as a life, as the life of God, as developing itself organically and naturally, not by supernatural assistance, but by an inward life-power, as in other cases of organic development. It assumes to rise to the conception of the whole world as an organism, in which God is one of the factors; the world and God differing not in substance or life, but simply in functions. It concedes to "speculation" that the fundamental truth of philosophy and of Christianity is the oneness of God and man. Man is God living in a certain form, or state of development. While "the mediating theology" concedes all this, it nevertheless admits of a miraculous or supernatural beginning of the world and of the person of Christ, and thus gives up its whole philosophical system. At least the members of one wing of Schleiermacher's school are thus inconsistent; those of the other are more true to their principles.

As Christian theology is simply the exhibition and illustration of the facts and truths of the Bible in their due relations and proportions, it has nothing to do with these speculations. The "mediating theology" does not pretend to be founded on the Bible. It does not, at least in Germany, profess allegiance to the Church doctrine. It avowedly gives up Christianity as a doctrine to save it as a life. It is founded on "speculation" and not upon authority, whether of the Scriptures or of the Church. It affords therefore no other and no firmer foundation for our faith and hope, than any other philosophical system; and that, as all history proves, is a foundation of quick-sand, shifting and sinking from month to month and even from day to day. Schleiermacher has been dead little more than thirty years, and already there are eight or ten different classes of his general disciples who differ from each other almost as much as from the doctrines of the Reformation. Twesten and Ullmann, Liebner and Thomasius, Lange and Alexander, Schweizer, are wide apart, each having his own philosophical solvent of the doctrines of the Bible, and each producing a different residuum.

The simple, sublime, and saving Christology of the Bible and of the Church universal is: "That the eternal Son of God became man by taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul and so was and continues to be God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever."

[355] Dorner, div. II. vol. iii. p. 101.

[356] Die christliche Lehre von der Dreieingkeit und Menschwerdung Gottes in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung. Von Dr. Ferdinand Christian Baur, Tbingen, 1843, vol. iii.

p. 751.

[357] Dr. Ullman, Essay in the Studien und Kritiken for 1846.

[358] Mercersburg Review, January, 1851, pp. 58, 61, 73. Review of Liebner's Christology, by Rev. John W. Nevin, D. D., Professor of Theology in the Seminary of the German Reformed Church.

[359] Das Leben Jesu, § 149, 3d edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1839, vol. ii. pp. 766, 767; and Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 214.

[360] Quoted by Strauss, Dogmatik, edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1841, vol. ii. p. 214.

[361] The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Freely translated from the German of W. F. Gess, with many additions, by J. A. Reubelt, D. D., Professor in Indiana University, Bloomington, Ind. Andover: Warren F. Draper, 1870, p. 414. This work is admirably translated, and presents the clearest outline of the modern doctrine of Kenosis which has yet appeared. The author expresses his satisfaction that he is sustained in his views arrived at by the study of the Scriptures, by the authority of Liebner and Thomasius, who reached substantially the same conclusions by the way of speculation. There is ground for this self-congratulation of the author, for his book is far more Scriptural in its treatment of the subject than any other book of the same class with which we are acquainted. It calls for a thorough review and candid criticism.

[362] Christi Person und Werk. Darstellung der evangelisch-lutherischen Dogmatik vom Mittelpunkte der Christologie aus. Von G. Thomasius, Dr. u. ord. Professor der Theologie an der Universit&#65533;t Erlangen. Zweite erweiterte Auflage, Erlangen, 1857, vol. ii. p. 295.

[363] Ibid. p. 299.

[364] Ibid. p. 296.

[365] Thomasius, ut supra, pp. 201, 202.

[366] Baur, in his Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, vol. iii. p. 987, gives the following account of Dorner's theory: Wie der Mensch das Haupt und die Krone der nat&#65533;rlichen Sch&#65533;pfung sei, so sei auch die Menscheit als die auseinandergetretene Vielheit eines h&#65533;hern Ganzen, einer h&#65533;hern Idee, zu betrachten, n&#65533;mlich Christi. Und wie die Natur sich nicht blos in der Idee eines Menschen zur Einheit versammle, sondern im wirklichen Menschen, so fasse sich auch die Menschheit nicht zusammen in einer blossen Idee, einem idealen Christus, sondern in dem wirklichen Gottmenschen, der ihre Totalit&#65533;t pers&#65533;nlich darstelle, und aller einzelnen Individualit&#65533;ten Urbilder oder ideale Pers&#65533;nlichkeiten in sich versammle. Und wenn die erste Zusammenfassung zerstreuter Momente in Adam, wenn auch selbst noch ein Naturwesen, doch eine unendlich h&#65533;here Gestalt dargestellt habe, als jedes der einzelnen Naturwesen, so stehe auch der zweite Adam, obwohl in sich eine Zusammenfassung der Menschheit und selbst noch ein Mensch, doch als eine unendlich h&#65533;here Gestalt da, denn alle einzelnen Darstellungen unserer Gattung. Sei Adam das Haupt der nat&#65533;rlichen Sch&#65533;pfung gewesen, als solches aber bereits hin&#65533;berreichend mit seinem Wesen in das Reich des Geistes und hin&#65533;bergreifend &#65533;ber die nat&#65533;rliche Welt, so sei Christus das Haupt der geistigen Sch&#65533;pfung, als solches aber schon hin&#65533;berweisend von der Menschheit auf eine kosmische oder metaphysiche Bedeutung seiner Person.

[367] Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk, vol. ii. pp. 141-143.

[368] Christliche Dogmatik. Von Johannes Heinrich August Ebrard, Doctor und ord. Professor der ref. Theologie zu Erlangen. K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. §§ 391-394, pp. 142-149.

[369] The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ. Translated from the German by J. A. Reubelt, D. D., p. 342.

[370] The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ, pp. 343, 344.

[371] The Scripture Doctrine of the Person of Christ, p. 378.

[372] When in Berlin the writer often attended Schleiermacher's church. The hymns to be sung were printed on slips of paper and distributed at the doors. They were always evangelical and spiritual in an eminent degree, filled with praise and gratitude to our Redeemer. Tholuck said that Schleiermacher, when sitting in the evening with his family, would often say, "Hush, children: let us sing a hymn of praise to Christ." Can we doubt that he is singing those praises now? To whomsoever Christ is God, St. John assures us Christ is a Savior.

[373] Dogmatik, T&#65533;bingen, 1841, vol. ii. p. 176.

[374] Ueber Schleiermacher's Glaubenlehre, ein kritischer Versuch, p. 182.

[375] See Gess, Uebersicht &#65533;ber Schleiermacher's System, p. 185.

[376] Baur's Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, vol. iii. p. 842.

[377] Ibid. p. 850.

[378] Baur's Lehre von der Dreieinigkeit, vol. ii. p. 851.

[379] See Baur, p. 858, who quotes Zeller (Theol. Jahrb. Bd. 1, H. 2, S. 285) as saying that these principles, which appear everywhere in Schleiermacher's Dogmatik, contain the whole secret of Spinozism.

[380] Dorner's Person of Christ, div. II. vol. iii. p. 301.

[381] The Mystical Presence, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 167.

[382] Gess's Uebersicht &#65533;ber Schleiermachers System, p. 225.

[383] Dorner, ut supra, II. vol. iii. p. 194.

[384] At a session of the Academic Senate of the University of Berlin, Marheinecke called Neander a blockhead, and asked him, What right had he to an opinion on any philosophical question? Neander, on the other hand, said that Marheinecke's doctrine, Hegelianism, was to him ein Greuel, a disgusting horror. And no wonder, for a doctrine which makes men the highest existence form of God, is enough to shock even Satan.

[385] Dorner, first edition, p. 488.

[386] In the Mercersburg Review, 1850, p. 550.

[387] Page 7 of the same volume.

[388] Schleiermacher (Zweites Sendschreiben zu L&#65533;cke; Works, edit. Berlin, 1836, first part, vol. ii. p. 653), says: "Where the supernatural occurs with me, it is always a first; it becomes natural as a second. Thus the creation is supernatural, but afterwards it is a natural process (Naturzusammenhang). So Christ is supernatural as to his beginning, but He becomes natural as a simple or pure human person. The same is true of the Holy Spirit and

of the Christian Church." In like manner Dr. Nevin repeatedly says, "The supernatural has become natural." This inconsistency in Schleiermacher's system, this collision between his philosophy and his theology is dwelt upon by all his German critics. Thus Schwarz (Geschichte des neuesten Theologie, p. 254), says, "Schleiermacher steht in seiner Ontologie und Kosmologie, in Dem, was er &#65533;ber das Verh&#65533;ltniss Gottes zur Welt in seiner Dialektik feststellt, ganz und gar auf dem Boden einer einheitlichen und zusammenh&#65533;ngenden Weltanschauung. Ebenso in der Lehre von der Sch&#65533;pfung und Erhaltung der Welt, wie sie die Dogmatik ausf&#65533;hrt. Gott und die Welt sind untrennbare Correlata; das Verh&#65533;ltniss Gottes zur Welt ist ein nothwendiges, stetiges, zusammenh&#65533;ngendes. F&#65533;r ausserordentliche Actionen, f&#65533;r ein vereinzeltes Handeln Gottes auf die Welt ausserhalb des Naturgesetzes oder gegen dasselbe ist nirgends ein Ort. . . . . Aber -- es ist zuzugeben, -- diese die philosophische Grundanschauung bildende Immanenz wird von dem Theologen Schleiermacher nicht streng innegehalten, das aus der Ontologie und Kosmologie verbannte Wunder dringt durch die Christologie wieder ein. Die Person Christi in ihrer religi&#65533;ssittlichen Absolutheit ist ein Wunder, eine Ausnahme vom Naturgesetz, sie stehet einzig da. Ihr Eintreten in die Menschheit erfodert trotz aller Anschliessungen nach r&#65533;ckw&#65533;rtz wie nach vorw&#65533;rtz einen besondern g&#65533;ttlichen Anstoss, sie ist aus der geschichtlichen Entwickelung nicht hervorgegangen und nicht zu begreifen. Und dieser &#65533;bernaturliche Anstoss ist es, welcher, so sehr er auch wieder in die Nat&#65533;rlichkeit einlenkt, doch mit dem religi&#65533;s-moralischen Wunder auch die M&#65533;glichkeit der damit zusammenh&#65533;ngenden physischen Wunder offen l&#65533;sst und so den ganzen Weltzusammenhang durchbricht."

[389] Schwarz, Geschichte der neuesten Theologie, p. 260.

[390] Baur's Christliche Lehre von der Vers&#65533;hnung, p. 621-624.

[391] The writer was once sitting with Tholuck in a public garden, when the latter said, "I turn my eyes in the opposite direction, and still I am conscious of your presence. How is that?" The reply was, "You know the fact that I am here; and that knowledge produces the state of mind, you call a consciousness of my presence." Tholuck good naturedly rejoined, "O how stupid that is. Don't you believe that there is an influence which streams forth from me to you and from you to me?" The only answer was, "Perhaps so." Of all the genial, lovely, and loving men whom the writer in the course of a long life has met, Tholuck stands among the very first. The writer derived more good from him than from all other sources combined during his two years sojourn in Europe.

[392] "Eigentliche Mirakel anzunehmen, d. h. Unterbrechungen oder Aufhebungen der Naturordnung, dazu wird kein philosophischer Denker sich herablassen." J. H. Fichte, by Schwarz, p. 319.

CHAPTER IV: THE MEDIATORIAL WORK OF CHRIST.

§ 1. Christ the only Mediator.

According to the Scriptures the incarnation of the eternal Son of God was not a necessary event arising out of the nature of God. It was not the culminating point in the development of humanity. It was an act of voluntary humiliation. God gave his Son for the redemption of man. He came into the world to save his people from their sins; to seek and save those who are lost. He took part in flesh and blood in order, by death, to destroy him who had the power of death, that is the devil, and to deliver those who through fear of death (i.e., through apprehension of the wrath of God), were all their lifetime subject to bondage. He died the just for the unjust that He might bring us near to God. Such is the constant representation of the Scriptures. The doctrine of the modern speculative theology, that the incarnation would have occurred though man had not sinned, is, therefore, contrary to the plainest teachings of the Bible. Assuming, however, that fallen men were to be redeemed, then the incarnation was a necessity. There was no other way by which that end could be accomplished. This is clearly taught in the Scriptures. The name of Christ is the only name whereby men can be saved. If righteousness could have been attained in any other way, Christ, says the Apostle, is dead in vain. (Galatians ii. 21.) If the law (any institution or device) could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law. (Galatians iii. 21.)

As the design of the incarnation of the Son of God was to reconcile us unto God, and as reconciliation of parties at variance is a work of mediation, Christ is called our mediator. As reconciliation is sometimes effected by mere intercession, or negotiation, the person who thus effectually intercedes may be called a mediator. But where reconciliation involves the necessity of satisfaction for sin as committed against God, then he only is a mediator who makes an atonement for sin. As this was done, and could be done by Christ alone, it follows that He only is the mediator between God and man. He is our peace-maker, who reconciles Jews and Gentiles unto God in one body by the cross. (Ephesians ii. 16.) To us, therefore, there is one mediator between God and man, the man Christ Jesus. (1 Timothy ii. 5.)

The Romish Church regards priests, and saints, and angels, and especially the Virgin Mary, as mediators, not only in the sense of intercessors, but as peace-makers without whose intervention reconciliation with God cannot be attained. This arises from two erroneous principles involved in the theology of the Church of Rome. The first concerns the office of the priesthood. Romanists teach that the benefits of redemption can be obtained only thrpugh the intervention of the priests. Those benefits flow through the sacraments. The sacraments to be available must be administered by men canonically ordained. The priests

offer sacrifices and grant absolution. They are as truly mediators, although in a subordinate station, as Christ himself. No man can come to God except through them. And this is the main idea in mediation in the Scriptural sense of the word.

The other principle is involved in the doctrine of merit as held by Romanists. According to them, good works done after regeneration have real merit in the sight of God. It is possible for the people of God not only to acquire a degree of merit sufficient for their own salvation, but more than suffices for themselves. This, on the principle of the communion of saints, may be made available for others. The saints, therefore, are appealed to, to plead their own merits before the throne of God as the ground of the pardon or deliverance of those for whom they intercede. This according to the Scriptures is the peculiar work of Christ as our mediator; assigning it to the saints, therefore, constitutes them mediators. As the Christian minister is not a priest, and as no man has any merit in the sight of God, much less a superabundance thereof, the whole foundation of this Romish doctrine is done away. Christ is our only mediator, not merely because the Scriptures so teach, but also because He only can and does accomplish what is necessary for our reconciliation to God; and He only has the personal qualifications for the work.

§ 2. Qualifications for the Work.

What those qualifications are the Scriptures clearly teach.

1. He must be a man. The Apostle assigns as the reason why Christ assumed our nature and not the nature of angels, that He came to redeem us. (Hebrews ii. 14-16.) It was necessary that He should be made under the law which we had broken; that He should fulfil all righteousness; that He should suffer and die; that He should be able to sympathize in all the infirmities of his people, and that He should be united to them in a common nature. He who sanctifies (purifies from sin both as guilt and as pollution) and those who are sanctified are and must be of one nature. Therefore as the children were partakers of flesh and blood, He also took part of the same. (Hebrews ii. 11-14.)

2. The Mediator between God and man must be sinless. Under the law the victim offered on the altar must be without blemish. Christ, who was to offer Himself unto God as a sacrifice for the sins of the world, must be Himself free from sin. The High Priest, therefore, who becomes us, He whom our necessities demand, must be holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners. (Hebrews vii. 26.) He was, therefore, "without sin." (Hebrews iv. 15; 1 Peter ii. 22.) A sinful Saviour from sin is an impossibility. He could not have access to God. He could not be a sacrifice for sins; and He could not be the source of holiness and eternal life to his people. This sinlessness of our Lord, however, does not amount to absolute impeccability. It was not a non potest peccare. If He was a true man He must have been capable of sinning. That He did not sin under the greatest provocation; that when He was reviled He blessed; when He suffered He threatened not; that He was dumb, as a sheep before its shearers, is held up to us as an example. Temptation implies the possibility of sin. If from the constitution of his person it was impossible for Christ to sin, then his temptation was unreal and without effect, and He cannot sympathize with his people.

3. It was no less necessary that our Mediator should be a divine person. The blood of

no mere creature could take away sin. It was only because our Lord was possessed of an eternal Spirit that the one offering of Himself has forever perfected them that believe. None but a divine person could destroy the power of Satan and deliver those who were led captive by him at his will. None but He who had life in Himself could be the source of life, spiritual and eternal, to his people. None but an almighty person could control all events to the final consummation of the plan of redemption, and could raise the dead; and infinite wisdom and knowledge are requisite in Him who is to be judge of all men, and the head over all to his Church. None but one in whom dwelt all the fulness of the Godhead could be the object as well as the source of the religious life of all the redeemed.

These qualifications for the office of mediator between God and man are all declared in the Scriptures to be essential; they are met in Christ; and they all were demanded by the nature of the work which He came to perform.

As it was necessary that Christ should be both God and man in two distinct natures and one person, in order to effect our redemption, it follows that his mediatorial work, which includes all He did and is still doing for the salvation of men, is the work not of his human to the exclusion of his divine nature, nor of the latter to the exclusion of the former. It is the work of the Theanthropos, of the God-man. Of the acts of Christ, as already remarked, some are purely divine, as creation, preservation, etc.; others purely human, i.e., those which the ordinary powers of man are not only adequate to accomplish, but in which only human faculties were exercised; and, thirdly, those which are mixed, which belong to the whole person. As speaking in man is a joint exercise of the mind and of the body, so the mediatorial work in Christ is the joint work of his divinity and humanity. Each nature acts agreeably to its own laws. When a man speaks, the mind and body concur in the production of the effect, each according to its nature. So when our Lord spake, the wisdom, truth, and authority with which He spake were due to his divinity; the human form of the thoughts and their articulation were what they were in virtue of the functions of his human nature. So with all his redemptive acts. As the mind of man concurs in the endurance of the sufferings of the body according to the nature of mind, so the divinity of Christ concurred with the sufferings of his human nature according to the nature of the divinity.

On this subject the schoolmen made the following distinctions: "(1.) Est ho energon, Agens seu Principium quod agit, quod est suppositum seu persona Christi. (2.) To energetikon seu Principium formale quo agit; illud per quod agens, seu persona Christi operatur, du scilicet natur, quarum unaqu que citra ullum confusionem operatur. (3.) Energeia seu operatio qu pendet a principio quo, et naturam sui principii refert, ut sit divina, si principium quo sit divina natura, humana vero, si sit humanitas. (4.) Energema, seu apotelesma, quod pendet a principio quod, estque opus externum quod mediationem vocamus. . . . . Ita unum est agens principale, nim. persona Christi, et unum apotelesma seu opus mediatorium; sed operatur per duas naturas, ut duo principia, unde fluunt du energeiai seu operationes ad unum illud opus concurrentes." [393]

All Christ's acts and sufferings in the execution of his mediatorial work were, therefore, the acts and sufferings of a divine person. It was the Lord of glory who was crucified; it was the Son of God who poured out his soul unto death. That this is the doctrine of the Scriptures is plain, (1.) Because they attribute the efficacy and power of his acts, the truth and wisdom of his words, and the value of his sufferings to the fact that they

were the acts, words, and sufferings of God manifested in the flesh. They are predicated of one and the same person who from the beginning was with God and was God, who created all things and for whom all things were made and by whom all things consist. (2.) If the mediatorial work of Christ belongs to his human nature exclusively, or, in other words, if He is our mediator only as man, then we have only a human Saviour, and all the glory, power, and sufficiency of the Gospel are departed. (3.) From the nature of the work. The redemption of fallen men is a work for which only a divine person is competent. The prophetic office of Christ supposes that He possessed "all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge;" his sacerdotal office required the dignity of the Son of God to render his work available; and none but a divine person could exercise the dominion with which Christ as mediator is intrusted. Only the Eternal Son could deliver us from the bondage of Satan, and from the death of sin, or raise the dead, or give eternal life, or conquer all his and our enemies. We need a Saviour who was not only holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners, but who also "is higher than the heavens."

[393] Turrettin, locus. XIV. qu?st. ii. 3, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 335. He quotes from Damasc. lib. li. 4, orth. fid. c. 18, and refers to Leo's 10th Epistle to Flavian.

§ 3. The Threefold Office of Christ.

It has long been customary with theologians to exhibit the mediatorial work of Christ under the heads of his prophetic, sacerdotal, and kingly offices. To this division and classification it has been objected by some that these offices are not distinct, as it was the duty of the priests as well as of the prophets to teach; by others, that time sacerdotal office of Christ was identical with the prophetic, that his redemption was effected by teaching. This method, however, has not only the sanction of established usage and obvious convenience, but it is of substantive importance, and has a firm Scriptural basis. (1.) In the Old Testament the several offices were distinct. The prophet, as such, was not a priest; and the King was neither priest nor prophet. Two of these offices were at times united in the same person under the theocracy, as Moses was both priest and prophet, and David prophet and king. Nevertheless the offices were distinct. (2.) The Messiah, during the theocracy and in the use of language as then understood, was predicted as prophet, priest, and king. Moses, speaking of Christ, said, "The Lord thy God will raise up unto thee a prophet from the midst of thee, of thy brethren, like unto me." It was abundantly taught that the coming deliverer was to discharge all the duties of a prophet as a revealer of the will of God. He was to be the great teacher of righteousness; a light to lighten the Gentiles as well as the glory of his people Israel. No less clearly and frequently was it declared that He should be a priest. "Thou art a priest forever after the order of Melchizedec." He was to be a priest upon his throne. (Zechariah vi. 13.) He was to bear the sins of the people, and make intercession for transgressors. His royal office is rendered so prominent in the Messianic prophecies that the Jews looked for Him only as a king. He was to reign over all nations. Of his kingdom there was to be no end. He was to be the Lord of lords and the King of kings. (3.) In the New Testament the Redeemer, in assuming the office of the promised Messiah, presented Him to the people as their prophet, priest, and king and those who received Him at all received Him in all these offices. He applied to Himself all the prophecies relating to the Messiah. He referred to Moses as predicting the Messiah as a

prophet; to David, as setting Him forth as a priest, and to Daniel's prophecies of the kingdom which He came to establish. The Apostles received Him as the teacher sent from God to reveal the plan of salvation and to unfold the future destiny of the Church. In the first chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said, "God, who at sundry times and in divers manners spake in time past unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son." In that Epistle the priesthood of Christ is elaborately set forth, and its superiority in every respect to the priesthood of the old economy strenuously insisted upon. In like manner the New Testament is full of instruction concerning the grounds, the nature, the extent, and the duration of his kingdom. He is constantly designated as Lord, as our absolute proprietor and sovereign. Nothing, therefore, can be plainer than that as the Old Testament prophets predicted that the Messiah should be a prophet, priest, and king, so the New Testament writers represent the Lord Jesus as sustaining all these offices. (4.) That this is not a merely figurative representation is plain from the fact that Christ exercised all the functions of a prophet, of a priest, and of a king. He was not simply so called, but the work which He actually performed included in perfection all that the ancient prophets, priests, and kings performed in a lower sphere and as an adumbration of Christ's more perfect work. (5.) We as fallen men, ignorant, guilty, polluted, and helpless, need a Saviour who is a prophet to instruct us; a priest to atone and to make intercession for us; and a king to rule over and protect us. And the salvation which we receive at his hands includes all that a prophet, priest, and king in the highest sense of those terms can do. We are enlightened in the knowledge of the truth; we are reconciled unto God by the sacrificial death of his Son; and we are delivered from the power of Satan and introduced into the kingdom of God; all of which supposes that our Redeemer is to us at once prophet, priest, and king. This is not, therefore, simply a convenient classification of the contents of his mission and work, but it enters into its very nature, and must be retained in our theology if we would take the truth as it is revealed in the Word of God.

Under the old economy the functions of these several offices were not only confided to different persons, no one under the theocracy being at once prophet, priest, and king; but when two of these offices were united in one person they were still separate. The same man might sometimes act as prophet and sometimes as priest or king; but in Christ these offices were more intimately united. He instructed while acting as a priest, and his dominion extending over the soul gave freedom from blindness and error as well as from the power of sin and the dominion of the devil. The gospel is his sceptre. He rules the world by truth and love. "Tria ista officia," says Turrettin, "ita in Christo conjunguntur, ut non solum eorum operationes distinctas exerat, sed eadem actio a tribus simul prodeat, quod rei admirabilitatem non parum auget. Sic Crux Christi, qu&#xfffd; est Altare sacerdotis, in quo se in victimam Deo obtulit, est etiam schola prophet&#xfffd;, in qua nos docet mysterium salutis, unde Evangelium vocatur verbum crucis, et Troph&#xfffd;um regis, in qua scil. triumphavit de principatibus et potestatibus. Col. ii. 15. Evangelium est lex prophet&#xfffd;, Is. ii. 2, 3, Sceptrum regis, Ps. cx. 2, Gladius sacerdotis, quo penetrat ad intimas cordis divisiones, Heb. iv. 12, et Altare, cui imponi debet sacrificium fidei nostr&#xfffd;. Ita Spiritus, qui ut Spiritus, sapienti&#xfffd; est effectus propheti&#xfffd;, ut Spiritus consolationis est fructus sacerdotii, ut Spiritus roboris et glori&#xfffd; est regis donum." [394]

[394] Locus. XIV. qu&#xfffd;st. v. 13, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 347, 348.

CHAPTER V: PROPHETIC OFFICE.

§ 1. Nature of the Prophetic Office.

According to Scriptural usage a prophet is one who speaks for another. In Exodus vii. 1, it is said, "See, I have made thee a God to Pharaoh: and Aaron thy brother shall be thy prophet." Moses was to be the authoritative source of the communication, Aaron the organ of communication. This is the relation of the prophet to God. God communicates, the prophet announces the message which he has received. In Exodus iv. 16, it is said of Aaron in relation to Moses, "He shall be to thee instead of a mouth." And in Jeremiah xv. 19, it is said of the prophet," Thou shalt be as my mouth." In the inauguration of a prophet, or in constituting a man the spokesman of God, it is said, "I will put my words in his mouth; and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him. And it shall come to pass, that whosoever will not hearken unto my words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him." (Deuteronomy xviii. 18, 19.) A prophet, therefore, is one who speaks in the name of God. He must, however, be the immediate organ of God. In one sense every one who reads or preaches the word of God may be said "to speak in his name." The truths which he utters rest upon the authority of God; they are his words which the preacher is the organ of announcing to the people. Ministers, however, are not prophets. A broad distinction is made both in the Old and New Testaments between prophets and teachers. The former were inspired, the latter were not. Any man receiving a revelation from God, or inspired in the communication of it, is, in the Scriptures, called a prophet. Hence all the sacred writings are called prophetic. The Jews divided their Scriptures into the law and the prophets. The law, or pentateuch, was written by Moses, who was confessedly a prophet, and the other class, including all the historical, devotional, and prophetic portions (commonly so called) is also the work of prophets, i.e., of inspired men. The prediction of the future was only at incidental part of the prophet's work, because some of the communications which he received had reference to future events.

When, therefore, the Messiah was predicted as a prophet it was predicted that He should be the great organ of God in communicating his mind and will to men. And when our Lord appeared on earth it was to speak the words of God. "The word which ye hear is not mine, but the Father's which sent me." (John xiv. 24.) "Jesus of Nazareth which was a prophet mighty in deed and word." (Luke xxiv. 19.)

§ 2. How Christ executes the Office of a Prophet.

In the execution of his prophetic office, Christ is revealed to us, (1.) As the eternal Word, the Logos, the manifested and manifesting Jehovah. He is the source of all

knowledge to the intelligent universe, and especially to the children of men. He was, and is, the light of the world. He is the truth. In Him dwell all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge; and from Him radiates all the light that men receive or attain. (2.) This, although independent of his official work as prophet in the economy of redemption, is its necessary foundation. Had He not in Himself the plenitude of divine wisdom He could not be the source of knowledge, and especially of that knowledge which is eternal life to all his people. Under the old dispensation, or before his advent in the flesh, He made known God and his purposes and will, not only by personal manifestations of Himself to the patriarchs and prophets, but also by his Spirit, in revealing the trukh and will of God, in inspiring those appointed to record these revelations, and in illuminating the minds of his people, and thus bringing them to the saving knowledge of the truth. (3.) While on earth He continued the exercise of his prophetic office by his personal instructions, in his discourses, parables, and expositions of the law and of the prophets; and in all that He taught concerning his own person and work, and concerning the progress and consummation of his kingdom. (4.) Since his ascension He performs the same office not only in the fuller revelation of the gospel made to the Apostles and in their inspiration as infallible teachers, but also in the institution of the ministry and constantly calling men to that office, and by the influences of the Holy Ghost, who coperates with the truth in every human heart, and renders it effectual to the sanctification and salvation of his own people. Thus from the beginning, both in his state of humiliation and of exaltation, both before and after his advent in the flesh, does Christ execute the office of a prophet in revealing to us by his Word and Spirit the will of God for our salvation.

CHAPTER VI: PRIESTLY OFFICE.

§ 1. Christ is truly, not figuratively, a Priest.

The meaning of the word priest and the nature of the office are to be determined, first, by general usage and consent; secondly, by the express declarations of the Scriptures; and, thirdly, by the nature of the functions peculiar to the office. From these sources it can be shown that a priest is, (1.) A man duly appointed to act for other men in things pertaining to God. The idea which lies at the foundation of the office is, that men, being sinners, have not liberty of access to God. Therefore, one, either having that right in himself, or to whom it is conceded, must be appointed to draw near to God in their behalf. A priest, consequently, from the nature of his office, is a mediator. (2.) A priest is appointed to offer gifts and sacrifices for sins. His function is to reconcile men to God; to make expiation for their sins; and to present their persons, acknowledgments, and offerings to God. (3.) He makes intercession for the people. Not merely as one man may pray for another, but as urging the efficacy of his sacrifice and the authority of his office, as grounds on which his prayers should be answered.

Much depends upon the correctness of this definition. It would amount to little to admit Christ to be a priest, if by that term we mean merely a minister of religion, or even one by whose intervention divine blessings are secured and conveyed. But if by a priest be meant all that is included in the above statement, then the relation in which Christ stands to us, our duties to Him, his relation to God, and the nature of his work, are all thereby determined.

That the above definition is correct, and that Christ is a priest in the true sense of the term, is evident,

1. From the general usage of the word and the nature of the office among all nations and in all ages of the world. Men have everywhere and at all times been conscious of sin. In that consciousness are included a sense of guilt (or of just exposure to the displeasure of God), of pollution, and of consequent unworthiness to approach God Their consciences, or the laws of their moral nature, have ever taught them the necessity of the expiation of guilt by a satisfaction of divine justice, and their own inability and unworthiness to make any adequate atonement, or to secure by their own efforts the favour of God. They have, therefore, ever sought for some one or some class of men to act in their behalf; to do for them what they knew must be done, and that which they were convinced they could not do for themselves. Hence the appointment of priests, who were always regarded as men whose business it was to propitiate God by expiatory sacrifices, by oblations, and by prayers. To say that a priest is merely a teacher of religion is to contradict the universal testimony of history.

2. The sense in which Christ is a priest must be determined by the use of the word and by the nature of the office under the old dispensation. In the Old Testament a priest was a man selected from the people, appointed to act as their mediator, drawing nigh to God in their behalf, whose business it was to offer expiatory sacrifices, and to make intercession for offenders. The people were not allowed to draw near to God. The High Priest alone could enter within the veil; and he only with blood which he offered for himself and for the sins of the people. All this was both symbolical and typical. What the Aaronic priests were symbolically, Christ was really. What they in their office and services typified was fulfilled in Him. They were the shadow, He the substance. They taught how sin was to be taken away, He actually removed it. It would be to set the Scriptures at naught, or to adopt principles of interpretation which would invalidate all their teaching, to deny that Christ is a priest in the Old Testament sense of the term.

3. We have in the New Testament an authoritative definition of the word, and an exhibition of the nature of the office. In Hebrews v. 1, it is said, "Every high priest . . . . is ordained for men (huper anthropon, for their benefit and in their place), in things pertaining to God, that he may offer both gifts and sacrifices for sins." Here all the ideas above insisted upon are distinctly recognized. A priest is a man appointed for others, to draw near to God, and to offer sacrifices. Such a priest Christ is declared to have been.

4. Christ is not only called a priest in Hebrews, but the Apostle throughout that Epistle proves, (a.) That He had all the qualifications for the office. (b.) That He was appointed by God. (c.) That He was a priest of a higher order than Aaron. (d.) That his priesthood superseded all others. (e.) That He performed all the functions of the office, -- mediation, sacrifice, and intercession. (f.) That such was the efficacy of his sacrifice that it needs not to be repeated. By the one offering of Himself He hath obtained eternal redemption for us.

5. The effects or benefits secured by the work of Christ are those which flow from the exercise of the priestly office in our behalf . Those benefits are, (a.) Expiation of our guilt; (b.) The propitiation of God; and (c.) Our consequent reconciliation with Him, whence flow all the subjective blessings of spiritual and eternal life. These are benefits which are not secured by teaching, by moral influence, by example, or by any inward change wrought in us. Christ, therefore, is truly a priest in the full Scriptural sense of the term.

§ 2. Christ our only Priest.

This follows from the nature and design of the office. (1.) No man, save the Lord Jesus Christ, has liberty of access unto God. All other men, being sinners, need some one to approach God on their behalf. (2.) No other sacrifice than his could take away sin. (3.) It is only through Him that God is propitious to sinful men; and (4.) It is only through Him that the benefits which flow from the favour of God are conveyed to his people.

The priests of the Old Testament were, as before remarked, only symbols and types of the true priesthood of Christ. Their sacrifices could not purify the conscience from the sense of sin. They availed only to the purifying of the flesh. They secured reconciliation with God only so far as they were regarded as representing the real sacrifice of Christ as the object of faith and ground of confidence. Hence, as the Apostle teaches, they were offered continually, because, being ineffectual in themselves, the people needed to be

constantly reminded of their guilt and of their need of the more effectual sacrifice predicted in their Scriptures.

If the Old Testament priests were not really priests, except typically, much less are ministers of the gospel. When among Protestants any class of ministers are called priests, the word is the substitute for presbyter, for which it is constantly interchanged. It stands for presbuteros and not for hiereus. (It is defined, Greek, presbuteros, elder; Latin, presbyter; Spanish, presbitero; French, pr&#65533;tre; Anglo Saxon, preost; Dutch and German, priester; Danish, pr&#65533;st.) Among Romanists it is not so. With them the minister is really a priest. (1.) Because he mediates between God and the people. (2.) Because he assumes to offer propitiatory sacrifices. (3.) Because in absolution he effectually and authoritatively intercedes, rendering the sacrifice for sin effectual in its application to individuals, which is the essential element in the intercession of Christ. The Roman priests are mediators, because it is taught that the sinner cannot for himself draw near to God through Christ and obtain pardon and grace, but can secure those blessings only through their intervention. They are sacrificers, because they assume to offer the real body and blood of Christ to God, as an expiation for the sins of the people. And they aro intercessors, not as one man may pray for another, but as having the power to forgive sins. They have therefore the power of life and death; the keys of the kingdom of heaven. They bind, and no man can loose; they loose, and no man can bind. This is the highest power which man has ever assumed over his fellow-men, and when recognized, reduces the people to a state of the most absolute subjection. No greater benefit was rendered the world by the Reformation than the breaking of this iron yoke. This was done by demonstrating, from Scripture, that the ministers of religion under the gospel are not priests in the official sense of the term. It was shown,

1. That the word priest, hiereus, is never once applied to them in the New Testament. Every appropriate title of honour is lavished upon them. They are called the bishops of souls, pastors, teach. ers, rulers, governors, the servants or ministers of God; stewards of the divine mysteries; watchmen, heralds, but never priests. As the sacred writers were Jews, to whom nothing was more familiar than the word priest, whose ministers of religion were constantly so denominated, the fact that they never once use the word, or any of its cognates, in reference to the ministers of the gospel, whether apostles, presbyters, or evangelists, is little less than miraculous. It is one of those cases in which the silence of Scripture speaks volumes.

2. No priestly function is ever attributed to Christian ministers. They do not mediate between God and man. They are never said to offer sacrifices for sins; and they have no power as intercessors which does not belong to every believer.

3. All believers are priests in the only sense in which men are priests under the gospel. That is, all have liberty of access to God through Christ. He has made all his people kings and priests into God.

4. This Romish doctrine is derogatory to the honour of Christ. He came to be the mediator between God and man; to make satisfaction for our sins, to secure for us pardon and reconciliation with God. To suppose that we still need the priestly intervention of men, is to assume that his work is a failure.

5. The sacred writers expressly teach what this doctrine denies. They teach that men have everywhere free access to Christ, and through Him unto God; that faith in Him secures

an interest in all the benefits of his redemption, and that, therefore, a thief on the cross, a prisoner in a dungeon, a solitary believer in his own chamber is near to God, and secure of his acceptance, provided he calls on the name of the Lord. To deny this, to teach the necessity of the intervention or ministration of men, to secure for us the salvation of our souls, is to contradict the plainest teachings of the Word of God.

6. This doctrine contradicts the intimate convictions of the people of God in all ages. They know that they have through Christ, and by the Spirit free access unto God. They are thus taught by the Holy Ghost. They avail themselves of this liberty in spite of all men can do. They know that the doctrine which subjects them to the priesthood as the only authorized dispensers of grace and salvation, is not of God; and that it brings the souls of men into the most slavish bondage.

7. All the principles on which the doctrine of the priesthood of the Christian clergy rests are false. It is false that the ministry are a distinct class from the people, distinguished from them by supernatural gifts, conveyed by the sacrament of orders. It is false that the bread and wine are transmuted into the body and blood of Christ. It is false that the Eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice applied for the remission of sins and spiritual benefits, according to the intention of the officiating priest. Christ, therefore, as He is the only mediator between God and man, is the only and all-sufficient High Priest of our profession.

§ 3. Definition of Terms.

Christ, it is said, executeth the office of a priest, in his once offering up of Himself a sacrifice to satisfy divine justice, and reconcile us to God, and in making continual intercession for us. Expiation, propitiation, reconciliation, and intercession are the several aspects under which the work of Christ as a priest, is presented in the Word of God.

Before attempting to state what the Scriptures teach in reference to these points, it will be well to define the terms which are of constant occurrence in theological discussions of this subject.

The Word Atonement.

The word atonement is often used, especially in this country, to designate the priestly work of Christ. This word does not occur in the English version of the New Testament except in Romans v. 11, where it is interchanged with "reconciliation" as the translation of the Greek word katallage. In the Old Testament it frequently occurs. The objections to its use to express the work of Christ are, --

1. Its ambiguity. To atone is properly to be, or cause to be, at one. It is so used in common language as well as in theology. In this sense to atone is to reconcile; and atonement is reconciliation. It, therefore, expresses the effect, and not the nature of Christ s work. But it is also, in the second place, used to express that by which the reconciliation is effected. It then means satisfaction, or compensation. It answers in our version to the Hebrew word kpr; which in relation to the offence or guilt, means to expiate. Thus in Leviticus v. 16, it is said, if a man commit an offence, hkhv ykpr lvv, the priest shall make atonement for him; i.e., shall expiate, or make satisfaction for his offence. So in Ex. xxxii. 30; Lev. iv. 26; Num. vi. 11. In reference to the person of the offender, it means to reconcile by means of expiation, to propitiate God in his behalf. See Ex. xxx. 15; Lev. iv. 20; xvi. 6.;

Ezekiel xlv. 17, "It shall be the prince's part to give burnt-offerings; . . . he shall prepare the sin-offering . . . vytysr'l lkpr bd to make reconciliation for the house of Israel." Thus often elsewhere. While the verb to atone thus means to expiate and to reconcile by expiation, the substantive means, either the reconciliation itself, or the means by which it is effected. This latter sense is not a Scriptural usage of the word, but is very common in theological writings. Thus when we speak of the atonement of Christ, of its necessity, efficacy, application, or extent, we mean Christ's work, what He did to expiate the sins of men. This ambiguity of the word necessarily gives rise to more or less confusion.

2. Another objection to its general use is that it is not sufficiently comprehensive. As commonly used it includes only the sacrificial work of Christ, and not his vicarious obedience to the divine law. The atonement of Christ is said to consist of his sufferings and death. But his saving work includes far more than his expiatory sufferings.

3. A third objection is that this use of the word atonement is a departure from the established usage of the Churches of the Reformation. It is important to adhere to old words if we would adhere to old doctrines.

Satisfaction.

The word satisfaction is the one which for ages has been generally used to designate the special work of Christ in the salvation of men. With the Latin theologians the word is "satisfactio," with the German writers, "Genugthun," its exact etymological equivalent, "the doing enough." By the satisfaction of Christ is meant all He has done to satisfy the demands of the law and justice of God, in the place and in behalf of sinners. This word has the advantage of being precise, comprehensive, and generally accepted, and should therefore be adhered to. There are, however, two kinds of satisfaction, which as they differ essentially in their nature and effects, should not be confounded. The one is pecuniary or commercial; the other penal or forensic. When a debtor pays the demand of his creditor in full, he satisfies his claims, and is entirely free from any further demands. In this case the thing paid is the precise sum due, neither more nor less. It is a simple matter of commutative justice; a quid pro quo; so much for so much. There can be no condescension, mercy, or grace on the part of a creditor receiving the payment of a debt. It matters not to him by whom the debt is paid, whether by the debtor himself, or by someone in his stead; because the claim of the creditor is simply upon the amount due and not upon the person of the debtor. In the case of crimes the matter is different. The demand is then upon the offender. He himself is amenable to justice. Substitution in human courts is out of the question. The essential point in matters of crime, is not the nature of the penalty, but who shall suffer. The soul that sins, it shall die. And the penalty need not be, and very rarely is, of the nature of the injury inflicted. All that is required is that it should be a just equivalent. For an assault, it may be a fine; for theft, imprisonment; for treason, banishment, or death. In case a substitute is provided to bear the penalty in the place of the criminal, it would be to the offender a matter of pure grace, enhanced in proportion to the dignity of the substitute, and the greatness of the evil from which the criminal is delivered. Another important difference between pecuniary and penal satisfaction, is that the one ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free, and that completely. No delay can be admitted, and no conditions can be attached to his deliverance. But in the case of a criminal, as he has no claim to have a substitute take his place, if one be provided, the

terms on which the benefits of his substitution shall accrue to the principal, are matters of agreement, or covenant between the substitute and the magistrate who represents justice. The deliverance of the offender may be immediate, unconditional, and complete; or, it may be deferred, suspended on certain conditions, and its benefits gradually bestowed.

As the satisfaction of Christ was not pecuniary, but penal or forensic; a satisfaction for sinners, and not for those who owed a certain amount of money, it follows, --

1. That it does not consist in an exact quid pro quo, so much for so much. This, as just remarked, is not the case even among men. The penalty for theft is not the restitution of the thing stolen, or its exact pecuniary value. It is generally something of an entirely different nature. It may be stripes or imprisonment. The punishment for an assault is not the infliction of the same degree of injury on the person of the offender. So of slander, breach of trust, treason, and all other criminal offences. The punishment, for the offence is something different from the evil which the offender himself inflicted. All that justice demands in penal satisfaction is that it should be a real satisfaction, and not merely something graciously accepted as such. It must bear an adequate proportion to the crime committed. It may be different in kind, but it must have inherent value. To fine a man a few pence for wanton homicide would be a mockery; but death or imprisonment for life would be a real satisfaction to justice. All, therefore, that the Church teaches when it says that Christ satisfied divine justice for the sins of men, is that what He did and suffered was a real adequate compensation for the penalty remitted and the benefits conferred. His sufferings and death were adequate to accomplish all the ends designed by the punishment of the sins of men. He satisfied justice. He rendered it consistent with the justice of God that the sinner should be justified. But He did not suffer either in kind or degree what sinners would have suffered. In value, his sufferings infinitely transcended theirs. The death of an eminently good man would outweigh the annihilation of a universe of insects. So the humiliation, sufferings, and death of the eternal Son of God immeasurably transcended in worth and power the penalty which a world of sinners would have endured.

2. The satisfaction of Christ was a matter of grace. The Father was not bound to provide a substitute for fallen men, nor was the Son bound to assume that office. It was an act of pure grace that God arrested the execution of the penalty of the law, and consented to accept the vicarious sufferings and death of his only begotten Son. And it was an act of unparalleled love that the Son consented to assume our nature, bear our sins, and die, the just for the unjust, to bring us near to God. All the benefits, therefore, which accrue to sinners in consequence of the satisfaction of Christ are to them pure gratuities; blessings to which in themselves they have no claim. They call for gratitude, and exclude boasting.

3. Nevertheless, it is a matter of justice that the blessings which Christ intended to secure for his people should be actually bestowed upon them. This follows, for two reasons: first, they were promised to Him as the reward of his obedience and sufferings. God covenanted with Christ that if He fulfilled the conditions imposed, if He made satisfaction for the sins of his people, they should be saved. It follows, secondly, from the nature of a satisfaction. If the claims of justice are satisfied they cannot be again enforced. This is the analogy between the work of Christ and the payment of a debt. The point of agreement between the two cases is not the nature of the satisfaction rendered, but one aspect of the effect produced. In both cases the persons for whom the satisfaction is made

are certainly freed. Their exemption or deliverance is in both cases, and equally in both, a matter of justice. This is what the Scriptures teach when they say that Christ gave Himself for a ransom. When a ransom is paid and accepted, the deliverance of the captive is a matter of justice. It does not, however, thereby cease to be to the captives a matter of grace. They owe a debt of gratitude to him who paid the ransom, and that debt is the greater when the ransom is the life of their deliverer. So in the case of the satisfaction of Christ. Justice demands the salvation of his people. That is his reward. It is He who has acquired this claim on the. justice of God; his people have no such claim except through Him. Besides, it is of the nature of a satisfaction that it answers all the ends of punishment. What reason can there be for the infliction of the penalty for which satisfaction has been rendered?

4. The satisfaction of Christ being a matter of covenant between the Father and the Son, the distribution of its benefits is determined by the terms of that covenant. It does not ipso facto liberate. The people of God are not justified from eternity. They do not come into the world in a justified state They remain (if adults) in a state of condemnation until they believe. And even the benefits of redemption are granted gradually. The believer receives more and more of them in this life, but the full plenitude of blessings is reserved for the life to come. All these are facts of Scripture and of experience, and they are all explained by the nature of the satisfaction rendered. It is not the payment of a debt, but a matter of agreement or covenant. It seemed good to the parties to the covenant of redemption that matters should be so arranged.

Penalty.

The words penal and penalty are frequently misunderstood. By the penalty of a law is often understood a specific kind or degree of suffering. The penalty of the divine law is said to be eternal death. Therefore if Christ suffered the penalty of the law He must have suffered death eternal; or, as others say, He must have endured the same kind of sufferings as those who are cast off from God and die eternally are called upon to suffer. This difficulty is sometimes met by the older theologians by saying, with Burman, [395] "Tenendum, passionem hanc Christi, licet poenarum nostrarum vim omnem quoad intensionem quasi exhauserit, non tamen ◆ternitatem earum tulisse: temporis enim infinitatem, infinita person◆ dignitas recompensavit." Turrettin says, [396] "Si Christus mortem ◆ternam non tulit sed temporalem tantum et triduanam, non minus tamen solvit quod a nobis debebatur quoad infinitatem poen◆. Quia si non fuit infinita quoad durationem, fuit tamen talis ◆quivalenter quoad valorem, propter person◆ patientis infinitam dignitatem, quia non fuit passio meri hominis, sed veri Dei, qui suo sanguine Ecclesiam acquisivit, Act. xx. 28, ut quod deest finito tempori, suppleatur per person◆ divin◆ conditionem, qu◆ passioni temporali pondus addit infinitum."

Another answer equally common is that Christ suffered what the law denounced on sinners, so far as the essence of the penalty is concerned, but not as to its accidents. These accidents greatly modify all punishments. To a man of culture and refinement, who has near relations of the same class, imprisonment for crime is an unspeakably more severe infliction than it is to a hardened and degraded offender. The essence of the penalty of the divine law is the manifestation of God's displeasure, the withdrawal of the divine favour. This Christ suffered in our stead. He bore the wrath of God. In the case of sinful creatures, this induces final and hopeless perdition, because they have no life in themselves. In the

case of Christ, it was a transient hiding of his Father's face. With sinners, thus being cast off from God is necessarily attended by remorse, despair, and rebellious resistance and enmity. All these are mere circumstantial accidents, not attending the sufferings of Christ. Thus Turrettin says, "Vere tulit poenas quas damnati tulissemus, non quidam tamdiu, non omnes, non in eo loco, non cum illis effectis; sed tamen sensit justam Dei iram." Again, [397] "Licet desperatio et fremitus conjungantur cum poenis damnatorum; non sequitur Christum ferendo poenas peccato debitas debuisse illis exponi, quia non sunt de essentia poen&#65533;, prout a judice infligitur, vel a sponsore sanctissimo fertur; sed habent rationem adjuncti, quod eam comitatur, propter vitium subjecti patientis."

A third and more satisfactory answer to the objection in question is that the words penal and penalty do not designate any particular kind or degree of suffering, but any kind or any degree which is judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice. The word death, as used in Scripture to designate the wages or reward of sin, includes all kinds and degrees of suffering inflicted as its punishment. By the words penal and penalty, therefore, we express nothing concerning the nature of the sufferings endured, but only the design of their infliction. Suffering without any reference to the reason of its occurrence is calamity; if inflicted for the benefit of the sufferer, it is chastisement; if for the satisfaction of justice, it is punishment. The very same kind and amount of suffering may in one case be a calamity; in another a chastisement; in another a punishment. If a man is killed by accident, it is a calamity. If he is put to death on account of crime and in execution of a judicial sentence, it is punishment. A man may be imprisoned to protect him from unjust violence. His incarceration is then an act of kindness. But if he be imprisoned in execution of a judicial sentence, then it is punishment. In both cases the evil suffered may be precisely the same. Luther was imprisoned for years to save him from the fury of the Pope. When, therefore, we say that Christ's sufferings were penal, or that He suffered the penalty of the law, we say nothing as to the nature or the degree of the pains which He endured. We only say, on the one hand, that his sufferings were neither mere calamities, nor chastisements designed for his own benefit, nor merely dogmatic, or symbolical, or exemplary, or the necessary attendants of the conflict between good and evil; and, on the other hand, we affirm that they were designed for the satisfaction of justice. He died in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly.

It is not to be inferred from this, however, that either the kind or degree of our Lord's sufferings was a matter of indifference. We are not authorized to say, as has so often been said, that one drop of his blood would have been sufficient to redeem the world. This may express a pious sentiment, but not a Scriptural truth. He would not have suffered as He did, nor to the degree He did, unless there had been an adequate reason for it. There must be some proportion between the evil endured, and the benefit to be secured. If a man were saved from death or bondage by a prince's paying a shilling, it would be absurd to call that either a satisfaction or a ransom. There must be enough of self-sacrifice and suffering to give dignity and inherent value to the proffered atonement. While, therefore, the value of Christ's sufferings is due mainly to the dignity of his person, their character and intensity are essential elements in their worth. Nevertheless, their character as penal depends not on their nature, but on their design.

Vicarious.

By vicarious suffering or punishment is not meant merely sufferings endured for the benefit of others. The sufferings of martyrs, patriots, and philanthropists, although endured for the good of the Church, the country, or of mankind, are not vicarious. That word, according to its signification and usage, includes the idea of substitution. Vicarious suffering is suffering endured by one person in the stead of another, i.e., in his place. It necessarily supposes the exemption of the party in whose place the suffering is endured. A vicar is a substitute, one who takes the place of another, and acts in his stead. In this sense, the Pope assumes to be the vicar of Christ on earth. He claims and assumes to exercise Christ's prerogatives. What a substitute does for the person whose place he fills, is vicarious, and absolves that person from the necessity of doing or suffering the same thing. [398] When, therefore, it is said that the sufferings of Christ were vicarious, the meaning is that He suffered in the place of sinners. He was their substitute. He assumed their obligation to satisfy justice. What He did and suffered precluded the necessity of their fulfilling the demands of the law in their own persons. This idea of substitution, and of vicarious obedience and suffering, pervades all the religions of the world; which proves that it has its foundation in the nature of man. It is sanctioned in the Word of God, and incorporated in the doctrines therein revealed. And this proves that the idea is not merely human, but divine; that it is in accordance, not only with the reason of man, but with the reason of God. It is an unfairness to use words in a sense inconsistent with their established meaning; to say, for example, that the sufferings of Christ were vicarious, when nothing more is meant than that his sufferings inured to the good of mankind. This may be said of any suffering for the public good; even of the sufferings of criminals; and of the finally impenitent. Christ's sufferings were vicarious in the sense in which the death of one man is vicarious who dies in the place of another to save him from a deserved penalty; in the sense in which the death of the Old Testament sacrifice, which was taken in lieu of the death of the transgressor, was vicarious. And this is the sense in which we are bound to use the word.

Guilt.

The word guilt, as has been repeatedly remarked, expresses the relation which sin bears to justice, or, as the older theologians said, to the penalty of the law. This relation, however, is twofold. First, that which is expressed by the words criminality and ill-desert, or demerit. This is inseparable from sin. It can belong to no one who is not personally a sinner, and it permanently attaches to all who have sinned. It is not removed by justification, much less by pardon. It cannot be transferred from one person to the other. But secondly, guilt means the obligation to satisfy justice. This may be removed by the satisfaction of justice personally or vicariously. It may be transferred from one person to another, or assumed by one person for another. When a man steals or commits any other offence to which a specific penalty is attached by the law of the land, if he submit to the penalty, his guilt in this latter sense is removed. It is not only proper that he should remain without further molestation by the state for that offence, but justice demands his exemption from any further punishment. It is in this sense that it is said that the guilt of Adam's sin is imputed to us; that Christ assumed the guilt of our sins; and that his blood cleanses from guilt. This is very different from demerit or personal ill-desert. The ordinary theological sense of the word guilt is well expressed by the German word Schuld, which means the responsibility for some wrong, or injury, or loss; or, the obligation to make satisfaction. It,

therefore, includes the meaning of our words guilt and debt. "Ich bin nicht schuldig," means I am not answerable. I am not bound to make satisfaction. "Des Todes schuldig seyn," means to be under the obligation to suffer death as a penalty. "Des h﷿llischen Feuers schuldig," means to be in justice bound to endure the fires of hell. So in the Lord's prayer, "Vergieb uns unsere Schulden," remit to us the obligation to satisfy for our sins. The German theologians, old and new, therefore, speak of the guilt (Schuld) of the offender being transferred in the sacrificial services of the Old Testament, from the offender to the victim. "Die Schuld," says Ebrard, [399] "kann, wie wir wissen, nur so hinweggethan werden, dass sie wirkhich gestraft, d. h. ges﷿hnt wird; entweder muss der S﷿nder selbst die Strafe tragen, oder es muss sich ein stellvertretendes Opfer ausfindig machen lassen, welches die Schuld zu ﷿bernehmen, die Strafe zu tragen und alsdann die dadurch erworbene Schuldfreiheit oder Gerechitigkeit dem Menschen wieder mitzutheilen vermag." That is, "Guilt, as we know, can be removed only by punishment. Either the sinner himself must bear the punishment, or a substitute must be provided to assume the guilt, and bear the punishment, and thus freedom from guilt, or righteousness, be secured for the offender." This is the fundamental idea of atonement or satisfaction, which lies at the basis of all sacrifices for sin, the world over, and especially those of the Mosaic economy. And this is the essential idea of the doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ as it is presented in the Scriptures from the beginning to the end, and which is so inwrought into the faith and experience of the people of God that it has withstood all manner of assaults from within and from without, from philosophizing believers and from avowed unbelievers. It assumes that guilt, Schuld, reatus, in the sense of the obligation of the sinner to satisfy divine justice, may be removed, may be transferred from one person to another, or assumed by one in the place of another. In perfect consistency with this doctrine it is maintained that guilt or reatus in the sense of demerit or ill-desert does not admit of removal or transfer.

Redemption.

Redemption sometimes means simple deliverance; but properly, and always in its application to the work of Christ, it means deliverance by purchase. This is plain because it is a deliverance not by authority, or power, or teaching, or moral influence, but by blood, by the payment of a ransom. This is the etymological signification of the word apolutrosis, which is from lutron, a ransom and that from luo, to purchase, e.g., the freedom of a slave or captive.

Expiation and Propitiation.

Expiation and propitiation are correlative terms. The sinner, or his guilt is expiated; God, or justice, is propitiated. Guilt must, from the nature of God, be visited with punishment, which is the expression of God's disapprobation of sin. Guilt is expiated, in the Scriptural representation, covered, by satisfaction, i.e., by vicarious punishment. God is thereby rendered propitious, i.e., it is now consistent with his nature to pardon and bless the sinner. Propitious and loving are not convertible terms. God is love. He loved us while sinners, and before satisfaction was rendered. Satisfaction or expiation does not awaken love in the divine mind. It only renders it consistent with his justice that God should exercise his love towards transgressors of his law. This is expressed by the Greek verb hilaskomai, propitium facio. "To reconcile oneself to any one by expiation." [400] That by which this reconciliation is effected is called hilasmos or hilasterion. The effect produced

is that God is hilaos. God is good to all, full of pity and compassion to all, even to the chief of sinners. But he is hilaos only to those for whose sins an expiation has been made. That is, according to the Old Testament usage, "whose sins are covered." "To cover sin," kpr, is never used to express the idea of moral purification, or sanctification, but always that of expiation. The means by which sin is said to be covered, is not reformation, or good works, but blood, vicarious satisfaction. This in Hebrew is kphr, that which covers. The combination of these two ideas led the LXX. to call the cover of the ark hilasterion, that which covered or shut out the testimony of the law against the sins of the people, and thus rendered God propitious. It was an hilasterion, however, only because sprinkled with blood. Men may philosophize about the nature of God, his relation to his creatures, and the terms on which He will forgive sin, and they may never arrive at a satisfactory conclusion; but when the question is simply, What do the Scriptures teach on this subject? the matter is comparatively easy. In the Old Testament and in the New, God is declared to be just, in the sense that his nature demands the punishment of sin; that therefore there can be no remission without such punishment, vicarious or personal; that the plan of salvation symbolically and typically exhibited in the Mosaic institution, expounded in the prophets, and clearly and variously taught in the New Testament, involves the substitution of the incarnate Son of God in the place of sinners who assumed their obligation to satisfy divine justice, and that He did in fact make a full and perfect satisfaction for sin, bearing the penalty of the law in their stead; all this is so plain and undeniable that it has always been the faith of the Church and is admitted to be the doctrine of the Scriptures by the leading Rationalists of our day. It has been denied only by those who are outside of the Church, and therefore not Christians, or by those who, instead of submitting to the simple word of God, feel constrained to explain its teachings in accordance with their own subjective convictions.

[395] Synopsis Theologie, V. xvii. 8, edit. Geneva, 1678, vol. ii. p. 89.

[396] Institutio, loc. XIV. qu. xi. 28; Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 384.

[397] Loc. XIV. qu. xi. 29, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 384.

[398] Even in medicine the word retains its proper meaning. "A vicarious secretion, is a secretion from one part instead of another." It ceases to be vicarious when the former fails to stop the latter.

[399] Dogmatik, § 401; edit. Knigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 159.

[400] Robinson, Lexicon of the New Testament, in verbo.

CHAPTER VII: SATISFACTION OF CHRIST.

§ 1. Statement of the Doctrine.

The Symbols of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches agree entire1y in their statement of this doctrine. In the "Augsburg Confession" [401] it is said, Christus "sua morte pro nostris peccatis satisfecit." In the "Apology for the Augsburg Confession" [402] it is more fully expounded, "Christus, quia sine peccato subiit poenam peccati, et victima pro nobis factus est, sustulit illud jus legis, ne accuset, ne damnet hos qui credunt in ipsum, quia ipse est propitiatio pro eis, propter quam nunc justi reputantur. Cum autem justi reputentur, lex non potest eos accusare, et damnare, etiamsi re ipsa legi non satisfecerint." "Mors Christi non est solum satisfactio pro culpa, sed etiam pro [illegible]terna morte." [403] "In propitiatore h[illegible]c duo concurrunt: Primum, oportet exstare verbum Dei, ex quo certo sciamus, quod Deus velit misereri et exaudire invocantes per hunc propitiatorem. Talis exstat de Christo promissio. . . . . Alterum est in propitiatore, quod merita ipsius proposita sunt, ut, qu[illegible] pro aliis satisfacerent, qu[illegible] aliis donentur imputatione divina, ut per ea, tanquam propriis meritis justi reputentur, ut si quis amicus pro amico solvit [illegible]s alienum, debitor alieno merito tanquam proprio liberatur. Ita Christi merita nobis donantur, ut justi reputemur fiducia meritorum Christi, cum in eum credimus, tanquam propria merita haberemus." [404] In the "Form of Concord" this doctrine is not only presented but elaborately expounded and vindicated. It is said, [405] "Justitia illa, qu[illegible] coram Deo fidei, aut credentibus, ex mera gratia imputatur, est obedientia, passio et resurrectio Christi, quibus ille legi nostra causa satisfecit, et peccata nostra expiavit. Cum enim Christus non tantum homo, verum Deus et homo sit, in una persona indivisa, tam non fuit legi subjectus, quam non fuit passioni et morti (ratione su[illegible] person[illegible]), obnoxius, quia Dominus legis erat. Eam ob causam ipsius obedientia (non ea tantum, qua patri paruit in tota sua passione et morte, verum etiam, qua nostra causa sponte sese legi subjecit, eamque obedientia illa sua implevit) nobis ad justitiam imputatur, ita, ut Deus propter totam obedientiam (quam Christus agendo et patiendo, in vita et morte sua, nostra causa Patri suo coelesti pr[illegible]stitit) peccata nobis remittat, pro bonis et justis nos reputet, et salute [illegible]terna donet."

The Reformed Confessions are of like import. The Second Helvetic Confession [406] says, "Christus peccata mundi in se recepit et sustulit, divin[illegible]que justiti[illegible] satisfecit. Deus ergo propter solum Christum passum et resuscitatum, propitius est peccatis nostris, nec illa nobis imputat." The Belgic Confession says, [407] "Credimus, Jesum Christum summum ilium sacerdotem esse, ... qui se nostro nomine coram Patre ad placandam ipsius iram cum plena satisfactione obtulit, sistens se ipsum super altare crucis, et sanguinem suum pretiosum ad purgationem peccatorum nostrorum profudit." The Heidelberg Catechism says, [408] "Deus vult justiti[illegible] satisfieri; quocirca necesse est, vel per nos, vel per alium

satisfaciamus." In the following answers it is taught that man cannot satisfy the justice of God for himself, nor any creature for him; that it was necessary that He who, as our substitute, would make satisfaction in our stead, should be both God and man. In answer to the question, [409] Why it was necessary that Christ should die, it is said, "Propterea quod justiti&#65533; et veritati Dei nullo alio pacto pro nostris peccatis potuit satisfieri, quam ipsa morte filii Dei." The Heidelberg Catechism being the standard of doctrine in all the Dutch and German Reformed churches in Europe and America, is one of the most important and authoritative of the symbols of the Reformation.

In the "Formula Consensus Helvetica" [410] it is said, "Ita Christus vice electorum obedientia mortis su&#65533; Deo patri satisfecit, ut in censum tamen vicari&#65533; justiti&#65533; et obedienti&#65533; illius, universa ejus, quam per totius vit&#65533; su&#65533; curriculum legi . . . . sive agendo sive patiendo pr&#65533;stitit, obedientia vocari debeat. . . . . Rotundo asserit ore Spiritus Dei, Christum sanctissima vita legi et justiti&#65533; divin&#65533; pro nobis satisfecisse, et pretium illud, quo empti sumus Deo, non in passionibus duntaxat, sed tota ejus vita legi conformata collocat."

The "Westminster Confession" [411] says, "The Lord Jesus, by his perfect obedience and sacrifice of Himself, which He through the eternal Spirit once offered up unto God, hath fully satisfied the justice of his Father; and purchased not only reconciliation, but an everlasting inheritance in the kingdom of heaven for all those whom the Father hath given unto Him."

This, however, is not a doctrine peculiar to the Lutheran and Reformed churches; it is part of the faith of the Church universal. The Council of Trent says, [412] "Jesus Christus, cum essemus inimici, propter nimiam caritatem qua dilexit nos, sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis nobis justificationem meruit, et pro nobis Deo patri satisfecit." "Christus Jesus, qui pro peccatis nostris satisfecit." [413] The Roman Catechism says, [414] "Hoc in passione, et morte Filius Dei salvator noster spectavit, ut omnium &#65533;tatum peccata redimeret ac deleret, et pro eis Patri abunde, cumulateque satisfaceret." "Prima satisfactio et pr&#65533;stantissima illa est, qua pro scelerum nostrorum ratione, etiam si Deus summo jure nobiscum velit agere, quidquid a nobis debeatur, cumulate persolutum est. H&#65533;c vero ejusmodi esse dicitur, qu&#65533; nobis Deum propitium et placatum reddidit, eamque uni Christo domino acceptam ferimus, qui in cruce, pretio pro peccatis nostris soluto, plenissime Deo satisfecit." [415]

[401] I. iv. 2; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. p. 10.

[402] III. 58; Ibid. p. 93.

[403] VI. 43; Ibid. p. 190.

[404] IX. 17, 19; Ibid. p. 226.

[405] III. 14, 15; Ibid. p. 684, 685.

[406] XV.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 494.

[407] XXI.; Ibid. p. 373.

[408] XII.; Ibid. p. 432.

[409] XL.; Ibid. p. 439.

[410] XV. 32, 33; Ibid. pp. 734, 735.

[411] Chap. viii. § 5.

[412] Sess. vi. cap. 7; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<unk>ttingen, 1846, pp. 24, 25.

[413] Sess. xiv. cap. 8; Ibid. p. 63.

[414] I. v. 11; Ibid. pp. 155, 156.

[415] II. v. 53 (lxxxvii. or 63), Ibid. p. 401.

§ 2. The Intrinsic Worth of Christ's Satisfaction.

The first point is that Christ's work was of the nature of a satisfaction, because it met and answered all the demands of God's law and justice against the sinner. The law no longer condemns the sinner who believes in Christ. Those, however, whom the infinitely holy and strict law of God does not condemn are entitled to the divine fellowship and favour. To them there can be no condemnation. The work of Christ was not, therefore, a mere substitute for the execution of the law, which God in his sovereign mercy saw fit to accept in lieu of what the sinner was bound to render. It had an inherent worth which rendered it a perfect satisfaction, so that justice has no further demands. It is here as in the case of state criminals. If such an offender suffers the penalty which the law prescribes as the punishment of his offence he is no longer liable to condemnation. No further punishment can justly be demanded for that offence. This is what is called the perfection of Christ's satisfaction. It perfectly, from its own intrinsic worth, satisfies the demands of justice. This is the point meant to be illustrated when the work of Christ is compared in Scripture and in the writings of theologians to the payment of a debt. The creditor has no further claims when the debt due to him is fully paid.

This perfection of the satisfaction of Christ, as already remarked, is not due to his having suffered either in kind or in degree what the sinner would have been required to endure; but principally to the infinite dignity of his person. He was not a mere man, but God and man in one person. His obedience and sufferings were therefore the obedience and sufferings of a divine person. This does not imply, as the Patripassians in the ancient Church assumed, and as some writers in modem times assume, that the divine nature itself suffered. This idea is repudiated alike by the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. In the "Second Helvetic Confession" [416] it is said, "Minime docemus naturam in Christo divinam passam esse." The "Form of Concord" [417] teaches the same thing, quoting Luther, who says that our Saviour to suffer must become man, "non enim in sua natura Deus mori potest. Postquam autem Deus et homo unitus est in una persona, recte et vere dicitur: Deus mortuus est, quando videlicet ille homo moritur, qui cum Deo unum quiddam, seu una persona est." This is precisely what the Apostle, in Hebrews ii. 14, teaches, when he says that He who was the Son of God, who made heaven and earth, who upholds all things by the word of his mouth, and who is immutable and eternal, assumed our nature (flesh and blood) in order that He might die, and by death destroy him who had the power of death, that is, the devil. Christ is but one person, with two distinct natures, and therefore whatever can be predicated of either nature may be predicated of the person. An indignity offered to a man's body is offered to himself. If this principle be not correct there was no greater crime in the crucifixion of Christ than in unjustly inflicting death on an ordinary man. The principle in question, however, is clearly recognized in Scripture, and therefore the sacred. writers do

not hesitate to say that God purchased the Church with his blood; and that the Lord of glory was crucified. Hence such expressions as Dei mors, Dei sanguis, Dei passio have the sanction of Scriptural as well of Church usage. It follows from this that the satisfaction of Christ has all the value which belongs to the obedience and sufferings of the eternal Son of God, and his righteousness, as well active as passive, is infinitely meritorious. This is what the Apostle clearly teaches in Hebrews ix. 13, 14: "For if the blood if bulls and of goats . . . . sanctifieth to the purifying of the flesh, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who through (or with) an eternal Spirit offered himself without spot to God, purge your conscience from dead works to serve the living God?" The superior efficacy of the sacrifice of Christ is thus referred to the infinitely superior dignity of his person.

It follows from the perfection of Christ's satisfaction that it supersedes and renders impossible all other satisfactions for sin. The sufferings which justified believers are called upon to endure are not punishments, because not designed for the satisfaction of justice. They are chastisements intended for the benefit of the sufferer, the edification of the Church, and the glory of God. In this view all Protestant churches concur.

Romish Doctrine of Satisfaction.

Romanists, while on the one hand they exalt to the utmost the intrinsic value of Christ's satisfaction, yet on the other hand they restrict its application. At one time, it was the prevalent doctrine in the Latin Church that the work of Christ availed only for the pardon of sins committed before baptism. With regard to post-baptismal sins, it was held either that they were unpardonable, or that atonement must be made for them by the sinner himself. This idea that the satisfaction of Christ avails only to the forgiveness of sins committed before conversion has been adopted by many Rationalists, as for example by Bretschneider. [418] He says, "F&#65533;r sp&#65533;tere S&#65533;nden der Christen gilt das Opfer Christi nicht, sondern es geht dem S&#65533;nder nur einmal, bei der Taufe, zu Gute." "The sacrifice of Christ does not avail for the later sins of the Christian. It benefits the sinner only once, at his baptism." [419] What is more remarkable, Dr. Emmons, Puritan though he was, has very much the same idea. The only benefit we receive from Christ, he says, is the forgiveness of sins. This is granted when we believe. After that, we are rewarded or punished, not only according to but on account of our works. [420] The doctrine that post-baptismal sins are unpardonable, having been rejected as heretical, the Romish theologians adopted the theory that the satisfaction of Christ availed only to the remission of the penalty of eternal death; leaving the sinner bound to suffer the temporal punishment due to his transgressions or to make satisfaction for them.

The Romish doctrine of satisfactions arose out of a perversion of the penances imposed in the early ages upon the lapsed. Those penances were satisfactions rendered to the Church; that is, they were intended to satisfy the Church of the sincerity of the offender's repentance. When they came to be regarded as satisfactions rendered to the justice of God, the theologians were obliged to adopt a theory to reconcile the Church practice with the doctrine of the infinitely meritorious satisfaction of Christ. That theory was that the satisfaction of Christ, infinite though it was in merit, was designed only to secure the remission of everlasting death. Temporal punishments and the pains of purgatory after death are still to be endured, at the discretion of the Church, as satisfactions for sins. This is not the place for the full discussion of this subject. It is enough to remark, (1.) That if, as the

Scriptures teach, every sin deserves God's wrath and curse, both in this life and in that which is to come, then it is out of all question for a sinner to make satisfaction for the least of all his sins. What he offers as the ground of pardon needs itself to be pardoned. This is so plain that Romanists have modified their theory so as in fact to destroy it, by teaching that the satisfaction rendered by penitents is accepted as such only for Christ's sake. But if this be so then the satisfaction of Christ is all-sufficient, and is not confined to removing the penalty of eternal death. (2.) In the Bible, the work of Christ is said to cleanse from all sin. All other sacrifices and satisfactions are said to be utterly unavailing, even should a man give the fruit of his body for the sin of his soul. (3.) Those who believe in Christ are justified, says the Apostle, from all things. They are not under condemnation. No one can lay anything to their charge. They have peace with God. (4.) This doctrine of supplementary satisfaction is derogatory to Christ and destructive of the peace of the believer, reducing him to a slavish state, and putting his salvation in the hands of the priests. (5.) If Christ be our only priest his work is the only satisfaction for sin. All others are unnecessary and every other is impossible.

[416] XI.; Niemeyer, p. 485.

[417] VIII. 44; Hase, p. 772.

[418] Dogmatik, part ii. ch. vi. 2, §§ 154-158, 3d edit. vol. ii. pp. 280-310.

[419] Systematische Entwickelung, § 107, 4th edit. p. 624.

[420] Works of Nathaniel Emmons, D. D., edit. by Jacob Ide, D. D. Boston, 1842, vol. v. Sermons 46, 47.

§ 3. Doctrine of the Scotists and Remonstrants.

While Protestants and the Church generally have held the doctrine that the satisfaction of Christ, because of the dignity of his person and the nature and degree of his sufferings was and is infinitely meritorious, absolutely perfect from its intrinsic worth, and completely efficacious in its application to all the sins of the believer, the Scotists in the Middle Ages, and after them Grotius and the Remonstrants, denied that the work of Christ had inherent value to satisfy divine justice, but said that it was taken as a satisfaction, acceptatione gratuita. The propositions laid down by Anselm, in his epoch-making book, "Cur Deus Homo?" were, "(1.) Quod necessarium fuit hominem redimi. (2.) Quod non potuit redimi sine satisfactione. (3.) Quod facienda erat satisfactio a Deo homine. (4.) Quod convenientior modus fuit hic, scilicet per passionem Christi." The argument of Anselm is founded on the assumption that the pardon of sin required an infinite satisfaction, i.e., a satisfaction of infinite merit, which could only be rendered by a person of infinite dignity. This principle, and all the propositions founded upon it, Duns Scotus contested. He advanced the opposite principle, namely, "Tantum valet omne creatum oblatum, pro quanto Deus acceptat." Therefore any man might have satisfied for his own sins; or one man for the sins of all men, had God seen fit so to ordain. "Meritum Christi," he says, "fuit finitum, quia a principio finito essentialiter dependens. Non enim Christus quatenus Deus meruit, sed quatenus homo." This principle became the foundation of the doctrine of the Remonstrants on the work of Christ, and of the work of Grotius, "De Satisfactione Christi." Limborch [421] says, "Satisfactio Christi dicitur, qua pro nobis poenas omnes luit peccatis nostris

debitas, easque perferendo et exhauriendo divin&#65533; justiti&#65533; satisfecit. Verum illa sententia nullum habet in Scriptura fundamentum. Mors Christi vocatur sacrificium pro peccato; atqui sacrificia non sunt solutiones debitorum, neque plenari&#65533; pro peccatis satisfactiones; sed illis peractis conceditur gratuita peccati remissio. In eo errant quam maxime, quod velint redemtionis pretium per omnia &#65533;quivalens esse debere miseri&#65533; illi, e qua redemtio fit. Redemtionis pretium enim constitui solet pro libera &#65533;stimatione illius qui captivum detinet, non autem solvi pro captivi merito." [422] Curcell&#65533;us, another distinguished Remonstrant, or Arminian theologian, says the same thing: [423] "Non ergo, ut vulgo putant, satisfecit [Christus] patiendo omnes poenas, quas peccatis nostris merueramus. Nam primo, istud ad sacrificii rationem non pertinet. . . . . Sacrificia enim non sunt solutiones debitorum. . . . . Secundo, Christus non est passus mortem &#65533;ternam qu&#65533; erat poena peccato debita, nam paucis tantum horis in cruce prependit, et tertia die resurrexit ex mortuis. Imo etiamsi mortem &#65533;ternam pertulisset, non videtur satisfacere potuisse pro omnibus totius mundi peccatis. H&#65533;c enim fuisset tantum una mors, qu&#65533; omnibus mortibus, quas singuli pro suis peccatis meruerant, non &#65533;quivaluisset."

It is obvious that the objections presented in the above extracts arise from confounding pecuniary with judicial or legal satisfaction. There is an analogy between them, and, therefore, on the ground of that analogy it is right to say that Christ assumed and paid our debts. The analogy consists, first, in the effect produced, namely, the certain deliverance of those for whom the satisfaction is made; secondly, that a real equivalent is paid; and, thirdly, that in both cases justice requires that the liberation of the obligee should take place. But, as we have already seen, the two kinds of satisfaction differ, first, in that in penal satisfaction the demand is not for any specific degree or kind of suffering; secondly, that while the value of pecuniary satisfaction is independent entirely of the person by whom the payment is made, in the other case everything depends on the dignity of him by whom the satisfaction is rendered; and, thirdly, that the benefits of a penal satisfaction are conferred according to the terms or conditions of the covenant in pursuance of which it is offered and accepted.

The principle that a thing avails for whatever God chooses to take it, which is the foundation of the doctrine that Christ's work was not a satisfaction in virtue of its intrinsic worth but only by the gracious acceptance of God, cannot be true. For, --

1. It amounts to saying that there is no truth in anything. God may (if such language may be pardoned) take anything for anything; a whole for a part, or a part for the whole; truth for error, or error for truth; right for wrong, or wrong for right; the blood of a goat for the blood of the Eternal Son of God. This is impossible. The nature of God is immutable, -- immutable reason, truth, and goodness; and his nature determines his will and his judgments. Therefore it is impossible that He should take that to be satisfaction which is not really such.

2. The principle in question involves the denial of the necessity of the work of Christ. It is inconceivable that God should send his only begotten Son into the world to suffer and die if the same end could have been accomplished in any other way. If every man could atone for his own sins, or one man for the sins of the whole world, then Christ is dead in vain.

3. If this doctrine be true then it is not true that it is impossible that the blood of bulls

and of goats should take away sins. If every creatum oblatum tantum valet, pro quanto Deus acceptat, then why might not the Old Testament sacrifices have sufficed to take away sin? What rendered them inefficacious was their own inherent worthlessness. And what renders the satisfaction of Christ effectual is its own inherent value.

4. The Scriptures teach the necessity of the death of Christ, not only by implication, but also by direct assertion. In Galatians ii. 21, the Apostle says, "If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain." This means that if the righteousness necessary for the salvation of men could have been secured in any other way the whole work of Christ is a matter of supererogation, an unnecessary expenditure of what was beyond all price. Still more explicit is his language in Galatians iii. 21: "If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness should have been by the law." It is here asserted that if any other method could have availed to save sinners it would have been adopted. Our Lord, in Luke xxiv. 26, asks, "Ought not Christ to have suffered these things?" There was an obligation, or necessity, which demanded his sufferings if the salvation of sinners was to be accomplished. The Apostle again, in Hebrews ii. 10, says, "It became him, for whom are all things, and by whom are all things, in bringing many sons unto glory, to make the captain of their salvation perfect through sufferings." There was a necessity for the sufferings of Christ, and that necessity was not merely governmental, nor for the accumulating moral power over the sinner's heart, but it arose out of the nature of God. It became Him. It was consonant with his perfections and character, which is the highest conceivable kind of necessity.

5. What the Scriptures teach of the justice of God leads to the same conclusion. Justice is a form of moral excellence. It belongs to the nature of God. It demands the punishment of sin. If sin be pardoned it can be pardoned in consistency with the divine justice only on the ground of a forensic penal satisfaction. Therefore the Apostle says (Romans iii. 25), that God sent forth Christ as a propitiation through faith in his blood, in order that God might be just in justifying the ungodly.

6. The Scriptures, in representing the gift of Christ as the highest conceivable exhibition of the divine love, do thereby teach, first, that the end to be accomplished was worthy of the sacrifice; and, secondly, that the sacrifice was necessary to the attainment of the end. If the end could have been otherwise attained there would have been no exhibition of love in the gift of Christ for its accomplishment.

7. All that the Bible teaches of the truth of God; of the immutability of the law; of the necessity of faith; of the uselessness and worthlessness of all other sacrifices for sin; and of the impossibility of salvation except through the work of the incarnate Son of God, precludes the idea that his satisfaction was not necessary to our salvation, or that any other means could have accomplished the object. And if thus absolutely necessary, it must be that nothing else has worth enough to satisfy the demands of God's law. It is the language and spirit of the whole Bible, and of every believing heart in relation to Christ that his "blood alone has power sufficient to atone."

[421] Theologia Christiana, III. xxi. 6; edit. Amsterdam, 1700, p. 255.

[422] Ibid. III. xxi. 8; ut supra, p. 256.

[423] Opera Theologica, edit. Amsterdam, 1675, p. 300.

§ 4. Satisfaction rendered to Justice.

The second point involved in the Scriptural doctrine concerning he satisfaction of Christ is, that it was a satisfaction to the justice of God. This is asserted in all the Confessions above cited. And by justice is not meant simply general rectitude or rightness of character and action; nor simply rectoral justice, which consists in a due regard to the rights and interests of subjects in relation to rulers; much less does it mean commutative justice or honesty. It is admitted that the Hebrew word tsdyq, the Greek dikaios, the Latin justus, the English just or righteous, and their cognates, are used in all these senses both in Scripture and in ordinary life. But they are also used to express the idea of distributive or retributive justice; that form of moral excellence which demands the righteous distribution of rewards and punishments which renders it certain, under the government of God, that obedience will be rewarded and sin punished. This is also properly called, especially in its relation to sin, vindicatory justice, because it vindicates and maintains the right. Vindicatory and vindictive, in the ordinary sense of this latter term, are not synonymous. It is a common mistake or misrepresentation to confound these two words, and to represent those who ascribe to God the attribute of vindicatory justice as regarding Him as a vindictive being, thirsting for revenge. There is as much difference between the words and the ideas they express as there is between a righteous judge and a malicious murderer. The question then is, Does the attribute of vindicatory justice belong to God? Does his infinite moral excellence require that sin should be punished on account of its own inherent demerit, irrespective of the good effects which may flow from such punishment? Or is justice what Leibnitz defines it to be, "Benevolence guided by wisdom." It is admitted that the work of Christ was in some sense a satisfaction; that it satisfied in some way the exigencies of the case, or the conditions necessary to the salvation of man. It is further, at least generally, admitted that it was in some sense a satisfaction of justice. This being the case, everything depends on what is meant by justice. If justice is "benevolence guided by wisdom," or a benevolent disposition on the part of a ruler to sustain his authority as a means of promoting the happiness of his. kingdom, then the work of Christ is one thing. It may be simply a means of reformation, or of moral impression. But if justice is that perfection of the divine nature which renders it necessary that. the righteous be rewarded and the wicked punished, then the work of Christ must be a satisfaction of justice in that sense of the term. The question, therefore, concerning "the nature of the atonement" depends on the question whether there is in God such an attribute as distributive or vindicatory justice. This question has already been discussed when treating of the attributes of God. All that is necessary here is a brief recapitulation of the arguments there presented, --

1. We ascribe intelligence, knowledge, power, holiness, goodness, and truth to God, (a.) Because these are perfections which belong to our own nature, and must of necessity belong to Him in whose image we were created. (b.) Because these attributes are all manifested in his works. (c.) Because they are all revealed in his Word. On the same grounds we ascribe to God justice; that. is, the moral excellence which determines Him to punish sin and reward righteousness. The argument in this case is not only of the same kind, but of the same cogency. We are just as conscious of a sense of justice as we are of intelligence or of power. This consciousness belongs to man as man, to all men in all ages and under all circumstances. It must, therefore, belong to the original constitution of their nature. Consequently it is as certain that God is just, in the ordinary sense of that word, as

that He is intelligent or holy.

2. The Spirit of God in convincing a man of sin convinces him of guilt as well as of pollution. That is, He convinces him of his desert of punishment. But a sense of a desert of punishment is a conviction that we ought to be punished; and this is of necessity attended with the persuasion that, under the righteous government of God, the punishment of sin is inevitable and necessary. They who sin, the Apostle says, know the righteous judgment of God, that they are worthy of death.

3. The justice of God is revealed in his works, (a.) In the constitution of our nature. The connection between sin and misery is so intimate that many have gone to the extreme of teaching that there is no other punishment of sin but its natural effects. This is contrary to fact as well as to Scripture. Nevertheless it is true that to be "carnally minded is death," that is, damnation. There is no help for it. It is vain to say that God will not punish sin when He has made sin and its punishment inseparable. The absence of light is darkness; the absence of life is death; (b.) It is, however, not only in the constitution of our nature, but also in all his works of providence, that God has revealed his purpose to punish sin. The deluge; the destruction of the cities of the plain; the overthrow of Jerusalem and the dispersion and long-continued degradation of the Jewish people; the ruins of Nineveh, of Babylon, of Tyre and Sidon, and of Egypt; and the present condition of many of the nations of the earth, as well as the general administration of the divine government, are proof enough that God is an avenger, that He will in no wise spare the guilty.

4. The Scriptures so constantly and so variously teach that God is just, that it is impossible to present adequately their testimony on the subject. (a.) We have the direct assertions of Scripture. Almost the first words which God spoke to Adam were, "In the day that thou eatest thereof thou shalt surely die." The angels who sinned are reserved in chains unto the judgment of the great lay. Death is declared to be the wages, i.e., the proper recompense of sin, which justice demands that it should receive. God is declared to be a consuming fire. Men can no more secure themselves from the punishment of their sins, by their own devices, than they can save themselves from a raging conflagration by a covering of chaff. The penalty of the law is as much a revelation of the nature of God as its precept is. As He cannot, consistently with his perfections, exonerate men from the obligation of obedience, so He cannot allow them to sin with impunity. It is, therefore, declared that He will reward every man according to his works. (b.) All the divinely ordained institutions of religion, whether Patriarchal, Mosaic, or Christian, were founded on the assumption of the justice of God, and were designed to impress that great truth in the minds of men. They take for granted that men are sinners; and that, being sinners, they need expiation for their guilt as well as moral purification, in order to salvation. Sacrifices, therefore, were instituted from the beginning to teach the necessity of expiation and to serve as prophetic types of the only effectual expiation which, in the fulness of time, was to be offered for the sins of men. Without the shedding of blood (i.e., without vicarious punishment) there is no remission. This is recorded, not merely as a fact under the Mosaic dispensation, but as embodying a principle valid under all dispensations. It is not, therefore, this or that declaration of Scripture, or this or that institution which must be explained away if the justice of God be denied, but the whole form and structure of the religion of the Bible. That religion as the religion for sinners rests on the assumption of the necessity of expiation. This is its corner-

stone, and the whole fabric falls into ruin if that stone be removed. That God cannot pardon sin without a satisfaction to justice, and that He cannot have fellowship with the unholy, are the two great truths which are revealed in the constitution of our nature as well as in the Scriptures, and which are recognized in all forms of religion, human or divine. It is because the demands of justice are met by the work of Christ, that his gospel is the power of God unto salvation, and that it is so unspeakably precious to those whom the Spirit of God has convinced of sin. (c.) We accordingly find that the plan of salvation as unfolded in the New Testament is founded on the assumption that God is just. The argument of the sacred writers is this: The wrath of God is revealed against all unrighteousness and ungodliness of men. That is, God is determined to punish sin. All men, whether Gentiles or Jews, are sinners. Therefore the whole world is guilty before God. Hence no man can be justified by works. It is a contradiction to say that those who are under condemnation for their character and conduct can be justified on the ground of anything they are or can do. There is no force in this argument unless there is a necessity for the punishment of sin. Human sovereigns pardon criminals; earthly parents forgive their children. If the penalty of the law could be as easily remitted in the divine government then it would not follow from the fact that all men are sinners that they cannot be forgiven on the ground of their repentance and reformation. The Scriptures, however, assume that if a man sins he must die. On this assumption all their representations and arguments are founded. Hence the plan of salvation which the Bible reveals supposes that the justice of God which renders the punishment of sin necessary has been satisfied. Men can be pardoned and restored to the favour of God, because Christ was set forth as an expiation for their sins, through faith in his blood because He was made a curse for us; because He died, the just for the unjust; because He bore our sins in his own body on the tree and because the penalty due to us was laid on Him. It is clear therefore, that the Scriptures recognize the truth that God is just, in the sense that He is determined by his moral excellence to punish all sin, and therefore that the satisfaction of Christ which secures the pardon of sinners is rendered to the justice of God. Its primary and principal design is neither to make a moral impression upon the offenders themselves, nor to operate didactically on other intelligent creatures, but to satisfy the demands of justice; so that God can be just in justifying the ungodly.

§ 5. The Work of Christ Satisfies the Demands of the Law.

A third point involved in the Church doctrine on the work of Christ, is that it is a satisfaction to the divine law. This indeed may seem to be included under the foregoing head. If a satisfaction to justice, it must be a satisfaction to law. But in the ordinary use of the terms, the word law is more comprehensive than justice. To satisfy justice is to satisfy the demand which justice makes for the punishment of sin. But the law demands far more than the punishment of sin, and therefore satisfaction to the law includes more than the satisfaction of vindicatory justice. In its relation to the law of God the Scriptural doctrine concerning the work of Christ includes the following points: --

1. The law of God is immutable. It can neither be abrogated nor dispensed with. This is true both as respects its precepts and penalty. Such is the nature of God as holy, that He cannot cease to require his rational creatures to be holy. It can never cease to be obligatory on them to love and obey God. And such is the nature of God as just, that He cannot cease

to condemn sin, and therefore all those who are guilty of sin.

2. Our relation to the law is two-fold, federal and moral. It is of the nature of a covenant prescribing the conditions of life. It says, "Ye shall keep my statutes and my judgments; which if a man do, he shall live in them." And, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them."

3. From this federal relation to the law we are, under the gospel, delivered. We are no longer bound to be free from all sin, and to render perfect obedience to the law, as the condition of salvation. If this were not the case, no flesh living could be saved. We are not under law but under grace.

4. This deliverance from the law is not effected by its abrogation, or by lowering its demands, but by the work of Christ. He was made under the law that He might redeem those who were under the law.

5. The work of Christ was therefore of the nature of a satisfaction to the demands of the law. By his obedience and sufferings, by his whole righteousness, active and passive, He, as our representative and substitute, did and endured all that the law demands.

6. Those, who by faith receive this righteousness, and trust upon it for justification, are saved; and receive the renewing of their whole nature into the image of God. Those who refuse to submit to this righteousness of God, and go about to establish their own righteousness, are left under the demands of the law; they are required to be free from all sin, or having sinned, to bear the penalty.

Proof of the Immutability of the Law.

The principles above stated are not arbitrarily assumed; they are not deductions from any ◆ priori maxims or axioms; they are not the constituent elements of a humanly constructed theory; they are not even the mere obiter dicta of inspired men; they are the principles which the sacred writers not only announce as true, but on which they argue, and which they employ in the construction of that system of doctrine which they present as the object of faith and ground of hope to fallen men. The only legitimate way therefore of combating these principles, is to prove, not that they fail to satisfy the reason, the feelings, or the imagination, or that they are incumbered with this or that difficulty; but that they are not Scriptural. If the sacred writers do announce and embrace them, then they are true, or we have no solid ground on which to rest our hopes for eternity.

The Scriptural character of these principles being the only question of real importance, appeal must be made at once to the Word of God. Throughout the Scriptures, the immutability of the divine law; the necessity of its demands being satisfied; the impossibility of sinners making that satisfaction for themselves; the possibility of its being rendered by substitution; and that a wonderfully constituted person, could and would, and in fact has, accomplished this work in our behalf, are the great constituent principles of the religion of the Bible. As the revelation contained in the Scriptures has been made in a progressive form, we find all these principles culminating in their full development in the later writings of the New Testament. In St. Paul's epistle to the Romans, for example, the following positions are assumed and established (1.) The law must be fulfilled. (2.) It demands perfect obedience; and, in case of transgression, the penalty of death. (3.) No fallen man can fulfil those conditions, or satisfy the demands of the law. (4.) Christ, the Eternal Son of God, clothed in our natures has made this satisfaction to law for us. (5.) We

are thus freed from the law. We are not under law, but under grace. (6.) All that is now required of us is faith in Christ. To those who are in Him there is no condemnation. (7.) By his obedience we are constituted righteous, and, being thus reconciled to God, we become partakers of the holy and immortal life of Christ, and are delivered not only from the penalty, but from the power of sin, and made the sons and heirs of God. (8.) The great condemning sin of men under the gospel, is rejecting the righteousness and Spirit of Christ, and insisting either that they need no Saviour, or that they can in some way save themselves; that they can satisfy all God's just demands, and deliver themselves from the power of sin. If the foregoing principles are eliminated from the Pauline epistles, their whole life and power are gone. And Paul assures us that he received his doctrines, not from men, but by the revelation of Jesus Christ. It is against this rock, -- the substitution of Christ in the place of sinners; his making a full satisfaction to the justice and law of God, thus working out for us a perfect righteousness, by which we may be justified, -- that the assaults of philosophy, falsely so called, and of heresy in all its forms have been directed from the beginning. This it is that the Gnostics and New Platonists in the first centuries; the Scotists and Franciscans during the Middle Ages; the Socinians and Remonstrants at, and after the Reformation; and Rationalists and the speculative philosophy of our own age, have striven to overthrow. But it remains, what it ever has been, the foundation of the faith, hope, and life of the Church.

§ 6. Proof of the Doctrine.

The Scriptural evidence in support of this great doctrine, as far as it can well be presented within reasonable limits, has already, in great measure, been exhibited, in the statement and vindication of the several elements which it includes.

It has been shown, (1.) That the work of Christ for our salvation, was a real satisfaction of infinite inherent dignity and worth. (2.) That it was a satisfaction not to commutative justice (as paying a sum of money would be), nor to the rectoral justice or benevolence of God, but to his distributive and vindicatory justice which renders necessary the punishment of sin; and (3.) That it was a satisfaction to the law of God, meeting its demands of a perfect righteousness for the justification of sinners. If these points be admitted, the Church doctrine concerning the satisfaction, or atonement of Christ, is admitted in all that is essential to its integrity. It remains, therefore, only to refer to certain classes of passages and modes of representation pervading the Scriptures, which assume or assert the truth of all the principles above stated.

Christ saves us as our Priest.

Christ is said to save men as a priest. It is not by the mere exercise of power, nor by instruction and mental illumination; nor by any objective, persuasive, moral influence; nor by any subjective operation, whether natural or supernatural, whether intelligible or mystical, but by acting for them the part of a representative, substitute, propitiator, and intercessor. It was in the Old Testament foretold that the Messiah was to be both priest and king, that he was to be a priest after the order of Melchisedec. In the New Testament, and especially in the Epistle to the Hebrews, which is devoted almost exclusively to the exhibition of the priestly character and work of Christ, it is taught, --

1. That a priest is a substitute or representative, appointed to do for sinners what they

could not do for themselves. Their guilt and pollution forbid their access to God. Someone, therefore, must be authorized to appear before God in their behalf, and effect reconciliation of God to sinners.

2. That this reconciliation can only be effected by means of an expiation for sin. The guilt of sin can be removed in no other way. Without the shedding of blood, there is no remission. A priest, therefore, is one appointed for men (i.e., to act in their behalf), to offer both gifts and sacrifices for sin.

3. That this expiation was effected by the substitution of a victim in the place of the sinner, to die in his stead, i.e., in Scriptural language, "to bear his sins." "Guilt," says Ebrard, in a passage already quoted, "can be removed only by being actually punished, i.e. expiated. Either the sinner himself must bear the punishment, or a substitute must be found, which can assume the guilt, bear the penalty, and give the freedom from guilt or righteousness thus secured, to the offender." [424] This he gives as the fundamental idea of the epistle to the Hebrews.

4. Such being the nature of the priesthood and the way in which a priest saves those for whom he acts, the Apostle shows, first, with regard to the priests under the old economy, that such was the method, ordained by God, by which the remission of ceremonial sins and restoration to the privileges of the theocracy, were to be secured; and secondly, that the victims then offered, having no inherent dignity or worth, could not take away sin; they could not purge the conscience from the sense of guilt, or bring to the end contemplated (teleiosai) those for whom they were offended, and hence had to be continually repeated. In Hebrews ix. 9, it is said dora te kai thusiai . . . . me dunamenai kata suneidesin teleiosai ton latreuonta, i.e., says Robinson, "which could never make full expiation for the bringer, so as to satisfy his conscience."

5. The Aaronic priesthood and sacrifices were, therefore, temporary, being the mere types and shadows of the true priest and the real sacrifice, promised from the beginning.

6. Christ, the Eternal Son of God, assumed our nature in order that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest, to make reconciliation for the sins of the people. That is, to make expiation for sin. The word used is hilaskomai, propitium reddere; which in the Septuagint, is the substitute for kpr (to cover guilt), to hide sin from the sight of God. In the New Testament, as in the Septuagint, hilaskomai is the special term for sacerdotal expiation, and is not to be confounded with apokatallattesthai, to reconcile. The latter is the effect of the former; reconciliation is secured by expiation.

7. Christ is proved, especially in Hebrews v., to be a real priest; first, because He has all the qualifications for the office, He was a man, was a substitute, had a sacrifice, and was able to sympathize with his people; secondly, because He was called of God to the priesthood, as was Aaron; thirdly, because He actually discharged all the functions of the office.

8. The sacrifice which this great high priest offered in our behalf, was not the blood of irrational animals, but his own most precious blood.

9. This one sacrifice has perfected forever (teteleioken, made a perfect expiation for) them that are sanctified. (Hebrews x. 14.)

10. This sacrifice has superseded all others. No other is needed; and no other is

possible.

11. Those who reject this method of salvation certainly perish. To them there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins. (Hebrews x. 26.)

It can hardly be questioned that this is a correct, although feeble statement of the leading ideas of the Epistle to the Hebrews. With this agree all other representations of the Scriptures both in the Old Testament and in the New, and therefore if we adhere to the doctrine of the Bible we must believe that Christ saves us, not by power, or by moral influence, but as a priest, by offering Himself as an expiatory sacrifice for our sins. To deny this; to explain away these express teachings of the Scriptures, as mere accommodations to the modes of thought prevalent in the age of the Apostles; or to substitute modern ideas of the nature of sacrifices, for those of the Bible and of the whole ancient world; or to attempt to get at the philosophical truth inclosed in these Scriptural forms, while we reject the forms themselves, are only different ways of substituting our thoughts for God's thoughts, our way of salvation for God's way. If the ordinary authoritative rules of interpretation are to be adhered to, it cannot be denied that the Scriptures teach that Christ saves us as a priest by making a full expiation for our sins, bearing the penalty of them in his own person in our behalf.

Christ saves us as a Sacrifice.

Intimately connected with the argument from the priestly office of Christ, and inseparable from it, is that which is derived from those numerous passages in which He is set forth as a sacrifice for sin. Much as the nature of the Old Testament sacrifices has of late years. been discussed, and numerous as are the theories which have been advanced upon this subject, there are some points with regard to which all who profess faith in the Scriptures, are agreed. In the first place, it is agreed that Christ was in some sense a sacrifice for the sins of men; secondly, that the sense in which He was a sacrifice is the same as that in which the sin offerings of the Old Testament were sacrifices; and, thirdly, that the true Scriptural idea of sacrifices for sin is a historical question and not a matter of speculation. According to Michaelis, they were mere fines; [425] according to Sykes, federal rites; according to others, expressions of gratitude, offerings to God in acknowledgment of his goodness; according to others, they were symbolical of the surrender and devotion of the life of the offerer to God; [426] according to others, they were confessions of sin and symbolical exhibitions of penitence; and according to others, their whole design and effect was in some way to produce a salutary moral impression. [427] It is admitted that the offerings of the old economy were of different kinds, not only as bloody and unbloody, but that among those which involved the shedding of blood some were designed for one purpose and some for another. The whole question relates to the sin offerings properly so called, of which the sacrifices on the great day of atonement were the special illustrative examples. The common doctrine as to these sin offerings is, (1.) That the design of such offerings was to propitiate God; to satisfy his justice, and to render it consistent and proper that the offence for which they were offered should be forgiven, (2.) That this propitiation of God was secured by the expiation of guilt; by such an offering as covered sin, so that it did not appear before Him as demanding punishment; (3.) That this expiation was effected by vicarious punishment; the victim being substituted for the offender, bearing his guilt, and suffering the penalty which he had incurred; (4.) That the

effect of such sin offerings was the pardon of the offender, and his restoration to favour and to the enjoyment of the privileges which he had forfeited. If this be the true Scriptural idea of a sacrifice for sin, then do the Scriptures in declaring that Christ was a sacrifice, intend to teach that He was the substitute for sinners; that He bore their guilt and suffered the penalty of the law in their stead; and thereby reconciled them unto God; i.e., rendered it consistent with his perfections that they should be pardoned and restored to the divine fellowship and favour.

Proof of the Common Doctrine concerning Sacrifices for Sin.

That this is the true doctrine concerning sacrifices for sin may be argued, --

1. From the general sentiment of the ancient world. These offerings arose from a sense of guilt and apprehension of the wrath of God. Under the pressure of the sense of sin, and when the displeasure of God was experienced or apprehended, men everywhere resorted to every means in their power to make expiation for their offences, and to propitiate the favour of God. Of these means the most natural, as it appears from its being universally adopted, was the offering of propitiatory sacrifices. The more numerous and costly these offerings the greater hope was cherished of their efficacy. Men did not spare even the fruit of their bodies for the sin of their souls. It was not that the Deity, to be propitiated, needed these oblations, or could Himself enjoy them; but it was that justice demanded satisfaction, and the hope was entertained that the death of the victims might be taken in lieu of that of the offender. Even those who repudiate the doctrine of expiation as belonging to the religion of the Bible, admit that it was the doctrine of the ancient world. But if it was the doctrine of the ancient world, two things naturally follow; first, that it has a foundation in the nature of man, and in the intuitive knowledge of the relation which he as a sinner bears to God; and, secondly, that when we find exactly the same rites and ceremonies, the same forms of expression and the same significant actions in the Scriptures, they cannot fairly be understood in a sense diametrically opposite to that in which all the rest of the world understood them.

2. The second argument is that it is beyond doubt that the Hebrews, to whom the Mosaic institutions were given, understood their sacrifices for sin to be expiatory offerings and not mere forms of worship or expressions of their devotion of themselves to God; or as simply didactic, designed to make a moral impression on the offender and on the spectators. They were explained as expiations, in which the victim bore the guilt of the sinner, and died in his stead and for his deliverance. That such was the doctrine of the Hebrews is proved by such authors as Outram, in his work "De Sacrificiis;" by Schoettgen, "Hor&#65533; Hebr&#65533;&#65533; et Talmudic&#65533;;" Eisenmenger, "Endecktes Judenthum," and other writers on the subject. Outram quotes from the Jewish authorities forms of confession connected with the imposition of hands on the victim. One is to the following effect: [428] "I beseech thee, O Lord, I have sinned, I have done perversely, I have rebelled, I have done (specifying the offence); but now I repent, and let this victim be my expiation." The design of the imposition of hands was to signify, say these authorities, the removal of sin from the offender to the animal. [429]

3. It is no less certain that the whole Christian world has ever regarded the sacrifices for sin to be expiatory, designed to teach the necessity of expiation and to foreshadow the method by which it was to be accomplished. Such, as has been shown, is the faith of the

Latin, of the Lutheran, and of the Reformed churches, all the great historical bodies which make up the sum of professing Christians. That this world-wide belief in the necessity of expiation even among the heathen; this uniform conviction of the Hebrews that the sacrifices, which they were commanded to offer for sin, were expiatory; this concurrent judgment of the Christian Church in all ages and places are, after all, mere error and delusion; that such is not the teaching either of the natural conscience, or of the Hebrew Scriptures, or of Christ and his Apostles, is absolutely incredible. The attempt to overthrow a conviction thus general and permanent, is chimerical.

4. But these arguments from general conviction and assent, although perfectly valid in such cases as the present, are not those on which the faith of Christians rests. They find the doctrine of expiatory sacrifices clearly taught in Scripture; they see that the sin offerings under the Old Testament were expiations.

The Old Testament Sacrifices Expiatory.

This is plain from the clear meaning of the language used in reference to them. They are called sin offerings; trespass offerings, i.e., offerings made by sinners on account of sin. They are said to bear the sins of the offender; to make expiation for sin, i.e., to cover it from the sight of God's justice; they are declared to be intended to secure forgiveness, not through repentance or reformation, these are presupposed before the offering is brought, but by shedding of blood, by giving soul for soul, life for life. The reason assigned in Leviticus xvii. 11, why blood should not be used for food, was that it was set apart to make expiation for sin. The Hebrew is lkpr tslnphstykm, which the Septuagint renders exilaskesthai peri ton psuchon humon; and the Vulgate, "Ut super altare in eo expietis pro animabus vestris." The elder Michaelis expresses clearly the meaning of the passage and the design of the prohibition, when he says (On Leviticus xvii. 10), "Ne sanguis res sanctissima, ad expiationem immundorum a Deo ordinata, communi usu profanaretur." The last clause of the verse, which in our version is rendered, "For it is the blood that maketh an atonement for the soul," is more literally and correctly rendered, "For blood by (its) soul or life makes atonement;" or, as B[illegible]hr and Fairbairn translate it, "The blood atones through the soul." The latter writer correctly remarks, [430] "This is the only sense of the passage that can be grammatically justified; for the preposition v after the verb to atone (kphr) invariably denotes that by which the atonement is made; while as invariably the person or object for which is denoted by l or l." -- Aben Ezra, quoted by B[illegible]hr, had briefly indicated the right interpretation. "Sanguis anima, qu[illegible] sibi inest, expiat." It seems impossible that this and similar express declarations of the Old Testament, that sacrifices for sins were expiations, can be reconciled with the modern speculation that they were symbolical expressions of devotion to God, or means of effecting a reformation of the offender, who because of that reformation was restored to God's favour.

The argument, therefore, is that the Scriptures expressly declare that these sacrifices were made for the expiation of sin. This idea is expressed by the word kpr, to cover, to hide from view, to blot out, to expiate. Hence the substantive kphr means that which delivers from punishment or evi. It is the common word for an atonement, but it also is used for a ransom, because it is rendered to secure deliverance. Thus the half shekel required to be paid by every male Israelite as a ransom for his soul was called a kphr (in Greek, lutron, or lutra). See Exodus xxx. 12-16: "When thou takest the sum of the children of Israel, ...

then shall they give every man a ransom (kphr) for his soul unto the Lord, ... half a shekel . . . . the rich shall not give more, and the poor shall not give less, than half a shekel, when they give an offering to the Lord, to make an atonement (lkpr, Gr. exilasasthai) for your souls." Here it is impossible to mistake the meaning. The half shekel was a ransom, something paid to secure deliverance from evil. It was not a symbol of devotion, or an expression of penitence, but a payment of a stipulated ransom. That the half shekel bore no proportion to the value of a man's life, or the blood of a victim to the value of the soul, does not alter the case. The idea is the same. The truth taught is that satisfaction must be made if sinners are to be saved. The constantly recurring expressions, "to make atonement for sin;" "to make atonement on the horns of the altar;" "to make atonement for the sins of the people," etc., which are correct renderings of the Hebrew phrases which mean "to make expiation," as understood from the beginning, cannot be reconciled with any other theory of sacrifices than that of vicarious satisfaction. In Numbers xxxv. 31, it is said, "Ye shall take no satisfaction (kphr, lutra, pretium), for the life of a murderer, which is guilty of death; but he shall be surely put to death . . . . the land cannot be cleansed (ykpr; Septuagint, exilasthesetai; Vulgate, nec aliter expiari potest) of the blood that is shed therein, but by the blood of him that shed it." Here again there can be no mistake. To cover sin, kpr, is to expiate it by a penal satisfaction; that expiation is expressed, as we have seen, by kkr, which literally magnifies that which covers, and, in such connections, that which covers sin so that it no longer demands punishment. When, therefore, a sacrifice is said to cover sin it must mean that it expiates it, hides it from the eyes of justice by a satisfaction. A kphr is a satisfaction. This satisfaction must be made either by the offender or by some one in his stead. In the case of murder, if the perpetrator could not be discovered, a victim was to be slain in his stead, and thus satisfaction was to be made. The law in reference to this case makes the nature and design of sin offerings perfectly plain. The elders of the nearest city were commanded to take a heifer which had net borne the yoke, and wash their hands over it in attestation of their innocence of the blood of the murdered man; the priests being present. The heifer was to be slain, and thus expiation made for the offence. The words are, vnkpr lhm hdm; Greek, kai exilasthesetai autois to haima; Latin, "Et auferetur ab eis reatus sanguinis." The removal of guilt by a vicarious death is, therefore, the Scriptural idea of a sin offering. It would, however, require a volume to present a tithe of the evidence furnished, by the phraseology of the Old Testament, that the sin offerings, were regarded as expiations for sin; not designed proximately for the reformation of the offender, but to secure the remission of the penalty due to his transgression. The constantly recurring formula is, Let him offer the sacrifice for "sin, and it shall be forgiven him."

The ceremonies attending the offering of sacrifices for sin show that they were understood to be expiatory. (1) The victims were selected from the class of clean animals appropriated for the support of the life of man. They were to be free from all blemish. This physical perfection was typical of the freedom from all sin of Him who was to be the substitute for sinners. (2.) The offender was required himself to bring the victim to the altar. The service involved an acknowledgment on the part of the offerer of his just exposure to punishment for his sin. (3.) The hands of the offender were to be laid on the head of the victim, to express the ideas of substitution and of transfer of guilt. The sin of the offerer was laid upon the head of the victim. (4.) The blood of the victim, slain by the priest, was received by him as the minister of God, sprinkled on the altar, or, on the great day of

atonement, carried into the Most Holy place where the symbol of God's presence was, and sprinkled on the top of the ark of the covenant; showing that the service terminated on God; that it was designed to appease his wrath (according to Scriptural phraseology), to satisfy his justice, and to open the way for the free forgiveness of sin. The significance assigned to these ceremonial acts is that which their nature demands; which the Scriptures themselves assign to them; and which they must have either to account for the effects which the sin offering produced, or to make out the correspondence between the type and the antitype which the New Testament declares was intended. These symbolical acts admit of no other explanation without doing violence to the text, and forcing on antiquity the ideas of modern times, which is to substitute our speculations for the authoritative teachings of the Scriptures.

The imposition of the hands of the offender upon the head of the victim was essential to this service. The general import of the imposition of hands was that of communication. Hence this ceremony was practiced on various occasions: (1.) In appointing to office, to signify the transfer of authority. (2.) In imparting any spiritual gift or blessing. (3.) In substituting one for another, and transferring the responsibility of one to another. This was the import of the imposition of hands upon the head of the victim. It was substituted in the place of the offerer, and the guilt of the one was symbolically transferred from the one to the other. Hence the victim was said to bear the sins of the people; their sins were said to be laid upon it. In the solemn services of the great day of atonement, the import of this rite is rendered especially clear It was commanded that two goats should be selected, one for a sin-offering and the other for a scape-goat. The two constituted one sacrifice, as it was impossible that one could signify all that was intended to be taught. Of the scape-goat it is said, "Aaron shall lay both his hands upon the head of the live goat, and confess over him all the iniquities of the children of Israel, and all their transgressions in all their sins, putting them upon the head of the goat, ... and the goat shall bear upon him all their iniquities unto a land not inhabited." This renders it plain that the design of the imposition of hands was to signify the transfer of the guilt of the offender to the victim. The nature of these offerings is still further evident from the fact that the victim was said "to bear the sin" of the offender. For example, in Isaiah liii. that the servant of the Lord made "his soul an offering for sin," is explained by saying that "He bare the sin of many;" that "the chastisement of our peace was upon him;" and that "the Lord hath laid on him the iniquity of us all." These and similar expressions do not admit of being understood of the removal of sin by reformation or spiritual renovation. They have a fixed and definite meaning throughout the Scriptures. To bear sin is to bear the guilt and punishment of sin. It may be admitted that the Hebrew word ns' may mean to remove, or bear away, as in 1 Samuel xvii. 34 and Judges xvi. 31, although even in these cases the ordinary sense is admissible. The question, however, is not what a word may mean, but what it does mean in a given formula and connection. The word signifies to raise, or lift up; to lift up the eyes, the hand, the voice, the head, the heart. Then it means to lift up in the sense of bearing, as a tree bears its fruit; or in the sense of enduring, as sorrow, suffering; or, of bearing as a burden, and especially the burden of guilt or punishment. And finally it may have the necessary meaning of bearing away, or of removing. If this should be insisted upon in those cases where sin is spoken of, then it remains to be asked what is the Scriptural sense of removing sin, or bearing sin away. That formula means two things; first, to remove the guilt of sin by

expiation, and secondly, to remove its defilement and power by spiritual renovation. One or the other of these ideas is expressed by all the corresponding terms used in the Bible; kathairein, to purify, or katharismon poiein; hagiazein, to cleanse; and others, as to wash, to blot out, etc. All these terms are used to express either sacrificial purification by blood, or spiritual purification by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. Which, in any particular case, is intended, is determined by the context. Therefore, even if the words ns'tsyv; be rendered to remove iniquity or sin, the question would still be, Does it mean the removal of guilt by expiation; or the removal of pollution by moral renovation? In point of fact the words in question always refer to bearing the punishment and thus removing the guilt of sin, and never to the removal of moral pollution. This is plain, (1.) Because ns' is interchanged with svl which never means to remove, but only to sustain, or bear as a burden. (2.) Because usage determines the meaning of the phrase and is uniform. In Numbers xiv. 34, it is said, "Ye shall bear your iniquities forty years." Leviticus v. 1, "If a soul . . . . hear the voice of swearing, and is a witness; . . . . if he do not utter it, he shall bear his iniquity." Leviticus v. 17, "He is guilty, and shall bear his iniquity." Leviticus vii. 18, "The soul that eateth of it shall bear his iniquity." Leviticus xvii. 16, "If he wash not . . . . then he shall bear his iniquity." Leviticus xix. 8; xx. 17; xxii. 9, "They shall keep my ordinance, lest they bear sin for it." Numbers ix. 13, If a man forbear to keep the passover, he shall be cut off from the people, "he shall bear his sin." See also Numbers xviii. 22, 32. Ezekiel iv. 4, 5, it is said to the prophet enduring penance, "So shalt thou bear the iniquity of the house of Israel." "Thou shalt bear the iniquity of the house of Judah forty days." "Lie thou upon thy left side . . . . according to the number of the days that thou shalt lie upon it, thou shalt bear their iniquity." Ezekiel xviii. 20, "The son shall not bear the iniquity of the father; neither shall the father bear the iniquity of the son." In all these, and in other like cases, it is simply impossible that "bearing sin" should mean the removal of sin by moral renovation. The expression occurs some forty times in the Bible, and always in the sense of bearing the guilt or punishment of sin. It is hardly an exception to this remark that there are a few cases in which ns' cht't means to pardon; as in Exodus x. 17; xxxii. 32; xxxiv. 7; Psalms xxxii. 5 (and lxxxv. 3); for pardon is not the removal of sin morally, but the lifting up, or removal of its guilt. This being the fact, it determines the nature of the sin offerings under the law. The victim bore the sin of the offerer, and died in his stead. An expiation was thereby effected by the suffering of a vicarious punishment. This also determines the nature of the work of Christ. If He was an offering for sin, if He saves us from the penalty of the law of God, in the same way in which the sin offering saved the Israelite from the penalty of the law of Moses, then He bore the guilt of our sins and endured the penalty in our stead. We may not approve of this method of salvation. The idea of the innocent bearing the sins of the guilty and being punished in his stead, may not be agreeable to our feelings or to our modes of thinking, but it can hardly be denied that such is the representation and doctrine of the Scriptures. Our only alternative is to accept that doctrine, or reject the authority of Scripture directly or indirectly. That is, either to deny their divine origin, or to explain away their explicit statements. In either case their plain meaning remains untouched. The German rationalists in general take the former of these two courses. They admit that the Bible teaches the doctrine of vicarious punishment, but they deny the truth of the doctrine because they deny the Bible to be the Word of God.

The passages in which Christ is represented as a sacrifice for sin, are too numerous to

be here specially considered. The New Testament, and particularly the Epistle to the Hebrews, as before remarked, declares and teaches, that the priesthood of the old economy was a type of the priesthood of Christ; that the sacrifices of that dispensation were types of his sacrifice; that as the blood of bulls and of goats purified the flesh, so the blood of Christ cleanses the soul from guilt; and that as they were expiations effected by vicarious punishment, in their sphere, so was the sacrifice of Christ in the infinitely higher sphere to which his work belongs. Such being the relation between the Old Economy and the New, the whole sacrificial service of the Mosaic institutions, becomes to the Christian an extended and irresistible proof and exhibition of the work of Christ as an expiation for the sins of the world, and a satisfaction to the justice of God.

The Fifty-third Chapter of Isaiah.

It is not however only in the typical services of the old economy that this great doctrine was set forth in the Hebrew Scriptures. In the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah this doctrine is presented with a clearness and copiousness which have extorted assent from the most unwilling minds. The prophet in that chapter not only foretells that the Messiah was to be a man of sorrows; not only that He was to suffer the greatest indignities and be put to a violent death; not only that these sufferings were endured for the benefit of others; but that they were truly vicarious, i.e., that He suffered, in our stead, the penalty which we had incurred, in order to our deliverance. This is done not only in those forms of expression which most naturally admit of this interpretation, but in others which can, consistently with usage and the analogy of Scripture, be understood in no other way. To the former class belong such expressions as the following, "He hath borne our griefs, and carried our sorrows." Our griefs and our sorrows are the griefs and sorrows which we deserved. These Christ bore in the sense of enduring, for He carried them as a burden. "He was wounded for our transgressions, he was bruised for our iniquities." "With his stripes we are healed." "For the transgression of my people was he stricken." These phrases might be used of the sufferings of a patriot for his country, of a philanthropist for his fellow-men, or of a friend for those dear to him. That they however are most naturally understood of vicarious suffering, can hardly be denied, And that they were intended by the Spirit of God to be so understood, is plain by their being intermingled with expressions which admit of no other interpretation. To this class belong the following clauses: First, "the chastisement (or punishment) of our peace was upon him." That is, the punishment by which our peace was secured. Of this clause Delitzsch, one of the very first of living Hebraists, says, [431] "Der Begriff der poena vicaria kann hebr&#xFFFD;isch gar nicht sch&#xFFFD;rfer ausgedr&#xFFFD;ckt werden als in jenen Worten." "The idea of vicarious punishment cannot be more precisely expressed in Hebrew than by those words." Secondly, it is said, "The Lord hath laid on him (caused to fall, or, cast on him) the iniquity of us all." We have already seen that this is the language used in the Old Testament to express the transfer of the guilt of the offender to the victim slain in his stead. They have a definite Scriptural meaning, which cannot be denied in this case without doing open violence to admitted rules of interpretation. "If," says Dr. J. Addison Alexander, [432] "vicarious suffering can be described in words, it is so described in these two verses;" i.e., the verses in which this clause occurs. Thirdly, it is said of the Messiah that He made, or was to make "his soul an offering for sin." The Hebrew word is 'sm, guilt, debt; and then an offering which bears guilt and expiates it. It is the common word in the Levitical law for "trespass offering." Michaelis in his marginal

annotations, remarks on this word (Isaiah liii. 10), "Delictum significat, ut notet etiam sacrificium, cui delictum imputatum est. Vide passim, inprimis Lev. iv. 3; v. 6, 7, 16; vii. 1, etc., etc. . . . . Recte etiam Raschi ad h. 1. Ascham,' inquit, significat satisfactionem, seu lytron, quod quis alteri exsolvit, in quem deliquit, Gallice, Amande, i.e. mulcta.'" The literal meaning of the words, therefore, is, His soul was made a satisfaction for sin. Fourthly, it is said, "My righteous servant shall justify many; for he shall bear their iniquities." "He was numbered with the transgressors, and he bare the sin of many." It has already been shown that to "bear sin" never means to sanctify, to effect a moral change by removing the power and pollution of sin, but uniformly, in the sacrificial language of the Bible, to bear the guilt or penalty for sin.

Passages of the Hew Testament in which the Work of Christ is set forth as Sacrifice.

In Romans iii. 25, it is said, He was set forth as "a propitiation through faith in his blood." The word here used is hilasterion, the neuter form of the adjective hilasterios ("propitiatory, expiatory") used substantively. It therefore means, as Robinson and other lexicographers define it, and as the great body of interpreters explain it, "an expiatory sacrifice." The meaning of the word is determined by the context and confirmed by parallel passages. The design of setting forth Christ as a hilasterion was precisely that which an expiatory sacrifice was intended to accomplish, namely, to satisfy justice, that God might be just in the forgiveness of sin. And the dikaiosune of God manifested in the sacrifice of Christ, was not his benevolence, but that form of justice which demands the punishment of sin. "It is a fundamental idea of Scripture," says Delitzsch, "that sin is expiated (ykpr) by punishment, as murder by the death of the murderer." [433] Again, "Where there is shedding of blood and of life, there is violent death, and where a violent death is (judicially) inflicted, there there is manifestation of vindicatory justice, der strafenden Gerechtigkeit." [434] In like manner, in Romans viii. 3, the Apostle says, God sent his Son as a sin offering (peri hamartias, which in Hellenistic Greek means an offering for sin, Hebrews x. 6), and thereby condemned sin in the flesh, that is, in the flesh or person of Christ. And thus it is that we are justified, or the righteousness of the law is fulfilled in us. The same Apostle, in Galatians i. 4, says that Christ "gave himself for our sins." That is, He gave Himself unto death as a sacrifice for our sins that He might effect our redemption. Such is the plain meaning of this passage, if understood according to the established usage of the Scripture. "The idea of satisfaction," says Meyer, on this passage, "lies not in the force of the preposition [huper] but in the nature of the transaction, in dem ganzen Sachverhltniss." In Ephesians v. 2, it is said Christ gave "himself for us, an offering and a sacrifice to God for a sweet-smelling savour." His offering was a sacrifice (thusian). His blood was shed as an expiation. The question, says Meyer, whether Christ is here represented as a sin offering, "is decided not so much by huper hemon as by the constant New Testament, and specially the Pauline, conception of the death of Christ as a hilasterion." Hebrews ix. 14, is especially important and decisive. The Apostle, in the context, contrasts the sacrifices of the law with that of Christ. If the former, consisting of the blood of irrational animals, nothing but the principle of animal life, could avail to effect external or ceremonial purification, how much more shall the blood of Christ, who was possessed of an eternal spirit, or divine nature, and offered Himself without spot unto God, avail to the purification of the conscience, i.e., effect the real expiation of sin. The purification spoken of in both members of this comparison, is purification from guilt, and not spiritual renovation. The

Old Testament sacrifices were expiatory and not reformatory, and so was the sacrifice of Christ. The certain result and ultimate design in both cases was reconciliation to the favour and fellowship of God; but the necessary preliminary condition of such reconciliation was the expiation of guilt. Again, toward the end of the same chapter, the Apostle says that Christ was not called upon to "offer himself often, . . . for then must he often have suffered since the foundation of the world: but now once in the end of the world hath he appeared to put away sin by the sacrifice of himself." The offering which He made was Himself. Its design and effect were to put away sin; i.e., to put away sin as was done by expiatory sacrifices. This is confirmed by what follows. Christ came the first time "to bear the sins of many;" He is to come the second time "without sin," without that burden which, on his first advent, He had voluntarily assumed. He was then burdened with our sins in the sense in which the ancient sacrifices bore the sins of the people. He bore their guilt; that is, he assumed the responsibility of making satisfaction for them to the justice of God. When He comes the second time, it will not be as a sin offering, but to consummate the salvation of his people. The parallel passage to this is found in 2 Corinthians v. 21: "He hath made him to be sin for us who knew no sin," The design of the Apostle is to explain how it is that God is reconciled unto the world, not imputing unto men their trespasses. He is free thus to pardon and treat as righteous those who in themselves are unrighteous, because for us and in our stead He who was without sin was treated as a sinner. The sense in which Christ was treated as a sinner is, says Meyer, in loco "in dem er n�mlich die Todesstrafe erlitt, in that he suffered the punishment of death." Here again the idea of the poena vicaria is clearly expressed.

In Hebrews x. 10, we are said to be "sanctified through the offering of the body of Jesus Christ once for all." The word hagiazein, here rendered sanctify, means to cleanse. Sin is, in Scripture, always regarded as a defilement in both its aspects of guilt and moral turpitude. As guilt, it is cleansed by blood, by sacrificial expiation, as defilement, by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. Which kind of purification is intended is determined in each case by the context. If the purification is effected by sacrifice, by the blood or death of Christ, then the removal of guilt is intended. Hence, all the passages in which we are said to be saved, or reconciled unto God, or purified, or sanctified by the blood or death of Christ, must be regarded as so many assertions that He was an expiatory sacrifice for sin. In this passage the meaning of the Apostle cannot be mistaken. He is again contrasting the sacrifices of the Old Testament with that of Christ. They were ineffectual, the latter was of sovereign efficacy. "Sacrifice and offering thou wouldest not, but a body hast thou prepared me. Lo, I come to do thy will." By which will, i.e., by the execution of this purpose of sending his incarnate Son, we are cleansed by the one offering up of his body. The ancient sacrifices, he says (verse 11), had to be constantly repeated. "But this man, after he had offered one sacrifice for sins, forever sat down on the right hand of God." "For by one offering he hath perfected forever (teteleioken, brought to the end contemplated by a sacrifice) them that are sanctified," i.e., cleansed from guilt. That sacrificial cleansing is here intended is plain, for the effect of it is pardon. "Their sins and iniquities will I remember no more. Now where remission of these is, there is no more offering for sin." And in verse 26, we are taught that for those who reject the sacrifice of Christ there remains "no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fearful looking for of judgment." It was pardon, therefore, founded upon the expiation of sin, that was secured by the sacrifice of

Christ. And this is declared to be the only possible means by which our guilt can be removed, or the justice of God satisfied. It is to be always borne in mind, however, that the end of expiation is reconciliation with God, and that reconciliation with God involves or secures conformity to his image and intimate fellowship with Him. The ultimate design of the work of Christ is, therefore, declared to be to "bring us to God;" to "purify unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works." The removal of guilt by expiation is, however, constantly set forth as the absolutely essential preliminary to this inward subjective reconciliation with God. This is a necessity, as the Scriptures teach, arising out of the nature of God as a holy and just Being.

What Paul teaches so abundantly of the sacrificial death of Christ is taught by the Apostle John (First Epistle, ii. 2). Jesus Christ "is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for the sins of the whole world." The word here used is hilasmos, propitiation, expiation; from "hilaskomai, to reconcile one's self to any one by expiation, to appease, to propitiate." And in chapter iv. 10, it is said, "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that he loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins." The inconsistency between love, and expiation or satisfaction for sin, which modern writers so much insist upon, was not perceived by men who spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. In chapter i. 7, this same Apostle says, "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin." To cleanse, katharizein, kathairein, katharismon poiein, hagiazein, louein (Revelation i. 5) are established sacrificial terms to express the removal of the guilt of sin by expiation.

The above are only a part of the passages in which our blessed Lord is, in the New Testament, set forth as a sin offering, in the Scriptural sense of that term. What is thus taught is taught by other forms of expression which imply the expiatory character of his death, or his priestly function of making satisfaction for sin. Thus in Hebrews ix. 28, it is said, "Christ was once offered to bear the sins of many." This is a quotation from Isaiah liii. 12, where the same word is used in the Septuagint that the Apostle here employs. The meaning of the Scriptural phrase "to bear sin" has already been sufficiently discussed. Robinson, who will not be suspected of theological bias, defines, in his "Greek Lexicon," the word in question (anaphero) in the formula anenenkein tas hamartias hemon, "to bear up our sins, to take upon oneself and bear our sins, i.e., to bear the penalty of sin, to make expiation for sin." This is the sense in which the sacrifices of old were said to bear the sins of the people, and in which it was said that one man, in God's dealings with his theocratic people, should not bear the sins of another. Delitzsch, on Hebrews ix. 28, says, [435] "This assumption of the sufferings which the sins of men had caused, into fellowship with whom He had entered, this bearing as a substitute the punishment of sins not his own, this expiatory suffering for the sins of others, is precisely what anenenkein amartias pollon in this passage means, and is the sense intended in the Italic and Vulgate versions; ad multorum exhaurienda peccata.'" He quotes with approbation the comment of Seb. Schmidt: "Quia mors in hominibus poena est, Christus oblatus est moriendo, ut morte sua portaret omnium hominum peccata h. e. omnes peccatorum poenas ex[illegible]quaret satisfaciendo." [436]

Nearly the same language is used by the Apostle Peter (First Epistle, ii. 24). "Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree." Whether anaphero here means sufferre, to bear or endure, or sursum ferre, to carry up, the sense is the same. Only the figure is

altered. Christ bore the guilt of our sins. This is the burden which He sustained; or which He carried up with Him when He ascended the cross. In the parallel passage in Isaiah liii. 11, evidently in the Apostle's mind, the words are in the Septuagint, tas hamartias auton autos anoisei, where in Hebrew ysbl is used, which appears decisive in favour of the rendering in our version, He "bare our sins," as svl always means to bear as a burden. As to the doctrinal meaning of this passage commentators of almost all classes agree. Wahl, in his "Lexicon," on the word anaphero referring to this place, makes it mean "peccatorum poenam et reatum ultro in se suscipit." Bretschneider (Rationalist) thus defines the word, "attollo et mihi impono, i.e., impositum mihi porto, tropice de poenis: poenam susceptam luo; Heb. ix. 28. . . . . Vide etiam Num. xiv. 33, anoisousi ten porneian humon, poena vestr&#65533; perfidi&#65533; illis persolvenda est." Wegscheider, the chief of the systematic theologians among the Rationalists, [437] referring to this passage, 1 Peter ii. 24, says that almost all the New Testament writers regard the death of Christ "tanquam [mortem] expiatoriam, eandemque vicariam, velut poenam peccatorum hominum omnium ab ipso susceptam, etc." Calvin does not go beyond these Rationalists; his comment is, "Sicuti sub lege peccator, ut reatu solveretur, victimam substituebat suo loco: ita Christus maledictionem peccatis nostris debitam in se suscepit, ut ea coram Deo expiaret. Hoc beneficium sophist&#65533; in suis scholis, quantum possunt, obscurant."

Another form of expression used by the sacred writers clearly teaches the expiatory character of Christ's work. Under the old economy, the great function of the high priest was to make expiation for sin, and thereby restore the people to the favour of God, and secure for them the blessings of the covenant under which they lived. All this was typical of Christ and of his work. He came to save his people from their sins, to restore them to the favour of God, and to secure for them the enjoyment of the blessings of the new and better covenant of which He is the mediator. He, therefore, assumed our nature in order that He might die, and by death effect our reconciliation with God. For as He did not undertake the redemption of angels, but the redemption of man, it was the nature of man that He assumed. He was made in all things like unto his brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful high priest in things pertaining to God, eis to hilaskesthai tas hamartias tou laou, to make expiation for the sins of the people. The word hilaskomai (or exilaskomai) is the technical word in Hellenistic Greek to express the idea of expiation. In common Greek, the word means propitium reddere, and in the passive form it is used in this sense in the Septuagint as in Psalm lxxix. 9. But in the middle and deponent form followed by the word sins in the accusative, it always expresses the act by which that in sin is removed which hinders God from being propitious. This is the precise idea of expiation. Hence the word is so constantly rendered in the Vulgate by expiare, and is in Greek the rendering of kpr. Hence Christ as He who renders God propitious to us is called the hilasmos peri ton hamartion hemon in 1 John ii. 2, and hilasterion in Romans iii. 25.

Still another form in which the doctrine of expiation is taught is found in those passages which refer our reconciliation to God to the death of Christ. The Greek word used to express this idea in Romans v. 10; 2 Corinthians v. 18, 19, 20, is katallassein, to exchange, or to change the relation of one person to another, from enmity to friendship. In Ephesians ii. 16; Colossians i. 20, 21, the word used is apokatallattein, only an intensive form, to reconcile fully. When two parties are at enmity a reconciliation may be effected by a change in either or in both. When, therefore, it is said that we are reconciled to God, it

only means that peace is restored between Him and us. Whether this is effected by our enmity towards Him being removed, or by his justice in regard to us being satisfied, or whether both ideas are in any case included, depends on the context where the word occurs, and on the analogy of Scripture. In the chief passage, Romans v. 10, the obvious meaning is that the reconciliation is effected by God's justice being satisfied, so that He can be favourable to us in consistency with his own nature. This is plain, --

1. Because the means by which the reconciliation is effected is "the death of his Son." The design of sacrificial death is expiation. It would be to do violence to all Scriptural usage to make the proximate design and effect of a sacrifice the removal of the sinner's enmity to God.

2. "Being reconciled by the death of his Son," in verse 10, is parallel to the clause "being justified by his blood" in verse 9. The one is exchanged for the other, as different forms of expressing the same idea. But justification is not sanctification. It does not express a subjective change in the sinner. And, therefore, the reconciliation here spoken of cannot express any such change.

3. Those reconciled are declared to be echthroi, in the passive sense of the word, "those who are the objects of God's just displeasure." They are guilty. Justice demands their punishment. The death of Christ, as satisfying justice, reconciles God to us; effects peace, so that we can be received into favour.

4. What is here taught is explained by all those passages which teach the method by which the reconciliation of God and man is effected, namely, by the expiation of sin. Meyer, on this passage, says, "katellagemen and katallagentes must of necessity be understood passively: ausges&#xFFFD;hnt mit Gott, atoned for in the sight of God, so that he no longer is hostile to us; he has said aside his anger, and we are made partakers of his grace and favour." The same doctrine is taught in Ephesians ii. 16. "That he might reconcile both unto God in one body by the cross." Here again the reconciliation of God with man is effected by the cross or death of Christ, which, removing the necessity for the punishment of sinners, renders it possible for God to manifest towards them his love. The change is not in man, but, humanly speaking, in God; a change from the purpose to punish to a purpose to pardon and save. There is, so to speak, a reconciliation of God's justice and of his love effected by Christ's bearing the penalty in our stead. In 2 Corinthians v. 18, it is said, God "hath reconciled us to himself by Jesus Christ, and hath given to us the ministry of reconciliation." This does not mean that God changed our heart, and made us love Him, and appointed the Apostle to announce that fact. It can only mean that through Christ, through what He did and suffered for us, peace is restored between God and man, who is able and willing to be gracious. This is the gospel which Paul was commissioned to announce, namely, as follows in the next verse, God is bringing about peace; He was in Christ effecting this peace, and now is ready to forgive sin, i.e., not to impute unto men their trespasses; and therefore the Apostle urges his readers to embrace this offer of mercy, to be reconciled unto God; i.e., to accept his overture of reconciliation. For it has a sure foundation. It rests on the substitution and vicarious death of Christ. He was made sin for us, that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him. It is impossible, therefore, that the reconciliation of which the Apostles speak as effected by the cross or death of Christ, should, in its primary and main aspect, be a subjective change in us from enmity to the love

of God. It is such a reconciliation as makes God our friend; a reconciliation which enables Him to pardon and save sinners, and which they are called upon most gratefully to embrace.

It is clearly, therefore, the doctrine of the New Testament, that Jesus Christ our Lord saves his people by acting for them the part of a priest. For this office He had all the requisite qualifications; He was thereto duly appointed, and He performed all its functions. He was an expiatory sacrifice for the sins of men. He is not only repeatedly declared to be a sin offering in the Old Testament sense of that term; but He is said to have borne our sins; to have made expiation for the sins of the people; and to have reconciled us, who were the just objects of the divine wrath, to God by his death, by his cross, by the sacrifice of Himself. These representations are so frequent; they are so formally stated, so illustrated, and so applied, as to render them characteristic. They constitute the essential element of the Scriptural doctrine concerning the method of salvation.

Christ our Redeemer.

There is a third class of passages equally numerous and equally important. Christ is not only set forth as a Priest and as a sacrifice, but also as a Redeemer, and his work as a Redemption. Redemption is deliverance from evil by the payment of a ransom. This idea is expressed by the words apolutrosis, from lutron, and the verbs lutros, agorazo (to purchase), and exagorazo (to buy from, or deliver out of the possession or power of any one by purchase). The price or ransom paid for our redemption is always said to be Christ himself, his blood, his death. As the evils consequent on our apostasy from God are manifold, Christ's work as a Redeemer is presented in manifold relations in the word of God.

Redemption from the Penalty of the Law.

1. The first and most obvious consequence of sin, is subjection to the penalty of the law. The wages of sin is death. Every sin of necessity subjects the sinner to the wrath and curse of God. The first step, therefore, in the salvation of sinners, is their redemption from that curse. Until this is done they are of necessity separated from God. But alienation from Him of necessity involves both misery and subjection to the power of sin. So long as men are under the curse, they are cut off from the only source of holiness and life. Such is the doctrine taught throughout the Bible, and elaborately in Romans, chapters vi. and vii. In effecting the salvation of his people, Christ "redeemed them from the curse of the law," not by a mere act of sovereignty, or power; not by moral influence restoring them to virtue, but by being "made a curse for them." No language can be plainer than this. The curse is the penalty of the law. We were subject to that penalty. Christ has redeemed us from that subjection by being made a curse for us. (Galatians iii. 13.) That the infinitely exalted and holy Son of God should be "accursed" (epikataratos), is so awful an idea, that the Apostle justifies the use of such language by quoting the declaration of Scripture, "Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree." Suffering, and especially the suffering of death, judicially inflicted on account of sin, is penal. Those who thus suffer bear the curse or penalty of the law. The sufferings of Christ, and especially his death upon the cross, were neither calamities, nor chastisements designed for his own good, nor symbolical or didactic exhibitions, designed to illustrate and enforce truth, and exert a moral influence on others; these are all subordinate and collateral ends. Nor were they the mere natural consequences of his becoming a man and subjecting Himself to the common lot of humanity. They were

divine inflictions. It pleased the Lord to bruise Him. He was smitten of God and afflicted. These sufferings were declared to be on account of sin, not his own, but ours. He bore our sins. The chastisement of our peace was on Him. And they were designed as an expiation, or for the satisfaction of justice. They had, therefore, all the elements of punishment, and consequently it was in a strict and proper sense that He was made a curse for us. All this is included in what the Apostle teaches in this passage (Gal. iii. 13), and its immediate context.

Redemption from the Law.

2. Nearly allied to this mode of representation are those passages in which Christ is said to have delivered us from the law. Redemption from bondage to the law includes not only deliverance from its penalty, but also from the obligation to satisfy its demands. This is the fundamental idea of Paul's doctrine of justification. The law demands, and from the nature of God, must demand perfect obedience. It says, Do this and live; and, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." No man since the fall is able to fulfil these demands, yet He must fulfil them or perish. The only possible method, according to the Scriptures, by which men can be saved, is that they should be delivered from this obligation of perfect obedience. This, the Apostle teaches, has been effected by Christ. He was "made under the law to redeem them that were under the law." (Gal. iv. 4, 5.) Therefore, in Romans vi. 14, he says to believers, "Ye are not under the law, but under grace." And this redemption from the law in Romans vii. 4, is said to be "by the body of Christ." Hence we are justified not by our own obedience, but "by the obedience" of Christ. (Rom. v. 18, 19.) Redemption in this case is not mere deliverance, but a true redemption, i. e., a deliverance effected by satisfying all the just claims which are against us. The Apostle says, in Galatians iv. 5, that we are thus redeemed from the law, in order "that we might receive the adoption of sons"; that is, be introduced into the state and relation of sons to God. Subjection to the law, in our case, was a state of bondage. Those under the law are, therefore, called slaves, douloi. From this state of bondage they are redeemed, and introduced into the liberty of the sons of God. This redemption includes freedom from a slavish spirit, which is supplanted by a spirit of adoption, filling the heart with reverence, love, and confidence in God as our reconciled Father.

Redemption from the Power of Sin.

3. As deliverance from the curse of the law secures restoration to the favour of God, and as the love of God is the life of the soul, and restores us to his image, therefore in redeeming us from the curse of the law, Christ redeems us also from the power of sin. "Whosoever committeth sin," saith our Lord, "is the servant (the slave) of sin." This is a bondage from which no man can deliver himself. To effect this deliverance was the great object of the mission of Christ. He gave Himself that He might purify unto Himself a peculiar people zealous of good works. He died, the just for the unjust, that He might bring us unto God. He loved the Church and gave Himself for it, that He might present it unto Himself a glorious Church, without spot or wrinkle or any such thing. This deliverance from sin is a true redemption. A deliverance effected by a ransom, or satisfaction to justice, was the necessary condition of restoration to the favour of God; and restoration to his favour was the necessary condition of holiness. Therefore, it is said, Galatians i. 8, Christ

"gave Himself for our sins, that He might deliver us (exeletai) from this present evil world." Titus ii. 14, "Who gave himself for us that he might redeem us from all iniquity." 1 Peter i. 18, 19, "Ye were not redeemed with corruptible things, as silver and gold, from your vain conversation received by tradition from your fathers, but with the precious blood of Christ, as of a lamb without blemish and without spot." Deliverance by sacrifice was deliverance by ransom. Therefore, here as elsewhere, the two modes of statement are combined. Thus our Lord in Matthew xx. 28, Mark x. 45, says, "The Son of Man came . . . . to give his life a ransom for many (anti, not merely huper, pollon)." The idea of substitution cannot be more definitely expressed. In these passages our deliverance is said to be effected by a ransom. In Matthew xxvi. 28, our Lord says that his blood was "shed for many for the remission of sins." Here his death is presented in the light of a sacrifice. The two modes of deliverance are therefore identical. A ransom was a satisfaction to justice, and a sacrifice is a satisfaction to justice.

Redemption from the Power of Satan.

4. The Scriptures teach that Christ redeems us from the power of Satan. Satan is said to be the prince and god of this world. His kingdom is the kingdom of darkness, in which all men, since Adam, are born, and in which they remain, until translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. They are his subjects "taken captive by him at his will." (2 Tim. ii. 26.) The first promise was that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. Christ came to destroy the works of the devil; to cast him down from his place of usurped power, to deliver those who are subject to his dominion. (2 Cor. iv. 4; Col. ii. 16.) The fact of this redemption of his people from the power of Satan, and the mode of its accomplishment, are clearly stated in Hebrews ii. 15. The eternal Son of God, who in the first chapter of that epistle, is proved to be God, the object of the worship of angels, the creator of heaven and earth, eternal and immutable, in verse 14 of the second chapter, is said to have become man, in order "that through death He might destroy him that had the power of death, and deliver them who through fear of death were all their lifetime subject to bondage." It is here taught, (1.) That men are in a state of bondage through fear of the wrath of God on account of sin. (2.) That in this state they are in subjection to Satan who has the power of death over them; i.e., the ability and opportunity of inflicting on them the sufferings due to them as sinners. (3.) That from this state of bondage and of subjection to the power of Satan, they are delivered by the death of Christ. His death, by satisfying the justice of God, frees them from the penalty of the law; and freedom from the curse of the law involves freedom from the power of Satan to inflict its penalty. "The strength of sin is the law." (1 Cor. xv. 56.) What satisfies the law deprives sin of the power to subject us to the wrath of God. And thus redemption from the law, is redemption from the curse, and consequently redemption from the power of Satan. This Scriptural representation took such hold of the imagination of many of the early fathers, that they dwelt upon it, almost to the exclusion of other and more important aspects of the work of Christ. They dallied with it and wrought it out into many fanciful theories. These theories have passed away; the Scriptural truth which underlay them, remains. Christ is our Redeemer from the power of Satan, as well as from the curse of the law, and from the dominion of sin. And if a Redeemer, the deliverance which He effected was by means of a ransom. Hence He is often said to have purchased his people. They are his because He bought them. "Know ye not that . . . . ye are not your own?" says the Apostle, "For ye are bought with a price." (1 Cor. vi. 20.) God, in Acts xx. 28, is said to

have purchased the Church "with his own blood." "Ye were redeemed (delivered by purchase) . . . . with the precious blood of Christ." (1 Pet. i. 18, 19.) "Thou art worthy . . . . for thou has purchased us (hegorasas) for God by thy blood." (Rev. v. 9.)

Final Redemption from all Evil.

5. Christ redeems us not only from the curse of the law, from the law itself as a covenant of works, from the power of sin, and from the dominion of Satan, but also from all evil. This evil is the consequence of the curse of the law, and being redeemed from that we are delivered from all evil. Hence the word redemption is often used for the sum of all the benefits of Christ's work, or for the consummation of the great scheme of salvation. Thus our Lord says, Luke xxi. 28, that when the Son of Man shall appear in his glory, then his disciples may be sure that their "redemption draweth nigh." They are sealed unto the day of redemption. (Eph. i. 14.) Christ has "obtained eternal redemption." (Heb. ix. 12.) Believers are represented as waiting for their redemption. (Rom. viii. 23.)

It is therefore the plain doctrine of Scripture that, as before said, Christ saves us neither by the mere exercise of power, nor by his doctrine, nor by his example, nor by the moral influence which He exerted, nor by any subjective influence on his people, whether natural or mystical, but as a satisfaction to divine justice, as an expiation for sin and as a ransom from the curse and authority of the law, thus reconciling us to God, by making it consistent with his perfections to exercise mercy toward sinners, and then renewing them after his own image, and finally exalting them to all the dignity, excellence, and blessedness of the sons of God.

Argument from Related Doctrines.

All the doctrines of grace are intimately connected. They stand in such relation to each other, that one of necessity supposes the truth of the others. The common Church doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, therefore, is not an isolated doctrine. It is assumed in all that the Scriptures teach of the relation between Christ and his people; of the condition on which our interest in his redemption is suspended; and of the nature of the benefits of that redemption.

1. No doctrine of the Bible, relating to the plan of salvation, is more plainly taught or more wide reaching than that which concerns the union between Christ and his people. That union in one aspect, was from eternity, we were in Him before the foundation of the world; given to Him of the Father, to redeem from the estate of sin and misery, into which it was foreseen our race would by transgression fall. It was for the accomplishment of this purpose of mercy that He assumed our nature, was born of a woman, and did and suffered all that He was called upon to do and to endure in working out our salvation. He did not, therefore, come into the world for Himself. It was not to work out a righteousness of his own to entitle Him to the exaltation and power which in our nature He now enjoys. In virtue of the Godhead of his personality, He was of necessity infinitely exalted above all creatures. He came for us. He came as a representative. He came in the same relation to his people, which Adam, in the original covenant, bore to the whole race. He came to take their place; to be their substitute, to do for them, and in their name, what they could not do for themselves. All He did, therefore, was vicarious; his obedience and his sufferings. The parallel between Adam and Christ, the two great representatives of man, the two federal heads, the one of all his natural descendants, the other of all given Him by the Father, is

carried out into its details in Romans v. 12-21. It is assumed or implied, however, everywhere else in the sacred volume. What Adam did, in his federal capacity, was in law and justice regarded as done by all whom he represented. And so all that Christ did and suffered as a federal head, was in law and justice done or suffered by his people. Therefore, as we were condemned for the disobedience of Adam, so we are justified for the obedience of Christ. As in Adam all died, so in Christ are all made alive. Hence Christ's death is said to be our death, and we are said to rise with Him, to live with Him, and to be exalted, in our measure, in his exaltation. He is the head and we are the body. The acts of the head, are the acts of the whole mystical person. The ideas, therefore, of legal substitution, of vicarious obedience and punishment, of the satisfaction of justice by one for all, underlie and pervade the whole scheme of redemption. They can no more be separated from that scheme than the warp can be separated from the woof without destroying the whole texture.

2. In like manner these same truths are implied in what sinners are required to do in order to become the subjects of the redemption of Christ. It is not enough that we should receive his doctrines; or endeavour to regulate our lives by his moral precepts; or that we confide in his protection, or submit to his control as one into whose hands all power in heaven and earth has been committed. It is not enough that we should open our hearts to all the influences for good which flow from his person or his work. We must trust in Him. We must renounce our own righteousness, and confide in his for our acceptance with God. We must give up the idea that we can satisfy the demands of God's justice and law, by anything we can do, suffer, or experience, and rely exclusively on what He, as our representative, substitute, and surety, has done and suffered in our stead. This is what the gospel demands. And this, the world over, is precisely what every true believer, no matter what his theological theories may be, actually does. But this act of self-renunciation and of faith in Christ as the ground of our forgiveness and acceptance with God, supposes Him to be our substitute, who has satisfied all the demands of law and justice in our stead.

3. If we turn to the Scriptural account of the benefits which we receive from Christ, we find that this view of the nature of his work, is therein necessarily implied. We are justified through Him. He is our righteousness. We are made the righteousness of God in Him. But justification is not a subjective work. It is not sanctification. It is not a change wrought in us either naturally or supernaturally. It is not the mere executive act of a sovereign, suspending the action of the law, or granting pardon to the guilty. It is the opposite of condemnation. It is a declaration that the claims of justice are satisfied. This is the uniform meaning of the Hebrew and Greek words employed in Scripture, and of the corresponding words in all other languages, as far as those languages are cultivated to express what passes in the consciousness of men. But if God, in justifying sinners, declares that with regard to them the claims of justice are satisfied, it confessedly is not on the ground that the sinner himself has made that satisfaction, but that Christ has made it in his behalf.

The doctrine of sanctification also, as presented in the Scriptures, is founded on the substitution of Christ. Sanctification is not a work of nature, but a work of grace. It is a transformation of character effected not by moral influences, but supernaturally by the Holy Spirit; although on that account only the more rationally. The first step in the process is

deliverance from the curse of the law by the body, or death of Christ. Then God being reconciled, He admits us into fellowship with Himself. But as the sinner is only imperfectly sanctified, he is still in his state and acts far from being in himself an object of the divine complacency. It is only as united to Christ and represented by Him, that he enjoys the continuance of the divine favour, which is his life, and constantly receives from Him the gift of the Holy Spirit. So that the life that the believer lives, is Christ living in him. Thus in the whole process of salvation the ideas of substitution, of representation, of Christ's being and doing for us, all that we are required to be and to do, are of necessity involved. And even to the last we are saved only in Him. It is in virtue of this union that believers are raised from the dead, admitted into heaven, and receive the crown of eternal life. It is not for what they have done, nor for what they have been made, but solely for what has been done in their stead that they are made partakers of his life, and, ultimately, of his glory.

Argument from the Religious Experience of Believers.

By the religious experience of Christians is meant those states and acts of the mind produced by "the things of the Spirit," or by the truths of God's Word as revealed and applied by the Holy Ghost. We are clearly taught in Scripture that the truth is not only objectively presented in the Word, but that it is the gracious office of the Spirit, as a teacher and guide, to lead the people of God properly to understand the truths thus outwardly revealed, and to cause them to produce their proper effect on the reason, the feelings, the conscience, and the life. What the Holy Spirit thus leads the people of God to believe must be true. No man however is authorized to appeal to his own inward experience as a test of truth for others. His experience may be, and in most cases is, determined more or less by his peculiar training, his own modes of thinking, and diverse other modifying influences. But this does not destroy the value of religious experience as a guide to the knowledge of the truth. It has an authority second only to that of the Word of God. One great source of error in theology has always been the neglect of this inward guide. Men have formed their opinions, or framed their doctrines on philosophical principles, or moral axioms, and thus have been led to adopt conclusions which contradict the inward teachings of the Spirit, and even their own religious consciousness. The only question is, How can we distinguish the human from the divine? How can we determine what in our experience is due to the teaching of the Spirit, and what to other influences? The answer to these questions is, (1.) That what is conformed to the infallible standard in the Scriptures, is genuine, and what is not thus conformed is spurious. The Bible contains not only the truths themselves, but a record of the effects produced on the mind when they are applied by the Holy Spirit. (2.) Another test is universality. What all true Christians experience must be referred to a cause common to all. It cannot be accounted for by what is peculiar to individuals or to denominations. (3.) A subordinate test, but one of great value to the individual, is to be found in the nature of the experience itself, and its effects upon the heart and life. A religious experience which makes a man self-complacent, self-righteous, proud, censorious, and persecuting, is certainly not to be referred to the Spirit of holiness and love. But if a man's experience renders him humble, meek, contrite, forgiving, and long-suffering; if it leads him to believe all things and hope all things; if it renders him spiritually and heavenly minded; if it makes it Christ for him to live; in short, if it produces the same effect on him that the truth produced on the prophets and apostles, there can be little doubt that it is due to the teaching and influence of the Holy Ghost.

It is certainly an unanswerable argument in favour of the divinity of Christ, for example, as a doctrine of the Bible, that all true Christians look up to Christ as God; that they render Him the adoration, the love, the confidence, the submission, and the devotion which are due to God alone, and which the apprehension of divine perfection only can produce. It is certainly a proof that the Scriptures teach that man is a fallen being, that he is guilty and defiled by sin, that he is utterly unable to free himself from the burden and power of sin, that he is dependent on the grace of God and the power of the Spirit, if these truths are inwrought into the experience of all true believers. In like manner, if all Christians trust in Christ for their salvation; if they look to Him as their substitute, obeying and suffering in their stead, bearing their sins, sustaining the curse of the law in their place; if they regard Him as the expiatory sacrifice to take away their guilt and satisfy the justice of God in their behalf; if they thank and bless Him for having given Himself as a ransom for their redemption from the penalty and obligation of the law as prescribing the condition of salvation, and from the dominion of Satan, from the power of sin and from all its evil consequences; then, beyond doubt, these are the truths of God, revealed by the Spirit in the word, and taught by the Spirit to all who submit to his guidance. That such is the experience of true believers in relation to the work of Christ, is plain, (1.) Because this is the form and manner in which holy men of old whose experience is recorded in the Scriptures, expressed their relation to Christ and their obligations to Him. He was to them an expiatory sacrifice; a ransom; an hilasmos or propitiation. They regarded Him as made a curse for them; as bearing their punishment, or "the chastisement of their peace." They received the "sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ," as the only means of being cleansed from the guilt of their sins, and of restoration to the favour of God and holiness of heart and life. This was undoubtedly their experience as it is recorded in the Bible. (2.) In the second place, from the times of the Apostle to the present day, the people of God have had the same inward convictions and feelings. This is clear from their confessions of faith, from their liturgies and prayers, from their hymns, and from all the records of their inward religious life. Let any one look over the hymns of the Latin Church, of the Moravians, the Lutherans, the Reformed, of Episcopalians, Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Independents, and Congregationalists, and see what truths on this subject constituted and now constitute the, food and atmosphere of their religious life: --

"Jesus, my God, Thy blood alone hath power sufficient to atone."

"To the dear fountain of Thy blood, incarnate God, I fly"

"My soul looks back to see the burdens Thou didst bear, When hanging on the cursed tree, and hopes her sins were there."

"Ein L[?]mmlein geht und tr[?]gt die Schuld,

Der Welt unnd ihren Kinder."

"Geh hin, nimm dich der S[?]nder an,

Die auch kein Engel retten kann

Von meines Zornes Ruthen!

Die Straf' ist schwer, der Zorn ist gross;

Du kannst und sollst sie machen los

Durch Sterben und durch Bluten."

Does any Christian object to such hymns? Do they not express his inmost religious convictions? If they do not agree with the speculations of his understanding, do they not express the feelings of his heart and the necessities of his fallen nature? The speculations of the understanding are what man teaches; the truths which call forth these feelings of the heart are what the Holy Ghost teaches.

This argument may be presented in another light. It may be shown that no other theory of the work of Christ does correspond with the inward experience of God's people. The theory that the work of Christ was didactic; that it was exemplary; that its proximate design was to produce a subjective change in the sinner or a moral impression on the minds of all intelligent creatures; these and other theories, contrary to the common Church doctrine, fail especially in two points. First, they do not account for the intimate personal relation between Christ and the believer which is everywhere recognized in Scripture, and which is so precious in the view of all true Christians. Secondly, they make no provision for the expiation of sin, or for satisfying the demands of a guilty conscience, which mere pardon never can appease.

Throughout the New Testament, Christ is represented not only as the object of worship and of supreme love and devotion, but also as being to his people the immediate and constant source of life and of all good. Not Christ as God, but Christ as our Saviour. He is the head, we are his members. He is the vine, we are the branches. It is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us. He is made unto us wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. His blood cleanses us from all sins. He redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us. He bore our sins in his own body on the tree. He is our great High Priest who ever lives to make intercession for us. It would be easy to show from the records of the religious life of the Church that believers have ever regarded Christ in the light in which He is here presented. The argument is that these representations are not consistent with any moral or governmental theory of the atonement.

There are two hymns which, perhaps, beyond all others, are dear to the hearts of all Christians who speak the English language. The one written by Charles Wesley, an Arminian; the other by Toplady, a Calvinist. It is hard to see what meaning can be attached to these hymns by those who hold that Christ died simply to teach us something, or to make a moral impression on us or others. How can they say, --

"Jesus, lover of my soul,

Let me to Thy bosom fly"?

Why should they fly to Him if He be only a teacher or moral reformer? What do they mean when they say, --

"Hide me, O my Saviour hide"?

Hide from what? Not from the vindicatory justice of God, for they admit no such attribute.

"Other refuge have I none;"

refuge from what?

"All my trust on Thee is laid."

For what do we trust Him? According to their theory He is not the ground of our confidence. It is not for his righteousness, but For our own that we are to be accepted by

God. It would seem that those only who hold the common Church doctrine can say, --

"Thou, O Christ, art all I need."

All I need as a creature, as a sinner, as guilty, as polluted, as miserable and helpless; all I need for time or for eternity. So of Toplady's precious hymn, --

"Rock of ages, cleft for me;"

for me personally and individually; as Paul said he lived "by faith of the Son of God who loved me, and gave himself for me."

"Let the water and the blood,

From Thy wounded side that flowed;

Be of sin the double cure;

Cleanse me from its guilt and power."

How can such language be used by those who deny the necessity of expiation; who hold that guilt need not be washed away, that all that is necessary is that we should be made morally good? No one can say, --

"Nothing in my hand I bring,

Simply to Thy cross I cling,"

who does not believe that Christ "bore our sins in his own body on the tree."

It is a historical fact that where false theories of the atonement prevail, Christ and his work are put in the background. We hear from the pulpits much about God as a moral governor; much about the law and obligation, and of the duty of submission; but little about Christ, of the duty of fleeing to Him, of receiving Him, of trusting in Him, of renouncing our own righteousness that we may put on the righteousness of God; and little of our union with Him, of his living in us, and of our duty to live by faith in Him Thus new theories introduce a new religion.

[424] Dogmatik, II. iii. 1, § 401. K&#xfffd;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 159.

[425] This also is the doctrine of Hofmann in his Schriftbeweis. It is one of the principal objects of Delitzsch in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews and in the long Excursus attached to that admirable work, to contest the doctrine of Hofmann on the nature of the work of Christ.

[426] This is the theory by Dr. B&#xfffd;hr, in his Symbolik.

[427] Keil in his Biblische Arch&#xfffd;ologie, and many others, give substantially this moral view. According to Keil, sacrifices were designed to teach the translation of the sinner from a state of alienation from God to a state of grace. Dr. Young, in his Light and Life of Men, represents them as B&#xfffd;hr does, as indicating the surrender of the soul to God, and as intended to give a divine sanction to the use of animal food. Notwithstanding these conflicting speculations of individual writers, it remains true that the great body of Biblical scholars of all ages and of all classes regard the sin offering of the Old Testament as real piacular sacrifices. This is done by the highest class of the modern German theologians, who for themselves reject the Church doctrine of the atonement.

[428] "Obsecro Domine, peccavi, rebellis fui, perverse egi, hoc et illud feci, nunc autem me peccasse poenitet; h&#xfffd;c sit itaque expiato mea." De Sacrificiis, I. xxii. 9, edit. London, 1677, p. 273.

[429] Lib. I. xv. 8, p. 166 ff.

[430] Typology, edit. Philadelphia, 1857, vol. ii. p. 288, note.

[431] Commentar zum Briefe an die Hebrer, Leipzig, 1857, p. 716.

[432] The Later Prophecies of Isaiah, New York, 1847, p. 264.

[433] Commentar zum Briefe an die Hebrer, p. 720.

[434] Ibid. p. 719.

[435] Page 442.

[436] Commentary on Hebrews, Leipzig, 1722.

[437] Institutiones Theologi, § 136, 5th edit. Halle, 1826, p. 424.

§ 7. Objections.

The only legitimate method of controverting a doctrine which purports to be founded on the Scriptures is the exegetical. If its advocates undertake to show that it is taught in the Bible, its opponents are bound to prove that the Bible, understood agreeably to the recognized laws of interpretation, does not teach it. This method, comparatively speaking, is little relied upon, or resorted to by the adversaries of the Church doctrine concerning the satisfaction of Christ. Their main reliance is on objections of two classes: the one drawn from speculative or philosophical principles; the other from the sentiments or feelings. It is not uncommon for modern writers, especially among the German theologians, to begin the discussion of this subject by a review of the Scriptural statements in relation to it. This is often eminently satisfactory. It is admitted that Christ saves us as a priest by offering Himself a sacrifice for sin; that He is a priest and sin offering in the Old Testament sense of those terms; and that a priest is a mediator, a representative of the people, and an offerer of sacrifices. It is admitted that the sin offerings of the old dispensation were expiatory sacrifices, designed to satisfy the justice of God and to secure the restoration of his favour to the sinner. It is admitted that expiation was made by substitution and vicarious punishment, that the victim bore the sins of the offerer and died not only for his benefit, but in his place. It is further admitted that all this was designed to be typical of the priesthood and sacrifice of Christ, and that the New Testament teaches that these types were fulfilled in Him; that He was the only true priest, and his offering of Himself was the only available sacrifice for sin; that He bore the sins of men; made expiation for their guilt by taking their place, and sustaining the penalty of the law and time wrath of God in their stead; and that the effect of his satisfaction of justice is that God is in such a sense reconciled to man, that He can consistently pardon their sins, and bestow upon them all saving blessings. Having given this exhibition of what the Scriptures teach on the subject, they go on to state what the Fathers taught; how the doctrine was presented during the Middle Ages, and afterwards by the Reformers; how the Rationalists and Supernaturalists of the last generation dealt with it; and how the modern speculative theologians have philosophized about it; and end, generally, by giving in their adhesion to some one of these modern theories more or less modified. All the while there stand the Scriptural statements untouched and unrefuted. They are allowed to go for what they are worth; but they are not permitted to control the writers own convictions. This course is adopted by different men on different principles. Sometimes it is upon the distinct denial of the inspiration of the sacred writers. They are

admitted to be honest end faithful. They may or may not have been the recipients of a supernatural revelation, but they were fallible men, subject to all the influences which determine the modes of thought and the expressions of the men of any given age or nation. The sacred writers were Jews, and accustomed to a religion which had priests and sacrifices. It was, therefore, natural that they should set forth under figures and in the use of terms, borrowed from their own institutions, the truths that Christ saved sinners, and that in the prosecution of that work He suffered and died. These truths may be retained, but the form in which they are presented in the Bible may be safely discarded.

Others, and perhaps the majority of the most popular of this class of theologians, go further than this. They are willing that criticism and forced interpretations should make what havoc they please with the Bible. Any and every book may be rejected from the canon. Any and every doctrine may be interpreted out of the sacred pages; still the only Christianity they value is safe. Christianity is independent of any form of doctrine. It is a life, an inward, organic power, which remodels the soul; which life is Christianity, because it is assumed to have its origin in Christ.

Others again act on the principles of that form of rationalism which has received the name of Dogmatism. The doctrines and facts of the Bible are allowed to stand as true. They are allowed to be the proper modes of statement for popular instruction and impression. But it is assumed to be the office of the theologian to discover, present, and bring into harmony with his system, the philosophical truths which underlie these doctrinal statements of the Bible. And these philosophical truths are assumed to be the substance of the Scriptural doctrines, of which the doctrines themselves are the unessential and mutable forms. Thus the doctrine of the Trinity is admitted. The form in which it is presented in the Bible is regarded as its popular form, which it may be useful to retain for the people. But the real and important truth which it involves is, that original, unintelligent, unconscious Being (the Father) comes to conscious existence in the world (the Son), by an eternal process, and returns by an unceasing flow into the infinite (the Spirit). It is also admitted that God became flesh, but it was, as some say, in the whole race of man; mankind are the manifestation of God in the flesh; or, as others say, the Church is his body, that is, the form in which the incarnation is realized. Christ is acknowledged to be our saviour from sin, but it is by a purely subjective process. He introduces a new life power into humanity, which enters into conflict with the evil of our nature, and after a painful struggle overcomes it. This is called the application of philosophy to the explanation of Scriptural doctrines. It is patent, however, that this is not explanation, but substitution. It is the substitution of the human for the divine; of the thoughts of men, which are mere vapour, for the thoughts of God, which are eternal verities. It is giving a stone for bread, and a scorpion for an egg. It is, indeed, a very convenient method of getting rid of the teachings of the Bible, while professing to admit its authority. It is important, however, to notice the concession involved in these modes of proceeding. It is acknowledged that the Church doctrine of a true expiatory sacrifice for sin, of a real satisfaction of justice by means of the vicarious punishment of sin, is the doctrine of the Scriptures, as well of the Old Testament as of the New. This is all we contend for, and all we care for. If God teaches this, men may teach what they please.

Moral Objections.

Another class of objections to the Scriptural doctrine of satisfaction, which may be called philosophical, although not of the speculative kind, are those which are founded on certain assumed moral axioms. It is said to be self-evident that the innocent cannot be guilty; and if not guilty he cannot be punished, for punishment is the judicial infliction of evil on account of guilt. As the Church doctrine, while maintaining the perfect sinlessness of Christ, teaches that He bore the guilt of sin, and therefore was regarded and treated as a sinner, that doctrine assumes both an impossibility and an act of injustice. It assumes that God regards things as they are not. He regards the innocent as guilty. This is an impossibility. And if possible for Him to treat the innocent as guilty, it would be an act of gross injustice. On this class of objections it may be remarked, --

1. That they avail nothing against the plain declaration of the Scriptures. If the Bible teaches that the innocent may bear the guilt of the actual transgressor; that He may endure the penalty incurred in his place, then it is in vain to say that this cannot be done.

2. If it be said that these moral objections render it necessary to explain these representations of Scripture as figurative, or as anthropomorphic modes of expression, as when God is said to have eyes, to stand, or to walk, then the reply is that these representations are so didactic, are so repeated; and are so inwrought into the whole system of Scriptural doctrine, that they leave us no alternative but to receive them as the truths of God, or to reject tie Bible as his word.

3. Rejecting the Bible does not help the matter. We cannot reject the facts of providence. Where is the propriety of saying that the innocent cannot justly suffer for the guilty, when we see that they actually do thus suffer continually, and everywhere since the world began? There is no moral principle asserted in tie Bible, which is not carried out in providence. God says He will visit the iniquities of the fathers upon their children to the third and fourth generation of those that hate Him. And so He does, and ever has done. Are we so confident in ourselves as to deny that there is a just God who governs the world, rather than admit that the innocent may rightfully bear the iniquity of the guilty? In teaching the doctrine of legal substitution, of the transfer of guilt from the transgressor to the innocent, of the satisfaction of justice by vicarious punishment, the Bible asserts and assumes no moral principle which does not underlie all the providential dealings of God with individuals or with nations.

4. Men constantly deceive themselves by postulating as moral axioms what are nothing more than the forms in which their feelings or peculiar opinions find expression. To one man it is an axiom that a holy God cannot permit sin, or a benevolent God allow his creatures to be miserable; and he, therefore, infers either that there is no God, or that He cannot control the acts of free agents. To another it is self-evidently true that a free act cannot be certain, and therefore that there can be no foreordination, or foreknowledge, or prediction of the occurrence of such acts. To another, it is self-evident that a merciful God cannot permit any portion of his rational creatures to remain forever under the dominion of sin and suffering. There would be no end of controversy, and no security for any truth whatever, if the strong personal convictions of individual minds be allowed to determine what is, or what is not true, what the Bible may, and what it may not, be allowed to teach. It must be admitted, however, that there are moral intuitions, founded on the constitution of our nature, and constituting a primary revelation of the nature of God, which no external

revelation can possibly contradict. The authority of these intuitive truths is assumed or fully recognized in the Bible itself. They have, however, their criteria. They cannot be enlarged or diminished. No man can add to, or detract from, their number. Those criteria are, (1.) They are all recognized in the Scriptures themselves. (2.) They are universally admitted as true by all rational minds. (3.) They cannot be denied. No effort of the will, and no sophistry of the understanding can destroy their authority over the reason and conscience.

5. It is very evident that the principle that "the innocent cannot justly be punished for the guilty," cannot stand the application of the above-mentioned criteria. So far from being recognized in the Bible, it is contrary to its plainest declarations and facts. So far from being universally received among men as true, it has never been received at all as part of the common faith of mankind. The substitution of the innocent for the guilty, of victims for transgressors in sacrifice, of one for many; the idea of expiation by vicarious punishment, has been familiar to the human mind in all ages. It has been admitted not only as possible, but as rational, and recognized as indicating the only method by which sinful men can be reconciled to a just and holy God. It is not, therefore, to be admitted that it conflicts with any intuition of the reason or of the conscience; on the contrary it is congenial with both. It is no doubt frequently the case that opposition to this doctrine arises from a misapprehension of the terms in which it is expressed. By guilt many insist on meaning personal criminality and ill desert; and by punishment evil inflicted on the ground of such personal demerit. In these senses of the words the doctrine of satisfaction and vicarious punishment would indeed involve an impossibility. Moral character cannot be transferred. The Remonstrants were right in saying that man cannot be good with another's goodness, any more than he can be white with another's whiteness. And if punishment means evil inflicted on the ground of personal demerit, then it is a contradiction to say that the innocent can be punished. But if guilt expresses only the relation of sin to justice, and is the obligation under which the sinner is placed to satisfy its demands, then there is nothing in the nature of things, nothing in the moral nature of man, nothing in the nature of God as revealed either in his providence or in his word, which forbids the idea that this obligation may on adequate grounds be transferred from one to an other, or assumed by one in the place of others.

To the head of objections founded on assumed moral axioms belong those urged by a large class of modern, and especially of German theologians. These theologians have their peculiar views of the nature of God, of his relation to the world, and of anthropology in all its branches, which underlie and determine all their theological doctrines. It is denied that Schleiermacher founded a school; but it is certain that he introduced a method of theologizing, and advocated principles, which have determined the character of the theology of a large class of men, not only in Germany, but also in England and America: Twesten, Nitsch, Lcke, Olshausen, Ullmann, Lange, Liebner, and even Ebrard in Germany and Morell and Maurice in England, belong to this class of writers. In this country what is known as the "Mercersburg Theology" is the product of the same principles. Everything which distinguishes that theology from the theology of the Reformed Church, comes from the introduction of these new German speculative principles. No two of the writers above mentioned agree in all points. They differ, however, only in the length to which they carry their common principles in modifying or overthrowing the faith of the Church. Ebrard, one of the best, because one of the most moderate and least infected of the class, says in the

preface to his "Dogmatik," that he goes hand in hand with the old Reformed theology in all points, and that for that reason he is more true to the principles of his Church, as a church of progress. He professes to have carried that theology forward by a process of "organic development;" and this Professor Harbaugh of Mercersburg, in his late inaugural address, claims to have been the service, and still to be the office of the German Reformed Church in this country. It is true that the leading theologians of that Church, as was perhaps to be expected, have given themselves up to the guidance of the German mind. All they have done has been to incorporate the modern German philosophy with theology. Their advances, therefore, have no more worth than belongs to any other form of human speculation. They do not pretend to get their peculiar doctrines from the Bible; they only labour to make the Bible agree with their doctrines. But this is just as impossible as that the Scriptures should teach the principles of modern chemistry, astronomy, or geology. These philosophical principles had no existence in the minds of men when the Bible was written, and they have no authority now but what they get from their human authors. If they survive for a generation, it will be more than similar speculations have in general been able to accomplish. [438] It is, however, lamentable to see how even good men allow themselves to explain away the most catholic, and plainly revealed doctrines of the Bible, in obedience to the dictates of the modern transcendental philosophy. What however we have here immediately in view is, the objections which this class of writers make to the Church form of the doctrine of satisfaction, in obedience to the assumed moral axiom above mentioned, namely, that the innocent cannot by God be regarded and treated as guilty, or the guilty regarded and treated as righteous. It is indeed true that God cannot but regard every person as he really is. His judgments are according to truth. But this is not inconsistent with his regarding Christ, although personally innocent, as having voluntarily assumed our place and undertaken to satisfy the demands of justice in our place; nor with his regarding the believer, although personally undeserving, as righteous, in the sense of being free from just exposure to condemnation, on the ground of the vicarious satisfaction of Christ. This is precisely what the Scriptures affirm to be true, and that which believers in all ages have made the ground of their hope toward God. This is almost the identical proposition affirmed by the Apostle, when he declares that on the ground of the propitiation of Christ, God "can justify the ungodly," i.e., declare the unrighteous to be righteous; unrighteous personally, but righteous in that the demands of justice in regard to him are satisfied. This also is precisely what the writers referred to (not Ebrard who does not go so far as those with whom he is classed) deny. If God, say they, regards Christ as sinful, He must be really sinful; if He pronounces the believer righteous, he must be truly, personally, and subjectively righteous. As most of these writers admit the sinlessness of Christ, and yet maintain that only sinners can be treated as sinners, and only the personally righteous treated as righteous; and as they hold that imputation implies the real possession of the quality, act, or relation which is imputed, they are forced to teach that Christ in assuming our nature as guilty and fallen, ipso facto, assumed all the responsibilities of men, and was bound to answer to the justice of God for all the sins which hnmanity had committed. The doctrine of one class of these writers is, that the Logos in assuming our nature did not become an individual, but the universal man; He did not take to Himself "a true body and a reasonable soul," but the whole of humanity, or humanity as an organic whole or law of life; the individual dying for the sins of other individuals, does not satisfy justice. When He was

nailed to the cross, not an individual merely, but humanity itself, was crucified; and, therefore, his sufferings were the sufferings not of an individual man, but of that which underlies all human individualities, and consequently avails for all in whom humanity is individualized. As Christ becomes personally responsible for the guilt which attaches to the humanity which He assumed, so we become personally righteous and entitled, on the ground of what we are or become, to eternal life, because, by our union with Him, we partake of his humanity as well as of his divinity. His theanthropic nature is conveyed to us with all its merits, excellence, and glories, as the nature of Adam with its guilt, pollution, and weaknesses, has been transmitted to his posterity. It is in favour of this theory that the church doctrine of the substitution of Christ, the innocent for the guilty; of his bearing the guilt not of his own nature, but of sinners; of his suffering the penalty of the law in the place of those by whom it had been incurred, one individual of infinite dignity dying in the stead of the multitude of his people (the shepherd for his sheep), is discarded and trodden under foot. In reference to this theory, it is sufficient here to remark, --

1. That it is a mere speculative, or philosophical, anthropological theory. It has no more authority than the thousands of speculations which the teeming mind of man has produced. Schleiermacher says that man is the form in which the universal spirit comes to consciousness and individuality on this earth. These writers say that man is the form in which generic humanity is individualized. Every philosophy has its own anthropology. It is evidently most unreasonable and presumptuous to found the explanation of a great Scriptural doctrine, which the people are bound to understand and receive, and on which they are required to rest their hope of salvation, upon a theory as to the nature of man, which has no divine authority, and which not one man in a thousand, perhaps not one in hundreds of thousands, believes or ever has believed. The self-confidence and self-exaltation which such a course implies, can hardly be the fruit of the Holy Spirit.

2. The theory itself is unintelligible. The phrases "universal man," and "the whole of humanity," as here used, have no meaning. To say that "humanity itself was nailed to the cross," conveys no rational idea. By a universal man might be meant a universal genius, or a man who represents all mankind as Adam did. But this is expressly repudiated. By "a universal man," as distinguished from an individual man, is intended a man who includes the whole of humanity in himself. Though this might be said of Adam when he stood absolutely alone, before the creation of Eve, yet it cannot be said of any one of a multitude of men. A universal man would be a man who included in himself all human persons; an idea as monstrous as the modern doctrine of "the all-personality of God."

In the language of the Church, to assume a nature is to assume a substance with its essential attributes and properties. Through all ages in the Church the words phusis, oisia, substantia, and natura, have, in relation to this subject, been used interchangeably. When it is said that the Logos assumed our nature, it is meant that He took into personal union with Himself a substance or essence having the same essential properties which constitute us men. But He did not assume the whole of that substance or essence. He assumed the whole of humanity in the sense of assuming all the attributes of humanity. He took upon Him all that was necessary to constitute Him "very man" as He was from eternity "very God." This, however, is not what these writers mean. They say He took upon Him the whole of humanity so as to be, not an individual, but the universal man. This is what some of the first

of German minds have pronounced to be Unsinn, i.e., meaningless. Even if the idea of substance, although recognized by the Bible, the Church, and mankind, be discarded, and humanity, or human nature, be defined as a life, or organic force, or aggregate of certain forces, the case is not altered. A universal man would still be a man who had in himself to the exclusion of all others, the totality of that life or of those forces. There is no conceivable sense in which Christ had in Himself the whole of humanity, when millions of other men existed around Him. This whole theory, therefore, which is set up as antagonistic to the Church doctrine of satisfaction, rests on an unintelligible, or meaningless proposition. It is no new thing in the history of the human mind that even great men should deceive themselves with words, and take mystic phrases, or vague imaginings for definite ideas.

3. There is a moral or ethical impossibility, as well as a metaphysical one, involved in this theory. The doctrine is, that in assuming human nature Christ assumed the guilt attaching to the sins humanity had committed. He became responsible for those sins; and was bound to bear the penalty they had incurred. Nevertheless human nature as it existed in his person was guiltless and absolutely pure. This, to our apprehensions, is an impossibility. Guilt and sin can be predicated only of a person. This if not a self-evident, is, at least, a universally admitted truth. Only a person is a rational agent. It is only to persons that responsibility, guilt, or moral character can attach. Human nature apart from human persons cannot act, and therefore cannot contract guilt, or be responsible. Christ assumed a rational soul which had never existed as a person, and could not be responsible on the ground of its nature for the sins of other men. Unless guilt and sin be essential attributes or properties of human nature, Christ did not assume guilt by assuming that nature. If guilt and sin cannot be predicated of Christ's person, they cannot by possibility be predicated of his human nature. The whole theory, therefore, which denies that Christ as a divine person clothed in a nature like our own, assumed the guilt of our sins by imputation of what did not belong to Him, and sustained the penalty which we had incurred, and makes that denial on the ground that the innocent cannot bear the sins of the guilty; that God could not regard Him as sin, unless He was in Himself sin, is founded on the moral impossibility that a nature, as distinguished from a person, can sin or be guilty.

When it is said that we derive a sinful nature from Adam, and that guilt as well as pollution attaches to the nature of fallen men, the doctrine is, that we, and all who derive that nature from Adam, are personally sinful and guilty. We are born, as the Apostle says, the children of wrath. It is not an impersonal nature which is guilty, for this would be a contradiction, but persons whose immanent, subjective state is opposed to the character and law of God. All this, however, is denied concerning Christ. These theologians admit that, as a person, He was without sin. But if without sin, He was without guilt. It was according to the Scriptures by the imputation to Him of sins not his own, that He bore our guilt, or assumed the responsibility of satisfying justice on our account. It is only by admitting that by being born of a woman, or becoming flesh, Christ placed Himself in the category of sinful men, and became personally a sinner, and guilty in the sight of God, as all other men are, that it can be maintained that the assumption of our nature in itself involved the assumption of guilt, or that He thereby became responsible for all the sins which men possessing that nature had committed.

4. It is another fatal objection to this scheme that it subverts the whole gospel plan of

salvation. Instead of directing the soul to Christ, to his righteousness, and to his intercession; that is, to what is objective and out of itself, as the ground of its hope toward God, it turns the attention of the sinner in upon himself. The only righteousness he has on which to trust is within. He has a new nature, and because of that nature is and deserves to be, reconciled unto God and entitled to eternal life. It places Christ just as far from us as Adam is. As Adam is the source of a nature for which we are condemned, so Christ is the source of a nature for which we are justified and saved. The system, therefore, calls upon us to exchange a hope founded upon what Christ is and has done in our behalf, a hope which rests upon an infinitely meritorious righteousness out of ourselves, for a hope founded on the glimmer of divine life which we find within ourselves. We may call this new nature by what high-sounding names we please. We may call it theanthropic, divine-human, or divine, it makes no difference. Whatever it is called, it is something so weak and so imperfect that it cannot satisfy ourselves, much less the infinitely holy and just God. To call on men to trust for their acceptance before God on the ground of what they are made by this inward change, is to call upon them to build their eternal hopes upon a foundation which cannot sustain a straw. That this is the true view of the plan of salvation as proposed by these theologians, notwithstanding the lofty terms in which they speak of Christ as our Saviour, is plain from the parallel which they constantly refer to between our relation to Christ and our relation to Adam. This is an analogy which the Apostle insists upon, and which as presented by him is full of instruction and hope. Adam was the head and representative of his race. We stood our probation in him. His sin was putatively the sin of his posterity. It was the judicial ground of their condemnation. The penalty of that transgression was death, the loss of the life of God, as well as of his fellowship and favour. All mankind, therefore, represented by Adam in the first covenant came into the world in a state of condemnation and of spiritual death. He was a type of Christ, because Christ is the head and representative of his people. He fulfilled all righteousness in their behalf and in their stead. As Adam's disobedience was the ground of the condemnation of all who were in him, so Christ's obedience is the ground of the justification of all who are in Him; and as spiritual death was the penal, and therefore certain consequence of our condemnation for the sin of Adam, so spiritual and eternal life is the covenanted, and therefore the certain and inseparable consequence of our justification for the righteousness of Christ. But according to the modern speculative (or as it is called by Dorner, [439] "the regenerated") theology, the parallel between Christ and Adam is very different. We are not condemned for Adam's sin, as his sin, but only for that sin as it was ours, committed by us as partakers of the numerically same nature that sinned in him, and for the consequent corruption of our nature. The whole ground of our condemnation is subjective or inward. We are condemned for what we are. In like manner we are justified for what we become through Christ. He assumed numerically the same nature that had sinned. He sanctified it, elevated it, and raised it to the power of a divine life by its union with his divine person, and He communicates this new, theanthropic nature to his people, and on the ground of what they thus become they are reconciled and saved. It is a favourite and frequently occurring statement with these writers that Christ redeems us, not by what He does, but by what He is. His assumption of our nature was its redemption. Extreme spiritualism always ends in materialism. This whole theory has a materialistic aspect. Humanity as derived from Adam is conceived of as a polluted stream, into which a healing purifying element was introduced

by Christ. From Him onward, it flows as a life-giving stream. What then becomes of those who lived before Christ? This is a question which these theologians are slow to answer. They agree, however, in saying that the condition of the patriarchs was deplorable; that their relation to Christ was essentially different from ours. There was no theanthropic life for them. That began with the incarnation, and the stream cannot flow backwards.

No one can read the theological works of the speculative school, without being satisfied that their design is not to set forth what the Scriptures teach. To this little or no attention is paid. Their object is to give a scientific interpretation of certain facts of Scripture (such as sin and redemption), in accordance with the principles of the current philosophy. These writers are as much out of the reach, and out of contact with the sympathies and religious life of the people, as men in a balloon are out of relation to those they leave behind. To the aeronauts indeed those on the earth appear very diminutive and grovelling; but they are none the less in their proper sphere and upon solid ground. All that the excursionists can hope for is a safe return to terra firma. And that is seldom accomplished without risk or loss.

Popular Objections.

The more popular objections to the doctrine of vicarious satisfaction have already been considered in the progress of the discussion. A certain amount of repetition may be pardoned for the sake of a brief and distinct statement of the several points. These objections were all urged by Socinus and his associates at the time of the Reformation. They are principally the following: --

There is no Vindicatory Justice in God.

1. There is no such attribute in God as vindicatory justice, and therefore there can be no satisfaction to justice required or rendered. This would be a fatal objection if the assumption which it involves were correct. But if it is intuitively true, that sin ought to be punished, then it is no less true that God will, and from the constitution of his nature must do, what ought to be done. All men, in despite of the sophistry of the understanding, and in despite of their moral degradation, know that it is the righteous judgment of God, that those who sin are worthy of death. They, therefore, know that without a satisfaction to justice, sin cannot be pardoned. If there be no sacrifice for sin, there is only a fearful looking for of judgment. This conviction lies undisturbed at the bottom of every human breast, and never fails, sooner or later, to reveal itself with irrepressible force on the reason and the conscience.

There can be no Antagonism in God.

2. To the same effect it is objected that there can be no antagonism in God. There cannot be one impulse to punish and another impulse not to punish . All God's acts or manifestations of Himself toward his creatures, must be referred to one principle, and that principle is love. And, therefore, his plan of saving sinners can only be regarded as an exhibition of love, not of justice in any form. All that He can, as a God of love, require, is the return of his creatures to Himself, which is a return to holiness and happiness. It is true God is love. But it is no less true that love in God is not a weakness, impelling Him to do what ought not to be done. If sin ought to be punished, as conscience and the word of God declare, then there is nothing in God which impels Him to leave it unpunished. His whole nature is indeed harmonious, but it has the harmony of moral excellence, leading with

absolute certainty to the judge of all the earth doing right; punishing or pardoning, just as moral excellence demands. The love of God has not prevented the final perdition of apostate angels; and it could not require the restoration of fallen men without an adequate atonement. The infinite, discriminating love of God to our race, is manifested in his giving his own Son to bear our sins and to redeem us from the curse of the law by sustaining the penalty in his own person. "Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation (hilasmos, propitiatio, expiatio. No man can get the saving import out of that word) for our sins." (1 John iv. 10.)

The Transfer of Guilt or Righteousness Impossible.

3. It is objected that the transfer of guilt and righteousness involved in the Church doctrine of satisfaction is impossible. The transfer of guilt or righteousness, as states of consciousness or forms of moral character, is indeed impossible. But the transfer of guilt as responsibility to justice, and of righteousness as that which satisfies justice, is no more impossible than that one man should pay the debt of another. All that the Bible teaches on this subject is that Christ paid as a substitute, our debt to the justice of God. The handwriting (cheirographon, the bond, Schuldbrief) Christ has cancelled, by nailing it to his cross. His complete satisfaction to the law, freed us as completely as the debtor is freed when his bond is legally cancelled.

Expiation a Heathenish Idea.

4. The idea of expiation, the innocent suffering for the guilty and God being thereby propitiated, is declared to be heathenish and revolting. No man has the right to make his taste or feelings the test of truth. That a doctrine is disagreeable, is no sufficient evidence of its untruth. There are a great many terribly unpleasant truths, to which we sinners have to submit. Besides, the idea of expiation is not revolting to the vast majority of minds, as is proved by its being incorporated in all religions of men, whether pagan, Jewish, or Christian. So far from being revolting, it is cherished and delighted in as the only hope of the guilty. So far from the innocent suffering for the guilty being a revolting spectacle, it is one of the sublimest exhibitions of self-sacrificing love. All heaven stands uncovered before the cross on which the Son of God, holy and harmless, bore the sins of men. And God forbid that redeemed sinners should regard the cross as an offence. God is not won to love by the death of his Son, but that death renders it consistent with moral excellence that his infinite love for sinful men should have unrestricted sway.

Satisfaction to Justice unnecessary.

5. It is objected that the doctrine of satisfaction to justice by means of vicarious punishment is unnecessary. All that is needed for the restoration of harmony in the universe can be effected by the power of love. The two great ends to be accomplished are a clue impression on rational minds of the evil of sin, and the reformation of sinners. Both these objects, it is contended, are secured without expiation or any penal suffering. According to some, the work of Christ operates æsthetically to accomplish the ends desired; according to others, it operates morally through the exhibition of love or by example, or by the confirmation of truth; and according to others, the operation is supernatural or mystical. But in any case his work was no satisfaction to justice or expiation for sin. It is enough to say in answer to all this, --

1. That such is not the doctrine of the Bible. The Scriptures teach that something more

was necessary for the salvation of men than moral influences and impressions, or the revelation and confirmation of truth, something very different from mystical influence on the nature of man. What was necessary was precisely what was done. The Son of God assumed our nature, took the place of sinners, bore the curse of the law in their stead, and thereby rendered it possible that God should be just and yet the justifier of the ungodly. If such be the Scripture doctrine, all these schemes of redemption may be dismissed without consideration.

2. These schemes are not only unscriptural, but they are inoperative They do not meet the necessities of the case, as those necessities reveal themselves in the consciousness of men. They make no provision for the removal of guilt. But the sense of guilt is universal and ineradicable. It is not irrational. It is not founded on ignorance or misconception of our relation to God. The more the soul is enlightened, the more deep and painful is its sense of guilt. There are some philosophers who would persuade us that there is no such thing as sin; that the sense of moral pollution of which men complain, and under which the holiest men groan as under a body of death, is all a delusion, a state of mind produced by erroneous views of God and of his relation to his creatures. There are others, theologians as well as philosophers, who while admitting the reality of moral evil, and recognizing the validity of the testimony of consciousness as to our moral pollution, endeavour to persuade us that there is no such thing as guilt. Responsibility to justice, the desert of punishment, the moral necessity for the punishment of sin, they deny. The one class is just as obviously wrong as the other. Consciousness testifies just as clearly and just as universally to the guilt, as to the pollution. It craves as importunately deliverance from the one as from the other. A plan of salvation, therefore, which makes no provision for the removal of guilt, or satisfaction of justice, which admits no such thing as the vicarious punishment of sin, is as little suited to our necessities as though it made no provision for the reformation and sanctification of men.

3. A third remark on these humanly devised schemes of redemption is, that while they leave out the essential idea of expiation, or satisfaction to justice by vicarious punishment, without which salvation is impossible, and reconciliation with a just God inconceivable they contain no element of influence or power which does not belong in a higher degree to the Scriptural and Church doctrine. Whatever there is of power in a perfectly sinless life, of a life of self-sacrifice and devotion to the service of God and the good of man, is to be found in the Church doctrine. Whatever there is of power in the prolonged exhibition of a love which passes knowledge, is to be found there. Whatever there is of power in the truths which Christ taught, and which He sealed with his blood, truths either before entirely unknown, or only imperfectly apprehended, belongs of course to the doctrine which the Church universal has ever held. And whatever there is of reality in the doctrine of our mystical union, and of our participation of the nature of Christ through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost, belongs to the Scriptural doctrine, without the blurring and enfeebling effects of modern speculation. While, therefore, we should lose everything in renouncing the doctrine of expiation through the sacrificial death of Christ, we should gain nothing, by adopting these modern theories.

"If a man," says Delitzsch, "keeps in view our desert of punishment, and allows the three saving doctrines of Scripture to stand in their integrity, namely, (1.) That God made

Him who knew no sin to be sin for us, i.e., imputed our sins to Him. (2.) That Christ, although free from guilt, laden with our guilt, was made a curse for us, i.e., suffered the wrath of God due to us; or, as the Scripture also says, that God executed on his Son judgment against sin, He having taken upon Him flesh and blood and offered Himself as a sacrifice for us for the expiation of sin. (3.) That in like manner his righteousness is imputed to believers, so that we may stand before God, as He had submitted to the imputation of our sins in order to their expiation; if these premises remain unobliterated, then it is as clear as the sun that Christ suffered and died as our substitute, in order that we need not suffer what we deserved, and in order that we instead of dying should be partakers of the life secured by his vicarious death." [440]

[438] Indeed, already the philosophy of Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher seems to be for the rising men of Germany as much a thing of the past, as that of the Hindus or the Cabala. The German mind has swung round from making spirit everything, to making it nothing.

[439] See his Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, p. 769, and onward. He dates this regeneration from Schelling, Hegel, and Schleiermacher, especially, of course the last.

[440] Commentar zum Briefe an die Hebr�er, p. 728. "Beh�lt man die Verdammnissw�rdigkeit unserer Schuld recht im Auge und l�sst man ohne Deuteln die drei grossen von der Schrift bezeugten Heilswahrheiten stehen: 1. dass Gott den der von keiner S�nde w�sste f�r uns zur S�nde gemacht d. i. ihm unsere S�nden imputirt hat; 2. dass Christus der Schuldlose, aber mit unserer Schuld Beladene f�r uns ein Fluch geworden d. i. den Blitz des Zorns, der uns treffen sollte, f�r uns erlitten, oder, wie die Schrift such sagt, dass Gott an seinem Sohne, der unser Fleisch und Blut angenommen und sich uns zum S�ndopfer, zur S�nden�hne begeben, das Gericht �ber die S�nde vollzogen; 3. dass uns nun im Glauben seine Gerechtigkeit ebenso zugerechnet wird, um vor Gott bestehen zu k�nnen, wie er sich hat unsere S�nden zurechnen lassen, um sie zu b�ssen --: so ist es auch, so lange diese Vorders�tze ungeschm�lert bleiben, sonnenklar, das er stellvertretend f�r uns gelitten und gestorben, damit wir nicht leiden m�ssten, was wir verwirkt, und damit wir statt zu sterben in seinem durch stellvertretenden Tod hindurch gewonnen Leben das Leben hatten."

CHAPTER VIII: FOR WHOM DID CHRIST DIE?

§ 1. State of the Question.

This is a question between Augustinians and Anti- Augustinians. The former believing that God from all eternity having elected some to everlasting life, had a special reference to their salvation in the mission and work of his Son. The latter, denying that there has been any such election of a part of the human family to salvation, maintain that the mission and work of Christ had an equal reference to all mankind.

The question, therefore, does not, in the first place, concern the nature of Christ's work. It is true, if it be denied that his work was a satisfaction for sin, and affirmed that it was merely didactic; that his life, sufferings, and death were designed to reveal and confirm truth; then it would follow of course that it had no reference to one class of men more than to another, or to men more than to angels. Truth is designed for the illumination of all the minds to which it is presented. But admitting the work of Christ to have been a true satisfaction for sin, its design may still be an open question. Accordingly, Lutherans and Reformed, although they agree entirely as to the nature of the atonement, differ as to its design. The former maintain that it had an equal reference to all mankind, the latter that it had special reference to the elect.

In the second place, the question does not concern the value of Christ's satisfaction. That Augustinians admit to be infinite. Its value depends on the dignity of the sacrifice; and as no limit car be placed to the dignity of the Eternal Son of God who offered Him self for our sins, so no limit can be assigned to the meritorious value of his work. It is a gross misrepresentation of the Augustinian doctrine to say that it teaches that Christ suffered so much for so many; that He would have suffered more had more been included in the purpose of salvation. This is not the doctrine of any Church on earth, and never has been. What was sufficient for one was sufficient for all. Nothing less than the light and heat of the sun is sufficient for any one plant or animal. But what is absolutely necessary for each is abundantly sufficient for the infinite number and variety of plants and animals which fill the earth. All that Christ did and suffered would have been necessary had only one human soul been the object of redemption; and nothing different and nothing more would have been required had every child of Adam been saved through his blood.

In the third place, the question does not concern the suitableness of the atonement. What was suitable for one was suitable for all. The righteousness of Christ, the merit of his obedience and death, is needed for justification by each individual of our race, and therefore is needed by all. It is no more appropriate to one man than to another. Christ fulfilled the conditions of the covenant under which all men were placed. He rendered the

obedience required of all, and suffered the penalty which all had incurred; and therefore his work is equally suited to all.

In the fourth place, the question does not concern the actual application of the redemption purchased by Christ. The parties to this controversy are agreed that some only, and not all of mankind are to be actually saved.

The whole question, therefore, concerns simply the purpose of God in the mission of his Son. What was the design of Christ's coming into the world, and doing and suffering all He actually did and suffered? Was it merely to make the salvation of all men possible; to remove the obstacles which stood in the way of the offer of pardon and acceptance to sinners? or, Was it specially to render certain the salvation of his own people, i.e., of those given to Him by the Father? The latter question is affirmed by Augustinians, and denied by their opponents. It is obvious that if there be no election of some to everlasting life, the atonement can have no special reference to the elect. It must have equal reference to all mankind. But it does not follow from the assertion of its having a special reference to the elect that it had no reference to the non-elect. Augustinians readily admit that the death of Christ had a relation to man, to the whole human family, which it had not to the fallen angels. It is the ground on which salvation is offered to every creature under heaven who hears the gospel; but it gives no authority for a like offer to apostate angels. It moreover secures to the whole race at large, and to all classes of men, innumerable blessings, both providential and religious. It was, of course, designed to produce these effects; and, therefore, He died to secure them. In view of the effects which the death of Christ produces in the relation of all mankind to God, it has in all ages been customary with Augustinians to say that Christ died "sufficienter pro omnibus, efficaciter tantum pro electis;" sufficiently for all, efficaciously only for the elect. There is a sense, therefore, in which He died for all, and there is a sense in which He died for the elect alone. The simple question is, Had the death of Christ a reference to the elect which it had not to other men? Did He come into the world to secure the salvation of those given to Him by the Father, so that the other effects of his work are merely incidental to what was done for the attainment of that object?

§ 2. Proof of the Augustinian Doctrine.

That these questions must be answered in the affirmative, is evident, --

1. From the nature of the covenant of redemption. It is admitted that there was a covenant between the Father and the Son in relation to the salvation of men. It is admitted that Christ came into the world in execution of that covenant. The nature of the covenant, therefore, determines the object of his death. According to one view, man having by his fall lost the ability of fulfilling the conditions of the covenant of life, God, for Christ's sake, enters into a new covenant, offering men salvation upon other and easier terms; namely, as some say, faith and repentance, and others evangelical obedience. If such be the nature of the plan of salvation, then it is obvious that the work of Christ has equal reference to all mankind. According to another view, the work of Christ was designed to secure the pardon of original sin and the gift of the Holy Spirit for all men, Jews or Gentiles, and those are saved who duly improve the grace they severally receive. The former is the doctrine of the ancient Semi-Pelagians and modern Remonstrants; the latter of the Wesleyan Arminians.

The Lutherans hold that God sent his Son to make a full and real legal satisfaction for the sins of all mankind; and that on the ground of this perfect satisfaction the offer of salvation is made to all who hear the gospel; that grace is given (in the word and sacraments) which, if unresisted, is sufficient to secure their salvation. The French theologians at Saumur, in the 17th century, taught also that Christ came into the world to do whatever was necessary for the salvation of men. But God, foreseeing that, if left to themselves, men would universally reject the offers of mercy, elected some to be the subjects of his saving grace by which they are brought to faith and repentance According to this view of the plan of salvation, election is subordinate to redemption. God first redeems all and then elects some. This is the view extensively adopted in this country. According to Augustinians, men, by their fall, having sunk into a state of sin and misery, might justly have been left, as were the fallen angels, to perish in their sins. But God, in his infinite mercy, having determined to save a multitude whom no man could number, gave them to his Son as his inheritance, provided He would assume their nature and fulfil all righteousness in their stead. In the accomplishment of this plan Christ did come into the world, and did obey and suffer in the place of those thus given to Him, and for their salvation. This was the definite object of his mission, and therefore his death had a reference to them which it could not possibly have to those whom God determined to leave to the just recompense of their sins. Now this plan only supposes that God determined from eternity to do what in time He has actually accomplished. If it were just that all men should perish on account of their sin it was just to leave a portion of the race thus to perish, while the salvation of the other portion is a matter of unmerited favour. It can hardly be denied that God did thus enter into covenant with his Son. That is, that He did promise Him the salvation of his people as the reward of his incarnation and sufferings; that Christ did come into the world and suffer and die on that condition, and, having performed the condition, is entitled to the promised reward. These are facts so clearly and so repeatedly stated in the Scriptures as not to admit of their being called into question. But if such is the plan of God respecting the salvation of men then it of necessity follows that election precedes redemption; that God had determined whom He would save before He sent his Son to save them. Therefore our Lord said that those given to Him by his Father should certainly come to Him, and that He would raise them up at the last day. These Scriptural facts cannot be admitted without its being also admitted that the death of Christ had a reference to his people, whose salvation it rendered certain, which it had not to others whom, for infinitely wise reasons, God determined to leave to themselves. It follows, therefore, from the nature of the covenant of redemption, as presented in the Bible, that Christ did not die equally for all mankind. but that He gave Himself for his people and for their redemption.

Argument from the Doctrine of Election.

2. This follows also almost necessarily from the doctrine of election. Indeed it never was denied that Christ died specially for the elect until the doctrine of election itself was rejected. Augustine, the follower and expounder of St. Paul, taught that God out of his mere good pleasure had elected some to everlasting life, and held that Christ came into the world to suffer and die for their salvation. He purchased them with his own precious blood. The Semi-Pelagians, in denying the doctrine of election, of course denied that Christ's death had more reference to one class of men than to another. The Latin Church, so long as it held to the Augustinian doctrine of election, held also to Augustine's doctrine concerning the design

and objects of Christ's death. All through the Middle Ages this was one of the distinctive doctrines of those who resisted the progress of the Semi-Pelagian party in the Western Church. At the time of the Reformation the Lutherans, so long as they held to the one doctrine held also to the other. The Reformed, in holding fast the doctrine of election, remained faithful to their denial of the doctrine that the work of Christ had equal reference to all mankind. It was not until the Remonstrants in Holland, under the teaching of Arminius, rejected the Church doctrine of original sin, of the inability of fallen man to anything spiritually good, the sovereignty of God in election, and the perseverance of the saints, that the doctrine that the atonement had a special reference to the people of God was rejected. It is, therefore, a matter of history that the doctrine of election and the Augustinian doctrine as to the design of the work of Christ have been inseparably united. As this connection is historical so also is it logical. The one doctrine necessarily involves the other. If God from eternity determined to save one portion of the human race and not another, it seems to be a contradiction to say that the plan of salvation had equal reference to both portions; that the Father sent his Son to die for those whom He had predetermined not to save, as truly as, and in the same sense that He gave Him up for those whom He had chosen to make the heirs of salvation.

Express Declarations of Scripture.

3. We accordingly find numerous passages in which the design of Christ's death is declared to be, to save his people from their sins. He did not come merely to render their salvation possible but actually to deliver them from the curse of the law, and from the power of sin. This is included in all the Scriptural representations of the nature and design of his work. No man pays a ransom without the certainty of the deliverance of those for whom it is paid. It is not a ransom unless it actually redeems. And an offering is no sacrifice unless it actually expiates and propitiates. The effect of a ransom and sacrifice may indeed be conditional, but the occurrence of the condition will be rendered certain before the costly sacrifice is offered.

There are also very numerous passages in which it is expressly declared that Christ gave Himself for his Church (Ephesians v. 25); that He laid down his life for his sheep (John x. 15); that He laid down his life for his friends (John xv. 13); that He died that He might gather together in one the children of God that are scattered abroad (John xi. 52); that it was the Church which He purchased with his blood (Acts xx. 28). When mankind are divided into two classes, the Church and the world, the friends and the enemies of God, the sheep and the goats, whatever is affirmed distinctively of the one class is impliedly denied of the other. When it is said that Christ loved his Church and gave Himself for it, that He laid down his life for his sheep, it is clear that something is said of the Church and of the sheep, which is not true of those who belong to neither. When it is said that a man labours and sacrifices health and strength for his children, it is thereby denied that the motive which controls him is mere philanthropy, or that the design he has in view is the good of society. He may indeed be a philanthropist, and he may recognize the fact that the well-being of his children will promote the welfare of society, but this does not alter the case. It still remains true that love for his children is the motive, and their good his object. It is difficult, in the light of Ephesians v. 25, where the death of Christ is attributed to his love of his Church, and is said to have been designed for its sanctification and salvation, to believe that He

gave Himself as much for reprobates as for those whom He intended to save. Every assertion, therefore that Christ died for a people, is a denial of the doctrine that He died equally for all men.

Argument from the Special Love of God.

4. By the love of God is sometimes meant his goodness, of which all sensitive creatures are the objects and of whose benefits they are the recipients. Sometimes it means his special regard for the children of men, not only as rational creatures, but also as the offspring of Him who is the Father of the spirits of all men. Sometimes it means that peculiar, mysterious, sovereign, immeasurable love which passes knowledge, of which his own people, the Church of the first-born whose names are written in heaven, are the objects. Of this love it is taught, (1.) That it is infinitely great. (2.) That it is discriminating, fixed on some and not upon others of the children of men. It is compared to the love of a husband for his wife; which from its nature is exclusive. (3.) That it is perfectly gratuitous and sovereign, i.e., not founded upon the special attractiveness of its objects, but like parental affection, or the mere fact that they are his children. (4.) That it is immutable. (5.) That it secures all saving blessings, and even all good; so that even afflictions are among its fruits intended for the greater good of the sufferer. Now to this love, not to general goodness, not to mere philanthropy, but to this peculiar and infinite love, the gift of Christ is uniformly referred. Herein is love, not that we loved God, but that He loved us, and sent his Son to be the propitiation for our sins. (1 John iv. 10.) Hereby perceive we the love of God (or, hereby we know what love is), because He (Christ) laid down his life for us. (1 John iii. 16.) God commendeth his love toward us, in that while we were yet sinners, Christ died for us. (Romans v. 8.) Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. (John xv. 13.) Nothing shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus. (Romans viii. 35-39.) He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things? (Romans vii. 32.) The whole argument of the Apostle in Romans v. 1-11, and especially throughout the eighth chapter, is founded upon this infinite and immutable love of God to his people. From this he argues their absolute security for time and eternity. Because He thus loved them He gave his Son for them; and, having done this, He would certainly give them everything necessary for their salvation. No enemy should ever prevail against them; nothing could ever separate them from his love. This whole argument is utterly irreconcilable with the hypothesis that Christ died equally for all men. His death is referred to the peculiar love of God to his people, and was the pledge of all other saving gifts. This peculiar love of God is not founded upon the fact that its objects are believers, for He loved them as enemies, as ungodly, and gave his Son to secure their being brought to faith, repentance, and complete restoration to the divine image. It cannot, therefore, be explained away into mere general benevolence or philanthropy. It is a love which secured the communication of Himself to its objects, and rendered their salvation certain; and consequently could not be bestowed upon all men, indiscriminately. This representation is so predominant in the Scriptures, namely, that the peculiar love of God to his people, to his Church, to the elect, is the source of the gift of Christ, of the mission of the Holy Spirit, and of all other saving blessings, that it cannot be ignored in any view of the plan and purpose of salvation. With this representation every other statement of the Scriptures must be consistent; and therefore the theory which denies this great and precious truth, and which assumes that the love which secured the gift

of God's eternal Son, was mere benevolence which had all men for its object, many of whom are allowed to perish, must be unscriptural.

Argument from the Believer's Union with Christ.

5. Another argument is derived from the nature of the union between Christ and his people. The Bible teaches, (1.) That a certain portion of the human race were given to Christ. (2.) That they were given to Him before the foundation of the world. (3.) That all thus given to Him will certainly come to Him and be saved. (4.) That this union, so far as it was from eternity, is not a union of nature, nor by faith, nor by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. It was a federal union. (5.) That Christ, therefore, was a federal head and representative. As such He came into the world, and all He did and suffered was as a representative, as a substitute, one acting in the place and for the benefit of others. But He was the representative of those given to Him, i.e., of those who were in Him. For it was this gift and the union consequent upon it, that gave Him his representative character, or constituted Him a federal head. He was therefore the federal head, not of the human race, but of those given to Him by the Father. And, therefore, his work, so far as its main design is concerned, was for them alone. Whatever reference it had to others was subordinate and incidental. All this is illustrated and proved by the Apostle in Romans v. 12-21, in the parallel which he draws between Adam and Christ. All mankind were in Adam. He was the federal head and representative of his race. All men sinned in him and fell with him in his first transgression. The sentence of condemnation for his one offence passed upon all men. In like manner Christ was the representative of his people. He acted for them. What He did and suffered in their place, or as their representative, they in the eye of the law, did and suffered. By his obedience they are justified. As all in Adam died, so all in Christ are made alive. Such is the nature of the union in both cases, that the sin of the one rendered certain and just the death of all united to Adam, and the righteousness of the other rendered certain and just the salvation of all who are in Him. The sin of Adam did not make the condemnation of all men merely possible; it was the ground of their actual condemnation. So the righteousness of Christ did not make the salvation of men merely possible, it secured the actual salvation of those for whom He wrought. As it would be unreasonable to say that Adam acted for those who were not in him; so it is unscriptural to say that Christ acted for those who were not in Him. Nevertheless, the act of Adam as the head and representative of his race, was fruitful of evil consequences, not to man only, but to the earth and all that it contains; and so the work of Christ is fruitful of good consequences to others than those for whom He acted. But this does not justify any one in saying that Adam acted as much as the representative of the brute creation, as of his posterity; neither does it justify the assertion that Christ died for all mankind in the same sense that He died for his own people. This is all so clearly revealed in Scripture that it extorts the assent of those who are decidedly opposed to the Augustinian system. One class of those opponents, of whom Whitby may be taken as a representative, admit the truth of all that has been said of the representative character of Adam and Christ. But they maintain that as Adam represented the whole race, so also did Christ; and as in Adam all men die, so in Christ are all made alive. But they say that this has nothing to do with spiritual death in the one case, or with the salvation of the soul in the other. The death which came on all men for the sin of Adam, was merely the death of the body; and the life which comes on all through Christ, is the restoration of the life of the body at the resurrection. The Wesleyans take the same view of the representative

character of Christ and of Adam. Each stood for all mankind. Adam brings upon all men the guilt of his first sin and corruption of nature. Christ secures the removal of the guilt of original sin and a seed of grace, or principle of spiritual life, for all men. So also one class of Universalists hold that as all men are condemned for the sin of Adam, so all are actually saved by the work of Christ. Rationalists also are ready to admit that Paul does teach all that Augustinians understand him to teach, but they say that this was only his Jewish mode of presenting the matter. It is not absolute truth, but a mere transient form suited to the age of the Apostles. In all these cases, however, the main fact is conceded. Christ did act as a representative; and what He did secured with certainty the benefits of his work for those for whom He acted. This being conceded, it of course follows that He acted as the representative and substitute of those only who are ultimately to be saved.

6. There is another argument on this subject generally presented, which ought not to be overlooked. The unity of the priestly office rendered the functions of the priesthood inseparable. The high-priest interceded for all those for whom he offered sacrifice. The one service did not extend beyond the other. He bore upon his breast the names of the twelve tribes. He represented them in drawing near to God. He offered sacrifices for their sins on the great day of atonement, and for them he interceded, and for no others. The sacrifice and the intercession went together. What was true of the Aaronic priests, is true of Christ. The former, we are told, were the types of the latter. Christ's functions as priest are in like manner united. He intercedes for all for whom He offered Himself as a sacrifice. He himself, however, says expressly, "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." (John xvii. 9.) Him the Father heareth always, and, therefore, He cannot be assumed to intercede for those who do not actually receive the benefits of his redemption.

The Church Doctrine embraces all the Facts of the Case.

7. The final test of any theory is its agreeing or disagreeing with the facts to be explained. The difficulty with all the Anti-Augustinian views as to the design of Christ's death, is that while they are consistent with more or less of the Scriptural facts connected with the subject, they are utterly irreconcilable with others not less clearly revealed and equally important. They are consistent, for example, with the fact that the work of Christ lays the foundation for the offer of the gospel to all men, with the fact that men are justly condemned for the rejection of that offer; and with the fact that the Scriptures frequently assert that the work of Christ had reference to all men. All these facts can be accounted for on the assumption, that the great design of Christ's death was to make the salvation of all men possible, and that it had equal reference to every member of our race. But there are other facts which this theory leaves out of view, and with which it cannot be reconciled. On the other hand it is claimed that the Augustinian doctrine recognizes all the Scriptural assertions connected with the subject, and reconciles them all. If this be so, it must be the doctrine of the Bible. The facts which are clearly revealed concerning the death or work of Christ are, --

(1.) That God from eternity gave a people to his Son.

(2.) That the peculiar and infinite love of God to his people is declared to be the motive for the gift of his Son; and their salvation the design of his mission.

(3.) That it was as their representative, head, and substitution, He came into the world, assumed our nature, fulfilled all righteousness, and bore the curse of the law.

(4.) That the salvation of all given to Him by the Father, is thus rendered absolutely certain.

That the Augustinian scheme agrees with these great Scriptural facts, is readily admitted, but it is denied that it accounts for the fact that on the ground of the work of Christ, salvation may be offered to every human being; and that all who hear and reject the gospel, are justly condemned for their unbelief. That these are Scriptural facts cannot be denied, and if the Augustinian doctrine does not provide for them, it must be false or defective. There are different grounds on which it is assumed that the Augustinian doctrine does not provide for the universal offer of the gospel. One is, the false assumption that Augustinians teach that the satisfaction of Christ was in all respects analogous to the payment of a debt, a satisfaction to commutative or commercial justice. Hence it is inferred that Christ suffered so much for so many; He paid so much for one soul, and so much for another, and of course He would have been called upon to pay more if more were to have been saved. If this be so, then it is clear that the work of Christ can justify the offer of salvation to those only whose debts He has actually cancelled. To this view of the case it may be remarked, --

1. That this doctrine was never held by any historical church and the ascription of it to Augustinians can only be accounted for on the ground of ignorance.

2. It involves the greatest confusion of ideas. It confounds the obligations which arise among men as owners of property, with the obligations of rational creatures to an infinitely holy God. A debtor is one owner, and a creditor is another. Commutative justice requires that they should settle their mutual claims equitably. But God is not one owner and the sinner another. They do not stand in relation to each other as two proprietors. The obligation which binds a debtor to pay a creditor, and the principle which impels a just God to punish sin, are entirely distinct. God is the absolute owner of all things. We own nothing. We cannot sustain to him, in this respect, the relation of a debtor to his creditor. The objection in question, therefore, is founded on an entire mistake or misrepresentation of the attribute of justice, to which, according to Augustinians, the satisfaction of Christ is rendered. Because the sin of Adam was the ground of the condemnation of his race, does any man infer that He sinned so much for one man and so much for another? Why then should it be said that because the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of our salvation, that He did and suffered so much for one man and so much for another?

3. As this objection is directed against a theory which no Church has ever adopted, and as it attributes to God a form of justice which cannot possibly belong to Him, so it is contrary to those Scriptural representations on which the Augustinian doctrine is founded. The Scriptures teach that Christ saves us as a priest, by offering Himself as a sacrifice for our sins. But a sacrifice was not a payment of a debt, the payment of so much for so much. A single victim was sometimes a sacrifice for one individual; sometimes for the whole people. On the great day of atonement the scape-goat bore the sins of the people, whether they were more or less numerous. It had no reference at all to the number of persons for whom atonement was to be made. So Christ bore the sins of his people; whether they were to be a few hundreds, or countless millions, or the whole human family, makes no difference as to the nature of his work, or as to the value of his satisfaction. What was absolutely necessary for one, was abundantly sufficient for all.

The objection, however, is at times presented in a somewhat different form. Admitting the satisfaction of Christ to be in itself of infinite value, how can it avail for the non-elect if it was not designed for them? It does not avail for the fallen angels, because it was not intended for them; how then can it avail for the non-elect, if not designed for them? How can a ransom, whatever its intrinsic value, benefit those for whom it was not paid? In this form the objection is far more specious. It is, however, fallacious. It overlooks the peculiar nature of the case. It ignores the fact that all mankind were placed under the same constitution or covenant. What was demanded for the salvation of one was demanded for the salvation of all. Every man is required to satisfy the demands of the law. No man is required to do either more or less. If those demands are satisfied by a representative or substitute, his work is equally available for all. The secret purpose of God in providing such a substitute for man, has nothing to do with the nature of his work, or with its appropriateness. The righteousness of Christ being of infinite value or merit, and being in its nature precisely what all men need, may be offered to all men. It is thus offered to the elect and to the non-elect; and it is offered to both classes conditionally. That condition is a cordial acceptance of it as the only ground of justification. If any of the elect (being adults) fail thus to accept of it, they perish. If any of the non-elect should believe, they would be saved. What more does any Anti-Augustinian scheme provide? The advocates of such schemes say, that the design of the work of Christ was to render the salvation of all men possible. All they can mean by this is, that if any man (elect or non-elect) believes, he shall, on the ground of what Christ has done, be certainly saved. But Augustinians say the same thing. Their doctrine provides for this universal offer of salvation, as well as any other scheme. It teaches that God in effecting the salvation of his own people, did whatever was necessary for the salvation of all men, and therefore to all the offer may be, and in fact is made in the gospel. If a ship containing the wife and children of a man standing on the shore is wrecked, he may seize a boat and hasten to their rescue. His motive is love to his family; his purpose is to save them. But the boat which he has provided may be large enough to receive the whole of the ship's company. Would there be any inconsistency in his offering them the opportunity to escape? Or, would this offer prove that he had no special love to his own family and no special design to secure their safety. And if any or all of those to whom the offer was made, should refuse to accept it, some from one reason, some from another; some because they did not duly appreciate their danger; some because they thought they could save themselves; and some from enmity to the man from whom the offer came, their guilt and folly would be just as great as though the man had no special regard to his own family, and no special purpose to effect their deliverance. Or, if a man's family were with others held in captivity, and from love to them and with the purpose of their redemption, a ransom should be offered sufficient for the delivery of the whole body of captives, it is plain that the offer of deliverance might be extended to all on the ground of that ransom, although specially intended only for a part of their number. Or, a man may make a feast for his own friends, and the provision be so abundant that he may throw open his doors to all who are willing to come. This is precisely what God, according to the Augustinian doctrine, has actually done. Out of special love to his people, and with the design of securing their salvation, He has sent his Son to do what justifies the offer of salvation to all who choose to accept of it. Christ, therefore, did not die equally for all men. He laid down his life for his sheep; He gave Himself for his Church. But in perfect consistency with all

this, He did all that was necessary, so far as a satisfaction to justice is concerned, all that is required for the salvation of all men. So that all Augustinians can join with the Synod of Dort in saying, "No man perishes for want of an atonement."

If the Atonement be limited in Design, it must be restricted in the Offer.

There is still another ground on which it is urged that Augustinians cannot consistently preach the gospel to every creature. Augustinians teach, it is urged, that the work of Christ is a satisfaction to divine justice. From this it follows that justice cannot condemn those for whose sins it has been satisfied. It cannot demand that satisfaction twice, first from the substitute and then from the sinner himself. This would be manifestly unjust, far worse than demanding no punishment at all. From this it is inferred that the satisfaction or righteousness of Christ, if the ground on which a sinner may be forgiven, is the ground on which he must be forgiven. It is not the ground on which he may be forgiven, unless it is the ground on which he must be forgiven. If the atonement be limited in design it must be limited in its nature, and if limited in its nature it must be limited in its offer. This objection again arises from confounding a pecuniary and a judicial satisfaction between which Augustinians are so careful to discriminate. This distinction has already been presented on a previous page (470). There is no grace in accepting a pecuniary satisfaction. It cannot be refused. It ipso facto liberates. The moment the debt is paid the debtor is free; and that without any condition. Nothing of this is true in the case of judicial satisfaction. If a substitute be provided and accepted it is a matter of grace. His satisfaction does not ipso facto liberate. It may accrue to the benefit of those for whom it is made at once or at a remote period; completely or gradually; on conditions or unconditionally; or it may never benefit them at all unless the condition on which its application is suspended be performed. These facts are universally admitted by those who hold that the work of Christ was a true and perfect satisfaction to divine justice. The application of its benefits is determined by the covenant between the Father and the Son. Those for whom it was specially rendered are not justified from eternity; they are not born in a justified state; they are by nature, or birth, the children of wrath even as others. To be the children of wrath is to be justly exposed to divine wrath. They remain in this state of exposure until they believe, and should they die (unless in infancy) before they believe they would inevitably perish notwithstanding the satisfaction made for their sins. It is the stipulations of the covenant which forbid such a result. Such being the nature of the judicial satisfaction rendered by Christ to the law, under which all men are placed, it may be sincerely offered to all men with the assurance that if they believe it shall accrue to their salvation. His work being specially designed for the salvation of his own people, renders, through the conditions of the covenant, that event certain; but this is perfectly consistent with its being made the ground of the general offer of the gospel. Lutherans and Reformed agree entirely, as before stated, in their views of the nature of the satisfaction of Christ, and consequently, so far as that point is concerned, there is the same foundation for the general offer of the gospel according to either scheme. What the Reformed or Augustinians hold about election does not affect the nature of the atonement. That remains the same whether designed for the elect or for all mankind. It does not derive its nature from the secret purpose of God as to its application.

Certain Passages of Scripture considered.

Admitting, however, that the Augustinian doctrine that Christ died specially for his

own people does account for the general offer of the gospel, how is it to be reconciled with those passages which. in one form or another, teach that He died for all men? In answer to this question, it may be remarked in the first place that Augustinians do not deny that Christ died for all men. What they deny is that he died equally, and with the same design, for all men. He died for all, that He might arrest the immediate execution of the penalty of the law upon the whole of our apostate race; that He might secure for men the innumerable blessings attending their state on earth, which, in one important sense, is a state of probation; and that He might lay the foundation for the offer of pardon and reconciliation with God, on condition of faith and repentance. These are the universally admitted consequences of his satisfaction, and therefore they all come within its design. By this dispensation it is rendered manifest to every intelligent mind in heaven and upon earth, and to the finally impenitent themselves, that the perdition of those that perish is their own fault. They will not come to Christ that they may have life. They refuse to have Him to reign over them. He calls but they will not answer. He says, "Him that cometh to me, I will in no wise cast out." Every human being who does come is saved. This is what is meant when it is said, or implied in Scripture, that Christ gave Himself as a propitiation, not for our sins only, but for the sins of the whole world. He was a propitiation effectually for the sins of his peop1e, and sufficiently for the sins of the whole world. Augustinians have no need to wrest the Scriptures. They are under no necessity of departing from their fundamental principle that it is the duty of the theologian to subordinate his theories to the Bible, and teach not what seems to him to be true or reasonable, but simply what the Bible teaches.

But, in the second place, it is to be remarked that general terms are often used indefinitely and not comprehensively. They mean all kinds, or classes, and not all and every individual. When Christ said, "I, if I be lifted up from the earth, will draw all men unto me," He meant men of all ages, classes, and conditions, and not every individual man. When God predicted that upon the advent of the Messiah He would pour out his Spirit upon all flesh, all that was foretold was a general effusion of the Holy Ghost. And when it is said that all men shall see (experience) the salvation of God, it does not mean that all men individually, but that a vast multitude of all classes shall be saved. The same remark applies to the use of the term world. It means men, mankind, as a race or order of beings. No one hesitates to call the Lord Jesus the "Salvator hominum." He is so hailed and so worshipped wherever his name is known. But no one means by this that He actually saves all mankind. What is meant is that He is our Saviour, the Saviour of men, not of angels, not of Jews exclusively, nor yet of the Gentiles only, not of the rich, or of the poor alone, not of the righteous only, but also of publicans and sinners. He is the Saviour of all men who come unto Him. Thus when He is called the Lamb of God that bears the sin of the world, all that is meant is that He bears the sins of men; He came as a sin-offering bearing not his own, but the sins of others.

In the third place, these general terms are always to be understood in reference to the things spoken of in the context. When all things, the universe, is said to be put in subjection to Christ it is, of course, to be understood of the created universe. In 1 Corinthians xv. 27, Paul expressly mentions this limitation, but in Hebrews ii. 8, it is not mentioned. It is, however, just as obviously involved in the one passage as in the other. When in Romans v. 18, it is said that by the righteousness of Christ the free gift of justification of life has come upon all men, it is of necessity limited to the all in Christ of whom the Apostle is speaking.

So also in 1 Corinthians xv. 22, As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive (zoopoiethesontai, i.e., quickened with the life of Christ), it is in both members of the sentence not absolutely all, but the all in Adam and the all in Christ. This is still more obvious in Romans viii. 32, where it is said that God gave up his own Son for us all. The us refers to the class of persons of which the whole chapter treats, namely, of those to whom there is no condemnation, who are led by the Spirit, for whom Christ intercedes, etc. Ephesians i. 10, and Colossians i. 20, are favourite texts with the Universalists, for they teach that all in heaven and on earth are reunited unto God by Jesus Christ. They are right in understanding these passages as teaching the salvation of all men, if by all in this connection we must understand all human beings. But why limit the word to all men? Why not include angels and even irrational creatures? The answer is, because the Bible teaches that Christ came to save men, and neither angels nor irrational animals. This is only saying that all must be limited to the objects of redemption. Who they are is to be learned not from these general terms, but from the general teaching of Scripture. The all who are to he united in one harmonious body by Jesus Christ are the all whom He came to save. The same remark applies to Hebrews ii. 9, Christ tasted "death (huper pantos) for every man." It is well known that Origen understood this of every creature; others, of every rational creature; others, of every fallen rational creature; others, of every man; others, of every one of those given to the Son by the Father. How are we to decide which of these interpretations is correct? So far as the mere signification of the words is concerned, one is as correct as another. It is only from the analogy of Scripture that the meaning of the sacred writer can be determined. Christ tasted death for every one of the objects of redemption. Whether He came to redeem all created sensuous beings, or all rational creatures, or all men, or all given to Him in the councils of eternity, the Bible must decide. The great majority of the passages quoted to prove that Christ died equally for all men come under one or other of the classes just mentioned, and have no real bearing on the question concerning the design of his death.

There is another class of passages with which it is said that the Augustinian doctrine cannot be reconciled; such, namely, as speak of those perishing for whom Christ died. In reference to these passages it may be remarked, first, that there is a sense, as before stated, in which Christ did die for all men. His death had the effect of justifying the offer of salvation to every man; and of course was designed to have that effect. He therefore died sufficiently for all. In the second place, these passages are, in some cases at least, hypothetical. When Paul exhorts the Corinthians not to cause those to perish for whom Christ died, he merely exhorts them not to act selfishly towards those for whom Christ had exhibited the greatest compassion. The passage neither asserts nor implies that any actually perish for whom Christ died. None perish whom He came to save; multitudes perish to whom salvation is offered on the ground of his death.

As God in the course of nature and in the dispensation of his providence, moves on in undisturbed majesty, little concerned at the apparent complication or even inconsistency of one effect or one dispensation with another; so the Spirit of God in the Bible unfolds the purposes, truths, and dealings of God, just as they are, assured that even finite minds will ultimately be able to see the consistency of all his revelations. The doctrines of foreordination, sovereignty, and effectual providential control, go hand in hand with those of the liberty and responsibility of rational creatures. Those of freedom from the law, of

salvation by faith without works, and of the absolute necessity of holy living stand side by side. On the same page we find the assurance of God's love to sinners, and declarations that He would that all men should come unto Him and live, with explicit assertions that He has determined to leave multitudes to perish in their sins. In like manner, the express declarations that it was the incomprehensible and peculiar love of God for his own people, which induced Him to send his Son for their redemption; that Christ came into the world for that specific object; that He died for his sheep; that He gave Himself for his Church; and that the salvation of all for whom He thus offered Himself is rendered certain by the gift of the Spirit to bring them to faith and repentance, are intermingled with declarations of good-will to all mankind, with offers of salvation to every one who will believe in the Son of God, and denunciations of wrath against those who reject these overtures of mercy. All we have to do is not to ignore or deny either of these modes of representation, but to open our minds wide enough to receive them both, and reconcile them as best we can. Both are true, in all the cases above referred to, whether we can see their consistency or not.

In the review of this subject, it is plain that the doctrine that Christ died equally for all men with the purpose of rendering the salvation of all possible, has no advantage over the doctrine that He died specially for his own people, and with the purpose of rendering their salvation certain. It presents no higher view of the love of God, or of the value of Christ's work. It affords no better ground for the offer of salvation "to every creature," nor does it render more obvious the justice of the condemnation of those who reject the gospel. They are condemned by God, angels, and all men, and by their own consciences, because they refuse to believe that Jesus is the Son of God, God manifest in the flesh, and to love, worship, trust, and obey Him accordingly. The opposite, or anti-Augustinian doctrine, is founded on a partial view of the facts of the case. It leaves out of view the clearly revealed special love of God to his peculiar people; the union between Christ and his chosen; the representative character which He assumed as their substitute; the certain efficacy of his sacrifice in virtue of the covenant of redemption; and the necessary connection between the gift of Christ and the gift of the Holy Spirit. It moreover leads to confused and inconsistent views of the plan of salvation, and to unscriptural and dangerous theories of the nature of the atonement. It therefore is the limited and meagre scheme; whereas the orthodox doctrine is catholic and comprehensive; full of consolation and spiritual power, as well as of justice to all mankind.

CHAPTER IX: THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.

The history of this doctrine is commonly divided into three per nods, the Patristic; the Scholastic; and the time of the Reformation and from that event to the present day. The method which the writers on this subject have usually adopted, is to pass in review in chronological order the distinguished theologians living during these several periods, and present a general outline of the teaching of each.

The two great objects to be accomplished by the work of Christ are, the removal of the curse under which mankind laboured on account of sin; and their restoration to the image and fellowship of God. Both these are essential to salvation. We have guilt to be removed, and souls dead in sin to be quickened with a new principle of divine life. Both these objects are provided for in the doctrine of redemption as presented in the Scriptures and held in the Church. In the opposing theories devised by theologians, either one of these objects is ignored or one is unduly subordinated to the other. It was characteristic of the early Greek church to exalt the latter, while the Latin made the former the more prominent. In reviewing the history of the doctrine it will be found that there are five general theories which comprise all the numerous forms in which it has been held.

§ 1. The Orthodox View.

The first is that which has been for ages regarded as the orthodox doctrine; in its essential features common to the Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed churches. This is the doctrine which the writer has endeavoured to exhibit and vindicate in the preceding pages. According to this doctrine the work of Christ is a real satisfaction, of infinite inherent merit, to the vindicatory justice of God; so that He saves his people by doing for them, and in their stead, what they were unable to do for themselves, satisfying the demands of the law in their behalf, and bearing its penalty in their stead; whereby they are reconciled to God, receive the Holy Ghost, and are made partakers of the life of Christ to their present sanctification and eternal salvation.

This doctrine provides for both the great objects above mentioned. It shows how the curse of the law is removed by Christ's being made a curse for us; and how in virtue of this reconciliation with God we become, through the Spirit, partakers of the life of Christ. He is made unto us not only righteousness, but sanctification. We are cleansed by his blood from guilt, and renewed by his Spirit after the image of God. Having died in Him, we live in Him. Participation of his death secures participation of his life.

§ 2. Doctrine of some of the Fathers.

The second theory is that which prevailed extensively among the fathers. It was

intended only as a solution of the question how Christ delivers us from the power of Satan. It contemplated neither the removal of guilt nor the restoration of divine life; but simply our deliverance from the power of Satan. It was founded on those passages of Scriptures which represent man since the fall as in bondage to the prince of darkness. The object of redemption was to deliver mankind from this bondage. This could only be done by in some way overcoming Satan and destroying his right or power to hold men as his slaves. This Christ has effected, and thus becomes the Redeemer of men. This general theory is presented in three different forms. The first appeals to the old principle of the rights of war, according to which the conquered became the slaves of the conqueror. Satan conquered Adam, and thus became the rightful owner of him and his posterity. Hence he is called the god and prince of this world. To deliver men from this dreaded bondage, Christ offered Himself as a ransom to Satan. Satan accepted the offer, and renounced his right to retain mankind as his slaves. Christ, however, broke the bonds of Satan, whose power was founded upon the sinfulness of his subjects. Christ being divine, and without sin, could not be held subject to his power. In answer to the question, How Satan could accept Christ as the ransom for men, if he knew Him to be a divine person? it was said that he did not know Him to be divine, because his divinity was veiled by his humanity. And then in answer to the question, How he could accept of Him as a ransom, if he regarded Him as merely a man? it is said that he saw that Christ was unspeakably superior to other men, and perhaps one of the higher order of angels, whom he might hope securely to retain. The second form of this theory does not regard Christ as a ransom paid to Satan, but as a conqueror. As Satan conquered mankind and made them his slaves; so Christ became a man, and, in our nature, conquered Satan; and thus acquired the right to deliver as from our bondage and to consign Satan himself to chains and darkness.

The third form of the theory is, that as the right and power of Satan over man is founded on sin, he exceeded his authority when he brought about the death of Christ, who was free from all sin; and thus justly forfeited his authority over men altogether. This general theory that Christ's great work, as a Redeemer, was to deliver man from bondage to Satan, and that the ransom was paid to Him and not to God; or that the difficulty in the way of our salvation was the right which Satan had acquired to us as slaves, which right Christ in some way cancelled, was very prevalent for a long time in the Church. It is found in Iren&#xFFFD;us, Origen, Theodoret, Basil, Cyril of Jerusalem, Augustine, Jerome, Hilary, Leo the Great, and others. [441] The Scriptural foundation for this view of the work of Christ is very slight. It is true that men are the captives of Satan, and under his dominion. It is true that Christ gave Himself as a ransom; and that by the payment of that ransom wc are freed from bondage to the prince of darkness. But it does not follow that the ransom was paid to Satan, or that he had any just claim to his authority over the children of men. What the Scriptures teach on this subject is, --

1. That man by sin became subject to the penalty of the divine law.

2. That Satan has the office of inflicting that penalty in so far as he is allowed to torment and degrade the children of men.

3. That Christ by his death having satisfied the penalty of the law, of course has delivered us from the power of Satan. See especially Hebrews ii. 14. But this gives no ground for the doctrine that Satan had any claim in justice to hold mankind as his slaves; or

that Christ offered Himself as a ransom to the prince of this world. This doctrine was strenuously opposed in the early Church by Gregory of Nyssa, and has long since passed into oblivion. The only interest which it now has is as a matter of history. It is of course not to be supposed that the great lights of the Church above mentioned believed that the whole work of Christ as the Saviour of men consisted in his delivering us from the power of Satan; that they ignored his office as a high priest unto God, or denied the effect of his death as an expiation for sin, or forgot that He is to us the source of spiritual life. These doctrines are as clearly asserted by them from time to time as are their peculiar views as to our deliverance from the bondage of Satan. Even Origen, so unrestrained in his thinking, and so disposed to explain Christian truths philosophically, teaches the catholic doctrine with perfect distinctness. In his comment on Romans iii. 25, 26, he says, [442] "Cum dixisset, quod pro omni genere humano redemptionem semetipsum dedisset, ... nunc addit aliquid sublimius et dicit, quia proposuit eum Deus propitiationem per fidem in sanguine ipsius:' quo scilicet per hostiam sui corporis propitium hominibus faceret Deum, et per hoc ostenderet justitiam suam. . . . . Deus enim justus est, et justus justificare non poterat injustos, ideo interventum voluit esse propitiatoris, ut per ejus fidem justificarentur qui per opera propria justificari non poterant." No one of the Reformers gives a clearer utterance to the truth than is contained in these words. So also he says, [443] "Posuit ergo et manum suam super caput vituli: hoc est peccata generis humani imposuit super caput suum. Ipse est enim caput corporis ecclesi[illegible] su[illegible]." In all ages of the Church, by the early fathers as well as in subsequent periods, the language of the New Testament in reference to Christ and his work is retained. He is familiarly called priest, and high priest, and held up as a sacrifice for sin, as a redeemer, as a ransom, and as one who cancelled our debts. As the early fathers were conversant with sacrifices, and knew the light in which they were regarded by the ancient world, that both heathen and Jewish sacrifices were expiatory, there is little doubt that the fathers, in calling Christ a sacrifice, meant to recognize Him as an expiation for our sins, although it is admitted that great vagueness, variety, and inconsistency prevail in their utterances on this subject. The whole activity of the cultivated minds was in the early ages directed first to the doctrines of the Trinity and of the person of Christ, and subsequently to those concerning sin and grace.

[441] The proof passages are given more or less at length in all the modern histories of doctrine, as in Hagenbach's Dogmengeschichte, translated by Dr. B. H. Smith; M[illegible]nscher's and Neander's Dogmengeschichte, and especially in the elaborate work of Baur of T[illegible]bingen, Die Lehre von der Vers[illegible]hnung.

[442] Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1759, vol. iv. p. 513, B, a, b, c.

[443] In Leviticum Homilia, I. 3. Works, edit. Paris, 1733, vol. ii. p. 186, d.

§ 3. The Moral Theory.

A third general theory concerning the work of Christ is that which rejects all idea of expiation, or of the satisfaction of justice by vicarious punishment, and attributes all the efficacy of his work to the moral effect produced on the hearts of men by his character, teachings, and acts. On this account it is usually designated the "moral view of the atonement." The assumption is that there is no such attribute in God as justice; i.e., no

perfection which renders it necessary, or morally obligatory, that sin should be punished. If this be so, there is no need of expiation in order to forgiveness. All that is necessary for the restoration of sinners to the favour of God is that they should cease to be sinners God's relation to his rational creatures is determined by their character. If they are morally corrupt they are repelled from his presence; if restored to holiness, they become the objects of his love and the recipients of his favours. All that Christ as the Saviour of men, therefore, came to accomplish was this moral reformation in the character of men. Here, as so generally elsewhere, errors are half truths. It is true that God's relation to his rational creatures is determined by their character. It is true that He repels sinners, and holds communion with the holy. It is true that Christ came to restore men to holiness, and thus to the favour and fellowship of God. But it is also true that to render the restoration of sinners to holiness possible it was necessary that the guilt of their sins should be expiated, or that justice should be satisfied. Until this is done, they are under the wrath and curse of God. And to be under the curse of God is to be shut out from the source of all holiness.

Some of the advocates of this view of the work of Christ do indeed speak freely of the justice of God. They recognize Him as a just Being who everywhere and always punishes sin. But this is done only by the operation of eternal laws. Holiness, from its nature, produces happiness; and that is its reward. Sin, from its nature, produces misery; and that is its punishment. Remove the sin and you remove the punishment. The case is analogous to health and disease. If a man is well, he is physically happy; if diseased, he is in a state of suffering. The only way possible to remove the suffering is to remove the disease; and further than this nothing can be required. This is the view presented by John Young, D. D. [444] He says, "There is no such attribute in God [as rectilineal justice.] But the inevitable punishment of moral evil always and everywhere, is certain nevertheless. The justice of the universe is a tremendous fact, an eternal and necessary fact which even God could not set aside. There is an irresistible, a real force springing out of its essential constitution whereby sin punishes sin. This is the fixed law of the moral universe, a law in perfect harmony with the eternal will, and which never is and never can be broken. God's mercy in our Lord Jesus Christ does not in the least set aside this justice; what it does is to remove and render non-existent the only ground on which the claim of justice stands. Instead of arbitrarily withdrawing the criminal from punishment, it destroys in his soul that evil which is the only cause and reason of punishment, and which being removed punishment ceases of itself." The same doctrine is taught by Dr. Bushnell. [445] Speaking of Christ, he says, "His work terminates, not in the release of penalties by due compensation, but in the transformation of character, and the rescue, in that manner, of guilty men from the retributive causations provoked by their sins." Remission is declared to be "spiritual release;" a deliverance from sin which secures exemption from the natural effects of transgression. This system necessarily excludes the idea of forgiveness in the ordinary sense of the word. To subdue inflammation in a wound removes the pain; to remove sin from the soul secures exemption from the pain which sin necessarily produces. The idea of pardon, in the latter case, is as incongruous as in the former. The Bible, however, is full of the promises of forgiveness and of the prayers of the penitent for pardoning mercy. It is very plain, therefore, that this scheme does not agree with the Scriptures; and it is equally plain that it is not a religion suited to those who feel the need of forgiveness.

Coleridge, in his "Aids to Reflection," presents the same view. In a note at the end of

that work he gives the following illustration of the subject. A widow has a prodigal son, who deserts her and leaves her desolate. That son has a friend who takes his place and performs all filial duties to the unhappy mother. The prodigal, won by the exhibition of goodness on the part of his friend, returns to his home penitent and reformed. How unreasonable and revolting, says Coleridge, would it be to say that the friend had made expiation or rendered a satisfaction to justice for the sins of the prodigal.

This moral view of the atonement, as it is called, has been presented in different forms. In the first form the work of Christ in the salvation of men is confined to his office of teacher. He introduced a new and higher form of religion, by which men were redeemed from the darkness and degradation of heathenism. This was so great a good, and so patent to the eyes of those who themselves were converts from heathenism, and who were surrounded by its evils, that it is not wonderful that some of the fathers exalted this function of Christ as a saviour, almost to the neglect of every other. In the early Church, however, frequent as were the recognitions of the obligations of men to Christ as the Redeemer from heathenism, He was still regarded by all Christians as a sacrifice and a ransom. In later times these latter aspects of his work were rejected and the former only retained.

A second form of this theory, while it retains the idea that the real benefit conferred by Christ was his doctrine, yet ascribes his title of Saviour principally to his death. As the Scriptures so constantly assert that we are saved by the blood, the cross, the sufferings of Christ, this feature of the Scriptural teaching cannot be overlooked. It is therefore said that He saves us, not as a sacrifice, but as a martyr. He died for us. By his death his doctrines were sealed with blood. Not only, therefore, as attesting his own sincerity, but as giving assurance of the truths which He taught, especially the truths concerning a future life, the love of God, and his willingness to forgive sin, and as confirming to us the truth of those doctrines He is entitled to be regarded as the Saviour of men.

Thirdly, others again regard the power of Christ in saving men from sin, as not due to his teaching, or to his sealing his doctrines with his blood, but to the manifestation which He made of self-sacrificing love. This exerts a greater power over the hearts of men than all else besides. If the wicked cannot be reclaimed by love, which manifests itself not only in words of gentleness, by acts of kindness, and by expressions of sympathy, but also by entire self-sacrifice, by the renunciation of all good, and by voluntary submission to all evil, their case must be hopeless. As such love as that of Christ was never before exhibited to men; as no such instance of self-sacrifice had ever before occurred, or can ever occur again, He is the Saviour by way of eminence. Other men, who through love submit to self-denial for the good of men, are within their sphere and in their measure, saviours too; the work of salvation by the exhibition of self-sacrificing love, is going on around us continually, and from eternity to eternity, so long as evil exists, in the presence of beings imbued with love. Still Christ in his work occupies a place peculiar and preeminent, and therefore we are Christians; we recognize Christ as the greatest of Saviours.

Such is the view elaborately presented by Dr. Bushnell in the work just referred to. Toward the end of his book, however, he virtually takes it all back, and lays down his weapons, conquered by the instincts of his own religious nature and by the authority of the Word of God. He says, "In the facts [of our Lord's passion], outwardly regarded, there is no sacrifice, or oblation, or atonement, or propitiation, but simply a living and dying thus and

thus. The facts are impressive; the person is clad in a wonderful dignity and beauty; the agony is eloquent of love; and the cross a very shocking murder triumphantly met. And if then the question arises, how we are to use such a history so as to be reconciled by it, we hardly know in what way to begin. How shall we come unto God by help of this martyrdom? How shall we turn it, or turn ourselves under it, so as to be justified and set in peace with God? Plainly there is a want here, and this want is met by giving a thought-form to the facts which is not in the facts themselves. They are put directly into the moulds of the altar, and we are called to accept the crucified God-man as our sacrifice, an offering or oblation for us, our propitiation; so as to be sprinkled from our evil conscience, washed, purged, purified, cleansed from our sin. Instead of leaving the matter of the facts just as they occurred, there is a reverting to familiar forms of thought, made familiar partly for this purpose; and we are told, in brief, to use the facts just as we would the sin-offerings of the altar, and make an altar grace of them, only a grace complete and perfect, an offering once for all. . . . . So much is there in this that, without these forms of the altar, we should be utterly at a loss in making any use of the Christian facts, that would set us in a condition of practical reconciliation with God. Christ is good, beautiful, wonderful, his disinterested love is a picture by itself, his forgiving patience melts into my feeling, his passion rends open my heart, but what is He for, and how shall He be made unto me the salvation I want? One word -- He is my sacrifice -- opens all to me, and beholding Him, with all my sin upon Him, I count Him my offering, I come unto God by Him and enter into the holiest by his blood." "We want to use these altar terms just as freely as they are used by those who accept the formula of expiation or judicial satisfaction for sin; in just their manner too, when they are using them most practically." "We cannot afford to lose these sacred forms of the altar. They fill an office which nothing else can fill, and serve a use which cannot be served without them." [446]

Objections to this Theory.

The obvious objections to this moral view of the atonement in all its forms, are, --

1. That while it retains some elements of the truth, in that it recognizes the restoration of man to holiness and God, as the great end of the work of Christ, and regards his work as involving the greatest possible or conceivable manifestation of divine love, which manifestation is the most powerful of all natural influences to operate on the hearts of men; yet it leaves out entirely what is essential to the Scriptural doctrine of atonement. The Bible exhibits Christ as a priest, as offering Himself a sacrifice for the expiation of our sins, as bearing our sins in his own body on the tree, as having been made a curse for us, and as giving Himself is a ransom for our redemption. The Scriptures teach that this expiation of guilt is absolutely necessary before the souls of the guilty can be made the subjects of renewing and sanctifying grace. Before this expiation they are spiritually dead under the penalty of the law, which is death in all its forms. And therefore while thus under the curse, all the moral influences in the world would be as useless as noonday light to give sight to the blind, or sanitary measures to raise the dead. In rejecting, therefore, the doctrine of expiation, or satisfaction to justice, this theory rejects the very essence of the Scriptural doctrine of atonement.

2. This theory does not meet the necessities of our condition. We are sinners; we are guilty as well as polluted. The consciousness of our responsibility to justice, and of the

necessity of satisfying its demands, is as undeniable and as indestructible as our consciousness of pollution. Expiation for the one is as much a necessity as sanctification for the other. No form of religion, therefore, which excludes the idea of expiation, or which fails to provide for the removal of guilt in a way which satisfies the reason and conscience, can be suited to our necessities. No such religion has ever prevailed among men, or can by possibility give peace to a burdened conscience. It is because the Lord Jesus Christ is revealed as a propitiation for our sins, as bearing in our stead the penalty which we had incurred, that his blood cleanses us from all sin, and gives that peace which passes all understanding.

The idea that there is no forgiveness with God; that by inexorable law He deals with his creatures according to their subjective state and character, and that therefore the only salvation necessary or possible is sanctification, is appalling. No man is in such an inward state, either during life or at death, that he can stand before God to be dealt with according to that state. His only hope is that God will, and does, deal with his people, not as they are in themselves, but as they are in Christ, and for his sake; that He loves and has fellowship with us although polluted and defiled, as a parent loves and delights in a misshapen and unattractive child. We should be now and always in hell, if the doctrine of Dr. Young were true, that justice by an inexorable law always takes effect, and that sin is always punished wherever it exists, as soon as it is manifested, and as long as it continues. God is something more than the moral order of the universe; He does not administer his moral government by inexorable laws over which He has no control. He can have mercy on whom He will have mercy, and compassion on whom He will have compassion. He can and does render sinners happy, in spite of their sin, for Christ's sake, remitting to them its penalty while its power is only partially broken; fostering them, and rejoicing over them until their restoration to spiritual health be completed. Anything that turns the sinner's regard inward on himself as a ground of hope, instead of bidding him took to Christ, must plunge him into despair, and despair is the portal of eternal death. In any view, therefore, whether as bold rationalistic Deism, or as the most high-toned portraiture of divine love, the moral theory of the atonement presents no rational, because no Scriptural, ground for a sinner's hope toward God. He must have a better righteousness than his own. He must have some one to appear before God in his stead to make expiation for sin, and to secure for him, independently of his own subjective state, the full pardon of all his offences, and the gift of the Holy Ghost.

3. All the arguments presented on the preceding pages, in favour of the doctrine of expiation, are of course arguments against a theory which rejects that doctrine. Besides, this theory evidently changes the whole plan of salvation. It alters all our relations to Christ, as our head and representative, and the ground of our acceptance with God; and consequently it changes the nature of religion. Christianity is one thing if Christ is a sacrifice for sin; and altogether a different thing if He is only a moral reformer, an example, a teacher, or even a martyr. We need a divine Saviour if He is to bear our iniquities, and to make satisfaction for the sins of the world; but a human saviour is all that is needed if the moral theory of the atonement is to be adopted. Gieseler says, what every Christian knows must be true without being told, that the fathers in treating of the qualifications of Christ as a Saviour, insisted that He must be, (1.) God; (2.) a man; and (3.) as man free from sin. [447] It is a historical fact that the two doctrines of the divinity of Christ, and expiation through th blood of the Son of God, have gone hand in hand. The one has seldom been long held by those who deny

the other. The doctrine of expiation, therefore, is so wrought into the whole system of revealed truth, that its rejection effects a radical change, not only in the theology but also in the religion of the Bible.

[444] Life and Light of Men, London and New York, 1866, pp. 115, 116.

[445] Vicarious Sacrifice grounded in Principles of Universal Obligation, edit. New York, 1866, p. 449.

[446] Bushnell, On Vicarious Sacrifice, edit. New York, 1866, pp. 534, 535; p. 537; p. 545.

[447] Dogmengeschichte, pp. 384, 385, being the sixth volume of his Ecclesiastical History.

§ 4. The Governmental Theory.

This theory was introduced into the Church by Grotius, in the seventeenth century. He wrote in opposition to the Socinians, and therefore his book is entitled: "Defensio fidei catholic[illegible] de satisfactione Christi." It is in point of learning and ability all that could be expected from one of the greatest men of his generation. The design with which the book was written, and the universally received formulas of expression at that time prevailing, to the use of which Grotius adheres, give his work an aspect of orthodoxy. He speaks of satisfaction to justice, of propitiation, of the penal character of our Lord's sufferings, of his death as a vicarious sacrifice, and of his bearing the guilt of our sins. In short, so far as the use of terms is concerned, there is hardly any departure from the doctrine of the Reformed Church, of which he was then a member. Different principles, however, underlaid his whole theory, and, therefore, a different sense was to be attached to the terms he used. There was, after all, no real satisfaction of justice, no real substitution, and no real enduring of the penalty of the law. His Socinian opponents, when they came to answer his book, said that he had given up all the main principles in dispute. Grotius was a jurist as well as a theologian, and looked at the whole subject from a juridical standpoint. The main elements of his theory are, --

1. That in the forgiveness of sin God is to be regarded neither as an offended party, nor as a creditor, nor as a master, but as a moral governor. A creditor can remit the debt due to him at pleasure; a master may punish or not punish as he sees fit; but a ruler must act, not according to his feelings or caprice, but with a view to the best interests of those under his authority. Grotius says that the overlooking the distinctions above indicated is the fundamental error of the Socinians. [448] In opposition to this view, he says: "Omnino hic Deum considerandum, ut rectorem. Nam poenas infligere, aut a poenis aliquem liberare, quam punire possis, quod justificare vocat Scriptura, non est nisi rectoris qua talis primo et per se: ut, puta, in familia patris; in republica regis, in universo Dei." [449]

2. The end of punishment is the prevention of crime, or the preservation of order and the promotion of the best interests of the community. "Justiti[illegible] rectoris pars est servare leges etiam positivas et a se latas, quod verum esse tam in universitate libera quam in rege summo probant jurisconsulti: cui illud est consequens, ut rectori relaxare legem non liceat, nisi causa aliqua accedat, si non necessaria, certe sufficiens: qu[illegible] itidem recepta est a jurisconsultis sententia. Ratio utriusque est, quod actus ferendi aut relaxandi legem non sit

actus absoluti dominii, sed actus imperii, qui tendere debeat ad boni ordinis conversationem." [450] On a previous page, he had said, in more general terms: "Poena omnis propositum habet bonum commune, ordinis nimirum conservationem et exemplum."

3. As a good governor cannot allow sin to be committed with immunity, God cannot pardon the sins of men without some adequate exhibition of his displeasure, and of his determination to punish it. This was the design of the sufferings and death of Christ. God punished sin in Him as an example. This example was the more impressive on account of the dignity of Christ's person, and therefore in view of his death, God can consistently with the best interests of his government remit the penalty of the law in the case of penitent believers.

4. Punishment, Grotius defined as suffering inflicted on account of sin. It need not be imposed on account of the personal demerit of the sufferer; nor with the design of satisfying justice, in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. It was enough that it should be on account of sin. As the sufferings of Christ were caused by our sins, insomuch as they were designed to render their remission consistent with the interest of God's moral government, they fall within this comprehensive definition of the word punishment. Grotius, therefore, could say that Christ suffered the punishment of our sins, as his sufferings were an example of what sin deserved.

5. The essence of the atonement, therefore, according to Grotius consisted in this, that the sufferings and death of Christ were designed as an exhibition of God's displeasure against sin. They were intended to teach that in the estimation of God sin deserves to be punished, and, therefore, that the impenitent cannot escape the penalty due to their offences. "Nihil iniquitatis in eo est quod Deus, cujus est summa potestas ad omnia per se non injusta, nulli ipse legi obnoxius, cruciatibus et morte Christi uti voluit, ad statuendum exemplum grave adversus culpas immensas nostrum omnium, quibus Christus erat conjunctissimus, natura, regno vadimonio." [451] Again: "Hoc ipso Deus non tantum suum adversus peccata odium testatum fecit, ac proinde nos hoc facto a peccatis deterruit (facilis enim est collectio, si Deus ne resipiscentibus quidem peccata remittere voluit, nisi Christo in poenas succedente, multo minus inultos sinet contumaces) verum insigni modo insuper patefecit summum erga nos amorem ac benevolentiam: quod ille scilicet nobis pepercit, cui non erat adiaphoron, indifferens, punire peccata, sed qui tanti id faciebat, ut potius quam impunita omnino dimitteret, Filium suum unigenitum ob illa peccata, poenis tradiderit." [452] It thus appears that, according to this theory, the work of Christ was purely didactic. It was designed to teach, by way of an example, God's hatred of sin. The cross was but a symbol.

Remonstrants.

The Synod of Dort met two years after the publication of the work in which this theory was propounded. Grotius joined those who remonstrated against the decisions of that Synod, and who on that account were called Remonstrants. The Remonstrant theologians, however, did not as a class adhere to Grotius's peculiar doctrine. They did not regard the work of Christ as a governmental transaction, but adhered to the Scriptural mode of representation. They spoke of his death as a sacrifice and ransom. They rejected indeed the Church doctrine. They denied that what Christ did was a satisfaction of justice; that He bore the penalty of the law; that He acted as our substitute, fulfilling in our place all the

demands of the law. As these ideas have no part, according to their view, in the doctrine of sacrifices for sin, so they have no place in the true doctrine concerning the work of Christ. Under the Old Testament a sacrifice was not an equivalent for the penalty incurred; it was not a satisfaction to justice; the victim did not do what the offerer ought to have done. It was simply a divine ordinance. God saw fit to ordain that the offering a sacrifice should be the condition of the pardon of the violations of the ceremonial law. So also He has seen fit to ordain that the sacrificial death of Christ should be the condition of the pardon of sin under the gospel. Even a ransom is no proper equivalent. The holder of a captive may take what he pleases as the condition of deliverance. On this point Limborch says: "In eo errant quam maxime, quod velint redemtionis pretium per omnia æquivalens esse debere miseri illi, e qua redemtio fit, redemtionis pretium enim constitui solet pro libera æstimatione illius, qui captivum detinet, non autem pro captivi merito. Ita pretium, quod Christus persolvit, juxta Dei patris æstimationem persolutum est." [453] This is the old Scholastic doctrine of "acceptatio;" a thing avails, irrespective of its inherent value, for what God sees fit to take it. The death of Christ was no more a satisfaction for sin, than that of bulls and of goats under the old dispensation. God saw fit to make the latter the condition of the pardon of violations of the ceremonial law; and He has seen fit to make the former the condition of the pardon of sins against the moral law.

The Supernaturalists.

Although the Remonstrants as a body did not accept of the governmental theory as proposed by Grotius, his main idea was frequently reproduced by subsequent writers. This was done especially by the Supernaturalists in Germany in their endeavour to save something from the destructive principles of the Rationalists. They conceded that the work of Christ was not strictly a satisfaction to justice. They taught that it was necessary as an example and a symbol. [454] It was designed as a manifestation of God's displeasure against sin; and, therefore, necessary to render its forgiveness consistent with the interests of God's moral government. This is true of Stäudlin, Flatt, and even of Storr. Speaking of the first of these writers, Baur says, "It was admitted that in the New Testament doctrine concerning the death of Jesus the Old Testament idea of a sin offering as a substitute and satisfaction was actually contained, and therefore that the Church doctrine of satisfaction agreed with the literal sense of the Scriptures; yet it was insisted upon that this literal doctrine of the Bible involved difficulties affecting our moral nature, and was evil in its practical effects, and inconsistent with what the Scriptures themselves elsewhere taught of guilt, merit, imputation, and of God's justice." Hence, he goes on to say, that to escape from this dilemma it was taught that when in the New Testament it is said "that Jesus suffered punishment in the place of men, and procured for them the forgiveness of sin, this can only mean that God, through the death of Christ and the sufferings therewith connected, declared himself to be the righteous judge of all evil." [455]

C. Ch. Flatt endeavoured to find "a middle way between the course of those who introduced into the Scriptures their own philosophical opinions, or the philosophy of the age in which they lived, and the strict grammatical, historical interpretation of those who insisted on taking the words of Scripture either in their etymological sense, or in that sense in which it can he historically proved that at least a part of the contemporaries of the sacred writers understood them, or which stupid Rabbinical literalists attached to certain phrases

without regard to the fact how often the meaning of words, without a change of form, through higher culture and refinement of moral feeling, is spiritualized and ennobled." [456] This middle way, according to Flatt, leads to the conclusion that the main design of Christ's death as viewed by Himself was effectually to correct the false ideas of the Jews concerning the Messiah's kingdom as one of earthly splendor, and to open the way for the entrance of his doctrine which taught that blessedness is to be secured by moral excellence. This doctrine of Flatt agrees with the governmental theory so far as it denies the Church doctrine of a satisfaction to justice, and makes the design of Christ's death purely didactic.

Storr, in all his works, and especially in his "Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews," and his dissertation on the design of Christ's death, makes the Scriptures his authoritative guide, and therefore approaches much nearer to the Church doctrine than perhaps any German theologian of his generation. He assumes that Christ as man was bound to render the same obedience to the divine law as is due from all other men. But in virtue of the union of his human with the divine nature He as man was entitled to all the exaltation and blessedness of which humanity is capable. Any reward, therefore, for his perfect obedience, are especially for his death on the cross, must be some benefit granted to others for his sake. The salvation of his people, therefore, is the Redeemer's reward. Such benefit, however, could not consistently be bestowed on sinners unless the death of Christ had been a vindication of the righteousness of God by being intended as an "example of punishment;" a manifestation of God's hatred of sin and of his determination to punish it. [457]

American Theologians.

The governmental theory of the atonement seems to have had an entirely independent origin in this country. It was the necessary consequence of the principle that all virtue consists in benevolence. If that principle be correct, all the moral attributes of God are modifications of benevolence. There is no such perfection in God as justice other than the purpose and disposition to promote happiness. The death of Christ, therefore, could have no other design than to render the forgiveness of sin consistent with the best interests of the moral government of God. This theory was elaborated by the younger President Edwards, presented in full in Dr. Beman's work on the Atonement, and adopted by that numerous and highly influential class of American theologians who embraced the principle on which the theory, as held in this country, is founded. In the work of Dr. E. A. Park, of Andover, on the Atonement, there is a collection of discourses from the pens of the most distinguished teachers of this doctrine. In the introduction to that volume Professor Park gives an interesting history of the development of this view of the atonement as held in this country.

Objections to the Theory.

1. The first and most obvious objection to this theory is that it is founded on an erroneous idea of the nature of punishment. It assumes that the special design of punishment is the good of society. If the best interests of a community, either human or divine, a commonwealth of men or the moral government of God, can be secured without the punishment of crime, then no such punishment ought to be inflicted. But suffering inflicted for the good of others is not punishment any more than suffering inflicted for the good of the sufferer. The amputation of a crushed limb is not of the nature of punishment, neither are the sufferings of martyrs, although intended to redound to the good of the Church and of the world. The sufferings of Paul, which were so abundant and so constant, although so fruitful

of good, were not penal. And the sufferings of Christ, if incurred in the discharge of his mission of mercy, and not judicially inflicted in execution of the penalty of the law, had no more tendency to show God's abhorrence of sin than the suffering of the martyrs.

No evil is of the nature of punishment unless it be inflicted in satisfaction of justice and in execution of the penalty of law. A writer in the "British Quarterly Review" for October, 1866, says: "There is a story of an English judge who once said to a criminal, You are transported not because you have stolen these goods, but that goods may not be stolen.'" The reviewer then adds, "No principle more false in itself or more ruinous to public morality was ever announced from the English bench. The whole moral effect of punishment lies in its being just. The man who suffers for the benefit of others is a martyr and not a convict." It is on this false principle that the whole governmental theory of the atonement is founded. It admits of no ground of punishment but the benefit of others. And if that benefit can be otherwise secured all necessity for punishment ceases, and all objection to the dispensing of pardon is removed. If the fundamental principle of a theory be false, the theory itself must be unsound.

2. The theory contradicts the intuitive moral judgments of men. The testimony of every man's conscience in view of his own sins is that he deserves to be punished, not for the good of others, but for his own demerit. If not guilty he cannot justly be punished; and if guilty he cannot justly be pardoned without satisfaction to justice. As this is the testimony of conscience with regard to our own sins, it is the testimony of the consciousness of all men with regard to the sins of others. When a great crime is committed, the instinctive judgment of men is that the perpetrators ought to be punished. No analysis of human consciousness can resolve this sentiment of justice into a conviction of the understanding that the interests of society demand the punishment of crime. That indeed is true. It is one of the incidental benefits, but not the special design or end of punishment. Indeed, the whole moral effect of punishment depends upon the assumption that it is inflicted on the ground of ill desert, and not for the public good. If the latter object be made prominent, punishment loses its nature and of course its appropriate moral effect. A theory which ignores these intuitive convictions of the mind is not suited to our state, and never can satisfy the conscience. We know that we deserve to be punished. We know that we ought to be punished, and therefore that punishment is inevitable under the government of a just God. If it is not borne by a substitute in our stead, it must be borne by ourselves. Where there is no expiation for sin there is inevitably a fearful looking for of judgment.

3. All the arguments heretofore urged in proof that the justice of God cannot be resolved into benevolence are valid arguments against the governmental theory of the atonement. The doctrine that happiness is the highest good, and that all virtue consists in the desire and purpose to promote the greatest possible amount of happiness, is almost discarded from the schools, and should be discarded from theology where it has wrought so much evil. It is so inconsistent with our moral nature, to assert that there is no difference between right and wrong except that between the expedient and the inexpedient, that the doctrine could never have been adopted except as a means of solving difficulties for the understanding, at the expense of the conscience. This point has been already considered when treating of the attributes of God and of the design of creation; and therefore it need not be further discussed in this place.

4. A fourth argument against the governmental theory is that it is unscriptural. The Bible constantly represents Christ as a priest, as a sacrifice, as a propitiation, as an expiation, as the substitute and representative of sinners; as assuming their place and sustaining the curse or penalty of the law in their stead. All these representations are either ignored or explained away by the advocates of this theory. Governments, civil commonwealths, from which the principles and illustrations of this theory are derived, know nothing of priests, sacrifices, and vicarious punishments. And, therefore, these ideas do not enter, and cannot be admitted into the governmental theory. But these ideas are the vital elements of the Scriptural doctrine of the atonement; so that if we renounce them we renounce the doctrine itself, or at least seriously impair its integrity and power. Whole volumes on the atonement have been written in which the words priest, sacrifice, and propitiation hardly occur.

5. This theory, as well as the moral view of the atonement is false, because defective. As it is true that the work of Christ is designed and adapted to exert the most powerful moral influence on sinners to induce them to return to God, so it is true that his work was designed and adapted to produce the strongest possible impression on the minds of all intelligent creatures of the evil of sin, and thus restrain them from the commission of it, but neither the one nor the other was its primary design. It has this moral impression on the sinner and upon the intelligent universe, because it was a satisfaction to the justice of God, and the strongest of all proofs that sin cannot be pardoned without an expiation, or adequate atonement.

[448] De Satisfactione, II. [§ 3]; Works, edit. London, 1679, vol. iii. p. 307, a, 25-34. "Vult (Socinus) partem omnem offensam esse poen&#xfffd; creditorem: atque in ea tale habere jus, quale alii creditores in rebus sibi debitis, quod jus s&#xfffd;pe etiam dominii voce appellat: ideoque s&#xfffd;pissime repitit Deum hic spectandum, ut partem offensam, ut creditorem, ut dominum tria h&#xfffd;c ponens tanquam tantundem valentia. Hic error Socini . . . . per totam ipsius tractationem diffusus . . . . ipsius to proton pseudos [est]."

[449] Ibid. II. [§ 1]; p. 305, b, 20-24.

[450] Ibid. V. [§ 11]; p. 317, b, 31-41.

[451] Grotius, De Satisfactione, IV [§ 18]; vol. iii. p. 315, b. 9-14.

[452] Ibid. V. [§ 8]; p. 317, a, 12-24.

[453] Limborch, Theologia Christiana, III. xxi. 8, edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 262, a.

[454] The word "symbol," however, is used in two senses. Sometimes it is synonymous with sign. Thus it is common to say that the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper are the symbols of Christ's body and blood. At other times, a symbol is that which expresses the analogy between the outward and the inward. Thus, in one view, the atoning death of Christ is symbolical of God's feelings towards sinners. In another view, the struggles and triumph of our Lord in conflict with physical evil are symbolical of the believer's struggles and triumph in the conflict with sin. The former was an illustration of the latter, and intended to encourage the people of God with the assurance of success.

[455] Lehre von der Vers&#xfffd;hnung, T&#xfffd;bingen, 1838, pp. 597, 598.

[456] Von der Vers&#xfffd;hnung, Zweiter Theil, Suttgart, 1798, Vorrede, p. xxxii.

[457] G. Ch. Storr, Pauli Brief an die Hebr&#xfffd;er. Zweiter Theil, &#xfffd;ber den eigentlichen

Zweck des Todes Jesu. T&#65533;bingen, 1789.

§ 5. The Mystical Theory.

The fifth theory on this subject is the mystical. This agrees with the moral view (under which it might be included), in that it represents the design of Christ's work to be the production of a subjective effect in the sinner. It produces a change in him. It overcomes the evil of his nature and restores him to a state of holiness. The two systems differ, however, as to the means by which this inward change is accomplished. According to the one it is by moral power operating according to the laws of mind by the exhibition of truth and the exercise of moral influence. According to the other it is by the mysterious union of God and man, of the divine with the human nature, i.e., of divinity with humanity, brought about by the incarnation.

This general idea is presented in various forms. Sometimes the writers quoted in favour of this mystical view teach nothing more ihan what has ever been held in the Church, and what is clearly caught in the Scriptures.. It is true that there is a moral and spiritual union between God and man effected by the incarnation of the Son of God and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. He and his people are one. Our Lord prays to the Father, John xvii. 22, 23, that those given to Him "may be one, even as we are one: I in them, and thou in me." And the Apostle Peter does not hesitate to say that we are made "partakers of the divine nature." This, and no more than this, is necessarily implied in the oft-quoted language of Athanasius in reference to Christ, autos enenthropesen, hina hemeis theopoiethomen. But besides this Scriptural doctrine there has prevailed a mystical view of the union of God and man to which the redemption of our race is ascribed, and in which, by some of its advocates, it is made exclusively to consist. So far as the fathers are concerned, a clear distinction was made between redemption and reconciliation; between the objective work of Christ in delivering us from the curse of the law and from the power of Satan, and the subjective application of that work. Both were ascribed to Christ. The former (our redemption), was effected by his bearing our sins, by his being made a curse for us, by his giving Himself as a ransom, and by his obedience being taken as a substitute for the obedience which we had failed to render. Our reconciliation with God, including restoration to his image and fellowship, was effected, not, as the Church has ever taught, by the work of the Holy Spirit, but according to the mystical theory, by the union of the divine nature with our fallen nature, brought about by the incarnation. In all ages of the Church there have been minds disinclined to rest in the simple statements of the Bible, and disposed to strive after something more philosophical and profound. Among the early fathers, M&#65533;nscher says, there was an obscure and peculiar notion that in some way the coming of Christ had produced a physical effect upon our race to ennoble it and render it immortal. [458] At times this idea is advanced in general terms and without any attempt to explain philosophically how this effect was produced. As Adam was the cause of the seeds of death and corruption being introduced into human nature, so Christ was the means of introducing a principle of life and immortality which operates as leaven in a mass of dough. Or, as any affection of one member of the body, especially of the head, affects the whole system, so the resurrection of Christ and his life has a physical effect upon the whole mass of mankind. They regarded the human race as one mass which, inasmuch as Christ had

united Himself with it by his incarnation, was restored to its original perfection and made immortal. [459] This idea was more perfectly worked out by the realists. They held humanity to be a generic substance and life, of which individual men are the modes of existence; and they also held that it was this generic humanity, and not merely a true body and a reasonable soul that Christ assumed into personal union with his divine nature; thus an element of divinity was introduced into humanity, by which it is restored and ennobled, and according to some, finally deified.

Among the Platonizing fathers, however, the mystical operation of the incarnation was connected with their doctrine of the Logos. What the real doctrine of the fathers and of Philo their predecessor and master in his matter concerning the Logos was, has ever been a matter of dispute among the learned. It is not at all even yet a settled matter whether Philo regarded the Logos as a person or not. Dorner, one of the latest and most competent authorities on this point, takes the negative side of the question. According to him Philo taught that the Logos was (1.) A faculty of God, the nous or understanding, and also the power of God. The two are united; thought and power. (2.) The Logos is the activity of God; not merely the power of thought and of creating, but also the actual activity of God in thinking and creating. God first created by thinking an ideal world, after which the actual world was to be fashioned. As a builder forms in his mind the plan of a city in all its details, before he carries that plan into execution; and as the dwelling-place of that ideal city is the understanding of the builder, so the ideal world is in the mind of God, i.e., in the Logos. (3.) According to Philo the Logos is not only the thinking principle which forms this ideal world, but the ideal world itself. (4.) This plenitude of ideas which constitutes the ideal world is the reality, life, and intelligence of the actual world. The latter is (or becomes) by the union of the ideal with matter, what it is. The kosmos noetos is realized in the kosmos aisthetos. The Logos, therefore (or the divine intelligence and activity), is the life and intelligence of the actual world. He is the reason in all rational creatures, angels and men. [460] According to Philo the Logos was on the one hand identical with God, and on the other identical with the world as its interior reality and life.

In the hands of the Platonizing fathers this doctrine was only modified. Some of them, as Origen, held that the Logos was a person eternally begotten of the Father; according to Clemens Alexandrinus, He was, as the Logos endiathetos, eternally in God as his wisdom, and therefore impersonal; but as the Logos prophorikos, or united to the world as its formative principle, He became a person. In applying these philosophical speculations to the explanation of the doctrine concerning the person and work of Christ, there is no little diversity among these writers, so far as the details are concerned. In substance they agree. The eternal Logos or Son, became truly a man, and as such gave Himself as a sacrifice and ransom for the redemption of men. He also by his incarnation secures our recovery from the power of sin and restoration to the image and fellowship of God. How this latter object is accomplished is the mystical part of the theory. The Logos is the eternal Son of God; but He is also the interior life and substance of the world. Rational creatures included in the world, are endowed with personality and freedom. Some of them, both angels and men, have turned away from the Logos which is their life. A renewed union of the divine with the human restores them to their normal relation. The original creation of man was imperfect. The divine element was not strong enough to secure a right development, hence evil occurred. A larger infusion of the divine element corrects the evil, and secures the

restoration ultimately. according to Origen, of all rational creatures to holiness and God. The Logos is the Mediator, the High-Priest between God and man (or rather God and the world). One with God, He is also one with the world. He unites the two, and they become one. The system has a pantheistic aspect, although it admits the freedom of rational creatures, and the separate existence, or an existence as self of the world. The whole universe, however, God and world, is one vast organism in which God is the only life and the only reason, and this life and reason are the Logos. And it is by giving the Logos, the rational or spiritual element, renewed power, that the world of rational creatures, who in the abuse of their freedom have turned away from God, are brought back not only to a real or substantial, but also to a cordial union with God, so that He becomes all in all.

In the beginning of the ninth century John Scotus Erigena anticipated most of the results of the highest modern speculation. Schelling and Hegel had him for a predecessor and guide. With him "Creator et creatura unum est. Deus est omnia, et omnia Deus." The creation is necessary and eternal; the incarnation is necessary and eternal; and redemption is necessary and eternal. All is process. An eternal unfolding of the infinite in the finite, and return of the finite into the infinite. Erigena, from his place in history and his relation to the Church, was forced to clothe his philosophy as much as possible with the drapery of Christianity this secured for him an influence which continued long after his death over later speculative theologians.

During the Middle Ages there was a succession of advocates of the mystical theory. Some of them following Erigena adopted a system essentially pantheistic; others were theistic. The one class strove to reduce Christianity into a system of philosophy. They adopted the principle of Erigena, "Conficitur inde, veram esse philosophiam veram religionem, conversimque, veram religionem esse veram philosophiam." The two sources of knowledge are recta ratio and vera auctoritas. Both are divine as coming from God. Reason however, as first, is the higher, and nothing is to be admitted as true which reason does not authenticate. [461] The other class strove after fellowship with God. Both assumed that what Mnscher and Gieseler call the physical union of the divine and human natures, was the normal and ultimate state of man. Whether this identity of the two was effected by a perfect development of God in man and nature; or by the elevation of the human until it is lost in the divine, the result is the same. Man is deified. And therein is his salvation. And so far as Christ was recognized as a Saviour at all, it was as the bond of union between the two, or the channel through which the divine flows into the human. The incarnation itself, the union of the divine and human natures, was the great saving act. Christ redeems us by what He is, not by what He does. The race, say some, the consummated Church, say others, is the God man, or God manifest in the flesh. Almost all this class of writers held that the incarnation would have been necessary, had man never sinned. The necessity arises out of the nature of God and his relation to the world, and out of the nature and destiny of man.

Mystical Theory at the Time of the Reformation.

At the time of the Reformation the same mode of apprehending and presenting Christianity was adopted. While the Reformers held to the great objective truths of the Bible, to a historical Christ, to the reality and necessity of his obedience and satisfaction as something done for us and in our place, i.e., to an objective redemption and justification, a

class of writers soon appeared who insisted on what they called the Christ within us, and merged the objective work of Christ into a subjective operation in the souls of his people; or at least subordinated the former entirely to the latter. A work, entitled "Die Deutsche Theologie" (German Theology), was published during the lifetime of Luther, which contained a great amount of important truth, and to which the illustrious reformer acknowledged himself greatly indebted. In that book, however, the mystical element was carried to a dangerous extreme. While the historical facts respecting Christ and his redeeming work were allowed to remain, little stress was laid upon them. The real value of the blessings received from Christ, was the change effected in the soul itself; and that change was not referred to the work of the Holy Spirit, so much as to the union of the divine nature with our nature, in virtue of the incarnation. The book teaches that if it were possible for a man to be as pure and obedient as Christ, he would become, through grace, what Christ was by nature. Through this obedience he would become one with God. Christ is not merely objective, isolated in his majesty, but we are all called that God should be incarnate in us, or that we should become God.

Osiander.

Osiander and Schwenkfeld, two contemporaries of Luther, were both advocates, although in different forms, of the same theory. Men are saved by the substantial union of the divine nature with the nature of man. According to Osiander justification is not by the imputation, but by the infusion of righteousness. And the righteousness infused is not the righteousness of Christ wrought out here on earth. What Christ did centuries ago cannot make us righteous. What we receive is his divine nature. This is the specific doctrine for which Osiander was denounced in the Form of Concord. Man, according to him, was originally created not after the image of God as such, nor of the Son as such, but of the Son as He was to become man. Manhood was eternally included in the idea and nature of the Son of God. His incarnation was, therefore, due to his nature, and not to the accident of man's sinning. The idea of the incarnation is eternal, and in reference to it the whole universe was created and all things consist. Christ's human nature is only the vehicle for conveying to us his divine nature. In the vine, he says, there are two natures, the one is the nature of the wood, which it retains, even if it should be withered up; the other is "plane occulta, fructifera et vinifera natura." And as the clusters of grapes could not have the vinous nature, unless they were wood of the wood of the vine; so neither can we partake of the divine nature of Christ, unless we, by faith and baptism, are so incorporated with Him, as to be flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone. But the human nature of Christ, without the divine (si sine Deo esset), would be of no avail. [462]

Schwenkfeld.

While Osiander makes the divine nature of Christ as communicated to us our righteousness and life, and regards his humanity as only the means of communication, Schwenkfeld exalts the human into the divine, and regards this divine human nature as the source of life to us. He agreed with Osiander in making justification subjective, by the infusion of righteousness; and also in teaching that the righteousness which is infused is the righteousness of Christ; but instead of depreciating the human nature and making it only the channel for communicating the divine, he laid special stress on the humanity of Christ. The human nature of Christ was not a creature. It was formed out of the substance of God; and

after its sojourn on earth, was even as to the body, rendered completely or perfectly divine, so that whatever can be predicated of God, can be predicated of the humanity of Christ. Nevertheless, the human nature was not so absorbed into the divinity, that Christ had but one nature. He continues God and man, but as man is God. And this divine human, or human divine nature, is communicated to us by faith. Faith itself is the first communication of the divine essence, the final result of which is the complete deification of man. The substance of God is not communicated to the race of men, so that God becomes thus identified with men in general. It is in the regenerated that this union of the divine and human natures is consummated. It cannot escape notice, that the views of this class of writers, so far as results are concerned, differ but little from those of the modern speculative theologians of Germany and their followers in England and America. The obvious objection, that if salvation depends on the union of the divine nature with ours, and if this union be due to the incarnation of Christ, those living before his advent in the flesh must be excluded from the benefits of his theanthropic nature, is very unsatisfactorily answered by the modern theologians referred to. Schwenkfeld had no hesitation in cutting the knot. In a Sendbrief written in 1532, in which he treats of the difference between the Old and New Testament economies, he says, that under the former there was no saving faith, and no justification, and that all the patriarchs had therefore perished forever.

Schwenkfeld's followers were numerous enough to form a distinct sect, which continues to this day. Some religionists, both in Germany and in this country, are still called by his name. All the writers on the history of doctrine give the authorities for the statements concerning the doctrines of Osiander and Schwenkfeld derived from sources not generally accessible in this country.

Oetinger.

The prominent representative of the mystical theory during the eighteenth century, was Friedrich Christopher Oetinger, a distinguished theologian of South Germany. He was born in 1702, and died in 1782. He enjoyed every advantage of culture in science, theology, and philosophy, which he diligently improved. After his death it was said, "When Oetinger died a whole academy of science died." Very early in life, he says, he adopted and avowed the purpose, "to understand whatever he learnt." By this he meant that he would receive nothing on authority. All that the Scriptures teach as doctrine, must be sublimated into truths of the reason and received, as such. He avowed it to be his purpose to furnish a philosophia sacra as a substitute for the systems of profane philosophy. For this purpose he devoted himself to the study of all previously received systems, extending his researches to the cabala of the Jews, and the mystical writers of the Church; to alchemy awl to all departments of science within his reach. He professed special reverence for Jacob B[illegible]hme, the great unlettered theosophist of the preceding century, to whom even Schelling and other of the leading modern philosophers bow as to an acknowledged seer. Oetinger examined the several systems in vogue before or during, his own period. Idealism and materialism, and realistic dualism were alike unsatisfactory. He assumed life to be the primordial principle. Life was the aggregate of all forces. These in God are united by a bond of necessity. In things out of God the union of these forces is not necessary; and hence evil may arise, and has, in fact, arisen. To remove this evil and bring all things back to God, the eternal Logos became man. He adopted the old Platonic idea, that in the Logos were the originales rerum antequam

exstiterunt form&#65533;: omnia constiterunt in ipso arehetypice sive actu. This plenitude of the Godhead dwells in Christ and renders his humanity divine. The union of the divine and human natures in Christ, secures the complete deification of his human nature. The hypostatical union of the two natures in Christ is the norm of the mystical union between Christ and his people. "Ut ibi adsumta caro consistit en logo per participationem hupostaseos, ita hic nostra subsistit in Christo per consortium grati&#65533; et theias phuseos," etc. [463] The second Adam having assumed humanity, says Oetinger, "Traxit carnem nostram in plenitudinem Deitatis," so that our race again becomes possessed of the divine nature in Him and in us; i.e., "unione tumu personali tum mystica." [464] It is indeed plain, as Dorner says, that we find in Oetinger the ideas which are the foundation of the philosophy of the present age. The nature of God and the nature of man are so homogeneous that they may be united and constitute one, which is divine human or human divine. We are saved not by the work of Christ for us, but by his work in us. The eternal Son is incarnate not in the man Christ Jesus, but in the Church.

The Modern Views.

In the present period of the Church's history, this mystical theory of the person and work of Christ is probably more prevalent than ever before. The whole school of German speculative theologians, with their followers in England and America, are on this ground. Of these theologians there are, as remarked above, two classes, the pantheistic and the theistic. According to the former, the nature of man at first was an imperfect manifestation of the absolute Being, and in the development of the race this manifestation is rendered complete; but complete only as an eternal progress. According to the other, man has an existence and personality, in one sense, outside of God. Nevertheless God and man are substantially the same. This identity or sameness is shown perfectly in Christ, and through Him, is realized more and more perfectly in the Church as some teach, or, as others say, in the whole race. [465]

[458] Dogmengeschichte, II., vi. § 122, 2d edit. Marburg, 1818, vol. iv. p. 285.

[459] Gieseler's Kirchengeschichte, iv. III. ii. 5, § 97, edit. Bonn, 1855; vol. vi. p. 384. M&#65533;nscher's Dogmengeschichte, vol. iv. p. 286.

[460] See Dorner's Entwicklungsgeschichte der Lehre von der Person Christi. 2d edition. Stuttgart, 1845. Introduction, pp. 26-42.

[461] De Divisione Natur&#65533;, I. 56, 66, 69.

[462] De Unico Med. Jes. Christo et Justif. Fid. Confessio, K&#65533;nigsberg, 1551, by count, pp. 144, 145.

[463] See Dorner, Person Christi, 1st edit. Stuttgart, 1839, pp. 305-322.

[464] Ibid. p. 317.

[465] On these views see above the chapters on the Person and Work of Christ.

§ 6. Concluding Remarks.

In reviewing these several theories concerning the method of salvation through our Lord Jesus Christ, it is important to remark, --

1. That it is not to be inferred because certain writers are quoted as setting forth one

particular theory, that they recognized the truth of no other view of the work of Christ. This remark is especially applicable to the patristic period. While some of the fathers speak at times of Christ's saving the world as a teacher, and others of them say that He gave himself as a ransom to Satan, and others again that He brings men back to the image of God, this does not prove that they ignored the fact that he was a sin offering, making expiation for the guilt of the world. It is characteristic of the early period of the Church, before special doctrines had become matters of controversy, that the people and the theologians retain the common language and representations of the Bible; while the latter, especially, dwell sometimes disproportionately on one mode of Scriptural representation, and sometimes disproportionately on another. The fathers constantly speak of Christ as a priest, as a sacrifice, and as a ransom. They ascribe our salvation to his blood and to his cross. The ideas of expiation and propitiation were wrought into all the services of the early Church. These Scriptural ideas sustained the life of the people of God entirely independently of the speculations of philosophical theologians.

2. The second remark which the preceding survey suggests is, that the theories antagonistic to the common Church doctrine are purely philosophical. Origen assumed that in man there are the three constituent principles: body, soul, and spirit; and that in analogy therewith, there are three senses of Scripture, the historical, the moral, and the spiritual. The first is the plain meaning of the words which suggests itself to any ordinary, intelligent reader; the second is the allegorical application of the historical sense for moral instruction. For example, what Moses commands about not muzzling an ox which treads out the corn, may be understood as teaching the general principle that labour should be rewarded, and, therefore, may be applied as it is by the Apostle, to enforce the duty of supporting ministers of the Gospel. The third or spiritual sense, is the general philosophical truth, which is assumed to underlie the doctrines of the Scriptures; of which truths the Scriptural doctrines are only the temporary forms. Thus Origen made the Bible teach Platonism. The object of most of the early apologists, was to show that Christianity had a philosophy as well as heathenism; and that the philosophy of the former is identical with the philosophy of the latter so far as that of the latter can prove itself to be true. The trouble was, and always has been, that whatever philosophy was assumed to be true, the doctrines of Scripture were made to conform to it or were sublimated into it. The historical and moral senses of Scripture constitute the object of faith; the spiritual sense is the object of gnosis or knowledge. The former is very well in its place and for the people; but the latter is something of a higher order to which only the philosophically cultivated can attain. That the mystical theory of the person and work of Christ, especially, is the product of philosophical speculation is obvious -- (1.) From the express avowals of its most distinguished advocates. (2.) From the nature of the theory itself, which reveals itself as a philosophy, i.e., as a speculative doctrine concerning the nature of being, the nature of God, the nature of man, and of the relation of God to the world, etc. (3.) From the fact that it has changed with the varying systems of philosophy. So long as Platonism was in vogue, the spiritual sense of Scripture was assumed to be Platonism; that system discarded, the schoolmen adopted the philosophy of Aristotle, and then the Bible taught the doctrines of Peripateticism. Those of them who followed Scotus Erigena found Pantheism in the Scriptures. When the philosophy of Leibnitz and Wolf dominated the schools, that philosophy determined the form of all Scriptural doctrine. And since the rise of the new

speculative philosophy all that the Scriptures teach is cast in its forms of thought. No man can be so blind as not to see that all that is peculiar in what the modern theology teaches of the person and work of Christ, is nothing more nor less than the application of modern speculative philosophy to the doctrines of the Bible. This, indeed, is generally admitted and avowed. This being the case, all these speculations are without authority. They form no part of the truth as it is revealed as the object of faith. We are bound to understand the Scriptures in their plain historical sense; and to admit no philosophy to explain or modify that sense, except the philosophy of the Bible itself; that is, those facts and principles concerning the nature of God, the nature of man, of the world, and of the relation between God and the world, which are either asserted or plainly assumed in the Scriptures. To depart from this principle is to give up the Bible as a rule of faith; and to substitute for it the teachings of philosophy. That form of Rationalism which consists in giving a philosophical explanation of the truths of revelation, or in resolving them into truths of the reason, is just as certain in the end to teach for doctrines the speculations of men, as the most avowed skepticism.

After all, apart from the Bible, the best antidote to all these false theories of the person and work of Christ, is such a book as Doctor Schaff's "Christ in Song." [466] The hymns contained in that volume are of all ages and from all churches. They set forth Christ as truly God, as truly man, as one person, a the expiation for our sins, as our intercessor, saviour, and king, as the supreme object of love, as the ultimate ground of confidence, as the all-sufficient portion of the soul. We want no better theology and no better religion than are set forth in these hymns. They were indited by the Holy Spirit in the sense that the thoughts and feelings which they express, are due to his operations on the hearts of his people.

[466] Christ in Song. Hymns of Immanuel: selected from all Ages, with Notes, by Philip Schaff, D. D. New York, Anson D. F. Randolph and Co., 1869.

CHAPTER X: INTERCESSION OF CHRIST.

§1. Christ our Intercessor.

Under the old dispensation the High Priest, after having offered sacrifices for sin in the outer court, was directed, on the day of atonement, to take the blood of the victims and a censer with burning incense, and to enter within the veil, and there present the blood before God, sprinkling it upon the mercy seat. In like manner, as we are taught by the Apostle, Christ, having offered Himself on the cross as a sacrifice for our sins, has passed through the heavens, there to appear before God in our behalf. He is, therefore, said to be the minister of the true tabernacle, which the Lord pitched and not man. His priestly office is now exercised in heaven, where he ever lives to intercede for us.

This work of Christ is expressed in Scripture, --

1. By saying that He appears before God for us. Hebrews ix. 24. The word used is emphanisthenai = emphanizein heauton tini. Christ presents Himself before God as our representative. His perfect manhood, his official character, and his finished work, plead for us before the throne of God. All that the Son of God as incarnate is, and all that He did on earth, He is, and did for us; so that God can regard us with all the favour which is due to Him. His presence, therefore, is a perpetual and prevailing intercession with God in behalf of his people, and secures for them all the benefits of his redemption.

2. His intercession is expressed by saying that He draws near to God on our behalf. The word used is entunchanein, to meet with, to talk with. To meet, or approach one for (huper) another, is to intercede in his behalf. (Romans viii. 34; Hebrews vii. 25.) To meet one against (kata) another is to intercede against him. (Romans xi. 2.) According to the Scriptures, and speaking after the manner of men, Christ speaks to God in our behalf; or, as it is expressed in John xvii. 9, He prays for us.

3. Christ is called our Paraclete, parakletos. This word is translated advocate in 1 John ii. 1, and comforter in John xiv. 16; xv. 26; xvi. 7. Neither translation expresses its full meaning. It signifies invoked, called upon for help. The Paraclete is, therefore, in the comprehensive sense of the word, a helper, whatever may be the specific nature of the aid afforded. As, however, the guilty, the ignorant, the friendless, when arraigned before a tribunal of justice, need above all things an advocate; one who will undertake their cause; present a plea in their behalf; and use all his influence to secure their acquittal; it is in this sense especially that Christ is set forth as our parakletos. He is our advocate. He appears at the bar of God for us. He pleads our cause. He presents his work of obedience and suffering as the ground of our justification. He exerts his influence, the influence of his character as the Son of God in whom the Father is ever well pleased, and whom He heareth

always, as well as the influence due to Him in virtue of the covenant of redemption, and the perfect fulfilment of its conditions, to secure for his people all the good they need. It is, therefore, especially in passages which speak of justification, and of judicial process, that Christ's intercession is brought into view. (See Romans viii. 34; 1 John ii. 1.)

§2. Its Nature.

As to the nature of Christ's intercession, little can be said. There is error in pressing the representations of Scripture too far; and there is error in explaining them away. This latter error is chargeable on many of the later theologians, who teach that the Scriptures intend, by the intercession of Christ, nothing more than his continued intervention or agency in the salvation of his people. Many of the Lutheran theologians, on the other extreme, err in insisting that this intercession of our Lord in our behalf in heaven is vocalis, verbalis, et oralis. Sounds and words suppose an atmosphere and a body, which is flesh and blood, which Paul says cannot inherit the kingdom of God. The Reformed theologians abstain from these extremes, and consider it enough to say that the intercession of Christ includes -- (1.) His appearing before God in our behalf, as the sacrifice for our sins, as our High Priest, on the ground of whose work we receive the remission of our sins, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and all needed good. (2.) Defence against the sentence of the law and the charges of Satan, who is the great accuser. (3.) His offering Himself as our surety, not only that the demands of justice shall be shown to be satisfied, but that his people shall be obedient and faithful. (4.) The oblation of the persons of the redeemed, sanctifying their prayers, and all their services, rendering them acceptable to God, through the savour of his own merits.

§3. Its Objects.

As to the objects of Christ's intercession, the Lutherans make a distinction between his intercession as general and special. He intercedes generally for all men, and specially for the elect. The former is assumed on the authority of Luke xxiii. 34, where Christ is represented as praying for his murderers, saying, "Father forgive them; for they know not what they do." It is said to be due to the intercession of Christ that the wicked are not immediately cut off; that they have the Gospel preached to them, and every opportunity afforded them of returning unto God. That there is, however, an intercession of which the people of Christ alone are objects, Lutherans themselves are constrained to admit, as our Lord Himself says: "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me." (John xvii. 9, 20.) So far as the intercession of Christ is part of his official work as the High Priest of our profession, He intercedes only for those who accept Him as their priest, and whom He represents in the covenant of redemption. This follows from the nature of his office as Priest, from his own express declaration, and from the fact that his intercession is certainly efficacious. Him the Father heareth always. If He interceded for all, all would certainly be saved.

§4. Intercession of Saints.

There is but one Mediator between God and man, and but one High Priest through

whom we draw near to God. And as intercession is a priestly function, it follows that Christ is our only intercessor. But as there is a sense in which all believers are kings and priests unto God, which is consistent with Christ's being our only king and priest; so there is a sense in which one believer may intercede for another, which is not inconsistent with Christ's being our only intercessor. By intercession in the case of believers is only meant that one child of God may pray for another or for all men. To intercede is in this sense merely to pray for. But in the case of Christ it expresses an official act, which none who does not fill his office can perform. As under the old economy one Israelite could pray for his brethren, but only the High Priest could enter within the veil and officially interpose in behalf of the people; so now, although we may pray, one for another, Christ only can appear as a priest before God in our behalf and plead his merits as the ground on which his prayers for his people should be answered.

Protestants object to the intercession of saints as taught and practised in the Church of Rome.

1. Because it supposes a class of beings who do not exist; that is, of canonized departed spirits. It is only those who, with the angels, have been officially declared by the Church, on account of their merits, to be now in heaven, who are regarded as intercessors. This, however, is an unauthorized assumption on the part of the Church. It has no prerogative to enable it thus to decide, and to enroll whom it will among glorified spirits. Often those thus dignified have been real enemies of God, and persecutors of his people.

2. It leads to practical idolatry. Idolatry is the ascription of divine attributes to a creature. In the popular mind the saints, and especially the Virgin Mary, are regarded as omnipresent; able at all times and in all places, to hear the prayers addressed to them, and to relieve the wants of their worshippers.

3. It is derogatory to Christ. As He is the only and sufficient mediator between God and man, and as He is ever willing to hear and answer the prayers of his people, it supposes some deficiency in Him, if we need other mediators to approach God in our behalf.

4. It moreover is contrary to Scripture, inasmuch as the saints are assumed to prevail with God on account of their personal merits. Such merit no human being has before God. No man has any merit to plead for his own salvation, much less for the salvation of others.

5. The practice is superstitious and degrading. Superstition is belief without evidence. The practice of the invocation of saints is founded on a belief which has no support from Scripture. It is calling upon imaginary helpers. It degrades men by turning them from the Creator to the creature, by leading them to put their trust in an arm of flesh, instead of in the power of Christ. It, therefore, turns away the hearts and confidence of the people from Him to those who can neither hear nor save.

CHAPTER XI: KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.

§1. The Church God's Kingdom.

God as the creator and preserver of the universe, and as infinite in his being and perfections, is, in virtue of his nature, the absolute sovereign of all his creatures. This sovereignty He exercises over the material world by his wisdom and power, and over rational beings as a moral ruler. From this rightful authority of God, our race revolted, and thereby became a part of the kingdom of darkness of which Satan is the head. To this kingdom the mass of mankind has ever since belonged. But God, in his. grace and mercy, determined to deliver men from the. consequences of their apostasy. He not only announced the coming of a Redeemer who should destroy the power of Satan, but He at once inaugurated an antagonistic kingdom? consisting of men chosen out of the world, and through the renewing of the Holy Ghost restored to their allegiance. Until the time of Abraham this kingdom does not appear to have had any visible organization apart from the families of the people of God. Every pious household was a church of which the parent was the priest.

To prevent the universal spread of idolatry, to preserve the knowledge of the truth, to gather in his elect, and to prepare the way for the coming of the promised Redeemer, God entered into covenant with the father of the faithful and with his descendants through Isaac, constituting them his visible kingdom, and making them the depositaries and guardians of his supernatural revelations. In this covenant He promised eternal life upon condition of faith in Him that was to come.

When Moses led the Israelites out of Egypt, they were made a theocracy so constituted in its officers, in its institutions, and in its services, as not only to preserve alive the knowledge of God's purpose and plan of salvation, but also to set forth the character, offices, and work of the promised seed of Abraham in whom all the nations of the earth were to be blessed.

The kingdom of God, therefore, as consisting of those who acknowledge, worship, love, and obey Jehovah as the only living and true God, has existed in our world ever since the fall of Adam. It has ever been the light and life of the world. It is the salt by which it is preserved. It is the leaven by which it is ultimately to be pervaded. To gather his people into this kingdom, and to carry it on to its consummation, is the end of all God's dispensations, and the purpose for which his eternal Son assumed our nature. He was born to be a king. To this end He lived and died and rose again, that He might be Lord of all those given to Him by the Father.

§2. Christ is truly a King.

Although the kingdom of God had existed from the beginning, yet as everything therewith connected before the Advent was merely preparatory, the Scriptures constantly speak of the Messiah as a king who was to set up a kingdom into which in the end all other kingdoms were to be merged. The most familiar designation applied to Him in the Scriptures is Lord. But Lord means proprietor and ruler; and when used of God or Christ, it means absolute proprietor and sovereign ruler. Apart from Christ's right in us and sovereignty over us as God, He as the God-man is our Lord. We belong to Him by the purchase of his blood, and God has set Him as King on his holy hill of Zion.

In the Book of Genesis the Messiah is set forth as the Shiloh to whom is to be the gathering of the people. In reference to Him it was said in Numbers xxiv. 17, "There shall come a Star out of Jacob; and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel. In 2 Samuel vii. 16, we have the record of God's formal covenant with David, "Thine house and thy kingdom shall be established forever before thee: thy throne shall be established forever." In fulfilment of that promise Isaiah predicted that a virgin should bear a son and call his name Immanuel, on whose shoulder should be the government, whose name should be called "Wonderful, Counsellor, the Mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace. Of the increase of his government and peace there shall be no end, upon the throne of David, and upon his kingdom, to order it, and to establish it with judgment and with justice from henceforth even forever. The zeal of the Lord of hosts will perform this." (Isaiah ix. 6, 7.) In the second Psalm God declares in reference to the Messiah, I have "set my king upon my holy hill of Zion. . . . . Ask of me and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession. Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter's vessel." The whole of the 45th, 72d, and 110th Psalms is devoted to the exhibition of the Messiah in his character as king. In Daniel vii. 13, 14, it is said, "One like the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of days, and they brought him near before him. And there was given him dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve him; his dominion is an everlasting dominion, which shall not pass away, and his kingdom that which shall not be destroyed." The prophet Micah v. 2, said, "Thou, Bethlehem, Ephratah, though thou be little among the thousands of Judah, yet out of thee shall he come forth unto me that is to be ruler in Israel; whose goings forth have been from of old, from everlasting." After the captivity the people were cheered with the hope that the promised king was soon to appear. "Rejoice greatly, O daughter of Zion, shout, O daughter of Jerusalem; Behold, thy King cometh unto thee; he is just, and having salvation; lowly, and riding upon an ass, and upon a colt the foal of an ass." (Zech. ix. 9.) This is the mode of representation which pervades the Old Testament Scriptures. As the priesthood, and sacrifices, and prophets of the former dispensation were typical of the prophetic and priestly offices of Christ, so the kings of Israel were typical of his kingly office, and so the national theocracy of the Mosaic economy was typical of the spiritual theocracy of the Messianic period.

In the New Testament Christ is set forth as a king, in harmony with the predictions which foretold his advent. The Angel Gabriel, in announcing to the Virgin Mary the approaching birth of the Messiah said, "Thou shalt conceive in thy womb, and bring forth a son, and shalt call his name Jesus. He shall be great, and shall be called the Son of the

Highest: and the Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David: And he shall reign over the house of Jacob forever; and of his kingdom there shall be no end." (Luke i. 31-33.) John the Baptist, the forerunner of Christ, prepared the people for his coming, saying, "Repent ye for the kingdom of heaven is at hand." (Matt. iii. 2.) And our Lord himself, when He entered upon his personal ministry, went everywhere preaching "the gospel of the kingdom of God." (Mark i. 14.) Much of his teaching was devoted to setting forth the nature of the kingdom which He came to establish.

Nothing, therefore, is more certain, according to the Scriptures, than that Christ is a king; and consequently, if we would retain the truth concerning Him and his work, He must be so regarded in our theology and religion.

§3. Nature of Christ's Kingdom.

Although the kingdom of God on earth was set up immediately after the fall, yet as the Messiah was to come to make all things new, and to take into his hands as the Theanthropos the administration of this kingdom, the Old Testament predicted, and the New Testament announces, the establishment of a new kingdom as consequent on his advent.

The word basileia is used in Scripture in three senses. (1.) For royal authority or dominion; such dominion as it is the prerogative of a king to exercise. (2.) For those who are subject to that authority. Among men any community, or commonwealth, or territory subject to a king, constitutes his kingdom. And in the New Testament, those who acknowledge Christ as their king constitute his kingdom. (3.) The word is used metonymically for the effects of the exercise of royal authority. It is to be understood in the first of these senses in all those cases in which a kingdom or dominion is said to be given to Christ; or when we pray, Thy kingdom come, or when it is said, Of his kingdom there is no end. It is used in the second sense when men are said to enter into the kingdom of Christ, or to be cast out of it, or when the character of those is described who are to constitute that kingdom. And it is used in the third sense when men are said to inherit, to see (or enjoy), to seek, and to value more than hid treasure, the kingdom of God. Hence also the kingdom of God is said to consist in righteousness, peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost. Such are the effects of the reign of Christ.

This kingdom is called the kingdom of Christ, or of the Son of God, because administered by Him. The royal authority is vested in Him. It is called the kingdom of God, because Christ is God, and because it is the kingdom which God was to establish on earth in distinction from the kingdoms of men. It is called the kingdom of heaven, because its king dwells in heaven, because it is spiritual and heavenly, and because it is to be consummated in heaven, Various as are the applications and uses of these designations in the New Testament, they are included under the general idea of the Messianic kingdom; that kingdom which the Messiah came into the world to establish. That kingdom, however, is presented in different aspects, or, in other words, Christ exercises his royal authority, so to speak, in different spheres.

Christ's Dominion over the Universe.

Christ has what theologians are accustomed to call his kingdom of power. As Theanthropos and as Mediator, all power in heaven and upon earth has been committed to

his hands. (Matt. xxviii. 18.) In Psalm viii. 6, it is declared to be the purpose of God that all things should be put under the feet of man. This purpose, we are taught by the Apostle, God fulfilled in the exaltation of Christ, "when he raised him from the dead, and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come; and hath put all things under his feet, and gave him to be the head over all things to the church." (Eph. i. 20-22.) In 1 Corinthians xv. 27, the argument is pushed to its utmost extreme. When all things are said to be put under the feet of Christ, nothing is to be excepted from this subjection, except Him "which did put all things under him." And in Hebrews ii. 8, it is said, "In that he put all (ta panta, the universe) in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him." The same universality of dominion is implied in Christ's sitting at the right hand of God. As this session on the throne of God involves equality with God in glory and dominion, it cannot be said of any creature. And as it is said of Christ it proves that Christ is a divine person, and is invested with all the power and authority of God. This is the Apostle's argument in Hebrews i. 13. "To which of the angels (to what created being) said he at any time, Sit on my right hand?" The Apostle says to the Philippians, that Him, who though equal with God was found in fashion as a man, "God hath highly exalted, and given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth." (Phil. ii. 9, 10.) This is a perfectly exhaustive statement. All in heaven, all in earth, and all under the earth, include all rational creatures. The person to whom they are to bow the knee is Jesus, not the Logos, but the God-man. And the acknowledgment which they are to make is, that He is Lord, i.e., their Lord, their absolute proprietor and Sovereign. It is in this sense also, that the Apostle says (Heb. i. 2), that God hath appointed the Son heir of all things. It is in virtue of this dominion over the universe that Christ is called Lord of lords and King of kings, i.e. the Sovereign over all other sovereigns in heaven and on earth.

This universal authority is exercised in a providential control, and for the benefit of his Church. He employs the angels as ministering spirits, to minister to the heirs of salvation. He controls and restrains the principalities, powers, world-rulers, and spirits of wickedness. (Eph. vi. 12.) He overrules all the affairs of nations and of individuals to the same end. He directs all events concerning his people severally and his Church collectively. Paul constantly recognized this providential control of Christ as directing all his steps. Under the present dispensation, therefore, Christ is the God of providence. It is in and through and by Him that the universe is governed. This dominion or kingdom is to last until its object is accomplished, i.e., until all his enemies, all forms of evil, and even death itself is subdued. Then this kingdom, this mediatorial government of the universe, is to be given up. (1 Cor. xv. 24.)

Christ's Spiritual Kingdom.

But besides this kingdom of power, Christ has a kingdom of grace. This also is exhibited under two aspects. It includes the relation in which He stands to his true people individually and collectively (the invisible Church); and the relation He sustains to the visible Church, or the body of his professing people.

He is the king of every believing soul. He translates it from the kingdom of darkness. He brings it into subjection to Himself. He rules in and reigns over it. Every believer

recognizes Christ as his absolute Sovereign; Lord of his inward, as well as of his outward, life. He yields to Him the entire subjection of the reason, of the conscience, and of the heart. He makes Him the object of reverence, love, and obedience. In Him he trusts for protection from all enemies, seen and unseen. On Him he relies for help in every emergency, and for final triumph. On Him the loyalty of the believer terminates. To acquit himself as a good soldier of Jesus Christ, to spend and be spent in his service and in the promotion of his kingdom, becomes the governing purpose of his life.

The terms of admission into this spiritual kingdom are faith and repentance (John iii. 3, 5). "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit he cannot enter into the kingdom of God;" or, conversion (Matt. xviii. 3), "Except ye be converted, and become as little children, ye shall not enter into the kingdom of heaven;" purity of life (1 Cor. vi. 9), "The unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God, nor "extortioners;" nor such as indulge in "adultery, fornication, uncleanness, lasciviousness, idolatry, witchcraft, hatred, variance, emulations, wrath, strife, seditions, heresies, envyings, murders, drunkenness, revellings, and such like; of which," the Apostle says, "I tell you before, as I have also told you in time past, that they which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God." (Gal. v. 19-21.)

On the other hand, we are taught that no external profession secures admission into this kingdom. "Not every one that saith unto me, Lord, Lord, shall enter into the kingdom of heaven." (Matt. vii. 21.) Nor any punctiliousness in the performance of rites and ceremonies, "Except your righteousness shall exceed the righteousness of the scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no case enter into the kingdom of heaven." (Matt. v. 20.) "He is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh." (Rom. ii. 28.) "For in Jesus Christ neither circumcision availeth anything, nor uncircumcision." (Gal. v. 6.) "Baptism doth also now save us; not the putting away of the filth of the flesh, but the answer of a good conscience towards God." (1 Pet. iii. 21.) Nor membership in any external community, "Think not to say within yourselves, We have Abraham to our father." (Matt. iii. 9.) "They are not all Israel, which are of Israel." (Rom. ix. 6.) The kingdom of Christ, in this aspect of it, is a purely spiritual community, consisting of those truly and inwardly his people.

The laws of this kingdom require first and above all, faith in Jesus Christ; the sincere belief that He is the Son of God and the Saviour of the world, and cordial submission to Him and trust in Him as our prophet, priest, and king. With this faith is united supreme love. "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me: and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, ir not worthy of me. . . . . He that findeth his life, shall lose it, and he that loseth his life for my sake shall find it." (Matt. x. 37, 39.) "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke xiv. 26.) "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." (1 Cor. xvi. 22.) With this supreme love are to be connected all the other religious affections. Christians are the worshippers of Christ. (1 Cor. i. 2.) Christ requires his disciples to honour Him as they honour the Father. (John v. 23.) They are to believe in Him (put the same confidence in Him), as they do in God. (John xiv. 1.) It is the same offence under the new dispensation to refuse to worship Christ as God manifest in the flesh, that it was under the old economy to refuse to worship Jehovah as the only living and true God. In both cases it was a violation of the fundamental

law of the kingdom, and of necessity worked excision from God's people. But if we are to recognize Christ as Thomas did (John xx. 28), as our Lord and our God, then of course we are bound not only to worship, but to obey Him. We stand to Him in the same relation that a slave does to his master, except that our subjection to Him is voluntary and joyful. We belong to Him, not only as the Creator, being his creatures, but also as the Theanthropos, being purchased by his blood. (1 Cor. vi. 19, 20.) His will, and not our own, must govern our conduct, and determine the use we make of our powers. All we gain, whether of knowledge, wealth, or influence, is his. He, and not we ourselves, is the object or end of our living. It is Christ for believers to live. His glory and the advancement of his kingdom, are the only legitimate objects to which they can devote their powers or resources; the only ends consistent with their relation to Christ, and the full enjoyment of the blessedness which membership in his Kingdom secures.

The laws of the kingdom moreover require not only these duties to Christ, but that his people should be holy in heart and life. They must be poor in spirit; meek; merciful; peace-makers; long-suffering; ready to forgive; disinterested, not seeking their own; bearing all things; believing all things; and hoping all things. They are forbidden to be avaricious, or covetous, or proud, or worldly minded. In one word, they are required to be like Christ, in disposition, character, and conduct.

The special law of Christ's kingdom is that its members should love one another, not only with the love of complacency and delight, but with brotherly love. A love which leads to the recognition of all Christians as brethren, belonging to the same family, entitled to the same privileges and blessings; and which prompts to and secures ministering to their necessities, so that there be no lack. This law is laid down at length by the Apostle in 2 Corinthians viii. The law of the kingdom is, that every man should labour to the extent of his ability to supply his own wants and the wants of those dependent on him; for "if any would not work neither should he eat" (2 Thess. iii. 10); but all deficiency which labour cannot supply is to be supplied by those having the ability. "Whoso hath this world's good, and seeth his brother have need, and shutteth up his bowels of compassion from him, how dwelleth the love of God in him?" (1 John iii. 17.) In praying, therefore, that the kingdom of God may come, we pray, among other things, that all men may recognize Christ as their king, invested with divine majesty and authority, and that they should all be like Him in character and conduct.

This kingdom of Christ over all his people is exercised not only by his power in their protection and direction, but especially by his Word and Spirit, through which and by whom He reigns in and rules over them.

This kingdom of Christ is everlasting. That is, the relation which believers sustain to Christ on earth they will sustain to Him forever.

Christ's Visible Kingdom.

As religion is essentially spiritual, an inward state, the kingdom of Christ as consisting of the truly regenerated, is not a visible body, except so far as goodness renders itself visible by its outward manifestations. Nevertheless as Christ has enjoined upon his people duties which render it necessary that they should organize themselves in an external society, it follows that there is and must be a visible kingdom of Christ in the world. Christians are required to associate for public worship, for the admission and exclusion of members, for

the administration of the sacraments, for the maintenance and propagation of the truth. They therefore form themselves into churches, and collectively constitute the visible kingdom of Christ on earth, consisting of all who profess the true religion, together with their children.

Nature of this Kingdom.

First, it is spiritual. That is, it is not of this world. It is not analogous to the other kingdoms which existed, or do still exist among men. It has a different origin and a different end. Human kingdoms are organized among men, under the providential government of God, for the promotion of the temporal well-being of society. The kingdom of Christ was organized immediately by God, for the promotion of religious objects. It is spiritual, or not of this world, moreover, because it has no power over the lives, liberty, or property of its members; and because all secular matters lie beyond its jurisdiction. Its prerogative is simply to declare the truth of God as revealed in his Word and to require that the truth should be professed and obeyed by all under its jurisdiction. It can decide no question of politics or science which is not decided in the Bible. The kingdom of Christ, under the present dispensation, therefore, is not worldly even in the sense in which the ancient theocracy was of this world. The latter organized the Hebrews as a nation, and directed all their municipal and national, as well as their social and religious affairs. It, therefore, could not coexist in time and place with any other national organization. The kingdom of Christ being designed to embrace all other kingdoms, can exist under all forms of civil government without interfering with any. It was especially in this view that Christ declared that his kingdom was not of this world. His immediate design was to vindicate his claim to be a king, from the charge that such claim was incompatible with the authority of the civil magistrate or of the Roman emperor. He intended to say that his kingdom was of such a nature that it necessitated no collision with the legitimate authority of any civil government. It belonged to a different sphere. It took cognizance of things which lie beyond the province of secular power; and it left untouched all that belongs peculiarly to civil rulers. Christ, therefore, could be recognized and obeyed as king by those who continued to render unto Csar the things which were Csar's. Every form or claim of the Church, therefore, which is incompatible with the legitimate authority of the State, is inconsistent with the nature of Christ's kingdom as declared by Himself.

Secondly, this kingdom of Christ is catholic or universal. It embraces all who profess the true religion. It is confined to no one organization; but includes them all; because all are under the authority of Christ and subject to the laws which He has laid down in his Word. As all Christians are included in the kingdom of Christ, it is the duty of all to recognize each other as belonging to one great commonwealth, and as subjects of the same sovereign.

Thirdly, this form of Christ's kingdom is temporary. It is to be merged into a higher form when He shall come the second time without sin unto salvation. As an external organization it is designed to answer certain ends, and will cease when those ends are accomplished.

Fourthly, the kingdom of Christ is not a democracy, nor an aristocracy, but truly a kingdom of which Christ is absolute sovereign. This involves the denial, --

1. That the State has any authority to make laws to determine the faith, to regulate the worship, or to administer the discipline of the Church. It can neither appoint nor depose its officers.

2. It denies that any civil officer as such, or in virtue of his office, has any authority in the kingdom of Christ; much less can any such officer be the head of the Church.

3. It denies that Church power vests ultimately in the people, or in the clergy. All their power is purely ministerial. It is derived from Christ, and is exercised by others in his name, and according to the rules laid down in his Word. How far the Church has discretionary power in matters of detail is a disputed point. By some all such discretion is denied. They maintain that everything concerning the organization, officers, and modes of action of the Church is as minutely laid down in the New Testament as the curtains, tassels, and implements of the tabernacle are detailed in the Old Testament. Others hold that while certain principles on this subject are laid down in Scripture, considerable latitude is allowed as to the means and manner in which the Church may carry them out in the exercise of her functions. This latter view has always been practically adopted. Even the Apostolical Churches were not all organized precisely in the same way. The presence of an Apostle, or of a man clothed with apostolical authority, as in the case of James in Jerusalem, necessarily gave to a Church a form which other churches where no Apostle permanently resided could not have. Some had deaconesses, others had not. So all churches in every age and wherever they have existed, have felt at liberty to modify their organization and modes of action so as to suit them to their peculiar circumstances. All such modifications are matters of indifference. They cannot be made to bind the conscience, nor can they be rendered conditions of Christian or ecclesiastical fellowship.

As Christ is the only head of the Church it follows that its allegiance is to Him, and that whenever those out of the Church undertake to regulate its affairs or to curtail its liberties, its members are bound to obey Him rather than men. They are bound by all legitimate means to resist such usurpations, and to stand fast in the liberty wherewith Christ has made them free. They are under equal obligation to resist all undue assumption of authority by those within the Church, whether it be by the brotherhood or by individual officers, or by Church councils or courts. The allegiance of the people terminates on Christ. They are bound to obey others only so far as obedience to them is obedience to Him. In the early ages some endeavoured to impose on Christians the yoke of the Jewish law. This of course they were bound to resist. In the following centuries, and by degrees, the intolerable rituals, ceremonies, fasts, festivals, and priestly, prelatical, and papal assumptions, which oppress so large a part of the Christian world, have been imposed upon the people in derogation to the authority of Christ as the sole head of the Church. Councils, provincial and ecumenical, have not only prescribed creeds contrary to the Scriptures, but also have made laws to bind the conscience, and ordained observances which Christ never enjoined.

As Christ is the head of his earthly kingdom, so is He its only lawgiver. He prescribes, --

1. The terms of admission into his kingdom. These cannot be rightfully altered by any human authority. Men can neither add to them, nor detract from them. The rule which He has laid down on this subject is, that what He requires as a condition for admission into his kingdom in heaven, is to be required as a condition of admission to his kingdom on earth. Nothing more and nothing less is to be demanded. We are to receive all those whom Christ receives. No degree of knowledge, no confession, beyond that which is necessary to salvation, can be demanded as a condition of our recognizing any one as a Christian brother

and treating him as such. Philip baptized the Eunuch on the confession "I believe that Jesus Christ is the Son of God." (Acts viii. 37.) "Him that is weak in the faith receive ye, but not to doubtful disputations." (Rom. xiv. 1.) "Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth." (Verse 4.) "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God." (1 John v. 1.) For men to reject from their fellowship those whom God has received into his, is an intolerable assumption. All those terms of Church communion which have been set up beyond the credible profession of faith in Christ are usurpations of an authority which belongs to Him alone.

2. A second law of this visible kingdom of our Lord is that heretics and those guilty of scandalous offences should be excommunicated. "A man that is an heretic, after the first and second admonition reject." (Titus iii. 10.) "I have written unto you not to keep company, if any man that is called a brother be a fornicator, or covetous, or an idolater, or a railer, or a drunkard, or an extortioner; with such an one no not to eat." (1 Cor. v. 11.) Our Lord teaches that such an offender when he refuses to hear "the Church" is to be regarded as a "heathen man and a publican." (Matt. xviii. 17.)

3. Christ has ordained that the power of exercising discipline and the other prerogatives of the Church should be in the hands of officers, having certain gifts and qualifications and duly appointed.

4. That the right to judge of the qualifications of such officers is vested in, or rather belongs to those who by the Holy Ghost have themselves been called to be office bearers.

5. That such officers are not lords over God's heritage, but servants. Their authority is restricted to prescribed limits, and the people have a right to a substantive part in the government of the Church through their representatives.

6. Every member of Christ's kingdom is bound to obey his brethren in the Lord. This obligation does not rest on consent or mutual covenant, but on the fact that they are brethren, the temples and organs of the Holy Spirit. It is, therefore, not limited to those brethren with whom the individual chooses to associate himself. It hence follows that in the normal condition of Christ's kingdom, each part would be subject to the whole, and the whole would be one body in the Lord.

The development of these several points belongs to the department of Ecclesiology.

§4. The Kingdom of Glory.

The Scriptures teach that when Christ shall come again, He will gather his people into the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world. Concerning that kingdom it is taught, --

1. That it shall consist only of the redeemed. None but the regenerate or converted can enter that kingdom. The tares are to be separated from the wheat. The evil, we are told (Gal. v. 21), "shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Nothing that defiles or is untrue can enter there.

2. Those counted worthy of that kingdom shall not only be elevated to the perfection of their nature, but shall also be exalted to great dignity, power, and glory. They shall be kings and priests unto God. They are to sit on thrones. They are to judge angels. They are to reign with Christ, sharing his dominion and glory.

3. This kingdom is to be everlasting.

4. The bodies of the saints, now natural, must be rendered spiritual. This mortal must put on immortality, and this corruptible must put on incorruption; for "flesh and blood (the body as now organized) cannot inherit the kingdom of God." (1 Cor. xv. 50.)

5. The seat of this kingdom is not clearly revealed. Some suppose that it is to be on this earth regenerated and fitted for this new order of things. Others understand the Scriptures to teach that heaven as indicating an entirely different locality, is to be the final home of the redeemed.

6. Diversity of opinion exists as to the time when this kingdom shall be inaugurated. Chiliasts have commonly held that Christ is to come a thousand years (or a protracted period) before the general resurrection and final judgment, and reign visibly on earth, and that this is the kingdom to which the prophecies and promises of Scripture especially refer. This doctrine of necessity greatly modifies the view taken of the nature of this kingdom. It must be an earthly kingdom, as distinguished from that which is spiritual and heavenly. It must be a kingdom which flesh and blood can inherit. The common doctrine of the Church on the subject is that the general resurrection, the final judgment, the end of the world, and the inauguration of Christ's kingdom of glory are synchronous events.

These are topics which belong to the head of Eschatology.

CHAPTER XII: HUMILIATION OF CHRIST.

§1. Includes his Incarnation.

The Apostle tells us that Christ humbled Himself. In answer to the question, Wherein his humiliation consisted? our standards wisely content themselves with the simple statements of the Scriptures: "Christ's humiliation consisted in his being born and that in a low condition, made under the law, undergoing the miseries of this life, the wrath of God, and the cursed death of the cross; in being buried, and continuing under the power of death for a time."

On all these points the schoolmen and modern philosophical theologians have indulged in unprofitable speculations. All that is known, or can be known respecting them is the facts themselves.

The person of whom all the particulars above enumerated are predicated, is the Eternal Son of God. It was He who was born, who suffered, and who died. It was a person equal with God, who, the Apostle says, in Philippians ii. 7, 8, was made in the likeness of men, and found in fashion as a man. It was the Son of God who was born of a woman, and made under the law. (Gal. iv. 4.) In the Old Testament it was predicted that a virgin should conceive, and bring forth a son, who should be called Immanuel, the mighty God. In revealing these facts the Scriptures reveal all we can know concerning the birth of Christ. He was born of a woman. In the birth of an ordinary human being there are mysteries which neither speculation nor science can solve. All we know is that in conception an immaterial principle, a human soul, is joined in unity of life with the germ of a human body, and, after a given process of development, is born a perfect child. In the case of our Lord, by the immediate or supernatural power of the Holy Ghost, these elements of humanity, material and immaterial (body and soul), from the beginning of their existence were n personal union with the Logos, so that the child born of the Virgin was in a true and exclusive sense the Son of God.

In opposition to the early heretics, some of whom said that Christ had no real human body, and others, that his body was not fashioned out of matter, but formed of a celestial substance, the fathers inserted in their creeds, that he was "born of the substance of the Virgin Mary." This is involved in the Scriptural statement that He was born of a woman, which can only mean that He was born in the sense in which other children of men are born of women. This is essential to his true humanity, and to that likeness to men which makes them his brethren, and which was se cured by his taking part in flesh and blood. (Heb. ii. 14.)

The incarnation of the Son of God, his stooping to take into personal and perpetual

union with Himself a nature infinitely lower than his own, was an act of unspeakable condescension, and therefore is properly included in the particulars in which He humbled Himself. It is so represented in the Scriptures, and that it is such is involved in the very nature of the act, on any other hypothesis than that which assumes the equality of God and man; or that man is a modus existendi of the Deity, and that the highest.

The Lutheran theologians exclude the incarnation as an element of Christ's humiliation, on the ground that his humiliation was confined to his earthly existence, whereas his union with our nature continues in heaven. This, however, is contrary to Scripture, because the Apostle says that He made himself of no reputation in becoming man. (Phil. ii. 7.) It is constantly represented as a wonderful exhibition of his love for his people. It was for their sake that He stooped to become a partaker of flesh and blood. The objection that his humiliation can include only what is limited to the earthly stage of his existence, is purely verbal or technical. That He bears his glorified humanity in heaven, having transmuted that humble mantle into a robe of glory, does not detract from the condescension involved in its assumption, and in his bearing it with all its imperfections during his earthly pilgrimage.

There are some forms of the modern speculations on this subject which effectually preclude our regarding the incarnation as an act of humiliation. It is assumed, as stated on a previous page, that this union of the divine and human is the culminating point in the regular development of humanity. Its relation to the sinfulness of man and the redemption of the race is merely incidental. It would have been reached had sin never entered into the world. It is obvious that this is a mere philosophical theory, entirely outside of the Scriptures, and can legitimately have no influence on Christian doctrine. The Bible everywhere teaches that God sent his Son into the world to save sinners; that He was born of a woman and made under the law for our redemption; that He became man in order that He might die, and by death destroy the power of Satan. No speculation inconsistent with these prevailing representations of the Word of God can be admitted as true by those to whom that word is the rule of faith.

Christ was born in a Low Condition.

Not only the assumption of human nature, out also all the circumstances by which it was attended enter into the Scriptural view of the humiliation of our Lord. Had He when He came into the world so manifested his glory, and so exercised his power, as to have coerced all nations to acknowledge Him as their Lord and God, and all kings to bow at his feet and bring Him their tributes, enthroning Him as the rightful and absolute sovereign of the whole earth, it had still been an act of unspeakable condescension for God to become man. But to be a servant; to be born in a stable and cradled in a manger; to be so poor as not to have a place where to lay his head; to appear without form or comeliness, so as to be despised and rejected of men, makes the condescension of our Lord to pass all comprehension. There is, indeed, a wonderful sublimity in this. It shows the utter worthlessness of earthly pomp and splendour in the sight of God. The manifestation of God in the form of a servant, has far more power not only over the imagination but also over the heart, than his appearing in the form of an earthly king clothed in purple and crowned with gold. We bow at the feet of the poor despised Galilean with profounder reverence and love than we could experience had He appeared as Solomon in all his glory.

§2. He was made under the Law.

The humiliation of Christ included also his being made under the law. The law to which Christ subjected Himself was, (1.) The law given to Adam as a covenant of works; that is, as prescribing perfect obedience as the condition of life. (2.) The Mosaic law which bound the chosen people. (3.) The moral law as a rule of duty. Christ was subject to the law in all these aspects, in that He assumed the obligation to fulfil all righteousness, i.e., to do everything which the law in all its forms demanded. This subjection to the law was voluntary and vicarious. It was voluntary, not only as his incarnation was a voluntary act, and therefore all its consequences were assumed of his own free will; but also because even after He assumed our nature He was free from obligation to the law in every sense of the word, until He voluntarily subjected Himself to its demands. The law is made for men, i.e., for human persons. But Christ was not a human person. He remained after the incarnation, as He had been from eternity, a divine person. All his relations to the law, therefore, except as voluntarily assumed, were those which God himself sustains to it. God being the source of all law cannot be subject to it, except by an act of humiliation. Even in human governments an autocrat is above the laws. They derive their authority from him. He can abrogate or change them at pleasure. He is subject so far as men are concerned to nothing but his own will. And so God, as the source of all law to his creatures, is Himself subject to none. He acts in consistency with his own nature, and it is inconceivable that He should act otherwise. He cannot be subject to any imposed rule of action, or to anything out of Himself. Whatever is true of God, is true of God manifested in the flesh. That Christ, therefore, should assume the obligation to fulfil the conditions of the covenant made with Adam, to observe all the injunctions of the Mosaic law, and submit to the moral law with its promises and penalty was an act of voluntary humiliation. This subjection to the law was not only voluntary, but vicarious. He was in our stead, as our representative, and for our benefit. He was made under the law that He might redeem those who were under the law. (Gal. iv. 4, 5.) It was in his character of Redeemer that He submitted to this subjection. There was no necessity for it on his part. As He was Lord of the Sabbath, so He was Lord of the law in all its extent and in all its forms. Obedience to it was not imposed ab extra as a condition of his personal happiness and enjoyment of the divine favour. These were secured by his Godhead. It was therefore solely for us that He was made under the saw. As by Adam's disobedience we were constituted sinners, He obeyed that we might be constituted righteous. (Rom. v. 19.) The whole course of Christ on earth was one of voluntary obedience. He came to do the will of his Father. In the Old Testament his common prophetic designation was servant. He was called the servant of the Lord, "my servant." He says of Himself, "I came down from heaven, not to do mine own will, but the will of him that sent me." (John vi. 38.) "Though he were a Son, yet learned he obedience." (Heb. v. 8.) "Being found in fashion as a man, he humbled himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross." (Phil. ii. 8.) All this was for us. His subjection to the law and to the will of the Father was voluntary arid vicarious for us men and for our salvation.

§3. His Sufferings and Death.

The sufferings of Christ, and especially his ignominious death on the cross, are an important element in his humiliation. These sufferings continued from the beginning to the

end of his earthly life. They arose partly from the natural infirmities and sensibilities of the nature which He assumed, partly from the condition of poverty in which He lived, partly from constant contact with sinners, which was a continued grief to his holy soul and caused Him to exclaim, "How long shall I be with you? how long shall I suffer you;" partly from the insults, neglects, and opposition to which He was subjected; partly from the cruel buffetings and scorning to which He submitted, and especially from the agonies of the crucifixion, the most painful as well as the most ignominious mode of inflicting the penalty of death; partly from the anguish caused by the foresight of the dreadful doom that awaited the whole Jewish nation; and especially no doubt from the mysterious sorrow arising from the load of his people's sins and the hiding of his Father's face, which forced from his brow the sweat of blood in the garden, and from his lips the cry of anguish which He uttered on the cross. These are wonders not only of love, but of self-abnegation and of humiliation, which angels endeavour to comprehend, but which no human mind can understand or estimate. There was never sorrow like unto his sorrow.

§4. He endured the Wrath of God.

Our standards specify "the wrath of God," as a distinct particular of the burden of sorrow which Christ, for our sakes, humbled Himself to bear. The word wrath is the familiar Scriptural term to express any manifestation of the displeasure of God against sin. Christ, although in Himself perfectly holy, bore our sins. He was "made sin" (2 Cor. v. 21); or, treated as a sinner. He was "numbered with the transgressors" (Is. liii. 12), not only in the judgment of men, but in the dealing of God with his soul when He stood in the place of sinners. Such Psalms as the sixteenth, fortieth, and especially the twenty-second, which treat of the sufferings of the Messiah, represent Him as passing through all the experiences consequent on the punishment of sin, save those which have their source in the sinfulness of the sufferer. We therefore find that even such language as that in Psalm xl. 12, "Innumerable evils have compassed me about: mine iniquities have taken hold upon me, so that I am not able to look up: they are more than the hairs of mine head; therefore my heart faileth me," may not inappropriately be taken as the language of his holy soul. In that case "mine iniquities" (vnty), as parallel with "evils" (rvt), must mean "my sufferings for sin," i.e., the punishment I am called to bear. The words uttered by our Lord upon the cross, "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" show that He was suffering under the hiding of his Father's face. What that experience was it is impossible for us to understand. Yet as in other cases He suffered anxiety, fear, a sinking of the heart, and other natural states of mind incident to the circumstances in which He was placed; so also He suffered all that a holy being could suffer that was enduring the divinely appointed penalty for sin, which penalty He sustained for his people. Into the relation between his divine and human nature as revealed in these experiences, it is in vain for us to inquire. As that relation was consistent with his human nature's being ignorant, with its progressive development, with all its natural affections, with its feeling apprehension in the presence of danger, and dread in the prospect of death, so it was consistent with the feeling of depression and anguish under the obscuration of the favour of God. As the sufferings of Christ were not merely the pains of martyrdom, but were judicially inflicted in satisfaction of justice, they produced the effect due to their specific character. This of course does not imply that our Lord suffered as the

finally impenitent suffer. Their sufferings are determined by their subjective state. The loss of the divine favour produces in them hatred, venting itself in blasphemies (Rev. xvi. 10, 11), but in Christ it produced the most earnest longing after the light of God's countenance, and entire submission, in the midst of the depressing and overwhelming darkness.

§5. His Death and Burial.

Christ humbled Himself even unto death, and continued under the power of death for a time. The reality of Christ's death has never been disputed among Christians. Some modern rationalists, unwilling to admit a miraculous resurrection, endeavoured to show that death was not in his case actually consummated, but that He was deposited in an unconscious state in the tomb. In answer to the arguments of rationalists, certain Christian writers have taken the trouble to demonstrate, from the facts stated in the account of the crucifixion, that it was not a swoon, but actual death which occurred. We are raised above such question by believing the inspiration of the New Testament. In the apostolic writings the death of Christ is so often asserted and assumed that the fact cannot be doubted by any who admit the infallible authority of those writings.

Under the clause, "He continued under the power of death for a time," is intended to be expressed all that is meant by ancient creeds which asserted "He descended into hell." Such at least is the view presented in our standards in accordance with the teachings of the majority of the Reformed theologians.

That the sufferings of Christ ceased the moment He expired on the cross, is plain from John xix. 30, where it is recorded, "When Jesus had received the vinegar, he said, It is finished (Tetelestai): and he bowed his head, and gave up the ghost." This is universally admitted. As, however, such passages as Psalms xviii. 5, and cxvi. 3, "The sorrows of death" (Hebrew Sheol in Psalm xviii. 5), were understood to mean extreme suffering, many of the Reformed understood the descensus ad inferos to refer to the extreme agony of our Lord in the garden and upon the cross, under the hiding of his Father's face. But, in the first place, the literal meaning of those passages is, "The bands (not the sorrows) of Sheol, or (as it is in Psalms cxvi. 3), of death." The allusion in both cases is the familiar one to a net. The idea is that the Psalmist felt himself so entangled that death appeared inevitable. This is something very different from what is meant by "descending into Hell or Sheol." And in the second place, the position which the clause in question holds in the creed forbids this interpretation. It follows the clause referring to the death and burial of Christ. It is the natural exegesis of the words immediately preceding it. "He was crucified, dead, and buried, he descended into Sheol," i.e., he passed into the invisible state. But it would be utterly incongruous to say, "He was dead, buried, and suffered extreme agony," when it is admitted that his sufferings ended upon the cross.

In the larger Westminster Catechism, [467] it is said, "Christ's humiliation after his death consisted in his being buried, and continuing in the state of the dead, and under the power of death till the third day, which hath been otherwise expressed in these words, He descended into hell." That this is the correct view of Christ's descensus ad inferos may be argued, --

1. From the original and proper meaning of the Greek word hades, and the

corresponding English word hell. Both mean the unseen world. The one signifies what is unseen, the other what is covered and thus hidden from view. Both are used as the rendering for the Hebrew word s'vl. (probably from s'l to ask, or demand), the state or place of the dead; the orcus rapax of the Latins. All the dead, the righteous and the wicked, alike go into the invisible world, or, in this sense, "descend into hell." Hence to be buried, to go down to the grave, to descend into hell, are in Scriptural language equivalent forms of expression. In Genesis xxxvii. 35, Jacob says 'rd s'vlh, which the Septuagint renders katabesomai eis hadou; the Vulgate, Descendam in infernum; the English, "I will go down into the grave." Thus also in Psalm xxx. 4, David says, hlyt mvs'vl nphsy, which the Septuagint renders, ex hadou ten psuchen mou; the Vulgate, "Eduxisti ab inferno animam meam;" and so Luther, "Du hast meine Seele aus der H�lle gef�hret;" while the English version is, "Thou hast brought up my soul from the grave," which is explained in the following clause, "Thou hast kept me alive, that I should not go down to the pit." In Scriptural language, therefore, to descend into Hades or Hell, means nothing more than to descend to the grave, to pass from the visible into the invisible world, as happens to all men when they die and are buried.

2. This view is confirmed by the fact that these words were not in the creed originally. They were introduced in the fourth century, and then not as a separate or distinct article, but as merely explanatory. "He was dead and buried," i.e., he descended into hell. That the two clauses were at first considered equivalent is obvious, because some copies of the creed had the one form, some the other, and some both, though all were intended to say the same thing.

3. The passages of Scripture which are adduced to prove that Christ descended into hell in a sense peculiar to Himself, do not teach that doctrine. In Psalm xvi. 10, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thy Holy One to see corruption," merely expresses the confidence of the speaker that God would not leave him under the power of death. Thou wilt not deliver me to the power of Sheol, nor suffer me to see corruption.' This is the precise sense ascribed to the passage by St. Peter in Acts ii. 27-31, and by St. Paul in Acts xiii. 34, 35. In both cases the Psalm is quoted to prove the resurrection of Christ. David was left in the state of the dead; his body did see corruption. Christ was delivered from the grave before corruption had time to affect his sacred person. My soul (nphsy), may be taken here, as so often elsewhere, for the personal pronoun, as in the passage quoted above. Psalm xxx. 4: "Thou hast brought up my soul (me) from the grave." See Psalm iii. 2, "Many there be which say of my soul (me), there is no help for him in God." Psalm vii. 8, "Lest he tear my soul (me) like a lion." Psalm xi. 1, "How say ye to my soul (to me) Flee as a bird to your mountain." Psalm xxxv. 7, "A pit which without cause they have digged for my soul (for me)." But even if the words "my soul" be taken in their strict sense, the meaning is still the same. The souls of men at death pass into the invisible world, they are hidden from the view and companionship of men. This condition was to continue in the case of Christ only for a few days. He was to be recalled to life. His soul was to be reunited to his body, as it was before.

A second passage relied upon in this matter is Ephesians iv. 9, "Now that he ascended, what is it but that he also descended first into the lower parts of the earth?" By "the lower parts of the earth" many understand the parts lower than the earth; the lower, or infernal regions. But in the first place, this is altogether an unnecessary interpretation. The words

may naturally mean here, as elsewhere, the lower parts, namely, the earth; the genitive tes ges being the genitive of apposition. See Isaiah xliv. 23, "Sing, O ye heavens; . . . . shout, ye lower parts the earth." In the second place, the context neither here nor in Psalm lxviii. whence the passage is taken, or on which the Apostle is commenting, suggests any other contrast than that between heaven and earth. He that ascended to heaven, is he who first descended to the earth.' In the third place, the Apostle's object does not render either necessary or probable any reference to what happened after the death of Christ. He simply says that the Psalm (lxviii.) which speaks of the triumph of its subject must be understood of the Messiah because it speaks of an ascension to heaven, which implies a previous descent to the earth.

Much less can 1 Timothy iii. 16, where it said of God as manifest in the flesh that He was "seen of angels," be understood of Christ appearing in the under-world in the presence of Satan and his angels. The word angeloi, angels, without qualification, is never used of fallen angels. The Apostle refers to the evidence afforded of the divinity of Christ; He was justified by the Spirit, seen and recognized by angels, preached among the Gentiles, believed upon in the world, and received up into glory. All classes of beings had been the witnesses of the fact that God was manifested in the flesh.

Much the most difficult and important passage bearing on this question is 1 Peter iii. 18, 19, "Being put to death in the flesh, but quickened by the Spirit: by which also he went and preached to the spirits in prison." The English version is an exposition, as well as a translation of the passage. As the words stand in our Bible they afford no ground for the doctrine that Christ after death went into hell and preached to the spirits there confined. The Greek is, thanatotheis men sarki, zoopoietheis de pneumati, en o kai tois en phulake pneumasi poreutheis ekeruxen. If in this passage sarki, means the body, and pneumati, the soul; if the dative is to have the same force in both clauses; and if zoopoietheis be taken to mean preserved alive; then the natural interpretation undoubtedly is, Being put to death as to the body, but continuing alive as to the soul, in which having gone he preached to the spirits in prison.' However different the views entertained as to what spirits are here meant, whether the spirits of living men in spiritual bondage; or the evil spirits of the dead; or the spirits of the faithful of former generations, still detained in Hades; the passage must, in this view, be understood to teach that Christ preached after his death, and if so, to the spirits of the dead. This is the interpretation which has been extensively adopted in all ages of the Church. The principal argument in its favour is that when sarx and pneuma are placed in antithesis, if the former mean the body the latter must mean the soul. In the present case as Christ's death is spoken of, and as it was only the body that died, it is urged that sarki, must refer to the body. The objections, however, to this interpretation are very serious.

1. When Christ is the subject the antithesis between sarx and pneuma is not necessarily that between the body and soul. It may be between the human and the divine nature. So in Romans i. 3, it is said, He was the son of David kata sarka, as to his human nature; but the Son of God kata pneuma, as to his divine nature.

2 The word zoopoieo never means to continue in life, but always to impart life. Therefore to render zoopoietheis, being preserved alive, is contrary to the proper meaning of the word. It is more over opposed to the antithesis between that word and thanatotheis, as the one expresses the idea of the infliction of death, the other expresses that of vivifying.

He was put to death as to his humanity, or as a man; but was quickened by the Spirit, or divine nature, energy or power that resided in his person.' He had power to lay down his life, and He had power to take it again.

3. The difference between the force of the two datives is justified and determined by the meaning of the participles with which sarki and pneumati are connected. He was put to death as to the flesh; he was made alive by the Spirit.' The one word demands one force of the dative, and the other a different, but equally legitimate sense.

4. Another objection to the interpretation above mentioned is, that it makes the passage teach a doctrine contrary to the analogy of faith. Whenever Christ is spoken of as preaching, in all cases in which the verb kerussein is used, it refers to making proclamation of the gospel. If, therefore, this passage teaches that Christ, after his death and before his resurrection, preached to spirits in prison, it teaches that He preached the gospel to them. But according to the faith of the whole Church, Latin, Lutheran, and Reformed, the offer of salvation through the gospel is confined to the present life. It is certainly a strong objection to an interpretation of any one passage that it makes it teach a doctrine nowhere else taught in the Word of God, and which is contrary to the teachings of that Word, as understood by the universal Church. For such reasons as these the authors of our standards have discarded the doctrine of a descensus ad inferos in any other sense than a departure into the invisible state. The meaning of the whole passage as given by Beza is in accordance with the doctrine of the Reformed Church. "Christus, inquit [apostolus], quem dixi virtute vivificatum, jam olim in diebus Noe, quum appararetur arca, profectus sive adveniens, e coelo videlicet, ne nunc primum putemus illum ecclesi&#xfffd; curam et administrationem suscepisse adveniens, inquam, non corpore (quod nondum assumpserat), sed ea ipsa virtute, per quam postea resurrexit, pr&#xfffd;dicavit spiritibus illis, qui nunc in carcere meritas dant poenas, utpote qui recta monenti Noe . . . . parere olim recusarint." [468]

The majority of modern interpreters adopt the old interpretation. Bretschneider [469] expresses the sense of the passage thus: "As God once through Noah exhorted men to repentance, and threatened to bring upon them the flood, as a punishment, so Jesus preached redemption, or announced the completion of the work of atonement, to the souls of men in Hades." According to others the souls to whom Christ preached were those who in the days of Noah had rejected the offers of mercy. According to the Luther and Christ after his death descended to the abode of evil spirits, not to preach the gospel, but to triumph over Satan and despoil him of his power. The "Form of Concord" [470] says on this subject, "Simpliciter credimus, quod tota persona (Christi), Deus et homo, post sepulturam, ad inferos descendent, Satanam devicerit, potestatem inferorum everterit, et Diabolo omnem vim et potentiam eripuerit. Quomodo vero Christus id effecerit, non est ut argutis et sublimibus imaginationibus scrutemur."

The Romish Doctrine of the "Descensus ad Inferos."

The Romanists teach that the department of Hades to which Christ descended, was not the abode of evil spirits, but that in which dwelt the souls of believers who died before the advent of the Redeemer, and that the object of his descent was neither to preach the gospel, nor to despoil Satan, but to deliver the pious dead from the intermediate state in which they then were (called the Limbus patrum), and to introduce them into heaven. These were the captives which, according to Ephesians iv. 8, He led in triumph when He ascended on high

after his resurrection. This doctrine not only has no Scriptural foundation, but it rests on an unscriptural theory as to the efficacy of the truth and ordinances as revealed and ordained under the old dispensation. Believing, as the Church of Rome does, that saving grace is communicated only through the Christian sacraments, Romanists are constrained to believe that there was no real remission of sin, or sanctification, before the institution of the Christian Church. The sacraments of the Old Testament, they say simply signified grace, while these of the New actually convey it. This being the case, believers lying before the coming of Christ were not really saved, but passed into a state of negative existence, neither of suffering nor of happiness, from which it was the object of Christ's descent into Hades to deliver them. The above are only a few of the speculations in which theologians in all ages of the Church have indulged as to the nature and design of the descensus ad inferos in which all profess to believe. Whole volumes have been devoted to this subject. [471]

The Views of Lutherans and of Modern Theologians on the Humiliation of Christ.

As the Lutherans at the time of the Reformation departed from the faith of the Church on the person of Christ, they were led into certain peculiarities of doctrine on other related subjects. Insisting, as Luther did, on the local presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, he was constrained to believe that Christ as to his human nature was everywhere present. This involved the assumption that, in virtue of the hypostatical union, the attributes of the divine, were communicated to his human nature, so that Christ's human soul was omniscient, almighty, and omnipresent. And as this communication of attributes took place from the very beginning, the human nature of Christ from the commencement of its existence, was endowed with all divine perfections. Yet not only in infancy, but throughout the whole of his earthly pilgrimage, He appeared, except on rare occasions, as an ordinary man, possessed as a man of no attributes which did not belong to other men. His miracles of knowledge and power were occasional manifestations of what as a man He really was, as those miracles were effects produced, not by his divine nature or Logos, nor by the Holy Spirit with which his humanity was endowed without measure, but by his human nature itself. His humiliation, therefore, consisted mainly and essentially in his voluntarily abstaining from the exercise and manifestation of the divine attributes with which his humanity was endowed and imbued. In the "Form of Concord" [472] it is said, "Credimus . . . . filium hominis ad dexteram omnipotentis majestatis et virtutis Dei realiter, hoc est, vere et reipsa secundum humanam suam naturam esse exaltatum, cum homo ille in Deum assumptus fuerit, quamprimum in utero matris a Spiritu Sancto est conceptus. . . . . Eamque majestatem, ratione unionis personalis semper Christus habuit: sed in statu su humilitationis sese exinanivit . . . . Quare majestatem illam non semper, sed quoties ipsi visum fuit, exseruit, donec formam servi, non autem naturam humanam post resurrectionem plene et prorsus deponeret, et in plenariam usurpationem manifestationem et declarationem divin majestatis collocaretur. . . . . Hanc suam potestatem ubique pr sens exercere potest, neque quidquam illi aut impossibile est aut ignotum. Inde adeo, et quidem facillime, corpus suum verum et sanguinem suum in sacra coena pr sens distribuere potest." "Humana natura . . . . inde . . . . quod cum divina natura personaliter unita est . . . . pr ter et supra naturales atque in ipsa permanentes humanas proprietates, etiam singulares . . . . supernaturales . . . . pr rogativas majestatis, glori, virtutis ac potenti super omne, quod nominatur, non solum in hoc seculo sed etiam in futuro, accepit." [473] "[Christus,]

postquam . . . . super omnes coelos ascendit, et revera omnia implet, et ubique non tantum ut Deus, verum etiam ut homo, pr&#65533;sens dominatur et regnat, a mari ad mare." [474] "Christus . . . . etiam secundum assumptam humanam naturam omnia novit et potest." [475] "Eam majestatem statim in sua conceptione, etiam in utero matris habuit: sed ut Apostolus loquitur se ipsum exinanivit, eamque, ut D. Lutherus docet, in statu su&#65533; humiliationis secreto habuit, neque eam semper, sed quoties ipsi visum fuit, usurpavit." [476]

In the seventeenth century there was an earnest and protracted dispute among the Lutherans as to the question, whether the humiliation of Christ was a mere krupsis (or concealing) of the divine majesty of his human nature; or whether it was an actual kenosis, an emptying himself for the time being of the divine attributes which belonged to his humanity in virtue of the hypostatical union. According to the former view, Christ, as man, was from the moment of his conception, everywhere present, omnipotent, and omniscient, and actually in his human nature governed the universe. The only difference, therefore, between the state of humiliation and that of exaltation, concerns the mode in which this universal dominion was exercised. While on earth it was in a way not to be apparent and recognized; whereas after his ascension, it was open and avowed. According to the opposite view both these points were denied. That is, while it was admitted that the human nature was entitled to these divine attributes and prerogatives, from the moment of its conception, nevertheless it is said that they were not claimed or exercised while He was on earth; and therefore during his humiliation although there was a ktesis or possession of the attributes, yet there was not the chresis of them, and consequently during that period He was not as man omnipresent, omniscient, and everywhere dominant. The exaltation, therefore, was not a mere change in the mode of exercising his divine prerogatives, but an entering on their use as well as on their manifestation. The theologians of Tubingen maintained the former view, those of Giessen the latter. The question having been referred to the Saxon theologians they decided substantially in favour of the latter doctrine, and this was the view generally adopted by the Lutheran divines. The precise point of dispute between the parties was "An homo Christus in Deum assumtus in statu exinanitionis tanquam rex pr&#65533;sens cuncta licet latenter gubernarit?" This the one party affirmed and the other denied. The one made omnipresence and dominion the necessary consequence of the hypostatical union, the other, while admitting the actual potential possession of the divine attributes by the human nature as a consequence of its union with the divine, regarded their use as dependent on the divine will. It is conceivable that power should be dependent on the will, and therefore in relation to that attribute the distinction between the possession and use might be admitted; but no such distinction is possible in reference to the attribute of omnipresence. If that perfection belonged to the human nature of Christ (to his body and soul), in virtue of the hypostatical union, it must have been omnipresent from the moment that this union was consummated. This is involved in the very statement of the doctrine of the hypostatical union as given by the Lutheran divines. Thus Gerhard [477] says, "Neque enim pars parti, sed totus logos toti carni et tota caro toti logo est unita; ideo propter hupostaseos tautoteta kai ton phuseon perichoresin, logos ita pr&#65533;sens est carni et caro ita pr&#65533;sens est to logo, ut nec logos sit extra carnem nec caro extra logon, sed ubicunque est logos , ibi etiam pr&#65533;sentissimam sibi habet carnem, quippe quam in person&#65533; unitatem assumsit: et ubicunque est caro, ibi pr&#65533;sentissimum sibi habet ton logon, quippe in cujus hypostasin est assumta. Quemadmodum logos non est extra suam deitatem, cujus est hypostasis: sic etiam

non est extra suam carnem, essentia quidem finitam, in logo tamen personaliter subsistentem. Ut enim to logo propria est sua deitas per ternam a Patre generationem: sic eidem to logo propria facta est caro per unionem personalem."

According to the Lutheran system, therefore, the subject of the humiliation was the human nature of Christ, and consisted essentially in the voluntary abstaining from the exercise and manifestation of the divine attributes with which it was imbued and interpenetrated. According to the Reformed doctrine it was He who was equal with God who emptied Himself in assuming the fashion of a man, and this divine person thus clothed in our nature humbled Himself to be obedient even unto death. It is therefore of the eternal Son of whom all that is taught of the humiliation of Christ is to be predicated. This is clearly the doctrine of the Apostle in Philippians ii. 6-8. It is the person who thought it no robbery to be equal with God, of whom it is said, (1.) That He made Himself of no reputation (heauton ekenose). (2.) That this was done by his taking upon Himself the form of a servant, being made in the likeness of men. (3.) That being thus incarnate, or found in fashion as a man, He humbled Himself by being obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. In this matter, as characteristically on all other points of doctrine, the Reformed Church adheres to the simple statements of the Scriptures, and abstains from the attempt to bring those doctrines within the grasp of the understanding.

The modern theologians, of whom Ebrard is a representative, in discarding the Church doctrine of two natures (in the sense of substances) in Christ, and in making the incarnation consist in a voluntary self-limitation, are necessarily led into a theory as to the humiliation of Christ at variance with both the Lutheran and Reformed views on that subject. According to this modern doctrine the Eternal Son of God did not assume a human nature, in the Church sense of those words, but He became a man. His infinite intellect was reduced to the limits of the intellect of human intelligence, to be gradually developed as in the case of other men. His omnipotence was reduced to the limits of human power. His omnipresence was exchanged for limitation to a definite portion of space. He did not, however, as stated above, when treating of the doctrine of Christ's person, cease to be God. According to this theory the incarnation resulted, as Ebrard says, [478] "In Christ's being a man. (1.) So far as his will is concerned, in statu integritatis, i.e., as Adam was before the fall, in a state to choose between good and evil. (2.) So far as natural endowments are concerned, with all the powers pertaining to humanity, which lay undeveloped in the first Adam. . . . . (3.) And as concerns his ability dominant over the laws of nature in the present disordered state of nature. Thus the eternal Son of God," he says, "had reduced himself, so that as God he willed, having assumed the form of man, to exert his activity only as man. . . . . The exercise of omnipotence, omniscience, omnipresence had been to renounce his humanity. . . . . His act of self-limitation in thus reducing himself to the limitations of humanity, is the kenosis; his voluntary submission to pain, shame, and death, is the tapeinosis spoken of by the Apostle in Philippians ii. 6-8: but both included in the wider sense of his humiliation."

[467] Answer to Question 50.

[468] Beza, Novum Testamentum, 1 Pet. iii. 19, edit. (Geneva?) 1565, p. 570.

[469] Bretschneider, Dogmatik, 3d edit., Leipzig, 1828, vol. ii. p. 219.

[470] Art. IX. 2; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 788.

[471] J. S. Semler, De Vario et Impari Veterum Studio in recolenda Historia

Descensus Christi ad Inferos. A. Dietelmaier, Hist. Dogma de Descensu Christi ad Inferos. J. Clausen, Dogmatis de Descensu J. C. ad Inf. Historia Biblica et Ecclesiastica. Harker, Diss. de Descensu Jesu ad Inferos. Bishop Pearson, On the Creed.

[472] Art. VIII. 16, 17; Hase, Libri Symbolici, pp. 608, 609.

[473] Art VIII. 51; Ibid. p. 716.

[474] Formula Concordi, Art. VIII. 27; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 768.

[475] Art. VIII. 74; Ibid. p. 782.

[476] Art. VIII. 26; Ibid. p. 767.

[477] Loci Theologici, IV. vli. 121; edit. Tubingen, 1764, vol. iii. p. 428.

[478] Dogmatik, II. ii. 359; edit. Knigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 32.

CHAPTER XIII: THE EXALTATION OF CHRIST.

According to our standards the exaltation of Christ includes, (1.) His resurrection. (2.) His ascension. (3.) His sitting at the right hand of God. (4.) His coming to judge the world at the last day.

§1. Resurrection of Christ.

The resurrection of Christ is not only asserted in the Scriptures, but it is also declared to be the fundamental truth of the gospel. "If Christ be not risen," says the Apostle, "then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain" (1 Cor. xv. 14). "If Christ be not raised, your faith is vain; ye are yet in your sins" (verse 17). It may be safely asserted that the resurrection of Christ is at once the most important, and the best authenticated fact in the history of the world.

(1.) It was predicted in the Old Testament. (2.) It was foretold by Christ Himself. (3.) It was a fact admitting of easy verification. (4.) Abundant, suitable, and frequently repeated evidence was afforded of its actual occurrence. (5.) The witnesses to the fact that Christ was seen alive after his death upon the cross, were numerous, competent, and on every account worthy of confidence. (6.) Their sincerity of conviction was proved by the sacrifices, even that of life, which their testimony entailed upon hem. (7.) Their testimony was confirmed by God bearing witness together with them (sunepimartorountos tou theou, Heb. ii. 4), in signs and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost. (8.) That testimony of the Spirit is continued to the present time and granted to all the true children of God, for the Spirit bears witness to the truth in the heart and conscience. (9.) The fact of Christ's resurrection has been commemorated by a religious observance of the first day of the week from its occurrence to the present time. (10.) The effects produced by his gospel, and the change which it has effected in the state of the world, admit of no other rational solution than the truth of his death and subsequent resurrection. The Christian Church is his monument. All believers are his witnesses.

The importance of Christ's resurrection arises, --

1. From the circumstance that all his claims, and the success of his work, rest on the fact that He rose again from the dead. If He rose, the gospel is true. If He did not rise, it is false. If He rose, He is the Son of God, equal with the Father, God manifest in the flesh; the Salvator Hominum; the Messiah predicted by the prophets; the prophet, priest, and king of his people; his sacrifice has been accepted as a satisfaction to divine justice, and his blood as a ransom for many.

2. On his resurrection depended the mission of the Spirit, without which Christ's work had been in vain.

3. As Christ died as the head and representative of his people, his resurrection secures and illustrates theirs. As He lives, they shall live also. If He remained under the power of death, there is no source of spiritual life to men; for He is the vine, we are the branches; if the vine be dead the branches must be dead also.

4. If Christ did not rise, the whole scheme of redemption is a failure, and all the predictions and anticipations of its glorious results for time and for eternity, for men and for angels of every rank and order, are proved to be chimeras. "But now is Christ risen from the dead and become the first-fruits of them that slept." Therefore the Bible is true from Genesis to Revelation. The kingdom of darkness has been overthrown. Satan has fallen like lightning from heaven; and the triumph of truth over error, of good over evil, of happiness over misery, is forever secured.

Nature of Christ's Resurrection Body.

1. The identity of the body in which Christ rose with that which expired upon the cross, was proved by indubitable evidence. It retained even the print of the nails which had pierced his hands and his feet. Nevertheless it was changed. To what extent, however, is not clearly made known. The facts recorded in the sacred history bearing on the nature of the Lord's body during the period between his resurrection and ascension are, (a.) That it was not at first clearly recognized as the same. Mary Magdalene mistook Him for the gardener. (John xx. 15.) The two disciples whom He joined on their way to Emmaus, did not recognize Hun until He was made known to them in the breaking of bread. (Luke xxiv. 31.) When He appeared to the disciples on the shore of the Sea of Tiberias they did not know who He was, until the miraculous draft of fishes taken at his command revealed Him. (John xxi. 7.) (b.) It appeared suddenly in the midst of his disciples in a room of which the doors were shut. (John xx. 19, and Luke xxiv. 36.) (c.) Nevertheless it was the same material body having "flesh and bones." That the appearance recorded in Luke xxiv. 36 was preternatural may be inferred from the effect which it produced upon the disciples: "They were terrified and affrighted, and supposed that they had seen a spirit." Our Lord reassured them saying, "Behold my hands and my feet, that it is I myself: handle me, and see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones as ye see me have." It appears from the transfiguration of Christ that his body while here on earth, was capable of passing from one state to another without losing its identity.

2. Such was the state of our Lord's body during the forty days subsequent to his resurrection. It then passed into its glorified state. What that state is we know only so far as may be learned from what the Apostle teaches from the nature of the bodies with which believers are to be invested after the resurrection. Those bodies, we are told, are to be like Christ's "glorious body." (Phil. iii. 21.) A description of the one is therefore a description of the other. That description is found in the contrast between the present body and that which the believer is to inhabit after the resurrection. The one is a soma psuchikon, and the other a soma pneumatikon. The one is adapted to the psuche, (principle of animal life) and to the present state of existence; the other to the pneuma (the rational and immortal principle) and to the future state of existence. The change which the "natural body" is to undergo in becoming a "spiritual body" is thus described. "It is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour; it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness; it is raised in power:" in one word, "It is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body."

(1 Cor. xv. 42-44.) It is still a body and therefore material, retaining all the essential properties of matter. It is extended. It occupies space. It has a definite form, and that a human form. It was seen by Paul on his way to Damascus and upon other occasions, and by John as recorded in the Apocalypse, as well as by the dying martyr Stephen. Nevertheless it is no longer "flesh and blood," for "flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." Flesh and blood are from their nature corruptible; and so the apostle adds, "neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." Hence "this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality." (1 Cor. xv. 50-53.) The future body will not be subject to the wants, the infirmities, or the passions which belong to the present state of existence. "In the resurrection they neither marry, nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven." (Matt. xxii. 30.) The saints are to he like angels, not in being incorporeal, but as being immortal, and not needing reproduction for the continuance of their race.

The risen body of Christ, therefore, as it now exists in heaven, although retaining its identity with his body while here on earth, is glorious, incorruptible, immortal, and spiritual. It still occupies a definite portion of space, and retains all the essential properties of a body.

The efficient Agent in the Resurrection of Christ.

In numerous passages of Scripture the resurrection of our Lord is referred to God as God or to the Father. The same person who in the second Psalm says, "Thou art my Son," is addressed in the sixteenth Psalm by that Son, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell; neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." In Romans vi. 4, it is said, that Christ "was raised up from the dead by the glory of the Father;" so also in Acts ii. 24, "Whom God hath raised up." In Acts xiii. 30, it is said, "God raised him from the dead." So in Ephesians i. 19, 20, we are told that sinners are converted by the same mighty power "which wrought in Christ, when he raised him from the dead." In other passages, however, it is said to be the work of Christ himself. Our Lord speaking of his body said, "Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up." (John ii. 19.) And again, John x. 17. 18, "I lay down my life, that I might take it again. No man taketh it from me, but I lay it down of myself; I have power to lay it down, and I have power to take it again." In Romans viii. 11, according to the reading adopted by Tischendorf, the resurrection of Christ is, constructively at least, referred to the Holy Spirit. This diverse reference of the same act to the several persons of the Trinity is in accordance with the common usage of the Scriptures. The three persons of the Godhead being the same in substance, the act of the one ad extra, is the act of the others. Any external divine act, i.e. any act terminating externally, is an act of the Godhead; and therefore may, with equal propriety, be referred to either of the divine persons. "What things soever he [the Father] doeth, these also doeth the Son likewise." (John v. 19.) All, therefore, that the Scriptures teach on this subject is that Christ was raised by the divine power. The Lutherans hold that Christ rose by the power of his human nature, to which divine attributes had, in the act of incarnation, been communicated. All the miracles of Christ, as before stated, according to their view of his person, were the works of his human nature distinctively, and so of course the crowning miracle of his resurrection.

§2. Ascension of Christ.

The next step in the exaltation of Christ was his ascension to heaven. In Mark xvi. 19, it is recorded that after Jesus had spoken unto his disciples, "He was received up into heaven." In Luke xxiv. 50, 51, "He led them out as far as to Bethany, and he lifted up his hands, and blessed them. And it came to pass, while he blessed them, he was parted from them, and carried up into heaven." The most detailed account of our Lord's ascension is found in the first chapter of the Acts. There the last words of Christ to the Apostles are recorded, and it is added, "When he had spoken these things, while they beheld, he was taken up; and a cloud received him out of their sight. And while they looked steadfastly toward heaven, as he went up, behold two men stood by them in white apparel; which also said, Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven? This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye nave seen him go into heaven." (Acts i. 9-11.) From these accounts it appears, (1.) That the ascension of Christ was of his whole person. It was the Theanthropos, the Son of God clothed in our nature, having a true body and a reasonable soul, who ascended. (2.) That the ascension was visible. The disciples witnessed the whole transaction. They saw the person of Christ gradually rise from the earth, and "go up" until a cloud hid Him from their view. (3.) It was a local transfer of his person from one place to another; from earth to heaven. Heaven is therefore a place. In what part of the universe it is located is not revealed. But according to the doctrine of Scripture it is a definite portion of space where God specially manifests his presence, and where He is surrounded by his angels (who not being infinite, cannot be ubiquitous), and by the spirits of the just made perfect. It is true that the word "heaven," both in the Old and New Testaments, is used in various senses, (1) Sometimes for the region of the atmosphere; as when the Bible speaks of the clouds, or birds of heaven, or of the rain as descending from heaven. (2.) Sometimes for the region of the stars, which are called the hosts of heaven. (3.) Sometimes it means a state, and answers to some of the senses of the phrase, "kingdom of heaven." The believer is said to be delivered from the power of darkness, and translated into the kingdom of God's dear Son. We are therefore said even in this world to be "in heaven," as in Ephesians ii. 6, where it is said, God "hath raised us up together (with Christ), and made us sit together (en tois epouraniois = en to ourano, agreeably to the constant usage of that Epistle) in heavenly places," i.e., in heaven. In the same sense we are said to be, "the citizens of heaven;" that is, the polis in which we dwell, and to the rights and privileges of which we are entitled. (Phil. iii. 20.) [479] The Apostle's words are, hemon to politeuma en ouranois huparchei, "Heaven is the city of which we are the citizens, or, in which is our citizenship." (4.) But, fourthly, it means the place where God dwells, where the angels and the spirits of the just are congregated; whence Christ came, and to which He has returned. He told his disciples that He went to prepare a place for them. (John xiv. 2.) In this sense the word is used when the Bible speaks of God as our Father "in Heaven;" or of heaven as his throne, his temple, his dwelling place. If Christ has a true body, it must occupy a definite portion of space. And where Christ is, there is the Christian's heaven.

In opposition to this Scriptural and generally accepted view of the ascension of Christ, as a transfer from one place to another, from the earth, as one sphere of the universe, to heaven, another, and equally definite locality, the Lutherans made it a mere change of state, of which change the human nature of Christ was the subject. Prior to his resurrection, the human nature of our Lord, although really possessed of the attributes of omnipresence,

omniscience, and omnipotence, voluntarily forbore the exercise and manifestation of these divine perfections. His ascension was his entering on their full enjoyment and exercise. He passed from the condition of an ordinary man to being as a man (as to his soul and body) everywhere present, and everywhere the supreme ruler. The heaven He entered is immensity. Thus the "Form of Concord" [480] says, "Ex hac unione et naturarum communione humana natura habet illam exaltationem, post resurrectionem a mortuis, super omnes creaturas in coelo et in terra, qu&#65533; revera nihil aliud est, quam quod Christus formam servi prorsus deposuit; humanam vero naturam non deposuit, sed in omnem &#65533;ternitatem retinet, et ad plenam possessionem et divin&#65533; majestatis usurpationem secundam assumptam humanam naturam evectus est. Eam vero majestatem statim in sua conceptione, etiam in utero matris habuit: sed ut Apostolus Phil. ii. 8 [7], loquitur, seipsum exinanivit, eamque, ut D. Lutherus docet, in statu su&#65533; humiliationis secreto habuit, neque eam semper, sed quoties ipsi visum fuit, usurpavit. Jam vero, postquam non communi ratione, ut alius quispiam sanctus in coelos ascendit, sed ut Apostolus, Eph. iv. 10, testatur, super omnes coelos ascendit, et revera omnia implet, et ubique non tantum ut Deus, verum etiam ut homo, pr&#65533;sens dominatur et regnat a mari ad mare et usque ad terminos terr&#65533;." Luther argued that as God's right hand at which Christ in his glorified body sits, is everywhere, so that body must be everywhere. In the "Form of Concord" [481] it is said, Dextera Dei "non est certus aliquis . . . . locus, sed nihil aliud est, nisi omnipotens Dei virtus, qu&#65533; coelum et terram implet." Gerhard [482] presents the same view, "Qualis est Dei dextra, taliter quoque sessio ad dextram Dei intelligenda. Jam vero dextra Dei non est locus aliquis corporeus, circumscriptus, limitatus, definitus, sed est infinita Dei potestas ac pr&#65533;sentissima ejus majestas in coelo et terra, est pr&#65533;sentissiinum illud dominium, quo Deus omnia conservat et gubernat." Whence it is inferred that the soul and body of Christ must have a like ubiquity. The omnipresence of God, however, is not to he conceived of as infinite extension, for extension is a property of matter; so the Lutheran theologians do not hold the infinite extension of the body of Christ. They merely say that He is present as God is present everywhere in knowledge and power. But a thing cannot act where it is not; and therefore omnipresence of knowledge and power implies omnipresence as to substance. And consequently as Christ in both natures is everywhere active, He must in both natures be everywhere present. Augustine found occasion to write against this notion of the ubiquity of the humanity of Christ, even in his age of the Church, "Noli itaque dubitare, ibi nunc esse hominem Christum Jesum, unde venturus est. . . . Et sic venturus est, illa angelica voce testante, quemadmodum ire visus est in coelum, i.e., in eadem carnis forma atque substantia; cui profecto immortalitatem dedit, naturam non abstulit. Secundum hanc formam non est putandus ubique diffusus. Cavendum est enim ne ita divinitatem astruamus hominis ut veritatem corporis auferamus. Non est autem consequens ut quod in Deo est, ita sit ubique, ut Deus [483] . . . Nam spatia locorum tolle corporibus, nusquam erunt, et quia nusquam erunt, nec erunt. Tolle ipsa corpora qualitatibus corporum, non erit ubi sint, et ideo necesse est ut non sint [484] . . . Christum autem Dominum nostrum unigenitum Dei filium &#65533;qualem Patri, eundemque hominis filium quo major est Pater, et ubique totum pr&#65533;sentem esse non dubites tanquam Deum, et in eodem templo Dei esse tanquam inhabitantem Deum, et in loco aliquo coeli propter veri corporis modum." [485]

The modern theory which makes the incarnation of the Son of God to consist in his laying aside "the existence-form" or God, and, by a process of self-limitation assuming that

of a man, of necessity modifies the view taken of his exaltation and ascension. That ascension is admitted to be a transfer from one portion of space to another, from earth to heaven. It is also admitted that our Lord now as a man occupies a definite portion of space. He is as to his human nature in one place and not everywhere. But his present existence-form is still human and only human. On this point Ebrard says, That the only begotten Son of God became a human soul, and formed itself a body in the womb of the Virgin Mary, and was born of her as a man. In the human nature thus assumed there were two elements. The one including all the essentials of humanity without which man is no longer man. The other includes only what is accidental and variable; as for example, weakness, subjection to death, and other evils consequent on sin. All these on his ascension he laid aside, and now dwells in heaven as a glorified man (verkl&#65533;rter Mensch). He has laid aside forever the existence-form of God, and assumed that of man in perpetuity, in which form by his Spirit He governs the Church and the world. Locally, therefore, He is absent from the world, but He is dynamically present to all his people in his present human existence-form. On this last mentioned point he quotes with approbation the language of Polanus: [486] "Ideo corpus Christi non est jam in terra, nedum ubique. Etsi autem Christus corpore suo non sit jam in terra, tamen est etiam conjunctus et pr&#65533;sens corpori nostro secundum carnem, sed non loco; sicut caput uniuscujusque hominis non est eo loco quo pedes, et tamen est illis suo modo unitum. Proinde adest Christus ecclesi&#65533; su&#65533; non tantum secundum divinam sed etiam secundum humanam naturam, verum spiritualiter sicut caput membris, quibus unitum est et qu&#65533; vivificat." This dynamic presence of Christ as to his human nature and oven as to his body, which Calvin asserted in reference to the Lord's Supper, has no special connection with Ebrard's doctrine of the incarnation. It is held by those who believe that the Eternal Son of God became man by taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was, and continueth to be God and man in two distinct natures, and one person forever. The doctrine in question has no doubt a form of truth in it. We are present with Christ, in a certain sense, in reference to his human, as well as in reference to his divine nature. The person to whom we are present, or, who is present with us, is theanthropic. We have all the advantage of his human sympathy and affection; and the form of divine life which we derive from Him comes from Him as God still clothed in our nature. All this may be admitted without admitting that the Eternal Son "became a human soul;" that He laid aside the existence-form of God, and assumed for eternity, that of man. If this be so, then He is a man and nothing more. If an adult man, by a process of self-limitation, or self-contraction, assumes the existence-form of an infant, he is an infant, and ceases to be an adult man. If he assumes the existence-form of an idiot, he is an idiot; or of a brute, he has only the instincts and sagacity of a brute. If, therefore, the Logos became man by self-contraction, He is no longer God.

According to the teaching of Scripture the ascension of Christ was necessary, --

1. In the first place He came from heaven. Heaven was his home. It was the appropriate sphere of his existence. His presence makes heaven, and therefore until this earth is purified from all evil, and has undergone its great process of regeneration, so as to become a new heavens and a new earth, this world is not suited for the Redeemer's abode in his state of exaltation.

2. It was necessary that as our High Priest He should, after offering Himself as a

sacrifice, pass through the heavens, to appear before God in our behalf. An essential part, and that a permanent one, of his priestly office was to be exercised in heaven. He there makes constant intercession for his people. As He died for our sins, He rose for our justification. All this was typified under the old dispensation. The victim was slain without in the court of the temple; the high priest bore the blood with much incense within the veil and sprinkled it on the Mercy Seat. What the high priest did in the earthly temple, it was necessary for the High Priest of our profession to do in the temple made without hands, eternal in the heavens. This is set forth with all clearness in the Epistle to the Hebrews.

3. It was expedient, our Lord said, that He should go away; "for if I go not away, the Comforter will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send him unto you." (John xvi. 7.) It was necessary that redemption should not only be acquired but applied. Men if left to themselves would have remained in their sins, and Christ had died in vain. The great blessing which the prophets predicted as characteristic of the Messianic period, was the effusion of the Holy Spirit. To secure that blessing for the Church his ascension was necessary. He was exalted to give repentance and the remission of sins; to gather his people from all nations and during all ages until the work was accomplished. His throne in the heavens was the proper place whence the work of saving men, through the merits of his death, was to be carried on.

4. Again our Lord told his sorrowing disciples, "I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also." (John xiv. 2, 3.) His ascension, therefore, was necessary for the completion of his work.

[479] See Meyer on Philippians iii. 20, for a statement of his view on this subject.

[480] Art. VIII. 26; Hase, Libri Symbolici, pp. 767, 768.

[481] Art. VIII. 28; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 768.

[482] Loci Theologici, IV. xii. 220, vol. iii. pp. 509, 510.

[483] Epistola CLXXXVII. (57) [iii.] 10, ad Dardanum, Works; edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. ii. pp. 1021, d, 1022, a.

[484] Ibid. vi. 18; p. 1025, e.

[485] Ibid. xiii. 41; p. 1038, a.

[486] Syntagma Theologi&#xfffd;, VI., XXV. edit Francofurti et Hanovi&#xfffd;, 1655, p. 762, a.

§3. Sitting at the Right Hand of God.

This is the next step in the exaltation of our Lord. He rose from the dead, ascended into heaven, and sat down at the right hand of God; that is, was associated with Him in glory and dominion. The subject of this exaltation was the Theanthropos, not the Logos specially or distinctively; not the human nature exclusively; but the theanthropic person. When a man is exalted it is not the soul in distinction from the body; nor the body in distinction from the soul, but the whole person.

The ground of Christ's exaltation is twofold: the possession of divine attributes by which He was entitled to divine honour and was qualified to exercise absolute and universal dominion; and secondly, his mediatorial work. Both these are united in Hebrews

i. 3. It is there said, that Christ "sat down on the right hand of the Majesty on high;" first (on, being, i.e.), because He is the brightness of the Father's glory and his express image, and sustains the universe by the word of his power; and secondly, because by the sacrifice of Himself, He made purification for our sins. So also in Philippians ii. 6-11, where we are taught that it was He who existed in the form of God and was equal with God, who humbled Himself to be obedient unto death even the death of the cross, and therefore, for those two reasons, "God also hath highly exalted him, and given him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth." In Ephesians i. 20-22, it is said, God raised Christ from the dead "and set him at his own right hand in the heavenly places, far above all principality, and power, and might, and dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come; and hath put all things under his feet." This latter passage, taken from the eighth Psalm, is repeatedly quoted to prove the absolutely universal dominion of the risen Saviour, as in Hebrews ii. 8: "In that he put all in subjection under him, he left nothing that is not put under him." And also 1 Corinthians xv. 27, when it is said, "All things are put under him, it is manifest that he is excepted, which did put all things under him." No creature therefore is excepted. This also is what our Lord Himself teaches. when He says, "All power is given unto me in heaven and in earth." (Matt. xxviii. 18.) Heaven and earth in Scriptural language, is the whole universe. In 1 Peter iii. 22, it is said, "Who is gone into heaven, and is on the right hand of God; angels and authorities and powers (i.e., all rational creatures) being made subject unto him." In the prophetic books of the Old Testament it was predicted that the Messiah should be invested with this universal dominion. (See Ps. ii., xlv., lxxii., cx.; Isa. ix. 67; Dan. vii. 14, etc.) That such authority and power could not be intrusted to a mere creature is plain from the nature of the case. Divine perfections, omniscience, omnipotence, and omnipresence, as well as infinite wisdom and goodness, are requisite for the effectual and righteous administration of a dominion embracing all orders of beings, all creatures rational and irrational, extending over the reason and conscience as well as over the external world. On this point the Scriptures are explicit. They teach expressly that to no angel, i, e., to no rational creature, as the term angel includes all intelligences higher than man, hath God ever said, "Sit on my right hand." (Heb. i. 13.) All angels, all rational creatures, are commanded to worship Him.

This universal dominion is exercised by the Theanthropos. It is vain for us to speculate on the relation of the divine and human natures in the acts of this supreme ruler. We cannot understand the relation between the soul and the body in the voluntary exercises in which both are agents, as when we write or speak. We know that such acts are neither exclusively mental nor exclusively corporeal; but how the two elements are combined, passes our comprehension. It is most unreasonable, therefore, and presumptuous, for us to endeavour to make intelligible to our feeble understandings, how the divine and human in the person of our Lord, cooperate in full accordance with the nature of each. In the case of our own voluntary exercises, we know that the attributes of the mind are not transferred to the body; much less are those of the body transferred to the mind. In like manner we know that the attributes of Christ's divine nature are not transferred to his human nature, nor those of his humanity to his divinity. It is enough for us to know that this supreme ruler of the universe is a perfect man as well as a perfect God; that He still has all human sympathies and affections, and can be touched with a sense of our infirmities. That a person in whom

dwells all the fulness of the Godhead bodily, and who is filled with all the love, tenderness, compassion, meekness, and forbearance, which Christ manifested while here on earth, has all power in heaven and earth committed to his hands, and is not far from any one of us, is an unspeakable delight to all his people.

In this exaltation of Christ to supreme dominion was fulfilled the prediction of the Psalmist, as the organ of the Holy Ghost, that all things, the whole universe, according to the interpretation of the Apostle as given in Hebrews ii. 8, and 1 Corinthians xv. 27. were to be put under subjection to man. In the former passage the Apostle argues thus: The world to come of which he spoke, i.e., the gospel dispensation, the world during the Messianic period, was not put under subjection to angels, for the Scriptures say that all things are put under man. And when it is said all things (ta panta) are put under Him, nothing is excepted. We do not yet, however, see all things put under man as man; but we do see the man Christ Jesus, on account of the suffering of death, crowned with this absolutely universal dominion. It is, therefore, at the feet of a man in whom dwells the fulness of the Godhead, that all principalities and powers bow themselves in willing subjection and adoring love. And it is at the feet of this once crucified man that all the redeemed are to cast down their crowns.

This absolute dominion has been committed to Christ as mediator. He who is over all is the head of the Church; it is for the Church, for the consummation of the work of redemption that as the God-man He has been thus exalted over all created beings. (Eph i. 22; Col. i. 17, 18; 1 Cor. xv. 25-28.) Having been committed to Him for a special purpose, this universal dominion as Mediator will be relinquished when that purpose is accomplished. He will reign until all his enemies are put under his feet. And when the last enemy is subdued He will deliver up this kingdom unto the Father, and reign forever as King over the redeemed.

§4. Christ's coming to judge the World.

This is the last step in his exaltation. He who was arraigned as a criminal at the bar of Pilate; who was unrighteously condemned, and who amid cruel mockings, was crucified with malefactors, is to come again with power and great glory; before Him are to be gathered all nations and all the generations of men, to receive from his lips their final sentence. He will then be exalted before all intelligences, as visibly their sovereign judge.

What the Scriptures teach on this subject is, (1.) That Christ is to come again. (2.) That this coming is to be personal, visible, and glorious. (3.) That the object of his second advent is to judge the world. (4.) That the persons to be judged are the quick and the dead, i.e., those then alive and those who died before his appearing. (5.) That the rule of judgment will be the law of God, either as written on the heart or as revealed in his Word. Those having the written revelation will be judged by it; those who have had no such external revelation, will be judged according to the light they have actually enjoyed. (6.) That the ground of judgment will be the deeds done in the body. (7.) That the sentence to be pronounced will be final, fixing the destiny of those concerned for eternity.

This whole subject belongs to the department of Eschatology, to which its more detailed consideration must be deferred. It is introduced here simply as connected with the

exaltation of Christ, of which it is to be the culminating point.

CHAPTER XIV: VOCATION.

§ 1. Scriptural Usage of the Word.

The Scriptures clearly teach that the several persons of the adorable Trinity sustain an economical relation to the work of man's redemption. To the Father is referred the plan itself, the selection of its objects, and the mission of the Son to carry the gracious purpose into effect. To the Son, the accomplishment of all that is requisite to render the salvation of sinful men consistent with the perfections and law of God, and to secure the final redemption of those given to Him by the Father. The special work of the Spirit is the application of the redemption purchased by Christ. Such is the condition of men since the fall, that if left to themselves they would continue in their rebellion and refuse the offers of reconciliation with God. Christ then had died in vain. To secure the accomplishment of the promise that He should "see of the travail of his soul and be satisfied," the Holy Spirit so operates on the chosen people of God, that they are brought to repentance and faith, and thus made heirs of eternal life, through Jesus Christ their Lord.

This work of the Spirit is in the Scriptures called Vocation. It is one of the many excellences of the Reformed Theology that it retains, as far as possible, Scriptural terms for Scriptural doctrines. It is proper that this should be done. Words and thoughts are so intimately related that to change the former, is to modify, more or less seriously, the latter. And as the words of Scripture are the words of the Spirit, it is becoming and important that they should be retained.

The act of the Spirit by which men are brought into saving union with Christ, is expressed by the word klesis, vocation. As in Hebrews iii. 1, "Partakers of the heavenly calling." Ephesians i. 18, "Hope of his calling." Ephesians iv. 1, "Walk worthy of the vocation wherewith ye are called." Ephesians iv. 4, "In one hope of your calling." 2 Timothy i. 9, "Hath . . . . called us with an holy calling." 2 Peter i. 10, "Make your calling and election sure," etc., etc. The verb used to express this act of the Spirit is kalein, to call. Romans viii. 30, "Whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and, whom he called, them he also justified." Also Romans ix. 11 and 24. 1 Corinthians i. 9: "By whom ye were called unto the fellowship of his Son." Verse 26: "Ye see your calling brethren, how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called." Galatians i. 6: "Him that called you." Verse 15, "It pleased God, who separated me from my mother's womb, and called me by his grace." 1 Thessalonians ii. 12, "Who hath called you unto his kingdom and glory." 1 Thessalonians v. 24, "Faithful is he that calleth you." 2 Thessalonians ii. 14, "Whereunto he called you by our gospel, to the obtaining of the glory of our Lord Jesus Christ." 1 Peter ii. 9, "Who hath called you out of darkness into his marvellous light." 1 Peter v. 10, "Who hath called us unto his eternal glory by Christ Jesus."

2 Peter i. 3, "Through the knowledge of him that hath called us to glory and virtue."

Those who are the subjects of this saving influence of the Spirit, are designated "the called." Romans i. 6, "The called of Jesus Christ." Romans viii. 28, "To them who are the called according to his purpose." To one class of the hearers of the gospel, the Apostle says (1 Cor. i. 24), Christ is a stumbling-block, and to another foolishness, "but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." Jude addresses his epistle to the "preserved in Jesus Christ, and called." "The called," and "the elect," hoi kletoi and hoi eklektoi, are convertible terms. Revelation xvii. 14, "The Lamb . . . . is the Lord of lords, and King of kings: and they that are with him are called, and chosen (kletoi, kai eklektoi), and faithful." So in 1 Corinthians i. 26, 27, Paul says, "Not many wise . . . . are called: but God hath chosen the foolish . . . . to confound the wise." In Hebrews ix. 15, it is said that Christ "is the mediator of the New Testament, that . . . . they which are called might receive the promise of eternal inheritance."

Such then is the established usage of Scripture. It is by a divine call, that sinners are made partakers of the benefits of redemption. And the influence of the Spirit by which they are translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son, is a vocation, or effectual calling. The ground of this usage is to be found in the Scriptural idea of God and of his relation to the world. He speaks and it is done. He said, Let there be light, and light was. He calls the things that are not, and they are. All effects of his power are produced by a word. As in the external world He created all things by the word of his power; so all effects in the moral or spiritual world are accomplished by a volition or a command. To call, therefore, in Scriptural language, is to effect, to cause to be, or to occur. There are two things involved in this form of expression. The one is, that God is the author or cause of the effect, which occurs in consequence of his call or command. The other is, that the efficiency to which the effect is due is not in second causes. God in such cases may work with means or without them, but in either event it is not through them. In creation and miracles, for example, there is neither intervention nor concomitancy of causes. God spoke (or willed). and the universe was. Our Lord said, Lazarus come forth, and Lazarus lived. He said to the leper, I will, be thou clean. When He put clay on the eyes of the blind man and bade him wash in the pool of Siloam, the restoration of sight was in no degree due to the properties of the clay or of the water. It was as truly the effect of the immediate divine efficiency, as raising the dead by a word. When, therefore, the Scriptures ascribe that subjective change in the sinner by which he becomes a new creature, to the call of God, it teaches that the effect is due not to natural or moral causes, or to the man's own agency, but simply to the power of God. Hence, as just said, to call is frequently in the Bible, to effect, to cause to be. A people or an individual becomes by the call of God that which the people or person is called to be. When God called the Hebrews to be his people, they became his people. When a man was called to be a prophet, he became a prophet. When Paul was called to be an apostle, he became an apostle. And those called to be saints become saints.

§ 2. The External Call.

The Scriptures, however, distinguish between this effectual call and the external call addressed in the Word of God to all to whom that word is made known. In this sense "many are called but few are chosen." God said by his prophet (Isa. lxv. 12), "When I called, ye

did not answer." And our Lord said, "I am not come to call the righteous, but sinners to repentance." (Matt. ix. 13.)

This external call includes, (1.) A declaration of the plan of salvation. (2.) The promise of God to save all who accede to the terms of that plan. (3.) Command, exhortation, and invitation to all to accept of the offered mercy. (4.) An exhibition of the reasons which should constrain men to repent and believe, and thus escape from the wrath to come. All this is included in the gospel. For the gospel is a revelation of God's plan of saving sinners. It contains the promise, Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be saved. Whosoever cometh unto me I will in no wise cast out. In the gospel God commands all men everywhere to repent and to believe on the Lord Jesus Christ. In the gospel men are not only commanded but exhorted to return unto God in the way of his appointment. Turn ye, turn ye, for why will ye die, is the language which it addresses to all to whom its message comes. Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts: and let him return unto the Lord, and He will have mercy upon him; and to our God, for He will abundantly pardon. Look unto me all ye ends of the earth and be ye saved. The gospel moreover addresses the reason, the conscience, the feelings, the hopes and the fears of men; and presents every consideration which should determine rational and immortal beings to comply with its gracious invitations.

This call is universal in the sense that it is addressed to all men indiscriminately to whom the gospel is sent. It is confined to no age, nation, or class of men. It is made to the Jew and Gentile, to Barbarians and Scythians, bond and free; to the learned and to the ignorant; to the righteous and to the wicked; to the elect and to the non-elect. This follows from its nature. Being a proclamation of the terms on which God is willing to save sinners, and an exhibition of the duty of fallen men in relation to that plan, it of necessity binds all those who are in the condition which the plan contemplates. It is in this respect analogous to the moral aw. That law is a revelation of the duties binding all men in virtue of their relation to God as their Creator and moral Governor. It promises the divine favour to the obedient, and threatens wrath to the disobedient. It therefore of necessity applies to all who sustain the relation of rational and moral creatures to God. So also the gospel being a revelation of the relation of fallen men to God as reconciling the world unto Himself, comes to all belonging to the class of fallen men.

The Scriptures, therefore, in the most explicit terms teach that the external call of the gospel is addressed to all men. The command of Christ to his Church was to preach the gospel to every creature. Not to irrational creatures, and not to fallen angels these two classes are excluded by the nature and design of the gospel. Further than this there is no limitation, so far as the present state of existence is concerned. We are commanded to make the offer of salvation through Jesus to every human being on the face of the earth. We have no right to exclude any man; and no man has any right to exclude himself. God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Hun might not perish but have everlasting life. The prediction and promise in Joel ii. 32, "Whosoever shall call on the name of the Lord shall be delivered," is repeatedly renewed in the New Testament, as in Acts ii. 21; Romans x. 13. David says (Psalm lxxxvi. 5), "Thou, Lord, art good, and ready to forgive; and plenteous in mercy unto all them that call upon thee." The prophet Isaiah lv. 1, gives the same general invitation: "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come

ye to the waters, and he that hath no money; come ye, buy and eat; yea, come, buy wine and milk without money, and without price." Our Lord's call is equally unrestricted, "Come unto me, all ye that labour and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest." (Matt. xi. 28.) And the sacred canon closes with the same gracious words, "The Spirit and the bride say, Come. And let him that heareth say, Come. And let him that is athirst, come: and whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely." (Rev. xxii. 17.) The Apostles, therefore, when they went forth in the execution of the commission which they had received, preached the gospel to every class of men, and assured every man whom they addressed, that if he would repent and believe in the Lord Jesus Christ he should be saved. If, therefore, any one holds any view of the decrees of God, or of the satisfaction of Christ, or of any other Scriptural doctrine, which hampers him in making this general offer of the gospel, he may be sure that his views or his logical processes are wrong. The Apostles were not thus hampered, and we act under the commission given to them.

It is not Inconsistent with the Doctrine of Predestination.

This general call of the gospel is not inconsistent with the doctrine of predestination. For predestination concerns only the purpose of God to render effectual in particular cases, a call addressed to all. A general amnesty on certain conditions may be offered by a sovereign to rebellious subjects, although he knows that through pride or malice many will refuse to accept it; and even although, for wise reasons, he should determine not to constrain their assent, supposing that such influence over their minds were within his power. It is evident from the nature of the call that it has nothing to do with the secret purpose of God to grant his effectual grace to some and not to others. All the call contains is true. The plan of salvation is designed for men. It is adapted to the condition of all. It makes abundant provision for the salvation of all. The promise of acceptance on the condition of faith is made to all. And the motives and reasons which should constrain obedience are brought to bear on every mind to which the call is sent. According to the Augustinian scheme, the non-elect have all the advantages and opportunities of securing their salvation, that, according to any other scheme, are granted to mankind indiscriminately. Augustinianism teaches that a plan of salvation adapted to all men and adequate for the salvation of all, is freely offered to the acceptance of all, although in the secret purpose of God, he intended that it should have precisely the effect which in experience it is found to have. He designed in its adoption to save his own people, but consistently offers its benefits to all who are willing to receive them. More than this no anti-Augustinian can demand.

It is Consistent with the Sincerity of God.

It is further said to be inconsistent with the sincerity of God, to offer salvation to those whom He has predetermined to leave to the just recompense of their sins. It is enough to say in answer to this objection, so strenuously urged by Lutherans and Arminians, that it bears with equal force against the doctrine of God's foreknowledge, which they admit to be an essential attribute of his nature. How can He offer salvation to those whom He foreknows will despise and reject it; and when He also knows that their guilt and condemnation will thereby be greatly aggravated. There is no real difficulty in either case except what is purely subjective. It is in us, in our limited and partial apprehensions; and in our inability to comprehend the ways of God, which are past finding out. We cannot understand how God

governs the world and accomplishes his infinitely wise designs. We must be satisfied with facts. Whatever actually is, it must be right for God to permit to be. And it is no less evident that whatever He permits to be, it must be right for Him to intend to permit. And this is all that the Augustinian scheme, in obedience to the Word of God, is constrained to assert. It is enough that the offer of salvation through Jesus Christ, is to be made to every creature; that whosoever accepts that offer shall be saved; and that for the salvation of all, abundant provision has been made. What God's purposes may be in instituting and promulgating this scheme of mercy, has nothing to do with our duty as ministers in making the proclamation, or with our obligation and privilege as sinners in accepting his proffered grace. If it is not inconsistent with the sincerity of God to command all men to love Him, it is not inconsistent with his sincerity to command them to repent and believe the gospel.

The Lutheran Doctrine.

The Lutherans from their anxiety to get rid of the sovereignty of God in the dispensation of his grace, are led to hold that the gospel offer is universal, not only in the sense above stated, in that the command is given to the Church, to make it known to all men, but that it has in some way been actually communicated to all. They admit the difficulty of reconciling this assumption with the present state of the world. They attempt to meet this difficulty by saying, that at three different epochs the knowledge of the plan of salvation was actually known to all men. First, when the promise of redemption through the seed of the woman, was made to our first parents. Secondly, in the days of Noah; and thirdly, during the age of the Apostles, by whom, it is assumed, the gospel was carried to the ends of the world, even to the inhabitants of this western continent. That this knowledge has since been lost, is to be referred not to the purpose of God, but to the wilful ingratitude and wickedness of the ancestors of the present inhabitants of the heathen world. They refer also to the fact that the Church is as a city set upon a hill; that it does more or less attract the attention of the whole earth. All men have heard of Christians and of Christianity; and it is their own fault if they do not seek further knowledge on the subject. It is very plain, however, that these considerations do not touch the difficulty. The heathen are without Christ and without God in the world. This is Paul's account of their condition. It is in vain, therefore, for us to attempt to show that they have the knowledge which the Apostle asserts they do not possess, and which, as all history shows, does not exist among them. The Lutheran divines feel the unsatisfactory nature of their own solution of this great problem. Gerhard, after referring to all possible sources of divine knowledge accessible to the heathen, says, [487] "Sed demus, in his et similibus exemplis specialibus non posse nos exacte causas divinorum consiliorum exquirere vel proponere; non tamen ad absolutum aliquod reprobationis decretum erit confugiendum sed adh&#xfffd;reamus firmiter pronunciatis istis universalibus. 1 Tim. ii. 4; Ezek. xxxiii. 11." "The Symbolical Books," says Schmid, [488] "adhere to the simple proposition quod non tantum pr&#xfffd;dicatio poenitenti&#xfffd;, verum etiam promissio evangelii sit universalis, hoc est ad omnes homines pertineat,'" [489] and that this vocatio is per verbum; without attempting to reconcile these statements with the facts of experience.

The Call to Salvation is only through the Gospel.

The call in question is made only through the Word of God, as heard or read. That is, the revelation of the plan of salvation is not made by the works or by the providence of

God; nor by the moral constitution of our nature, nor by the intuitions or deductions of reason; nor by direct revelation to all men everywhere and at all times; but only in the written Word of God. It is not denied that God may, and in past ages certainly did, convey this saving knowledge by direct revelation without the intervention of any external means of instruction. Such was the fact in the case of the Apostle Paul. And such cases, for all we know, may even now occur. But these are miracles. This is not the ordinary method. For such supernatural revelations of truth after its being made known in the Scriptures and committed to the Church with the command to teach all nations, we have no promise in the Scriptures and no evidence from experience.

It has ever been, and still is, the doctrine of the Church universal in almost all its parts, that it is only in and through the Scriptures that the knowledge necessary to salvation is revealed to men. The Rationalists, as did the Pelagians, hold that what they call "the light of nature," reveals enough of divine truth to secure the return of the soul to God, if it be properly improved. And many Arminians, as well as Mystics, hold that the supernatural teaching of the Spirit is granted in sufficient measure to every man to secure his salvation, if he yields himself up to its guidance. It would be very agreeable to our natural feelings to believe this, as it would be to believe that all men will be saved. But such is not the doctrine of the Bible; and it requires but little humility to believe that God is better as well as wiser than man; that his ways are higher than our ways, and his thoughts than our thoughts; and that whatever He ordains is best.

That the Scriptures do teach that saving knowledge is contained only in the Bible, and consequently that those ignorant of its contents, are ignorant of the way of salvation, is plain, --

1. Because the Scriptures both of the Old and of the New Testament, constantly represent the heathen as in a state of fatal ignorance. They are declared by the ancient prophets to be afar off from God; to be the worshippers of idols, to be sunk in sin. The people of Israel were separated from other nations for the express purpose of preserving the knowledge of the true religion. To them were committed the oracles of God. In the New Testament the same representation is given of their condition. It is said, They know not God. The Apostle proves at length in the first chapter ef his Epistle to the Romans, that they are universally and justly in a state of condemnation. He exhorts the Ephesians to call to mind their condition before they received the gospel. They were "without Christ, being aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise, having no hope, and without God, in the world." (Eph. ii. 12.) Such is the uniform teaching of the Word of God. It is utterly inconsistent with these representations, to assume that the heathen had such knowledge of God either by tradition, or by inward revelation, as was sufficient to lead them to holiness and God.

2. This doctrine follows also from the nature of the gospel. It claims to be the only method of salvation. It takes for granted that men are in a state of sin and condemnation, from which they are unable to deliver themselves. It teaches that for the salvation of men the Eternal Son of God assumed our nature, obeyed and suffered in our stead, and having died for our sins, rose again for our justification; that, so far as adults are concerned, the intelligent and voluntary acceptance of Christ as our God and Saviour is the one indispensable condition of salvation; that there is no other name under heaven whereby men

can be saved. It provides, therefore, for a Church and a Ministry whose great duty it is to make known to men this great salvation. All this takes for granted that without this knowledge, men must perish in their sins.

3. This is further evident from the nature of the message which the ministers of the gospel are commissioned to deliver. They are commanded to go into all the world, and say to every creature, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt he saved." "He that believeth on the Son, hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." Where is the propriety of such a message if men can be saved without the knowledge of Christ, and consequently without faith in Him.

4. This necessity of a knowledge of the gospel is expressly asserted in the Scriptures. Our Lord not only declares that no man can come unto the Father, but by Him; that no man knoweth the Father, but the Son, and he to whom the Son shall revel Him; but He says expressly, "He that believeth not, shall be damned." (Mark xvi. 16; John iii. 18.) But faith without knowledge is impossible. The Apostle John says, "He that hath the Son, hath life; he that hath not the Son of God, hath not life." (1 John v. 12.) The knowledge of Christ is not only the condition of life, but it is life; and without that knowledge, the life in question cannot exist. Him to know is life eternal. Paul, therefore, said, "I count all things but loss, for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ Jesus my Lord." (Phil. iii. 8.) Christ is not only the giver, but the object of life. Those exercises which are the manifestations of spiritual life terminate on Him; without the knowledge of Him, therefore, there can be no such exercises; as without the knowledge of God there can be no religion. It is consequently, as the Apostle teaches, through the knowledge of Christ, that God "hath called us to glory and virtue." (2 Peter i. 3.) To be without Christ is to be without hope, and without God. (Eph. ii. 12.) The Apostle Paul, while asserting the general vocation of men, saying, "Whosoever shall call upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved;" immediately adds, "How then shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher?" (Rom. x. 14.) Invocation implies faith; faith implies knowledge; knowledge implies objective teaching. "Faith cometh by hearing, and hearing by the word of God." (Verse 17.) There is no faith, therefore, where the gospel is not heard; and where there is no faith, there is no salvation.

This is indeed an awful doctrine. But are not the words of our Lord also awful, "Wide is the gate, and broad is the way, that leadeth to destruction, and many there be which go in thereat; because strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, which leadeth unto life, and few there be that find it"? (Matt. vii. 13, 14.) Is not the fact awful which stares every man in the face, that the great majority even of those who hear the gospel reject its offers of mercy? Facts are as mysterious as doctrines. If we must submit to the one, we may as well submit to the other. Our Lord has taught us, in view of facts or doctrines which try our faith, to remember the infinite wisdom and rectitude of God, and say, "Even so Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight." The proper effect of the doctrine that the knowledge of the gospel is essential to the salvation of adults, instead of exciting opposition to God's word or providence, is to prompt us to greatly increased exertion to send the gospel to those who are perishing for lack of knowledge.

Why is the Gospel addressed to all Men?

As all men are not saved, the question arises, Why should the call he addressed to all? or, What is the design of God in making the call of the gospel universal and indiscriminate? The answer to this question will be determined by the views taken of other related points of Christian doctrine. If we adopt the Pelagian hypothesis that God limits Himself by the creation of free agents. that such agents must from their nature be exempt from absolute control; then the relation to God in this matter is analogous to that of one finite spirit to another. He can instruct, argue, and endeavour to persuade. More than this free agency does not admit. Men as rational, voluntary beings, must be left to determine for themselves, whether they will return to God in the way of his appointment, or continue in their rebellion. The call of the gospel to them is intended to bring them to repentance. This is an end which God sincerely desires to accomplish, and which He does all He can to effect. He cannot do more than the preaching of the gospel accomplishes, without doing violence to the freedom of voluntary agents.

The Lutherans admit total depravity, and the entire inability of men since the fall to do anything spiritually good; but they hold that the Word of God has an inherent, supernatural, and divine power, which would infallibly secure the spiritual resurrection of the spiritually dead, were it not wilfully neglected, or wickedly resisted. The call of the gospel is, therefore, addressed to all men with the same intention on the part of God. He not only desires, as an event in itself well pleasing in his sight, that all may repent and believe, but that is the end which He purposes to accomplish. Its accomplishment is hindered, in all cases of failure, by the voluntary resistance of men. While, therefore, they attribute the conversion of men to the efficacious grace of God, and not to the co&#65533;peration or will of the subjects of that grace, they deny that grace is "irresistible." The fact that one man is converted under the call of the gospel and not another, that one accepts and another rejects the offered mercy, is not to be referred to anything in the purpose of God, or to the nature of the influence of which the hearers of the gospel are the subjects, but solely to the fact that one does, and the other does not resist that influence. The Lutheran doctrine is thus clearly stated by Quenstedt: "Vocatio est actus grati&#65533; applicatricis Spiritus Sancti, quo is benignissimam Dei erga universum genus humanum lapsum voluntatem per externam Verbi pr&#65533;dicationem, in se semper sufficientem ac efficacem, manifestat, et bona per Redemtoris meritum parta, omnibus in universum hominibus offert, ea seria intentione, ut omnes per Christum salvi fiant et &#65533;terna vita donentur." And again: "Forma vocationis consistit in seria atque ex Dei intentione semper sufficiente, semperque efficaci voluntatis divin&#65533; manifestatione ac beneficiorum per Christum acquisitorum oblatione. . . . . Nulla enim vocatio Dei sive ex se et intrinseca sua qualitate, sive ex Dei intentione est inefficax, ut nec possit nec debeat effectum salutarem producere, sed omnis efficax est licet, quo minus effectum suum consequatur, ab hominibus obicem ponentibus, impediatur, atque ita inefficax fit vitio mal&#65533; obstinat&#65533;que hominum voluntatis." [490]

The objections to this view are obvious.

1. It proceeds on the assumption that events in time do not correspond to the purpose of God. This is not only inconsistent with the divine perfection, but contrary to the express declarations of Scripture, which teaches that God works all things according to the counsel of his own will. He foreordains whatever comes to pass.

2. It supposes either that God has no purpose as to the futurition of events, or that his

"serious intentions" may fill of being accomplished. This is obviously incompatible with the nature of an infinite Being.

3. It not only assumes that the purpose of God may fail, but also that it may be effectually resisted; that events may occur which it is his purpose or intention should not occur. How then can it be said that God governs the world; or, that He does his pleasure in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth?

4. It assumes without proof, and contrary to Scripture and experience, that the Word of God as read or spoken by men, has an inherent, supernatural, life-giving power, adequate to raise the spiritually dead. Whereas the Scriptures constantly teach that the efficacy of the truth is due to the attending influence of the Holy Spirit, ab extra incidens; that the Word is effectual only when attended by this demonstration of the Spirit, and that without it, it is foolishness to the Greek and an offence to the Jew; that Paul may plant, and Apollos water, but that God only can give the increase.

5. It assumes that the only power which God exercises in the conversion of sinners is that inherent in the Word, whereas the Scriptures abound with prayers for the gift of the Spirit to attend the Word and render it effectual; and such prayers are constantly offered, and ever have been offered, by the people of God. They would, however, be not only unnecessary but improper, if God had revealed his purpose not to grant any such influence, but to leave men to the unattended power of the Word itself. Any doctrine contrary to what the Bible prescribes as a duty, and what all Christians do by the instinct of their renewed nature, must be false.

6. This doctrine, moreover, takes for granted that the ultimate reason why some hearers of the gospel believe and others do not, is to be found in themselves; that the one class is better, more impressible, or less obstinate than the other. The Scriptures, however, refer this fact to the sovereignty of God. Our Lord says, "I thank thee, O Father, Lord of heaven and earth, because thou hast hid these things from the wise and prudent, and hast revealed them unto babes." (Matt. xi. 25.) The Apostle says, "It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that sheweth mercy." "I will have mercy," saith God, "on whom I will have mercy, and I will have compassion on whom I will have compassion." (Rom. ix. 15, 16.) "Of him [God] are ye in Christ Jesus, not of yourselves, lest any should boast." (1 Cor. i. 30.)

7. The doctrine in question has no support from Scripture. The passages constantly referred to in its favour are, 1 Timothy ii. 3, 4. "God our Saviour, who will have all men to be saved, and to come unto the knowledge of the truth;" and Ezekiel xxxiii. 11, "As I live, saith the Lord God, I have no pleasure in the death of the wicked; but that the wicked turn from his way and live." God forbid that any man should teach anything inconsistent with these precious declarations of the Word of God. They clearly teach that God is a benevolent Being; that He delights not in the sufferings of his creatures; that in all cases of suffering there is an imperative reason for its infliction, consistent with the highest wisdom and benevolence. God pities even the wicked whom He condemns, as a father pities the disobedient child whom he chastises. And as the father can truthfully and with a full heart say that he delights not in the sufferings of his child, so our Father in heaven can say, that He delights not in the death of the wicked. The difficulty as to the passage in 1 Timothy ii. 4, arises simply from the ambiguity of the word thelein there used. Commonly the word

means to will, in the sense of to intend, to purpose. Such cannot be its meaning here, because it cannot be said that God intends or purposes that all men should be saved; or, that all should come to the knowledge of the truth. This is inconsistent with Scripture and experience. The word, however, often means to delight in, and even to love. In the Septuagint it is used as the equivalent of hphts, as in Psalms xxii. 9, cxii. 1, cxlvii. 10. In Matthew, xxvii. 43, ei thelei auton, is correctly rendered in our version, "If he will have him." (Heb. x. 5, 8; Luke xx. 46; Mark xii. 38; Col. ii. 18.) The Apostle. therefore, says only what the prophet had said. God delights in the happiness of his creatures. He takes no pleasure in the death of the wicked. But this is perfectly consistent with his purpose not to "spare the guilty."

8. Finally, the Lutheran doctrine relieves no difficulty. The Reformed doctrine assumes that some men perish for their sins; and that those who are thus left to perish are passed by not because they are worse than others, but in the sovereignty of God. The Lutheran doctrine concedes both those facts. Some men do perish; and they perish, at least in the case of the heathen, without having the means of salvation offered to them. There is the same exercise of sovereignty in the one case as in the other. The Lutheran must stand with his hand upon his mouth, side by side with the Reformed, and join him in saying, "Even so Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight."

The simple representation of Scripture on this subject, confirmed by the facts of consciousness and experience is, that all men are sinners; they are all guilty before God; they have all forfeited every claim upon his justice. His relation to them is that of a father to his disobedient children; or, of a sovereign to wickedly rebellious subjects. It is not necessary that all should receive the punishment which they have justly incurred. In the sight of an infinitely good and merciful God, it is necessary that some of the rebellious race of man should suffer the penalty of the law which all have broken. It is God's prerogative to determine who shall be vessels of mercy, and who shall be left to the just recompense of their sins. Such are the declarations of Scripture; and such are the facts of the case. We can alter neither. Our blessedness is to trust in the Lord, and to rejoice that the destiny of his creatures is not in their own hands, nor in the hands either of fate or of chance; but in those of Him who is infinite in wisdom, love and power.

But if the Lutheran doctrine that the call of the gospel is universal, or indiscriminate, because it is the intention of God that all should be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth, is contrary to Scripture, the question remains, Why are those called whom it is not the intention of God to save? Why are all called, if God has a fixed purpose of rendering that call effectual to some and not to others?

1. The most obvious answer to that question is found in the nature of the call itself. The call of the gospel is simply the command of God to men to repent and believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, with the promise that those who believe shall be saved. It is the revelation of a duty binding upon all men. There is as much reason that men should be commanded to believe in Christ, as that they should be commanded to love God. The one duty is as universally obligatory as the other. The command to believe no more implies the intention on the part of God to give faith, than the command to love implies the intention to give love. And as the latter command does not assume that men have of themselves power to love God perfectly, so neither does the command to believe assume the power of

exercising saving faith, which the Scriptures declare to be the gift of God.

2. The general call of the gospel is the means ordained by God to gather in his chosen people. They are mingled with other men, unknown except by God. The duty obligatory on all is made known to all; a privilege suited to all is offered indiscriminately. That some only are made willing to perform the duty, or to accept the privilege, in no way conflicts with the propriety of the universal proclamation.

3. This general call of the gospel with the promise that whoever believes shall be saved, serves to show the unreasonable wickedness and perverseness of those who deliberately reject it. The justice of their condemnation is thus rendered the more obvious to themselves and to all other rational creatures. "This is the condemnation, that light is come into the world, and men loved darkness rather than light, because their deeds were evil. He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." (John iii. 19, 18.) The most unreasonable sin which men commit is refusing to accept of the Son of God as their Saviour. This refusal is as deliberate, and as voluntary, according to the Reformed doctrine, as it is according to the Lutheran or even the Pelagian theory.

[487] Loci Theologici, loc. VIII.; vii. 136, vol. iv. p. 191.

[488] Dogmatik, 3rd edit. Frankfort on the Maine and Erlangen, 1853, p. 350.

[489] Formula Concordi&#65533;, XI. 28; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 804.

[490] Systema Theologicum, III. v. 1. 15 and 10, edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 669; pp. 666, 667.

§ 3. Common Grace.

The word charis, hmd, means a favourable disposition, or kind feeling; and especially love as exercised towards the inferior, dependent, or unworthy. This is represented as the crowning attribute of the divine nature. Its manifestation is declared to be the grand end of the whole scheme of redemption. The Apostle teaches that predestination, election, and salvation are all intended for the praise of the glory of the grace of God which He exercises towards us in Christ Jesus. (Eph. i. 3-6.) He raises men from spiritual death, "and makes them sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, that in the ages to come he might show the exceeding riches of his grace." (Eph. ii. 6, 7.) Therefore it is often asserted that salvation is of grace. The gospel is a system of grace. All its blessings are gratuitously bestowed; all is so ordered that in every step of the progress of redemption and in its consummation, the grace, or undeserved love of God, is conspicuously displayed. Nothing is given or promised on the ground of merit. Everything is an undeserved favour. That salvation was provided at all, is a matter of grace and not of debt. That one man is saved, and another not, is to the subject of salvation, a matter of grace. All his Christian virtues, are graces, i.e., gifts. Hence it is that the greatest of all gifts secured by the work of Christ, that without which salvation had been impossible, the Holy Ghost, in the influence which He exerts on the minds of men, has in all ages and in all parts of the Church been designated as divine grace. A work of grace is the work of the Holy Spirit; the means of grace, are the means by which, or in connection with which, the influence of the Spirit is conveyed or exercised. By common grace, therefore, is meant that influence of the Spirit, which in a

greater or less measure, is granted to all who hear the truth. By sufficient grace is meant such kind and degree of the Spirit's influence, as is sufficient to lead men to repentance, faith, and a holy life. By efficacious grace is meant such an influence of the Spirit as is certainly effectual in producing regeneration and conversion. By preventing grace is intended that operation of the Spirit on the mind which precedes and excites its efforts to return to God. By the gratia gratum faciens is meant the influence of the Spirit which renews or renders gracious. Cooperating grace is that influence of the Spirit which aids the people of God in all the exercises of the divine life. By habitual grace is meant the Holy Spirit as dwelling in believers; or, that permanent, immanent state of mind due to his abiding presence and power. Such is the established theological and Christian usage of this word. By grace, therefore, in this connection is meant the influence of the Spirit of God on the minds of men.

This is an influence of the Holy Spirit distinct from, and accessary to the influence of the truth. There is a natural relation between truth, whether speculative, æsthetic, moral, or religious, and the mind of man. All such truth tends to produce an effect suited to its nature, unless counteracted by inadequate apprehension or by the inward state of those to whom it is presented. This is of course true of the Word of God. It is replete with truths of the highest order; the most elevated; the most important; the most pertinent to the nature and necessities of man; and the best adapted to convince the reason, to control the conscience, to affect the heart, and to govern the life. Opposed to this doctrine of the supernatural influence of the Spirit of God on the minds of men, additional to the moral influence of the truth, is the deistical theory of God's relation to the world. That theory assumes that having created all things, and endowed his creatures of every order, material and immaterial, rational and irrational, with the properties and attributes suited to their nature and destiny, he leaves the world to the control of these subordinate or second causes, and never intervenes with the exercise of his immediate agency. This same view is by many Rationalists, Pelagians, and Remonstrants, transferred to the sphere of the moral and religious relations of man. God having made man a rational and moral being and endowed him with free agency; and having revealed in his works and in his Word the truth concerning Himself and the relation of man to the great Creator, leaves man to himself. There is no influence on the part of God exerted on the minds of men, apart from that which is due to the truth which He has revealed. Those numerous passages of Scripture which attribute the conversion and sanctification of men to the Spirit of God, the advocates of this theory explain by saying: That as the Spirit is the author of the truth, He may be said to be the author of the effects which the truth produces; but they deny any intervention or agency of the Spirit additional to the truth objectively present to the mind. On this point Limborch [491] says, "Interna vocatio . . . . quæ fit per Spiritum Dei, ... non est virtus Spiritus seorsim operans a verbo, sed per verbum, et verbo semper inest . . . . . Non dicimus duas esse (verbi et Spiritus) actiones specie distinctas: sed unam eandemque actionem; quoniam verbum est Spiritus, hoc est, Spiritus verbo inest." [492] This may be understood either in a Rationalistic, or in a Lutheran sense. It expresses the views of those extreme Remonstrants who inclined most to Pelagianism. With Pelagius little more was meant by grace than the providential blessings which men enjoyed in a greater or les degree. Even free will as a natural endowment he called grace.

Lutheran Doctrine on Common Grace.

A second view on this subject is that of the Lutherans already referred to. They also deny any influence of the Spirit accessary to the power inherent in the Word. But they are very far from adopting the deistical or rationalistic hypothesis. They fully admit the supernatural power of Christianity and all its ordinances. They hold that the Word "habet vim aut potentiam activam supernaturalem ac vere divinam ad producendos supernaturales effectus, scilicet, mentes hominum convertendas, regenerandas et renovendas." [493] This divine efficacy is inherent in, and inseparable from the Word. The words of man have only human power, presenting arguments and motives to convince and to persuade. The Word of God has supernatural and divine power. If in any case it fail to produce supernatural effect, i.e., to renew and sanctify, the fault is in the hearer. It is like articles of the materia medica, which have inherent virtue, but which nevertheless require a suitable condition in those to whom they are administered, in order to their proper effect. Or, to take a much higher illustration and one of which the Lutheran divines are especially fond; the Word is like the person of our Lord Jesus Christ when here on earth. He was replete with divine virtue. Whoever touched even the hem of his garment, was made whole of whatever disease he had. Nevertheless without faith, contact with Christ was inefficacious. There is all the difference, therefore, according to the Lutheran doctrine, between the word of man and the Word of God, that there was between Christ and ordinary men. The effect of the Word is no more to be attributed to its natural power as truth on the understanding and conscience, than the cures effected by Christ are to be referred to any natural remedial agencies. The effect in both cases is supernatural and divine. "Verbum Dei," says Quensted, [494] "non agit solum persuasiones morales, proponendo nobis objectum amabile, sed etiam vero, reali, divino et ineffabili influxu potenti&#xfffd; su&#xfffd; gratios&#xfffd;, ita ut efficaciter et vere convertat, illuminet, salvet in illo, cum illo et per illud operante Spiritu Sancto; in hoc enim consistit verbi divini et humani differentia." So Hollaz says, [495] "Verbum Dei, qua tale, non potest fingi sine divina virtute aut sine Spiritu Sancto, qui a verbo suo inseparabilis est. Nam si a verbo Dei separetur Spiritus Sanctus, non esset id Dei verbum vel verbum Spiritus, sed esset verbum humanum." As the Spirit, so to speak, is thus immanent in the Word, he never operates on the mind except through and by the Word. On this point Luther and the Lutheran divines insisted with great earnestness. They were especially led to take this ground from the claims of fanatical Anabaptists, to direct spiritual communications independent of the Scriptures to which they made the written Word subordinate: "Pater neminem trahere vult, absque mediis, sed utitur tanquam ordinariis mediis et instrumentis, verbo suo et sacramentis." [496] "Constanter tenendum est, Deum nemini Spiritum vel gratiam suam largiri, nisi per verbum et cum verbo externo et pr&#xfffd;cedente, ut ita pr&#xfffd;muniamus nos adversum enthusiastas, id est, spiritus, qui jactitant, se ante verbum et sine verbo Spiritum habere, et ideo scripturam sive vocale verbum judicant, flectunt et reflectunt pro libito, ut faciebat Monetarius, et multi adhuc hodie, qui acute discernere volunt inter Spiritum et literam, et neutrum norunt, nec quid statuant, sciunt." [497] The Lutherans, therefore, reject the distinction made by Calvinists between the external and internal call. They admit such a distinction, "sed," as Quenstedt [498] says, "ut externam vocationem intern&#xfffd; non opponamus, nec unam ab altera separemus, cum externa vocatio intern&#xfffd; medium sit ac organon et per illam Deus efficax sit in cordibus hominum. Si externa vocatio non ex asse congruit intern&#xfffd;, si externe vocatus esse potest qui non interne, vana fuerit, fallax, illusoria."

Rationalistic View.

A third doctrine which is opposed to the Scriptural teaching on this subject, is that which makes no distinction between the influence of the Spirit and the providential efficiency of God. Thus Wegscheider [499] says, "Operationes grati□ immediatas et supernaturales jam olim nonnulli recte monuerunt, nec diserte promissas esse in libris sacris nec necessarias, quum, qu□ ad animum emendandum valeant, omnia legibus natur□ a Deo optime efficiantur, nec denique ita conspicuas ut cognosci certo et intelligi possint. Accedit, quod libertatem et studium hominum impediunt, mysticorum somnia fovent et Deum ipsum auctorem arguunt peccatorum ab hominibus non emendatis commissorum. . . . . Omnis igitur de gratia disputatio rectius ad doctrinam de providentia Dei singulari et concursu refertur." To the same effect De Wette says: "It is one and the same efficiency, producing good in men, which according to the natural anthropological view we ascribe to themselves, and according to the religious view to God. These two modes of apprehension ought not to be considered as opposed to each other, but as mutually compensative." Again, "Religious faith regards the impulse to good (die Begeisterung zum Guten) as an efflux from God; philosophical reflection as the force of reason." [500]

It depends of course on the view taken of God's relation to the world, what is the degree or kind of influence to be ascribed to Him in promoting the reformation or sanctification of men. According to the mechanical theory, adopted by Deists, Rationalists, or (as they are often called in distinction from Supernaturalists) Naturalists, there is no exercise of the power of God on the minds of men. As He leaves the external world to the control of the laws of nature, so He leaves the world of mind to the control of its own laws. But as almost all systems of philosophy assume a more intimate relation between the Creator and his creatures than this theory acknowledges, it follows that confounding the providential agency of God over his creatures with the influence of the Holy Spirit, admits of the ascription to Him of an agency more or less direct in the regeneration and sanctification of men.

According to the common doctrine of Theism second causes have a real efficiency, but they are upheld and guided in their operation by the omnipresent and universally active efficiency of God; so that the effects produced are properly referred to God. He sends rain upon the earth; He causes the grass to grow; He fashions the eye and forms the ear; and He feeds the young ravens when they cry. All the operations of nature in the external world, which evince design, are due not to the working of blind physical laws, but to those laws as constantly guided by the mind and will of God. In like manner He is said to control the laws of mind: to sustain and direct the operation of moral causes. His relation to the world of mind is, in this point, analogous to his relation to the material world. And in the same sense, and for the same reason that He is said to give a plentiful harvest, He is said to make men fruitful in good feelings and in good works. Conversion, according to this view, is just as much a natural process as intellectual culture, or the growth of vegetables or animals. This is the doctrine of Rationalists as distinguished from Supernaturalists.

Many philosophical systems, however, ignore all second causes. They assume that effects are due to the immediate agency of God. This is the doctrine not only of Pantheists, but also of many Christian philosophers. This idea is involved in the theory of occasional causes, and in the doctrine so popular at one time among theologians that preservation is a

continual creation. If God creates the universe ex nihilo every successive moment, as even President Edwards strenuously asserts, then all effects and changes are the product of his omnipotence, and the efficiency or agency of second causes is of necessity excluded. According to this doctrine there can be no distinction between the operations of nature and those of grace. The same thing is obviously true in reference to the theory of Dr. Emmons and the high Hopkinsians. Dr. Emmons teaches that God creates all the volitions of men, good or bad. The soul itself is but a series of exercises. First in chronological order comes a series of sinful volitions; then, in some cases, not in all, this is followed by a series of holy volitions. God is equally the author of the one and of the other. This is true of all mental exercises. No creature can originate action. God is the only real agent in the universe. According to this doctrine all operations of the Spirit are merged in this universal providential efficiency of God; and all distinction between nature and grace, the natural and the supernatural is obliterated.

In opposition, therefore, first, to the proper naturalistic theory, which excludes God entirely from his works, and denies to Him any controlling influence either over material or mental operations and effects; secondly, in opposition to the doctrines which identify the operations or influence of the Spirit with the power of the truth; and thirdly, in opposition to the theory which ignores the influence between the providential efficiency of God and the operations of the Holy Spirit; the Scriptures teach that the influence of the Spirit is distinct from the mere power, whether natural or supernatural, of the truth itself; and that it is no less to be distinguished from the providential efficiency (or potentia ordinata) of God which coperates with all second causes.

There is an influence of the Spirit distinct from the Truth.

As to the first of these points, namely, that there is an influence of the Spirit on the minds distinct from and accessary to the power of the truth, which attends the truth sometimes with more, and sometimes with less power, according to God's good pleasure, the proof from Scripture is plain and abundant.

1. The Bible makes a broad distinction between the mere hearers of the Word, and those inwardly taught by God. When our Lord says (John vi. 44), "No man can come to me except the Father which hath sent me draw him;" he evidently refers to an inward drawing and teaching beyond that effected by the truth as objectively presented to the mind. All the power which the truth as truth has over the reason and conscience is exerted on all who hear it. This of itself is declared to be insufficient. An inward teaching by the Spirit is absolutely necessary to give the truth effect. This distinction between the outward teaching of the Word and the inward teaching of the Spirit is kept up throughout the Scriptures. The Apostle in 1 Corinthians i. 23-26, as well as elsewhere, says that the gospel however clearly preached, however earnestly enforced, even though Paul or Apollos were the teacher, is weakness and foolishness, without power to convince or to convert, unless rendered effectual by the demonstration of the Spirit. "The called," therefore, according to the Scriptures are not the hearers of the Word, but are those who receive an inward vocation by the Spirit. All whom God calls, He justifies, and all whom He justifies He glorifies. (Rom. viii. 30.)

2. The reason is given why the truth in itself is inoperative and why the inward teaching of the Spirit is absolutely necessary. That reason is found in the natural state of

man since the fall, He is spiritually dead. He is deaf and blind. He does not receive the things of the Spirit, neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. It is therefore those only who are spiritual, i.e., in whom the Spirit dwells, and whose discernment, feelings and whole life are determined by the Spirit, who receive the truths which are freely given unto all who hear the gospel. This is the doctrine of the Apostle as delivered in 1 Corinthians ii 10-15. And such is the constant representation of the word of God on this subject.

3. The Scriptures therefore teach that there is an influence of the Spirit required to prepare the minds of men for the reception of the truth. The truth is compared to light, which is absolutely necessary to vision; but if the eye be closed or blind it must be opened or restored before the light can produce its proper impression. The Psalmist therefore prays, "Open thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of thy law." (Psalm cxix. 18.) In Acts xvi. 14, it is said of Lydia, "Whose heart the Lord opened, that she attended unto the things which were spoken of Paul."

4. Accordingly the great promise of the Scriptures especially in reference to the Messianic period was the effusion of the Holy Spirit. "Afterward," said the prophet Joel, "I will pour out my Spirit upon all flesh" (ii. 28). The effects which the Spirit was to produce prove that something more, and something different from the power of the truth was intended. The truth however clearly revealed and however imbued with supernatural energy could not give the power to prophesy, or to dream dreams or to see visions. The Old Testament abounds with predictions and promises of this gift of the Holy Ghost, which was to attend and to render effectual the clearer revelation of the things of God to be made by the Messiah. Isaiah xxxii. 15, "Until the Spirit be poured upon us from on high, and the wilderness be a fruitful field, and the fruitful field be counted for a forest." Isaiah xliv. 3, "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty, and floods upon the dry ground; I will pour my Spirit upon thy seed, and my blessing upon thine offspring." Ezekiel xxxix. 29, "I have poured out my Spirit upon the house of Israel." Zechariah xii. 10, "1 will pour upon the house of David, and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplications; and they shall look upon me whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him, as one mourneth for his only son."

After the resurrection of our Lord He directed his disciples to remain at Jerusalem until they were imbued with power from on high. That is, until they had received the gift of the Holy Spirit. It was on the day of Pentecost that the Spirit descended upon the disciples, as the Apostle said, in fulfilment of the predictions of the Old Testament prophets. The effect of his influence was not only a general illumination of the minds of the Apostles, and the communication of miraculous gifts, but the conversion of five thousand persons to the faith at once. It is impossible to deny that these effects were due to the power of the Spirit as something distinct from, and accessary to, the mere power of the truth. This is the explanation of the events of the day of Pentecost given by the Apostle Peter, in Acts ii. 32, 38, "This Jesus hath God raised up, whereof we all are witnesses. Therefore being by the right hand of God exalted, and having received of the Father the prom ise of the Holy Ghost, he hath shed forth this, which ye now see and hear." This was the fulfilment of the promise which Christ made to his disciples that He would send them another Comforter, even the Spirit of truth who should abide with them forever. (John xiv. 16.) That Spirit was

to teach them; to bring all things to their remembrance; He was to testify of Christ; reprove the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; and he was to give the Apostles a mouth and wisdom which their adversaries should not be able to gainsay or resist. Believers, therefore, are said to receive the Holy Ghost. They have an unction from the Holy One, which abides with them and teaches them all things. (1 John ii. 20 and 27.)

When our Lord says (Luke xi. 13), that our Father in heaven is more willing to give the Holy Spirit to those who ask Him, than parents are to give good gifts unto their children, He certainly means something more by the gift of the Spirit, than the knowledge of his Word. Thousands hear and do not understand or believe. The Spirit is promised to attend the teaching of the Word and to render it effectual, and this is the precious gift which God promises to bestow on those who ask it. "Hereby we know," says the Apostle, "that he abideth in us, by the Spirit which he bath given us." (1 John iii. 24.) The Holy Ghost, therefore, is a gift. It is a gift bestowed on those who already have the Word, and consequently it is something distinct from the Word.

5. Another clear proof that the Spirit exercises upon the minds of men an influence distinguishable from the influence of the truth either in the Lutheran or Remonstrant view, is that those who have the knowledge of the Word as read or heard, are directed to pray for the gift of the Spirit to render that Word effectual. Of such prayers we have many examples in the Sacred Scriptures. David, in Psalm li. 11, prays," Take not thy Holy Spirit from me." The Apostle prays in behalf of the Ephesians to whom for more than two years he had been preaching the Gospel, that God would give them the Holy Spirit, that they might have the knowledge of Him, that their eyes might be opened to know the hope of their calling, and the riches of the glory of the inheritance of the saints, and the exceeding greatness of the power of which they were the subjects. (Eph. i. 17-19.) He makes a similar prayer in behalf of the Colossians. (Col. i. 9-11.) On the other hand men are warned not to grieve or quench the Spirit lest he should depart from them. The great judgment which ever hangs over the impenitent hearers of the Gospel is, that God may withhold the Holy Spirit, leaving them to themselves and to the mere power inherent in the truth. Such are reprobates; men with whom the Spirit has ceased to strive. It is obvious, therefore, that the Scriptures recognize an influence of the Holy Ghost which may be given or withheld, and which is necessary to give the truth any power on the heart.

6. The Scriptures therefore always recognize the Holy Spirit as the immediate author of regeneration, of repentance, of faith, and of all holy exercises. He dwells in believers, controlling their inward and outward life. He enlightens, leads, sanctifies, strengthens, and comforts. All these effects are attributed to his agency. He bestows his gifts on every one severally as he will. (1 Cor. xii. 11.) The Bible does not more clearly teach that the gifts of tongues, of healing, of miracles, and of wisdom, are the fruits of the Spirit, than that the saving graces of faith, love, and hope are to be referred to his operations. The one class of gifts is no more due to the inherent power of the truth than the other. The Apostle, therefore, did not depend for the success of his preaching upon the clearness with which the truth was presented, or the earnestness with which it was enforced, but on the attending "demonstration of the Spirit." (1 Cor. ii. 4.) He gave thanks to God that the Gospel came to the Thessalonians "not in word only, but also in power, and in the Holy Ghost." (1 Thess. i. 5.) He prayed that God would fulfil in them "the work of faith with power." (2 Thess. i. 11.)

He reminded the Philippians that it was God who worked in them "both to will and to do of his good pleasure." (Phil. ii. 13.) In Hebrews xiii. 21, he prays that God would make his people perfect, working in them "that which is well-pleasing in his sight." Indeed, every prayer recorded in the Scriptures for the conversion of men, for their sanctification, and for their consolation, is a recognition of the doctrine that God works on the mind of men by his Holy Spirit according to his own good pleasure. This is especially true of the apostolic benediction. By the "communion of the Holy Ghost, which that benediction invokes, is meant a participation in the sanctifying and saving influences of the Spirit.

7. This truth, that the Spirit does attend the Word and ordinances of God by a power not inherent in the Word and sacraments themselves, but granted in larger or less measures, as God sees fit, is inwrought into the faith of the whole Christian Church. All the Liturgies of the Greek, Latin, and Protestant churches are filled with prayers for the gift of the Spirit to attend the Word and sacraments. Every Christian offers such prayers daily for himself and others. The whole history of the Church is full of the record of facts which are revelations of this great doctrine. Why were thousands converted on the day of Pentecost, when so few believed under the preaching of Christ himself? Why during the apostolic age did the Church make such rapid progress in all parts of the world? Why at the Reformation, and at many subsequent periods, were many born in a day? Every revival of religion is a visible manifestation of the power of the Holy Ghost accessary to the power of the truth. This, therefore, is a doctrine which no Christian should allow himself for a moment to call into question.

The Influence of the Spirit may be without the Word.

There is another unscriptural view of this subject which must at least be noticed, although its full consideration belongs to another department. Many admit that there is a supernatural power of the Spirit attending the Word and sacraments, but they hold that the Spirit is confined to these channels of communication; that He works in them and by them but never without them. On this subject Romanists hold that Christ gave the Holy Spirit to the Apostles. They transmitted the gift to their successors the bishops. Bishops in the laying on of hands in ordination communicate the grace of orders to the priests. In virtue of this grace the priests have supernatural power to render the sacraments the channels of grace to those who submit to their ministrations. Those, therefore, who are in the Romish Church, and those only, are, through the sacraments, made partakers of the Holy Spirit. All others, whether adults or infants, perish because they are not partakers of those ordinances through which alone the saving influences of the Spirit are communicated. This also is the doctrine held by those called Anglicans in the Church of England.

The Lutheran Church rejected with great earnestness the doctrine of Apostolic Succession, the Grace of Orders, and the Priesthood of the Christian Ministry as held by the Church of Rome. Lutherans, however, taught not only that there is "a mystical union" between the Spirit and the Word, as we have already seen, so that all saving effects are produced by the power inherent in the Word itself, and that the Spirit does not operate on the hearts of men without the Word, but also that there is an objective supernatural power in the sacraments themselves, so that they are, under all ordinary circumstances, the necessary means of salvation.

The Reformed, while they teach that, so far as adults are concerned, the knowledge of

the Gospel is necessary to salvation, yet hold that the operations of the Holy Spirit are confined neither to the Word nor to the sacraments. He works when and where He sees fit, as in the times of the Old Testament and during the Apostolic age his extraordinary gifts were not conveyed through the medium of the truth, so neither now are the gifts for ecclesiastical office, nor is the regeneration of infants, effected by any such instrumentality. The saving efficacy of the Word and sacraments where they take effect, is not due to "any virtue in them; . . . . but only" to "the blessing of Christ, and the working of his Spirit in them that by faith receive them."

The Work of the Spirit is distinct from Providential Efficiency.

As grace, or the influence of the Holy Spirit, is not inherent in the Word or sacraments, so neither is it to be confounded with the providential efficiency of God. The Scriptures clearly teach, (1.) That God is everywhere present in the world, upholding all the creatures in being and activity. (2.) That He constantly co-operates with second causes in the production of their effects. He fashioned our bodies. He gives to every seed its own body. (3.) Besides this ordered efficiency (potentia ordinata), which works uniformly according to fixed laws, He, as a free, personal, extramundane Being, controls the operations of these fixed laws, or the efficiency of second causes, so as to determine their action according to his own will. He causes it to rain at one time and not at another. He sends fruitful seasons, or He causes drought. "Elias . . . . prayed earnestly that it might not rain; and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he prayed again, and the heaven gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit." (James. v. 17, 18.) (4.) A like control is exercised over mankind. The king's heart is in the. hands of the Lord, and He turns it as the rivers of water are turned. He makes poor and makes rich. He raises up one and puts down another. A man's heart deviseth his way; but the Lord directeth his steps. By Him kings rule and princes decree justice. Such, according to the Scriptures, is the providential government of God who works all things according to the counsel of his own will.

As distinct from this providential control which extends over all creatures, the Scriptures tell of the sphere of the Spirit's operations. This does not imply that the Spirit has nothing to do in the creation, preservation, and government of the world. On the contrary the Bible teaches that whatever God does in nature, in the material world and in the minds of men, He does through the Spirit. Nevertheless the Scriptures make a broad distinction between providential government, and the operations of the Spirit in the moral government of men and in carrying forward the great plan of redemption. This is the distinction between nature and grace. To these special operations of the Spirit are attributed, --

1. The revelation of truth. Nothing is plainer than that the great doctrines of the Bible were made known not in the way of the orderly development of the race, or of a growth in human knowledge, but by a supernatural intervention of God by the Spirit.

2. The inspiration of the sacred writers, who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost.

3. The various gifts, intellectual, moral, and physical, bestowed on men to qualify them for the special service of God. Some of these gifts were extraordinary or miraculous, as in the case of the Apostles and others; others were ordinary, i.e., such as do not

transcend the limits of human power. To this class belong the skill of artisans, the courage and strength of heroes, the wisdom of statesmen, the ability to rule, etc. Thus it was said of Bezaleel, "I have filled him with the Spirit of God, in wisdom and in understanding and in knowledge and in all manner of workmanship, to devise cunning works, to work in gold, and in silver, and in brass." (Exod. xxxi. 3, 4.) Of the seventy elders chosen by Moses, it is said, "I will take of the Spirit which is upon thee, and will put it upon them." (Num. xi. 17.) Joshua was appointed to succeed Moses, because in him was the Spirit. (Num. xxvii. 18.) "The Spirit of the Lord came upon" Othniel "and he judged Israel." (Judg. iii. 10.) So the Spirit of the Lord is said to have come upon Gideon, Jephtha, and Samson. When Saul was called to be king over Israel, the Spirit of the Lord came upon him; and when he was rejected for disobedience, the Spirit departed from him. (1 Sam. xvi. 14.) When Samuel anointed David, it is said, "The Spirit of the Lord came upon David from that day forward." (1 Sam. xvi. 13.) In like manner under the new dispensation, "There are diversities of gifts, but the same Spirit." (1 Cor. xii. 4.) And by these gifts some were made apostles, some prophets, some teachers, some workers of miracles. (1 Cor. xii. 29.) Paul, therefore, exhorted the elders of Ephesus to take heed to the flock, over which the Holy Ghost had made them overseers. (Acts xx. 28.)

4. To the Spirit are also referred conviction of sin, righteousness, and judgment; the resistance and rebuke of evil in the heart; strivings and warnings; illumination of the conscience; conviction of the truth; powerful restraints; and temporary faith founded on moral convictions; as well as regeneration, sanctification, consolation, strength, perseverance in holiness, and final glorification both of the soul and of the body.

All these effects which the Bible clearly and constantly refers to the Holy Spirit, Rationalism refers to second causes and to the attending providential efficiency of God. It admits of revelation, but only of such as is made in the works of God and in the constitution of our nature, apprehended by the mind in its normal exercises. All truth is discovered by the intuitive or discursive operations of reason. Inspiration is only the subjective state due to the influence of these truths on the mind. Miracles are discarded, or referred to some higher law. Or if admitted, they are allowed to stand by themselves, and all other subsequent intervention of God in controlling the minds of men is reduced to the regular process of human development and progress. The Bible and the Church universal recognize a broad distinction between the work of the Spirit and the operation of second causes as energized and controlled by the general efficiency of God. It is to one and the same divine agent that all the influences which control the conduct, form the character, and renew and sanctity the children of men, are to be referred; that by his energy revealed the truth to the prophets and apostles, rendered them infallible as teachers, and confirmed their divine missions by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles. The former class no more belong to the category of nature or natural operations, than the latter. God as an extramundane Spirit, a personal agent, has access to all other spirits. He can and He does act upon them as one spirit acts upon another, and also as only an Almighty Spirit can act; that is, producing effects which God alone can accomplish.

The Bible therefore teaches that the Holy Spirit as the Spirit of truth, of holiness, and of life in all its forms, is present with every human mind, enforcing truth, restraining from evil, exciting to good, and imparting wisdom or strength, when, where, and in what measure

seemeth to Him good. In this sphere also He divides "to every man severally as He will." (1 Cor. xii. 11.) This is what in theology is called common grace.

The Influences of the Spirit granted to all Man.

That there is a divine influence of the Spirit granted to all men, is plain both from Scripture and from experience.

1. Even in Genesis vi. 3 (according to our version), it is said, "My Spirit shall not always strive with man." The Hebrew verb dvv means, to rule, to judge. The sense of the passage therefore may be, as given by Gesenius, De Wette, and others, "Nicht f□r immer soll mein Geist walten im Menschen." My Spirit shall not always rule in man. But this means more than the Septuagint expresses by katameine and the Vulgate by permanebit. The Spirit of God, as Keil and Delitzsch properly remark, is the principle of spiritual as well as of natural life. What God threatened was to withdraw his Spirit from men on account of their wickedness, and to give them up to destruction. This includes the idea expressed in the English version of the passage. The Spirit of God had hitherto exerted an influence in the government of men which, after the appointed time of delay, was to cease. Rosenm□ller's explanation is, "Non feram, at Spiritus meus, per prophetas admonens homines, ab his in perpetuum contemnatur: puniam!" The clause per prophetas admonens has nothing in the text to suggest or justify it. It is inserted because Rosenm□ller admitted no influence of the Spirit that was not indirect or mediate.

2. The martyr Stephen (Acts vii. 51) tells the Jews, "As your fathers did . . . . ye do always resist the Holy Ghost," as the prophet Isaiah lxiii. 10, said of the men of his generation, that they vexed God's Holy Spirit. The Spirit, therefore, is represented as striving with the wicked, and with all men. They are charged with resisting, grieving, vexing, and quenching his operations. This is the familiar mode of Scriptural representation. As God is everywhere present in the material world, guiding its operations according to the laws of nature; so He is everywhere present with the minds of men, as the Spirit of truth and goodness, operating on them according to the laws of their free moral agency, inclining them to good and restraining them from evil.

3. That the Spirit does exercise this general influence, common to all men, is further plain from what the Scriptures teach of the reprobate. There are men from whom God withdraws the restraints of his Spirit; whom for their sins, He gives up to themselves and to the power of evil. This is represented as a fearful doom. It fell, as the Apostle teaches, upon the heathen world for their impiety. As they "changed the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator . . . . God gave them up unto vile affections . . . . As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind" (Rom. i. 25-28.) "My people would not hearken to my voice: and Israel would none of me. So I gave them up unto their own hearts' lusts: and they walked in their own counsels." (Ps. lxxxi. 11, 12.) As men are warned against grieving the Spirit as they are taught to pray that God would not take his Holy Spirit from them; as withdrawing the Spirit from any individual or people is represented as a direful judgment, the fact that the Spirit of God does operate on the minds of all men, to a greater or less degree, is clearly taught in Scripture.

4. The Bible therefore speaks of men as partakers of the Spirit who are not regenerated, and who finally come short of eternal life. It not only speaks of men repenting,

of their believing for a time, and of their receiving the Word with joy, but still further. of their being enlightened, of their tasting of the heavenly gift, and of their being made partakers of the Holy Ghost. (Heb. vi. 4.)

Argument from Experience.

What is thus taught in Scripture is confirmed by the experience of every man, and of the Church in the whole course of its history. God leaves no man without a witness. No one can recall the time when he was not led to serious thoughts, to anxious inquiries, to desires and efforts, which he could not rationally refer to the operation of natural causes. These effects are not due to the mere moral influence of the truth, or to the influence of other men over our minds, or to the operation of the circumstances in which we may be placed. There is something in the nature of these experiences, and of the way in which they come and go, which proves that they are due to the operation of the Spirit of God. As the voice of conscience has in it an authority which it does not derive from ourselves, so these experiences have in them a character which reveals the source whence they come. They are the effects of that still small voice, which sounds in every human ear, saying, This is the way; walk ye in it. This is much more obvious at one time than at others. There are seasons in every man's life, when he is almost overwhelmed with the power of these convictions. He may endeavour to suppress them by an effort of the will, by arguments to prove them to be unreasonable, and by diverting his mind by business or amusement, without success. God reveals Himself as distinctly in the workings of our inward nature as He does in the outward world. Men feel that they are in the hands of God; that He speaks to them, argues with them, expostulates, reproves, exhorts, and persuades them. And they know that they are resisting Him, when they are striving to stifle this mysterious voice within them.

During the apostolic period the Spirit, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel, was poured out on all classes of men. The effects of his influence were, (1) The various spiritual gifts, whether miraculous or ordinary, then so abundantly enjoyed. (2.) The regeneration, holiness, zeal, and devotion of the multitudes added to the Church. And (3.) The moral conviction of the truth, the excitement of all the natural affections, temporary faith, repentance, and reformation. The latter class of effects was just as conspicuous and as undeniable as either of the others. And such has been the experience of the Church in all ages. Whenever and wherever the Spirit has been manifested to a degree in any measure analogous to the revelation of his presence and power on the day of Pentecost, while many have been truly born of God, more have usually been the subjects of influences which did not issue in genuine conversion.

The evidence therefore from Scripture, and from experience, is clear that the Holy Spirit is present with every human mind, and enforces, with more or less power, whatever of moral or religious truth the mind may have before it.

The Effects of common Grace.

The effects produced by common grace, or this influence of the Spirit common to all men, are most important to the individual and to the world. What the external world would be if left to the blind operation of physical causes, without the restraining and guiding influence of God's providential efficiency, that would the world of mind be, in all its moral and religious manifestations, without the restraints and guidance of the Holy Spirit. There are two ways in which we may learn what the effect would be of the withholding the Spirit

from the minds of men. The first is, the consideration of the effects of reprobation, as taught in Scripture and by experience, in the case of individual men. Such men have a seared conscience. They are reckless and indifferent, and entirely under the control of the evil passions of their nature. This state is consistent with external decorum and polish. Men may be as whitened sepulchres. But this is a restraint which the wise regard to their greatest selfish gratification places on the evil principles which control them. The effects of reprobation are depicted in a fearful manner by the Apostle in the first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans. Not only individuals, but peoples and churches may be thus abandoned by the Spirit of God, and then unbroken spiritual death is the inevitable consequence. But, in the second place, the Scriptures reveal the effect of the entire withdrawal of the Holy Spirit from the control of rational creatures, in the account which they give of the state of the lost, both men and angels. Heaven is a place and state in which the Spirit reigns with absolute control. Hell is a place and state in which the Spirit no longer restrains and controls. The presence or absence of the Spirit makes all the difference between heaven and hell. To the general influence of the Spirit (or to common grace), we owe, --

1. All the decorum, order, refinement, and virtue existing among men. Mere fear of future punishment, the natural sense of right, and the restraints of human laws, would prove feeble barriers to evil, were it not for the repressing power of the Spirit, which, like the pressure of the atmosphere, is universal and powerful, although unfelt.

2. To the same divine agent is due specially that general fear of God, and that religious feeling which prevail among men, and which secure for the rites and services of religion in all its forms, the decorous or more serious attention which they receive.

3. The Scriptures refer to this general influence of the Spirit those religious experiences, varied in character and degree, which so often occur where genuine conversion, or regeneration does not attend or follow. To this reference has already been made in a general way as a proof of the doctrine of common grace. The great diversity of these religious experiences is due no doubt partly to the different degrees of religious knowledge which men possess; partly to their diversity of culture and character; and partly to the measure of divine influence of which they are the subjects. In all cases, however, there is in the first place a conviction of the truth. All the great doctrines of religion have a self-evidencing light; an evidence of their truth to which nothing but the blindness and hardness of heart produced by sin, can render the mind insensible. Men may argue themselves into a theoretical disbelief of the being of God, of the obligation of the moral law, and of a future state of retribution. But as these truths address themselves to our moral constitution, which we cannot change, no amount of sophistry can obscure their convincing light, if our amoral nature be aroused. The same is true also of the Bible. It is the Word of God. It contains internal evidence of being his Word. All that is necessary to produce an irresistible conviction of its truth is that the veil which sin and the God of this world have spread over the mind, should be removed. This is done, at least sufficiently to admit light enough to produce conviction, whenever the moral elements of our nature assume their legitimate power. Hence it is a matter of common observation that a man passes suddenly from a state of scepticism to one of firm belief, without any arguments being addressed to his understanding, but simply by a change in his inward moral state. When, as the Bible

expresses it, "the eyes of the heart" are thus opened, he can no more doubt the truths perceived, than he can doubt the evidence of his senses.

In the second place, with this conviction of the truths of religion is connected an experience of their power. They produce to a greater or less degree an effect upon the feelings appropriate to their nature; a conviction of sin, the clear perception that what the Bible and the conscience teach of our guilt and pollution, produces self-condemnation, remorse, and self-abhorrence. These are natural, as distinguished from gracious affections. They are experienced often by the unrenewed and the wicked. A sense of God's justice necessarily produces a fearful looking for of judgment. Those who sin, the Apostle says, know the righteous judgment of God, that they who do such things are worthy of death. (Rom. i. 32.) The attending conviction of entire helplessness; of the soul's utter inability either to make expiation for its guilt, or to destroy the inward power of sin, and wash away its defilement, tends to produce absolute despair. No human suffering is more intolerable than that which is often experienced even in this life from these sources. "Heu me miserum et nimis miserum! nimis enim miserum, quem torquet conscientia sua quam fugere non potest! nimis enim miserum quem exspectat damnatio sua, quam vitare non potest! Nimis est infelix, qui sibi ipsi est horribilis; nimis infelicior, cui mors ⍰eterna erit sensibilis. Nimis ⍰rumnosus, quem terrent continui de sua infelicitate horrores." [501]

It is also natural and according to experience, that the promise of the Gospel, and the exhibition of the plan of salvation, contained in the Scriptures, which commend themselves to the enlightened conscience, should often appear not only as true but as suited to the condition of the awakened sinner. Hence he receives the Word with joy. He believes with a faith founded on this moral evidence of the truth. This faith continues as long as the state of mind by which it is produced continues. When that changes, and the sinner relapses into his wonted state of insensibility, his faith disappears. To this class of persons our Saviour refers when He speaks of those who receive the Word in stony places or among thorns. Of such examples of temporary faith there are numerous instances given in the Scriptures, and they are constantly occurring within our daily observation.

In the third place, the state of mind induced by these common operations of the Spirit, often leads to reformation, and to an externally religious life. The sense of the truth and importance of the doctrines of the Bible constrains men often to great strictness of conduct and to assiduous attention to religious duties.

The experiences detailed above are included in the "law work" of which the older theologians were accustomed to speak as generally preceding regeneration and the exercise of saving faith in Christ. They often occur before genuine conversion, and perhaps more frequently attend it; but nevertheless they are in many cases neither accompanied nor followed by a real change of heart. They may be often renewed, and yet those who are their subjects return to their normal state of unconcern and worldliness.

No strictness of inward scrutiny, no microscopic examination or delicacy of analysis, can enable an observer, and rarely the man himself, to distinguish these religious exercises from those of the truly regenerated. The words by which they are described both in the Scriptures and in ordinary Christian discourse, are the same. Unrenewed men in the Bible are said to repent, to believe, to be partakers of the Holy Ghost, and to taste the good Word of God, and the powers of the world to come. Human language is not adequate to express

all the soul's experiences. The same word must always represent in one case, or in one man's experience, what it does not in the experience of another. That there is a specific difference between the exercises due to common grace, and those experienced by the true children of God, is certain. But that difference does not reveal itself to the consciousness, or at least, certainly not to the eye of an observer. "By their fruits ye shall know them." This is the test given by our Lord. It is only when these experiences issue in a holy life, that their distinctive character is known.

As to the nature of the Spirit's work, which He exercises, in a greater or less degree, on the minds of all men, the words of our Lord admonish us to speak with caution. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." (John iii. 8.) This teaches that the mode of the Spirit's operation whether in regeneration or in conviction, is inscrutable. If we cannot understand how our souls act on our bodies, or how evil spirits act on our minds, the one being a familiar fact of consciousness, and the other a clear fact of revelation, it cannot be considered strange that we should not understand how the Holy Spirit acts on the minds of men. There are certain statements of the Bible, however, which throw some light on this subject. In the first place, the Scriptures speak of God's reasoning with men; of his teaching them and that inwardly by his Spirit; of his guiding or leading them; and of his convincing, reproving, and persuading them. These modes of representation would seem to indicate "a moral suasion;" an operation in accordance with the ordinary laws of mind, consisting in the presentation of truth and urging of motives. In the second place, so far as appears, this common influence of the Spirit is never exercised except through the truth. In the third place, the moral and religious effects ascribed to it never rise above, so to speak, the natural operations of the mind. The knowledge, the faith, the conviction, the remorse, the sorrow, and the joy, which the Spirit is said to produce by these common operations, are all natural affections or exercises; such as one man may measurably awaken in the minds of other men. In the fourth place, these common influences of the Spirit are all capable of being effectually resisted. In all these respects this common grace is distinguished from the efficacious operation of the Spirit to which the Scriptures ascribe the regeneration of the soul. The great truth, however, that concerns us is that the Spirit of God is present with every human mind, restraining from evil and exciting to good; and that to his presence and influence we are indebted for all the order, decorum, and virtue, as well as the regard for religion and its ordinances, which exist in the world. And consequently that the greatest calamity that can befall an individual, a church, or a people, is that God should take his Holy Spirit from them. And as this is a judgment which, according to the Scriptures, does often come upon individuals, churches, and people, we should above all things dread lest we should grieve the Spirit or quench his influences. This is done by resistance, by indulgence in sin, and especially, by denying his agency and speaking evil of his work. "Whosoever speaketh a word against the Son of Man it shall be forgiven him: but whosoever speaketh against the Holy Ghost, it shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, neither in the world to come." (Matt. xii. 32.)

[491] Theologia Christiana, IV. xii. 2; edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 350, a.

[492] Theologia Christiana, IV. xii. 4; p. 351, a.

[493] Schmid, Dogmatik, third edit. p. 393.

[494] Systema Theologicum, I. iv. 2, 16, 4, edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 248.

[495] Examen, III. ii. 1, 4; Holmi[illegible] et Lipsi[illegible], 1741, p. 987.

[496] Formula Concordi[illegible], xi. 76; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 818. See Confessio Augustana, x. v. 2; Ibid. p. 11.

[497] Articuli Smalcaldici, viii. 3; Hase, p. 331.

[498] Systema Theologicum, III. vi. ii. echthesis viii.; Wittenberg, 1685, part ii. p. 467, a.

[499] Institutiones Theologi[illegible], III. iii. § 152; fifth edit. pp. 469, 470.

[500] Dogmatik, 2ter Th. III. i. § 77; Berlin, 1816, 2d part, p. 167.

[501] Augustine, De Contritione Cordis, Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. appendix, p. 1376, c.

§ 4. Efficacious Grace.

Besides those operations of the Spirit, which in a greater or less degree are common to all men, the Scriptures teach that the covenant of redemption secures the Spirit's certainly efficacious influence for all those who have been given to the Son as his inheritance.

Why called Efficacious.

This grace is called efficacious not simply ab eventu. According to one view the same influence at one time, or exerted on one person, produces a saving effect; and at other times, or upon other persons, fails of such effect. In the one case it is called efficacious, and in the other not. This is not what Augustinians mean by the term. By the Semi-Pelagians, the Romanists, and the Arminians, that influence of the Spirit which is exerted on the minds of all men is called "sufficient grace." By the two former it is held to be sufficient to enable the sinner to do that which will either merit or secure larger degrees of grace which, if duly improved, will issue in salvation. The Arminians admit that the fall of our race has rendered all men utterly unable, of themselves, to do anything truly acceptable in the sight of God. But they hold that this inability, arising out of the present state of human nature, is removed by the influence of the Spirit given to all. This is called "gracious ability"; that is, an ability due to the grace, or the supernatural influence of the Spirit granted to all men. On both these points the language of the Remonstrant Declaration or Confession is explicit. It is there said, "Man has not saving faith from himself, neither is he regenerated or converted by the force of his own free will; since, in the state of sin, he is not able of and by himself to think, will, or do any good thing, any good thing that is saving in its nature, particularly conversion and saving faith. But it is necessary that he be regenerated, and wholly renewed by God in Christ, through the truth of the gospel and the added energy of the Holy Spirit, -- in intellect, affections, will, and all his faculties, -- so that he may be able rightly to perceive, meditate upon, will, and accomplish that which is a saving good." [502] On the point of sufficient grace the Declaration says: "Although there is the greatest diversity in the degrees in which grace is bestowed in accordance with the divine will, yet the Holy Ghost confers, or at least is ready to confer, upon all and each to whom the word of faith is ordinarily preached, as much grace as is sufficient for generating faith and carrying forward their conversion in its successive stages. Thus sufficient grace for faith and conversion is

allotted not only to those who actually believe and are converted, but also to those who do not actually believe and are not in fact converted." [503] In the Apology for the Remonstrance, it is said, "The Remonstrants asserted that the servitude to sin, to which men (per natur&#65533; conditionem) in their natural state, are subject, has no place in a state of grace. For they hold that God gives sufficient grace to all who are called, so that they can be freed from that servitude, and at the same time they have liberty of will to remain in it if they choose." [504] In the Apology it is expressly stated, "Gratia efficax vocatur . . . . ab eventu," which is said to mean, "Ut statuatur gratia habere ex se sufficientem vim, ad producendum consensum in voluntate, sed, quia vis illa partialis est, non posse exire in actum sine co&#65533;perante liber&#65533; voluntatis human&#65533;, ac proinde, ut effectum habeat, pendere a libera voluntate." [505] Limborch [506] teaches the same doctrine. "Sufficiens vocatio, quando per co&#65533;perationem liberi arbitrii sortitur suum effectum, vocatur efficax."

Augustinians of course admit that common grace is in one sense sufficient. It is sufficient to render men inexcusable for their impenitence and unbelief. This Paul says even of the light of nature. The heathen are without excuse for their idolatry, because the eternal power and Godhead of the divine Being are revealed to them in his works. Knowing God, they glorified Him not as God. (Rom. i. 20, 21.) So common grace is sufficient to convince men, (1.) Of sin and of their need of redemption. (2.) Of the truth of the gospel. (3.) Of their duty to accept its offers and to live in obedience to its commands; and (4.) That their impenitence and unbelief are due to themselves, to their own evil hearts; that they voluntarily prefer the world to the service of Christ. These effects the grace common to all who hear the gospel tends to produce. These effects it does in fact produce in a multitude of cases, and would produce in all were it not resisted and quenched. But it is not sufficient to raise the spiritually dead; to change the heart, and to produce regeneration; and it is not made to produce these effects by the co&#65533;peration of the human will. This is a point which need not be discussed separately. The Remonstrant and Romish doctrine is true, if the other parts of their doctrinal system are true; and it is false if that system be erroneous. If the Augustinian doctrine concerning the natural state of man since the fall, and the sovereignty of God in election, be Scriptural, then it is certain that sufficient grace does not become efficacious from the co&#65533;peration of the human will. Those who hold the last mentioned doctrine reject both the others; and those who hold the two former of necessity reject the last. It is not, however, only in virtue of its logical relation to other established doctrines that the doctrine of sufficient grace is rejected. It may be proved to be contrary to what the Scriptures teach on regeneration and the mode in which it is effected. These arguments, however, may be more properly presented when we come to the answer to the question, Why the grace of God is efficacious in the work of conversion?

Congruity.

Another erroneous view on this subject is that the influence of the Spirit in conversion owes its efficacy to its congruity. By this is sometimes meant its adaptation to the state of mind of him who is its subject. When a man is in one state, the same influence, both as to kind and degree, may fail to produce any serious impression; when in a different and more favourable frame of mind, it may issue in his true conversion. In this view the doctrine of congruity does not differ from the view already considered. It supposes that the subject of the Spirit's influence, in one state of mind resists, and in another, submits to, and

co□perates with it and that its efficacy is in the end due to this co□peration.

Sometimes, however, more is meant than that the grace is congruous to the state of mind of its subject. Cardinal Bellarmin objects to the view above stated that it assumes that the reason why one man believes and another disbelieves, is to be found in the free will of the subject. This, he says, is directly contrary to what the Apostle says in 1 Corinthians iv. 7, "Who maketh thee to differ? And what hast thou that thou didst not receive?" "Nam," he adds, "si duo sint, qui eandem concionatorem audiant, et eandem interius inspirationem habeant, et unus credat, alter non credat, nonne dicere poterit is qui crediderit, se discerni ab infideli, per liberum arbitrium quia ipse inspirationem acceperit, quam alter rejecit? nonne gloriari poterit contra infidelem, quod ipse Dei grati□ co□peratus sit, quam ille contempsit? et tamen Apostolus hoc omnino prohibet?" [507] Here the main principle which distinguishes Augustinianism from all other schemes of doctrine is conceded. Why does one man repent and believe the Gospel, while another remains impenitent? The Augustinian says it is because God makes them to differ. He gives to one what He does not give to another. All Anti-Augustinians say that the reason is, that the one co□perates with the grace of God, and the other does not; or, the one yields, and the other does not; or, that the one resists, and the other does not. Bellarmin here sides with Augustine and Paul. His own theory, however, is a virtual retraction of the above mentioned concession. He says that the different results in the cases supposed, are to be referred to the congruity between the influence exerted and the state of mind of the person on whom that influence is exerted. But this congruity is foreseen and designed. God knows just what kind and degree of influence will be effectual in determining the will of a given person, under given circumstances, and in a given state of mind. And this influence he determines to exert with the purpose of securing the sinner's conversion, and with the certain foreknowledge of success. Bellarmin [508] says, "Ut efficacia proveniat non tam ex vehementia persuasionis, quam ex dispositione voluntatis, quam Deus pr□videt. Nimirum cum Deus ita proponit aliquid interna persuasione, ut videt voluntatem aptam esse ad consentiendum." And again, "Infallibilitas [rei] non oriatur ex vehementia motionis divin□, sed ex pr□visione aptitudinis ipsius voluntatis." [509] In one view this seems to refer the cause of the difference between the believer and the unbeliever, to the purpose of God; as it is He who foresees and intends the issue and adapts the means for the attainment of the end. But really the cause of the difference is in the man himself. One man is susceptible and yielding; another is hard and obstinate. Besides, this view as well as the preceding, regards the influence by which regeneration is effected, as a mere suasion, which is contrary to the representations of Scripture. It ignores the Scriptural doctrine of the natural state of man since the fall as one of spiritual death; and it professedly repudiates that of the divine sovereignty. It cannot, therefore, be reconciled with the Scriptures, if those doctrines are taught, as all Augustinians believe, in the Word of God. The Jesuits adopted much the same view as that presented by Bellarmin. Molina, in his celebrated work, "Liberi arbitrii cum grati□ donis, divina pr□scientia, providentia, pr□destinatione et reprobatione concordia," says, "Una et eadem est natura grati□ sufficientis et efficacis; a nostro arbitrio et libero consensu pendet, ut efficax fiat nobis consentientibus, aut inefficax, nobis dissentientibus. Dens infallibiliter operatur ope scienti□ medi□: vidit per scientiam rerum sub conditione futurarum, quem h□c aut illa gratia effectum habitura sit in homine, si detur; ponit decretum talem largiendi, cum qua pr□videt consensuram voluntatem; talis gratia est

efficax, -- itaque pr&#65533;scientia non fallitur." [510]

Neither the Symbols of the Romish Church, nor the majority of its theologians adopt this doctrine of Bellarmin. They make the difference between sufficient and efficacious grace to be determined simply by the event. One man co&#65533;perates with the grace he receives, and it becomes efficacious; another does not co&#65533;perate, and it remains without saving effect. On this point the Council of Trent [511] decided, "Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum, et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam justificationis gratiam se disponat, ac pr&#65533;paret, neque posse dissentire, si velit, sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere, anathema sit." "According to Catholic principles," says M&#65533;hler, [512] "two agencies are combined in the holy work of regeneration, a human and divine, which interpenetrate each other, when the work is effected; so that it is a divine-human work. God's holy power goes before, exciting, awakening, and quickening, without the man's meriting, procuring, or determining this influence, but he must yield to, and freely follow it." This he confirms by citing the language of the Council of Trent. [513] "Ut, qui per peccata a Deo aversi erant, per ejus excitantem atque adjuvantem gratiam ad convertendum se ad suam ipsorum justificationem eidem gratia libere assentiendo, et cooperando, disponantur: ita ut tangente Deo cor hominis per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem, neque homo ipse nihil omnino agat, inspirationem illam recipiens, quippe qui illam et abjicere potest, neque tamen sine gratia Dei movere se ad justitiam coram illo libera sua voluntate possit."

Augustinian Doctrine of Efficacious Grace.

According to the Augustinian doctrine the efficacy of divine grace in regeneration depends neither upon its congruity nor upon the active co&#65533;peration, nor upon the passive non-resistance of its subject, but upon its nature and the purpose of God. It is the exercise of "the mighty power of God," who speaks and it is done. This is admitted to be the doctrine of Augustine himself. He says, "Non lege atque doctrina insonante forinsecus, sed interna et occulta, mirabili ac ineffabili potestate operari Deum in cordibus hominum non solum veras revelationes, sed bonas etiam voluntates." [514] "Nolentem pr&#65533;venit, ut velit; volentem subsequitur, ne frustra velit." [515]

The Jansenists, the faithful disciples of Augustine, endeavoured to revive his doctrine in the Roman Church. Among the propositions selected from their writings and condemned by Pope Clement XI. in the famous Bull, Unigenitus, are the following: "Num. ix., Gratia Christi est gratia suprema, sine qua Christum confiiteri nunquam possumus, et cum qua nunquam illum abnegamus. 1 Cor. xii. 3. Num. x., Gratia est manus omnipotentis Dei, jubentis et facientis quod jubet. Mar. ii. 11. Num. xix., Dei gratia nihil aliud est quam ejus omnipotens voluntas: h&#65533;c est idea, quam Deus ipse nobis tradit in omnibus suis Scripturis. Rom. xiv. 4. Num. xxi., Gratia Jesu Christi est gratia fortis, potens, suprema, invincibilis, utpote qu&#65533; est operatio voluntatis omnipotentis, sequela et imitatio operationis Dei incarnantis et resuscitantis filium suum. 2 Cor. v. 21. Num. xxiv., Justa idea, quam centurio habet de omnipotentia Dei et Jesu Christi in sanandis corporibus solo motu su&#65533; voluntatis, est imago ide&#65533;, qu&#65533; haberi debet de omnipotentia su&#65533; grati&#65533; in sanandis animabus a cupiditate. Luc. vii. 7" [516]

It is not a matter of doubt or dispute that the Reformed Church adopted the Augustinian

doctrine on this subject. In the "Second Helvetic Confession," it is said, "Quantum ad bonum et ad virtutes, intellectus hominis, non recte judicat de divinis ex semetipso. . . . . Constat vero mentem vel intellectum, ducem esse voluntatis, cum autem coecus sit dux, claret, quousque et voluntas pertingat. Proinde nullum est ad bonum homini arbitrium liberum nondum renato, vires null[illegible] ad perficiendum bonum. . . . . In regeneratione . . . . voluntas non tantum mutatur per Spiritum, sed etiam instruitur facultatibus, ut sponte velit et possit bonum. . . . . Observandum est -- regeneratos in boni electione et operatione, non tantum agere passive, sed active. Aguntur enim a Deo, ut agant ipsi, quod agunt." [517]

The Synod of Dort, [518] "Omnes homines in peccato concipiuntur . . . . inepti ad omne bonum salutare . . . . et absque Spiritus Sancti regenerantis gratia, ad Deum redire, naturam depravatam corrigere, vel ad ejus correctionem se disponere nec volunt, nec possunt." "Fides Dei donum est, non eo, quod a Deo hominis arbitrio offeratur, sed quod homini reipsa conferatur, inspiretur, et infundatur." [519] Quando Deus . . . . veram in electis conversionem operatur, non tantum evangelium illis externe pr[illegible]dicari curat et mentem eorum per Spiritum Sanctum potenter illuminat, ... sed ejusdem etiam Spiritus regenerantis efficacia ad intima hominis penetrat, cor clausum aperit, durum emollit, ... voluntati novas qualitates infundit, facitque eam ex mortua vivam, ex mala bonam, ex nolente volentem." [520]

The following proposition contains one of the positions assume by Remonstrants on which the Synod was called to decide. "Operatio grati[illegible] in prima conversione indifferens est et resistibilis, ut per eam possit homo converti vel non converti: nec sequatur ejus conversio nisi libero assensu ad eam se determinet, et converti velit." On this proposition the Theologians of the Palatinate in their "Judicium," after referring to the Remonstrant idea that regeneration is effected by moral suasion, say, "Scriptura vero, etsi moralem (quam vocant) suasionem non removet ab hoc negotio (quid enim est totum ministerium reconciliationis, quam ejusmodi commendatio ac suasio? 2 Cor. v. 18-20), pr[illegible]cipuam tamen vim conversionis in ea minime collocat, verum in actione longe diviniore, qu[illegible] efficacia nec creationi, nec resuscitationi mortuorum quicquam concedat. . . . . Et irresistibilis quidem est tum ex parte grati[illegible] Dei, tum ex parte voluntatis. Ex parte grati[illegible]: quia efficax Dei operatio est in actu posita, cui nemo potest resistere, Rom. ix. 19, prout Christus ne gratia sapienti[illegible] Apostolis dat[illegible] dixit: cui omnes non poterunt resistere, Luc. xxi. 15. . . . . Ex parte voluntatis: nam subdita grati[illegible] eficaci jam non vult resistere: et quia non vult, necessario non vult, sicque resistere velle non potest salva sua libertate." [521]

The "Westminster Confession" [522] says, "All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace.

"II. This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered

and conveyed in it.

"III. Elect infants, dying in infancy, are regenerated and saved by Christ through the Spirit, who worketh when, where, and how He pleaseth. So also are all other elect persons, who are incapable of being outwardly called by the ministry of the Word."

In the "Larger Catechism," [523] effectual calling is declared to be "the work of God's almighty power and grace."

The Main Principle involved.

These authoritative declarations of the faith of the Reformed Church agree as to the one simple, clear, and comprehensive statement, that efficacious grace is the almighty power of God. There are, as has been before remarked, three classes into which all events of which we have any knowledge may be arranged. First, those which are produced by the ordinary operations of second causes as guided and controlled by the providential agency of God. Secondly, those events in the external world which are produced by the simple volition, or immediate agency of God, without the cooperation of second causes. To this class all miracles, properly so called, belong. Thirdly, those effects produced on the mind, heart, and soul, by the volition, or immediate agency of the omnipotence of God. To this class belong, inward revelation, inspiration, miraculous powers, as the gift of tongues, gift of healing, etc., and regeneration.

Efficacious Grace Mysterious and Peculiar.

If this one point be determined, namely, that efficacious grace is the almighty power of God, it decides all questions in controversy on this subject.

1. It is altogether mysterious in its operations. Its effects are not to be explained rationally, i.e., by the laws which govern our intellectual and moral exercises. To this aspect of the case our Lord refers in John iii. 8, "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." Volumes have been written on the contrary hypothesis; which volumes lose all their value if it be once admitted that regeneration, or effectual calling, is the work of omnipotence. No one is hardy enough to attempt to explain how the efficiency of God operates in creation; or how the mere volition of Christ healed the sick or raised the dead. Neither would men attempt to explain how Christ raises the spiritually dead, did they believe that it was a simple work of almighty power.

2. Another equally obvious corollary of the above proposition is, that there is a specific difference between not only the providential efficiency of God and efficacious grace, but also between the latter and what is called common, or sufficient grace. It is not a difference in degree, or in circumstances, or in congruity, but the operations are of an entirely different kind. There is no analogy between an influence securing or promoting mental development, or the formation of moral character, and the efficiency exerted in raining the dead.

Not Moral Suasion.

3. It is no less clear that efficacious grace is not of the nature of "moral suasion." By moral suasion is meant the influence exerted by one mind over the acts and states of another mind, by the presentation of truth and motives, by expostulations, entreaty, appeals, etc. Under the influence of this kind of moral power, the mind yields or refuses. Its decision is

purely its own, and within its own power. There is nothing of all this in the exercise of omnipotence. Healing the sick by a word, is an essentially different process from healing him by medicine. A living man may be persuaded not to commit suicide; but a dead man cannot be persuaded into life. If regeneration be effected by the volition, the command, the almighty power of God, it certainly is not produced by a process of argument or persuasion.

Efficacious Grace Acts Immediately.

4. It is a no less obvious conclusion that the influence of the Spirit acts immediately on the soul. All effects in the ordinary dealings of God with his creatures are produced through the agency of second causes. It is only in miracles and in the work of regeneration that all second causes are excluded. When Christ said to the leper, "I will; be thou clean," nothing intervened between his volition and the effect. And when He put clay in the eyes of the blind man, and bade him wash in the pool of Siloam, there was nothing in the properties of the clay or of the water that co[illegible]perated in the restoration of his sight. In like manner nothing intervenes between the volition of the Spirit and the regeneration of the soul. Truth may accompany or attend the work of the Spirit, but it has no co[illegible]peration in the production of the effect. It may attend it, as the application of the clay attended the miracle of restoring sight to the blind man; or as Naaman's bathing in the Jordan attended the healing of his leprosy. It is however to be remembered that the word regeneration (or its equivalents) is used, sometimes in a limited, and sometimes in a comprehensive sense. The translation of a soul from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son, is a great event. It involves a varied and comprehensive experience. There is much that usually precedes and attends the work of regeneration in the limited sense of the word; and there is much that of necessity and (in the case of adults) immediately succeeds it. In all that thus precedes and follows, the truth has an important, in some aspects, an essential part in the work. In most cases conviction of the truth, and of sin, a sense of shame, of remorse, of sorrow, and of anxiety, and longing desires after peace and security, precede the work of regeneration; and faith, joy, love, hope, gratitude, zeal, and other exercises follow it, in a greater or less degree. In all these states and acts, in everything, in short, which falls within the sphere of consciousness, the truth acts an essential part. These states and acts are the effects of the truth attended by the power, or demonstration of the Spirit. But regeneration itself, the infusion of a new life into the soul, is the immediate work of the Spirit. There is here no place for the use of means any more than in the act of creation or in working a miracle. Moses smiting the rock attended the outflow of the water, but had not the relation of a means to an effect. So the truth (in the case of adults) attends the work of regeneration, but is not the means by which it is effected. Much preceded and much followed the healing of the man with a withered arm; but the restoration of vitality to the limb, being an act of divine omnipotence was effected without the co[illegible]peration of secondary causes. There are two senses in which it may be said that we are begotten by the truth. First, when the word to beget (or regeneration), is meant to include the whole process, not the mere act of imparting life, but all that is preliminary and consequent to that act. The word "to beget" seems to be used sometimes in Scripture, and very often in the writings of theologians in this wide sense. And secondly, when the word by expresses not a co[illegible]perating cause, or means, but simply an attending circumstance. Men see by the light. Without light vision is impossible. Yet the eyes of the blind are not opened by means of the light. In like manner all the states and acts of consciousness preceding or attending, or following regeneration, are by the

truth; but regeneration itself, or the imparting spiritual life, is by the immediate agency of the Spirit.

The Use of the Word Physical.

This idea is often expressed by the word physical. The Schoolmen spoke of "a physical influence of the Spirit." The Pope condemned Jansenius for teaching, "Gratia de se efficax vere, realiter et physice pr&#65533;movens et pr&#65533;determinans, immutabiliter, infallibiliter insuperabiliter, et indeclinabiliter necessaria est," etc. Thus also Turrettin says: [524] "Grati&#65533; efficacis motio, nec physica nec ethica proprie dicenda est, sed supernaturalis et divina, qu&#65533; utramque illam schesin quadantenus includit. Non est simpliciter physica, quia agitur de facultate morali, qu&#65533; congruenter natur&#65533; su&#65533; moveri debet; nec simpliciter ethica, quasi Deus objective solum ageret, et leni suasione uteretur, quod pertendebant Pelagiani. Sed supernaturalis est et divina, qu&#65533; transcendit omnia h&#65533;c genera. Interim aliquid de ethico et physico participat, quia et potenter et suaviter, grate et invicte, operatur Spiritus ad nostri conversionem. Ad modum physicum pertinet, quod Deus Spiritu suo nos creat, regenerat, cor carneum dat, et efficienter habitus supernaturales fidei et charitatis nobis infundit. Ad moralem, quod verbo docet, inclinat, suadet et rationibus variis tanquam vinculis amoris ad se trahit." Here as was common with the writers of that age, Turrettin includes under "conversion," what is now more frequently distinguished under the two heads of regeneration and conversion. The former including what the Spirit does in the soul, and the latter what the sinner, under his influence, is induced to do. With his usual clearness he refers what is now meant by regeneration to the physical operation of the Spirit; and all that belongs to conversion or the voluntary turning of the soul to God, to the mediate influence of the Holy Ghost through the truth.

Owen, in his work on the Spirit, strenuously insists on the necessity of this physical operation. He uses the words conversion and regeneration interchangeably, as including all that Turrettin understands by them. And hence he says that in the work of conversion there is both a physical and moral influence exerted by the Spirit. Speaking of moral suasion, he says, "That the Holy Spirit doth make use of it in the regeneration or conversion of all that are adult, and that either immediately in and by the preaching of it, or by some other application of light and truth unto the mind derived from the Word; for by the reasons, motives, and persuasive arguments which the Word affords, are our minds affected, and our souls wrought upon in our conversion unto God, whence it becomes our reasonable obedience. And there are none ordinarily converted, but they are able to give some account by what considerations they were prevailed on thereunto. But, we say that the whole work, or the whole of the work of the Holy Ghost in our conversion, doth not consist herein; but there is a real, physical work, whereby He infuseth a gracious principle of spiritual life into all that are effectually converted, and really regenerated, and without which there is no deliverance from the state of sin and death which we have described; which among others may be proved by the ensuing arguments. The principal arguments in this case will ensue in our proofs from the Scriptures, that there is a real, physical work of the Spirit on the souls of men in their regeneration. That all He doth, consisteth not in this moral suasion, the ensuing reasons do sufficiently evince." [525]

It is too obvious to need remark that the word physical is used antithetically to moral. Any influence of the Spirit that is not simply moral by the way of argument and persuasion,

is called physical. The word, perhaps, is as appropriate as any other; if there be a necessity for any discriminating epithet in the case. All that is important is, on the one hand, the negation that the work of regeneration is effected by the moral power of the truth in the hands of the Spirit; and, upon the other, the affirmation that there is a direct exercise of almighty power in giving a new principle of life to the soul.

This doctrine both in what it denies and in what it affirms, is not peculiar to the older theologians. The modern German divines, each in the language of his peculiar philosophy, recognize that apart from the change in the state of the soul which takes place in the sphere of consciousness, and which is produced by God through the truth, there is a communication by his direct efficiency of a new form of life. This is sometimes called the life of Christ; sometimes the person of Christ; sometimes his substance; sometimes his divine-human nature, etc. They teach that man is passive in regeneration, but active in repentance. [526] "Man is every moment unspeakably more than lies in consciousness," says Ebrard. [527] This is true, and it should teach us that there is much pertaining to our internal life, which it is impossible for us to analyze and explain.

Efficacious Grace Irresistible.

5. It will of course be admitted that, if efficacious grace is the exercise of almighty power it is irresistible. That common grace, or that influence of the Spirit which is granted more or less to all men is often effectually resisted, is of course admitted. That the true believer often grieves and quenches the Holy Spirit, is also no doubt true. And in short that all those influences which are in their nature moral, exerted through the truth, are capable of being opposed, is also beyond dispute. But if the special work of regeneration, in the narrow sense of that word, be the effect of almighty power, then it cannot be resisted, any more than the act of creation. The effect follows immediately on the will of God, as when He said let there be light, and light was.

The Soul passive in Regeneration.

6. It follows, further, from the same premises, that the soul is passive in regeneration. It is the subject, and not the agent of the change. The soul co&#65533;perates, or, is active in what precedes and in what follows the change, but the change itself is something experienced, and not something done. The blind and the lame who came to Christ, may have undergone much labour in getting into his presence, and they joyfully exerted the new power imparted to them, but they were entirely passive in the moment of healing. They in no way co&#65533;perated in the production of that effect. The same must be true in regeneration, if regeneration be the effect of almighty power as much as the opening the eyes of the blind or the unstopping by a word the ears of the deaf.

Regeneration Instantaneous.

7. Regeneration, according to this view of the case, must be instantaneous. There is no middle state between life and death. If regeneration be a making alive those before dead, then it must be as instantaneous as the quickening of Lazarus. Those who regard it as a protracted process, either include in it all the states and exercises which attend upon conversion; or they adopt the theory that regeneration is the result of moral suasion. If the work of omnipotence, an effect of a mere volition on the part of God, it is of necessity instantaneous. God bids the sinner live; and he is alive, instinct with a new and a divine life.

An Act of Sovereign Grace.

8. It follows, also, that regeneration is an act of sovereign grace. If a tree must be made good before the fruit is good; the goodness of the fruit cannot be the reason which determines him who has the power to change the tree from bad to good. So if works spiritually good are the fruits of regeneration, then they cannot be the ground on which God exerts his life-giving power. If, therefore, the Scriptures teach the doctrine of efficacious grace in the Augustinian sense of those terms, then they teach that regeneration is a sovereign gift. It cannot be granted on the sight or foresight of anything good in the subjects of this saving change. None of those whom Christ healed, pretended to seek the exercise of his almighty power in their behalf on the ground of their peculiar goodness, much less did they dream of referring the restoration of their sight or health to any co�peration of their own with his omnipotence.

[502] Confessio Remonstrantium, xvii. 5; Episcopii Opera, edit. Rotterdam, 1665, vol. ii. pp. 88, 89, of second set. "Homo itaque salvificam fidem non habet ex seipso: neque ex arbitrii sui liberi viribus regeneratur, aut convertitur: quandoquidem in statu peccati nihil boni, quod quidem salutare bonum sit (cujusmodi imprimis est conversio et fides salvifica), ex seipso, vel cogitare potest, nedum, velle, aut facere: sed necesse est, ut a Deo, in Christo, per verbum, evangelii, eique adjunctam Spiritus Sancti virtutem regeneretur, atque totus renovetur; puta intellectu, affectibus, voluntate, omnibusque viribus; ut salutaria bona recte possit intelligere, meditari, velle, ac perficere."

[503] Confessio Remonstrantium, xvii. 8; p. 89, a, of second set. "Etsi vero maxima est grati� disparitas, pro liberrima scilicet voluntatis divin� dispensatione: tamen Spiritus Sanctus omnibus et singulis, quibus verbum fidei ordinarie pr�dicatur, tantum grati� confert, aut saltem conferre paratus est, quantum ad fidem ingenerandum, et ad promovendum suis gradibus salutarem ipsorum conversionem sufficit. Itaque gratia sufficiens ad fidem et conversionem non tantum iis obtingit, qui actu credunt et convertuntur: sed etiam iis, qui actu ipso non credunt, nec reipsa convertuntur."

[504] Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantum, cap. VI.; ut supra, p. 144, b. of second set. "Remonstrantes asserunt necessitatem sive servitutem istam peccati, cui homines, per natur� conditionem subjecti sunt, locum non habere sub statu grati�. Nam statuunt, vocatis omnibus gratiam sufficientem a Deo concedi, ita ut possint a servitute illa liberari, et simul manere in iis voluntatis libertatem, ut possint eidem servituti mander subjecti, si velint."

[505] Ibid. cap. xvii. iii.; p. 191, b, of second set.

[506] Theologia Christiana, IV. xii. 8, edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 352, b.

[507] De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, I. xii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 420, d.

[508] Ibid. IV. ix.; Disputationes, vol. iv. pp. 543 e, 544 a.

[509] See Turrettin, Institutio Theologi�, locus xv. ques. iv.

[510] See K�llner's Symbolik, Hamburg, 1844, vol. ii. p. 334.

[511] Sess. VI. cap. iv.; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G�ttingen, 1846, p. 34.

[512] Symbolik, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 105.

[513] Sess. VI. cap. iv.; Sreitwolf, Libri Symbolici, p. 23.

[514] De Gratia Christi (xxiv.), 25; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1838, vol. x. pp. 545 d, 546 a.

[515] Enchiridon de Fide, Spe et Charitate (xxxii.), 9; Works, vol. vi. p. 363 a. For a full exposition of Augustine's Theory see Wiggers, Augustinism and Pelagianism, ch. xiii. Andover, 1840, pp. 194-218.

[516] See Herzog's Encyklop&#65533;die, Art. Unigenitus.

[517] IX.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 479, 480.

[518] Cap. III. art. iii.; Niemeyer, p. 709.

[519] Cap. III. art. xiv.; Ibid. p. 711.

[520] Cap. III. art. xi.; Ibid. p. 710.

[521] Acta Synodi Dordrechtan&#65533;, edit. Leyden, 1620, pp. 138, 139, of second set.

[522] Chapter x. §§ 1-3.

[523] Answer to the 67th question.

[524] XV. iv. 18; edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. pp. 461, 462.

[525] Pneumatologia, or a Discourse concerning the Holy Spirit, book III. v. 18, 19, edit. London, 1674, p. 261.

[526] See Ebrard, Dogmatik, III. v. 2, § 447, edit. K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 328.

[527] Ibid. § 444, vol. ii. p. 319.

§ 5. Proof of the Doctrine.

Common Consent.

1. The first argument in proof of the Augustinian doctrine of efficacious grace, is drawn from common consent. All the great truths of the Bible are impressed on the convictions of the people of God; and find expression in unmistakable language. This is done in despite of the theologians, who often ignore or reject these truths in their formal teachings. There are in fact but two views on this subject. According to the one, regeneration is the effect of the mighty power of God; according to the other, it is the result of moral suasion. This latter may be understood to be nothing more than what the moral truths of the Bible are in virtue of their nature adapted to produce on the minds of men. Or, it may characterize the nature of the Spirit's influence as analogous to that by which one man convinces or persuades another. It is from its nature one which may be effectually resisted. All those, therefore, who hold to this theory of moral suasion, in either of its forms, teach that this influence is effectual or not, according to the determination of the subject. One chooses to yield, and another chooses to refuse. Every man may do either. Now, infants are confessedly incapable of moral suasion. Infants, therefore, cannot be the subjects of regeneration, if regeneration be effected by a process of rational persuasion and conviction. But, according to the faith of the Church Universal, infants may be renewed by the Holy Ghost, and must be thus born of the Spirit, in order to enter the kingdom of God. It therefore follows that the faith, the in-wrought conviction of the Church, the aggregate body of God's true and professing people, is against the doctrine of moral suasion, and in favour of the doctrine that regeneration is effected by the immediate almighty power of the Spirit. There is no possibility of its operating, in the case of infants, mediately through the truth as

apprehended by the reason. It is hard to see how this argument is to be evaded. Those who are consistent and sufficiently independent, admit its force, and rather than give up their theory, deny the possibility of infant regeneration. But even this does not much help the matter. A place outside of the faith of the universal Church is a very unpleasant position. It is, moreover, unsafe and untenable. The whole Church, led and taught by the Spirit of Truth, cannot be wrong, and the metaphysicians and theorists alone right. The error of the Papists as to the authority of the Church as a teacher, was twofold: first, in rendering it paramount to the Scriptures; and secondly, in understanding by the Church, not the body of Christ filled by his Spirit, but the mass of unconverted wicked men gathered with the true people of God within the pale of an external organization. With them the Church consists of that external commonwealth of which the Pope is the head, and to which all belong who acknowledge his authority. It is a matter of very small moment what such a body may believe. But if we understand by the Church the aggregate of the true children of God, men renewed, guided, and taught by the Holy Spirit, then what they agree in believing, must be true. This universality of belief is a fact which admits of no rational solution, except that the doctrine thus believed is revealed in the Scriptures, and taught by the Spirit. This argument is analogous to that for the being of God founded upon the general belief of the existence of a Supreme Being among all nations. It is a philosophical maxim that "What all men believe must be true." This principle does not apply to the facts of history or science, the evidence of which is present only to the minds of the few. But it does apply to all facts, the evidence of which is contained either in the constitution of our nature or in a common external revelation. If what all men believe must be accepted as a truth revealed in the constitution of human nature, what all Christians believe must be accepted as a truth taught by the Word and the Spirit of God. The fact that there are many theoretical, speculative, or practical atheists in the world, neither invalidates nor weakens the argument for the being of God, founded upon the general convictions of men; so neither does the fact that theorists and speculative theologians deny the possibility of infant regeneration either invalidate or weaken the argument for its truth, founded on the faith of the Church Universal. But if infants may be subjects of regeneration, then the influence by which regeneration is effected is not a moral suasion, but the simple volition of Him whose will is omnipotent.

Argument from Analogy.

2. A second argument, although most weighty, is nevertheless very difficult adequately to present. Happily its force does not depend on the clearness or fulness of its presentation. Every mind will apprehend it for itself. It is founded on that analogy between the external and spiritual world, between matter and mind, which pervades all our forms of thought and language, and which is assumed and sanctioned in the Word of God. We borrow from the outward and visible world all the terms by which we express our mental acts and states. We attribute sight, hearing, taste, and feeling to the mind. We speak of the understanding as dark, the heart as hard, the conscience as seared. Strength, activity, and clearness, are as truly attributes of the mind, as of material substances and agencies. Dulness and acuteness of intellect are as intelligibile forms of speech, as when these characteristics are predicated of a tool. Sin is a leprosy. It is a defilement, a pollution, something to be cleansed. The soul is dead. It needs to be quickened, to be renewed, to be cleansed, to be strengthened, to be guided. The eyes of the mind must be opened, and its ears unstopped. It would be impossible that there should be such a transfer of modes of expression from the sphere of

the outward and material to that of the inward and spiritual, if there were not a real analogy and intimate relation between the two. A feeble or diseased mind is scarcely more a figurative mode of speech than a feeble or diseased body. The one may be strengthened or healed as well as the other. The soul may be purified as literally as the body. Birth and the new-birth, are equally intelligible and literal forms of expression. The soul may be quickened as really as the body. Death in the one case is not more a figure of speech than it is in the other. When the body dies, it is only one form of activity that ceases; all the active properties belonging to it as matter remain. When the soul is dead, it also is entirely destitute of one form of life, while intellectual activity remains.

Such being the state of the case; such being the intimate relation and analogy between the material and spiritual, and such being the consequent law of thought and language which is universal among men, and which is recognized in Scripture, we are not at liberty to explain the language of the Bible when speaking of the sinful state of men, or of the method of recovery from that state, as purely metaphorical, and make it mean much or little according to our good pleasure. Spiritual death is as real as corporeal death. The dead body is not more insensible and powerless in relation to the objects of sense, than the soul, when spiritually dead, is to the things of the Spirit. This insensibility and helplessness are precisely what the word dead in both cases is meant to express. It is as literal in the one case as in the other. It is on the ground of this analogy that much of the language descriptive of the moral and spiritual state of man, used in the Bible, is founded. And the account given of the mode of his recovery from his estate of sin has the same foundation. As the blind could not open their own eyes, or the deaf unstop their own ears, or the dead quicken themselves in their graves; as they could not prepare themselves for restoration, or coperate in effecting it, so also with the blind, the deaf, and the dead in sin. The cure in both cases must be supernatural. It can be accomplished by nothing short of almighty power. One grand design of Christ's miracles of healing was to teach this very truth. They were intended to teach the sinner that his case was beyond all creature-help; that his only hope was in the almighty, and unmerited grace of Christ, to whom he must come and to whom he must submit. "As many as touched [Him] were made perfectly whole." Their cure was by no medicinal process. It was not a gradual work. It was not a change to be understood and accounted for by the laws of matter or mind. It was due to the simple volition of an almighty will. As there have been persons disposed to give the rationale of these cures; to explain them on the theory of animal magnetism, of occult forces, or of the power of the imagination, so there are those who prefer to explain the process of regeneration on rational principles, and to show how it is accomplished by moral suasion, and how it depends for its success on the coperation of the subject of the work. This is not the Scriptural account. Our Lord said to the leper, I will; be thou clean; as he said to the winds, Be still.

There is another view of the subject. As the Bible recognizes and teaches this analogy between the material and spiritual worlds, so it constantly assumes a like analogy between the relation which God sustains to the one and the relation which He sustains to the other. He has given to his creatures, the aggregate of whom constitutes nature, their properties, attributes, and powers. These are not inert. They act constantly and each according to its own laws. What we regard as the operations of nature, especially in the external world, are the effects of these agencies, that is, of the efficiency of second causes, which God has ordained, and which act with uniformity and certainty, so that like causes always produce

like effects. God, however, is everywhere present with his creatures, not only upholding, but guiding, so that the effects produced, in the infinite diversity of vegetable and animal forms, are indicative of an everywhere present and everywhere active intelligence. In the exercise of this potentia ordinata God acts uniformly according to the laws which He has ordained. But the Scriptures teach that God has not limited Himself to this ordered action. He is over, as well as in all things. He controls the operations of the laws of nature so as to produce given results. He so directs the agencies that produce rain, that it rains at one time and place and not at others, as seems to Him good. He so controls the winds that they sink navies in the depths of the sea, or waft the richly freighted vessel to its desired haven. This providential control, everywhere distinguished from his providential efficiency, or potentia ordinata, is universal and constant, extending even to the casting of the lot, the flight of an arrow, or the falling of a sparrow. In all this providential control, however, God acts with and through second causes. It was not by a mere volition that He scattered the Spanish Armada; He made the winds and the waves his instruments. The Bible, however, teaches that He is not confined to this use of means; that He intervenes by his immediate efficiency producing effects by his simple volition without any intervention of second causes. In such cases the effect is to be referred exclusively to his almighty power. There special interventions of God, for what we know, may be, and probably are, innumerable. However this may be, it is certain that the Bible is full of recorded cases of this kind. All his supernatural revelations, all inspiration and prophecy, all supernatural gifts, and all miracles, whether in the Old Testament or in the New, belong to this class. There were no second causes employed in revealing the future to the mind of the ancient seer, or in healing the sick, or in opening the eyes of the blind, or in raising the dead by a word.

In strict analogy to this relation of God to the external world, is, according to the Scriptures, his relation to his rational and moral creatures. They have their essential attributes and faculties. Those faculties act according to established laws; for there are laws of mind as well as laws of matter, and the one are as uniform and as imperative as the other. Mental action, not in accordance with the laws of mind, is insanity. God is in all his rational creatures, sustaining them and all their faculties. He is, moreover, over them and out of them, controlling and guiding them at his pleasure, in perfect consistency with their free agency. He restrains the wrath of men. He puts it into the hearts of the wicked to be favourable to his people. He conducts all the progress of history, overruling the minds of men, with unerring certainty and infinite wisdom. All this is mediate government; a rule exercised not only according to the laws of human agency, but through the rational influences by which that agency is determined in its operations. In like manner in his dealings with his people by the Spirit, He argues, remonstrates, reproves, exhorts, excites, comforts, and strengthens, through the truth. But He is not confined to this mediate action. He operates when, where, and how He sees fit, without the intervention of any second cause. By a word, or a volition, raising the spiritually dead, opening the eyes of the heart, renewing the will, communicating what the Scriptures call a new nature.

There are men who deny the providential intervention of God in nature and in the government of the world. To them the world is a great mechanism, which, admitting it to have been framed by an intelligent first cause, does not need the constant supervision and intervention of its Maker to keep it in successful operation. There are others who acknowledge the necessity of such providential intervention for the preservation of second

causes in their activity, but deny anything beyond this potentia ordinata of God. They deny any special providence. Events in the natural world and among the nations of the earth, are not determined by his control, but by natural causes and the uncontrolled free agency of men. And there are others, who admit not only the general concursus or co-operation of the first, with all second causes, but also the special providence of God, and yet who insist that He always operates through means; He never intervenes by the immediate exercise of his power; there can be no such thing as a miracle, in the ordinary and proper sense of that word. In like manner in reference to the relation of God to moral and rational creatures, there are those who deny that He is anything more than their creator. Having made them, He leaves them entirely to their own control. He neither positively upholds them in being; nor does He control them by an operation on their minds by truth and motives presented and urged by his Spirit. There are others who admit the universal agency of God in sustaining rational creatures, and who are willing to concede that He operates on them according to the laws of mental action, as one mind may influence other minds; but they deny any more than this. They deny any miracles in the sphere of grace, any effects produced by the immediate exertion of the omnipotence of God.

It is a strong argument in favour of the Augustinian doctrine of efficacious grace, which teaches that regeneration is an act of almighty power, or, in its subjective sense, an effect produced in the soul by the omnipotence of God, that it is in analogy with the whole teaching of the Bible as to the relation between the outward and spiritual world, and as to the relation in which God stands to the one and to the other. This doctrine assumes nothing beyond what is recognized as true in every other department of the universe of God. He is everywhere present, and everywhere active, governing all creatures and all their actions in a way suited to their nature, working in, with, through, or without second causes, or instrumental agency, as seems good in his sight.

Argument from Ephesians i. 17-19.

3. A third argument on this subject is founded on Ephesians i. 17-19. The truth involved in this doctrine was so important in the eyes of the Apostle Paul, that he earnestly prayed that God would enable the Ephesians by his Spirit to understand and believe it. It was a truth which the illumination and teaching of the Holy Ghost alone could enable them duly to appreciate. Paul prayed that their eyes might be enlightened not only to know the blessedness of being the subjects of God's vocation, and the glory of the inheritance in reserve for them, but also "the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe, according to the working of his mighty power which He wrought in Christ, when He raised him from the dead." There are two questions to be decided in the interpretation of this passage. First, does the Apostle speak of the present or of the future? Does he refer to what the believer experiences in this life, or to what he is to experience at the last day? In other words, does the passage refer to the spiritual resurrection from a state of death in sin, or to the resurrection of the body and the glory that is to follow? The great majority of commentators, Greek as well as Latin, Protestant as well as Catholic, ancient as well as modern, understand the passage to refer to the conversion or regeneration of believers. This general consent is prim- facie evidence of the correctness of this interpretation. Besides, the whole context, preceding and subsequent, shows that such is the meaning of the Apostle. In what precedes, the prayer refers to the present experience of the believer. Paul prayed

that the Ephesians might be made to know the value of the vocation they had already received; the preciousness of the hope they then enjoyed, and the greatness of the power of which they had already been the subjects. Here a reference to the future would be out of place. Besides, in what follows, the Apostle does not trace the analogy between the resurrection of Christ and the future resurrection of his people. He does not say here as he does in Romans viii. 11, "He that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also quicken your mortal bodies," but He that raised Christ from the dead, has quickened you "who were dead in trespasses and sins." It is clear, therefore, that it is the analogy between the resurrection of Christ from the grave, and the spiritual resurrection of believers, that the Apostle has in view. And this is an analogy to which the Scriptures elsewhere refer, as in Romans vi. 4. The parallel passage in Colossians ii. 12. "Buried with him in baptism, wherein also ye are risen with him through the faith of the operation of God who hath raised him from the dead;" renders it plain that it is the spiritual resurrection of believers which the Apostle refers to the mighty power of God, and not the future resurrection of their bodies.

But if this be, as seems so clear, the meaning of the Apostle, what does the passage teach? What is it that Paul desired that the Ephesians should understand, when he says, that their regeneration, or spiritual resurrection was effected by the mighty power of God? (1.) In the first place it is very clear that he meant them to understand that it was not their own work. They had not by their own power, by the efficiency of their own will, raised themselves from the dead. (2.) It is no less clear that he does not mean to teach that there was any special difficulty in the case, as it regards God. To Him all things are easy. He speaks and it is done. He upholds all things by the word of his power. It is not the difficulty, but the nature of the work, he would have them to understand. (3.) And, therefore, the precise truth which the passage teaches is that regeneration belongs to that class of events which are brought about by the immediate agency, or almighty power of God. They are not the effect of natural causes. They are not due to the power of God acting through second causes. This is the definite meaning of the words. There can be no reason for saying that the Ephesians had experienced the effects of the mighty power of God, if they were subjects of no other influence than that of moral suasion, which all more or less experience, ano which all may resist. The language would be incongruous to express that idea. Besides, the very point of the illustration would then be lost. The Ephesians had been quickened by the very power which wrought in Christ when God raised Him from the dead. This was the immediate power of God. It was not exercised through second causes. It was not a natural process aided by divine efficiency; much less was it the result of any form of moral suasion. As then Christ was raised by the immediate power of God, so are the people of God raised from spiritual death by the same almighty power.

This was in the view of the Apostle a most important truth. It determines the whole nature of religion. It raises it from the sphere of the natural, into that of the supernatural. If regeneration is a change effected by the man's own will; if it be due to the mere force of truth and motives, it is a small affair. But if it be the effect of the mighty power of God, it is as to its nature and consequences supernatural and divine. The whole nature of Christianity turns on this point. The conflict of ages concerns the question, Whether our religion is natural or supernatural; whether the regeneration, sanctification, and salvation promised and effected under the gospel, are natural effects, produced by second causes, aided and guided, it may be, by the coperation of God, as He aids and guides the forces of nature in

the production of their wonderful effects; or whether they are something entirely above nature, due to the supernatural intervention and constant operation of the Holy Spirit. Which of these views is Scriptural, can hardly be a question among unsophisticated Christians. And if the latter be the true view, it goes far to decide the question, Whether regeneration be due to moral suasion, or to the almighty power of the Spirit.

Argument from the General Teaching of Scripture.

4. This introduces the fourth argument on this subject. It is drawn from the general account given in the Scriptures of subjective Christianity, or the nature of the divine life in the soul. It is the tendency of all anti-Augustinian systems, as just remarked, to represent all inward religion as a rational affair, that is, something to be accounted for and explained on rational principles; the result of moral culture, of the right exercise of our free agency, and the favourable influence of circumstances. Such is not the view given in the Bible. When our Lord said, "I am the vine, ye are the branches: he that abideth in me, and I in him, the same bringeth forth much fruit: for without me ye can do nothing" (John xv. 5), He certainly meant that the vital union between Him and his people is something more than that which may subsist between disciples and their master, -- a union including merely trust, congeniality, and affection. The influence to which the fruitfulness of the believer is attributed is something more than the influence of the truth which He taught; however that truth may be applied or enforced. Their abiding in Him, and He in them, is something more than abiding in the profession and belief of the truth. Christ is the head of the Church not merely as its ruler, but as the source of its life. It is not I, says the Apostle, that live, "but Christ liveth in me." (Gal. ii. 20.) "Know ye not your own selves, how that Jesus Christ is in you, except ye be reprobates?" (2 Cor. xiii. 5.) It is from Him, as the same Apostle teaches us, that the whole body derives those supplies by which it lives and grows. (Eph. iv. 16.) "Because I live, ye shall live also. (John xiv. 19.) "I am the resurrection, and the life." (John xi. 25.) "1 am that bread of life." (John vi. 48.) "He that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me and I in him." (John vi. 56.) "This is that bread which came down from heaven: . . . . he that eateth of this bread shall live forever." (John vi. 58.) "We shall be saved by his life." (Rom. v. 10.) "The first man Adam was made a living soul, the last Adam was made a quickening spirit." (1 Cor. xv. 45.) "As the Father hath life in himself, so hath he given to the Son to have life in himself." (John v. 26.) "Thou hast given him power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast given him." (John xvii. 2.) "Your life is hid with Christ in God. When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with him in glory." (Col. iii. 3, 4.)

The Scriptures, therefore, plainly teach that there is a vital union between Christ and his people; that they have a common life analogous to that which exists between the vine and its branches, and between the head and members of the body. The believer is truly partaker of the life of Christ. This great truth is presented under another aspect. The Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit are one God. Wherever, therefore, the Father is, there is the Son, and where the Son is, there is the Spirit. Hence if Christ dwells in the believer, the Father does and the Spirit also does. In answer to the question of the disciples, "Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world?" our Lord answered, "If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." (John xiv. 22, 23.) In the Bible, therefore, it is

said that God dwells in his people; that Christ dwells in them, and that the Spirit dwells in them. These forms of expression are interchanged, as they all mean the same thing. Thus in Romans viii. 9-11, "Ye are not in the flesh, but in the Spirit, if so be that the Spirit of God dwell in you. Now if any man have not the Spirit of Christ he is none of his." Here the same person is called the Spirit of God and the Spirit of Christ. But in the next verse it is said, "If Christ be in you, the body is dead because of sin;" and then in verse 11, "But if the Spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." It is thus plain that the indwelling of the Spirit is the indwelling of Christ. And therefore those numerous passages in which the Spirit of God is said to dwell in his people, are so many proofs of the mystical union between Christ and all true believers. They are One. One with Him and one with one another. For by one Spirit they are all baptized into one body. (1 Cor. xii. 13.)

These representations of Scripture concerning the union between Christ and his people, are neither to be explained nor explained away. Both attempts have often been made. Numerous theories have been adopted and urged as divine truth, which in fact are only philosophical speculations. Some say that it is "the substance of Christ's person" that dwells in the believer. Others say that it is his divine nature, the Logos, who becomes incarnate in the Church; others that it is the humanity of Christ, his soul and body; others that it is the theanthropic nature; others that it is generic humanity raised by its union with the divine nature to the power of divinity. All this is darkening counsel by words without wisdom. It is, however, far better than the opposite extreme, which explains everything away. The one method admits the vital fact, however unauthorized may be the explanations given of it. The other denies the fact, and substitutes something easily intelligible for the great Scriptural mystery. It is enough for us to know that Christ and his people are really one. They are as truly one as the head and members of the same body, and for the same reason; they are pervaded and animated by the same Spirit. It is not merely a union of sentiment, of feeling, and of interests. These are only the consequences of the vital union on which the Scriptures lay so much stress.

Now if the whole nature of religion, of the life of God in the soul, is, according to the Scriptures, thus something supernatural aid divine; something mysterious; something which is not to be explained by the ordinary laws of mental action or moral culture, then assuredly regeneration, or the commencement of this divine life in the soul, is no simple process, the rationale of which can be made intelligible to a child. It is no unassisted act of the man himself yielding to the force of truth and motives; nor is it an act to which he is determined by the persuasion of the Spirit, giving truth its due influence on the mind. It is an event of a different kind. It is not thus natural but supernatural; not referrible to any second cause, but to the mighty power of God. This does not involve any undervaluing of the truth, nor any oversight of the constant mediate influence of the Spirit on the minds of all men, and especially upon the minds of the people of God. We may admit the value and absolute necessity of light, while we deny that light can open the eyes of the blind, or preserve the restored organ in its normal vigour. The man who contends for the possibility and truth of miracles, does not make everything miraculous. He may admit both the potentia ordinata of God, and his constant providential control over second causes, while he holds that there are occasions in which He acts immediately by his power, without the intervention of any other agency. So Augustinians, while they hold to the supernatural character of the inward life of

the believer, and to the fact that regeneration is due to the immediate exercise of the almighty power of God, nevertheless believe that the Holy Spirit constantly operates on the minds of men, according to the laws of mind, enlightening, convincing, persuading, and admonishing. They believe all that their opponents believe, but they believe more.

Argument from the Nature of Regeneration.

5. The Scriptures not only teach that regeneration is the work of the immediate omnipotent agency of the Spirit, but they give such an account of its nature as admits of no other explanation of its cause. It is a kind of work which nothing but almighty power can accomplish. It is a zoopoiesis, a making alive. Originating life is from its nature an act of God, for He alone can give life. It is also an act of immediate power. It precludes the intervention of second causes as much as creation does. Christ was raised from the dead by the power of God. So was Lazarus. So are the regenerated. Spiritual resurrection is just as really and as literally an act of making alive as calling a dead body to life. The one occurs in the sphere of the outward, the other in the sphere of the spiritual world. But the one is just as real a communication of life as the other. When the principle of life is communicated to a dead body, all the chemical properties which belong to it are controlled by the vital force, so as to make them work for its preservation and increase, instead of for its disintegration. And when the principle of spiritual life is imparted to the soul, it controls all its mental and moral energies, so that they work to its spiritual nourishment and growth in grace. The Scriptures, therefore, in teaching that regeneration is a quickening, do thereby reveal to us its nature as a work not of man, or of moral suasion, or of divine efficiency operating through second causes, but of the immediate, and therefore the almighty power of God.

The Bible teaches the same truth when it declares believers to be new creatures, and says that they are created anew in Christ Jesus. Creation is the work of God, and it is an immediate work It precludes the intervention of means. It is of necessity the work of almighty power, and therefore the Scriptures so often claim it as the peculiar prerogative of God. It is true that the Greek and Hebrew words which we translate by the English word create, are often used in the sense of to make, to fashion out of preexistent materials. They occur, also, in a secondary or figurative sense, and express in such cases only the idea of a great, and generally a favourable change, no matter how produced. It would not, therefore, be sufficient to establish the Augustinian doctrine of regeneration, that it is called a creation, if in other parts of Scripture it were spoken of as a change produced by second causes, and if the means and the mode were described. In that case it would be natural to take the word in a figurative sense. But the contrary of all this is true. If the Bible taught the eternity of matter, or that the world is an emanation from God, or a mode of God's existence, we should be forced to give a figurative sense to the words, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." But as the Scriptures tell us that God alone is eternal, and that all else owes its existence to his will, we are authorized and bound to retain these words in their simple and sublime significance. Now, as regeneration is always declared to be God's work, his peculiar work, and a work of his mighty power, analogous to that which He wrought in Christ, when He raised Him from the dead; as it is declared to be a making alive, an opening of the eyes, and an unstopping the ears; then, when it is also called a new creation, we are bound to understand that term as containing a new assertion

that it is a work of almighty power.

Another common Scriptural representation leads to the same conclusion. Believers are the children of God, not merely as his rational creatures, but as the subjects of a new birth. They are born of God. They are born of the Spirit. They are begotten of God. 1 John v. 1-18. The essential idea in such representations, is that of communication of life. We derive one form of life from our corrupt earthly parents, and another from the Spirit. "That which is born of the flesh, is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit, is Spirit." (John iii. 6.) In the case of creatures, this communication of life by the parent to the offspring is merely transmission. In the case of God, the fountain of all life, it is a real communication. He originates the life which He gives. As it is utterly incongruous to think of a creature's begetting itself, or originating its own life; and no less incongruous to regard this commencement of life or being, as brought about by secondary influences, so is it utterly inconsistent with the Scriptures to regard regeneration as a man's own work, or as due to his coperation, or as produced by the influences of truth. As well might it be assumed that light, heat, and moisture could make a dead seed germinate, and bring forth fruit. All beginning of life is directly from God; and this is what the Bible most explicitly asserts to be true of regeneration. Those who become the children of God are "born, not of blood, nor of the will of the flesh, nor of the will of man, but of God." (John i. 13.)

This argument is not invalidated by the fact that Paul says to the Corinthians, "I have begotten you through the gospel." All words are used literally and figuratively; and no man is misled (or need be) by this change of meaning. We are accustomed to speak of one man as the spiritual father of another man, without any fear of being misunderstood. When the historian tells us that the monk Augustine converted the Britons, or the American missionaries the Sandwich Islanders, we are in no danger of mistaking his meaning; any more than when it is said that Moses divided the Red Sea, or brought water out of the rock, or gave the people manna out of heaven. The same Paul who told the Corinthians that he had "begotten them through the gospel," told them in another place, "I have planted, Apollos watered: but God gave the increase. So then, neither is he that planteth anything, neither he that watereth; but God that giveth the increase." (1 Cor. iii. 6, 7.)

In 1 Peter i. 23, it is written, "Being born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the Word of God, which liveth and abideth forever." From this passage it is sometimes inferred that the new birth is a change produced not by the immediate agency of God, but instrumentally by the Word, and therefore by a rational process, or moral suasion. It has, however, been already remarked that regeneration is often taken in the wide sense of conversion. That is, for the whole change which takes place in the sinner when he is made a child of God. This is a comprehensive change, including all that takes place in the consciousness, and all that occurs in the soul itself (so to speak), below the consciousness, and subsequently in the state and relation of the soul to God. In this change the Word of God is eminently instrumental. It is by the Word that the sinner is convinced, aroused, made to seek reconciliation with God, and enlightened in the way of salvation. It is by the Word that the person and work of Christ are revealed, and all the objects on which the activity of the regenerated soul terminates, are presented to the mind. The Gospel is, therefore, the wisdom and power of God unto salvation. It is by the Word that all the graces of the Spirit are called into exercise, and without it holiness, in all its conscious

manifestations, would be as impossible as vision without light. But this does not prove that light produces the faculty of seeing; neither does truth produce the principle of spiritual life. The Apostle Paul, who glories so much in the gospel, who declares that it is by the foolishness of preaching that God saves those that believe, still teaches that the inward work of the Spirit is necessary to enable men to receive the things freely given to them of God; that the natural man receives not the things of the Spirit, that they must be spiritually discerned. (1 Cor. ii. 8-11.) As examples of the latitude with which the words beget, begotten, and new-birth are used in Scripture, reference need be made only to such passages as 1 Peter i. 3, where it is said, He "hath begotten us again unto a lively hope by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead;" and 1 Corinthians iv. 15. There is therefore nothing in what the Scriptures teach of the agency of the truth in conversion, or regeneration in the wide sense of the word, inconsistent with their distinct assertion that in its narrow sense of quickening or imparting spiritual life, it is an act of the immediate omnipotence of God. This point was adverted to in a previous chapter.

The fact then that the Bible represents regeneration as a spiritual resurrection, as a new creation, and as a new birth, proves it to be the work of God's immediate agency. There is another familiar mode of speaking on this subject which leads to the same conclusion. In Deuteronomy xxx. 6, Moses says: "The Lord thy God will circumcise thine heart, and the heart of thy seed, to love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, that thou mayest live." In Ezekiel xi. 19, it is said, "I will give them one heart, and I will put a new spirit within you; and I will take the stony heart out of their flesh, and will give them an heart of flesh." And in chapter xxxvi. 26, "A new heart also will I give you, and a new spirit will I put within you: and I will take away the stony heart out of your flesh, and I will give you an heart of flesh. And I will put my Spirit within you, and cause you to walk in my statutes, and ye shall keep my judgments and do them." Jeremiah xxiv. 7, "I will give them an heart to know me. The Psalmist prayed, "Create in me a clean heart, O God; and renew a right spirit within me." (Ps. li. 10.) It is admitted that the word heart, like all other familiar terms, is used in different senses in the Scriptures. It often means the whole soul; as when mention is made of the eyes, the thoughts, and the intentions of the heart. It very frequently means the feelings or affections, or is used collectively for them all, or for the seat of the feelings. A cold, hard, sluggish, timid, humble, broken, heart are all common forms of expression for what exists in the consciousness; for transient and changeable states of the mind, or inward man. Notwithstanding it is no less clear that the word is often used in the same sense in which we use the word nature, for a principle of action, a permanent habit or disposition. Something that exists not in the consciousness, but below it. That such is its meaning in the passages just quoted, and in all others in which God is said to change or renew the heart, is plain: (1.) Because it is something which God not only gives, but which He creates. (2.) Because it is the source of all right action. It cannot be a volition, or a generic purpose, or any state of mind which the man himself produces; because it is said to be the source of love, of fear, and of new obedience. Our Lord's illustration, derived from trees good and bad, forbids any other interpretation. A good tree produces good fruit. The goodness of the tree precedes and determines the goodness of the fruit; and so a good heart precedes all just thoughts, all right purposes, all good feelings and all holy exercises of every kind. (3.) The Scriptures explain what is meant by "creating a new heart" by the exegetical expression, "I will put my Spirit within you." This surely is not a right purpose.

The indwelling Spirit or Christ dwelling in us, is the principle and source of that new life of which the believer is made the subject. All those passages in which God promises to give a new heart, are proofs that regeneration is a supernatural work of the Holy Spirit; not a moral suasion, but a creating and imparting a principle of a new form of life.

Argument from related Doctrines.

6. Another decisive argument in favour of the Augustinian doctrine of efficacious grace, is derived from its necessary connection with other Scriptural doctrines. If the latter be true, the former must be true also. If the Bible teaches that men since the Fall have not lost all ability to what is spiritually good; that they are not dead in trespasses and sins; that they still have the power to turn themselves unto God, or, at least, the power to yield to the influence which God exerts for their conversion, and power to resist and refuse, then so far as this point is concerned it might be true that regeneration is the result of moral suasion. It might be true that "God offers the same necessary conditions of acceptance to all men; desires from the heart that all men as free agents comply with them and live; brings no positive influence upon any mind against compliance, but, on the contrary, brings all those kinds and all that degree of influence in favour of it, upon each individual, which a system of measures best arranged for the success of grace in a world of rebellion allows; and finally, saves, without respect of kindred, rank, or country, whether Scythian, Greek or Jew, all who under this influence, accept the terms and work out their own salvation, and reprobates alike all who refuse." [528] But, on the other hand, if the Scriptures teach that "man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man being altogether averse from that good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto;" [529] then must it also be true that "when God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin, and by his grace alone, enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good." [530] Then is it also true, that man in effectual calling "is altogether passive, until, being quickened and renewed by the Holy Spirit, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and to embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it." [531] If man is as really spiritually dead, in his natural state since the fall, as Lazarus was corporeally dead, then is the spiritual resurrection of the one as really a work of divine omnipotence as the bodily resurrection of the other. These doctrines, therefore, thus logically connected, have never in fact been dissociated. All who hold that original sin involves spiritual death and consequent utter inability to any spiritual good, do also hold that his recovery from that state is not effected by any process of moral suasion human or divine, but by the immediate exercise of God's almighty power. It is in reference to both classes of the dead that our Lord said, "As the Father raiseth up the dead, and quickeneth them; even so the Son quickeneth whom he will. Verily, verily, I say unto you, The hour is coming, and now is, when the dead shall hear the voice of the Son of God: and they that hear shall live." (John v. 21, 25.)

There is the same intimate connection between the doctrines of God's sovereignty in election and efficacious grace. If it were true that men make themselves to differ; that election is founded on the foresight of good works; that some who hear the Gospel and feel the influence of the Spirit, allow themselves to be persuaded, that others refuse, and that the former are therefore chosen and the latter rejected, then it would be consistent to represent

the grace exercised in the vocation of men as an influence to be submitted to or rejected. But if God has mercy on whom He will have mercy; if it is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that showeth mercy; if it be of God, and not of ourselves, that we are in Christ Jesus; if God hides these things from the wise and prudent and reveals them unto babes as seems good in his sight; then the influence by which He carries his purpose into effect must be efficacious from its own nature, and not owe its success to the determination of its subjects.

The same conclusion follows from what the Scriptures teach of the covenant of redemption. If in that covenant God gave to the Son his people as the reward of his obedience and death, then all those thus given to Him must come unto Him; and the influence which secures their coming must be certainly efficacious. Thus this doctrine is implicated with all the other great doctrines of grace. It is an essential, or, at least, an inseparable element of that system which God has revealed for the salvation of men; a system the grand design of which is the manifestation of the riches of divine grace, i.e., of his unmerited, mysterious love to the unworthy; and which, therefore, is so devised and so administered that he that glories must glory in the Lord; he must be constrained to say, and rejoice in saying, "Not unto us, O Lord; not unto us, but unto thy name give glory." (Ps. cxv. 1.)

Argument from Experience.

7. Appeal on this subject may safely be made to the experience of the individual believer, and to the history of the Church. All the phenomena of the Christian life are in accordance with the Augustinian doctrine of efficacious grace. No believer ever ascribes his regeneration to himself. He does not recognize himself as the author of the work, or his own relative goodness, his greater susceptibility to good impression, or his greater readiness of persuasion, as the reason why he rather than others, is the subject of this change. He knows that it is a work of God; and that it is a work of God's free grace. His heart responds to the language of the Apostle when he says: "Not by works of righteousness which we have done, but according to his mercy he saved us, by the washing of regeneration, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost." (Tit. iii. 5.) Paul says of himself that God, having separated him from his mother's womb called him by his grace. (Gal. i. 15.) There was nothing in him, who was injurious and a persecutor, to demand the special intervention of God in his behalf. So far from his referring his vocation to himself, to his greater readiness to yield to the influence of the truth, he constantly represents himself as a monument of the wonderful condescension and grace of God. He would have little patience to listen to the philosophical account of conversion, which makes the fact so intelligible why one believes and another rejects the offer of the Gospel. Paul's conversion is the type of every genuine conversion from that day to this. The miraculous circumstances attending it were simply adventitious. He was not converted by the audible words or by the blinding light, which encountered him on his way to Damascus. Our Lord said, "If they hear not Moses and the prophets, neither will they be persuaded, though one rose from the dead." (Luke xvi. 31.) Neither was the change effected by a process of reasoning or persuasion. It was by the instantaneous opening his eyes to see the glory of God in the person of Jesus Christ. And this opening his eyes was as obviously an act of unmerited favour and of God's almighty power, as was the restoration of the blind Bartimeus to sight. God, says the

Apostle, revealed his Son in Him. The revelation was internal and spiritual. What was true in his own experience, he tells us, is no less true in the experience of other believers. "The god of this world," he says, "hath blinded the minds of them which believe not." But "God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." (2 Cor. iv. 4, 6.) The truth concerning the person and work of Christ is presented objectively to all. The reason why some see it, and others do not, the Apostle refers to the simple fiat of Him who said in the beginning, "Let there be light." This is Paul's theory of conversion.

Five thousand persons were converted on the day of Pentecost. Most of them had seen the person and works of Christ. They had heard his instructions. They had hitherto resisted all the influences flowing from the exhibition of his character and the truth of his doctrines. They had remained obdurate and unbelieving under all the strivings of the Spirit who never fails to enforce truth on the reason and the conscience. Their conversion was sudden, apparently instantaneous. It was radical, affecting their whole character and determining their whole subsequent life. That this was not a natural change, effected by the influence of truth on the mind, or produced by a process of moral suasion, in prim□ facie certain from the whole narrative and from the nature of the case. The Holy Ghost was poured out abundantly, as the Apostle tells, in fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel. Three classes of effects immediately followed. First, miracles; that is, external manifestations of the immediate power of God. Secondly, the immediate illumination of the minds of the Apostles, by which they were raised from the darkness, prejudices, ignorance, and mistakes of their Jewish state, into the clear comprehension of the Gospel in all its spirituality and catholicity. Thirdly, the instantaneous conversion of five thousand of those who with wicked hands had crucified the Lord of glory, into his broken-hearted, adoring, devoted worshippers and servants. This third class of effects is as directly referred to the Spirit as either of the others. They all belong to the same general category. They were all supernatural, that is, produced by the immediate agency or volition of the Spirit of God. The Rationalist admits that they are all of the same general class. But he explains them all as natural effects, discarding all supernatural intervention. He has the advantage, so far as consistency is concerned, over those who admit the gift of tongues and the illumination of the Apostles to be the effects of the immediate agency of the Spirit, but insist on explaining the conversions as the consequents of argument and persuasion. This explanation is not only inconsistent with the narrative, but with the Scriptural method of accounting for these wonderful effects. The Bible says they are produced by "the exceeding greatness of" the power of God; that He raises those spiritually dead to a new life: that He creates a new heart in them; that He takes from them the heart of stone and gives them a heart of flesh; that He opens their eyes, and commands light to shine into their hearts, as in the beginning He commanded light to shine in the darkness which brooded over chaos. The Bible, therefore, refers conversion, or regeneration, to the class of events due to the immediate exercise of the power of God.

The scenes of the day of Pentecost do not stand alone in the history of the Church. Similar manifestations of the power of the Spirit have occurred, and are still occurring, in every part of the world. They all bear as unmistakably the impress of divine agency, as the miracles of the apostolic age did. We are justified, therefore, in saying that all the phenomena of Christian experience in the individual believer and in the Church

collectively, bear out the Augustinian doctrine of Efficacious Grace, and are inconsistent with every other doctrine on the subject.

[528] The Quarterly Christian Spectator of New Haven, vol. iii. 1831, p. 635.

[529] Westminster Quarterly, ch. ix. § 3.

[530] Ibid. ix. § 4.

[531] Ibid. x. § 2.

§ 6. Objections.

There are no specific objections against the doctrine of efficacious grace which need to be considered. Those which are commonly urged are pressed with equal force against other allied doctrines, and have already come under review. Thus, --

1. It is urged that this doctrine destroys human responsibility. If we need a change which nothing but almighty power can effect before we can do anything spiritually good, we cease to be responsible. This is the old objection that inability and responsibility are incompatible. This difficulty has been presented thousands of times in the history of the Church, and has been a thousand times answered. It assumes unwarrantably that an inability which arises from character, and constitutes character, is incompatible with character.

2. It is objected that if nothing but the creative power of God can enable us to repent and believe, we must patiently wait until that power is exerted. It is thus doubtless that those reason who are in love with sin and do not really desire to be delivered from it. Some leper, when Christ was upon earth, might have been so unreasonable as to argue that because he could not heal himself, he must wait until Christ came to heal him. The natural effect, however, of a conviction of utter helplessness is to impel to earnest application to the source whence alone help can come. And to all who feel their sinfulness and their inability to deliver themselves, there is the promise, "Come unto me . . . . and I will give you rest." "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you." It will be time enough for any man to complain when he fails to experience Christ's healing power, after having sought it as long, as earnestly, and as submissively to the directions of God's Word as its importance demands; or, even with the assiduity and zeal with which men seek the perishing things of this life.

3. It is objected that a doctrine which supposes the intervention of the immediate agency of the Great First Cause in the development of history, or regular series of events, is contrary to all true philosophy, and inconsistent with the relation of God to the world. This is a point, however, as to which philosophy and the Bible, and not the Bible only, but also natural religion, are at variance. The Scriptures teach the doctrines of creation, of a particular providence, of supernatural revelation, of inspiration, of the incarnation, of miracles, and of a future resurrection, all of which are founded on the assumption of the supernatural and immediate agency of God. If the Scriptures be true, the philosophy which denies the possibility of such immediate intervention, must be false. There every Christian is willing to leave the question.

§ 7. History of the Doctrine of Grace.

The doctrines of sin and grace are so intimately related, that the one cannot be stated without involving a statement of the other. Hence the views of different parties in the Church in reference to the work of the Spirit in the salvation of men, have already been incidentally presented in the chapter on Sin. With regard to the period antecedent to the Pelagian controversy, it may be sufficient to remark, (1.) As there was no general discussion of these subjects, there were no defined parties whose opinions were clearly announced and generally known. (2.) It is therefore, not the creeds adopted by the Church, but the opinions of individual writers, to which reference can be made as characteristic of this period. (3.) That the statements of a few ecclesiastical writers are very insufficient data on which to found a judgment as to the faith of the people. The convictions of believers are not determined by the writings of theologians, but by the Scriptures, the services of the Church, and the inward teaching of the Spirit, that is, by the unction from the Holy One of which the Apostle speaks, 1 John ii. 20. (4.) There is abundant evidence that the Church then, as always, held that all men since the fall are in a state of sin and condemnation; that this universality of sin had its historical and causal origin in the voluntary apostasy of Adam; that deliverance from this state of sin and misery can be obtained only through Christ, and by the aid of his Spirit; and that even infants as soon as born need regeneration and redemption. The practice of infant baptism was a constant profession of faith in the doctrines of original sin and of regeneration by the immediate agency of the Holy Spirit. (5.) It is no doubt true that many declarations may be cited from the early writers, especially of the Greek Church, inconsistent with one or more of the doctrines just stated; but it is no less true that these same writers and others of equal authority explicitly avow them. (6.) As the prevalent heresies of that time tended to fatalism, the natural counter tendency of the Church was to the undue exaltation of the liberty and ability of the human will. (7.) That this tendency was specially characteristic of the Greek Church, and has continued to distinguish the theology of that Church to the present day.

Pelagian Doctrine.

The Pelagian doctrine has already repeatedly been presented. It is only in reference to the views of Pelagius and his followers on the subject of grace that anything need now be said. As the Pelagians insisted so strenuously upon the plenary ability of man to avoid all sin, and to fulfil all duty, it was obvious to object that they ignored the necessity of divine grace of which the Scriptures so frequently and so plainly speak. This objection, however, Pelagius resented as an injury. He insisted that he fully recognized the necessity of divine grace for everything good, and magnified its office on every occasion. [532] In a letter to Innocent he assures the Roman bishop that while praising the nature of man, we always add the help of the grace of God; "ut Dei semper grati addamus auxilium." [533] By grace, however, he meant, (1.) Free will, the ability to do right under all circumstances. This inalienable endowment of our nature he regarded as a great distinction or gift of God. (2.) The law, and especially the revelation of God in the Gospel, and the example of Christ. He says God rouses men from the pursuit of earthly things, by his promises of future blessedness, etc. [534] (3.) The forgiveness of sin. The Pelagian heresy "asserts that the grace of God includes our being so created that we have power to avoid sin, that God has given us the help of the law and of his commands, and further that he pardons those who having sinned return unto him.' [535] In these things alone is the grace of God recognized." (4.) Both Pelagius and Julian speak of the operation of the Spirit on the minds of men as a

form of divine grace. In commenting on the words, "Ye are . . . . the epistle of Christ" (2 Cor. iii. 3), Pelagius says, "To all it is manifest that through our doctrine ye have believed on Christ, confirmante virtutem Spiritu Sancto.'" This influence of the Spirit, however, he regarded as didactic, or enlightening the mind; while he denied the absolute necessity of such spiritual influence, and taught that it only rendered obedience more easy. [536]

We have already seen that Augustine, holding as he did that man since the fall is in a state of spiritual death, utterly disabled and opposite to all good, taught that his restoration to spiritual life was an act of God's almighty power; and being an act of omnipotence was instantaneous, immediate, and irresistible. This point is sufficiently well known and already established.

Semi-Pelagianism.

The doctrine of Pelagius had been condemned in the provincial Synod of Carthage, A.D. 412; in the Council of Jerusalem, 413; and in the Third General Council at Ephesus, 431. The opposite doctrine of Augustine was declared to be Scriptural and the doctrine of the Church. It was one of the inevitable consequences of Augustine's doctrine of efficacious grace, that God is sovereign in election and reprobation. If the sinner cannot convert himself, nor prepare himself for that work, nor co-operate in effecting it, then it can neither be out of regard to such preparation or co-operation, nor because of the foresight thereof that God makes one, and not another the subject of his saving grace. This Augustine freely admitted, and taught, in accordance with the plain teachings of the Scriptures, that God has mercy on whom He will have mercy. It was this inevitable consequence of the doctrine rather than the doctrine itself, whether of total depravity and helplessness, or of irresistible grace, that led to the strenuous opposition which continued to be made to the Augustinian system notwithstanding the decision of councils in its favour. So prominent was the doctrine of predestination in these controversies, and so strong was the antipathy to that doctrine, that the Augustinians were called by their opponents Pr-destinati. To avoid the dreaded conclusion that fallen men lie at the mercy of God, and that He has mercy on whom He will have mercy, the Semi-Pelagians denied that the grace of God was irresistible. If not irresistible, then it depends on the sinner whether it be yielded to or rejected. But this yielding to the grace of God, is something right and good, and something leading to salvation. Fallen men therefore are not utterly disabled to all good. And if not thus powerless for spiritual good, they are not spiritually dead. Original sin consequently, is not so dreadful an evil as Augustine represented it. Men are weak and sick; but not helpless and dead. The Semi-Pelagians, as the designation implies, therefore, endeavoured to hold a middle ground between Augustine and Pelagius. They held, (1.) That in consequence of the fall of Adam, and our connection with him, all men are born in a state of sin and condemnation. (2.) That in consequence of this inherent, hereditary corruption, all the powers of man are weakened, so that he is of himself unable to resist sin and turn himself unto God. (3.) But while divine grace or aid is thus necessary to conversion, men may begin the work. They may seek after God, strive to walk in his ways, and comply with all the demands of the gospel. (4.) Those who thus begin the work of conversion, God assists in their endeavours by his grace; and if the sinner makes due improvement of this divine assistance, the work of conversion is effected. (5.) As it rests with those who hear the gospel to receive or to reject it, it cannot be admitted that any definite portion of the human

race was given to Christ as us inheritance whose salvation is rendered certain by that gift, and by the efficacious grace of God securing their conversion and their perseverance in faith. As the conversion of the sinner depends upon himself, so does his perseverance. The truly regenerated, therefore, may fall away and be lost.

On some of these points the original leaders of the Semi-Pelagian party differed among themselves, but this is a correct exhibition of the system as known in history as a form of doctrine. The characteristic principle of the Semi-Pelagian theory, by which it is distinguished from the doctrine afterwards adopted in the Romish Church, and by the Remonstrants and others, is that the sinner begins the work of conversion. The Semi-Pelagians denied "preventing grace." God helps those only who begin to help themselves. He is found only of those who seek Him.

The historical details of the rise of Semi-Pelagianism are given above in the section on Original Sin. The most obscure point in the system is the meaning to be attached to the word "grace." It was used, as before remarked, in a sense so wide as to include all divine help, whether afforded externally in the revelation of the truth, the institutions of the Church, or the circumstances of life, or by the providential efficiency of God as exerted in co�peration with all second causes, or by the special influence of the Holy Spirit. This last came to be the accepted meaning of the word grace. According to Augustinians, this influence of the Spirit was mediate, or through the truth, in all those exercises which, in the case of adults, usually precede the work of regeneration, such as conviction, remorse, anxiety, desire for deliverance from the curse of the law, etc.; and also in the constant activity of the soul after regeneration in the exercise of all the gifts of the Spirit. It is, however, immediate, creative, and almighty in the work of regeneration. A blind man might be deeply sensible of the misery of his sightless state, and earnestly desire that his eyes should be opened. He might be informed that Jesus of Nazareth restored sight to the blind. Arguments might be used to awaken confidence in the power and willingness of Jesus to grant that blessing to him. Under these mediate influences he might frequent the place where Jesus was to be found, and seek his aid. If the Lord spake the word, his eyes were instantly opened. Then all the glories of the heavens and the wonders of the earth broke on his view. The state of that man's mind was very complex. It was the result of many co�perating causes. But the restoration of sight itself, was the simple, mediate, instantaneous effort of almighty power. This was precisely what the Semi-Pelagians denied as in relation to regeneration. They saw that if that was admitted, they must admit the sovereignty of God in election and all the other features of the Augustinian system. They, therefore, insisted not only that the preliminary work was from the man himself, and not due to the Spirit's drawing one man and not another, but that in every state of the process, the Spirit's influence was mediate, i.e., a moral suasion through the truth, which could be, and in multitudes of cases actually is, effectually resisted. These are the doctrines condemned in the Councils of Orange and Valence, A.D. 529. The decrees of those Councils being ratified by the Bishop of Rome, Augustinianism was reestablished as the authoritative form of doctrine for the Latin Church.

Scholastic Period.

All conceivable forms of doctrine concerning sin and grace were ventilated successively by the subtle intellects of the schoolmen of the Middle Ages. Some of the

theologians of that period were really pantheistic in their philosophy; others, while recognizing a personal God, merge all the efficiency of second causes in his omnipresent agency; others went to the opposite extreme of making the human will independent of God, and maintained that men can act contrary to all kinds and degrees of influence not destructive of their nature, which may be brought to bear upon them. These sided naturally with Pelagius. Plenary ability, the power to do whatever is obligatory, they said, is essential to free agency. Men may, therefore, abstain from all sin. When sinners they may turn themselves unto God. If God condescends to aid them in this work, either by external revelations or by inward influence, they must have the power to yield or to refuse. The alternative rests with themselves. Others again come nearer to the Semi-Pelagian theory, admitting that man cannot save himself; cannot turn unto God; cannot repent or believe without divine aid. But this aid they held was given to all in sufficient measure to enable every man to become and to continue a true penitent and believer. Many of the most distinguished theologians of the Latin Church, however, during this period adhered more or less closely to the doctrines of Augustine. This was the case with Leo and Gregory the Great, in the fifth and sixth centuries, and Bede and Alcuin in the eighth and ninth. When, however, Gottschalk avowed the Augustinian doctrine, not only of original sin and grace, but also of predestination, it gave rise to violent opposition and issued in his condemnation in the Council of Chiersy, 849, under the influence of Hincmar; but in the opposing Council of Valence, 855 A.D., the doctrines of election and grace in the Augustinian sense were maintained.

Anselm in the eleventh century was essentially Augustinian in his views of sin and grace. He held that man is born in a state of sin, with a will enslaved to evil, free only in sinning. From this state of helplessness, he can be freed only by the grace of the Holy Spirit, not by his own power, and not by an influence which owes its success to the coperation of an enslaved will. [537]

The two great contending powers in the Latin Church for two centuries before the Council of Trent, were the Dominicans and Franciscans, the Thomists and Scotists, the former the followers of Thomas Aquinas, and the latter of Duns Scotus. As Aquinas adopted very nearly the doctrine of Augustine concerning original sin, he approached more nearly to Augustinianism in his views concerning grace and predestination than the majority of the schoolmen. He held that man since the fall had lost all ability to anything spiritually good; that, without grace, he could do nothing acceptable to God or which secured salvation. But he held, --

1. That a gratia preveniens, a divine influence which precedes any good effort on the part of the sinner is granted to men, by which they are excited, encouraged, and aided. If this influence be improved, it secures the merit of congruity, "Quia congruum est, ut dum homo bene utitur sua virtute, Deus secundum superexcellentem virtutem excellentius operetur." [538] This divine influence is called "gratia prima," and "gratia gratis data."

2 To this preventing grace when improved, is added the "gratia gratum faciens," renewing grace, called also "gratia operans;" and, in reference to its effects, "gratia habitualis," by which is meant, "infusio grati."

3. To this succeeds the constant "gratia cooperans." "Gratia," he says, "dupliciter potest intelligi. Uno modo divinum auxilium quo nos movet ad bene volendum et agendum.

Alio modo habituale donum." Again, "Gratia dividitur in operantem et cooperantem, secundum diversos effectus, ita etiam in pr&#65533;venientem et subsequentem, qualitercunque gratia accipiatur. Sunt autem quinque effectus grati&#65533; in nobis, quorum primus est, ut anima sanetur: secundus, ut bonum velit; tertius est, ut bonum quod vult, efficaciter operetur: quartus est, ut in bono perseveret: quintus est, ut ad gloriam perveniat." [539]

Duns Scotus, in his philosophy and theology, was indeed devoted to the Church, but antagonistic to the views of her most distinguished teachers. This antagonism was most pronounced against Thomas Aquinas, whose opinions he took every opportunity of opposing. Scotus endeavoured, as far as possible, to obliterate the distinction between the supernatural and the natural. Admitting the operations of divine grace, and their necessity, he endeavoured to reduce them to the category of the natural or established agency of God in co&#65533;peration with second causes. He held the doctrine of "absolute power," according to which everything, the moral law, the method of salvation, everything but absolute contradictions, are subject to the arbitrary will of God. God can, as Scotus taught, make right wrong and wrong right, love a crime and malice a virtue. Nothing has any value or merit in itself. It depend. simply on the good pleasure of God, what it avails. There is no merit, much less infinite merit in the work of Christ. God might have made anything else, even the most insignificant, the ground of our salvation. The requisition of faith and repentance in order to salvation is alike arbitrary. It depends solely on the absolute will of God that holiness, the supernatural work of the Spirit, has higher value than morality, which is the product of the unassisted free-will of man. Sin is wholly voluntary. Hereditary depravity is not truly sin; it is simply the want of the supernatural righteousness which Adam lost for himself and for all his posterity. The will remains free. Man can sin or avoid all sin. Nevertheless, God determines to accept only the fruits of grace, with which the will co&#65533;perates. It was principally the doctrine of Duns Scotus concerning original sin, and its universality, and especially in reference to the Virgin Mary, which was the subject of constant conflict between the Dominicans and Franciscans in the Latin Church. [540]

The Tridentine Doctrine.

The Council of Trent had a very difficult task to perform in framing a statement of the doctrines of sin and grace which, while it condemned the Protestant doctrine, should not obviously infringe against either the acknowledged doctrines of the Latin Church, or the cherished views of one or other of the conflicting parties within its pale. This, indeed, was not merely a difficult, but an impossible task. It was impossible to condemn the Protestant doctrine on these subjects without condemning the doctrine of Augustine, which the Church had already sanctioned. The Council availed itself of generalities as far as possible, and strove so to frame its canons as to secure the assent of the greatest number. On the subject of grace it, (1.) Expressly condemned the Pelagian doctrine of free-will or plenary ability. "Si quis dixerit hominem suis operibus, qu&#65533; vel per human&#65533; natur&#65533; vires, vel per legis doctrinam fiant, absque divina per Jesum Christum gratia posse justificari (become holy) coram Deo; anathema sit." "Si quis dixerit, ad hoc solum gratiam per Jesum Christum dari, ut facilius homo justi vivere, ac vitam &#65533;ternam promereni possit; quasi per liberum arbitrium sine gratia utrumque, sed &#65533;gre tamen, et difficiliter possit; anathema sit." (2.) It condemned with equal distinctness the Semi-Pelagian doctrine that man begins the work of conversion: "Si quis dixerit, sine pr&#65533;venienti Spiritus Sancti inspiratione, atque ejus

adjutorio, hominem credere, sperare, diligere aut poenitere posse, sicut oportet, ut ei justificationis (regeneration) gratia conferatur; anathema sit." (3.) Against the Reformers and Augustine the Council decided, "Si quis dixerit, liberum hominis arbitrium a Deo motum, et excitatum nihil cooperari assentiendo Deo excitanti, atque vocanti, quo ad obtinendam justificationis gratiam se disponat, ac pr[?]paret; neque posse dissentire si velit; sed velut inanime quoddam nihil omnino agere, mereque passive se habere; anathema sit." "Si quis liberum homninis arbitrium [by which is meant, potestas ad utramque partem] post Ad[?] peccatum amissum, et extinctum esse dixerit; aut rem esse de solo titulo, immo titulum sine re, figmentum denique a Satana invectum in ecclesiam: anathema sit." [541]

There is of course confusion and misapprehension in all these statements. The Protestants did not deny that men co[?]perate in their own conversion, taking that word in the sense in which the Romanists used the term (and the still broader term justificatio), as including the whole work of turning unto God. No one denies that the man in the synagogue co[?]perated in stretching out his withered arm or that the impotent one at the pool was active in obeying the command of Christ, "Arise, take up thy bed, and go unto thine house." But the question is, Did they co[?]perate in the communication of vital power to their impotent limbs? So Protestants do not deny that the soul is active in conversion, that the "arbitrium a Deo motum" freely assents; but they do deny that the sinner is active and co[?]perating in the production of the new life in the exercise of which the sinner turns to God. Moehler, the ablest and most plausible of the modern defenders of Romanism, uses the word "new-birth" as including the life-long process of sanctification, in which the soul is abundantly co[?]perative. He recognizes, however, the radical difference between the Tridentine doctrine and that of the Protestants. He insists that in the whole work, in regeneration in its limited sense, as well as in conversion, the soul co[?]perates with the Spirit, and that it depends on this co[?]peration, whether the sinner receives the new life or not. The power of the Spirit in all its inward operations may be resisted or assented to as the free-will of the subjects of his influence may decide. "According to Catholic principles," as before quoted, he says, "there are two agencies combined in the work of the new birth, the human and the divine, so that it is a divine-human work. The divine influence goes first, exciting, awakening and vivifying, without any agency of the man in meriting, invoking, or procuring it; but the subject must allow himself to be aroused and must freely follow. God offers his help to deliver from the fall, but the sinner must consent to be helped and embrace the offered aid; if he accepts, he is taken by the divine Spirit, and gradually, although in this life never perfectly, restored to the heights from which he fell. The Spirit of God does not work by necessitating, although he is actively urgent; his omnipotence sets itself a limit in human liberty, which it does not overstep; for such violation of free agency would be the destruction of the moral order of the world which eternal wisdom has founded on liberty." He therefore justifies the Papal condemnation of the Jansenist doctrine: "Quando Deus vult animam salvam facere, et eam tangit interiori grati[?] su[?] manu, nulla voluntas humana ei resistit. -- Dei gratia nihil aliud est, quam ejus omnipotens voluntas." [542] On the following page, [543] he says, "The Catholic doctrine that there are in fallen men moral and religious powers which do not always sin, and which must in the new birth be called into exercise, gave rise to the idea, that this activity of what is natural in man, was a transition into grace, that is, that the right use of what is natural conditions or secures grace. This would indeed be Pelagian, and the man, not Christ, would merit grace, and

grace cease to be grace. . . . . The delicate and refined sense of the Catholic doctrine, which carefully distinguishes between nature and grace, avoids that difficulty. The finite, even when sinless, may stretch itself to the utmost, it never reaches the Infinite, so as to seize and appropriate it. Nature may honestly unfold all its powers, it never can by and out of itself be sublimated into the Supernatural; the human can by no exertion of power make itself divine. There is an impassable gulf between the two, if grace does not interpose. The divine must come down to the human, if the human is to become divine." This is philosophy. The question is not, whether the finite can attain the Infinite, or the human become divine. Nor is the question between Romanists and Protestants, Whether fallen men can become holy without the supernatural grace of the Holy Spirit. But the question is, Whether the regeneration of the soul is due to the nature of the Spirit's influence, and to the purpose of God, or to the consent and co<?>peration of the subject of that influence.

The Synergistic Controversy.

The Lutherans from the beginning held the doctrine of original sin in its most extreme form. In the Augsburg Confession, in the Apology for that Confession, in the Smalcald Articles, and finally, in the Form of Concord, that doctrine is stated in stronger terms than in any other Christian Symbol. If men are since the fall in a state of condemnation, if the hereditary corruption derived from Adam is not only truly sin, but the deepest and greatest of all sins; if the soul is not merely morally sick and enfeebled, but spiritually dead, as taught in those Symbols, then it follows: (1.) That man since the fall has no ability to anything spiritually good (2.) That in order to his return to God he needs the life giving power of the Spirit of God. (3.) That the sinner can in no way prepare himself to be the subject of this grace, he cannot merit it, nor can he co<?>perate with it. Regeneration is exclusively the work of the Spirit, in which man is the subject and not the agent. (4.) That, therefore, it depends on God, and not on man, who are, and who are not, to be made partakers of eternal life. (5.) That consequently God acts as a sovereign, according to his good pleasure, and according to the counsel of his own will, in saving some and in passing by others, who are left to the just recompense of their sins. All these inferences are, as Augustinians believe, drawn in Scripture, and were freely accepted by Luther and, at first, by the Lutheran Church. Before the death of the Reformer, and more openly after that event, many of the Lutheran theologians adopted the later views of Melancthon, who taught, "Concurrunt tres caus<?> bon<?> actionis, verbum Dei, Spiritus Sanctus, et humana voluntas assentiens nec repugnans verbo Dei. Posset enim excutere, ut excutit Saul sua sponte." [544] He defined freewill as "facultas applicandi se, ad gratiam." [545] In these views, which of necessity involved a modification of the doctrine of original sin, Melancthon was followed by a large class of Lutheran theologians, especially those of Wittemberg. The theologians of Jena, with one prominent exception, Strigel, adhered to the old Lutheran doctrine. Besides this discussion about sin and grace, there were several other subjects which greatly agitated the Lutheran Church. The doctrine concerning the person of Christ, the nature of justification, the necessity of good works, toleration of Papal ceremonies (the adiaphora), and the Lord's Supper, were debated with so much zeal that the Protestant rulers were constrained to interfere. Under their auspices, Andreas and Chemnitz, assisted by other theologians, drew up what is known as the "Form of Concord," in which with great clearness and skill they reviewed all the matters in dispute, and endeavoured to adopt a mode of statement which should secure general assent. In this they were not disappointed.

The Form of Concord was so generally adopted that it received full symbolical authority, and has ever since been regarded as the standard of orthodoxy among the Lutherans. [546]

As to original sin, and the consequent utter inability of man to any spiritual good, the doctrine of Luther was retained in its integrity. Luther had said in his book, "De Servo Arbitrio," [547] "Admonitos velim liberi arbitrii tutores, ut sciant, sese esse abnegatores Christi dum asserunt liberum arbitrium. Nam si meo studio gratiam Dei obtineo, quid opus est Christi gratia pro mea gratia accipienda?" "Humiliari penitus non potest homo, donec sciat, prorsus extra suas vires, studia, voluntatem, opera, omnino ex alterius arbitrio, consilio, voluntate, opere suam pendere salutem, nempe Dei solius." [548] On this point the "Form of Concord" says, inter alia, "Credimus, quantum abest, ut corpus mortuum seipsum vivificare atque sibi ipsi corporalem vitam restituere possit, tantum abesse, ut homo, qui ratione peccati spiritualiter mortuus est, seipsum in vitam spiritualem revocandi ullam facultatem habeat." [549] Of course, if such be the state of the natural man, there can be no coperation on the part of the sinner in the work of regeneration. This Symbol, therefore, says, "Antequam homo per Spiritum Sanctum illuminatur, convertitur, regeneratur et trahitur, ex sese et propriis naturalibus suis viribus in rebus spiritualibus et ad conversionem aut regenerationem suam, nihil inchoare operari, nut cooperari potest, nec plus, quam lapis, truncus, aut limus." [550] Again, "Quamvis renati etiam in hac vita eousque progrediantur, ut bonum velint eoque delectentur, et bene agere atque in pietate proficere studeant: tamen hoc ipsum non a nostra voluntate aut a viribus nostris proficiscitur, sed Spiritus Sanctus operatur in nobis illud velle et perficere." [551]

If original sin involves spiritual death, and spiritual death implies utter inability to spiritual good, and to all coperation in the work of regeneration, it follows that regeneration is exclusively the work of the Spirit, in which the subject is entirely passive. This, also, the "Form of Concord" admits. "Item, quod D. Lutherus scripsit, hominis voluntatem in conversione pure passive se habere: id recte et dextere est accipiendum, videlicet respectu divin grati in accendendis novis motibus, hoc est, de eo intelligi oportet, quando Spiritus Dei per verbum auditum, aut per usum sacramentorum hominis voluntatem aggreditur, et conversionem atque regenerationem in homine operatur. Postquam enim Spiritus Sanctus hoc ipsum jam operatus est atque effecit, hominisque voluntatem sola sua divina virtute et operatione immutavit atque renovavit: tunc revera hominis nova illa voluntas instrumentum est et organon Dei Spiritus Sancti, ut ea non modo gratiam apprehendat, verum etiam in operibus sequentibus Spiritui Sancto cooperetur." [552]

But if the reason why any man is regenerated is not that he yields of his own will to the grace of God, or that he coperates with it, but simply that God gives him a new heart, then it would seem to follow that God saves some and not others of the fallen race of men, of his own good pleasure. In other words, it follows that election to eternal life is not founded in anything in us, but solely in the will or purpose of God. This conclusion the "Form of Concord" admits, so far as the saved are concerned. It teaches (1) That predestination has reference only to the saved. That God predestinates no one either to sin or to eternal death. (2.) That the election of some persons to salvation is not for anything good in them, but solely of the mercy or grace of God. (3.) That predestination to life is the cause of salvation. That is, it is because God from eternity purposed to save certain individuals of the human family, that they are saved. (4.) That this predestination or election

renders the salvation of the elect certain. Should they for a time fall away, their election secures their restoration to a state of grace. The following passages contain the avowal of these several principles. "Pr&#65533;destinatio, seu &#65533;terna Dei electio, tantum ad bonos et dilectos filios Dei pertinet; et h&#65533;c est causa ipsorum salutis. Etenim eorum salutem procurat, et ea, qu&#65533; ad ipsam pertinent, disponit. Super hanc Dei pr&#65533;destinationem salus nostra ita fundata est, ut inferorum port&#65533; eam evertere nequeant." [553] "Hac pia doctrina et declaratione articuli de &#65533;terna et salvifica electorum filiorum Dei pr&#65533;destinatione Deo gloria sua omnis solide tribuitur, quod videlicet mera et gratuita misericordia in Christo (absque omnibus nostris meritis aut bonis operibus) salvos nos faciat, secundum voluntatis su&#65533; propositum. Eph i. 5 sq. . . . . Falsum igitur est et cum verbo Dei pugnat, cum docetur, quod non sola Dei misericordia, et unicum sanctissimum Christi meritum, verum etiam aliquid in nobis causa sit electionis divin&#65533;, propter quod nos Deus ad vitam &#65533;ternam pr&#65533;destinaverit. Non enim tantum antequam aliquid boni faceremus, verum etiam priusquam nasceremur, imo ante jacta fundamenta mundi elegit nos Deus in Christo. Ut secundum electionem propositum Dei maneret, non ex operibus, sed ex vocante, dictum est ei: Major serviet minori. Rom. 9, [11.]" [554]

As to the perseverance of the saints, it is said, "Cum etiam electio nostra ad vitam &#65533;ternam non virtutibus aut justitia nostra, sed solo Christi merito, et benigna coelestis Patris voluntate nitatur, qui seipsum negare non potest (cum in voluntate et essentia sua sit immutabilis), eam ob causam, quando filii ipsius obedientiam non pr&#65533;stant, sed in peccata labuntur, per verbum eos ad poenitentiam revocat, et Spiritus Sanctus per verbum vult in iis efficax esse, ut in viam redeant, et vitam emendent." [555] The older Lutheran theologians adhered to this doctrine. Hutter [556] asks, "Siccine ergo electi non possunt excidere gratia Dei? Immo vero possunt; sed ita, ut per veram poenitentiam et fidem sese rursus virtute Spiritus Sancti ad Deum convertant et ad vitam redeant. Nisi enim redirent, non essent in numero electorum."

But if all men since the fall are in a state of spiritual death, utterly unable to do anything to secure the grace of God, or to give that grace, when offered, a saving effect; if election is not a mere general purpose to save those who believe, but a purpose to save particular individuals; if that purpose is of God's mere good pleasure, and not founded upon anything actual or foreseen in its objects; if, moreover, it is the cause of salvation, and renders the salvation of its objects certain; then it would seem inevitably to follow, that although the judicial reason why the non-elect fail of salvation is their own sin, yet the reason why they, and not others equally guilty are left to suffer the penalty of their sins, is to be found in the sovereignty of God. "Even so, Father; for so it seemed good in thy sight." This, however, the Lutherans of that day could not admit; and therefore, with what Guericke calls "g&#65533;ttlich nothwendiger Verstandes-Inconsequenz" [557] (a divinely necessitated logical inconsistency), they rejected that consequence of their avowed principles. In this illogical position the theologians of the Lutheran Church could not remain, and therefore, since Gerhard (who died A.D. 1637), they have adopted the more consistent scheme which has already been exhibited. According to that scheme, God sincerely not only desires, but purposes the salvation of all men; He makes abundant provision for the salvation of all; sends grace and truth to all, which grace and truth become certainly efficacious, unless resisted. Those whom God foresees will not resist, He elects to eternal life; those whom He foresees will resist unto the end, He foreordains to eternal death.

Reformed Church.

The experience of the Reformed Church conformed to that of the Lutheran, in so far as that the same defection from the original confessional doctrines occurred in both. As the followers of Melancthon adopted the theory of synergism, or of the co-operation of the sinner in his own regeneration, on which co-operation his fate depended, substantially the same view was adopted by the Remonstrants or Arminians within the pale of the Reformed Church. The departure of the Remonstrants from the principles of the Reformation, as to original sin, grace, ability, the satisfaction of Christ, justification and faith, was far more serious than that which occurred among the Lutherans. Another marked difference between the two cases is, that the synergistic controversy resulted in a modification of the Lutheran scheme of doctrine which became general and permanent; whereas the Remonstrants or Arminians formed a distinct ecclesiastical organization outside of the Reformed churches which adhered to the Reformed faith. The peculiar doctrines of the Remonstrants, both as to sin and as to grace, were stated above; [558] and also those of the Evangelical or Wesleyan Arminians. [559] The decision of the Synod of Dort, condemnatory of the Arminian doctrines, was unanimous. That Synod included delegates from all the Reformed churches except that of France, whose delegates were prevented from attending by an order from the King. The established churches of England and Scotland, as well as those of Holland, Germany, and Switzerland were represented. The judgment of the Synod was therefore the judgment of the Reformed Church. In accordance with the acknowledged Symbols of that Church, the Synod decided, (1.) That "all mankind sinned in Adam and became exposed to the curse and eternal death. That God would have done no injustice to any one, if He had determined to leave the whole human race under sin and the curse." [560] (2.) "That God out of the human race, fallen by their fault into sin and destruction, according to the most free good pleasure of his own will, and of mere grace, chose a certain number of men, neither better nor worthier than others to salvation in Christ." [561] (3.) That this decree to elect "a certain number" to eternal life, involves of necessity and according to the teaching of Scripture, a purpose to pass by, and leave those not elected to suffer the just punishment of their sins. [562] (4.) That God out of infinite and unmerited love sent his Son "efficaciously to redeem" all those "who were from eternity chosen unto salvation and given to Him by the Father." [563] (5.) That Christ makes satisfaction for us, being "made sin and a curse upon the cross for us, or in our stead," and that "this death of the Son of God is a single and most perfect sacrifice and satisfaction for sins, if infinite value and price abundantly sufficient to expiate the sins of the whole world." [564] "The promise of the Gospel is, that whosoever believeth in Christ crucified shall not perish, but have eternal life. Which promise ought to be announced and proposed, promiscuously and indiscriminately, to all nations and men to whom God, in his good pleasure, hath sent the Gospel, with the command to repent and believe." [565] "But because many who are called by the Gospel do not repent, nor believe in Christ, but perish in unbelief; this doth not arise from defect or insufficiency of the sacrifice offered by Christ upon the cross, but from their own fault." [566] This general invitation or call is perfectly sincere on the part of God; "for sincerely and most truly God shows in his Word what is pleasing to Him; namely, that they who are called should come to Him. And He sincerely promises to all who come to Him, and believe, the peace of their souls and eternal life." [567] That some do come and are converted, "is not to be ascribed to man, as if he distinguished himself by free-will from

others furnished with equal or sufficient grace for faith and conversion (which the proud heresy of Pelagius states) but to God, who, as He chose his own people in Christ from eternity, so He effectually calls them in time." [568] "This regeneration is declared in the Scriptures to be a new creation, a resurrection from the dead, a giving of life which God without us (that is, without our concurrence) worketh in us. And this is by no means effected by the doctrine alone sounding without, by moral suasion, or by such a mode of operation, that after the operation of God (as far as He is concerned) it should remain in the power of man, to be regenerated or not regenerated, converted or not converted; but it is manifestly an operation supernatural, at the same time most powerful, most sweet, wonderful, secret, ineffable in its power, according to Scripture (which is inspired by the author of this operation) not less than, or inferior to, creation, or the resurrection of the dead." [569] "This grace God owes to no man." He who receives it must render everlasting thanks; he who does not receive it, either cares not for spiritual things, and rests satisfied with himself, or, secure, he vainly boasts that he has that which he has not. [570] "This divine grace of regeneration does not act upon men like stocks and trees, or take away the properties of his will, or violently compel it while unwilling; but it spiritually quickens (vivifies), heals, corrects, and sweetly, and at the same time powerfully inclines it." [571] "Those whom God, according to his purpose, calleth to fellowship of his Son our Lord Jesus Christ, and regenerates by his Holy Spirit, He indeed sets free from the dominion and slavery of sin, but not entirely in this life from the flesh and the body of sin." [572] Because of these remains of sin, believers, if left to themselves, would fall away, "but God is faithful, who confirms them in the grace once mercifully conferred upon them, and powerfully preserves them in the same even unto the end." [573]

Hypothetical Universalism.

A class of theologians in the Reformed Church who did not agree with the Remonstrants against whom the decisions of the Synod of Dort, sustained by all branches of the Reformed body, were directed, were still unable to side with the great mass of their brethren. The most distinguished of these theologians were Amyraut, La Place, and Cappellus. Their views have already been briefly stated in the sections treating of mediate imputation; and of the order of decrees and of the design of redemption. These departures from the accepted doctrines of the Reformed Church produced protracted agitation, not in France only but also in Holland and Switzerland. The professors of the University of Leyden. Andreas Rivet and Frederick Spanheim, were especially prominent among the opposers of the innovations of the French theologians. The clergy of Geneva drew up a protest in the form of a Consensus of the Helvetic Churches which received symbolical authority The doctrines against which this protest was directed are, (1.) That God, out of general benevolence towards men, and not out of special love to his chosen people, determined to redeem all mankind, provided they should repent and believe on the appointed Redeemer. Hence the theory was called hypothetical universalism. (2.) That the death or work of Christ had no special reference to his own people; it rendered the salvation of no man certain, but the salvation of all men possible. (3.) As the call of the gospel is directed to all men, all have the power to repent and believe. (4.) God foreseeing that none, if left to themselves, would repent, determines of his own good pleasure to give saving grace to some and not to others. This is the principal distinguishing feature between the theory of these French theologians and of the Semi-Pelagians and Remonstrants. The

former admit the sovereignty of God in election; the latter do not.

This system necessitates a thorough change in the related doctrines of the gospel. If fallen men have power to repent and believe, then original sin (subjectively considered) does not involve absolute spiritual death. If this be so, then mankind are not subject to the death threatened to Adam. Therefore, there is no immediate imputation of Adam's sin to his posterity. As they derive a polluted nature from him, which is the ground of the displeasure of God, they may so far be said to share in his sin. This is mediate imputation. Again, if the death of Christ does not render certain the salvation of his people, then it was not vicarious in the proper sense of that word; nor did He die as a substitute. His satisfaction assumes of necessity the character of a general display, a didactic exhibition of truth. At least this is the logical tendency, and the actual historical consequence of the theory. Moreover, if Christ did not act as the substitute and representativc of his people, there is no ground for the imputation of his righteousness to them. The French theologians, therefore, denied that his active obedience is thus imputed to believers. The merit of his death may be said to be thus imputed as it is the ground of the forgiveness of sin. This of course destroys the idea of justification by merging it into an executive act of pardon. Moreover, the principles on which this theory is founded, require that as every other provision of the gospel is general and universal, so also the call must be. But as it is undeniable that neither the written word nor the preached gospel has extended to all men, it must be assumed that the revelation of God made in his works, in his providence, and in the constitution of man, is adequate to lead men to all the knowledge necessary to salvation; or, that the supernatural teaching and guidance of the Spirit securing such knowledge must be granted to all men. It is too obviously inconsistent and unreasonable to demand that redemption must be universal, and ability universal as the common heritage of man, and yet admit that the knowledge of that redemption and of what sinners are required to do in the exercise of their ability, is confined to comparatively few. The "Formula Consensus Helvetica," therefore, includes in its protest the doctrine of those "qui vocationem ad salutem non sola Evangelii pr&#65533;dicatione, sed natur&#65533; etiam ac Providenti&#65533; operibuis, citra ullum exterius pr&#65533;conium expediri sentiunt," etc. [574] It is not wonderful, therefore, that this diluted form of Augustinianismn should be distasteful to the great body of the Reformed Churches. It was rejected universally except in France, where, after repeated acts of censure, it came to be tolerated.

Supernaturalism and Rationalism.

The departure from the doctrines of the church standards of the Protestant churches began early, with the decline of vital godliness. The only stable foundation for truth is either the external authority of the Church tolerating no dissent, or the inward testimony of the Spirit, the unction of the Holy One which both teaches and convinces. The former from its nature can secure only apparent conformity or the assent of indifference. Living faith can come only from a life-giving source.

The first great change was effected by the introduction of the Wolf-Leibnitzian method into theology. Wolf assumed that all the truths of religion, even its highest mysteries, were truths of the reason, and capable of being demonstrated to the reason. This was a complete revolution. It changed the foundation of faith from the testimony of God in his Word and by his Spirit, to the testimony of our own feeble, insignificant reason. No wonder that a

building resting on such a foundation, first tottered, and then fell. If the demonstration of the doctrine of the Trinity from the truths of the reason failed to convince, the doctrine was rejected. So of all the other great doctrines of revelation, and so especially of the Scriptural doctrines of sin and grace. A class of Rationalists was therefore soon formed; some rejecting everything supernatural, all prophecy, immediate revelation, inspiration, miracles, and divine influence other than what was mediate and providential; and others, while admitting a supernatural revelation supernaturally authenticated, still maintained that the truths of such revelation were only those of natural religion, all others being explained away or rejected as accommodations to the modes of thinking and speaking in past ages. This change was of course gradual. The Rationalists proper soon came to deny any supernatural influence of the Spirit of God in the conversion of men. Being Theists, and admitting that God exercises a providential efficiency, not only in the external world, but also in the support and guidance of free agents, -- an efficiency which is natural, as operating in accordance with natural laws, they referred all that the Scriptures teach and all that the Church teaches, of the operations of grace, to the general head of providence. God does no more and no less in the conversion of men than He does in their education, and in furthering their success in life, or in causing the rain to fall and the grass to grow. In denying the Scriptural account of the fall of man, the Rationalists rejected the foundation on which the whole Scriptural scheme of redemption rested.

The Supernaturalists, although united against the Rationalists, differed very much among themselves. Some stood on the dividing line, admitting supernatural intervention on the part of God, in revelation and in grace, not because asserted in the Scriptures, but because consistent with reason, and because probable and desirable. Thus Bretschneider says in reference to grace, "Reason finds the immediate operation of God on the souls of men for their illumination and improvement, not only possible, but probable. As God stands in connection with the external world, and in virtue of his infinitely perfect life constantly operates therein; so must He also stand in connection with the moral world, or there could be no moral government. But as his working in the natural world appears as natural, so that we never apprehend his supernatural efficiency; thus his operation in the moral world is also natural conformed to psychological laws, so that we are never conscious of his operation." [575] This divine influence, therefore, he says, is simply "moral." "It can consist only in this, that God, through the ideas which the truth awakens in the soul, rouses it to decide for the good." [576]

Morus [577] makes the reformation of men the work of God in so far that God sustains "nostrum in usu doctrin\u0000 studium," so that it is successful. He attributes to man the ability to devote himself to this study, and declares that we do not need to determine, "quid et quantum Deus atque homo faciant, ubi aut quando Deus aut homo incipiat, seu desinat, Deus solus agat, seu homo aliquid conferat."

J. L. Z. Junkheim [578] taught that the work of God in conversion as supernatural, not because He acts immediately, but because the means through which He works, his Word as a divine revelation, and the effect are supernatural. The modus agendi is purely natural, and the reformation only so far exceeds the natural power of man, as that the truth by which it is effected was not discovered by man, but revealed by God; and so far as this revealed truth has more power than the thoughts or speculations of men.

Michaelis [579] and D&#65533;derlein [580] took the same ground, and denied any supernatural influence in the work of conversion. Others taught that the grace of God is universal, and that by grace is to be understood natural knowledge, and the helps to virtue, of which men have the opportunity and power to avail themselves. Eberhard, [581] Henke, Eckermann, and Wegscheider [582] acknowledge only a general agency of God in conversion, in that He has written the moral law on the hearts of men, given them the power of self-reformation, and is the author of Christianity, and in his providence gives them the occasion and inducements to virtuous action. Ammon [583] says grace consists in "procuratione institutionis salutaris, excitatione per exempla virtutis illustria, paupertate, calamitatibus, admonitionibus amicorum et inimicorum," etc. [584] There was a class of theologians during this period to which Storr, Flatt, and Knapp belonged, who opposed these open denials of the principles, not only of Protestant, but also of Catholic Christianity, but who were nevertheless far below the standard of the Reformation.

To this state of extreme attenuation was the theology of the Reformers reduced, when the introduction of the speculative, transcendental, or pantheistic philosophy effected an entire revolution, which even such writers as Dorner are accustomed to call "the regeneration of theology." The leading principle of this philosophy, in all its phases, is Monism, the denial of all real dualism between God and man. If man is only the modus existendi of God, then of course there is an end of all questions about sin and grace. Sin can only be imperfect development, and man's activity bcing only a form of the agency of God, there is no place for what the Church means by grace. All resolves itself into the Hegelian dictum, "What God does I do, and what I do God does. "Der menschliche Wille eine Wirkungsform des g&#65533;ttlichen Willens . . . . ist." [585]

The change introduced by the new philosophy was pervading. Even those who did not adopt it in its anti-christian or anti-theistic results, had all their modes of thought and expression modified by its influence. The views thus induced, of the nature of God, of his relation to the world, of the nature or constitution of man, of the person of Christ, and of the method of redemption, were so diverse from those previously adopted, that the new theology, whether designated as mystic or speculative, has few points of contact with the systems previously adopted. Its whole nomenclature is changed, so that the productions of the writers of this class cannot be understood without some previous training. Of course it is out of the question to class these theologians, who differ greatly among themselves, under the old categories. To say that they were Pelagian, Semi-Pelagian, Tridentine, Lutheran, Reformed, or Arminian, would be absurd. Schleiermacher, Ullmann, Nitzsch, Twesten, Martensen, Lange, Liebner, Dorner, Schoeberlein, Delitzsch, and many others, are believers in the divine origin of Christianity; and are able, learned, and zealous in the support of the truth as they apprehend it; and yet, in their theological discussions, their whole mode of thinking, and their method of presenting the doctrines of Scripture, are so controlled by their philosophy, that to a great degree, and to a degree much greater in some cases than in others, their writings have the aspect of philosophical disquisitions, and not of exhibitions of Scriptural doctrines. [586] With these writers as a class, all questions concerning grace, are merged into the more comprehensive questions of the nature of God, his relation to the world, the person of Christ, and the way in which his life becomes the life of his people. In many cases, indeed, the person, and the special work of the Spirit, are altogether ignored. We are redeemed because the divine and human are united in Christ, and we derive from

Him, through the Church and the sacraments, the power of this divine-human life.

All the topics connected with the great doctrines of sin and grace have been frequently and earnestly debated by the theological writers of our own country. But into these debates no new questions have entered. The principles involved in these controversies are the same as those involved in the earlier conflicts in the Church. Even the system of Dr. Emmons, which has most appearance of originality, is the doctrine of a continued creation pushed to its legitimate consequences, combined with certain incongruous elements derived from other sources. With Dr. Emmons God is the only cause; second causes (so called), whether material or mental, have no efficiency. God creates everything at every moment; all volitions or mental states, as well as all things external. He denied all substance out of God; identity consists in a sameness and continuity of phenomena or effects connected by the will or constitution of God. The moral and religious convictions of this distinguished man were too strong to allow him to draw the legitimate conclusions from his theory of divine efficiency. He therefore maintained that men's volitions are free, although created by God; and that they are morally good or evil, determining character and involving responsibility, although they are the acts of God, or the product of his creative power. This is very different from the Church doctrine of original or concreated righteousness, and of infused grace. The Bible does indeed teach that God created man in his own image in knowledge, righteousness, and true holiness. But this holiness was a permanent state of mind the character of a person, a suppositum, or individual subsistence; and not the character of an act which is good or bad according to the motives by which it is determined. If God creates holy acts, He is a Holy Being, but the acts have no moral character apart from their efficient cause or author. Faith and repentance are due to the power of God, they are his gifts; but they are truly our acts, and not God's. They are his gifts, because it is under his gracious influence we are induced to repent and believe. There can be no moral character pertaining to an act which does not belong to the agent.

[532] See his letter to Innocent, A.D. 417, quoted by Augustine, De Gratia Christi [xxxi-xxxv.]. 33-38; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1838, vol. x. pp. 549-552.

[533] Augustine, De Gratia Christi [xxxvii.], 40; p. 553, a.

[534] Ibid. [x.], 11; pp. 535, 536.

[535] Augustine, de Gestis Pelagii; Works, vol. x. p. 513, b.

[536] Wiggers, p. 183. See Wiggers' Augustinism and Pelagianism, ch. xiii., Andover, 1840, pp. 177-218.

[537] See J. A. Hasse's Anselm von Canterbury; Parts I. and II., the second part containing en exposition of his doctrines. See also Dr. Shedd's History of Christian Doctrine, vol. ii. ch. 5.

[538] Summa, II. i. qu. cxiv. 6, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 219 a, of second set.

[539] Ibid. qu. cxi. 2, 3, pp. 210 b, 211 a.

[540] On the philosophical and theological position of Duns Scotus, see Ritter's Geschichte der Christlichen Philosophie, Hamburg, 1845, vol. iv. pp. 354-472.

[541] Sess. VI. can. i.-v.; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, pp. 33, 34.

[542] Symbolik, 6th edit., Mainz, 1843, ch. III. § ii. pp. 105, 106.

[543] Pages 113, 114.

[544] Loci Com. p. 90.

[545] Page 92.

[546] The Form of Concord consists of two parts; the first is called the Epitome and contains a brief statement of the several articles of faith and of the opposing errors; and the second is the Solida Declaratio or more extended exhibition and vindication of the doctrines taught. The Epitome itself occupies fifty pages in Hase's edition of the Libri Symbolici of the Lutheran Church.

[547] Works, edit. Wittenberg (Latin), 1546, vol. ii. p. 522.

[548] Ibid. p. 467, b.

[549] Epitome, II. 3; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1836, p. 579.

[550] II. 24; Hase, p. 662.

[551] II. 39; Ibid. p. 666.

[552] Epitome II. 18; Ibid. pp. 582, 583.

[553] Formula Concordi&#65533;, Epitome, XI. 5; Hase, p. 618.

[554] XI. lxxxvii., lxxxviii., Hase, p. 821.

[555] XI. lxxv.; Ibid. p. 817.

[556] Compendium Locorum Theologicum, loc. xiii. qu. 30; Wittenberg, 1659, p. 159.

[557] Kirchengeschichte, Per. VII. B. cap. ii. § 203, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1846, vol. iii. p. 419.

[558] Pages, 327, 328.

[559] Pages 329, 330.

[560] Chapter i. art. 1.

[561] Chapter i. art. 7.

[562] Chapter i. art. 15.

[563] Chapter ii. art 8.

[564] Chapter ii. art. 3.

[565] Chapter ii. art. 5.

[566] Chapter ii. art. 6.

[567] Chapter iii. art. 9.

[568] Chapter iii. art. 10.

[569] Chapter iii. art. 12.

[570] Chapter iii. art. 15.

[571] Chapter iii. art. 6.

[572] Chapter v. art 1.

[573] Chapter v. art 3. See Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 693-716.

[574] XX.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 737.

[575] Handbuch der Dogmatik, § 185, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1828, vol. ii. p. 600.

[576] Ibid. p. 604.

[577] Epitome, Theologi&#xfffd;, V. iii. 4; 4th edit. Leipzig, 1799, pp. 229, 230.

[578] Von dem Uebernat&#xfffd;rlichen in den Gnadenwirkungen, Erlangen, 1775.

[579] Dogm. p. 180.

[580] Institutio Theoligi Christiani, edit. Nuremberg and Altorf, 1797, vol. II. p. 698.

[581] Apol. des Sokrat, 2 Thl. p. 387.

[582] Institutiones Theologi&#xfffd;, 5th edit. Halle, 1826, § 152.

[583] Summa, III. 4, § 158; 4th edit. Leipzig, 1830, p. 307.

[584] See Bretschneider, vol. II. p. 615, 616. Dorner's Geschichte der protestantischen Theologi&#xfffd;.

[585] See Hase's Dogmatik, § 177, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1842, p. 305.

[586] It is characteristic of these writers, however, that some of their own productions are simple and Biblical, while others are in the highest degrees mystical and obscure. Lange's Commentaries, for example, are for the most part intelligible enough, but his Philosophische Dogmatik none but a German, native or naturalized, can understand. It would be difficult to name a book more replete with sound Scriptural doctrine, clearly stated than Delitzsch's Commentar zum Briefe an die Hebr&#xfffd;er, with its archaeological and doctrinal Excursus on sacrifices and atonement, and yet at other times he writes like a Cabalist.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. III

CHAPTER XV: REGENERATION

§ 1. Usage of the Word.

The subjective change wrought in the soul by the grace of God, is variously designated in Scripture. It is called a new birth, a resurrection, a new life, a new creature, a renewing of the mind, a dying to sin and living to righteousness, a translation from darkness to light, etc. In theological language, it is called regeneration, renovation, conversion. These terms are often used interchangeably. They are also used sometimes for the whole process of spiritual renovation or restoration of the image of God, and sometimes for a particular stage of that process. Thus Calvin gives the term its widest scope: "Uno verbo poenitentiam interpretor regenerationem, cujus non alius est scopus nisi ut imago Dei, qu� per Ad� transgressionem foedata et tantum non obliterata fuerat, in nobis reformetur. . . . Atque h�c quidem instauratio non uno momento, vel die, vel anno impletur, sed per continuos, imo etiam lentos interdum profectus abolet Deus in electis suis carnis corruptelas." [1]

With the theologians of the seventeenth century conversion and regeneration were synonymous terms. In the acts of the Synod of Dort, we find such expressions as "Status conversionis aut regenerationis," and "effecta ad conversionem sive regenerationem pr�via." John Owen, in his work on the Holy Spirit, follows the same usage. The fifth chapter of the third book of that work is entitled "The nature of regeneration," and one of the heads under this is, "Conversion not wrought by moral suasion only." "If the Holy Spirit," he says, "acts no otherwise on men in regeneration or conversion," then so and so follows. Turrettin, as we have seen, distinguishes between what he calls "conversio habitualis" and "conversio actualis." "Conversio habitualia seu passiva, fit per habituum supernaturalium infusionem a Spiritu Sancto. Actualis vero seu activa per bonorum istorum exercitium. . . . Per illam homo renovatur et convertitur a Deo. Per istam homo a Deo renovatus et convertus convertit se ad Deum, et actus agit. Illa melius regeneratio dicitur, quia se habet ad modum nov� nativitatis, qua homo reformatur ad imaginem Creatoris sui. Ista vero conversio, quia includit hominis ipsius operationem." [2] This is clear and accurate. As these two things are distinct they should be designated by different terms. Great confusion arises from this ambiguity of terms. The questions whether man is active or passive in regeneration and whether regeneration is effected by the mediate or immediate influence of the Spirit must be answered in one way if regeneration includes conversion, and in another if it be taken in its restricted sense. In the Bible, the distinction is generally preserved; metanoia, repentance, change of mind, turning to God, i.e., conversion, is what man is called upon to do; anagennesis, regeneration, is the act of God. God regenerates; the

soul is regenerated. In the Romish Church justification is making subjectively just, i.e., free from sin and inwardly holy. So is regeneration. So is sanctification. These terms, therefore, in the theology of that church are constantly interchanged.

Even by the Lutherans, in the "Apology for the Augsburg Confession," regeneration is made to include justification. That is, it is made to include the whole process by which the sinner is transferred from a state of sin and condemnation into a state of salvation. In the "Form of Concord" it is said, "Vocabulum regenerationis interdum in eo sensu accipitur, ut simul et remissionem peccatorum (qu duntaxat propter Christam contingit) et subsequentem renovationem complectatur, quam Spiritus Sanctus in illis, qui per fidem justificati sunt, operatur, quandoque etiam solam remissionem peceatorum, et adoptionem in filios Dei significat. Et in hoc posteriore usu spe multumque id vocabulam in Apologia Confessionis ponitur. Verbi gratia, cum dicitur: Justificatio est regeneratio. . . . Quin etiam vivificationis vocabulum interdum ita accipitur, ut remissionem peccatorum notet. Cum enim homo per fidem (quam quidem solus Spiritus Sanctus operatur) justificatur, id ipsum revera est qudam regeneratio, quia ex filio ir fit filius Dei, et hoc modo e morte in vitam transfertur. . . . Deinde etiam regeneratio spe pro sanctificatione et renovatione (qu fidei justificationem sequitur) usurpatur. In qua significatione D. Lutherus hac voce, tum in libro de ecelesia et conciliis, tum alibi etiam, multum usus est." [3]

As this lax use of terms was unavoidably attended with great confusion, the "Form of Concord" itself, and the later Lutheran theologians were more precise. They made especially a sharp distinction between justification and anything signifying a subjective change in the sinner.

In the early Church regeneration often expressed, not any inward moral change, but an external change of state or relation. Among the Jews when a heathen became a proselyte to their religion, he was said to be born again. The change of his status from without to within the theocracy, was called regeneration. This usage in a measure passed over to the Christian Church. When a man became a member of the Church he was said to be born anew; and baptism, which was the rite of initiation, was called regeneration. This use of the word has not yet entirely passed away. A distinction is still sometimes made between regeneration and spiritual renovation. The one is external, the other internal. Some of the advocates of baptismal regeneration make this distinction, and interpret the language of the formulas of the Church of England in accordance with it. The regeneration effected in baptism, in their view, is not any spiritual change in the state of the soul, but simply a birth into the visible Church.

[1] Institutio, lib. III. cap. iii. 9, edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. p. 389.

[2] Locus xv. qus. iv. 13, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 460.

[3] III. 19, 20, 21; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. p. 686.

§ 2. Nature of Regeneration.

By a consent almost universal the word regeneration is now used to designate, not the whole work of sanctification, nor the first stages of that work comprehended in conversion, much less justification or any mere external change of state, but the instantaneous change from spiritual death to spiritual life. Regeneration, therefore, is a spiritual resurrection; the

beginning of a new life. Sometimes the word expresses the act of God. God regenerates. Sometimes it designates the subjective effect of his act. The sinner is regenerated. He becomes a new creature. He is born again. And this is his regeneration. These two applications of the word are so allied as not to produce confusion. The nature of regeneration is not explained in the Bible further than the account therein given of its author, God, in the exercise of the exceeding greatness of his power; its subject, the whole soul; and its effects, spiritual life, and all consequent holy acts and states. Its metaphysical nature is left a mystery. It is not the province of either philosophy or theology to solve that mystery. It is, however, the duty of the theologian to examine the various theories concerning the nature of this saving change, and to reject all such as are inconsistent with the Word of God.

Not a change in the Substance of the Soul.

Regeneration does not consist in any change in the substance of the soul. The only advocate of the opposite doctrine among Protestant theologians was Flacius Illyricus, so called from the place of his birth. He was one of the most prominent Lutheran theologians in what is called the second Reformation in Germany. He did great service in the cause of truth in resisting the synergism of Melancthon, and the concessions which that eminent but yielding reformer was disposed to make to the papists. He contributed some of the most important works of the age in which he lived to the vindication of the Protestant faith. His "Catalogus Testiam Veritatis," designed to prove that the doctrine of the Reformation had had their witnesses in all ages; his "Clavis Scriptur&#65533; Sacr&#65533;;" and especially the great historical work, "The Magdeburg Centuries" (in thirteen volumes, folio), of which he was the originator and principal author, attest his learning, talents, and untiring industry. His fervent and uncompromising spirit involved him in many difficulties and sorrows. He died worn out by suffering and labour, says his biographer; one of those men of faith of whom the world was not worthy. Always extreme in his opinions, he held that original sin was a corruption of the substance of the soul, and regeneration such a change of that substance as to restore its normal purity. All his friends who had sided with him in his controversy with the Synergists and the supporters of the Leipzig Interim, forsook him now, and he stood alone. In the "Form of Concord," adopted to settle all the controversies of the period, these peculiar views of Flacius were condemned as a virtual revival of the Manich&#65533;an heresy. It was urged that if the substance of the soul be sinful, God, by whom each individual soul is created, must be the author of sin; and that Christ who, in assuming our nature, became consubstantial with us, must be a partaker of sin. No Christian Church has assumed the responsibility of the doctrine of Flacius, or held that regeneration involves a change of the essence of the soul.

Regeneration does not consist in an Act of the Soul.

Regeneration does not consist in any act or acts of the soul. The word here, of course, is to be understood not as including conversion, much less the whole work of sanctification, but in its restricted sense for the commencement of spiritual life. The opposite view, which makes regeneration, even in its narrowest sense, an act of the soul, has been held by very different classes of theologians. It is, of course, involved in the Pelagian doctrine which denies moral character to everything except acts of the will. If "all sin is sinning," and "all love loving," then every moral change in man must be a change from one form of voluntary

activity to another. As the later Remonstrants held the principle in question they made regeneration to consist in the sinner's own act in turning unto God. The influence exerted on him was one which he could yield to or resist. If he yielded, it was a voluntary decision, and in that decision his regeneration, or the beginning of his religious life, consisted.

Dr. Emmons's View.

Dr. Emmons, holding that all sin and holiness consist in acts, which acts, whether sinful or holy, are immediately created by God, makes regeneration to consist in God's giving rise to the commencement of a series of holy acts. In his discourse on Regeneration, the first proposition which he undertakes to establish is, "that the Spirit of God, in regeneration, produces nothing but love." This is maintained in opposition to those who say that the Spirit produces a new nature, principle, disposition, or taste. "Those in the state of nature," he says, "stand in no need of having any new power, or faculty, or principle of action produced in them, in order to their becoming holy. They are just as capable of loving as of hating God. . . . This is true of all sinners, who are as much moral agents, and the proper subjects of moral government, before as after regeneration. Whenever, therefore, the divine Spirit renews, regenerates, or sanctifies them, He has no occasion of producing anything in their minds besides love." [4] "The love which the Spirit of God produces in regeneration is the love of benevolence, and not the love of complacence." [5] "Though there is no natural or necessary connection between the first exercise of love and all future exercises of grace yet there is a constituted connection, which renders future exercises of grace as certain, as if they flowed from a new nature, or holy principle, as many suppose." [6] His first inference from the doctrine of his sermon is, "If the Spirit of God produces nothing but love in regeneration, then there is no ground for the distinction which is often made between regeneration, conversion, and sanctification. They are, in nature and kind, precisely the same frdits of the Spirit. In regeneration, He produces holy exercises; in conversion, He produces holy exercises; and in sanctification, He produces holy exercises." [7] Secondly, "If the Spirit of God in regeneration produces nothing but love, then men are no more passive in regeneration than in conversion or sanctification. Those who hold that the divine Spirit in regeneration produces something prior to love as the foundation of it, that is, a new nature, or new principle of holiness, maintain that men are passive in regeneration, but active in conversion and sanctification. . . . But if what has been said in this discourse be true, there is no new nature, or principle of action, produced in regeneration, but only love, which is activity itself." [8]

Professor Finney's Doctrine.

Professor Finney, in his "Lectures on Systematic Theology, teaches: (1.) That satisfaction, happiness, blessedness, is the only absolute good; that virtue is only relatively good, i.e., good as tending to produce happiness. (2.) That all virtue lies in the intention to promote the happiness of being, that is, of universal being. There is no virtue in emotion, feeling, or any state of the sensibility, for these are involuntary. Love to God even is not complacency in his excellence, but "willing him good." (3.) All sin is selfishness, or the choice of our own happiness in preference to the good of universal being. (4.) Every moral agent is always "as sinful or holy as with their knowledge they can be." (5.) "As the moral law is the law of nature, it is absurd to suppose that entire obedience to it should not be the unalterable condition of salvation." [9] (6.) Regeneration is an "instantaneous" change

"from entire sinfulness to entire holiness." [10] It is a simple change of purpose.

The system of Professor Finney is a remarkable product of relentless logic. It is valuable as a warning. It shows to what extremes the human mind may be carried when abandoned to its own guidance. He begins with certain axioms, or, as he calls them, truths of the reason, and from these he draws conclusions which are indeed logical deductions, but which shock the moral sense, and prove nothing but that his premises are false. His fundamental principle is that ability limits obligation. Free will is defined to be "the power of choosing, or refusing to choose, in compliance with moral obligation in every instance." [11] "Consciousness of the affirmation of ability to comply with any requisition, is a necessary condition of the affirmation of obligation to comply with that requisition." [12] "To talk of inability to obey moral law, is to talk sheer nonsense." [13]

But it is acknowledged that man's ability is confined to acts of the will, therefore moral character can be predicated only of such acts. The acts of the will are either choices or volitions. "By choice is intended the selection or choice of an end. By volition is intended the executive efforts of the will to secure the end intended." [14] We are responsible, therefore, only for our choices in the selection of an ultimate end. "It is generally agreed that moral obligation respects strictly only the ultimate intention or choice of an end for its own sake." [15] "I have said that moral obligation respects the ultimate intention only. I am now prepared to say, still further, that this is a first truth of reason." [16] "Right can be predicated only of good-will, and wrong only of selfishness. . . . It is right for him [for a man] to intend the highest good of being as an end. If he honestly does this, he cannot, doing this, mistake his duty, for in doing this he really performs the whole of duty." [17] "Moral character belongs solely to the ultimate intention of the mind, or to choice, as distinguished from volition." [18]

The end to be chosen is "the highest good of being." "Good may be natural or moral. Natural good is synonymous with valuable. Moral good is synonymous with virtue." [19] Moral good is only a relative good. It does meet a demand of our being, and therefore produces satisfaction. This satisfaction is the ultimate good of being." [20] "I come now to state the point upon which issue is taken, to wit: That enjoyment, blessedness, or mental satisfaction, is the only ultimate good." [21] "Of what value is the true, the right, the just, etc., aside from the pleasure as mental satisfaction resulting from them to sentient existences." [22]

It follows from these principles that men perform their whole duty, and are perfect, if they intend the happiness of being in general. There is no morality in emotions, sentiments, or feelings. These are involuntary states of the sensibility, and are in themselves neither good nor bad. "If any outward action or state of the feeling exists, in opposition to the intention or choice of the mind, it cannot by any possibility have moral character. Whatever is beyond the control of a moral agent, he cannot be responsible for." [23] "Love may, and often does exist, as every one knows, in the form of a mere feeling or emotion. . . . This emotion or feeling, as we are all aware, is purely an involuntary state of mind. Because it is a phenomenon of the sensibility, and of course a passive state of mind, it has in itself no moral character." [24] Gratitude, "as a mere feeling or phenomenon of the sensibility, . . . has no moral character." [25] The same is said of benevolence, compassion, mercy, conscientiousness, etc. The doctrine is, "No state of the sensibility, . . . has any moral

character in itself." [26] The love which has moral excellence, and which is the fulfilling of the law, is not a feeling of complacency, but "good-will," willing the good or happiness of its object. Should a man, therefore, under the impulse of a benevolent feeling, or a sense of duty, perform a right act, he would sin as really as if, under the impulse of malice or cupidity, he should perform a bad act. The illustration is, that to pay a debt from a sense of justice, is as wicked as to steal a horse from acquisitiveness. A man "may be prevented [from committing commercial injustice] by a constitutional or phrenological conscientiousness or sense of justice. But this is only a feeling of the sensibility, and if restrained only by this, he is just as absolutely selfish as if he had stolen a horse in obedience to acquisitiveness." [27] "If the selfish man were to preach the gospel, it would be only because upon the whole it was most pleasing or gratifying to himself, and not at all for the sake of the good of being as an end. If he should become a pirate, it would be exactly for the same reason. . . . Whichever course he takes, he takes it for precisely the same reason; and with the same degree of light it must involve the same degree of guilt." [28] To feed the poor from a feeling of benevolence, and to murder a parent from a feeling of malice, involve the same degree of guilt! Such a sacrifice to logic was never made by any man before. But still more wonderful, if possible, is the declaration that a man may "feel deeply malicious and revengeful feelings toward God. But sin does not consist in these feelings, nor necessarily imply them." [29]

Moral excellence is not an object of love. To say that we are bound to love God because He is good, is said to be "most nonsensical. What is it to love God? Why, as is agreed, it is not to exercise a mere emotion of complacency in Him. It is to will something to Him." [30] "Should it be said that God's holiness is the foundation of our obligation to love Him, I ask in what sense it can be so? What is the nature or form of that love, which his virtue lays us under an obligation to exercise? It cannot be a mere emotion of complacency, for emotions being involuntary states of mind and mere phenomena of the sensibility, are without the pale of legislation and morality." [31] "We are under infinite obligation to love God, and to will his good with all our power, because of the intrinsic value of his well-being, whether He is holy or sinful. Upon condition that He is holy, we are under obligation to will his actual blessedness, but certainly we are under obligation to will it with no more than all our heart, and soul, and mind, and strength. But this we are required to do because of the intrinsic value of his blessedness, whatever his character might be." [32] Surely such a system is a hupodeigma tes apeitheias.

Dr. Taylor's View.

The system of Dr. Taylor of New Haven agrees with that of Professor Finney in making free agency include plenary power; in limiting responsibility and moral character to voluntary acts, in regarding happiness as the chief good; and in making regeneration to consist in a change of purpose. The two systems differ, however, essentially as to the ground of moral obligation or nature of virtue; and as to the nature of that change of purpose in which regeneration consists. Professor Finney adopts the common eud&#65533;monistic theory which makes the happiness of being, i.e. of the universe, the chief good; and therefore makes virtue consist in the governing purpose to promote that happiness, and all sin in the purpose to seek our own happiness, instead of the happiness of being; consequently, regeneration is a change of that purpose; that is, it is a change from selfishness to

benevolence.

Dr. Taylor, on the other hand, recognized the fact that as the desire of happiness is a constituent element of our nature, or law of our being, it must be innocent, and therefore is not to be confounded with selfishness. He hence inferred that this desire of happiness is rightfully the controlling principle of action in all sentient and rational creatures. Sin consists in seeking happiness in the creature; holiness in seeking happiness in God; regeneration is the purpose or decision of a sinner to seek his happiness in God and not in the world. This change of purpose, he sometimes calls a "change of heart," sometimes "giving the heart to God," sometimes "loving God." As regeneration is the choice of God as our chief good, it is an intelligent, voluntary act of the soul, and therefore must take place according to the established laws of mental action. It supposes the preliminary acts of consideration, appreciation, and comparison. The sinner contemplates God as a source of happiness, estimates his suitableness to the necessities of his nature, compares Him with other objects of choice, and decides to choose God as his portion. Sometimes the word regeneration is used in a comprehensive sense, including the whole process of consideration and decision; sometimes in a restricted sense, for the decision itself.

Such being the nature of regeneration, it is of course brought about through the influence of the truth. The Bible reveals the nature of God, and his capacity and willingness to make his creatures happy; it exhibits all the motives which should determine the soul to take God for its portion. As regeneration is a rational and voluntary act, it is inconceivable that it should take place except in view of rational considerations. The Spirit's influence in this process is not denied. The fact is admitted that all the considerations which ought to determine the sinner to make choice of God, will remain without saving effect, unless the Spirit renders them effectual.

These views are presented at length in the "Christian Spectator" (a quarterly review) for 1829. On the nature of the change in question, Dr. Taylor says: "Regeneration, considered as a moral change of which man is the subject -- giving God the heart -- making a new heart -- loving God supremely, etc., are terms and phrases which, in popular use, denote a complex act. . . . These words, in all ordinary speech and writing, are used to denote one act, and yet this one act includes a process of mental acts, consisting of the perception and comparison of motives, the estimate of their relative worth, and the choice or willing of the external action." "When we speak of the means of regeneralion, we shall use the word regeneration in a more limited import than its ordinary popular import; and shall confine it, chiefly for the sake of convenient phraseology, to the act of the will or heart, in distinction from other mental acts connected with it; or to that act of the will or heart which consists in a preference of God to every other object; or to that disposition of the heart, or governing affection or purpose of the man, which consecrates him to the service and glory of God." [33]

"Self-love or desire of happiness, is the primary cause or reason of all acts of preference or choice which fix supremely on any object. In every moral being who forms a moral character, there must be a first moral act of preference or choice. This must respect some one object, God or mammon, as the chief good, or as an object of supreme affection. Now whence comes such a choice or preference? Not from a previous choice or preference of the same object, for we speak of the first choice of the object. The answer which human

consciousness gives, is, that the being constituted with a capacity for happiness desires to be happy; and knowing that he is capable of deriving happiness from different objects, considers from which the greatest happiness may be derived, and as in this respect he judges or estimates their relative value, so he chooses or prefers the one or the other as his chief good. While this must be the process by which a moral being forms his first moral preference, substantially the same process is indispensable to a change of this preference. The change involves the preference of a new object as the chief good; a preference which the former preference has no tendency to produce, but a direct tendency to prevent; a preference, therefore, not resulting from, or in any way occasioned by a previous preference of any given object, but resulting from those acts of considering and comparing the sources of happiness, which are dictated by the desire of happiness or self-love." [34]

Regeneration being a change of purpose, the mode in which it is produced is thus explained. "If man without divine grace is a moral agent, then he is qualified so to consider, compare, and estimate the objects of choice as means of happiness, and capable also of such constitutional excitement in view of the good and evil set before him, as might result in his giving his heart to God, without grace. . . . The act of giving God the heart must take place in perfect accordance with the laws of moral agency and of voluntary action. If the interposing grace violate these laws, the effect cannot be moral action; and it must violate these laws, if it dispense with the class of mental acts now under consideration. Whatever, therefore, be the influence which secures a change of heart in the sinner, the change itself is a moral change, and implies the exercise of all the powers and capacities of the moral agent, which in the nature of things are essential to a moral act." [35] On a previous page it had been said, "The Scriptures authorize us to assert, generally, that the mode of divine influence is consistent with the moral nature of this change as a voluntary act of man; and, also, that it is through the truth, and implies attention to truth on the part of man." [36] "Cannot," Dr. Taylor asks, "He who formed the mind of man, reach it with an influence of his Spirit, which shall accord with all the laws of voluntary and moral action? Because motives, without a divine interposition, will not secure this moral change in sinful man, and because they have no positive efficiency in its production, must God in producing it dispense with motives altogether? Must the appropriate connections between motives and acts of will, or between the exercise of affections and the perception of their objects, be dissolved, and have no place? Must God, if by his grace He brings sinners to give Him their heart in holy love, accomplish the change in such a manner that they shall have no prior perception or view of the object of their love; and know not what or whom they love, or wherefore they love Him, rather than their former idols? Does a consistent theology thus limit the Holy One, and oblige Him to accomplish the veriest impossibilities, in transforming the moral character of sinful man?" [37] This may be a correct account of the process of conversion, with which this system confounds regeneration. Conversion is indeed a voluntary turning of the soul from sin to God. From the nature of the case it is produced proximately by appropriate motives, or it would be neither rational nor holy. But this proves nothing as to the nature of regeneration. The most accurate analysis of the laws of vision can throw no light on the way in which Christ opened the eyes of the blind.

Remarks.

It is plain that these views of regeneration are mere philosophical theories. Dr.

Emmons assumes that such is the dependence of a creature upon the creator, that it cannot act. No creature can be a cause. There is no efficiency in second causes. Then, of course the first cause must produce all effects. God creates everything, even volitions. In the soul there are only acts or exercises. Regeneration, therefore, is an act or volition created by God; or, it is the name given to the commencement of a new series of exercises which are holy instead of sinful.

Professor Finney assumes that plenary ability is essential to moral agency; that a man, so far as his internal life is concerned, has power only over his choices and volitions; all, therefore, for which he is responsible, all that constitutes moral character, must fall under the category of choice, the selection of an ultimate end. Assuming, moreover, that happiness is the only absolute good, all sin consists in the undue pursuit of our own happiness, and all virtue in benevolence or the purpose to seek the happiness of being. Regeneration, therefore, consists in the change of the purpose to seek our own happiness, for the purpose to seek as our ultimate end the happiness of the universe.

Dr. Taylor, agreeing with Professor Finney on the nature of free agency, and in the doctrine that happiness is the chief good, holds with him that all sin and holiness consist in voluntary action. But assuming that self-love, as distinguished from selfishness, is the motive in all rational moral action, he makes regeneration to consist in the choice of God as the source of our own happiness.

All these speculations are outside of the Bible. They have no authority or value which they do not derive from their inherent truth, and any man is at liberty to dispute them, if they do not commend themselves to his own reason and conscience. But besides thc purely philosophical character of these views, it would be easy to show, not only that they have no valid ground on which to rest, but also that they are inconsistent with the teachings of Scripture and with genuine Christian experience. This will be attempted when the Scriptural account of regeneration comes to be considered.

Regeneration not a change in any one Faculty of the Soul.

Regeneration does not consist in a change in any one of the faculties of the soul, whether the sensibility, or the will, or the intellect. According to some theologians, the feelings, or heart, in the restricted sense of that word, is the exclusive seat of original sin. Hereditary corruption, in other words, is made to consist in the aversion of the heart from divine things, and a preference for the things of the world. The end to be accomplished in regeneration, therefore, is simply to correct this aversion. The understanding, it is urged, so far as moral and religious truth is concerned, apprehends aright and appreciates what is loved; and in like manner, in the same sphere, we believe what we apprehend as right and good. If, therefore, the feelings are made what they ought to be, all the other operations of the mind, or inner man, will be right. This theory is founded in part upon a mistaken view of the meaning of the word "heart" as used in the Scriptures. In a multitude of cases, and in all cases where regeneration is spoken of, it means the whole soul; that is, it includes the intellect, will, and the conscience as well as the affections. Hence the Bible speaks of the eyes, of the thoughts, of the purposes, of the devices, as well as of the feelings or affections of the heart. In Scriptural language, therefore, a "new heart" does not mean simply a new state of feeling, but a radical change in the state of the whole soul or interior man. Besides, this theory overlooks what the Bible constantly assumes: the unity of our inward life. The

Scriptures do not contemplate the intellect, the will, and the affections, as independent, separable elements of a composite whole. These faculties are only different forms of activity in one and the same subsistence. No exercise of the affections can occur without an exercise of the intellect, and, if the object be moral or religious, without including a correspondent exercise of our moral nature.

Regeneration not merely Illumination.

Another and antagonistic theory equally one-sided, is that the intellect only is in fault, and that regeneration resolves itself into illumination. This view is far more plausible than the preceding. The Bible makes eternal life to consist in knowledge; sinfulness is blindness, or darkness; the transition from a state of sin to a state of holiness is a translation from darkness into light; men are said to be renewed unto knowledge. i.e., knowledge is the effect of regeneration, conversion is said to be effected by the revelation of Christ; the rejection of Him as the Son of God and Saviour of men is referred to the fact that the eyes of those who believe not are blinded by the god of this world. These Scriptural representations prove much. They prove that knowledge is essential to all holy exercises; that truth as the object of knowledge, is of vital importance, and that error is always evil and often fatal; and that the effect of regeneration, so far as they reveal themselves in our consciousness, consist largely in the spiritual apprehension or discernment of divine things. These representations also prove that in the order of nature, knowledge, or spiritual discernment, is antecedent and causative relatively to all holy exercises of the feelings or affections. It is the spiritual apprehension of the truth that awakens love, faith, and delight; and not love that produces spiritual discernment. It was the vision Paul had of the divine glory of Christ that made him instantly and forever his worshipper and servant. The Scriptures, however, do not teach that regeneration consists exclusively in illumination, or that the cognitive faculties are exclusively the subject of the renewing power of the Spirit. It is the soul as such that is spiritually dead; and it is to the soul that a new principle of life controlling all its exercises, whether of the intellect, the sensibility, the conscience, or the will is imparted.

Not a Change of the Higher, as distinguished from the Lower Powers of the Soul.

There is another view of the subject, which falls under this head of what may be called partial regeneration. it is founded on trichotomy, or the assumption of three elements in the constitution of man, namely, the body, the soul, and the spirit (the soma, psuche, and pneuma); the first material, the second animal, the third spiritual. To the second, i.e., to the soul or psuche, are referred what man has in common with the lower animals; life, sensibility, will, and understanding; to the spirit what is peculiar to us as rational, moral, and religious beings, namely, conscience and reason. This third element, the pneuma, or reason, is often called divine; sometimes in a literal, and sometimes in a figurative sense. In either case, according to the theory under consideration, it is not the seat of sin, and is uncorrupted by the fall. It remains, although clouded and perverted by the disorder in the lower departments of our nature, the point of contact and connection between man and God. This at least is one view of the matter. According to another view, neither the body nor the soul (neither soma nor psuche), has any moral character. The seat of the moral and divine life is exclusively the pneuma or spirit. This is said to be paralyzed by the fall. It is figuratively dead insusceptible of impression from divine things. There are as many

theories of the nature of regeneration among the advocates of this threefold division in the constitution of man, as there are systems of anthropology. The idea common to all, or to a majority of them, is that regeneration consists in restoring the pneuma or spirit to its normal controlling influence over the whole man. According to some, this is a natural process in which an animal man, i.e., a man governed by the psuche, comes to be reasonable, or pneumatic, i.e., governed by the pneuma or higher powers of his nature. According to others, it is a supernatural effect due to the action of the divine (Pneuma) Spirit upon the human pneuma or spirit. In either case, however, the pneumatikos, or Spiritual man, is not one in whom the Holy Spirit dwells as a principle of a new, spiritual life; but one who is governed by his own pneuma or spirit. According to others again, the pneuma or reason in man is God, the God-consciousness, the Logos, and regeneration is the gradually acquired ascendency of this divine element of our nature.

In reference to these views of regeneration it is sufficient to remark, (1.) That the threefold division of our nature on which they are founded is antiscriptural, as we have already attempted to prove. (2.) Admitting that there is a foundation for such a distinction, it is not of the kind assumed in these theories. The soul and spirit are not distinct substances or essences, one of which may be holy and the other unholy, or negative. This is inconsistent with the unity of our interior life which the Scriptures constantly assume. (3.) It subverts the Scriptural dostrine of regeneration and sanctification to make the governing principle in the renewed to be their own pneuma or spirit, and not the Holy Spirit.

Modern Speculative Views on this Subject.

The modern speculative philosophy has introduced such a radical change in the views entertained of the nature of God, of his relation to the world, of the nature of man and of his relation to God, of the person and work of Christ, and of the application of his redemption to the salvation of men, that all the old, and, it may be safely said, Scriptural forms of these doctrines have been superseded, and others introduced which are unintelligible except in the light of that philosophy, and which to a great extent reduce the truths of the Bible to the form of philosophical dogmas. We cease to hear of the Holy Ghost as the third person of the Trinity, applying to men the redemption purchased by Christ; of regeneration by his almighty power, or of his dwelling in the hearts of believers. The forms of this new theology are very diversified. They are all perhaps comprehended under three classes: first, those which are avowedly pantheistic, although claiming to be Christian; secondly, those which are Theistic but do not admit the doctrine of the Trinity; and thirdly, those which endeavour to bring theology as a philosophy into the forms of Christian doctrine. In all, however, the anthropology, christology, soteriology, and ecclesiology advocated, are so changed as to render it impossible to retain in their exhibition the terms and formulas with which the Church from the beginning has been familiar. Regeneration, justification, and sanctification are almost antiquated terms; and what remains of the truths those terms were used to express, is merged into the one idea of the development of a new divine life in the soul. As to anthropology, these modern speculative, or as they often call themselves, and are called by others, mystic, theologians teach, (1.) That there is no dualism in man between soul and body. There is but one life. The body is the soul projecting itself externally. Without a body there is no soul. (2.) That there is no real dualism between God and man. The identity between God and man is the last result of modern speculation; and it

is the fundamental idea of Christianity.

Soul and Body one.

As to the former of these points, Schleiermacher [38] says, "There are not a spiritual and a corporeal world, a corporeal and spiritual existence of man. Such representations lead to nothing but the dead mechanism of a pre-established harmony. Body and spirit are actual only in and with each other, so that corporeal and spiritual action can only be relatively distinguished." The Late President Rauch [39] says, "A dualism which admits of two principles for one being, offers many difficulties, and the greatest is, that it cannot tell how the principles can be united in a third. A river may originate in two fountains, but a science cannot, and much less individual life." "It would be wrong to say that man consists of two essentially different substances, of earth and the soul; but he is soul only, and cannot be anything else. This soul, however, unfolds itself externally in the life of the body, and internally in the life of the mind." So Olshausen [40] teaches that the soul has no subsistence but in the body. Dr. J. W. Nevin [41] says, "We have no right to think of the body in any way as a form of existence of and by itself, into which the soul as another form of such existence is thrust in a mechanical way. Both form one life. The soul to be complete, to develop itself at all as a soul, must externalize itself, throw itself out in space; and this externalization is the body."

God and Man one.

As to the second point, or the oneness of God and man, as the soul externalizes itself in the body, "dividing itself only that its unity may become thus the more free and intensely complete," [42] so God externalizes Himself in the world. Schleiermacher says, it is in vain to attempt to conceive of God as existing either before or out of the world. They may be distinguished in thought, but are only "zwei Werthe fur dieselbe Forderung, two values of the same postulate." According to this philosophy, it is just as true, "No world, no God," as "No body, no soul." "The world, [43] in its lower view, is not simply the outward theatre or stage on which man is to act his part as a candidate for heaven. In the midst of all its different forms of existence, it is pervaded throughout with the power of a single life, which comes ultimately to its full sense and force only in the human person." The world, therefore, is pervaded by "the power of a single life;" the highest form of that life (on earth) is man. What is that life? What is that pervading principle which reveals itself in such manifold forms of existence, and culminates in man? It is, of course, God. Man, therefore, as Schleiermacher says, is "the existence-form" of God on earth. [44] Ullmann [45] says that the German mystics in the Middle Ages taught "the oneness of Deity and humanity." The results reached by the mystics under the guidance of feeling, he says, modern philosophy has reached by speculation. This doctrine of the essential oneness of God and man, the speculative theologians adopt as the fundamental idea of Christianity. To work out that idea in a manner compatible with Theism and the Gospel, is the problem which those theologians have attempted to solve. These attempts have resulted, in some cases, in avowed Christian Pantheism, as it is called; in others, in forms of doctrine so nearly pantheistic as to be hardly distinguished from Pantheism itself; and in all, in a radical modification, not only of the theology of the Church as expressed in her received standards, but also of the Scriptural form of Christian doctrines, if not of their essence. This is seen to be true in the anthropology of this system, which destroys the essential difference between

the creator and his creatures, between God and man.

The christology of this modern theology has already been presented in its essential features. There is no dualism in Christ as between soul and body. The two are one life. Neither is there any dualism between divinity and humanity in Him. The divine and human in his person are one life. In being the ideal or perfect man, He is the true God. The deification which humanity reached in Christ, is not a supernatural act on the part of God; it is reached by a process of natural development in his people, i.e., the Church.

Soteriology of these Philosophers.

The soteriology of this system is simple. The soul projects itself in the body. They are one life, but the body may be too much for the soul. The development of this one life in its twofold form, inward and outward, may not be symmetrical. So humanity as a generic life, a form of the life of God, as projected externally in the world from Adam onward, has not developed itself aright. If left unaided it would not reach the goal, or unfold itself as divine. A new start, therefore, must be given to it, a new commencement made. This is done by a supernatural intervention resulting in the production of the person of Christ. In Him divinity assumes the fashion of a man, -- the existence-form of man, -- God becomes man, and man is God. This renewed entrance, so to speak, of God into the world, this special form of divine-human life, is Christianity, which is constantly declared to be "a life," "the life of Christ," "a new theanthropic life." Men become Christians by being partakers of this life. They become partakers of this life by union with the Church and reception of the sacraments. The incarnation of God is continued in the Church; and this new principle of "divine-human life" descends from Christ to the members of his Church, as naturally and as much by a process of organic development, as humanity, derived from Adam, unfolded itself in his descendants. Christ, therefore, saves us, not so much by what He did, as by what He is. He made no satisfaction to the divine justice; no expiation for sin; no fulfilling of the law. There is, therefore, really no justification, no real pardon even, in the ordinary sense of the word. There is a healing of the soul, and with that healing the removal of the evils incident to disease. Those who become partakers of this new principle of life, which is truly human and truly divine, become one with Christ. All the merit, righteousness, excellence, and power, inherent in this "divine-human life" of course belong to those who partake of that life. This righteousness, excellence, etc., are our own. They are subjective in us, and form our character, just as the nature derived from Adam was ours, with all its corruptions and infirmities.

If asked what is regeneration according to this system, the proper answer would probably be, that it is an obsolete term. There is no room for the thing usually signified by the word, and no reason for retaining the word itself. Regeneration is a work of the Holy Spirit. But this system in its integrity does not acknowledge the Holy Spirit as a distinct person or agent. And those who are constrained to make the acknowledgment of his personality, are evidently embarrassed by the admission. What the Scriptures and the Church attribute to the Spirit working with the freedom of a personal agent, when and where he sees fit, this system attributes to the "theanthropic-life" of Christ, working as a new force, according to the natural laws of development. [46]

The impression made upon the readers of the modern theologians of this school, is that made by any other form of philosophical disquisition. It has not, and from its nature it

cannot have anything more than human authority. This system may be adopted as a matter of opinion, but it cannot be an object of faith. And therefore it cannot support the hopes of a soul conscious of guilt. In turning from such writings to the Word of God, the transition these theologians would have us believe, is from gnw/sij to pi,stij; but to the consciousness of the Christian, it is like the transition from the confusion of tongues at Babel, where no man understood his fellow, to the symphonious utterance of those "who spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Doctrine of Ebrard.

Of the writers who belong to the general class of "speculative" theologians, some adhere much more nearly to the Scriptures than others. Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard, of Erlangen, has already been repeatedly referred to as addicted to the Reformed faith; and where he consciously departs from it, he considers himself as only carrying out its legitimate principles. His "Dogmatik" has, in fact, a far more Scriptural character than most of the modern German systems. In Ebrard, as in others, we find a compromise attempted between the Church doctrine of regeneration, and the modern theory of the incarnation of God in the race of man. Not only is a distinction made between repentance, conversion, and regeneration; but also true repentance and genuine conversion are made to precede regeneration. The two former take place in the sphere of the consciousness. In all the states and exercises connected with repentance and conversion, the soul is active and coperative; and the only influence exercised by God or his Spirit, is mediate and moral. It is not until the sinner has obeyed the command to repent, to believe in Christ, and to return unto God, that God gives the soul that divine something which makes it a new creature, and effects its living organic union with Christ. In this latter process the soul is simply passive. God is the only agent. What is said to be communicated to the soul is Christ; the person of Christ; the life of Christ; his substance, or a new substance. A distinction, however, is made between essence and substance. Ebrard insists [47] that the most hidden, substantial germ of our being is born again in regeneration -- not merely changed, but new-born. Nevertheless, he says that the "essentia anim human" is not changed, and assents to the statement by Bucan, "Renovatio fit non quoad essentiam ut deliravit Illyricus, sed quoad qualitates inhrentes." What he asserts, [48] frequently elsewhere, is, "That Christ, real and substantial, is born in us. But he adds that the words "real and substantial" are used to guard against the assumption that regeneration consists simply in some inward exercise, or transient state of the consciousness. It is, as he truly teaches, much more; something lower than the consciousness; a change in the state of the soul, which determines the acts and exercises which reveal themselves in the consciousness, and manifest themselves in the life. He finds his doctrine of regeneration, not in what Calvin and some few of the Reformed theologians taught under that head, but in what they teach of the Lord's Supper, and of the mystical union. Calvin [49] says, "Sunt qui manducare Christi carnem, et sanguinem ejus bibere, uno verbo definiunt, nihil esse aliud, quam in Christum ipsum credere. Sed mihi expressius quiddam ac sublimius videtur voluisse docere Christus . . . . nempe vera sui participatione nos vivificari. . . .Quemadmodum enim non aspectus sed esus panis corpori alimentum sufficit, ita vere ac penitus participem Christi animam fieri convenit, ut ipsius virtute in vitam spiritualem vegetetur." "We have here certainly," says Ebrard, [50] "the doctrine of a secret, mystical communication of Christ's substance to the substantial centre in man (the anima'), which

develops itself on the one hand in the physical, and on the other, in the noetic life." These writers are correct in denying that regeneration is a mere change in the purposes, or feelings, or conscious states of any kind in man; and also in affirming that it involves the communication of a new and abiding principle of life to the soul. But they depart from Scripture and from the faith of the Church universal in substituting "the theanthropic nature of Christ," "his divine-human life," "generic humanity healed and exalted to the power of a divine life" (i.e., deified), for the Holy Ghost. This substitution is made avowedly in obedience to modern science, to the new philosophy which has discovered a true anthropology and revealed "the real oneness of God and man." As already remarked, it is assumed that this communication of the "theanthropic nature of Christ" carried with it his merits as well as his blessedness and power. All we have of Christ, we have within us. And if we can discover little of God, and little God-like in our souls, so much the worse. It is all we have to expect, until our inner life is further developed. The Christ within (as some of the Friends also teach), is, according to this system, all the Christ we have. Ebrard, therefore, in one view identifies regeneration and justification. "Regeneration," he says, [51] "as the act of Christ, is the cause (causa efficiens') of justification; He communicates his life to us, and awakens a new life in us. This is justification, an inward subjective change, which involves merit as well as holiness. This confounding the work of the Holy Spirit in regeneration, with the judicial, objective act of justification, belongs to the system. At least it is only on the ground of this infused life that we are pronounced righteous in the sight of God. What we receive is "the real divine-human life of Christ," and "whatever there may be of merit, virtue, efficacy or moral value it any way, in the mediatorial work of Christ, it is all lodged in the life, by the power of which alone this work has been accomplished, and in the presence of which only it can have either reality or stability. The imagination that the merits of Christ's life may be sundered from his life itself, and conveyed over to his people under this abstract form, on the ground of a merely outward legal constitution, is unscriptural and contrary to all reason at the same time." [52] Regeneration consisting in the communicating the life of Christ, his substance, to the soul, and this divine-human life comprehending all the merit, virtue, or efficacy belonging to Christ and his work, -- regeneration involves justification, of which it is the ground and the cause.

Doctrine of Delitzsch.

Delitzsch devotes one division of his "Biblical Psychology" to the subject of regeneration. He begins the discussion with a discourse on Christ's person. "When we wish to consider the new spiritual life of the redeemed man, we proceed from the divine human archetype, the person of the Redeemer." [53] Man was, as to his spirit and soul, originally constituted in the image of God; the spirit was the image "of His triune nature and the latter [the soul] of His sevenfold doxa.'" Man was free to conform his life to the spirit, or divine principle within him, or to allow the control of his life to be assumed by the soul. Utter ruin was the consequence of the fall. This could be corrected and man redeemed only by "a new beginning of similar creative intensity." [54] This new beginning was effected in the incarnation. The Son of God became man, not by assuming our nature, in the ordinary sense of those words, but by ceasing to be almighty, omniscient, and omnipresent, and contracting Himself to the limits of humanity. It was a human life into which He thus entered; a life including a spirit, soul, and body. There is no dualism in Christ's person, as between the

corporeal and spiritual, or between the human and divine. It is the divine nature in the form of humanity, or this divine-human nature, which is purely and simply, though perfectly, human, which is communicated to the people of God in their regeneration. To this fellowship in the life of Christ, faith is indispensable, and therefore Ebrard says, infants cannot be the subjects of regeneration, while Delitzsch, a Lutheran, maintains that infants are capable of exercising faith, and therefore are capable of being regenerated. What is received from Christ, or that of which his people are made partakers, is "the Spirit, the soul, the body of Christ." [55] The new man, or second Adam, was made a "life-giving spirit," and gradually subdues the old man, or our Adamic nature, and brings the whole man (pneuma, psuche, and soma), spirit, soul, and body, up to the standard of the life of Christ, in whom the divine and human are merged into one, or rather appear in their original oneness.

The communication of the theanthropic life to the soul is an act of the divine Spirit in which we have neither agency nor consciousness. Delitzsch infers from what our Lord said to Nicodemus, John iii. that "The operation of the Spirit of regeneration is, therefore, (1.) A free one, withdrawn from the power of human volition, of human special agency. (2.) A mysterious one, lying beyond human consciousness, and only to be recognized by its effects." [56] "It is peculiar to all God's creative agencies, that the creature which is thereby brought into existence, or in which this or that is brought into existence, has no consciousness of what is occurring." [57]

Various as are the modifications of this doctrine as presented by different writers of this general school, regeneration is by all of them understood to be the communication of the life of Christ to the soul. By the life of Christ is meant his manhood, his human nature, which was at the same time divine, and therefore is theanthropic. It may be called human, and it may be called divine, for although being one, one life, it is truly divine by being perfectly human. We are all partakers of humanity as polluted and degraded by the apostasy of Adam. Christ, or rather, the Eternal Son of God, assumed human nature, in that He became man, and being God, humanity in Him was filled with the treasures of wisdom and knowledge and grace and power; of that humanity we must partake in order to have any part in the salvation of Christ. The communication of this life to us, which is our regeneration, is through the Church, which is his body, because animated by his human life. As we derive our deteriorated humanity by descent from Adam, we are made partakers of this renovated, divine humanity by union with the Church, in which Christ as a man, and God-man, lives and dwells. And as the communication of humanity as it existed in fallen Adam to his descendants is by a natural process of organic development; so the communication of the renovated humanity as it exists in Christ, to his people, and through the world, is also a natural process. It supposes no special interference or intervention on the part of God, any more than any other organic development in the vegetable or animal world. The only thing supernatural about it is the starting point in Christ.

Doctrine of the Latin Church.

In the later Latin Church the word regeneration is used as synonymous with justification, and is taken in a wide sense as including everything involved in the translation of the soul from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son. In regeneration the sinner becomes a child of God. It is made therefore, to include, (1.) The

removal of the "reatus" or guilt of sin. (2.) The cleansing away of inherent moral corruption. (3.) The "infusion of new habits of grace;" and (4.) Adoption, or recognition of the renewed as sons of God. The Council of Trent says, [58] "Justificatio . . . non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio, et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem grati&#65533;, et donorum, unde homo ex injusto fit justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit heres secundum spem vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533;." The instrumental cause of justification in this sense, is declared to be "sacramentum baptismi, quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nulli umquam contigit justificatio." As to the effect of baptism, it is taught [59] that it takes away not only guilt, but everything of the nature of sin, and communicates a new life. "Si quis per Jesu Christi Domini gratiam; qu&#65533; in baptismate confertur, reatum originalis peccati remitti negat, aut etiam asserit, non tolli totum id, quod veram, et propriam peccati rationem habet; sed illud dicit tantum radi, aut non imputari: anathema sit. In renatis enim nihil odit Deus, quia nihil est damnationis iis qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per baptisma in mortem: qui non secundum carnem ambulant, sed veterem hominem exuentes, et novum, qui secundum Deum creatus est, induentes, innocentes, immaculati, puri, innoxii, ac Deo dilecti effecti sunt, heredes quidem Dei, coheredes autem Christi, ita ut nihil prorsus eos ab ingressu coeli remoretur." [60]

Regeneration, therefore, as effected in baptism, is the removal of the guilt and pollution of sin, the infusion of new habits of grace, and introduction into the family of God. It is in baptism that all the benefits of the redemption of Christ are conveyed to the soul, and this is its regeneration or birth into the kingdom of God.

Doctrine of the Church of England.

1. There has always been a class of theologians in the English Church who hold the theology of the Church of Rome in its leading characteristics. They accept, therefore, the definition of regeneration, or justification, as they call it, as given by the Council of Trent, and quoted above.

2. Others make a distinction between conversion and regeneration. The latter is that grace which attends baptism, and as that sacrament without sacrilege cannot be repeated, so regeneration can be experienced only once. Conversion is "a change of heart and life from sin to holiness." "To the heathen and infidel conversion is absolutely and always necessary to salvation." To the baptized Christian conversion is not always necessary. "Some persons have confused conversion with regeneration, and have taught that all men, the baptized, and therefore in fact regenerate, must be regenerated afterwards, or they cannot be saved. Now this is in many ways false: for regeneration, which the Lord Jesus Christ himself has connected with holy baptism, cannot be repeated: moreover, not all men (though indeed most men do) fall into such sin after baptism, that conversion, or as they term it, regeneration, is necessary to their salvation; and if a regeneration were necessary to them, it could only be obtained through repetition of baptism, which were an act of sacrilege." "They who object to the expression baptismal regeneration, by regeneration mean, for the most part, the first influx of irresistible and indefectible grace; grace that cannot be repelled by its subject, and which must issue in its final salvation. Now, of such grace our Church knows nothing, and of course, therefore, means not by regeneration at baptism, the first influx of such grace. That the sins, original and actual, of the faithful recipient of baptism, are washed away, she doth indeed believe; and also that grace is given to him by the

immediate agency of the Holy Spirit; yet so that the conscience thus cleansed may be again defiled, and that the baptized person may, and often does, by his own fault, fall again into sin, in which if he die he shall without doubt perish everlastingly; his condemnation not being avoided, but rather increased, by his baptismal privilege." [61]

3. A third form of doctrine on this subject, held by some divines of this church, is that regeneration properly expresses an external change of relation, and not an internal change of the state of the soul and of its relation to God. As a proselyte was regenerated when he professed himself a Jew, so any one initiated into the visible Church is thereby regenerated. This is held to be entirely different from spiritual renovation. Regeneration, in this outward sense, is admitted to be by baptism; renovation is by the Spirit.

4. A large class of English theologians have ever remained faithful to the evangelical doctrine on this subject, in accordance with the views of the Reformers in their Church, who were in full sympathy both in doctrine and in ecclesiastical and Christian fellowship with other Protestant churches.

[4] Sermon 51, Works, edit. Boston, 1842, vol. v. p. 112.

[5] Ibid. p. 114.

[6] Sermon 51, Works, edit. Boston, 1842, vol. v. p. 116.

[7] Ibid. p. 116.

[8] Ibid. pp. 117, 118.

[9] Lectures on Systematic Theology, by Charles G. Finney, edit. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846, p. 364.

[10] Ibid. p. 500.

[11] Lectures on Systematic Theology, by Charles G. Finney, edit. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846, p. 26.

[12] Ibid. p. 33.

[13] Ibid. p. 4.

[14] Ibid. p. 44.

[15] Ibid. p. 26.

[16] Ibid. p. 36.

[17] Ibid. p. 149.

[18] Ibid. p. 157.

[19] Ibid. p. 45.

[20] Ibid. p. 48.

[21] Ibid. p. 120.

[22] Lectures on Systematic Theology, by Charles G. Finney, edit. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846, p. 122.

[23] Ibid. p. 164.

[24] Ibid. p. 213.

[25] Ibid. p. 278.

[26] Ibid. p. 521.

[27] Ibid. p. 317, 318.

[28] Ibid. p. p. 355.

[29] Lectures on Systematic Theology, by Charles G. Finney, edit. Oberlin, Boston, and New York, 1846, p. 296.

[30] Ibid. p. 64.

[31] Ibid. p. 91.

[32] Ibid. p. 99.

[33] Christian Spectator, vol. i. New Haven, 1829, pp. 16-19.

[34] Ibid. p. 21.

[35] Christian Spectator, 1829, p. 223.

[36] Ibid. p. 17.

[37] Ibid. p. 433.

[38] Dialektik, sect. 290-295; Works, Berlin, 1839, 3d div. vol. iv. part 2. pp. 245-255.

[39] Psychology, New York, 1840, pp. 169, 173.

[40] Commentary, 1 Cor. xv. 20.

[41] Mystical Presence, edit Philadelphia, 1846, p. 171.

[42] Mystical Presence, edit. Philadelphia, 1846, p. 172.

[43] Mercersburg Review, 1850, vol. ii. p. 550.

[44] Dorner's Christologie, 1st edit., Stuttgart, 1839, p. 488.

[45] "Charakter des Christenthums," Studien und Kritiken, 1845, erstes Heft, p. 59. See also a translation of this article at the beginning of The Mystical Presence, by J. W. Nevin, D. D. Philadelphia, 1846.

[46] Mystical Presence, edit. Philadelphia, 1846, pp. 225-229.

[47] Dogmatik, edit. Knigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 320.

[48] Ibid. p. 300.

[49] Institutio, IV. xvii. 5, edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. ii. p. 403.

[50] Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 310.

[51] Ibid. p. 315.

[52] Mystical Presence, by J. W. Nevin, D. D., Philadelphia, 1846, p. 191.

[53] A System of Biblical Psychology, by Franz Delitzsch, D. D., translated by R. R. Wallis, Ph. D.; Edinburgh, 1867, p. 381.

[54] Ibid. p. 382.

[55] A System of Biblical Psychology, by Franz Delitzsch, D. D., translated by R. R. Wallis, Ph. D.; Edinburgh, 1867, p. 398.

[56] Ibid. p. 402.

[57] Ibid. p. 403.

[58] Sessio. VI. cap. 7.

[59] Ibid. v. 5.

[60] Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<unk>ttingen, 1846, pp. 24, 25, 28.

[61] A Church Dictionary, by Walter Farquhar Hook, D. D., Vicar of Leeds, article, "Conversion"; 6th edit., Philadelphia, 1854.

§ 3. The Evangelical Doctrine.

In the Lutheran Symbols the doctrine of Regeneration, which is made to include conversion, is thus stated: "Conversio hominis talis est immutatio, per operationem Spiritus Sancti, in hominis intellectu, voluntate et corde, qua homo (operatione videlicet Spiritus Sancti) potest oblatam gratiam apprehendere." [62]

"Hominis autem nondum renati intellectus et voluntas tantum sunt subjectum convertendum, sunt enim hominis spiritualiter mortui intellectus et voluntas, in quo homine Spiritus Sanctus conversionem et renovationem operatur, ad quod opus hominis convertendi voluntas nihil confert, sed patitur, ut Deus in ipsa operetur, donec regeneretur. Postea vero in aliis sequentibus bonis operibus Spiritui Sancto cooperatur, ea faciens, qu<unk> Deo grata sunt." [63]

"Sicut igitur homo, qui corporaliter mortuus est, seipsum propriis viribus pr<unk>parare aut accommodare non potest, ut vitam externam recipiat: ita homo spiritualiter in peccatis mortuus, seipsum propriis viribus ad consequendam spiritualem et coelestem justitiam et vitam pr<unk>parare, applicare, aut vertere non potest, nisi per Filium Dei a morte peccati liberetur et vivificetur." [64]

"Rejicimus errorem eorum qui fingunt, Deum in conversione et regeneratione hominis substantiam et essentiam veteris Adami, et pr<unk>cipue animam rationalem penitus abolere, novamque anima essentiam ex nihilo, in illa conversione et regeneratione creare." [65]

With these statements the doctrines taught in the Symbols and by the theologians of the Reformed churches, perfectly agree. It is sufficient to quote the standards of our own Church. The "Westminster Confession" says, "Man, by his fall into a state of sin, hath wholly lost all ability of will to any spiritual good accompanying salvation; so as a natural man being altogether averse from that which is good, and dead in sin, is not able, by his own strength, to convert himself, or to prepare himself thereunto." "When God converts a sinner, and translates him into the state of grace, He freeth him from his natural bondage under sin, and by his grace alone enables him freely to will and to do that which is spiritually good." "All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in his appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by his Word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds, spiritually and savingly, to understand the things of God, taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them an heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by his Almighty power, determining them to that which is good, and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by his grace." "This effectual call is of God's free and special grace alone, not from anything at all foreseen in man, who is altogether passive therein, until being quickened and renewed by the Holy Ghost, he is thereby enabled to answer this call, and embrace the grace offered and conveyed in it." [66]

The Larger Catechism [67] says, "What is effectual calling? Effectual calling is the

work of God's almighty power and grace, whereby (out of his free and especial love to his elect, and from nothing in them moving Him thereunto) He doth in his accepted time invite and draw them to Jesus Christ by his Word and Spirit; savingly enlightening their minds, renewing and powerfully determining their wills, so as they (although in themselves dead in sin) are hereby made willing and able, freely to answer his call, and to accept and embrace the grace offered and conveyed therein."

Exposition of the Doctrine.

According to the common doctrine of Protestants, i.e., of Lutherans and Reformed, as appears from the above quotations --

Regeneration an Act of God.

1. Regeneration is an act of God. It is not simply referred to Him as its giver, and, in that sense, its author, as He is the giver of faith and of repentance. It is not an act which, by argument and persuasion, or by moral power, He induces the sinner to perform. But it is an act of which He is the agent. It is God who regenerates. The soul is regenerated. In this sense the soul is passive in regeneration, which (subjectively considered) is a change wrought in us, and not an act performed by us.

Regeneration an Act of God's Power.

2. Regeneration is not only an act of God, but also an act of his almighty power. Agreeably to the express declarations of the Scriptures, it is so presented in the Symbols of the Protestant churches. If an act of omnipotence, it is certainly efficacious, for nothing can resist almighty power. The Lutherans indeed deny this. But the more orthodox of them mean simply that the sinner can keep himself aloof from the means through which, or, rather, in connection with which it pleases God to exercise his power. He can absent himself from the preaching of the Word, and the use of the sacraments. Or he may voluntarily place himself in such an inward posture of resistance as determines God not to exert his power in his regeneration. The assertion that regeneration is an act of God's omnipotence, is, and is intended to be, a denial that it is an act of moral suasion. It is an affirmation that it is "physical" in the old sense of that word, as opposed to moral; and that it is immediate, as opposed to mediate, or through or by the truth. When either in Scripture or in theological writings, the word regeneration is taken in a wide sense as including conversion or the voluntary turning of the soul to God, then indeed it is said to be by the Word. The restoration of sight to the blind by the command of Christ, was an act of omnipotence. It was immediate. Nothing in the way of instrumentary or secondary co�perating influence intervened between the divine volition and the effect. But all exercises of the restored faculty were through and by the light. And without light sight is impossible. Raising Lazarus from the dead was an act of omnipotence. Nothing intervened between the volition and the effect. The act of quickening was the act of God. In that matter Lazarus was passive. But in all the acts of the restored vitality, he was active and free. According to the evangelical system it is in this sense that regeneration is the act of God's almighty power. Nothing intervenes between his volition that the soul, spiritually dead, should live, and the desired effect. But in all that belongs to the consciousness; all that precedes or follows the imparting of this new life, the soul is active and is influenced by the truth acting according to the laws of our mental constitution.

Regeneration in the Subjective Sense of the Word not an Act.

3. Regeneration, subjectively considered, or viewed as an effect or change wrought in the soul, is not an act. It is not a new purpose created by God (if that language be intelligible), or formed by the sinner under his influence. Nor is it any conscious exercise of any kind. It is something which lies lower than consciousness.

Not a Change of Substance.

4. It is not, however, according to the Church doctrine, any change in the substance of the soul. This is rejected universally as Manicheism, and as inconsistent with the nature of sin and holiness. It is, indeed, often assumed that there is nothing in the soul but its substance and its acts; and, therefore, if regeneration be not a change in the acts, it must be a change of the substance of the soul. This assumption, however, is not only arbitrary, but it is also opposed to the intimate convictions of all men. That is, of all men in their normal state, when not speculating or theorizing. That such is the common judgment of men has already been proved under the heads of original righteousness and original sin. Every one recognizes, in the first place, that such constitutional principles as parental love, the social affections, a sense of justice, pity, etc., are immanent states of the soul which can be resolved neither into its essence nor acts. So also acquired habits are similar permanent and immanent states which are not acts, much less modifications or changes of the essence. The same is true of dispositions, amiable and unamiable. The refinement of taste and feeling due to education and culture, is not a change in the essence of the mind. It cannot reasonably be denied that a state of mind produced by culture, may be produced by the volition of God. What is true in every other department of our inner life, is true of our moral and religious nature. Besides those acts and states which reveal themselves in the consciousness, there are abiding states, dispositions, principles, or habits, as they are indifferently called, which constitute character and give it stability, and are the proximate determining cause why our voluntary exercises and conscious states are what they are. This is what the Bible calls the heart, which has the same relation to all our acts that the nature of a tree, as good or bad, has to the character of its fruit. A good tree is known to be good if its fruit be good. But the goodness of the fruit does not constitute or determine the goodness of the tree, but the reverse. In like manner, it is not good acts which make the man good; the goodness of the man determines the character of his acts.

It is a New Life.

5. While denying that regeneration is a change either in the essence or acts of the soul, evangelical Christians declare it to be, in the language of Scripture, "a quickening," a zoopoiein, a communication of a new principle of life. It is hard, perhaps impossible, to define what life is. Yet every man is familiar with its manifestations. He sees and knows the difference between death and life, between a dead and living plant or animal. And, therefore, when the Bible tells us that in regeneration God imparts a new form of life to the soul, the language is as intelligible as human language can be in relation to such a subject. We know that when a man is dead as to the body he neither sees, feels, nor acts. The objects adapted to impress the senses of the living make no impression upon him. They awaken no corresponding feeling, and they call forth no activity. The dead are insensible and powerless. When the Scriptures declare that men are spiritually dead they do not deny to them physical, intellectual, social, or moral life. They admit that the objects of sense, the truths of reason, our social relations and moral obligations, are more or less adequately

apprehended; these do not fail to awaken feeling and to excite to action. But there is a higher class of objects than these, what the Bible calls "The things of God, "The things of the Spirit," "The things pertaining to salvation." These things, although intellectually apprehended as presented to our cognitive faculties, are not spiritually discerned by the unrenewed man. A beautiful object in nature or art may be duly apprehended as an object of vision by an uncultivated man, who has no perception of its ◆sthetic excellence, and no corresponding feeling of delight in its contemplation. So it is with the unrenewed man. He may have an intellectual knowledge of the facts and doctrines of the Bible, but no spiritual discernment of their excellence, and no delight in them. The same Christ, as portrayed in the Scriptures, is to one man without form or comeliness that we should desire Him; to another He is the chief among ten thousand and the one altogether lovely; "God manifest in the flesh," whom it is impossible not to adore, love, and obey.

This new life, therefore, manifests itself in new views of God, of Christ, of sin, of holiness, of the world, of the gospel, and of the life to come; in short, of all those truths which God has revealed as necessary to salvation. This spiritual illumination is so important and so necessary and such an immediate effect of regeneration, that spiritual knowledge is not only represented in the Bible as the end of regeneration (Col. iii. 10; 1 Tim. ii. 4), but the whole of conversion (which is the effect of regeneration) is summed up in knowledge. Paul describes his conversion as consisting in Christ's being revealed to Him (Gal. i. 16); and the Scriptures make all religion, and even eternal life, to be a form of knowledge. Paul renounced everything for the excellency of the knowledge of Christ (Phil. iii. 8), and our Lord says that the knowledge of Himself and of the Father is eternal life. (John xvii. 8). The whole process of salvation is described as a translation from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light. There is no wonder, therefore, that the ancients called regeneration a photismos, an illumination. If a man born blind were suddenly restored to sight, such a flood of knowledge and delight would flow in upon him, through the organ of vision, that he might well think that all living consisted in seeing. So the New Testament writers represent the change consequent on regeneration, the opening the eyes on the certainty, glory, and excellence of divine things, and especially of the revelation of God in the person of his Son, as comprehending almost everything which pertains to spiritual life. Inseparably connected with this knowledge and included in it, is faith, in all the forms and exercises in which spiritual truths are its objects. Delight in the things thus revealed is the necessary consequence of spiritual illumination; and with delight come satisfaction and peace, elevation above the world, or spiritual mindedness, and such a sense of the importance of the things not seen and eternal, that all the energies of the renewed soul are (or, it is acknowledged, they should be) devoted to securing them for ourselves and others.

This is one of the forms in which the Bible sets forth the doctrine of regeneration. It is raising the soul dead in sin to spiritual life. And this spiritual life unfolds or manifests itself just as any other form of life, in all the exercises appropriate to its nature.

It is a New Birth.

The same doctrine on this subject is taught in other words when regeneration is declared to be a new birth. At birth the child enters upon a new state of existence. Birth is not its own act. It is born. It comes from a state of darkness, in which the objects adapted to

its nature cannot act on it or awaken its activities. As soon as it comes into the world all its faculties are awakened; it sees, feels, and hears, and gradually unfolds all its faculties as a rational and moral, as well as physical being. The Scriptures teach that it is thus in regeneration. The soul enters upon a new state. It is introduced into a new world. A whole class of objects before unknown or unappreciated are revealed to it, and exercise upon it their appropriate influence. The "things of the Spirit" become the chief objects of desire and pursuit, and all the energies of the new-born soul are directed towards the spiritual, as distinguished from the seen and temporal. This representation is in accordance with the evangelical doctrine on this subject. It is not consistent with any of the false theories of regeneration, which regard regeneration as the sinner's own act; as a mere change of purpose; or as a gradual process of moral culture.

A New Heart.

Another mode in which this doctrine is set forth is found in those passages in which God is represented as giving his people a new heart. The heart in Scripture is that which thinks, feels, wills, and acts. It is the soul; the self. A new heart is, therefore, a new self, a new man. It implies a change of the whole character. It is a new nature. Out of the heart proceed all conscious, voluntary, moral exercises. A change of heart, therefore, is a change which precedes these exercises and determines their character. A new heart is to a man what goodness is to the tree in the parable of our Lord.

In regeneration, therefore, there is a new life communicated to the soul; the man is the subject of a new birth; he receives a new nature or new heart, and becomes a new creature. As the change is neither in the substance nor in the mere exercises of the soul, it is in those immanent dispositions, principles, tastes, or habits which underlie all conscious exercises, and determine tht character of the man and of all his acts.

The whole Soul the Subject of this change.

6. According to the evangelical doctrine the whole soul is the subject of regeneration. It is neither the intellect to the exclusion of the feelings, nor the feelings to the exclusion of the intellect; nor is it the will alone, either in its wider or in its more limited sense, that is the subject of the change in question. This is evident, --

(1.) Because the soul is a unit, and is so recognized in Scripture. Its faculties are not so dissociated that one can be good and another bad, one saved and another lost, one active in the sphere of morals and religion and the others inactive. In every such exercise the intelligence, the feelings, the will, and the conscience, or moral consciousness, are of necessity involved.

(2.) In the description of this work all the faculties of the soul are represented as affected. The mind is illuminated, the eyes of the understanding are opened; the heart is renewed; the will is conquered, or, the man is made willing.

(3.) When Lazarus was restored to life, it was not one member of the body, or one faculty that received the vivifying influence. It was not the heart that was set in motion, the brain and lungs being restored by its action. It was the whole man that was made alive. And it is the whole soul that is regenerated.

(4.) This is further evident from the effects ascribed to regeneration. These effects are not confined to any one department of our nature. Regeneration secures right knowledge as

well as right feeling; and right feeling is not the effect of right knowledge, nor is right knowledge the effect of right feeling. The two are the inseparable effects of a work which affects the whole soul.

(5.) When our Lord teaches that the tree must be made good in order that the fruit should be good, it was not any one part of the tree which must be changed, but the whole tree. In like manner it is the soul, in the centre and unity of its life, that is the subject of that life-giving power of the Holy Ghost, by which it becomes a new creature. The doctrine that regeneration is a change affecting only one of the faculties of the soul has its foundation entirely outside of the Scriptures. It is simply an inference from a particular psychological theory, and has no authority in theology.

[62] Form of Concord, II. 83.

[63] Ibid. 91.

[64] Ibid. 71.

[65] Ibid. 14; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1836, pp. 679, 681, 658, 581.

[66] IX. 3, 4; x. 1, 2.

[67] Question 67.

§ 4. Objection.

The same objections which are urged against other doctrines of grace are pressed against the Augustinian view of the nature of regeneration. These objections are of three classes.

Denial of Supernaturalism.

1. The first class of objections are founded on the denial of Theism; or at least on the denial of the Scriptural doctrine of the relation of God to the world. It is an assumption common to most of the forms of modern philosophy that the only agency of the Supreme Being (whether personal or impersonal) is according to law. It is ordered, uniform, and in, with, and through second causes, if such causes are admitted. Everything is natural, and nothing supernatural, either in the outward world or in the sphere of things spiritual. There can be no creation "ex nihilo," no miracles, no immediate revelation, no inspiration in the church sense of that term; no supernatural work upon the heart, and therefore no regeneration in the sense of an immediate operation of almighty power on the soul. Those who depart from their principles so far as to admit the person of Christ to be supernatural in its origin contend that the supernatural in Him becomes natural, and that from Him onward the diffusion of spiritual life is by a regular process of development, as simply natural as the development of humanity from Adam through all his posterity.

This is purely a philosophical theory. It has no authority for Christians. As it is contrary to the express teaching of the Scriptures it cannot be adopted by those who recognize them as the infallible rule of faith and practice. As it contradicts the moral and religious convictions arising from the constitution of our nature, it must be hurtful in all its tendencies, and can be adopted by those only who sacrifice to speculation their interior life.

Resting on False Psychological Theories.

2. A second class of objections are founded on certain psychological theories on free agency, on the nature of the soul, and on the conditions of moral obligation. No theories on these, or any other subjects, have any authority, except those which underlie and are necessarily assumed in the facts and doctrines of the Scripture. If any theory teaches that plenary ability is essential to free agency; that God cannot control with certainty the acts of free agents without destroying their liberty; or that free acts cannot be foreseen, predicted, or foreordained, then such theory must be false if the Scriptures assert facts which imply the contrary. If a theory teaches that men are responsible only for acts of the will, under their own control, that theory must be rejected if the Bible teaches that we are responsible for states of mind over which the will has no direct power. The facts involved in the evangelical doctrine of regeneration, as stated above, contradict the theories on which the arguments of the Remonstrants, Pelagians, and others against that doctrine rest, and therefore those theories must share the fate of every doctrine which contradicts established facts. This has been demonstrated over and over in different ages of the Church. The principles involved in these objections have been discussed in the preceding pages, and need not be again considered.

Objections founded on the Divine Perfection.

3. A third class of objections are drawn from the supposed inconsistency of this doctrine with the moral perfections of God. If all men are dead in sin, destitute of the power to restore themselves to life, then not only is it unjust that they should be condemned, but it is also incompatible with the divine rectitude that God should exert his almighty power in the regeneration of some, while He leaves others to perish. Justice, it is said, demands that all should have an equal opportunity; that all should have, by nature or from grace, power to secure their own salvation. It is obvious that such objections do not bear peculiarly against the Augustinian system. They are urged by atheists against Theism. If there be a personal God of infinite power, why does He permit sin and misery to hold joint supremacy on earth; why are good and evil so unequally distributed, and why is the distribution so arbitrary?

Deists make the same objections against the divine authority of the Bible. They cannot receive it as the Word of God because it represents the Creator and Governor of the world as placing men under circumstances which secure in some way the universality of sin, and then punishing them with inexorable severity even for their idle words.

It is also plain that the different anti-Augustinian systems afford no real relief from these difficulties. Admitting that regeneration is the sinner's own act; admitting that every man has all the knowledge and all the ability necessary to secure his salvation, it remains true that few are saved, and that God does not interpose to prevent the great majority of adult men in the present state of the world perishing in their sins.

Augustinians do not deny these difficulties. They only maintain that they are not peculiar to their system; and they rest content with the solution of them given in the Scriptures. That solution agrees with all the facts of consciousness and experience, so far as consciousness and experience extend. The Bible teaches that man was created holy; that by his voluntary transgression of the divine law he apostatized from God; that in consequence of this apostasy all men come into the world in a state of spiritual death, both guilty and polluted; that God exercises no influence to lead them into sin, but on the

contrary, by his truth, his providence, and by his Spirit exerts all that influence over them which should induce rational beings to repent and seek his pardoning mercy and sanctifying grace; that all those who sincerely and faithfully seek reconciliation with God in the way of his appointment He actually saves; that of his sovereign grace He, in the exercise of his mighty power, renews and sanctifies a multitude which no man can number, who would otherwise have continued in their sins. With these representations of the Scriptures everything within the sphere of our knowledge agrees. Consciousness and experience testify that we are an apostate race; that all men are sinners, and, being sinners, have forfeited all claims on the favour of God; that in continuing in sin and in rejecting the overtures of mercy men act voluntarily, following the desires of their own hearts. Every man's conscience, moreover, teaches him that he has never sought the salvation of his soul with the sincerity and perseverance with which men seek the things of the world, and yet failed in his efforts. Every man who comes short of eternal life knows that the responsibility rests upon himself. On the other hand, the experience of every believer is a witness to him that it is of God and not of himself that he is in Christ (1 Corinthians i. 30); every believer knows that if God had left him to himself he wodd have continued in unbelief and sin. Why God intervenes to save one and not another, when all are equally undeserving; why the things of God are revealed unto babes while hidden from the wise and prudent, can only be answered in the language of our Lord, "Even so, Father, for so it seemed good in thy sight." (Matthew xi. 26.)

The more popular and common objections that the Augustinian doctrine of regeneration leads to the neglect of the means of grace, "to waiting for God's time," to indifference or despair; that it is inconsistent with exhortations and commands addressed to sinners to repent and believe, and incompatible with moral responsibility, have already been repeatedly considered. It is enough to say once more that these objections are founded on the assumption that inability, even when it arises out of our own sinfulness, is incompatible with obligation. Besides, it is the natural and actual tendency of a sense of helplessness under a burden of evil, to lead to earnest and importunate application for relief to Him who is able to afford it, and by whom it is offered.

CHAPTER XVI: FAITH

§ 1. Preliminary Remarks.

The first conscious exercise of the renewed soul is faith, as the first conscious act of a man born blind whose eyes have been opened, is seeing. The exercise of vision in such a man is indeed attended by so many new sensations and emotions that he cannot determine how much of this new experience comes through the eye, and how much from other sources. It is so with the believer. As soon as his eyes are opened by the renewing of the Holy Ghost he is in a new world. Old things have passed away, all things are become new. The apprehension of "the things of God" as true lies at the foundation of all the exercises of the renewed soul. The discussions on the question, Whether faith precedes repentance, or repentance faith, can have no place if the meaning of the words be agreed upon. Unless faith be limited to some of its special exercises there can be no question that in the order of nature it must precede repentance. Repentance is the turning of the soul from sin unto God, and unless this be produced by the believing apprehension of the truth it is not even a rational act. As so much prominence is assigned to faith in the Scriptures, as all the promises of God are addressed to believers, and as all the conscious exercises of spiritual life involve the exercise of faith, without which they are impossible, the importance of this grace cannot be overestimated. To the theologian and to the practical Christian it is indispensable that clear and correct ideas should be entertained on the subject. It is one of special difficulty. This difficulty arises partly from the nature of the subject; partly from the fact that usage has assigned the word faith so many different meanings; partly from the arbitrary definitions given of it by philosophers and theologians; and partly from the great diversity of aspects under which it is presented in the Word of God.

The question, What is Faith? is a very comprehensive one In one view it is a metaphysical question. What is the psychological name of the act or state of the mind which we designate faith, or belief? In this aspect the discussion concerns the philosopher as much as the theologian. Secondly, faith may be viewed as to its exercise in the whole sphere of religion and morality. Thirdly, it may be considered as a Christian grace, the fruit of the Spirit; that is, those exercises of faith which are peculiar to the regenerated people of God. This is what is meant by saving faith. Fourthly, it may be viewed in its relation to justification, sanctification, and holy living, or, as to those special exercises of faith which are required as the necessary conditions of the sinner's acceptance with God, or as essential to holiness of heart and life.

§ 2. The Psychological Nature of Faith.

Faith in the widest sense of the word, is assent to the truth, or the persuasion of the mind that a thing is true. In ordinary popular language we are said to believe whatever we regard as true. The primary element of faith is trust. The Hebrew word 'mn means to sustain, to uphold. In the Niphal, to be firm, and, in a moral sense, to be trustworthy. In the Hiphil, to regard as firm, or trustworthy, to place trust or confidence in. In like manner the Greek pisteuo (from pistis, and that from peitho, to persuade), means to trust, i.e., to be persuaded that a person or thing is trustworthy. Hence the epithet pistos is applied to any one who is, and who shows himself to be, worthy of trust. In Latin credere (whence our word credit) has the same meaning. In mercantile matters it means to lend, to trust to; and then in general, to exercise trust in. "Crede mihi," trust me, rely on my word. Fides (from fido, and that from peitho), is also trust, confidence exercised in regard to any person or thing; then the disposition, or virtue which excites confidence; then the promise, declaration, or pledge which is the outward ground of confidence. In the cognate words, fidens, fidelis, fiducia, the same idea is prominent. The German word "Glaube" has the same general meaning. It is defined by Heinsius (Wrterbuch): "der Zustand des Gemthes, da man eine Sache fr wahr hlt und sich darauf verlsst," i.e., "that state of mind in which a man receives and relies upon a thing as true." The English word "faith" is said to be from the Anglo-Saxon "fgan" to covenant. It is that state ef mind which a covenant requires or supposes; that is, it is confidence in a person or thing as trustworthy. "To believe," is defined by the Latin "credere, fidem dare sive habere." "The etymologists," says Richardson, "do not attempt to account for this important word: it is undoubtedly formed on the Dut. Leven; Ger. Leben; A.-S. Lif-ian, Be-lif-ian; Goth. Liban, vivere, to live, or be-live, to dwell. Live or leve, be- or bi-live or leve, are used indifferently by old writers, whether to denote vivere or credere. . . . . To believe, then, is to live by or according to, to abide by; to guide, conduct, regulate, govern, or direct the life by; to take, accept, assume or adopt as a rule of life; and, consequently, to think, deem, or judge right; to be firmly persuaded of, to give credit to; to trust, or think trustworthy; to have or give faith or confidence; to confide, to think or deem faithful."

The Primary Idea of Faith is Trust.

From all this it appears that the primary idea of faith is trust. The primary idea of truth is that which is trustworthy; that which sustains our expectations, which does not disappoint, because it really is what it is assumed or declared to be. It is opposed to the deceitful, the false, the unreal, the empty, and the worthless. To regard a thing as true, is to regard it as worthy of trust, as being what it purports to be. Faith, in the comprehensive and legitimate meaning of the word, therefore, is trust.

In accordance with this general idea of faith, Augustine [68] says, "Credere, nihil aliud est, quam cum assensione cogitare." Thus, also, Reid [69] says, "Belief admits of all degrees, from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance. . . . . There are many operations of the mind in which . . . . we find belief to be an essential ingredient. . . . . Belief is an ingredient in consciousness, in perception, and in remembrance. . . . . We give the name of evidence to whatever is a ground of belief. . . . . What this evidence is, is more easily felt than described. . . . . The common occasions of life lead us to distinguish evidence into different kinds, ... such as the evidence of sense, the evidence of memory, the evidence of consciousness, the evidence of testimony, the evidence of axioms, the

evidence of reasoning. . . . . They seem to me to agree only in this, that they are all fitted by nature to produce belief in the human mind."

The more limited Sense of the Word.

There is, however, in most cases a great difference between the general signification of a word and its special and characteristic meaning. Although, therefore, there is an element cf belief in all our cognitions, there is an important difference between what is strictly and properly called faith, and those states or acts of the mind which we designate as sight or perception, intuition, opinions, conclusions, or apodictic judgments. What that characteristic difference is, is the point to be determined. There are modes of statement on this subject current among a certain class of philosophers and theologians, which can hardly be regarded as definitions of faith. They take the word out of its ordinary and established meaning, or arbitrarily limit it to a special sphere of our mental operations. Thus Morell [70] says, "Faith is the intuition of eternal verities." But eternal verities are not the only objects of faith; nor is intuition the only mode of apprehending truth which is of the nature of belief. The same objections bear against the assertion that "Faith is the organ for the supernatural and divine; "or, as Eschenmayer expresses it, [71] "Ein vom Denken, F&#65533;hlen und Wollen verschiedenes, eigenth&#65533;mliches Organ f&#65533;r das Ewige und Heilige; a special organ for the eternal and the holy." The supernatural and divine, however, are not the exclusive objects even of religious faith. It is by faith we know that the worlds were made by the word of God; it was by faith Noah prepared the ark, and Abraham, being called of God, went out not knowing whither he went. The objects of faith in these cases are not what is meant by "eternal verities." It is, moreover, an arbitrary assumption that faith is "a special organ," even when things supernatural and divine are its object. Our nature is adapted to the reception of all kinds of truth of which we can have any idea. But it is not necessary to assume a special organ for historical truths, a special organ for scientific truths, and another for the general truths of revelation, and still another for "the eternal and the holy." God has constituted us capable of belief, and the complex state of mind involved in the act of faith is of course different according to the nature of the truth believed, and the nature of the evidence on which our faith is founded. But this does not necessitate the assumption of a distinct organ for each kind of truth.

Faith not to be regarded as simply a Christian Grace.

No less unsatisfactory are those descriptions of faith which regard it only in its character as a Christian and saving grace. Delitzsch, for example, [72] describes faith as the most central act of our being; the return to God, the going out of our inner life to Him. "This longing after God s free, merciful love, as his own Word declares it, a longing, reaching forth, and grasping it; this naked, unselfish craving, feeling itself satisfied with nothing else than God's promised grace; this eagerness, absorbing every ray of light that proceeds from God's reconciled love; this convinced and safety-craving appropriation and clinging to the word of grace; this is faith. According to its nature, it is the pure receptive correlative of the word of promise; a means of approaching again to God, which, as the word itself, is appointed through the distance of God in consequence of sin; for faith has to confide in the word, in spite of all want of comprehension, want of sight, want of experience. No experimental actus reflexi belong to the nature of faith. It is, according to its nature, actia directa, to wit, fiducia supplex." All this is doubtless true of the believer. He

does thus long after God, and appropriate the assurance of his love, and cling to his promises of grace; but faith has a wider range than this. There are exercises of faith not included in this description, recorded in Scripture, and especially in the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews.

Erdmann [73] says that religious faith, the faith on which the Scriptures lay so much stress, is, "Bewusstseyn der Vers&#65533;hnung mit Gott, consciousness of reconciliation with God." He insists that faith cannot be separated from its contents. It is not the man who holds this or that to be true, who is a believer; but the man who is convinced of a specific truth, namely, that he is reconciled with God. Calling faith a consciousness is not a definition of its nature. And limiting it to a consciousness of reconciliation with God is contrary to the usage of Scripture and of theology.

Definitions of Faith founded on its Subjective Nature.

The more common and generally received definitions of faith, may perhaps be reduced to three classes, all of which include the general idea of persuasion of the truth. But some seek the distinguishing character of faith in its subjective nature, others, in the nature of its object; others, in the nature of the evidence, or ground on which it rests.

Faith as distinguished from Opinion and Knowledge.

To the first of these classes belong the following definitions: Faith or belief is said to be a persuasion of the truth stronger than opinion, and weaker than knowledge. Metaphysicians divide the objects of our cognitions into the possible, the real, and the necessary. With regard to the merely possible we can form only conjectures, or opinions, more or less plausible or probable. With regard to things which the mind with greater or less confidence views as certain, although it cannot justify that confidence to itself or others, i.e., cannot demonstrate the certainty of the object, it is said to believe. What it is perfectly assured of, and can demonstrate to be true so as to coerce conviction, it is said to know. Thus Locke defines faith to be the assent of the mind to propositions which are probably, but not certainly true. Bailey [74] says, "I propose to confine it [belief or faith] first, to the effect on the mind of the premises in what is termed probable reasoning, or what I have named contingent reasoning -- in a word the premises in all reasoning, but that which is demonstrative; and secondly, to the state of holding true when that state, far from being the effect of any premises discerned by the mind, is dissociated from all evidence." To believe is to admit a thing as true, according to Kant, on grounds sufficient subjectively, insufficient objectively. Or, as more fully stated, "Holding for true, or the subjective validity of a judgment in relation to conviction (which is, at the same time, objectively valid) has the three following degrees: opinion, belief, and knowledge. Opinion is a consciously insufficient judgment, subjectively as well as objectively. Belief is subjectively sufficient, but is recognized as being objectively insufficient. Knowledge is both subjectively and objectively sufficient. Subjective sufficiency is termed conviction (for myself); objective sufficiency is termed certainty (for all)." [75] Erdmann [76] says, "Man versteht unter Glauben eine jede Gewissheit, die geringer ist als das Wissen, und etwa st&#65533;rker ist als ein blesses Meinen oder F&#65533;rm&#65533;glichhalten (z. B. ich glaube, dass es heute regnen wird)." "By faith is understood any persuasion which is weaker than knowledge, but somewhat stronger than a mere deeming possible or probable, as, e.g., I believe it will rain to-day." This he gives as the commonly accepted meaning of the word,

although he utterly repudiates it as a definition of religious faith.

It is urged in support of this definition of faith that with regard to everything of which we are not absolutely sure, and yet are persuaded or convinced of its truth, we say we believe. Thus with respect to things remembered; if the recollection is indistinct and uncertain, we say we think, e.g., we think we saw a certain person at a given time and place; we are not sure, but such is our impression. If our persuasion of the fact be stronger, we say we believe it. If we have, and can have, no doubt about it, we say we know it. In like manner the testimony of our senses may be so weak as to produce only a probability that the thing is as it appears; if clearer, it produces a belief more or less decided; if so clear as to preclude all doubt, the effect is knowledge. If we see a person at a distance, and we are entirely uncertain who it is, we can only say we think it is some one whom we know. If that persuasion becomes stronger, we say, we believe it is he. If perfectly sure, we say, we know it. In all these cases the only difference between opinion, belief, and knowledge, is their relative strength. The objects are the same, their relation to the mind is the same, and the ground or evidence on which they severally rest is of the same kind. It is said that it would be incorrect to say, "We believe that we slept in our house last night;" if perfectly sure of the fact. If a witness in a court of justice simply says, "I believe I was at a certain place at a given time," his testimony would be of no value. He must be able to say that he is sure of the fact -- that he knows it.

Objections to this Definition.

Of this definition of faith, it may be remarked, --

1. That the meaning which it assigns to the word is certainly legitimate, sustained by established usage. The states of mind expressed by the words, I think a thing to be true; I believe it; I know it, are distinguished from each other simply by the different degrees of certainty which enter into them respectively. The probable ground of this use of the word to believe, is, that there is more of the element of trust (or a voluntarily giving to evidence a greater influence on the mind than of necessity belongs to it), manifest in our consciousness, than is expressed by saying we think, or, we know. However this may be, it cannot be denied that the word belief often expresses a degree of conviction greater than opinion and less than knowledge.

2. But this is not the distinguishing characteristic of faith, or its differentia. There are exercises of faith into which this uncertainty does not enter. Some of the strongest convictions of which the mind is capable are beliefs. Even our assurance of the veracity of consciousness, the foundation of all other convictions, is of the nature of faith. So the primary truths which are, and must be assumed in all our researches and arguments, are beliefs. They are taken on trust. They cannot be proved. If any man denies them, there is nothing more to be said. He cannot be convinced. Sir William Hamilton [77] says, "St. Austin accurately says, We know what rests upon reason; we believe what rests upon authority.' But reason itself must at last rest upon authority; for the original data of reason do not rest on reason, but are necessarily accepted by reason on the authority of what is beyond itself. These data are, therefore, in rigid propriety, beliefs or trusts. Thus it is that, in the last resort, we must, perforce, philosophically admit, that belief is the primary condition of reason, and not reason the ultimate ground of belief. We are compelled to surrender the proud Intellige ut credas of Abelard, to content ourselves with the humble

Crede ut intelligas of Anselm."

The same is true in other spheres. The effect on the mind produced by human testimony is universally recognized as faith. If that testimony is inadequate it does not preclude doubt; but it may be so strong as to make all doubt impossible. No sane man ean doubt the existence of such cities as London and Paris. But to most men that existence is not a matter of knowledge either intuitive or discursive. It is something taken on trust, on the authority of others; which taking on trust is admitted by philosophers, theologians, and the mass of men, to be a form of faith. Again, in some moral states of mind a man's conviction of the reality of a future state of reward and punishment is as strong as his belief in his own existence, and much stronger than his confidence in the testimony of his senses. And yet a future state of existence is not a matter of knowledge. It is an object of faith, or a thing believed. We accordingly find that the Scriptures teach that there is a full assurance of faith; a faith which precludes the possibility of doubt. Paul says, "I know whom I have believed, and am persuaded that he is able to keep that which I have committed unto him against that day." (2 Tim. i. 12.) As Job had said ages before, "I know that my Redeemer liveth." The Apostle declares, Hebrews xi. 1, faith to be an hupostasis and elenchos, than which no stronger terms could be selected to express assured conviction. The power, also, which the Bible attributes to faith as the controlling principle of life, as overcoming the world, subduing kingdoms, stopping the mouths of lions, quenching the violence of fire, turning to flight the armies of the aliens, is proof enough that it is no weak persuasion of the truth. That definition, therefore, which makes the characteristic of faith to be a measure of confidence greater than opinion, but less than knowledge, cannot be deemed satisfactory.

Faith not a Voluntary Conviction.

A second definition of faith, founded on its nature, is that which makes it "a voluntary conviction or persuasion of the truth." This is a very old view of the matter. According to Theodoret, [78] pistis estin hekousios tes psuches sunkatatheitis, i.e., "a voluntary assent of the mind." And Thomas Aquinas says, [79] "Credere est actus intellectus assentientis veritati divin&#xfffd; ex imperio voluntatis a Deo mot&#xfffd; per gratiam." [80] He distinguishes between knowledge and faith by representing the former as the conviction produced by the object itself seen intuitively or discursively ("sicut patet in principiis primis, ... vel . . . . sicut patet de conclusionibus") to be true; whereas in the latter the mind is not sufficiently moved to assent "ab objecto proprio, sed per quandam electionem, voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in alteram. Et siquidem h&#xfffd;c sit cum dubitatione et formidine alterius partis, erit opinio. Si autem sit cum certitudine absque tali formidine, erit fides."

This definition admits of different explanations. The word "voluntary," if its meaning be determined by the wide sense of the word "will," includes every operation of the mind not purely intellectual. And therefore to say that faith is a voluntary assent is to say that faith is not merely a speculative assent, an act of the judgment pronouncing a thing to be true, but includes feeling. Nitsch, therefore, defines faith to be a "gef&#xfffd;hlsmassiges Erkennen." "Die Einheit des Gef&#xfffd;hls und der Erkenntniss; [81] a knowledge or persuasion of truth combined with feeling, -- the unity of feeling and knowledge." But if the word "will" be taken in the sense of the power of self-determination, then nothing is voluntary which does not involve the exercise of that power. If in this sense faith be voluntary, then we must have the power to believe or disbelieve at pleasure. If we believe the truth, it is because we

choose or determine ourselves to receive it; if we reject it, it is because we will to disbelieve it. The decision is determined neither by the nature of the object nor by the nature or degree of the evidence. Sometimes both of these meanings of the word voluntary seem to be combined by those who define faith to be a voluntary assent of the mind, or an assent of the intellect determined by the will. This appears from what Aquinas, for example, says when he discusses the question whether faith is a virtue. He argues that if faith be a virtue, which he admits it to be, it must include love, because love is the form or principle of all the virtues; and it must be self-determined because there could be no virtue in faith if it were the inevitable effect of the evidence or testimony. If a virtue, it must include an act of self-determination; we must decide to do what we have the power not to do.

Remarks on this Definition of Faith.

This definition of faith contains many elements of truth. In the first place: it is true that faith and feeling are often inseparable. They together constitute that state of mind to which the name faith is given. The perception of beauty is of necessity connected with the feeling of delight. Assent to moral truth involves the feeling of moral approbation. In like manner spiritual discernment (faith when the fruit of the Spirit) includes delight in the things of the Spirit, not only as true, but as beautiful and good. This is the difference between a living and dead faith. This is the portion of truth involved in the Romish doctrine of a formed and unformed faith. Faith (assent to the truth) connected with love is the fides formata; faith without love is fides informis. While, however, it is true that faith is often necessarily connected with feeling, and, therefore, in one sense of the term, is a voluntary assent, yet this is not always the csse. Whether feeling attends and enters into the exercise of faith, depends upon its object (or the thing believed) and the evidence on which it is founded. When the object of faith is speculative truth, or some historical event past or future; or when the evidence or testimony on which faith is founded is addressed only to the understanding and not to the conscience or to our emotional or religious nature, then faith does not involve feeling. We believe the great mass of historical facts to which we assent as true, simply on historical testimony, and without any feeling entering into, or necessarily connected with it. The same is true with regard to a large part of the contents of the Bible. They, to a great extent, are historical, or the predictions of historical events. When we believe what the Scriptures record concerning the creation, the deluge, the calling of Abraham, the overthrow of the cities of the plain, the history of Joseph, and the like, our faith does not include feeling. It is not an exercise of the will in either sense of that word. It is simply a rational conviction founded on sufficient evidence. It may be said, as Aquinas does say, that it is love or reverence towards God which inclines the will to believe such facts on the authority of his Word. But wicked men believe them, and cannot help believing them. A man can hardly be found who does not believe that the Israelites dwelt in Egypt, escaped from bondage, and took possession of the land of Canaan.

In the second place, it is true not only that faith is in many cases inseparable from feeling, but also that feeling has much influence in determining our faith. This is especially true when moral and religious truths are the objects of faith. Want of congeniality with the truth produces insensibility to the evidence by which it is supported. Our Lord said to the Jews, "Ye believe not, because ye are not of my sheep." (John x. 26.) And in another place,

"If any man will do his will, he shall know of the doctrine, whether it be of God." (vii. 17.) And the Apostle says of those that are lost, "The god of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them." (2 Cor. iv. 4.) The truth was present, attended by appropriate and abundant evidence, but there was no susceptibility. The defect was in the organ of vision, not in the want of light. The Scriptures uniformly refer the unbelief of those who reject the gospel to the state of their hearts. There can be no doubt that all the true children of God received Christ as their God and Saviour on the evidence which He gave of him divine character and mission, and that He was rejected only by the unrenewed and the wicked, and because of their wickedness. Hence unbelief is so great a sin. Men are condemned because they believe not on the only begotten Son of God. (John iii. 18.) All this is true. It is true of saving faith. But it is not true of all kinds of even religious faith; that is, of faith which has religious truth for its object. And, therefore, it cannot furnish the differentia or criterion to distinguish faith from other forms of assent to truth. There are states of mind not only popularly, but correctly called belief, of which it is not true that love, or congeniality, is an element. There is such a thing as dead faith, or orthodoxy. There is such a thing as speculative faith. Simon Magus believed. Even the devils believe. And if we turn to other than religious truths it is still more apparent that faith is not necessarily a voluntary assent of the mind. A man may hear of something most repugnant to his feelings, as, for example, of the triumph of a rival. He may at first refuse to believe it; but the testimony may become so strong as to force conviction. This conviction is, by common consent, faith or belief. It is not sight; it is not intuition; it is not a deduction; it is belief; a conviction founded on testimony. This subject, i.e., the connection between faith and feeling, will come up again in considering other definitions.

In the third place, if we take the word voluntary in the sense which implies volition or self-determination, it is still more evident that faith cannot be defined as voluntary assent. It is, indeed, a proverb that a man convinced, against his will remains unconvinced. But this is only a popular way of expressing the truth just conceded, namely, that the feelings have, in many cases, great influence in determining our faith. But, as just remarked, a man may be constrained to believe against his will. He may struggle against conviction; he may determine he will not believe, and yet conviction may be forced upon him. Napoleon, at the battle of Waterloo, hears that Grouchy is approaching. He gladly believes it. Soon the report reaches him that the advancing columns are Prussians. This he will not believe. Soon, however, as courier after courier confirms the unwelcome fact, he is forced to believe it. It is not true, therefore, that in faith as faith there is always, as Aquinas says, an election "voluntarie declinans in unam partem magis quam in alteram." There is another frequent experience. We often hear men say they would give the world if they could believe. The dying Grotius said he would give all his learning for the simple faith of his unlettered servant. To tell a man he can believe if he will is to contradict his consciousness. He tries to believe. He earnestly prays for faith; but he cannot exercise it. It is true, as concerns the sinner in relation to the gospel, that this inability to believe arises from the state of his mind. But this state of the mind lies below the will. It cannot be determined or changed by the exercise of any voluntary power. On these grounds the definition of faith, whether as generic or religious, as a voluntary assent to truth, must be considered unsatisfactory.

Definitions founded on the Object of Faith.

The preceding definitions are all founded on the assumed subjective nature of faith. The next definition is of a different kind. It is founded on the nature of its object. Faith is said to be the persuasion of the truth of things not seen. This is a very old and familiar definition. "Quid est fides," asks Augustine, [82] "nisi credere quod non vides." And Lombard [83] says, "Fides est virtus qua creduntur qu\u00e2 non videntur." Hence faith is said to be swallowed up in vision; and the one is contrasted with the other; as when the Apostle says, "We walk by faith, not by sight." And in Hebrews, eleventh chapter, all the objects of faith under the aspect in which it is considered in that chapter, are included under the categories of ta elpizomena and ta ou blepomena, "things hoped for, and things not seen." The latter includes the former. "We hope," says the Apostle, "for that we see not." (Romans viii. 25.) The word sight, in this connection, may be taken in three senses. First, in its literal sense. We are not said to believe what we see with our eyes. What we see we know to be true. We believe that the planet Saturn is surrounded by a belt, and that Jupiter has four satellites, on the unanimous testimony of astronomers. But if we look through a telescope and see the belt of the one and the satellites of the other, our faith passes into knowledge. We believe there is such a city as Rome, and that it contains the Colosseum, Trajan's Arch, and other monuments of antiquity. If we visit that city and see these things for ourselves, our faith becomes knowledge. The conviction is no stronger in the one case than in the other. We are just as sure there is such a city before having seen it, as though we had been there a hundred times. But the conviction is of a different kind. Secondly, the mind is said to see when it perceives an object of thought to be true in its own light, or by its own radiance. This mental vision may be either immediate or mediate -- either intuitive or through a process of proof. A child may believe that the angles of a triangle are together equal to two right angles, on the authority of his teacher. When he understands the demonstration of that proposition, his faith becomes knowledge. He sees it to be true. The objects of sense-perception, the objects of intuition, and what we recognize as true on a process of proof, are not, according to this definition of the term, objects of faith. We know what we see to be true; we believe when we recognize as true what we do not see. It is true that the same thing may be an object of faith and an object of knowledge, but not at the same time. We may recognize as true the being of God, or the immortality of the soul, because the propositions, "God is," "the soul is immortal," are susceptible of proof. The arguments in support of those propositions may completely satisfy our minds. But they are truths of revelation to be believed on the authority of God. These states of mind which we call knowledge and faith, are not identical, neither are they strictly coexisting. The effect produced by the demonstration is one thing. The effect produced by the testimony of God's word, is another thing. Both include a persuasion of the truth. But that persuasion is in its nature different in the one case from what it is in the other, as it rests on different grounds. When the arguments are before the mind, the conviction which they produce is knowledge. When the testimony of God is before the mind, the conviction which it produces is faith. On this subject Thomas Aquinas says, [84] "Necessarium est homini accipere per modum fidei non solum ea, qu\u00e2 sunt supra rationem: sed etiam ea, qu\u00e2 per rationem cognosci possunt. Et hoc propter tria, Primo quidem, ut citius homo ad veritatis divin\u00e2 cognitionem perveniat. . . . . Secundo, ut cognitio Dei sit communior. Multi enim in studio scienti\u00e2 proficere non possunt. . . . . Tertio modo proptor certitudinem. Ratio enim humana in rebus divinis est multum

deficiens."

Thirdly, under the "things not seen," some would include all things not present to the mind. A distinction is made between presentative and representative knowledge. In the former the object is present at the time; we perceive it, we are conscious of it. In representative knowledge there is an object now present, representing an absent object. Thus we have the conception of a person or thing. That conception is present, but the thing represented is absent. It is not before the mind. It belongs to the category of things not seen. The conception which is present is the object of knowledge; the thing represented is an object of faith. That is, we know we have the conception; we believe that the thing which it represents, does or did exist. If we visit a particular place while present to our senses we know that it exists; when we come away and form an idea or conception of it, that is, when we recall it by an effort of memory, then we believe in its existence. "Whenever we have passed beyond presentative knowledge, and are assured of the reality of an absent object, there faith . . . . has entered as an element." [85]

Sir William Hamilton [86] says, "Properly speaking, we know only the actual and the present, and all real knowledge is an immediate knowledge. What is said to be mediately known, is, in truth, not known to be, but only believed to be." This, it may be remarked in passing, would apply to all the propositions of Euclid. For they are "mediately known," i.e., seen to be true by means of a process of proof. Speaking of memory, Hamilton says, "It is not a knowledge of the past at all; but a knowledge of the present and a belief of the past." "We are said," according to Dr. McCosh, "to know ourselves, and the objects presented to the senses and the representations (always however as presentations) in the mind; but to believe in objects which we have seen in time past, but which are not now present, and in objects which we have never seen, and very specially in objects which we can never fully know, such as an Infinite God." [87]

Objections to this Definition.

According to this view, we know what is present to the mind, and believe what is absent. The first objection to this representation is the ambiguity of the words present and absent as thus used. When is an object present? and when is it absent? It is easy to answer this question when the object is something material or an external event. Such objects are present ("pr&#65533;sensibus") when they affect the senses; and absent when they do not. A city or building is present when we actually see it; absent, when we leave the place where it is, and recall the image of it. But how is it with propositions? The Bible says all men are sinners. The truth thus announced is present to the mind. We do not know it. We cannot prove it. But we believe it upon the authority of God. The Scriptures teach that Christ died as a ransom for many. Here, not only the historical fact that He died is announced, but the purpose for which He died. Here again, we have a truth present to the mind, which is an object of faith.

The second objection is involved in the first. The terms present and absent are not only ambiguous in this connection, but it is not true, as just stated, that an object must be absent in order to be an object of faith. The differentia, in other words, between knowledge and faith, is not found in the presence or absence of their objects. We can know what is absent, and we can believe what is present.

The third objection is, that the conviction we have of the reality or truth of what we

distinctly remember is knowledge, and not distinctively faith, unless we choose to establish a new and arbitrary definition of the word knowledge. We know what is perceived by the senses; we know what the mind sees, either intuitively or discursively, is and must be true; and we know what we distinctly remember. The conviction is in all these cases of the same nature. In all it resolves itself into confidence in the veracity of consciousness. We are conscious that we perceive sensible objects. We are conscious that we cognize certain truths. We are conscious that we remember certain events. In all these cases this consciousness involves the conviction of the reality or truth of what is seen, mentally apprehended or remembered. This conviction is, or may be, as strong in any one of these cases as in either of the others; and it rests in all ultimately on the same ground. There is, therefore, no reason for calling one knowledge and the other belief. Memory is as much a knowledge of the past, as other forms of consciousness are a knowledge of the present.

The fourth objection is that to deny that memory gives us the knowledge of the past, is contrary to established usage. It is true we are said to believe that we remember such and such events, when we are uncertain about it. But this is because in one of the established meanings of the word, belief expresses a less degree of certainty than knowledge. But men never speak of believing past events in their experience concerning which they are absolutely certain. We know that we were alive yesterday. No man says he believes he has seen his father or mother or any intimate friend, whom he had known for years. Things distinctly remembered are known, and not merely believed.

The definition which makes faith to be the persuasion of the truth of things not seen, is, however, correct, if by "things not seen" are meant things which are neither objects of the senses, nor of intuition, nor of demonstrative proof. But it does not seem to be correct to include among the "things not seen," which are the special objects of faith, things remembered and not now present to mind. This definition of faith, while correct in limiting it as to its objects to things not seen, in the sense above stated, is nevertheless defective in not assigning the ground of our conviction of their truth. Why do we believe things to be true, which we have never seen and which we cannot prove? Different answers are given to that question; and, therefore, the definition which gives no answer to it, must be considered defective.

Definitions founded on the Nature of the Evidence on which Faith rests.

Some of the definitions of faith, as we have seen, are founded on its subjective nature; others on its objects. Besides these there are others which seek its distinguishing characteristic in the ground on which the conviction which it includes, rests. The first of these is that which makes faith to be a conviction or persuasion of truth founded on feeling. This is by many regarded as the one most generally received. Hase [88] says, "Every cultivated language has a word for that form of conviction which, in opposition to the self-evident and demonstrable, rests on moral and emotional grounds." That word in Greek is pistis; in English "faith." In his "Hutterus Redivivus," [89] he says, "The common idea of faith is: unmittelbar F�rwahrhalten, ohne Vermittelung eines Schlussbeweises, durch Neigung und Bed�rfniss," i.e., "A persuasion of the truth, without the intervention of argument, determined by inclination and inward necessity." He quotes the definition of faith by Twesten, as "a persuasion or conviction of truth produced by feeling;" and that of Nitzsch, given above, "the unity of knowledge and feeling." Strauss [90] says, "The way in

which a man appropriates the contents of a revelation, the inward ascent which he yields to the contents of the Scriptures and the doctrine of the Church, not because of critical or philosophical research, but often in opposition to them overpowered by a feeling which the Evangelical Church calls the testimony of the Spirit, but which in fact is only the perception of the identity of his own religious life with that portrayed in the Scripture and prevailing in the Church, -- this assent determined by feeling -- in ecclesiastical language, is called Faith." Again, [91] he says, "The pious man receives religious truth because he feels its reality, and because it satisfies his religious wants," and, therefore, he adds, "No religion was ever propagated by means of arguments addressed to the understanding, or of historical or philosophical proofs, and this is undeniably true of Christianity." Every preacher of a new religion assumes in those to whom he presents it, an unsatisfied religious necessity, and all he has to do is to make them feel that such necessity is met by the religion which he proposes. Celsus, he tells us, made it a ground of reproach against the Christians that they believed blindly, that they could not justify the doctrines which they held at the bar of reason. To this Origen answered, that this was true only of the people; that with the educated, faith was elevated into knowledge, and Christianity transformed into a philosophy. The Church was divided between believers and knowers. The relation between faith and knowledge, between religion and philosophy, has been the subject of controversy from that day to this. Some took the ground of Origen and of the Alexandrian school generally, that it is incumbent on educated Christians to justify their doctrines at the bar of reason, and prove them to be true of philosophical grounds. Others held that the truths of revelation were, at least in many cases, of a kind which did not admit of philosophical demonstration, although they were not on that account to be regarded as contrary to reason, but only as beyond its sphere. Others, again, taught that there is a direct conflict between faith and knowledge; that what the believing Christian holds to be true, can be shown by the philosopher to be false. This is Strauss's own doctrine, and, therefore, he concludes his long discussion of this point by saying, "The believer should let the knower go his own way in peace, just as the knower does the believer. We leave them their faith, let them leave us our philosophy. . . . . There have been enough of false irenical attempts. Henceforth only separation of opposing principles can lead to any good." [92] On the same page he admits the great truth, "That human nature has one excellent characteristic: what any man feels is for him a spiritual necessity, he allows no man to take from him."

Remarks on this Definition.

With regard to the definition of faith which makes it a conviction founded on feeling, it may be remarked, --

First, That there are forms of faith of which this is not true. As remarked above, when treating of the cognate definition of faith as a voluntary assent of the mind, it is not true of faith in general. We often believe unwillingly, and what is utterly repugnant to our feelings.

Secondly, It is not true even of religious faith, or faith which has religious truth for its object. For there may be faith without love, i.e., a speculative, or dead faith.

Thirdly, It is not true of many of the exercises of faith in good men. Isaac believed that Jacob would be preferred to Esau, sorely against his will. Jacob believed that his descendants would be slaves in Egypt. The prophets believed in the seventy years captivity of their countrymen. The Apostles believed that a great apostasy in the Church was to occur

between their age and the second coming of the Lord. The answer of Thomas Aquinas to this, is, that a man is constrained by his will (i.e., his feelings) to believe in the Scriptures, and then he believes all the Scriptures contain. So that his faith, even in the class of truths just referred to, rests ultimately on feeling. But this answer is unsatisfactory. For if the question is asked, Why did the prophets believe in the captivity, and the Apostles in the apostasy? the answer would be, not from the effect of these truths upon their feelings, but on the authority of God. And if it be further asked, Why did they believe the testimony of God? the answer may be because God's testimony carries conviction. He can make his voice heard even by the deaf or the dead. Or, the answer may be, because they were good men. But in either case, the question carries us beyond the ground of their faith. They believe because God had revealed the facts referred to. Their goodness may have rendered them susceptible to the evidence afforded, but it did not constitute that evidence.

Fourthly, It is admitted that the exercise of saving faith, i.e., of that faith which is the fruit of the Spirit and product of regeneration, is attended by feeling appropriate to its object. But this is to be referred to the nature of the object. If we believe a good report, the effect is joy; if an evil report, the effect is sorrow. The perception of beauty produces delight; of moral excellence, a glow of approbation, of spiritual things, in many cases. a joy that is unspeakable and full of glory.

Fifthly, It is also true that all these truths, if not all truth, have a sell-evidencing light, which cannot be apprehended without a conviction that it really is what it is apprehended as being. It may also be admitted, that so far as the consciousness of true believers is concerned, the evidence of truth is the truth itself; in other words, that the ground of their faith is, in one sense, subjective. They see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, and therefore believe that He is God manifested in the flesh. They see that the representations made by the Scriptures of the sinfulness, guilt, and helplessness of fallen man, correspond with their own inward experience, and they are therefore constrained to receive these representations as true. They see that the plan of salvation proposed in the Bible suits their necessities, their moral judgments and religious aspirations, they therefore embrace it. All this is true, but it does not prove faith to be a conviction founded on feeling; for there are many forms of faith which confessedly are not founded on feeling; and even in the case of true believers, their feelings are not the ultimate ground of faith. They always fall back on the authority of God, who is regarded as the author of these feelings, through which the testimony of the Spirit is revealed to the consciousness. "We may be moved and induced," says the "Westminster Confession," [93] "by the testimony of the Church to an high and reverend esteem of the Holy Scripture; and the heavenliness of the matter, the efficacy of the doctrine, the majesty of the style, the consent of all the parts, the scope of the whole (which is to give all glory to God), the full discovery it makes of the only way of man's salvation, the many other incomparable excellences, and the entire perfection thereof, are arguments whereby it doth abundantly evidence itself to be the word of God; yet, notwithstanding, our full persuasion and assurance of the infallible truth and divine authority thereof is from the inward work of the Holy Spirit, bearing witness by and with the word in our hearts." The ultimate ground of faith, therefore, is the witness of the Spirit.

Faith a Conviction of the Truth founded on Testimony.

The only other definition of faith to be considered, is that which makes it, a conviction

of truth founded on testimony. We have already seen that Augustine says, "We know what rests upon reason; we believe what rests upon authority." A definition to which Sir William Hamilton gives his adhesion. [94] In the Alexandrian School also, the Christian pistis, was Auctorit€ts-Glaube, a faith founded on authority, opposed, on the one hand, to the heathen episteme, and on the other to the Christian gnosis, or philosophical explanation and proof of the truths believed. Among the school-men also, this was the prevalent idea. When they defined faith to be the persuasion of things not seen, they meant things which we receive as true on authority, and not because we either know or can prove them. Hence it was constantly said, faith is human when it rests on the testimony of men; divine when it rests on the testimony of God. Thomas Aquinas [95] says, "Non fides, de qua loquimur, assentit alicui, nisi quia est a Deo revelatum." "Faith, of which we speak, assents to nothing except because it is revealed by God." We believe on the authority of God, and not because we see, know, or feel a thing to be true. This is the purport of the teaching of the great body of the scholastic divines. Such also was the doctrine of the Reformers, and of the theologians of the subsequent age, both Lutheran and Reformed. Speaking of assent, which he regards as the second act or element of faith, Aquinas says, "Hic actus fidei non rerum evidentia aut causarum et proprietatum notitia, sed Dei dicentis infallibili auctoritate." Turrettin [96] says, "Non qu€ritur, An fides sit scientia, qu€ habeat evidentiam: Sic enim distinguitur a scientia, qu€ habet assensum certum et evidentem, qui nititur ratione clara et certa, et ab opinione, qu€ nititur ratione tantum probabili; ubi fides notat assensum certum quidem, sed inevidentem, qui non ratione, sed testimonio divino nititur." De Moor [97] says, "Fides subjectiva est persuasio de veritate rei, alterius testimonio nixa, quomodo fides illa generatim descripta, scienti€ et conjectur€ opponitur. . . . . Dividitur . . . . in fidem divinam, qu€ nititur testimonio divino, et humanam, qu€ fundata est in testimonio humano fide accepto." Owen, [98] "All faith is an assent upon testimony; and divine faith is an assent upon a divine testimony." John Howe [99] asks, "Why do I believe Jesus to be the Christ? Because the eternal God hath given his testimony concerning Him that so He is." "A man's believing comes all to nothing without this, that there is a divine testimony." Again, [100] "I believe such a thing, as God reveals it, because it is reported to me upon the authority of God." Bishop Pearson [101] says, "When anything propounded to us is neither apparent to our sense, nor evident to our understanding, in and of itself, neither certainly to be collected from any clear and necessary connection with the cause from which it proceedeth, or the effects which it naturally produceth, nor is taken up upon any real arguments or reference to other acknowledged truths, and yet notwithstanding appeareth to us true, not by a manifestation, but attestation of the truth, and so moveth us to assent not of itself, but by virtue of the testimony given to it; this is said properly to be credible; and an assent unto this, upon such credibility, is in the proper notion faith or belief."

This View almost universally Held.

This view of the nature of faith is all but universally received, not by theologians only, but by philosophers, and the mass of Christian people. The great question has ever been, whether we are to receive truth on authority, or only upon rational evidence. Leibnitz begins his "Discours de la Conformit€ de la Foi avec la Raison," by saying, "Je suppose, que deux v€rit€s ne sauroient se contredire; que l'objet de la foi est la v€rit€ que Dieu a r€v€l€e d'une mani€re extraordinaire, et que la raison est l'enchainment des v€rit€s, mais particuli€rement (lorsqu'elle est compar€s avec la foi) de celles o€

l'esprit humain peut atteindre naturellement, sans ?tre aid? des lumi?res de la foi." [102]

It has already been admitted that the essential element of faith is trust; and, therefore, in the general sense of the word to believe, is to trust. Faith is the reliance of the mind on anything as true and worthy of confidence. In this wide sense of the word, it matters not what may be the objects, or what the grounds of this trust. The word, however, is commonly used in reference to truths which we receive on trust without being able to prove them. Thus we are said to believe in our own existence, the reality of the external world, and all the primary truths of the reason. These by common consent are called beliefs. Reason begins with believing, i.e., with taking on trust what it neither comprehends nor proves. Again, it has been admitted that the word belief is often and legitimately used to express a degree of certainty less than knowledge and stronger than probability; as when we say, we are not sure, but we believe that a certain thing happened.

The Strict Sense of the Word "Faith."

But in the strict and special sense of the word, as discriminated from knowledge or opinion, faith means the belief of things not seen, on the ground of testimony. By testimony, however, is not meant merely the affirmation of an intelligent witness. There are other methods by which testimony may be given than affirmation. A seal is a form of testimony; so is a sign. So is everything which pledges the authority of the attester to the truth to be established. When Elijah declared that Jehovah was God, and Baal a lie, he said, "The God that answereth by fire, let him be God." The descent of the fire was the testimony of God to the truth of the prophet's declaration. So in the New Testament God is said to have borne witness to the truth of the Gospel by signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, and gifts of the Holy Ghost (Heb. ii. 4); and the Spirit of God is said to witness with our spirits that we are the children of God (Rom. viii. 16). The word in these cases is marture,w, to testify. This is not a lax or improper use of the word testimony; for an affirmation is testimony only because it pledges the authority of him who makes it to the truth. And therefore whatever pledges that authority, is as truly of the nature of testimony, as an affirmation. When, therefore, it is said that faith is founded on testimony, it is meant that it is not founded on sense, reason, or feeling, but on the authority of him by whom it is authenticated.

Proof from the General Use of the Word.

That such is the foundation and the distinctive characteristic of faith, may be argued, -- 1. From the general use of the word We are said to know what we see or can prove; and to believe what we regard as true on the authority of others. This is admitted to be true of what is called historical faith. This includes a great deal; all that is recorded of the past; all that is true of present actualities, which does not fall within the sphere of our personal observation; all the facts of science as received by the masses; and almost all the contents of the Bible, whether of the Old or of the New Testament. The Scriptures are a record of the history of the creation, of the fall, and of redemption. The Old Testament is the history of the preparatory steps of this redemption. The New Testament is a history of the fulfilment of the promises and types of the Old in the incarnation, life, sufferings, death, and resurrection of the Son of God. Whoever believes this record has set to his seal that God is true, and is a child of God.

Proof from Consciousness.

2. In the second place, consciousness teaches us that such is the nature of faith not only when historical facts are its objects, but when propositions are the things believed. The two indeed are often inseparable. That God is the creator of the world, is both a fact and a doctrine. It is as the Apostle says, a matter of faith. We believe on the authority of the Scriptures, which declare that "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth." That God set forth his Son to be a propitiation for our sins, is a doctrine. It rests solely on the authority of God. We receive it upon his testimony. So with all the great doctrines of grace; of regeneration, of justification, of sanctification, and of a future life. How do we know that God will accept all who believe in Christ? Who can know the things of God, save the Spirit of God, and he to whom the Spirit shall reveal them (1 Cor. ii. 10, 11)? From the nature of the case, "the things of the Spirit," the thoughts and purposes of God, can be known only by revelation, and they can be received only on the authority of God. They are objects neither of sense nor of reason.

Proof from Scripture.

3. It is the uniform teaching of the Bible that faith is founded on the testimony or authority of God.

The first proof of this is the fact that the Scriptures come to us under the form of a revelation of things we could not otherwise know. The prophets of the Old Testament were messengers, the mouth of God, to declare what the people were to believe and what they were to do. The New Testament is called "The testimony of Jesus." Christ came, not as a philosopher, but as a witness. He said to Nicodemus, "We speak that we do know, and testify that we have seen; and ye receive not our witness." (John iii. 11). "He that cometh from above is above all. . . . . And what he hath seen and heard, that he testifieth; and no man receiveth his testimony. He that hath received his testimony hath set to his seal that God is true (verses 31-33). In like manner the Apostles were witnesses. As such they were ordained (Luke xxiv. 48). After his resurrection, and immediately before his ascension, our Lord said to them, "Ye shall receive power, after that the Holy Ghost is come upon you: and ye shall be witnesses unto me, both in Jerusalem, and in all Judea, and in Samaria, and unto the uttermost part of the earth. (Acts i. 8). When they declared the death and resurrection of Christ, as facts to be believed, they said, "Whereof we are witnesses" (Acts ii. 32, iii. 15, v. 32). In this last passage the Apostles say they were witnesses not only of the fact of Christ's resurrection but that God had "exalted" Him "with his right hand to be a prince and a saviour, for to give repentance to Israel, and forgiveness of sins." See Acts x. 39-43, where it is said, "He commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is he which was ordained of God to be the judge of quick and dead. To him give all the prophets witness, that through his name whosoever believeth in him shall receive remission of sins."

The great complaint against the Apostles, especially in the Grecian cities, was that they did not present their doctrines as propositions to be proved; they did not even state the philosophical grounds on which they rested, or attempt to sustain them at the bar of reason. The answer given to this objection by St. Paul is twofold: First, that philosophy, the wisdom of men, had proved itself utterly incompetent to solve the great problems of God and the universe, of sin and redemption. It was in fact neither more nor less than foolishness, so far as all its speculations as to the things of God were concerned. Secondly, that the doctrines which He taught were not the truths of reason, but matters of revelation; to

be received not on rational or philosophical grounds, but upon the authority of God; that they, the Apostles, were not philosophers, but witnesses; that they did not argue using the words of man's wisdom, but that they simply declared the counsels of God, and that faith in their doctrines was to rest not on the wisdom of men, but on the powerful testimony of God.

The second proof, that the Scriptures teach that faith is the reception of truth on the ground of testimony or on the authority of God, is, that the thing which we are commanded to do, is to receive the record which God has given of his Son. This is faith; receiving as true what God has testified, and because He has testified it. "He that believeth not God hath made him a liar; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." The Greek here is, hou pepisteuken eis ten marturian hen memartureken ho Theos peri tou huiou hautou, "believeth not the testimony which God testified concerning his Son." "And this is the testimony, (he marturian) that God hath given to us eternal life, and this life ii in his Son" (1 John v. 10, 11). There could hardly be a more distinct statement of the Scriptural doctrine as to the nature of faith. Its object is what God has revealed. Its ground is the testimony of God. To receive that testimony, is to set to our seal that God is true. To reject it, is to make God a liar. "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater: for this is the witness of God which he hath testified of his son."

Such is the constant teaching of Scripture. The ground on which we are authorized and commanded to believe is, not the conformity of the truth revealed to our reason, nor its effect upon our feelings, nor its meeting the necessities of our nature and condition, but simply, "Thus saith the Lord." The truths of revelation do commend themselves to the reason; they do powerfully and rightfully affect our feelings; they do meet all the necessities of our nature as creatures and as sinners; and these considerations may incline us to believe, may strengthen our faith, lead us to cherish it, and render it joyful and effective; but they are not its ground. We believe on the testimony or authority of God.

It is objected to this view that we believe the Bible to be the Word of God on other ground than testimony. The fulfilment of prophecies, the miracles of its authors, its contents, and the effects which it produces, are rational grounds for believing it to be from God. To this objection two answers may be made: First, that supernatural occurrences, such as prophecies and miracles, are some of the forms in which the divine testimony is given. Paul says that God bears "witness both with signs and wonders" (Hebrews ii. 4). And, secondly, that the proximate end of these manifestations of supernatural foresight and power was to authenticate the divine mission of the messengers of God. This being established, the people were called upon to receive their message and to believe on the authority of God, by whom they were sent.

The third proof, that the Scriptures teach that faith is a reception of truth on the ground of testimony, is found in the examples and illustrations of faith given in the Scriptures. Immediately after the fall the promise was made to our first parents that the seed of the woman should bruise the serpent's head. On what possible ground could faith in this promise rest except on the authority of God. When Noah was warned of God of the coming deluge, and commanded to prepare the ark, he believed, not because he saw the signs of the approaching flood, not because his moral judgment assured him that a just God would in that way avenge his violated law; but simply on the testimony of God. Thus when God promised to Abraham the possession of the land of Canaan, that he, a childless old man,

should become the father of many nations, that through his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed, his faith could have no other foundation than the authority of God. So of every illustration of faith given by the Apostle in the eleventh chapter of his epistle to the Hebrews. The same is true of the whole Bible. We have no foundation for our faith in a spiritual world, in the heaven and hell described in Scripture, in the doctrines of redemption, in the security and ultimate triumph of the Church other than the testimony of God. If faith does not rest on testimony it has nothing on which to rest. Paul tells us that the whole Gospel rests on the fact of Christ's resurrection from the dead. If Christ be not risen our faith is vain, and we are yet in our sins. But our assurance that Christ rose on the third day rests solely upon the testimony which God in various ways has given to that fact.

This is a point of great practical importance. If faith, or only persuasion of the truths of the Bible, rests on philosophical grounds, then the door is opened for rationalism; if it rests on feeling, then it is open to mysticism. The only sure, and the only satisfying foundation is the testimony of God, who cannot err, and who will not deceive.

Faith may, therefore, be defined to be the persuasion of the truth founded on testimony. The faith of the Christian is the persuasion of the truth of the facts and doctrines recorded in the Scriptures on the testimony of God.

[68] De Pr&#65533;destinatioe Sanctorum [II.], 5; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1838, vol. x. p. 1849 b.

[69] On the Intellectual Powers, Essay II. ch. xx.; Works, Edinburgh, 1849, pp. 237 b, 328 a, b.

[70] Philosophy of Religion.

[71] Die einfachste Dogmatik, Sec. 338; T&#65533;bingen, 1826, p. 376.

[72] Biblical Psychology, p. 174.

[73] Vorlesungen &#65533;ber Glauben und Wissen, von Johann Eduard Erdmann, Berlin, 1837, p. 30.

[74] Letters on the Philosophy of the Human Mind, London, 1855, pp. 75, 76.

[75] Meiklejohn's Translation of Critic of Pure Reason, London, 1855, p. 498.

[76] Glauben und Wissen, Berlin, 1837, p. 29.

[77] Reid's Works; edit. Edinburgh, 1849, note A, § 5, p. 760 b.

[78] Gr&#65533;carum Affectionum Curatio, sermo. i. edit. Commelinus, Heidelberg(?) 1592, p. 16, lines 11, 12.

[79] Summa, II. ii. qu&#65533;st. ii. art. 9, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 8 b, of third set.

[80] Ibid. qu&#65533;st. i. art. 4, pp. 3 b, 4 a, of third set.

[81] System der Christlichen Lehre, Einl. II. A. § 8. 3, 5th edit. Bonn, 1844, p. 18.

[82] In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, XL. 9; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. iii. p. 2088 b.

[83] Liber Sententiarum, III. xxiii. B., edit. 1472(?).

[84] Summa, II. ii. qu&#65533;st. ii. art. 4, edit. Cologne, 1636, pp. 6 b, 7 a, of third set.

[85] McCosh, Intuitions of the Mind, part II. book ii. ch. 1, edit. New York, 1860, p. 197.

[86] Lectures on Metaphysics and Logic, vol. i. "Metaphysics," lect. xii. sub fin., edit. Boston, 1859, pp. 152, 153.

[87] Intuitions of the Mind, p. 198.

[88] Dogmatik, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1842, p. 307.

[89] Sixth edit. Leipzig, 1845, p. 4.

[90] Dogmatik, § 20, edit. T[?]bingen and Stuttgart, 1840, vol. i. p. 282.

[91] Dogmatik, edit. T[?]bingen and Stuttgart, 1840, vol. i. p. 298.

[92] Ibid. p. 356.

[93] Chapter i. § 5.

[94] See page 46.

[95] Summa, II. ii. qu[?]st. 1. art 1. Cologne, 1640, p. 2, a, of third set.

[96] Institutio, XV. ix. 3, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 497.

[97] Commentarius in Johannis Marckii Compendium, cap. xxii. § 4, Leyden, 1766, vol. iv. p. 299.

[98] Doctrine of Justification, ch. i. edit. Philadelphia, 1841, p. 84.

[99] Works, vol. ii. p. 885, Carter's edition, New York, 1869.

[100] Ibid. p. 1170.

[101] An Exposition of the Creed, 7th edit. London, 1701, p. 3.

[102] Th[?]odic[?]e, Works, edit. Berlin, 1840, 1839, part ii. p. 479.

§ 3. Different Kinds of Faith.

Though the definition above given be accepted, it is to be admitted that there are different kinds of faith. In other words, the state of mind which the word designates is very different in one case from what it is in others. This difference arises partly from the nature of its objects, and partly from the nature or form of the testimony on which it is founded. Faith in a historical fact or speculative truth is one thing; faith in [?]sthetic truth another thing; faith in moral truth another thing; faith in spiritual truth, and especially faith in the promise of salvation made to ourselves another thing. That is, the state of mind denominated faith is very different in any one of these cases from what it is in the others. Again, the testimony which God bears to the truth is of different kinds. In one form it is directed especially to the understanding; in another to the conscience; in another to our regenerated nature. This is the cause of the difference between speculative, temporary, and saving faith.

Speculative or Dead Faith.

There are many men who believe the Bible to be the Word of God; who receive all that it teaches; and who are perfectly orthodox in their doctrinal belief. If asked why they believe, they may be at a loss for an answer. Reflection might enable them to say they believe because others believe. They receive their faith by inheritance. They were taught from their earliest years thus to believe. The Church to which they belong inculcates this faith, and it is enjoined upon them as true and necessary. Others of greater culture may say that the evidence of the divine origin of the Bible, both external and internal, satisfies their

minds, and produces a rational conviction that the Scriptures are a revelation from God, and they receive its contents on his authority. Such a faith as this, experience teaches, is perfectly compatible with a worldly or wicked life. This is what the Bible calls a dead faith.

Temporary Faith.

Again, nothing is more common than for the Gospel to produce a temporary impression, more or less deep and lasting. Those thus impressed believe. But, having no root in themselves, sooner or later they fall away. It is also a common experience that men utterly indifferent or even skeptical, in times of danger, or on the near approach of death, are deeply convinced of the certainty of those religious truths previously known, but hitherto disregarded or rejected. This temporary faith is due to common grace; that is, to those influences of the Spirit common in a measure greater or less to all men, which operate on the soul without renewing it, and which reveal the truth to the conscience and cause it to produce conviction.

Saving Faith.

That faith which secures eternal life; which unites us to Christ as living members of his body; which makes us the sons of God; which interests us in all the benefits of redemption; which works by love, and is fruitful in good works; is founded, not on the external or the moral evidence of the truth, but on the testimony of the Spirit with and by the truth to the renewed soul.

What is meant by the Testimony of the Spirit

It is necessary, before going further, to determine what is meant by the testimony of the Spirit, which is said to be the ground of saving faith.

God, or the Spirit of God, testifies to the truth of the Scriptures and of the doctrines which they contain. This testimony, as has been seen, is partly external, consisting in prophecies and miracles, partly in the nature of the truths themselves as related to the intellectual and moral elements of the soul, and partly special and supernatural. Unrenewed men may feel the power of the two former kinds of testimony, and believe with a faith either merely intellectual and speculative, or with what may be called from its ground, a moral faith, which is only temporary. The spiritual form of testimony is confined to the regenerated. It is, of course, inscrutable. The operations of the Spirit do not reveal themselves in the consciousness otherwise than by their effects. We know that men are born of the Spirit, that the Spirit dwells in the people of God and continually influences their thoughts, feelings, and actions. But we know this only from the teaching of the Bible, not because we are conscious of his operations. "The wind bloweth where it listeth, and thou hearest the sound thereof, but canst not tell whence it cometh, and whither it goeth: so is every one that is born of the Spirit." (John iii. 8.)

This witness of the Spirit is not an affirmation that the Bible is the Word of God. Neither is it the production of a blind, unintelligent conviction of that fact. It is not, as is the case with human testimony, addressed from without to the mind, but it is within the mind itself. It is an influence designed to produce faith. It is called a witness or testimony because it is so called in Scripture; and because it has the essential nature of testimony, inasmuch as it is the pledge of the authority of God in support of the truth.

The effects of this inward testimony are, (1.) What the Scriptures call "spiritual discernment." This means two things: A discernment due to the influence of the Spirit; and a discernment not only of the truth, but also of the holiness, excellence, and glory of the things discerned. The word spiritual, in this sense, means conformed to the nature of the Spirit. Hence the law is said to be spiritual, i.e., holy, just, and good. (2.) A second effect flowing necessarily from the one just mentioned is delight and complacency, or love. (3.) The apprehension of the suitableness of the truths revealed, to our nature and necessities. (4.) The firm conviction that these things are not only true, but divine. (5.) The fruits of this conviction, i.e., of the faith thus produced, good works, -- holiness of heart and life.

When, therefore, a Christian is asked, Why he believes the Scriptures and the doctrines therein contained, his simple answer is, On the testimony or authority of God. How else could he know that the worlds were created by God, that our race apostatized from God, that He sent his Son for our redemption, that faith in Him will secure salvation. Faith in such truths can have no other foundation than the testimony of God. If asked, How God testifies to the truth of the Bible? If an educated man whose attention has been called to the subject, he will answer, In every conceivable way: by signs, wonders, and miracles; by the exhibition which the Bible makes of divine knowledge, excellence, authority, and power. If an uneducated man, he may simply say, "Whereas I was blind, now I see." Such a man, and indeed every true Christian, passes from a state of unbelief to one of saving faith, not by any process of research or argument, but of inward experience. The change may, and often does, take place in a moment. The faith of a Christian in the Bible is, as before remarked, analogous to that which all men have in the moral law, which they recognize not only as truth, but as having the authority of God. What the natural man perceives with regard to the moral law the renewed man is enabled to perceive in regard to "the things of the Spirit," by the testimony of that Spirit with and by the truth to his heart.

Proof from Express Declarations of Scripture.

1. That this is the Scriptural doctrine on the subject is plain from the express declarations of the Scriptures. Our Lord promised to send the Spirit for this very purpose. "He will reprove the world of sin," especially of the sin of not believing in Christ; "and of righteousness," that is, of his righteousness, -- the rightfulness of his claims to be regarded and received as the Son of God, God manifest in the flesh, and the Saviour of the world, "and of judgment," that is, of the final overthrow of the kingdom of darkness and triumph of the kingdom of light. (John xvi. 8.) Faith, therefore, is always represented in Scripture as one of the fruits of the Spirit, as the gift of God, as the product of his energy (pistis tes energeias tou Theou) (Colossians ii. 12). Men are said to believe in virtue of the same power which wrought in Christ, when God raised Him from the dead. (Eph i. 19, 20.) The Apostle Paul elaborately sets forth the ground of faith in the second chapter of First Corinthians. He declares that he relied for success not on the enticing words of man's wisdom, but on the demonstration of the Spirit, in order that the faith of the people might rest not on the wisdom of men, but on the power of God. Faith was not to rest on argument, on historical or philosophical proof, but on the testimony of the Spirit. The Spirit demonstrates the truth to the mind, i.e., produces the conviction that it is truth, and leads the soul to embrace it with assurance and delight. Passages have already been quoted which teach that faith rests on the testimony of God, and that unbelief consists in rejecting that

testimony. The testimony of God is given through the Spirit, whose office it is to take of the things of Christ and show them unto us. The Apostle John tells his readers, "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things. . . . . The anointing which ye have received of him abideth in you: and ye need not that any man teach you: but as the same anointing teacheth you of all things, and is truth, and is no lie, and even as it hath taught you, ye shall abide in him." (1 John ii. 20, 27.) This passage teaches, (1.) That true believers receive from Christ (the Holy One) an unction. (2.) That this unction is the Holy Ghost. (3.) That it secures the knowledge and conviction of the truth. (4.) That this inward teaching which makes them believers is abiding, and secures them from apostasy.

1 Corinthians ii. 14.

Equally explicit is the passage in 1 Corinthians ii. 14, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God; for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned. But he that is spiritual judgeth all things, yet he himself is judged of no man." The things of the Spirit, are the things which the Spirit has revealed. Concerning these things, it is taught: (1.) that the natural or unrenewed man does not receive them. (2.) That the spiritual man, i.e., the man in whom the Spirit dwells, does receive them. (3.) That the reason of this difference is that the former has not, and that the latter has, spiritual discernment. (4.) This spiritual discernment is the apprehension of the truth and excellence of the things discerned. (5.) It is spiritual, as just stated, both because due to the operation of the Spirit, and because the conformity of the truths discerned to the nature of the Spirit, is apprehended.

When Peter confessed that Jesus was the Christ the Son of the living God, our Lord said, "Blessed art thou, Simon Bar-jona: for flesh and blood hath not revealed it unto thee, but my Father which is in heaven." (Matt. xvi. 17.) Other men had the same external evidence of the divinity of Christ that Peter had. His faith was due not to that evidence alone, but to the inward testimony of God. Our Lord rendered thanks that God had hidden the mysteries of his kingdom from the wise and prudent and revealed them unto babes. (Matt. xi. 25.) The external revelation was made to both classes. Besides this external revelation, those called babes received an inward testimony which made them believers. Hence our Lord said, No man can come unto me except he be drawn or taught of God. (John vi. 44, 45.) The Apostle tells us that the same Gospel, the same objective truths, with the same external and rational evidence, which was an offence to the Jew and foolishness to the Greek, was to the called the wisdom and the power of God. Why this difference? Not the superior knowledge or greater excellence of the called, but the inward divine influence, the klesis, of which they were the subjects. Paul's instantaneous conversion is not to be referred to any rational process of argument; nor to his moral suceptibility to the truth; nor to the visible manifestation of Christ, for no miracle, no outward light or splendour could change the heart and transform the whole character in a moment. It was, as the Apostle himself tells us (Gal. i. 15, 16), the inward revelation of Christ to him by the special grace of God. It was the testimony of the Spirit, which being inward and supernatural, enabled him to see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ. The Psalmist prayed that God would open his eyes that he might see wondrous things out of his law. The Apostle prayed for the Ephesians that God would give them the Holy Spirit, that the eyes of their souls might be opened, that they might know the things freely given to them of God. (Eph. i. 17, 18.)

Everywhere in the Bible the fact that any one believes is referred not to his subjective state, but to the work of the Spirit on his heart.

Proof from the Way the Apostles acted.

2. As the Scriptures thus expressly teach that the ground of true or saving faith is the inward witness of the Spirit, the Apostles always acted on that principle. They announced the truth and demanded its instant reception, under the pain of eternal death. Our Lord did the same. "He that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." (John iii. 18.) Immediate faith was demanded. Being demanded by Christ, and at his command by the Apostles, that demand must be just and reasonable. It could, however, be neither unless the evidence of the truth attended it. That evidence could not be the external proofs of the divinity of Christ and his Gospel, for those proofs were present to the minds of comparatively few of the hearers of the Gospel; nor could it be rational proof or philosophical arguments, for still fewer could appreciate such evidence, and if they could it would avail nothing to the production of saving faith. The evidence of truth, to which assent is demanded by God the moment it is announced, must be in the truth itself. And if this assent be obligatory, and dissent or unbelief a sin, then the evidence must be of a nature, to which a corrupt state of the soul renders a man insensible. "If our gospel be hid," says the Apostle, "it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. . . . . [But] God, who commanded the light to shine out of darkness, hath shined in our hearts, to give the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ." (2 Cor. iv. 3-6.) It is here taught, (1.) That wherever and whenever Christ is preached, the evidence of his divinity is presented. The glory of God shines in his face. (2.) That if any man fails to see it, it is because the God of this world hath blinded his eyes. (3.) That if any do perceive it and believe, it is because of an inward illumination produced by Him who first commanded the light to shine out of darkness.

Proof from the Practice in the Church.

3. As Christ and the Apostles acted on this principle, so have all faithful ministers and missionaries from that day to this. They do not expect to convince and convert men by historical evidence or by philosophical arguments. They depend on the demonstration of the Spirit.

Proof from Analogy.

4. This doctrine, that the true and immediate ground of faith in the things of the Spirit is the testimony of the Spirit, producing spiritual discernment, is sustained by analogy. If a man cannot see the splendour of the sun, it is because he is blind. If he cannot perceive the beauties of nature and of art, it is because he has no taste. If he cannot apprehend "the concord of sweet sounds," it is because he has not a musical ear. If he cannot see the beauty of virtue, or the divine authority of the moral law, it is because his moral sense is blunted. If he cannot see the glory of God in his works and in his Word, it is because his religious nature is perverted. And in like manner, if he cannot see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, it is because the god of this world has blinded his eyes.

No one excuses the man who can see no excellence in virtue, and who repudiates the authority of the moral law. The Bible and the instinctive judgment of men, condemn the

atheist. In like manner the Scriptures pronounce accursed all who do not believe that Jesus is the Christ the Son of the living God. This is the denial of supreme excellence; the rejection of the clearest manifestation of God ever made to man. The solemn judgment of God is, "If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ, let him be anathema maranatha." (1 Cor. xvi. 22.) In this judgment the whole intelligent universe will ultimately acquiesce.

Faith in the Scriptures, therefore, is founded on the testimony of God. By testimony, as before stated, is meant attestation, anything which pledges the authority of the attester in support of the truth to be established. As this testimony is of different kinds, so the faith which it produces, is also different. So far as the testimony is merely external, the faith it produces is simply historical or speculative. So far as the testimony is moral, consisting in the power which the Spirit gives to the truth over the natural conscience, the faith is temporary, depending on the state of mind which is its proximate cause. Besides these, there is the inward testimony of the Spirit, which is of such a nature and of such power as to produce a perfect revolution in the soul, compared in Scripture to that effected by opening the eyes of the blind to the reality, the wonders, and glories of creation. There is, therefore, all the difference between a faith resting on this inward testimony of the Spirit, and mere speculative faith, that there is between the conviction a blind man has of the beauties of nature, before and after the opening of his eyes. As this testimony is informing, enabling the soul to see the truth and excellence of the "things of the Spirit," so far as the consciousness of the believer is concerned, his faith is a form of knowledge. He sees to be true, what the Spirit reveals and authenticates.

§ 4. Faith and Knowledge.

The relation of faith to knowledge is a wide field. The discussions on the subject have been varied and endless. There is little probability that the points at issue will ever be settled to the satisfaction of all parties. The ground of faith is authority. The ground of knowledge is sense or reason. We are concerned here only with Christian faith, i.e., the faith which receives the Scriptures as the Word of God and all they teach as true on his authority.

Is a Supernatural Revelation needed?

The first question is, Whether there is any need of a supernatural revelation, whether human reason be not competent to discover and to authenticate all needful truth. This question has already been considered under the head of Rationalism, where it was shown, (1.) That every man's consciousness tells him that there are questions concerning God and his own origin and destiny, which his reason cannot answer. (2.) That he knows a priori, that the reason of no other man can satisfactorily answer them. (3.) That he knows from experience that they never have been answered by the wisdom of men, and (4.) That the Scriptures declare that the world by wisdom knows not God, that the wisdom of the world is foolishness in his estimation, and that God has therefore himself made known truths undiscoverable by reason, for the salvation of man.

Must the Truths of Revelation be Demonstrable by Reason?

A second question is, Whether truths, supernaturally revealed, must be able to authenticate themselves at the bar of reason before they can be rationally received; so that

they are received, not on the ground of authority, but of rational proof. This also has been previously discussed. It has been shown that the assumption that God can reveal nothing which human reason cannot, when known, demonstrate to be true, assumes that human reason is the measure of all truth; that there is no intelligence in the universe higher than that of man; and that God cannot have purposes and plans, the grounds or reasons of which we are competent to discover and appreciate. It emancipates the from the authority of God, refusing to believe anything except the authority of reason. Why may we not believe on the testimony of God that there is a spiritual world, as well as believe that there is such a nation as the Chinese on the testimony of men? No man acts on the principle of believing only what he can understand and prove, in any other department. There are multitudes of truths which every sane man receives on trust, without being able either to prove or comprehend them. If we can believe only what we can prove at the bar of reason to be true, then the kingdom of heaven would be shut against all but the wise. There could be no Christian who was not also a philosopher. In point of fact no man acts on this principle. It is assumed in the pride of reason, or as an apology for rejecting unpalatable truths, but men believe in God, in sin, in freedom of the will, in responsibility, without the ability of comprehending or reconciling these truths with each other or with other facts of consciousness or experience.

May not Revealed Truths be Philosophically vindicated?

A third question is, Whether, admitting a supernatural revelation, and moreover admitting the obligation to receive on the authority of God the doctrines which revelation makes known, the revealed doctrines may not be philosophically vindicated, so as to commend them to the acceptance of those who deny revelation. May not the Scriptural doctrines concerning God, creation, providence, the trinity, the incarnation, sin, redemption, and the future state, be so stated and sustained philosophically. as to constrain acquiescence in them as truths of the reason. This was the ground taken in the early Church by the theologians of the Alexandrian School, who undertook to elevate the pistis of the people into a gnosis for the philosophers. Thus the sacred writers were made Platonists, and Christianity was transmuted into Platonism. A large part of the mental activity of the School-men, during the Middle Ages, was expended in the same way. They received the Bible as a supernatural revelation from God. They received the Church interpretation of its teachings. They admitted their obligation to believe its doctrines on the authority of God and of the Church. Nevertheless they held that all these doctrines could be philosophically proved. In later times Wolf undertook to demonstrate all the doctrines of Christianity on the principles of the Leibnitzian philosophy. In our own day this principle and these attempts have been carried further than ever. Systems of theology, constructed on the philosophy of Hegel, of Schelling, and of Schleiermacher, have almost superseded the old Biblical systems. If any man of ordinary culture and intelligence should take up a volume of what is called "Speculative Theology," (that is, theology presented in the forms of the speculative philosophy,) he would not understand a page and would hardly understand a sentence. He could not tell whether the theology which it proposed to present was Christianity or Buddhism. Or, at best, he would find a few drops of Biblical truth so diluted by floods of human speculation that the most delicate of chemical tests would fail to detect the divine element.

Attempts to do this Futile.

All such attempts are futile. The empirical proof of this is, that no such attempt has ever succeeded. The experiment has been made hundreds of times, and always with the same result. Where are now the philosophical expositions and vindications of Scripture doctrines by the Platonizing fathers; by the Schoolmen; by the Cartesians; by the Leibnitzians? What power over the reason, the conscience, or the life, has any of the speculative systems of our day? Who, beyond the devotees of the systems which they represent, understand or adopt the theology of Daub, of Marheinecke, of Lange, and others? Strauss, therefore, is right when he repudiates all these vain attempts to reconcile Christianity with philosophy, or to give a form to Christian doctrine which satisfies the philosophical thinker. [103]

But apart from this argument from experience, the assumption is preposterous that the feeble intellect of man can explain, and from its own resources, vindicate and prove the deep things of God. An infant might as well undertake to expound Newton's "Principia." If there are mysteries in nature, in every blade of grass, in the insect, in the body and in the soul of man, there must be mysteries in religion. The Bible and our consciousness teach us that God is incomprehensible, and his ways past finding out; that we cannot explain either his nature or his acts; we know not how he creates, upholds, and governs without interfering with the nature of his creatures; how there can be three persons in the Godhead; how in the one person of Christ there can be two intelligences and two wills; how the Spirit inspires, renews, sanctifies, or comforts. It belongs to the "self-deifying" class of philosophers to presume to know all that God knows, and to banish the incomprehensible from the religion which he has revealed. "To the school of Hegel," says Bretschneider, "there are mysteries in religion only for those who have not raised themselves to the Hegelian grade of knowledge. For the latter all is clear; all is knowledge; and Christianity is the solution, and therefore the revelation of all mysteries." [104] This may be consistent in those who hold that man is God in the highest form of his existence, and the philosopher the highest style of man. Such an assertion, however, by whomsoever it may be made, is the insanity of presumption.

May what is True in Religion be False in Philosophy?

A fourth question included in this general subject is, Whether there is or may be a real conflict between the truths of reason and those of revelation? Whether that which is true in religion may be false in philosophy? To this question different answers have been given.

The Fathers on this Question.

First, while the Greek fathers were disposed to bring religion and philosophy into harmony, by giving a philosophical form to Christian doctrines, the Latins were inclined to represent the two as irreconcilable. "What," asks Tertullian, "has Athens to do with Jerusalem? The academy with the Church? What have heretics to do with Christians? Our instruction is from the porch of Solomon, who himself taught that the Lord was to be sought in the simplicity of the heart. . . . . We need no seeking for truth after Christ; no research after the Gospel. When we believe, we desire nothing beyond faith, because we believe that there is nothing else we should do. . . . . To know nothing beyond is to know all things." [105] He went so far as to say, "Prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est; . . . . certum est, quia impossibile est." [106] Without going to this extreme, the theologians of the Latin

Church, those of them at least most zealous for Church doctrines, were inclined to deny to reason even the prerogative of a judicium contradictionis. They were constrained to take this ground because they were called upon to defend doctrines whici contradicted not only reason but the senses. When it was objected to the doctrine that the consecrated wafer is the real body of Christ, that our senses pronounce it to be bread, and that it is impossible that a human body should be in heaven and in all parts of the earth at the same time, what could they say but that the senses and reason are not to be trusted in the sphere of faith? That what is false to the reason and the senses may be true in religion?

Lutheran Teaching on this Point.

The Lutherans were under the same necessity. Their doctrine of the person of Christ involves the denial of the primary truth, that attributes cannot be separated from the substance of which they are the manifestation. Their doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper involves the assumption of the ubiquity of Christ's body, which seems to be a contradiction in terms.

Luther's utterances on this subject are not very consistent. When arguing against the continued obligation of monastic vows, he did not hesitate to say that what was contrary to reason was contrary to God. "Was nun der Vernunft entgegen ist, ist gewiss dass es Gott viehmehr entgegen ist. Denn wie sollte es nicht wider die gttliche Wahrheit seyn, das wider Vernunft und menschliche Wahrheit ist." [107] But in the sacramentarian controversy he will not allow reason to be heard. "In the things of God," he says, reason or nature is stock-star-and-stone blind. "It is, indeed," he adds, "audacious enough to plunge in and stumble as a blind horse; but all that it explains or concludes is as certainly false and wrong as that God lives." [108] In another place he says that reason, when she attempts to speculate about divine things, becomes a fool; which, indeed, is very much what Paul says. (Rom. i. 22, 1 Cor. i. 18-31.)

The Lutheran theologians made a distinction between reason in the abstract, or reason as it was in man before the fall, and reason as it now is. They admit that no truth of revelation can contradict reason as such; but it may contradict the reason of men all of whose faculties are clouded and deteriorated by sin. By this was not meant simply that the unrenewed man is opposed to the truth of God; that "the things of the Spirit" are foolishness to him, that it seems to him absurd that God should be found in fashion as a man; that He should demand a satisfaction for sin; or save one man and not another, according to his own good pleasure. This the Bible clearly teaches and all Christians believe. In all this there is no contradiction between reason and religion. The being of God is foolishness to the atheist; and personal immortality is foolishness to the pantheist. Yet who would admit that these doctrines are contrary to reason? The Lutheran theologians intended to teach, not only that the mysteries of the Bible are above reason, that they can neither be understood nor demonstrated; and not only that "the things of the Spirit" are foolishness to the natural man, but that they are really in conflict with the human understanding; that by a correct process of reasoning they can be demonstrated to be false; so that in the strict sense of the terms what is true in religion is false in philosophy. "The Sorbonne," says Luther, "has pronounced a most abominable decision in saying that what is true in religion is also true in philosophy; and moreover condemning as heretics all who assert the contrary. By this horrible doctrine it has given it to be clearly understood that the doctrines of faith are to be subjected to the

yoke of human reason." [109]

Sir William Hamilton.

Secondly, the ground taken by Sir William Hamilton on this subject is not precisely the same with that taken by the Lutherans. They agree, indeed, in this, that we are bound to believe what (at the bar of reason) we can prove to be false, but they differ entirely as to the cause and nature of this conflict between reason and faith. According to the Lutherans, it arises from the corruption and deterioration of our nature by the fall. It is removed in part in this world by regeneration, and entirely hereafter by the perfection of our sanctification. According to Hamilton, this conflict arises from the necessary limitation of human thought. God has so made us that reason, acting according to its own laws, of necessity arrives at conclusions directly opposed to the doctrines of religion both natural and revealed. We can prove demonstrably that the Absolute being cannot know, cannot be a cause, cannot be conscious. It may be proved with equal clearness that the Infinite cannot be a person, or possess moral attributes. Here, then, what is true in religion, what we are bound to believe, and what in point of fact all men, in virtue of the constitution of their nature do believe, can be proved to be false. There is thus an irreconcilable conflict between our intellectual and moral nature. But as, according to the idealist, reason forces us to the conclusion that the external world does not exist, while, nevertheless, it is safe and proper to act on the assumption that it is, and is what it appears to be; so, according to Hamilton, it is not only safe, but obligatory on us to act on the assumption that God is a person, although infinite, while our reason demonstrates that an infinite person is a contradiction. The conflict between reason and faith is avowed, while the obligation of faith on the testimony of our moral and religious nature and of the Word of God is affirmed. This point has been already discussed.

The View of Speculative Philosophers.

Thirdly, we note the view taken by the speculative philosophers. They, too, maintain that reason demonstrates the doctrines of revelation and even of natural religion to be false. But they do not recognize their obligation to receive them as objects of faith. Being contrary to reason, those doctrines are false, and being false, they are, by enlightened men, to be rejected. If any cling to them as a matter of feeling, they are to be allowed to do so, but they must renounce all claim to philosophic insight.

May the Objects of Faith be above, and yet not against Reason?

A fifth question is, Whether the objects of faith may be above, and yet not contrary to reason? The answer to this question is to be in the affirmative, for the distinction implied is sound and almost universally admitted. What is above reason is simply incomprehensible. What is against reason is impossible. It is contrary to reason that contradictions should be true; that a part should be greater than the whole; that a thing should be and not be at the same time; that right should be wrong and wrong right. It is incomprehensible how matter attracts matter; how the mind acts on the body, and the body on the mind. The distinction between the incomprehensible and the impossible, is therefore plain and admitted. And the distinction between what is above reason, and what is against reason, is equally obvious and just. The great body of Christian theologians have ever taken the ground that the doctrines of the Bible are not contrary to reason, although above it. That is, they are matters of faith to be received on the authority of God, and not because they can be either

understood or proved. As it is incomprehensible how a soul and body can be united in one conscious life; so it is incomprehensible how a divine and human nature can be united in one person m Christ. Neither is impossible, and therefore neither is contrary to reason. We know the one fact from consciousness; we believe the other on the testimony of God. It is impossible, and therefore contrary to reason, that three should be one. But it is not impossible that the same numerical essence should subsist in three distinct persons. Realists tell us that humanity, as one numerical essence, subsists in all the millions of human individuals. Thomas Aquinas takes the true ground when he says: "Ea qu□ sunt supra naturam, sola fide tenemus. Quod autem credimus, auctoritati debemus. Unde in omnibus asserendis sequi debemus naturam rerum, pr□ter ea, qu□ auctoritate divina traduntur, qu□ sunt supra naturam." [110] "Qu□ igitur fidei sunt, non sunt tentanda probare nisi per auctoritates his, qui auctoritates suscipiunt. Apud alios vero sufficit defendere non esse impossibile quod pr□dicat fides." [111] "Quidquid in aliis scientiis invenitur veritati hujus scienti□ [sacr□ doctrin□] repugnans, totum condemnatur ut falsum." [112]

The Objects of Faith are consistent with Reason.

While, therefore, the objects of faith as revealed in the Bible, are not truths of the reason, i.e., which the human reason can discover, or comprehend, or demonstrate, they are, nevertheless, perfectly consistent with reason. They involve no contradictions or absurdities; nothing impossible, nothing inconsistent with the intuitions either of the intellect or of the conscience; nothing inconsistent with any well established truth, whether of the external world or of the world of mind. On the contrary, the contents of the Bible, so far as they relate to things within the legitimate domain of human knowledge, are found to be consistent, and must be consistent, with all we certainly know from other sources than a divine revelation. All that the Scriptures teach concerning the external world accords with the facts of experience. They do not teach that the earth is a plane; that it is stationary in space; that the sun revolves around it. On the other hand, they do teach that God made all plants and animals, each after its own kind; and, accordingly, all experience shows that species are immutable. All the anthropological doctrines of the Bible agree with what we know of man from consciousness and observation. The Bible teaches that God made of one blood all nations which dwell on the face of the earth. We accordingly find that all the varieties of our race have the same anatomical structure; the same physical nature; the same rational and moral faculties. The Bible teaches that man is a free, accountable agent; that all men are sinners; that all need redemption, and that no man can redeem himself or find a ransom for his brother. With these teachings the consciousness of all men agrees. All that the Scriptures reveal concerning the nature and attributes of Gods corresponds with our religious nature, satisfying, elevating, and sanctifying all our powers and meeting all our necessities. If the contents of the Bible did not correspond with the truths which God has revealed in his external works and the constitution of our nature, it could not be received as coming from Him, for God cannot contradict himself. Nothing, therefore, can be more derogatory to the Bible than the assertion that its doctrines are contrary to reason.

Faith in the Irrational impossible.

The assumption that reason and faith are incompatible; that we must become irrational in order to become believers is, however it may be intended, the language of infidelity; for faith in the irrational is of necessity itself irrational. It is impossible to believe that to be

true which the mind sees to be false. This would be to believe and disbelieve the same thing at the same time. If, therefore, as modern philosophers assert, it is impossible that an infinite being can be a person, then faith in the personality of God is impossible. Then there can be no religion, no sin, no accountability, no immortality. Faith is not a blind, irrational conviction. In order to believe, we must know what we believe, and the grounds on which our faith rests. And, therefore, the refuge which some would take in faith, from the universal scepticism to which they say reason necessarily leads, is insecure and worthless.

While admitting that the truths of revelation are to be received upon the authority of God; that human reason can neither comprehend nor prove them; that a man must be converted and become as a little child before he can truly receive the doctrines of the Bible; and admitting, moreover, that these doctrines are irreconcilable with every system of philosophy, ever framed by those who refuse to be taught of God, or who were ignorant of his Word, yet it is ever to be maintained that those doctrines are unassailable; that no created intellect can prove them to be impossible or irrational. Paul, while spurning the wisdom of the world, still claimed that he taught the highest wisdom, even the wisdom of God. (1 Cor. ii. 6, 7.) And who will venture to say that the wisdom of God is irrational?

Knowledge essential to Faith.

A sixth question, included under the head of the relation of faith to knowledge is, Whether knowledge is essential to faith? That is, whether a truth must be known in order to be believed? This Protestants affirm and Romanists deny.

Protestants of course admit that mysteries, or truths which we are unable to comprehend, may be, and are, proper objects of faith. They repudiate the rationalistic doctrine that we can believe only what we understand and what we can prove, or, at least, elucidate so that it appears to be true in its own light. What Protestants maintain is that knowledge, i.e., the cognition of the import of the proposition to be believed, is essential to faith; and, consequently, that faith is limited by knowledge. We can believe only what we know, i.e., what we intelligently apprehend. If a proposition be announced to us in an unknown language, we can affirm nothing about it. We can neither believe nor disbelieve it. Should the man who makes the declaration, assert that it is true, if we have confidence in his competency and integrity, we may believe that he is right, but the proposition itself is no part of our faith. The Apostle recognizes this obvious truth when he says, "Except ye utter by the tongue words easy to be understood (eusemon logon), how shall it be known what is spoken? for ye shall speak into the air. . . . . If I know not the meaning of the voice, I shall be unto him that speaketh a barbarian, and he that speaketh shall be a barbarian unto me. . . . . When thou shalt bless with the Spirit, how shall he that occupieth the room of the unlearned, say Amen at thy giving of thanks? seeing he understandeth not what thou sayest?" (1 Cor. xiv. 9-16.) To say Amen, is to assent to, to make one's own. According to the Apostle, therefore, knowledge, or the intelligent apprehension of the meaning of what is proposed, is essential to faith. If the proposition "God is a Spirit," be announced to the unlearned in Hebrew or Greek, it is impossible that they should assent to its truth. If they understand the language, if they know what the word "God" means, and what the word "Spirit" means, then they may receive or reject the truth which that proposition affirms. The declaration "Jesus is the Son of God," admits of different interpretations. Some say the term Son is an official title, and therefore the proposition "Jesus is the Son of God," means that

Jesus is a ruler. Others say it is a term of affection, then the proposition means that Jesus was the special object of the love of God. Others say that it means that Jesus is of the same nature with God; that He is a divine person. If this be the meaning of the Spirit in declaring Jesus to be the Son of God, then those who do not attach that sense to the words, do not believe the truth intended to be taught. When it is said God set forth Christ to be a propitiation for our sins, if we do not understand what the word propitiation means, the proposition to us means nothing, and nothing cannot be an object of faith.

Knowledge the Measure of Faith.

It follows from what has been said, or rather is included in it, that knowledge being essential to faith, it must be the measure of it. What lies beyond the sphere of knowledge, lies beyond the sphere of faith. Of the unseen and eternal we can believe only what God has revealed; and of what God has revealed, we can believe only what we know. It has been said that he who believes the Bible to be the Word of God, may properly be said to believe all it teaches, although much of its instructions may be to him unknown. But this is not a correct representation. The man who believes the Bible, is prepared to believe on its authority whatever it declares to be true. But he cannot properly be said to believe any more of its contents than he knows. If asked if he believed that men bitten by poisonous serpents were ever healed by merely looking at a brazen serpent, he might, if ignorant of the Pentateuch, honestly answer, No. But should he come to read and understand the record of the healing of the dying Israelites, as found in the Bible, he would rationally and sincerely, answer, Yes. This disposition to believe whatever the Bible teaches, as soon as we know what is taught, may be called an implicit faith, but it is no real faith. It has none of its characteristics and none of its power.

Proof that Knowledge is Essential to Faith.

That knowledge, in the sense above stated, is essential to faith is obvious, --

1. From the very nature of faith. It includes the conviction of the truth of its object. It is an affirmation of the mind that a thing is true or trustworthy, but the mind can affirm nothing of that of which it knows nothing.

2. The Bible everywhere teaches that without knowledge there can be no faith. This, as just stated, is the doctrine of the Apostle Paul. He condemned the speaking in an unknown tongue in a promiscuous assembly, because the hearers could not understand what was said; and if they did not know the meaning of the words uttered, they could neither assent to them, nor be profited by them. In another place (Rom. x. 14) he asks, "How shall they believe in him of whom they have not heard?" "Faith," he says, "cometh by hearing." The command of Christ was to preach the Gospel to every creature; to teach all nations. Those who received the instructions thus given, should, He assured his disciples, be saved; those who rejected them, should be damned. This takes for granted that without the knowledge of the Gospel, there can be no faith. On this principle the Apostles acted everywhere. They went abroad preaching Christ, proving from the Scriptures that He was the Son of God and Saviour of the world. The communication of knowledge always preceded the demand for faith.

3. Such is the intimate connection between faith and knowledge, that in the Scriptures the one term is often used for the other. To know Christ, is to believe upon Him. To know the truth, is intelligently and believingly to apprehend and appropriate it. Conversion is

effected by knowledge. Paul says he was made a believer by the revelation of Christ within him. The Spirit is said to open the eyes of the understanding. Men are said to be renewed so as to know. We are translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of light. Believers are children of the light. Men are said to perish for the lack of knowledge. Nothing is more characteristic of the Bible than the importance which it attaches to the knowledge of the truth. We are said to be begotten by the truth; to be sanctified by the truth; and the whole duty of ministers and teachers is said to be to hold forth the word of life. It is because Protestants believe that knowledge is essential to faith, that they insist so strenuously on the circulation of the Scriptures and the instruction of the people.

Romish Doctrine on this Subject.

Romanists make a distinction between explicit and implicit faith. By the former is meant, faith in a known truth; by the latter faith in truths not known. They teach that only a few primary truths of religion need be known, and that faith without knowledge, as to all other truths, is genuine and sufficient. On this subject Thomas Aquinas says, "Quantum ad prima credibilia, qu sunt articuli fidei, tenetur homo explicite credere. Quantum autem ad alia credibilia non tenetur homo explicite credere, sed solum implicite, vel in prparatione animi, in quantum paratus est credere quidquid divina Scriptura continet." [113] Implicit faith is defined as, "Assensus, qui omnia, quamvis ignota, qu ab ecclesia probantur, amplectitur." [114] Bellarmin [115] says, "In eo qui credit, duo sunt, apprehensio et judicium, sive assensus: sed apprehensio non est fides, sed aliud fidem prcedens. Possunt enim infideles apprehendere mysteria fidei. Prterea, apprehensio non dicitur proprie notitia. . . . . Mysteria fidei, qu rationem superant, credimus, non intelligimus, ac per hoc fides distingintur contra scientiam, et melius per ignorantiam, quam per notitiam definitur." The faith required of the people is simply, A general intention to believe whatever the Church believes." [116] The Church teaches that there are seven sacraments. A man who has no idea what the word sacrament means, or what rites are regarded by the Church as having a sacramental character, is held to believe that orders, penance, matrimony, and extreme unction, are sacraments. So, of all other doctrines of the Church. True faith is said to be consistent with absolute ignorance. According to this doctrine, a man may be a true Christian, if he submits to the Church, although in his internal convictions and modes of thought, he be a pantheist or pagan.

It is to this grave error as to the nature of faith, that much in the character and practice of the Romish Church is to be referred, --

1. This is the reason why the Scriptures are withheld from the people. If knowledge is not necessary to faith, there is no need that the people should know what the Bible teaches.

2. For the same reason the services of public worship are conducted in an unknown language.

3. Hence, too, the symbolism which characterizes their worship. The end to be accomplished is a blind reverence and awe. For this end there is no need that these symbols should be understood. It is enough that they affect the imagination.

4. To the same principle is to be referred the practice of reserve in preaching. The truth may be kept back or concealed. The cross is held up before the people, but it is not necessary that the doctrine of the sacrifice for sin made thereon should be taught. It is enough if the people are impressed; it matters not whether they believe that the sign, or the

material, or the doctrine symbolized, secures salvation. Nay, the darker the mind, the more vague and mysterious the feeling excited, and the more blind the submission rendered, the more genuine is the exercise of faith. "Religious light," says Mr. Newman, "is intellectual darkness." [117]

5. It is on the same principle the Roman Catholic missions have always been conducted. The people are converted not by the truth, not by a course of instruction, but by baptism. They are made Christians by thousands, not by the intelligent adoption of Christianity as a system of doctrine, of that they may be profoundly ignorant, but by simple submission to the Church and its prescribed rites. The consequence has been that the Catholic missions, although continued in some instances for more than a hundred years, take no hold on the people, but almost uniformly die out, as soon as the supply of foreign ministers is cut off.

[103] See above, p. 58.

[104] Systematische Entwickelung, § 29, 4th edit. Leipzig, 1841, p. 163.

[105] De Pr&#65533;scriptionibus adversus H&#65533;reticos, cap. 7, 8, 14, Works, Paris, 1608, (t. iii.), p. 331: "Quid ergo Athenis et Hierosolymis? quid Academi&#65533; et Ecclesi&#65533;? quid h&#65533;reticis et Christianis? Nostra institutio de portica Solomonis est, qui et ipse tradiderat: Dominum in simplicitate cordis esse qu&#65533;rendum. Viderint qui Stoicum, et Platonicum, et Dialecticum, Christianissimum protulerunt. Nobis curiositate opus non est post Christum Jesum, nec inquisitione post Evangelium. Cum credimus, nihil desideramus ultra credere. Hoc enim prius credimus, non esse quod ultra credere debeamus. . . . . Cedat curiositas fidei, cedat gloria saluti. Certe aut non obstrepant, aut quiescant adversus regulam. Nihil ulta scire, omnia scire est."

[106] De Carne Christi, cap. 5, Works, (t. iii.), p. 555: "Natus est Dei filius: non pudet quia pudendum est. Et mortuus est Dei filius: prorsus credibile est, quia ineptum est. Et sepultus, resurrexit: certum est, quia impossibile est."

[107] Works, edit. Walch, vol. xix. p. 1940.

[108] Ibid. vol. xii. pp. 399, 400.

[109] Works, edit. Walch, vol. x. p. 1399.

[110] Summa, I. quest. xcix. art 1, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 185, a.

[111] Ibid. qu&#65533;st. xxxii. art. 1, p. 64, a.

[112] Ibid. qu&#65533;st. i. art. 6, p. 2, b.

[113] Summa, II. ii. qu&#65533;st. ii. art. 5, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 7, a, of third set.

[114] Hutterus Redivivius, § 108, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1845, p. 271.

[115] De Justificatione, lib. i. cap. 7, Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. 714, a, c.

[116] Strauss, Dogmatik, Die Christliche Glaubenslehre. T&#65533;bingen and Stuttgart, 1840, vol. i. p. 284.

[117] Sermons, vol. i. p. 124.

§ 5. Faith and Feeling.

It has already been seen, --

1. That faith, the act of believing, cannot properly be defined as the assent of the understanding determined by the will. There are, unquestionably, many cases in which a man believes against his will.

2. It has also been argued that it is not correct to say that faith is assent founded on feeling. On this point it was admitted that a man's feelings have great influence upon his faith; that it is comparatively easy to believe what is agreeable, and difficult to believe what is disagreeable. It was also admitted that in saving faith, the gift of God, resting on the inward illuminating testimony of the Holy Spirit, there is a discernment not only of the truth but of the divine excellence of the things of the Spirit, which is inseparably connected with appropriate feeling. It was moreover conceded that, so far as the consciousness of the believer is concerned, he seems to receive the truth on its own evidence, on its excellence and power over his heart and conscience. This, however, is analogous to other facts in his experience. When a man repents and believes, he is conscious only of his own exercises and not of the supernatural influences of the Spirit, to which those exercises owe their origin and nature. Thus also in the exercise of faith, consciousness does not reach the inward testimony of the Spirit on which that faith is founded. Nevertheless, notwithstanding these admissions, it is still incorrect to say that faith is founded on feeling, because it is only of certain forms or exercises of faith that this can even be plausibly said; and because there are many exercises of even saving faith (that is, of faith in a true believer,) which are not attended by feeling. This is the case when the object of faith is some historical fact. Besides, the Scriptures clearly teach that the ground of faith is the testimony of God, or demonstration of the Spirit. He has revealed certain truths, and attends them with such an amount and kind of evidence, as produces conviction, and we receive them on his authority.

3. Faith is not necessarily connected with feeling. Sometimes it is, and sometimes it is not. Whether it is or not, depends, (a.) On the nature of the object. Belief in glad tidings is of necessity attended by joy; of evil tidings with grief. Belief in moral excellence involves a feeling of approbation. Belief that a certain act is criminal, involves disapprobation. (b.) On the proximate ground of faith. If a man believes that a picture is beautiful on the testimony of competent judges, there is no æsthetic feeling connected with his faith. But if he personally perceives the beauty of the object, then delight is inseparable from the conviction that it is beautiful. In like manner if a man believes that Jesus is God manifest in the flesh, on the mere external testimony of the Bible, he experiences no due impression from that truth. But if his faith is founded on the inward testimony of the Spirit, by which the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ is revealed to him, then he is filled with adoring admiration and love.

Religious Faith more than Simple Assent.

4. Another question agitated on this subject is, Whether faith is a purely intellectual exercise; or Whether it is also an exercise of the affections. This is nearly allied to the preceding question, and must receive substantially the same answer. Bellarmin, [118] says, "Tribus in rebus ab hæreticis Catholici dissentiunt; Primum, in objecto fidei justificantis, quod hæretici restringunt ad solam promissionem misericordiæ specialis, Catholici tam late patere volunt, quam late patet verbam. . . . Deinde in facultate et potentia animi quæ sedes est fidei. Siquidem illi fidem collocant in voluntate [seu in corde] cum fiduciam esse

definiunt; ac per hoc eam cum spe confundunt. Fiducia enim nihil est aliud, nisi spes roborata. . . . Catholici fidem in intellectu sedem habere docent. Denique, in ipso actu intellectus. Ipsi enim per notitiam fidem definiunt, nos per assensum. Assentimur enim Deo, quamvis ea nobis credenda proponat, qu\u00e9 non intelligimus." Regarding faith as a mere intellectual or speculative act, they consistently deny that it is necessarily connected with salvation. According to their doctrine, a man may have true faith, i.e., the faith which the Scriptures demand, and yet perish. On this point the Council of Trent says: "Si quis dixerit, amissa per peccatum gratia, simul et fidem semper amitti, aut fidem, qu\u00e9 remanet, non esse veram fidem, licet non sit viva; aut eum, qui fidem sine caritate habet, non esse Christianum; anathema sit." [119]

Protestant Doctrine.

On the other hand Protestants with one voice maintain that the faith which is connected with salvation, is not a mere intellectual exercise. Calvin says: [120] "Verum observemus, fidei sedem non in cerebro esse, sed in corde: neque vero de eo contenderim, qua in parte corporis sita sit fides: sed quoniam cordis nomen pro serio et sincero affectu fere capitur, dico firmam esse et efficacem fiduciam, non nudam tantum notionem." He also says: [121] "Quodsi expenderent illud Pauli, Corde creditur ad justitiam (Rom. x. 10): fingere desinerent frigidam illam qualitatem. Si una h\u00e9c nobis suppeteret ratio, valere deberet ad litem finiendam: assensionem scilicet ipsam sicuti ex parte attigi, et fusius iterum repetam, cordis esse magis quam cerebri, et affectus magis quam intelligenti\u00e9."

The answer in the Heidelberg Catechism, to the question, What is Faith? is, "It is not merely a certain knowledge, whereby I receive as true all that God has revealed to us in his Word, but also a cordial trust, which the Holy Ghost works in me by the Gospel, that not only to others, but to me also, the forgiveness of sin, and everlasting righteousness and life are given by God, out of pure grace, and only for the sake of Christ's merit." [122]

That saving faith is not a mere speculative assent of the understanding, is the uniform doctrine of the Protestant symbols. On this point, however, it may be remarked, in the first place, that,as has often been stated before, the Scriptures do not make the sharp distinction between the understanding, the feelings, and the will, which is common in our day. A large class of our inward acts and states are so complex as to be acts of the whole soul, and not exclusively of any one of its faculties. In repentance there is of necessity an intellectual apprehension of ourselves as sinners, of the holiness of God, of his law to which we have failed to be conformed and of his mercy in Christ; there is a moral disapprobation of our character and conduct; a feeling of sorrow, shame, and remorse; and a purpose to forsake sin and lead a holy life. Scarcely less complex is the state of mind expressed by the word faith as it exists in a true believer. In the second place, there is a distinction to be made between faith in general and saving faith. If we take that element of faith which is common to every act of believing; if we understand by it the apprehension of a thing as true and worthy of confidence, whether a fact of history or of science, then it may be said that faith in its essential nature is intellectual, or intelligent assent. But if the question be, What is that act or state of mind which is required in the Gospel, when we are commanded to believe; the answer is very different. To believe that Christ is "God manifest in the flesh," is not the mere intellectual conviction that no one, not truly divine, could be and do what Christ was and did; for this conviction demoniacs avowed; but it is to receive Him as our God. This

includes the apprehension and conviction of his divine glory, and the adoring reverence, love, confidence, and submission, which are due to God alone. When we are commanded to believe in Christ as the Saviour of men, we are not required merely to assent to the proposition that He does save sinners, but also to receive and rest upon Him alone for our own salvation. What, therefore, the Scriptures mean by faith, in this connection, the faith which is required for salvation, is an act of the whole soul, of the understanding, of the heart, and of the will.

Proof of the Protestant Doctrine.

The Protestant doctrine that saving faith includes knowledge, assent, and trust, and is not, as Romanists teach, mere assent, in sustained by abundant proofs.

1. In the first place, it is proved from the nature of the object of saving faith. That object is not merely the general truth of Scripture, not the fact that the Gospel reveals God's plan of saving sinners; but it is Christ himself; his person and work, and the offer of salvation to us personally and individually. From the nature of the case we cannot, as just remarked, believe in Christ on the inward testimony of the Spirit which reveals his glory and his love, without the feelings of reverence, love, and trust mingling with the act and constituting its character. Nor is it possible that a soul oppressed with a sense of sin should receive the promise of deliverance from its guilt and power, without any feeling of gratitude and confidence. The act of faith in such a promise is in its nature an act of appropriation and confidence.

2. We accordingly find that in many cases in the Bible the word trust is used instead of faith. The same act or state of mind which in one place is expressed by the one word, is in others expressed by the other. The same promises are made to trust as are made to faith. The same effects are attributed to the one, that are attributed to the other.

3. The use of other words and forms of expression as explanatory of the act of faith, and substituted for that word, shows that it includes trust as an essential element of its nature. We are commanded to look to Christ, as the dying Israelites looked up to the brazen serpent. This looking involved trusting; and looking is declared to be believing. Sinners are exhorted to flee to Christ as a refuge. The man-slayer fled to the city of refuge because he relied upon it as a place of safety. We are said to receive Christ, to rest upon Him, to lay hold of Him. All these, and other modes of expression which teach us what we are to do when we are commanded to believe, show that trust is an essential element in the act of saving faith.

4. The command to believe is expressed by the word pisteu,w not only when followed by the accusative, but also when followed by the dative and by the prepositions epi, eis, en. But the literal meaning of pisteuein eis, or epi, or en, is not simply to believe, but to believe upon, to confide in, to trust. Faith in a promise made to ourselves, from the nature of the case, is an act of confidence in him who makes the promise.

5. Unbelief is, therefore, expressed by doubt, fear, distrust and despair.

6 The believer knows from his own experience that when he believes he receives and rests on Jesus Christ for salvation, as He is freely offered to us in the Gospel.

The controversy between Romanists and Protestants on this subject turns on the view taken of the plan of salvation. If, as Protestants hold, every man in order to be saved, must

receive the record which God has given of his Son; must believe that He is God manifest in the flesh, the propitiation for our sins, the prophet, priest, and king of his people, then it must be admitted that faith involves trust in Christ as to us the source of wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. But if, as Romanists teach, the benefits of redemption are conveyed only through the sacraments, effective ex opere operato, then faith is the opposite of infidelity in its popular sense. If a man is not a believer, he is an infidel, i.e., a rejecter of Christianity. The object of faith is divine revelation as contained in the Bible. It is a simple assent to the fact that the Scriptures are from God, and that the Church is a divinely constituted and supernaturally endowed institute for the salvation of men. Believing this, the sinner comes to the Church and receives through her ministrations, in his measure, all the benefits of redemption. According to this system the nature and office of faith are entirely different from what they are according to the Protestant theory of the Gospel.

[118] De Justificatione, lib. i. cap. 4, Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 706, d, e.

[119] Session vi., Canon 28; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, Gttingen, 1846, vol. i. p. 37.

[120] On Romans x. 10; Commentaries, edit. Berlin, 1831, vol. v. p. 139.

[121] Institutio, III. ii. 8; edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. p. 358.

[122] Question 21.

§ 6. Faith and Love.

As to the relation between faith and love there are three different views: --

1. That love is the ground of faith; that men believe the truth because they love it. Faith is founded on feeling. This view has already been sufficiently discussed.

2. That love is the invariable and necessary attendant and consequent of saving faith. As no man can see and believe a thing to be morally good without the feeling of approbation; so no one can see and believe the glory of God as revealed in the Scriptures without adoring reverence being awakened in his soul; no one can believe unto salvation that Christ is the Son of God and the Son of Man; that He loved us and gave Himself for us, and makes us kings and priests unto God, without love and devotion, in proportion to the clearness and strength of this faith, filling the heart and controlling the life. Hence faith is said to work by love and to purify the heart. Romanists, indeed, render pistis di' agapes energoumene in this passage (Gal. v. 6), "faith perfected or completed by love." But this is contrary to the constant usage of the word energeisthai in the New Testament, which is always used in a middle sense, "vim suam exserere." According to the Apostle's teaching in Rom. vii. 4-6, love without faith, or anterior to it, is impossible. Until we believe, we are under the condemnation of the law. While under condemnation, we are at enmity with God. While at enmity with God, we bring forth fruit unto death. It is only when reconciled to God and united to Christ, that we bring forth fruit unto God. Believing that God loves us we love Him. Believing that Christ gave Himself for us, we devote our lives to Him. Believing that the fashion of this world passes away, that the things unseen are eternal, those who have that faith which is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen, set

their affections on things above where Christ sitteth at the right hand of God. This necessary connection between faith and love, has already been sufficiently insisted upon.

Romanists make Love the Essence of Faith.

3. The third doctrinal view on this subject is that of the Romanists, who make love the essence of faith. In other words, love with them is the form (in the scholastic sense of the word) of faith; it is that which gives it being or character as a Christian virtue or grace. While on the one hand they teach, as we have seen with the Council of Trent, that faith is in itself mere intellectual assent, without any moral virtue, and which may be exercised by the unrenewed or by those in a state of mortal sin; on the other hand, they hold that there is such a Christian grace as faith; but in that case, faith is only another name for love. This is not the distinction between a living and dead faith which the Scriptures and all Evangelical Christians recognize. With Romanists the fides informis is true faith, and the fides formata is love. On this point, Peter Lombard [123] says: "Fides qua dicitur [creditur?], si cum caritate sit, virtus est, quia caritas ut ait Ambrosius mater est omnium virtutum, qu\u00e9 omnes informat, sine qua nulla vera virtus est." Thomas Aquinas [124] says: "Actus fidei ordinatur ad objectum voluntatis, quod est bonum, sicut ad finem. Hoc autem bonum quod est finis fidei, scilicet bonum divinum, est proprium objectum charitatis: et ideo charitas dicitur forma fidei, in quantum per charitatem actus fidei perficitur et formatur." Bellarmin [125] says: "Quod si charitas est forma fidei, et fides non justificat formaliter, nisi ab ipsa caritate formata certe multo magis charitas ipsa justificat. . . . . Fides qu\u00e9 agitur, ac movetur, formatur, et quasi animatur per dilectionem. . . . . Apostolus Paulus . . . . explicat dilectionem formam esse extrinsecam fidei non intrinsecam, qu\u00e9 det illi, non ut sit, sed ut moveatur." All this is intelligible and reasonable, provided we admit subjective justification, and the merit of good works. If justification is sanctification, then it may be admitted that love has more to do with making men holy, than faith considered as mere intellectual assent. And if it be conceded that we are accepted by God on the ground of our own virtue, then it may be granted that love is more valuable than any mere exercise of the intellect. Romanists argue, "Maxima virtus maxime justificat. Dilectio est maxima virtus. Ergo maxime justificat." It was because this distinction between a "formed and unformed faith" was made in the interest of justification on the ground of our own character and merit, that Luther, with his usual vehement power, says: "Ipsi duplicem faciunt fidem, informem et formatam, hanc pestilentissimam et satanicam glossam non possum non vehementer detestari." It is only as connected with false views of justification that this question has any real importance. For it is admitted by all Protestants that saving faith and love are inseparably connected; that faith without love, i.e., that a faith which does not produce love and good works, is dead. But Protestants are strenuous in denying that we are justified on account of love, which is the real meaning of the Romanists when they say "fides non justificat formaliter, nisi ab ipsa caritate formata."

[123] Liber Sententiarum, III. xxiii. C. edit. 1472(?)

[124] Summa, II. ii. qu\u00e9st. iv. art. 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 11, a, of third set.

[125] De Justificatione, lib. ii. cap. 4; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. pp. 789, a, b, 790, c.

§ 7. The Object of Saving Faith.

Fides Generalis.

It is conceded that all Christians are bound to believe, and that all do believe everything taught in the Word of God, so far as the contents of the Scriptures are known to them. It is correct, therefore, to say that the object of faith is the whole revelation of God as contained in his Word. As the Bible is with Protestants the only infallible rule of faith and practice, nothing not expressly taught in Scripture, or deduced therefrom by necessary inference, can be imposed on the people of God as an article of faith. This is "the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free," and in which we are bound to stand fast. This is our protection on the one hand, against the usurpations of the Church. Romanists claim for the Church the prerogative of infallible and authoritative teaching. The people are bound to believe whatever the Church, i.e., its organs the bishops, declare to be a part of the revelation of God. They do not, indeed, assume the right "to make" new articles of faith. But they claim the authority to decide, in such a way as to bind the conscience of the people, what the Bible teaches; and what by tradition the Church knows to be included in the teaching of Christ and his Apostles. This gives them latitude enough to teach for doctrines the commandments of men. Bellarmin [126] says: "Omnium dogmatum firmitas pendet ab auctoritate pr[illegible]sentis ecclesi[illegible]." On the other hand, however, it is not only against the usurpations of the Church, that the principle above mentioned is our security, but also against the tyranny of public opinion. Men are as impatient of contradiction now as they ever were. They manifest the same desire to have their own opinions enacted into laws, and enforced by divine authority. And they are as fierce in their denunciations of all who venture to oppose them. Hence they meet in conventions or other assemblies, ecclesiastical or voluntary, and decide what is true and what is false in doctrine, and what is right and what is wrong in morals. Against all undue assumptions of authority, true Protestants hold fast to the two great principles, -- the right of private judgment, and that the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice. The object of faith, therefore, is all the truths revealed in the Word of God. All that God in the Bible declares to be true, we are bound to believe. This is what theologians call fides generalis.

Fides Specialis.

But, besides this, there is a fides specialis necessary to salvation. In the general contents of the Scriptures there are certain doctrines concerning Christ and his work, and certain promises of salvation made through Him to sinful men, which we are bound to receive and on which we are required to trust. The special object of faith, therefore, is Christ, and the promise of salvation through Him. And the special definite act of faith which secures our salvation is the act of receiving and resting on Him as He is offered to us in the Gospel. This is so clearly and so variously taught in the Scriptures as hardly to admit of being questioned.

Christ's Testimony.

In the first place, our Lord repeatedly declares that what men are required to do, and what they are condemned because they do not do, is to believe on Him. He was lifted up, "That whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life." (John iii. 15.) "He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already, because he hath not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God." (v. 18.) "He that

believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: but he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." (v. 36.) "This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 40.) "Verily, verily, I say unto you, He that believeth on me hath everlasting life. I am that bread of life. . . . . This is the bread which cometh down from heaven, ... any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever." (vers. 47-51.) In another place our Lord says, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath sent. (John vi. 29.) The passages, however, in which faith in Christ is expressly demanded as the condition of salvation, are too numerous to be cited.

We are said to be saved by receiving Christ.

That Christ is the immediate object of saving faith is also taught in all those passages in which we are said to receive Christ, or the testimony of God concerning Christ, and in which this act of receiving is said to secure our salvation. For example, in John i. 12, "As many as received him, to them gave he power to become the sons of God." "I am come in my Father's name, and ye receive me not." (John v. 43.) "If we receive the witness of men, the witness of God is greater: for this is the witness of God which he hath testified of his Son. He that believeth on the Son of God hath the witness in himself: he that believeth not God has made him a liar; because he believeth not the record that God gave of his Son." (1 John v. 9, 10.) "He that hath the Son hath life; he that hath not the Son of God hath not life." (v. 12.) "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." (v. 1.) It is, therefore, receiving Christ; receiving the record which God has given of his Son; believing that He is the Christ the Son of the living God, which is the specific act required of us in order to salvation. Christ, therefore, is the immediate object of those exercises of faith which secure salvation. And, therefore, faith is expressed by looking to Christ; coming to Christ; committing the soul to Him, etc.

Teaching of the Apostles

Accordingly the Apostle teaches we are justified "by the faith of Christ." It is not faith as a pious disposition of the mind not faith as general confidence in God; not faith in the truth of divine revelation; much less faith "in eternal verities," or the general principles of truth and duty, but that faith of which Christ is the object. Romans iii. 22: "The righteousness of God which is by faith of Jesus Christ unto all and upon all them that believe." Galatians ii. 16: "Knowing that a man is not justified by the works of the law, but by the faith of Jesus Christ, even we have believed in Jesus Christ, that we might be justified by the faith of Christ, and not by the works of the law." iii. 24: "The law was our schoolmaster to bring us unto Christ, that we might be justified by faith." v. 26: "For ye are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." Galatians ii. 20: "I live by the faith of the Son of God," etc., etc.

Christ our Ransom.

Christ declares that He gave Himself as a ransom for many; He was set forth as a propitiation for sins; He offered Himself as a sacrifice unto God. It is through the merit of his righteousness and death that men are saved. All these representations which pervade the Scriptures necessarily assume that the faith which secures salvation must have special reference to Him. If He is our Redeemer, we must receive and trust Him as such. If He is a propitiation for sins, it is through faith in his blood that we are reconciled to God. The

whole plan of salvation, as set forth in the Gospel, supposes that Christ in his person and work is the object of faith and the ground of confidence.

We live in Christ by Faith.

The same thing follows from the representations given of the relation of the believer to Christ. We are in Him by faith. He dwells in us. He is the head from whom we, as members of his body, derive our life. He is the vine, we are the branches. It is not we that live, but Christ, who liveth in us. These and other representations are utterly inconsistent with the doctrine that it is a vague general faith in God or in the Scriptures which secures our salvation. It is a faith which terminates directly on Christ, which takes Him to be our God and Saviour. God sent his Son into the world, clothed in our nature, to reveal his will, to die for our sins and to rise again for our justification. In Him dwells the fulness of the Godhead, from his fulness we are filled. He to us is wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. Those who receive this Saviour as being all He claimed to be, and commit their souls into his hands to be used in his service and saved to his glory, are, in the Scriptural sense of the term, believers. Christ is not only the object of their faith, but their whole inward, spiritual life terminates on Him. Nothing, therefore, can be more foreign to the Gospel than the Romish doctrine, substantially revived by the modern philosophy which turns the mind away from the historical, really existing, objective Christ, to the work within us; leaving us nothing to love and trust, but what is in our own miserable hearts.

Christ is not received in a Special Office alone.

Admitting that Christ is the immediate and special object of those acts of faith which secure salvation, it is asked, Whether it is Christ in all his offices, or Christ in his priestly office, especially, that is the object of justifying faith? This seems an unnecessary question. It is not raised in the Bible; nor does it suggest itself to the believer. He receives Christ. He does not ask himself for what special function of his saving work he thus accepts Him. He takes Him as a Saviour, as a deliverer from the guilt and power of sin, from the dominion of Satan, and from all the evils of his apostasy from God. He takes Him as his wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. He takes Him as his God and Saviour, as the full, complete, satisfying, life-giving portion of the soul. If this complex act of apprehension and surrender were analyzed it doubtless would be found to include submission to all his teaching, reliance on his righteousness and intercession, subjection to his will, confidence in his protection, and devotion to his service. As He is offered to us as a prophet, priest, and king, as such He is accepted. And as He is offered to us as a source of life, and glory, and blessedness, as the supreme object of adoration and love, as such He is joyfully accepted.

Is the Sinner required to believe that God loves him?

Again, it is questioned, Whether the object of saving faith is that God is reconciled to us; that our sins are forgiven; that we are the objects of the saving love of God? This is not the question above considered, namely, Whether, as Romanists say, the object of faith is the whole revelation of God, or, as Protestants contend, Christ and the promise of redemption through Him, although many of the arguments of the Romanists are directed against the special form of the doctrine just stated. They argue that it is contradictory to say that we are pardoned because we believe; and, in the same breath, to say that the thing to be believed is that our sins are already pardoned. Again, they argue that the only proper object of faith is

some revelation of God, but it is nowhere revealed that we individually are reconciled to God, or that our sins are pardoned, or that we are the objects of that special love which God has to his own people.

In answer to the first of these objections, the Reformed theologians were accustomed to say, that a distinction is to be made between the remission of sin de jure already obtained through the death of Christ, and remission de facto through the efficacious application of it to us. In the former sense, "remissio peccatorum jam impetrata" is the object of faith. In the latter sense, it is "remissio impetranda," because faith is the instrumental cause of justification, and must precede it. "Unde," says Turrettin, [127] "ad obtinendam remissionem peccatorum, non debeo credere peccata mihi jam remissa, ut perperam nobis impingunt; sed debeo credere peccata mihi credenti et poenitenti, juxta promissionem factam credentibus et poenitentibus, remissum iri certissime, qu&#65533; postea actu secundari et reflexo ex sensu fidei credo mihi esse remissa."

The second objection was answered by distinguishing between the direct and the reflex act of faith. By the direct act of faith we embrace Christ as our Saviour; by the reflex act, arising out of the consciousness of believing, we believe that He loved us and died for us, and that nothing can ever separate us from his love. These two acts are inseparable, not only as cause and effect, antecedent and consequent; but they are not separated in time, or in the consciousness of the believer. They are only different elements of the complex act of accepting Christ as He is offered in the Gospel. We cannot separate the joy and gratitude with which a great favour is accepted. Although a psychological analysis might resolve these emotions into the effects of the act of acceptance, they belong, as revealed in consciousness, to the very nature of the act. It is a cordial and grateful acceptance of a promise made to all who embrace it. If a general promise of pardon be made to criminals on the condition of the confession of guilt, every one of their number who makes the confession knows or believes that the promise is made to him. On this point the early Reformed and Lutheran theologians were agreed in teaching that when the sinner exercises saving faith. He believes that for Christ's sake he is pardoned and accepted of God. In other words, that Christ loved him and gave Himself for him. We have already seen that the "Heidelberg Catechism," [128] the symbolical book of so large a portion of the Reformed Church, declared saving faith to be "Certa fiducia, a Spiritu Sancto per evangelium in corde meo accensa, qua in Deo acquiesco, certo statuens, non solum aliis, sed mihi quoque remissionem peccatorum &#65533;ternam, justitiam et vitam donatam esse idque gratis, ex Dei misericordia, propter unius Christi meritum." In the "Apology of the Augsburg Confession of the Lutheran Church" it is said, [129] "Nos pr&#65533;ter illam fidem [fidem generalem] requirimus, ut credat sibi quisque remitti peccata." Calvin says, [130] "Grati&#65533; promissione opus est, qua nobis testificetur se propitium esse Patrem: quando nec aliter ad eum appropinquare possumus, et in eam solam reclinare cor hominis potest. . . . . Nunc justa fidei definitio nobis constabit, si dicamus esse divin&#65533; erga nos benevolenti&#65533; firmam certamque cognitionem, qu&#65533; gratuit&#65533; in Christo promissionis veritate fundata, per Spiritum Sanctum et revelatur mentibus nostris et cordibus obsignatur." "Hic pr&#65533;cipuus fidei cardo vertitur, ne quas Dominus offert misericordi&#65533; promissiones, extra nos tantum veras esse arbitremur, in nobis minime: sed ut potius eas intus complectendo nostras faciamus. . . . . In summa, vere fidelis non est nisi qui solida persuasione Deum sibi propitium benevolumque patrem esse persuasus, de ejus benignitate omnia sibi pollicetur:

nisi qui divin&#65533; erga se benevolenti&#65533; promissionibus fretus, indubitatam salutis expectationem pr&#65533;sumit."

This is strong language. The doctrine, however, is not that faith implies assurance. The question concerns the nature of the object seen, not the clearness of the vision; what it is that the soul believes, not the strength of its faith. This Calvin himself elsewhere beautifully expresses, saying, "When the least drop of faith is instilled into our minds, we begin to see the serene and placid face of our reconciled Father; far off and on high, it may be, but still it is seen." A man in a dungeon may see only a ray of light streaming through a crevice. This is very different from broad daylight. Nevertheless, what he sees is light. So what the penitent sinner believes is, that God for Christ's sake is reconciled to him. It may be with a very dim and doubtful vision, he apprehends that truth; but that is the truth on which his trust is stayed.

Proof of this Doctrine.

This is involved in the appropriation of the general promise of the Gospel. The Scriptures declare that God is love; that He set forth his Son to be a propitiation for sin; that in Him He is reconciled; that He will receive all who come to Him through Christ. To appropriate these general declarations, is to believe that they are true, not only in relation to others, but to ourselves that God is reconciled to us. We have no right to exclude ourselves. This self-exclusion is unbelief. It is refusing to take of the waters of life, freely offered to all.

Galatians ii. 20.

Accordingly the Apostle in Galatians ii. 20, says, "The life which I now live in the flesh, I live by the faith of the Son of God, who loved me, and gave Himself for me." The object of the Apostle's faith, therefore, the truths which he believed, and faith in which gave life to his soul, were, (1.) That Christ is the Son of God; (2.) That He loved him; (3.) That He gave Himself for him. The faith by which a believer lives, is not specifically different in its nature or object from the faith required of every man in order to his salvation. The life of faith is only the continued repetition, it may be with ever increasing strength and clearness, of those exercises by which we first receive Christ, in all his fuiness and in all his offices, as our God and Saviour. "Qui fit ut vivamus Christi fide? quia nos dilexit, et se ipsum tradidit pro nobis. Amor, inquam, quo nos complexus est Christus, fecit ut se nobis coadunaret. Id implevit morte sua nam se ipsum tradendo pro nobis, non secus atque in persona nostra passus est. . . . . Neque parum energi&#65533; habet pro me: quia non satis fuerit Christum pro mundi salute mortuum reputare, nisi sibi quisque effectum ac possessionem hujus grati&#65533; privatim vindicet." [131]

It is objected to this view of the case that by the "love of God," or "of Christ," in the above statement, is not meant the general benevolence or philanthropy of God, but his special, electing, and saving love. When Paul said he lived by the faith of Christ who loved him, and gave Himself for him, he meant something more than that Christ loved all men and therefore him among the rest. He evidently believed himself to be a special object of the Saviour's love. It was this conviction which gave power to his faith. And a like conviction enters into the faith of every true believer. But to this it is objected that faith must have a divine revelation for its object. But there is no revelation of God's special love to individuals, and, therefore, no individual has any Scriptural ground to believe that Christ

loved him, and gave Himself for him. Whatever force there may be in this objection, it bears against Paul's declaration and experience. He certainly did believe that Christ loved him and died for him. It will not do to say that this was a conclusion drawn from his own experience; or to assume that the Apostle argued himself into the conviction that Christ loved him. Christ specially loves all who believe upon Him. I believe upon Him. Therefore Christ specially loves me. But a conclusion reached by argument is not an object of faith. Faith must rest on the testimony of God. It must be, therefore, that God in some way testifies to the soul that it is the object of his love. This he does in two ways. First, by the general invitations and promises of the Gospel. The act of appropriating, or of accepting these promises, is to believe that they belong to us as well as to others. Secondly, by the inward witness of the Spirit. Paul says (Rom. v. 5), "The love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Ghost which is given unto us." That is, the Holy Ghost convinces us that we are the objects of God's love. This is done, not only by the various manifestations of his love in providence and redemption, but by his inward dealings with the soul. "He that loveth me shall be loved of my Father, and I will love him, and will manifest myself to him." (John xiv. 21). This manifestation is not outward through the word. It is inward. God has fellowship or intercourse with the souls of his people. The Spirit calls forth our love to God, and reveals his love to us. Again, in Romans viii. 16, the Apostle says, "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit, that we are the children of God." This does not mean that the Spirit excites in us filial feelings toward God, from whence we infer that we are his children. The Apostle refers to two distinct sources of evidence of our adoption. The one is that we can call God Father; the other, the testimony of the Spirit. The latter is joined with the former. The word is summarturei, unites in testifying. Hence we are said to be sealed, not only marked and secured, but assured by the Spirit; and the Spirit is a pledge, an assurance, that we are, and ever shall be, the objects of God's saving love. (Eph. i. 13, 14; iv. 30. 2 Cor. i. 22.)

This is not saying that a man must believe that he is one of the elect. Election is a secret purpose of God. The election of any particular person is not revealed, and, therefore, is not an object of faith. It is a thing to be proved, or made sure, as the Apostle Peter says, by the fruits of the Spirit. All that the doctrine of the Reformers on this subject includes is, that the soul in committing itself to Christ does so as to one who loved it and died for its salvation. The woman healed by touching our Saviour's garment, believed that she was an object of his compassionate love, because all who touched Him with faith were included in that number. Her faith included that conviction.

[126] De Sacram. lib. ii. c. 2. (?)

[127] Institutio, XV. xii. 6; Works, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 508.

[128] XXI.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 434.

[129] V. 60; Hase, Libri Symbolici, Leipzig, 1846, p. 172.

[130] Institutio, lib. III. ii. 7, 16; edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. pp. 357, 364.

[131] Calvin in loco.

§ 8. Effects of Faith.

Union with Christ.

The first effect of faith, according to the Scriptures, is union with Christ. We are in Him by faith. There is indeed a federal union between Christ and his people, founded on the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son in the counsels of eternity. We are, therefore, said to be in Him before the foundation of the world. It is one of the promises of that covenant, that all whom the Father had given the Son should come to Him; that his people should be made willing in the day of his power. Christ has, therefore, been exalted to the right hand of God, to give repentance and the remission of sins. But it was also, as we learn from the Scriptures, included in the stipulations of that covenant, that his people, so far as adults are concerned, should not receive the saving benefits of that covenant until they were united to Him by a voluntary act of faith. They are "by nature the children of wrath, even as others." (Eph. ii. 8.) They remain in this state of condemnation until they believe. Their union is consummated by faith. To be in Christ, and to believe in Christ, are, therefore, in the Scriptures convertible forms of expression. They mean substantially the same thing and, therefore, the same effects are attributed to faith as are attributed to union with Christ.

Justification an Effect of Faith.

The proximate effect of this union, and, consequently, the see. ond effect of faith, is justification. We are "justified by the faith of Christ." (Gal. ii. 16.) "There is therefore now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus." (Rom. vii. 1.) "He that believeth on him is not condemned." (John iii. 18.) Faith is the condition on which God promises in the covenant of redemption, to impute unto men the righteousness of Christ. As soon, therefore, as they believe, they cannot be condemned. They are clothed with a righteousness which answers all the demands of justice. "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? It is God that justifieth. Who is he that condemneth? It is Christ that died, yea rather, that is risen again, who is even at the right hand of God, who also maketh intercession for us." (Rom. viii. 33, 34.)

Participation of Christ's Life an Effect of Faith.

The third effect of faith, or of union with Christ, is a participation of his life. Those united with Christ, the Apostle teaches (Rom. vi. 4-10), so as to be partakers of his death, are partakers also of his life. "Because I live, ye shall live also." (John xiv. 19.) Christ dwells in our hearts by faith. (Eph. iii. 17.) Christ is in us. (Rom. viii. 10.) It is not we that live, but Christ liveth in us. (Gal. ii. 20.) Our Lord's illustration of this vital union is derived from a vine and its branches. (John xv. 1-6.) As the life of the vine is diffused through the branches, and as they live only as connected with the vine, so the life of Christ is diffused through his people, and they are partakers of spiritual and eternal life, only in virtue of their union with Him. Another familiar illustration of this subject is derived from the human body. The members derive their life from the head, and perish if separated from it. (Eph. i. 22; 1 Cor. xii. 12-27, and often). In Ephesians iv. 15, 16, the Apostle carries out this illustration in detail. "The head, even Christ: from whom the whole body fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth, according to the effectual working in the measure of every part, maketh increase of the body unto the edifying of itself in love." As the principle of animal life located in the head, through the complicated yet ordered system of nerves extending to every member, diffuses life and energy through the whole body; so the Holy Spirit, given without measure to Christ the head of the Church,

which is his body, diffuses life and strength to every member. Hence, according to Scripture, Christ's dwelling in us is explained as the Spirit's dwelling in us. The indwelling of the Spirit is the indwelling of Christ. If God be in you; if Christ be in you; if the Spirit be in you, -- all mean the same thing. See Romans viii. 9-11.

To explain this vital and mystical union between Christ and his people as a mere union of thought and feeling, is utterly inadmissible. (1.) In the first place, it is contrary to the plain meaning of his words. No one ever speaks of Plato's dwelling in men; of his being their life, so that without him they can do nothing; and much less, so that holiness, happiness, and eternal life depend upon that union. (2.) Such interpretation supposes that our relation to Christ is analogous to the relation of one man to another. Whereas it is a relation between men and a divine person, who has life in Himself, and gives life to as many as He wills. (3.) It ignores all that the Scriptures teach of the work of the Holy Spirit and of his dwelling in the hearts of men. (4.) It overlooks the supernatural character of Christianity, and would reduce it to a mere philosophical and ethical system.

Peace as the Fruit of Faith.

The fourth effect of faith is peace. "Being justified by faith, we have peace with God, through our Lord Jesus Christ." (Rom. v. 1.) Peace arises from a sense of reconciliation. God promises to pardon, to receive into his favour, and finally to save all who believe the record which He has given of his Son. To believe, is therefore to believe this promise; and to appropriate this promise to ourselves is to believe that God is reconciled to us. This faith may be weak or strong. And the peace which flows from it may be tremulous and intermitting, or it may be constant and assured.

Assurance.

To make assurance of personal salvation essential to faith, is contrary to Scripture and to the experience of God's people. The Bible speaks of a weak faith. It abounds with consolations intended for the doubting and the desponding. God accepts those who can only say, "Lord, I believe; help thou mine unbelief." Those who make assurance the essence of faith, generally reduce faith to a mere intellectual assent. They are often censorious, refusing to recognize as brethren those who do not agree with them, and sometimes they are antinomian.

At the same time, Scripture and experience teach that assurance is not only attainable, but a privilege and a duty. There may indeed be assurance, where there is no true faith at all; but where there is true faith, the want of assurance is to be referred either to the weakness of faith, or to erroneous views of the plan of salvation. Many sincere believers are too introspective. They look too exclusively within, so that their hope is graduated by the degree of evidence of regeneration which they find in their own experience. This, except in rare cases, can never lead to the assurance of hope. We may examine our hearts with all the microscopic care prescribed by President Edwards in his work on "The Religious Affections," and never be satisfied that we have eliminated every ground of misgiving and doubt. The grounds of assurance are not so much within, as without us. They are, according to Scripture, (1.) The universal and unconditional promise of God that those who come to Him in Christ, He will in no wise cast out; that whosoever will, may take of the water of life without money and without price. We are bound to be assured that God is faithful and will certainly save those who believes (2.) The infinite, immutable, and

gratuitous love of God. In the first ten verses of the fifth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans, and in the eighth chapter of that epistle from the thirty-first verse to the end, the Apostle dwells on these characteristics of the love of God, as affording an immovable foundation of the believer's hope. (3.) The infinite merit of the satisfaction of Christ, and the prevalence of his continued intercession. Paul, in Romans viii. 34, especially emphasizes these points. (4.) The covenant of redemption in which it is promised that all given by the Father to the Son, shall come to Him, and that none of them shall be lost. (5.) From the witness of the Spirit, Paul says, "We . . . . rejoice in hope of the glory of God," because the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts, by the Holy Ghost given unto us. That is, the Holy Ghost assures us that we are the objects of that love which he goes on to describe as infinite, immutable, and gratuitous. (Rom. v. 3-5.) And again, "The Spirit itself beareth witness with our spirit that we are the children of God." If, therefore, any true believer lacks the assurance of faith, the fault is in himself and not in the plan of salvation, or in the promises of God.

Sanctification a Fruit of Faith.

The fifth effect of faith is sanctification. "Which are sanctified," says our Lord "by faith that is in me." Although in this verse (Acts xxvi. 18), the words "by faith" do not qualify the preceding clause, "are sanctified," alone, but are to be referred to all the preceding particulars, illumination, deliverance from Satan, forgiveness of sins, and the eternal inheritance, yet the immediate antecedent is not to be omitted. We are sanctified by faith as is elsewhere clearly taught. "Faith which worketh by love and purifies the heart." (Gal. v. 6, and Acts xv. 9.)

The relation of faith to sanctification is thus set forth in the Scriptures, --

1. We are justified by faith. So long as we are under the law, we are under the curse, and bring forth fruit unto death. There is, and can be no love to God, and no holy living until we are delivered from his wrath due to us for sin. We are freed from the law, delivered from its condemnation, by the body or death of Christ. It is by faith in Him as the end of the law for righteousness, that we personally are freed from condemnation and restored to the favour of God. See all this clearly taught in Romans vi., and in the first six verses of the seventh chapter. It is thus by faith we pass from judicial death to judicial life, or justification. This is the first and indispensable step of sanctification so far as it reveals itself in the consciousness of the believer.

2. It is by faith that we receive the indwelling of the Spirit. Christ (or the Spirit of Christ) dwells in our hearts by faith. Faith is the indispensable condition (so far as adults are concerned) of this indwelling of the Spirit. And the indwelling of the Spirit is the source of all spiritual life. Faith is indeed the fruit of the Spirit, and therefore the gift of the Spirit must precede the exercise of faith. It is nevertheless true that faith is the condition of the indwelling of the Spirit, and consequently of spiritual life. Life must precede breathing, and yet breathing is the necessary condition of living.

3. Faith is not only the condition of the Spirit's dwelling in us as the source of spiritual life, but we live by faith. That is, the continuance and exercise of spiritual life involve and suppose the constant exercise of faith. We live by exercising faith in God, in his attributes, in his providence, in his promises, and in all the truths which He has revealed. Especially is this life sustained by those exercises of faith of which Christ is the object; his divine and

mysteriously constituted person, as God manifest in the flesh his finished work for our redemption; his constant intercession; his intimate relation to us not only as our prophet, priest, and king, but as our living head in whom our life is hid in God, and from whom it flows into our souls. We are thus sanctified by faith, because it is through faith that all the religious affections and all the activities of spiritual life are called into exercise.

4. We are sanctified by faith, as it is the substance of things hoped for, and the evidence of things not seen. "The things of God," the truths which He has revealed concerning the spiritual and eternal world exist for us while in this world, only as the objects of faith. But faith is to the soul what the eye is to the body. It enables us to see the things unseen and eternal. It gives them substance, reality, and therefore power, -- power in some little measure in proportion to their value. Thus the things seen and temporal lose their dominant power over the soul. They are not worthy to be compared with the things which God has prepared for them that love Him. The believer, -- the ideal, and at times the actual believer, as we learn from Scripture and from history, is raised above the things of time and sense, overcomes the world, and becomes heavenly minded. He lives in heaven, breathes its atmosphere, is pervaded by its spirit, and has a prelibation of its joys. This renders him pure, spiritual, humble, self-denying, laborious, meek, gentle, forgiving, as well as firm and courageous. The whole of the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Hebrews is devoted to the illustration of the power of faith especially in this aspect. The Apostle shows that in times past, even under the dim light of the former dispensation, it enabled Noah to stand alone against the world, Abraham to offer up his only son, Moses to prefer the reproach of Christ to the treasures of Egypt; that others through faith subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire; that others were by faith made strong out of weakness, waxed valiant in fight; that others submitted to the trial of cruel mockings and scourgings that others by faith endured to be stoned, sawn asunder, or slain with the sword; and that yet others through faith consented to wander about in sheepskins and goatskins, destitute, afflicted, and tormented. All these, we are told, through faith obtained a good report.

5. Faith sanctifies because it is the necessary condition of the efficacy of the means of grace. It is through the Word, sacraments, and prayer, that God communicates constant supplies of grace. They are the means of calling the activities of spiritual life into exercise. But these means of grace are inoperative unless they are received and used by faith. Faith does not, indeed, give them their power, but it is the condition on which the Spirit of God renders them efficacious.

That good works are the certain effects of faith is included in the doctrine that we are sanctified by faith. For it is impossible that there should be inward holiness, love, spirituality, brotherly kindness, and zeal, without an external manifestation of these graces in the whole outward life. Faith, therefore, without works, is dead. We are saved by faith. But salvation includes deliverance from sin. If, therefore, our faith does not deliver us from sin, it does not save us. Antinomianism involves a contradiction in terms.

Certainty of Salvation.

A sixth effect attributed to faith in the Scriptures is security, or, certainty of salvation. "God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 16.) "He that heareth my word,

and believeth on him that sent me, hath everlasting life, and shall not come into condemnation; but is passed from death unto life." (John v. 24.) "I am the living bread which came down from heaven: if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever." (John vi. 51.) "All that the Father giveth me shall come to me; and him that cometh to me I will in no wise cast out. . . . . And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day." (John vi. 37, 40.) "My sheep hear my voice, and I know them. and they follow me: and I give unto them eternal life; and they shall never perish, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand." (John x. 27, 28.)

The Eighth Chapter of Romans.

The whole of the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans is designed to prove the certain salvation of all who believe. The proposition to be established is, that there is "no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus." That is, they can never perish; they can never be so separated from Christ as to come into condemnation. The Apostle's first argument to establish that proposition, is, that believers are delivered from the law by the sacrifice of Christ. The believer, therefore, is not under the law which condemns, as Paul had before said (Rom. vi. 14), "Ye are not under the law, but under grace." But if not under the law he cannot be condemned. The law has had its course, and found full satisfaction in the work of Christ, who is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth. He renders every one righteous, in the sight of the law, who believes on Him. This is the first reason which the Apostle gives why those who are in Christ shall never be condemned.

His second argnment is that they have already within them the principle of eternal life. That principle is the Spirit of God; "the life-giving" as He was designated by the ancient Church. To be carnally minded is death. To be spiritually minded is life and peace. Sin is death; holiness is life. It is a contradiction to say that those in whom the Spirit of life dwells, should die. And, therefore, the Apostle says, Although the body dies, the soul lives. And if the Spirit of Him who raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, He that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken even your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you. The indwelling of the Spirit, therefore, secures not only the life of the soul, but also the ultimate and glorious life of the body.

The third argument for the security of believers, is, that they are the sons of God. As many as are led by the Spirit of God, they are the sons of God. That is, they are partakers of his nature, the special objects of his love, and entitled to the inheritance which He gives. If sons then heirs, heirs of God and joint heirs with Christ. According to the Apostle's mode of thinking, that any of the sons of God should perish, is impossible. If sons they shall certainly be saved.

The fourth argument is from the purpose of God. Those whom He has predestinated to be conformed to the image of his Son, them He calls to the exercise of faith and repentance; and whom He thus calls He justifies, He provides for them and imputes to them a righteousness which satisfies the demands of the law, and which entitles them in Christ and for his sake to eternal life; and those whom He justifies He glorifies. There is no flaw in this chain. If men were predestinated to eternal life on the ground of their repenting and believing through their own strength, or through a cooperation with the grace of God which

others fail to exercise, then their continuance in a state of grace might be dependent on themselves. But if faith and repentance are the gifts of God, the results of his effectual vocation, then bestowing those gifts is a revelation of the purpose of God to save those to whom they are given. It is an evidence that God has predestinated them to be conformed to the image of his Son, i.e., to be like Him in character, destiny, and glory, and that He will infallibly carry out his purpose. No one can pluck them out of his hands.

Paul's fifth argument is from the love of God. As stated above, [132] the Apostle argues from the greatness, the freeness, and the immutability of that love that its objects never can be lost. "He that spared not his own Son, but delivered him up for us all, how shall he not with him also freely give us all things." If He has done the greater, will He not do the less? If he gave even his own Son, will He not give us faith to receive and constancy to persevere even unto the end? A love so great as the love of God to his people cannot fail of its object. This love is also gratuitous. It is not founded on the attractiveness of its objects. He loved us "while we were yet sinners;" "when we were enemies." "Much more, then, being now justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him. For if, when we were enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of his Son, much more, being reconciled, we shall be saved by his life." God's love in this aspect is compared to parental love. A mother does not love her child because it is lovely. Her love leads her to do all she can to render it attractive and to keep it so. So the love of God, being in like manner mysterious, unaccountable by anything in its objects, secures his adorning his children with the graces of his Spirit, and arraying them in all the beauty of holiness. It is only the lamentable mistake that God loves us for our goodness, that can lead any one to suppose that his love is dependent on our self-sustained attractiveness, when we should look to his fatherly love as the source of all goodness, and the ground of the assurance that He will not allow Satan or our own evil hearts to destroy the lineaments of his likeness which He has impressed upon our souls. Having loved his own, He loves them to the end. And Christ prays for them that their faith may not fail.

It must be remembered that what the Apostle argues to prove is not merely the certainty of the salvation of those that believe but their certain perseverance in holiness. Salvation in sin, according to Paul's system, is a contradiction in terms. This perseverance in holiness is secured partly by the inward secret influence of the Spirit, and partly by all the means adapted to secure that end -- instructions, admonitions, exhortations, warnings, the means of grace, and the dispensations of his providence. Having, through love, determined on the end, He has determined on the means for its accomplishment.

The sixth argument of the Apostle is that, as the love of God is infinitely great and altogether gratuitous, it is also immutable, and, therefore, believers shall certainly be saved. Hence the conclusion, "I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Christ Jesus our Lord."

It will be seen that the Apostle does not rest the perseverance of the saints on the indestructible nature of faith, or on the imperishable nature of the principle of grace in the heart, or on the constancy of the believer's will, but solely on what is out of ourselves. Perseverance, he teaches us, is due to the purpose of God, to the work of Christ, to the

indwelling of the Holy Spirit, and to the primal source of all, the infinite, mysterious, and immutable love of God. We do not keep ourselves; we are kept by the power of God, through faith unto salvation. (1 Peter i. 5.)

[132] Page 107.

CHAPTER XVII: JUSTIFICATION

§ 1. Symbolical Statement of the Doctrine.

Justification is defined in the Westminster Catechism, "An act of God's free grace, wherein He pardoneth all our sins, and accepteth us as righteous in his sight, only for the righteousness of Christ imputed to us, and received by faith alone."

The Heidelberg Catechism in answer to the question, "How dost thou become righteous before God?" answers, "Sola fide in Jesum Christum, adeo ut licet mea me conscientia accuset, quod adversus omnia mandata Dei graviter peccaverim, nec ullum eorum servaverim, adh[illegible]c etiamnum ad omne malum propensus sim, nihilominus tamen (modo h[illegible]c beneficia vera animi fiducia amplectar), sine ullo meo merito, ex mera Dei misericordia, mihi perfecta satisfactio, justitia, et sanctitas Christi, imputetur ac donetur; perinde ac si nec ullum ipse peccatum admisissem, nec ulla mihi labes inh[illegible]reret; imo vero quasi eam obedientiam, quam pro me Christus pr[illegible]stitit, ipse perfecte pr[illegible]stitissem." And in answer to the question, Why faith alone justifies? it says. "Non quod dignitate me[illegible] fidei Deo placeam, sed quod sola satisfactio, justitia ac sanctitas Christi, mea justitia sit coram Deo. Ego vero eam non alia ratione, quam fide amplecti, et mihi applicare queam."

The Second Helvetic Confession, [133] says "Justificare significat Apostolo in disputatione de justificatione, peccata remittere, a culpa et poena absolvere, in gratiam recipere, et justum pronunciare. Etenim ad Romanos dicit apostolus, Deus est, qui justificat, quis ille, qui condemnet?' opponuntur justificare et condemnare. . . . . Etenim Christus peccata mundi in se recepit et sustulit, divin[illegible]que justiti[illegible] satisfecit. Deus ergo propter solum Christum passum et resuscitatum, propitius est peccatis nostris, nec illa nobis imputat, imputat autem justitiam Christi pro nostra: ita ut jam simus non solum mundati a peccatis et purgati, vel sancti, sed etiam donati justitia Christi, adeoque absoluti a peccatis, morte vel condemnatione, justi denique ac h[illegible]redes vit[illegible] [illegible]tern[illegible]. Proprie ergo loquendo, Deus solus nos justificat, et duntaxat propter Christum justificat, non imputans nobis peccata, sed imputans ejus nobis justitiam." [134]

These are the most generally received and authoritative standards of the Reformed Churches, with which all other Reformed symbols agree. The Lutheran confessions teach precisely the same doctrine on this subject. [135] "Unanimi consensu, docemus et confitemur. . . . . quod homo peccator coram Deo justificetur, hoc est, absolvatur ab omnibus suis peccatis et a judicio justissim[illegible] condemnationis, et adoptetur in numerum filiorum Dei atque h[illegible]res [illegible]tern[illegible] vit[illegible] scribatur, sine ullis nostris meritis, aut dignitate, et absque ullis pr[illegible]cedentibus, pr[illegible]sentibus, aut sequentibus nostris operibus, ex mera gratia, tantummodo propter unicum meritum, perfectissimam obedientiam, passionem

acerbissimam, mortem et resurrectionem Domini nostri, Jesu Christi, cujus obedientia nobis ad justitiam imputatur." [136]

Again, "Credimus, docemus, et confitemur, hoc ipsum nostram esse coram Deo justitiam, quod Dominus nobis peccata remittit, ex mera gratia, absque ullo respectu pr&#65533;cedentium, pr&#65533;sentium, aut consequentium nostrorum operum, dignitatis, aut meriti. Ille enim donat atque imputat nobis justitiam obedienti&#65533; Christi; propter eam justitiam a Deo in gratiam recipimur et justi reputamur." [137] "Justificari significat hic non ex impio justum effici, sed usu forensi justum pronuntiari." And "Justificare hoc loco (Rom. v. 1.) forensi cousuetudine significat reum absolvere et pronuntiare justum, sed propter alienam justitiam, videlicet Christi, qu&#65533; aliena justitia communicatur nobis per fidem." [138] So also "Vocabulum justificationis in hoc negotio significat justum pronuntiare, a peccatis et &#65533;ternis peccatorum suppliciis absolvere, propter justitiam Christi, qu&#65533; a Deo fidei imputatur." [139]

Hase, [140] concisely states the Lutheran doctrine on this subject in these words: "Justificatio est actus forensis, quo Deus, sola gratia ductus, peccatori, propter Christi meritum fide apprehensum, justitiam Christi imputat, peccata remittit, eumque sibi reconciliat."

The" Form of Concord" says, "Hic articulus, de justitia fidei, pr&#65533;cipuus est (ut Apologia loquitur) in tota doctrina Christiana, sine quo conscienti&#65533; perturbat&#65533; nullam veram et firmam consolationem habere, aut divitias grati&#65533; Christi recte agnoscere possunt. Id D. Lutherus suo etiam testimonio confirmavit, cum inquit: Si unicus his articulus sincerus permanserit, etiam Christiana Ecclesia sincera, concors et sine omnibus sectis permanet: sin vero corrumpitur, impossibile est, ut uni errori aut fanatico spiritui recte obviam iri possit." [141] The Lutheran theologians, therefore, speak of it as the "akropolis totius Christian&#65533; religionis, ac nexus, quo omnia corporis doctrin&#65533; Christian&#65533; membra continentur, quoque rupto solvuntur." [142]

President Edwards.

This statement of the doctrine of justification has retained symbolical authority in the Lutheran and Reformed churches, to the present day. President Edwards, who is regarded as having initiated certain departures from some points of the Reformed faith, was firm in his adherence to this view of justification, which he held to be of vital importance. In his discourse on "Justification by Faith alone," he thus defines justification: "A person is said to be justified when he is approved of God as free from the guilt of sin and its deserved punishment; and as having that righteousness belonging to him that entitles to the reward of life. That we should take the word in such a sense and understand it as the judge's accepting a person as having both a negative and positive righteousness belonging to him, and looking on him therefore as not only quit or free from any obligation to punishment, but also as just and righteous, and so entitled to a positive reward, is not only most agreeable to the etymology and natural import of the word, which signifies to make righteous, or to pass one for righteous in judgment, but also manifestly agreeable to the force of the word as used in Scripture." He then shows how it is, or why faith alone justifies. It is not on account of any virtue or goodness in faith, but as it unites us to Christ, and involves the acceptance of Him as our righteousness. Thus it is we are justified "by faith alone, without any manner of virtue or goodness of our own."

The ground of justification is the righteousness of Christ imputed to the believer. "By that righteousness being imputed to us," says Edwards, "is meant no other than this, that that righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that perfect inherent righteousness that ought to be in ourselves: Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account, so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves: and so we suppose that a title to eternal life is given us as the reward of this righteousness. . . . The opposers of this doctrine suppose that there is an absurdity in it: they say that to suppose that God imputes Christ's obedience to us, is to suppose that God is mistaken, and thinks that we performed that obedience that Christ performed. But why cannot that righteousness be reckoned to our account, and be accepted for us, without any such absurdity? Why is there any more absurdity in it, than in a merchant's transferring debt or credit from one man's account to another, when one man pays a price for another, so that it shall be accepted, as if that other had paid it? Why is there any more absurdity in supposing that Christ's obedience is imputed to us, than that his satisfaction is imputed? If Christ has suffered the penalty of the law for us, and in our stead, then it will follow, that his suffering that penalty is imputed to us, i.e., that it is accepted for us, and in our stead, and is reckoned to our account, as though we had suffered it. But why may not his obeying the law of God be as rationally reckoned to our account, as his suffering the penalty of the law?" [143]

Points included in the above Statement of the Doctrine.

According to the above statements, justification is, --

1. An act, and not, as sanctification, a continued and progressive work.

2. It is an act of grace to the sinner. In himself he deserves condemnation when God justifies him.

3. As to the nature of the act, it is, in the first place, not an efficient act, or an act of power. It does not produce any subjective change in the person justified. It does not effect a change of character, making those good who were bad, those holy who were unholy. That is done in regeneration and sanctification. In the second place, it is not a mere executive act, as when a sovereign pardons a criminal, and thereby restores him to his civil rights, or to his former status in the commonwealth. In the third place, it is a forensic, or judicial act, the act of a judge, not of a sovereign. That is, in the case of the sinner, or, in foro Dei, it is an act of God not in his character of sovereign, but in his character of judge. It is a declarative act in which God pronounces the sinner just or righteous, that is, declares that the claims of justice, so far as he is concerned, are satisfied, so that he cannot be justly condemned, but is in justice entitled to the reward promised or due to perfect righteousness.

4. The meritorious ground of justification is not faith; we are not justified on account of our faith, considered as a virtuous ot holy act or state of mind. Nor are our works of any kind the ground of justification. Nothing done by us or wrought in us satisfies the demands of justice, or can be the ground or reason of the declaration that justice as far as it concerns us is satisfied. The ground of justification is the righteousness of Christ, active and passive, i.e., including his perfect obedience to the law as a covenant, and his enduring the penalty of the law in our stead and on our behalf.

5. The righteousness of Christ is in justification imputed to the believer. That is, is set to his account, so that he is entitled to plead it at the bar of God, as though it were

personally and inherently his own.

6. Faith is the condition of justification. That is, so far an adults are concerned, God does not impute the righteousness of Christ to the sinner, until and unless, he (through grace) receives and rests on Christ alone for his salvation.

That such is the doctrine of the Reformed and Lutheran churches on this important doctrine, cannot be disputed. The statements of the standards of those churches are so numerous, explicit, and discriminating as to preclude all reasonable doubt on this subject. That such is the doctrine of the Word of God appears from the following considerations.

It will not be necessary to discuss all the points above specified separately, as some of them are necessarily included in others. The following propositions include all the essential points of the doctrine.

[133] Chapter XV.

[134] See Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840.

[135] The main passages are Augsburg Confession, part i., article iv.; the Apology for that Confession, article iii.; and the Form of Concord, article iii.

[136] Form of Concord, III. 9.

[137] Ibid. Epitome, III. 4.

[138] Apology for the Augsburg Confession, Art. III. 131, 184.

[139] Form of Concord, III. 17. See Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit., Leipzig, 1836.

[140] Hutterus Redivivus, § 109, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1845, p. 274.

[141] III. 6.

[142] Quenstedt.

[143] Works of President Edwards, New York, 1868, vol. iv. pp. 66, 91, 92.

§ 2. Justification is a Forensic Act.

By this the Reformers intended, in the first place, to deny the Romish doctrine of subjective justification. That is, that justification consists in an act or agency of God making the sinner subjectively holy. Romanists confound or unite justification and sanctification. They define justification as "the remission of sin and infusion of new habits of grace." By remission of sin they mean not simply pardon, but the removal of everything of the nature of sin from the soul. Justification, therefore, with them, is purely subjective, consisting in the destruction of sin and the infusion of holiness. In opposition to this doctrine, the Reformers maintained that by justification the Scriptures mean something different from sanctification. That the two gifts, although inseparable, are distinct, and that justification, instead of being an efficient act changing the inward character of the sinner, is a declarative act, announcing and determining his relation to the law and justice of God.

In the second place, the Symbols of the Reformation no less explicitly teach that justification is not simply pardon and restoration. It includes pardon, but it also includes a declaration that the believer is just or righteous in the sight of the law. He has a right to plead a righteousness which completely satisfies its demands.

And, therefore, in the third place, affirmatively, those Symbols teach that justification

is a judicial or forensic act, i.e., an act of God as judge proceeding according to law, declaring that the sinner is just, i.e., that the law no longer condemns him, but acquits and pronounces him to be entitled to eternal life.

Here, as so often in other cases, the ambiguity of words is apt to create embarrassment. The Greek word dikaios and the English word righteous, have two distinct senses. They sometimes express moral character. When we say that God is righteous, we mean that He is right. He is free from any moral imperfection. So when we say that a man is righteous, we generally mean that he is upright and honest; that he is and does what he ought to be and do. In this sense the word expresses the relation which a man sustains to the rule of moral conduct. At other times, however, these words express, not moral character, but the relation which a man sustains to justice. In this sense a man is just with regard to whom justice is satisfied; or, against whom justice has no demands. The lexicons, therefore, tell us that dikaios sometimes means, leges observans; at others insons, culpa vacans (free from guilt or obligation to punishment) -- judicio Dei insons. Pilate (Matt. xxvii. 24) said, "I am innocent of the blood of this just person;" i.e., of this person who is tree from guilt; free from anything which justifies his condemnation to death. "Christ, also," says the Apostle, "hath once suffered for sins, the just for the unjust;" the innocent for the guilty. See Romans ii. 18; v. 19. "As by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." "As the predicate of judicandus in his relation to the judge, righteousness' expresses, not a positive virtue, but a judicial negative freedom from reatus. In the presence of his judge, he is tsryq who stands free from guilt and desert of punishment (straflos), either because he has contracted no guilt (as, e.g., Christ), or, because in the way demanded by the Judge (under the Old Testament by expiatory sacrifice) he has expiated the guilt contracted." [144] If, therefore, we take the word righteous in the former of the two senses above mentioned, when it expresses moral character, it would be a contradiction to say that God pronounces the sinner righteous. This would be equivalent to saying that God pronounces the sinner to be not a sinner, the wicked to be good, the unholy to be holy. But if we take the word in the sense in which the Scriptures so often use it, as expressing relation to justice, then when God pronounces the sinner righteous or just, He simply declares that his guilt is expiated, that justice is satisfied, that He has the righteousness which justice demands. This is precisely what Paul says, when he says that God "justifieth the ungodly." (Rom. iv. 5.) God does not pronounce the ungodly to be godly; He declares that notwithstanding his personal sinfulness and unworthiness, he is accepted as righteous on the ground of what Christ has done for him.

Proof of the Doctrine just stated.

That to justify means neither simply to pardon, nor to make inherently righteous or good is proved, --

From the Usage of Scripture.

1. By the uniform usage of the word to justify in Scripture it is never used in either of those senses, but always to declare or pronounce just. It is unnecessary to cite passages in proof of a usage which is uniform. The few following examples are enough. Deuteronomy xxv. 1, "If there be a controversy between men, and they come unto judgment, that the judges may judge them; then they shall justify the righteous, and condemn the wicked." Exodus xxiii. 7, "I will not justify the wicked." Isaiah v. 23, "Which justify the wicked for reward."

Proverbs xvii. 15, "He that justifieth the wicked" is "abomination to the Lord." Luke x. 29, "He willing to justify himself." Luke xvi. 15, "Ye are they which justify yourselves before men." Matthew xi. 19, "Wisdom is justified of her children." Galatians ii. 16, "A man is not justified by the works of the law," v. 6, "Whosoever of you are justified by the law; ye are fallen from grace." Thus men are said to justify God. Job xxxii. 2, "Because he justified himself, rather than God." Psalms li. 4, "That thou mightest be justified when thou speakest." Luke vii. 29, "All the people that heard him, and the publicans, justified God." The only passage in the New Testament where the word dikaioo is used in a different sense is Revelation xxii. 11, 6, ho dikaios, dikaiotheto eti, "He that is righteous, let him be righteous still." Here the first aorist passive appears to be used in a middle sense, Let him show himself righteous, or continue righteous.' Even if the reading in this passage were undoubted, this single case would have no force against the established usage of the word. The reading, however, is not merely doubtful, but it is, in the judgment of the majority of the critical editors, Tischendorf among the rest, incorrect. They give, as the true text, dikaiosunen poiesato eti. Even if this latter reading be, as De Wette thinks, a gloss, it shows that ho dikaios dikaiotheto eti was as intolerable to a Greek ear as the expression, He that is righteous, let him justify himself still,' would be to us.

The usage of common life as to this word is just as uniform as that of the Bible. It would be a perfect solecism to say of a criminal whom the executive had pardoned, that he was justified, or that a reformed drunkard or thief was justified. The word always expresses a judgment, whether of the mind, as when one man justifies another for his conduct, or officially of a judge. If such be the established meaning of the word, it ought to settle all controversy as to the nature of justification. We are bound to take the words of Scripture in their true established sense. And, therefore, when the Bible says, "God justifies the believer," we are not at liberty to say that it means that He pardons, or that He sanctifies him. It means, and can mean only that He pronounces him just.

Justification the Opposite of Condemnation.

2. This is still further evident from the antithesis between condemnation and justification. Condemnation is not the opposite either of pardon or of reformation. To condemn is to pronounce guilty; or worthy of punishment. To justify is to declare not guilty; or that justice does not demand punishment; or that the person concerned cannot justly be condemned. When, therefore, the Apostle says (Rom. vii. 1), "There is therefore, now no condemnation to them which are in Christ Jesus," he declares that they are absolved from guilt; that the penalty of the law cannot justly be inflicted upon them. "Who," he asks, "shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect? God who justifieth? Who is he that condemneth? Christ who died?" (vers. 33, 34.) Against the elect in Christ no ground of condemnation can be presented. God pronounces them just, and therefore no one can pronounce them guilty.

This passage is certainly decisive against the doctrine of subjective justification in any form. This opposition between condemnation and justification is familiar both in Scripture and in common life. Job ix. 20, "If I justify myself, mine own mouth shall condemn me." xxxiv. 17, "And wilt thou condemn him that is most just." If to condemn does not mean to make wicked, to justify does not mean to make good. And if condemnation is a judicial, as opposed to an executive act, so is justification. In condemnation it is a judge who pronounces sentence on the guilty. In justification it is a judge who pronounces or who

declares the person arraigned free from guilt and entitled to be treated as righteous.

Argument from Equivalent Forms of Expression.

3. The forms of expression which are used as equivalents of the word "justify" clearly determine the nature of the act. Thus Paul speaks of "the blessedness of the man unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works." (Rom. iv. 6.) To impute righteousness is not to pardon; neither is it to sanctify. It means to justify, i.e., to attribute righteousness. The negative form in which justification is described is equally significant. "Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." (Rom. iv. 7, 8.) As "to impute sin" never means and cannot mean to make wicked; so the negative statement "not to impute sin cannot mean to sanctify. And as "to impute sin" does mean to lay sin to one's account and to treat him accordingly; so to justify means to lay righteousness to one's account and treat him accordingly. "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world He that believeth on him is not condemned: but he that believeth not is condemned already." (John iii. 17, 18.)

For "as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." (Rom. v. 18.) It was krima, a judicial sentence, which came on men for the offence of Adam, and it is a judicial sentence (justification, a dikaiosis) which comes for the righteousness of Christ, or, as is said in ver. 16 of the same chapter, it was a krima eis katakrima, a condemnatory sentence that came for one offence; and charisma eis dikaioma, a sentence of gratuitous justification from many offences. Language cannot be plainer. If a sentence of condemnation is a judicial act, then justification is a judicial act.

Argument from the Statement of the Doctrine.

4. The judicial character of justification is involved in the mode in which the doctrine is presented in the Bible. The Scriptures speak of law, of its demands, of its penalty, of sinner. as arraigned at the bar of God, of the day of judgment. The question is, How shall man be just with God? The answer to this question determines the whole method of salvation. The question is not, How a man can become holy? but, How can he become just? How can he satisfy the claims which justice has against him? It is obvious that if there is no such attribute as justice in God; if what we call justice is only benevolence, then there is no pertinency in this question. Man is not required to be just in order to be saved. There are no claims of justice to be satisfied. Repentance is all that need be rendered as the condition of restoration to the favour of God. Or, any didactic declaration or exhibition of God's disapprobation of sin, would open the way for the safe pardon of sinners. Or, if the demands of justice were easily satisfied; if partial, imperfect obedience and fatherly chastisements, or self-inflicted penances, would suffice to satisfy its claims, then the sinner need not be just with God in order to be saved. But the human soul knows intuitively that these are refugee of lies. It knows that there is such an attribute as justice. It knows that the demands thereof are inexorable because they are righteous. It knows that it cannot be saved unless it be justified, and it knows that it cannot be declared just unless the demands of justice are fully satisfied. Low views of the evil of sin and of the justice of God lie at the foundation of all false views of this great doctrine.

The Apostle's Argument in the Epistle to the Romans.

The Apostle begins the discussion of this subject by assuming that the justice of God,

his purpose to punish all sin, to demand perfect conformity to his law, is revealed from heaven, i.e., so revealed that no man, whether Jew or Gentile, can deny it. (Rom. i. 18.) Men, even the most degraded pagans, know the righteous judgment of God that those who sin are worthy of death, (ver. 32.) He next proves that all men are sinners, and, being sinners are under condemnation. The whole world is "guilty before God." (iii. 19.) From this he infers, as intuitively certain (because plainly included in the premises), that no flesh living can be justified before God "by the deeds of the law," i.e., on the ground of his own character and conduct. If guilty he cannot be pronounced not guilty, or just. In Paul's argument, to justify is to pronounce just. Dikaios is the opposite of hupodikos (i.e., "reus, satisfactionem alteri debens"). That is, righteous is the opposite of guilty. To pronounce guilty is to condemn. To pronounce righteous, i.e., not guilty, is to justify. If a man denies the authority of Scripture; or if he feels at liberty, while holding what he considers the substance of Scripture doctrines, to reject the form, it is conceivable that he may deny that justification is a judicial act; but it seems impossible that any one should deny that it is so represented in the Bible. Some men professing to believe the Bible, deny that there is anything supernatural in the work of regeneration and sanctification. Being born of the Spirit;' quickened by the mighty power of God;' created anew in Christ Jesus,' are only, they say, strong oriental expressions for a self-wrought reformation. By a similar process it is easy to get rid, not only of the doctrine of justification as a judicial act, but of all other distinguishing doctrines of the Scriptures. This, however, is not to interpret, but to pervert.

The Apostle, having taught that God is just, i.e., that He demands the satisfaction of justice, and that men are sinners and can render no such satisfaction themselves, announces that such a righteousness has been provided, and is revealed in the Gospel. It is not our own righteousness, which is of the law, but the righteousness of Christ, and, therefore, the righteousness of God, in virtue of which, and on the ground of which, God can be just and yet justify the sinner who believes in Christ. As long as the Bible stands this must stand as a simple statement of what Paul teaches as to the method of salvation. Men may dispute as to what he means, but this is surely what he says.

Argument from the Ground of Justification.

5. The nature of justification is determined by its ground. This indeed is an anticipation of another part of the subject, but it is in point here. If the Bible teaches that the ground of justification, the reason why God remits to us the penalty of the law and accepts us as righteous in his sight, is something out of ourselves, something done for us, and not what we do or experience, then it of necessity follows that justification is not subjective. It does not consist in the infusion of righteousness, or in making the person justified personally holy. If the "formal cause" of our justification be our goodness; then we are justified for what we are. The Bible, however, teaches that no man living can be justified for what he is. He is condemned for what he is and for what he does. He is justified for what Christ has done for him.

Justification not mere Pardon.

For the same reason justification cannot be mere pardon. Pardon does not proceed on the ground of a satisfaction. A prisoner delivered by a ransom is not pardoned. A debtor whose obligations have been cancelled by a friend, becomes entitled to freedom from the claims of his creditor. When a sovereign pardons a criminal, it is not an act of justice. It is

not on the ground of satisfaction to the law. The Bible, therefore, is reaching that justification is on the ground of an atonement or satisfaction; that the sinner's guilt is expiated; that he is redeemed by the precious blood of Christ; and that judgment is pronounced upon him as righteous, does thereby teach that justification is neither pardon nor infusion of righteousness.

Argument from the Immutability of the Law.

6. The doctrine that justification consists simply in pardon, and consequent restoration, assumes that the divine law is imperfect and mutable. In human governments it is often expedient and right that men justly condemned to suffer the penalty of the law should be pardoned. Human laws must be general. They cannot take in all the circumstances of each particular case. Their execution would often work hardship or injustice. Human judgments may therefore often be set aside. It is not so with the divine law. The law of the Lord is perfect. And being perfect it cannot be disregarded. It demands nothing which ought not to be demanded. It threatens nothing which ought not to be inflicted. It is in fact its own executioner. Sin is death. (Rom. vii. 6.) The justice of God makes punishment as inseparable from sin, as life is from holiness. The penalty of the law is immutable, and as little capable of being set aside as the precept. Accordingly the Scriptures everywhere teach that in the justification of the sinner there is no relaxation of the penalty. There is no setting aside, or disregarding the demands of the law. We are delivered from the law, not by its abrogation, but by its execution. (Gal. ii. 19.) We are freed from the law by the body of Christ. (Rom. vii. 4.) Christ having taken our places bore our sins in his own body on the tree. (1 Pet. ii. 24.) The handwriting which was against us, he took out of the way, nailing it to his cross. (Col. ii. 14.) We are therefore not under the law, but under grace. (Rom. vi. 14.) Such representations are inconsistent with the theory which supposes that the law may be dispensed with; that the restoration of sinners to the favour and fellowship of God, requires no satisfaction to its demands; that the believer is pardoned and restored to fellowship with God, just as a thief or forger is pardoned and restored to his civil rights by the executive in human governments. This is against the Scriptures. God is just in justifying the sinner. He acts according to justice.

It will be seen that everything in this discussion turns on the question, Whether there is such an attribute in God as justice? If justice be only "benevolence guided by wisdom," then there is no justification. What evangelical Christians so regard, is only pardon or sanctification. But if God, as the Scriptures and conscience teach, be a just God, as immutable in his justice as in his goodness and truth, then there can be no remission of the penalty of sin except on the ground of expiation, and no justification except on the ground of the satisfaction of justice, and therefore justification must be a judicial act, and neither simply pardon nor the infusion of righteousness. These doctrines sustain each other. What the Bible teaches of the justice of God, proves that justification is a judicial declaration that justice is satisfied. And what the Bible teaches of the nature of justification, proves that justice in God is something more than benevolence. It is thus that all the great doctrines of the Bible are concatenated.

Argument from the Nature of our Union with Christ.

7. The theory which reduces justification to pardon and its consequences, is inconsistent with what is revealed concerning our union with Christ. That union is mystical,

supernatural, representative, and vital. We were in Him before the foundation of the world (Eph. i. 4); we are in Him as we were in Adam (Rom. v. 12, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 22); we are in Him as the members of the body are in the head (Eph. i. 23, iv. 16; 1 Cor. xii. 12, 27, and often); we are in Him as the branches are in the vine (John xv. 1-12). We are in Him in such a sense that his death is our death, we were crucified with Him (Gal. ii. 20; Rom. vi. 1-8) ; we are so united with Him that we rose with Him, and sit with Him in heavenly places. (Eph. ii. 1-6.) In virtue of this union we are (in our measure) what He is. We are the sons of God in Him. And what He did, we did. His righteousness is our righteousness. His life is our life. His exaltation is our exaltation. Such is the pervading representation of the Scriptures. All this is overlooked by the advocates of the opposite theory. According to that view, Christ is no more united to his people, except in sentiment, than to other men. He has simply done what renders it consistent with the character of God and the interests of his kingdom, to pardon any and every man who repents and believes. His relation is purely external. He is not so united to his people that his merit becomes their merit and his life their life. Christ is not in them the hope of glory. (Col. i. 27.) He is not of God made unto them wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. (1 Cor. i. 30.) They are not so in Him that, in virtue of that union, they are filled with all the fulness of God. (Col. ii. 10; and Eph. iii. 19.) On the other hand, the Protestant doctrine of justification harmonizes with all these representations. If we are so united to Christ as to be made partakers of his life, we are also partakers of his righteousness. What He did in obeying and suffering He did for his people. One essential element of his redeeming work was to satisfy the demands of justice in their behalf, so that in Him and for his sake they are entitled to pardon and eternal life.

Arguments from the Effects ascribed to Justification.

8. The consequences attributed to justification are inconsistent with the assumption that it consists either in pardon or in the infusion of righteousness. Those consequences are peace, reconciliation, and a title to eternal life. "Being justified by faith," says the Apostle, "we have peace with God." (Rom. v. 1.) But pardon does not produce peace. It leaves the conscience unsatisfied. A pardoned criminal is not only just as much a criminal as he was before, but his sense of guilt and remorse of conscience are in no degree lessened. Pardon can remove only the outward and arbitrary penalty. The sting of sin remains. There can be no satisfaction to the mind until there is satisfaction of justice. Justification secures peace, not merely because it includes pardon, but because that pardon is dispensed on the ground of a full satisfaction of justice. What satisfies the justice of God, satisfies the conscience of the sinner. The blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth from all sin (1 John i. 7) by removing guilt, and thus producing a peace which passes all understanding. When the soul sees that Christ bore his sins upon the cross, and endured the penalty which he had incurred; that all the demands of the law are fully satisfied; that God is more honoured in his pardon than in his condemnation; that all the ends of punishment are accomplished by the work of Christ, in a far higher degree than they could be by the death of the sinner; and that he has a right to plead the infinite merit of the Son of God at the bar of divine justice, then he is satisfied. Then he has peace. He is humble; he does not lose his sense of personal demerit, but the conscience ceases to demand satisfaction. Criminals have often been known to give themselves up to justice. They could not rest until they were punished. The infliction of the penalty incurred gave them peace. This is an element in Christian experience. The

convinced sinner never finds peace until he lays his burden of sin on the Lamb of God; until he apprehends that his sins have been punished, as the Apostle says (Rom. viii. 3), in Christ.

Again, we are said to be reconciled to God by the death of his Son. (Rom. v. 10.) But pardon does not produce reconciliation. A pardoned criminal may be restored to his civil rights, so far as the penalty remitted involved their forfeiture, but he is not reconciled to society. He is not restored to its favour. Justification, however, does secure a restoration to the favour and fellowship of God. We become the sons of God by faith in Jesus Christ. (Gal. iii. 26.) No one can read the eighth chapter of the Epistle to the Romans without being convinced that in Paul's apprehension a justified believer is something more than a pardoned criminal. He is a man whose salvation is secure because he is free from the law and all its demands; because the righteousness of the law (i.e., all its righteous requirements) has been fulfilled him; because thereby he is so united to Christ as to become a partaker of his life; because no one can lay anything to the charge of those for whom Christ died and whom God has justified; and because such believers being justified are revealed as the objects of the mysterious, immutable, and infinite love of God.

Again, justification includes or conveys a title to eternal life. Pardon is purely negative. It simply removes a penalty. It confers no title to benefits not previously enjoyed. Eternal life, however, is suspended on the positive condition of perfect obedience. The merely pardoned sinner has no such obedience. He is destitute of what, by the immutable principles of the divine government, is the indispensable condition of eternal life. He has no title to the inheritance promised to the righteous. This is not the condition of the believer. The merit of Christ is entitled to the reward. And the believer, being partaker of that merit, shares in that title. This is constantly recognized in the Scriptures. By faith in Christ we become the sons of God. But sonship involves heirship, and heirship involves a title to the inheritance. "If children, then heirs; heirs of God, and joint heirs with Christ." (Rom. viii. 17.) This is the doctrine taught in Romans v. 12-21. For the offence of one, judgment passed on all men to condemnation. For the righteousness of one, the sentence of justification of life has passed on all; that is, of a justification which entitles to life. As the sin of Adam was the judicial ground of our condemnation (i.e., was the ground on which justice demanded condemnation), so the righteousness of Christ is the judicial ground of justification. That is, it is the ground on which the life promised to the righteous should in justice be granted to the believer. The Church in all ages has recognized this truth. Believers have always felt that they had a title to eternal life. For this they have praised God in the loftiest strains. They have ever regarded it as intuitively true that heaven must be merited The only question was, Whether that merit was in them or in Christ. Being in Christ, it was a free gift to them; and thus righteousness and peace kissed each other. Grace and justice unite in placing the crown of righteousness on the believer's head.

It is no less certain that the consequences attributed to justification do not flow from the infusion of righteousness. The amount of holiness possessed by the believer does not give him peace. Even perfect holiness would not remove guilt. Repentance does not atone for the crime of murder. It does not still the murderer's conscience; nor does it satisfy the sense of justice iu the public mind. It is the proton pseudos of Romanism, and of every theory of subjective justification, that they make nothing of guilt, or reduce it to a minimum.

If there were no guilt, then infusion of righteousness would be all that is necessary for salvation. But if there be justice in God then no amount of holiness can atone for sin, and justification cannot consist in making the sinner holy. Besides this, even admitting that the past could be ignored, that the guilt which burdens the soul could be overlooked or so easily removed, subjective righteousness, or holiness, is so imperfect that it could never give the believer peace. Let the holiest of men look within himself and say whether what he sees there satisfies his own conscience. If not, how can it satisfy God. He is greater than our hearts, and knoweth all things. No man, therefore, can have peace with God founded on what he is or on what he does. Romanists admit that nothing short of perfect holiness justifies or gives peace to the soul. In answer to the Protestant argument founded on that admission, Bellarmin says: [145] "Hoc argumentum, si quid probat, probat justitiam actualem non esse perfectam: non autem probat, justitiam habitualem, qua formaliter justi sumus, ... non esse ita perfectam, ut absolute, simpliciter, et proprie justi nominemur, et simus. Non enim formaliter justi sumus opere nostro, sed opere Dei, qui simul maculas peccatorum tergit, et habitum fidei, spei, et caritatis infundit. Dei autem perfecta sunt opera. . . . . Unde parvuli baptizati, vere justi sunt, quamvis nihil operis fecerint." Again, "Justitia enim actualis, quamvis aliquo modo sit imperfecta, propter admixtionem venalium delictorum, et egeat quotidiana remissione peccati, tamen non propterea desinit esse vera justitia, et suo etiam quodam modo perfecta." No provision is made in this system for guilt. If the soul is made holy by the infusion of habits, or principles, of grace, it is just in the sight of God. No guilt or desert of punishment remains. "Reatus," says Bellarmin, [146] . . . . "est relatio," but if the thing of which it is a relation be taken away, where is the relation. It is impossible that such a view of justification can give peace. It makes no provision for the satisfaction of justice, and places all our hopes upon what is within, which our conscience testifies cannot meet the just requirements of God.

Neither can the theory of subjective justification account for reconciliation with God, and for the same reasons. What is infused, the degree of holiness imparted, does not render us the objects of divine complacency and love. His love to us is of the nature of grace; love for the unlovely. We are reconciled to God by the death of his Son. That removes the obstacle arising from justice to the outflow toward us of the mysterious, unmerited love of God. We are accepted in the beloved. We are not in ourselves fit for fellowship with God. And if driven to depend on what is within, on our subjective righteousness, instead of peace we should have despair.

Again, justification according to the Scriptures gives a title to eternal life. For this our own righteousness is utterly inadequate. So far from anything in us being meritorious, or entitled to reward, the inward state and the exercises of the holiest of men, come so far short of perfection as to merit condemnation. In us there is no good thing. When we would do good, evil is present with us. There is ever a law in our members warring against the law of the mind. Indwelling sin remains. It forced even Paul to cry out, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death." (Rom. vii. 24.) "Nullum unquam exstitisse pii hominis opus, quod, si severo Dei judicio examinaretur, non esset damnabile." [147] Ignoring this plain truth of Scripture and of Christian experience expressing itself in daily and hourly confession, humiliation, and prayers for forgiveness, the doctrine of subjective justification assumes that there is no sin in the believer, or no sin which merits the condemnation of God, but on the contrary that there is in him what merits

eternal life. The Romanists make a distinction between a first and second justification. The first they admit to be gratuitous, and to be founded on the merit of Christ, or rather, to be gratuitously bestowed for Christ's sake. This consists in the infusion of habitual grace (i.e., regeneration). This justifies in rendering the soul subjectively just or holy. The second justification is not a matter of grace. It is founded on the merit of good works, the fruits of regeneration. But if these fruits are, as our consciousness testifies, deified by sin, how can they merit eternal life? How can they cancel the handwriting which is against us? How can they be the ground of Paul's confident challenge, "Who shall lay anything to the charge of God's elect?" It is not what is within us, but what is without us; not what we are or do, but what Christ is and has done, that is the ground of confidence and of our title to eternal life. This is the admitted doctrine of the Protestant Reformation. "Apud theologos Augustan confessionis extra controversiam positum est," says the "Form of Concord," [148] "totam justitiam nostram extra nos, et extra omnium hominum merita, opera, virtutes atque dignitatem qu rendam, eamque in solo Domino nostro, Jesu Christo consistere." As high as the heavens are above the earth, so high is a hope founded on the work of Christ for us, above a hope founded on the merit of anything wrought in us. Calvin teaches the same doctrine as Luther. [149] He quotes Lombard as saying that our justification in Christ may be interpreted in two ways: "Primum, mors Christi nos justificat, dum per eam excitatur caritas in cordibus nostris, qua justi efficimur: deinde quod per eandem exstinctum est peccatum; quo nos captivos distinebat diabolus, ut jam non habeat unde nos damnet." To which Calvin replies, "Scriptura autem, quem de fidei justitia loquitur, longe alio nos ducit: nempe ut ab intuitu operum nostrorum aversi, in Dei misericordiam ac Christi perfectionem, tantum respiciamus. . . . . Hic est fidei sensus, per quem peccator in possessionem venit su salutis, dum ex Evangeli doctrina agnoscit Deo se reconciliatum: quod intercedente Christi justitia, impetrata peccatorum remissione, justificatus sit: et quanquam Spiritu Dei regeneratus, non in bonis operibus, quibus incumbit, sed sola Christi justitia repositam sibi perpetuam justitiam cogitat."

That justification is not merely pardon, and that it is not the infusion of righteousness whereby the sinner is made inherently just or holy, but a judgment on the part of God that the demands of the law in regard to the believer are satisfied, and that he has a right to a righteousness which entitles him to eternal life, has been argued, (1.) From the uniform usage of Scripture both in the Old and New Testament. (2.) From the constant opposition between justification and condemnation. (3.) From equivalent forms of expression. (4.) From the whole design and drift of the Apostle's argument in his Epistles to the Romans and to the Galatians. (5.) From the ground of justification, namely, the righteousness of Christ. (6.) From the immutability of the law and the justice of God. (7.) From the nature of our union with Christ. (8.) From the fact that peace, reconciliation with God, and a title to eternal life which according to Scripture, are the consequences of justification, do not flow either from mere pardon or from subjective righteousness, or from sanctification. That this is the doctrine of Protestants, both Lutheran and Reformed, cannot with any show of reason be disputed.

Calvin's Doctrine.

It is true, indeed, that by the earlier Reformers, and especially by Calvin, justification is often said to consist in the pardon of sin. But that that was not intended as a denial of the

judicial character of justification, or as excluding the imputation of the righteousness of Christ by which the believer is counted just in the sight of the law, is obvious, --

1. From the nature of the controversy in which those Reformers were engaged. The question between them and the Romanists was, Does justification consist in the act of God making the sinner inherently just or holy? or, Does it express the judgment of God by which the believer is pronounced just. What Calvin denied was that justification is a making holy. What he affirmed was that it was delivering the believer from the condemnation of the law and introducing him into a state of favour with God. The Romanists expressed their doctrine by saying that justification consists in the remission of sin and the infusion of charity or righteousness. But by the remission of sin they meant the removal of sin; the putting off the old man. In other words, justification with them consisted (to use the scholastic language then in vogue) in the removal of the habits of sin and the infusion of habits of grace. In those justified, therefore, there was no sin, and, therefore, nothing to punish. Pardon, therefore, followed as a necessary consequence. It was a mere accessary. This view of the matter makes nothing of guilt; nothing of the demands of justice. Calvin therefore, insisted that besides the subjective renovation connected with the sinner's conversion, his justdication concerned the removal of guilt, the satisfaction of justice, which in the order of nature, although not of time, must precede the communication of the life of God to the soul. That Calvin did not differ from the other Reformers and the whole body of the Reformed Church on this subject appears from his own explicit declarations, and from the perfectly unambiguous statements of the Confessions to which he gave his assent. Thus he says, [150] "Porro ne impingamus in ipso limine (quod fieret si de re incognita disputationem ingrediremur) primum explicemus quid sibi velint ist loquutiones, Hominem coram Deo justificari, Fide justificari, vel operibus. Justificari coram Deo dicitur qui judicio Dei et censetur justus, et acceptus est ob suam justitiam: siqui dem ut Deo abominabilis est iniquitas, ita nec peccator in ejus oculis potest invenire gratiam, quatenus est peccator, et quamdiu talis censetur. Proinde ubicunque peccatum est, illic etiam se profert ira et ultio Dei. Justificatur autem qui non loco peccatoris, sed justi habetur, eoque nomine consistit coram Dei tribunali, ubi peccatores omnes corruunt. Quemadmodum si reus innocens ad tribunal qui judicis adducatur, ubi secundum innocentiam ejus judicatum fuerit, justificatus apud judicem dicitur: sic apud Deum justificatur, qui numero peccatorum exemptus, Deum habet su justiti testem et assertorem. Justificari, ergo, operibus ea ratione dicetur, in cujus vita reperietur ea puritas ac sanctitas qu testimonium justiti apud Dei thronum mereatur: seu qui operum suorum integritate respondere et satisfacere illius judicio queat. Contra, justificabitur ille fide, qui operum justitia exclusus, Christi justitiam per fidem apprehendit, qua vestitus in Dei conspectu non ut peccator, sed tanquam justus apparet. Ita nos justificationem simpliciter interpretamur acceptionem, qua nos Deus in gratiam receptos pro justos habet. Eamque in peccatorum remissione ac justiti Christi imputatione positam ease dicimus."

This passage is decisive as to the views of Calvin; for it is professedly a formal statement of the "Status Questionis" given with the utmost clearness and precision. Justification consists "in the remission of sins and the imputation of the righteousness of Christ." "He is justified in the sight of God, who is taken from the class of sinners, and has God for the witness and assertor of his righteousness."

[144] Christliche Dogmatik, von Johannes Heinrich August Ebrard, § 402, edit. K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 163.

[145] De Justificatione, ii. 14; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 819, a, b.

[146] De Amissione Grati&#65533; et Statu Peccati, v. 7; Ibid. p. 287.

[147] Calvin, Institutio, III. xiv. 11; edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 38.

[148] Solida Declaratio, III. 55; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 695.

[149] Institutio, III. xi. 15, 16; ut supra, p. 17.

[150] Institutio, III. x. 2; ut supra, p. 6.

§ 3. Works not the Ground of Justification.

In reference to men since the fall the assertion is so explicit and so often repeated, that justification is not of works, that that proposition has never been called in question by any one professing to receive the Scriptures as the word of God. It being expressly asserted that the whole world is guilty before God, that by the works of the law no flesh living can be justified, the only question open for discussion is, What is meant by works of the law?

To this question the following answers have been given, First, that by works of the law are meant works prescribed in the Jewish law. It is assumed that as Paul's controversy was with those who taught that unless men were circumcised and kept the law af Moses, they could not be saved (Acts xv. 1, 24), all he intended to teach was the reverse of that proposition. He is to be understood as saying that the observance of Jewish rites and ceremonies is not essential to salvation; that men are not made righteous or good by external ceremonial works, but by works morally good. This is the ground taken by Pelagians and by most of the modern Rationalists. It is only a modification of this view that men are not justified, that is, that their character before God is not determined so much by their particular acts or works, as by their general disposition and controlling principles. To be justified by faith, therefore, is to be justified on the ground of our trust, or pious confidence in God and truth. Thus Wegscheider [151] says, "Homines non singulis quibusdam recte factis operibusque operatis, nec propter meritum quoddam iis attribuendum, sed sola vera fide, i.e., animo ad Christi exemplum ejusdemque pr&#65533;cepta composito et ad Deum et sanctissimum et benignissimum converso, ita, ut omnia cogitata et facta ad Deum ejusque voluntatem sanctissimam pie referant, Deo vere probantur et benevolenti&#65533; Dei confisi spe beatitatis futur&#65533; pro dignitate ipsorum morali iis concedend&#65533; certissima imbuuntur." Steudlin, [152] expresses the same view. "All true reformation, every good act," he says, "must spring from faith, provided we understand by faith the conviction that something is right, a conviction of general moral and religious principles." Kant says that Christ in a religious aspect is the ideal of humanity. When a man so regards him and endeavours to conform his heart and life to that ideal, he is justified by faith. [153] According to all these views, mere ceremonial works are excluded, and the ground of justification is made to be our own natural moral character and conduct.

Romish Doctrine.

Secondly. The doctrine of Romanists on this subject is much higher. Romanism retains the supernatural element of Christianity throughout. Indeed it is a matter of devout

thankfulness to God that underneath the numerous grievous and destructive errors of the Romish Church, the great truths of the Gospel are preserved. The Trinity, the true divinity of Christ, the true doctrine concerning his person as God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever; salvation through his blood, regeneration and sanctification through the almighty power of the Spirit, the resurrection of the body, and eternal life, are doctrines on which the people of God in that communion live, and which have produced such saintly men as St. Bernard, F�n�lon, and doubtless thousands of others who are of the number of God's elect. Every true worshipper of Christ must in his heart recognize as a Christian brother, wherever he may be found, any one who loves, worships, and trusts the Lord Jesus Christ as God manifest in the flesh and the only Saviour of men. On the matter of justification the Romish theologians have marred and defaced the truth as they have almost all other doctrines pertaining to the mode in which the merits of Christ are made available to our salvation. They admit, indeed, that there is no good in fallen man; that he can merit nothing and claim nothing on the ground of anything he is or can do of himself. He is by nature dead in sin; and until made partaker of a new life by the supernatural power of the Holy Ghost, he can do nothing but sin. For Christ's sake, and only through his merits, as a matter of grace, this new life is imparted to the soul in regeneration (i.e., as Romanists teach, in baptism). As life expels death; as light banishes darkness, so the entrance of this new divine life into the soul expels sin (i.e., sinful habits), and brings forth the fruits of righteousness. Works done after regeneration have real merit, "meritum condigni," and are the ground of the second justification the first justification consisting in making the soul inherently just by the infusion of righteousness. According to this view, we are not justified by works done before regeneration, but we are justified for gracious works, i.e., for works which spring from the principle of divine life infused into the heart. The whole ground of our acceptance with God is thus made to be what we are and what we do.

Remonstrant Doctrine.

Thirdly. According to the Remonstrants or Arminians the works which are excluded from our justification are works of the law as distinguished from works of the Gospel. In the covenant made with Adam God demanded perfect obedience as the condition of life. For Christ's sake, God in the Gospel has entered into a new covenant with men, promising them salvation on the condition of evangelical obedience. This is expressed in different forms. Sometimes it is said that we are justified on account of faith. Faith is accepted in place of that perfect righteousness demanded by the Adamic law. But by faith is not meant the act of receiving and resting upon Christ alone for salvation. It is regarded as a permanent and controlling state of mind. And therefore it is often said that we are justified by a "fides obsequiosa," an obedient faith; a faith which includes obedience. At other times, it is said that we are justified by evangelical obedience, i.e., that kind and measure of obedience which the Gospel requires, and which men since the fall, in the proper use of "sufficient grace" granted to all men, are able to render. Limborch says, "Sciendum, quando dicimus, nos fide justificari, nos non excludere opera, qu� fides exigit et tanquam foecunda mater producit; sed ea includere." And again, "Est itaque [fides] talis actus, qui, licet in se spectatus perfectus nequaquam sit, sed in multis deficiens, tamen a Deo, gratiosa et liberrima voluntate, pro pleno et perfecto acceptatur, et propter quem Deus homini gratiose remissionem peccatoram et vit� ⁄tern⁄ premium conferre vult." Again, [154] God, he says, demands, "obedientiam fidei, hoc est, non rigidam et ab omnibus ⁄qualem,

prout exigebat lex; sed tantam, quantam fides, id est, certa de divinis promissionibus persuasio, in unoquoque efficere potest." Therefore justification, he says, [155] "Est gratiosa ⁄stimatio, seu potius acceptatio justiti⁄ nostr⁄ imperfect⁄ pro perfecta, propter Jesum Christum."

Protestant Doctrine.

Fourthly. According to the doctrine of the Lutherans and Reformed, the works excluded from the ground of our justification are not only ritual or ceremonial works, nor merely works done before regeneration, nor the perfect obedience required by the law given to Adam, but works of all kinds, everything done by us or wrought in us. That this is the doctrine of the Bible is plain, --

1. Because the language of Scripture is unlimited. The declaration is, that we are not justified "by works." No specific kind of works is designated to the exclusion of all others. But it is "works;" what we do; anything and everything we do. It is, therefore, without authority that any man limits these general declarations to any particular class of works.

2. The word law is used in a comprehensive sense. It includes all revelations of the will of God as the rule of man's obedience and, therefore, by "works of the law" must be intended all kinds of works. As nomos means that which binds, it is used for the law of nature, or the law written on the heart (Rom. ii. 14), for the Decalogne, for the law of Moses, for the whole of the Old Testament Scriptures. (Rom. iii. 19.) Sometimes one, and sometimes another of these aspects of the law is specially referred to. Paul assures the Jews that they could not be justified by the works of the law, which was especially binding on them. He assures the Gentiles that they could not be justified by the law written on their hearts. He assures believers under the Gospel that they cannot be justified by works of the law binding on them. The reason given includes all possible works That reason is, that all human obedience is imperfect; all men are sinners: and the law demands perfect obedience. (Gal. iii. 10.) Therefore, it is that "by the deeds of the law there shall no flesh be justified." (Rom. iii. 20.)

3. The law of which Paul speaks is the law which says, "Thou shalt not covet" (Rom. vii. 7); the law which is spiritual (ver. 14); which is "holy, and just, and good" (ver. 12); the law of which the great command is, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and thy neighbour as thyself. Besides, what are called works of the law are in Titus iii. 5 called "works of righteousness." Higher works than these there cannot be. The Apostle repudiates any ground of confidence in his "own righteousness" (Phil. iii. 9), i.e., own excellence, whether habitual or actual. He censures the Jews because they went about to establish their own righteousness, and would not submit to the righteousness of God. (Rom. x. 3.) From these and many similar passages it is clear that it is not any one or more specific kinds of work which are excluded from the ground of justification, but all works, all personal excellence of every kind.

4. This is still further evident from the contrast constantly presented between faith and works. We are not justified by works, but by faith in Jesus Christ. (Gal. ii. 16, and often elsewhere.) It is not one kind of works as opposed to another; legal as opposed to evangelical; natural as opposed to gracious; moral as opposed to ritual; but works of every kind as opposed to faith.

5 The same is evident from what is taught of the gratuitous nature of our justification.

Grace and works are antithetical. "To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt." (Rom. iv. 4.) "If by grace, then is it no more of works: otherwise grace is no more grace." (Rom. xi. 6.) Grace of necessity excludes works of every kind, and more especially those of the highest kind, which might have some show of merit. But merit of any degree is of necessity excluded, if our salvation be by grace.

6. When the positive ground of justification is stated, it is always declared to be not anything done by us or wrought in us, but what was done for us. It is ever represented as something external to ourselves. We are justified by the blood of Christ (Rom. v. 9); by his obedience (Rom. v. 19); by his righteousness (ver. 18). This is involved in the whole method of salvation. Christ saves us as a priest; but a priest does not save by making those who come to him good. He does not work in them, but for them. Christ saves us by a sacrifice; but a sacrifice is effectual, not because of its subjective effect upon the offerer, but as an expiation, or satisfaction to justice. Christ is our Redeemer; he gave himself as a ransom for many. But a ransom does not infuse righteousness. It is the payment of a price. It is the satisfaction of the claims of the captor upon the captive. The whole plan of salvation, therefore, as presented in the Bible and as it is the life of the Church, is changed, if the ground of our acceptance with God be transferred from what Christ has done for us, to what is wrought in us or done by us. The Romish theologians do not agree exactly as to whether habitual or actual righteousness is the ground of justification. Bellarmin says it is the former. [156] He says, "Solam esse habitualem justitiam, per quam formaliter justi nominamur, et sumus: justitiam vero actualem, id est, opera vere justa justificare quidem, ut sanctus Jacobus loquitur, cum ait cap. 2 ex operibus hominem justificari, sed meritorie, non formaliter." This he says is clearly the doctrine of the Council of Trent, which teaches, [157] "Causam formalem justificationis esse justitiam, sive caritatem, quam Deus unicuique propriam infundit, secundum mensuram dispositionum, et qu&#65533; in cordibus justificatorum inn&#65533;ret." This follows also, he argues, from the fact that the sacraments justify, [158] "per modum instrumenti ad infusionem justiti&#65533; habitualis." This, however, only amounts to the distinction, already referred to, between the first and second justification. The infusion of righteousness renders the soul inherently righteous; then good works merit salvation. The one is the formal, the other the meritorious cause of the sinner's justification. But according to the Scriptures, both habitual and actual righteousness, both inherent grace and its fruits are excluded from any share in the ground of our justification.

7. This still further and most decisively appears from the grand objection to his doctrine which Paul was constantly called upon to answer. That objection was, that if our personal goodness or moral excellence is not the ground of our acceptance with God, then all necessity of being good is denied, and all motive to good works is removed. We may continue in sin that grace may abound. This objection has been reiterated a thousand times since it was urged against the Apostles. It seems so unreasonable and so demoralizing to say as Paul says, Romans iii. 22, that so far as justification is concerned there is no difference between Jew and Gentile; between a worshipper of the true God and a worshipper of demons; between the greatest sinner and the most moral man in the world, that men have ever felt that they were doing God service in denouncing this doctrine as a soul-destroying heresy. Had Paul taught that men are justified for their good moral works as the Pelagians and Rationalists say; or for their evangelical obedience as the Remonstrants say; or for their inherent righteousness and subsequent good works as the Romanists say,

there would have been no room for this formidable objection. Or, if through any misapprehension of his teaching, the objection had been urged, how easy had it been for the Apostle to set it aside. How obvious would have been the answer, I do not deny that really good works are the ground of our acceptance with God. I only say that ritual works have no worth in his sight, that He looks on the heart; or, that works done before regeneration have no real excellence or merit; or, that God is more lenient now than in his dealing with Adam; that He does not demand perfect obedience, but accepts our imperfect, well-meant endeavours to keep his holy commandments.' How reasonable and satisfactory would such an answer have been. Paul, however, does not make it. He adheres to his doctrine, that our own personal moral excellence has nothing to do with our justification; that God justifies the ungodly, that He receives the chief of sinners. He answers the objection in deed, and answers it effectually; but his answer supposes him to teach just what Protestants teach, that we are justified without works, not for our own righteousness, but gratuitously, without money and without price, solely on the ground of what Christ has done for us. His answer is, that so far from its being true that we must be good before we can be justified, we must be justified before we can be good; that so long as we are under the curse of the law we bring forth fruit unto death; that it is not until reconciled unto God by the death of his Son, that we bring forth fruit unto righteousness; that when justified by the righteousness of Christ, we are made partakers of his Spirit; being justified we are sanctified; that union with Christ by faith secures not only the imputation of his righteousness to our justification, but the participation of his life unto our sanctification, so that as surely as He lives and lives unto God, so they that believe on Him shall live unto God; and that none are partakers of the merit of his death who do not become partakers of the power of his life. We do not, therefore, he says, make void the law of God. Yea, we establish the law. We teach the only true way to become holy; although that way appears foolishness unto the wise of this world, whose wisdom is folly in the sight of God.

[151] Institiones Theologi, III. iii. § 155, 5th edit. Halle, 1826, p. 476.

[152] Dogmatik, 2ter Th. § 134, 13, g, h; G ttingen, 1800, pp. 783, 784.

[153] See Strauss, Dogmatik, T bingen and Stuttgart, 1841, vol. ii. pp. 493, 494.

[154] Theologia Christiana, VI. iv. 32, 31, 37; edit. Amsterdam, 1725, pp. 705, b, a, 706 a.

[155] Limborch, VI. iv. 18; ut supra, p. 703, a.

[156] De Justificatione, II. 15; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 820, a.

[157] See Session vi. cap. 7.

[158] Bellarmin, ut supra, p. 820, b.

§ 4. The Righteousness of Christ the Ground of Justification.

The imperative question remains, How shall a man be just with God? If our moral excellence be not the ground on which God pronounces us just, what is that ground? The grand reason why such different answers are given to this question is, that it is understood in different senses. The Scriptural and Protestant answer is absurd, if the question means what Romanists and others understand it to mean. If "just" means good, i.e., it the word be taken in its moral, and not in its judicial sense, then it is absurd to say that a man can be

good with the goodness of another; or to say that God can pronounce a man to be good who is not good. Bellarmin says an Ethiopian clothed in a white garment is not white. Curcell□us, the Remonstrant, says, "A man can no more be just with the justice of another, than he can be white with the whiteness of another." Moehler [159] says, it is impossible that anything should appear to God other than it really is; that an unjust man should appear to him, or be pronounced by him just. All this is true in the sense intended by these writers, "The judgment of God is according to truth." (Rom. ii. 2.) Every man is truly just whom He justifies or dodares to be just. It is in vain to dispute until the "status qu□stionis" be clearly determined. The word dikaios, "righteous," or "just," has two distinct senses, its above stated. It has a moral, and also a legal, forensic, or judicial sense. It sometimes expresses moral character, sometimes simply a relation to law and justice. In one sense to pronounce a man just, is to declare that he is morally good. In another sense, it is to declare that the claims of justice against him are satisfied, and that he is entitled to the reward promised to the righteous. When God justifies the ungodly, he does not declare that he is godly, but that his sins are expiated, and that he has a title founded in justice to eternal life. In this there is no contradiction and no absurdity. If a man under attainder appear before the proper tribunal, and show cause why the attainder should in justice be reversed, and he be declared entitled to his rank, titles, and estates, a decision in his favour would be a justification. It would declare him just in the eye of the law, but it would declare nothing and effect nothing as to his moral character. In the like manner, when the sinner stands at the bar of God, he can show good reason why he cannot be justly condemned, and why he should be declared entitled to eternal life. Now the question is, "On what ground can God pronounce a sinner just in this legal or forensic sense?" It has been shown that to justify, according to uniform Scriptural usage, is to pronounce just in the sense stated, that it is not merely to pardon, and that it is not to render inherently righteous or holy. It has also been shown to be the doctrine of Scripture, what indeed is intuitively true to the conscience, that our moral excellence, habitual or actual, is not and cannot be the ground of any such judicial declaration. What then is the ground? The Bible and the people of God, with one voice answer, "The righteousness of Christ." The ambiguity of words, the speculations of theologians, and misapprehensions, may cause many of the people of God to deny in words that such is the proper answer, but it is nevertheless the answer rendered by every believer's heart. He relies for his acceptance with God, not on himself but on Christ, not on what he is or has done, but on what Christ is and has done for him.

Meaning of the Terms.

By the righteousness of Christ is meant all he became, did, and suffered to satisfy the demands of divine justice, and merit for his people the forgiveness of sin and the gift of eternal life. The righteousness of Christ is commonly represented as including his active and passive obedience. This distinction is, as to the idea, Scriptural. The Bible does teach that Christ obeyed the law in all its precepts, and that he endured its penalty, and that this was done in such sense for his people that they are said to have done it. They died in Him. They were crucified with Him. They were delivered from the curse of the law by his being made a curse for them. He was made under the law that he might redeem those who were under the law. We are freed from the law by the body of Christ. He was made sin that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him. He is the end of the law for righteousness to all them that believe. It is by his obedience that many are made righteous. (Rom. v. 19.)

We obeyed in Him, according to the teaching of the Apostle, in Romans v. 12-21, in the same sense in which we sinned in Adam. The active and passive obedience of Christ, however, are only different phases or aspects of the same thing. He obeyed in suffering. His highest acts of obedience were rendered in the garden, and upon the cross. Hence this distinction is not so presented in Scripture as though the obedience of Christ answered one purpose, and his sufferings another and a distinct purpose. We are justified by his blood. We are reconciled unto God by his death. We are freed from all the demands of the law by his body (Rom. vii. 4), and we are freed from the law by his being made under it and obeying it in our stead. (Gal. iv. 4, 5.) Thus the same effect is ascribed to the death or sufferings of Christ, and to his obedience, because both are forms or parts of his obedience or righteousness by which we are justified. In other words the obedience of Christ includes all He did in satisfying the demands of the law.

The Righteousness of Christ is the Righteousness of God.

The righteousness of Christ on the ground of which the believer's justified is the righteousness of God. It is so designated in Scripture not only because it was provided and is accepted by Him; it is not only the righteousness which avails before God, but it is the righteousness of a divine person; of God manifest in the flesh. God purchased the Church with his own blood. (Acts xx. 28.) It was the Lord of glory who was crucified. (1 Cor. ii. 8.) He who was in the form of God and thought it not robbery to be equal with God, became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross (Phil. ii. 6-8.) He who is the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person, who upholds all things by the word of his power; whom angels worship; who is called God; who in the beginning laid the foundations of the earth, and of whose hands the heavens are the workmanship; who is eternal and immutable, has, the Apostle teaches, by death destroyed him who has the power of death and delivered those who through fear of death (i.e., of the wrath of God) were all their lifetime subject to bondage. (Heb. i., ii.) He whom Thomas recognized and avowed to be his Lord and God was the person into whose wounded side he thrust his hand. He whom John says he saw, looked upon, and handled, he declares to be the true God and eternal life. The soul, in which personality resides, does not die when the man dies, yet it is the soul that gives dignity to the man, and which renders his life of unspeakably greater value in the sight of God and man, than the life of any irrational creature. So it was not the divine nature in Christ in which his personality resides, the eternal Logos, that died when Christ died. Nevertheless the hypostatic union between the Logos and the human nature of Christ, makes it true that the righteousness of Christ (his obedience and sufferings) was the righteousness of God. This is the reason why it can avail before God for the salvation of the whole world. This is the reason why the believer, when arrayed in this righteousness, need fear neither death nor hell. This is the reason why Paul challenges the universe to lay anything to the charge of God's elect.

[159] Symbolik, § 14, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 139.

§ 5. Imputation of Righteousness.

The righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer for his justification. The word impute is familiar and unambiguous. To impute is to ascribe to, to reckon to, to lay to one's

charge. When we say we impute a good or bad motive to a man, or that a good or evil action is imputed to him, no one misunderstands our meaning. Philemon had no doubt what Paul meant when he told him to impute to him the debt of Onesimus. "Let not the king impute anything unto his servant." (1 Sam. xxii. 15.) "Let not my lord impute iniquity unto me." (2 Sam. xix. 19.) "Neither shall it be imputed unto him that offereth it." (Lev. vii. 18.) "Blood shall be imputed unto that man; he hath shed blood." (Lev. xvii. 4.) "Blessed is the man unto whom the Lord imputeth not iniquity." (Ps. xxxii. 2.) "Unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works." (Rom. iv. 6.) God is "in Christ not imputing their trespasses unto them." (2 Cor. v. 19.)

The meaning of these and similar passages of Scripture has never been disputed. Everyone understands them. We use the word impute in its simple admitted sense, when we say that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer for his justification.

It seems unnecessary to remark that this does not, and cannot mean that the righteousness of Christ is infused into the believer or in any way so imparted to him as to change, or constitute His moral character. Imputation never changes the inward, subjective state of the person to whom the imputation is made. When sin is imputed to a man he is not made sinful; when the zeal of Phinehas was imputed to him, he was not made zealous. When you impute theft to a man, you do not make him a thief. When you impute goodness to a man, you do not make him good. So when righteousness is imputed to the believer, he does not thereby become subjectively righteous. If the righteousness be adequate, and if the imputation be made on adequate grounds and by competent authority, the person to whom the imputation is made has the right to be treated as righteous. And, therefore, in the forensic, although not in the moral or subjective sense, the imputation of the righteousness of Christ does make the sinner righteous. That is, it gives him a right to the full pardon of all his sins and a claim in justice to eternal life.

That this is the simple and universally accepted view of the doctrine as held by all Protestants at the Reformation, and by them regarded as the corner-stone of the Gospel, has already been sufficiently proved by extracts from the Lutheran and Reformed Symbols, and has never been disputed by any candid or competent authority. This has continued to be the doctrine of both the great branches of the Protestant Church, so far as they pretend to adhere to their standards. Schmid [160] proves this by a whole catena of quotations so far as the Lutheran Church is concerned. Schweizer [161] does the same for the Reformed Church. A few citations, therefore, from authors of a recognized representative character will suffice as to this point. Turrettin with his characteristic precision says: "Cum dicimus Christi justitiam ad justificationem nobis imputari, et nos per justitiam illam imputatam justos esse coram Deo, et non per justitiam ullam qu\u0000 nobis inh\u0000reat; Nihil aliud volumus, quam obedientiam Christi Deo Patri nomine nostro pr\u0000stitam, ita nobis a Deo donari, ut vere nostra censeatur, eamque esse unicam et solam illam justitiam propter quam, et cujus merito, absolvamur a reatu peccatorum nostrum, et jus ad vitam obtinemus; nec ullam in nobis esse justitiam, aut ulla bona opera, quibus beneficia tanta promereamur, qu\u0000 ferre possint severum judicii divini examen, si Deus juxta legis su\u0000 rigorem nobiscum agere vellet nihil nos illi posse opponere, nisi Christi meritum et satisfactionem, in qua sola, peccatorum conscientia territi, tutum adversus iram divinam perfugium, et animarum nostrarum pacem invenire possumus." [162]

On the following page he refers to Bellarmin, [163] who says, "Si [Protestantes hoc] solum vellent, nobis imputari Christi merita, quia [a Deo] nobis donata sunt, et possumus ea [Deo] Patri offere pro peccatis nostris, quoniam Christus suscepit super se onus satisfaciendi pro nobis, nosque Deo Patri reconciliandi, recta esset eorum sententia." On this Turrettin remarks, "Atqui nihil aliud volumus; Nam quod addit, nos velle ita imputari nobis Christi justitiam, ut per eam formaliter justi nominemur et simus,' hoc gratis et falso supponit, ex perversa et pr�postera sua hypothesi de justificatione morali. Sed qu�ritur, Ad quid imputatio ista fiat? An ad justificationem et vitam, ut nos pertendimus, An vero tantum ad grati� intern� et justiti� inh�rentis infusionem, ut illi volunt; Id est, an ita imputentur et communicentur nobis merita Christi, ut sint causa meritoria sola nostr� justificationis, nec ulla alia detur justitia propter quam absolvamur in conspectu Dei; quod volumus; An vero ita imputentur, ut sint conditiones caus� formalis, id. justiti� inh�rentis, ut ea homo donari possit, vel caus� extrinsec�, qu� mereantur infusionem justiti�, per quam justificatur homo; ut ita non meritum Christi proprie, sed justitia inh�rens per meritum Christi acquisita, sic causa propria et vera, propter quam homo justificatur; quod illi statuunt." It may be remarked in passing that according to the Protestant doctrine there is properly no "formal cause" of justification. The righteousness of Christ is the meritorious, but not the formal cause of the sinner's being pronounced righteous. A formal cause is that which constitutes the inherent, subjective nature of a person or thing. The formal cause of a man's being good, is goodness, of his being holy, holiness; of his being wicked, wickedness. The formal cause of a rose's being red, is redness; and of a wall's being white, is whiteness. As we are not rendered inherently righteous by the righteousness of Christ, it is hardly correct to say that his righteousness is the formal cause of our being righteous. Owen, and other eminent writers do indeed often use the expression referred to, but they take the word "formal" out of its ordinary scholastic sense.

Campegius Vitringa [164] says: "Tenendum est certissimum hoc fundamentum, quod justificare sit vocabulum forense, notetque in Scriptura actum judicis, quo causam alicujus in judicio justam esse declarat; sive eum a crimine, cujus postulatus est, absolvat (qu� est genuina, et maxime propria vocis significatio), sive etiam jus ad hanc, vel illam rem ei sententia addicat, et adjudicet."

"17. Per justificationem peccatoris intelligimus actum Dei Patris, ut judicis, quo peccatorem credentem, natura filium ir�, neque ullum jus ex se habentem bona coelestia petendi, declarat immunem esse ab omni reatu, et condemnatione, adoptat in filium, et in eum ex gratia confert jus ad suam communionem, cum salute �terna, bonisque omnibus cum ea conjunctis, postulandi."

"27. Teneamus nullam carnem in se posse reperire et ex se producere causam, et fundamentum justificationis. 29. Qu�rendum igitur id, propter quod peccator justificatur, extra peccatorem in obedientia Filli Dei, quam pr�stitit Patri in humana natura ad mortem, imo ad mortem crucis, et ad quam pr�standam se obstrinxerat in sponsione. (Rom. v. 19.)" "32. H�c [obedientia] imputatur peccatori a Deo judice ex gratia juxta jus sponsionis, de quo ante dictum."

Owen in his elaborate work on justification, [165] proves that the word to justify, "whether the act of God towards men, or of men towards God, or of men among

themselves, or of one towards another, be expressed thereby, is always used in a forensic' sense, and does not denote a physical operation, transfusion, or transmutation." He thus winds up the discussion: "Wherefore as condemnation is not the infusing of a habit of wickedness into him that is condemned, nor the making of him to be inherently wicked, who was before righteous, but the passing a sentence upon a man with respect to his wickedness; no more is justification the change of a person from inherent unrighteousness to righteousness, by the infusion of a principle of grace, but a sentential declaration of him to be righteous." [166]

The ground of this justification in the case of the believing inner is the imputation of the righteousness of Christ. This is set forth at length. [167] "The judgment of the Reformed Churches herein," he says, "is known to all and must be confessed, unless we intend by vain cavils to increase and perpetuate contentions. Especially the Church of England is in her doctrine express as to the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, both active and passive, as it is usually distinguished. This has been of late so fully manifested out of her authentic writings, that is, the Articles of Religion' and Books of Homilies,' and other writings publicly authorized, that it is altogether needless to give any further demonstration of it."

President Edwards in his sermon on justification [168] sets forth the Protestant doctrine in all its fulness. "To suppose," he says, "that a man is justified by his own virtue or obedience, derogates from the honour of the Mediator, and ascribes that to man's virtue that belongs only to the righteousness of Christ. It puts man in Christ's stead, and makes him his own saviour, in a respect in which Christ only is the Saviour: and so it is a doctrine contrary to the nature and design of the Gospel, which is to abase man, and to ascribe all the glory of our salvation to Christ the Redeemer. It is inconsistent with the doctrine of the imputation of Christ's righteousness, which is a gospel doctrine. Here I would (1.) Explain what we mean by the imputation of Christ's righteousness. (2.) Prove the thing intended by it to be true. (3.) Show that this doctrine is utterly inconsistent with the doctrine of our being justified by our own virtue or sincere obedience.

"First. I would explain what we mean by the imputation of Christ's righteousness. Sometimes the expression is taken by our divines in a larger sense, for the imputation of all that Christ did and suffered for our redemption, whereby we are free from guilt, and stand righteous in the sight of God; and so implies the imputation both of Christ's satisfaction and obedience. But here I intend it in a stricter sense, for the imputation of that righteousness or moral goodness that consists in the obedience of Christ. And by that righteousness being imputed to us, is meant no other than this, that that righteousness of Christ is accepted for us, and admitted instead of that perfect inherent righteousness that ought to be in ourselves: Christ's perfect obedience shall be reckoned to our account so that we shall have the benefit of it, as though we had performed it ourselves: and so we suppose that a title to eternal life is given us as the reward of this righteousness." In the same connection, he asks, "Why is there any more absurdity in supposing that Christ's obedience is imputed to us, than that his satisfaction is imputed? If Christ has suffered the penalty of the law for us, and in our stead, then it will follow that his suffering that penalty is imputed to us, i.e., that it is accepted for us, and in our stead, and is reckoned to our account, as though we had suffered it. But why may not his obeying the law of God be as rationally reckoned to our account as his suffering the penalty of the law." He then goes on to argue that there is the same necessity for the one

as for the other.

Dr. Shedd says, "A second difference between the Anselmic and the Protestant soteriology is seen in the formal distinction of Christ's work into his active and his passive righteousness. By his passive righteousness is meant his expiatory sufferings, by which He satisfied the claims of justice, and by hie active righteousness is meant his obedience to the law as a rule of life and conduct. It was contended by those who made this distinction, that the purpose of Christ as the vicarious substitute was to meet the entire demands of the law for the sinner. But the law requires present and perfect obedience, as well as satisfaction for past disobedience. The law is not completely fulfilled by the endurance of penalty only. It must also be obeyed Christ both endured the penalty due to man for disobedience, and perfectly obeyed the law for him; so that He was a vicarious substitute in reference to both the precept and the penalty of the law. By his active obedience He obeyed the law, and by his passive obedience He endured the penalty. In this way his vicarious work is complete." [169]

The earlier Symbols of the Reformation do not make this distinction. So far as the Lutheran Church is concerned, it first appears in the "Form of Concord" (A.D. 1576). Its statement is as follows: "That righteousness which is imputed to faith, or to believers, of mere grace, is the obedience, suffering, and resurrection of Christ, by which He satisfied the law for us, and expiated our sins. For since Christ was not only man, but truly God and man in one undivided person, He was no more subject to the law than He was to suffering and death (if his person, merely, be taken into account), because He was the Lord of the law Hence, not only that obedience to God his Father which He exhibited in his passion and death, but also that obedience which He exhibited in voluntarily subjecting Himself to the law and fulfilling it for our sakes, is imputed to us for righteousness, so that God on account of the total obedience which Christ accomplished (pr&#xfffd;stitit) for our sake before his heavenly Father, both in acting and in suffering, in life and in death, may remit our sins to us, regard us as good and righteous, and give us eternal salvation." [170] In this point the Reformed or Calvinistic standards agree.

It has already been remarked that the distinction between the active and passive obedience of Christ is, in one view, unimportant. As Christ obeyed in suffering, his sufferings were as much a part of his obedience as his observance of the precepts of the law. The Scriptures do not expressly make this distinction, as they include everything that Christ did for our redemption under the term righteousness or obedience. The distinction becomes important only when it is denied that his moral obedience is any part of the righteousness for which the believer is justified, or that his whole work in making satisfaction consisted in expiation or bearing the penalty of the law. This is contrary to Scripture, and vitiates the doctrine of justification as presented in the Bible.

[160] Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt, 3d edit. Frankfort and Erlangen, 1853.

[161] Die Glaubenslehre der evangelisch-reformirten Kirche dargestellt und aus den Quellen belegt, Zurich, 1844, 1847.

[162] Institutio, loc. XVI. iii. 9, edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. ii. p. 570.

[163] De Justificatione, ii. 7; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, p. 801, b.

[164] Doctrina Christian&#xfffd; Religionis, III. xvi. 2; Leyden, 1764, vol. iii. p. 254, ff.

[165] Justification, chap. 4, edit. Philadelphia, 1841, p. 144.

[166] Ibid. p. 154.

[167] Ibid. chap. 7, p. 187.

[168] Serm. IV. Works, edit. N. Y. 1868, vol. iv. pp. 91, 92.

[169] History of Christian Doctrine, New York, 1863, vol. ii. p. 341.

[170] Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit., Leipzig, 1846, pp. 684, 685.

§ 6. Proof of the Doctrine.

That the Protestant doctrine as above stated is the doctrine of the word of God appears from the following considerations: --

1. The word dikaioo, as has been shown, means to declare dikaios. No one can be truthfully pronounced dikaios to whom dikaiosune cannot rightfully be ascribed. The sinner (ex vi verbi) has no righteousness of his own. God, therefore, imputes to him a righteousness which is not his own. The righteousness thus imputed is declared to be the righteousness of God, of Christ, the righteousness which is by faith. This is almost in so many words the declaration of the Bible on the subject. As the question, What is the method of justification? is a Biblical question, it must be decided exegetically, and not by arguments drawn from assumed principles of reason. We are not at liberty to say that the righteousness of one man cannot be imputed to another; that this would involve a mistake or absurdity; that God's justice does not demand a righteousness such as the law prescribes, as the condition of justification; that He may pardon and save as a father without any consideration, unless it be that of repentance; that it is inconsistent with his grace that the demands of justice should be met before justification is granted; that this view of justification makes it a sham, a calling a man just, when he is not just etc. All this amounts to nothing. It all pertains to that wisdom which is foolishness with God. All we have to do is to determine, (1.) What is the meaning of the word to justify as used in Scripture? (2.) On what ground does the Bible affirm that God pronounces the ungodly to be just? If the answer to these questions be what the Church in all ages, and especially the Church of the Reformation has given, then we should rest satisfied. The Apostle in express terms says that God imputes righteousness to the sinner. (Rom. iv. 6, 24.) By righteousness every one admits is meant that which makes a man righteous, that which the law demands. It does not consist in the sinner's own obedience, or moral excellence, for it is said to be "without works;" and it is declared that no man can be justified on the ground of his own character or conduct. Neither does this righteousness consist in faith; for it is "of faith," "through faith," "by faith." We are never said to be justified on account of faith. Neither is it a righteousness, or form of moral excellence springing from faith, or of which faith is the source or proximate cause; because it is declared to be the righteousness of God; a righteousness which is revealed; which is offered; which must be accepted as a gift. (Rom. v. 17.) It is declared to be the righteousness of Christ; his obedience. (Rom. v. 19.) It is, therefore, the righteousness of Christ, his perfect obedience in doing and suffering the will of God, which is imputed to the believer, and on the ground of which the believer, although in himself ungodly, is pronounced righteous, and therefore free from the curse of the law and entitled to eternal life.

The Apostle's Argument.

2. All the points above stated are not only clearly affirmed by the Apostle but they are also set forth in logical order, and elaborately sustained and vindicated in the Epistle to the Romans. The Apostle begins with the declaration that the Gospel "is the power of God unto salvation." It is not thus divinely efficacious because of the purity of its moral precepts; nor because it brings immortality to light; nor because it sets before us the perfect example of our Lord Jesus Christ; nor because it assures us of the love of God; nor because of the elevating, sanctifying, life-giving influence by which it is attended. There is something preliminary to all this. The first and indispensable requisite to salvation is that men should be righteous before God. They are under his wrath and curse. Until justice is satisfied, until God is reconciled, there is no possibility of any moral influence being of any avail. Therefore the Apostle says that the power of the Gospel is due to the fact that "therein is the righteousness of God revealed." This cannot mean the goodness of God, for such is not the meaning of the word. It cannot in this connection mean his justice, because it is a righteousness which is "of faith;" because the justice of God is revealed from heaven and to all men; because the revelation of justice terrifies and drives away from God; because what is here called the righteousness of God, is elsewhere contrasted with our "own righteousness" (Rom. x. 8; Phil. iii. 9); and because it is declared to be the righteousness of Christ (Rom. v. 18), which is (Rom. v. 19) explained by his "obedience," and in Romans v. 9 and elsewhere declared to be "his blood." This righteousness of Christ is the righteousness of God, because Christ is God; because God has provided, revealed, and offers it; and because it avails before God as a sufficient ground on which He can declare the believing sinner righteous. Herein lies the saving power of the Gospel. The question, How shall man be just with God? had been sounding in the ears of men from the beginning. It never had been answered. Yet it must be answered or there can be no hope of salvation. It is answered in the Gospel, and therefore the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth; i.e., to every one, whether Jew or Gentile, bond or free, good or bad, who, instead of going about to establish his own righteousness, submits himself in joyful confidence to the righteousness which his God and Saviour Jesus Christ has wrought out for sinners, and which is freely offered to them in the Gospel without money and without price.

This is Paul's theme, which he proceeds to unfold and establish, as has been already stated under a previous head. He begins by asserting, as indisputably true from the revelation of God in the constitution of our nature, that God is just, that He will punish sin; that He cannot pronounce him righteous who is not righteous. He then shows from experience and from Scripture, first as regards the Gentiles, then as regards the Jews, that there is none righteous, no not one; that the whole world is guilty before God. There is therefore no difference, since all have sinned.

Since the righteousness which the law requires cannot be found in the sinner nor be rendered by him, God has revealed another righteousness (Rom. iii. 21); "the righteousness of God," granted to every one who believes. Men are not justified for what they are or for what they do, but for what Christ has done for them. God has set Him forth as a propitiation for sin, in order that He might be just and yet the justifier of them that believe.

The Apostle teaches that such has been the method of justification from the beginning.

It was witnessed by the law and the prophets. There had never, since the fall, been any other way of justification possible for men. As God justified Abraham because he believed in the promise of redemption through the Messiah; so He justifies those now who believe in the fulfilment of that promise. (Rom. iv. 3, 9, 24.) It was not Abraham's believing state of mind that was taken for righteousness. It is not faith in the believer now; not faith as a virtue, or as a source of a new life, which renders us righteous. It is faith in a specific promise. Righteousness, says the Apostle, is imputed to us, "if we believe on Him that raised up Jesus our Lord from the dead." (Rom. iv. 24.) Or, as he expresses it in Romans x. 9, "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." The promise which Abraham believed, is the promise which we believe (Gal. iii. 14); and the relation of faith to justification, in his case, is precisely what it is in ours. He and we are justified simply because we trust in the Messiah for our salvation. Hence, as the Apostle says, the Scriptures are full of thanksgiving to God for gratuitous pardon, for free justification, for the imputation of righteousness to those who have no righteousness of their own. This method of justification, he goes on to show, is adapted to all mankind. God is not the God of the Jews only but also of the Gentiles. It secures peace and reconciliation with God. (Rom. v. 1-3.) It renders salvation certam, for if we are saved not by what we are in ourselves, but for what Christ has done for us, we may be sure that if we are "justified by his blood, we shall be saved from wrath through him." (Rom. v. 9.) This method of justification, he further shows, and this only, secures sanctification, namely, holiness of heart and life. it is only those who are reconciled to God by the death of his Son, that are "saved by his life." (v. 10.) This idea he expands and vindicates in the sixth and seventh chapters of this Epistle.

The Parallel between Adam and Christ.

3. Not content with this clear and formal statement of the truth that sinners can be justified only through the imputation of a righteousness not their own; and that the righteousness thus imputed is the righteousness (active and passive if that distinction be insisted upon) of the Lord Jesus Christ; he proceeds to illustrate this doctrine by drawing a parallel between Adam and Christ. The former, he says, was a type of the latter. There is an analogy between our relation to Adam and our relation to Christ. We are so united to Adam that his first transgression was the ground of the sentence of condemnation being passed on all mankind, and on account of that condemnation we derive from him a corrupt nature so that all mankind descending from him by ordinary generation, come into the world in a state of spiritual death. In like manner we are so united to Christ, when we believe, that his obedience is the ground on which a sentence of justification passes upon all thus in Him, and in consequence of that sentence they derive from Him a new, holy, divine, and imperishable principle of spiritual life. These truths are expressed in explicit terms. "The judgment was by one (offence) to condemnation, but the free gift is of many offences unto justification." (Rom. v. 16.) "Therefore as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life. For as by one man's disobedience many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one shall many be made righteous." (v. 18, 19.) These two great truths, namely, the imputation of Adam's sin and the imputation of Christ's righteousness, have graven themselves on the consciousness of the Church universal. They have been reviled,

misrepresented, and denounced by theologians, but they have stood their ground in the faith of God's people, just as the primary truths of reason have ever retained control over the mass of men, in spite of all the speculations of philosophers. It is not meant that the truths just mentioned have always been expressed in the terms just given; but the truths themselves have been, and still are held by the people of God, wherever found, among the Greeks, Latins, or Protestants. The fact that the race fell in Adam; that the evils which come upon us on account of his transgression are penal; and that men are born in a state of sin and condemnation, are outstanding facts of Scripture and experience, and are avowed every time the sacrament of baptism is administered to an infant. No less universal is the conviction of the other great truth. It is implied in every act of saving faith which includes trust in what Christ has done for us as the ground of our acceptance with God, as opposed to anything done by us or wrought in us. As a single proof of the hold which this conviction has on the Christian consciousness, reference may be made to the ancient direction for the visitation of the sick, attributed to Anselm, but of doubtful authorship: "Dost thou believe that thou canst not be saved, but by the death of Christ? The sick man answereth, Yes. Then let it be said unto him, Go to, then, and whilst thy soul abideth in thee, put all thy confidence in this death alone, place thy trust in no other thing, commit thyself wholly to this death, cover thyself wholly with this alone, cast thyself wholly on this death, wrap thyself wholly in this death. And if God would judge them, say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy judgment, and otherwise I will not contend, or enter into judgment with thee. And if He shall say unto thee, that thou art a sinner, say, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and my sins. If He shall say unto thee, that thou hast deserved damnation, say, Lord, I put the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between thee and all my sins; and I offer his merits for my own, which I should have, and have not. If He say that He is angry with thee: say, Lord, I place the death of our Lord Jesus Christ between me and thy anger." [171]

Such being the real and only foundation of a sinner's hope towards God, it is of the last importance that it should not only be practically held by the people, but that it should also be clearly presented and maintained by the clergy. It is not what we do or are, but solely what Christ is and has done that can avail for our justification before the bar of God.

Other Passages teaching the same Doctrine.

4. This doctrine of the imputation of the righteousness of Christ; or, in other words, that his righteousness is the judicial ground of the believer's justification, is not only formally and argumentatively presented as in the passages cited, but it is constantly asserted or implied in the word of God. The Apostle argues, in the fourth chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, that every assertion or promise of gratuitous forgiveness of sin to be found in the Scriptures involves this doctrine. He proceeds on the assumption that God is just; that He demands a righteousness of those whom He justifies. If they have no righteousness of their own, one on just grounds must be imputed to them. If, therefore, He forgives sin, it must be that sin is covered, that justice has been satisfied. "David, also," he says, "describeth the blessedness of the man, unto whom God imputeth righteousness without works; saying, Blessed are they whose iniquities are forgiven, and whose sins are covered. Blessed is the man to whom the Lord will not impute sin." (Rom. iv. 6-8.) Not to impute sin implies the imputation of righteousness.

In Romans v. 9, we are said to be "justified by his blood." In Romans iii. 25, God is said to have set Him forth as a propitiation for sin, that He might be just in justifying the ungodly. As to justify does not mean to pardon, but judicially to pronounce righteous, this passage distinctly asserts that the work of Christ is the ground on which the sentence of justification is passed. In Romans x. 3, 4, he says of the Jews, "They being ignorant of God's righteousness, and going about to establish their own righteousness, have not submitted themselves unto the righteousness of God. For Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believeth." It can hardly be questioned that the word (dikaiosune) righteousness must have the same meaning in both members of the first of these verses. If a man's "own righteousness" is that which would render him righteous, then "the righteousness of God," in this connection, must be a justifying righteousness. It is called the righteousness of God, because, as said before, He is its author. It is the righteousness of Christ. It is provided, offered, and accepted of God. Here then are two righteousnesses; the one human, the other divine; the one valueless, the other infinitely meritorious. The folly of the Jews, and of thousands since their day, consists in refusing the latter and trusting to the former. This folly the Apostle makes apparent in the fourth verse. The Jews acted under the assumption that the law as a covenant, that is, as prescribing the conditions of salvation, was still in force, that men were still bound to satisfy its demands by their personal obedience in order to be saved, whereas Christ had made an end of the law. He had abolished it as a covenant, in order that men might be justified by faith. Christ, however, has thus made an end of the law, not by merely setting it aside, but by satisfying its demands. He delivers us from its curse, not by mere pardon, but by being made a curse for us. (Gal. iii. 13.) He redeems us from the law by being made under it (Gal. iv. 4, 5), and fulfilling all righteousness.

In Philippians iii. 8, 9, the Apostle says, he "suffered the loss of all things," that he might be found in Christ, not having his "own righteousness, which is of the law, but that which is through the faith of Christ, the righteousness which is of God by faith." Here again one's own righteousness is contrasted with that which is of God. The word must have the same sense in both members. What Paul trusted to, was not his own righteousness, not his own subjective goodness, but a righteousness provided for him and received by faith. De Wette (no Augustinian) on this passage says, the righteousness of God here means," a righteousness received from God (graciously imputed) on condition of faith" ("die von Gott empfangene (aus Gnaden zugerechnete) Gerechtigkeit um des Glaubenswillen.")

The Apostle says (1 Cor. i. 30), Christ of God is made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, and sanctification, and redemption." In this enumeration sanctification and righteousness are distinguished. The one renders us holy; the other renders us just, i.e., satisfies the demands of justice. As Christ is to us the source of inward spiritual life, so He is the giver of that righteousness which secures our justification. Justification is not referred to sanctification as its proximate cause and ground. On the contrary, the gift of righteousness precedes that of sanctification. We are justified in order that we may be sanctified. The point here, however, is that righteousness is distinguished from anything and everything in us which can recommend us to the favour of God. We are accepted, justified, and saved, not for what we are, but for what He has done in our behalf. God "made him to be sin for us, who knew no sin; that we might be made the righteousness of God in him." (2 Cor. v. 21.) As Christ was not made sin in a moral sense; so we are not (in justification) made

righteousness in a moral sense. As He was made sin in that He "bare our sins;" so we are made righteousness in that we bear his righteousness. Our sins were the judicial ground of his humiliation under the law and of all his sufferings; so his righteousness is the judicial ground of our justification. In other words, as our sins were imputed to Him; so his righteousness is imputed to us. If imputation of sin did not render Him morally corrupt; the imputation of righteousness does not make us holy or morally good.

Argument from the General Teachings of the Bible.

5. It is unnecessary to dwell upon particular passages in support of a doctrine which pervades the whole Scriptures. The question is, What is the ground of the pardon of sin and of the acceptance of the believe as righteous (in the forensic or judicial sense of the word), in the sight of God? Is it anything we do, anything experienced by us, or wrought in us; or, is it what Christ has done for us? The whole revelation of God concerning the method of salvation shows that it is the latter and not the former. In the first place, this is plain from what the Scriptures teach of the covenant of redemption between the Father and the Son. That there was such covenant cannot be denied if the meaning of the words be once agreed upon. It is plain from Scripture that Christ came into the world to do a certain work, on a certain condition. The promise made to Him was that a multitude whom no man can number, of the fallen race of man, should be saved. This included the promise that they should be justified, sanctified, and made partakers of eternal life. The very nature of this transaction involves the idea of vicarious substitution. It assumes that what He was to do was to be the ground of the justification, sanctification, and salvation of his people.

In the second place this is involved in the nature of the work which He came to perform. He was to assume our nature, to be born of a woman, to take part of flesh and blood with all their infirmities, yet without sin. He was to take his place among sinners; be made subject to the law which they are bound to obey, and to endure the curse which they had incurred. If this be so, then what He did is the ground of our salvation from first to last; of our pardon, of our reconciliation with God, of the acceptance of our persons, of the indwelling of the Spirit, of our being transformed into His image, and of our admission into heaven. "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory," has, therefore, been the spontaneous language of every believer from the beginning until now.

In the third place, the manner in which Christ was to execute the work assigned as described in the prophets, and the way in which it was actually accomplished as described by Himself and by his Apostles, prove that what He did and suffered is the ground of our salvation. He says that He came "to give his life a ransom for many." (Matt. xx. 28.) "There is one God," says the Apostle, "and one mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus; who gave Himself a ransom for all." (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6.) The deliverance effected by a ransom has no reference to the character or conduct of the redeemed. Its effects are due exclusively to the ransom paid. It is, therefore, to deny that Christ was a ransom, that we are redeemed by his blood, to affirm that the proximate ground of our deliverance from the curse of the law and of our introduction into the liberty of the sons of God, is anything wrought in us or done by us. Again, from the beginning to the end of the Bible, Christ is represented as a sacrifice. From the first institution of sacrifices in the family of Adam; during the patriarchal period; in all the varied and costly ritual of the Mosaic law; in the predictions of the prophets; in the clear didactic statements of the New Testament, it is

taught with a constancy, a solemnity, and an amplitude, which proves it to be a fundamental and vital element of the divine plan of redemption, that the Redeemer was to save his people by offering himself as a sacrifice unto God in their behalf. There is no one characteristic of the plan of salvation more deeply engraven on the hearts of Christians, which more effectually determines their inward spiritual life, which so much pervades their prayers and praises, or which is so directly the foundation of their hopes, as the sacrificial nature of the death of Christ. Strike from the Bible the doctrine of redemption by the blood of Christ, and what have we left? But if Christ saves us as a sacrifice, then it is what He does for us, his objective work, and nothing subjective, nothing in us, which is the ground of our salvation, and of all that salvation includes. For even our sanctification is due to his death. His blood cleanses from all sin. (1 John i. 7.) It cleanses from the guilt of sin by expiation; and secures inward sanctification by securing the gift of the Holy Spirit.

Again, the whole Bible is full of the idea of substitution. Christ took our place. He undertook to do for us what we could not do for ourselves. This is taught in every possible way. He bore our sins. He died for us and in our place. He was made under the law for us. He was made a curse for us. He was made sin for us that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him. The chastisement of our peace was laid on Him. Everything, therefore, which the Bible teaches of the method of salvation, is irreconcilable with the doctrine of subjective justification in all its forms. We are always and everywhere referred to something out of ourselves as the ground of our confidence toward God.

In the fourth place, the effects ascribed to the work of Christ, as before remarked, are such as do not flow from anything in the believer himself, but must be referred to what has been done for him. These effects are expiation of sin, propitiation, the gift and indwelling of the life-giving Spirit of God; redemption, or deliverance from all forms of evil; and a title to eternal life and actual participation in the exaltation, glory, and blessedness of the Son of God. It is out of all question that these wonderful effects should be referred to what we personally are; to our merit, to our holiness, to our participation of the life of Christ. In whatever sense these last words may be understood, they refer to what we personally are or become. His life in us is after all a form of our life. It constitutes our character. And it is self-evident to the conscience that our character is not, and cannot be the ground of our pardon, of God's peculiar love, or of our eternal glory and blessedness in heaven.

In the fifth place, the condition on which our participation of the benefits of redemption is suspended, is inconsistent with any form of the doctrine of subjective justification. We are never said to be justified on account of faith, considered either as an act or as a principle, as an exercise or as a permanent state of the mind. Faith is never said to be the ground of justification Nor are we saved by faith as the source of holiness or of spiritual life in the soul, or as the organ of receiving the infused life of God. We are saved simply "by" faith, by receiving and resting upon Christ alone for salvation. The thing received is something out of ourselves. It is Christ, his righteousness, his obedience, the merit of his blood or death. We look to Him. We flee to Him. We lay hold on Him. We hide ourselves in Him. We are clothed in his righteousness. The Romanist indeed says, that an Ethiopian in a white robe does not become white. True, but a suit of armor gives security from the sword or spear, and that is what we need before attending to the state of our complexion. We need protection from the wrath of God in the first instance. The inward

transformation of the soul into his likeness is provided for by other means.

In the sixth place and finally, the fact that we are saved by grace proves that the ground of salvation is not in ourselves. The grace of God, his love for the unlovely, for the guilty and polluted, is represented in the Bible as the most mysterious of the divine perfections. It was hidden in God. It could not be discovered by reason, neither was it revealed prior to the redemption of man. The specific object of the plan of salvation is the manifestation of this most wonderful, most attractive, and most glorious attribute of the divine nature. Everything connected with our salvation, says the Apostle, is intended for the "praise of the glory of his grace" (Eph. i. 6.) God hath quickened us, he says, and raised us up, and made us sit together in heavenly places in Christ Jesus, in order "that in the ages to come, he might show the exceeding riches of his grace, in his kindness toward us, through Christ Jesus."

From their nature, grace and works are antithetical. The one excludes the other. What is of grace, is not of works. And by works in Scripture, in relation to this subject, is meant not individual acts only, but states of mind, anything and everything internal of which moral character can be predicated. When, therefore, it is said that salvation is of grace and not of works, it is thereby said that it is not founded upon anything in the believer himself. It was not any moral excellence in man, that determined God to interpose for his redemption, while He left the apostate angels to their fate. This was a matter of grace. To deny this, and to make the provision of a plan of salvation for man a matter of justice, is in such direct contradiction to everything in the Bible, that it hardly ever has been openly asserted. The gift of his Son for the redemption of man is ever represented as the most wonderful display of unmerited love. That some and not all men are actually saved, is expressly declared to be not of works, not on account of anything distinguishing favourably the one class from the other, but a matter of pure grace. When a sinner is pardoned and restored to the favour of God, this again is declared to be of grace. If of grace it is not founded upon anything in the sinner himself. Now as the Scriptures not only teach that the plan of salvation is thus gratuitous in its inception, execution, and application, but also insist upon this characteristic of the plan as of vital importance, and even go so far as to teach that unless we consent to be saved by grace, we cannot be saved at all, it of necessity follows that the doctrine of subjective justification is contrary to the whole spirit of the Bible. That doctrine in all its forms teaches that that which secures our acceptance with God, is something in ourselves, something which constitutes character. If so, then salvation is not of grace; and if not of grace, it is unattainable by sinners.

[171] See "The General Considerations," prefixed by Owen to his work on Justification.

§ 7. The Consequences of the Imputation of Righteousness.

It is frequently said that justification consists in the pardon of sin and in the imputation of righteousness. This mode of statement is commonly adopted by Lutheran theologians. This exhibition of the doctrine is founded upon the sharp distinction made in the "Form of Concord" between the passive and active obedience of Christ. To the former is referred the remission of the penalty due to us for sin; to the latter our title to eternal life. The

Scriptures, however, do not make this distinction so prominent. Our justification as a whole is sometimes referred to the blood of Christ, and sometimes to his obedience. This is intelligible because the crowning act of his obedience, and that without which all else had been unavailing, was his laying down his life for us. It is, perhaps, more correct to say that the righteousness of Christ, including all He did and suffered in our stead, is imputed to the believer as the ground of his justification, and that the consequences of this imputation are, first, the remission of sin, and secondly, the acceptance of the believer as righteous. And if righteous, then he is entitled to be so regarded and treated.

By the remission of sin Romanists understand the removal of the pollution of sin. So that their definition of justification as consisting in the remission of sin and infusion of righteousness, is only a statement of the negative and positive aspects of sanctification, i.e., putting off the old man and putting on the new man. The effect of remission is constantly declared to be that nothing of the nature of sin remains in the soul. The Council of Trent says, "Justificatio . . . . non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctificatio, et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem grati□ et donorum. . . . . Quanquam nemo possit esse justus, nisi cui merita passionis Domini nostri Jesu Christi communicantur: id tamen in hac impii justificatione fit, dum ejusdem sanctissim□ passionis merito per Spiritum Sanctum caritas Dei diffunditur in cordibus eorum, qui justificantur, atque ipsis inh□ret." "Quibus verbis justificationis impii descriptio insinuatur, ut sit translatio ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius primi Ad□, in statum grati□ et adoptionis filiorum Dei, per secundum Adam Jesum Christum, salvatorem nostrum: qu□ quidem translatio post evangelium promulgatum sine lavacro regenerationis, aut ejus voto fieri non potest." [172] By "status grati□" in this definition is not meant a state of favour, but a state of subjective grace or holiness; because in other places and most commonly justification is said to consist in the infusion of grace. In this definition, therefore, the pardon of sin in the proper sense of the words is not included. Bellarmin [173] says this translation into a state of adoption as sons of God, "non potest . . . . fieri, nisi homo per remissionem peccati desinat esse impius; et per infusionem justiti□ incipiat esse pius. Sed sicut a□r cum illustratur a sole per idem lumen, quod recipit, desinit esse tenebrosus et incipit esse lucidus: sic etiam homo per eandem justitiam sibi a sole justiti□ donatam atque infusam desinit esse injustus, delente videlicet lumine grati□ tenebras peccatorum." The remission of sin is therefore defined to be the removal of sin. Bellarmin argues in support of this view that guilt is removed by holiness, that guilt is a relation; the relation of sin to justice. When the thing itself is taken away, the relation itself of course ceases. [174] Hence remission of sin, even in the sense of pardon, is effected by the infusion of righteousness, as darkness is banished by the introduction of light. It is thus, as remarked above, that guilt is either ignored, or reduced to a minimum by the Romish theory of justification. There is really no satisfaction of justice in the case. The merits of Christ avail to secure for man the gift of the Holy Ghost, by whose power as exercised in the sacrament of baptism, the soul is made holy, and by the introduction of holiness everything of the nature of sin is banished, and all ground for the infliction of punishment is removed. A scheme so opposed to Scripture, and so inconsistent with even the natural conscience, cannot be practically adopted by the mass of the people. The conviction is too intimate that the desert of punishment is not removed by the reformation, or even by the regeneration of the sinner, to allow the conscience to be satisfied with any scheme of salvation which does not provide for the expiation of the guilt

of sin by what really satisfies the justice of God.

In the Bible, therefore, as well as in common life, pardon is not a mere consequence of sanctification. It is exemption from the infliction of the deserved penalty of the law. Whether this exemption is a mere matter of caprice, or unworthy partiality for the offender, or for considerations of expediency, or at the promptings of compassion, or upon the ground of an adequate satisfaction to the demands of justice, makes no difference so far as the nature of pardon is concerned. It is in all cases the remission of a penalty adjudged to be deserved. It is in this sense, therefore, that justification is declared to include the pardon of sins, founded on the imputation to the believing sinner of the perfect righteousness of Christ. It is this that gives the believer peace. He sees that he is delivered from "the wrath and curse of God" due to him, not by any arbitrary exercise of executive authority, but because God, as a righteous judge, can, in virtue of the propitiation of Christ, be just and yet justify the ungodly.

The sins which are pardoned in justification include all sins, past, present, and future. It does indeed seem to be a solecism that sins should be forgiven before they are committed. Forgiveness involves remission of penalty. But how can a penalty be remitted before it is incurred? This is only an apparent difficulty arising out of the inadequacy of human language. The righteousness of Christ is a perpetual donation. It is a robe which hides, or as the Bible expresses it, covers from the eye of justice the sins of the believer. They are sins; they deserve the wrath and curse of God, but the necessity for the infliction of that curse no longer exists. The believer feels the constant necessity for confession and prayer for pardon, but the ground of pardon is ever present for him to offer and plead. So that it would perhaps be a more correct statement to say that in justification the believer receives the promise that God will not deal with him according to his transgressions, rather than to say that sins are forgiven before they are committed.

This subject is thus presented by the Apostle: believers "are not under the law but under grace." (Rom. vi. 14.) They are not under a legal system administered according to the principles of retributive justice, a system which requires perfect obedience as the condition of acceptance with God, and which says, "Cursed is every one that continueth not in all things which are written in the book of the law to do them." They are under grace, that is, under a system in which believers are not dealt with on the principles of justice, but on the principles of undeserved mercy, in which God does not impute "their trespasses unto them." (2 Cor. v. 19.) There is therefore to them no condemnation. They are not condemned for their sins, not because they are not sins and do not deserve condemnation, but because Christ has already made expiation for their guilt and makes continual intercession for them.

The second consequence attributed to the imputation of Christ's righteousness, is a title to eternal life. This in the older writers is often expressed by the words "adoption and heirship." Being made the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus (Gal. iii. 26), they are heirs of God and joint heirs with Jesus Christ of a heavenly inheritance. (Rom. viii. 17.) The mere expiation of guilt confers no title to eternal life. The condition of the covenant under which man was placed was perfect obedience. This, from all that appears in Scripture, the perfection of God requires. As He never pardons sins unless the demands of justice be satisfied, so He never grants eternal life unless perfect obedience be rendered. Heaven is always represented as a purchased possession. In the covenant between the

Father and the Son the salvation of his people was promised as the reward of his humiliation, obedience, and death. Having performed the stipulated conditions. He has a claim to the promised recompense. And this claim inures to the benefit of his people. But besides this, as the work of Christ consisted in his doing all that the law of God, or covenant of works requires for the salvation of men, and as that righteousness is freely offered to every one that believes, every such believer has as valid a claim to eternal life as he would have had, had he personally done all that the law demands. Thus broad and firm is the foundation which God has laid for the hopes of his people. It is the rock of ages; Jehovah our righteousness.

[172] Sess. VI. cap. 7, 4; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<unk>ttingen, 1846, pp. 24, 25, 22.

[173] De Justificatione, II. ii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. pp. 780, e, 781, a.

[174] De Amissione Grati<unk> et Statu Peccati, V. vii., Ibid. p. 287, a, b.

§ 8. Relation of Faith to Justification.

All who profess to be Christians admit the doctrine of justification by faith. There are different views, however, as to the relation between faith and justification, as has been already intimated.

1. Pelagians and rationalists teach that faith in God's being and perfection, or in the great principles of moral and religious truth, is the source of that moral excellence on account of which we are accepted of God. It is perhaps only a different way of expressing the same idea, to say that God, in the case of Abraham, and, therefore, of other men, accepts the pious state of mind involved in the exercise of faith or confidence in God, in lieu of perfect righteousness.

2. Romanists make faith mere assent. It does not justify as a virtue, or as apprehending the offered righteousness of Christ. It is neither the formal nor the instrumental cause of justification, it is merely the predisposing or occasional cause. A man assents to the truth of Christianity, and to the more special truth that the Church is a divine institution for saving men. He therefore comes to the Church and receives the sacrament of baptism, by which, "ex opere operato," a habit of grace, or spiritual life is infused into the soul, which is the formal cause of justification; i.e., it renders the soul inherently just or holy. In this sense the sinner may be said to be justified by faith. This is the first justification. After the man is thus rendered holy or regenerated, then the exercises of faith have real merit, and enter into the ground of his second justification, by which he becomes entitled to eternal life. But here faith stands on a level with other Christian graces. It is not the only, nor the most important ground of justification. It is in this view inferior to love, from which faith indeed derives all its virtue as a Christian grace. It is then "fides formata," i.e., faith of which love s the essence, the principle which gives it character.

The Romish Doctrine.

According to the Romish scheme (1.) God is the efficient cause of justification, as it is by his power or supernatural grace that the soul is made just. (2.) Christ is the meritorious cause, as it is for his sake God grants this saving grace, or influence of the Spirit to the

children of men. (3.) Inherent righteousness is the formal cause, since thereby the soul is made really just or holy. (4.) Faith is the occasional and predisposing cause, as it leads the sinner to seek justification (regeneration), and disposes God to grant the blessing. In this aspect it has the merit of congruity only, not that of condignity. (5.) Baptism is the essential instrumental cause, as it is only through or by baptism that inherent righteousness is infused or justification is effected. So much for the first justification. After this justification, which makes the sinner holy, then, (6.) Good works, all the fruits and exercises of the new life, have real merit and constitute the ground of the Christian's title to eternal life.

The language of the Council of Trent on this subject is as follows: "Hujus justificationis caus&#65533; sunt, finalis quidem, gloria Dei et Christi, ac vita &#65533;terna: efficiens vero, misericors Deus, qui gratuito abluit et sanctificat, signans et ungens Spiritu promissionis sancto, ... meritoria autem dilectissimus unigenitus suus, Dominus noster, Jesus Christus, qui, cum essemus inimici, propter nimiam caritatem, qua dilexit nos, sua sanctissima passione in ligno crucis nobis justificationem [i.e., regeneration] meruit et pro nobis Deo Patri satisfecit: instrumentalis item, sacramentum baptismi, quod est sacramentum fidei, sine qua nulli unquam contigit justificatio: demum unica formalis causa est justitia Dei, non qua ipse justus est, sed qua nos justos facit: qua videlicet ab eo donati, renovamur spiritu mentis nostr&#65533;, et non modo reputamur, sed vere justi nominamur, et sumus, justitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam secundum mensuram, quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis prout vult, et secundum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem." Again, it is said: "Qu&#65533; enim justitia nostra dicitur, quia per eam nobis inh&#65533;rentem justificamur; illa eadem Dei est, quia a Deo nobis infunditur per Christi meritum." [175] All this relates to the first justifications or regeneration, in which the soul passes from spiritual death to spiritual Life. Of the second justification, which gives a title to eternal life, Bellarmin says, [176] "Habet communis catholicorum omnium sententia, opera bona justorum vere, ac proprie esse merita, et merita non cujuscunque pr&#65533;mii, sed ipsius vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533;." The thirty-second canon of the Tridentine Council at this sixth session anathematizes any one who teaches a different doctrine. "Si quis dixerit, hominis justificati bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita; aut ipsum justificatum bonis operibus, qu&#65533; ab eo per Dei gratiam et Jesu Christi meritum, cujus vivum membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum grati&#65533;, vitam &#65533;ternam, et ipsius vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533;, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem, atque etiam glori&#65533; augmentum; anathema sit." It appears from all this that, according to the doctrine of the Church of Rome, faith has no special or direct connection with justification, and that "justification by faith" in that Church means something entirely different from what is intended by those words in the lips of evangelical Christians.

Remonstrant View.

3. According to the Remonstrants or Arminians, faith is the ground of justification. Under the Gospel God accepts our imperfect obedience including faith and springing from it, in place of the perfect obedience demanded by the law originally given to Adam. There is one passage in the Bible, or rather one form of expression, which occurs in several places, which seems to favour this view of the subject. In Romans iv. 3, it is said, "Abraham believed God, and it was counted unto him for righteousness;" and again in ver. 22 of that chapter, and in Galatians iii. 6. If this phrase be interpreted according to the

analogy of such passages as Romans ii. 26, "Shall not his uncircumcision be counted for circumcision?" it does mean that faith is taken or accepted for righteousness. The Bible, however, is the word of God and therefore self-consistent. Consequently if a passage admits of one interpretation inconsistent with the teaching of the Bible in other places, and of another interpretation consistent with that teaching, we are bound to accept the latter. This rule, simple and obvious as it is, is frequently violated, not only by those who deny the inspiration of the Scriptures, but even by men professing to recognize their infallible authority. They seem to regard it as a proof of independence to make each passage mean simply what its grammatical structure and logical connection indicate, without the least regard to the analogy of Scripture. This is unreasonable. In Genesis xv. we are told that Abraham lamented before the Lord that he was childless, and that one born in his house wasto be his heir. And God said unto him, "This shall not be thine heir; but he that shall come forth out of thine own bowels, shall be thine heir. And he brought him forth abroad, and said, Look now toward heaven, and tell the stars, if thou be able to number them. And he said unto him, So shall thy seed be. And he believed in the Lord: and He counted it to him for righteousness." Taking this passage by itself, it is inferred that the object of Abraham's faith was the promise of a numerous posterity. Supposing this to be true, which it certainly is not, what right has any one to assume that Abraham's faith's being imputed to him for righteousness, means anything more than when it is said that the zeal of Phinehas was imputed for righteousness (Ps. cvi. 31); or when in Deuteronomy xxiv. 13, it is said that to return a poor man's pledge "shall be righteousness unto thee before the Lord thy God." No one supposes that one manifestation of zeal, or one act of benevolence, is taken for complete obedience to the law. All that the phrase "to impute for righteousness" by itself means, according to Old Testament usage, is, to esteem as right, to approve. The zeal of Phinehas was right. Returning a poor man's pledge was right. These were acts which God approved. And so He approved of Abraham's faith. He gained the favour of God by believing. Now while this is true, far more, as the Apostle teaches, is true. He teaches, first, that the great promise made to Abraham, and faith in which secured his justification, was not that his natural descendants should be as numerous as the stars of heaven, but that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed; secondly, that the seed intended was not a multitude, but one person, and that that one person was Christ (Gal. iii. 16); and, thirdly, that the blessing which the seed of Abraham was to secure for the world was redemption. "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the law, being made a curse for us: . . . . that the blessing ol Abraham (i.e., the promise made to Abraham) might come on" us. The promise made to Abraham, therefore, was redemption through Christ. Hence those who are Christ's, the Apostle teaches, are Abraham's seed and heirs of his promise. What, therefore, Abraham believed, was that the seed of the woman, the Shiloh, the promised Redeemer of the world, was to be born of him. He believed in Christ, as his Saviour, as his righteousness, and deliverer, and therefore it was that he was accepted as righteous, not for the merit of his faith, and not on the ground of faith, or by taking faith in lieu of righteousness, but because he received and rested on Christ alone for his salvation.

Unless such be the meaning of the Apostle, it is hard to see how there is any coherence or force in his arguments. His object is to prove that men are justified, not by works, but gratuitously; not for what they are or do, but for what is done for them. They are saved by a ransom; by a sacrifice. But it is absurd to say that trust in a ransom redeems, or is taken in

place of the ransom; or that faith in a sacrifice, and not the sacrifice itself, is the ground of acceptance. To prove that such is the Scriptural method of justification, Paul appeals to the case of Abraham. He was not justified for his works, but by faith in a Redeemer. He expected to be justified as ungodly. (Rom. iv. 5.) This, he tells us, is what we must do. We have no righteousness of our own. We must take Christ for our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption. In the immediately preceding chapter the Apostle had said we are justified by faith in the blood of Christ, as a propitiation for sin; and for him to prove this from the fact that Abraham was justified on account of his confiding, trusting state of mind, which led him to believe that, although a hundred years old, he should be the father of a numerous posterity, would be a contradiction.

Besides, it is to be remembered, not only that the Scriptures never say that we are justified "on account" of faith (dia pistin), but always "by," or "through" faith (dia or ek pisteos or pistei); but also that it is not by faith as such; not by faith in God, nor in the Scriptures; and not by faith in a specific divine promise such as that made to Abraham of a numerous posterity, or of the possession of the land of Canaan; but only by faith in one particular promise, namely, that of salvation through Christ. It is, therefore, not on account of the state of mind, of which faith is the evidence, nor of the good works which are its fruits, but only by faith as an act of trust in Christ, that we are justified. This of necessity supposes that He, and not our faith, is the ground of our justification. He, and not our faith, is the ground of our confidence. How can any Christian wish it to be otherwise? What comparison is there between the absolutely perfect and the infinitely meritorious righteousness of Christ, and our own imperfect evangelical obedience as a ground of confidence and peace!

This doctrine is moreover dishonouring to the Gospel. It supposes the Gospel to be less holy than the law. The law required perfect obedience; the Gospel is satisfied with imperfect obedience. And how imperfect and insufficient our best obedience is the conscience of every believer certifies. If it does not satisfy us, how can it satisfy God?

The grand objection, however, to this Remonstrant doctrine is to the relation between faith and justification, is that it is in direct contradiction to the plain and pervading teachings of the Word of God. The Bible teaches that we are not justified by works. This doctrine affirms that we are justified by works. The Bible teaches that we are justified by the blood of Christ; that it is for his obedience that the sentence of justification is passed on men. This doctrine affirms that God pronounces us righteous because of our own righteousness. The Bible from first to last teaches that the whole ground of our salvation or of our justification is objective, what Christ as our Redeemer, our ransom, our sacrifice, our surety, has done for us. This doctrine teaches us to look within, to what we are and to what we do, as the ground of our acceptance with God. It may safely be said that this is altogether unsatisfactory to the awakened conscience. The sinner cannot rely on anything in himself. He instinctively looks to Christ, to his work done for us as the ground of confidence and peace. This in the last resort is the hope of all believers, whatever their theory of justification may be. Whether Papist, Remonstrant, or Augustinian, they all cast their dying eyes on Christ. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up; that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life."

Protestant Doctrine.

4. The common doctrine of Protestants on this subject is that faith is merely the instrumental cause of justification. It is the act of receiving and resting upon Christ, and has no other relation to the end than any other act by which a proffered good is accepted. This is clearly the doctrine of Scripture, (1.) Because we are constantly said to be justified by, or through faith. (2.) Because the faith which justifies is described as a looking, as a receiving, as a coming, as a fleeing for refuge, as a laying hold of, and as a calling upon. (3.) Because the ground to which our justification is referred, and that on which the sinner's trust is placed, is declared to be the blood, the death, the righteousness, the obedience of Christ. (4.) Because the fact that Christ is a ransom, a sacrifice, and as such effects our salvation, of necessity supposes that the faith which interests us in the merit of his work is a simple act of trust. (5.) Because any other view of the case is inconsistent with the gratuitous nature of justification, with the honour of Christ, and with the comfort and confidence of the believer.

[175] Sess. VI. cap. 7, 16; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<?>ttingen, 1846, vol. i. pp. 24, 25, 32.

[176] De Justificatione, v. 1; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, p. 949, a.

§ 9. Objections to the Protestant Doctrine of Justification.

It is said to lead to Licentiousness.

1. The first, most obvious, and most persistently urged objection against the doctrine of gratuitous justification through the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, has already been incidentally considered. That objection is that the doctrine leads to license; that if good works are not necessary to justification, they are not necessary at all; that if God accepts the chief of sinners as readily as the most moral of men, on the simple condition of faith in Christ, then what profit is there in circumcision? in Judaism? in being in the Church? in being good in any form? Why not live in sin that grace may abound? This objection having been urged against the Apostle, it needs no other answer than that which he himself gave it. That answer is found in the sixth and seventh chapters of his Epistle to the Romans, and is substantially as follows:

First, the objection involves a contradiction. To speak of salvation in sin is as great an absurdity as to speak of life in death. Salvation is deliverance from sin. How then can men be delivered from sin in order that they may live in it. Or, as Paul expresses it, "How shall we, that are dead to sin, live any longer therein?"

Secondly, the very act of faith which secures our justification, secures also our sanctification. It cannot secure the one without securing also the other. This is not only the intention and the desire of the believer, but it is the ordinance of God; a necessary feature of the plan of salvation, and secured by its nature. We take Christ as our Redeemer from sin, from its power as well as from its guilt. And the imputation of his righteousness consequent on faith secures the indwelling of the Holy Spirit as certainly, and for the very same reasons (the covenant stipulations), that it secures the pardon of our sins. And, therefore, if we are partakers of his death, we are partakers of his life. If we die with Him, we rise with Him. If we are justified, we are sanctified. He, therefore, who lives in sin, proclaims himself an

unbeliever. He has neither part nor lot in the redemption of Him who came to save his people from their sins.

Thirdly, our condition, the Apostle says, is analogous to that of a slave, belonging first to one master, then to another. So long as he belonged to one man, he was not under the authority of another. But if freed from the one and made the slave of the other, then he comes under an influence which constrains obedience to the latter. So we were the slaves of sin, but now, freed from that hard master, we have become the servants of righteousness. For a believer, therefore, to live in sin, is just as impossible as for the slave of one man to be at the same time the slave of another. We are indeed free; but not free to sin. We are only free from the bondage of the devil and introduced into the pure, exalted, and glorious liberty of the sons of God.

Fourthly, the objection as made against the Apostle and as constantly repeated since, is urged in the interests of morality and of common sense. Reason itself, it is said, teaches that a man must be good before he can be restored to the favour of God, and if we teach that the number and heinousness of a man's sins are no barrier to his justification, and his good works are no reason why he should be justified rather than the chief of sinners, we upset the very foundations of morality. This is the wisdom of men. The wisdom of God, as revealed in the Scriptures, is very different. According to the Bible the favour of God is the life of the soul. The light of his countenance is to rational creatures what the light of the sun is to the earth, the source of all that is beautiful and good. So long, therefore, as a soul is under his curse, there is no life-giving or life-sustaining intercourse between it and God. In this state it can only, as the Apostle expresses it, "bring forth fruit unto death." As soon, however, as it exercises faith, it receives the imputation of the righteousness of Christ, God's justice is thereby satisfied, and the Spirit comes and takes up his dwelling in the believer as the source of all holy living. There can therefore be no holiness until there is reconciliation with God, and no reconciliation with God except through the righteousness imputed to us and received by faith alone. Then follow the indwelling of the Spirit, progressive sanctification, and all the fruits of holy living.

It may be said that this scheme involves an inconsistency. there can be no holiness until there is reconciliation, and no reconciliation (so far as adults are concerned) until there is faith. But faith is a fruit of the Spirit, and an act of the renewed soul. Then there is and must be, after all, holy action before there is reconciliation. It might be enough to say in answer to this objection, that logical order and chronological succession are different things; or that the order of nature and order of time are not to be confounded. Many things are contemporaneous or co-instantaneous which nevertheless stand in a certain logical, and even causal relation to each other. Christ commanded the man with a withered arm to stretch forth his hand. He immediately obeyed, but not before he received strength. He called to Lazarus to come forth from the grave; and he came forth. But this presupposes a restoration of life. So God commands the sinner to believe in Christ; and he thereupon receives Him as his Saviour; though this supposes supernatural power or grace.

Our Lord, however, gives another answer to this objection. He says, as recorded in John xvii. 9, "I pray not for the world, but for them which thou hast given me; for they are thine." The intercession of Christ secures for those given to Him by the Father the renewing of the Holy Ghost. The first act of the renewed heart is faith; as the first act of a restored

eye is to see. Whether this satisfies the understanding or not, it remains clear as the doctrine of the Bible that good works are the fruits and consequences of reconciliation with God, through faith in our Lord Jesus Christ.

Inconsistent with the Grace of the Gospel.

2. It is objected that the Protestant doctrine destroys the gratuitous nature of justification. If justice be satisfied; if all the demands of the law are met, there can, it is said, be no grace in the salvation of the sinner. If a man owes a debt, and some one pays it for him, the creditor shows no grace in giving an acquittal. This objection is familiar, and so also is the answer. The work of Christ is not of the nature of a commercial transaction. It is not analogous to a pecuniary satisfaction except in one point. It secures the deliverance of those for whom it is offered and by whom it is accepted. In the case of guilt the demand of justice is upon the person of the offender. He, and he alone is bound to answer at the bar of justice. No one can take his place, unless with the consent of the representative of justice and of the substitute, as well as of the sinner himself. Among men, substitution in the case of crime and its penalty is rarely, if ever admissible, because no man has the right over his own life or liberty; he cannot give them up at pleasure; and because no human magistrate has the right to relieve the offender or to inflict the legal penalty on another. But Christ had power, i.e., the right (exousia) to lay down his life and "power to take it again" And God, as absolute judge and sovereign, the Lord of the conscience, and the proprietor of all his creatures, was at full liberty to accept a substitute for sinners. This is proved beyond contradiction by what God has actually done. Under the old dispensation every sacrifice appointed by the law was a substitute for him in whose behalf it was offered. In the clearest terms it was predicted that the Messiah was to be the substitute of his people; that the chastisement of their sins was to be laid on Him, and that He was to make his soul an offering for sin. He was hailed as He entered on his ministry as the Lamb of God who was to bear the sins of the world. He died the just for the unjust. He redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us. This is what is meant by being a substitute. To deny this is to deny the central idea of the Scriptural doctrine of redemption. To explain it away, is to absorb as with a sponge the life-blood of the Gospel.

It is the glory, the power, and the preciousness of the Protestant doctrine that it makes the salvation of sinners a matter of grace from the beginning to the end. On the part of the eternal Father it was of grace, i.e., of unmerited, mysterious, and immeasurable love that He provided a substitute for sinners, and that He spared not his own Son, but freely gave Him up for us all It was a matter of grace, i.e., of love to sinners, to the ungodly, to his enemies, that the eternal Son of God became man, assumed the burden of our sins, fulfilled all righteousness, obeying and suffering even unto death, that we might not perish but have eternal life. It is of grace that the Spirit applies to men the redemption purchased by Christ; that He renews the heart; that He overcomes the opposition of sinners, making them willing in the day of his power; that He bears with all their ingratitude, disobedience, and resistance, and never leaves them until his work is consummated in glory. In all this the sinner is not treated according to his character and conduct. He has no claim to any one in this long catalogue of mercies. Everything to him is a matter of unmerited grace. Merited grace, indeed, is a solecism. And so is merited salvation in the case of sinners.

Grace does not cease to be grace because it is not exercised in violation of order,

propriety, and justice. It is not the weak fondness of a doting parent. It is the love of a holy God, who in order to reveal that love and manifest the exceeding glory of that attribute when exercised towards the unworthy, did what was necessary to render its exercise consistent with the other perfections of the divine nature. It was indispensable that God should be just in justifying the ungodly, but He does not thereby cease to be gracious, inasmuch as it was He who provided the ransom by which the objects of his love are redeemed from the curse of the law and the power of sin.

God cannot declare the Unjust to be Just.

3. Another standing objection to the Protestant doctrine has been so often met, that nothing but its constant repetition justifies a repetition of the answer. It is said to be absurd that one man should be righteous with the righteousness of another; that for God to pronounce the unjust just is a contradiction. This is a mere play on words. It is, however, very serious play; for it is caricaturing truth. It is indeed certain that the subjective, inherent quality of one person or thing cannot by imputation become the inherent characteristic of any other person or thing. Wax cannot become hard by the imputation of the hardness of a stone, nor can a brute become rational by the imputation of the intelligence of a man; nor the wicked become good by the imputation of the goodness of other men. But what has this to do with one man's assuming the responsibility of another man? If among men the bankrupt can become solvent by a rich man's assuming his responsibilities, why in the court of God may not the guilty become righteous by the Son of God's assuming their responsibilities? If He was made sin for us, why may we not be made the righteousness of God in Him? The objection assumes that the word "just" or "righteous" in this connection, expresses moral character; whereas in the Bible, when used in relation to this subject, it is always used in a judicial sense, i.e., it expresses the relation of the person spoken of to justice. Dikaios is antithetical to hupodikos. The man with regard to whom justice is unsatisfied, is hupodikos, "guilty." He with regard to whom justice is satisfied, is dikaios, "righteous." To declare righteous, therefore, is not to declare holy; and to impute righteousness is not to impute goodness; but simply to regard and pronounce chose who receive the gift of Christ's righteousness, free from condemnation and entitled to eternal life for his sake. Some philosophical theologians seem to think that there is real antagonism between love and justice in the divine nature, or that these attributes are incompatible or inharmonious. This is not so in man, why then should it be so in God? The highest form of moral excellence includes these attributes as essential elements of its perfection. And the Scriptures represent them as mysteriously blended in the salvation of man. The gospel is a revelation to principalities and powers in heaven of the polupoikilos sophia tou Theou, because therein He shows that He can be just and yet justify, love, sanctify, and glorify the chief of sinners. For which all sinners should render Him everlasting thanksgiving and praise.

Christ's Righteousness due for Himself.

4. It was natural that Socinus, who regarded Christ as a mere man, should object to the doctrine of the imputation of his righteousness to the believer, that Christ was under the same obligation to obey the law and to take his share of human suffering as other men, and therefore that his righteousness being due for Himself, could not be imputed to others. This objection is substantially urged by some who admit the divinity of Christ. In doing so, however, they virtually assume the Nestorian, or dualistic view of Christ's person. They

argue on the assumption that He was a human person, and that he stood, in virtue of his assumption of our nature, in the same relation to the law as other men. It is admitted, however, that the Son, who became incarnate, was from eternity the second person in the Godhead. If, therefore, humanity as assumed by him was a person, then we have two persons, -- two Christs, -- the one human, the other divine. But if Christ be only one person, and if that person be the eternal Son of God, the same in substance, and equal in power and glory with the Father, then the whole foundation of the objection is gone. Christ sustained no other relation to the law, except so far as voluntarily assumed, than that which God himself sustains. But God is not under the law. He is Himself the primal, immutable, and infinitely perfect law to all rational creatures. Christ's subjection to the law therefore, was as voluntary as his submitting to the death of the cross. As He did not die for Himself, so neither did He obey for Himself. In both forms of his obedience He acted for us, as our representative and substitute, that through his righteousness many might be made righteous.

As to the other form of this objection, it has the same foundation and admits of the same answer. It is said that the obedience and sufferings of Christ, being the obedience and sufferings of a mere man, or at best of only the human element in the constitution of his person, could have only a human, and, therefore, only a finite value, and consequently could be no adequate satisfaction for the sins of the whole world. Our Lord told his disciples. "Ye are of more value than many sparrows." If, then, in the sight of God a man is of far greater value than irrational creatures, why should it be thought incredible that the blood of the eternal Son of God should cleanse from all sin? What a man does with his hands, the man does; and what Christ through his human nature did, in the execution of his mediatorial work, the Son of God did. Therefore, men who spake as they were moved by the Holy Spirit did not hesitate to say, that the Lord of glory was crucified (1 Cor. ii. 8), and that God purchased the Church" with his own blood." (Acts xx. 28.) [177] If, then, the obedience rendered, and the sufferings endured, were those of a divine person, we can only shut our mouths and bow down before God in adoring wonder, with the full assurance that the merit of that obedience and of those sufferings, must be abundantly sufficient for the justification of every sinner upon earth, in the past, the present, or the future.

Believers continue Guilty, and liable to Punishment.

5. It is sometimes objected to the Protestant doctrine on this subject, that believers not only recognize themselves as justly exposed to condemnation for their present shortcomings and transgressions, but that the Scriptures so represent them, and constantly speak of God as punishing his people for their sins. How is this to be reconciled with the doctrine that they are not under condemnation; that, as regards them, justice has been fully satisfied, and that no one can justly lay anything to the charge of God's elect.

It must be admitted, or rather it is fully acknowledged that every believer feels himself unworthy of the least of God's mercies. He knows that if God were to deal with him according to his character and conduct, he must inevitably be condemned. This sense of ill-desert or demerit, is indelible. It is a righteous judgment which the sinner passes, and cannot but pass upon himself. But the ground of his justification is not in himself. The believer acknowledges that in himself he deserves nothing but indignation and wrath, not only for what he has been, but for what he now is. This is what he feels when he looks at himself. Nevertheless, he knows that there is no condemnation to them that are in Christ

Jesus; that Christ has assumed the responsibility of answering for him at the bar of God; that He constantly pleads his own perfect righteousness, as a reason why the deserved penalty should not be inflicted. If punishment were not deserved, pardon would not be gratuitous; and if not felt to be deserved, deliverance could not be received as a favour. The continued sense of ill-desert, on the part of the believer, is in no wise inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine that the claims of justice in regard to him have been satisfied by his substitute and advocate. There is a great difference, as often remarked, between demerit and guilt. The latter is the liability in justice to the penalty of the law. The former is personal ill-desert. A criminal who has suffered the legal punishment of his crime, is no longer justly exposed to punishment for that offence. He however thinks of himself no better than he did before. He knows he cannot be subjected to further punishment; but his sense of demerit is not thereby lessened. And so it is with the believer; he knows that, because of what Christ has done for him, he cannot be justly condemned, but he feels and admits that in himself he is as hell-deserving as he was from the beginning. The heart of the believer solves many difficulties which the speculative understanding finds it hard to unravel. And it need not inordinately trouble him, if the latter be dissatisfied with the solution, provided he is sure that he is under the guidance of the Spirit by the word.

This Theory concerns only the Outward.

6. Modern theologians in many instances object to the Protestant doctrine of justification, that it is outward; concerns only legal relations; disregards the true nature of the mystical union, and represents Christ and his righteousness as purely objective, instead of looking upon Christ as giving Himself, his life to become the life of the believer, and with his life conveying its merits and its power. We are not concerned at present with the theory on which this objection is founded, but simply with the objection itself. What is urged as an objection to the doctrine is true. It does concern what is outward and objective; what is done for the sinner rather than what is done within him. But then it is to be considered, first, that this is what the sinner needs. He requires not only that his nature should be renewed and that a new principle of spiritual or divine life should be communicated to him; but also that his guilt should be removed, his sins expiated, and justice satisfied, as the preliminary condition of his enjoying this new life, and being restored to the favour of God. And secondly, that such is the constant representation of Scripture, our only trustworthy guide in matters of religious doctrine. The Bible makes quite as prominent what Christ does for us, as what He does in us. It says as much of his objective, expiatory work, as of the communication of a higher spiritual life to believers. It is only by ignoring this objective work of Christ, or by merging justification into inward renovation, that this objection has force or even plausibility. Protestants do not depreciate the value and necessity of the new life derived from Christ, because, in obedience to the Scriptures, they insist so strenuously upon the satisfaction which He has rendered by his perfect righteousness to the justice of God. Without the latter, the former is impossible.

[177] The text in this passage is indeed disputed. The common text has theou "the Church of God;" which is retained by Mill, Bengel, Knapp, Hahn, and others in their editions of the New Testament. Many MSS, have kuriou kai theou; and others, simply kuriou. The fact that the phrase "the Church of God" occurs eleven times in the New Testament, while "Church of the Lord" never occurs, is urged as a reason in favour of the

latter reading, as it is assumed that transcribers would be apt to adopt a familiar, rather than unexampled expression. There may be some force in this. On the other hand, the presumption is that the sacred writers adhere to their own "usus loquendi." The words in Acts xx. 28 are Paul's words, and as he, at least in ten other cases, speaks of the "Church of God," and never once uses the expression "Church of the Lord," it is in the highest degree improbable that he uses that phrase here. Besides, it is evident that transcribers, critics, and heretics would have a strong disposition to get rid of such a phrase as "the blood of God." Modern critics do not hesitate to assign, as one of their reasons for rejecting the common text, that the expression is "too strong." The passage, however, though sacred, is not essential. the usage pervades the New Testament of predicating of the person of Christ what is true of either element, the human or the divine, of his mysteriously constituted personality. In Hebrews i. 3 the person who upholds the universe by the word of his power, is said to have purged our sins by Himself, i.e., by the sacrifice of Himself. And in ii. 14, the person whom the sacred writer had set forth as higher than the angels, as God, as creator of heaven and earth, as eternal and immutable, is said to have become partaker of flesh and blood, in order that by death He might destroy him that had the power of death. And in Philippians ii. 6, 9, he who was in the form of God and thought it not robbery to be equal with God, became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross. Nevertheless, Acts xx. 28 be not essential to prove any doctrine, those who believe it as it reads in the common text, to be part of the word of God, are bound to stand by it.

§ 10. Departures from the Protestant Doctrine.

Osiander.

During the lifetime of the Reformers, a very earnest controversy began in the Lutheran Church on the nature of justification. This arose from the views of Andreas Osiander, a man of distinguished learning and of a speculative turn of mind; eminent first as a preacher, and afterwards as a professor in the university of K&#65533;nigsberg. His principal work is entitled "De Unico Mediatore Jesu Christo et Justificatione Fidei. Confessio Andre&#65533; Osiandri." His difference of opinion from the other Reformers so clearly indicated in the following words, in which he denounces the errors which he means to oppose: "Omnes horribiliter errant. Primo, quia verbum justificare tantum pro justum reputare et pronunciare intelligunt, atque interpretantur, et non pro eo, quod est, reipsa et in veritate justum efficere. Deinde etiam in hoc quod nullam differentiam tenent inter redemptionem et justificationem, quum tamen magna differentia sit, sicut vel inde intelligi sit, quod homines furem a suspendio redimere possunt, bonum et justum efficere non possunt. Porro etiam in hoc, quod nihil certe statuere possunt, quid tandem justitia Christi sit, quam per fidem in nobis esse, nobisque imputari oporteat. Ac postremo errant omnium rudissime etiam in hoc, quod divinam naturam Christi a justificatione separant, et Christum dividunt atque solvunt, id quod haud dubie execrandi Satan&#65533; opus est." [178]

Osiander taught, (1.) That Christ has redeemed us by the satisfaction which He rendered to divine justice. (2.) But he denied that this was any part of our justification. (3.) He maintained that to justify does not mean to declare just, or to render righteous in a judicial or forensic sense, but to render inherently or subjectively just and holy. (4.) That the righteousness of Christ by which the believer is justified, and which he receives by

faith, and which is imputed to him in the judgment of God, is not, as the Protestants taught, the work of Christ, consisting in what He did and suffered as the substitute of sinners, nor is it, as Romanists teach, the work of the Holy Spirit consisting in the infusion of a holy nature or of new habits of grace, but it is the "essential righteousness of God," "the divine essence, "God Himself." (5.) That consequently the proximate and real ground of our acceptance with God, and of our reception into heaven, is what we are, or what we become, in virtue of this in-dwelling of God in the soul.

The speculations of Osiander as to the nature of God and his relation to man, might have led him under any circumstances to adopt the peculiar views above stated, but the proximate cause was no doubt the reaction from the too exclusive prominence given at that time to the objective work of Christ. This is not to be wondered at, and perhaps was not to be blamed. The Romanists, with whom the Protestants had to contend, did not deny the necessity of an inward change in the nature of fallen man. But they made this almost all of Christ's redeeming work. What He did for the expiation of sin and for meeting the demands of justice, was only to open the way for God's giving renewing and sanctifying grace to sinners. Men were themselves to merit eternal life. It was unavoidable therefore, that the Reformers should strenuously insist upon what Christ did for us and that they should protest against confounding justification with sanctification. Osiander's cast of mind made him revolt at this, and carried him completely over to the Romish side, so far as the nature of justification is concerned. He said that the Protestant doctrine of justification is "colder than ice." It is as though a man should pay the ransom of a Turkish slave, and leave him and his children in bondage. Still more violent is his denunciation of the doctrine that Christ's righteousness, of which we partake through faith, consists of his obedience and sufferings. What good can they do us? Christ obeyed and suffered centuries ago; we cannot appropriate what He then did and make it our own. Imputing it to us does not alter the case. It does not make us better. Speculative as well as Biblical reasons, however, prevented Osiander from accepting the Romish solution of the difficulty. What we are said to receive is "the righteousness of Christ," "the righteousness of God;" but sanctifying grace is never called the righteousness of God. If, therefore, that righteousness by which the believer is constituted righteous, be neither the obedience of Christ, nor infused grace, what can it be other than the essential righteousness of God, the divine essence itself? Calvin, who in his "Institutes" earnestly combats the theory of Osiander, says that he invented "monstrum nescio quod essentialis justiti&#65533;." "Dilucide exprimit, se non ea justitia contentum, qu&#65533; nobis obedientia et sacrificio mortis Christi parta est, fingere nos substantialiter in Deo justos esse tam essentia quam qualitate infusa. . . . . Substantialem mixtionem ingerit, qua Deus se in nos transfundens, quasi partem sui faciat. Nam virtute Spiritus sancti fieri, ut coalescamus cum Christo, nobisque sit caput et nos ejus membra, fere pro nihilo ducit, nisi ejus essentia nobis misceatur." [179]

But what theory of the nature of God and of his relation to man did Osiander hold, which admitted of this doctrine of the infusion of the divine essence into the soul? His views on this point were not clearly brought out, but the primary idea which underlies his speculation is the old doctrine of the oneness of God and man. Man is God in at least one form of his existence. He held that Christ is the image, the representative, the realized ideal of the Godhead, not as Logos or Son, but as Godman, the Theanthropos. As from its nature or from the nature of God this idea realized, this manifestation of God in his true idea must

occur, and therefore the incarnation would have taken place had man never sinned. The fall of Adam only modified the circumstances attending the incarnation, determining that it should involve suffering and death. But the incarnation itself, the appearance of God in fashion as a man arose from a law of the divine nature. Adam was created not after the image of God as such, but after the image of Christ; in some sort, a God-man. The affinity of this theory with the modern pantheistic speculations is apparent. Baur, therefore, is doubtless right when he says, at the close of his apologetic notice of Osiander's doctrine, that his idea of the relation between the divine and human "is that which at last found its adequate scientific expression by Schleiermacher and Hegel, that Christ as Redeemer is the perfected creation of human nature; or, that the divine nature is the truth of humanity, and human nature the reality, or existence-form (die Wirklichkeit) of the divine nature." [180]

Stancarus.

Stancarus, a contemporary and opponent of Osiander, went to the extreme of asserting that the righteousness of Christ was the work of his human nature exclusively. This doctrine was however repudiated by the Romanists as well as by Protestants. If it was Christ's human nature as such (and not the divine person) who obeyed, then the human nature in Christ was a distinct subsistence, and thus the unity of his person is destroyed. Besides, if it was not a divine person in his human nature who obeyed and suffered, then we have but a human Saviour, and a righteousness of no higher than a human value. We know from Scripture that it was the Lord of glory who was crucified, the Son of God who, being born of a woman, was made under the law.

Piscator.

The first conspicuous departure from the Protestant doctrine of justification among the Reformed, was on the part of Piscator, whose denial of the imputation of the active obedience of Christ to the believer, excited for some years a good deal of discussion, but it passed away without leaving any distinct trace in the theology of the Reformation. Baur, indeed, assigns to it more importance, as he regards it as the first step in the downfall of the whole doctrine of the satisfaction of Christ, over which he rejoices. Piscator was a native of Strasburg, and a member of the Lutheran Church, to whose service his first ministerial and professional labors were devoted. It coming to the knowledge of the ecclesiastical authorities that in his exposition of the Epistle to the Philippians he denied the ubiquity of the human nature of Christ, and taught the doctrine of predestination, he was deprived of his position in the Lutheran Church and passed over to the Reformed. He was soon appointed one of the professors of the new Institution of Hebron founded by the Duke of Nassau. He remained in connection with that institution from 1584 until his death in 1625, in the seventy-ninth year of his age. He was a prolific writer. Besides a new translation of the Bible, he wrote numerous commentaries on books of the Old and New Testaments, and conducted many controversies with Lutherans and Romanists, before he embroiled himself with the theologians of his own church. [181] He took the ground that the "imputatio justiti&#65533;" and "remissio peccatorum" are identical; the former means nothing more than the latter; and consequently that Christ's work consists simply in the expiation of sin. His active obedience to the divine law constitutes no part of the righteousness by which the believer is justified before God. He admits that Christ rendered a twofold obedience, -- the one to the law of God as a rule of duty; the other to the special command given to Him as Mediator.

He came to accomplish a certain work; to do the will of the Father, which was to make satisfaction for sin. In this we are interested; but his obedience to the moral law was for Himself, and was the necessary condition of his satisfaction. He could not have made atonement for others had He not been Himself holy. "Tribuitur morti," he says, [182] "quod ei tribuendum, nimirum, quod sit plenissima satisfactio pro peccatis nostris; sic etiam vit obedienti tribuitur, quod scriptura ei tribuendum perhibet, nimirum, quod sit causa, sine qua non potuerat Christus idoneus esse mediator inter Deum et hominem." Although Piscator made some effort to prove exegetically that pardon and justification, the remission of sin and imputation of righteousness, are identical, yet his arguments against the received doctrine, that the obedience of Christ is part our justifying righteousness, are not Biblical. The question before his mind was not simply, What do the Scriptures teach? but, What is true, logical, and symmetrical? He saw objections to the imputation of the active obedience of Christ, which seemed to him fatal, and on the ground of those objections he rejected the doctrine. Thus, for example, he argues that Christ's obedience to the law was due from Himself as a man, and therefore not imputable to others. He argues thus, [183] "Qui Christum dicunt ubique ut hominem, Christum dicunt non hominem, dum enim dico ubique, dico Deum, qui solus est in coelo et in terra. Similiter cum dico subjectum legi, dico hominem. Qui ergo Christum subjectum legi negant, negant ipsum esse hominem." Every man as such in virtue of being a man's individually bound to obey the moral law. Christ was a man; therefore He was bound to obey the law for Himself. He did not perceive, or was not willing to admit, that the word "man" is taken in different senses in the different members of this syllogism, and therefore, the conclusion is vitiated. In the first clause, "man" means a human person; in the second clause, it means human nature. Christ was not a human person, although He assumed human nature. He was a man in the sense in which we are dust and ashes. But because we are dust, it does not follow that all that may be predicated of dust, may be predicated of us; e.g., that we have no life, no reason, no immortality. In like manner, although the eternal Son of God took upon Himself a true body and a reasonable soul, yet as He was a divine person, it does not follow that everything that is true of human persons must be true of Him. Piscator also argues that the law binds either to punishment or to obedience, but not to both at once. Therefore, if Christ's obedience is imputed to us, there was no necessity that He should die for us. On the other hand, if He died for us, there was no necessity that He should obey for us. The principle here assumed may be true with regard to unfallen man. But where sin has been committed there is need of expiation as well as of obedience, and of obedience as well as expiation, if the reward of perfect obedience is to be conferred. Again, he says, if Christ has fulfilled the law for us, we are not bound to keep it. This is the old objection of the Jews; if justified by grace we may live in sin. But Christ has fulfilled the law for us only as a covenant of works. In that sense, says the Apostle, we are not under the law, but it does not thence follow that we are free from all moral obligation arising from our relation to God, as rational creatures. It may be true as Baur, himself a thorough skeptic in the English and American sense of that word, thinks, that this innovation of Piscator prepared the way for the rejection of the whole Scriptural doctrine of satisfaction. Certain it is that both Lutherans and Reformed united, with scarcely a dissenting voice, in the condemnation of Piscator's doctrine. It was judicially repudiated by the national Synod of France on several different occasions; first in 1603, again at La Rochelle in 1607, and afterwards in 1612 and 1613. The Swiss churches

in the "Formula Consensus Helvetica," which received symbolical authority in Switzerland, pronounced clearly in favour of the old doctrine. This matter was soon lost sight of in consequence of the rise of Arminianism of far more historical importance.

The Arminian Doctrine.

Jacobus Arminius, a man of learning, talents, attractive accomplishments, and exemplary character, was born in Holland 1560, and died professor in the University of Leyden, in 1609, having filled the chair of theology since 1603. His departures from the Reformed doctrines in which he had been educated were far less serious than those of his successors, although involving them, apparently, by a logical necessity. His great difficulty was with the doctrine of predestination or the sovereignty of God in election. He could not, however, get rid of that doctrine without denying the entire inability of man to do what is spiritually good. He, therefore, taught that although mankind fell in Adam and are born in a state of sin and condemnation, and are of themselves entirely unable to turn from sin to holiness, yet that they are able to co�perate with the grace of the Holy Spirit given to all men, especially to all who hear the Gospel, in sufficient measure to enable them to repent and believe, and to persevere in holy living unto the end. But whether any man doe thus repent and believe, or, having believed, perseveres in a holy life, depends on himself and not on God. The purpose of election, therefore, is not a purpose to save, and to that end to give faith and repentance to a definite number of individuals, but a purpose to save those who repent, believe, and persevere in faith until the end. The work of Christ has, therefore, an equal reference to all men. He made full satisfaction to God for the sins of all and every man, so that God can now consistently offer salvation to all men on the conditions laid down in the Gospel.

This is a self-consistent scheme. One part implies, or necessitates admission of the others. The above statement includes all the doctrines presented by the followers of Arminius, after his death, to the authorities in the form of a Remonstrance, as a justification of their views. Hence the Arminians were called Remonstrants. The document just mentioned contains the five points on which its authors and their associates differed from the Reformed faith. The first relates to predestination, which is explained as the purpose "illos in Christo, propter Christum et per Christum servare, qui Spiritus Sancti gratia, in eundem ejus filjum credunt, et in ea, fideique obedientia, per eandem gratiam in finem perseverant: contra vero eos, qui non convertentur et infideles, in peccato et ir� subjectos relinquere, et condemnare, secundum illud Evang. Joann. iii. 36."

The second relates to the work of Christ, as to which it is said, "Proinde Jesum Christum mundi servatorem pro omnibus et singulis mortuum esse, atque ita quidem, ut omnibus per mortem Christi reconciliationem et peccatorum remissionem impetravit: ea tamen conditione, ut nemo illa remissione peccatorum re ipsa fruatur, pr�ter hominem fidelem, et hoc quoque secundum Evang. Joann. iii. 16, et 1 Joann. ii. 2."

The third, concerning the sinner's ability, declares, "Hominem vero salutarem fidem a se ipso non habere, nec vi liberi sui arbitrii, quandoquidem in statu defectionis et peccati nihil boni, quandoquidem vere bonum est, quale quid est fides salutaris, ex se possit cogitare, vel facere: sed necessarium esse eum a Deo in Christo per Spiritum Sanctum regigni et renovari mente, affectibus, seu voluntate et omnibus facultatibus, ut aliquid boni possit intelligere, cogitare, velle et perficere. Ev. Joann. xv. 5." No Augustinian, whether

Lutheran or Calvinist, can say more than that, or desire more to be said by others.

The fourth article, concerning grace, however, shows the point of departure: "Hanc Dei gratiam esse initium, progressum ac perfectionem omnis boni, atque id eo quidem usque ut ipse homo regenitus absque hac pr&#65533;cedentia, sen adventitia excitante, consequente et cooperante gratia, neque boni quid cogitare, velle, aut facere possit, neque etiam ulli mal&#65533; tentatione resistere; adeo quidem ut omnia bona opera, qu&#65533; excogitare possumus, Dei grati&#65533; in Christo tribuenda sint; quod vero modum operationis illius grati&#65533;, illa non irresistibilis; de multis enim dicitur eos Spiritui Sancto resistere, Act. vii. 51 et alibi multis locis." It was not to be expected, in a brief exposition of principles designed for the justification of those who hold them, as members of a Reformed or Calvinistic church, that doubtful terms should be explained. It is beyond controversy, however, and, it is believed, is not controverted, that irresistible is here used in the sense of certainty efficacious. The Holy Spirit operates on the hearts of all men. Some are thereby renewed and brought to faith and repentance; others are not. This difference, according to the Remonstrants, is not to be referred to the nature of the influence exerted, but to the fact that some yield to this grace and co&#65533;perate with it; while others reject and resist it.

The fifth article refers to the perseverance of the saints, and is indefinite. It admits that the Spirit furnishes grace abundantly sufficient to enable the believer to persevere in holiness: "Sed an illi ipsi negligentia sua initium sui esse in Christo deserere non possint, et pr&#65533;sentem mundum iterum amplecti, a sancta doctrina ipsis semel tradita deficere, conscienti&#65533; naufragium facere, a gratia excidere; penitus ex sacra Scriptura esset expendum, antequam illud cum plena animi tranquillitate et plerophoria docere possent." Of course no man who believed the doctrine could write thus, and this doubtful mode of expression was soon laid aside, and "falling from grace," in the common sense of the phrase, was admitted to be an Arminian doctrine.

It will be observed that the doctrine of justification is not embraced in the five points in the Remonstrance as presented to the authorities in Holland, and as made the basis of the decisions of the Synod of Dort. The aberration of the Arminians, however, from the faith of the Reformed churches, extended to all the doctrines connected with the plan of salvation. Arminius himself, at least, held far higher and more Scriptural views on original sin, inability, and the necessity of supernatural grace, than those which have since become so prevalent even among the Reformed or Calvinistic churches themselves. In matters concerning the method of salvation, especially as to the nature of Christ's work and its application to the believer, they at first adhered closely to the language of the Reformed confessions. Thus they did not hesitate to say that Christ made full satisfaction for the sins of men; that He was a ransom, a sacrifice, a propitiation; that He made expiation for sin; that his righteousness or obedience is the ground of our acceptance with God; that the faith which saves is not mere assent to truth, or pious confidence in God, but specifically faith in Christ as the Saviour of men; and that justification is an act of God pronouncing the sinner just, or in which He pardons sin and accepts the sinner as righteous. All this is satisfactory to the ear. Language, however, admits a different interpretations and it soon became apparent and avowed that the Remonstrants intended something very different from what the Reformed Church meant to express by the same terms.

1. They said that Christ's work was a satisfaction to divine justice. But they did not

mean by satisfaction, either a "solutio," a real value rendered for what was due; nor even an "acceptio," taking one thing for another as an equivalent; but an "acceptilatio," a gracious acceptance as a satisfaction of that which in its own nature was no equivalent; as though God should accept the life of a brute for that of a man; or faith for perfect obedience. Neither did the Remonstrants mean by justice the attribute which requires the righteous distribution of rewards and punishments, and which renders it necessary that the penalty of the law should be executed in case of transgression.

With regard to this latter point (the nature of justice) the language of Grotius, and of the great body of the Remonstrant or Arminian theologians, is perfectly explicit. Grotius says: "Poenas infligere, aut a poenis aliquem liberare, quem punire possis, quod justificare vocat Scriptura, non est nisi rectoris, qua talis primo et per se: ut, puta, in familia patris; in republica regis, in universo Dei. . . . . Unde sequitur, omnino hic Deum considerandum, ut rectorem." [184] Again, [185] "Ratio [cur rectori relaxare legem talem non liceat, nisi causa aliqua accedat, si non necessaria, certe sufficiens'] . . . . est, quod actus ferendi aut relaxandi legem non sit actus absoluti dominii, sed actus imperii, qui tendere debeat ad boni ordinis conservationem." [186] "Poena enim omnis propositum habet bonum commune." "Prudentia quoque hoc nomine rectorem ad poenam incitat. Augetur pr&#xfffd;terea causa puniendi, ubi lex aliqua publicata est, qu&#xfffd; poenam minatur. Nam tunc omissio poen&#xfffd; ferme aliquid detrahit de legis authoritate apud subditos." [187]

Here everything is purely governmental. It is not justice, in the proper and ordinary sense of the word, that is satisfied, but God's wise and benevolent regard to the interests of his moral government. This changes everything. If God's justice be not satisfied guilt is not removed, and sin is not expiated. And therefore conscience is not appeased; nor can the real authority and honour of the law be upheld.

As to the other point, the nature of the satisfaction rendered it was not a real equivalent, which by its intrinsic value met the obligations of the sinner, but it was something graciously accepted as such. Although Grotius rejects the use of the word "acceptilatio," and endeavours to show that it does not express his meaning, nevertheless, though he repudiates the word, he retains the idea. He says, [188] "Ea est pretii natura, ut sui valore aut &#xfffd;stimatione alterum moveat ad concedendam rem, aut jus aliquod, puta impunitatem." This amounts to the principle of Duns Scotus that a thing avails (is worth) for what God pleases to take it. Although Grotius does not carry out the principle to the length to which the Schoolmen carried it, and say that God might have accepted the death of one man as a satisfaction for the sins of the world, or the blood of bulls or of goats as a real expiation, nevertheless, he teaches that God graciously accepted "aliquid pro aliquo," the death of Christ for the death of all the world, not because of its being a real equivalent in itself, but because as ruler, having the right to remit sin without any satisfaction, He saw that the interests of his government could thereby be promoted. Still more clearly is this idea expressed by Limborch: [189] "In eo errant quam maxime, quod velint redemtionis pretium per omnia equivalens esse debere miseri&#xfffd; illi, e qua redemtio fit: redemtionis pretium enim constitui solet pro libera &#xfffd;stimatione illius, qui captivum detinet, non autem solvi pro captivi merito. . . . . Ita pretium, quod Christus persolvit, juxta Dei Patris &#xfffd;stimationem persolutum est."

According to Grotius, Christ died as an example, "exemplum poen&#xfffd;." The whole

efficacy of his work was its moral impression on the universe. It was not an expiation or satisfaction for past sins, but a means of deterring from the commission of sin in the future. This, as Baur [190] and Strauss [191] remark, is the point in which the theory of Grotius and that of Socinus coincide. They both refer the efficacy of Christ's work to the moral impression which it makes on the minds of intelligent creatures. They refer that moral influence, indeed, to different causes, but moral impression is all the efficacy it has. Although the word satisfaction is retained by Grotius, the idea attached to it by the Church is rejected. The leading Remonstrant or Arminian theologians, as Episcopius, Curcell&#65533;us, and Limborch, differ from Grotius in their mode of presenting this subject. Instead of regarding the work of Christ as an example of punishment, designed to deter from the commission of sin, they adhere to the Scriptural mode of regarding Him as a ransom and sacrifice. The difference however is more in form than in reality. They admit that Christ redeems us by giving Himself as a ransom for many. But a ransom, as Curcell&#65533;us says, is not an equivalent; it is anything the holder of the captive sees fit to accept. It is admitted, also, that Christ gave Himself as a sacrifice for our salvation; but a sacrifice is said not to be a satisfaction to justice, but simply the condition on which pardon is granted. Under the Old Testament God pardoned sin on the occasion of the sacrifice of irrational animals; under the New Testament, on the occasion of the sacrifice of Christ. "Sacrificia," says Limborch, [192] "non sunt solutiones debitorum, neque plenari&#65533; pro peccatis satisfactiones; sed illis peractis conceditur gratuita peccati remissio." "Redemtionis pretium constitui solet pro libera &#65533;stimatione illius, qui captivum detinet." We know, however, from Scripture that a sacrifice was not merely an arbitrarily appointed antecedent of gratuitous forgiveness; it was not simply an acknowledgment of guilt. We know also that the blood of bulls and of goats under the Old Testament could not take away sin; it availed only to the purifying of the flesh, or the remission of ceremonial penalties. The only efficacy of the Old Testament sacrifices, so far as sin committed against God is concerned, was sacramental; that is, they signified, sealed, and applied the benefits of the only real and effectual expiation for sin, to those who believed. As the victim symbolically bore the penalty due to the offender, so the eternal Son of God really bore our sins, really became a curse for us, and thus made a true and perfect satisfaction to God for our offences.

2. As the Remonstrants denied that Christ's work was a real satisfaction for sin, they of necessity denied any real justification of the sinner. Justification with them is merely pardon. This is asserted by Grotius in the passage above cited; and even the Rev. Richard Watson, whose excellent system of theology, or "Theological Institutes," is deservedly in high repute among the Wesleyan Methodists, not only over and over defines justification as pardon, but elaborately argues the question. "The first point," he says, "which we find established by the language of the New Testament is, that justification, the pardon and remission of sins, the non-imputation of sin, and the imputation of righteousness, are terms and phrases of the same import." [193] He then goes on to establish that position.

If therefore, pardon and justification are distinct things, the one the executive act of a ruler, the other a judicial act; the one setting aside the demands of justice, the other a declaration that justice is satisfied; then those who reduce justification to mere pardon, deny the doctrine of justification as understood and professed by the Lutheran and Reformed churches. It of course is not intended that these Remonstrant or Arminian theologians do not hold what they call justification; nor is it denied that they at times, at

least, express their doctrine in the very language of the Symbols of the Protestant churches. Thus the Remonstrants [194] say, "Justificatio est actio Dei, quam Deus pure pute in sua ipsius mente efficit, quia nihil aliud est, quam volitio aut decretum, quo peccata remittere, et justitiam imputare aliquando vult iis, qui credunt, id est, quo vult poenas, peccatis eorum promeritas, iis non infligere, eosque tanquam justos tractare et premio afficere." Nevertheless they tell us that they mean by this only pardon. Protestants, when they say justification includes pardon "and" the imputation of righteousness, mean two distinct things by pardon and imputation of righteousness. The Remonstrants regard them as identical, and, therefore, can use the very language of Protestants, while rejecting their doctrine. As every one feels and knows that when a criminal is pardoned by the executive, and allowed to resume his rights of property and right of voting, he is not thereby justified; so every candid mind must admit that there is an immense difference between the Remonstrant or Arminian doctrine of justification and that held as the cardinal principle of the Reformation by both Lutherans and Reformed.

3. This difference becomes still more apparent when we consider what the Remonstrants make the ground of justification As they deny that Christ made any real satisfaction to divine justice (as distinguished from benevolence), so they deny that the righteousness of Christ is imputed to the believer as the ground of his justification. On this point, Limborch [195] says, "H�c autem, qu� nobis imputatur, non est Christi justitia; nus quam enim Scriptura docet, Christi justitiam nobis imputari; sed tantum fidem nobis imputari in justitiam, et quidem propter Christum." And Curcell�us [196] says, "Nullibi docet Scriptura justitiam Christi nobis imputari. Et id absurdum est. Nemo enim in se injustus aliena justitia potest esse formaliter justus, non magis, quam aliena albedine �thiops esse albus."

As the righteousness of Christ is not imputed to the believer, the ground of his justification, that which is accepted as righteousness, is faith and its fruits, or faith and evangelical obedience. On this subject Limborch says, [197] that under the new covenant God demands "obedientiam fidei, hoc est, non rigidam et omnibus �qualem, prout exigebat lex; sed tantam, quantam fides, id est, certa de divinis promissionibus persuasio, in unoquoque efficere potest; in qua etiam Deus multas imperfectiones et lapsus condonat, modo animo sincero pr�ceptorum ipsius observationi incumbamus, et continuo in eadem proficere studeamus."

And again, [198] "Deus non judicat hominum justitiam esse perfectam, imo eam judicat esse imperfectam; sed justitiam, quam imperfectam judicat, gratiose accipit ac si perfecta esset." He, therefore, [199] thus defines justification, "Est gratiosa �stimatio, seu potius acceptatio justiti� nostr� imperfect� (qu�, si Deus rigide nobiscum agere vellet, in judicio Dei nequaquam consistere posset) pro perfecta, propter Jesum Christum."

The same view is presented when he speaks of faith in its relation to justification. Faith is said to be imputed for righteousness; but Limborch says, [200] "Sciendum, quando dicimus, nos fide justificari, nos non excludere opera, qu� fides exigit et tanquam foecunda mater producit; sed ea includere." Again, [201] "Fides est conditio in nobis et a nobis requisita, ut justificationem consequamur. Est itaque talis actus, qui, licet in se spectatus perfectus nequaquam sit, sed in multis deficiens, tamen a Deo gratiosa et liberrima voluntate pro pleno et perfecto acceptatur et propter quem Deus homini gratiose

remissionem peccatorum et vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533; pr&#65533;mium conferre vult."

Fletcher [202] says, "With respect to the Christless law of paradisaical obedience, we entirely disclaim sinless perfection." "We shall not be judged by that law; but by a law adapted to our present state and circumstances, a milder law, called the law of Christ." "Our Heavenly Father never expects of us, in our debilitated state, the obedience of immortal Adam in paradise."

Dr. Peck [203] says, "The standard of character set up in the Gospel must be such as is practicable by man, fallen as he is. Coming up to this standard is what we call Christian perfection."

Under the covenant of works as made with Adam, perfect obedience was the condition of acceptance with God and of eternal life; under the Gospel, for Christ's sake, imperfect, or evangelical obedience, is the ground of justification, i.e., it is that (propter quam) on account of which God graciously grants us the remission of sin and the reward of eternal life.

We have then the three great systems. First, that of the Romanists, which teaches that on account of the work of Christ God grants, through Christian baptism, an infusion of divine grace, by which all sin is purged from the soul and all ground for the infliction of the penalty is removed and the sinner rendered inherently just or holy. This is the first justification. Then in virtue of the new principle of spiritual life thus imparted, the baptized or regenerated are enabled to perform good works, which are really meritorious and on account of which they are admitted to heaven.

Secondly, the Arminian theory, that on account of what Christ has done, God is pleased to grant sufficient grace to all men, and to accept the imperfect obedience which the believer is thus enabled to render in lieu of the perfect obedience required under the covenant made with Adam, and on account of that imperfect obedience, eternal life is graciously bestowed.

Thirdly, the Protestant doctrine that Christ, as the representative and substitute of sinners or of his people, takes their place under the law, and in their name and in their behalf fulfils all righteousness, thereby making a real, perfect, and infinitely meritorious satisfaction to the law and justice of God, which righteousness is imputed, or set to the account of the believer, who is thereupon and on that account freely pardoned and pronounced righteous in the sight of God, and entitled not only to the remission of sin but also to eternal life. Being united to Christ by faith, the believer becomes partaker of his life, so that it is not he that lives but Christ that liveth in him, and the life which the believer now lives in the flesh is by faith of the Son of God, who loved him, and gave Himself for him.

Comparison of the Different Doctrines.

The first remark which suggests itself on the comparison of these several schemes is, that the relation between the believer and Christ is far more close, peculiar, and constant on the Protestant scheme than on any other. He is dependent on Him every hour; for the imputation of his righteousness; for the supplies of the Spirit of life; and for his care, guidance, and intercession. He must look to Him continually; and continually exercise faith in Him as an ever present Saviour in order to live. According to the other schemes, Christ has merely made the salvation of all men possible. There his work ended. According to

Romanists, He has made it possible that God should give sanctifying grace in baptism; according to the Remonstrants, He has rendered it possible for Him to give sufficient grace to all men whereby to sanctify and save themselves. We are well aware that this is theory; that the true people of God, whether Romanists or Remonstrants, do not look on Christ thus as a Saviour afar off. They doubtless have the same exercises towards Him that their fellow believers have; nevertheless, such is the theory. The theory places a great gulf between the soul and Christ.

Secondly, it hardly admits of question that the Protestant view conforms to the Scriptural mode of presenting the plan of salvation. Christ in the Bible is declared to be the head of his people, their representative; they were in Him in such a sense that they died in Him; they are raised with Him, and sit with Him in heavenly places. They were in Him as the race was in Adam, and as branches are in the vine. They individually receive the sprinkling of that blood which cleanses from all sin. They are constituted righteous by his obedience. As He was made sin for them, so are they made the righteousness of God in Him. He is not only an example of punishment as Grotius represents, a mere governmental device, but a sacrifice substituted for us, on whose head every believer must lay his hand and to whom he must transfer the burden of his sins.

Thirdly, what is included indeed in the above, but is so important and decisive as to require distinct and repeated mention; all schemes, other than the Protestant, refer the proximate ground of our acceptance with God to our own subjective character. It is because of our own goodness that we are regarded and treated as righteous. Whereas conscience demands, the Scriptures reveal, and the believer instinctively seeks something better than that. His own goodness is badness. It cannot satisfy his own bleared vision; how then can it appear before the eyes of God? It matters not how the Romanist may exalt his "inward habits of grace;" or how the Arminian may sublimate his evangelical obedience to perfection; neither can satisfy either the conscience or God.

Fourthly, the Protestant doctrine is the only one on which the soul can live. This has been urged before when speaking of the work of Christ. It is fair to appeal from theology to hymnology from the head to the heart; from what man thinks to what God makes men feel. It is enough to say on this point, that Lutheran and Reformed Christians can find nowhere, out of the Bible, more clear, definite, soul-satisfying expression of their doctrinal views upon this subject, than are to be found in many, of the hymns of the Latin and Arminian churches. As a single example may be cited the following stanzas from John Wesley's "Hymns and Spiritual Songs": --

"Join, earth and heaven to bless
The Lord our Righteousness.
The mystery of redemption this,
This the Saviour's strange design --
Man's offence was counted his.
Ours his righteousness divine.
"In Him complete we shine;
His death, his life, is mine;
Fully am I justified,

Free from sin, and more than free,

Guiltless, since for me He died;

Righteous, since He lived for me."

[178] Confessio, K&#65533;nigsberg, 1551; by count, pp. 42, 43, of the text.

[179] Institutio, III. xi. 5, edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 8.

[180] Baur, Die Christliche Lehre von der Vers&#65533;hnung, II. i. 1, T&#65533;bingen, 1838, p. 330, note.

[181] Theses Theolog., vol. iii. locus 39: "De causa meritoria justificationis hominis coram Deo, sive de ea re, qu&#65533; a Deo ad justitiam imputatur."

[182] Loc. xxvi. p. 331.

[183] Loc. xxvi. p. 334.

[184] De Satisfactione Christi, cap. 2; Works, edit. London, 1679, vol. iii. p. 306, b (19-24).

[185] Ibid. cap. 5; p. 317, b (35-41).

[186] Ibid. cap. 2; p. 308, b (62, 63).

[187] Ibid. cap. 5; p. 316, b (9-13).

[188] De Satisfactione Christi, cap. 8; Works, edit. London, 1679, vol. iii. p. 328, b (12-14).

[189] Theologia Christiana, III. xxi. 8, edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 262, a.

[190] Die christliche Lehre von der Vers&#65533;hnung, II. i. 4, T&#65533;bingen, 1838, p. 429.

[191] Dogmatik, T&#65533;bingen and Stuttgart, 1841, vol. ii. p. 315.

[192] Theologia Christiana, III. xxi. 6, 8, ut supra, pp. 261, a, 262, a.

[193] II. xxiii.; edit. New York, 1832, p. 426.

[194] Apologia pro Confessione Remonstrantium, cap. 11, 12; Episcopii Opera, edit. Rotterdam, 1665, vol. ii. p. 166, a, of second set.

[195] Theologia Christiana, VI. iv. 18, ut supra, p. 703, a.

[196] Relig. Christ. Inst. 7, 9, 6.

[197] Theologia Christiana, VI. iv. 37, ut supra, p. 706, a.

[198] Ibid. VI. iv. 41; p. 706, b, 707, a.

[199] Ibid. VI. iv. 18; p. 703, a.

[200] Ibid. VI. iv. 32; p. 705, b.

[201] Ibid. VI. iv. 31; p. 705, a.

[202] Last Check to Antinomianism, sect. i; Works, N. Y. 1833, vol. ii. pp. 493, 494.

[203] Christian Perfection, New York, 1843, p. 294.

§ 11. Modern Views on Justification.

Rationalistic Theories.

These cannot be given in detail. Certain classes of opinions can be referred to only in the briefest manner. The Rationalists were divided into two classes; first, those who

regarded the Scriptures as a supernatural revelation of natural religion, or of the truths of reason; and secondly, those who denied the supernatural origin of the Scriptures altogether, assigning to them no higher authority than belongs to the writings of good and wise men.

The former class came to agree very nearly with the latter as to what the Bible actually teaches, or, at least, as to what is by us to be regarded and received as true. Those who admitted the divine origin of the Scriptures got rid of its distinctive doctrines by the adoption of a low theory of inspiration, and by the application of arbitrary principles of interpretation. Inspiration was, in the first instance, confined to the religious teachings of the Bible, then to the ideas or truths, but not to the form in which they were presented, nor to the arguments by which they were supported. The fact that Christ saves men in some way was admitted, but not as a sacrifice nor as a ransom, nor by being a substitute for sinners. The miracles of Christ were acknowledged as historical facts, but they were explained as mere natural events distorted by the imaginations of spectators and historians. It was granted by some that Christ and the Apostles did teach the Church doctrines, but this, it was said, was done only by way of accommodation to the prejudices, superstitions, or modes of thought of the men of that generation. The first step in this process was the denial of all distinction between the prophetic, priestly, and kingly offices of Christ. In this way a wet sponge was passed over all the doctrines of redemption, and their outlines obliterated. This unnatural process could not be long continued, and, therefore, the majority of Rationalists soon threw off all regard to the normal authority of the Bible, and avowed their faith in nothing which did not commend itself to their own understanding as true, and for that reason alone.

As to the doctrine of justification, the whole tendency of the efforts during this period was, as Baur correctly says, [204] to make the reconciliation of man to God the work of the man himself. "A man was entitled to regard himself as reconciled with God as soon as he determined to repent and to reform." God was regarded as a father. A father is displeased with a son only so long as he is disobedient. The only end of any chastisement he may inflict, is the reformation of his child. If that be accomplished, all necessity and all propriety of punishment cease. Wegscheider, a representative of this class of theologians, says, [205] "Quicunque e vita turpi, qua poenas sibi contraxit, ad virtutem emerserit, is eadem proportione, qua jam in virtutis studio progressus fuerit, in gratiam cum Deo reversus, ab eodem pr&#65533;miis dignus judicabitur."

Philosophical Theories.

The philosophical theories on this subject were as different as the systems on which they were founded. Some of these systems were theistic, others pantheistic, and others monistic, i.e., founded "a the oneness of God and man, without denying the distinct personality of either.

The influence of Kant's philosophy upon theology, for a time at least, was very great, and in some aspects salutary. As he exalted the power of the pure reason, making it give law to the outward, subordinating, as his disciples say, the objective to the subjective, so in the sphere of religion and morality he exalted the power and authority of the practical reason. Everything was subordinate to moral excellence. Happiness was not the end. It was only a means of promoting and rewarding what is morally good. The attainment of the highest amount of moral excellence requires perfect harmony between happiness and

goodness, that is, that rational creatures should be happy in exact proportion to their goodness, and miserable in proportion as they are wicked. The punishment of sin is therefore inevitable. It is determined by the immutable moral order of the universe, which can no more be changed or set aside than any physical law on which the existence or order of the external world depends.

From these principles some of the Kantian theologians inferred that the pardon of sin is impossible. Misery is as inseparable from sin as pain is from the laceration of the body. If the only punishment of sin, however, be its natural consequences, then the removal of sin effects the removal of punishment. This determines the view which many of the disciples of Kant take of the nature of redemption. It is purely subjective. Men are delivered from sin and thereby from its punishment.

To others, however, this view was unsatisfactory, (1.) Because the punishment of sin is not purely or exclusively natural. It is not so even in this world, as is proved by the deluge, by the destruction of the cities of the plain, and by a thousand other instances. Much less is it true with regard to the future world. Conscience is not the only worm that never dies, or remorse the only fire which is never quenched. (2.) Because this theory reverses the natural order of events. It makes reformation precede pardon, whereas pardon must precede reformation. On this point Bretschneider [206] quotes even Ewald [207] as saying, "It is as unpsychological as it is unchristian so to present Christian reformation, that a man must become better before he is forgiven. It is precisely through the love of God anticipating our reformation, by which the man morally dead is quickened, that the elements of all religion, gratitude, trust, and love are called into exercise." This is certainly Paul's doctrine. (3.) The theory in question overlooks guilt, responsibility to justice for sins already committed. (4.) The ends of punishment (according to the Kantians) are, first, the satisfaction of the moral excellence of God, who by necessity of his moral perfection must punish sin; secondly, the improvement of the offender; and thirdly, the upholding the moral order of the universe. The two former of these ends, Bretschneider says, may be answered by the reformation of the sinner. When a man ceases to sin, he ceases to be opposed to God, and God ceases to be opposed to him. But the third end of punishment, namely, preserving the moral order of the universe, is not answered by the sinner's reformation. He is not the only person to be considered. The interests of morality would suffer, if he were rendered happy notwithstanding his past transgression. The question then is, is there any way in which the authority of the moral law can be sustained, and yet the sinner be forgiven and rendered blessed? The Church answer to this question, the disciples of Kant reject as contrary to reason; but reason, says Bretschneider, has nothing to object to the doctrine stated generally that God can consistently pardon sin for Christ's sake. He sums up under the following heads, what reason may accept in regard to this whole subject. (1.) That the divine nature of Christ rendered his sufferings more important for the spiritual world and more available for man than they otherwise would have been. (2.) We cannot properly say that He suffered the penalty of the law, or the punishment of our sins, but that He endured his unmerited sufferings for the good of the world. (3.) That He did not make satisfaction for sin, but rendered secure the moral order of the universe. (4.) Although He did not make satisfaction, He procured or mediated our pardon. He is not our sponsor, but our "mediator salutis." (5.) The expression "the merit of Christ" does not mean any good imputed to us, or any title belonging to us, but simply the claim of Christ that his sufferings shall avail to the good of

men. (6.) The word "reconciliation" is anthropopathic. It does not express any change in God; but either objectively the possibility of pardon, or subjectively the hope of pardon. (7.) "To impute the merit of Christ" does not mean that God regards Christ's obedience as our obedience, or his sufferings as our punishment, but simply that, through love, God has determined to render his sufferings available for the good of men. (8.) That Christ's death was vicarious in so far that in consequence thereof sin may be pardoned in the renewed. (9.) Justification is the application to individuals of the general declaration of God that He will save all who strive to reform. This is the highest form in which theologians regarded as rationalistic are willing to receive the doctrines of atonement and justification.

Speculative Theologians.

The views of the speculative theologians on these points have already been presented in the chapters on the person of Christ and on his work, as fully as is proper in such a work as this.

However much this class of theologians may differ as to their philosophical principles, or as to the length to which they carry those principles in their explanation of Christian doctrine, they agree, first, in rejecting the Church view of the plan of salvation; they deny that Christ obeyed the law and bore its penalty vicariously, or as the substitute of sinners; they deny that his righteousness is imputed to the believer as the ground of his justification; they deny that saving faith consists in receiving and resting on the righteousness of Christ as something objective; they deny that justification is a forensic or judicial act in which God pronounces the sinner just, not on the ground of his subjective state or character, but on the ground of what Christ has done for him. All this they pronounce mechanical, external, magical, unreal, and unsatisfactory. On the other hand, they agree in representing justification as an act by which the sinner is made inherently or subjectively just; and consequently that his acceptance with God, and his title to eternal life, are founded on what he is; they agree in regarding faith as that state of mind which renders the sinner receptive of the infusion of whatever it is that renders him thus subjectively righteous in the sight of God. What that is, is the main point on which their representations differ. Those who regard man as only a form of the manifestation of God, say that one man's being justified and not another, means that God is more fully developed in the one than in the other; or that the one realizes more truly the idea of man than the other; and this, after all, consists in one's coming to the consciousness of his oneness with God, which others have not attained. "The most universal and essential idea of redemption and reconciliation is man's becoming one with God. The necessary objective assumption, on which alone the individual can be one with God, or redeemed and reconciled, is the truth, that man as such is one with God (dass der Mensch an sich mit Gott Eins ist)." [208] This, according to one view, is an eternal process; God is ever becoming man, and man is ever returning into God. According to Schleiermacher, as already repeatedly stated, this manifestation of God in man was hindered and could never become perfect by a process of natural development; and, therefore, by a new creative act Christ was produced, in whom the idea of man was fully realized, or in whom the oneness of God and man was clearly exhibited, and from Him a new process of development commenced as perfectly natural as the process before his advent, and the redemption of man consists in the communication of the sinlessness and blessedness of Christ to the individual. This is expressed commonly by

saying that the life of Christ, -- not the Holy Spirit as derived from Him; not his divine nature; not his humanity; but his divine-human life, -- is communicated to the Church and to all its members. In other words, as Christ is God in human form, so is every believer. The incarnation goes forward in the Church. In the language of the older mystics, what is communicated is "the essential righteousness of God," or "the essence of God," the life of God, or God Himself.

According to this view the objective work of Christ, what He did and suffered is of no avail for us; it is not that which makes us righteous, or by which we are redeemed. Redemption and reconciliation are a purely subjective process; something which takes place in the sinner's own soul, and not something which was done for him. It matters little whether there was a historical Christ or not; or, at least, whether the facts recorded of Him be true or untrue; whether the Gospels are historical or mythical.

According to another view, the work of Christ was in no sense a satisfaction to divine justice; neither his obedience nor his suffering was designed to be set over to his people with its merit, as the ground of their justification. The Word became flesh. He assumed our fallen humanity into personal union with Himself. This necessitated conflict and suffering as the only way in which the new life could triumph over the law of sin and death which belonged to our fallen humanity. This was the atonement of Christ, the triumph of health over disease. This was the victory of Christ over sin and hell. Thus He becomes the author of salvation to men. Humanity in Christ suffered and died, and rose again. That humanity is our nature. It is that which constitutes us what we are. By union with the Church, which is the body of Christ animated by his theanthropic nature or life, we become one with Him. What is communicated to us is not his merit, nor his Spirit, but his essence, his substance, his life. There is no dualism between the soul and body. They are one life. The soul externalizes itself in the body, they are one. So there is no dualism in Christ; not a divine and human substance; not a divine and human life; but one life which is simply and purely human and yet divine; for God and man are one; and humanity reaches its completion only when thus identified with the divine. This divine-human life passes over from Christ to the Church; and this takes place in the way of history, growth, and development. Partaking thus of the life of Christ, we partake of its righteousness, its holiness, and its glory. Thus redemption is purely subjective. It is wrought in us, although the source is without us. As we partake of Adam's sin and condemnation, because we partake of his nature; so we partake of Christ's righteousness and holiness because we partake of his divine-human life, or of humanity as healed and exalted in Him. [209]

Ebrard of Erlangen.

There is an important class of modern theological writers, of whom Dr. J. H. A. Ebrard of Erlangen may be taken as a representative, who consider themselves faithful to the doctrines of the Reformation, while developing them into new forms. As Ebrard represents this class of writers among the Reformed, so Delitzsch does the same for the Lutheran theologians. These writers are abundantly orthodox in their exposition of the nature of Christ's work. This is especially true of Delitzsch in his admirable treatise on "The Vicarious Satisfaction of Christ." [210] As these writers identify regeneration and justification, their views may be found briefly stated in the chapter on regeneration.

Christ, it is admitted, made expiation for sin and satisfied the justice of God as our

substitute by his vicarious obedience and sufferings. This righteousness, however, becomes ours not by being received by faith and imputed to us by the just judgment of God, but by regeneration, whereby we become partakers of the life, substance, or essence, however it may be designated, of Christ. On this subject Ebrard says: "Regeneration is the substantial objective ground both of the transient act of justification, and of the progressive work of sanctification; whereas conversion (repentance and faith) is the subjective condition of both. And justification as the act of the Father, is a forensic judicial act; as the act of Christ, it is identical with regeneration, i.e., with the real implantation of Christ in us and of us in Christ." Both propositions, therefore, he says, are equally true, namely, "Christ justifies us; and faith justifies us." In explaining this, he says: "Dikaios before God is one who does not merit punishment; who is free from guilt in the sight of God's eternal law, either because he is absolutely sinless, or holy, never having contracted guilt, as in the case of Christ; or because his guilt has been expiated, and his lack of the righteousness demanded by the law is covered. Dikaoun means either to acknowledge as dikaios one who is dikaios or to make dikaios one who is not dikaios." The latter is its sense when used in reference to sinners. In their case, "The act of dikaiosis consists, (1.) In the gift of the expiation (S□hne) made by Christ without the sinner's co□peration; and (2.) In the gift of the absolute righteousness of Christ, in such sense that God does not regard the sinner as he is by nature, and by self-development, but as he is as implanted in Christ." There is, therefore, a clear distinction to be made between the appropriation of righteousness, and the procuring of righteousness. "Christ has procured and merited (erworben hat) righteousness by his historical life and sufferings; it is applied by Christ's being born in us." "The Scriptures," he says, "do not speak of Christ's righteousness being imputed to us. They teach that it comes upon us (Rom. v. 18), and becomes our own. It is our own, however, because the person of Christ becomes ours in the strictest possible (allerrealsten, the most literal) sense of the terms." What Ebrard contends for is (die substantielle Lebenseinheit mit der Person Christi), the substantial oneness of life with Christ; [211] or as he often elsewhere expresses it, "the mysterious, mystical communication of the substance of Christ to the central substance of man." [212] Dr. Alexander Schweizer of Z□rich, [213] although differing much in other points from Ebrard, agrees with him in this. The essential element in the work of Christ, he says, "is the founding and upholding a community animated or pervaded by his theanthropic life (gottmenschlichen Lebenspotenz). Dr. Nevin [214] says, "Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The idea which it embodies can never be fully actualized, under any other form. The incarnation is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal man." "The incarnation was no mere theophany; no transient wonder; no illusion exhibited to the senses. . . . . The Word became flesh; not a single man only, as one among many; but flesh,' or humanity in its universal conception. How else could He be the principle of a general life, the origin of a new order of existence for the human world as such? How else could the value of his mediatorial work be made over to us in a real way, by a true imputation, and not a legal fiction only?" [215] "Christianity is a life, not only as revealed at first in Christ, but as continued also in the Church. It flows over from Christ to his people, always in this form. They do not simply bear his name and acknowledge his doctrine. They are so united to Him as to have part in the substance of his life itself." [216] He had before said, [217] that "by the hypostatical union of the two natures in the person of Jesus Christ, our

humanity as fallen in Adam was exalted again to a new and imperishable divine life." "The object of the incarnation was to couple the human nature in real union with the Logos, as a permanent source of life." Again, [218] "the new life of which Christ is the source and organic principle, is in all respects a true human life; . . . . . not a new humanity, wholly dissevered from that of Adam; but the humanity of Adam itself, only raised to a higher character, and filled with new meaning and power, by its union with the divine nature. . . . . Christ's life, as now described, rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; thus constituting the Church, which is his body, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all." "Christ communicates his own life substantially to the soul on which He acts, causing it to grow into his very nature. This is the mystical union; the basis of our whole salvation; the only medium by which it is possible for us to have an interest in the grace of Christ under any other view." [219] With his substance, his life, his divine-human nature thus communicated to the soul come his merit, his holiness, his power, his glory. These are predicates of the nature which becomes ours, constituting our personal life and character. Even the resurrection is to be effected, not by the power of Christ operating "ab extra," as when He raised Lazarus from the dead, but by "a new divine element, introduced into our nature by the incarnation." [220]

Objections to these Theories.

In opposition to these views it may be said very briefly in the way of recapitulation of what has been more fully said in the chapters above referred to, --

1. That this is a philosophy. The scheme has its entire basis in a philosophical theory as to the nature of man and his relation to God. This is undeniable, and is hardly denied. Dr. Nevin states three "scientific principles," ignorance of which led the Reformers to a misapprehension and imperfect representation of Christianity, and the recognition of which and of their application to theology, enables the modern theologian to set forth the nature and plan of salvation in a much more satisfactory light. Those principles are, (1.) The true import of organic law. The Reformers did not make a clear distinction, he says, "between the idea of the organic law which constitutes the proper identity of a human body, and the material volume it is found to embrace as exhibited to the senses." There may be, therefore, a real communication of Christ and even of his body to his people without a communication of his flesh. (2.) The absolute unity involved in personality. In the case of Christ, body, soul, and divinity are united in "a single indivisible life," so that where the one is, all are. To communicate Christ to the soul is therefore to communicate that indivisible life, including in it as an organizing, organic principle, body, soul, and divinity. (3.) The distinction between individual and generic life. "In every sphere of life," it is said, "the individual and the general are found closely united in the same subject." The acorn, in one view, is only a single existence; but it includes the force of a life capable of reaching far beyond itself. The life of a forest of oaks is only the expansion of the life of the original acorn, "and the whole general existence thus produced is bound together, inwardly and organically, by as true and close a unity as that which holds in any of the single existences embraced in it, separately considered." Thus also Adam, in one view, was a man; in another, he was the man. A whole world of separate personalities lay involved in his life, as a generic principle or root. "Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he has ever lived in his own person." In like manner, although in a higher form, the life of Christ is to be viewed

under the same twofold aspect In one view the Saviour was a man; but in another, He was the man, "the Son of man, in whose person stood revealed the true idea of humanity, under its ultimate and most comprehensive form. Without any loss or change of character in the first view, his life is carried over in this last view continually into the persons of his people. He lives in Himself, and yet lives in their really and truly at the same time." As we participate in Adam's whole nature, soul and body, so the people of Christ participate in his whole nature, body, soul, and divinity. These are one indivisible life; and that one theanthropic life is communicated to believers and constitutes them Christians. In this is included all their participation in the righteousness, merit, and glory of their Redeemer. [221]

Behind and under these three scientific principles there is another without which the three mentioned amount to nothing; namely, the unity of God and man. Man in his highest form; the ideal or perfect man; He in whom the idea of humanity is fully realized, is God. What does it amount to, if we admit that "organic law" constitutes identity, as in the case of man; or that personality includes the idea of "one indivisible life;" that in man there is not one life of the body and another of the soul, that these are only different manifestations of one and the same life; that the soul can no more be without the body than the body without the soul; and that in Christ there is not one life of the divinity and another of his humanity? Suppose we deny what the Church in all ages has affirmed, that there are two energeiai in Christ, what does this amount to? Or what does it avail to admit the realistic doctrine of a generic life; if that life (one and indivisible) be merely human, Adamic? How can it redeem us? It is only on the assumption that the human and the divine are one, that this unity, fully realized in Christ, constitutes the "one indivisible life" which passes over to us; that it has any redeeming power; and that it exalts man from his degradation, and brings him back to conscious as well as real unity with God.

This theory as presented by Schleiermacher, its author in modern times, was undeniably pantheistic; as held by many of his disciples, it is, in their apprehension, theistic. In either form the leading idea of the identity of God and man is retained. [222] Christ is the ideal man. In Him the idea of humanity is fully realized. and therefore He is God. The manifestation of God in the form of man, belongs to the divine nature. The incarnation is entirely independent of the fall of man; or, admitting that the failure of the race to reach its true ideal in the first instance was the occasion of a new, special, and supernatural intervention, yet the whole end of that intervention was to realize the original idea of humanity as God made flesh.

The watchword of this whole system is, in the language of Dr. Ullmann, "The life of Christ is Christianity;" i.e., the one indivisible life of Christ; the life of God in the form of humanity. And that life as communicated to men brings them to this real, substantial life union with God. "What," asks Dr. Ullmann, "is that in the personality of Christ by which He is constituted a perfect Saviour in the way of atonement and redemption? We reply generally, his own substantial nature, at once human and divine; his life filled with all the attributes of God, and representing at the same time the highest conception of nature and man; complete and self-sufficient in its own fulness, and yet by this fulness itself the free principle of a new corresponding life-process, in the way of self-communication, for the human world. This life itself, however, has again its central heart, to which especially we

must look for the peculiar being of Christ. Here the whole theology of the present time, in all its different tendencies, may be said to have but one voice. That which constitutes the special being of Christ, makes Him to be what He is and gives Him thus his highest significance for the world, is the absolute unity of the divine and human in his nature. Deity and manhood in Him come fully together and are made one. This is the last ground of Christianity. Here above all we are to look for its distinctive character." He goes on to show that on this point all are agreed. God and man are one. The difference is between the pantheistic and the Christian view which acknowledges a personal God and a positive revelation. "For the whole apprehension of Christianity, we may say, not only that much, but that all depends on the question, which of these views shall be adopted; whether this central fact shall be regarded as a general unity of the divine and human' realizing itself in the consciousness of the race as such, or be conceived of as a concrete union of God and man,' that actualizes itself from a definite point and only under certain moral conditions." [223] That is, whether God is incarnate in the race or in the Church. According to the latter view, the life of Christ, his human life, "filled with all the attributes of God," passes over to his people, by a process of natural development. As we are fallen men by partaking of the nature or generic life of Adam, we are God-men, and therefore redeemed by partaking of the divine human nature or generic life of Christ.

That the oneness of God and man is the ultimate principle on which this heteron euangelion rests, is obvious not only from the general character of the philosophy from which it is derived, but also from the fact that everything is made to depend upon the life of Christ becoming the life of his people, not by his controlling their life by his Spirit dwelling in them, but by a substantial union and identification of their life with his, of them with Him. We can measurably understand what is meant by life, by organic life, by a life principle or force which develops itself, and communicates and transmits itself in a given form. We know what is meant when it is said that the life of the acorn is developed into an oak, and communicated to other acorns, and thus to other oaks in endless succession and boundless multiplication. But here the essential idea is the unity and sameness of the life transmitted. You cannot combine the "organic law," or life, of the apple with that of the acorn, so that the life transmitted should be "an acorn-apple-life." Much less can you combine the organic life principle of an animal with that of the acorn, so as to produce an "acorn-bovine," or, "an acorn-equine life." Least of all can you combine the intellectual life of man with that of the oak, so as to have a "human-oak-life." Therefore if the life of God and the life of man be so combined as to constitute one life and that a divine-human life, then God and man must be one; i.e., one substance, one life differently manifested. Those who press the modern doctrine of the correlation of forces to the extreme of making thought and gravity identical, may accept these conclusions. With them the universe and all it contains, all its physical, mental, ästhetic, moral, and religious phenomena are to be referred to one and the same force variously modified. The same force modified by the brain produces all the phenomena of mind; as modified by animal tissues, all the phenomena of animal life; and as modified by vegetable organisms all the phenomena of vegetable life, -- a theory which has been annihilated as by a bolt from heaven by the single question. Where is the brain which elaborated the mind, which framed the universe?

It may indeed be said, and is said by modern theologians, that God became man, and therefore man may become God. God and man, they say, were so united as to become one

nature or life in the person of Christ. But this is contrary to Scripture and to the faith of the Church universal. There is not a historical Church on earth, and never has been, whose creed does not teach that in the person of Christ two distinct natures or substances are united, that He was born, not merely "per," but "ex matre sua Maria," of her substance; that He is as man consubstantial with men, as God consubstantial with the Father; or as the Apostle expresses it, kata sarka, He is the son of David, kata pneuma the Son of God. Humanity and divinity in Him are no more identified or reduced to one life, than soul and body in man are identified or reduced to one life.

This whole modern theory of the Gospel rests, therefore, ultimately on the idea of the identity of God and man; that man is a "modus existendi" of God.

The grand objection to this scheme is that it is a philosophy. It is a product of the human mind. It is the wisdom of the world. It is the recent philosophy of the speculative school of Germany, clothed in Biblical forms and phrases. The reason why the Reformers did not present the plan of salvation in this form, is declared to be that they were ignorant of modern philosophy. It is because Hegel thought that the Gospel admitted of being cast into the mould of his philosophy that he pronounced Christianity to be the absolute religion. All, therefore, that the Bible says of the "wisdom of the wise," "of the wisdom of men," of "the wisdom of the world," of "philosophy as a vain deceit," applies, and was intended to apply to this scheme and to all of like nature. "To the poor the gospel is preached." The Gospel is designed for babes and sucklings. He that runs may read and understand it. This system not one man in ten thousand can understand.

These Theories Unscriptural.

2. The second great objection to this scheme is that it is unscriptural. The Bible tells us that Christ saves us as a priest. This a child can understand. He knows that a priest takes the place of those for whom he acts; that he approaches God in their behalf; that he makes expiation for sin; that he does what satisfies the demands of God's justice against the sinner, so that He can be just and yet justify the ungodly. He knows that a priest saves, not by what he does in us, not by imparting his life to us, but by what he does for us; by an objective, and not by a subjective work. What there is of an inward work, and that is much and absolutely necessary, is not the work of a priest, under which aspect the work of Christ is so prominently presented in the Scriptures. Again, Christ saves us as a sacrifice; but a sacrifice is a substitute; it bears the sins of the offender; dies in his stead, and by its vicarious death delivers the offerer from the penalty which he had incurred. A sacrifice is not a symbol of an inward conflict between good and evil; its proximate design is not to effect a subjective change in the sinner; it does not produce or communicate a new principle of life, much less its own generic life to the offerer by which his real redemption is effected.

In like manner the Bible teaches that Christ gave Himself as a ransom for many. But a ransom is a price paid. Those delivered by it are bought. They are delivered by purchase. A ransom meets and satisfies the claims of a third party. This is its essential idea, and cannot be omitted without rejecting the very truth, which the Scriptures, in the use of the term, design to teach. This again is an objective work. It is something which the person redeemed neither does, nor inwardly experiences; but which is done for him and without him and not in him.

Moreover, the whole idea of redemption, the primary truth taught in setting forth Christ as a Redeemer, is that He delivers his people not by power, not by instruction, not by moral influence, not by any subjective change wrought in them, and not by any new form of life imparted to them, but by purchase. This is the signification and the meaning of the word. The words apolutrosis, lutroun, agorazein, exagorazein, are never used in Scripture in reference to the work of Christ in any other sense than that of deliverance by purchase or payment of a ransom; and to substitute any other mode of deliverance, is to put man's thoughts in the place of God's truth; it is to substitute the human for the divine; the worthless for the priceless.

Moreover, Christ is constantly represented as a rock, a refuge, a hiding place. The duty required of sinners is trust; relying on Him and his work, as something out of themselves on which to place their hope toward God.

These Theories lead Men to trust to themselves.

3. This introduces the third great objection to this scheme. It makes redemption subjective. It is what we are; what we become; it is the Christ within us; the new heart, the new nature, the new life, the divine-human life of Christ, or whatever else it may be called, which is at once the ground of our justification and the source of sanctification. This is utterly inconsistent with the Bible, and with the experience of the people of God in all ages and under all dispensations. In no instance are believers represented as trusting to what is within them, but to what is without them. The Protestant doctrine, as we have seen, makes full provision for an inward work of deliverance from the power of sin, as well as for redemption from the curse of the law; for sanctification as well as for justification. But it does not confound the two, neither does it refer either or both to the new principle of life, the new seed or leaven implanted or inserted which works as "an organic law," and by a regular process of development, as natural as the operation of any other law. The whole work of the Spirit is ignored in this new theory of redemption. What in the Bible is referred to the Spirit of God is, by the theologians of this class, referred to the "divine-human" nature of Christ. The latter, and not the former, is the proximate and efficient source of holiness of heart and life. "Christ," says Dr. Nevin, "does dwell in us, by his Spirit; but only as his Spirit constitutes the very form and power of his own presence as the incarnate and everlasting Word." [224] That is, the Spirit is the power of the incarnate Word, i.e., of the divine-human life of Christ. "The life," he adds, "thus wrought in our souls by his agency, is not a production out of nothing, but the very life of Jesus Himself organically continued in this way over into our persons." "It is with the mediatorial life of Christ that the Christian salvation, in the form now contemplated, is concerned. In this is comprehended the entire new creation revealed by the Gospel; the righteousness of Christ, and all the benefits He has procured for his people. But the mediatorial life, by the communication of which only all this grace is made to pass over to men, is one and undivided;" and this life, as he goes on to show, includes his body, soul, and divinity. To the same effect, [225] it is said, "That the whole spiritual life of the Christian, including the resurrection of his body, is thus organically connected with the mediatorial life of the Lord Jesus, might seem to be too plainly taught in the New Testament to admit of any question; and yet we find many slow to allow the mystery, notwithstanding. A very common view appears to be, that the whole salvation of the Gospel is accomplished in a more or less

outward and mechanical way, by supernatural might and power, rather than by the Spirit of the Lord as a revelation of a new historical life in the person of the believer Himself. So we have an outward imputation of righteousness to begin with; a process of sanctification carried forward by the help of proper spiritual machinery brought to bear on the soul, including perhaps, as its basis, the notion of an abrupt creation de novo,' by the fiat of the Holy Ghost; and finally, to crown all, a sudden unprepared refabrication of the body, to be superadded to the life of the spirit already complete in its state of glory." The doctrines of justification by the imputation of the righteousness of Christ; of the regeneration and sanctification of the soul by the supernatural power of the Spirit, and the resurrection of the body by the power of God at the last day, are rejected and despised; and the doctrine substituted for them is, that the divine-human life of Christ, as a new organic law, develops itself in the Church, just as the life of the acorn develops itself in the oak and in the forest, by a natural, historical process, so that the members of the Church, in virtue of their participation of this life, are justified and sanctified, and their bodies (since the life of Christ is a human life actualizing itself outwardly in a body as well as inwardly in a soul), ultimately raised from the dead, are fashioned after the glorious body of Christ. The resurrection of the body is as much a natural process as the development of a seed into a flower, or of a grub into a butterfly. This is Dr. Nevin's own illustration: "The birth of the butterfly, as it mounts in the air on wings of light, is comparatively sudden, too; but this is the revelation only of a life which had been gradually formed for this efflorescence before, under cover of the vile, unsightly larve." "The new creation," he says, "is indeed supernatural; but as such it is strictly conformable to the general order and constitution of life. It is a new creation in Christ Jesus, not by Him in the way of mere outward power. The subjects of it are saved, only by being brought within the sphere of his life, as a regular, historical, divine-human process, in the Church. The new nature implanted in them at their regeneration, is not a higher order of existence framed for them at the moment out of nothing by the fiat of God, but truly and strictly a continuation of Christ's life over in their persons." [226]

This is the modern view of Christianity introduced by Schleiermacher, modified more or less by his disciples, and which has passed over into England and into this country. Humanity as revealed in Adam as a generic life was too feeble. Its development failed and would have ever failed to reach the ideal. Therefore God interposed and interrupted the process of natural development by the production of a new ideal man containing in himself a generic life, a seed, a principle, an organic law, which develops itself in the Church by a historical process, just as the life of Adam developed itself in his posterity. We, therefore, are justified, not by what Christ did, but by his life in us, which is as truly and properly our life, as the life we derived from Adam is our own life. We must stand before God to be justified or condemned, accepted or rejected, on the ground of what we are. We have nothing to offer but our own subjective, inherent character such as it is. The man is to be pitied who dares to do this. It is surely better to agree with Paul, who renounced his own righteousness, his own goodness, everything pertaining to himself, everything subjective, and trusted only and confidently to the righteousness of Christ received by faith.

[204] Die Christliche Lehre von der Vers﷯hnung, III. i. T﷯bingen, 1830, p. 565.

[205] Institutiones Theologi﷯, III. ii. § 140, 5th edit. Halle, 1826, p. 438.

[206] Dogmatik, § 159, 3d edit. Leipzig, vol. II. p. 320, note.

[207] Die Religionslehren der Bibel, II. v. zu nro. 27; Stuttgart and Tbingen, 1812, vol. ii. p. 149.

[208] Baur, Die Christliche Lehre von der Vershnung, Tbingen, 1830, p. 628.

[209] See Mystical Presence, by John W. Nevin, D. D.; Morell's Philosophy of Religion, and Princeton Review, April, 1848.

[210] Ueber den festen Schriftgrund der Kirchenlehre von der stellvertretenden Genugthuung, printed as a second Appendix to his elaborate commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews.

[211] Christliche Dogmatik, II. i. 2, § 443; Knigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. pp. 311, 312, 314.

[212] Ibid. p. 310.

[213] Glaubenslehre, Zrich, 1847, vol. ii. p. 335.

[214] Mystical Presence, Philadelphia, 1846, pp. 200, 201.

[215] Mystical Presence, Philadelphia, 1846, pp. 210, 211.

[216] Ibid. p. 218.

[217] Ibid. p. 165.

[218] Ibid. p. 167.

[219] Ibid. p. 168.

[220] Ibid. p. 226.

[221] See Mystical Presence, section first of the Scientific Statement.

[222] See this clearly presented in Dr. Ullmann's paper on "The Distinctive Character of Christianity," in the Studien und Kritiken for January, 1845, translated by Dr. Nevin and prefixed as a Preliminary Essay to his work on The Mystical Presence.

[223] See Nevin's Mystical Presence, pp. 27, 28, 29.

[224] Mystical Presence, pp. 197, 198.

[225] Ibid. p. 228, note.

[226] Mystical Presence, pp. 228, 229.

CHAPTER XVIII: SANCTIFICATION

§ 1. Its Nature.

Sanctification in the Westminster Catechism is said to be "the work of God's free grace, whereby we are renewed in the whole man after the image of God, and are enabled more and more to die unto sin and live unto righteousness."

Agreeably to this definition, justification differs from sanctification, (1.) In that the former is a transient act, the latter a progressive work. (2.) Justification is a forensic act, God acting as judge, declaring justice satisfied so far as the believing sinner is concerned, whereas sanctification is an effect due to the divine efficiency. (3.) Justification changes, or declares to be changed, the relation of the sinner to the justice of God; sanctification involves a change of character. (4.) The former, therefore, is objective, the latter subjective. (5.) The former is founded on what Christ has done for us; the latter is the effect of what He does in us. (6.) Justification is complete and the same in all, while sanctification is progressive, and is more complete in some than in others.

Sanctification is declared to be a work of God's free grace. Two things are included in this. First, that the power or influence by which it is carried on is supernatural. Secondly, that granting this influence to any sinner, to one sinner rather than another, and to one more than to another, is a matter of favour. No one has personally, or in himself, on the ground of anything he has done, the right to claim this divine influence as a just recompense, or as a matter of justice.

It is a Supernatural Work.

In representing, in accordance with Scripture, sanctification as a supernatural work, or as a work of grace, the Church intends to deny the Pelagian or Rationalistic doctrine which confounds it with mere moral reformation. It not unfrequently happens that men who have been immoral in their lives, change their whole course of living. They become outwardly correct in their deportment, temperate, pure, honest, and benevolent. This is a great and praiseworthy change. It is in a high degree beneficial to the subject of it, and to all with whom he is connected. It may be produced by different causes, by the force of conscience and by a regard for the authority of God and a dread of his disapprobation, or by a regard to the good opinion of men, or by the mere force of an enlightened regard to one's own interest. But whatever may be the proximate cause of such reformation, it falls very far short of sanctification. The two things differ in nature as much as a clean heart from clean clothes. Such external reformation may leave a man's inward character in the sight of God unchanged. He may remain destitute of love to God, of faith in Christ, and of all holy exercises or affections.

Nor is sanctification to be confounded with the effects of moral culture or discipline. It is very possible, as experience proves, by careful moral training, by keeping the young from all contaminating influences, and by bringing them under the forming influences of right principles and good associates, to preserve them from much of the evil of the world, and to render them like the young man in the Gospel whom Jesus loved. Such training is not to be undervalued. It is enjoined in the Word of God. It cannot, however, change the nature. It cannot impart life. A faultless statue fashioned out of pure marble in all its beauty, is far below a living man.

The word supernatural, as before said, is used in two senses. First, for that which is above nature, and by nature is meant everything out of God. An effect, therefore, is said to be supernatural, in the production of which nature exercises no efficiency. But secondly, the word is often used to mark the distinction between the providential efficiency of God operating according to fixed laws, and the voluntary agency of the Holy Spirit. The Bible makes a wide distinction between the providence of God and the operations of his grace. The difference between the two is, in some respects, analogous to that between the efficiency of a law, or of a uniformly acting force, and the agency of a person. The one is ordered, the other is exercised from time to time, the Spirit distributing his gifts to every one severally as He wills. In the providential agency of God, the effects produced never transcend the power of second causes as upheld and guided by Him; whereas the effects produced by the Spirit do transcend the power of second causes. The effect is due neither to the power of the truth, nor to that of the rational subject in whom the effect is produced. It is due to the power of God over and above the power of the second causes concerned. The effects of grace, or fruits of the Spirit, are above the sphere of the natural they belong to the supernatural. The mere power of truth, argument, motive, persuasion, or eloquence cannot produce repentance, faith, or holiness of heart and life. Nor can these effects be produced by the power of the will, or by all the resources of man, however protracted or skilful in their application. They are the gifts of God, the fruits of the Spirit. Paul may plant and Apollos water, but it is God who gives the increase.

In this latter sense of the word supernatural, the cooperation of second causes is not excluded. When Christ opened the eyes of the blind no second cause interposed between his volition and the effect. But men work out their own salvation, while it is God who worketh in them to will and to do, according to his own good pleasure. In the work of regeneration, the soul is passive. It cannot cooperate in the communication of spiritual life. But in conversion, repentance, faith, and growth in grace, all its powers are called into exercise. As, however, the effects produced transcend the efficiency of our fallen nature, and are due to the agency of the Spirit, sanctification does not cease to be supernatural, or a work of grace, because the soul is active and cooperating in the process.

Proof of its Supernatural Character.

That sanctification is a supernatural work in the sense above stated is proved, --

1. From the fact that it is constantly referred to God as its author. It is referred to God absolutely, or to the Father, as in 1 Thessalonians v. 23, "The very God of peace sanctify you wholly." Hebrews xiii. 20, 21, "The God of peace that brought again from the dead our Lord Jesus . . . . make you perfect in every good work to do his will, working in you that which is well pleasing in his sight." It is also referred to the Son, as in Titus ii. 14, He

"gave himself for us, that he might . . . . purify unto himself a peculiar people zealous of good works." Ephesians v. 25, He "loved the church and gave himself for it, that he might sanctify and cleanse it with the washing of water by the word, that he might present it to himself a glorious church, not having spot, or wrinkle, or any such thing; but that it should be holy and without blemish." Predominantly sanctification is referred to the Holy Spirit, as his peculiar work in the economy of redemption. Hence He is called the Spirit of all grace; the Spirit of joy, of peace, of love, of faith, and of adoption. All Christian graces are set forth as fruits of the Spirit. We are said to be born of the Spirit, and by Him to he enlightened, taught, led, and cleansed. We are said to be in the Spirit, to live, to walk, and to rejoice in the Spirit. The Spirit dwells in the people of God, and is the abiding source of all the actings of that spiritual life which He implants in the soul. The Bible teaches that the Son and Spirit are in the Holy Trinity subordinate to the Father, as to their mode of subsistence and operation, although the same in substance, and equal in power and glory. Hence it is that the same work is often attributed to the Father, to the Son, and to the Spirit; and as the Father and Son operate through the Spirit, the effects due to the agency of God are referred specially to the Holy Ghost.

This reference of sanctification to God proves it to be a supernatural work, because the insufficiency of second causes to produce the effect is declared to be the ground of this reference. It is because men cannot cleanse or heal themselves, that they are declared to be cleansed and healed by God. It is because rites, ceremonies, sacraments, truth, and moral suasion, cannot bring the soul back to God, that it is said to be transformed, by the renewing of the mind, through the power of the Spirit, into the image of God. We are, therefore, declared to be God's workmanship, created unto good works. And it is not we that live, but Christ that liveth in us.

All Holy Exercises referred to the Spirit as their Author.

2. This reference of sanctification to God as its author, the more decisively proves the supernatural character of the work, because the reference is not merely general, as when the wind and rain, and the production of vegetable and animal life, are referred to his universal providential agency. The reference is special. The effect is one which the Scriptures recognize as not within the sphere of second causes, and therefore ascribe to God. They recognize the free agency of man; they acknowledge and treat him as a moral and rational being; they admit the adaptation of of truth to convince the understanding, and of the motives presented to determine the will and to control the affections, and nevertheless they teach that these secondary causes and influences be utterly ineffectual to the conversion and sanctification of the soul, without the demonstration of the Spirit. The sacred writers, therefore, constantly pray for this divine influence, "extrinsecus accidens," to attend the means of grace and to render them effectual, as well for sanctification as for regeneration and conversion. Every such prayer, every thanksgiving for grace imparted, every recognition of the Christian virtues as fruits of the Spirit, and gifts of God, are so many recognitions of the great truth that the restoration of man to the image of God is not a work of nature, either originated or carried on by the efficiency of second causes, but is truly and properly supernatural, as due to the immediate power of the Spirit producing effects for which second causes are inadequate.

We are taught to pray for Repentance, Faith, and other Graces.

3. We accordingly find the Apostle and the sacred writers generally, referring not only regeneration, the communication of spiritual life to those spiritually dead, but the continuance of that life in its activity and growth, not merely to the power of God, but to his almighty power. Paul prays in Ephesians i. 19, that his readers might know "what is the exceeding greatness of his power to us-ward who believe according to the working of his mighty power, which he wrought in Christ when he raised him from the dead." The same almighty power which was exhibited in the resurrection of Christ, is exercised in the spiritual resurrection of the believer. And as the power which raised Christ from the dead was exercised in his ascension and glorification; so also the same power, according to the Apostle, which is exerted in the spiritual resurrection of the believer, is exercised in carrying on his sanctification, which is inward and real glorification. Accordingly, in the same Epistle (iii. 7), he ascribes all the grace whereby he was fitted for the apostleship, "to the effectual working of his power." And further on (ver. 20), to encourage the people of God to pray for spiritual blessings, he reminds them of his omnipotence whereby He was "able to do exceeding abundantly above all that we ask or think, according to the power that worketh in us." It is almighty power, therefore, and not the impotence of secondary influences, which works in the believer and carries on the work of his salvation.

They who are in Christ, therefore, are new creatures. They are created anew in Christ Jesus. This does not refer exclusively to their regeneration, but to the process by which the sinner is transformed into the image of Christ.

Argument from the Believer's Union with Christ.

4. All that the Scriptures teach concerning the union between the believer and Christ, and of the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, proves the supernatural character of our sanctification. Men do not make themselves holy; their holiness, and their growth in grace, are not due to their own fidelity, or firmness of purpose, or watchfulness and diligence, although all these are required, but to the divine influence by which they are rendered thus faithful, watchful, and diligent, and which produces in them the fruits of righteousness. Without me, saith our Lord, ye can do nothing. As the branch cannot bear fruit of itself, except it abide in the vine, no more can ye, except ye abide in me. The hand is not more dependent on the head for the continuance of its vitality, than is the believer on Christ for the continuance of spiritual life in the soul.

Argument from related Doctrines.

5. This, however, is one of those doctrines which pervade the whole Scriptures. It follows of necessity from what the Bible teaches of the natural state of man since the fall; it is assumed, asserted, and implied in all that is revealed of the plan of salvation. By their apostasy, men lost the image of God; they are born in a state of alienation and condemnation. They are by nature destitute of spiritual life. From this state it is as impossible that they should deliver themselves, as that those in the grave should restore life to their wasted bodies, and when restored, continue and invigorate it by their own power. Our whole salvation is of Christ. Those who are in the grave hear his voice. They are raised by his power. And when they live it is He who lives in them. This is the doctrine which our Lord Himself so clearly and so frequently teaches, and upon which his Apostles so strenuously insist. St. Paul in the sixth and seventh chapters of his Epistle to the Romans, where he treats of this subject "in extenso," has for his main object to prove that as we are

not justified or our own righteousness, so we are not sanctified by our own power, or by the mere objective power of the truth. The law, the revelation of the will of God, including everything which He has made known to man either as a rule of obedience or as exhibiting his own attributes and purposes, was equally inadequate to secure justification and sanctification. As it demanded perfect obedience and pronounced accursed those who continue not in all things written in the book of the law to do them, it can only condemn. It can never pronounce the sinner just. And as it was a mere outward presentation of the truth, it could no more change the heart than light could give sight to the blind. He winds up his discussions of the subject with the exclamation, "O wretched man that I am! who shall deliver me from the body of this death? I thank God, through Jesus Christ our Lord." His deliverance was to be effected by God through Jesus Christ. We learn from the eighth chapter that he was fully confident of this deliverance, and we learn also the ground on which that confidence rested. It was not that he had in regeneration received strength to sanctify himself, or that by the force of his own will, or by the diligent use of natural or appointed means, the end was to be accomplished without further aid from God. On the contrary, his confidence was founded, (1.) On the fact that he had been delivered from the law, from its curse, and from its inexorable demand of perfect obedience. (2.) On the fact that he had received the Spirit as the source of a new, divine, and imperishable life. (3.) This life was not a mere state of mind, but the life of God, or the Spirit of God dwelling in the heart; which indwelling secured not only the continuance of "spiritual mindedness," but even the resurrection from the dead. "For if," says he, "the spirit of him that raised up Jesus from the dead dwell in you, he that raised up Christ from the dead shall also quicken (zoopoiesei make alive with the life of Christ) your mortal bodies by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." (4.) Being led by the Spirit of God as the controlling principle of their inward and outward life, believers are the sons of God. The Spirit of God which is in them being the Spirit of the Son, is in them the Spirit of sonship, i.e., it produces in them the feelings of sons toward God, and assures them of their title to all the privileges of his children. (5.) The sanctification and ultimate salvation of believers are secured by the immutable decree of God. For those "whom he did foreknow he also did predestinate to be conformed to the image of his Son; . . . . moreover, whom he did predestinate, them he also called: and whom he called, them he also justified: and whom he justified, them he also glorified." This last includes sanctification; the inward glory of the soul; the divine image as retraced by the Spirit of God, which to and in the believer is the Spirit of glory. (1 Pet. iv. 14.) The indwelling of the Spirit renders the believer glorious. (6.) The infinite and immutable love which induced God to give his own Son for our salvation, renders it certain that all other things shall be given necessary to keep them in the love and fellowship of God. Salvation, therefore, from beginning to end is of grace; not only as being gratuitous to the exclusion of all merit on the part of the saved, but also as being carried on by the continued operation of grace, or the supernatural power of the Spirit. Christ is our all. He is of God made unto us wisdom, and righteousness, sanctification and redemption.

§ 2. Wherein it consists.

Admitting sanctification to be a supernatural work, the question still remains, What does it consist in? What is the nature of the effect produced? The truth which lies at the

foundation of all the Scriptural representations of this subject is, that regeneration, the quickening, of which believers are the subject, while it involves the implanting, or communication of a new principle or form of life, does not effect the immediate and entire deliverance of the soul from all sin. A man raised from the dead may be and long continue to be, in a very feeble, diseased, and suffering state. So the soul by nature dead in sin, may be quickened together with Christ, and not be rendered thereby perfect. The principle of life may be very feeble, it may have much in the soul uncongenial with its nature, and the conflict between the old and the new life may be protracted and painful. Such not only may be, but such in fact is the case in all the ordinary experience of the people of God. Here we find one of the characteristic and far-reaching differences between the Romish and Protestant systems of doctrine and religion. According to the Romish system, nothing of the nature of sin remains in the soul after regeneration as effected in baptism. From this the theology of the Church of Rome deduces its doctrine of the merit of good works; of perfection; of works of supererogation; and, indirectly, those of absolution and indulgences. But according to the Scriptures, the universal experience of Christians, and the undeniable evidence of history, regeneration does not remove all sin. The Bible is filled with the record of the inward conflicts of the most eminent of the servants of God, with their falls, their backslidings, their repentings, and their lamentations over their continued shortcomings. And not only this, but the nature of the conflict between good and evil in the heart of the renewed is fully described, the contending principles are distinguished and designated, and the necessity, difficulties, and perils of the struggle, well as the method of properly sustaining it, are set forth repeatedly and in detail. In the seventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans we have an account of this conflict elaborately described by the Apostle as drawn from his own experience. And the same thing occurs in Galatians v. 16, 17. This I say then, "Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not fulfil the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh: and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye would." Again, in Ephesians vi. 10-18, in view of the conflict which the believer has to sustain with the evils of his own heart and with the powers of darkness, the Apostle exhorts his brethren to be strong in the Lord, and in the power of his might. . . . . "Wherefore take unto you the whole armour of God, that ye may be able to withstand in the evil day, and having done all, to stand."

With the teachings of the Scriptures the experience of Christians in all ages and in all parts of the Church agrees. Their writings are filled with the account of their struggles with the remains of sin in their own hearts; with confessions; with prayers for divine aid; and with longings after the final victory over all evil, which is to be experienced only in heaven. The great lights of the Latin Church, the Augustines and Bernards and F[illegible]n[illegible]lons, were humble, penitent, struggling believers, even to the last, and with Paul did not regard themselves as having already attained, or as being already perfect. And what the Bible and Christian experience prove to be true, history puts beyond dispute. Either there is no such thing as regeneration in the world, or regeneration does not remove all sin from those who are its subjects.

Putting off the Old, and putting on the New Man.

Such being the foundation of the Scriptural representations concerning sanctification, its nature is thereby determined. As all men since the fall are in a state of sin, not only

sinners because guilty of specific acts of transgression, but also as depraved, their nature perverted and corrupted, regeneration is the infusion of a new principle of life in this corrupt nature. It is leaven introduced to diffuse its influence gradually through the whole mass. Sanctification, therefore, consists in two things: first, the removing more and more the principles of evil still infecting our nature, and destroying their power; and secondly, the growth of the principle of spiritual life until it controls the thoughts, feelings, and acts, and brings the soul into conformity to the image of Christ.

Paul details his own Experience in Romans vii. 7-25.

The classical passages of the New Testament on the nature of this work are the following, -- Romans vii. 7-25. This is not the place to enter upon the discussion whether the Apostle in this passage is detailing his own experience or not. This is the interpretation given to it by Augustinians in all ages. It is enough to say here that the "onus probandi" rests on those who take the opposite view of the passage. It must require very strong proof that the Apostle is not speaking of himself and giving his own experience as a Christian, when, --

1. His object in the whole discussion throughout the sixth and seventh chapters, is to prove that the law, as it cannot justify, neither can it sanctify; as it cannot deliver from the guilt, so neither can it free us from the power of sin. This is not the fault of the law, for it is spiritual, holy, just, and good. It commends itself to the reason and the conscience as being just what it ought to be; requiring neither more nor less than what it is right should be demanded, and threatening no penalty which want of conformity to its requirements does not justly merit. What is the effect of the objective presentation of the ideal standard of moral perfection to which we are bound to be conformed on the penalty of death? The Apostle tells us that the effects are, (a.) A great increase of knowledge. He had not known lust, had not the law said, Thou shalt not covet. (b.) A sense of moral pollution, and consequently of shame and self-loathing. (c.) A sense of guilt, or of just exposure to the penalty of the law of which our whole lives are a continued transgression. (d.) A sense of utter helplessness. The standard, although holy, just, and good, is too high. We know we never can of ourselves conform to it; neither can we make satisfaction for past transgression. (e.) The result of the whole is despair. The law kills. It destroys not only all self-complacency, but all hope of ever being able to effect our own salvation. (f.) And thus it lead. the sinner to look out of himself for salvation; i.e., for deliverance from the power, as well as the guilt of sin. The law is a schoolmaster to lead us to Christ. Why could not the Apostle say all this of himself? There is nothing here inconsistent with the character or experience of a true believer. It is as true of the Christian that he is not sanctified by moral suasion, by the objective presentation of truth, as it is of the unrenewed sinner, that he is not regenerated by any such outward influences. It is, therefore, perfectly pertinent to the Apostle's object that he should detail his own experience that sanctification could not be effected by the law.

2. But in the second place, he uses the first person singular throughout. He says, "I had not known sin," "I died," "The commandment which was ordained to life, I found to be unto death," "I consent unto the law that it is good," "I delight in the law of God after the inward man, but I see another law in my members," etc., etc. We are bound to understand the Apostle to speak of himself in the use of such language, unless there be something in the

context, or m the nature of what is said, to render the reference to him impossible. It has been shown, however, that the context favours, if it does not absolutely demand the reference of what is said to the Apostle himself. And that there is nothing in the experience here detailed inconsistent with the experience of the true children of God, is evident from the fact that the same humility, the same sense of guilt, the same consciousness of indwelling sin, the same conviction of helplessness, here expressed, are found in all the penitential portions of Scripture. Job, David, Isaiah, and Nehemiah, make the same confessions and lamentations that the Apostle here makes. The same is true of believers since the coming of Christ. There is no one of them, not even the holiest, who is not constrained to speak of himself as Paul here speaks, unless indeed he chooses to give the language of the Apostle a meaning which it was never intended to express.

3. While the passage contains nothing inconsistent with the experience of true believers, it is inconsistent with the experience of unrenewed men. They are not the subjects of the inward conflict here depicted. There is in them indeed often a struggle protracted and painful, between reason and conscience on the one side, and evil passion on the other. But there is not in the unrenewed that utter renunciation of self, that looking for help to God in Christ alone, and that delight in the law of God, of which the Apostle here speaks.

What Romans vii. 7-25 teaches.

Assuming, then, that we have in this chapter an account of the experience of a true and even of an advanced Christian, we learn that in every Christian there is a mixture of good and evil; that the original corruption of nature is not entirely removed by regeneration; that although the believer is made a new creature, is translated from the kingdom of darkness into the kingdom of God's dear Son, he is but partially sanctified; that his selfishness pride, discontent, worldliness, still cleave to, and torment him, that they effectually prevent his "doing what he would," they prevent his living without sin, they prevent his intercourse with God being as intimate and uninterrupted as he could and does desire. He finds not only that he is often, even daily, overcome so as to sin in thought, word, and deed, but also that his faith, love, zeal, and devotion are never such as to satisfy his own conscience; much less can they satisfy God. He therefore is daily called upon to confess, repent, and pray for forgiveness. The Apostle designates these conflicting principles which he found within himself, the one, indwelling sin; "sin that dwelleth in me;" or the "law in my members;" "the law of sin;" the other, "the mind," "the law of my mind," "the inward man." His internal self, the Ego, was sometimes controlled by the one, and sometimes by the other.

We learn, further, that the control of the evil principle is resisted, that subjection to it is regarded as a hateful bondage, that the good principle is in the main victorious, and that through Christ it will ultimately be completely triumphant. Sanctification therefore, according to this representation, consists in the gradual triumph of the new nature implanted in regeneration over the evil that still remains after the heart is renewed. In other words, as elsewhere expressed, it is a dying unto sin and living unto righteousness. (1 Pet. ii. 24.)

Galatians v. 16-26.

Another passage of like import is Galatians v. 16-26, "Walk in the Spirit, and ye shall not full the lust of the flesh. For the flesh lusteth against the Spirit, and the Spirit against the flesh; and these are contrary the one to the other: so that ye cannot do the things that ye

would," etc., etc. The Scriptures teach that the Spirit of God dwells in his people, not only collectively as the Church, but individually in every believer, so that of every Christian it may be said, he is a temple of the Holy Ghost. God is said to dwell wherever He permanently manifests his presence, whether as of old in the temple, or in the hearts of his people, in the Church, or in heaven. And as the Spirit dwells in believers, He there manifests his life-giving, controlling power, and is in them the principle, or source, or controlling influence which determines their inward and outward life. By the flesh, in the doctrinal portions of Scripture, is never, unless the word be limited by the context, meant merely our sensuous nature, but our fallen nature, i.e., our nature as it is in itself, apart from the Spirit of God. As our Lord says (John iii. 6), "That which is born of the flesh is flesh; and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit." These then are the principles which "are contrary the one to the other." No man can act independently of both. He must obey one or the other. He may sometimes obey the one, and sometimes the other; but one or the other must prevail. The Apostle says of believers that they have crucified the flesh with its affections and lusts. They have renounced the authority of the evil principle; they do not willingly, or of set purpose, or habitually yield to it. They struggle against it, and not only endeavour, but actually do crucify it, although it may die a long and painful death.

Ephesians iv. 22-24.

In Ephesians iv. 22-24, we are told: "Put off concerning the former conversation the old man, which is corrupt according to the deceitful lusts; and be renewed in the spirit of your mind; and" put ye "on the new man, which after God is created in righteousness and true holiness." By the old man is to be understood the former self with all the evils belonging to its natural state. This was to be laid aside as a worn and soiled garment, and a new, pure self, the new man, was to take its place. This change, although expressed in a figure borrowed from a change of raiment, was a profound inward change produced by a creating process, by which the soul is new fashioned after the image of God in righteousness and holiness. It is a renewing as to the Spirit, i.e., the interior life of the mind; or as Meyer and Ellicott, the best of modern commentators, both interpret the phrase, "By the Spirit" (the Holy Spirit) dwelling in the mind. This is a transformation in which believers are exhorted to cooperate; for which they are to labour, and which is therefore a protracted work. Sanctification, therefore, according to this representation, consists in the removal of the evils which belong to us in our natural condition, and in being made more and more conformed to the image of God through the gracious influence of the Spirit of God dwelling in us.

It is not, however, merely in such passages as those above cited that the nature of sanctification is set forth. The Bible is full of exhortations and commands addressed to the people of God, to those recognized and assumed to be regenerate, requiring them, on the one hand, to resist their evil passions and propensities, to lay aside all malice, and wrath, and pride, and jealousy; and on the other, to cultivate all the graces of the Spirit, faith, love, hope, long-suffering, meekness, lowliness of mind, and brotherly kindness. At the same time they are reminded that it is God who worketh in them both to will and to do, and that therefore they are constantly to seek his aid and to depend upon his assistance.

It follows from this view of the subject that sanctification is not only, as before proved, a supernatural work, but also that it does not consist exclusively in a series of a

new kind of acts. It is the making the tree good, in order that the fruit may be good. It involves an essential change of character. As regeneration is not an act of the subject of the work, but in the language of the Bible a new birth, a new creation, a quickening or communicating a new life, and in the language of the old Latin Church, the infusion of new habits of grace; so sanctification in its essential nature is not holy acts, but such a change in the state of the soul, that sinful acts become more infrequent, and holy acts more and more habitual and controlling. This view alone is consistent with the Scriptural representations, and with the account given in the Bible of the way in which this radical change of character is carried on and consummated.

§ 3. The Method of Sanctification.

It has already been shown that although sanctification does not exclude all cooperation on the part of its subjects, but, on the contrary, calls for their unremitting and strenuous exertion, it is nevertheless the work of God. It is not carried on as a mere process of moral culture by moral means; it is as truly supernatural in its method as in its nature. What the Bible teaches in answer to the question, How a soul by nature spiritually dead, being quickened by the mighty power of God, is gradually transformed into the image of Christ, is substantially as follows, --

The Soul is led to exercise Faith.

1. It is led to exercise faith in the Lord Jesus Christ, to receive Him as its Saviour, committing itself to Him to be by his merit and grace delivered from the guilt and power of sin. This is the first step, and secures all the rest, not because of its inherent virtue or efficacy, but because, according to the covenant of grace, or plan of salvation, which God has revealed and which He has pledged Himself to carry out, He becomes bound by his promise to accomplish the full salvation from sin of every one who believes.

The Effect of Union with Christ.

2. The soul by this act of faith becomes united to Christ. We are in Him by faith. The consequences of this union are, (a.) Participation in his merits. His perfect righteousness, agreeably to the stipulations of the covenant of redemption, is imputed to the believer. He is thereby justified. He is introduced into a state of favour or grace, and rejoices in hope of the glory of God. (Rom. v. 1-3.) This is, as the Bible teaches, the essential preliminary condition of sanctification. While under the law we are under the curse. While under the curse we are the enemies of God and bring forth fruit unto death. It is only when delivered from the law by the body or death of Christ, and united to Him, that we bring forth fruit unto God. (Rom. vi. 8; vii. 4-6.) Sin, therefore, says the Apostle, shall not reign over us, because we are not under the law. (Rom. vi. 14.) Deliverance from the law is the necessary condition of deliverance from sin. All the relations of the believer are thus changed. He is translated from the kingdom of darkness and introduced into the glorious liberty of the sons of God. Instead of an outcast, a slave under condemnation, he becomes a child of God, assured of his love, of his tenderness, and of his care. He may come to Him with confidence. He is brought under all the influences which in their full effect constitute heaven. He therefore becomes a new creature. He has passed from death to life; from darkness to light, from hell (the kingdom of Satan) to heaven. He sits with Christ in

heavenly places. (Eph. ii. 6.) (b.) Another consequence of the union with Christ effected by faith, is the indwelling of the Spirit. Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law by being made a curse for us, in order that we might receive the promise of the Holy Ghost. (Gal. iii. 13, 14.) It was not consistent with the perfections or purposes of God that the Spirit should be given to dwell with his saving influences in the apostate children of men, until Christ had made a full satisfaction for the sins of the world. But as with God there are no distinctions of time, Christ was slain from the foundation of the world, and his death availed as fully for the salvation of those who lived before, as for that of those who have lived since his coming in the flesh. (Rom. iii. 25, 26; Heb. ix. 15.) The Spirit was given to the people of God from the beginning. But as our Lord says (John x. 10) that He came into the world not only that men might have life, but that they might have it more abundantly, the effusion, or copious communication of the Spirit is always represented as the great characteristic of the Messiah's advent. (Joel ii 28, 29; Acts ii. 16-21; John vii. 38, 39.) Our Lord, therefore, in his last discourse to his disciples, said it was expedient for them that He went away, for "if I go not away, the Comforter (the Parakletos, the helper) will not come unto you; but if I depart, I will send Him unto you." (John xvi. 7.) He was to supply the place of Christ as to his visible presence, carry on his work, gather in his people, transform them into the likeness of Christ, and communicate to them all the benefits of his redemption. Where the Spirit is, there Christ is; so that, the Spirit being with us, Christ is with us; and if the Spirit dwells in us, Christ dwells in us. (Rom. viii. 9-11.) In partaking, therefore, of the Holy Ghost, believers are partakers of the life of Christ. The Spirit was given to Him without measure, and from him flows down to all his members. This participation of the believer in the life of Christ, so that every believer may say with the Apostle, "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20), is prominently presented in the Word of God. (Rom. vi. 5; vii. 4; John xiv. 19; Col. iii. 3, 4.) The two great standing illustrations of this truth are the vine and the human body. The former is presented at length in John xv. 1-8, the latter in 1 Corinthians xii. 11-27; Romans xii. 5; Ephesians i. 22, 23; iv. 15, 16; v. 30; Colossians i. 18; ii. 19; and frequently elsewhere. As the life of the vine is diffused through all the branches, sustaining and rendering them fruitful; and as the life of the head is diffused through all the members of the body making it one, and imparting life to all, so the life of Christ is diffused through all the members of his mystical body making them one body in Him; having a common life with their common head. This idea is urged specially in Ephesians iv. 15, 16, where it is said that it is from Christ that the whole body fitly joined together, through the spiritual influence granted to every part according to its measure, makes increase in love. It is true that this is spoken of the Church as a whole. But what is said of Christ's mystical body as a whole is true of all its members severally. He is the prophet, priest, and king of the Church; but He is also the prophet, priest, and king of every believer. Our relation to Him is individual and personal. The Church as a whole is the temple of God; but so is every believer. (1 Cor. iii. 16; vi. 19.) The Church is the bride of Christ, but every believer is the object of that tender, peculiar love expressed in the use of that metaphor. The last verse of Paul Gerhardt's hymn, "Ein L&#65533;mmlein geht und tr&#65533;gt die Schuld," every true Christian may adopt as the expression of his own hopes: --

"Wann endlich ich soll treten ein
In deines Reiches Freuden,

So soll diess Blut mein Purpur seyn,
Ich will mich darein kielden;
Es soll seyn meines Hauptes Kron'
In welcher ich will vor den Thron
Des h[illegible]chsten Vaters gehen,
Und dir, dem er mich anvertraut,
Als eine wohlgeschm[illegible]ckte Braut,
An deiner Seiten stehen."

The Inward Work of the Spirit.

3. The indwelling of the Holy Spirit thus secured by union with Christ becomes the source of a new spiritual life, which constantly increases in power until everything uncongenial with it is expelled, and the soul is perfectly transformed into the image of Christ. It is the office of the Spirit to enlighten the mind; or, as Paul expresses it, "to enlighten the eyes of the understanding" (Eph. i. 18), that we may know the things freely given to us of God (1 Cor. ii. 12); i.e., the things which God has revealed; or, as they are called in v. 14, "The things of the Spirit of God." These things, which the natural man cannot know, the Spirit enables the believer "to discern," i.e., to apprehend in their truth and excellence; and thus to experience their power. The Spirit, we are taught, especially opens the eyes to see the glory of Christ, to see that He is God manifest in the flesh; to discern not only his divine perfections, but his love to us, and his suitableness in all respects as our Saviour, so that those who have not seen Him, yet believing on Him, rejoice in Him with joy unspeakable and full of glory. This apprehension of Christ is transforming; the soul is thereby changed into his image, from glory to glory by the Spirit of the Lord. It was this inward revelation of Christ by which Paul on his way to Damascus was instantly converted from a blasphemer into a worshipper and self-sacrificing servant of the Lord Jesus.

It is not, however, only one object which the opened eye of the believer is able to discern. The Spirit enables him to see the glory of God as revealed in his works and in his word; the holiness and spirituality of the law; the exceeding sinfulness of sin; his own guilt, pollution, and helplessness; the length and breadth, the height and depth of the economy of redemption; and the reality glory, and infinite importance of the things unseen and eternal. The soul is thus raised above the world. It lives in a higher sphere. It becomes more and more heavenly in its character and desires. All the great doctrines of the Bible concerning God, Christ, and things spiritual and eternal, are so revealed by this inward teaching of the Spirit, as to be not only rightly discerned, but to exert, in a measure, their proper influence on the heart and life. Thus the prayer of Christ (John xvii. 17), "Sanctify them through thy truth," is answered in the experience of his people.

God calls the Graces of his People into Exercise.

4. The work of sanctification is carried on by God's giving constant occasion for the exercise of all the graces of the Spirit. Submission, confidence, self-denial, patience, and meekness, as well as faith, hope, and love, are called forth, or put to the test, more or less effectually every day the believer passes on earth. And by this constant exercise he grows in grace and in the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. It is, however,

principally by calling his people to labour and snffer for the advancement of the Redeemer's kingdom, and for the good of their fellow-men, that this salutary discipline is carried on. The best Christians are in general those who not merely from restless activity of natural disposition, but from love to Christ and zeal for his glory, labour most and suffer most in his service.

The Church and Sacraments as means of Grace.

5. One great end of the establishment of the Church on earth, as the communion of saints, is the edification of the people of God. The intellectual and social life of man is not developed in isolation and solitude. It is only in contact and collision with his fellow-men that his powers are called into exercise and his social virtues are cultivated. Thus also it is by the Church-life of believers, by their communion in the worship and service of God, and by their mutual good offices and fellowship, that the spiritual life of the soul is developed. Therefore the Apostle says, "Let us consider one another, to provoke unto love and to good works: not forsaking the assembling of ourselves together. as the manner of some is; but exhorting one another; and so much the more as ye see the day approaching." (Heb. x. 24, 25.)

6. The Spirit renders the ordinances of God, the word, sacraments, and prayer, effectual means of promoting the sanctification of his people, and of securing their ultimate salvation. These, however, must be more fully considered in the sequel.

The Kingly Office of Christ.

7. In this connection, we are not to overlook or undervalue the constant exercise of the kingly office of Christ. He not only reigns over his people, but He subdues them to Himself, rules and defends them, and restrains and conquers all his and their enemies. These enemies are both inward and outward, both seen and unseen; they are the world, the flesh, and the devil. The strength of the believer in contending with these enemies, is not his own. He, is strong only in the Lord, and in the power of his might. (Eph. vi. 10.) The weapons, both offensive and defensive, are supplied by Him, and the disposition and the skill to use them are his gifts to be sought by praying without ceasing. He is an ever present helper. Whenever the Christian feels his weakness either in resisting temptation or in the discharge of duty, he looks to Christ, and seeks aid from Him. And all who seek find. When we fail, it is either from self-confidence, or from neglecting to call upon our ever present and almighty King, who is always ready to protect and deliver those who put their trust in Him. But there are dangers which we do not apprehend, enemies whom we do not see, and to which we would become an easy prey, were it not for the watchful care of Him who came into the world to destroy the works of the devil, and to bruise Satan under our feet. The Christian runs his race "looking unto Jesus;" the life he lives, he lives by faith in the Son of God; it is by the constant worship of Christ; by the constant exercise of love toward Him; by constant endeavours to do his will; and by constantly looking to Him for the supply of grace and for protection and aid, that he overcomes sin and finally attains the prize of the high-calling of God.

§ 4. The Fruits of Sanctification, or Good Works.

Their Nature.

The fruits of sanctification are good works. Our Lord says "A good tree bringeth not forth corrupt fruit; neither doth a corrupt tree bring forth good fruit, For every tree is known by his own fruit: for of thorns men do not gather figs, nor of a bramble bush gather they grapes." (Luke vi. 43, 44.) By good works, in this connection, are meant not only the inward exercises of the religious life, but also outward acts, such as can be seen and appreciated by others.

There are three senses in which works may be called good, --

1. When as to the matter of them they are what the law prescribes. In this sense even the heathen perform good works; as the Apostle says, Romans ii. 14, "The Gentiles . . . do by nature the things contained in the law." That is, they perform acts of justice and mercy. No man on earth is so wicked as never, in this sense of the term, to be the author of some good works. This is what the theologians call civil goodness, whose sphere is the social relations of men.

2. In the second place, by good works are meant works which both in the matter of them, and in the design and motives of the agent, are what the law requires. In other words, a work is good, when there is nothing either in the agent or in the act which the law condemns. In this sense not even the works of the holiest of God's people are good. No man is ever, since the fall, in this life, in such an inward state that he can stand before God and be accepted on the ground of what he is or of what he does. All our righteousnesses are as filthy rags. (Is. lxiv. 6.) Paul found to the last a law of sin in his members. He groaned under a body of death. In one of his latest epistles he says he had not attained, or was not already perfect, and all Christians are required to pray daily for the forgiveness of sin. What the Scriptures teach of the imperfection of the best works of the believer, is confirmed by the irrepressible testimony of consciousness. It matters not what the lips may say, every man's conscience telis him that he is always a sinner, that he never is free from moral defilement in the sight of an infinitely holy God. On this subject the Form of Concord [227] says, "Lex Dei credentibus bona opera ad eum modum pr&#65533;scribit, ut simul, tanquam in speculo, nobis commonstret, ea omnia in nobis in hac vita adhuc imperfecta et impura esse;" and [228] "Credentes in hac vita non perfecte, completive vel consummative (ut veteres locuti sunt) renovantur. Et quamvis ipsorum peccata Christi obedientia absolutissima contecta sint, ut credentibus non ad damnationem imputentur, et per Spiritum Sanctum veteris Adami mortificatio et renovatio in spiritu mentis eorum inchoata sit: tamen vetus Adam in ipsa natura, omnibusque illius interioribus et exterioribus viribus adhuc semper inh&#65533;ret." Calvin [229] says, "Seligat ex tota sua vita sanctus Dei servus, quod in ejus cursu maxime eximium se putabit edidisse, bene revolvat singulas partes: deprehendet procul dubio alicubi quod carnis putredinem sapiat, quando numquam ea est nostra alacritas ad bene agendum qu&#65533; esse debet, sed in cursu retardando multa debilitas. Quanquam non obscuras esse maculas videmus, quibus respersa sint opera sanctorum, fac tamen minutissimos esse n&#65533;vos duntaxat: sed an oculos Dei nihil offendent, coram quibus ne stell&#65533; quidem pur&#65533; sunt? Habemus, nec unum a sanctis exire opus, quod, si in se censeatur, non mereatur justam opprobrii mercedem."

Romish Doctrine on Good Works.

Against the doctrine that the best works of the believer are imperfect, the Romanists are especially denunciatory. And with good reason. It subverts their whole system, which is

founded on the assumed merit of good works. If the best works of the saints merit "justam opprobrii mercedem" (i.e., condemnation), they cannot merit reward. Their argument on this subject is, that if the Protestant doctrine be true which declares the best works of the believer to be imperfect; then the fulfilment of the law is impossible; but if this be so, then the law is not binding; for God does not command impossibilities. To this it may be answered, first, that the objection is inconsistent with the doctrine of Romanists themselves. They teach that man in his natural state since the fall is unable to do anything good in the sight of God, until he receives the grace of God communicated in baptism. According to the principle on which the objection is founded, the law does not bind the unbaptized. And secondly, the objection assumes the fundamental principle of Pelagianism, namely that ability limits obligation; a principle which, in the sphere of morals, is contrary to Scripture, consciousness, and the common judgment of mankind. We cannot be required to do what is impossible because of the limitation of our nature as creatures, as to create a world, or raise the dead; but to love God perfectly does not exceed the power of man as he came from the hands of his maker. It is not absolutely, but only relatively impossible, that is, in relation of the thing commanded, to us not as men, but as sinners. Although it is essential to the Romish doctrine of merit, of indulgences, of works of supererogation, and of purgatory, that the renewed should be able perfectly to fulfil the demands of the law, nevertheless, Romanists themselves are compelled to admit the contrary. Thus Bellarmin says, [230] "Defectus charitatis, quod videlicet non faciamus opera nostra tanto fervore dilectionis, quanto faciemus in patria, defectus quidem est, sed culpa et peccatum non est. . . . . Unde etiam charitas nostra, quamvis comparata ad charitatem beatorum sit imperfecta, tamen absolute perfecta dici potest." That is, although our love is in fact imperfect, it may be called perfect. But calling it perfect, does not alter its nature. To the same effect another of the leading theologians of the Roman Church, Andradius, says, "Peccata venalia per se tam esse minuta et levia, ut non adversentur perfectioni caritatis, nec impedire possint perfectam et absolutam legis obedientiam: utpote qu non sint ira Dei et condemnatione, sed venia digna, etiamsi Deus cum illis in judicium intret." [231] That is, sins are not sins, because men choose to regard them as trivial.

Works of Supererogation.

But if no work of man since the fall in this life is perfectly good, then it not only follows that the doctrine of merit must be given up, but still more obviously, all works of supererogation are impossible. Romanists teach that the renewed may not only completely satisfy all the demands of the law of God, which requires that we should love Him with all the heart, and all the mind, and all the strength, and our neighbour as ourselves; but that they can do more than the law demands, and thus acquire more merit than they need for their own salvation, which may be made available for those who lack.

It is impossible that any man can hold such a doctrine, unless he first degrades the law of God by restricting its demands to very narrow limits. The Romanists represent our relation to God as analogous to a citizen's relation to the state. Civil laws are limited to a narrow sphere. They concern only our social and political obligations. It is easy for a man to be a good citizen; to fulfil perfectly all that the law of the land requires. Such a man, through love to his country, may do far more than the law can demand. He may not only pay tribute to whom tribute is due, custom to whom custom, and honour to whom honour; but he

may also devote his time, his talents, his whole fortune to the service of his country. Thus also, according to Romanists, men may not only do all that the law of God requires of men as men, but they may also through love, far exceed its demands. This M[illegible]hler represents as a great superiority of Romish ethics over the Protestant system. The latter, according to him, limits man's obligations to his legal liabilities, to what in justice may be exacted from him on pain of punishment. Whereas the former rises to the higher sphere of love, and represents the believer cordially and freely rendering unto God what in strict justice could not be demanded of him. "It is the nature of love, which stands far, even immeasurably higher than the demands of the law, never to be satisfied with its manifestation, and to become more and more sensitive, so that believers, who are animated with this love, often appear to men who stand on a lower level as fanatics or lunatics." [232] But what if the law itself is love? What if the law demands all that love can render? What if the love which the law requires of every rational creature calls for the devotion of the whole soul, with all its powers to God as a living sacrifice? It is only by making sin to be no sin; by teaching men that they are perfect when even their own hearts condemn them; it is only by lowering the demands of the law which, being founded on the nature of God, of necessity requires perfect conformity to the divine image, that any man in this life can pretend to be perfect, or be so insane as to imagine that he can go beyond the demands of the law and perform works of supererogation.

Precepts and Counsels.

The distinction which Romanists make between precepts and counsels, rests upon the same low view of the divine law. By precepts are meant the specific commands of the law which bind all men, the observance of which secures a reward, and non-observance a penalty. Whereas counsels are not commands; they do not bind the conscience of any man, but are recommendations of things peculiarly acceptable to God, compliance with which merits a much higher reward than the mere observance of precepts. There are many such counsels in the Bible, the most important of which are said to be celibacy, monastic obedience, and poverty. [233] No man is bound to remain unmarried, but if he voluntarily determines to do so for the glory of God, that is a great virtue. No one is bound to renounce the acquisition of property, but if he voluntarily embraces a life of absolute poverty, it is a great merit. Our Lord, however, demands everything. He saith, "He that loveth father or mother more than me, is not worthy of me, and he that loveth son or daughter more than me, is not worthy of me." "He that findeth his life, shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake, shall find it." (Matt. x. 31, 39.) "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters, yea, and his own life also, he cannot be my disciple." (Luke xiv. 26.) The law of Christ demands entire devotion to Him. If his service requires that a man should remain unmarried, he is bound to live a life of celibacy; if it requires that he should give up all his property and take up his cross, and follow Christ, he is bound to do so; if it requires him to lay down his life for Christ's sake, he is bound to lay it down. Greater love hath no man than this, that a man lay down his life for his friends. Nothing can go beyond this. There can be no sacrifice and no service which a man can make or render, which duty, or the law of Christ, does not demand when such sacrifice or service becomes necessary as the proof or fruit of love to Christ. There is no room, therefore, for this distinction between counsels and precepts, between what the law demands and what love is willing to render. And therefore the doctrine of works of

supererogation is thoroughly anti-Christian.

They Sense in which the Fruits of the Spirit in Believers are called Good.

3. Although no work even of the true people of God, while they continue in this world, is absolutely perfect, nevertheless those inward exercises and outward acts which are the fruits of the Spirit are properly designated good, and are so called in Scripture. Acts ix. 36, it was said of Dorcas that she "was full of good works." Ephesians ii. 10, believers are said to be "created in Christ Jesus unto good works." 2 Timothy iii. 17, teaches that the man of God should be "thoroughly furnished unto all good works." Titus ii. 14, Christ gave Himself for us that He might "purify unto himself a peculiar people, zealous of good works." There is no contradiction in pronouncing the same work good and bad, because these terms are relative, and the relations intended may be different. Feeding the poor, viewed in relation to the nature of the act is a good work. Viewed in relation to the motive which prompts it, it may be good or bad. If done to be seen of men, it is offensive in the sight of God. If done from natural benevolence, it is an act of ordinary morality. If done to a disciple in the name of a disciple, it is an act of Christian virtue. The works of the children of God, therefore, although stained by sin, are truly and properly good, because, (1.) They are, as to their nature or the thing done, commanded by God. (2.) Because, as to the motive, they are the fruits, not merely of right moral feeling, but of religious feeling, i.e., of love to God; and (3.) Because they are performed with the purpose of complying with his will, of honouring Christ and of promoting the interests of his kingdom.

It follows from the fundamental principle of Protestantism, that the Scriptures are the only rule of faith and practice, that no work can be regarded as good or obligatory on the conscience which the Scriptures do not enjoin. Of course it is not meant that the Bible commands in detail everything which the people of God are bound to do, but it prescribes the principles by which their conduct is to be regulated, and specifies the kind of acts which those principles require or forbid. It is enough that the Scriptures require children to obey their parents, citizens the magistrate, and believers to hear the Church, without enjoining every act which these injunctions render obligatory. In giving these general commands, the Bible gives all necessary limitations, so that neither parents, magistrates, nor Church can claim any authority not granted to them by God, nor impose anything on the conscience which He does not command. As some churches have enjoined a multitude of doctrines as articles of faith, which are not taught in Scripture, so they have enjoined a multitude of acts, which the Bible neither directly, nor by just or necessary inference requires. They have thus imposed upon those who recognize their authority as infallible in teaching, a yoke of bondage which no one is able to bear. After the example of the ancient Pharisees, they teach for doctrines the commandments of men, and claim divine authority for human institutions. From this bondage it was one great design of the Reformation to free the people of God. This deliverance was effected by proclaiming the principle that nothing is sin but what the Bible forbids and nothing is morally obligatory but what the Bible enjoins.

Such, however, is the disposition, on the one hand, to usurp authority, and, on the other, to yield to it, that it is only by the constant assertion and vindication of this principle, that the liberty wherewith Christ has made us free can be preserved.

[227] VI. 21; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 723.

[228] VI. 7; Ibid. p. 719.

[229] Institutio, III. xiv. 9; edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 37.

[230] De Justificatione, IV. xvii; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 933, b.

[231] See Chemnitz Examen, De Bonis Operibus, III. edit. Frankfort, 1574, part i. p. 209, a.

[232] Mhler, Symbolik, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 216.

[233] Bellarmin, De Membris Ecclesi Militantis, lib. II. de Monachis, cap. 7, 8; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. ii. pp. 363-365.

§ 5. Necessity of Good Works.

On this subject there has never been any real difference of opinion among Protestants, although there was in the early Lutheran Church some misunderstanding. First. It was universally admitted that good works are not necessary to our justification; that they are consequences and indirectly the fruits of justification, and, therefore, cannot be its ground. Secondly, it was also agreed that faith, by which the sinner is justified, is not as a work, the reason why God pronounces the sinner just. It is the act by which the sinner receives and rests upon the righteousness of Christ, the imputation of which renders him righteous in the sight of God. Thirdly, faith does not justify because it includes, or is the root or principle of good works; not as "fides obsequiosa." Fourthly, it was agreed that it is only a living faith, i.e., a faith which works by love and purifies the heart, that unites the soul to Christ and secures our reconciliation with God. Fifthly, it was universally admitted that an immoral life is inconsistent with a state of grace; that those who wilfully continue in the practice of sin shall not inherit the kingdom of God. The Protestants while rejecting the Romish doctrine of subjectve justification, strenuously insisted that no man is delivered from the guilt of sin who is not delivered from its reiguing power; that sanctification is inseparable from justification, and that the one is just as essential as the other.

The controversy on this subject was due mainly to a misunderstanding, but in a measure also to a real difference of opinion as to the office of the law under the Gospel. Melancthon taught that repentance was the effect of the law and anterior to faith, and used forms of expression which were thought to imply that good works, or sanctification, although not the ground of justification, were nevertheless a "causa sine qua non" of our acceptance with God. To this Luther objected, as true sanctification is the consequence, and in no sense the condition of the sinner's justification. We are not justified because we are holy; but being justified, we are rendered holy. Agricola (born in Eisleben, 1492, died 1566), a pupil of Luther, and greatly influential as a preacher, took extreme ground against Melancthon. He not only held that repentance was not due to the operation of the law, and was the fruit of faith, but also that the law should not be taught under the Gospel, and that good works are not necessary to salvation. The believer is entirely free from the law, is not under the law but under grace; and being accepted for what Christ did, it is of little consequence what he does. Luther denounced this perversion of the Gospel, which overlooked entirely the distinction between the law as a covenant of works demanding perfect obedience as the condition of justification, and the law as the revelation of the immutable will of God as to what rational creatures should be and do in character and

conduct. He insisted that faith was the receiving of Christ, not only for the pardon of sin, but also as a saviour from its power; that its object was not merely the death, but also the obedience of Christ. [234]

The controversy was renewed not long after in another form, in consequence of the position taken by George Major, also a pupil of Luther and Melancthon, and for some years professor of theology and preacher at Wittenberg. He was accused of objecting to the proposition "we are saved by faith alone" and of teaching that good works were also necessary to salvation. This was understood as tantamount to saying that good works are necessary to justification. Major, indeed, denied the justice of this charge. He said he did not teach that good works were necessary as being meritorious, but simply as the necessary fruits of faith and part of our obedience to Christ; nevertheless, he maintained that no one could be saved without good works. How then can infants be saved? And how can this unconditional necessity of good works be consistent with Paul's doctrine that we are justified by faith without works? Whom God justifies He glorifies. Justification secures salvation; and, therefore, if faith alone, or faith without works, secures justification, it secures salvation. It is very evident that this was a dispute about words. Major admitted that the sinner was in a state of salvation the moment he believed, but held that if his faith did not produce good works it was not a saving faith. In his sermon "On the Conversion of Paul," he said: "As thou art now justified by faith alone, and hast become a child of God, and since Christ and the Holy Ghost through that faith dwell in thy heart, so are good works necessary, not to obtain salvation (which thou already hast as a matter of grace, without works, through faith alone on the Lord Jesus Christ), but to hold fast your salvation, that it be not lost, and also because if thou dost not produce good works, it is an evidence that thy faith is false and dead, a mere pretence or opinion." Amsdorf, the chief representative of the extremists in this controversy, laid down his doctrine in the following propositions: (1.) Etsi h[illegible]c oratio: bona opera sunt necessaria ad salutem in doctrina legis abstractive et de idea tolerari potest, tamen mult[illegible] sunt graves caus[illegible], propter quas vitanda, et fugienda est non minus, quam h[illegible]c oratio: Christus est creatura. (2.) In foro justificationis h[illegible]c propositio nullo modo ferenda est. (3.) In foro nov[illegible] obedienti[illegible] post reconciliationem nequaquam bona opera ad salutem, sed propter alias causas necessaria sunt. (4.) Sola fides justificat in principio, medio, et fine. (5.) Bona opera non sunt necessaria ad retinendam salutem. (6.) Synonyma sunt et [illegible]quipollentia, seu termini convertibiles, justificatio et salvatio, nec ulla ratione distrahi aut possunt aut debent. (7.) Explodatur ergo ex ecclesia cothurnus papisticus propter scandala multiplicia, dissensiones innumerabiles et alias causas, de quibus Apostoli Act. xv. loquuntur."

The "Form of Concord," in which this and other controversies in the Lutheran Church were finally adjusted, took the true ground on this subject, midway between the two extreme views. It rejects the unqualified proposition that good works are necessary to salvation, as men may be saved who have no opportunity to testify to their faith by their works. On the other hand, it utterly condemns the unwarrantable declaration that good works are hurtful to salvation; which it pronounces to be pernicious and full of scandal. It teaches that "Fides vera nunquam sola est, quin caritatem et spem semper secum habeat." [235]

The same doctrine was clearly taught in the Lutheran Symbols from the beginning, so

that the charge made by Romanists, that Protestants divorced morality from religion, was without foundation, either in their doctrine or practice. In the "Apology for the Augsburg Confession" it is said: "Quia fides affert Spiritum Sanctum, et parit novam vitam in cordibus, necesse est, quod pariat spirituales motus in cordibus. Et qui sint illi motus, ostendit propheta, cum ait: Dabo legem meam in corda eorum.' Postquam igitur fide justificati et renati sumus, incipimus Deum timere, diligere, petere, et expectare ab eo auxilium. . . . . Incipimus et diligere proximos, quia corda habent spirituales et sanctos motus. H&#65533;c non possunt fieri, nisi postquam fide justificati sumus et renati accipimus Spiritum Sanctum. . . . . Profitemur igitur, quod necesse est, inchoari in nobis et subinde magis magisque fieri legem. Et complectimur simul utrumque videlicet spirituales motus et externa bona opera. Falso igitur calumniantur nos adversarii, quod nostri non doceant bona opera, cum ea non solum requirant, sed etiam ostendant, quomodo fieri possint." [236]

Antinomianism.

Antinomianism has never had any hold in the churches of the Reformation. There is no logical connection between the neglect of moral duties, and the system which teaches that Christ is a Saviour as well from the power as from the penalty of sin; that faith is the act by which the soul receives and rests on Him for sanctification as well as for justification; and that such is the nature of the union with Christ by faith and indwelling of the Spirit, that no one is, or can be partaker of the benefit of his death, who is not also partaker of the power of his life; which holds to the divine authority of the Scripture which declares that without holiness no man shall see the Lord (Heb. xii. 14); and which, in the language of the great advocate of salvation by grace, warns all who call themselves Christians: "Be not deceived: neither fornicators, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners shall inherit the kingdom of God." (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10.) It is not the system which regards sin as so great an evil that it requires the blood of the Son of God for its expiation, and the law as so immutable that it requires the perfect righteousness of Christ for the sinner's justification, which leads to loose views of moral obligation; these are reached by the system which teaches that the demands of the law have been lowered, that they can be more than met by the imperfect obedience of fallen men, and that sin can be pardoned by priestly intervention. This is what logic and history alike teach.

[234] See Dorner, Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, Munich, 1867, pp. 336-344.

[235] Epitome, III. xi.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. 1846, p. 586.

[236] III. iv., v., xv.; Hase, pp. 83, 85.

§ 6. Relation of Good Works to Reward.

Romish Doctrine.

On this subject the Romanists make a distinction between works done before, and those done after regeneration. Works as to the matter of them good, when performed from mere natural conscience, have no other merit than that of congruity. They are necessarily imperfect, and constitute no claim on the justice of God. But works performed under the control of gracious principles infused in baptism, are perfect; they have therefore real

merit, i.e., the merit of condignity. They give a claim for reward, not merely on the ground of the divine promise, but also on the divine justice. To him that worketh is the reward not reckoned of grace, but of debt. (Rom. iv. 4.) On this subject the Council of Trent, [237] says: "Si quis dixerit, hominis justificati bona opera ita esse dona Dei, ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita; aut ipsum justificatum bonis operibus, qu&#65533; ab eo per Dei gratiam, et Jesu Christi meritum cujus vivum membrum est, fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum grati&#65533;, vitam &#65533;ternam, et ipsius vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533;, si tamen in gratia decesserit, consecutionem, atque etiam glori&#65533; augmentum; anathema sit." Bellarmin [238] says: "Habet communis catholicorum omnium sententia, opera bona justorum vere, ac proprie esse merita, et merita non cujuscunque premii, sed ipsius vit&#65533; &#65533;tern&#65533;."

The conditions of such meritorious works, according to Bellarmin, are: (1.) That they be good in their nature. (2.) Done in obedience to God. (3.) By a man in this life. (4.) That they be voluntary. (5.) That the agent be in a state of justification and favour with God. (6.) That they be prompted by love. (7.) That some divine promise be attached to them.

Refutation of this Romish Doctrine.

1. This whole doctrine of merit is founded on the assumption that justification, their term for regeneration, removes everything of the nature of sin from the soul; that works performed by the renewed being free from sin are perfect; that a renewed man can not only fulfil all the demands of the law, but also do more than the law requires. As these assumptions are contrary to Scripture, and to the experience of all Christians, the doctrine founded on them must be false.

2. The doctrine is inconsistent, not only with the express declarations of the word of God, but also with the whole nature and design of the Gospel. The immediate or proximate design of the plan of salvation, as the Scriptures abundantly teach, is the manifestation of the grace of God, and therefore it must be gratuitous in all its parts and provisions, to the entire exclusion of all merit. Unless salvation be of grace it is not a revelation of grace, and if of grace it is not of works.

3. The doctrine is so repugnant to the inward teachings of the Spirit, as well as to the teachings of his word, that it cannot be practically believed even by those who profess it. The children of God, in spite of their theories and their creeds, do not trust for their salvation, either in whole or in part, to what they are or to what they do; but simply and exclusively to what Christ is and has done for them. In proof of this, appeal may be made to the written or recorded experience of all the great lights of the Latin Church. If every Christian is intimately convinced that he is unholy in the sight of God; that all his best acts are polluted; and that in no one thing and at no time does he come up to the standard of perfection; it is impossible that he can believe that he merits eternal life on the ground of his own works.

4. As the doctrine of merit is opposed to the nature and design of the Gospel, and to the express declarations of Scripture that we are not justified or saved by works, but gratuitously for Christ's sake, so it is derogatory to the honour of Christ as our Saviour. He gave Himself as a ransom; he offered Himself as a sacrifice; it is by his obedience we are constituted righteous; it is, therefore, only on the assumption that his ransom, sacrifice, and obedience are inadequate that the merit of our works can be needed or admitted. The Romanists attempt to evade the force of this objection by saying that we owe to Christ the

grace or spiritual life by which we perform good works. Had He not died for our sins, God would not in baptism wash away our guilt and pollution and impart those "habits of grace" by which we are enabled to merit eternal life. This does not help the matter; for salvation remains a debt as a matter of justice on the ground of our good works. It is this which is so contrary to Scripture, to the intimate conviction of every Christian, and to the glory of Christ, to whom the whole honour of our salvation is due.

Doctrine of the older Protestant Divines.

The older theologians, in order the more effectually to refute the doctrine of merit, assumed that a work, to be meritorious, must be (1.) "Indebitum," i.e., not due. Something which we are not bound to do. (2.) Our own. (3.) Absolutely perfect. (4.) Equal, or bearing a due proportion to the recompense. (5.) And, therefore, that the recompense should be due on the gound of justice, and not merely of promise or agreement. On these conditions, all merit on the part of creatures is impossible. It is, however, clearly recognized in Scripture that a labourer is worthy of his hire. To him that worketh, says the Apostle, the reward is not reckoned of grace, but of debt. It is something due in justice. This principle also is universally recognized among men. Even on the theory of slavery, where the labourer himself his time, and strength, and all he has, are assumed to belong to his master, the servant has a claim to a proper recompense, which it would be unjust to withhold from him. And in every department of life it is recognized as a simple matter of justice, that the man who performs a stipulated work, earns his wages. The payment is not a matter of favour; it is not due simply because promised; but because it has been earned. It is a debt. So in the case of Adam, had he remained perfect, there would have been no ground in justice why he should die, or forfeit the favour of God; which favour is life.

The passage in Luke xvii. 10, is relied upon as proving that a creature can in no case perform a meritorious act, i.e., an act which lays a claim in justice for a reward. Our Lord there says, "When ye shall have done all those things which are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants: we have done that which was our duty to do.'" This does not teach that the labourer is not worthy of his hire. The passage is part of a parable in which our Lord says, that a master does not thank his servant for merely doing his duty. It does not call for gratitude. But it does not follow that it would be just to withhold the servant's wages, or to refuse to allow him to eat and drink. God is just, and being just, He rewards every man according to his works, so long as men are under the law. If not under the law, they are dealt with, not on the principles of law, but of grace.

But although Protestants deny the merit of good works, and teach that salvation is entirely gratuitous, that the remission of sins, adoption into the family of God, and the gift of the Holy Spirit are granted to the believer, as well as admission into heaven, solely on the ground of the merits of the Lord Jesus Christ; they nevertheless teach that God does reward his people for their works. Having graciously promised for Christ s sake to overlook the imperfection of their best services, they have the assurance founded on that promise that he who gives to a disciple even a cup of cold water in the name of a disciple, shall in no wise lose his reward. The Scriptures also teach that the happiness or blessedness of believers in a future life, will be greater or less in proportion to their devotion to the service of Christ in this life. Those who love little, do little; and those who do little enjoy less. What a man sows that shall he also reap. As the rewards of heaven are given on the ground of the merits

of Christ, and as He has a right to do what He will with his own, there would be no injustice were the thief saved on the cross as highly exalted as the Apostle Paul. But the general drift of Scripture is in favour of the doctrine that a man shall reap what he sows; that God will reward every one according to, although not on account of his works.

[237] Sess. vi. canon 32; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, Gttingen, 1846, vol. i. p. 37.

[238] De Justificatione, v. i.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 949, a.

§ 7. Perfectionism.

Protestant Doctrine.

The doctrine of Lutherans and Reformed, the two great branches of the Protestant Church, is, that sanctification is never perfected in this life; that sin is not in any case entirely subdued; so that the most advanced believer has need as long as he continues in the flesh, daily to pray for the forgiveness of sins.

The question is not as to the duty of believers. All admit that we are bound to be perfect as our Father in heaven is perfect. Nor is it a question as to the command of God; for the first, original, and universally obligatory commandment is that we should love God with all our heart and our neighbour as ourselves. Nor does the question concern the provisions of the Gospel. It is admitted that the Gospel provides all that is needed for the complete sanctification and salvation of believers. What can we need more than we have in Christ, his Spirit, his word and his ordinances? Nor does it concern the promises of God; for all rejoice in the hope, founded on the divine promise, that we shall be ultimately delivered from all sin. God has in Christ made provision for the complete salvation of his people: that is, for their entire deliverance from the penalty of the law, from the power of sin, from all sorrow, pain, and death; and not only for mere negative deliverance, but for their being transformed into the image of Christ, filled with his Spirit, and glorified by the beauty of the Lord. It is, however, too plain that, unless sanctification be an exception, no one of these promises besides that which concerns justification, is perfectly fulfilled in this life. Justification does not admit of degrees. A man either is under condemnation, or he is not. And, therefore, from the nature of the case, justification is instantaneous and complete, as soon as the sinner believes. But the question is, whether, when God promises to make his people perfectly holy, perfectly happy, and perfectly glorious, He thereby promises to make them perfect in holiness in this life? If the promises of happiness and glory are not perfectly fulfilled in this life, why should the promise of sanctification be thus fulfilled? It is, however, a mere question of fact. All admit that God can render his people perfect before death as well as after it. The only question is, Has He promised, with regard to sanctification alone, that it shall be perfected on this side of the grave? and, Do we see cases in which the promise has been actually fulfilled? The answer given to these questions by the Church universal is in the negative. So long as the believer is in this world, he will need to pray for pardon.

The grounds of this doctrine are, --

1. The spirituality of the divine law and the immutability of its demands. It condemns as sinful any want of conformity to the standard of absolute perfection as exhibited in the Bible. Anything less than loving God constantly with all the heart, all the soul, all the mind,

and all the strength, and our neighbour as ourselves, is sin.

2. The express declaration of Scripture that all men are sinners. This does not mean simply that all men have sinned, that all are guilty, but that all have sin cleaving to them. "If," declares the Apostle, "we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us." (1 John i. 8.) As the wise man had said before him, "There is not a just man upon earth, that doeth good, and sinneth not." (Eccles. vii. 20.) And in 1 Kings viii. 46, it is said, "There is no man that sinneth not." And the Apostle James, iii. 2, says: "In many things we offend all." It is a manifest perversion of the simple grammatical meaning of the words to make hamartian ouk echomen to refer to the past. The verb is in the present tense. The truth is not in us, says the Apostle, if we say we have no sin, i.e., that we are not now polluted by sin. In the context he sets forth Christ as the "Word of Life," as having life in Himself, and as being the source of life to us. Having fellowship with Him, we have fellowship with God. But God is light, i.e., is pure, holy, and blessed; if, therefore, we walk in darkness, i.e., in ignorance and sin, we can have no fellowship with Him. But if we walk in the light, as He is in the light, the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin. If we say we have no sin, and do not need now and at all times the cleansing power of Christ's blood, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us.

Argument from the General Representations of Scripture.

The declarations of Scripture, which are so abundant, that there is none righteous, no not one; that all have sinned and come short of the glory of God; that no flesh living is just in the sight of God; and that every one must lay his hand upon his mouth, and his mouth in the dust in the sight of the infinitely holy God, who accuses his angels of folly, refer to all men without exception; to Jews and Gentiles; to the renewed and unrenewed; to babes in Christ and to mature Christians. All feel, and all are bound to acknowledge that they are sinners whenever they present themselves before God; all know that they need constantly the intervention of Christ, and the application of his blood, to secure fellowship with the Holy One. As portrayed in Scripture, the inward life of the people of God to the end of their course in this world, is a repetition of conversion. It is a continued turning unto God; a constant renewal of confession, repentance, and faith; a dying unto sin, and living unto righteousness. This is true of all the saints, patriarchs, prophets, and apostles of whose inward experience the Bible gives us any account.

Passages which describe the Conflict between the Flesh and the Spirit.

3. More definitely is this truth taught in those passages which describe the conflict in the believer between the flesh and the Spirit. To this reference has already been made. That the seventh chapter of Paul's Epistle to the Romans is an account of his own inward life at the time of writing that Epistle, has already, as it is believed, been sufficiently proved; and such has been the belief of the great body of evangelical Christians in all ages of the Church. If this be the correct interpretation of that passage, then it proves that Paul, at least, was not free from sin; that he had to contend with a law in his members, warring against the law of his mind; that he groaned constantly under the burden of indwelling sin. At a still later period of his life, when he was just ready to be offered up, he says to the Philippians, iii. 12-14, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect: but I follow after, if that I may apprehend that for which also I am apprehended of Christ Jesus. Brethren, I count not myself to have apprehended: but this one thing I do, forgetting those

things which are behind and reaching forth unto those things which are before, I press toward the mark for the prize of the high calling of God in Christ Jesus." This is an unmistakable declaration on the part of the Apostle that even at this late period of his life he was not yet perfect; he had not attained the end of perfect conformity to Christ, but was pressing forward, as one in a race, with all earnestness that he might reach the end of his calling. To answer this, as has been done by some distinguished advocates of perfectionism, by saying that Paul's not being perfect, is no proof that other men may not be is not very satisfactory.

The parallel passage in Galatians, v. 16-26, is addressed to Christians generally. It recognizes the fact that they are imperfectly sanctified; that in them the renewed principle, the Spirit as the source of spiritual life, is in couffict with the flesh, the remains of their corrupt nature. It exhorts them to mortify the flesh (not the body, but their corrupt nature), and to strive constantly to walk under the controlling influence of the Spirit. The characteristic difference between the unrenewed and the renewed is not that the former are entirely sinful, and the latter perfectly holy; but that the former are wholly under the control of their fallen nature, while the latter have the Spirit of God dwelling in them, which leads them to crucify the flesh, and to strive after complete conformity to the image of God. There was nothing in the character of the Galatian Christians to render this exhortation applicable to them alone. What the Scriptures teach concerning faith, repentance, and justification, is intended for all Christians; and so what is taught of sanctification suits the case of all believers. Indeed, if a man thinks himself perfect, and apprehends that he has already attained what his fellow believers are only striving for, a great part of the Bible must for him lose its value. What use can he make of the Psalms, the vehicle through which the people of God for millenniums have poured out their hearts? How can such a man sympathize with Ezra, Nehemiah, or any of the prophets? How strange to him must be the language of Isaiah, "Woe is me! for I am undone; because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips: for mine eyes have seen the King, the Lord of hosts."

Argument from the Lord's Prayer.

4. Not only do the holy men of God throughout the Scriptures in coming into his presence, come with the confession of sin and imperfection, praying for mercy, not only for what they were but also for what they are, but our Lord has taught all his disciples whenever they address their Father in heaven to say, "Forgive as our trespasses." This injunction has ever been a stumbling block in the way of the advocates of perfection from Pelagius to the present day. It was urged by Augustine in his argument against the doctrine of his great opponent that men could be entirely free from sin in the present life. The answer given to the argument from this source has been substantially the same as that given by Pelagius. It is presented in its best form by the Rev. Richard Watson. [239] That writer says, "(1.) That it would be absurd to suppose that any person is placed under the necessity of trespassing, in order that a general prayer designed for men in a mixed condition might retain its aptness to every particular ease. (2.) That trespassing of every kind and degree is not supposed by this prayer to be continued, in order that it might be used always in the same import, or otherwise it might be pleaded against the renunciation of any trespass or transgression whatever. (3.) That this petition is still relevant to the case of the entirely

sanctified and the evangelically perfect, since neither the perfection of the first man nor that of angels is in question; that is, a perfection measured by the perfect law, which in its obligation, contemplates all creatures as having sustained no injury by moral lapse, and admits, therefore, of no excuse from infirmities and mistakes of judgment; nor of any degree of obedience below that which beings created naturally perfect, were capable of rendering. There may, however, be an entire sanctification of a being rendered naturally weak and imperfect, and so liable to mistake and infirmity, as well as to defect as to the degree of that absolute obedience and service which the law of God, never bent to human weakness, demands from all. These defects, and mistakes, and infirmities, may be quite consistent with the entire sanctification of the soul and the moral maturity of a being still naturally infirm and imperfect."

The first and second of these answers do not touch the point. No one pretends that men are placed under the necessity of sinning, "in order that" they may be able to repeat the Lord's prayer. This would indeed be absurd. The argument is this. If a man prays to be forgiven, he confesses that he is a sinner, and if a sinner, he is not free from sin or perfect. And therefore, the use of the Lord's prayer by all Christians, is an acknowledgment that no Christian in this life is perfect. The third answer which is the one principally relied upon and constantly repeated, involves a contradiction. It assumes that what is not sin requires to be forgiven. Mr. Watson says the petition, "Forgive us our trespasses," may be properly used by those who are free from sin. This is saying that sin is not sin. The argument by which this position is sustained also involves a contradiction. Our "infirmities" are sins if judged by "the perfect law"; but not if judged by "the evangelical law." As we are not to be judged by the former, but by the latter, want of conformity tc the law is not sin. The only inability under which men, since the fall, labour, arises from their sinfulness, and therefore is no excuse for want of conformity to that law which it is said, and said rightly, is "never bent to human weakness."

Argument from the Experience of Christians.

5. Appeal may be made on this subject to the testimony of the Church universal. There are no forms of worship, no formulas for private devotion, in any age or part of the Church, which do not contain confession of sin and prayer for forgiveness. The whole Christian Church with all its members prostrates itself before God, saying, "Have mercy upon us miserable sinners." If here and there one and another among this prostrate multitude refuse to bow and join in this confession, they are to be wondered at and pitied. They are, however, not to he found. Consciousness is too strong for theory, and therefore,

6. We may appeal to the conscience of every believer. He knows that he is a sinner. He never is in a state which satisfies his own conviction as to what he ought to be. He may call his deficiencies infirmities, weaknesses, and errors, and may refuse to call them sins. But this does not alter the case. Whatever they are called, it is admitted that they need God's pardoning mercy.

[239] Theological Institutes, II. xxix.; edit. New York, 1832, p. 545.

§ 8. Theories of Perfectionism.

Pelagian Theory.

The two radical principles of Pelagianism are, first, that the nature of man is uninjured by the fall, so that men are free from sin until by voluntary transgression they incur guilt. Secondly, that our natural powers, since, as well as before the fall, are fully competent to render complete obedience to the law.

From these principles Pelagius inferred, (1.) That a man (even among the heathen) might live from birth to death free from all sin, although he did not assert that any man ever had so lived. (2.) That when converted, men might, and numbers of men did, live without sin; perfectly obeying the law. (3) That this obedience was rendered in the exercise of their ability, assisted by the grace of God.

By grace, Pelagius says that we are to understand, (1.) The goodness of God in so constituting our nature that we can completely obey the law in virtue of our free agency. (2.) The revelation, precepts, and example of Christ. (3.) The pardon of sins committed before conversion. (4.) The moral influences of the truth and of the circumstances in which we are placed. The effect of grace thus understood, is simply to render obedience more easy.

In the Council of Carthage, A.D. 418, the Pelagians were condemned, among other things, for teaching, (1.) That the effect of grace was merely to render obedience more easy. (2.) That the declaration of the Apostle John, "If we say that we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us," is, as to some, a mere expression of humility. (3.) That the petition in the Lord's prayer, "Forgive us our trespasses," is not suited to the saints. They use it only as expressing the desire and necessity of others.

According to the Pelagian theory, therefore, (1.) The sin from which the believer may be perfectly free is the voluntary transgression of known law. Nothing else is of the nature of sin. (2.) The law to which perfect conformity in this life is possible, and in many cases actual, is the moral law in all its strictness. (3.) This obedience may be rendered without any supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit.

Romish Theory.

Romanists teach, (1.) That by the infusion of grace in justification as effected by or in baptism, everything of the nature of sin is removed from the soul. (2.) That good works performed in a state of grace are free from the taint of sin, and are perfect. "Si quis in quolibet bono opere justum saltem venaliter peccare dixerit . . . . anathema sit." [240] (3.) That the law may be and often is, perfectly obeyed by the children of God in this life. (4.) That men may not only do all that the law requires, but may even go beyond its demands. (5.) Nevertheless, as there is in higher law than that by which men are to be judged, no man is entirely free from venial sins, i.e., sins which do not bring the soul under condemnation, and therefore all men in this life have need to say, "Forgive us our trespasses."

From this statement it appears,

1. That by sin from which advanced believers are said to be free, is meant only what merits condemnation, and in itself deserves the forfeiture of grace or divine favour. It is admitted that "concupiscence," or the remains of original sin, is not removed by baptism, but it is not of the nature of sin, in the sense just stated. Neither are venial sins, i.e., sins which do not forfeit grace, properly sins, if judged by the law under which believers are now placed. So far, therefore, as the negative part of perfection, or freedom from sin is concerned, the Romanists do not mean freedom from moral faults, but simply freedom from what incurs the sentence of the law. It is perfection as judged by a lower standard of

judgment.

2. The law to which we are now subject, and the demands of which Romanists say are satisfied by the obedience of the saints, is not the moral law in its original strictness, but the sum of that which is due from man in his present circumstances; in other words, the demands of the law are accommodated to the condition of men in this life. This is evident, because they say that the saints obey the law so far as it is now binding, and because they admit that saints commit venial sins, which can only mean sins which, under a stricter rule of judgment, would merit condemnation.

3. As stated above, they distinguish between the law and love. The former is that which all men, and especially Christians, are bound to observe, but love is a higher principle which prompts to doing more than the law or justice demands. Consequently, the positive part of perfection, or conformity to the law, does not imply the highest degree of moral excellence of which our nature is susceptible, but only such as answers to the lower demands of the law to which we are now subject. In a passage already quoted, Bellarmin says, "Defectus charitatis, quod videlicet non faciamus opera nostra tanto fervore dilectionis, quanto faciemus in patria, defectus quidem est, sed culpa, et peccatum non est. Unde etiam charitas nostra, quamvis comparata ad charitatem beatorum sit imperfecta, tamen absolute perfecta dici potest." [241] In like manner Moehler says, [242] "In modern times the attempt has been made to sustain the old orthodox doctrine by assuming that the moral law makes ideal demands, which, as every other ideal, must remain unattainable. If this be true, then the man who falls short of this ideal is as little responsible, and as little deserving of punishment, as an epic poet who should fall short of the Iliad of Homer."

The Romish theory is consistent. In baptism all sin is washed away. By the infusion of grace full ability is given to do all that is required of us. Nothing can be required beyond what we are able to perform, and, therefore, the demands of the law are suited to our present state. By obedience to this modified law, we merit increased supplies of grace and eternal life.

The perfection, therefore, which Romanists insist upon is merely relative; not an entire freedom from sin, but only from such sins as merit condemnation; not holiness which is absolutely perfect, but perfect only relatively to the law under which we are now placed. It is clear that there is a radical difference between Romanists and Protestants as to the nature of sin and the limits of moral obligation. If they were to adopt our definition of sin, they would not pretend to any perfection in the present life.

The Arminian Theory.

The perfection which the Arminians teach is attainable, and which, in many cases, they say is actually attained in this life, is declared to be complete conformity to the law; including freedom from sin, and the proper exercise of all right affections and the discharge of all duties.

Episcopius defines it to be, keeping the commandments of God with a perfect fulfilment; or loving God as much as we ought to love Hun, according to the requirements of the Gospel; or according to the covenant of grace. "By a perfection of degrees is meant that highest perfection which consists in the highest exertion of human strength assisted by grace." "This perfection includes two things, (1.) A perfection proportioned to the powers of each individual; (2.) A desire of making continual progress, and of increasing one s

strength more and more."

Limborch defines it as "keeping the precepts of the Gospel after such manner, and in such degree of perfection as God requires of us under the denunciation of eternal damnation." This obedience is "perfect as being correspondent to the stipulations contained in the divine covenant." "It is not a sinless or absolutely perfect obedience, but such as consists in a sincere love and habit of piety, which excludes all habit of sin, with all enormous and deliberate actions." [243] This perfection has three degrees (1.) That of beginners. (2.) That of proficients. (3.) That of the truly perfect, who have subdued the habit of sin, and take delight in the practice of virtue.

Wesley [244] says; "Perfection is the loving God with all the heart, mind, soul, and strength. This implies that no wrong temper, none contrary to love, remains in the soul; and that all the thoughts, words, and actions, are governed by love." Dr. Peck [245] says that it is "a state of holiness which fully meets the requirements of the Gospel."

Although these definitions differ in some respects, they agree in the general idea that perfection consists in entire conformity to the law to which we are now subject, and by which we are to be judged.

The Law to which Believers are subject.

What, according to the Arminian theory, is that law? The answer to that question is given in a negative, and in a positive form. Negatively, it is said by Dr. Peck not to be the Adamic law, or the law originally given to Adam. Fletcher [246] says: "With respect to the Christless law of paradisiacal obedience, we utterly disclaim sinless perfection." "We shall not be judged by that law; but by a law adapted to our present state and circumstances, called the law of Christ." "Our Heavenly Father never expects of us, in our debilitated state, the obedience of immortal Adam in paradise." The positive statements are, "It is the law of Christ." "The Gospel." "The standard of character set up in the Gospel must be such as is practicable by man, fallen as he is. Coming up to this standard is what we call Christian perfection." [247]

From this it appears that the law according to which men are pronounced perfect, is not the original moral law, but the mitigated law suited to the debilitated state of man since the fall. The sin from which the believer may be entirely free, is not all moral imperfection which in itself deserves punishment, but only such delinquencies as are inconsistent with the mitigated law of the Gospel.

On this point the language of Limborch above quoted, is explicit. It is not "an absolutely sinless perfection" that is asserted. And Fletcher says, We utterly disclaim "sinless perfection" according to the paradisiacal law. Wesley says, By sin is meant (1.) Voluntary transgression of known law. In this sense all who are born of God are free from sin. (2.)It means all unholy tempers, self-will, pride, anger, sinful thoughts. From these the perfect are free. (3.) But mistakes and infirmities are not sins. "These are," indeed, "deviations from the perfect law, and consequently need atonement. Yet they are not properly sins." "A person filled with the love of God is still liable to these involuntary transgressions. Such transgressions you may call sins, if you please, I do not." [248] The question, however, is not what Wesley or any other man chooses to call sin; but what does the law of God condemn. Nothing which the law does not condemn can need expiation. If these transgressions, therefore, need atonement, they are sins in the sight of God. Our

refusing to recognize them as such does not alter their nature, or remove their guilt.

According to the Arminian system, especially as held by the Wesleyans, this perfection is not due to the native ability, or free will of man, but to the grace of God, or supernatural influence of the Spirit. Perfection is a matter of grace, (1.) Because it is solely on account of the work of Christ that God lowers the demands of the law, and accepts as perfect the obedience which the milder law of the Gospel demands. (2.) Because the ability to render this obedience is due to the gracious influence of the Holy Spirit. (3.) Because believers constantly need the intercession of Christ as our High Priest, to secure them from condemnation for involuntary transgressions, which, judged by the law, would incur its penalty.

Oberlin Theory.

This theory is so called because its prominent advocates are the officers of the Oberlin University in Ohio. President Mahan [249] says, perfection in holiness implies a full and perfect discharge of our entire duty; of all existing obligations in respect of God and all other beings. It is loving God with all the heart, soul, mind, and strength. It implies the entire absence of selfishness and the perpetual presence and all pervading influence of pure and perfect love.

Professor Finney says: "By entire sanctification, I understand the consecration of the whole being to God. In other words, it is the state of devotedness to God and his service required by the moral law. The law is perfect. It requires just what is right, all that is right, and nothing more. Nothing more nor less can possibly be perfection or entire sanctification than obedience to the law. Obedience to the law of God in an infant, a man, an angel, and in God himself, is perfection in each of them. And nothing can possibly be perfection in any being short of this; nor can there possibly be anything above it." [250]

The law which now binds men and to which they are bound to be perfectly conformed, is the original moral law given to Adam. But that law demands nothing more and nothing less than what every man in his inward state and outward circumstances is able to render. The law meets man at every step of his ascending or descending progress. The more grace, knowledge, or strength he has, the more does the law demand. On the other hand, the less of knowledge, culture, moral susceptibility, or strength he possesses, the less does the law require of him.

President Mahan says, Perfection does not imply that we love God as the saints do in heaven, but merely that we love Him as far as practicable with our present powers.

Professor Finney says, The law does not require that we should love God as we might do, had we always improved our time, or had we never sinned. It does not suppose that our powers are in a perfect state. The service required is regulated by our ability.

The principle of this perfect obedience is our own natural ability. A free moral agent must be able to be and to do all that the law can justly demand. Moral ability, natural ability, gracious ability, are distinctions which Professor Finney pronounces perfectly nonsensical. "It is," he says, "a first truth of reason that moral obligation implies the possession of every kind of ability which is required to render the required act possible." [251]

The Oberlin theory of perfection is founded on the following principles: --

1. Holiness consists in disinterested benevolence, i.e., a perfect willingness that God should do whatever the highest good of the universe demands. A man either has, or has not, this willingness. If he has, he has all that is required of him. He is perfect. If he has not this willingness he is in rebellion against God. Therefore it is said, "Perfection, as implied in the action of our voluntary powers in full harmony with our present convictions of duty is an irreversible condition of eternal life." [252]

2. There is no sin but in the voluntary transgression of known law.

3. There is no moral character in anything but generic volitions, or those purposes which terminate on an ultimate end. There is no moral character in feeling, and much less in states of mind not determined by the will. When a man's purpose is to promote the happiness of the universe he is perfectly holy; when it is anything else, he is perfectly sinful.

4. Every man, in virtue of being a free agent, has plenary ability to fulfil all his obligations. This principle, though mentioned last, is the root of the whole system.

The Relation between these Theories of Perfection.

The Pelagian and the Oberlin theories agree as to their views of the nature of sin; the ability of man; and the extent of the obligation of the law.

They differ as to their views of the nature of virtue or holiness. The Pelagian system does not assume that disinterested benevolence, or the purpose to promote the highest good of the universe, is the sum of all virtue; i.e., it does not put the universe in the place of God, as that to which our allegiance is due. They differ also in that, while the Oberlin divines maintain the plenary ability of man, they give more importance to the work of the Holy Spirit; and in that, it is generally admitted that although men have the ability to do their whole duty, yet that they will not exert it aright unless influenced by the grace of God.

The Romish and Arminian theories agree, (1.) In that both teach that the law to which we are bound to be conformed is not "ideal excellence;" not the Adamic law; not the moral law in its original strictness; but a milder law suited to our condition since the fall. (2.) That by freedom from sin is not meant freedom from what the law in its strictness condemns, and what in its nature needs expiation and pardon, but from everything which the milder law, "the law of Christ," condemns. (3.) They agree in denying to men since the fall ability perfectly to keep the commandments of God, but attribute the ability and disposition to obey to the grace of God; or the supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit.

They differ as to the mode in which this grace is communicated, in that the Romanists say that it is only through the sacraments, whereas Arminians say that sufficient grace is given to all men, which, if duly improved, secures such larger measures of grace as will enable the believer to become perfect. They differ also as to the nature of good works in so far as Romanists include under that category many things not commanded in the Scriptures; and as they teach the possibility of performing works of supererogation, which the Arminians deny. The Romanists also teach that good works merit eternal life, which evangelical Arminians do not.

These theories, however, all agree in teaching that the law of God has been lowered in so far that its demands are satisfied by a less degree of obedience than was required of Adam, or of man in his normal state; and therefore in calling that perfection which in fact is

not perfection, either in the sight of God or of an enlightened conscience. It is a contradiction to say that a man is perfect whose acts and shortcomings need expiation and the pardoning mercy of God.

It may be safely assumed that no man living has ever seen a fellow-man whom, even in the imperfect light in which a man reveals himself to his fellows, he deems perfect. And no sound minded man can regard himself as perfect, unless he lowers the standard of judgment to suit his case. And here lies one of the special dangers of the whole system. If the law of God can be relaxed in its demands to suit the state of its subjects, then there is no limit to be assigned to its condescension. Thus perfectionism has sometimes, although not among the Methodists, lapsed into antinomianism.

[240] Council of Trent, Sess. V., Canon 25; Streitworlf, vol. i. p. 36.

[241] De Justificatione, IV. xvii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iv. p. 933, b.

[242] Symbolik, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 216.

[243] Theologia Christiana, V. lxxix. 2, 8, 14; edit. Amsterdam, 1715, pp. 658, a, 659, b, 661, a.

[244] Plain Account of Christian Perfection, p. 48.

[245] Christian Perfection, New York, 1843, p. 292.

[246] See above, p. 192.

[247] Peck, Christian Perfection, p. 294.

[248] Plain Account, pp. 62-67.

[249] Christian Perfection, p. 7.

[250] Oberlin Evangelist, vol. ii. p. 1.

[251] Sermons, vol. iv. No. 18.

[252] Oberlin Quarterly Review, May 1846, p. 468.

CHAPTER XIX: THE LAW

§ 1. Preliminary Principles.

The Personality of God involved in the Idea of Law; and, therefore, all Morality is founded on Religion.

The principal meanings of the word law are, (1.) An established order in the sequence of events. A law, in this sense, is a mere fact. That the planets are distant from the sun according to a determined proportion; that the leaves of a plant are arranged in a regular spiral around the stem; and that one idea by association suggests another, are simple facts. Yet they are properly called laws, in the sense of established orders of sequence or relation. So also what are called the laws of light, of sound, and of chemical affinity, are, for the most part, mere facts. (2.) A uniformly acting force which determines the regular sequence of events. In this sense the physical forces which we see in operation around us, are called the laws of nature. Gravitation, light, heat, electricity, and magnetism, are such forces. The fact that they act uniformly gives them the character of laws. Thus the Apostle speaks also of a law of sin in his members which wars against the law of the mind. (3.) Law is that which binds the conscience. It imposes the obligation of conformity to its demands upon all rational creatures. This is true of the moral law in its widest sense. It is also true of human laws within the sphere of their legitimate operation.

In all these senses of the word, law implies a law-giver; that is, an intelligence acting voluntarily for the attainment of an end. The irregular, or unregulated action of physical forces produces chaos; their ordered action produces the cosmos. But ordered action is action pre-established, sustained, and directed for the accomplishment of a purpose.

This is still more obviously true with regard to moral laws. The slightest analysis of our feelings is sufficient to show that moral obligation is the obligation to conform our character and conduct to the will of an infinitely perfect Being, who has the authority to make his will imperative, and who has the power and the right to punish disobedience. The sense of guilt especially resolves itself into a consciousness of being amenable to a moral governor. The moral law, therefore, is in its nature the revelation of the will of God so far as that will concerns the conduct of his creatures. It has no other authority and no other sanction than that which it derives from Him.

The same is true with regard to the laws of men. They have no power or authority unless they have a moral foundation. And if they have a moral basis, so that they bind the conscience, that basis must be the divine will. The authority of civil rulers, the rights of property, of marriage, and all other civil rights, do not rest on abstractions, nor on general principles of expediency. They might be disregarded without guilt, were they not sustained

by the authority of God. All moral obligation, therefore, resolves itself into the obligation of conformity to the will of God. And all human rights are founded on the ordinance of God. So that theism is the basis of jurisprudence as well as of morality. This doctrine is taught by Stahl, perhaps the greatest living authority on the philosophy of law. "Every philosophical science," he says, "must begin with the first principle of all things, that is, with the Absolute. It must, therefore, decide between Theism and Pantheism, between the doctrine that the first cause or principle is the personal, extramundane, self-revealing God, and the doctrine that the first principle is an impersonal power immanent in the world." [253] It is not pantheism, but fetichism to make all things God. The real question is, Whether the Absolute has personality and self-consciousness or not? Stahl had previously said to the same effect, that every philosophy, and every religion, and especially the Christian, must proceed on a theory of the universe (a Weltanschauung). It is the Christian doctrine of God and of this relation to the world, that he makes the foundation of legal and political science (of Rechts- und Staatslehre). [254] He therefore calls his system "theological" in so far as it makes the nature and will of God the foundation of all duties and the source of all rights.

He recognizes, however, the distinction between morality and religion. "Morality," he says, "is the perfection (Vollendung) of man in himself (so far as the will is concerned); or the revelation of the divine being in man. Man is the image of God, and therefore in his nature is like God, perfect or complete in himself; and conformity to the divine image is for him the goal and command. (Matt. v. 45). Religion, on the other hand, is the bond between man and God, or what binds men to God, so that we should know and will only in Hun, refer everything to Him, entire consecration, the personal union with God. Thus, love of our neighbour, courage, spirituality (the opposite of sensuality), may be simply moral virtues; whereas faith and the love of God are purely religious. The courage of Napoleon's guard was a moral virtue (a state of the will); the courage of Luther was religious (a power derived from his relation to God)." [255]

Religion and morality, although thus different, are not independent. They are but different phases of our relation to God. Stahl, therefore, controverts the doctrine of Grotius, that there would be a jus naturale if there were no God; which is really equivalent to saying that there would be an obligation to goodness if there were no such thing as goodness. Moral excellence is of the very essence of God. He is concrete goodness; infinite reason, excellence, knowledge, and power in a personal form; so that there can be no obligation to virtue which does not involve obligation to God. Wolf carried out the doctrine of Grotius to the length of saying that an Atheist, if consistent, would act just as the Christian acts. This principle of Grotius, says Stahl, contained the germ of separation from religion, which unfolded itself with Kant into an ignoring, and, with those who followed him, into the denial of God. [256]

"The primary idea of goodness, is the essential, not the creative, will of God. The divine will in its essence is infinite love, mercy, patience, truth, faithfulness, rectitude, spirituality, and all that is included in holiness, which constitutes the inmost nature of sod. The holiness of God, therefore, neither precedes his will sanctitas antecedens voluntatem' of the Schoolmen), nor follows it, but is his will itself. The good is not a law for the divine will (so that God wills it because it is good); neither is it a creation of his will (so that it becomes good because He wills it); but it is the nature (das Urwollen) of God from

everlasting to everlasting." [257] Again it is said, "Hence it follows that moral goodness is concrete, specific, ... absolute, original, as little determined by logical laws as by a relation to external ends. . . . This is not the doctrine of modern ethics. According to the eudaimonistic view adopted by the English philosophers, by Thomasius, and others, the good is good because it tends to produce happiness. According to the rationalists, the good is conformity with the laws of thought (Denkrichtigkeit). . . . . This was the real doctrine of Wolf, who made morality to consist in order (Regelm䟸ssigkeit); still more decidedly was it the doctrine of Kant, with whom the moral law is a consequence of the laws of thought. He says, expressly, that the idea of moral good must be derived from preceding law, that is, the law of reason." [258]

These two principles, then, are to be taken for granted; first, that moral good is good in its own nature, and not because of its tendencies, or because of its conformity to the laws of reason and, second, that all law has its foundation in the nature and will of God. These principles are very comprehensive. They are of special importance in the exposition of the law in its aspect as the revealed will of God designed to regulate human character and conduct.

Protestant Principles limiting Obedience to Human Laws.

There is another principle regarded as fundamental by all Protestants, and that is, that the Bible contains the whole rule of duty for men in their present state of existence. Nothing can legitimately bind the conscience that is not commanded or forbidden by the Word of God. This principle is the safeguard of that liberty wherewith Christ has made his people free. If it be renounced, we are at the mercy of the external Church, of the State, or of public opinion. This is simply the principle that it is right to obey God rather than man. Our obligation to render obedience to human enactments in any form, rests upon our obligation to obey God; and, therefore, whenever human laws are in conflict with the law of God we are bound to disobey them. When heathen emperors commanded Christians to worship idols, tne martyrs refused. When popes and councils commanded Protestants to worship the Virgin Mary, and to acknowledge the supremacy of the bishop of Rome, the Protestant martyrs refused. When the Presbyterians of Scotland were required by their rulers in Church and State to submit themselves to the authority of prelatical bishops, they refused. When the Puritans of England were called upon to recognize the doctrine of "passive obedience," they again refused. And it is to the stand thus taken by those martyrs and confessors that the world is indebted for all of the religious and civil liberty it now enjoys.

Whether any enactment of the Church or State conflicts with the truth or law of God, is a question which every man must decide for himself. On him individually rests the responsibility, and therefore to him, as an individual, belongs the right of judgment.

Although these principles, when stated in in thesi, are universally recognized among Protestants, they are nevertheless very frequently disregarded. This is true not only of the past when the Church and State both openly claimed the right to make laws to bind the conscience. It is true at the present time. Men still insist on the right of making that sin which God does not forbid; and that obligatory which God has not commanded. They proscribe rules of conduct and terms of church fellowship, which have no sanction in the Word of God. It is just as much a duty for the people of God to resist such usurpations, as it was for the early Christians to resist the authority of the Roman Emperors in matters of

religion, or for the early Protestants to refuse to recognize the right of the Pope to determine for them what they were to believe, and what they were to do. The essence of infidelity consists in a man's putting his own convictions on matters of truth and duty above the Bible. This may be done by fanatics in the cause of benevolence, as well as by fanatics in any other cause. It is infidelity in either case. And as such it should be denounced and resisted unless we are willing to renounce our allegiance to God, and make ourselves the servants of men.

Christian Liberty in Matters of Indifference.

It is perfectly consistent with the principle above stated, that a thing may be right or wrong according to circumstances, and, therefore, it may often be wrong for a man to do what the Bible does not condemn. Paul himself circumcised Timothy; yet he told the Galatians that if they allowed themselves to be circumcised, Christ would profit them nothing. Eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols was a matter of indifference. Yet the Apostle said, "If meat make my brother to offend, I will eat no flesh while the world standeth, lest I make my brother to offend."

There are two important principles involved in these Scriptural facts. The first is, that a thing indifferent in itself may become even fatally wrong if done with a wrong intention. Circumcision was nothing, and uncircumcision was nothing. It mattered little whether a man was circumcised or not. But if any one submitted to circumcision as an act of legal obedience, and as the necessary condition of his justification before God, he thereby rejected the Gospel, or, as the Apostle expressed it, he fell from grace. He renounced the gratuitous method of justification, and Christ became of no effect to him. In like manner, eating meat which had been offered in sacrifice to an idol, was a matter of indifference. "Meat," says Paul, "commendeth us not to God: for neither, if we eat, are we the better; neither, if we eat not, are we the worse." Yet if a man ate such meat as an act of reverence to the idol, or under circumstances which implied that it was an act of worship, he was guilty of idolatry. And, therefore, the Apostle taught that participation in feasts held within the precincts of an idol's temple, was idolatry.

The other principle is that, no matter what our intention may be, we sin against Christ when we make such use of our liberty, in matters of indifference, as causes others to offend. In the first of these cases the sin was not in being circumcised, but in making circumcision a condition of our justification. In the second case, the idolatry consisted not in eating meat offered in sacrifice to idols, but in eating it as an act of worship to the idol. And in the third case, the sin was not in asserting our liberty in matters of indifference, but in causing others to offend.

The rules which the Scriptures clearly lay down on this subject are: (1.) That no man or body of men has the right to pronounce that to be sinful which God does not forbid. There was no sin in being circumcised, or in eating meat, or in keeping the sacred days of the Hebrews. (2.) That it is a violation of the law of love, and therefore a sin against Christ, to make such use of our liberty as to cause others to sin. "Take heed," says the Apostle, "lest by any means this liberty of yours become a stumbling block to them that are weak." "When ye sin so against the brethren, and wound their weak conscience, ye sin against Christ." (1 Cor. viii. 9, 12.) "It is good (i.e., morally obligatory) neither to eat flesh, nor to drink wine, nor any thing whereby thy brother stumbleth, or is offended, or is made weak." "All things

indeed are pure, but it is evil for that man who eateth with offence. (Rom. xiv. 21, 20.) (3). Nothing in itself indifferent can be made the ground of permanent and universal obligation. Because it was wrong in Galatia to submit to circumcision, it does not follow that it was wrong in Paul to circumcise Timothy. Because it was wrong in Corinth to eat meat, it does not follow that it is wrong always and everywhere. An obligation arising out of circumstances must vary with circumstances. (4.) When it is obligatory to abstain from the use of things indifferent, is a matter of private judgment. No man has the right to decide that question for other men. No bishop, priest, or church court has the right to decide it. Otherwise it would not be a matter of liberty. Paul constantly recognized the right (exousia) of Christians to judge in such cases for themselves. He does this not by implication only, but he also expressly asserts it, and condemns those who would call it in question. "Let not him that eateth despise him that eateth not; and let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth: for God hath received him. Who art thou that judgest another man's servant? to his own master he standeth or falleth." "One man esteemeth one day above another: another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." (Rom. xiv. 3, 4, 5.) It is a common saying that every man has a pope in his own bosom. That is, the disposition to lord it over God's heritage is almost universal. Men wish to have their opinions on moral questions made into laws to bind the consciences of their brethren. This is just as much a usurpation of a divine prerogative when done by a private Christian or by a church court, as when done by the Bishop of Rome. We are as much bound to resist it in the one case as in the other. (5.) It is involved in what has been said that the use which a man makes of his Christian liberty can never be legitimately made the ground of church censure, or a term of Christian communion.

Scriptural Usage of the Word Law.

The Scriptures uniformly understand by law a manifestation of the will of God. All the operations of nature are ordered by laws of his appointment. And his will is represented as the ultimate foundation of moral obligation. In Hebrew it is called tvrh, instruction, because it is, as the Apostle says, "the form of knowledge and of the truth." It is the standard of right and wrong. In Greek it is called nomos, custom, and then, as custom or usage regulates the conduct of men, whatever has that authority does in fact control action, is called nomos. In the New Testament it is constantly used in this wide sense. It is sometimes applied to a rule of conduct however revealed; sometimes to the Scriptures as the supernaturally revealed will of God, as the rule of faith and practice; sometimes to the Pentateuch or Law of Moses; and sometimes specifically to the moral law. It is here to be taken to mean that revelation of the will of God which is designed to bind the conscience and to regulate the conduct of men.

How the Law is revealed.

This law is revealed in the constitution of our nature, and more fully and clearly in the written Word of God. That there is a binding revelation of the law, independently of any supernatural external revelation, is expressly taught in the Bible. Paul says of the heathen that they are a law unto themselves. They have the law written on their hearts. This is proved, he tells us, because they do, phusei, by nature, i.e., in virtue of the constitution of their nature, the things of the law. The same moral acts which the written law prescribes, the conduct of the heathen shows that they know to be obligatory. Hence their conscience

approves or disapproves, as they obey or disobey this inwardly revealed law. What is thus taught in Scripture is confirmed by consciousness and experience. Every man is conscious of a knowledge of right and wrong, and of a sense of obligation, which are independent of all external revelation. He may be unable to determine whence that knowledge comes. He knows, however, that it has been in him coeval with the dawn of reason, and has enlarged and strengthened just as his reason unfolded. His consciousness tells him that the rule is within, and would be there though no positive or external revelation of duty existed. In other words, we do not refer the sense of moral obligation to an externally revealed law, as its source, but to the constitution of our nature. This is not the experience of any class of men exclusively, but the common experience of the race. Wherever there are men, there is the sense of moral obligation, and a knowledge of right and wrong.

It is frequently objected to this doctrine that men differ widely in their moral judgments. What men of one age or country regard as virtues, men of other ages or countries denounce as crimes. But this very diversity proves the existence of the moral sense. Men could not differ in judgments about beauty, if the ✠sthetic element did not belong to their nature. Neither could they differ on questions of morality unless the sense of right and wrong were innate and universal. The diversity in question is not greater than in regard to rational truths. That men differ in their judgments as to what is true, is no proof that reason is not a natural and essential element of their constitution. As there are certain truths of the reason which are intuitive and perceived by all men, so there are moral truths so simple that they are universally recognized. As beyond these narrow limits there is diversity of knowledge, so there must be diversity of judgment. But this is not inconsistent with the Scriptural doctrine that even the most degraded heathen are a law unto themselves, and show the work of the law written on their hearts. As the revelation which God has made of his eternal power and Godhead in his works is true and trustworthy, and sufficient to render ignorance or denial of his existence inexcusable, while it does not supersede the necessity of a clearer revelation in his word; so there is an imperfect revelation of the law made in the very constitution of our nature, by which those who have no other revelation are to be judged, but which does not render unnecessary the clearer teachings of the Scriptures.

Different Kinds of Laws.

In looking into the Bible as containing a revelation of the will of God, the first thing which arrests attention is the great diversity of precepts therein contained. This difference concerns the nature of the precepts, and the ground on which they rest, or the reason why they are obligatory.

1. There are laws which are founded on the nature of God. To this class belong the command to love God supremely, to be just, merciful, and kind. Love must everywhere and always be obligatory. Pride, envy, and malice must everywhere and always be evil. Such laws bind all rational creatures, angels as well as men. The criterion of these laws is that they are absolutely immutable and indispensable. Any change in them would imply, not merely a change in the relations of men, but in the very nature of God.

2. A second class of laws includes those which are founded on the permanent relations of men in their present state of existence. Such are the moral, as opposed to mere statute laws, concerning property, marriage, and the duties of parents and children, or superiors and inferiors. Such laws concern men only in their present state of being. They are,

however, permanent so long as the relations which they contemplate continue. Some of these laws bind men as men; others husbands as husbands, wives as wives, and parents and children as such, and consequently they bind all men who sustain these several relations. They are founded on the nature of things, as it is called; that is, upon the institution which God has seen fit to ordain. This constitution might have been different, and then these laws would have had no place. The right of property need not have existed. God might have made all things as common as sun-light or air. Men might have been as angels, neither marrying nor giving in marriage. Under such a constitution there would be no room for a multitude of laws which are now of universal and necessary obligation.

3. A third class of laws have their foundation in certain temporary relations of men, or conditions of society, and are enforced by the authority of God. To this class belong many of the judicial or civil laws of the ancient theocracy; laws regulating the distribution of property, the duties of husbands and wives, the punishment of crimes, etc. These laws were the application of general principles of justice and right to the peculiar circumstances of the Hebrew people. Such enactments bind only those who are in the circumstances contemplated, and cease to be obligatory when those circumstances change. It is always and everywhere right that crime should be punished, but the kind or degree of punishment may vary with the varying condition of society. It is always right that the poor should be supported, but one mode of discharging that duty may be proper in one age and country, and another preferable in other times and places. All those laws, therefore, in the Old Testament, which had their foundation in the peculiar circumstances of the Hebrews, ceased to be binding when the old dispensation passed away.

It is often difficult to determine to which of the last two classes certain laws of the Old Testament belong; and therefore, to decide whether they are still obligatory or not. Deplorable evils have flowed from mistakes as to this point. The theories of the union of Church and State, of the right of the magistrate to interfere authoritatively in matters of religion, and of the duty of persecution, so far as Scriptural authority is concerned, rest on the transfer of laws founded on the temporary relations of the Hebrews to the altered relations of Christians. Because the Hebrew kings were the guardians of both tables of the Law, and were required to suppress idolatry and all false religion, it was inferred that such is still the duty of the Christian magistrate. Because Samuel hewed Agag to pieces, it was inferred to be right to deal in like manner with heretics. No one can read the history of the Church without being impressed with the dreadful evils which have flowed from this mistake. On the other hand, there are some of the judicial laws of the Old Testament which were really founded on the permanent relations of men, and therefore, were intended to be of perpetual obligation, which many have repudiated as peculiar to the old dispensation. Such are some of the laws relating to marriage, and to the infliction of capital punishment for the crime of murder. lf it be asked, How are we to determine whether any judicial law of the Old Testament is still in force? the answer is first, When the continued authority of such law is recognized in the New Testament. That for Christians is decisive. And secondly, If the reason or ground for a given law is permanent, the law itself is permanent.

4. The fourth class of laws are those called positive, which derive all their authority from the explicit command of God. Such are external rites and ceremonies, as circumcision, sacrifices, and the distinction between clean and unclean meats, and between months, days,

and years. The criterion of such laws is that they would not be binding unless positively enacted; and that they bind those only to whom they are given, and only so long as they continue in force by the appointment of God. Such laws may have answered important ends, and valid reasons doubtless existed why they were imposed; still they are specifically different from those commands which are in their own nature morally obligatory. The obligation to obey such laws does not arise from their fitness for the end for which they have been given, but solely from the divine command.

How far may the Laws contained in the Bible be dispensed with?

This is a question much discussed between Protestants and Romanists. Protestants contended that the Church had not the power claimed by Romanists, to relieve men from the obligation of an oath, and to render marriages lawful which without the sanction of the Church would be invalid. The Church has neither the authority to set aside any law of God, nor to decide the circumstances under which a divine law ceases to be obligatory, so that it continues in force until the Church declares the parties free frum its obligation. On this subject it is plain, (1.) That none but God can free men from the obligation of any divine law, which He has imposed upon them. (2.) That with regard to the positive laws of the Old Testament, and such judicial enactments as were designed exclusively for the Hebrews living under the theocracy, they were all abolished by the introduction of the new dispensation. We are no longer under obligation to circumcise our children, to keep the Passover, or feast of tabernacles or to go up three times in the year to Jerusalem, or to exact an eye for an eye, or a tooth for a tooth. (3.) With regard to those laws which are founded on the permanent relations of men, such as the laws of property, of marriage, and of obedience to parents, they can be set aside by the authority of God. It was not wrong for the Hebrews to spoil the Egyptians or to dispossess the Canaanites, because He whose is the earth and the fulness thereof, authorized those acts. He had a right to take the property of one people and give it to another. The extermination of the idolatrous inhabitants of the promised land at the command of Joshua, was as much an act of God as though it had been effected by pestilence or famine. It was a judicial execution by the Supreme Ruler. In like manner, although marriage as instituted by God was and is an indissoluble covenant between one man and one woman, yet He saw fit to allow, under the Mosaic Law, within certain limitations, both polygamy and divorce. While that permission continued, those things were lawful; when it was withdrawn, they ceased to be allowable.

When one Divine Law is superseded by another.

The above classification of the divine laws, which is the one usually adopted, shows that they differ in their relative dignity and importance. Hence when they come into conflict the lower must yield to the higher. This we are taught when God says, "I will have mercy, and not sacrifice." And our Lord also says, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath," and, therefore, the Sabbath might be violated when the duties of mercy rendered it necessary. Throughout the Scriptures we find positive laws subordinated to those of moral obligation. Christ approved of the lawyer who said that to love God with all the heart, and our neighbour as ourselves, "is more than all whole burnt-offerings and sacrifices."

Perfection of the Law.

The perfection of the moral law as revealed in the Scriptures, includes the points

already considered, -- (1.) That everything that the Bible pronounces to be wrong, is wrong; that everything which it declares to be right, is right. (2.) That nothing is sinful which the Bible does not condemn; and nothing is obligatory on the conscience which it does not enjoin. (3.) That the Scriptures are a complete rule of duty, not only in the sense just stated, but also in the sense that there is and can be no higher standard of moral excellence. Romanists, on the contrary, teach that a man can do more than the law requires. There are certain things which are commanded, and therefore absolutely obligatory; and others which are recommended, but not enjoined, such as voluntary poverty, celibacy, and monastic obedience. These are held to be virtues of a higher grade than obedience to explicit commands. This doctrine is founded on the erroneous views of the Church of Rome on the nature of sin, and the grounds of moral obligation. If nothing is sinful but voluntary, i.e., deliberate transgression of known law; and if the law is satisfied by voluntary action in this sense of the terms, then it is conceivable that a man may in this life render perfect obedience to the law, and even go beyond its demands. This is also connected with the distinction which Romanists make between mortal and venial sins. The former are those which forfeit baptismal grace, and reduce the soul to its original state of spiritual death and condemnation. The latter are sins which have not this deadly effect, but can be fully atoned for by confession and penance. But if the law of God be spiritual, extending to the thoughts and feelings whether impulsive or cherished; and if it demands all kinds and degrees of moral excellence, or complete congeniality with God, and conformity to his image, then there is no room for these distinctions, and no higher rule of moral conduct. The law of the Lord, therefore, is perfect in every sense of the word.

The Decalogue.

The question whether the decalogue is a perfect rule of duty is, in one sense, to be answered in the affirmative. (1.) Because it enjoins love to God and man, which, our Saviour teaches, includes every other duty. (2.) Because our Lord held it up as a perfect code, when he said to the young man in the Gospel, "This do and thou shalt live." (3.) Every specific command elsewhere recorded may be referred to some one of its several commands. So that perfect obedience to the decalogue in its spirit, would be perfect obedience to the law. Nevertheless, there are many things obligatory on us, which without a further revelation of the will of God than is contained in the decalogue, we never should have known to be obligatory. The great duty of men under the Gospel, is faith in Christ. This our Lord teaches when He says, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom he hath went." This comprehends or produces all that is required of us either as to faith or practice. Hence he that believeth shall be saved.

Rules of Interpretation.

Theologians are accustomed to lay down numerous rules for the proper interpretation of the divine law, such as that negative precepts are to be understood as including positive, and positive, negative; that, in forbidding an act, everything which naturally leads to it is comprehended; that, in condemning one offence, all others of a like kind are forbidden, and the like. All such rules resolve themselves into one. The decalogue is not to be interpreted as the laws of men, which take cognizance only of external acts, but as the law of God, which extends to the thoughts and intents of the heart. In all cases it will be found that the several commandments contain some comprehensive principle of duty, under which a

multitude of subordinate specific duties are included.

[253] Die Philosophie des Rechts, von Friedrich Jullus Stahl; Rechts und Staatslehre, I. i. 1, § 1; 4th edit. Heidelberg, 1870, vol. ii. part 1, p. 7.

[254] Einleitung, § 5, ut supra, p. 4.

[255] Stahl, ut supra, I. ii. 1, § 24; Ibid. p. 71.

[256] Ibid. pp. 73, 74.

[257] Ibid. I. ii. 2, § 29; Ibid. pp. 84, 85.

[258] Stahl, ut supra, p. 87.

§ 2. Division of the Contents of the Decalogue.

As the law given on Sinai and written on two tables of stone, is repeatedly called in the Scriptures "The Ten Words," or, as it is in the English version of Exodus xxxiv. 28, "The Ten Commandments," there is no doubt that the contents of that law are to be divided into ten distinct precepts. (See Deut. iv. 13, and x. 4.) This summary of moral duties is also called in Scripture "The Covenant," as containing the fundamental principles of the solemn contract between God and his chosen people. Still more frequently it is called "The Testimony," as the attestation of the will of God concerning human character and conduct.

The decalogue appears in two forms which differ slightly from each other. The original form is found in Exodus the twentieth chapter; the other in Deuteronomy v. 6-21. The principal differences between them are, first, that the command respecting the Sabbath is in Exodus enforced by a reference to God's resting on the seventh day, after the work of creation; whereas in Deuteronomy it is enforced by a reference to God's delivering his people out of Egypt. Secondly, in the command respecting coveting, in Exodus, it is said, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour' s house, thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife," etc. In both clauses the word is chmd. In Deuteronomy it is, "Neither shalt thou desire (chmd) thy neighbour's wife; neither shalt thou covet ('vh) thy neighbour's house," etc. This latter difference has been magnified into a matter of importance.

The Scriptures themselves determine the number of the commandments, but not in all cases what they are. They are not numbered off as first, second, third, etc. The consequence is that different modes of division have been adopted. The Jews from an early period adopted the arrangement which is still recognized by them. They regard the words in Exodus xx. 2, as constituting the first commandment, "I am the Lord thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage." The command is that the people should recognize Jehovah as their God; and the special ground of this recognition is made to be, that He delivered them from the tyranny of the Egyptians. These words, however, are not in the form of a command. They constitute the preface or introduction to the solemn injunctions which follow. In making the preface one of the commandments it became necessary to preserve the number ten, by uniting the first and second, as they are commonly arranged. The command, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," and "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image," being regarded as substantially the same; the latter being merely an amplification of the former. An idol was a false god; worshipping idols was therefore having other gods than Jehovah.

Augustine, and after him the Latin and Lutheran churches, agreed with the Jews in uniting the first and second commandments; but differed from them in dividing the tenth. There is, however, a difference as to the mode of division. Augustine followed the text as given in Deuteronomy, and made the words, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife;" the ninth, and the words, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," etc., the tenth commandment. This division was necessitated by the union of the first and second, and justified by Augustine on the ground that the "cupido impur&#65533; voluptatis" is a distinct offence from the "cupido impuri lucri." The Romish Church, however, adheres to the text as given in Exodus, and makes the clause, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's house," the ninth, and what follows, "Thou shalt not covet thy neighbour's wife, nor his man servant, nor his maid servant," etc., the tenth commandment.

The third method of arrangement is that adopted by Josephus, Philo, and Origen, and accepted by the Greek Church, and also by the Latin until the time of Augustine. At the Reformation it was adopted by the Reformed, and has the sanction of almost all modern theologians. According to this arrangement, the first commandment forbids the worship of false gods; the second, the use of idols in divine worship. The command, "Thou shalt not covet," is taken as one commandment.

It is universally admitted that there are two tables of the decalogue; the one containing the precepts concerning our duties to God, and the other those which concern our duties to our fellowmen. Philo referred five commands to each table, as he regarded reverence to parents, enjoined in the fifth, as a religious rather than a moral duty. Those who unite the first and second, and divide the tenth, refer three commandments to the first table and seven to the second. According to the third arrangement mentioned above, there are four in the first, and six in the second. The only objection urged against this is founded on the symbolism of numbers. Three and seven among the Jews are sacred end significant; four and six are not.

Arguments for the Arrangement adopted by the Reformed.

There are two questions to be determined. First, should the commandments concerning idolatry be united or separated? In favour of considering them two distinct commandments, it may be urged, (1.) That all the way through the decalogue, a new command is introduced by a positive injunction or prohibition "Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain;" "Thou shalt not steal;" "Thou shalt not kill," etc. This is the way in which new commands are introduced. The fact, therefore, that the command, "Thou shalt have no other gods," is distinguished by the repetition of the injunction, "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image," is an indication that they were intended as different commands. The tenth commandment is indeed an exception to this rule, but the principle holds good in every other case. (2.) The things forbidden are in their nature distinct. Worshipping false gods is one thing; using images in divine worship is another. They therefore called for separate prohibitions. (3.) These offences are not only different in their own nature, but they differed also in the apprehension of the Jews. The Jews regarded worshipping false gods, and using images in the worship of the true God, as very different things. They were severely punished for both offences. Both external and internal considerations, therefore, are in favour of retaining the division which has been so long and so extensively adopted in the Church.

The second question concerns the division of the tenth commandment. It is admitted that there are ten commandments. If, therefore, the two commands, "Thou shalt have no other gods," and "Thou shalt not make any graven image," are distinct, there is no room for the question whether the command against coveting should he divided. There is, moreover, no pretext for such division, unless we follow the order given in Deuteronomy, which puts the words, "Neither shalt thou desire thy neighbour's wife," before the words, "Neither shalt thou covet thy neighbour's house, his field," etc., etc. As coveting a man's wife is a different offence, or at least a different form of a general offence, from coveting his house or land, if the order given in Deuteronomy be considered authoritative, there might be some reason for the separation. But if the order given in Exodus be adhered to, no such reason exists. The thing forbidden is cupidity, whatever be its object. That the order given in Exodus is authoritative may be argued, (1.) Because the law as there given was not only the first chronologically, but also was solemnly announced from Mount Sinai. (2.) The recension given in Deuteronomy differs from the other in many unimportant particulars. If the order in which the objects of cupidity are mentioned be a matter of indifference, then the diversity is a matter of no consequence. But if it be made a matter of importance, controlling the order and interpretation of the commandments, then it is hard to account for it. There is, therefore, every reason for regarding it as one of those diversities which were not intended to be significant. (3.) The distinction is nowhere else recognized in Scripture. On the contrary, the command, "Thou shalt not covet," is elsewhere given as one command. Paul, in Romans vii. 7, says: "I had not known sin but by the law: for I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." And in Romans xiii. 9, in enumerating the laws forbidding sins against our neighbour, Paul gives as one command, "Thou shalt not covet." (4.) Our Lord refers the sin of "coveting a man's wife" to the seventh commandment. If included under that, it would be incongruous and out of harmony with the context, to make it a distinct commandment by itself.

§ 3. Preface to the Ten Commandments.

"I am Jehovah thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me." Theism and Monotheism, the foundation of all religion, are taught in these words. The first clause is the preface or introduction to the decalogue. It presents the ground of obligation and the special motive by which obedience is enforced. It is because the commandments which follow are the words of God that they bind the conscience of all those to whom they are addressed. It is because they are the words of the covenant God and Redeemer of his people that we are specially bound to render them obedience.

History seems to prove that the question whether the Infinite is a person cannot be satisfactorily answered by the unassisted reason of man. The historical fact is, that the great majority of those who have sought the solution of that question on philosophical principles have answered it in the negative. It is impossible, therefore, duly to estimate the importance of the truth involved in the use of the pronoun "I" in these words. It is a person who is here presented. Of that person it is affirmed, first, that He is Jehovah; and secondly, that He is the covenant God of his people.

In the first place, in calling himself Jehovah, God reveals that He is the person known

to his people by that name, and that He is in his nature all that that name imports. The etymology and signification of the name Jehovah seem to be given by God Himself in Exodus iii. 13, 14, where it is written, "Moses said unto God, Behold, when I come unto the children of Israel, and shall say unto them, The God of your fathers hath sent me unto you; and they shall say to me, What is his name? what shall I say unto them, and God said unto Moses, I am that I am: and he said, Thus shalt thou say unto the children of Israel, I am hath sent me unto you."

Jehovah, therefore, is the I am; a person always existing and always the same. Self-existence, eternity, and immutability are included in the signification of the word. This being the case, the name Jehovah is presented as the ground of confidence to the people of God; as in Deuteronomy xxxii. 40, and Isaiah xl. 28, "Hast thou not known? hast thou not heard, that the everlasting God, Jehovah, the Creator of the ends of the earth, fainteth not, neither is weary? there is no searching of his understanding." These natural attributes, however, would be no ground of confidence if not associated with moral excellence. He who as Jehovah is declared to be infinite, eternal, and immutable in his being, no less infinite, eternal, and immutable in his knowledge, wisdom, holiness, goodness, and truth. Such is the Person whose commands are recorded in the decalogue.

In the second place, it is not only the nature of the Being who speaks, but the relation in which He stands to his people that is here revealed. "I am Jehovah thy God." The word God has a definite meaning from which we are not at liberty to depart. We may not substitute for the idea which the word in Scripture and in ordinary language is intended to express, any arbitrary philosophical notion of our own. God is the Being, who, because He is all that the word Jehovah implies, is the proper object of worship, that is, of all the religious affections, and of their appropriate expression. He is, therefore, the only appropriate object of supreme love, adoration, gratitude, confidence, and submission. Him we are bound to trust and to obey.

Jehovah is not only God, but He says to his people collectively and individually, "I am thy God." That is, not only the God whom his people are to acknowledge and worship, but who has entered into covenant with them; promising to be their God, to be all that God can be to his creatures and children, on condition that they consent to be his people. The special covenant which God formed with Abraham, and which was solemnly renewed at Mount Sinai, was that He would give to the children of Abraham the land of Palestine as their possession and bless them in that inheritance on condition that they kept the laws delivered to them by his servant Moses. And the covenant which He has made with the spiritual children of Abraham, is that He will be their God for time and eternity on condition that they acknowledge, receive, and trust his only begotten Son, the promised seed of Abraham, in whom all the nations of the earth are to be blessed. And as in this passage the redemption of the Hebrews from their bondage in Egypt is referred to as the pledge of God's fidelity to his promise to Abraham, and the special ground of the obligation of the Hebrews to acknowledge Jehovah as their God; so the mission of the Eternal Son for the redemption of the world is at once the pledge of God's fidelity to the promise made to our first parents after their fall, and the special ground of our allegiance to our covenant God and Father.

§ 4. The First Commandment.

The first commandment is, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." I, that is, the person whose name, and nature, and whose relation to his people are given in the preceding words, sad I only, shall be recognized by you as God.

This command, therefore, includes, first, the injunction to recognize Jehovah as the true God. As this recognition must be intelligent and sincere, it includes, --

1. Knowledge. We must know who, or what Jehovah is. This implies a knowledge of his attributes, of his relation to the world as its creator, preserver, and governor, and especially his relation to his rational creatures and to his own chosen people. This of course involves a knowledge of our relation to Him as dependent and responsible creatures and as the objects of his redeeming love.

2. Faith. We must believe that God is, and that He is what He declares Himself to be; and that we are his creatures and his children.

3. Confession. It is not enough that we secretly in our hearts recognize Jehovah as the true God; we must openly and under all circumstances and despite of all opposition, whether from magistrates or from philosophers, avow our faith in Him as the only living and true God. This confession must be made, not only by the avowal of the lips as when we repeat the Creed, but by all appropriate acts of worship in public and private, by praise, prayer, and thanksgiving.

4. As the law is spiritual, not only as bearing the impress of the Spirit, and, therefore, holy, just, and good, but also as taking cognizance of the inward as well as of the outward life, of the thoughts and feelings as well as of external acts, this recognition of Jehovah as our God includes the exercise towards Him of all the religious affections; of love, fear, reverence, gratitude, submission, and devotion. And as this is not an occasional duty to be performed at certain times and places, but one of perpetual obligation, a habitual state of mind is the thing required. The recognition of Jehovah as our God involves a constant sense of his presence, of his majesty, of his goodness, and of his providence, and of our dependence, responsibility, and obligation. We are to have God always before our eyes; to walk and live with Him, having a constant reference to his will in the conduct of our inward and outward life; recognizing continually his hand in everything that befalls us, submitting to all his chastisements and grateful for all his mercies.

The second or negative aspect of the command is the condemnation of the failure to recognize Jehovah as the true God; failing to believe in his existence and attributes, in his government and authority; failing to confess him before men; and failing to render him the inward reverence and the outward homage which are his due, that is, the first commandment forbids Atheism whether theoretical or practical. It moreover forbids the recognition of any other than Jehovah as God. This includes the prohibition of ascribing to any other being divine attributes rendering to any creature the homage or obedience due to God alone; or exercising towards any other person or object those feelings of love, confidence, and submission which belong of right only to God.

It is, therefore, a violation of this commandment either to fail in the full and sincere recognition of God as God, or to give to any creature the place in our confidence and love due to God alone.

This the Chief of all the Commandments.

The duty enjoined in this commandment is the highest duty of man. It is proved to be so in the estimation of God by the express declaration of Christ. When asked, "Which is the great commandment in the law," He answered, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind. This is the first and great commandment." (Matt. xxii. 37, 38.) It is so also in the sight of reason. That infinite excellence should be reverenced; that He who is the author of our being and giver of all our mercies; on whom we are absolutely dependent; to whom we are responsible; who is the rightful possessor of our souls and bodies; and whose will is the highest rule of duty, should be duly recognized by his creatures, from the nature of the case must be the highest duty of all rational beings. It is, moreover, the first and greatest of the commandments if measured by the influence which obedience to its injunction has upon the soul itself. It places the creature in its proper relation to its Creator on which its own excellence and well-being depend. It purifies, ennobles, and exalts the soul. It calls into exercise all the higher and nobler attributes of our nature; and assimilates man to the angels who surround the throne of God in heaven. The preeminence of this commandment is further evident from the fact that religion, or the duty we owe to God, is the foundation of morality. Without the former, the latter cannot exist. This is plain, (1.) From the nature of the case. Morality is the conformity of an agent's character and conduct to the moral law. But the moral law is the revealed will of God. If there be no God, there is no moral law; and if a man does not acknowledge or recognize God, there is no higher law than his own reason to which he can feel any obligation to be conformed. (2.) It is a principle of our nature that if a man disregard a higher obligation, he will not be controlled by a lower. This principle was recognized by our Lord when He said, "He that is faithful in that which is least, is faithful also in much; and he that is unjust in the least, is unjust also in much." (Luke xvi. 10.) This involves the converse: He that is unfaithful in much, is unfaithful in that which is least. (3.) It is the testimony of experience that where religion has lost its hold on the minds of the people, there the moral law is trampled under foot. The criminal and dangerous class in every community consists of those who have no fear of God before their eyes. (4.) It is the secret conviction of every man that his duty to God is his highest duty, as is evinced by the fact that the charge of atheism is one from which the human soul instinctively recoils. It is felt to be a charge of the utter degradation, or of the deadness of all that is highest and noblest in the nature of man. (5.) The most decisive and solemn evidence of this truth, however, is to be found in the revealed purpose of God to forsake those who forsake Him; to give up to the unconstrained control of their evil passions, those who cast off their allegiance to Him. The Apostle says of the heathen world that it was "Because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God, neither were thankful, ... God gave them up unto vile affections." (Rom. i. 21, 26.) And again in ver. 28, "As they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, wickedness, covetousness, maliciousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful." Such are the natural, the actual, the inevitable, and the judicially ordained effects of men's refusing to retain God in their knowledge.

Notwithstanding all this we see multitudes of men of whom it may be said that God is

not in all their thoughts. They never think of Him. They do not recognize his providence. They do not refer to his will as a rule of conduct. They do not feel their responsibility to Him for what they think or do. They do not worship Him, nor thank Him for their mercies. They are without God in the world. Yet they think well of themselves. They are not aware of the dreadful guilt involved in thus forgetting God, in habitually failing to discharge the first and highest duty that rests on rational creatures. Self-respect or regard to public opinion often renders such men decorous in their lives. But they are really dead while they live; and they have no security against the powers of darkness. It is painful also to see that scientific men and philosophers so often endeavour to invalidate the arguments for the existence of God, and advance opinions inconsistent with Theism; arguing, as they in many cases do, to prove either that there is no evidence of the existence of any power in the universe other than of physical force, or that no knowledge, consciousness, or voluntary action can be predicated of an infinite Being. This is done in apparent unconsciousness that they are undermining the foundations of all religion and morality; or that they are exhibiting a state of mind which the Scriptures pronounce worthy of reprobation.

§ 5. The Invocation of Saints and Angels.

Saints and angels, and especially the Virgin Mary, are confessedly objects of worship in the Romish Church. The word "worship," however, means properly to respect or honour. It is used to express both the inward sentiment and its outward manifestation. This old sense of the word is still retained in courts of law in which the judge is addressed as "Your Worship," or as "worshipful." The Hebrew word hshchvh and the Greek proskuneo often translated in the English version by the word "worship," mean simply to bow down, or prostrate one's self. They are used whether the person to whom the homage is rendered be an equal, an earthly superior, or God Himself. It is not, therefore, from the use of any of these words that the nature of the homage rendered can be determined. Romanists are accustomed to distinguish between the cultus civilis due to earthly superiors, douleia due to saints and angels; huperdouleia due to the Virgin Mary; and latreia due to God alone. These distinctions, however, are of little use. They afford no criterion by which to distinguish between douleia and huperdouleia and between huperdouleia and latreia. The important principle is this: Any homage, internal or external, which involves the ascription of divine attributes to its object, if that object be a creature, is idolatrous. Whether the homage paid by Romanists to saints and angels be idolatrous is a question of fact rather than of theory; that is, it is to be determined by the homage actually rendered, and not by that which is prescribed. It is easy to say that the saints are not to be honoured as God is honoured; that He is to be regarded as the original source and giver of all good, and they as mere intercessors, and as channels of divine communications; but this does not alter the case if the homage rendered them assumes that they possess the attributes of God; and if they are to the people the objects of religious affection and confidence.

What the Church of Rome teaches on this subject may be learned from the following passages, from the decisions of the Council of Trent, from the Roman Catechism, and from the writings of the leading theologians of that Church: [259] "Mandat sancta synodus omnibus episcopis . . . . ut . . . . fideles diligenter instruant, docentes eos, sanctos, una cum Christo regnantes, orationes suas pro hominibus Deo offerre; bonum, atque utile esse

suppliciter eos invocare; et ob beneficia impetranda a Deo per filium ejus Jesus Christum, Dominum nostrum, qui solus noster redemptor et salvator est, ad eorum orationes, opem auxiliumque confugere: illos vero, qui negant sanctos, ◆terna felicitate in coelo fruentes, invocandos esse; aut qui asserunt, vel illos pro hominibus non orare; vel eorum, ut pro nobis etiam singulis orent, invocationem esse idolatriam; vel pugnare cum verbo Dei; adversarique honori unius mediatoris Dei et hominum Jesu Christi; vel stultum esse in coelo regnantibus voce, vel mente supplicare; impie sentire." "Et quamvis in honorem et memoriam sanctorum nonnullas interdum missas ecclesia celebrare consueverit; non tamen illis sacrificium offerri docet, sed Deo soli, qui illos coronavit; unde nec sacerdos dicere solet, offero tibi sacrificium Petre, vel Paule; sed Deo de illorum victoriis gratias agens, eorum patrocinia implorat, ut ipsi pro nobis intercedere dignentur in coelis, quorum memoriam facimus in terris." [260]

The Roman Catechism [261] teaches the same doctrine.

"Invocandi sunt [angeli eorum]; quod et perpetuo Deum intuentur et patrocinium salutis nostr◆, sibi delatum, libentissime suscipiunt." This invocation, it says, does not conflict with the law "de uno Deo colendo."

Thomas Aquinas says: "Quanquam solus Deus sit orandus, ut vel gratiam vel gloriam nobis donet; sanctos nihilominus viros orare expedit, ut illorum precibus et meritis, nostr◆ orationes sortiantur effectum." [262]

On this subject Bellarmin lays down the following propositions, (1.) "Non licet a sanctis petere, ut nobis tanquam auctores divinorum beneficiorum, gloriam, vel gratiam aliaque ad beatitudinem media concedunt." This, however, he virtually nullifies, when he adds, "Est tamen notandum, cum dicimus, non debere peti ◆ sanctis, nisi ut orent pro nobis, nos non agere de verbis, sed de sensu verborum; nam quantum ad verba, licet dicere, S. Petre miserere mihi, salva me, aperi mihi aditum coeli: item, da mihi sanitatem corporis, da patientiam, da mihi fortitudinem." (2.) "Sancti non sunt immediati intercessores nostri apud Deum, sed quidquid a Deo nobis impetrant, per Christum impetrant." (3.) "Sancti orant pro nobis saltem in genere, secundum Scripturas." (4) "Sancti qui regnant cum Christo, pro nobis orant, non solum in genere, sed etiam in particulari.quot; [263] As to the question, How the saints in heaven can know what men on earth desire of them, he says four answers are given. First, some say that the angels, who are constantly ascending to heaven and thence descending to us, communicate to the saints the prayers of the people. Secondly, others say, "Sanctorum animas, sicut etiam angelos, mira quadam celeritate natur◆, quodammodo esse ubique; et per se audire preces supplicantium." Thirdly, others again say, "Sanctos videre in Deo omnia a principio su◆ beatitudinis, qu◆ ad ipsos aliquo modo pertinent, et proinde etiam orationes nostras ad se directas." Fourthly, others say that God reveals to them the prayers of the people. As on earth God revealed the future to the prophets and gives to men at times the power to read the thoughts of others, so He can reveal to the saints in heaven the wants and prayers of those who call upon them. This last solution of the difficulty Bellarmin himself prefers. [264]

The objections which Protestants are accustomed to urge against this invocation of saints are, --

1. That it is, to say the least, superstitious. It requires faith without evidence. It assumes not only that the dead are in a conscious state of existence in another world; and

that departed believers belong to the same living mystical body of Christ, or which their brethren still on earth are members, both of which Protestants, on the authority of God's word, cheerfully admit, but it assumes, without any evidence from Scripture or experience, that the spirits of the dead are accessible to those who are still in the flesh; that they are near us, capable of hearing our prayers, knowing our thoughts, and answering our requests. The Church or the soul is launched on an ocean of fantasies and follies, without a compass, if either suffers itself to believe without evidence then there is nothing in astrology, alchemy, or demonology which may not be received as true, to perplex, to pervert, or to torment.

2. The whole thing is a deceit and illusion. If in fact departed saints are not authorized and not enabled to hear and answer the prayers of suppliants on earth, then the people are in the condition of those who trust in gods who cannot save, who have eyes that see not, and ears that cannot hear. That the saints have no such office as the theory and practice of invocation suppose is plain, because the fact if true cannot be known except by divine revelation. But no such revelation exists. It is a purely superstitious belief, without the support of either Scripture or reason. The conjectural methods suggested by Bellarmin of explaining how the saints may be cognizant of the wants and wishes of men, is a confession that nothing is known or can be known on the subject; and, therefore, that the invocation of the saints has no Scriptural or rational foundation. If this be so, then how dreadfully are the people deluded! How fearful the consequences of turning their eyes and hearts from the one divine mediator between God and man, who ever lives to make intercession for us, and whom the Father heareth always, and causing them to direct their prayers to ears which never hear, and to place their hopes in arms which never save. It is turning from the fountain of living waters, to cisterns which can hold no water.

3. The invocation of saints as practised in the Church of Rome is idolatrous. Even if it be conceded that the theory as expounded by theologians is free from this charge, it remains true that the practice involves all the elements of idolatry. Blessings are sought from the saints which God only can bestow; and attributes are assumed to belong to them which belong to God alone. Every kind of blessing, temporal and spiritual, is sought at their hands, and sought directly from them as the givers. This Bellarmin admits so far as the words employed are concerned. He says it is right to say: "Holy Peter, save me; open to me the gates of heaven; give me repentance, courage," etc. God alone can grant these blessings; the people are told to seek them at the hands of creatures. This is idolatry. Practically it is taken for granted that the saints are everywhere present, that they can hear prayers addressed to them from all parts of the earth at the same time; that they know our thoughts and unexpressed desires. This is to assume that they possess divine attributes. In fact. therefore, the saints are the gods whom the people worship, whom they trust, and who are the objects of the religious affections.

The polytheism of the Church of Rome is in many respects analogous to that of heathen Rome. In both cases we find gods many and lords many. In both cases either imaginary beings are the objects of worship, or imaginary powers and attributes are ascribed to them. In both cases, also, the homage rendered, the blessings sought, the prerogatives attributed to the objects of worship and the affections exercised toward them, involve the assumption that they are truly divine. In both cases the hearts of the people, their confidence and hopes,

are turned from the Creator to the creature. There is indeed, however, this great difference between the two cases. The objects of heathen worship were unholy; the objects of worship in the Church of Rome are regarded as ideals of holiness. This, in one view, makes an immense difference. But the idolatry is in either case the same. For idolatry consists in paying creatures the homage due to God.

Mariolatry.

The mother of our Lord is regarded by all Christians as "blessed," as "the most highly favoured of women." No member of the fallen family of man has had such an honour as she received in being the mother of the Saviour of the world. The reverence due to her as one thus highly favoured of God, and as one whose heart was pierced through with many sorrows, led the way to her being regarded as the ideal of all female grace and excellence, and gradually to her being made the object of divine honours, as the Church lost more and more of its spirituality.

The deification of the Virgin Mary in the Church of Rome was a slow process. The first step was the assertion of her perpetual virginity. This was early taken and generally conceded. The second step was the assertion that the birth, as well as the conception of our Lord, was supernatural. The third was the solemn, authoritative decision by the ecumenical council of Ephesus, A.D. 431, that the Virgin Mary was the "Mother of God. On this decision it may be remarked, (a.) That it was rendered rather as a vindication of the divinity of Christ, than as an exaltation of the glory of the Blessed Virgin. It had its origin in the Nestorian controversy. Nestorius was accused of teaching that the Logos only inhabited the man Jesus, whence it was inferred that he held that the person born of the Virgin was simply human. It was to emphasize the assertion that the "person" thus born was truly divine that the orthodox insisted that the Virgin should be called the Mother of God. (b.) There is a sense in which the designation is proper and according to the analogy of Scripture. The Virgin was the Mother of Christ. Christ is God manifest in the flesh: therefore she was the Mother of God. The infant Saviour was a divine person. Christians do not hesitate to say that God purchased his Church with his own blood. According to the usage of Scripture, the person of Christ may be designated from one nature, when the predicate belongs to the other. He may be called the Son of man when we speak of his filling immensity; and He may be called God when we speak of his being born. (c.) Nevertheless, although the designation be in itself justifiable, in the state of feeling which then pervaded the Church, the decision of the Council tended to increase the superstitious reverence for the Virgin. It was considered by the common people as tantamount to a declaration of divinity. The members of the Council were escorted from their place of meeting by a multitude bearing torches, preceded by women bearing censers filled with burning incense. In combating the assumed Nestorian doctrine of two persons in Christ, there was a strong tendency to the opposite, to the doctrine of Eutyches, who held that there was in our Lord but one nature. According to this view the Virgin might be regarded as the Mother of God in the same sense that any ordinary mother is the parent of her child. However it may be accounted for, the fact is that the decision of the Council of Ephesus marks a distinct epoch in the progress of the deification of the Virgin.

The fourth step soon followed in the dedication to her honour of numerous churches, shrines, and festivals; and in the introduction of solemn offices designed for public and

private worship in which she was solemnly invoked. No limit was placed to the titles of honour by which she was addressed or to the prerogatives and powers which were attributed to her. She was declared to be deificata. She was called the Queen of heaven, Queen of queens. said to be exalted above all principalities and powers; to be seated at the right hand of Christ, to share with Him in the universal and absolute power committed to his hands. All the blessings of salvation were sought at her hands, as well as protection from all enemies, and deliverance from all evils. Prayers, hymns, and doxologies were allowed and prescribed to be addressed to her. The whole Psalter has been transformed into a book of praise and confession to the Mother of Christ. What in the Bible is said to God and of God, is in this book addressed to the Virgin. In the First Psalm, for example, it is said, "Blessed is the man who walketh not in the counsel of the ungodly," etc. In the Psalter of the Virgin it reads, "Blessed is the man who loveth thy name, O Virgin Mary; thy grace shall comfort his soul. As a tree irrigated by fountains of water, he shall bring forth the richest fruits of righteousness." In the second Psalm the prayer is directed to the Virgin: "Protect us with thy right hand, O Mother of God," etc. Ps. ix., "I will confess to Thee, O Lady (Domina); I will declare among the people thy praise and glory. To thee belong glory, thanksgiving, and the voice of praise." Ps. xv., "Preserve me, O Lady, for I have hoped in thee." Ps. xvii., "I will love thee O Queen of heaven and earth, and will glorify thy name among the Gentiles." Ps. xviii., "The heavens declare thy glory, O Virgin Mary; the fragrance of thy ointments is dispersed among all nations." Ps. xli., "As the hart panteth after the water brooks, so panteth my soul for thy love, O Holy Virgin." And so on to the end. The Virgin is throughout addressed as the Psalmist addressed God; and the blessings which he sought from God, the Romanist is taught to seek from her. [265]

In like manner the most holy offices of the Church are parodied. The Te Deum, For example, is turned into an address to the Virgin. "We praise thee, Mother of God; we acknowledge thee to be a virgin. All the earth doth worship thee, the spouse of the eternal Father. All the angels and archangels, all thrones and powers, do faithfully serve thee. To thee all angels cry aloud, with a never-ceasing voice, Holy, Holy, Holy, Mary, Mother of God. . . . . The whole court of heaven doth honour thee as queen. The holy Church throughout all the world doth invoke and praise thee, the mother of divine majesty. . . . . Thou sittest with thy Son on the right hand of the Father. . . . . In thee, sweet Mary, is our hope; defend us for evermore. Praise be cometh thee; empire becometh thee; virtue and glory be unto thee for ever and ever." [266]

It is hardly necessary to refer to the Litanies of the Virgin Mary in further proof of the idolatrous worship of which she is the object. Those litanies are prepared in the form usually adopted in the worship of the Holy Trinity; containing invocations, deprecations, intercessions, and supplications. They contain such prayers as the following: "Peccatores, te rogamus audi nos; Ut sanctam Ecclesiam piissima conservare digneris, Ut justis gloriam, peccatoribus gratiam impetrare digneris, Ut navigantibus portum, infirmantibus sanitatem, tribulatis consolationem, captivis liberationem, impetrare digneris, Ut famulos et famulas tuas tibi devote servientes, consolare digneris, Ut cunctum populum Christianum filii tui pretioso sanguine redemptum, conservare digneris, Ut cunctis fidelibus defunctis, eternam requiem impetrare digneris, Ut nos exaudire digneris, Mater Dei, Filia Dei, Sponsa Dei, Mater carissima, Domina nostra, miserere, et dona nobis perpetuam pacem." More than this cannot be sought at the hands of God or Christ. The Virgin Mary is to her worshippers what

Christ is to us. She is the object of all religious affections; the ground of confidence; and the source whence all the blessings of salvation are expected and sought.

There was, however, always an undercurrent of opposition to this deification of the mother of our Lord. This became more apparent in the controversy on the question of her immaculate conception. This idea was never broached in the early Church. The first form in which the doctrine appeared was, that from the fact that God says of Jeremiah, "Before thou camest forth out of the womb I sanctified thee" (Jer. i. 5), it was maintained that the same might be said of the Virgin Mary. Jeremiah indeed was sanctified before birth, in the sense that he was consecrated or set apart in the purpose of God to the prophetic office; whereas Mary, it was held, was thus sanctified in the sense of being made holy. All the great lights of the Latin Church, Augustine, Anselm, Bernard of Clairvaux, and Thomas Aquinas, held that if the Virgin Mary were not a partaker of the sin and apostasy of man, she could not be a partaker of redemption. As Thomas Aquinas, and after him the Dominicans, took the one side in this controversy, Duns Scotus and the Franciscans took the other. The public feeling was in favour of the Franciscan doctrine of the immaculate conception. Even John Gerson, chancellor of the University of Paris, distinguished not only for his learning but also for his zeal in reforming abuses, in 1401 came out publicly in support of that view. He was, however, candid enough to admit that it had not hitherto been the doctrine of the Church. But he held that God communicated the truth gradually to the Church, hence Moses knew more than Abraham, the prophets more than Moses, the Apostles more than the prophets; in like manner, the Church has received from the Spirit of God many truths not known to the Apostles. This of course implies the rejection of the doctrine of tradition. That doctrine is, that a plenary revelation of all Christian doctrine was made by Christ to the Apostles and by them communicated to the Church, partly in their writings and partly by oral instructions. To prove that any doctrine is of divine authority, it must be proved that it was taught by the Apostles, and to prove that they taught it, it must be proved that it has been always and everywhere held by the Church. But according to Gerson the Church of today may hold what the Apostles never held, and even the very reverse of what was held by them and by the Church for ages to be true. He teaches that the Church before his time taught that the Virgin Mary, in common with all other members of the human race, was born with die infection of original sin; but that the Church of his day, under the inspiration of the Spirit, believed in her immaculate conception. This resolves tradition into, or rather substitutes for it, the sensus communis ecclesi of any given time. It has already been shown [267] that Moehler in his "Symbolik" teaches substantially the same doctrine.

This question was undecided at the time of the meeting of the Council of Trent, and gave the fathers there assembled a great deal of trouble. The Dominicans and Franciscans, of nearly equal influence in the Council, each urged that their peculiar views should be sanctioned. The legates in their perplexity referred to Rome for instructions, and were directed for fear of schism to prevent any further controversy on the subject, and so to frame the decision as to satisfy both parties. This could only be done by leaving the question undecided. This was substantially the course which the Council adopted. After affirming that all man kind sinned in Adam and derive from him a corrupt nature, it adds: "Declarat tamen hc ipsa Sancta Synodus, non esse su intentionis comprehendere in hoc decreto, ubi de peccato originali agitur, beatam, et immaculatam Viriginem Mariam, Dei genetricem; sed observandas esse constitutiones felicis recordationis Xysti pap IV., sub

poenis in eis constitutionibus contentis, quas innovat." [268] This last clause refers to the Bull of Sixtus IV., issued in 1483, threatening both parties in this controversy with the pains of excommunication if either pronounced the other guilty of heresy or mortal sin.

The controversy went on, therefore, after the Council of Trent very much as it had done before, until the present Pope, himself a devoted worshipper of the Virgin, announced his purpose to have the immaculate conception of the Mother of our Lord declared. This purpose he carried into effect, and on the eighth of December, 1854, he went in great pomp to St. Peter's in Rome, and pronounced the decree that the "Virgin Mary, from the first moment of conception by the special grace of almighty God in view of the merits of Christ, was preserved from all stain of original sin." She was thus placed, as to complete sinlessness, on an equality with her adorable Son, Jesus Christ, whose place she occupies in the confidence and love of so large a part of the Roman Catholic world.

[259] Concilii Tridentini, sess. XXV.

[260] Ibid. sess. XXII. caput. iii.

[261] III. ii. qu. 4 [xix. 10]. See Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, Gttingen, 1846, pp. 93, 78, 79, 479.

[262] Summa, II. ii. qust. 83, art. 4, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 153, a, of third set.

[263] De Ecclesia Triumphante, lib. I., De Sanctorum Beatitudine, cap. xvii, xviii., Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. ii. pp 718-721.

[264] Ut supra, cap. XX. p. 735.

[265] This Psalter is published under the title Psalterium Virginis Mari, a Devoto Doctore Sancto Bonaventura compilatum. It is given at length by Chemnitz in his Examen Concilii Tridentini, edit. Frankfort, 1574, part iii. pp. 166-179. Chemnitz does not refer its authorship to Bonaventura; but gives it as a document sanctioned and used in the Church of Rome.

[266] See A Church Dictionary. B. Walter Farquhar Hook, D. D., Vicar of Leeds. Sixth edition. Philadelphia, 1854, article Mariolatry. Dr. Hook quotes the so-called "Psalter of Bonaventura;" and refers to Sancti Bonaventur Opera, tom. vi. part. ii. from p. 466 to 473. Fol. Mogunti, 1609.

[267] Vol. i. p. 114.

[268] This is from Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, Gttingen, 1846, p. 20. A foot-note says, "Totum hanc periodum. Declarat-innovat,' omnes fere editiones ante Romanas omittunt."

§ 6. The Second Commandment.

The two fundamental principles of the religion of the Bible are first, that there is one only the living and true God, the maker of heaven and earth, who has revealed Himself under the name Jehovah; secondly, that this God is a Spirit, and, therefore, incapable of being conceived of or represented under a visible form. The first commandment, therefore, forbids the worship of any other being than Jehovah; and the second, the worship of any visible object whatever. This includes the prohibition, not only of inward homage, but of all external acts which are the natural or conventional expression of such inward reverence.

That the second commandment does not forbid pictorial or sculptured representations of ideal or visible objects, is plain because the whole command has reference to religious worship, and because Moses, at the command of God himself, made many such images and representations. The curtains of the tabernacle and especially the veil separating between the Holy and Most Holy places, were adorned with embroidered figures representing cherubim; cherubim overshadowed the Ark of the Covenant with their wings; the Golden Candlestick was in the form of a tree "with branches, knops, and flowers;" the hem of the high priest's robe was adorned with alternate bells and pomegranates. When Solomon built the temple, "he carved all the walls of the house round about with carved figures of cherubim, and palm-trees, and open flowers, within and without." (1 Kings vi. 29.) The "molten sea" stood upon twelve oxen. Of this house thus adorned God said, "I have hallowed this house, which thou hast built, to put my name there forever; and mine eyes and mine heart shall be there perpetually." (1 Kings ix. 3.) There can therefore be no doubt that the second commandment was intended only to forbid the making or using the likeness of anything in heaven or earth as objects of worship. [269]

The Worship of Images forbidden.

It is equally clear that the second commandment does forbid the use of images in divine worship. In other words, idolatry consists not only in the worship of false gods, but also in the worship of the true God by images. This is clear, --

1. From the literal meaning of the words. The precise thing forbidden is, bowing down to them, or serving them, i.e., rendering them any kind of external homage. This, however, is exactly what is done by all those who employ images as the objects, or aids of religious worship.

2. This is still further plain because the Hebrews were solemnly enjoined not to make any visible representation of the unseen God, or to adopt anything external as the symbol of the invisible and make such symbol the object of worship; i.e., they were not to bow down before these images or symbols or serve them. The Hebrew word tsvr, rendered "to serve," includes all kinds of external homage, burning incense, making oblations, and kissing in token of subjection. The Hebrews were surrounded by idolaters. The nations, having forgotten God, or refusing to acknowledge Him, had given themselves up to false gods. It was nature's invisible force, of which they saw constant, and often fearful manifestations around them, that was the great object of their reverence and fear. But nature, force, the invisible, could no more satisfy them, than the invisible Jehovah. They symbolized not the unknown, but the real, first in one way and then in another. Light and darkness were the two most obvious symbols of good and evil; light, therefore, the sun, moon, and stars, the host of heaven, were among the earlier objects of reverence. But anything external and visible, living or dead, might be made to the people, by association or arbitrary appointment, the representative of the great unknown power by which all things were controlled. Most naturally, men distinguished by force of character and by their exploits would be regarded as manifestations of the unknown. Thus nature-worship and hero-worship, the two great forms of heathenism, are seen to be radically the same. It was in view of this state of the Gentile world, all nations being given to the worship of the visible as the symbol of the invisible, that Moses delivered the solemn address to the chosen people recorded in the fourth chapter of Deuteronomy. "Only take heed to thyself," said the prophet, "and keep thy

soul diligently, lest thou forget the things which thine eyes have seen, and lest they depart from thy heart all the days of thy life; but teach them thy sons, and thy sons sons." What is it that he thus earnestly called on them to remember? It was that in all the wonderful display of the divine presence and majesty upon Sinai, they had seen "no similitude," but only heard a voice, "Take ye therefore good heed unto yourselves; (for ye saw no manner of similitude on the day that the Lord spake unto you in Horeb out of the midst of the fire,) lest ye corrupt yourselves, and make you a graven image, the similitude of any figure, the likeness of male or female, the likeness of any beast that is on the earth, the likeness of any winged fowl that flieth in the air, the likeness of anything that creepeth on the ground, the likeness of any fish that is in the waters beneath the earth: and lest thou lift up thine eyes unto heaven, and when thou seest the sun, and the moon, and the stars, even all the host of heaven, shouldest be driven to worship them [literally, "to prostrate thyself before them"], and serve them, which the Lord thy God hath divided unto all nations under the whole heaven. . . . . Take heed unto yourselves, lest ye forget the covenant of the Lord your God, which he made with you, and make you a graven image, the likeness of anything which the Lord thy God hath forbidden thee. For the Lord thy God is a consuming fire, even a jealous God." The thing thus repeatedly and solemnly forbidden as a violation of the covenant between God and the people, was the bowing down to, or using anything visible, whether a natural object as the sun or moon, or a work of art and man s device, as an object or mode of divine worship. And in this sense the command has been understood by the people to whom it was given, from the time of Moses until now. The worship of the true God by images, in the eyes of the Hebrews, has ever been considered as much an act of idolatry as the worship of false gods.

3. A third argument on this subject is, that the worship of Jehovah by the use of images is denounced and punished as an act of apostasy from God. When the Hebrews in the wilderness said to Aaron, "Make us gods which shall go before us," neither they nor Aaron intended to renounce Jehovah as their God; but they desired a visible symbol of God, as the heathen had of their gods. This is plain, because Aaron, when he fashioned the golden calf and built an altar before it, made proclamation, and said, "To-morrow is a feast to Jehovah." "Their sin then lay, not in their adopting another god, but in their pretending to worship a visible symbol of Him whom no symbol could represent." [270]

In like manner, when the ten tribes separated from Judah and were erected into a separate kingdom under Jeroboam, the worship of God by idols was regarded as an apostasy from the true God. It is evident from the whole narrative that Jeroboam did not intend to introduce the worship of any other god than Jehovah. It was the place and mode of worship which he sought to change. He feared that if the people continued to go up to Jerusalem and worship in the temple there established, they would soon return to their allegiance to the house of David. To prevent this, he made two golden calves, as Aaron had done, symbols of the God who had brought his people out of Egypt, and placed one in Dan and the other in Bethel, and commanded the people to resort to those places for worship. Thus also Jehu, who boasted of his "zeal for Jehovah," and exterminated the priests and worshippers of Baal, retained the service of the golden calves, because, as Winer expresses it, "that had become the established form of the Jehovah-worship in Israel." "Er [Jehu] behielt den Klberdienst in Dan und Bethel, als in Israel einheimisch gewordenen Jehovahdienst." [271] In Leviticus xxvi. 1, it is said: "Ye shall make you no idols nor graven image, neither rear you up a standing image, neither shall ye set up any image of

stone in your land, to bow down unto it: for I am the Lord your God." And Moses commanded that when the people had gained possession of the promised land, six of the tribes should be gathered on Mount Gerizim to bless, and six upon Mount Ebal to curse: "And the Levites shall speak and say unto all the men of Israel with a loud voice, cursed be the man that maketh any graven or molten image, an abomination unto the Lord, the work of the hands of the craftsman, and putteth it in a secret place. And all the people shall answer and say, Amen." (Deut. xxvii. 15.)

The specific thing thus frequently and solemnly forbidden is the bowing down to images, or rendering them any religious service. In this sense these commands were understood by the ancient people of God to whom they were originally given, and by the whole Christian Church until the sudden influx of nominally converted heathen into the Church after the time of Constantine, who brought with them heathenish ideas and insisted on heathen modes of worship.

The simple obvious facts with regard to the religion of the gentile world are, (1.) That the gods of the nations were imaginary beings; that is, they either had no existence except in the imaginations of their worshippers, or they did not possess the attributes which were ascribed to them. Therefore they are called in Scripture vanity, lies, nonentities. (2.) Of these imaginary beings symbols were selected or images formed, to which all the homage supposed to be due to the gods themselves was paid. This was not done on the assumption that the symbols or images were really gods. The Greeks did not think that Jupiter was a block of marble. Neither did the heathen mentioned in the Bible believe that the sun was Baal. Nevertheless some connection was supposed to exist between the image and the divinity which it was intended to represent. With some this connection was simply that between the sign and the thing signified; with others it was more mystical, or what in these days we should call sacramental. In either case it was such that the homage due to the divinity was paid to his image; and any indignity offered to the latter was resented as offered to the former.

As, therefore, the heathen gods were no gods, and as the homage due to God was paid to the idols, the sacred writers denounced the heathen as the worshippers of stocks and stones, and condemned them for the folly of making gods out of wood or metal "graven by art and man's device." They made little or no difference between the worshipping of images and the worshipping false gods. The two things were, in their view, identical. Hence in the Bible the worship of images is denounced as idolatry, without regard to the divinity, whether true or false, to whom the image was dedicated.

The Reasons annexed to this Commandment.

The relation between the soul and God is far more intimate than that between the soul and any creature. Our life, spiritual and eternal, depends on our relation to our Maker. Hence our highest duty is to Him. The greatest sin a man can commit is to refuse to render to God the admiration and obedience which are his due, or to transfer to the creature the allegiance and service which belong to him. Hence no sin is so frequently or so severely denounced in the Scriptures.

The most intimate relation which can subsist among men is that of marriage. No injury which can be rendered by one man against another is greater than the violation of that relation; and no sin which a wife can commit is more heinous and degrading than infidelity

to her marriage vows.

This being the case, it is natural that the relation between God and his people should be, as it is, in the Bible so often illustrated by a reference to the marriage relation. A people who refuse to recognize, or an individual man who refuses to recognize Jehovah as his God, who transfers the allegiance and obedience due to God alone to any other object, is compared to an unfaithful wife. And as jealousy is the strongest of human passions, the relation of God to those who thus forsake Him is illustrated by a reference to the feelings of an injured and forsaken husband. It is in this way that the Scriptures teach that the severest displeasure of God, and the most dreadful manifestations of his wrath, are the certain consequences of the sin of idolatry; that is, of the sin of having any other God than Jehovah, or of giving to images, to stocks and stones, the external homage due to Him who is a spirit, and who must be worshipped in spirit and in truth.

The Lord, therefore, in this commandment, declares Himself to be "a jealous God, visiting the iniquities of the fathers upon the children unto the third and fourth generation; and showing mercy unto thousands (unto the thousandth generation) of them that love me, and keep my commandments." The evil consequences of apostasy from God are not confined to the original apostates. They are continued from generation to generation. They seem indeed, and, humanly speaking, in fact are remediless. The degradation and untold miseries of the whole heathen world are the natural and inevitable consequence of their forefathers having turned the truth of God into a lie, and worshipped and served the creature more than the Creator. These natural consequences, however, are designed, ordained, and judicial. They are not mere calamities. They are judgments, and therefore are not to be counteracted or evaded. Consequently those who teach atheism, or who undermine religion, or who corrupt and degrade the worship of God by associating with it the worship of creatures; or who teach that we may make graven images and bow down to them and serve them, are bringing down upon themselves and upon coming generations the most direful calamities that can degrade and afflict the children of men. Such must be the issue unless they not only can counteract the operation of natural causes, but also can thwart the purpose of Jehovah.

It is a great cause for thankfulness, and adapted to fill the hearts of God's faithful people with joy and confidence, to know that He will bless their children to the thousandth generation.

The Doctrine and Usage of the Romish Church as to Images.

Salvation, our Lord said, is of the Jews. The founders of the Christian Church were Jews. The religion of the Old Testament in which they had been educated forbade the use of images in divine worship. All the heathen were worshippers of idols. Idol-worship, therefore, was an abomination to the Jews. With the Old Testament authority against the use of images and with this strong national prejudice against their use, it is absolutely incredible that they should be admitted in the more spiritual worship of the Christian Church. It was not until three centuries after the introduction of Christianity, that the influence of the heathen element introduced into the Church was strong enough to overcome the natural opposition to their use in the service of the sanctuary. Three parties soon developed themselves in connection with this subject. The first adhered to the teachings of the Old Testament and the usage of the Apostolic Churches, and repudiated the religious use

of images in any form. The second allowed the use of images and pictures for the purpose of instruction, but not for worship. The common people could not read, and therefore it was argued that visible representations of Scriptural persons and incidents were allowable for their benefit. The third contended for their use not only as a means of instruction, but also for worship.

As early as A.D. 305, the Council of Elvira in Spain condemned the use of pictures in the Church. [272] In the thirty-sixth Canon the Council says, [273] "Placuit picturas in ecclesia esse non debere; ne quod colitur et adoratur in parietibus depingatur." Augustine complained of the superstitious use of images; Eusebins of C&#65533;sarea, and Epiphanius of Salamis, protested against their being made objects of worship; and Gregory the Great allowed their use only as means of instruction. [274]

In A.D. 726 the Emperor Leo III. issued an ordinance forbidding the use of images in churches as heathenish and heretical. To support his action a council was called, which met in Constantinople A.D. 754, and which gave ecclesiastical sanction to this condemnation. In A.D. 787, however, the Empress Irene, under Roman influence, called a council, which Romanists of the Italian school consider ecumenical, at Nice, by which image-worship was fully sanctioned. This Council first met in Constantinople, but there the opposition to the use of images was so strong that it was disbanded and called to meet the following year at Nice. Here the face of things had changed; enemies had been converted; opponents became advocates; even Gregory of Neo-C&#65533;sarea, who had been a zealous supporter of the policy of Leo III. and of his son Constantine Copronymus, was brought to say, "Si omnes consentiunt, ego non dissentio." Few could withstand the promises and threats of those in power, and the cogency of the argument for image worship drawn from the numerous miracles adduced in favour of their worship. This Council, therefore, declared the previous Council, called by Leo III., heretical, and ordained the worship of pictures in the churches; not indeed with latreia, or the reverence due to God, but with aspasmos kai timetike proskunesis (with salutations and reverent prostrations). The Council announced the principle on which image-worship, whether among the heathen or Christians, has generally been defended, i.e., that the worship paid the image terminates on the object which it represents. He tes eikonos time epi to prototupon diabainei kai ho proskunon ten eikona proskunei en aute tou engraphomenou ten hupostasin.

The decisions of this Council, although sanctioned by the Pope, gave offence to the Western Churches. The Emperor Charlemagne not only caused a book to be written (entitled "Libri Carolini") to refute the doctrines inculcated, but also summoned a council to meet at Frankfort on the Main A.D. 794, at which delegates from Britain, France, Germany, Italy, and even two legates from the Bishop of Rome, were present; where the decrees of the so-called General Council of Nice were "rejected," "despised," and "condemned." All worshipping of pictures and images was forbidden, but their presence in the churches for instruction and ornament was allowed.

The friends of image-worship, however, rapidly gained the ascendancy, so that Thomas Aquinas, one of the best as well as the greatest of the Romish theologians in the thirteenth century, held the extreme doctrine on this subject. He taught that images were to be used in the churches for three purposes, first, for the instruction of the masses who could not read; secondly, that the mystery of the incarnation and the examples of the saints may be

the better remembered; and thirdly, that pious feelings may be excited, as men are more easily moved by what they see than by what they hear. He taught that to the image in itself and for itself no reverence is due, but that if it represents Christ, the reverence due to Christ is due to the image. "Sic ergo dicendum est, quod imagini Christi in quantum est res qu�dam (puta lignum vel pictum) nulla reverentia exhibetur; quia reverentia nonnisi rationali natur� debetur. Relinquitur ergo quod exhibeatur ei reverentia solum, in quantum est imago: et sic sequitur, quod eadem reverentia exhibeatur imagini Christi et ipsi Christo. Cum ergo Christus adoretur adoratione latri�, consequens est, quod ejus imago sit adoratione latri� adoranda." [275]

Tridentine Doctrine.

The Council of Trent acted with reference to the worship of images with its usual caution. It decreed that to the images of Christ and the saints "due reverence" should be paid, without defining what that reverence is. The council decided: "Imagines porro Christi, Deipar� Virginis, et aliorum sanctorum, in templis pr�sertim habendas, et retinendas; eisque debitum honorem, et venerationem impertiendam; non quod credatur inesse aliqua in eis divinitas, vel virtus, propter quam sint colend�; vel quod ab eis sit aliquid petendum; vel quod fiducia in imaginibus sit figenda; veluti olim fiebat a gentibus, qu� in idolis spem suam collocabant; sed quoniam honos, qui eis exhibetur refertur ad prototypa, qu� ill� representant: ita ut per imagines, quas osculamur, et coram quibus caput aperimus, et procumbimus, Christum adoremus; et sanctos, quorum ill� similitudinem gerunt, veneremur."

In the same session it was decreed concerning relics: "Sanctorum quoque martyrum, et aliorum cum Christo viventium sancta corpora, qu� viva membra fuerunt Christi, et templum Spiritus Sancti, ab ipso ad �ternam vitam suscitanda, et glorificanda, a fideibus veneranda esse; per qu� multa beneficia a Deo hominibus pr�stantar: ita ut affirmantes, sanctorum reliquiis venerationem, atque honorem non deberi; vel eas, aliaque sacra monumenta a fidelibus inutiliter honorari; atque eorum opis impetrand� causa sanctorum memorias frustra frequentari; omnino damnandos esse; prout jampridem eos damnavit, et nunc etiam damnat ecclesia." [276]

On relic-worship the Roman Catechism, says, "Cui fidem non faciant et honoris, qui sanctis debetur, et patrocinii, quod nostri suscipiunt, mirabiles effect� res ad eorum sepulcra, et oculis, et manibus membrisque omnibus captis, in pristinum statum restitutis, mortuis ad vitam revocatis, ex corporibus hominum ejectis demoniis? qu� non audisse, ut multi, non legisse, ut plurimi gravissimi viri, sed vidisse, testes locupletissimi sancti Ambrosius et Augustinus litteris prodiderunt. Quid multa? si vestes, sudaria, si umbra sanctorum, priusquam e vita migrarent, depulit morbos, viresque restituit, quis tandem negare audeat, Deum per sacros cineres, ossa, ceterasque sanctorum reliquias eadem mirabiliter efficere? Declaravit id cadaver illud, quod forte illatum in sepulcrum Elisei, ejus tacto corpore, subito revixit." [277]

Bellarmin.

The whole of the Liber Secundus of Bellarmin's Disputation "De Ecclesia Triumphante" in the second volume of his works, is devoted to the discussion of the question of the worship of the relics and images of the saints. As to the worship of images he says there are three opinions among Romanists themselves: "Prima, quod imago non sit

ullo modo in se colenda, sed solum coram imagine colendum exemplar." "Secunda opinio est, quod idem honor debeatur imagini ut exemplari, et proinde Christi imago sit adoranda cultu latri&#65533;, Beat&#65533; Mari&#65533; cultu hyperduli&#65533;, sanctorum aliorum, cultu duli&#65533;." "Tertia opinio versatur in medio, estque eorum, qui dicunt, ipsas imagines in se, et proprie honorari debere, sed honore minori, quam ipsum exemplar, et proinde nullam imaginem adorandam esse cultu latri&#65533;." [278] His own opinion is given in the following propositions: "Prima sententia, sive propositio. Imagines Christi, et sanctorum venerand&#65533; sunt, non solum per accidens, vel improprie, sed etiam per se proprie, ita ut ips&#65533; terminent venerationem ut in se considerantur, et non solum ut vicem gerunt exemplaris." "Secunda propositio. Quantum ad modum loquendi pr&#65533;sertim in concione ad populum, non est dicendum imagines ullas adorari debere latria, sed e contrario non debere sic adorari." "Tertia propositio. Si de re ipsa agatur, admitti potest, imagines posse coli improprie, vel per accidens, eodem genere cultus, quo exemplar ipsum colitur." "Quarta propositio. Imago per se, et proprie non est adoranda eodem cultu, quo ipsum exemplar, et proinde nulla imago est adoranda cultu latri&#65533; per se, et proprie." "Quinta conclusio, Cultus, qui per se, proprie debetur imaginibus, est cultus quidam imperfectus, qui analogice et reductive pertinet ad speciem ejus cultus, qui debetur exemplari." [279]

Relics.

Bellarmin in his defence of the "cultus reliquiarum" begins with an attempted refutation of Calvin's five arguments against such worship. He then presents his own in favour of it. [280] They are such as these: First, from Scriptural examples: (a.) Moses carried the bones "sancti Josephi" with him when he left Egypt; (b.) God honoured the remains of Moses by burying them with his own hands; (c.) A dead man was restored to life by contact with the bones of Elisha (2 Kings xiii. 21); (d.) Isaiah predicted that the sepulchre of the Messiah should be glorious. The Vulgate renders Isaiah xi. 10, "Et erit sepulcrum ejus gloriosum;" which Bellarmin understands as foretelling "ut sepulcrum Domini, ab omnibus honoraretur." And adds, "Ex quo refellitur Lutheri blasphemia, qui in libro de abolenda Missa dicit, Deo non majorem curam esse de sepulcro Domini, quam de bobus." (e.) The woman mentioned in the Gospel was healed by touching Christ's garment; the sick, according to Acts v. 15, were placed in the streets "that at least the shadow of Peter passing by might overshadow some of them"; again, in Acts xix. 11, 12, it is said: "God wrought special miracles by the hands of Paul: so that from his body were brought unto the sick handkerchiefs or aprons, and the diseases departed from them, and the evil spirits went out of them." If, says Bellarmin, Christ were now on earth, and we should kiss his garment, the Protestants would call us idolaters.

His second argument is from the decisions of councils; the third from the testimony of the fathers; the fourth and fifth from the miracles wrought by and in the relics of the saints, of which he cites numerous examples; the sixth from the miraculous discovery of the remains of the saints, "Si enim Deo cultus reliquiarum non placeret, cur ipse servis suis corpora sanctorum, qu&#65533; latebant, ostenderet?" the seventh, from the translation of relics from one place to another. He also argues from the custom of depositing the remains of the saints under altars, and burning incense and lamps before their tombs. [281]

Remarks.

1. From all this it appears that the Romanists worship images in the same way that the

heathen of old did, and pagans of our own day still do. They "bow down to them and serve them." They pay them all the external homage which they render to the persons they are intended to represent.

2. The explanations and defence of such worship are the same in both cases. The heathen recognized the fact that the images made of gold, silver, wood, or marble were lifeless and insensible in themselves; they admitted that they could not see, or hear, or save. They attributed no inherent virtue or supernatural power to them. They claimed that the homage paid to them terminated on the gods which they represented; that they only worshipped before the images, or at most through them. So far as the Greeks and Romans are concerned, they were less reverential to the mere image, and claimed far less of the supernatural in connection with their use.

3. Both among the heathen and the Romanists, for the uneducated people the images themselves were the objects of worship. It would be hard to find in any heathen author such justification of image-worship as the Romish theologians put forth. What heathen ever said that the same homage was due to the image of Jupiter as to Jupiter himself? This Thomas Aquinas says of the images of Christ and of the saints. Or what heathen ever has said, as Bellarmin says, that although the homage to be paid to the image is not strictly and properly the same as that due to its prototype, it is nevertheless improperly and analogically the same; the same in kind although not in degree? What can the common people know of the difference between proprie and improprie? They are told to worship the image, and they worship it just as the heathen worshipped the images of their gods. As the Bible pronounces and denounces as idolatry not only the worship of false gods, but also the worship of images, the bowing down to them and serving them,' it is clear that the Roman Church is as wholly given to idolatry as was Athens when visited by Paul.

4. The moral and religious effects of image worship are altogether evil. It is enough to prove that it is evil in its consequences that God has forbidden it, and threatened to visit the worshippers of idols with his severe judgments. It degrades the worship of God. It turns off the minds of the people from the proper object of reverence and confidence, and leads the uneducated masses to put their trust in gods who cannot save.

5. As to the worship of relics, it is enough to say, (a.) That it has no support from Scripture. The outline of Bellarmin's arguments given above, is sufficient to show that the Bible furnishes no apology for this superstitious custom. (b.) What pass for relics, in the great majority of cases, are spurious. There is no end to the deceptions practised on the people in this regard. There are, it is said, enough fragments of the cross exhibited in different sanctuaries, to build a large ship; and there are innumerable nails which are reverenced as the instruments of our Lord's torture. Bones not only of ordinary men, but even of brutes, are set before the people as relics of the saints. [282] In one of the cathedrals of Spain there is a magnificent ostrich feather preserved in a gorgeous casket, which the priests affirm fell from the wing of the angel Gabriel. Romanists themselves are obliged to resort to the doctrine of "economics or pious fraud, to justify these palpable impositions on the credulity of the people. Of such impositions the most flagrant example is the blood of St. Januarius, which is annually liquefied in Naples. (c.) Ascribing miraculous powers to these pretended relics as Romanists do, is to the last degree superstitious and degrading. It is true that a little more than a century ago belief in necromancy and witchcraft

was almost universal even among Protestants. But there is the greatest possible difference between superstitious beliefs prevailing for a time among the people, and those beliefs being adopted by the Church and enacted into articles of faith to bind the conscience of the people in all time. The Church of Rome is chained down by the decisions of her popes and councils pronouncing the grossest superstitions to be matters of divine revelation sanctioned and approved by God. She has rendered it impossible for men entitled to be called rational to believe what she teaches. The great lesson taught by the history of image-worship and the reverencing of relics, is the importance of adhering to the word of God as the only rule of our faith and practice; receiving nothing as true in religion but what the Bible teaches, and admitting nothing into divine worship which the Scriptures do not either sanction or enjoin.

Protestant Doctrine on the Subject.

As the worship of images is expressly forbidden in the Scriptures, Protestants, as well Lutheran as Reformed, condemned their being made the objects of any religious homage. As, however, their use for the purposes of instruction or ornament is not thus expressly forbidden, Luther contended that such use was allowable and even desirable. He, therefore, favoured their being retained in the Churches. The Reformed, however, on account of the great abuse which had attended their introduction, insisted that they should be excluded from all places of worship.

The Lutheran standards do not dilate on this subject. In the Apology for the Augsburg Confession it is said: "Primum quia cum alii mediatores pr&#xfffd;ter Christum qu&#xfffd;runtur, collocatur fiducia in alios, obruitur tota notitia Christi, idque res ostendit. Videtur initio mentio sanctorum, qualis est in veteribus orationibus, tolerabili consilio recepta esse. Postea secuta est invocatio, invocationem prodigiosi et plus quam ethnici abusus secuti sunt. Ab invocatione ad imagines ventum est, h&#xfffd; quoque colebantur, et putabatur eis inesse qu&#xfffd;dam vis, sicut Magi vim inesse fingunt imaginibus signorum coelestium certo tempore sculptis." [283]

Luther was tolerant of the use of images in the churches. On this subject he says: "If the worship of images be avoided, we may use them as we do the words of Scripture, which bring things before the mind and cause us to remember them." [284] "Who is so stone blind," he asks, "as not to see that if sacred events may be described in words without sin and to the profit of the hearers, they may with the same propriety, for the benefit of the uneducated, be portrayed or sculptured, not only at home and in our houses, but in the churches." [285] In another place he says that when one reads of the passion of Christ, whether he will or not an image of a man suspended on a cross is formed in his mind just as certainly as his face is reflected when he looks into the water. There is no sin in having such an image in the mind why then should it be sinful to have it before the eyes? [286]

The Reformed went further than this. They condemned not only the worship of images, but also their introduction into places of worship, because they were unnecessary, and because they were so liable to abuse. The Second Helvetic Confession says, "Rejicimus non modo gentium idola, sed et Christianorum simulachra. Tametsi enim Christus humanam assumpserit naturam, non ideo tamen assumpsit, ut typum pr&#xfffd;ferret statuariis atque pictoribus. . . . . Et quando beati spiritus et divi coelites, dum hic viverent, omnem cultum sui averterunt, et statuas oppugnarunt, cui verisimile videatur divis coelestibus et angelis

suas placere imagines, ad quas genua flectunt homines, detegunt capita, allisque prosequuntur honoribus?" In another paragraph of the same chapter it is said: "Idcirco approbamus Lactantii veteris, scriptoris sententiam, dicentis, Non est dubium, quin religio nulla est, ubicunque simulachrum est." [287]

The Heidelberg Catechism, says, [288] "Is it forbidden to make any images or statues? God cannot and ought not in any way to be depicted, and although it is lawful to make representations of creatures, yet God forbids that they should be worshipped, or He through them. But may not images be tolerated in the churches for the instruction of the uneducated? By no means; for it does not become us to be wiser than God, who has willed that his Church be instructed, not by dumb images, but by the preaching of his word."

No one who has ever seen any of the masterpieces of Christian art, whether of the pencil or of the chisel, and felt how hard it is to resist the impulse to "bow down to them and serve them," can doubt the wisdom of their exclusion from places of public worship.

[269] The later Jews interpreted this commandment more strictly than either Moses or Solomon. Josephus, Ant. 8, 7, 5, pronounced making the figures of oxen to support the brazen laver to be contrary to the law. One of the most distinguished ministers of our Church objected to the American Sunday School Union, that they published books with pictures. When asked, What he thought of maps, he answered that so far as maps were designed simply to show the relative position of places on the face of the earth, they were allowed but if they had any shading on them to represent mountains, they were forbidden by the second commandment.

[270] The Holy Bible, with an Explanatory and Critical Commentary. By Bishops and other Clergy of the Anglican Church. New York. Charles Scribner & Co., 1871, vol. i. p. 405.

[271] Biblishces Realwrterbuch. von Dr. Georg Benedict Winer, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1847, art. "Jehu."

[272] The year 305 is usually assigned as the date of this Council, although the precise time of its session is a matter of dispute.

[273] Binius, Concilia Generalia Provincalia, Cologne, 1618, t. i. vol. i. p. 195, b, c.

[274] See Guericke, Kirchengeschichte, II. iii. 2, § 77, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1846, vol. i. p. 350.

[275] Summa, III. qust. XXV. art. 3, edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 53 of fourth set.

[276] Sess. XXV.; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, Gttingen, 1846, vol. i. pp. 93, 94.

[277] III. ii. 8 (15, xxx., xxxi.); Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 482.

[278] De Ecclesia Triumphante, lib. II. De Imaginibus Sanctorum, cap. xx.; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, vol. ii. pp. 801, 802.

[279] Ut supra, cap. xxi.-xxv. pp. 802-809.

[280] Ut supra, cap. iii. pp. 746-753.

[281] In the Decreta et Articuli fidei jurandi per Episcopos et alios Prlatos in susceptione muneris consecrationis, publicati Rom in Consistorio ap. S. Marcum, d. IV. Septbr. a. MDLX., are the following articles: "Virgo Dei genitrix, Angeli, et Sancti religiose coli debent, et invocari, ut eorum meritis, et precibus juvemur. "Crux Christi, et

imagines, ac qu□cunque attigerunt, adorana sunt, juxta Ecclesi□ catholic□ doctrinam, et fidem. "Deipar□ Virginis Mari□, angelorum, et sanctorum sunt imagines adorand□ (id est in honore habend□, as it reads in the margin) tum corpora, et reliqui□ qu□vis." See Steitwolf, Libri Symbolici Ecclesi□ Catholic□, G□ttingen, 1846, vol. ii. p. 328. Notwithstanding such authoritative declarations, Bellarmin enumerates it as among the "mendacia" of the Centuriators and of Calvin that they say that the Catholics "Non solum sanctos Christi loco adorant, sed etiam eorum ossa, vestes, calceos, et simulacra;" and asks: "At quis unquam Catholicorum reliquias invocavit? Quis unquam auditus est un precibus, aut litaniis dixisse: Sanct□ reliqui□, orate pro me?' Et quis easdem unquam divino honore affecit, vel Christi loco adoravit: nos enim reliquias quidem honoramus, et osculamur ut sacra pignora patronorum nostrorum: sed nec adoramus ut Deum nec invocamus ut sanctos, sed minore cultu veneramur, quam sanctorum spiritus, nedum quam Deum ipsum." De Ecclesia Triumphante, lib. ii., De Reliquiis Sanctorum, cap. ii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. ii. pp. 745, e, 746, a.

[282] Luther in the Smalcard Articles says: "Reliqu□ sanctorum refert□ multis mendaciis, ineptis et fatuitatibus. Canum et equorum ossa ibi s□pe reperta sunt." In German it reads thus: "Das Heiligthum (reliqui□ sanctorum), darinne so manche □ffentliche L□gen und Narrenwerk erfunden, von Hunds- und Rossknochen, das auch um solcher B□berei willen, das der Teufel gelacht hat, l□ngst sollte verdammt worden seyn, wenn gleich etwas Gutes daran w□re, dazu auch ohne Gottes Wort, weder geboten noch gerathen, g□nz unn□thig und unn□tz Ding ist." Pars. II. art. ii. 22. In the church at Wittenburg there hangs an original portrait of Luther under which it is written, "All his words were thunderbolts."

[283] IX. 34; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 229.

[284] On Micah i. 7; Works, edit. Walch, vol. vi. p. 2747.

[285] Ibid. p. 2740.

[286] Wider die himmlischen Propheten, von den Bildern und Sacrament, 63, Ibid. vol. xx. p. 213.

[287] Confessio Helvetica Posterior, cap. iv.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 472.

[288] Quest. 97, 98. Niemeyer, 453, 454.

§ 7. The Third Commandment.

"Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain; for the Lord will not hold him guiltless that taketh his name in vain."

The literal meaning of this command is doubtful. It may mean, "Thou shalt not utter the name of God in a vain or irreverent manner;" or, "Thou shalt not utter the name of God to a lie," i.e., "Thou shalt not swear falsely." The Septuagint renders the passage thus; Ou lepse to onoma kuriou tou theou sou epi matio. The Vulgate has, "Non assumes nomen Domini Dei tui in vanum." Luther, as usual, freely ad sensum: "Du sollist den Namen des Herrn, deines Gottes, nicht missbrauchen." Our translators have adopted the same rendering.

The ancient Syriac Version, the Targum of Onkelos, Philo, and many modern

commentators and exegetes understand the command as directed against false swearing: "Thou shalt not utter the name of God to a lie." So the elder Michaelis in his annotated Hebrew Bible, explains "ad vanum confirmandum: non frustra, nedum, falso." Gesenius in his Hebrew Lexicon renders the passage, [289] "Du sollst den Namen Jehova's nicht zur L□ge aussprechen; nicht falsch schw□ren." Rosenm□ller [290] renders it: "Nolli enunciare nomen Jova Dei tui ad falsum sc. comprobandum." Knobel [291] reads: "Nicht sollst du erheben den Namen Jehova's zur Nichtigkeit;" and adds, "The prohibition is directed specially against false swearing."

This interpretation is consistent with the meaning of the words, as asv', here rendered "vanity," or with the preposition, "in vain," elsewhere means "falsehood." (See Ps. xii. 3 (2); xli. 7 (6); Isaiah lix. 4; Hos. x. 4.) To lift up, or pronounce the name of God for a lie, naturally means, to call upon God to confirm a falsehood. The preposition l also has its natural force. Compare Leviticus xix. 12, "Ye shall not swear by my name [lstr to a lie'] falsely." The general import of the command remains the same, whichever interpretation be adopted. The command not to misuse the name of God, includes false swearing, which is the greatest indignity which can be offered to God. And as the command, "Thou shalt do no murder," includes all indulgence of malicious feelings; so the command, "Thou shalt not forswear thy self," includes all lesser forms of irreverence in the use of the name of God.

It is urged, as an objection to the second interpretation given above, that perjury is an offence against our neighbour, and therefore belongs to the second table of the Law; and that it is in fact included in the ninth commandment, "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour." Bearing false testimony and false swearing are, however, different offences. The first and second commandment forbid the worship of any other being than Jehovah, and worshipping Him in any way not appointed in his word; and the third, supposing it to forbid false swearing, is here in place, as false swearing is a practical denial of the being or perfections of God.

Import of the Command.

The word "name" is used in reference to God in a very comprehensive sense. It often means a personal or individual designation; as when God says, "This is my name," i.e., Jehovah. Frequently the "name of God" is equivalent to God himself. To call on the name of the Lord, and to call on God, are synonymous forms of expression. As names are intended to distinguish one person or thing from another, anything distinguishing or characteristic may be included under the term. The name of God, therefore, includes everything by which He makes Himself known. This commandment, therefore, forbids all irreverence towards God; not only the highest act of irreverence in calling on Him to bear witness to a falsehood, but also all irreverent use of his name; all careless, unnecessary reference to him, or his attributes; all indecorous conduct in his worship; and in short, every indication of the want of that fear, reverence, and awe due to a Being infinite in all his perfections, on whom we are absolutely dependent, and to whom we are accountable for our character and conduct.

The third commandment, therefore, specially forbids not only perjury, but also all profane, or unnecessary oaths, all careless appeals to God, and all irreverent use of his name. All literature, whether profane or Christian, shows how strong is the tendency in human nature to introduce the name of God even on the most trivial occasions. Not only are

those formulas, such as Adieu, Good-bye or God be with you, and God forbid, which may have had a pious origin, constantly used without any recognition of their true import, but even persons professing to fear God often allow themselves to use his name as a mere expression of surprise. God is everywhere present. He hears all we say. He is worthy of the highest reverence; and He will not hold him guiltless who on any occasion uses his name irreverently.

Oaths.

The command not to call upon God to confirm a lie, cannot be considered as forbidding us to call upon Him to confirm the truth. And such is the general nature of an oath. Oaths are of two kinds, assertatory, when we affirm a thing to be true; and promissory, when we bring ourselves under an obligation to do, or to forbear doing certain acts. To this class belong official oaths and oaths of allegiance. In both cases there is an appeal to God as a witness. An oath, therefore, is in its nature an act of worship. It implies, (1.) An acknowledgment of the existence of God. (2.) Of his attributes of omnipresence, omniscience, justice, and power. (3.) Of his moral government over the world; and (4.) Of our accountability to Him as our Sovereign and Judge. Hence "to swear by the name of Jehovah," and to acknowledge Him as God, are the same thing. The former involves the latter.

Such being the case, it is evident that a man who denies the truths above mentioned cannot take an oath. For him the words he utters have no meaning. If he does not believe that there is a God; or suppose that he admits that there is some being or force which may be called God, if he does not believe that that Being knows what the juror says, or that He will punish the false swearer, the whole service is a mockery. It is a great injustice, tending to loosen all the bonds of society, to allow atheists to give testimony in courts of justice. [292]

The imprecation usually introduced in the formula of an oath, is not essential to its nature. It is indeed involved in the appeal to God to bear witness to the truth of what we say, but its direct assertion is not necessary. Indeed, it is not found in any of the oaths recorded in the Bible. Some strenuously object to its introduction, as involving a renunciation of all hope of the mercy and grace of God, and as an equivalent to an imprecation on one s self of everlasting perdition.

The Lawfulness of Oaths.

The lawfulness of oaths may be inferred, --

1. From their nature. Being acts of worship involving the acknowledgment of the being and attributes of God, and of our responsibility to Him, they are in their nature good. They are not superstitious, founded on wrong ideas of God or of his relation to the world; nor are they irreverent; nor are they useless. They have a real power over the consciences of men; and that power is the greater according as the faith of the juror and of society in the truths of religion, is the more intelligent and the stronger.

2. In the Scriptures, oaths, on proper occasions, are not only permitted, but commanded. "Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God, and shalt swear by his name. (Deut. vi. 13.) "He who blesseth himself in the earth, shall bless himself in the God of truth; and he that sweareth in the earth, shall swear by the God of truth." (Is. lxv. 16.) "It shall come to pass, if they will diligently learn the ways of my people, to swear by my name, Jehovah liveth;

(as they taught my people to swear by Baal;) then shall they be built in the midst of my people." (Jer. xii. 16; iv. 2.) God Himself is represented as swearing. (Psalms cx. 4; Hebrews vii. 21.) "When God made promise to Abraham, because he could swear by no greater, he sware by himself." (Heb. vi. 13.) Our blessed Lord also, when put upon his oath by the high priest, did not hesitate to answer. (Matt. xxvi. 63.) The words are, Exorkizo se kata tou Theou tou zontos, which are correctly rendered by our version, "I adjure thee (call on thee to swear) by the living God." Meyer in his comment on this passage says: "An affirmative answer to this formula was an oath in the full meaning of the word." And our Lord's reply, "Thou sayest," is the usual Rabbinical form of direct affirmation. [293] The Hebrew word hsby is rendered in the Septuagint by horkizo and exorkizo, and in the Vulgate by adjuro. See Genesis 1. 5, "My father made me swear, horkise me." Num. v. 19, "The priest shall charge her by an oath, horkiei auten." It appears from this passage as well as from others in the Old Testament, that oaths were on certain occasions enjoined by God himself. (Ex. xxii. 10.) They cannot, therefore, be unlawful.

Seeing, then, that an oath is an act of worship; that it is enjoined on suitable occasions; that our Lord himself submitted to be put upon his oath; and that the Apostles did not hesitate to call God to witness to the truth of what they said; we cannot admit that Christ intended to pronounce all oaths unlawful, when he said, as recorded in Matthew v. 34, "Swear not at all." This would be to suppose that Scripture can contradict Scripture, and that Christ's conduct did not conform to his precepts. Nevertheless, his words are very explicit. They mean in Greek just what our version makes them mean. Our Lord did say, "Swear not at all." But in the sixth commandment it is said, "Thou shalt not kill." That, however, does not mean that we may not kill animals for food; for that is permitted and commanded. It does not forbid homicide in self-defence, for that also is permitted. Neither does it forbid capital punishment; for that is not only permitted but even commanded. The meaning of this command has never been doubted or disputed, because it is sufficiently explained by the context and occasion, and by the light shed upon it by other parts of Scripture. As, therefore, the command, "Thou shalt not kill," forbids only unlawful killing; so also the command, "Swear not at all," forbids only unlawful swearing.

This conclusion is confirmed by the context. A great part of our Lord's Sermon on the Mount is devoted to the correction of perversions of the law, introduced by the Scribes and Pharisees. They made the sixth commandment to forbid only murder; our Lord said that it forbade all malicious passions. They limited the seventh commandment to the outward act; He extended it to the inward desire. They made the precept to love our neighbour consistent with hating our enemies; Christ says, "Love your enemies, bless them that curse you." In like manner, the Scribes taught that the law allowed all kinds of swearing, and swearing on all occasions, provided a man did not forswear himself; but our Lord said, I say unto you, in your communications swear not at all; this is plain from ver. 37, "Let your communications (logos, word, talk) be Yea, yea; Nay, nay: for whatsoever is more than these, cometh of evil." It is unnecessary, colloquial, irreverent swearing our Lord condemns. This has nothing to do with those solemn acts of worship, permitted and commanded in the word of God. The Jews of that age were especially addicted to colloquial swearing, holding that the law forbade only fake swearing, or swearing by the name of false gods; [294] hence our Lord had the more occasion to rebuke this sin, and show the evil of any such adjurations.

When are Oaths lawful.

1. As an oath involves an act of worship, it is plain that it should not be taken on any trivial occasion, or in an irreverent manner.

2. An oath is lawful when prescribed and administered by duly authorized officers of the State, or of the Church; they are the "ministers of God," acting in his name and by his authority. There are many who do not regard it as proper that an oath should ever be taken, except when thus imposed by those in authority. The Church of England in the thirty-ninth article, says: "As we confess that vain and rash swearing is forbidden Christian men by our Lord Jesus Christ, and James his Apostle; so we judge that Christian religion doth not prohibit, but that a man may swear when the magistrate requireth, in a cause of faith and charity, so it be done according to the prophet's teaching, in justice, judgment, and truth." The same ground has been taken by many moral philosophers and theologians.

There does not, however, seem to be any sufficient reason for this restriction, either in the nature or design of an oath, or in the teachings of Scripture. The oath being an appeal to God to bear witness to the truth of our declarations, or the sincerity of our promises, there is no reason why this appeal should not be made whenever any important end is to be accomplished by it. There should be a necessity for it; that is, no man should swear lightly or profanely, but only when all the conditions which justify this appeal to God are present. According to the old law those conditions are, "judicium in jurante, justitia in objecto, veracitas in mente." That is, the juror must be competent. He must have a just judgment of the nature and obligation of an oath, so as to understand what he is about to do. Therefore an idiot, a child, or an unbeliever cannot properly be put upon his oath. By "justitia in objecto," is meant that the object concerning which the oath is taken, should be a proper object. If it be a promissory oath, the thing we engage to do must be possible and lawful; if an assertatory oath, the object must have due importance; it must be within the knowledge of the juror; and there must be an adequate reason why this appeal to God should be made. The "veracitas in mente," includes the sincere purpose of doing what we promise, or of telling the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, to the best of our knowledge in the case in which we testify. This excludes all intention to deceive, all mental reservation, and all designed ambiguity of language. All these conditions may be present in private, as well as in judicial or official oaths.

Then again, as the design of an oath is to produce conviction of the truth, to satisfy others of our sincerity and fidelity, and to make an end of controversy, it is evident that circumstances may arise in private life, or in the intercourse of a man with his fellow-men, when an oath may be of the greatest importance. If we risk a great deal on the fidelity or veracity of a man, we have a right to bind him by the solemnity of an oath; or if it is of great importance that others should confide in our veracity or fidelity, it may be right to give them the assurance which an oath is suited and intended to afford.

As to the Scriptural examples, by far the greater number of the oaths recorded in the Bible, and that with the implied approbation of God, are of a non-judicial character. Abraham swore to Abimelech. (Gen. xxi. 23.) Abraham made his servant swear to him. (Gen. xxiv. 3.) Isaac and Abimelech interchanged oaths. (Gen. xxvi. 31.) Jacob caused Joseph to swear not to bury him in Egypt. (xlvii. 31.) Joseph exacted a similar oath from his brethren. So we read of David's swearing to Saul, and to Jonathan, of Jonathan's to David,

and of David's to Shimei. Such private oaths seem at times to have been prescribed in the Mosaic law. In Exodus xxii. 19, it is said, if a man deliver any animal to his neighbour for safe-keeping, and it die on his hands, "then shall an oath of the Lord be between them both, that he hath not put his hand unto his neighbour's goods." In the New Testament we find the Apostle frequently appealing to God to witness to truth of what he said (Rom. i. 9; Phil. i. 8; 1 Thess. ii. 10); doing this also in the most formal manner, as in 2 Corinthians i. 23, "I call God for a record upon my soul."

Augustine's rule on this subject is good: "Quantum ad me pertinet, juro, sed quantum mihi videtur, magna necessitate compulsus." [295] The multiplicity of oaths is a great evil. The rapid irreverent administration of them is profane.

The Form of an Oath.

Under the Old Testament, in voluntary oaths the usual fona was, "The Lord do so to me, and more also." (Ruth i. 17; 2 Sam. iii. 9, 35; l Kings ii. 23; 2 Kings vi. 31.) Or simply,"As the Lord liveth." (Ruth iii. 13; Judges viii. 19; 2 Sam. ii. 27, Jer. xxxviii. 16); or as it is in Jeremiah xlii. 5. "The Lord be a true and faithful witness." In judicial proceedings the oath consisted in a simple assent to the adjuration, which assent was expressed in Hebrew by 'tv, and in Greek by su eipas. The form is a matter of indifference; any form of words which implies an appeal to God as a witness is an oath. In swearing, the right hand was usually elevated towards heaven. Genesis xiv. 22, "Abram said to the king of Sodom, I have lift up mine hand unto the Lord, the most high God, the possessor of heaven and earth." Hence "to lift up the hand" was to swear. (See Deut. xxxii. 40; Ex. vi. 8 (in the Hebrew); Ezek. xx. 5.) Lifting up the hand was evidently intended to intimate that the juror appealed to the God of heaven. Among Christians it is usual to put the hand upon the Bible, to indicate that the oath is taken in the name of the God of the Bible, and that the judgment invoked in case of perjury is that which the Bible denounces against false swearing. Kissing the Bible, another usual part of the ceremonial of an oath, is an expression of faith in the Bible as the word of God. There is nothing unseemly or superstitious in this. On the contrary, instead of appealing to the God of nature, it is most appropriate that the Christian should appeal to the God of the Bible, who, through Jesus Christ, is our reconciled God and Father.

Rules which determine the Interpretation and Obligation of an Oath.

An oath must be interpreted according to the plain natural meaning of the words, or the sense in which they are understood by the party to whom the oath is given or by whom it is imposed. This is a plain dictate of honesty. If the juror understands the oath in a sense different from that attached to it by the party to whom it is given, the whole service is a deceit and mockery. The commander of whom Paley speaks, who swore to the garrison of a besieged town that if they surrendered, a drop of their blood should not be shed, and buried them all alive, was guilty, not only of perjury, but also of dastardly and cruel mockery. The animus imponentis, as is universally admitted, must therefore determine the interpretation of an oath. It was the fact that the results inculcated the lawfulness of mental reservation, which more than anything else made them an abomination in the eyes of all Christendom. It was this which furnished the sharpest thong to the scourge with which Pascal drove them out of Europe.

This is a matter about which men who mean to be honest are not always sufficiently

careful. Their conscience is satisfied if what they say will bear an interpretation consistent with the truth, although the obvious sense is not true. [296]

No oath is obligatory which binds a man to do what is unlawful or impossible. The sin lies in taking such an oath, not in breaking it. The reason of this rule is, that no man can bring himself under an obligation to commit a sin. Herod was not bound to keep his oath to the daughter of Herodias when she demanded the head of John the Baptist. Neither were the forty men, who had bound themselves with "an oath of execration" to kill Paul. But an oath voluntarily taken to do what is lawful and within the power of the juror binds the conscience, (a.) Even when fulfilling it involves injury to the temporal interests of the juror. The Bible pronounces the man blessed who "sweareth to his own hurt and changeth not." (Ps. xv. 4.) (b.) When the oath is obtained by deceit or violence. In the latter case the juror makes a choice of evils. He swears to make a sacrifice to save himself from what he dreads more than the loss of what he promises to relinquish. This may often be a hard case. But such is the solemnity of an oath, and such the importance of its inviolable sanctity being preserved, that it is better to suffer injustice than that an oath should be broken. The case where an oath is obtained by deceit is more difficult, for when such deceit is practised the juror did not intend to assume the obligation which the oath imposes. He might, therefore, plausibly argue that if he did not intend to assume an obligation, it was not assumed. But, on the other hand, the principle involved in the commercial maxim, caveat emptor, applies to oaths. A man is bound to guard against deception; and if deceived he must take the consequences. Besides, those to whom the oath is given trust to it, and act upon it, and, in a certain sense at least, acquire rights under it. The Scriptures, however, in this as in all other cases, are our safest guide. When the Israelites conquered Canaan, the Gibeonites who dwelt in the land, sent delegates to Joshua pretending that they were from a distant country, and "Joshua made peace with them, and made a league with them, to let them live: and the princes of the congregation sware unto them." When the deception was discovered, the people clamoured for their extermination. "But all the princes said unto all the congregation, We have sworn unto them by the Lord God of Israel: now, therefore, we may not touch them." (Joshua ix. 15, 19.) This oath, as appears from 2 Samuel xxi. 1, was sanctioned by God and the people were punished for violating it.

Romish Doctrine.

The principle on which the authorities of the Roman Church assume the right to free men from the obligation of their oaths, is that no man can bind himself to do what is sinful. It is the prerogative of the Church to decide what is sinful. If therefore the Churoh decide that an oath to obey a sovereign disobedient to the Pope, to preserve inviolate a safe conduct, or to keep faith with heretics or infidels is sinful, the obligation of every such oath ceases as soon as the judgment of the Church is rendered.

In answer to the question, "Cui competit potestas dispensandi super juramento?" the Romish theologians answer: "Principaliter competit summo Pontifici; non tamen nisi ex rationabili causa, quia dispensat in jure alieno: competit etiam jure ordinario Episcopis, non Parochis. Requirit autem h[illegible]c dispensatio potestatem jurisdictionis majoris." [297] The casuists, on this as on all other practical subjects, go into the most minute details and subtle distinctions. Dens, for example, in the section above quoted, gives no less than ten conditions under which the obligation of an oath ceases. To the question: "Quibus modis

potest cessare obligatio juramenti promissorii?" he answers: "1. Irritatione. 2. Dispensatione et relaxatione. 3. Commutatione. 4. Materi[illegible] mutatione vel subtracione. 5. Cessante fine totali complete. 6. Ratione conditionis non adimplet[illegible]. 7. Cessante principali obligatione cessat juramentum pure accessorium. 8. Non acceptatione, et condonatione, seu remissione. 9. Si juramentum incipiat vergere in deteriorem exitum, vel in pr[illegible]judicium boni communis, vel etiam alicujus particularis, v. g. quis juravit occultare furtum alterius, sed inde alter liberius prolabitur ad alia furta: item cessat juramentum, quando directe est majoris boni impeditivum. 10. Denique cessat obligatio juramenti, licet improprie, per adimpletionem sive totalem solutionem rei jurat[illegible]: et e contra dicitur cessare ab initio, quia juramentum fuit nullum, sive quia nullam ab initio obligationem produxit." Number nine opens a very wide door: the last clause especially seems to teach that a promissory oath ceases to bind whenever it is expedient to break it. [298]

The whole Romish system is the masterpiece of the "wisdom of the world." As many promissory oaths are not obligatory, it would seem to be wise, instead of leaving the question of their continued obligation to be decided by the individual juror, who is so liable to be unduly biased, to refer the matter to some competent authority. This would tend to prevent false judgments, to satisfy the conscience of the juror and the public mind. And as the question is a matter of morals and religion, it would seem to be proper that the decision should be referred to the organs of the Church. Rome makes all these seemingly wise arrangements. But as God has exalted no human authority over the individual conscience, as no man can delegate his responsibility to another, but every man must answer to God for himself, it is clear that no such arrangement can be consistent with the divine will. Again, if it were true that the Church were divinely guided so as to be infallible in its judgment, this tremendous power over the consciences of men might be safely intrusted to it; but as in fact the representatives of the Church are men of like passions as other men, and no more infallible than their fellows, Romanism is nothing more than a device to put the prerogatives and power of God into the hands of sinful men. History teaches how this usurped power has been used.

Vows.

Vows are essentially different from oaths, in that they do not involve any appeal to God as a witness, or any imprecation of his displeasure. A vow is simply a promise made to God. The conditions of a lawful vow are, first, as to the object, or matter of the vow, (1.) That it be something in itself lawful. (2.) That it be acceptable to God. (3.) That it be within our own power. (4.) That it be for our spiritual edification. Secondly, as to the person making the vow, (1.) That he be competent; that is, that he have sufficient intelligence, and that he be sui juris. A child is not competent to make a vow; neither is one under authority so that he has not liberty of action as to the matter vowed. (2.) That he act with due deliberation and solemnity; for a vow is an act of worship. (3.) That it be made voluntarily, and observed cheerfully.

All these principles are recognized in the Bible. "When thou shalt vow a vow unto the Lord thy God, thou shalt not slack to pay it: for the Lord thy God will surely require it of thee; and it would be sin in thee. But if thou shalt forbear to vow, it shall be no sin in thee. That which is gone out of thy lips thou shalt keep and perform: even a freewill offering, according as thou hast vowed unto the Lord thy God, which thou hast promised with thy

mouth." (Deut. xxiii. 21-23.) In Numbers xxx. 3-5, it is enacted that if a woman in her father's house make a vow, and her father disallow it, it shall not stand, "and the Lord shall forgive her, because her father disallowed her." The same rule is applied to wives and to children, on the obvious principle, that where the rights of others are concerned, we are not at liberty to disregard them.

All the conditions requisite to the lawfulness of a vow, may be included under the old formula, "judicium in vovente, justitia in objecto, veritas in mente." There are two conditions insisted upon by Romanists to which Protestants do not consent. The one is that a vow must be "de meliore bono," i.e., for a greater good. If a man vows to devote himself to the priesthood, to make a pilgrimage, to found a church, or to become a monk, the thing vowed is not only good in itself, but it is better than its opposite. The other condition is, that the thing vowed must be in itself not obligatory, so that the sphere of duty is enlarged by the vow. These conditions are included in those laid down by Dens. [299] He says: "Quinque ex causis provenire, quod aliquid non sit apta materia voti; 1°. quia est impossibile; 2°. quia est necessarium; 3°. quia est illicitum; 4°. quia est indifferens vel inutile; 5°. quia non est bonum melius." The two conditions just specified no doubt concur in many vows acceptable to God, but they are not essential. A man may vow to do what he is bound to do, as is the case with every man who consecrates himself to God in baptism. Nor is it necessary that the thing vowed should be in its own nature a greater good. A man may bind himself to a work out of gratitude to God, which in its own nature is indifferent. This was the case with many of the particulars included in the vows of the Nazarite. There was no special virtue in abstaining from wine, vinegar, grapes moist or dry, or in letting "the locks of the hair of his head grow." (Num. vi. 3-5.) The Romish doctrine on this subject is connected with the distinction which Papists make between precepts and counsels. The former bind the conscience, the others do not. There is special merit, according to their theory, in doing more than is commanded. No man is commanded to devote himself to a life of obedience, celibacy, and poverty, but if he does, so much the better; he has the greater merit.

As usual, the Romanists connect so many subordinate rules with the general principles laid down that they are explained away, or rendered of little use. Thus the rule that the matter of a vow must be "bonum melius," is explained to mean better in itself considered, and not better in relation to the person making the vow. Thus it may be very injurious to a man's spiritual interests to be bound by monastic vows; nevertheless, as the monastic life is in itself a "bonum melius," the vows once taken are obligatory. Then as to the condition of possibility; if possible as to the substance, but impossible as to the accidents, the vow is binding. Thus if a man vows to make a pilgrimage to Jerusalem on his knees, although going on his knees be impossible, he is bound to go in some way.

Lawfulness of Vows.

On this subject there is little or no diversity of opinion. That they are lawful appears, --

1. From their nature. A vow is simply a promise made to God. It may be an expression of gratitude for some signal favour already given, or a pledge to manifest such gratitude for some blessing desired should God see fit to grant it. Thus Jacob vowed that if God would bring him back in peace to his father's house, he would consecrate to Him the tenth of all

that he possessed. The Bible, and especially the Psalms, abound with examples of such vows of thank-offerings to God. Even Calvin, notwithstanding his deep sense of the evils entailed on the Church by the abuse of vows by the Romanists, says, "Ejusmodi vota hodie quoque nobis in usu esse possunt, quoties nos Dominus vel a clade aliqua, vel a morbo difficili, vel ab alio quovis discrimine eripuit. Neque enim a pii hominis officio tunc abhorret, votivam oblationem, velut sollenne recognitionis symbolum, Deo consecrare: ne ingratus erga ejus benignitatem videatur." [300] He also recognized the propriety of vows of abstinence from indulgences which we have found to be injurious; and also of vows the end of which is to render us more mindful of duties which we may be inclined to neglect. In all such vows there is a devout recognition of God, and of our obligations to Him. They, therefore, as well as oaths, are acts of worship. They are regarded as such in the Symbols of the Reformed Churches. Thus, for example, the "Declaratio Thoruniensis" [301] includes, under acts of worship, "jusjurandum legitimum, quo Deum cordium inspectorem, ut veritatis testem, et falsitatis vindicem appellamus. Denique votum sacrum, quo vel nos ipsos, vel res aut actiones nostras Deo, velut sacrificium quoddam spirituale, consecramus et devovemus."

2. The fact that the Scriptures contain so many examples of vows, and so many injunctions to their faithful observance, is a sufficient proof that in their place, and on proper occasions, they are acceptable in the sight of God.

3. This is further evident from the fact that the baptismal covenant is of the nature of a vow. In that ordinance we solemnly promise to take God the Father to be our Father, Jesus Christ his Son to be our Saviour, the Holy Ghost to be our Sanctifier, and his word to be the rule of our faith and practice. The same is true of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper; in that ordinance we consecrate ourselves to Christ as the purchase of his blood, and vow to be faithful to Him to the end. The same thing is true also of the marriage covenant, because the promises therein made are not merely between the parties, but by both parties to the contract, to God.

But while the lawfulness of vows is to be admitted, they should not be unduly multiplied, or made on slight occasions, or allowed to interfere with our Christian liberty. Not only have the violation of these rules been productive of the greatest evils in the Church of Rome, but Protestant Christians also have often reduced themselves to a miserable state of bondage by the multiplication of vows. When such cases occur, it is healthful and right for the Christian to assert his liberty. As a believer cannot rightfully be brought into bondage to men, so neither can he rightfully make a slave of himself. He should remember that God prefers mercy to sacrifice; that no service is acceptable to Him which is injurious to us; that He does not require us to observe promises which we ought never to have made and that vows about trifles are irreverent, and should neither be made nor regarded, but should be repented of as sins. Even Thomas Aquinas says, "Vota qu sunt de rebus vanis et inutilibus, sunt magis deridenda, quam servanda." [302]

Monastic Vows.

At the time of the Reformation the doors of all the monasteries in lands in which Protestants had the power, were thrown open, and their inmates declared free in the sight of God and man, from the vows by which they had hitherto been bound. Protestants did not maintain that there was anything intrinsically wrong in a man, or a company of men

renouncing the ordinary avocations of life, and devoting himself or themselves to a religious life. Nor did they object to such men living together and conforming to a prescribed rule of discipline; nor did they deny that such institutions under proper regulations, might be, and in fact had been of great and manifold utility. They had been places of security for those who had no taste for the conflicts by which all Christendom was so long agitated. In many cases they were places of education and seats of learning. Their objections to them were, --

1. That they had been perverted from their original design, and had become the sources of evil and not of good, in every part of the Church. Instead of its being free to every one to enter and to leave these institutions at discretion, those once initiated were bound for life by the vows which they had made, and instead of the obligations assumed being rational and Scriptural, they were unreasonable and unscriptural. Instead of the inmates of these institutions supporting themselves by their own labour, they were allowed to live in idleness, supported by alms or by the revenues of the convents, which had in many cases become enormous. This objection was directed to the very principle on which the monastic institutions of the Romish Church were founded. On this point Calvin says, "Proinde meminerint lectores, fuisse me de monachismo potius quam de monachis loquutum, et ea vitia notasse, non qu\u0000 in paucorum vita h\u0000rent, sed qu\u0000 ab ipso vivendi instituto separari nequeunt." [303]

2. To this, however, was added the argument from experience. Monastic institutions had become the sources of untold evils to the Church. Being in a great measure independent of the ordinary ecclesiastical authorities, they were the cause of conflict and agitation. Each order was an "imperium in imperio," and one order was arrayed against another, as one feudal baron against his fellows. Besides, the corruption of manners within the convents as portrayed by Romanists themselves, rendered them such a scandal and offence as to justify their summary suppression. Much is implied in the answer of Erasmus to Frederick the Wise, "Lutherus peccavit in duobus, nempe quod tetigit coronam pontificis et ventres monachorum." [304]

3. Practical evils might be reformed, but Protestants objected that the whole system of monkery was founded on the false principle of the merit of good works. It was only on the assumption that men could work out a righteousness of their own, that they submitted to the self-denial and restraints of the monastic life. If, however, as Protestants believe, there is no merit in the sight of God in anything fallen men can do, and the righteousness of Christ is the sole ground of our acceptance with God, the whole ground on which these institutions were defended is undermined. To enter a monastery, on the theory of the Romish Church, was to renounce the doctrine of salvation by grace. Besides, it was also taught that celibacy, obedience, and voluntary poverty, being uncommanded, the monastic vow to observe these rules of life, involved special merit. This was a twofold error. First, it is an error to suppose that there can be any work of supererogation. The law of God demanding absolute perfection of heart and life, there can be no such thing as going beyond its requirements. And, secondly, it is an error to assume that there is any virtue at all in celibacy, monastic obedience, or voluntary poverty. These are not "meliora bona" in the Romish sense of the words. In this view, also, monastic vows are antichristian.

4. A fourth reason urged by Protestants for pronouncing monastic vows invalid, was

that they were unlawful, not only for the reason just assigued, but also because they were contrary to the law of Christ. No man has the right to swear away his liberty; to reduce himself to a state of absolute subjection to a fellow-mortal. To his own master he must stand or fail. The vow of obedience made by every monk or nun was a violation of the apostolic injunction, "Be not ye the servants of men." The same remark is applicable to the vow of celibacy. No one has a right to take that vow; because celibacy is right or wrong according to circumstances. It may be a sin, and therefore no such vow can bind the conscience.

5. Monastic life, instead of being subservient to holiness of heart, was in the vast majority of cases injurious to the monks themselves. The fearful language of Jerome is full of instruction: "O quoties ego ipso in eremo constitutus in illa vasta solitudine, qu\u00e9 exusta solis ardoribus, horridum monachis pr\u00e9stat habitaculum, putavi me Romanis interesse deliciis. . . . . Ille igitur ego, qui ob Gehenn\u00e9 metum tali me carcere ipse damnaveram, scorpiorum tantum socius et ferarum, s\u00e9pe choris intereram puellarum. Pallebant ora jejuniis, et mens desideriis \u00e9stuabat in frigido corpore, et ante hominem sua jam in carne pr\u00e9mortuum, sola libidinum incendia bulliebant." [305] In the day when that which is hidden shall be made manifest, there will probably be no such fearful revelation of self-torture as that made by unveiling the secret life of the inmates of monastic institutions. They are in necessary conflict with the laws of nature and with the law of God.

The Protestants adopted the rule announced by Calvin: [306] "Omnia non legitima nec rite concepta, ut apud Deum nihili sunt, sic nobis irrita esse debere." For, he immediately adds, as in human contracts only that continues binding, which he to whom the promise is made wishes us to observe, so it is to be supposed that we are not bound to do what God does not wish us to do, simply because we have promised Him to do it. On these grounds the Reformers with one accord pronounced all monastic vows to be null and void. Thus the Gospel became a proclamation of liberty to the captive, and the opening of the prison to those who were bound.

[289] Edit. Leipzig, 1857, sub voce, sv'.

[290] Scholia in Vetus Testamentum in Compendium redacta, Leipzig, 1828, vol. i. p. 404.

[291] Kurzgefasstes exegetische Handbuch zum Alten Testament: Exodus und Leviticus, von August Knobel, Leipzig, 1857, p. 205.

[292] In a recent murder trial in one of the courts of New York, a young scientific physician was called to give testimony on what constitutes insanity. He distinctly asserted that thought was a function of the brain; that where there is no brain there can be no thought; and that a disordered brain necessitates disordered mental action. Of course, God having no brain cannot be intelligent; in other words, there can be no God. Such a man may be a good chemist or a good surgeon; but he is no more competent to be a witness in a court of justice, than he is fit to be a preacher.

[293] See Schoettgen's Hor. Hebr. et Talm., Matt. v. 34; Dresden and Leipzig, 1733, p. 40.

[294] See Meyer on this passage, who refers to Philo, De Spec. Leg.; A. Lightfoot, Hor\u00e9, and Meuschen, N. T. ex Talm. illustr. See, also, Winer's Realw\u00e9rterbuch, and Tholuck's Auslegung der Bergpredigt Christi, 3d edit. Hamburg, 1845.

[295] Sermon CLXXX. 10 [ix.]; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. v. p. 1250, a.

[296] A gentleman was charged with having written a certain article in a newspaper. He declared that he did not write it. That was true. But he had dictated it.

[297] Theologia Moralis Dogmatica Reverendi et Eruditissimi Domini Petri Dens: de Juramento, x. 177, edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. iv. pp. 214-216.

[298] In conversation with a very intelligent Romish priest who had been educated at Maynooth, the question was asked, What was the effect of a course of "Moral Theology" designed to train priests for the confessional? The prompt answer was, Utterly to destroy the moral sense.

[299] Tractatus de Voto; Theologia, edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. iv. N. 91, p. 111.

[300] Institutio, IV. xiii. 4, edit. Berlin, 1834, par. ii. p. 338.

[301] De Cultu Dei, 5; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 678.

[302] Summa, II. ii. qu&#65533;st. lxxxviii. 2; edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 164, b, of third set.

[303] Institutio, IV. xiii. 15; edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. ii. p. 345.

[304] Guericke's Kirchengeschichte, VII. 1. ii. § 174, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1846, vol. iii. p. 69.

[305] Epistola xxii; Ad Eustochium, Paul&#65533; Filiam, De Custodia Virginitatis, Opera, ed. Migne, Paris, 1845, vol. i. p. 398. This long epistle is addressed to a young Roman lady of rank and wealth; and is designed to confirm her in her resolution not to marry. It is founded on the assumption that virginity was not only a great virtue, but also that a special reward, a glory not otherwise attainable, was attached to it. He says to her: "Cave, qu&#65533;so, ne quando de te dicat Deus: Virgo Israel cecidit, et non est qui suscitet eam.' (Amos v. 2). Audenter loquar: Cum omnia possit Deus, suscitare virginem non potest post ruinam. Valet quidem liberare de poena, sed non vult coronare corruptam." Ibid. p. 394. He enjoins upon her all kinds of ascetic observances even while confessing their inefficacy in his own case.

[306] Institutio, IV. xiii. 20; edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. ii. p. 349.

§ 8. The Fourth Commandment.

Its Design.

The design of the fourth commandment was, (1.) To commemorate the work of creation. The people were commanded to remember the Sabbath-day and to keep it holy, because in six days God had made the heavens and the earth. (2.) To preserve alive the knowledge of the only living and true God. If heaven and earth, that is, the universe, were created, they must have had a creator; and that creator must be extramundane, existing before, out of, and independently of the world. He must be almighty, and infinite in knowledge, wisdom, and goodness; for all these attributes are necessary to account for the wonders of the heavens and the earth. So long, therefore, as men believe in creation, they must believe in God. This accounts for the fact that so much stress is laid upon the right observance of the Sabbath. Far more importance is attributed to that observance than to any merely ceremonial institution. (3.) This command was designed to arrest the current of the outward life of the people and to turn their thoughts to the unseen and spiritual. Men are so

prone to be engrossed by the things of this world that it was, and is, of the highest importance that there should be one day of frequent recurrence on which they were forbidden to think of the things of the world, and forced to think of the things unseen and eternal. (4.) It was intended to afford time for the instruction of the people, and for the public and special worship of God. (5.) By the prohibition of all servile labour, whether of man or beast, it was designed to secure recuperative rest for those on whom the primeval curse had fallen: "In the sweat of thy face shalt thou eat bread." (6.) As a day of rest and as set apart for intercourse with God, it was designed to be a type of that rest which remains for the people of God, as we learn from Psalms xcv. 11, as expounded by the Apostle in Hebrews iv. 1-10. (7.) As the observance of the Sabbath had died out among the nations, it was solemnly reenacted under the Mosaic dispensation to be a sign of the covenant between God and the children of Israel. They were to be distinguished as the Sabbath-keeping people among all the nations of the earth, and as such were to be the recipients of God's special blessings. Exodus xxxi. 13, "Verily my Sabbaths ye shall keep: for it is a sign between me and you throughout your generations; that ye may know that I am the Lord that doth sanctify you." And in verses 16, 17, "Wherefore the children of Israel shall keep the Sabbath, to observe the Sabbath throughout their generations, for a perpetual covenant. It is a sign between me and the children of Israel forever." And in Ezekiel xx. 12, it is said, "Moreover, also, I gave them my Sabbaths, to be a sign between me and them, that they might know that I am the Lord that sanctify them."

The Sabbath was instituted from the Beginning, and is of Perpetual Obligation.

1. This may be inferred from the nature and design of the institution. It is a generally recognized principle, that those commands of the Old Testament which were addressed to the Jews as Jews and were founded on their peculiar circumstances and relations, passed away when the Mosaic economy was abolished; but those founded on the immutable nature of God, or upon the permanent relations of men, are of permanent obligation. There are many such commands which bind men as men; fathers as fathers; children as children; and neighbours as neighbours. It is perfectly apparent that the fourth commandment belongs to this latter class. It is important for all men to know that God created the world, and therefore is an extramundane personal being, infinite in all his perfections. All men need to be arrested in their worldly career, and called upon to pause and to turn their thoughts Godward. It is of incalculable importance that men should have time and opportunity for religious instruction and worship. It is necessary for all men and servile animals to have time to rest and recuperate their strength. The daily nocturnal rest is not sufficient for that purpose, as physiologists assure us, and as experience has demonstrated. Such is obviously the judgment of God.

It appears, therefore, from the nature of this commandment as moral, and not positive or ceremonial, that it is original and universal in its obligation. No man assumes that the commands, "Thou shalt not kill," and "Thou shalt not steal," were first announced by Moses, and ceased to be obligatory when the old economy passed away. A moral law is one that binds from its own nature. It expresses an obligation arising either out of our relations to God or out of our permanent relations to our fellow-men. It binds whether formally enacted or not. There are no doubt positive elements in the fourth commandment as it stands in the Bible. It is positive that a seventh, and not a sixth or eighth part of our time

should be consecrated to the public service of God. It is positive that the seventh rather than any other day of the week should be thus set apart. But it is moral that there should be a day of rest and cessation from worldly avocations. It is of moral obligation that God and his great works should be statedly remembered. It is a moral duty that the people should assemble for religious instruction and for the united worship of God. All this was obligatory before the time of Moses, and would have been binding had he never existed. All that the fourth commandment did was to put this natural and universal obligation into a definite form.

2. The original and universal obligation of the law of the Sabbath may be inferred from its having found a place in the decalogue. As all the other commandments in that fundamental revelation of the duties of men to God and to their neighbour, are moral and permanent in their obligation, it would be incongruous and unnatural if the fourth should be a solitary exception. This argument is surely not met by the answer given to it by the advocates of the opposite doctrine. The argument they say is valid only on the assumption "that the Mosaic law, because of its divine origin, is of universal and permanent authority." [307] May it not be as well said, If the command, "Thou shalt not steal," be still in force, the whole code of the Mosaic law must be binding? The fourth commandment is read in all Christian churches, whenever the decalogue is read, and the people are taught to say, "Lord, have mercy upon us, and incline our hearts to keep this law."

3. Another argument is derived from the penalty attached to the violation of this commandment. "Ye shall keep the Sabbath, therefore, for it is holy unto you: every one that defileth it shall surely be put to death." (Ex. xxxi. 14.) The violation of no merely ceremonial or positive law was visited with this penalty. Even the neglect of circumcision, although it involved the rejection of both the Abrahamic and the Mosaic covenant, and necessarily worked the forfeiture of all the benefits of the theocracy, was not made a capital offence. The law of the Sabbath by being thus distinguished was raised far above the level of mere positive enactments. A character was given to it, not only of primary importance, but also of special sanctity.

4. We accordingly find that in the prophets as well as in the Pentateuch, and the historical books of the Old Testament, the Sabbath is not only spoken of as "a delight," but also its faithful observance is predicted as one of the characteristics of the Messianic period. Thus Isaiah says, "If thou turn away thy foot from the Sabbath, from doing thy pleasure on my holy day; and call the Sabbath a Delight, the Holy of the Lord, Honourable; and shalt honour him, not doing thine own ways, nor finding thine own pleasure, nor speaking thine own words: then shalt thou delight thyself in the Lord; and I will cause thee to ride upon the high places of the earth, and feed thee with the heritage of Jacob thy father; for the mouth of the Lord hath spoken it." (Is. lviii. 13, 14.) Gesenius is very much puzzled at this. The prophets predicted that under the Messiah the true religion was to be extended to the ends of the earth. But the public worship of God was by the Jewish law tied to Jerusalem. That law was neither designed nor adapted for a universal religion. To those, therefore, who believe that the Sabbath was a temporary Mosaic institution to pass away when the old economy was abolished, it is altogether incongruous that a prophet should represent the faithful observance of the Sabbath as one of the chief blessings and glories of the Messiah's reign.

These considerations, apart from historical evidence or the direct assertion of the Scriptures, are enough to create a strong, if not an invincible presumption, that the Sabbath was instituted from the beginning, and was designed to be of universal and permanent obligation. Whatever law had a temporary ground or reason for its enactment, was temporary in its obligation. Where the reason of the law is permanent the law itself is permanent.

The greater number of Christian theologians who deny all this still admit the Sabbath to be a most wise and beneficent institution. Nay, many of them go so far as to represent its violation, as a day of religious rest, as a sin. This, however, is a concession that the reason for the command is permanent, and that if God has not required its observance, the Church or State is bound to do so.

Direct Evidence of the ante-Mosaic institution of the Sabbath.

Presumptive evidence may be strong enough to coerce assent. The advocates of the early institution of the Sabbath, however, are not limited to that kind of evidence. There is direct proof of the fact for which they contend, --

1. In Genesis ii. 3, it is said, "God blessed the seventh day, and sanctified it; because that in it he had rested from all his work which God created and made." It is indeed easy to say that this is a prolepsis; that the passage assigns the reason why in the times of Moses, God selected the seventh, rather than any other day of the week to be the Sabbath. This is indeed possible, but it is not probable. It is an unnatural interpretation which no one would adopt except to suit a purpose. The narrative purports to be an account of what God did at the time of the creation. When the earth was prepared for his reception, God created man on the sixth day, and rested from the work of creation on the seventh, and set apart that day as a holy day to be a perpetual memorial of the great work which He had accomplished. [308] This is the natural sense of the passage, from which only the strongest reasons would authorize us to depart. All collateral reasons, however, are on its side.

In support of this interpretation the authority of the most impartial, as well as the most competent interpreters might be quoted. Grotius did not believe in the perpetuity of the Sabbath, yet he admits that in Genesis ii. 3, it is said that the seventh day was set apart as holy from the creation. He assumes, on the authority, as he says, of many learned Hebrews, that there were two precepts concerning the Sabbath. The one given at the beginning enjoined that every seventh day should be remembered as a memorial of the creation. And in this sense, he says, the Sabbath was doubtless observed by the patriarchs, Enoch, Noah, Abraham, etc. The second precept was given from Mount Sinai when the Sabbath was made a memorial of the deliverance of the Israelites from Egyptian bondage. This latter law enjoined rest from labour on the Sabbath. The Scriptural argument which he urges in support of this theory, is, that in all the accounts of the journeyings of the patriarchs, we never read of their resting on the seventh day; whereas after the law given from Mount Sinai, this reference to the resting of the people on the Sabbath is of constant occurrence. [309]

Delitzsch says "Hengstenberg understands Genesis ii. 3, as though it were written from the stand-point of the Mosaic law, as if it were said, God for this reason in after times blessed the seventh day; which scarcely needs a refutation. God himself, the Creator, celebrated a Sabbath immediately after the six days work, and because his sabbatismos

could become the sabbatismos of his creatures, He made for that purpose the seventh day, by his blessing, to be a perennial fountain of refreshment, and clothed that day by hallowing it with special glory for all time to come." [310]

Baumgarten in his comment on this verse says the separation of this day from all others was made so that "the return of this blessed and holy day should be to him a memorial, and participation of the divine rest." [311] And Knobel, one of the most pronounced of the rationalistic commentators, says, "That the author of Genesis makes the distinction of the seventh day coeval with the creation, although the carrying out of the purpose thus intimated was deferred to the time of Moses. Nothing is known of any ante-Mosaic celebration of the Sabbath." [312]

2. Apart from the fact that the reason for the Sabbath existed from the beginning, there is direct historical evidence that the hebdomadal division of time prevailed before the deluge. Noah in Genesis viii. 10, 12, is said twice to have rested seven days. And again in the time of Jacob, as appears from Genesis xxix. 27, 28, the division of time into weeks was recognized as an established usage. As seven is not an equal part either of a solar year or of a lunar month, the only satisfactory account of this fact, is to be found in the institution of the Sabbath. This fact moreover proves not only the original institution, but also the continued observance of the seventh day. There must have been something to distinguish that day as the close of one period or the commencement of another. It is altogether unnatural to account for this hebdomadal division by a reference to the worship of the seven planets. There is no evidence that the planets were objects of worship at that early period of the world, or for a long time afterwards, especially among the Shemitic races. Besides, this explanation is inconsistent with the account of the creation. The divine authority of the book of Genesis is here taken for granted. What it asserts, Christians are bound to believe. It is undeniably taught in this book that God created the heavens and the earth in six days and rested on the seventh. It matters not how the word "days" may be explained, we have in the history of the creation this hebdomadal division of time. No earlier cause for the prevalence of that division can be given, and no other is needed, or can reasonably be assumed.

This division of time into weeks, was not confined to the Hebrew race. It was almost universal. This fact proves that it must have had its origin in the very earliest period in the history of the world. [313]

3. That the law of the Sabbath was not first given on Mount Sinai, may also be inferred from the fact that it was referred to as a known and familiar institution, before that law was promulgated. Thus in the sixteenth chapter of Exodus the people were directed to gather on the sixth day of the week manna sufficient for the seventh, as on that day none would be provided. And more particularly in the twenty-third verse, it is said, "To-morrow is the rest of the holy Sabbath unto the Lord: bake that which ye will bake to-day, and seethe that ye will seethe; and that which remaineth over lay up for you, to be kept until morning." And in the twenty-sixth verse we read, "Six days ye shall gather it; but on the seventh day, which is the Sabbath, in it there shall be none." There was therefore a Sabbath before the Mosaic law was given. Again, the language used in the fourth commandment, "Remember the Sabbath day to keep it holy," naturally implies that the Sabbath was not a new institution. It was a law given in the beginning, that had doubtless in a good measure, especially during

their bondage in Egypt, become obsolete, which the people were henceforth to remember and faithfully observe.

The objection to the pre-Mosaic institution of the Sabbath founded on the silence of Genesis on the subject in the history of the patriarchs, is of little weight. It is to be remembered that the book of Genesis, comprised in some sixty octavo pages, gives us the history of nearly two thousand years. All details not bearing immediately on the design of the author were of necessity left out. If nothing was done but what is there recorded, the antediluvians and patriarchs lived almost entirely without religious observances.

The Sabbath does not stand alone. It is well known that Moses adopted and incorporated with his extended code many of the ancient usages of the chosen people. This was the case with sacrifices and circumcision, as well as with all the principles of the decalogue. That a particular law, therefore, is found in the Mosaic economy is not sufficient evidence that it had its origin with the Hebrew Lawgiver, or that it ceased to be binding when the old dispensation was abrogated. If the reason for the law remains, the law itself remains; and if given to mankind before the birth of Moses, it binds mankind. On this point even Dr. Paley says: "If the divine command was actually delivered at the creation, it was addressed, no doubt, to the whole human species alike, and continues, unless repealed by some subsequent revelation, binding upon all who come to the knowledge of it." [314] That the law of the Sabbath was thus given is, as has been shown, the common opinion even of those who deny its perpetual obligation, and therefore its permanence cannot reasonably be questioned by those who admit the principle that what was given to mankind was meant for mankind.

4. It is a strong argument in favour of this conclusion, that the law of the Sabbath was taken up and incorporated in the new dispensation by the Apostles, the infallible founders of the Christian Church. All the Mosaic laws founded on the permanent relations of men either to God or to their fellows, are in like manner adopted in the Christian Code. They are adopted, however, only as to their essential elements. Every law, ceremonial are typical, or designed only for the Jews, is discarded. Men are still bound to worship God, but this is not now to be done especially at Jerusalem, or by sacrifices, or through the ministration of priests. Marriage is as sacred now as it ever was, but all the special laws regulating its duties, and the penalty for its violation, are abrogated. Homicide is as great a crime now as under the Mosaic economy, but the old laws about the avenger of blood and cities of refuge are no longer in force. The rights of property remain unimpaired under the gospel dispensation, but the Jewish laws regarding its distribution and protection, are no longer binding. The same is true with regard to the Sabbath. We are as much bound to keep one day in seven boly unto the Lord, as were the patriarchs or Israelites. This law binds all men as men, because given to all mankind, and because it is founded upon the nature common to all men, and the relation which all men bear to God. The two essential elements of the command are that the Sabbath should be a day of rest, that is, of cessation from worldly avocations and amusements; and that it should be devoted to the worship of God and the services of religion. All else is circumstantial and variable. It is not necessary that it should be observed with special reference to the deliverance of the Israelites out of Egypt; nor are the details as to the things to be done or avoided, or as to the penalty for transgression obligatory on us. We are not bound to offer the sacrifices required of the Jews, nor are we

bound to abstain from lighting a fire on that day. In like manner the day of the week is not essential. The change from the seventh to the first was circumstantial. If made for sufficient reason and by competent authority, the change is obligatory. The reason for the change is patent. If the deliverance of the Hebrew from the bondage in Egypt should be commemorated, how much more the redemption of the world by the Son of God. If the creation of the material universe should be kept in perpetual remembrance, how much more the new creation secured by the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. If men wish the knowledge of that event to die out, let them neglect to keep holy the first day of the week; if they desire that event to be everywhere known and remembered, let them consecrate that day to the worship of the risen Saviour. This is God's method for keeping the resurrection of Christ, on which our salvation depends, in perpetual remembrance.

This change of the Sabbath from the seventh to the first day of the week was made not only for a sufficient reason, but also by competent authority. It is a simple historical fact that the Christians of the apostolic age ceased to observe the seventh, and did observe the first day of the week as the day for religious worship. Thus from the creation, in unbroken succession, the people of God have, in obedience to the original command, devoted one clay in seven to the worship of the only living and true God. It is hard to conceive of a stronger argument than this for the perpetual obligation of the Sabbath as a divine institution. It is not worth while to stop to answer the objection, that the record of this uninterrupted observance of the Sabbath is incomplete. History does not record everything. We find the fountain of this river of mercy in paradise; we trace its course from age to age; we see its broad and beneficent flow before our eyes. If here and there, in its course through millenniums, it be lost from view in a morass or cavern, its reappearance proves its identity and the divinity of its origin. The Sabbath is to the nations what the Nile is to Egypt, and you might as well call the one a human device as the other. Nothing but divine authority and divine power can account for the continued observance of this sacred institution from the beginning until now.

5. It is fair to argue the divine origin of the Sabbath from its supreme importance. As to the fact of its importance all Christians are agreed. They may differ as to the ground on which the obligation to observe it rests, and as to the strictness with which the day should be observed, but that men are bound to observe it, and that its due observance is of essential importance, there is no difference of opinion among the churches of Christendom. But if so essential to the interests of religion, is it conceivable that God has not enjoined it? He has given the world the Church, the Bible, the ministry, the sacraments; these are not human devices. And can it be supposed that the Sabbath, without which all these divine institutions would be measurably inefficient, should be left to the will or wisdom of men? This is not to be supposed. That these divinely appointed means for the illumination and sanctification of men, are in a great measure without effect, where the Sabbath is neglected or profaned, is a matter of experience. It is undeniable that the mass of the people are indebted to the services of the sanctuary on the Lord's Day, for their religious knowledge. Any community or class of men who ignore the Sabbath and absent themselves from the sanctuary, as a general thing, become heathen. They have little more true religious knowledge than pagans. But without such knowledge morality is impossible. Religion is not only the lifeblood of morality, so that without the former the latter cannot be; but God has revealed his purpose that it shall not be. If men refuse to retain Him in their knowledge, He

declares that He will give them up to a reprobate mind. (Rom. i. 28.) Men do not know what they are doing, when by their teaching or example they encourage the neglect or profanation of the Lord's Day. We have in the French Communists an illustration and a warning of what a community without a Sabbath, i.e., without religion, must ultimately and inevitably become. Irreligious men of course sneer at religion and deny its importance, but the Bible and experience are against them.

Objections.

The general objections against the doctrine that the law of the sabbath is of universal and perpetual obligation, have already been incidentally considered. Those derived from the New Testament are principally the following: --

1. An objection is drawn from the absence of any express command. No such command was needed. The New Testament has no decalogue. That code having been once announced, and never repealed, remains in force. Its injunctions are not so much categorically repeated, as assumed as still obligatory. We find no such words as, "Thou shalt have no other gods before me," or "Thou shalt not make unto thee any graven image." Paul says, "I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." (Rom. vii. 7.) The law which said "Thou shalt not covet," is in the decalogue. Paul does not re[illegible]nact the command, he simply takes for granted that the decalogue is now as ever the law of God.

2. It is urged not only that there is no positive command on the subject, but also that there is a total silence in the New Testament respecting any obligation to keep holy one day in seven. Our Lord in his Sermon on the Mount, it is said, while correcting the false interpretations of the Mosaic law given by the Pharisees, and expounding its precepts in their true sense, says nothing of the fourth commandment. The same is true of the council in Jerusalem. That council says nothing about the necessity of the heathen converts observing a Sabbath. But all this may be said of other precepts the obligation of which no man questions. Neither our Lord nor the council say anything about the worshipping of graven images. Besides, our Lord elsewhere does do, with regard to the fourth commandment, precisely what He did in the Sermon on the Mount with regard to other precepts of the decalogue. He reproved the Pharisees for their false interpretation of that commandment, without the slightest intimation that the law itself was not to remain in force.

3. Appeal is made to such passages as Colossians ii. 16, "Let no man therefore judge you in meat, or in drink, or in respect of an holy day, or of the new moon, or of the Sabbath days;" and Romans xiv. 5, "One man esteemeth one day above another; another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully persuaded in his own mind." Every one knows, however, that the apostolic churches were greatly troubled by Judaizers, who insisted that the Mosaic law continued in force, and that Christians were bound to conform to its prescriptions with regard to the distinction between clean and unclean meats, and its numerous feast days, on which all labour was to be intermitted. These were the false teachers and this was the false doctrine against which so much of St. Paul's epistles was directed. It is in obvious reference to these men and their doctrines that such passages as those cited above were written. They have no reference to the weekly Sabbath, which had been observed from the creation, and which the Apostles themselves introduced and perpetuated in the Christian Church.

4. It is also frequently said that a weekly Sabbath is out of keeping with the spirit of

the Gospel, which requires the consecration of the whole life and of all our time to God. With the Christian, it is said, every day is holy, and one day is not more holy than another. It is not true, however, that the New Testament requires greater consecration to God than the Old. The Gospel has many advantages over the Mosaic dispensation, but that is not one of them. It was of old, even from the beginning, required of all men that they should love God with all the heart, with all the mind, and with all the strength; and their neighbour as themselves. More than this the Gospel demands of no man If it consists with the spirituality of the Church that believers should not neglect the assembling themselves together; and that they should have a stated ministry, sacramental rites, and the power of excommunication, and all this by Divine appointment; then it is hard to see why the consecration of one day in seven to the service of God, should be inconsistent with its spiritual character. So long as we are in the body, religion cannot be exclusively a matter of the heart. It must have its institutions and ordinances; and any attempt to dispense with these would be as unreasonable and as futile as for the soul, in this our present state of existence, to attempt to do without the body.

5. Another ground is often taken on this subject. The importance of the Sabbath is not denied. The obligation to keep it holy is admitted. It is declared to be sinful to engage in worldly avocations or amusements on that day; but it is denied that this obligation to consecrate the day to God rests upon any divine command. It is denied that the original sanctification of the seventh day at the creation binds all men to keep one day in seven holy to the Lord. It is maintained that the fourth commandment, both as to its essence and as to its accidents is abrogated; and, therefore, that there is no express command of God now in force requiring us to keep holy the Sabbath. The obligation is either self-imposed, or it is imposed by the Church. The Church requires its members to observe the Lord's Day, as it requires them to observe Christmas or Good Friday; and Christians, it is said, are bound to obey the Church, as citizens are bound to obey the state. But Protestants deny that the Church power to make laws to bind the conscience. That is the prerogative of God. If the Church may do it in one case it may another; and we should be made the servants of men. It is by this simple principle, that men are bound to obey the Church, that Rome has effectually despoiled all who acknowledge her authority of the liberty wherewith Christ has made his people free.

Most of the modern evangelical theologians in Germany say that the obligation to observe the Sabbath is self-imposed. That is, that every man, and especially every Christian, is bound to do all he can to promote the interests of religion and the good of society. The consecration of the Lord's Day to the worship of God is eminently conducive to these ends; therefore men are bound to keep it holy. But an obligation self-imposed is limited to self. One man thinks it best to devote Sunday to religion; another that it should be kept as a day of relaxation and amusement. One man's liberty cannot be judged by another man's conscience. Expediency can never be the ground of a universal and permanent obligation. The history of the Church proves that no such views of duty are adequate to coerce the conscience and govern the lives of men. The Sabbath is not in fact consecrated to religion, where its divine authority is denied. The churches may be more or less frequented, but the day is principally devoted to amusement. A German theologian [315] says that the doctrine that the religious observance of the Sabbath rests on an express divine command, "prevails throughout the whole English-speaking part of Christendom," and that

in the Evangelical Church in Germany, some either from a too legal view of Christianity, or from servile subjection to the letter of the Bible, or impressed by the solemn stillness of an English Sunday as contrasted with its profanation elsewhere, have ever been inclined to the same views. Although this writer, the representative of a large class, asserts his Christian liberty to observe one day above another, or all days alike, he admits that the religious observance of the Lord's Day is not a matter of indifference; on the contrary, he says that "its profanation (Verleztung) is a sin." To make a thing sinful, however, he says it is not necessary that it should be against an express divine command. A Christian's conscience, "guided by the word, and enlightened by the Spirit of God," is his rule of conduct. Conscience thus guided and enlightened, may enjoin or forbid much for which no explicit directions can he found in the Scriptures. No man denies all this; but a man's conscience is a guide for himself, and not for other people. If we hold fast the fundamental principle of our Protestant faith and freedom, "that the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice," we must be able to plead express divine authority for the religious observance of the Lord's Day, or allow every man so to keep it or not as he sees fit. To his own master he stands or falls; to Him alone is he accountable for the use which he makes of his Christian liberty. But as no man is at liberty to steal or not to steal as he sees fit, so all "English speaking" Christians with one voice say, he is not at liberty to sanctify or profane the Sabbath, as he sees fit. He is bound by the primal and immutable law given at the creation, to keep one day in seven holy to the Lord.

If it be true that it is peculiar to the Anglo-Saxon race to hold this view of the obligation of the Christian Sabbath, then they have special reason for profound gratitude to God. God of old said to the Israelites, "Hallow my Sabbaths; and they shall be a sign between me and you, that ye may know that I am the Lord your God." That is, it shall be for a sign that you are my people. So long as you keep the Sabbath holy I will bless you; when you neglect and profane it, your blessings shall depart from you. (Jer. xvii. 20-27.) If it be then the distinction of Anglo-Saxon Christians, that they are a sabbath-keeping people, it is one to be highly prized and sedulously guarded; and in this country especially, we should be watchful lest the influx of immigrants of other nationalities deprive us of this great distinction and its blessings.

It is a popular objection against the religious observance of the Lord's Day, that the labouring classes need it as a day of recreation. On this it is obvious to remark, (1.) That there are many grievous evils in our modern civilization, but these are not to be healed by trampling on the laws of God. If men crowd labourers into narrow premises, and overwork them in heated factories six days in the week, they cannot atone for that sin by making the Lord's Day a day for amusement. (2.) So far from Sunday, as generally spent by the labouring class, being a day of refreshment, it is just the reverse. Monday is commonly with them the worst day in the week for labour; it is needed as a day for recovery from the effects of a misspent Sunday (3.) If the labouring classes are provided with healthful places of abode and are not overworked, then the best restorative is entire rest from ordinary occupations, and directing their thoughts and feelings into new channels, by the purifying and elevating offices of religion. This is the divinely appointed method of preserving the bodies and souls of men in a healthful state, a method which no human device is likely to improve.

How is the Sabbath to be Sanctified?

It may be said in general terms to be the opinion of the whole Jewish and Christian Church, that the sanctification required by God, consists not merely in cessation from worldly avocations, but also in the consecration of the day to the offices of religion. That this is the correct view is proved, (1.) Not only by the general consent of the people of God under both dispensations, but also by the constant use of the words to "hallow," to "make" or, "keep holy," and to "sanctify." The uniform use of such expressions, shows that the day was set apart from a common to a sacred use. (2.) From the command to increase the number of sacrifices in the temple service, which proves that the day was to be religiously observed. (3.) From the design of the institution, which from the beginning was religious; the commemoration of the work of creation, and after the advent, of the resurrection of Christ. (4.) In Leviticus xxiii., a list is given of those lays on which there was to be "a holy convocation" of the people; i.e., on which the people were to be called together for public worship, and the Sabbath is the first given. (5.) The command is constantly repeated that the people should be faithfully instructed out of the law, which was to be read to them on all suitable occasions. To give opportunity for such instruction was evidently one of the principal objects of these "holy convocations." (Deut. vi. 6, 7, 17-19; Josh. i. 8.) This instruction of the people was made the special duty of the Levites (Deut. xxxiii. 10); and of the priests. (Lev. x. 11, comp. Mal. ii. 7.) The reading of the law was doubtless a regular part of the service on all the days on which the people were solemnly called together for religious worship. Thus in Deuteronomy xxxi. 11, 12, we read, "When all Israel is come to appear before the Lord thy God in the place which he shall choose, thou shalt read this law before all Israel in their hearing. Gather the people together, men, and women, and children, and thy stranger that is within thy gates, that they may hear, and that they may learn, and fear the Lord your God, and observe to do all the words of this law." Such was the design of the convocation of the people. We know from the New Testament that the Scriptures were read every Sabbath in the synagogues; and the synagogues were among the earliest institutions of the chosen people. 2 Kings iv. 23, at least proves that at that period it was customary for the people to resort on the Sabbath to holy men for instruction. In Psalm lxxiv. 8, it is said of the heathen, "They have burned up all the synagogues of God in the land." The word here rendered "synagogues," means "assemblies," but burning up "assemblies" can only mean places of assembly; as burning up churches, in our mode of expression, can only mean the edifices where churches or congregations are accustomed to assemble. What other places of assembling the Psalmist could refer to, if synagogues did not then exist, it is hard to understand. But admitting that synagogues were not common among the Jews until after the exile, which is a very improbable supposition, the fact that reading the Scriptures on the Sabbath was an established part of the synagogue service, goes far to prove that it was a sabbatical service long before the exile. (6.) The place of the fourth command in the decalogue; the stress laid upon it in the Old Testament; the way in which it is spoken of in the prophets; and the Psalms appointed to be used on that day, as for example the ninety-second, all show that the day was set apart for religious duties from the beginning. (7.) This may also be argued from the whole character of the old dispensation. All its institutions were religious; they were all intended to keep alive the knowledge of the true God, and to prepare the way for the coming of Christ. It would be entirely out of keeping with the spirit of the Mosaic economy to assume that its most important and solemn holy day was purely

secular in its design. [316]

It is admitted that the precepts of the decalogue bind the Church in all ages; while the specific details contained in the books of Moses, designed to point out the way in which the duty they enjoined was then to be performed, are no longer in force. The fifth commandment still binds children to obey their parents, but the Jewish law giving fathers the power of life and death over their children, is no longer in force. The seventh commandment forbids adultery, but the ordeal enjoined for the trial of a woman suspected of that crime, is a thing of the past. The same principle applies to the interpretation of the fourth commandment. The command itself is still in force; the Mosaic laws respecting the mode of its observance have passed away with the economy to which they belonged. It is unjust therefore to represent the advocates of the continued obligation of the fourth commandment, as Judaizers. They are no more Judaizers than those who hold that the other precepts of the decalogue are still in force.

There are two rules by which we are to be guided in determining how the Sabbath is to be observed, or in deciding what is, and what is not lawful on that holy day. The first is, the design of the commandment. What is consistent with that design is lawful; what is inconsistent with it, is unlawful. The second rule is to be found in the precepts and example of our Lord and of his Apostles. The design of the command is to be learned from the words in which it is conveyed and from other parts of the word of God. From these sources it is plain that the design of the institution, as already remarked, was in the main twofold. First, to secure rest from all worldly cares and avocations; to arrest for a time the current of the worldly life of men, not only lest their minds and bodies should be overworked, but also that opportunity should be afforded for other and higher interests to occupy their thoughts. And secondly, that God should be properly worshipped, his word duly studied and taught, and the soul brought under the influence of the things unseen and eternal. Any man who makes the design of the Sabbath as thus revealed in Scripture his rule of conduct on that day, can hardly fail in its due observance. The day is to be kept holy unto the Lord. In Scriptural usage to hallow or make holy is to set apart to the service of God. Thus the tabernacle, the temple, and all its utensils were made holy. In this sense the Sabbath is holy. It is to be devoted to the duties of religion, and what is inconsistent with such devotion, is contrary to the design of the institution.

It is however to be remembered that the specific object of the Christian Sabbath is the commemoration of the resurrection of Jesus Christ from the dead. All the exercises of the day, therefore, should have a special reference to Him and to his redeeming work. It is the day in which He is to be worshipped, thanked, and praised; in which men are to be called upon to accept his offers of grace, and to rejoice in the hope of his salvation. It is therefore a day of joy. It is utterly incongruous to make it a day of gloom or fasting. In the early Church men were forbidden to pray on their knees on that day. They were to stand erect, exulting in the accomplishment of the work of God's redeeming love.

The second rule for our guidance is to be found in the precepts and example of our Lord. In the first place, He lays down the principle, "The Sabbath was made for man, and not man for the Sabbath." It is to be remarked that Christ says, "the Sabbath was made for man," not for the Jews, not for the people of any one age or nation, but for man; for man as man, and therefore for all men. Moral duties, however, often conflict, and then the lower

must yield to the higher. The life, the health, and the well-being of a man are higher ends in a given case, than the punctilious observance of any external service. This is the rule laid down by the prophet (Hosea vi. 6): "I desired mercy, and not sacrifice; and the knowledge of God more than burnt offering." This passage our Lord quotes twice in application to the law of the Sabbath, and thus establishes the general principle for our guidance, that it is right to do on the Sabbath whatever mercy or a due regard to the comfort or welfare of ourselves or others requires to be done. Christ, therefore, says expressly, "It is lawful to do well (kalos poiein, that is, as the context shows to confer benefits) on the Sabbath days." (Matt. xii. 12. See also Mark iii. 4.)

Again, we are told by the same authority, that "the priests in the temple profane the Sabbath and are blameless." (Matt. xii. 5.) The services of the temple were complicated and laborious, and yet were lawful on the Sabbath. On another occasion He said to his accusers, " If a man on the Sabbath day receive circumcision, that the law of Moses should not be broken; are ye angry at me, because I have made a man every whit whole on the Sabbath day? Judge not according to the appearance, but judge righteous judgment." (John vii. 23, 24.) From this we learn that whatever is necessary for the due celebration of religious worship, or for attendance thereon, is lawful on the Sabbath.

Again in Luke xiv. 1-14, we read, "And it came to pass, as he went into the house of one of the chief Pharisees, to eat bread on the Sabbath day, that they watched him. And, behold, there was a certain man before him, which had the dropsy. And Jesus answering, spake unto the lawyers and Pharisees, saying, Is it lawful to heal on the Sabbath day? And they held their peace. And he took him, and healed him, and let him go. . . . . And he put forth a parable to those which were bidden, when he marked how they chose out the chief rooms; saying unto them," etc., etc. This was evidently a large entertainment to which guests were "bidden." Christ, therefore, thought right, in the prosecution of his work, to attend on such entertainments on the Sabbath.

The frequency with which our Lord was accused of Sabbath-breaking by the Pharisees, proves that his mode of observing that lay was very different from theirs, and the way in which He vindicated himself proves that He regarded the Sabbath as a divine institution of perpetual obligation. It had been easy for Him to say that the law of the Sabbath was no longer in force; that He, as Lord of the Sabbath, erased it from the decalogue. It may indeed be said that as the whole of the Mosaic law was in force until the resurrection of Christ, or until the day of Pentecost, the observance of the Sabbath was as a matter of course then obligatory, and therefore that Christ so regarded it. In answer to this, however, it is obvious to remark, that Christ did not hesitate to abrogate those of the laws of Moses which were in conflict with the spirit of the Gospel. This He did with the laws relating to polygamy and divorce. Under the old dispensation it was lawful for a man to have more than one wife; and also to put away a wife by giving her a bill of divorcement. Both of these things Christ declared should not be allowed under the Gospel. The fact that He dealt with the Sabbath just as He did with the fifth, sixth, and seventh precepts of the decalogue, which the Pharisees had misinterpreted, shows that He regarded the fourth commandment as belonging to the same category as the others. His example affords us a safe guide as to the way in which the day is to be observed.

The Sunday Laws.

It is very common, especially for foreign-born citizens, to object to all laws made by the civil governments in this country to prevent the public violation of the Lord's Day. It is urged that as there is in the United States an entire separation of the Church and State, it is contrary to the genius of our institutions, that the observance of any religious institution should be enforced by civil laws. It is further objected that as all citizens have equal rights irrespective of their religious opinions, it is an infringement of those rights if one class of the people are required to conform their conduct to the religious opinions of another class. Why should Jews, Mohammedans, or infidels be required to respect the Christian Sabbath? Why should any man, who has no faith in the Sabbath as a divine institution, be prevented from doing on that day whatever is lawful on other days? If the State may require the people to respect Sunday as a day of rest, why may it not require the people to obey any or all other precepts of the Bible?

State of the Question.

It is conceded, (1.) That in every free country every man has equal rights with his fellow-citizens, and stands on the same ground in the eye of the law. (2.) That in the United States no form of religion can be established; that no religious test for the exercise of the elective franchise or for holding of office can be imposed; and that no preference can be given to the members of one religious denomination above those of another. (3.) That no man can be forced to contribute to the support of any church, or of any religious institution. (4.) That every man is at liberty to regulate his conduct and life according to his convictions or conscience, provided he does not violate the law of the land.

On the other hand it is no less true, --

1. That a nation is not a mere conglomeration of individuals. It is an organized body. It has of necessity its national life, its national organs, national principles of action, national character, and national responsibility.

2. In every free country the government must, in its organization and mode of action, be an expression of the mind and will of the people.

3. As men are rational creatures, the government cannot banish all sense and reason from their action, because there may be idiots among the people.

4. As men are moral beings, it is impossible that the government should act as though there were no distinction between right and wrong. It cannot legalize theft and murder. No matter how much it might enrich itself by rapine or by the extermination of other nations, it would deserve and receive universal condemnation and execration, should it thus set at nought the bonds of moral obligation. This necessity of obedience to the moral law on the part of civil governments, does not arise from the fact that they are instituted for the protection of the lives, rights, and property of the people. Why have our own and other Christian nations pronounced the slave-trade piracy and punishable with death? Not because it interferes with the rights or liberty of their citizens but because it is wicked. Cruelty to animals is visited with civil penalties, not on the principle of profit and loss, but because it is a violation of the moral law. As it is impossible for the individual man to disregard all moral obligations, it is no less impossible on the part of civil governments.

5. Men moreover are religious beings. They can no more ignore that element of their nature than their reason or their conscience. It is no matter what they may say, or may pretend to think, the law which binds them to allegiance to God, is just as inexorable as the

law of gravitation. They can no more emancipate themselves from the one than they can from the other. Morality concerns their duty to their fellow-men; religion concerns their duty to God. The latter binds the conscience as much as the former. It attends the man everywhere. It must influence his conduct as an individual, as the head of a family, as a man of business, as a legislator, and as an executive officer. It is absurd to say that civil governments have nothing to do with religion. That is not true even of a fire company, or of a manufactory, or of a banking-house. The religion embraced by the individuals composing these associations must influence their corporate action, as well as their individual conduct. If a man may not blaspheme, a publishing firm may not print and disseminate a blasphemous book. A civil government cannot ignore religion any more than physiology. It was not constituted to teach either the one or the other, but it must, by a like necessity, conform its action to the laws of both. Indeed it would be far safer for a government to pass an act violating the laws of health, than one violating the religious convictions of its citizens. The one would be unwise, the other would be tyrannical. Men put up with folly, with more patience than they do with injustice. It is vain for the potsherds of the earth to contend with their Maker. They must submit to the laws of their nature not only as sentient, but also as moral and religious beings. And it is time that blatant atheists, whether communists, scientists, or philosophers, should know that they are as much and as justly the objects of pity and contempt, as of indignation to all right-minded men. By right-minded men, is meant men who think, feel, and act according to the laws of their nature. Those laws are ordained, administered, and enforced by God, and there is no escape from their obligation, or from the penalties attached to their violation.

6. The people of this country being rational, moral, and religious beings, the government must be administered on the principles of reason, morality, and religion. By a like necessity of right, the people being Christians and Protestants, the government must be administered according to the principles of Protestant Christianity. By this is not meant that the government should teach Christianity, or make the profession of it a condition of citizenship, or a test for office. Nor does it mean that the government is called upon to punish every violation of Christian principle or precept. It is not called upon to punish every violation of the moral law. But as it cannot violate the moral law in its own action, or require the people to violate it, so neither can it ignore Christianity in its official action. It cannot require the people or any of its own officers to do what Christianity forbids, nor forbid their doing anything which Christianity enjoins. It has no more right to forbid that the Bible should be taught in the public schools, than it has to enjoin that the Koran should be taught in them. If Christianity requires that one day in seven should be a day of rest from all worldly avocations, the government of a Christian people cannot require any class of the community or its own officers to labour on that day, except in cases of necessity or mercy. Should it, on the ground that it had nothing to do with religion, disregard that day, and direct that the custom-houses, the courts of law, and the legislative halls should be open on the Lord's Day, and public business be transacted as on other days, it would be an act of tyranny, which would justify rebellion. It would be tantamount to enacting that no Christian should hold any office under the government, or have any share in making or administering the laws of the country. The nation would be in complete subjection to a handful of imported atheists and infidels.

Proof that this is a Christian and Protestant Nation.

The proposition that the United States of America are a Christian and Protestant nation, is not so much the assertion of a principle as the statement of a fact. That fact is not simply that the great majority of the people are Christians and Protestants, but that the organic life, the institutions, laws, and official action of the government, whether that action be legislative, judicial, or executive, is, and of right should be, and in fact must be, in accordance with the principles of Protestant Christianity.

1. This is a Christian and Protestant nation in the sense stated in virtue of a universal and necessary law. If you plant an acorn, you get an oak. If you plant a cedar, you get a cedar. If a country be settled by Pagans or Mohammedans, it develops into a Pagan or Mohammedan community. By the same law, if a country be taken possession of and settled by Protestant Christians, the nation which they come to constitute must be Protestant and Christian. This country was settled by Protestants. For the first hundred years of our history they constituted almost the only element of our population. As a matter of course they were governed by their religion as individuals, in their families, and in all their associations for business, and for municipal, state, and national government. This was just as much a matter of necessity as that they should act morally in all these different relations.

2. It is a historical fact that Protestant Christianity is the law of the land, and has been from the beginning. As the great majority of the early settlers of the country were from Great Britain, they declared that the common law of England should be the law here. But Christianity is the basis of the common law of England, and is therefore of the law of this country; and so our courts have repeatedly decided. It is so not merely because of such decisions. Courts cannot reverse facts. Protestant Christianity has been, is, and must be the law of the land, Whatever Protestant Christianity forbids, the law of the land (within its sphere, i.e., within the sphere in which civil authority may appropriately act) forbids. Christianity forbids polygamy and arbitrary divorce, Se does the civil law. Romanism forbids divorce even on the ground of adultery; Protestantism admits it on that ground. The laws of all the states conform in this matter to the Protestant rule. Christianity forbids all unnecessary labour, or the transaction of worldly business, on the Lord's Day; that day accordingly is a dies non, throughout the land. No contract is binding, made on that day. No debt can be collected on the Christian Sabbath. If a man hires himself for any service by the month or year, he cannot be required to labour on that day. All public offices are closed, and all official business is suspended. From Maine to Georgia, from ocean to ocean, one day in the week, by the law of God and by the law of the land, the people rest.

This controlling Influence of Christianity, is Reasonable and Right.

lt is in accordance with analogy. If a man goes to China, he expects to find the government administered according to the religion of the country. If he goes to Turkey, he expects to find the Koran supreme and regulating all public action. If he goes to a Protestant country, he has no right to complain, should he find the Bible in the ascendancy and exerting its benign influence not only on the people, but also on the government.

The principle that the religion of a people rightfully controls the action of the government, has of course its limitation. If the religion itself be evil and require what is morally wrong, then as men cannot have the right to act wickedly, it is plain that it would be wrong for the government to conform to its requirements. If a religion should enjoin infanticide, or the murder of the aged or infirm, neither the people nor the government

should conform their conduct to its laws. But where the religion of a people requires nothing unjust or cruel or in any way immoral, then those who come to live where it prevails are bound to submit quietly to its controlling the laws and institutions of the country.

The principle contended for is recognized in all other departments of life. If a number of Christian men associate themselves as a manufacturing or banking company, it would be competent for them to admit unbelievers in Christianity into their association, and to allow them their full share in its management and control. But it would be utterly unreasonable for such unbelievers to set up a cry of religious persecution, or of infringement of their rights and liberty, because all the business of the company was suspended upon the Lord's Day. These new members knew the character and principles of those with whom they sought to be associated. They knew that Christians would assert their right to act as Christians. To require them to renounce their religion would be simply preposterous.

When Protestant Christians came to this country they possessed and subdued the land. They worshipped God, and his Son Jesus Christ as the Saviour of the world, and acknowledged the Scriptures to be the rule of their faith and practice. They introduced their religion into their families, their schools, and their colleges. They abstained from all ordinary business on the Lord's Day, and devoted it to religion. They built churches, erected school-houses, and taught their children to read the Bible and to receive and obey it as the word of God. They formed themselves as Christians into municipal and state organizations. They acknowledged God in their legislative assemblies. They prescribed oaths to be taken in his name. They closed their courts, their places of business, their legislatures, and all places under the public control, on the Lord's Day. They declared Christianity to be part of the common law of the land. In the process of time thousands have come among us, who are neither Protestants nor Christians. Some are papists, some Jews, some infidels, and some atheists. All are welcomed; all are admitted to equal rights and privileges. All are allowed to acquire property, and to vote in every election, made eligible to all offices, and invested with equal influence in all public affairs. All are allowed to worship as they please, or not to worship at all, if they see fit. No man is molested for his religion or for his want of religion. No man is required to profess any form of faiths or to join any religious association. More than this cannot reasonably be demanded. More, however, is demanded. The infidel demands that the government should be conducted on the principle that Christianity is false. The atheist demands that it should be conducted on the assumption that there is no God, and the positivist on the principle that men are not free agents. The sufficient answer to all this is, that it cannot possibly be done.

The Demands of Infidels are Unjust.

The demands of those who require that religion, and especially Christianity, should be ignored in our national, state, and municipal laws, are not only unreasonable, but they are in the highest degree unjust and tyrannical. It is a condition of service in connection with any railroad which is operated on Sundays, that the employee be not a Christian. If Christianity is not to control the action of our municipal, state, and general governments, then if elections be ordered to be held on the Lord's Day, Christians cannot vote. If all the business of the country is to go on, on that as on other days, no Christian can hold office. We should thus have not a religious, but an anti-religious test-act. Such is the free-thinker's idea of

liberty. [317] But still further, if Christianity is not to control the laws of the country, then as monogamy is a purely Christian institution, we can have no laws against polygamy, arbitrary divorce, or "free love." All this must be yielded to the anti-Christian party; and consistency will demand that we yield to the atheists, the oath and the decalogue; and all the rights of citizenship must be confined to blasphemers. Since the fall of Lucifer, no such tyrant has been made known to men as August Comte, the atheist. If, therefore, any man wishes to antedate perdition, he has nothing to do but to become a free-thinker and join in the shout, "Civil government has nothing to do with religion; and religion has nothing to do with civil government."

Conclusion.

We are bound, therefore, to insist upon the maintenance and faithful execution of the laws enacted for the protection of the Christian Sabbath. Christianity does not teach that men can be made religious by law; nor does it demand that men should be required by the civil authority to profess any particular form of religious doctrine, or to attend upon religious services; but it does enjoin that men should abstain from all unnecessary worldly avocations on the Lord's Day. This civil Sabbath, this cessation from worldly business, is what the civil government in Christian countries is called upon to enforce. (1.) Because it is the right of Christians to be allowed to rest on that day, which they cannot do, without forfeiting their citizenship, unless all public business be arrested on that day. (2.) Because such rest is the command of God; and this command binds the conscience as much as any other command in the decalogue. So far as the point in hand is concerned, it matters not whether such be the command of God or not; so long as the people believe it, it binds their conscience; and this conscientious belief the government is bound to respect, and must act accordingly. (3.) Because the civil Sabbath is necessary for the preservation of our free institutions, and of the good order of society. The indispensable condition of social order is either despotic power in the magistrate, or good morals among the people. Morality without religion is impossible; religion cannot exist without knowledge; knowledge cannot be disseminated among the people, unless there be a class of teachers, and time allotted for their instruction. Christ has made all his ministers, teachers; He has commanded them to teach all nations; He has appointed one day in seven to be set apart for such instruction. It is a historical fact that since the introduction of Christianity, nine tenths of the people have derived the greater part of their religious knowledge from the services of the sanctuary. If the Sabbath, therefore, be abolished, the fountain of life for the people will be sealed. [318]

Hengstenberg, after referring to the authority of the Church and other grounds, for the observance of the Lord's Day, closes his discussion of the subject with these words: "Thank God these are only the outworks; the real fortress is the command that sounded out from Sinai, with the other divine commands therewith connected, as preparatory, confirmatory, or explanatory. The institution was far too important, and the temptations too powerful, that the solid ground of Scriptural command could be dispensed with. . . . It is as plain as day that the obligation of the Old Testament command instead of being lessened is increased. This follows of course from the fact that the redemption through Christ is infinitely more glorious than the deliverance of the Israelites out of Egypt, which in the preface to the Ten Commandments is referred to as a special motive to obedience. No ingratitude is blacker

than refusing to obey Him who for our sakes gave up his only begotten Son." [319] He had said before that the Sabbath "rests on the unalterable necessities of our nature, inasmuch as men inevitably become godless if the cares and labours of their earthly life be not regularly interrupted" [320]

[307] Palmer, in Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, art. "Sonntagsfeier."

[308] The force of this argument does not depend on the supposition that the days of creation were periods of twenty-four hours. Admitting that they were geologic periods, at the end of the sixth of which man appeared, and that then followed a period of permanent rest, that would be reason enough why every seventh day should be selected as a memorial of the creation, to teach Adam and his descendants that the earth did not owe its existence to a blind process of development, but to the fiat of Jehovah.

[309] De Veritate Religionis Christian&#65533;, v. 10; Works, London, 1679, vol. iii. p. 79.

[310] Die Genesis Ausgelegt, von Franz Delitzsch, Leipzig, 1852, pp. 84, 85.

[311] Theologische Commentar zum Pentateuch, Kiel, 1843, vol. i. p. 29.

[312] Die Genesis Erkl&#65533;rt, von August Knobel, Leipzig, 1852.

[313] Of this general prevalence in the ancient world, of a special reverance for the seventh day and of the division of time into weeks, Grotius gives abundant evidence in his work De Veritate Religionis Christian&#65533;, v. 16; Works, vol. iii. p. 16. On this subject, see Winer's Realw&#65533;rterbuch, word "Sabbath." Winer refers, among other authoritities discussing this question of the antiquity of the Sabbath, to Selden, Jus Nat. et Gent.; Spencer, Legg. ritual.; Eichhorn, Urgesch.; Hebenstreit, De Sabb. ante legg. Mos. existente; Michaelis, Mos. Recht.

[314] Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, v. 7, edit. Boston, 1848, vol. ii. p. 43.

[315] Palmer in Herzog's Real Encyklop&#65533;die.

[316] The doctrine that the Jewish sabbath was simply a day of relaxation from labour, was advanced among Protestants towards the close of the seventeenth century, by Selden, in his work De Legibus Hebr&#65533;orum. This opinion was adopted by Vitringa in the first book of his Observationes Sacr&#65533;. It is also advocated by B&#65533;hr in his Symb. des Mos. Cultus. The contrary doctrine was adopted by all the Reformers, and by the great body of Christian theologians; and is ably sustained by Hengstenberg in his treatise Ueber den Tag des Herrn, pp. 29-41. This subject is discussed in the January number of the Princeton Review, for 1831, pp. 86-134.

[317] A free-thinker is a man whose understanding is emancipated from his conscience. It is therefore natural for him to wish to see civil government emancipated from religion.

[318] The Sabbath and Free Institutions. A paper read before the National Sabbath Convention, Saratoga, August 13, 1863, by Rev. Mark Hopkins, D. D., President of Williams College, Mass. See also an able article from the pen of Rev. Joshua H. McIlvaine, D. D. entitled, "A Nation's Right to Worship God," in the Princeton Review for October, 1859; also the article on "Sunday Laws," in the same number of that journal.

[319] Ueber den Tag des Herrn, Berlin, 1852, pp. 92-94.

[320] Ibid. p. 40.

§ 9. The Fifth Commandment.

Its Design.

The general principle of duty enjoined in this commandment, is that we should feel and act in a becoming manner towards our superiors. It matters not in what their superiority consists, whether in age, office, power, knowledge, or excellence. There are certain feelings, and a certain line of conduct due to those who are over us, for that very reason, determined and modified in each case by the degree and nature of that superiority. To superiors are due, to each according to the relation in which he stands to us, reverence, obedience, and gratitude. The ground of this obligation is to be found, (1.) In the will of God, who has enjoined this duty upon all rational creatures. (2.) In the nature of the relation itself. Superiority supposes, in some form or degree, on the part of the inferior, dependence and indebtedness, and therefore calls for reverence, gratitude, and obedience; and, (3.) In expediency, as the moral order of the divine government and of human society depend upon this due submission to authority.

In the case of God, as his superiority is infinite the submission of his creatures must be absolute. To Him we owe adoration or the profoundest reverence, the most fervent gratitude, and implicit obedience. The fifth commandment, however, concerns our duty to our fellow-creatures. First in order and in importance is the duty of children to their parents, hence the general duty is embodied in the specific command, "Honour thy father and thy mother."

The Filial Relation.

When a child is born into the world it is entirely helpless and dependent. As it derives its existence from its parents, so it would immediately perish without their assiduous and constant care. The parents are not only its superiors in knowledge, in power, and in every other attribute of humanity; but they are also the proximate source of all good to the child. They protect, cherish, feed, clothe, educate, and endow it. All the good be-stowed, is bestowed disinterestedly. Self is constantly sacrificed. The love of parents to their children is mysterious and immutable, as well as self-sacrificing. It is a form of love which none but a parent can know. A mother's love is a mystery and a wonder. It is the most perfect analogue of the love of God.

As the relation in which parents stand to their children has this close analogy to the relation in which God stands to his rational creatures, and especially to his own people, so the duties resulting from that relation are analogous. They are expressed by the same word. Filial piety is as correct an expression as it is common. Parents stand to their dependent children, so to speak, in the place of God. They are the natural objects of the child's love, reverence, gratitude, confidence, and devotion. These are the sentiments which naturally flow out of the relation; and which in all ordinary cases do flow from it; so that Calvin is justified in saying that children destitute of these feelings, "monstra sunt non homines." This endearing and intimate relation between parents and children (which cannot exist where monogamy is not the law), binding all in the closest union which can exist among men, makes the family the corner-stone of the well-being of society on earth, and the type of the

blessedness of heaven. The Church is the family of God. He is the Father, its members are brethren.

While the relative duties of parents and children must be everywhere and always essentially the same, yet they are more or less modified by varying conditions of society. There are laws on this subject in the Bible, which being intended for the state of things existing before the coming of Christ, are no longer binding upon us. It was unavoidable in the patriarchal state of society, and especially in its nomadic state, that the father of a family should be at once father, magistrate, and priest. And it was natural and right that many of the parental prerogatives necessary in such a state of society, should be retained in the temporary and transition state organized under the Mosaic institutions. We find accordingly that the laws of Moses invested parents with powers which can no longer properly belong to them; and sustained parental authority by penal enactments which are no longer necessary. Thus it was ordered, "He that curseth (or revileth, Septuagint ho kakologon, Vulgate qui maledixerit') his father or his mother shall surely be put to death." (Exod. xxi. 17) In the fifteenth verse of the same chapter it is said, "He that smiteth his father or his mother, shall be surely put to death." (Compare Deut. xxvii. 16; Prov. xx. 20; Matt. xv. 4.) It may be remarked here, in passing, that our Lord's comment on this commandment given in Matthew xv. 4-6, shows that the honouring of their parents required of children, does not mean simply the cherishing right feelings towards them, but as well the ministering to their support when necessary. Christ said to the Pharisees, "God commanded, saying, Honour thy father and mother; . . . . but ye say, Whosoever shall say to his father or his mother, It is a gift (consecrated to God), by whatsoever thou mightest be profited by me, and honour not his father or his mother, he shall be free." That is, the Pharisees taught that a son might evade the obligation to honour, i.e., to support his father or mother, by saying that his property was consecrated to God.

The Mosaic law also enacted that "If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him, will not hearken unto them; then shall his father and his mother lay hold on him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city and unto the gates of his place: and they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn and rebellious; he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And all the men of the city shall stone him with stones, that he die." (Deut. xxi. 18-21.)

Fathers under the old economy had the right to choose wives for their sons and to give their daughters in marriage. (Gen. xxiv.; Ex. xxi. 9; Judges xiv. 2; Gen. xxix. 18; xxxiv. 12.) Children also were liable to be sold to satisfy the debts of their fathers. (Levit. xxv. 39-41; 2 Kings iv. 1; Is. l. 1; Matt. xviii. 25.) These judicial enactments have passed away. They serve to prove, however, how intimate in the sight of God is the relation between parents and children. A father's benediction was coveted as the greatest blessing; and his curse deprecated as a fearful evil. (Gen. xxvii. 4, 12, 34-38; xlix. 2 ff.)

In the New Testament the duty enjoined in the fifth commandment is frequently recognized and enforced. Our blessed Lord himself was subject to his parents. (Luke ii. 51.) The Apostle commands children to obey their parents in the Lord (Eph. vi. 1), and to obey them in all things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. (Col. iii. 20.) This obedience is to be not only religious, but specifically Christian, as the word Lord, in

Ephesians vi. 1, refers to Christ. This is plain because in ch. v. 21, the Apostle says that these specific duties are to be performed "in the fear of Christ;" [321] because the Lord is always in the New Testament to be understood of Christ, unless the context forbids; and because especially throughout these chapters Lord and Christ are interchanged, so that it is evident that both words refer to the same person. Children are required to obey their parents in the Lord, i.e., as a religious duty, as part of the obedience due to the Lord. They are to obey them "in all things;" i.e., in all things falling within the sphere of parental authority. God has never committed unlimited power to the hands of men. The limitations of parental authority are determined partly by the nature of the relation, partly by the Scriptures, and partly by the state of society or the law of the land. The nature of the relation supposes that parents are to be obeyed as parents, out of gratitude and love; and that their will is to be consulted and respected even where their decisions are not final. They are not to be obeyed as magistrates, as though they were invested with the power to make or to administer civil laws; nor yet as prophets or priests. They are not lords of the conscience. They cannot control our faith or determine for us questions of duty so as to exonerate us from personal obligation. Being a service of love, it does not admit of strictly defined boundaries. Children are to conform to the wishes and to be controlled by the judgments of their parents, in all cases where such submission does not conflict with higher obligations.

The Scriptural rule is simple and comprehensive. It does not go into unnecessary details. It prescribes the general rule of obedience. The exceptions to that rule must be such as justify themselves to a divinely enlightened conscience, i.e., a conscience enlightened by the Word and Spirit of God. The general principle given in the Bible in all such cases is, "It is right to obey God rather than man."

The Promise.

This commandment has a special promise attached to it. This promise has a theocratical form as it stands in the decalogue, "That thy days may be long upon the land which the Lord thy God giveth thee." The Apostle, in Ephesians vi. 3, by leaving out the last clause generalizes it, so that it applies to no one land or people, but to obedient children everywhere. The promise announces the general purpose of God and a general principle of his providential government. "The hand of the diligent maketh rich," that is the general rule, which is not invalidated if here and there a diligent man remains poor. It is well with obedient children; they prosper in the world. Such is the fact, and such is the divine promise. The family being the corner-stone of social order and prosperity, it follows that those families are blessed in which God's plan and purpose are most fully carried out and realized.

Parental Duties.

As children are bound to honour and obey their parents, so parents have duties no less important in reference to their children. These duties are summarily expressed by the Apostle in Ephesians vi. 4, first in a negative, and then in a positive form. "Ye fathers provoke not your children to wrath." This is what they are not to do. They are not to excite the bad passions of their children by anger, severity, injustice, partiality, or any undue exercise of authority. This is a great evil. It is sowing tares instead of wheat in a fruitful soil. The positive part of parental duty is expressed by the cemprehensive direction, "but

bring them up in the nurture (paideia) and admonition (nouthesia) of the Lord." The former of these words is comprehensive, the latter specific. The one expresses the whole process of education or training; the other the special duty of warning and correction. The "nurture and admonition" is to be Christian; that is, not only such as Christ approves and enjoins, but which is truly his, i.e., that which He exercises by his word and Spirit through the parent as his organ. "Christ is represented as exercising this nurture and admonition, in so far as He by his Spirit influences and controls the parent." [322] According to the Apostle, this religious or Christian element is essential in the education of the young. Man has a religious as well as an intellectual nature. To neglect the former would be as unreasonable as to neglect the latter and make all education a matter of mere physical training. We must act in accordance with facts. It is a fact that men have a moral and religious nature. It is a fact that if their moral and religious feelings are enlightened and properly developed, they become upright, useful, and happy; on the other hand, if these elements of their nature are uncultivated or perverted, they become degraded, miserable, and wicked. It is a fact that this department of our nature as much needs right culture as the intellectual or the physical. It is a fact that this culture can be effected only by the truth instilled into the mind and impressed upon the conscience. It is a fact that this truth, as all Christians believe, is contained in the Holy Scriptures. It is a fact, according to the Scriptures, that the eternal Son of God is the only Saviour of men, and that it is by faith in Him and by obedience to Him, men are delivered from the dominion of sin; and therefore it is a fact that unless children are brought up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, they, and the society which they constitute or control, will go to destruction. Consequently, when a state resolves that religious instruction shall be banished from the schools and other literary institutions, it virtually resolves on self-destruction. It may indeed be said that such a resolution does not imply that religious education is to be neglected. It simply declares that it is not a function of the state, that it is a duty which belongs to the family and to the Church. This is plausible, but it is fallacious.

1. All the education received by a large portion of the people of any country, is received in its primary schools. If that be irreligious (in the negative sense, if in this case there be such a sense), their whole training is irreligious.

2. It is to be remembered that the Christian people of a country are the Church of that country. The Christians of Antioch were the Church of Antioch, and the Christians of Rome were the Church of Rome. In like manner the Christians in the United are the Church in the United States. As therefore the schools belong to the people, as they are their organs for the education of their children; if the people be Christians, the schools of right must be Christian. Any law which declares that they shall not be so, is tyrannical. It may be said that the law does not forbid Christians having religious schools, it only says that such schools shall not be supported by the public money. But the people are the public; and if the people be Christians, Christians are the public. The meaning of such a law, therefore, really is, that Christians shall not use their own money for the support of their own schools.

3. If Christian men therefore constitute a nation, a state, a county, a town, or a village, they have the right, with which no civil power can justly interfere, of having Christian schools. If any who are not Christians choose to frequent such schools, they should not be required to attend upon the religious instruction. They can derive all the benefit they seek,

although they omit attendance on what is designed for the children of Christian parents.

4. It is true that Church and State are not united in this country as they ever have been in Europe. It is conceded that this separation is wise. But it is not to be inferred from that concession that the state has nothing to do with religion; that it must act as though there were no Christ and no God. It has already been remarked that this is as impossible as it would be for the state to ignore the moral law. It may be admitted that Church and State are, in this country, as distinct as the Church and a banking company. But a banking company, if composed of Christians, must conduct its business according to Christian principles, so far as those principles apply to banking operations. So a nation, or a state, composed of Christians, must be governed by Christianity, so far as its spirit and precepts apply to matters of civil government. If therefore the state assumes that the education of the people is one of its functions, it is bound in a Christian country, -- a country in which ninety hundredths of the population consist of Christians, -- to conduct the schools on Christian principles, otherwise it tramples on the most sacred rights of the people. This the people never will submit to, until they lose all interest in their religion. No one doubts that the Bible does require that education should be religiously conducted. "These words which I command thee this day, shall be in thine heart and thou shalt teach them diligently unto thy children, and shalt talk of them when thou sittest in thine house, and when thou walkest by the way, and when thou liest down, and when thou risest up." (Deut. vi. 6, 7. and xi. 19.) "He established a testimony in Jacob, and appointed a law in Israel, which he commanded our fathers, that they should make them known to their children; that the generation to come might know them, even the children which should be born, who should arise and declare them to their children; that they might set their hope in God, and not forget the works of God, but keep his commandments." (Ps. lxxviii. 5, 6, 7.) "Train up a child in the way he should go, and when he is old he will not depart from it." (Prov. xxii. 6.) Fathers bring up your children "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord." (Eph. vi. 4.) These are not ceremonial or obsolete laws. They bind the consciences of men just as much as the command, "Thou shalt not steal." If parents themselves conduct the education of their children, these are the principles upon which it must be conducted. If they commit that work to teachers, they are bound, by the law of God, to see that the teachers regard these divine prescriptions; if they commit the work to the state, they are under equally sacred obligation to see that the state does not violate them. This is an obligation which they cannot escape.

5. When the Sunday laws were under discussion, on a previous page, it was urged that it would be unreasonable and unjust for a man who joined a business association of moral men, to insist that the affairs of the association should be conducted on immoral principles; if he joined a company of Christian manufacturers, it would be unjust for him to require that they should violate the laws of Christianity. So if a Christian should go to Turkey, it would be preposterous for him to insist that the Koran should be banished from the public schools. No less preposterous is it for any man to demand that Christians in this country should renounce their religion. Christianity requires that education in all its departments should be conducted religiously. If any set of men should found a school or a university from which all religious instruction should be banished, the law of the land would doubtless permit them to do so. But for the law to forbid that the religion of the people should be taught in schools sustained by the money of the people, ought not to be submitted to.

6. The banishment of religious influence from our schools is impossible. If a man is not religious, he is irreligious; if he is not a believer, he is an unbeliever. This is as true of organizations and institutions, as it is of Individuals. Byron uttered a profound truth when he put into the mouth of Satan the words "He that does not bow to God, has bowed to me." If you banish light, you are in darkness. If you banish Christianity from the schools, you thereby render them infidel. If a child is brought up in ignorance of God, he becomes an atheist. If never taught the moral law, his moral nature is as undeveloped as that of a pagan. This controversy, therefore, is a controversy between Christianity and infidelity; between light and darkness; between Christ and Belial. [323]

It is admitted that this subject is encumbered with practical difficulties where the people of a country differ widely in their religious convictions. In such cases it would be far better to refer the matter to the people of each school district, than by a general law to prohibit all religious instruction from the public schools. This would, in fact, be to make them infidel, in deference to a numerically insignificant minority of the people. It is constantly said that the state, if it provides for anything more than secular education, is travelling out of its sphere; that civil government is no more organized to teach religion than a fire company is. This latter assertion may be admitted so far as this, that the same rule applies to both cases. That is, all individual men, and all associations of men, are bound to act according to the principles of morality and religion, so far as those principles are applicable to the work which they have to do. Men cannot lawfully cheat in banking, nor can they rightfully conduct their business on the Lord's Day. In like manner if God requires that education should be conducted religiously, the state has no more right to banish religion from its schools, than it has to violate the moral law. The whole thing comes to this: Christians are bound by the express command of God as well as by a regard to the salvation of their children and to the best interests of society, to see to it that their children are brought up "in the nurture and admonition of the Lord;" this they are bound to do; through the state if they can; without it, if they must.

Obedience due to Civil Magistrates.

It the fifth commandment enjoins as a general principle, respect and obedience to our superiors, it includes our obligations to civil rulers, we are commanded to "Submit ourselves to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake: whether it be to the king as supreme; or unto governors, as unto them that are sent by him for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of them that do well. For so is the will of God." (1 Peter ii. 13-15.) The whole theory of civil government and the duty of citizens to their rulers, are comprehensively stated by the Apostle in Romans xiii. 1-5. It is there taught, (1.) That all authority is of God. (2.) That civil magistrates are ordained of God. (3.) That resistance to them, is resistance to Him; they are ministers exercising his authority among men. (4.) That obedience to them must be rendered as a matter of conscience, as a part of our obedience to God.

From this it appears, -- First, that civil government is a divine ordinance. It is not merely an optional human institution; something which men are free to have or not to have, as they see fit. It is not founded on any social compact; it is something which God commands. The Bible, however, does not teach that there is any one form of civil government which is always and everywhere obligatory. The form of government is

determined by the providence of God and the will of the people. It changes as the state of society changes. Much less is it implied in the proposition that government is a divine institution, that God designates the persons who are to exercise the various functions of the government; or the mode of their appointment; or the extent of their powers.

Secondly, it is included in the Apostle's doctrine, that magistrates derive their authority from God; they are his ministers; they represent Him. In a certain sense they represent the people, as they may be chosen by them to be the depositaries of this divinely delegated authority; but the powers that be are ordained by God; it is his will that they should be, and that they should be clothed with authority.

Thirdly, from this it follows that obedience to magistrates and to the laws of the land, is a religious duty. We are to submit to "every ordinance of man," for the Lord's sake, out of our regard to Him, as St. Peter expresses it; or for "conscience sake," as the same idea is expressed by St. Paul. We are bound to obey magistrates not merely because we have promised to do so; or because we have appointed them; or because they are wise or good; but because such is the will of God. In like manner the laws of the land are to be observed, not because we approve of them, but because God has enjoined such obedience. This is a matter of great importance; it is the only stable foundation of civil government and of social order. There is a great difference between obedience to men and obedience to God; between lying to men and lying to God; and between resistance to men and resistance to God. This principle runs through the Bible, which teaches that all authority is of God, and therefore all obedience to those in authority is part of our obedience to God. This applies not only to the case of citizens and rulers, but also to parents and children, husbands and wives, and even masters and slaves. In all these relations we are to act not as the servants of men, but as the servants of God. This gives to authority by whomsoever exercised a divine sanction; it gives it power over the conscience; and it elevates even menial service into an element of the glorious liberty of the sons of God. No man can have a servile spirit who serves God in rendering obedience to men. None but a law-abiding people can be free or prosperous; and no people can be permanently law-abiding who do not truly believe that "the powers that be are ordained of God. "Whosoever, therefore, resisteth the power (those in authority), resisteth the ordinance of God: and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation (krima)." That is, God will punish them.

Fourthly, another principle included in the Apostle's doctrine is, that obedience is due to every de facto government, whatever its origin or character. His directions were written under the reign of Nero, and enjoined obedience to him. The early Christians were not called to examine the credentials of their actual rulers, every time the pr�torian guard chose to depose one emperor and install another. The people of England were not free from their obligation to William and Mary when once established on the throne, because they might think that James II. was entitled to the crown. We are to obey "the powers that be." They are in authority by the will of God, which is revealed by facts, as clearly as by words. It is by Him that "kings reign and princes decree justice." "He raiseth up one, and putteth down another."

Fifthly, the Scriptures clearly teach that no human authority is intended to be unlimited. Such limitation may not be expressed, but it is always implied. The command "Thou shalt not kill," is unlimited in form, yet the Scriptures recognize that homicide may in some cases

be not only justifiable but obligatory. The principles which limit the authority of civil government and of its agents are simple and obvious. The first is that governments and magistrates have authority only within their legitimate spheres. As civil government is instituted for the protection of life and property, for the preservation of order, for the punishment of evil doers, and for the praise of those who do well, it has to do only with the conduct, or external acts of men. It cannot concern itself with their opinions, whether scientific, philosophical, or religious. An act of Parliament or of Congress, that Englishmen or Americans should be materialists or idealists, would be an absurdity and a nullity. The magistrate cannot enter our families and assume parental authority, or our churches and teach as a minister. A justice of the peace cannot assume the prerogatives of a governor of a state or of a president of the United States. Out of his legitimate sphere a magistrate ceases to be a magistrate. A second limitation is no less plain. No human authority can make it obligatory on a man to disobey God. If all power is from God, it cannot be legitimate when used against God. This is self-evident. The Apostles when forbidden to preach the Gospel, refused to obey. When Daniel refused to bow down to the image which Nebuchadnezzar had made; when the early Christians refused to worship idols; and when the Protestant martyrs refused to profess the errors of the Romish Church, they all commended themselves to God, and secured the reverence of all good men. On this point there can be no dispute. It is important that this principle should be not only recognized, but also publicly avowed. The sanctity of law, and the stability of human governments, depend on the sanction of God. Unless they repose on Him, they rest on nothing. They have his sanction only when they act according to his will; that is in accordance with the design of their appointment and in harmony with the moral law.

Sixthly, another general principle is that the question, When the civil government may be, and ought to be disobeyed, is one which every man must decide for himself. It is a matter of private judgment. Every man must answer for himself to God, and therefore, every man must judge for himself, whether a given act is sinful or not. Daniel judged for himself. So did Shadrach, Meshech, and Abednego. So did the Apostles, and so did the martyrs.

An unconstitutional law or commandment is a nullity; no man sins in disregarding it. He disobeys, however, at his peril. If his judgment is right, he is free. If it be wrong, in the view of the proper tribunal, he must suffer the penalty. There is an obvious distinction to be made between disobedience and resistance. A man is bound to disobey a law, or a command, which requires him to sin, but it does not follow that he is at liberty to resist its execution. The Apostles refused to obey the Jewish authorities; but they submitted to the penalty inflicted. So the Christian martyrs disobeyed the laws requiring them to worship idols, but they made no resistance to the execution of the law. The Quakers disobey the law requiring military service, but quietly submit to the penalty. This is obviously right. The right of resistance is in the community. It is the right of revolution, which God sanctions, and which good men in past ages have exercised to the salvation of civil and religious liberty. When a government fails to answer the purpose for which God ordained it, the people have a right to change it. A father, if he shamefully abuses his power, may rightfully be deprived of authority over his children. [324]

Obedience to the Church.

The Apostle commands Christians "Obey them that have the rule over you, and submit

yourselves: for they watch for your souls." "Remember them which have the rule over you, who have spoken unto you the word of God." (Heb. xiii. 17, 7.) Our Lord said to his disciples, that if an offending brother resisted other means to bring him to repentance, his offence must be told to the Church; and that if he neglected to hear the Church, he was to be regarded as a heathen man and a publican. (Matt. xviii. 17.)

The principles which regulate our obedience to the Church, are very much the same as those which concern our relation to the State, --

1. The visible Church is a divine institution. In one sense indeed it is a voluntary society, in so far as that no man can be coerced to join it. If he joins it at all, it must be of his own free will. Nevertheless it is the will of God that the visible Church as an organized body should exist; and every man who hears the Gospel, is bound to enroll himself among its members and to submit to its authority.

2. All Church power is of God, and all legitimate Church officers are his ministers. They act in his name and by his authority. Resistance to them, therefore, is resistance to the ordinance of God.

3. All the prerogatives of the Church and all the powers of its officers are laid down in the word of God.

4. The prerogatives of the Church are, first, to teach. Its great commission is to teach all nations. It is to teach what God has revealed in his word as to what men are to believe and what they are to do. Beyond the limits of the revelation contained in the Scriptures the Church has no more authority to teach than any other association among men. Secondly, the Church has the right and duty to order and conduct public worship, to administer the sacraments, to select and ordain its own officers, and to do whatever else is necessary for its own perpetuity and extension. Thirdly, it is the prerogative of the Church to exercise discipline over its own members, and to receive or to reject them as the case may be.

5. As to the external organization of the Church all Christians agree that there are certain rules laid down in the word of God which are of universal and perpetual obligation. All Christian Churches, however, have acted on the assumption, that beyond these prescribed rules, the Church has a certain discretion to modify its organization and its organs to suit varying emergencies.

6. The visible Church being organized for a definite purpose, its power being derived from God, and its prerogatives being all laid down in the Scriptures, it follows not only that its powers are limited within the bounds thus prescribed, but also that the question, whether its decisions and injunctions are to be obeyed, is to be determined by every one concerned, on his own responsibility. If the decision is within the limits to which God has confined the action of the Church, and in accordance with the Scriptures, it is to be obeyed. If it transcends those limits, or is contrary to the word of God, it is to be disregarded. If therefore the Church through any of its organs should assume to decide questions of pure science, or of political economy, or of civil law, such decisions would amount to nothing. Or, if it should declare that to be true which the Scriptures pronounce to be false; or that to be false which the Scriptures declare to be true, such judgment would bind no man's conscience. And in like manner, should the Church declare any thing to be sinful which the word of God teaches to be right or indifferent; or that to be right and obligatory which that word pronounces to be evil, then again its teaching is void of all authority. All this is

included in the principle that we must obey God rather than man; and that as to when obedience to man conflicts with our allegiance to God, every man from the nature of the case must judge for himself. No man can estimate the importance of these simple principles. It was by disregarding them that the Church came gradually to deny the right of private judgment; to subordinate the Scriptures to its decisions; and to put itself in the place of God. In this way it has imposed unscriptural doctrines upon the faith of men; made multitudes of things to be obligatory which God never enjoined; and declared the greatest sins, such at treason, persecution, and massacre to be Christian duties.

While, therefore, the duty of obedience to our superiors, and submission to law, as enjoined in the fifth commandment, is the source of all order in the family, the Church, and the State; the limitation of this duty by our higher obligation to God, is the foundation of all civil and religious liberty.

[321] The common text indeed in Ephesians v. 21, has Theou, but the authority of the MSS. is so decidedly in favour of Christou that that reading is almost universally adopted by editors and commentators.

[322] Meyer, Commentary in loco.

[323] So little is this matter understood, that one of the most respectable and influential journals in this land, recently announced the fact one of the cantons of Switzerland had prohibited all religious instruction in the schools, as a proof that "the world was getting tired of sacerdotalism." Thus religion is reduced to sacerdotalism or priestcraft.

[324] All these subjects are fully expounded in the great works on Jurisprudence and Civil Polity. For a popular discussion of them, reference may be made to, Discussions of Church Principles, By William Cunningham, D. D., Principal of New College, Edinburgh. Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1863, particularly chapters vi. and vii. See also the Princeton Review for January, 1851, article, "Civil Government."

§ 10. The Sixth Commandment.

Its Design.

This commandment, as expounded by our Lord (Matt. v. 21, 22), forbids malice in all its degrees and in all its manifestations. The Bible recognizes the distinction between anger and malice. The former is on due occasion allowable; the other is in its nature, and therefore always, evil. The one is a natural or constitutional emotion arising out of the experience or perception of wrong, and includes not only disapprobation but also indignation, and a desire in some way to redress or punish the wrong inflicted. The other includes hatred and the desire to inflict evil to gratify that evil passion. Our Lord is said to have been angry; but in Him there was no malice or resentment. He was the Lamb of God; when He was reviled, He reviled not again; when He suffered, He threatened not; He prayed for his enemies even on the cross.

In the several commandments of the decalogue, the highest manifestation of any evil is selected for prohibition, with the intention of including all lesser forms of the same evil. In forbidding murder, all degrees and manifestations of malicious feeling are forbidden. The Bible assigns special value to the life of man, first, because he was created in the image of

God. He is not only like God in the essential elements of his nature, but he s also God's representative on earth. An indignity or injury inflicted on him, is an act of irreverence toward God. And secondly, all men are brethren. They are of one blood; children of a common father. On these grounds we are bound to love and respect all men as men; and to do all we can not only to protect their lives but also to promote their well-being. Murder therefore, is the highest crime which a man can commit against a fellow-man.

Capital Punishment.

As the sixth commandment forbids malicious homicide, it is plain that the infliction of capital punishment is not included in the prohibition. Such punishment is not inflicted to gratify revenge, but to satisfy justice and for the preservation of society. As these are legitimate and most important ends, it follows that the capital punishment of murder is also legitimate. Such punishment, in the case of murder, is not only lawful, but also obligatory.

1. Because it is expressly declared in the Bible, "Whoso sheddeth man's blood, by man shall his blood be shed: for in the image of God made he man." (Gen. ix. 6.) That this is of perpetual obligation is clear, because it was given to Noah, the second head of the human race. It was, therefore, not intended for any particular age or nation. It is the announcement of a general principle of justice; a revelation of the will of God. Moreover the reason assigned for the law is a permanent reason. Man was created in the image of God; and, therefore, whoso sheds his blood, by man shall his blood be shed. This reason has as much force at one time or place as at any other. Rosenm[?]ller's comment on this clause is, "Cum homo ad Dei imaginem sit factus, [?]quum est, ut, qui Dei imaginem violavit et destruxit, occidatur, cum Dei imagini injuriam faciens, ipsum Deum, illius auctorem, petierit." [325] This is a very solemn consideration, and one of wide application. It applies not only to murder and other injuries infficted on the persons of men, but also to anything which tends to degrade or to defile them. The Apostle applies it even to evil words, or the suggestion of corrupt thoughts. If it is an outrage to defile the statue or portrait of a great and good man, or of a father or mother, how much greater is the outrage when we defile the imperishable image of God impressed on the immortal soul of man. We find the injunction, that the murderer should surely be put to death, repeated over and over in the Mosaic law. (Ex. xxi. 12, 14; Lev. xxiv. 17; Num. xxxv. 21; Deut. xix. 11, 13.)

There are clear recognitions in the New Testament of the continued obligation of the divine law that murder should be punished with death. In Romans xiii. 4, the Apostle says that the magistrate "beareth not the sword in vain." The sword was worn as the symbol of the power of capital punishment. Even by profane writers, says Meyer, "bearing the sword" by a magistrate was the emblem of the power over life and death. The same Apostle said (Acts xxv. 11): "If I be an offender, or have committed anything worthy of death, I refuse not to die;" which clearly implies that, in his judgment, there were offenses, for which the appropriate penalty is death.

2. Besides these arguments from Scripture, there are others drawn from natural justice. It is a dictate of our moral nature that crime should be punished; that there should be a just proportion between the offence and the penalty; and that death, the highest penalty, was the proper punishment for the greatest of all crimes. That such is the instinctive judgment of men is proved by the difficulty often experienced in restraining the people from taking summary vengeance in cases of atrocious murder. So strong is this sentiment that a species

of wild justice is sure to step in to supply the place of judicial remissness. Such justice, from being lawless and impulsive, is too often misguided and erroneous, and, in a settled state of society, is always criminal. It being the nature of men, that if the regular, lawful infliction of death as a judicial penalty be abolished, it will be inflicted by the avenger of blood, or by tumultuous assemblies of the people, society has to choose between securing to the homicide a fair trial by the constituted authorities, and giving him up to the blind spirit of revenge.

3. Experience teaches that where human life is undervalued, it is insecure; that where the murderer escapes with impunity or is inadequately punished, homicides are fearfully multiplied. The practical question, therefore, is, Who is to die? the innocent man or the murderer?

Homicide in Self-Defence.

That homicide in self-defence is not forbidden by the sixth commandment, is plain, (1.) Because such homicide is not malicious, and, therefore, does not come within the scope of the prohibition. (2.) Because sell-preservation is an instinct of our nature, and therefore, a revelation of the will of God. (3.) Because it is a dictate of reason and of natural justice that if of two persons we must die, it should be the aggressor and not the aggrieved. (4.) Because the universal judgment of men, and the Word of God, pronounce the man innocent who kills another in defence of his own life or that of his neighbor.

War.

It is conceded that war is one of the most dreadful evils that can be inflicted on a people; that it involves the destruction of property and life; that it demoralizes both the victors and the vanquished; that it visits thousands of non-combatants with all the miseries of poverty, widowhood, and orphanage; and that it tends to arrest the progress of society in everything that is good and desirable. God overrules wars in many cases, as He does the tornado and the earthquake, to the accomplishment of his benevolent purposes, but this does not prove that war in itself is not a great evil. He makes the wrath of man to praise Him. It is conceded that wars undertaken to gratify the ambition, cupidity, or resentment of rulers or people, are unchristian and wicked. It is also conceded that the vast majority of the wars which have desolated the world have been unjustifiable in the sight of God and man. Nevertheless it does not follow from this that war in all cases is to be condemned.

1. This is proved because the right of self-defence belongs to nations as well as to individuals. Nations are bound to protect the lives and property of their citizens. If these are assailed by force, force may be rightfully used in their protection. Nations also have the right to defend their own existence. If that be endangered by the conduct of other nations, they have the natural right of self-protection. A war may be defensive and yet in one sense aggressive. In other words, self-defence may dictate and render necessary the first assault. A man is not bound to wait until a murderer actually strikes his blow. It is enough that he sees undeniable manifestations of a hostile purpose. So a nation is not bound to wait until its territories are actually invaded and its citizens murdered, before it appeals to arms. It is enough that there is clear evidence on the part of another nation of an intention to commence hostilities. While it is easy to lay down the principle that war is justifiable only as a means of self-defence, the practical application of this principle is beset with difficulties. The least aggression on national property, or the slightest infringement of national rights, may be

regarded as the first step toward national extinction, and therefore justify the most extreme measures of redress. A nation may think that a certain enlargement of territory is necessary to its security, and, therefore, that it has the right to go to war to secure it. So a man may say that a portion of his neighbour's farm is necessary to the full enjoyment of his own property, and therefore that he has the right to appropriate it to himself. It is to be remembered that nations are as much bound by the moral law as individual men; and therefore that what a man may not do in the protection of his own rights, and on the plea of self-defence, a nation may not do. A nation therefore is bound to exercise great forbearance, and to adopt every other available means of redressing wrongs, before it plunges itself and others into all the demoralizing miseries of war.

2. The lawfulness of defensive war, however, does not rest exclusively on these general principles of justice; it is distinctly recognized in Scripture. In numerous cases, under the Old Testament, such wars were commanded. God endowed men with special qualifications as warriors. He answered when consulted through the Urim and Thummim, or by the prophets, as to the propriety of military enterprises (Judges xx. 27 f., 1 Sam. xiv. 37, xxiii. 2, 4; 1 Kings xxii. 6 ff.); and He often interfered miraculously in behalf of his people when they were engaged in battle. Many of the Psalms of David, dictated by the Spirit, are either prayers for divine assistance in war or thanksgivings for victory. It is very plain, therefore, that the God whom the patriarchs and prophets worshipped did not condemn war, when the choice was between war and annihilation. It is a very clear case that if the Israelites had not been allowed to defend themselves against their heathen neighbours they would have soon been extirpated, and their religion would have perished with them.

As the essential principles of morals do not change, what was permitted or commanded under one dispensation, cannot be unlawful under another, unless forbidden by a new revelation. The New Testament, however, contains no such revelation. It does not say, as in the case of divorce, that war was permitted to the Hebrews because of the hardness of their hearts, but that under the Gospel a new law was to prevail. This very silence of the New Testament leaves the Old Testament rule of duty on this subject still in force. Accordingly, although there is no express declaration on the subject, as none was needed, we find the lawfulness of war quietly assumed. When the soldiers inquired of John the Baptist what they should do to prepare for the kingdom of God, he did not tell them that they must forsake the profession of arms. The centurion, whose faith our Lord so highly commended (Matt. viii. 5-13), was not censured for being a soldier. So also the centurion, a devout man, whom God in a vision commanded to send for Peter, and on whom, and his associates, according to the record in the tenth chapter of Acts, the Holy Ghost came with miraculous gifts, was allowed to remain in the army of even a heathen emperor. If magistrates, as we learn from the thirteenth chapter of Romans, are armed with a right or power of life and death over their own citizens, they certainly have the right to declare war in self-defence.

In the early ages of the Church there was a great disinclination to engage in military service, and the fathers at times justified this reluctance by calling the lawfulness of all wars into question. But the real sources of this opposition of Christians to entering the army, were that they thereby gave themselves up to the service of a power which

persecuted their religion; and that idolatrous usages were inseparably connected with military duties. When the Roman empire became Christian, and the cross was substituted for the eagle on the standards of the army, this opposition died away, till at length we hear of fighting prelates, and of military orders of monks.

No historical Christian Church has pronounced all war to be unlawful. The Augsburg Confession [326] expressly says that it is proper for Christians to act as magistrates, and among other things "jure bellare, militare," etc. And Presbyterians especially have shown that it is not against their consciences to contend to the death for their rights and liberties.

Suicide.

It is conceivable that men who do not believe in God or in a future state of existence, should think it allowable to take refuge in annihilation from the miseries of this life. But it is unaccountable, except on the assumption of temporary or permanent insanity, that any man should rush uncalled into the retributions of eternity. Suicide, therefore, is most frequent among those who have lost all faith in religion. [327] It is a very complicated crime; our life is not our own; we have no more right to destroy our life than we have to destroy the life of a fellow-man. Suicide is, therefore, self murder. It is the desertion of the post which God has assigned us; it is a deliberate refusal to submit to his will; it is a crime which admits of no repentance, and consequently involves the loss of the soul.

Duelling.

Duelling is another violation of the sixth commandment. Its advocates defend it on the same principle on which international war is defended. As independent nations have no common tribunal to which they can resort for the redress of injuries, they are justifiable, on the principle of self-defence, in appealing to arms for the protection of their rights. In like manner, it is said, there are offences for which the law of the land affords no redress, and therefore, the individual must be allowed to seek redress for himself. But (1.) There is no evil for which the law does not, or should not, afford redress. (2.) The redress sought in the duel is unjustifiable. No one has the right to kill a man for a slight or an insult. Taking a man's life for a hasty word, or even for a serious injury, is murder in the sight of God, who has ordained the penalty of death as the punishment for only the most atrocious crimes. (3.) The remedy is preposterous; for most frequently it is the aggrieved party who loses his life. (4.) Duelling is the cause of the greatest suffering to innocent parties, which no man has a right to inflict to gratify his pride or resentment. (5.) The survivor in a fatal duel entails on himself, unless his heart and conscience be seared, a life of misery.

[325] Scholia in Vetus Testamentum, Leipzig, 1795.

[326] I. xvi. 2; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. p. 14.

[327] It is estimated that one death out of 175 in London is suicide; in New York, one in 172; in Vienna, one in 160; in Paris, one in 72.

§ 11. The Seventh Commandment.

This commandment, as we learn from our Lord's exposition of it, given in his sermon on the mount, forbids all impurity in thought, speech, and behaviour. As the social organization of society is founded on the distinction of the sexes, and as the well-being of the state and the purity and prosperity of the Church rest on the sanctity of the family

relation, it is of the last importance that the normal, or divinely constituted relation of the sexes be preserved in its integrity.

Celibacy.

Among the important questions to be considered under the head of this commandment, the first is, Whether the Bible teaches that there is any special virtue in a life of celibacy? This is really a question, whether there was an error in the creation of man.

1. The very fact that God created man, male and female, declaring that it was not good for either to be alone, and constituted marriage in paradise, should be decisive on this subject. The doctrine which degrades marriage by making it a less holy state, has its foundation in Manicheeism or Gnosticism. It assumes that evil is essentially connected with matter; that sin has its seat and source in the body; that holiness is attainable only through asceticism and "neglecting of the body;" that because the "vita angelica" is a higher form of life than that of men here on earth, therefore marriage is a degradation. The doctrine of the Romish Church on this subject, therefore, is thoroughly anti-Christian. It rests on principles derived from the philosophy of the heathen. It presupposes that God is not the author of matter; and that He did not make man pure, when He invested him with a body.

2. Throughout the Old Testament Scriptures marriage is represented as the normal state of man. The command to our first parents before the fall was, "Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth." Without marriage the purpose of God in regard to our world could not be carried out; it is, therefore, contradictory to the Scriptures to assume that marriage is less holy, or less acceptable to God than celibacy. To be unmarried, was regarded under the old dispensation as a calamity and a disgrace. (Judges xi. 37; Ps. lxxviii. 63; Is. iv. 1; xiii. 12.) The highest earthly destiny of a woman, according to the Old Testament Scriptures, which are the word of God, was not to be a nun, but to be the mistress of a family, and a mother of children. (Gen. xxx. 1; Ps. cxiii. 9; cxxvii. 3; cxxviii. 3, 4; Prov. xviii. 22; xxxi. 10, 28.)

3. The same high estimate of marriage, characterizes the teachings of the New Testament. Marriage is declared to be "honourable in all." (Heb. xiii. 4.) Paul says, " Let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." (1 Cor. vii. 2.) In 1 Timothy v. 14, he says: "I will, that the younger women marry." In 1 Timothy iv. 3, "forbidding to marry" is included among the doctrines of devils. As the truth comes from the Holy Spirit, so false doctrines, according to the Apostle's mode of thinking, come from Satan, and his agents, the demons; they are "the seducing spirits" spoken of in the same verse. [328] Our Lord more than once (Matt. xix. 5; Mark x. 7) quotes and enforces the original law given in Genesis ii. 24, that man shall "leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife, and they shall be one flesh." The same passage is quoted by the Apostle as containing a great and symbolical truth. (Eph. v. 31.) It is thus taught that the marriage relation is the most intimate and sacred that can exist on earth, to which all other human relations must be sacrificed. We accordingly find that from the beginning, with rare exceptions, patriarchs, prophets, apostles, confessors, and martyrs, have been married men. If marriage was not a degradation to them, surely it cannot be to monks and priests.

The strongest proof of the sanctity of the marriage relation in the sight of God, is to be found in the fact that both in the Old and in the New Testaments, it is made the symbol of the relation between God and his people. "Thy Maker is thy husband," are the words of God,

and contain a world of truth, of grace, and of love. The departure of the people from God, is illustrated by a reference to a wife forsaking her husband; while God's forbearance, tenderness, and love, area compared to those of a faithful husband to his wife. "As the bridegroom rejoiceth over the bride, so shall thy God rejoice over thee." (Is. lxii. 5.) In the New Testament, this reference to the marriage relation, to illustrate the union between Christ and the Church, is frequent and instructive. The Church is called "the Bride, the Lamb's wife." (Rev. xxi. 9.) And the consummation of the work of salvation is set forth as the marriage, or the marriage-supper of the Lamb. (Rev. xix. 7 , 9.) In Ephesians v. 22-33, the union between husbands and wives, and the duties thence resulting, are set forth as so analogous to the union between Christ and his Church, that in some cases it is hard to determine to which union the language of the Apostle is to be applied. It is a matter of astonishment, in view of all these facts, that marriage has so extensively and persistently been regarded as something degrading, and celibacy or perpetual virginity as a special and peculiar virtue. No more striking evidence of the influence of a false philosophy in perverting the minds of even good men, is afforded in the whole history of the Church. Even the Reformers did not escape altogether from its influence. They often speak of marriage as the less of two evils; not as in itself a good; and not as the normal and appropriate state in which men and women should live, as designed by God in the very constitution of their nature, and as the best adapted to the exercise and development of all social and Christian virtues. Thus Calvin says: "Unde constat et aliam quamlibet, extra conjugium, societatem coram ipso [Deo] maledictam esse; et illam ipsam conjugalem in necessitatis remedium esse ordinatam, ne in effrenem libidinem proruamus. . . . . Jam quum per natur&#65533; conditionem et accensa post lapsum libidine, mulieris consortio bis obnoxii simus, nisi quos singulari gratia Deus inde exemit; videant singuli quid sibi datum sit. Virginitas, fateor, virtus est non contemnenda: sed quoniam aliis negata est, allis nonnisi ad tempus concessa, qui ab incontinentia vexantur, et superiores in certamine esse nequeunt ad matrimonii subsidium se conferant, ut ita in su&#65533; vocationis gradu castitatem colant." [329] That is, virginity is a virtue. Celibacy is a higher state than marriage. Those who cannot live in that state, should descend to the lower platform of married life. With such dregs of Manichean philosophy was the pure truth of the Bible contaminated, even as held by the most illustrious Reformers.

4. The teaching of Scripture as to the sanctity of marriage is confirmed by the experience of the world. It is only in the marriage state that some of the purest, most disinterested, and most elevated principles of our nature are called into exercise. All that concerns filial piety, and parental and especially maternal affection, depends on marriage for its very existence. Yet on the purifying and restraining influence of these affections the well-being of human society is in a large measure dependent. It is in the bosom of the family that there is a constant call for acts of kindness, of sell-denial, of forbearance, and of love. The family, therefore, is the sphere the best adapted for the development of all the social virtues; and it may be safely said that there is far more of moral excellence and of true religion to be found in Christian households, than in the desolate homes of priests, or in the gloomy cells of monks and nuns. A man with his children or grandchildren on his knees, is an object of higher reverence than any emaciated anchorite in his cave.

5. Our Lord teaches that a tree is known by its fruits. There has been no more prolific source of evil to the Church than the unscriptural notion of the special virtue of virginity

and the enforced celibacy of the clergy and monastic vows, to which that action has given rise. This is the teaching of history. On this point the testimony of Romanists as well as of Protestants is decisive and overwhelming. It may be admitted that the Catholic clergy in this and in some other countries are as decorous in their lives, as the clergy of other denominations, without invalidating the testimony of history as to the evils of vows of celibacy.

Protestants, while asserting the sanctity of marriage and denying the superior virtue of a life of celibacy, do not deny that there are times and circumstances in which celibacy is a virtue: i.e., that a man may perform a virtuous act in resolving never to marry. The Church often has work to do, for which single men are the only proper agents. The cares of a family, in other words, would unfit a man for the execution of the task assigned. This, however, does not suppose that celibacy is in itself a virtue. It may also happen that a rich man may be called upon to undertake a work which would necessitate his disencumbering himself of the care of his estate, and subjecting himself to a life of poverty. The same is true of the state. In fact military service, for the great majority of the rank and file of an army, is an estate of forced celibacy so long as the service continues. And even with regard to the officers, the liberty to marry is very much restricted in the standing armies of Europe. There are times when marriage is inexpedient. Our Lord in foretelling the destruction of Jerusalem said, "Woe unto them that are with child, and to them that give suck in those days." It is the part of wisdom to escape such woes. When Christians had no security for life or home; when they were liable to be torn away from their families, or to have all means of providing for their wants taken out of their hands, it was better for them not to marry. It is in reference to such times and circumstances that the words of Christ, in the nineteenth chapter of Matthew, were uttered, and the advice of the Apostle, in the seventh chapter of First Corinthians was given. The Pharisees asked our Lord whether a man could put away his wife at pleasure. He referred them to the original institution of marriage, as showing that it was intended to be an indissoluble connection. His disciples said, In that case it is better that a man should not marry. Our Lord replied: Whether it is better for a man to marry or not, is not a question for every man to decide for himself. "That the unmarried state is better, is a saying not for every one, and indeed only for such as it is divinely intended for." [330] That is, those to whom the requisite grace is given, "Omnes hujus dicti capaces esse negans, significat electionem non esse positam in manu nostra, acsi de re nobis subjecta esset consultatio. Si quis utile sibi esse putat uxore carere, atque ita nullo examine habito, coelibatus legem sibi edicit, longe fallitur. Deus enim, qui pronuntiavit bonum esse, ut viro adjutrix sit mulier, contempti sui ordinis poenam exiget: quia nimium sibi arrogant mortales, dum se a coelesti vocatione eximere tentant. Porro non esse omnibus liberum, eligere utrum libuerit, inde probat Christus, quia speciale sit continenti donum: nam quum dicit, non omnes esse capaces, sed quibus datum est, clare demonstrat non omnibus esse datum." [331] Those to whom it is given to lead an unmarried life, as our Lord teaches (Matt. xix. 10), are not only those who by their natural constitution are unfit for the marriage state, but those whom God calls to special service in his Church and whom He fits for that work.

The doctrine which Paul teaches on this subject is perfectly coincident with the teachings of our Lord. He recognizes marriage as a divine institution; as in itself good; as the normal and proper state in which men and women should live; but as it is necessarily

attended by many cares and distractions, it was expedient in times of trouble, to remain unmarried. This is the purport of Paul's teachings in First Corinthians ii. No one of the sacred writers, whether in the Old or in the New Testament, so exalts and glorifies marriage as does this Apostle in his Epistle to the Ephesians. He, therefore, is not the man, guided as he was in all his teachings by the Spirit of God, to depreciate or undervalue it, as only the less of two evils. It is a positive good: the union of two human persons to supplement and complement the one the other in a way which is necessary to the perfection or full development of both. The wife is to her husband what the Church is to Christ. Nothing higher than this can possibly be said.

History.

No one can read the Epistles of Paul, especially those to the Ephesians and Colossians, without seeing clear indications of the prevalence, even in the apostolic churches, of the principles of that philosophy which held that matter was contaminating; and which inculcated asceticism as the most efficacious means of the purification of the soul. This doctrine had already been adopted and reduced to practice by the Essenes among the Jews. Farther East, under a somewhat different form, it had prevailed for ages before the Christian era, and still maintains its ground. According to the Brahminical philosophy the individuality of man depends on the body. Complete emancipation from the body, therefore, secures the merging of the finite into the infinite. The drop is lost in the ocean, and this is the highest and ultimate destiny of man. It is not therefore to be wondered at, that the early fathers came more or less under the influence of these principles, or that asceticism gained so rapidly and maintained so long its ascendancy in the Church. The depreciation of the divine institution of marriage, and the exaltation of virginity into the first place among Christian virtues, was the natural and necessary consequence of this spirit. Ignatius called voluntary virgins "the jewels of Christ." Justin Martyr desired celibacy to prevail to the "greatest possible extent." Tatian regarded marriage as inconsistent with spiritual worship. Origen "disabled himself in his youth" and regarded marriage as a pollution. Hieracas made "virginity a condition of salvation." Tertullian denounced second marriage as criminal, and represented celibacy as the ideal of Christian life, not only for the clergy, but also for the laity. Second marriage was early prohibited so far as the clergy were concerned, and soon came in their case the prohibition of marriage altogether. The Apostolical Constitutions prohibited priests from contracting marriage after consecration. The Council of Ancyra, A.D. 314, allowed deacons to marry, provided they stipulated for the privilege before ordination. The Council of Elvira, A.D. 305, forbade the continuance of the marriage relation (according to the common interpretation of its canons) to bishops, presbyters, and deacons on pain of deposition. [332] Jerome was fanatical in his denunciation of marriage; and even Augustine was carried away by the spirit of the age. In answer to the objection that if men acted on his principles the world would be depopulated, he answered So much the better, for in that case Christ would come the sooner. [333] Siricius, Bishop of Rome A.D. 385, decided that marriage was inconsistent with the clerical office; and was followed in this view by his successors. Great opposition, however, was experienced in enforcing celibacy, and it required all the energy of Gregory VII. to have the decisions of councils carried into effect. Ultimately, however, the rule, so far as the clergy are concerned, was acquiesced in, and received the authoritative sanction of the Council of Trent. That Council decided, [334] "Si quis dixerit, statum conjugalem

anteponendum esse statui virginitatis, vel coelibatus, et non esse melius, et beatius manere in virginitate aut coelibatu, quam jungi matrimonio: anathema sit." On this assumed higher virtue of celibacy, in the preceding canon it was ordered: "Si quis dixerit, clericos in sacris ordinibus constitutos, vel regulares, castitatem solemniter professos, posse matrimonium contrahere, contractumque validum esse, non obstante lege ecclesiastica, vel voto: et oppositum nil aliud esse, quam damnare matrimonium; posseque omnes contrahere matrimonium, qui non sentiunt se castitatis, etiam si eam voterint, habere donum; anathema sit; cum Deus id recte petentibus non deneget, nec patiatur nos supra id, quod possumus, tentari."

Although the doctrine that virginity, as the Roman Catechism expresses it, "summopere commendatur," as being better, and more perfect and holy than a state of marriage, is made the ostensible ground of the enforced celibacy of the clergy, it is manifest that hierarchical reasons had much to do in making the Romish Church so strenuous in insisting that its clergy should be unmarried. This Gregory VII. avows when he says, [335] "Non liberari potest ecclesia a servitute laicorum, nisi liberentur clerici ab uxoribus." And Melancthon felt authorized to say in reference to the celibacy of the clergy in the Church of Rome, "Una est vera et sola causa tuendi coelibatus, ut opes commodius administrentur et splendor ordinis retineatur." [336]

As the Reformation was a return to the Scriptures as the only infallible rule of faith and practice; and as in the Scriptures marriage is exalted as a holy state, and no preeminence in excellence is assigned to celibacy or virginity; and as the Reformers denied the authority of the Church to make laws to bind the conscience or to curtail the liberty with which Christ had made his people free, Protestants pronounced with one voice against the obligation of monastic vows and of the celibacy of the clergy.

The Greek Church petrified at an early date. It assumed the form which it still retains, before the doctrine of the special sanctity of celibacy had gained ascendancy. It abides therefore by the decisions of the Council of Chalcedon, A.D. 451, and of Trullo, A.D. 692, which permitted marriage to priests and deacons. Those Greeks who are in communion with the Church of Rome enjoy the same liberty. Benedict XIV. declared in reference to them, "Etsi expetendum quam maxime esset, ut Grci, qui sunt in sacris ordinibus constituti, castitatem non secus ac Latini servarent. Nihilominus, ut eorum clerici, subdiaconi, diaconi et presbyteri uxores in eorum ministerio retineant, dummodo ante sacros ordines, virgines, non viduas, neque corruptas duxerint, Romana non prohibet Ecclesia. Eos autem, qui viduam vel corruptam duxerunt, vel ad secunda vota, prima uxore mortua, convolarunt, ad subdiaconatum, diaconatum et presbyteratum promoveri omnino prohibemus." [337] In the Russian Church the priests are required to be married men; but second marriages are forthem prohibited. The bishops are chosen from the monks and must be unmarried.

Marriage a Divine Institution.

Marriage is a divine institution. (1.) Because founded on the nature of man as constituted by God. He made man male and female, and ordained marriage as the indispensable condition of the continuance of the race. (2.) Marriage was instituted before the existence of civil society, and therefore cannot in its essential nature be a civil institution. As Adam and Eve were man led not in virtue of any civil law, or by the

intervention of a civil magistrate, so any man and woman cast together on a desert island, could lawfully take each other as husband and wife, It is a degradation of the institution to make it a mere civil contract. (3.) God commanded men to marry, when He commanded them to increase, and multiply and replenish the earth. (4.) God in his word has prescribed the duties belonging to the marriage relation; He has made known his will as to the parties who may lawfully be united in marriage; He has determined the continuance of the relation; and the causes which alone justify its dissolution. These matters are not subject to the will of the parties, or to the authority of the State. (5.) The vow of mutual fidelity made by husband and wife, is not made exclusively by each one to the other, but by each to God. When a man connects himself with a Christian Church he enters into covenant with his brethren in the Lord; mutual obligations are assumed; but nevertheless the covenant is made with God. He joins the Church in obedience to the will of God; he promises to regulate his faith and practice by the divine word; and the vow of fidelity is made to God. It is the same in marriage. It is a voluntary, mutual compact between husband and wife. They promise to be faithful to each other; but nevertheless they act in obedience to God, and promise to Him that they will live together as man and wife, according to his word. Any violation of the compact is, therefore, a violation of a vow made to God.

Marriage is not a sacrament in the sense in which baptism and the Lord's Supper are sacraments, nor in the sense of the Romish Church; but it is none the less a sacred institution. Its solemnization is an office of religion. It should, therefore, be entered upon with due solemnity and in the fear of God; and should be celebrated, i.e., the ceremony should be performed by a minister of Christ. He alone is authorized to see to it that the law of God is adhered to; and he alone can receive and register the marriage vows as made to God. The civil magistrate can only witness it as a civil contract, and it is consequently to ignore its religious character and sanction to have it celebrated by a civil officer. As the essence of the marriage contract is the mutual compact of the parties in the sight of God and in the presence of witnesses, it is not absolutely necessary that it should be celebrated by a minister of religion or even by a civil magistrate. It may be lawfully solemnized, as among the Quakers, without the intervention of either. Nevertheless as it is of the greatest importance that the religious nature of the institution should be kept in view, it is incumbent on Christians, so far as they themselves are concerned, to insist that it should be solemnized as a religious service.

Marriage as a Civil Institution.

As a man's being a servant of God and bound to make his word the rule of his faith and practice, is not inconsistent with his being a servant of the state, and bound to render obedience to its laws; so it is not inconsistent with the fact that marriage is an ordinance of God, that it should be, in another aspect, a civil institution. It is so implicated in the social and civil relations of men that it of necessity comes under the cognizance of the state. It is therefore a civil institution. (1.) In so far as it is, and must be, recognized and enforced by the state. (2.) It imposes civil obligations which the state has the right to enforce. The husband is bound to sustain his wife, for example, and he is constrained by the civil law to the performance of this duty. (3.) Marriage also involves, on both sides, rights to property; and the claims of children born in wedlock to the property of their parents. All these questions concerning property fall legitimately under the control of the civil law. In many

countries not only property, but rank, title, and political prerogatives are implicated with the question of marriage. (4.) It belongs to the state, therefore, as the guardian of these rights, to determine what marriages are lawful and what unlawful; how the contract is to be solemnized and authenticated; and what shall be its legal consequences. All these laws Christians are bound to obey, so far as obedience to them is consistent with a good conscience.

The legitimate power of the state in all these matters is limited by the revealed will of God. It can make nothing an impediment to marriage which the Scriptures do not declare to be a bar to that union. It can make nothing a ground of dissolving the marriage contract which the Bible does not make a valid ground of divorce. And the state can attach none other than civil pains and penalty to the violation of its laws concerning marriage. This is only saying that a Christian government is bound to respect the conscientious convictions of the people. It is a violation of the principles of civil and religious liberty for the state to make its will paramount to the will of God. Plain as this principle seems to be, it is nevertheless constantly disregarded in almost all Christian nations, whether Catholic or Protestant. In England, for example, it is still the law, that no member of the royal family can marry without the consent of the reigning sovereign. If this meant nothing more than that any member of the royal family thus marrying, should forfeit for himself and his children all right of succession to the crown, it might be all right. But the real meaning is that such a marriage is null and void that parties otherwise lawfully married and whom God has joined together as man and wife, are not man and wife. This is to bring the law of man and the law of God into direct collision, and make the human supersede the divine. In Prussia a subordinate officer of the army cannot marry without the consent of his commander. If he should marry without that consent, it might be right to make him throw up his commission; but to say that his wife is not a wife, is not only untrue, but it is a monstrous injustice and cruelty. In England, until of late years, no marriage was valid unless solemnized in church, within canonical hours, and by a man in priest's orders. This law was designed specially for the protection of heiresses from the wiles of fortune-hunters. It might be just to determine that no marriage not thus solemnized should convey any right to property; but to say that parties married five minutes after twelve o'clock, noon, are not married at all, whereas had the ceremony been performed ten minutes sooner, they would be truly man and wife, shocks the conscience and common sense of men. So in this country before the abolition of slavery, according to the laws of our Southern States, no slave could marry. A young white man married a young woman, whom no one in the community supposed had a drop of African blood in her veins. It was proved, however, that she was a slave. Her husband purchased her, manumitted her, repudiated her, married another woman, and was received into the communion of a Presbyterian Church. The law of God was thus regarded as a mere nullity. [338]

Because marriage is in some of its aspects a civil institution, to be regulated within certain limits, by the civil law, men have treated it as though it were a mere business engagement. They ignore its character as a divine institution, regulated and controlled by divine laws. Civil legislatures should remember that they can no more annul the laws of God than the laws of nature. If they pronounce those not to be married who, by the divine law, are married; or if they separate those whom God hath joined together, their laws are absolute nullities at the bar of conscience and in the sight of God.

Monogamy.

Marriage is a compact between one man and one woman to live together, as man and wife, until separated by death. According to this definition, first, the marriage relation can subsist only between one man and one woman; secondly, the union is permanent, i.e., it can be dissolved only by the death of one or both of the parties, except for reasons specified in the word of God; and thirdly, the death of one of the parties dissolves the union, so that it is lawful for the survivor to marry again.

As to the first of these points, or that the Scriptural doctrine of marriage is opposed to and condemns polygamy, it is to be remarked, --

1. That such has been the doctrine of the Christian Church in all ages and in every part of the world. There has never been a church calling itself Christian which tolerated a plurality cf wives among its members. There could hardly be a stronger proof than this fact that such is the law of Christ. It is morally certain that the whole Church cannot have mistaken, on such a subject as this, the mind and will of its divine Head and Master.

2. Marriage as originally constituted and ordained by God was between one man and one woman. And the language of Adam when he received Eve from the hands of her Maker, proves that such was the essential nature of the relation: "And Adam said, This is now bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh. . . . . Therefore shall a man leave his father and his mother, and shall cleave unto his wife and they shall be one flesh." (Gen. ii. 23, 24.) Or, as our Lord quotes and expounds the passage, "They twain shall be one flesh: so then they are no more twain, but one flesh." (Mark x. 8.) "The two," and no more than two, become one. This was not only the language of unfallen Adam in Paradise, but the language of God uttered through the lips of Adam, as appears not only from the circumstances of the case, but also from our Lord's attributing to them divine authority, as He evidently does in the passage just quoted. Thus the law of marriage as originally instituted by God, required that the union should be between one man and one woman. This law could be changed only by the authority by which it was originally enacted. Delitzsch remarks on this passage: [339] "In these words not only the deepest spiritual union, but a union comprehending the whole nature of man, an all comprehending personal communion, is represented as the essence of marriage; and monogamy is set forth as its natural and divinely appointed form."

3. Although this original law was partially disregarded in later times it was never abrogated. Polygamy and divorce were in a measure tolerated under the Mosaic law, yet in all ages among the Hebrews, monogamy was the rule, and polygamy the exception, as it was among other civilized nations of antiquity. Polygamy first appears among the descendants of Cain. (Gen. iv. 19.) Noah and his sons had each but one wife. Abraham had but one wife, until the impatience of Sarah for children led him to take Hagar as a concubine. The same rule of marriage was observed by the prophets as a class. Polygamy was confined in a great measure to kings and princes. There was also an honourable distinction made between the wife and the concubine. The former retained her preeminence as the head of the family. Numerous passages of the Old Testament go to prove that monogamy was considered as the law of marriage, from which plurality of wives was a departure. Throughout the Proverbs, for example, it is the blessing of a good wife, not of wives, that is continually set forth. (Prov. xii. 4; xix. 14; xxxi. 10 ff.) The apocryphal books contain clear evidence that after the exile monogamy was almost universal among the Jews;

and it may be inferred from such passages as Luke i. 5; Acts v. 1, and many others, that the same was true at the time of the advent of Christ.

With regard to the toleration of polygamy under the Mosaic law, it is to be remembered that the seventh commandment belongs to the same category as the sixth and eighth. These laws are not founded on the essential nature of God, and therefore are not immutable. They are founded on the permanent relations of men in their present state of existence. From this it follows, (1.) That they bind men only in their present state. The laws of property and marriage can have no application, so far as we know, to the future world, where men shall be as angels, neither marrying nor giving in marriage. (2.) These laws being founded on the permanent and natural relations of men, cannot be set aside by human authority, because those relations are not subject to the will or ordinance of men. (3.) They may however be dispensed with by God. He commanded the Israelites to despoil the Egyptians and to dispossess the Canaanites, but this does not prove that one nation may, of its own motion, seize on the inheritance of another people. If God, therefore, at any time said to any people granted permission to practise polygamy, then so long as that permission lasted and for those to whom it was given, polygamy was lawful, and at all other times and for all other persons it was unlawful. This principle is clearly recognized in what our Saviour teaches concerning divorce. It was permitted the Jews under the Mosaic law to put away their wives; as soon as that law was abolished, the right of divorce ceased.

4. Monogamy, however, does not rest exclusively on the original institution of marriage, or upon the general drift of the Old Testament teaching, but mainly on the clearly revealed will of Christ. His will is the supreme law for all Christians, and rightfully for all men. When the Pharisees came to Him and asked Him whether a man could lawfully put away his wife, He answered, that marriage as instituted by God was an indissoluble union between one man and one woman; and, therefore, that those whom God had joined together no man could put asunder. This is the doctrine clearly taught in Matthew xix. 4-9; Mark x. 4-9; Luke xvi. 18; Matthew v. 32. In these passages our Lord expressly declares that if a man marries while his first wife is living he commits adultery. The exception which Christ himself makes to this rule, will be considered under the head of divorce.

The Apostle teaches the same doctrine in Romans vii. 2, 3: "The woman which hath an husband is bound by the law to her husband, so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband. So then, if while her husband liveth, she be married to another man, she shall be called an adulteress: but if her husband be dead, she is free from that law; so that she is no adulteress, though she be married to another man." The doctrine of this passage is that marriage is a compact between one man and one woman, which can be dissolved only by the death of one of the parties. So in 1 Corinthians vii. 2: "Let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband," it is taken for granted that, in the Christian Church, a plurality of wives is as much out of the question as a plurality of husbands. This assumption runs through the whole New Testament. We not only never read of a Christian's having two or more wives; but whenever the duty of the marriage relation is spoken of, it is always of the husband to his wife, and of the wife to her husband. In the judgment, therefore, of the whole Christian Church, marriage is a covenant between one man and one woman to live together as husband and wife until separated by death.

5. This Scriptural law is confirmed by the providential law which secures the numerical equality of the sexes. Had polygamy been according to the divine purpose, we should naturally expect that more women would be born than men. But the reverse is the fact. There are more men than women born into the world. The excess, however, is only sufficient to provide for the greater peril to life to which men are exposed. The law of providence is the numerical equality of the sexes; and this is a clear intimation of the will of God that every man should have his own wife, and every woman her own husband. Such being the will of God, as revealed both in his word and in his providence, everything which tends to counteract it must be evil in its nature and consequences. The doctrine which depreciated marriage, and made celibacy a virtue, flooded the Church with corruption. And everything in our modern civilization and modes of living which renders marriage difficult, and consequently infrequent, is to be deprecated, and if possible removed. That every man should have his own wife and every woman her own husband, is the divinely appointed preventive of the "Social Evil" with all its unutterable horrors. [340] Every other preventive is human and worthless. Rather than that the present state of things should continue, it would be better to return to the old patriarchal usage, and let parents give their sons and daughters in marriage as soon as they attained the proper age, on the best terms they can.

6. As all the permanently obligatory laws of God are founded on the nature of his creatures, it follows that if He has ordained that marriage must be the union of one man and one woman, there must be a reason for this in the very constitution of man and in the nature of the marriage relation. That relation must be such that it cannot subsist between one and many; between one man and more than one woman. This is plain, first, from the nature of the love which it involves; and secondly, from the nature of the union which it constitutes. First, conjugal love is peculiar and exclusive. It can have but one object. As the love of a mother for a child is peculiar, and can have no other object than her own child, so the love of a husband can have no other object than his wife, and the love of a wife no other object than her husband. It is a love not only of complacency and delight, but also of possession, of property, and of rightful ownership. This is the reason why jealousy in man or woman is the fiercest of all human passions. It involves a sense of injury; of the violation of the most sacred rights; more sacred even than the rights of property or life. Conjugal love, therefore, cannot by possibility exist except between one man and one woman. Monogamy has its foundation in the very constitution of our nature. Polygamy is unnatural, and necessarily destructive of the normal, or divinely constituted relation between husband and wife.

Secondly, in another aspect, the union involved in marriage cannot exist except between one man and one woman. It is not merely a union of feeling and of interests. It is such a union as to produce, in some sense, identity. The two become one. Such is the declaration of our Lord. Husband and wife are one, in a sense which justified the Apostle in saying as he does, in Ephesians v. 30, that the wife is bone of her husband's bone, and flesh of his flesh. She is his body. She is himself (v. 28). Such is this union that "Qui uxorem repudiat, quasi dimidiam sui partem a seipso avellit. Hoc autem minime patitur natura, ut corpus suum quisque discerpat." What all this means it may be hard for us to understand. It is certain, -- (1.) That it does not refer to anything material, or to any identification of substance. When Adam said of Eve, "This is bone of my bones, and flesh of my flesh," he doubtless referred to her being formed out of his body. But as these words

are used by the Apostle to express the relation of all wives to their husbands, they must be understood of something else than identity of substance. (2.) The oneness of man and wife, of which the Scriptures speak cannot be understood in any sense inconsistent with their distinct subsistence or personality. They may be very different in character and destiny. The one may be saved, the other lost. (3.) It is evident, however, that the meaning of the strong language of Scripture on this subject is not exhausted, by representing the marriage union as being merely one of affection; or by saying that the husband is the complement of the wife and the wife of the husband; that is, that the marriage relation is necessary to the completeness of our nature and to its full development in the present state of existence; that there are capacities, feelings, and virtues which are not otherwise or elsewhere called into exercise. All this may be true, but it is not the whole truth. (4.) There is, in a certain sense, a community of life between husband and wife. We are accustomed to say, and to say truly, that the life of parents is communicated to their children. Each nation and every historical family has a form of life by which it is distinguished. As, therefore, the life of a father and the life of his son are the same, in that the blood (i.e., the life) of the parent flows in the veins of his children; so in an analogous sense the life of the husband and wife is one. They have a common life, and that common or joint life is transmitted to their offspring. This is the doctrine of the early Church. The Apostolical Constitutions say: [341] he gune koinonos esti biou, enoumene eis hen soma ek duo para Theou.

The analogy which the Apostle traces out in Ephesians v. 22-33, between the conjugal relation and the union between Christ and his Church, brings out the Scriptural doctrine of marriage more clearly than perhaps any other passage in the Bible. No analogy is expected to answer in all respects, and no illustration borrowed from earthly relations can bring out all the fulness of the things of God. The relation, therefore, between a husband and his wife, is only an adumbration of the relation of Christ to his Church. Still there is an analogy between the two, (1.) As the Apostle teaches, the love of Christ to his Church is peculiar and exclusive. It is such as He has for no other class or body of rational creatures in the universe. So the love of the husband for his wife is peculiar and exclusive. It is such as he has for no other object; a love in which no one can participate. (2.) Christ's love for his Church is self-sacrificing. He gave himself for it. He purchased the Church with his blood. So the husband should, and when true, does, in all things sacrifice himself for his wife. (3.) Christ and his Church are one; one in the sense that the Church is his body. So the husband and wife are in such a sense one, that a man in loving his wife loves himself. (4.) Christ's life is communicated to the Church. As the life of the head is communicated to the members of the human body; and the life of the vine to the branches, so there is, in a mysterious sense, a community of life between Christ and his Church. In like manner, in a sense no less truly mysterious, there is a community of life between husband and wife.

From all this it follows that as it would be utterly incongruous and impossible that Christ should have two bodies, two brides, two churches, so it is no less incongruous and impossible that a man should have two wives. That is, the conjugal relation, as it is set forth in Scripture, cannot by possibility subsist, except between one man and one woman.

Conclusions.

1. If such be the true doctrine of marriage, it follows, as just stated, that polygamy destroys its very nature. It is founded on a wrong view of the nature of woman; places her

in a false and degrading position; dethrones and despoils her; and is productive of innumerable evils.

2. It follows that the marriage relation is permanent and indissoluble. A limb may be violently severed from the body, and lose all vital connection with it; and husband and wife may be thus violently separated, and their conjugal relation annulled; but in both cases the normal connection is permanent.

3. It follows that the state can neither constitute nor dissolve the marriage relation. It can no more free a husband or wife "a vinculo matrimonii," than it can free a father "a vinculo paternitatis." It may protect a child from the injustice or cruelty of its father, or even, for due cause, remove him from all parental control, and it may legislate about its property, but the natural bond between parents and children is beyond its control. So the state may legislate about marriage, and determine its accidents and legal consequences; it may decide who, in the sight of the law, shall be regarded as husband and wife, and when, or under what circumstances, the legal or civil rights and privileges arising out of the relation shall cease to be enforced; and it may protect the person and rights of the wife, and, if necessary, remove her from the control of her husband, but the conjugal bond it cannot dissolve. All decrees of divorce "a vinculo matrimonii," issued by civil or ecclesiastical authorities, so far as the conscience is concerned, are perfectly inoperative, unless antecedently to such decree and by the law of God, the conjugal relation has ceased to exist.

4. It follows from the Scriptural doctrine of marriage that all laws are evil which tend to make those two whom God pronounces to be one; such laws, for example, as give to the wife the right to conduct business, contract debts, and sue and be sued, in her own name. This is attempting to correct one class of evils at the cost of incurring others a hundred-fold greater. The Word of God is the only sure guide of legislative action as well as of individual conduct.

5. It need hardly be remarked that it follows from the nature of marriage, that next to murder, adultery is the greatest of all social crimes, under the Old Dispensation it was punishable with death. And even now it is practically impossible to convict a husband of murder who kills the man who has committed adultery with his wife. This comes from human laws being in conflict with the laws of nature and of God. The law of God regards marriage as identifying a man and his wife; the laws of the state too often regard it as merely a civil contract, and give an injured husband no redress but a suit for damages for the pecuniary loss he has sustained by being deprived of the services of his wife. The penalty for adultery, to be in any due proportion to the magnitude of the crime, should be severe and degrading.

6. The relative duties of husband and wife arising out of their relation, may be expressed in a few comprehensive words. The husband is to love, protect, and cherish his wife as himself, i.e., as being to him another self. The duties of the wife are set forth in the time-honoured Christian formula, "love, honour, and obey."

Converted Polygamists.

The question has been mooted, Whether a polygamist, when converted to Christianity, should be required to repudiate all his wives but one, as a condition of his admission into the Christian Church? The answer to this question has been sought from three sources: First,

the Scriptural doctrine of marriage; secondly, the example of the Apostles when dealing with such cases; and thirdly, from a consideration of the effects which would follow from making monogamy an indispensable condition of admission to the Church.

As to the first point, it is admitted by all Christians, that it ie the law of God, the law of Christ, and consequently the law of the Christian Church that polygamy is sinful, being a violation of the original and permanently obligatory law of marriage. As every man who enters the Church professes to be a Christian, and as every Christian is bound to obey the law of Christ, it seems plain that no man should be received into the communion of the Church who does not conform to the law of Christ concerning marriage. The only question is, Whether Christ has made a special exception in favour of those who in the times of their ignorance, contracted the obligations of marriage with more than one woman? It is of course possible that such an exception might have been made. It would be analogous to the temporary suspension of the original law of marriage in favour of the hardhearted Jews. Has then such an exception been made? This is the second point to be considered. It concerns a matter of fact. Those who assume that such an exception has been made, are bound to produce the clearest evidence of the fact. This is necessary not only to satisfy the consciences of the parties concerned, but also to justify a departure from a plainly revealed law of God. It would be a very serious matter to set up in a heathen country, a church not conformed in this matter to the usual law of Christendom. Missionaries are sent forth to teach not only Christian doctrines but Christian morals. And the churches which they found, profess to be witnesses for Christ as to what He would have men to believe, and as to what He would have them to do. They ought not to be allowed to bear false testimony. It is certain that there is no clear and definite expression of the will of Christ, recorded in the New Testament, that the case contemplated should be an exception to the Scriptural law of marriage. There is no instance recorded in the New Testament, of the admission of a polygamist to the Christian Church. It has, indeed, been inferred from 1 Timothy iii. 2, where the Apostle says, a bishop must be "the husband of one wife," that a private member of the Church might have more wives than one. But this is in itself a very precarious inference; and being inconsistent with Christ's express prohibition, it is altogether inadmissible. The meaning of the passage has been much disputed. What the Apostle requires is that a bishop should be in all respects an exemplary man: not given to wine, no striker, not greedy of filthy lucre; the husband of one wife, i.e., not a polygamist. This no more implies that other men may be polygamists, than his saying that a bishop must not be greedy of filthy lucre and not a brawler, implies that other men may be covetous or contentious. According to another and widely accepted interpreation of the passage in 1 Timothy iii. 2, and the corresponding passage in Titus i. 6, the injunction of the Apostle is that a man who has been married more than once, must not be appointed a bishop or presbyter. If this be the true meaning of the Apostle, his language affords still less ground for the argument drawn from it in favour of the lawfulness of polygamy in church members. If even second marriage was forbidden to presbyters, a fortiori must polygamy be regarded as inconsistent with the law of Christ.

This interpretation was very generally adopted in the early Church, during the Middle Ages, and by Romanists, and is sustained by many of the recent commentators. Bishop Ellicott decides in favour of this interpretation. His reasons are, -- (1.) The opinion of the early writers and of some councils. (2.) The special respect paid among pagans to a woman

who was "univira." (3.) The propriety, in the case of episkopoi and diakonoi, of a greater temperance. (4.) And the manifestation of a greater sanctity (semnotes) of a single marriage, which he thinks is indicated even in Scripture (Luke ii. 36, 37). The objections to it are, In the first place, that it rests on an unscriptural view of marriage. According to the Bible, marriage is a better, higher, and holier, because the normal state, than celibacy. It was only in the interest of the doctrine of the peculiar sanctity of celibacy, that this interpretation was adopted by the fathers.

In the second place, it rests on the no less unscriptural assumption of the superior holiness of the clergy. No higher degree of moral purity is required of them than of other men, for the simple reason that every man is required to be perfectly holy in heart and life. The interpretation in question gained the stronger hold of the Church as the doctrine of "the grace of orders," and of the priesthood of the clergy gained ascendancy. When the Reformation came and swept away these two doctrines, it removed the two principal supports of the interpretation in question. It is not to be admitted that there can be anything unholy in second marriages, which an infinitely holy God declares to be lawful (Rom. vii. 3), nor can it be conceded that the clergy are holier than other believers, seeing that the only priesthood in the Church on earth is the priesthood common to all believers.

In the third place, the interpretation which makes the Apostle interdict second marriages to bishops and deacons, is contrary to the natural meaning of the words. The parallel passage in Titus i. 5, 6, reads thus: "That thou shouldest, ... ordain elders in every city, as I had appointed thee: if any be blameless, the husband of one wife, etc;" ei' tis estin . . . mias gunaikos, aner, if any one is at this present time the husband of one wife.' It is the present state and character of the man that are to be taken into the account. He might before have been unmarried, or even a polygamist, but when ordained, he must, if married at all, be the husband of but one woman. "Qui sit: non autem, Qui fuerit," says Calvin in his comment on 1 Timothy iii. 2. And on Titus i. 6 he says, "Qui defuncta uxore alteram jam coelebs inducit, nihilominus unius uxoris maritus censeri debet. Non enim eligendum docet qui fuerit maritus unius uxoris, sed qui sit." Whichever of these interpretations of 1 Timothy iii. 2, be adopted, whether we understand the Apostle to forbid that a polygamist, or that a man twice married, should be admitted to the ministry, in neither case does the passage give authority to receive a polygamist into the fellowship of the Church. Considering, then, that monogamy is the undoubted law of Christ; considering that we have no evidence that He made an exception in favour of heathen converts; and considering the great importance that churches, founded in heathen lands, should bear true witness of the doctrines and precepts of Christianity, it would seem clear that no man having more than one wife should be admitted to Christian fellowship.

The third aspect of this question concerns the effects of enforcing the Christian law of marriage in heathen lands. It is urged that this would result in great cruelty and injustice. For a man to cast off women whom he had engaged to protect and cherish, to abandon not only them but their children, it is said, cannot be reconciled with any right principle. To this it may be replied, (1.) That in many heathen countries it is not the husband who supports the wives, but the wives who support the husband. They are his slaves, and sustain him by their labour. There would be no great hardship in his setting them free. (2.) But when this is not the case, it does not follow that because a man ceases to regard several women as his

wives, he should cease to provide for them, and for the welfare of his children. This in any event, as a Christian, he is bound to do.

It is also suggested, as a difficulty in this matter, that it is hard to determine which of his several wives a converted polygamist should retain. Some say, that it is the one first married; others say, that he should be allowed to make his own selection. If marriage among the heathen were what it is in Christian countries, there would be no room for doubt on this subject. Then the first contract would be the only binding one, and all the rest null and void. But in the Christian sense of the word there has been no marriage in any case. There has been no promise and vow of mutual fidelity. The relation of a heathen polygamist to the women of his harem, is more analogous to concubinage than to Christian marriage. The relation of a heathen polygamist to his numerous wives, is so different from the conjugal relation as contemplated in Scripture, as to render it at least doubtful whether the husband s obligation is exclusively, or preeminently, to the woman first chosen. This is a point of casuistry to which those who expect to labour in heathen countries should direct their attention. The Romish Church decides in favour of the first wife. The Roman Catechism [342] says: "Atque ob eam rem fieri intelligimus, ut, si infidels quispiam, gentis su\u0000 more et consuetudine, plures uxores duxisset, cum ad veram religionem conversus fuerit, jubeat eum Ecclesia ceteras omnes relinquere, ac priorem tantum just\u0000 et legitim\u0000 uxoris loco habere."

Divorce.

The questions which call for, at least a brief consideration, under this head are, (1.) What is divorce, and what are its legitimate effects? (2.) What are the Scriptural grounds of divorce? (3.) What are the Romish doctrine, and practice on this subject? (4.) What are the doctrine and practice of Protestant Churches and countries? (5.) What is the duty of the Church and of its officers in cases where the laws of the state on this subject are in conflict with the law of God? Works on civil and canon law, when treating of divorce, take a much wider range than this, but the points above indicated seem to include those of most interest and importance to the theologian.

Divorce; its Nature and Effects.

Divorce is not a mere separation, whether temporary or permanent, "a mensa et thoro." It is not such a separation as leaves the parties in the relation of husband and wife, and simply relieves them from the obligation of their relative duties. Divorce annuls the "vinculum matrimonii," so that the parties are no longer man and wife. They stand henceforth to each other in the same relation as they were before marriage. That this is the true idea of divorce is plain from the fact that under the old dispensation if a man put away his wife, she was at liberty to marry again. (Deut. xxiv. 1, 2.) This of course supposes that the marriage relation to her former husband was effectually dissolved. Our Lord teaches the same doctrine. The passages in the Gospels, referring to this subject, are Matthew v. 31, 32; xix. 3-9; Mark x. 2-12; and Luke xvi. 18. The simple meaning of these passages seems to be, that marriage is a permanent compact, which cannot be dissolved at the will of either of the parties. If, therefore, a man arbitrarily puts away his wife and marries another, he commits adultery. If he repudiates her on just grounds and marries another, he commits no offence. Our Lord makes the guilt of marrying after separation to depend on the ground of the separation. Saying, that if a man puts away his wife for any cause save fornication, and

marries another, he commits adultery'; is saying that the offence is not committed if the specified ground of divorce exists.' And this is saying that divorce, when justifiable, dissolves the marriage tie.

Although this seems so plainly to be the doctrine of the Scriptures, the opposite doctrine prevailed early in the Church, and soon gained the ascendancy. Augustine himself taught in his work "De Conjugiis Adulterinis," [343] and elsewhere, that neither of the parties after divorce could contract a new marriage. In his "Retractions," however, he expresses doubt on the subject. It passed, however, into the canon law, and received the authoritative sanction of the Council of Trent, which says, [344] "Si quis dixerit, ecclesiam errare, cum docuit et docet, juxta evangelicam et apostolicam doctrinam, propter adulterium alterius conjugum matrimonii vinculum non posse dissolvi; et utrumque, vel etiam innocentem, qui causam adulterio non dedit, non posse, altero conjuge vivente, aliud matrimonium contrahere; moecharique eum, qui, dimissa adultera, aliam duxerit, et eam, qu�, dimisso adultero, alii nupserit; anathema sit." This is the necessary consequence of the doctrine, that the marriage relation can be dissolved only by death. The indisposition of the medi�val and Romish Church to admit of remarriages after divorce, is no doubt to be attributed in part to the low idea of the marriage state prevailing in the Latin Church. It had its ground, however, in the interpretation given to certain passages of Scripture. In Mark x. 11, 12, and in Luke xvi. 18, our Lord says without any qualification: "Whosoever putteth away his wife, and marrieth another, committeth adultery; and whosoever marrieth her that is put away from her husband, committeth adultery." This was taken as the law on the subject, without regard to what is said in Matthew v. 31, 32, and xix. 3-9. As, however, there is no doubt of the genuineness of the passages in Matthew, they cannot be overlooked. One expression of the will of Christ is as authoritative and as satisfactory as a thousand repetitions could make it. The exception stated in Matthew, therefore, must stand. The reason for the omission in Mark and Luke may be accounted for in different ways. It is said by some that the exception was of necessity understood from its very nature, whether mentioned or not. Or having been stated twice, its repetition was unnecessary. Or what perhaps is most probable, as our Lord was speaking to Pharisees, who held that a man might put away his wife when he pleased, it was enough to say that such divorces as they were accustomed to, did not dissolve the bonds of marriage, and that the parties remained as much man and wife as they were before. Under the Old Testament, divorce on the ground of adultery, was out of the question, because adultery was punished by death. And, therefore, it was only when Christ was laying down the law of his own kingdom, under which the death penalty for adultery was to be abolished, that it was necessary to make any reference to that crime.

It has been earnestly objected to the doctrine that adultery dissolves the marriage bond, that both parties, the guilty as well the innocent become free, and either may contract a new marriage. If this be so, it is said, that all that a man, who wishes to get rid of his wife, has to do, is to commit that offence. He will then be at liberty to marry whom he chooses. To this it might be a sufficient answer to say that the objection bears rather against the wisdom of the law, than against the fact that it is the law; or in other words, the objection is against the plain meaning of the words of Christ. But it is to be remembered, that adultery is a crime in the sight of man as well as in the sight of God, and as such it ought to be punished. Under the old dispensation it was punished by death; under the new, it

may be punished by imprisonment, or by prohibition of any future marriage. Christ leaves the punishment of this, as of other crimes, to be determined by his disciples in their civil capacity. All He does is to teach what its effects are, "in foro conscienti&#65533;," as to the marriage bond.

Grounds of Divorce.

As already stated, marriage is an indissoluble compact between one man and one woman. It cannot be dissolved by any voluntary act of repudiation on the part of the contracting parties; nor by any act of the Church or State. "Those whom God has joined together, no man can put asunder." The compact may, however, be dissolved, although by no legitimate act of man. It is dissolved by death. It is dissolved by adultery; and as Protestants teach, by wilful desertion. In other words, there are certain things which from their nature work a dissolution of the marriage bond. All the legitimate authority the state has in the premises is to take cognizance of the fact that the marriage is dissolved; officially to announce it, and to make suitable provision for the altered relation of the parties.

Under the preceding head it has already been shown that according to the plain teaching of our Saviour the marriage bond is annulled by the crime of adultery. The reason of this is, that the parties are no longer one, in the mysterious sense in which the Bible declares a man and his wife to be one. [345] The Apostle teaches on this subject the same doctrine that Christ had taught. The seventh chapter of his First Epistle to the Corinthians is devoted to the subject of marriage, in reference to which several questions had been proposed to him.

He first lays down the general principle, founded on the Word of God and the nature of man, that it is best that every man should have his own wife and every wife her own husband; but in view of the "present (or imminent) distress," he advises his readers not to marry. He writes to the Corinthians as a man would write to an army about to enter on a most unequal conflict in an enemy's country, and for a protracted period. He tells them: This is no time for you to think of marriage. You have a right to marry. And in general it is best that all men should marry. But in your circumstances marriage can only lead to embarrassment and increase of suffering.' This limitation of his advice not to marry, to men in the circumstances of those to whom the advice is given, is not only stated in so many words in verse 26, but it is the only way in which Paul can be reconciled with himself or with the general teaching of the Bible. It has already been remarked, that no one of the sacred writers speaks in more exalted terms of marriage than this Apostle. He represents it as a most ennobling spiritual union, which raises a man out of himself and makes him live for another; a union so elevated and refining as to render it a fit symbol of the union between Christ and his Church. Marriage, according to this Apostle, does for man in the sphere of nature, what union with Christ does for him in the sphere of grace.

Having thus given it as a matter of advice that it was best, under existing circumstances, for Christians not to marry, he proceeds to give directions to those who were already married. Of these here were two classes: first, those where both husband and wife were Christians; and secondly, those where one of the parties was a believer and the other an unbeliever, i.e., a Jew or a heathen. With regard to the former he says, that as according to the law of Christ the marriage is indissoluble, neither party had the right to repudiate the other. But if, in violation of the law of Christ, a wife had deserted her

husband, she was bound either to remain unmarried, or to be reconciled to her husband. The Apostle thus impliedly recognizes the principle that there may be causes which justify a woman's leaving her husband, which do not justify a dissolution of the marriage bond.

With regard to those cases in which one of the parties was a Christian and the other an unbeliever, he teaches, first, that such marriages are lawful, and, therefore, ought not to be dissolved. But, secondly, that if the unbelieving partner depart, i.e., repudiates the marriage, the believing partner is not bound; i.e., is no longer bound by the marriage compact. This seems to be the plain meaning. If the unbelieving partner is willing to continue in the marriage relation, the believing party is bound; bound, that is, to be faithful to the marriage compact. If the unbeliever is not willing to remain, the believer in that case is not bound; i.e., bound by the marriage compact. In other words, the marriage is thereby dissolved. This passage is parallel to Romans vii. 2. The Apostle there says, a wife "is bound by the law to her husband, so long as he liveth; but if the husband be dead, she is loosed from the law of her husband." So here he says, A wife is bound to her husband if he is willing to remain with her; but if he deserts her, she is free from him.' That is, wilful desertion annuls the marriage bond. This desertion, however, must be deliberate and final. This is implied in the whole context. The case contemplated is where the unbelieving husband refuses any longer to regard his believing partner as his wife.

This interpretation of the passage is given not only by the older Protestant interpreters, but also by the leading modern commentators, as De Wette, Meyer, Alford, and Wordsworth, and in the Confessions of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches. Even the Romanists take the same view. They hold, indeed, that among Christians marriage is absolutely indissoluble except by the death of one of the parties. But if one of the partners be an unbeliever, then they hold that desertion annuls the marriage contract. On this point Cornelius ? Lapide, of Louvain and Rome, says, "Nota, Apostolum permittere hoc casu non tantum thori divortium sed etiam matrimonii; ita ut possit conjux fidelis aliud matrimonium inire." Lapide refers to Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, and Ambrose in support of this opinion. [346] The Canon Law, under the title "Divortiis" teaches the same doctrine. Wordsworth's comment on the passage is, "Although a Christian may not put away his wife, being an unbeliever, yet if the wife desert her husband (chorizetai) he may contract a second marriage."

The Romanists indeed rest their sanction to remarriage in the case supposed, on the ground that there is an essential difference between marriage where one or both the parties are heathen, and marriage where both parties are Christians. This, however, makes no difference. Paul had just said that such unequal marriages were lawful and valid. Neither party could legitimately repudiate or leave the other. The ground of divorce indicated is not difference of religion, but desertion.

There is a middle ground taken by many, both ancients and moderns, in the interpretation of this passage. They admit that desertion justifies divorce, but not the remarriage of the party deserted. To this it may be objected, --

1. That this is inconsistent with the nature of divorce. We have already seen that divorce among the Jews, as explained by Christ, and as understood in the apostolic Church, was such a separation of man and wife as dissolved the marriage bond. This idea was expressed in the use of the words apoluein, aphienai, chorizein and these are the words

here used.

2. This interpretation is inconsistent with the context and with the design of the Apostle. Among the questions submitted to his decision, was this, Is it lawful for a Christian to remain in the marriage relation with an unbeliever?' Paul answers, Yes; such marriages are lawful and valid. Therefore if the unbeliever is willing to continue the marriage relation, the believer remains bound; but if the unbeliever refuses to continue the marriage, the believer is no longer bound by it.' To say that the believer is no longer bound to give up his or her religions which seems to be Neander's idea, or is not bound to force himself or herself upon an unwilling partner, would be nothing to the point. No Christian could think himself bound to give up his religion, and no one could think it possible that married life could be continued without the consent of the parties. The question, in this sense, was not worth either asking or answering.

3. Desertion, from the nature of the offence, is a dissolution of the marriage bond. Why does death dissolve a marriage? It is because it is a final separation. So is desertion. Incompatibility of temper, cruelty, disease, crime, insanity, etc., which human laws often make grounds of divorce, are not inconsistent with the marriage relation. A woman may have a disagreeable, a cruel, or a wicked husband, but a man in his grave, or one who refuses to recognize her as his wife, cannot be her husband.

It is said, indeed, that this doctrine makes marriage depend on the option of the parties. Either may desert the other; and then the marriage is dissolved. The same objection was made to our Lord's doctrine that adultery destroys the marriage bond. It was maid that if this be so, either party might dissolve the marriage, by committing that crime. As the objections are the same, the answer is the same. As adultery is a crime, so is desertion; and both should be punished. The question is not what these crimes deserve, but what are their legitimate effects, according to the Scriptures, on the marriage relation.

That desertion is a legitimate ground of divorce, was therefore, as before mentioned, the doctrine held by the Reformers, Luther, Calvin, and Zwingle, and almost without exception by all the Protestant churches. [347]

Doctrine of the Church of Rome.

Marriage is thus defined in the Roman Catechism: "Matrimonium est viri, et mulieris maritalis conjunctio inter legitimas personas, individuam vit[illegible] consuetudinem retinens." The clause "inter legitimas personas," is explained by saying, "Qui a nuptiarum conjunctione legibus omnino exclusi sunt, ii matrimonium inire non possunt; neque, si ineant, ratum est, exempli enim gratia: qui intra quartum gradum propinquitate conjuncti sunt, puerque ante decimum quartum annum, aut puella ante duodecimum, qu[illegible]tas legibus constituta est, ad matrimonii justa foedera ineunda apti esse non possunt." The clause, "Individuam vit[illegible] consuetudinem retinens," it is said, "indissolubilis vinculi naturam declarat quo vir, et uxor colligantur." [348]

Marriage is to be contemplated under two aspects. It is an institution founded in nature, and therefore exists wherever men exist. It is a lawful institution among the heathen as well as among Christians. But as it is an ordinance of God it has a character among those who know the true God and thus regard it, far higher than it has for those who are the worshippers of false gods. And, therefore, marriage, under the old dispensation, had a much higher character than it had among the heathen. Nevertheless, among Christians

marriage is something far more sacred than it was under the Mosaic economy. Christ had raised it te the dignity of a sacrament. [349]

Marriage a Sacrament.

The word sacrament is one of vague and various meaning. Sometimes it means that which is sacred or consecrated; sometimes that which has, or is intended to have a sacred meaning; i.e., an external sign of some religious truth or grace; sometimes a divinely appointed external rite instituted to be a means of grace; and sometimes a divinely appointed external sign that contains and conveys the grace which it signifies. It is in this last sense that the word is used by Romanists; and it is in this sense they teach that marriage is a sacrament. The principal Scriptural authority for this doctrine they find in Ephesians v. 32, where, as they understand the passage, the words to musterion touto mega estin, rendered in the Vulgate, "Sacramentum hoc magnum est," are spoken of marriage. According to this version and interpretation, the Apostle does indeed directly assert that marriage is a mystery. But (1.) The words do not refer to marriage, but to the mystical union between Christ and his people as appears from the Apostle's own explanation in the following clause: "I speak concerning Christ and the Church." The two subjects, the union of husband and wife and the union between Christ and his people, had been so combined and interwoven in the preceding verses, that it would have been difficult to determine to which the words, "This is a great mystery," were intended to refer, had not the Apostle himself told us. But (2.) Even if the Apostle does say that the marriage union is a great mystery, which in one sense it clearly is, that would not prove that it is a sacrament. The word "mystery," as used in the Bible, means something hidden or unknown; something which can be known only by divine revelation. Thus the Gospel itself is repeatedly said to be a mystery (Eph. iii. 3-9); the future conversion of the Jews is said to be a mystery (Rom. xi. 25); the incarnation is said to be the great mystery of godliness (1 Tim. iii. 16); and anything obscure or enigmatical is called a mystery (Rev. xvii. 6); thus the mystery of the seven candlesticks is their secret meaning. If, therefore, Paul says that marriage is a great mystery in the sense that no one can fully understand what is meant when God says that husband and wife are one, or even in the sense that marriage has a sacred import, that it is a symbol of a great religious truth, this is what all Protestants admit and what is clearly taught in Scripture. Paul had himself just set forth marriage as the great analogue of the mystical union of Christ and the Church. (3.) Admitting still further that marriage was properly called "sacramentum," that would prove nothing to the purpose. That Latin word had not the sense attached to it by Romanists until long after the apostolic age. It has not that sense even in the Vulgate. In 1 Timothy iii. 16, the manifestation of God in the flesh is declared to be the "great mystery of godliness," which the Vulgate translates "magnum pietatis sacramentum;" but Romanists do not hold that the incarnation is a sacrament in the ecclesiastical sense of that term. The Latin Church, however, having gradually come to attach to the word the idea of a divinely appointed rite or ceremony, which signifies, contains, and conveys grace, and finding, as the words were understood, marriage declared in Ephesians v. 32 to be a "sacramentum," it came to teach that it was a sacrament in the same sense as baptism and the Lord's Supper.

Romanists then teach that marriage is a sacrament not merely because it is the sign or symbol of the union of Christ and his Church. The Roman Catechism says, [350] (1). That

no one should doubt "quod scilicet viri, et mulieris conjunctio, cujus Deus auctor est, sanctissimi illius vinculi, quo Christus dominus cum Ecclesia conjungitur, sacramentum, id est, sacrum signum sit." If this were all, no Protestant could object. (2). But Romanists teach that marriage is a sacrament because it not only signifies but also confers grace. The ceremony, including the consent of the parties, the benediction, and the intention of the priest, renders the bride and groom holy. It sanctifies them. "Ex opere operato," it transforms mere natural human love into that holy spiritual affection which renders their union a fit emblem of the union of Christ and the Church. On this point the Council of Trent says: [351] "Gratiam, vero, qu[illegible] naturalem illum amorem perficeret, et indissolubilem unitatem confirmaret, conjugesque sanctificaret, ipse Christus, venerabilium sacramentorum institutor, atque perfector, sua nobis passione promeruit." It would be a great blessing if this were so. Facts, however, prove that the sacramental efficacy of matrimony no more so sanctifies husbands and wives as to make their mutual love like the holy love of Christ for his Church, than baptism confers (to those not opposing an obstacle) all the benefits, subjective and objective, of the redemption of Christ. If the sacramentarian theory were true, all Christians would be perfect and Christendom would be paradisaical.

Marriage between Christians, according to Romanists, is indissoluble. Neither adultery nor desertion justifies divorce. Death alone can sever the bond. It is not to be inferred from this, however, that marriage is a more sacred institution among Romanists than among Protestants. Any departure from Scriptural rules is sure to work evil. The denial that adultery destroys the marriage bond, leads naturally, and in fact has led, not only to render that crime more frequent, but also to unscriptural devices to remedy the injustice of forcing a husband or wife to maintain the conjugal relation with a guilty partner. One of these devices is the multiplication of the causes of separation "a mensa et thoro"; and another still more unscriptural, is the multiplying the reasons which render marriage null and void "ab initio." No less than sixteen causes which render marriages null are enumerated by Romish theologians. [352]

The causes which justify separation without divorce, are vows, adultery, apostasy, and crimes. Under the last head they include cruelty and prodigality. If the parties had not been baptized, divorce "a vinculo" was allowed when one of the partners became a Romanist and the other refused to, and also for any serious crime. The whole matter is in the hands of the Church, which claims the right of making and unmaking impediments to marriage at pleasure. "Si quis dixerit Ecclesiam non potuisse constituere impedimenta, matrimonium dirimentia, vel in iis constituendis errasse; anathema sit." [353] At one period the Church of Rome made consanguinity within the seventh degree an impediment to marriage; at present it forbids marriage within the fourth degree inclusive. "The old Catholic theory of marriage," says President Woolsey, "was practically a failure in all its parts, in its ascetic frown on marriage, in its demand from the clergy of an abstinence not required from the Christian laity, in teaching that nothing but death could release the married pair from their obligations. When it sought for impracticable virtue, and forbade to some what God had allowed to all, it opened a fountain of vice with the smallest incitement to virtue." [354]

Laws of Protestant Countries concerning Divorce.

It has already been shown that Protestants, making the Scriptures their guide, taught that the dissolution of the bond of marriage was allowable only for the two offences of

adultery and wilful desertion. So far as the churches and their confessions are concerned, this is still the doctrine of almost all Protestant denominations. When, however, marriage came to be regarded as essentially a civil contract, it gradually fell under the jurisdiction of the state, and laws were passed varying in different countries, as legislators were influenced by mere views of justice or expediency. The legislation of all European nations was greatly influenced by the old Roman law; and, therefore, when marriage was removed from the exclusive jurisdiction of the Church, the laws concerning it were more or less adopted from the ancient code. The Roman laws concerning divorce were very lax. Mutual consent was, even after the Roman emperors became Christian, regarded as a sufficient reason for dissolving the bond of marriage. When the Church gained the ascendancy over the State, and the pope became the virtual legislator of Christendom, divorce for any reason was forbidden; and when and where the pope in his turn was dethroned, there was a general tendency to return to the laxity of the Roman legislation.

England.

England was an exception to this rule. It discarded less of popish usages than any other Protestant nation. For a long time after the Reformation no special law concerning divorce was passed. The ecclesiastical courts could decree separation "a mensa et thoro," but a full divorce "a vinculo" could be obtained only by a special act of Parliament. Under the reign of the present sovereign all such questions were removed from the ecclesiastical courts and remitted to a civil tribunal. That tribunal is authorized to grant judicial separation "a mensa et thoro" on the ground of adultery, or cruelty, or desertion without just cause for two years and upward; and dissolution of marriage on account of simple adultery on the part of the wife, or aggravated adultery on the part of the husband. Such divorce gives both parties liberty to contract a new marriage. "On the whole, with serious defects," says President Woolsey, "it seems to us to be an excellent law. It does honour to the Christian country where it is in force, and it is certainly a great improvement on the former mode of regulating divorce in England." [355] It may be a good law in comparison with the lawlessness that preceded it, and in comparison with the lax legislation of other Protestant nations, but it is not good so far as it is not conformed to the Scriptures. The New Testament makes no such distinction as is made in this law, between adultery on the part of the wife and the same offence on the part of the husband. And it is not good in not allowing wilful desertion to be a legitimate ground of divorce, if, as Protestants almost universally believe, the Bible teaches the contrary.

France.

In France the laws of the Romish Church were in force until the Revolution. That event threw everything into confusion, and the sanctity of marriage was in a great degree disregarded. Under the empire of the first Napoleon, the civil code allowed divorce, (1.) for simple adultery on the part of the wife; (2.) for aggravated adultery on the part of the husband; (3.) for outrages and cruelty; (4.) for the condemnation of either party to an infamous punishment; and (5.) for mutual persistent consent. The restoration of the Bourbons put an end to these laws and led to the entire prohibition of divorce.

Germany.

Among the Protestants of Germany, the views of the Reformers, as a general thing, controlled the action of the several states on this subject until about the middle of the

eighteenth century, when the laws of marriage were greatly relaxed. G[illegible]schen attributes this change in a great measure to the influence of Thomasius (1728), who regarded marriage as merely a civil institution designed for the purposes of the state, and which, therefore, might be set aside whenever it failed to answer the desired end. [356] The present law of Prussia, although an improvement on the previous legislation, is far below the Scriptural standard. Besides adultery and wilful desertion, it makes many other offences grounds of divorce, for example, plots endangering the life or health of the other party; gross injuries; dangerous incompatibility of temper; crimes entailing an infamous punishment; habitual drunkenness and extravagance; and deliberate mutual consent, if there be no children fruit of the marriage to be dissolved.

The United States.

The laws of the several states of this Union on the subject of divorce vary from the extreme of strictness to the extreme of laxness. In South Carolina no divorce has ever been given. The effect of refusing to regard adultery as a dissolution of the marriage bond is, as proved by the experience of Catholic countries, to lead the people to regard that crime as a pardonable offence. It was indictable. In New York adultery is the only ground of divorce; but separation from bed and board is granted for cruelty, desertion, and refusal on the part of the husband to make provision for the support of the wife. In several of the other states, besides adultery and desertion, many other grounds are made sufficient to justify divorce; of these grounds the following are the principal: imprisonment, neglect to provide for the maintenance of the wife, habitual drunkenness, and cruelty. In some states the whole matter is left to the discretion of the courts. In the laws of Maine it is said that divorce "a vinculo" may be granted by any justice of the Supreme Court, "when in the exercise of a sound discretion, he deems it reasonable and proper, conducive to domestic harmony, and consistent with the peace and morality of society." The law of Indiana says divorce may be granted for any cause for which the court deems it proper. [357] In Rhode Island to the enumeration of specific causes is added, "and for any other gross misbehaviour and wickedness in either of the parties, repugnant to and in violation of the marriage covenant." In Connecticut the statute passed in 1849 allows divorce for "any such misconduct as permanently destroys the happiness of the petitioner and defeats the purpose of the conjugal relation." [358]

Duty of the Church and of its Officers.

There are certain principles bearing on this subject which will be generally conceded, (1.) Every legislative body is bound to conform its enactments to the moral law. This may be assumed as a self-evident proposition. (2.) Every Christian legislature is bound to conform its action to the laws of Christianity. By a Christian legislature is meant one which makes laws for a Christian people. It is not necessary that it should represent them as Christians, to be their agents in teaching, propagating, or enforcing the principles of the Christian religion. It is enough to constitute it a Christian legislature that the great body of its constituents who are bound to obey its laws are Christians. No one hesitates to say that Italy, Spain, and France are Catholic countries; or that England, Sweden, and Prussia are Protestant. As all the powers of legislatures are derived from the people, it is irrational to suppose that the people would delegate to their representatives authority to violate their religion. No legislature of a Christian state, therefore, can have the right to make laws

inconsistent with the Christian religion. This principle, so reasonable and obvious, is conceded in the abstract. No state in this Union would dare to legalize adultery or bigamy. Before the Reformation all questions concerning marriage were under the jurisdiction of the Church; after that event they were, in Protestant countries, referred to the authorities of the state. "It never, however," says Stahl, "entered the minds of the Reformers, to assert that marriage was purely a civil institution, to be determined by civil, and not religious laws, or that the testimony of the Church as to the divine laws of marriage was not a binding rule for the legislation of the state." [359] And in still more general terms he declares that "What the Church as such [the body of Christians] testifies to be an unchangeable divine law, jus divinum,' and upholds within its sphere, is the impassable rule and limit for the legislation of a Christian state." [360]

3. No act of any human legislature contrary to the moral law can bind any man, and no such act contrary to the law of Christ can bind any Christian. If, therefore, a human tribunal annuls a marriage for any reason other than those assigned in the Bible, the marriage is not thereby dissolved. In the judgment of Christians it remains in full force; and they are bound so to regard it. And on the other hand, if the state pronounces a marriage valid, which the Bible declares to be invalid, in the view of Christians it is invalid. There is no help for this. Christians cannot give up their convictions; nor can they renounce their allegiance to Christ. This state of conflict between the laws and the conscience of the people, is the necessary consequence, if a body making laws for a Christian people disregards an authority which the people recognize as divine.

4. The laws of many of the states of this Union, on the matter of divorce, are unscriptural and immoral. If the former, they are the latter in the view of all who believe in the divine authority of the Bible. If the Scriptures be the only infallible rule of faith and practice, they contain the only standard of right and wrong. The moral law is not something self-imposed. It is not what any man or body of men may think right or expedient. It is the revealed will of God as to human conduct; and whatever is contrary to that will is morally wrong. If this be so, then there can be no doubt that the divorce laws of many of our states are immoral. They contravene the law of God. They annul marriages for other reasons than those allowed in Scripture, and even, in some cases, at the discretion of the courts. They pronounce persons not to be man and wife, who by the law of God are man and wife. They pronounce those to be legally married, whose union Christ declares to be adulterous. That is, they legalize adultery. This is a conclusion which cannot be avoided, except by denying either the authority of the Bible, or that it legislates on the subject of marriage. If marriage were a mere civil compact, with regard to which the Scriptures gave no special directions, it might be regulated by the state according to its news of wisdom or expediency. But if it be an ordinance of God; if He has revealed his will as to who may, and who may not intermarry, and who, when married, may or may not be released from the marriage bond, then the state has no more right to alter these laws than it has to alter the decalogue, and to legalize idolatry or blasphemy. There is no use in covering this matter over. It is wrong to regard anti-Christian laws as matters of small importance.

The action of the state in this matter is not merely negative. It does not simply overlook or refuse to punish the violation of the Scriptural law of divorce, but it intervenes by its positive action, and declares that certain parties are not man and wife, between

whom, according to the law of God, the bond of marriage still subsists. It condemns bigamy, but it sanctions what the Bible pronounces bigamy. The law of the state and the law of God, in this regard, are so opposed to each other, that he who obeys the one violates the other.

5. As the Church and its officers are under the highest obligations to obey the law of Christ, it follows that where the action of the state conflicts with that law, such action must be disregarded. If a person be divorced on other than Scriptural grounds and marries again, such person cannot consistently be received to the fellowship of the Church. If a minister be called upon to solemnize the marriage of a person improperly divorced, he cannot, in consistency with his allegiance to Christ, perform the service. This conflict between the civil and divine law is a great evil, and has often, especially in Prussia, given rise to great difficulty.

As all denominations of Christians, Romanists and Protestants, are of one mind on this subject, it is matter of astonishment that these objectionable divorce laws are allowed to stand on the statute-books of so many of our states. This fact proves either that public attention has not to a sufficient degree been called to the subject, or that the public conscience is lamentably blinded or seared. The remedy is with the Church, which is the witness of God on earth, bound to testify to his truth and to uphold his law. If Christians, in their individual capacity and in their Church courts, would unite in their efforts to arouse and guide public sentiment on this subject, there is little doubt that these objectionable laws would be repealed.

The Social Evil.

This is not a subject to be discussed in these pages; a few remarks, however, in reference to it may not be out of place.

1. It is obviously Utopian to expect that all violations of the seventh commandment can be prevented, any more than that the laws against theft or falsehood should never be disregarded.

2. The history of the world shows that the instinct which leads to the evil in question can never be kept within proper limits, except by moral principle, or by marriage.

3. To these two means of correction, therefore, the efforts of the friends of virtue should be principally directed. There can be no efficient moral culture without religious training. If we would reform our fellow-men, we must bring and keep them from the beginning to the end of their lives under the influence of the truth and ordinances of God; to accomplish this work is the duty assigned to the Church. Besides this general moral culture, there is needed special effort to produce a proper public sentiment with regard to this special evil. So long as the seventh commandment can be violated without any serious loss of self-respect or of public confidence, one of the strongest barriers against vice is broken down. If loss of character as certainly followed a breach of the seventh commandment, as it follows theft or perjury, the evil would be to a good degree abated. This is already the fact with regard to certain classes. It is so with regard to women; and it is so in the case of the clergy. If a minister of the gospel be guilty of this offence, he is as certainly and effectually ruined as he would be by the commission of any other crime short of murder. The same moral law, however, binds all men. Theft in the case of one man is, in its essential character, just what it is in the case of any other man.

4. The divinely appointed preventive of the social evil is laid down in 1 Corinthians vii. 2: "Let every man have his own wife, and let every woman have her own husband." That there are serious difficulties, in the present state of society, in the way of frequent and early marriages, cannot be denied. The principal of these is no doubt the expensive style of living generally adopted. Young people find it impossible to commence life with the conveniences and luxuries to which they have been accustomed in their fathers houses, and therefore marriage is neglected or postponed. With regard to the poorer classes, provision might be made to endow young women of good character, so as to enable them to begin their married life in comfort. Arrangements may also be made in various ways to lessen the expense of family living. The end to be accomplished is to facilitate marriage. Those who are so happy as to find in a dictum of Scripture the ultimate reason and the highest motive, may see the end to be attained, although, as in the present case, they are obliged to leave the means of its accomplishment to experts in social science.

Prohibited Marriages.

That certain marriages are prohibited is almost the universal judgment of mankind. Among the ancient Persians and Egyptians, indeed, the nearest relations were allowed to intermarry and in the corrupt period of the Roman Empire, equal laxness more or less prevailed. These isolated facts do not invalidate the argument from the general judgment of mankind. What all men think to be wrong, must be wrong. This unanimity cannot be accounted for, except by assuming that the judgment in which men thus agree is founded on the constitution of their nature, and that constitution is the work of God. There are cases, therefore, in which the "vox populi" is the "vox Dei."

The Ground or Reason of such Prohibitions.

The reason why mankind so generally condemn the intermarriage of near relations cannot be physical. Physiology is not taught by instinct. It is, therefore, not only an unworthy, but is an altogether unsatisfactory assumption, that such marriages are forbidden because they tend to the deterioration of the race. The fact assumed may, or may not be true; but if admitted, it is utterly insufficient to account for the condemnatory judgment in question.

The two most natural and obvious reasons why the intermarriage of near relations is forbidden are, first, that the natural affection which relatives have for each other is incompatible with conjugal love. They cannot coexist. The latter is a violation and destruction of the former. This reason need only be stated. It requires no illustration. These natural affections are not only healthful, but in the higher grades of relationship, even sacred. The second ground for such prohibitions is a regard to domestic purity. When persons are so nearly related to each other as to justify their living together as one family, they should be sacred one to the other. If this were not the case, evil could hardly fail to occur, when young people grow up in the familiarity of domestic life. The slightest inspection of the details of the law as laid down in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus, shows that his principle underlies many of its specifications.

J. D. Michaelis, in his work on the law of Moses, makes this the only reason for the Levitical prohibitions. He goes to the extreme of denying that "nearness of kin" is in itself any bar to marriage. His views had great influence, not only on public opinion, but even on legislation in Germany. That influence, however, passed away when a deeper moral and

religious feeling gained ascendancy. [361]

Augustine's Theory.

Augustine advanced a theory on this subject, which still has its earnest advocates. He held that the design of all these prohibitory laws was to widen the circle of the social affections. Brothers and sisters are bound together by mutual love. Should they intermarry the circle is not extended. If they choose husbands and wives from among strangers, a larger number of persons are included in the bonds of mutual love. "Habita est ratio rectissima charitatis, ut homines quibus esset utilis atque honesta concordia, diversarum necessitudinum vinculis necterentur; nec unus in uno multas haberet, sed singul spargerentur in singulos; ac sic ad socialem vitam diligentius colligandam plurim plurimos obtinerent." Thus it would come to pass, "Ut unus homo haberet alteram sororem, alteram uxorem, alteram consobrinam, alterum patrem, alterum avunculum, alterum socerum, alteram matrem, alteram amitam, alteram socrum: atque ita se non in paucitate coarctatum, sed latius atque numerosius propinquitatibus crebris vinculum sociale diffunderet." [362]

A writer in Hengstenberg's "Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung," adopts and elaborately vindicates this theory. He endeavours to show that it answers all the criteria by which any theory on the subject should be tested. These marriages are called "abominations;" and he asks, Is it not shameful that the benevolent ordinance of God for extending the circle of the social affections should be counteracted? They are called "confusion," because they unite those whom God commands to remain separate. It also accounts for the propriety of the intermarriage of brothers and sisters in the family of Adam; for in the beginning the circle of affection did not admit of being enlarged. It even meets the case if the Levirate law which bound a man to marry the childless widow of his brother. The law which forbids the marriage of relations, holds only where the relationship is close. There must, therefore, be cases just on the line beyond which relationship is no bar to marriage. And with regard to those just within the line, there must be considerations which sometimes outweigh the objections to a given marriage. That God dispensed with the law forbidding the marriage of a man with his brother's widow, when the brother died without children, this German writer regards as impossible. "Evil," he says, "may be tolerated, but not commanded." He adds that it provokes a smile (man muss es naiv nennen) that Gerhard finds an analogy between the case in question and the permission given to the Israelites to despoil the Egyptians. [363] It is probable that the venerable Gerhard would smile at the writer's criticisms. In the first place, God can no more allow evil than He can command it. An act otherwise evil, ceases to be so when He either allows (i.e., sanctions) it, or commands it. If He commands a man to be put to deaths it ceases to be murder to put him to death. There are two principles of morality generally accepted and clearly Scriptural; one of which is, that any of those moral laws which are founded, not on the immutable nature of God, but upon the relations of men in the present state of existence, may be set aside by the divine law-giver whenever it seems good in his sight; just as God under the old dispensation set aside the original monogamic law of marriage. Polygamy was not sinful as long as God permitted it. The same principle is involved in the words of Christ, God loves mercy and not sacrifice. When two laws conflict, the weaker yields to the stronger. It is wrong to labour on the Sabbath, but any amount of labour on that day becomes a duty, if necessary to save life. In

the case of the Levirate law, the prohibition to marry a brother's widow, yielded to what under the Mosaic economy was regarded as a higher obligation, that is, to perpetuate the family. To die childless was considered one of the greatest calamities.

The question, however, concerning the rationale of these laws is one of minor importance. We may not be able to see exactly in all cases why certain things are forbidden. The fact that they are forbidden should satisfy the reason and the conscience. The two important questions in connection with this subject, to be considered, are, first, is the Levitical law respecting prohibited marriages still in force? and, second, how is that law to be interpreted, and what marriages does it forbid?

Is the Levitical Law of Marriage still in force?

1. It is a strong a priori argument in favour of an affirmative answer to that question, that it always has been regarded as obligatory by the whole Christian Church.

2. The reason assigned for the prohibition contained in that law, has no special reference to the Jews. It is not found is their peculiar circumstances, nor in the design of God in selecting them to be depositaries of his truth to prepare the world for the coming of the Messiah. The reason assigned "is nearness of kin." This reason has as much force at one time as at another, for all nations as for any one nation. There was nothing peculiar in the relation in which Hebrew parents and children, Hebrew brothers and sisters, and Hebrew uncles and nieces, stood, which was the ground of these prohibitions. That ground was the nearness of the relationship itself as it exists in every and in all ages. There is, therefore, in the sight of God, a permanent reason why near relations ought not to intermarry.

3. If the Levitical law be not still in force, we have no divine law on the subject. Then there is no such sin as incest. It is an offence only against the civil law, and a sin against God only in so far as it is sinful to violate the law of the state. But this is contrary to the universal judgment of men, at least of Christian men. For parents and children, brothers and sisters, to intermarry is universally considered as sin against God, irrespective of any human prohibition. But if a sin against God, it must be forbidden in his Word, or we must give up the fundamental principle of Protestantism, that the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of our faith and practice. As such marriages are nowhere in the Bible forbidden except in the Levitical law, if that law does not forbid them, the Bible does not forbid them.

4. The judgments of God are denounced against the heathen nations for permitting the marriages which the Levitical law forbids. In Leviticus xviii. 8, it is said, "After the doings of the land of Egypt, wherein ye dwelt shall ye not do: and after the doings of the land of Canaan, whither I bring you, shall ye not do; neither shall ye walk in their ordinances." This is the introduction to the law of prohibited marriages, containing the specification of the "ordinances" of the Egyptians and Canaanites, which the people of God were forbidden to follow. And in the twenty-seventh verse of the same chapter, at the close of these specifications, it is said, "All these abominations have the men of the land done, which were before you, and the land is deified." Again, in ch. xx. 23, still in reference to these marriages, it is said, "Ye shall not walk in the manners of the nations which I cast out before you: for they committed all these things, and therefore I abhorred them." This is a clear proof that these laws were binding, not on the Jews alone, but upon all people and at all times.

5. The continued obligation of the Levitical law on this subject is also recognized in

the New Testament. This recognition as involved in the constant reference to the law of Moses as the law of God. If in any of its parts or specifications it is no longer obligatory, that is to be proved. It contains much which we learn from the New Testament was designed simply to keep the Hebrews a distinct people; much which was typical; much which was a shadow of things to come, and which passed away when the substance was revealed. It contained, however, much which was moral and of permanent obligation. If God gives a law to men, those who deny its perpetual obligation are bound to prove it. The presumption is that it continues in force until the contrary is proved. It must be hard to prove that laws founded on the permanent social relations of men were intended to be temporary.

Besides this general consideration, we find specific recognitions of the continued obligation of the Levitical law in the New Testament. John the Baptist, as recorded in Mark vi. 18 and Matthew xiv. 4, said to Herod that it was not lawful for him to have his brother Philip's wife. It matters not, as to the argument, whether Philip was living or not. The offence charged was not that he had taken another man's wife, but that he had taken his brother's wife. It may be objected to this argument that during the ministry of John the Baptist the law of Moses was still in force. This Gerhard denies, who argues from Matthew xi. 13, "All the prophets and the law prophesied until John, that the Baptist's ministry belongs to the new dispensation. [364] This may be doubted. Nevertheless John expressed the moral sentiment of his age; and the record of the fact referred to by the Evangelists whose Gospels were written after the Christian Church was fully organized, is given in a form which involves a sanction of the judgment which the Baptist had expressed against the marriage of Herod with his brother's wife. It is also to be remembered that the Herodian family was Idumean, and therefore, that a merely Jewish law would have no natural authority over them.

The Apostle Paul, moreover, in 1 Corinthians v. 1, speaks of a man's marrying his step-mother as an unheard of offence. That this was a case of marriage and not of adultery is plain because the phrase gunaika echein is never used in the New Testament except of marriage. This, therefore, is a clear recognition of the continued obligation of the law forbidding marriage between near relations, whether the relationship was by consanguinity or affinity.

6. The Bible everywhere enforces those laws which have their foundation in the natural constitution of men. That this Levitical law is a divine authentication of a law of nature, may be inferred from the fact that with rare exceptions the intermarriage of near relations is forbidden among all nations. Paul says that the marriage of a man with his step-mother was unheard of among the heathen; i.e., it was forbidden and abhorred. Cicero exclaims, "Nuoit genero socrus. . . . . O mulieris incredibile et pr[illegible]ter hanc unam in omni vita inauditum!" [365] Beza says, It must not be overlooked that the civil laws of the Romans agree completely in reference to this subject with the divine law. They seemed to have copied from it. [366]

No Christian Church doubts the continued obligation of any of the laws of the Pentateuch, of which it can be said that the reason assigned for their enactment is the permanent relations of men; that the heathen are condemned for their violation; and that the New Testament refers to them as still in force: and which heathen nations under the

guidance of natural conscience have enacted.

How is the Levitical Law to be interpreted?

Admitting the Levitical law of marriage to be still in force, the next question is, How is it to be interpreted? Is it to be understood as specifying the degrees of relation, whether of consanguinity or of affinity, within which intermarriage is forbidden? or, is it to be viewed as an enumeration of particular cases, so that no case not specifically mentioned is to be included in the prohibition?

The former of these rules of interpretation is the one generally adopted; for the following reasons: --

1. The language of the law itself. It begins with a general prohibition of marriage between those who are near of kin. Nearness of kindred is made the ground of the prohibition. The specifications which follow are intended to show what degree of nearness of kindred works a prohibition. This reason applies to many cases not particularly mentioned in Leviticus xvii. or elsewhere. The law would seem to be applicable to all cases in which the divinely assigned reason for its enactment is found to exist.

2. The design of the law, as we have seen, is twofold: first, to keep sacred those relationships which naturally give rise to feelings and affections which are inconsistent with the marriage relation; and secondly, the preservation of domestic purity. As the natural affections are due partly to the very constitution of our nature, and partly to the familiarity and constancy of intercourse, and the interchange of kindly offices, it is natural that in the enumeration of the prohibited cases regard should be had, in the selection, to those in which this familiarity of intercourse, at the time the law was enacted, actually prevailed. In the East the family is organized on different principles from those on which it is organized in the West. Among the early Oriental nations especially, the males of a family with their wives remained together; while the daughters, being given in marriage, went away and were amalgamated with the families of their husbands. Hence it would happen that relatives by the father's side would be intimate associates, while those of the same degree on the mother's side might be perfect strangers. A law, therefore, constructed on the principle of prohibiting marriage between parties so related as to be already in the bonds of natural affection and who were domesticated in the same family circle, would deal principally in specifications of relationships on the father's side. It would not follow, however, from this fact, that relations of the same grade of kindred might freely intermarry, simply because they were not specified in the enumeration. The law in its principle applies to all cases, whether enumerated or not, in which the nearness of kin is the source of natural affection, and in which it leads to and justifies intimate association.

3. Another consideration in favour of the principle of interpretation usually adopted, is, that the opposite rule would introduce the greatest inconsistencies into the law. The law forbids marriage between those near of kin; and, according to this rule, it goes on alternately permitting and forbidding marriages where the relationship is precisely the same. Thus, a man cannot marry the daughter of his son; but a woman may marry the son of her daughter; a man cannot marry the widow of his father's brother, but he may marry the widow of his mother's brother; a woman cannot marry two brothers, but a man may marry two sisters. These inconsistencies might be intelligible if the law were a temporary and local enactment, designed for a transient state of society; but they are utterly unaccountable

if the law be one of permanent and universal obligation. A rule of interpretation which brings uniformity and consistency into these enactments of Scripture, is certainly to be preferred to one which renders them confused and inconsistent.

Prohibited Degrees.

The cases specifically mentioned are: 1. Mother. 2. Stepmother. 3. Grand-daughter. 4. Sister and half-sister, "born at home or born abroad," i.e., legitimate or illegitimate. 5. Aunt on the father's side. 6. Maternal aunt. 7. The wife of a father's brother. 8. Daughter-in-law. 9. Brother's wife. 10. A woman and her daughter. 11. A wife's grand-daughter. 12. Two sisters at the same time.

The meaning of Leviticus xviii. 18, has been much disputed. The question is, Whether the words 'sh 'l'tth, "a woman to her sister," are to be understood in their idiomatic sense, "one to another," so that the law forbids bigamy, the taking of one wife to another during her lifetime; or, Whether they are to be taken literally, so that this law forbids a man's marrying the sister of his wife while the latter is living. It is certain that the words in question have in several places the idiomatic sense ascribed to them. In Exodus xxvi. 3, "Five curtains shall be coupled together one to another," literally, "a woman to her sister;" so in verse 5, the loops take hold, "a woman and her sister;" ver. 6, the taches of gold unite the curtains, "a woman and her sister." Also in ver. 17. Thus also in Ezekiel i. 9, it is said, "their wings were joined one to another," "a woman to her sister;" and again in ch. iii. 13. The words therefore admit of the rendering given in the margin of the English version. But it is objected to this interpretation in this case: (1.) That the words in question never mean "one to another," except when preceded by a plural noun; which is not the case in Leviticus xviii. 18. (2.) If this explanation be adopted, the passage contains an explicit prohibition of polygamy, which the law of Moses permitted. (3.) It is unnatural to take the words "wife" and "sister" in a sense different from that in which they are used throughout the chapter. (4) The ancient versions agree with the rendering given in the text of the English Bible. The Septuagint has gunaika ep adelphe autes; the Vulgate, "sororem uxoris tu&#65533;."

In this interpretation the modern commentators almost without exception agree. Thus Maurer renders the passage: "Uxorem ad (i.e., pr&#65533;ter) sororem ejus ne ducito,' i.e., Nolli pr&#65533;ter tuam conjugem aliam insuper uxorem ducere, qu&#65533; illius soror est." [367] Baumgarten's comment is: "From the fact that the prohibition of the marriage of a wife's sister is expressly conditioned on the life of the former, we must infer with the Rabbins, that after the death of the wife this marriage is permitted. True, the degree of affinity is here the same as in ver. 16, but there the relationship is on the male, here on the female side; this makes a difference, because under the Old Testament the woman had not attained to the same degree of personality and independence as the man." [368] Rosenm&#65533;ller says: "Uxorem ad sororem ejus ne ducas, duas sorores ne ducas in matrimonium, scil. vhyyh in vita ejus, i.e., uxore tua vivente. Non igitur prohibet Moses matrimonium cum sorores uxoris mortu&#65533;." [369] Knobel says: "Finally, a man shall not marry . . . . the sister of his wife, so long as the latter lives. . . . . To marry one after the other, after the death of the other, is not forbidden." [370] Keil understands v. 18 in the same way. It forbids, according to his view, a man's having two sisters, at the same time, as his wives. "After the death of the first wife," he adds, "marriage with her sister was allowed." [371]

The inference which these writers draw from the fact that in this passage the marriage

of a wife's sister is forbidden during the life of the wife, that the marriage of the sister, after the death of the wife, is allowed, is very precarious. All that the passage teaches is, that if a man chooses to have two wives, at the same time, which the law allowed, they must not be sisters; and the reason assigned is, that it would bring the sisters into a false relation to each other. This leaves the question of the propriety of marrying the sister of a deceased wife just where it was. This verse has no direct bearing on that subject.

The cases not expressly mentioned in Leviticus xviii., although involving the same degree of kindred as those included in the enumeration, are: 1. A man's own daughter. This is a clear proof that the enumeration was not intended to be exhaustive. 2. A brother's daughter. 3. A sister's daughter. 4. A maternal uncle's widow. 5. A brother's son's widow. 6. A sister's son s widow. 7. The sister of a deceased wife.

As nearness of kindred is made the ground of prohibition, and as these cases are included within "the degrees" specified, the Church has considered them as belonging to the class of prohibited marriages. It is, however, to be considered that the word "prohibited," as here used, is very comprehensive. Some of the marriages specified in the Levitical law are prohibited in very different senses. Some are pronounced abominable, and those who contract them are made punishable with death. Others are pronounced unseemly, or evil, and punished by exclusion from the privileges of the theocracy. Others again incur the penalty of dying childless; probably meaning that the children of such marriages should not be enrolled in the family registers which the Jews were so careful to preserve.

As this distinction is recognized in the law itself, so it is founded in the nature of the case. As nearness of kin varies from the most intimate relationship to the most distant, so these marriages vary in their impropriety from the highest to the lowest degree. Some of them may, in certain cases, be wrong, not in themselves, but simply from the obligation to uphold a salutary law. That is, there may be cases to which the law, but not the reason of the law applies. For example; a man may go thousands of miles from home and marry: his wife would stand in a very different relation to her husband's brothers, than had she lived in the same house with them. The law forbidding a woman to marry the brother of her deceased husband, would apply to her; but the reason of that law would affect her in a very slight degree; nevertheless, even in her case, the law should be observed.

There is another obvious remark that ought to be made. Strong repugnance is often felt and expressed against the Levitical law, not only because it is regarded as placing all the marriages specified on the same level, representing all as equally offensive in the sight of God, but also from the assumption that all the marriages forbidden are, if contracted, invalid. This is a wrong view of the subject. It is inconsistent with the law itself, and contrary to the analogy of Scripture. The law recognizes a great disparity in the impropriety of these marriages. Some, as just remarked, are utterly abominable and insufferable. Others are specified because inexpedient or dangerous, as conflicting with some ethical or prudential principle.

It is in this as in many other cases. The Mosaic law discountenanced and discouraged intermarriage between the chosen people and their heathen neighbours. With regard to the Canaanites, such intermarriages were absolutely forbidden; with other heathen nations, although discountenanced, they were tolerated. Joseph married an Egyptian; Moses, a Midianite; Solomon married Pharaoh's daughter. Such marriages, in the settled state of the

Jewish nation, may have been wrong, but they were valid. Even now under the Christian dispensation, believers are forbidden to be unequally yoked together with unbelievers. It does not follow from this that every marriage between a believer and an unbeliever is invalid. These remarks are not out of place. The truth suffers from being misapprehended. If the Bible is made to teach what is contrary to the common sense, or the intuitive judgments of men, it suffers great injustice. No man can force himself to believe that a man's marrying the sister of a deceased wife is the same kind of offence as a father's marrying his own daughter. The Bible teaches no such doctrine; and it is a slander so to represent it.

Concluding Remarks.

The laws of God are sacred. They are founded, not only on his infinite wisdom, but also on the nature of his creatures, and, therefore, should be sedulously observed. There may, in some cases, be honest difference of opinion as to what the law or will of God is, but when ascertained, it is our wisdom and duty to make it the rule of our conduct. This is so obvious that the statement of it may seem entirely superfluous. It is so common. however, for men professing to be Christians to make their own feelings, opinions, and views of expediency, the rule of action for themselves and others, that it is by no means a work of supererogation, to reiterate on all proper occasions the truism that there is no wisdom like God's wisdom, and that men are never wise except when they follow the wisdom of God as revealed in his Word, even when they have to do it blindly.

There are certain principles which underlie the marriage laws of the Bible, which all men in their private capacity and when acting as legislators, would do well to respect, --

1. The first is, that marriage is not a mere external union; it is not simply a mutual compact; it is not merely a civil contract. It is a real, physical, vital, and spiritual union, in virtue of which man and wife become, not merely in a figurative sense, but really, although in a mysterious sense, one flesh. This is not only expressly declared by Christ himself to be the nature of marriage, but it is the doctrine which underlies the whole Levitical law on this subject. Nearness of kin is expressed constantly by saying that one is "flesh of the flesh" of the other, s'r vsrv, "Carnem carnis su[illegible] s. corporis sui esse cognatam propinquam, qu[illegible] est ut caro ejusdem corporis." [372] According to the Scriptures, therefore, husband and wife are the nearest of all relations to each other. According to the spirit, and most of the legislation of the present age, they are no relations at all. They are simply partners. If one member of a business firm die, his property does no; go to his partner, but to his own family; so if a wife die, without children, her property does not go to her husband, but to her third or fourth cousins. They, in the eye of the law, are more nearly related to her than her husband. This is not the light in which God looks upon marriage.

2. The second principle which underlies these marriage-laws is, that affinity is as real a bond of relationship as consanguinity. Fully one half of the marriages specified in Leviticus are prohibited on the ground of affinity. The same form of expression is used to designate both kinds of relationship. Those related to each other by affinity are said to be "flesh of the flesh," one of the other, just as blood relations; because all the specifications contained in the eighteenth chapter of Leviticus are included under the general prohibition contained in the sixth verse, "None of you shall approach to any that is near of kin to him;" under this head are included step-mothers; mothers-in-law; step-daughters; sisters-in-law (as when a man is forbidden to marry the widow of his brother); uncle's wife, etc. These

relationships are traced out in the line of affinity, just as far as they are in that of consanguinity. The declaration, therefore, contained in the Westminster Confession, [373] "The man may not marry any of his wife's kindred nearer in blood than he may of his own, nor the woman of her husband's kindred nearer in blood than of her own," is a simple and comprehensive statement of the law as laid down in Leviticus. In saying that affinity is as real a bond of relationship as consanguinity, it is not meant that it is as strong. A daughter is a nearer relation than a step-daughter, or daughter-in-law; a mother than a step-mother; a sister than a sister-in-law. This, as we have seen, is recognized in the law itself. The Bible asserts nothing inconsistent with fact or nature. In making affinity a real bond of kindred, it is meant that it is no merely nominal, or conventional, or arbitrary. It has its foundation in nature and fact.

Mr. Bishop, in his elaborate work on "Marriage and Divorce," says, " A truly enlightened view will doubtless discard altogether affinity as an impediment, while it will extend somewhat the degrees of consanguinity within which marriages will be forbidden." [374] He also teaches [375] that "the relationship by affinity" ceases "with the dissolution which death brings to the marriage. . . . . If, when a man's wife dies, she is still his wife, then, of course, her sister is still his sister. . . . . If, on the other hand, the wife is no more the wife after her death, then is her sister no more the sister of the husband. And though men who have no other idea of religion than to regard it as a bundle of absurd and loathed forms, may not be able to see how the termination of the relationship by the death of the wife is of any consequence in the case, yet men who discern differently and more wisely, will discover nothing unseemly in practically acting upon a fact which everybody knows to exist."

It is very evident that Mr. Bishop never asked himself what, in the present connection, the word "relationship" means. Had he had any clear idea of the meaning of the word, he never could have written the above sentences. By relationship is here meant the relation in which parties stand to each other; and that, in the case supposed, is a matter of feeling, affection, and intimacy. This relationship is not dissolved by the death of the person through whom it arose. A wife's sister continues to cherish to her widowed brother-in-law the same sisterly affection after, as before her sister's death. She can live with him, guide his house, and take charge of his children, without the slightest violation of her self-respect, and without fear of incurring the disrespect of others.

Besides, if relationship by affinity is dissolved by death, then a son may, on the death of his father, marry his step-mother, which Paul says (1 Cor. v. 1) was not tolerated among the heathen. We have not come to that yet. On the principle of Mr. Bishop, a man may marry his mother-in-law, his daughter-in-law, and, on the death of the mother, his step-daughter. All this the Bible forbids; and whatever religion in some of its manifestations may be, the Bible, surely, is not "a bundle of absurd and loathed forms." It is the wisdom of God, in the presence of which the wisdom of man is foolishness.

3. The great truth contained in these laws is, that it is the will of God, the dictate of his infinite and benevolent wisdom that the affections which belong to the relation in which kindred (whether by consanguinity or affinity) stand to each other, should not be disturbed, perverted, or corrupted by that essentially different kind of love which is appropriate and holy in the conjugal relation; and that a protecting halo should be shed around the family

circle.

[328] Calvin in his comment on this verse says: "Non multo post Apostoli mortem exorti sunt Encratit&#65533; (qui nomen sibi a continentia indiderunt) Taciani; Cathari; Montanus cum sua secta, et tandem Manich&#65533;i, qui ab esu carnium et conjugio abhorrerent, et tanquam res profanas damnarent. . . . . Excipiunt [Papist&#65533;] se Encratitis et Manich&#65533;is esse dissimiles, quia non simpliciter usum conjugii et carnium interdicunt, sed certis tantum diebus cogunt ad carnis abstinentiam, solos autem monachos et sacerdotes cum monialibus ad votum coelibatus cogunt. Verum h&#65533;c. . . . . nimis frivola est excusatio. Nam sanctimoniam nihilo minus in his rebus locant; deinde falsum et adulterinum Dei cultum instituunt: postrema conscientias alligant necessitati, a qua debebant esse liber&#65533;." Edit. Berlin, 1831.

[329] Institutio, II. viii. 41, 42; edit. Berlin, 1834, vol. i. pp. 264. 265.

[330] Commentary, Critical and Explanatory, on The Old and New Testament. Matthew xix. 11. By Rev. Robert Jamieson, St. Paul's, Glasgow, Scotland; Rev. A. R. Fausset, A. M., St. Cuthbert, York, England; and the Rev. David Brown, D. D., Aberdeen, Scotland, Hartford, Conn. 1871.

[331] Calvin on Matthew xix. 10, 11, in N. T. Comment. Berlin, 1838, vol. ii. p. 159. Although Calvin sometimes speaks disparagingly of marriage, at other times, especially when writing against the Papists, he vindicates its sanctity. Thus in connection with the passage quoted above, he says: "Si conjugium instituit Deus in communem humani generis salutem, licet qu&#65533;dem minus grata secum trahat, non ideo protinus spernendum est. Discamus ergo, si quid in Dei beneficiis nobis non arridet, non tam lauti esse ac morosi, quin reverenter illis utamur. Pr&#65533;sertim nobis in sancto conjugio cavenda est h&#65533;c pravitas: nam quia multis molestiis implicitum est, semper conatus est Satan odio et infamia gravare, ut homines ab eo subduceret. Et Hieronymus nimis luculentum maligni perversique ingenii specimen in eo edidit, quod non tantum calumniis exagitat sacrum illum et divinum vit&#65533; ordinem, sed quascunque potest ex profanis auctoribus loidorias accumulat, qu&#65533; ejus honestatem determent." Ibid. p. 158.

[332] See Schaff, History of the Christian Church, New York, 1867, vol. i., §§ 91, 96.

[333] Augustine, De Bono Conjugali, 10; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. p. 551, c.

[334] Sess. xxiv., canon 10; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G&#65533;ttingen, 1846, p. 91.

[335] Epist. lib. iii. p. 7.

[336] See Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, Art. "C&#65533;libat."

[337] Bulla, lvii. § 7, 26; Magn. Bull. Rom., Luxemburg, 1752, vol. xvi. p. 100, b. The controversies in the Church on this subject are detailed by the leading modern ecclesiastical historians, as Neander, Gieseler, and Schaff. The merits of the question are discussed in numerous separate treatises, as well as in such books as Burnet's Exposition of the Thirty-Nine Articles, Jeremy Taylor's Ductor Dubitantium (III. iv. Works, London, 1828, vol. xiii. pp. 549-616), Elliott's Delineation of Romanism, Thiersch's Vorlesungen &#65533;ber Katholicemus und Protestantismus, 2d edit. Erlangen, 1848.

[338] This however was in accordance with the canonical law, which made error as to the condition of one of the parties, as bond or free, a ground of annulling the marriage

contract. Stahl, De Matrimonio Rescindendo. Berlin, 1841. Canon Leg. cap. 2, 4, x., de conjugio servorum, 4, 9. See G<?>schen in Herzog's Encyklop<?>die, art. "Ehe." This is still the doctrine of the Romish Church. See Dens, Tractatus de Matrimonio; Theologia, edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. vii. N. 72, p. 199. See also Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, by Joel Prentiss Bishop. 4th edit., Boston, 1864, vol. i. chap. x. § 154-163.

[339] Die Genesis, Leipzig, 1852, p. 114.

[340] The fact that men and women, who make the murder of infants a profession, are rolling in wealth, is enough to rouse any community from its false security.

[341] Lib. VI. cap. xiv.; Works of Clement of Rome, edit. Migne, Paris, 1857, vol. i. p. 245, c.

[342] II. viii. 17 (19, xxvi.); Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<?>ttingen, 1846, vol. i. p. 458.

[343] Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. p. 658.

[344] Sess. xxiv. Canon 7; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, G<?>ttingen, 1846, vol. i. pp. 90, 91.

[345] That the word porneia, as used in Matthew v. 32, and xix. 9, means adultery, there can be no reasonable doubt. Porneia is a general term including all unlawful cohabitation, as Theodoret on Romans i. 29 (edit. Halle, 1771) says, kalei porneian ten ou kata gamon ginomenen sunousian; whereas moicheia is the same offence when committed by a married person. For the definite use of the word porneia, see 1 Corinthians v. 1. Tholuck discusses the meaning of this word as used in Matthew, at great length in his Bergpredigt, edit. Hamburg, 1845, pp. 225-230.

[346] Comment. 1 Cor. vii. 15: edit. Venice, 1717.

[347] See the elaborate article on "Ehe" in Herzog's Encyklop<?>die, and President Woolsey's recent Essay on Divorce, New York, 1869, chap. IV. President Woosley does not, for himself, understand 1 Corinthians vii. 15, to teach that desertion justifies divorce.

[348] Catechismus, ex Decreto Concilii Tridentini, ad Parochos, Pii V. Pont. Max. Jussu editus, II. viii. qu<?>st. 3; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 448.

[349] Catechismus Romanus, II. viii. qu<?>st. 14, 16; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 454-457.

[350] II. viii. qu<?>st. 15; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 455, 456.

[351] Sess. XXIV.; Ibid. vol. i. p. 89.

[352] These sixteen causes are expressed in the following lines: --

"Error, conditio, votum, cognatio, crimen,

Cultus disparitas, vis, ordo, ligamen, honestas,

Amens, affinis, si clandestinus et impos,

Si mulier sit rapta, loco nec reddita tuto;

Si impubes, ni forte potentia suppleat annos;

H<?>c socianda vetant connubia, facta retractant." Dens, Theologia Moralis et Dogmatica, De Matrimonio, N. 70, edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. vii. p. 194.

[353] Council of Trent, Sess. XXIV. canon 4; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 90.

[354] Essay on Divorce, by Theodore D. Woolsey, D. D., LL. D., New York, 1869, p.

127.

[355] Essay on Divorce, p. 178.

[356] See his elaborate article on "Ehe" in Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, Stuttgart and Hamburg, 1855, vol. iii. p. 703.

[357] Bishop, Marriage and Divorce, book VII. chap. xl. §§ 827 [542], 830 [544], 4th edit. Boston, 1864, vol. i.

[358] See Woolsey, Essay on Divorce, New York, 1869, p. 205.

[359] Die Philosophie des Rechts, Rechts- und Staatslehre, I. iii. 3. 1. § 69, 4th edit. Heidalberg, 1870, vol. ii. part 1, p. 441.

[360] Ibid. § 68; p. 435.

[361] Commentaries on the Laws of Moses. By Sir John David Michaelis, Professor of Philosophy in the University of G&#65533;ttingen. Translated by Alexander Smith, D. D., London, 1814, vol. ii. arts. 104-108, pp. 54-76.

[362] De Civitate Dei, XV. xvi. 1: Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1838, vol. vii. pp. 633, 634.

[363] Evangelische Kirchen-Zeitung, June 1840, pp. 369-416; see p. 378.

[364] Loci Theologici, XXVI. v. ii. 2. 1. 1. § 129, edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1776, vol. xv. p. 285. Gerhard subjects the whole subject of prohibited marriages to a protracted discussion.

[365] Pro A. Cluentio, V. vi. (14, 15); Works, edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. 374, b.

[366] Beza, De Repudiis et Divortiis, Tractationes Theologic&#65533;, edit. Eustathius Vignon, 1582, vol. ii. p. 52.

[367] Commentarius Grammaticus Criticus in Vetus Testamentum, Leipzig, 1835, vol. i. p. 51.

[368] Theologischer Commentar zum Pentateuch, Kiel, 1844, vol. i. part 2, p. 204.

[369] Scholia in Vetus Testamentum in Compendium redacta, Leipzig, 1828, vol. i. p. 539.

[370] Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zum Alten Testament. Exodus und Leviticus erkl&#65533;rt, von August Knobel, Leipzig, 1857, pp. 505, 506.

[371] Biblischer Commentar &#65533;ber das Alte Testament, Herausgegeben von Carl Friedr. Keil und Frank Delitzsch; Die B&#65533;cher Moses, von C. F. Keil, Leipzig, 1862, vol. ii. p. 117.

[372] Rosenm&#65533;ller, Scholia in Vetus Testamentum in Compendium redacta, Leipzig, 1838, vol. i. pp. 536, 537.

[373] Chap. xxiv. 4.

[374] Commentaries on the Law of Marriage and Divorce, by Joel Prentiss Bishop, Boston, 1864, vol. i. § 320.

[375] Ibid. § 314, note 2.

§ 12. The Eighth Commandment.

This commandment forbids all violations of the rights of property. The right of

property in an object is the right to its exclusive possession and use.

The foundation of the right of property is the will of God. By this is meant, (1.) That God has so constituted man that he desires and needs this right of the exclusive possession and use of certain things. (2.) Having made man a social being, He has made the right of property essential to the healthful development of human society. (3.) He has implanted a sense of justice in the nature of man, which condemns as morally wrong everything inconsistent with the right in question. (4.) He has declared in his Word that any and every violation of this right is sinful.

This doctrine of the divine right of property is the only security for the individual or for society. If it be made to rest on any other foundation, it is insecure and unstable. It is only by making property sacred, guarded by the fiery sword of divine justice, that it can be safe from the dangers to which it is everywhere and always exposed.

Numerous theories have been advanced on this subject. These theories have had a twofold object: the one to explain the nature and ground of the right; the other to explain how the right was originally acquired. These objects are distinct and should not be confounded.

1. The modern philosophical theory that might is right, that the strongest is always the best, includes indeed both these objects. If being is the only good, and if it is true the more of being the more of good, then he who has the most of being, he in whom the infinite is most fully revealed, has the right to have and to hold whatever he chooses to possess.

2. If a regard to our individual well-being be the only ground of moral obligation, then a man has the right to whatever will make him happy. He may, and he certainly would, make a great mistake, if he supposed that taking what does not belong to him would promote his happiness; but he is restrained from such injustice only by a sense of prudence. He is entitled to have whatever in fact would make him happy, and for that reason.

3. If regard to the general good, the greatest happiness of the greatest number, or expediency, as Paley makes it, be the rule and ground of duty, then it will always be a matter of opinion, a matter on which men will ever differ, what is, and what is not expedient. One might think that a community of goods would promote the greatest good, and then he would, at least in his own conscience, be entitled to act on that principle. Others might think that agrarianism, or the periodic distribution of all the land of the country in equal portions among the people, would promote the general good, and then that would be to them the rule of action. There would be no end to the devices to promote the greatest good, if the rights of men rested on no other foundation than that of expediency.

Some of the most distinguished legal and philosophical writers of the present age teach that "property is founded on utility." With some, however, utility is not the ground, but rather the test of human rights and duties. The fact that an institution or a course of conduct is conducive to the public good, is not so much the reason why it is right, as a proof that it is right and in accordance with the will of God. "God designs the happiness of all his sentient creatures. Some human actions forward that benevolent purpose, or their tendencies are beneficent and useful. Other human actions are adverse to that purpose, or their tendencies are mischievous or pernicious. The former, as promoting his purpose, God has enjoined. The latter, as opposed to his purpose, God has forbidden. He has given us the faculty of observing; of remembering; and of reasoning; and by duly applying those

faculties, we may collect the tendencies of our actions. Knowing the tendencies of our actions, and knowing his benevolent purpose, we know his tacit commands." [376] It is no doubt true that it is a fair and conclusive argument that a thing is right or wrong in itself and conformed or opposed to the will of God, that its tendency is of necessity and always to produce, on the one hand, good. or, on the other, evil. But this is a roundabout way of getting at the truth. Whether an institution or a course of action be useful or not, must be a matter of opinion. And if a matter of opinion, men will differ about it; and the opinion of one man, or even of the majority of men, will have no authority over others. God has revealed his will in his Word, and in the constitution of our nature. Paul says that even the heathen "do by nature the things contained in the law," that the law is "written in their hearts." (Rom. ii. 14, 15.) Property is sacred, not because in our opinion it is a useful institution, and hence inferentially approved by God, but He has said in the Bible, and says in every man's conscience, "Thou shalt not steal." Mr. Austin's theory does not prevent his teaching that "property jus in rem," depends on "principles of utility." [377]

4. Paley says also that "the real foundation of our right [to property] is the law of the land." He admits, however, that the law may authorize the most flagitious injustice. He therefore makes a distinction between the words and the intention of the law; and adds: "With the law, we acknowledge, resides the disposal of property; so long, therefore, as we keep within the design and intention of a law, that law will justify us, as well in foro conscienti, as in foro humano, whatever be the equity or expediency of the law itself." [378] The law of the land has indeed legitimately much to do with questions of property; but the right itself does not rest upon that law, and is, in the sight of God, independent of it. The right exists prior to all law of the state. The law cannot ignore that right. It cannot rightfully deprive a man of his property, except in punishment of crime, or on the ground of stringent necessity, and, in the latter case, with due compensation. Property, however, is not the creature of the law. No unjust law gives a title to property, valid in the sight of God; that is, a title which should satisfy a conscientious man in entering upon its possession and use. Even when the law is not unjust, it may work, not legal, but moral injustice. A will, for example, may clearly express the wishes and intention of a testator, but for some clerical or technical error be set aside and the property go to a person for whom it was not intended. Such person would have a legal, but not a morally valid title to the property. Good men are sometimes heard to say: "We will take all the law gives us;" in saying this, they do not apprehend the full meaning of their words; it amounts to saying that in matters of property they will make the law of the land, and not the law of God, the rule of their conduct.

5. It is a very common doctrine that the right of property is founded on common consent, or on the social compact. Men agree that each man may appropriate to himself a portion of what originally is common to all. But this consent only recognizes a right; it does not create it. If a man takes a glass of water from a stream common to all, it is of right his; and he has no need to appeal to any compact or consent to justify his appropriating it to himself. The question how a man acquires a right to property, and the nature of the right itself, as before remarked, are different questions, although intimately related.

6. Both are included in the common theory on the subject. If a man puts under culture a portion of unappropriated land, it is for the time being his, on the principle that a man owns himself, and therefore the fruits of his labour. Exclusive possession and use of the land in

question are necessary to secure the man those fruits; he has, therefore, the right to the land as long as he uses it. If he abandons it, his right ceases. On the other hand, if his use is continued, so as to involve occupancy, his right of possession becomes permanent. It is on this principle men act in mining districts in unoccupied lands. Each man, the first comer, stakes out for himself a claim; this he works, or is entitled to keep to himself. If he abandons it and goes elsewhere, it ceases to be his. If he permanently occupies it, it is permanently his. The right of property is thus made to rest on occupancy and use; in other words, on labour. But even this, according to Blackstone, is not a natural right. "All property," he says, "must cease upon death, considering men as absolute individuals, and unconnected with civil society: for then, by the principles before established, the next immediate occupant would acquire a right in all that the deceased possessed. But as, under civilized governments which are calculated for the peace of mankind, such a constitution would be productive of endless disturbances, universal law of almost every nation (which is a kind of secondary law of nature) has either given the dying person a power of continuing his property, by disposing of his possessions by will or, in case he neglects to dispose of it, or is not permitted to make any disposition at all, the municipal law of the country then steps in, and declares who shall be the successor, representative, or heir of the deceased; that is, who alone shall have a right to enter upon this vacant possession, in order to avoid that confusion which its becoming again common would occasion." On the same page, speaking of the right of inheritance, he says: "We are apt to conceive at first view that it has nature on its side; yet we often mistake for nature what we find established by long and inveterate custom. It is a wise and effectual, but clearly a political establishment; since the permanent right of property, vested in the ancestor himself, was no natural, but merely a civil right." [379] He had said before, [380] "Necessity begat property; and in order to insure that property, recourse was had to civil society, which brought along with it a long train of inseparable concomitants; states, government, laws, punishments, and the public exercise of religions duties." This seems to be inverting the natural order of things. Disregard of the moral law would result in endless evil, and there is an absolute necessity that its commands should be observed and enforced; but the obligation of the law does not rest on that necessity; it is altogether anterior and independent of it. So the right of property is anterior and independent of the necessity of its being held sacred, in order to secure the wellbeing of mankind. The fact is, that the right of property is analogous to the right of life, liberty, or pursuit of happiness. It does not come from men; it is not given by man; and it cannot be ignored, or arbitrarily interfered with by man. It rests on the will of God as revealed in the constitution of our nature and in our relation to persons and things around us.

7. Stahl, the distinguished German jurist, gives substantially the following account of the matter. Man was formed out of the earth; but a divine spirit was breathed into him. He is, therefore, on the one hand, dependent on the material world; on the other, exalted above it. He is placed here as its lord and owner. The things of the outer world are given to him for the satisfaction of his physical wants, and of his spiritual necessities. He, therefore, has power and right over things external, and they must be permanently and securely under his control. This is the foundation of the right of property. Property is the means for the development of the individuality of the man. The manner in which it is acquired and used, reveals what the man is; his food, clothing, and habitation; his expenditures for sensual

enjoyment, for objects of taste, of art, and of science, and for hospitality, benevolence, and the good of society; and the consecration of his acquisitions to the interests of a higher life, -- these in their totality as they rest on the right of property, make out a man's portrait. Property, however, is specially designed to enable a man to discharge his moral duties. Every man has duties of his own to perform; duties which belong to him alone, not to others, not to society; duties which arise out of his personal vocation and standing, especially such as belong to his own family. Therefore he must have what is exclusively his own. Property, therefore, is not intended for mere self-gratification or support; nor is it a mere objectless mastery over things external; it is the necessary means to enable a man to fulfil his divinely-appointed destiny. Herein lies the divine right of property! [381]

The right of property, therefore, is not founded on the law of the land, or on any explicit or implied contract among men; but upon the law of nature. It is true that natural, as distinguished from positive laws, have been differently explained. "As the science of ethics," says Lord Mackenzie, "embraces the whole range of moral duties, its province is evidently much wider than that of jurisprudence, which treats only of those duties that can be enforced by external law." [382] The duties, however, which can be thus enforced are of two kinds; those which arise from the natural, and those which arise from common or statute law. "By the law of nature," says Chancellor Kent, [383] "I understand those fit and just rules of conduct which the Creator has prescribed to man as a dependent and social being, and which are to be ascertained from the deduction of right reason, though they may be more precisely known and more explicitly declared by divine revelation." Cicero, teaches that God is the author of natural law, and that its duties are of unchangeable obligation. He says, "Nec erit alia lex Rom�, alia Athenis, alia nunc, alia posthac; sed et omnes gentes et omni tempore una lex et sempiterna et immutabilis continebit, unusque erit communis quasi magister et imperator omnium deus." [384]

Lord Mackenzie gives the doctrine of Cicero the sanction of his own judgment: "Where," he says, "the law of nature absolutely commands or forbids, it is immutable and of universal obligation, so that, although it may be confirmed, it cannot be controlled by human laws without a manifest violation of the divine will." [385]

In these days, when so many are disposed to throw off the authority of God, and regard marriage and property as mere creatures of the law, which may be regulated or ignored at the caprice or will of the people, it is well to remind them that there is a law higher than any law of man, enforced by the authority of God, which no man and no community can violate with impunity.

Although the right of property involves the right of absolute control, so that a man can do what he will with his own, it does not follow that this right is unlimited, or that the civil law has no legitimate control over the use or distribution of his property. A man has no right to use his knowledge or strength to the injury of his fellow-men; neither can he use his property so as to make it a public nuisance; nor can he devote it to any immoral or hurtful object; nor can he dispose of it by will so as to militate against the public policy. Of course, as different nations are organized on different principles, the laws regulating the use and distribution of property must also differ. Among the Hebrews the land of Canaan was originally distributed equitably among the several families. The head of the family had not the unrestricted control of what was thus given him. He could not finally alienate it. His

sons, not his daughters, unless there were no sons, were his heirs. The first-born had a double portion. (Deut. xxi. 15 ff.) These limitations of the right of property were ordained by God, in order that the ends of the theocracy might be accomplished. God saw fit to render it impossible that any large portion of the land should be engrossed by one or by a few families. In England public policy has assumed that it is important to maintain a powerful order of nobility. To secure that end the laws of primogeniture and entail have been long in force, with the result that the greater part of the land in Great Britain is in the hands of comparatively few families. This unequal distribution of property has gone on rapidly increasing, so that Hugh Miller, when editor of the "Edinburgh Witness," said that England was now like a pyramid poised on its apex. In France the right of a testator to dispose of his property is very much limited. "If any one die without issue or ascendants, he may leave his whole property to strangers; but if a man at his death has one lawful child, he can only so dispose of the half of his estate; if he leave two children, the third; and if he leave three or more children, the fourth." In Scotland "if a man die without either wife or issue, his whole property is at his own disposal; if he leave a wife and issue, his goods or personal property are divided into three equal parts, one of which goes to his wife as jus relict, another to his children as legitim (i.e., legitima portio), and the third is at his own disposal; if he leave no wife, he may dispose of one half, and the other half goes to his children, and so e converso, if he leave no children, the wife is entitled to one half, and he may bequeath the other." [386] These facts are referred to simply as illustrations of the way in which the law, both divine and human, may limit the exercise of the right of property while the sacredness of that right, as higher than any human law, is fully recognized.

Community of Goods.

Community of goods does not necessarily involve the denial of the right of private property. When Ananias, having sold a possession, kept back part of the price, Peter said to him: "While it remained was it not thine own? and after it was sold, was it not in thine own power?" (Acts v. 4.) Any number of men may agree to live in common, putting all their possessions and all the fruits of their labour into a common fund, from which each member is supplied according to his wants. This experiment was tried on a small scale and for a short time, by the early Christians in Jerusalem. "The multitude of them that believed were of one heart and of one soul: neither said any of them that ought of the things which he possessed was his own; but they had all things common. . . . . Neither was there any among them that lacked: for as many as were possessors of lands or houses, sold them, and brought the prices of the things that were sold, and laid them down at the Apostles' feet: and distribution was made unto every man as he had need." (Acts iv. 32-35.) Some indeed say that these passages do not imply any actual community of goods. Having "all things common" is understood to mean, "No one regarded his possessions as belonging absolutely to himself, but as a trust for the benefit of others also." This interpretation seems inconsistent with the whole narrative. Those who had possessions sold them. They renounced all control over what was once their own. The price was handed over to the Apostles and distributed by them or under their direction.

On the narrative as given in the Acts it may be remarked, --

1. That the conduct of these early Christians was purely spontaneous. They were not commanded by the Apostles to sell their possessions and to have all things in common.

There is not the slightest intimation that the Apostles gave any encouragement to this movement. They seem simply to have permitted it. They allowed the people to act under the impulse of their own feelings, each one doing what he pleased with his own.

2. It can hardly be deemed unnatural that the early Christians were led into this experiment. To us the wonders of redemption are "the old, old story," inexpressibly precious indeed, but it has lost the power of novelty. In those to whom it was new it may well have produced an ecstatic bewilderment, which led their judgment astray. There are two great truths involved in the Gospel, the clear perception of which may account for the determination of those early converts to have all things in common. The one is that all believers are one body in Christ Jesus; all united to Him by the indwelling of the Holy Spirit; all equally partakers of his righteousness; all the objects of his love; and all destined to the same inheritance of glory. The other great truth is contained in the words of Christ, "Inasmuch as ye have done it unto one of the least of these my brethren, ye have done it unto me." It was no wonder, then, that men whose minds were filled with these truths, were oblivious of mere prudential considerations.

3. This experiment, for all that appears, was confined to the Christians in Jerusalem, and was soon abandoned. We never hear of it elsewhere or afterwards. It has, therefore, no preceptive force.

4. The conditions of the success of this plan, on any large scale, cannot be found on earth. It supposes something near perfection in all embraced within the compass of its operation. It supposes that men will labour as assiduously without the stimulus of the desire to improve their condition and to secure the welfare of their families as with it. It supposes absolute disinterestedness on the part of the more wealthy, the stronger, or the more able members of the community. They must be willing to forego all personal advantages from their superior endowments. It supposes perfect integrity on the part of the distributors of the common fund, and a spirit of moderation and contentment in each member of the community, to be satisfied with what offers, and not he, may think to be his equitable share. We shall have to wait till the millennium before these conditions can be fulfilled. The attempt to introduce a general community of goods in the present state of the world, instead of elevating the poor, would reduce the whole mass of society to a common level of barbarism and poverty. The only secure basis of society is in those immutable principles of right and duty which God has revealed in his Word, and written upon the hearts of men. And these truths, even if acknowledged as matters of opinion, lose their authority and power if they cease to be regarded as revelations of the mind and will of God, to which human reason and human conduct must conform.

Communism and Socialism.

Heaven is not higher than "the lower parts of the earth," than the principles and aims of the early Christians were exalted above those of the modern advocates of the community of goods. This idea is not of modern origin. It appears in different forms in all ages of the world. It entered into the scheme of Plato's Republic, for in his view private property was the chief source of all social evils. It was included in the monasticism of the Middle Ages. Renunciation of the world included the renunciation of all property. Voluntary poverty was one of the vows of all monastic institutions. It was adopted by many of the mystical and fanatical sects which appeared before the Reformation, as the Beghards, and "Brethren of

the Free Spirit," who taught that the world should be restored to its paradisiacal state, and that all the distinctions created by law, whether of social organization, property, or marriage, should be done away. At the time of the Reformation the followers of M[illegible]nzer adopted the same principles, and their efforts to carry them into practice led to the miseries of the "peasant-war." All these movements were connected with fanatical religious doctrines. The leaders of these sects claimed to be inspired, and represented themselves as the organs and messengers of God.

Modern communism, on the contrary, so far as its general character is concerned, is materialistic and atheistic, and in some of its forms pantheistic. [387] This is consistent with the admission that some of its advocates, as St. Simon, Fourier, and others were sincere and benevolent men. Some of them, indeed, said that they only desired to carry out the principle of brotherly love so often inculcated by Christ. Communism and socialism are not properly convertible terms, although often used to designate the same system. The one has reference more especially to the principle of community in property; the latter to the mode of social organization. With Fourier, the former warn subordinate to the latter. He did not entirely deny the right of property, but insisted that society was badly organized. Instead of living in distinct families, each struggling for support and advancement, men should be gathered in large associations having common property, and all labouring for a common fund. That fund was to be distributed according to the capital contributed by each member, and according to the time and skill employed in the common service. Proudhon, immortalized by the book in which the question "What is property?" is answered by saying, "Property is theft," makes the rule for the distribution of the common fund to be the time devoted to labour. Louis Blanc puts capital, labour, and skill out of consideration, and makes the wants of the individual the only rule of distribution. It is common to all these schemes that the right to property in land or its productions is denied. The two latter deny to a man all property in his own skill or talents; and the last, even in his labour, so that the idlest and least efficient member of society should, according to it, receive as much as the most industrious and useful.

The denial of the right of property is, to a great extent, connected with the rejection of religion and of marriage. Marriage, next to religion and property, was declared to be the greatest means of social misery. Children were not to belong to their parents, but to the state; inclination and enjoyment were to be the motive and the end and the rule of life. [388]

International Society.

France has been the birthplace and the principal seat of Communism in its modern form. The principles involved in the system have made wide progress in other countries, and leavened to a fearful extent the minds of the labouring classes both in Europe and in America. Organization and combination among the scattered millions said to be included in the membership of this society have given it an importance which has forced itself on the attention of almost all Christian states. What the principles and aims of this formidable body are, it is not easy satisfactorily to state. There has been no authoritative annunciation of principles recognized by all the affiliated societies. They differ, within certain limits, doubtless, among themselves. Some find their fit representatives in the Communists of Paris as they revealed themselves during the current year (1871). Others would shrink from the excesses which rendered the name of Communists an object of execration and abhorrence

in all parts of the civilized world. Enough, however, is known of the designs of the society in question, to render it certain that its success would involve the overthrow of all existing governments; in placing all power in the hands, not of the people, but of a particular class, the operatives, the proletariat (the men without land); in the dissolution of society as at present organized; the abolition of private property; the extinction of the family; the abrogation of all marriage laws; and the proscription of religion, and especially of Christianity, as a public evil. Such are the avowed objects of some of the leaders of the movement, and such are the logical consequences of the principles advocated by the more reticent of their number.

It is a historical fact that Communism had its origin in its modern form in materialistic atheism; in the denial of God, who has the right to give laws to men, and the power and the purpose to enforce those laws by the retributions of justice; in the belief that the present life is the whole period of existence allotted to men, and that the enjoyments of this life are, therefore, all that men have to desire or expect. These principles had long been inculcated by such men as Rousseau, Voltaire, d'Holbach, Diderot, and others. To produce a conflagration, however, there must be not only fire, but combustible materials. These materialistic principles would have floated about as mere speculations, had there not been such a mass of suffering and degradation among the people. It was minds burdened with the consciousness of misery and the sense of injustice which were inflamed by the new doctrines, and which burst forth in a fire that for a time set all Europe in a blaze. We must not attribute all the evil either to the infidels or to the people. Had it not been for the preceding centuries of cruelty and oppression, France had not furnished such a bloody page to the history of modern Europe.

"L'Internationale" for March 27th, 1870, expressed succinctly the object of the International Society: "The rights of the working-men, that is our principle; the organization of the working-men, that is our means of action; social revolution, that is our end." It is "working-men," artisans, not the mass of the people, educated or uneducated; but a single class whose interests are to be regarded. It is not a political revolution, the change of one form of government for another, that is the end aimed at; but a social revolution, a complete upturning of the existing order of society.

As this institution is looming up with such portentous aspect in every direction, the question is, How is it to be met, and its influence counteracted? Open outbreaks may be suppressed by force, but the evil cannot be healed by any such means. Artillery is inefficient against opinions. If Communism, as organized in this society, owes its origin to the causes above specified, the rational method of procedure is, to correct or remove those causes. If Communism is the product of materialistic Atheism, its cure is to be found in Theism; in bringing the people to know and believe that there is a God on whom they are dependent and to whom they are responsible; in teaching them that this is not the only life, that the soul is immortal, and that men will be rewarded or punished in the world to come according to their character and conduct in the present life; that consequently well-being here is not the highest end of existence; that the poor here may hereafter be far more blessed than their rich neighbours; and that it is better to be Lazarus than Dives. It will be necessary to bring them to believe that there is a divine providence over the affairs of the world; that events are not determined by the blind operation of physical causes; but that God reigns;

that He distributes to every one severally as He pleases; "that the Lord maketh poor and maketh rich;" that it is not the rich and the noble, but the poor and the lowly, that are his special favourites; and that the right of property, the right of marriage, the rights of parents and magistrates, are all ordained by God, and cannot be violated without incurring his displeasure and the certain infliction of divine punishment. To imbue the minds of the mass of the people, especially in great cities, will be a slow and difficult work; but it is absolutely necessary. If Materialism and Atheism are practically embraced by the mass of any community, it will inevitably perish. The religious training of the people, however, is only one half of the task which society has to accomplish, to secure its own existence and prosperity. The great body of the people must be rendered comfortable, or at least have the means of becoming so; and they must be treated with justice. Misery and a sense of wrong are the two great disturbing elements in the minds of the people. They are the slumbering fires which are ever ready to break out into destructive conflagration.

Violations of the Eighth Commandment.

It may well be doubted whether society is more in danger from the destructive principles of Communism, than from the secret or tolerated frauds which, to so great an extent, pervade almost all ate departments of social life. If this commandment forbids all unfair or unjust appropriation of the property of others to our own use or advantage, if every such appropriation is stealing in the sight of God, then theft is the most common of all the outward transgressions of the decalogue. It includes not merely vulgar theft such as the law can detect and punish, but, --

1. All false pretences in matters of business; representing an article proposed for purchase or exchange to be other and better than it is. This includes a multitude of sins. Articles produced at home are sold as foreign productions, and the price asked and given is determined by this fraudulent representation. Shawls of Paris are sold as Indian; wines manufactured in this country are sold as the productions of France, Portugal, or Madeira. It is said that more Champagne wine is drunk in Russia than is made in France. More cigars are consumed in this country, under the name of Havanas, than Cuba produces. A great part of the paper made in the United States bears the stamp of London or Bristol. This kind of fraud has scarcely any limit. It does not seem to disturb any man's conscience. Worse than this is the selling things as sound and genuine, which in fact are spurious and often worthless. So wide-spread is fraud in matters of trade that it has become a legal maxim, "Let the buyer take care of himself." He should expect to be cheated, and therefore is required to be always on his guard. It is not uncommon to hear men say to a clergyman, "If I were dealing with a man of business, I would of course try to cheat him; for I know he would try to cheat me. But as you are not a man of business, I make an exception in your case, and will deal honestly."

Under this head of false pretences comes the adulteration of articles of food, of medicine, and of the materials for clothing. The extent to which this is carried is fearful. The English Parliament not long since appointed a commission to examine into the adulterations of articles of food sold by the green grocers in London. The result of the examination was that only six out of every hundred of the specimens collected were pure, i.e., were what they were represented or declared to be. There is no reason to suppose that London is peculiar or preeminent in this kind of fraud. The same complaint is made of the

adulteration of drugs. This evil was so great that some governments have taken the preparation of medicine for their navies and armies into their own hands. If we are to believe the public papers, the greater part of the wines and other liquors, spirituous and malt, sold to the public, are not only adulterated but mixed with poisonous drugs. The clothing furnished soldiers in active service, exposed to all the severities, and changes of weather, was and often is, made of worthless materials. There would be no end to the enumeration of frauds of this kind. A prominent English journal recently said that the great part of the revenue of the British government was taken up in endeavouring to prevent and detect frauds against the public.

2. Another large class of violations of the eighth commandment comprises attempts to take undue advantage of the ignorance or of the necessities of our fellow-men. It is of the nature of theft if a man sells an article knowing it to be of less value than he to whom he offers it for sale takes it to be. If a man is aware that the credit of a bank is impaired, or that the affairs of a railroad, or of any other corporation, are embarrassed, and takes advantage of that knowledge, to dispose of the stock or notes of such corporations to those ignorant on the subject, demanding more for them than their actual worth, he is guilty of theft, if the command, "Thou shalt not steal," forbids all unfair acquisition of the property of our neighbour. In like manner all unfair attempts to enhance or depress the value of articles of commerce, are violations of the law of God. Unfounded reports are often designedly circulated to have this enhancing or depressing effect on values, so that advantage may be taken of the unwary or uninformed. It is an offence of the same kind to engross commodities to enhance their price. "He that withholdeth corn, the people shall curse him: but blessing shall be upon the head of him that selleth it." (Prov. xi. 26.) Again it is a violation of the law to take advantage of the necessities of our fellow-men and to demand an exorbitant price for what they may need. In the recent dreadful conflagration in Chicago a thousand dollars were demanded for the use of a horse and wagon for a single hour. It may be said that there is no fixed standard of value; that a thing may be worth what it costs the man who owns it; or what it is worth to the man who demands it; or what it will bring in open market. If an hour's use of the horse and wagon was worth more to the man in Chicago than a thousand dollars, it may be said that it was not unfair to demand that sum. If this be so, then if a man perishing of thirst is willing to give his whole estate for a glass of water, it would be right to exact that price; or if a man in danger of drowning should offer a thousand dollars for a rope, we might refuse to throw it to him for a less reward. Such conduct every man feels would be worthy of execration. The fact is that things have an intrinsic value, however determined, which cannot be enhanced because our suffering fellow-men may be in pressing need of them.

3. This commandment forbids also depriving men of property, on the ground of any mere technical flaw, or legal defect in their title. Such defect may be the effect of unavoidable ignorance; or loss by shipwreck, fire, theft, or other so called accident, of the evidence of their right. The law may in such cases be inexorable: it may be on the whole right that it should be so, but nevertheless the man who avails himself of such defect to get possession or his neighbour's property, breaks the command which says "Thou shalt not steal;" i.e., thou shalt not take what in the sight of God does not belong to you. Gambling falls under the same category where advantage is taken of the unwary or unskilful, to deprive them of their property without compensation. It is, however, impossible to

enumerate or to classify the various methods of fraud. The code of morals held by many business and professional men is very far below the moral law as revealed in the Bible. This is especially true in reference to the eighth commandment in the decalogue. Many who have stood well in society, and even in the Church, will be astonished at the last day to find the word "Thieves" written after their names in the great book of judgment.

[376] Lectures on Jurisprudence, or the Philosophy of Positive Law, by the late John Austin, 2d edit. revised and edited by Robert Campbell, London, 1869, vol. i. p. 109.

[377] Jurisprudence, vol. i. pp. 132, 382; vol. ii. pp. 1161.

[378] The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, book iii. part i. ch. iv.; edit. Boston, 1848, vol. i. pp. 87-89.

[379] Commentaries on the Laws of England, II. i. by Sir William Blackstone, Knt. 16th edit. London, 1825, vol. ii. p. 10.

[380] Ibid. p. 7.

[381] Die Philosophie des Rechts, Rechts- und Staatslehre, I. iii. 2, 1, § 22, 4th edit. Heidelberg, 1870, vol. ii. part 1, p. 350 f. The paragraph in the text is not a translation, but a condensation.

[382] Studies in Roman Law, with Comparative Views of the Laws of France, England, and Scotland, by Lord Mackenzie, one of the Judges of the Court of Session in Scotland, 2d edit. Edinburgh and London, 1865, p. 45.

[383] Chancellor Kent, quoted by Lord Mackenzie.

[384] De Republica, III. xxii. 33. 16. edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. 1193, a.

[385] Studies in Roman Law, etc., p. 49.

[386] Lord Mackenzie, ut supra, p. 270.

[387] Enfantin, a disciple of St. Simon, began one of his public discourses, delivered in Paris in 1831, with the words, "Dieu est tout ce qui est; Tout est in lui, tout est par lui, Nui de nous n'est hors de lui;" and Henri Heine called himself a Hegelian. On the other hand, one of St. Simon's books is entitled Le nouveau Christianisme. See Guerike's Kirchen-Geschichte, VII. D. § 220, 6th edit. Leipzig, 1846, vol. iii. p. 679, foot-notes. We are tempted to quote a single characteristic sentence from Guericke, ut supra, pp. 678-682: "Die originellste und selbst&#65533;ndigste religi&#65533;s-politische Secte der neuesten Zeit aber, von einem Manne gegr&#65533;ndet, dem erst durch verungl&#65533;ckten, Selbstmord der g&#65533;ttliche Mensch sich kund that' (dem franz&#65533;sischen Grafen Claude Henri St. Simon, geb. zu Paris 1760, gest. 19. Mai 1825), und sodann durch die Juli-Revolution 1830 erst in rechten Schwung gebracht, welche, als die Quintessenz des tief verderbten antichristischen Zeitgeistes, als die einzig ganz consequente unter allen widerg&#65533;ttlichen Richtungen der Zeit, Welt und Gott, Staat und Kirche, Fleisch und Geist, Diesseits and Jenseits, B&#65533;se and Gut, (auch Weib und Mann) sowohl wissenschaftlisch als praktisch unirte und identificirte, unbeschr&#65533;nkte vollst&#65533;ndig organisirte Herrschaft des widerg&#65533;ttlichen Fleisches, ungebundenes systematisches Leben nur f&#65533;r diesseitige (die einzige) Welt, unbedingte Geltung eines consequenten politisch-religi&#65533;sen Materialismus in gl&#65533;hender Beredtsamkeit predigte, und auf den Thron des heiligen Gottes den reizenden' F&#65533;rsten dieser Welt setzte, wollte nicht etwa eine christliche Parthei oder Secte, sondern die neue Welt-religion sein; und diese seligen Menshen der Zukunft,' so verschollen auch mit all

ihrer abenteuerlich gl[illegible]nzenden Aeusserllchkeit sie wieder fur den Moment sind, -- aber in einem J[illegible]ngen-Deutschland,' (zuerst 1834 and besonders 1835) sowie im vollkommen organisirten englischen Socialisten- und in den continentalischen Communisten-Vereinen, und nun nach modischerem Schnitt, verj[illegible]ngt auch bereits wider erstanden, und in allerlei neuen Formen stets neu erstehend, -- bahnten so einer f[illegible]rchterlichen Weltepoche den gr[illegible]sslich ammuthigen Weg." Unless the reader is somewhat accustomed to find his way through the mazes of Dr. Guerike's sentences, he may experience some difficulty in threading the above labyrinth. It is, however, interesting, as characteristic of the man and of his book. One of his countrymen called his history a Strafpredigt.

[388] See Herzog's Real-Encyklop[illegible]die, art. "Communismus und Socialismus." Stahl's Philosophie des Rechts, Rechts- und Staatslehre, I. iii. 2. 2. § 31-34; 4th edit. Heidelberg, 1870, vol. ii. part 1. pp. 367-376. Cyclop[illegible]dia of Biblical, Theological, and Ecclesiastical Literature, prepared by the Rev. John McClintock, D. D., and James Strong, S. T. D., New York, 1869, art. "Communism." The Cyclop[illegible]dias above referred to give copious references to the literature on this subject.

§ 13. The Ninth Commandment.

This commandment forbids all violations of the obligations of veracity. The most aggravated of this class of offences is bearing false wituess against our neighbour. But this includes every offence of the same general character; as the command thou shalt uot kill, forbids all indulgence or manifestation of malice.

The command to keep truth inviolate belongs to a different class from those relating to the Sabbath, to marriage, or to property. These are founded on the permanent relations of men in the present state of existence. They are not in their own nature immutable. God may at any time suspend or modify them. But truth is at all times sacred, because it is one of the essential attributes of God, so that whatever militates against, or is hostile to truth is in opposition to the very nature of God. Truth is, so to speak, the very substratum of Deity. It is in such a sense the foundation of all the moral perfections of God, that without it they cannot be conceived of as existing. Unless God really is what He declares Himself to be; unless He means what He declares Himself to mean; unless He will do what He promises, the whole idea of God is lost. As there is no God but the true God, so without truth there is and can be no God. As this attribute is the foundation, so to speak, of the divine, so it is the foundation of the physical and moral order of the universe. What is the immutability of the laws of nature, but a revelation of the truth of God? They are manifestations of his purposes. They are promises on which his creatures rely, and by which they must regulate their conduct. If those laws were capricious, if the same effects did not uniformly follow from the same causes, the very existence of living beings would be impossible. The food of one day might be poison the next. If a man did not reap what he sowed, there could be no security for anything. The truth of God, therefore, is written on the heavens. It is the daily proclamation made by the sun, moon, and stars in their solemn procession through space, and it is echoed back by the earth and all that it contains.

The truth of God, too, is the foundation of all knowledge. How do we know that our senses do not deceive us; that consciousness is not mendacious? that the laws of belief

which by the constitution of our nature we are forced to obey, are not false guides? Unless God be true there can be no certainty in anything; much less can there be any security; we can have no confidence in the future: no assurance that evil will not ultimately triumph over good, darkness over light, and confusion and misery over order and happiness. There is, therefore, something awfully sacred in the obligations of truth. A man who violates the truth, sins against the very foundation of his moral being. As a false god is no god, so a false man is no man; he can never be what man was designed to be; he can never answer the end of his being. There can be in him nothing that is stable, trustworthy, or good.

There are two classes of sins which the ninth commandment forbids. The first is, all forms of detraction; everything which is unjustly or unnecessarily injurious to our neighbour's good name; and the second, all violations of the laws of truth. This latter, indeed, includes the former. Bearing false witness, however, being the definite thing forbidden, should be separately considered.

Detraction.

The highest form of this offence is bearing false testimony in a court of justice. This includes the guilt of malice, falsehood, and mockery of God; and its commission justly renders a man infamous, and places him outside of the pale of society. As it strikes at the security of character, property, and even of life, it is an offence which cannot be passed by with impunity. The false swearer is, therefore, a criminal in the sight of the civil law, and subject to public disgrace and punishment.

Slander is an offence of the same character. It differs from the sin of bearing false witness, only in not being committed in a judicial process, and in not being attended by the same effect. The slanderer, however, does bear false witness against his neighbour. He does it in the ears of the public, and not in those of a jury. The offence includes the elements of malice and falsehood against which the command is specially directed. The circulation of false reports, "tale-bearing," as it is called in Scripture, is indicative of the same state of mind, and comes under the same condemnation. As the law of God takes cognizance of the thoughts and intents of the heart, in condemning an external act it condemns the disposition which tends to produce it. In condemning all speaking ill of our neighbour, the Scriptures condemn a suspicious temper, a disposition to impute bad motives, and an unwillingness to believe that men are sincere and honest in the avowal of their principles and aims. This is the opposite of that charity which "thinketh no evil," "believeth all things, hopeth all things." It is still more opposed to the spirit of this law, that we should cherish or express satisfaction in the disgrace of others, even if they be our competitors or enemies. We are commanded to "rejoice with them that do rejoice and weep with them that weep." (Rom. xii. 15.)

The usages of life, or the principles of professional men, allow of many things which are clearly inconsistent with the requirements of the ninth commandment. Lord Brougham is reported to have said in the House of Lords, that an advocate knows no one but his client. He is bound per fus et nefas, if possible, to clear him. If necessary for the accomplishment of that object, he is at liberty to accuse and defame the innocent, and even (as the report stated) to ruin his country. [389] It is not unusual, especially in trials for murder, for the advocates of the accused to charge the crime on innocent parties and to exert all their ingenuity to convince the jury of their guilt. This is a cruel and wicked injustice, a clear

violation of the command which says. "Thou shalt not bear false witness against thy neighbour."

Falsehood.

1. The simplest and most comprehensive definition of falsehood is, enunciatio falsi. This enunciation need not be verbal. A sign or gesture may be as significant as a word. If, to borrow Paley's illustration, a man is asked which of two roads is the right one to a given place, and he intentionally points to the wrong one, he is as guilty of falsehood as if he had given the wrong directions in words. This is true; nevertheless there is a power peculiar to words. A thought, a feeling, or a conviction is not only more clearly revealed in the consciousness when clothed in words, but it is thereby strengthened. Every man feels this when he says, "I believe;" or, "I know that my Redeemer liveth."

2. The above definition of falsehood, although resting on high authority, is too comprehensive. It is not every enunciatio falsi which is a falsehood. This enunciation may be made through ignorance or mistake, and therefore be perfectly innocent. It may even be deliberate and intentional. This we see in the case of fables and parables, and in works of fiction. No one regards the Iliad or the Paradise Lost as a repertorium of falsehoods. It is not necessary to assume that the parables of our Lord, are veritable histories. They were not designed to give a narrative of actual occurrences. Intention to deceive, therefore, is an element in the idea of falsehood. But even this is not always culpable. When Pharaoh commanded the Hebrew midwives to slay the male children of their countrywomen, they disobeyed him. And when called to account for their disobedience, they said, "The Hebrew women are not as the Egyptian women; for they are lively, and are delivered ere the midwives come in unto them. Therefore God dealt well with the midwives: and the people multiplied, and waxed very mighty." (Ex. i. 19, 20.) In 1 Samuel xvi. 1, 2, we read that God said to Samuel, "I will send thee to Jesse the Bethlehemite: for I have provided me a king among his sons. And Samuel said, How can I go? if Saul hear it, he will kill me. And the Lord said, Take an heifer with thee, and say, I am come to sacrifice to the Lord." Here, it is said, is a case of intentional deception actually commanded. Saul was to be deceived as to the object of Samuel's journey to Bethlehem. Still more marked is the conduct of Elisha as recorded in 2 Kings vi. 14-20. The king of Syria sent soldiers to seize the prophet at Dothan. "And when they came down to him, Elisha prayed unto the Lord, and said, Smite this people I pray thee with blindness. And He smote them with blindness, according to the word of Elisha. And Elisha said unto them, This is not the way neither is this the city: follow me and I will bring you to the man whom ye seek. But he led them to Samaria. And it came to pass, when they were come into Samaria, that Elisha said, Lord, open the eyes of these men, that they may see. And the Lord opened their eyes, and they saw; and behold, they were in the midst of Samaria;" that is, in the hands of their enemies. The prophet. however, would not allow them to be injured; but commanded that they should be fed and sent back to their master. Examples of this kind of deception are numerous in the Old Testament. Some of them are simply recorded facts, without anything to indicate how they were regarded in the sight of God; but others, as in the cases above cited, received either directly or by implication the divine sanction. Of our blessed Lord himself it is said in Luke xxiv. 28, "He made as though (prosepoieito, he made a show of) he would have gone further." He so acted as to make the impression on the two disciples that it was his purpose

to continue his journey. (Comp. Mark vi. 48.) Many theologians do not admit that the fact recorded in Luke xxiv. 28, involved any intentional deception; because the "simulatio non fuerit in verbis veritati contradicentibus, sed in gestibus veritati consentientibus. Christus . . . . agebat, ut qui iturus esset longius, et revera iturus fuerat, nisi rogatus fuisset a discipulis, alia fortasse ratione se iis manifesturus. . . . . Alii dicunt, simulationem fuisse tentatoriam, ﷺque ac illam, quﷺ in Abrahami historia a scriptore sacro commemoratur Gen. xxii. 2. In eandem sententiam descendunt Beausobre et L'Enfant, qui in notis gallicis ad Luc. xxiv. 28, ita scribunt: C'est un feinte innocente et pleine d'amour, par laquelle Jﷺsus-Christ veut ﷺprouver la foi de ses disciples. Ainsi en usent les medicins ﷺ l'ﷺgard des malades, et les pﷺres ﷺ l'ﷺgard de leurs enfans." [390]

It is the general sentiment among moralists that stratagems in war are allowable; that it is lawful not only to conceal intended movements from an enemy, but also to mislead him as to your intentions. A great part of the skill of a military commander is evinced in detecting the intentions of his adversary, and in concealing his own. Few men would be so scrupulous as to refuse to keep a light in a room, when robbery was apprehended, with the purpose of producing the impression that the members of the household were on the alert.

On these grounds it is generally admitted that in criminal falsehoods there must be not only the enunciation or signification of what is false, and an intention to deceive, but also a violation of some obligation. If there may be any combination of circumstances under which a man is not bound to speak the truth, those to whom the declaration or signification is made have no right to expect him to do so. A general is under no obligation to reveal his intended movements to his adversary; and his adversary has no right to suppose that his apparent intention is his real purpose. Elisha was under no obligation to aid the Syrians in securing his person and taking his life; and they had no right to assume that he would thus assist them. And, therefore, he did no wrong in misleading them. There will always be cases in which the rule of duty is a matter of doubt. It is often said that the rule above stated applies when a robber demands your purse. It is said to be right to deny that you have anything of value about you. You are not bound to aid him in committing a crime; and he has no right to assume that you will facilitate the accomplishment of his object. This is not so clear. The obligation to speak the truth is a very solemn one; and when the choice is left a man to tell a lie or lose his money, he had better let his money go. On the other hand, if a mother sees a murderer in pursuit of her child, she has a perfect right to mislead him by any means in her power, because the general obligation to speak the truth is merged or lost, for the time being, in the higher obligation. This principle is not invalidated by its possible or actual abuse. It has been greatly abused. Jesuits taught that the obligations to promote the good of the Church absorbed or superseded every other obligation. And, therefore, in their system not only falsehood and mental reservation, but perjury, robbery, and assassination became lawful if committed with the design of promoting the interests of the Church. Notwithstanding this liability to abuse, the principle that a higher obligation absolves from a lower stands firm. It is a dictate even of the natural conscience. It is evidently right to inflict pain in order to save life. It is right to subject travellers to quarantine, although it may grievously interfere with their wishes or interests, to save a city from pestilence. The principle itself is clearly inculcated by our Lord when He said, "I will have mercy and not sacrifice;" and when He taught that it was right to violate the Sabbath in order to save the life of an ox, or even to prevent its suffering. The Jesuits erred in assuming that the

promotion of the interests of the Church (in their sense especially of the word Church) was a higher duty than obedience to the moral law. They erred also in assuming that the interests of the Church could be promoted by the commission of crime; and their principle was in direct violation of the Scriptural rule that it is wrong to do evil that good may come.

The question now under consideration is not whether it is ever right to do wrong, which is a solecism; nor is the question whether it is ever right to lie; but rather what constitutes a lie. It is not simply an "enunciatio falsi," nor, as it is commonly defined by the moralists of the Church of Rome, a "locutio contra mentem loquentis;" [391] but there must be an intention to deceive when we are expected and bound to speak the truth. That is, there are circumstances in which a man is not bound to speak the truth, and therefore there are cases in which speaking or intimating what is not true is not a lie. The Roman moralists just referred to, answer the question, Whether it is ever lawful to lie? in the negative. Dens, for example goes so far as to say: "Non licet mentiri (i.e., to utter what is not true, as he defines the word mendacium') ad avertendum mortem aut interitum Reipublic[?], vel qu[?]cunque alia mala: in hujusmodi perplexitatibus debent homines confugere ad auxilium Dei, angeli custodis," etc. [392] This is a sound rule, provided the obligation to speak the truth exists. It is far better that a man should die or permit a murder to be committed, than that he should sin against God. Nothing could tempt the Christian martyrs to save their own lives or the lives of their brethren by denying Christ, or by professing to believe in false gods; in these cases the obligation to speak the truth was in full force. But in the case of a commanding general in time of war, the obligation does not exist to intimate his true intentions to his adversary. Intentional deception in his case is not morally a falsehood. Although the Romanist theologians lay down the rule that a mendacium is never lawful, and although they define mendacium as stated above, yet they teach that if a confessor is asked whether he knows a fact confided to him in the confessional, he is at liberty to answer, No; meaning that he does not know it scientia communicabili. That is, he is authorized, according to their own definition of the word, to tell a downright falsehood. He may be right to reply to the question, Whether he knows a fact communicated to him in his character of confessor, by saying, "I am not at liberty to answer;" but it is hard to see how he could be justified in a direct falsehood. [393]

In order to include the third element entering into the nature of criminal falsehood, Paley defines a lie to be a violation of a promise. Every violation of a promise is not a lie, for it may not include the other elements of a falsehood; but every lie is a violation of a promise. It arises out of the very nature of human society, and from the relation in which men of necessity stand to each other, that every man is expected to speak the truth, and is under a tacit but binding promise not to deceive his neighbours by word or act. If in any case he is guilty of intentional deception, he must be able to show that in that particular case the obligation does not exist; that is, that the party deceived has no right to expect the truth, and that no virtual promise is violated in deceiving him. This is certainly the fact in military manoeuvres, and in some other cases of rare occurrence.

This, however, is not always admitted. Augustine, for example, makes every intentional deception, no matter what the object or what the circumstances, to be sinful. "Ille mentitur," he says, "qui aliud habet in animo, et aliud verbis vel quibuslibet significationibus enuntiat." [394] Again he says, [395] "Nemo autem dubitat mentiri eum

qui volens falsum enuntiat causa fallendi: quapropter enuntiationem falsam cum voluntate ad fallendum prolatam, manifestum est esse mendacium." He reviews the cases recorded in the Bible which seem to teach the opposite doctrine. This would be the simplest ground for the moralist to take. But, as shown above, and as generally admitted, there are cases of intentional deception which are not criminal.

Kinds of Falsehood.

Augustine divides falsehood into no less than eight classes. But these differ for the most part simply as to their subject matter, or their effects. The division as given by Thomas Aquinas and very generally adopted since, [396] is into three classes; the pernicious, the benevolent, and the jocose. Under the first head come all falsehoods which are instigated by any evil motive and are designed to promote some evil end. It includes not only the direct enunciation of what is false, but also all quibbling or prevarication.

Mental Reservation.

This class includes also all cases of mental reservation. It should be said in justice to the teachers of Moral Theology in the Romish Church, that, although the Jesuits made themselves so obnoxious by asserting the propriety of mental reservation, they at least in general terms condemn it. "Restrictio mentalis," says Gury, "est actus mentis verba alicujus propositionis ad alium sensum quam naturalem et obvium detorquentis vel restringentis." This he says is unlawful, because it is "simpliciter mendacium." It is true these theologians make serious modifications of this rule. It is only of reservation "proprie mentalis," that is, when the true meaning of the speaker cannot be detected, that this condemnation is pronounced. If it be possible, from the circumstances of the mode of expression, to know what he means, the rule does not always apply. There are cases in which it is allowable to permit a man to deceive himself. Under this head is brought in the case above referred to. It is said that a confessor may properly say that he does not know a thing, when he means that he does not know it as a man, or with a knowledge that is communicable. So it is said that if a man be asked by one who has no right to interrogate him, whether he has committed a crime, he may say, No; meaning none that he was bound to confess. So also it is taught that public persons, ambassadors, magistrates, advocates, etc., may use mental reservation in its wider sense. In like manner a servant may say his master is not at home, whom he knows to be in the house, because such denial so often means that the person inquired for does not wish to be seen. [397] This opens a very wide door of which not only Jesuits, but men professing to be Protestants and Christians freely avail themselves. To an unsophistical mind all the instances above specified are cases of unmitigated falsehood.

The extent to which the Jesuits carried the principle of mental reservation is a matter of notoriety. The three rules by which they perverted the whole system of morals, and which threatened to overturn the very foundations of society, and which led at one time to the suppression of the order, were, --

1. The doctrine that the character of an act depended solely on the intention. If the intention be good, the act is good; whether it be falsehood, perjury, murder, or any other conceivable crime. Pascal quotes the Jesuit moralist Escobar as laying down the general principle, "that promises are not binding unless there was an intention of keeping them, at the time they were made." [398] On the same principle, that the intention determines the character of the act, the murder of Henry III. in 1589; of the Prince of Orange in 1584; of

Henry IV. of France in 1610; and especially the massacres on the feast of St. Bartholomew, were all justified. This principle is not confined to the Jesuits. When in 1819 young Sand murdered Kotzebue, the poet, from political motives, he not only justified the act to the last, but perhaps the general sentiment among his younger countrymen was that of approbation. Even De Wette, the distinguished theologian and commentator, in a letter of consolation to the mother of Sand, spoke of the assassination as "a favourable sign of the times." [399] It was regarded very much as the killing of Marat by Charlotte Corday is regarded by the public to this day. When the doctrine comes to be formalized as a moral principle that the intention determines the character of the act, so that murder committed for the good of the Church or the State is commendable, then the law of God is set at nought and the bonds of society are unloosed.

2. The doctrine of probability. If it was probable that an act was right there was no sin in committing it, although in the conviction of the agent the act was wrong; and an act was probably right, if among the moralists there was a difference of opinion on the subject.

3. The above-mentioned doctrine of mental reservation. It was taught that a man might innocently swear he did not do a certain thing, provided he said to himself, not audibly to others, "I mean I did not do it ten years ago." All these different kinds of lying, though referred to different heads by the Jesuit teachers, belong properly to the class of pernicious falsehoods, such as the law of God utterly condemns.

The second class, called "mendacia officiosa," includes all falsehoods uttered for a good object. Such as those told the sick by their attendants, to comfort or encourage them; those told by detectives for the discovery of crimes; or those which are designed to prevent evil or secure good for ourselves or others. All such falsehoods are pronounced by Romanists to be venial sins, mere peccadilloes. [400] The example given by Dens, in the place referred to, of this class of sins, is the case of a man having money, denying that he has it to avoid being robbed. This is very different from the doctrine of Augustine, who teaches that it is unlawful to lie to save life, or even to save a soul. [401] Augustine's position is consistent with what was said above, that there are occasions on which a higher obligation absolves from a lower, as our Lord himself teaches. But that principle applies to the case of falsehood only when the enunciation of what is untrue ceases to be falsehood in the criminal sense of the word. It has been seen that three elements enter into the nature of falsehood properly so called, (1.) The enunciation of what is false. (2.) The intention to deceive. (3.) The violation of a promise; that is, the violation of the obligation to speak the truth, the obligation which rests upon every man to keep faith with his neighbour. In military manoeuvres, as above remarked, there is no expectation, and no right for expectation, that a general will reveal his true intentions to his adversary, and therefore in that case deception is not falsehood, because there is no violation of an obligation. But when a confessor was called upon by a heathen magistrate to say whether he was a Christian, he was expected, and bound to speak the truth, although he knew the consequence would be a cruel death. So when a man is asked if he has money about him, he is expected to speak the truth, and has no right to lie any more than a Christian had a right to lie to save his life. The doctrine that "mendacia officiosa" are only venial sins, rests on the principle that the intention determines the character of the act. The simple Scriptural rule is, that he who does "evil that good may come," his "damnation is just."

It is a fact of experience, that, so far as our inner life at least is concerned, exorbitant attention to how to do a thing destroys the ability to do it. An adept in logic may be a very poor reasoner; and a man who spends his life in studying the rules of elocution may be a very indifferent orator. So a man versed in all the subtleties of casuistry is apt to lose the clear and simple apprehension of right and wrong. Professor Gury has for the motto of his book on moral theology, the words of St. Gregory: "Ars artium regimen animarum." Very true, but it is a bad way to lead a man to a given point to put him into a labyrinth. These books of casuistry only serve to mystify the plainest subjects. Indulging in such subtleties can hardly fail to lead to the adoption of false principles. It is very plain that the man who was at once a prince and a bishop, could not well be drunk as prince and sober as bishop; yet, as we have seen, these books teach that a priest may lie as a man, and yet speak truth as a vicar of God. The plain directions of the Word of God and a conscience enlightened by his Spirit, are safer guides in matters of duty than all the books on moral theology the Jesuits evet wrote. This is not saying that morals are not a proper subject of study, or that there is not a call in that field for the exercise of discrimination and distinction. The objection is not to the study of morals, but to inordinate devotion to that department, and to the perplexing and perverting subtleties of casuistry.

Pious Frauds.

Pious fraud was reduced by Romanists to a science and an art. It was called economics, from oikonomia, "dispensatio rei familiaris," the discretionary use of things in a family according to circumstances. The theory is founded on the principle that if the intention be lawful, the act is lawful. Any act, therefore, designed to promote any "pious" end is justifiable "in foro conscienti&#65533;." This principle was introduced at an early period into the Christian Church. Mosheim attributes to it a heathen origin. [402] He says that the Platonists and Pythagoreans taught that it was commendable to lie to promote a good end. The evil, however, had probably an independent origin wherever it appeared. It is plausible enough to rise spontaneously in any mind not under the control of the Word and Spirit of God.

Augustine had to contend against this error in his day. There were certain orthodox Christians who thought it right falsely to assert that they were Priscillianists in order to gain their confidence and thus be able to convict them of heresy. This brought up the question whether it was allowable to commit a fraud for a good end; in other words, whether the intention determined the character of the act. Augustine took the negative of the question, and argued that a lie was always a lie, and always wicked that it was not lawful to tell a falsehood for any purpose whatever. "Interest quidem plurimum," he says, "qua causa, quo fine, qua intentione quid fiat: sed ea qu&#65533; constat esse peccata, nullo bon&#65533; caus&#65533; obtentu, nullo quasi bono fine, nulla velut bona intentione facienda sunt. . . . . Cum vero jam opera ipsa peccata sunt; sicut furta, stupra, blasphemi&#65533;, vel c&#65533;tera talia; quis est qui dicat causis bonis esse facienda, ut vel peccata non sint, vel quod est absurdius, justa peccata sint? Quis est qui dicat: ut habeamus quod demus pauperibus, faciamus furta divitibus; aut, testimonia falsa vendamus, maxime si non inde innocentes l&#65533;duntur, sed nocentes potius damnaturis judicibus eruuntur?" [403] He specially condemns all "pious frauds," i.e., frauds committed in pretended service of religion.

Notwithstanding the authority of Augustine, the doctrine that it was right to use fraud in

efforts to promote the interests of the Church, was openly avowed by some of his contemporaries and many of his immediate successors, and during the Middle Ages was the practical rule of the Romish Church, as it is at the present day. Among the early advocates of this lax principle of morals is found the name even of Jerome. In his epistle to Pammachius, he says, that in teaching, a man is bound to be honest, but in dealing with an adversary, he may do what he pleases; it is right "nunc h□c nunc illa proponere. Argumentari ut libet, aliud loqui, aliud agere, panem, ut dicitur, ostendere, lapidem tenere." [404] The principle that the intention sanctifles the deed, is clearly asserted by John Cassian, a disciple of Chrysostom. Falsehood, he says, is like poison: taken moderately and in illness, it may be salutary; but if taken inopportunely, it is fatal. "Non enim Deus verborum tantum actuumque nostrorum discussor et judex, sed etiam propositi ac destinationis inspector est. . . . . Ille tamen intimam cordis inspiciens pietatem, non verborum sonum, sed votum dijudicat voluntatis, quia finis, operis et affectus considerandus est perpetrantis." [405]

Forgeries.

The principle having been once admitted that it is right to deceive in order to accomplish a good object, there was no limit set in practice to its application. Hence, --

1. Even from the earliest times genuine works of the apostolic fathers were corrupted by interpolations; and works were issued bearing the names of authors who were dead long before the works were written. Besides the apocryphal books which are now admitted to be spurious, the Letters of Ignatius, a portion of which are generally received as authentic, were so corrupted as to be the source of an extended and permanent evil influence. Of these letters there are, as is well known, three recensions, the larger containing fifteen epistles, the shorter, and the Syrian, founded on a Syriac translation. The larger collection is given up by scholars as spurious; as to the others, many who admit their authenticity, insist that they are more or less corrupted by interpolation. [406]

The so-called "Apostolical Constitutions" are a collection of rules or canons derived partly from the New Testament, partly from the decisions of early provincial councils, and partly from tradition; all, however, imposed on the Church as of apostolical authority. As the number of councils increased there was a necessity for renewed collections of their decisions. These collections included "decretals" issued by the Bishop of Rome; both classes being included under the name of "canons," these collections were gradually consolidated into the Canon Law. It was a natural and easy method of imposing on the Church to insert spurious decretals in the collections from time to time, and to found on these forgeries exorbitant pretensions to priestly dignity and power. The most notorious of these impositions is what is known as the Decretals of Isidore, Bishop of Seville, the most distinguished writer of the seventh century. He died A.D. 636. The collection which went under his name did not make its appearance until the ninth century. It contains many genuine decretals and canons, but also litany that are manifest forgeries. The author of the collection and of the spurious documents it contains is unknown. Its date is fixed by Gieseler between 829 and 845. These decretals "were soon circulated," says that historian, "in various collections, appealed to without suspicion in public transactions, and used by the popes, from Nicolaus I., immediately after he had become acquainted with them (864), without any opposition being made to their authenticity, and continued in undiminished reputation, till

the Reformation led to the detection of the cheat. On these false decretals were founded the pretensions of the popes to universal sway in the Church; while the pretended donatio Constantini M.,' a fiction of an earlier time, but soon adopted into them, was the first step from which the papacy endeavoured to elevate itself even above the state." [407] The authenticity of these documents was first seriously attacked by the Magdeburgh Centuriators, who were answered by the Jesuit Turrianus. "The question was decided by Dav. Blondelli Pseudoisidorus et Turrianus vapulantes, Genev. 1628. The Ultramontanists, though they admit the deception, deny the revolution of ecclesiastical principles caused by it." [408] These decretals attribute to the pope absolute supremacy over the Church, over patriarchs, bishops, and priests. To him an appeal lies in all questions of doctrine, and his decisions are final. The gift of Constantine conferred on the pontiff more than imperial dignity and power. It conveyed the sovereignty of the city of Rome, of Italy, and of the western provinces. Among other things it says, "Et sicut nostram terrenam imperialem potentiam, sic ejus (Petri) sacrosanctam Romanam Ecclesiam decrevimus veneranter honorari, et amplius quam nostrum imperium terrenumque thronum, sedem sacratissimam b. Petri gloriose exaltari: tribuentes ei potestatem et glori&#65533; dignitatem, atque vigorem et honorificentiam imperialem. Unde ut pontificalis apex non vilescat, sed magis quam imperii dignitas, gloria et potentia decoretur, ecce tam palatium nostrum, ut pr&#65533;dictum est, quam Romanam urbem, et omnes Itali&#65533;, seu occidentalium regionum provincias, loca et civitates pr&#65533;fato beatissimo Pontifici nostro Sylvestro, universali pap&#65533;, contradimus atque relinquimus: et ab eo et a successoribus ejus per hanc divalem nostram, et pragmaticum constitutum decernimus disponenda, atque juri sanct&#65533; Roman&#65533; Ecclesi&#65533; concedimus permansura." [409]

False Miracles.

The second great class of pious frauds by which the Church of Rome has for ages endeavoured to sustain its errors and confirm its power, is that of pretended miracles. On this subject it may be remarked, --

1. That there is nothing in the New Testament inconsistent with the occurrence of miracles in the post-apostolic age of the Church. The Apostles were indeed chosen to be the witnesses of Christ, to bear testimony to the facts of his history and to the doctrines which He taught. And among the signs of an Apostle, or necessary credentials of his commission, was the power to work miracles. (Rom. xv. 18, 19; 2 Cor. xii. 12.) When the Apostles had finished their work, the necessity of miracles, so far as the great end they were intended to accomplish was concerned, ceased. This, however, does not preclude the possibility of their occurrence, on suitable occasions, in after ages. It is a mere question of fact to be decided on historical evidence. In some few cases the nature of the event, its consequences, and the testimony in its support, have constrained many Protestants to admit the probability, if not the certainty of these miraculous interventions. [410] Among the controversial writings which the great questions in debate in the late Vatican Council have called forth, there are two of special interest which have already been translated and circulated in this country. The one is entitled "The Pope and The Council," [411] a series of papers written by German Catholic scholars of distinction. It is a historical argument against Ultramontanism. Among other things it demonstrates that the claims of the Ultramontanists have been sustained by a regular system of forgeries in all ages of the

Church. [412]

The other work is by the late Abbe Gratry, [413] one of the most distinguished Romish ecclesiastics of France, whose death has just been announced. In these masterly letters the writer establishes two points, as he says truly beyond the possibility of rational denial. The first is, that the popes have erred when speaking "ex cathedra," and therefore are not infallible; and the second, that the claims of Papal infallibility have been sustained by the most bare-faced and persistent forgeries and frauds. Both of these points are proved specially in the case of Pope Honorius. Yet, sad to say, this eminent man, not long before his death, submitted to the decree of the Vatican Council by which the infallibility of the Pope was made an article of faith. He said he "erased" all he had written aganst that doctrine. [414]

2. During the first hundred years after the death of the Apostles we hear little or nothing of the working of miracles by the early Christians. On this point Bishop Douglass says, "If we except the testimonies of Papias and Iren&#65533;us, who speak of raising the dead, ... I can find no instances of miracles mentioned by the fathers before the fourth century, as what were performed by Christians in their times, but the cures of diseases, particularly the cures of demoniacs, by exorcising them, which last, indeed, seems to be the favourite standing miracle, and the only one which I find (after having turned over their writings carefully and with a view to this point): they challenged their adversaries to come and see them perform." [415] The fathers of the fourth century freely speak of the age of miracles as past, that such interpositions, being no longer necessary, were no longer to be expected. Thus Chrysostom says: "Ne itaque ex eo, quod nunc signa non fiunt, argumentum ducas tunc etiam non fuisse. Etenim tunc utiliter fiebant, et nunc utiliter non fiunt." [416] And Augustine says: "Cur, inquiunt, nunc illa miracula, qu&#65533; pr&#65533;dicatis facta esse, non fiunt? Possem quidem dicere, necessaria fuisse priusquam crederet mundus, ad hoc ut crederet mundus." [417] However these declarations may be reconciled with the fact that these fathers, themselves, give accounts of what passed for miracles in their day, they at least show that in their view there was such a difference between the Scriptural and ecclesiastical miracles that they did not belong to the same category. Although these miracles were unfrequent in the early ages of the Church, yet they rapidly increased in number until they became matters of every day's occurrence.

3. They admit of being classified on different principles. As to their nature, some are grave and important; others are trifling, childish, and even babyish; others are indecorous; and others are irreverent and even blasphemous. Professor Newman, one of the richest prizes gained by the Romanists from the Church of England in this generation, is candid enough to admit the contrast between the Scriptural and what he calls ecclesiastical miracles. Of the former, he says, [418] "The miracles of Scripture are, as a whole, grave, simple, and majestic: those of ecclesiastical history often partake of what may not unfitly be called a romantic character, and of that wildness and inequality which enters into the notion of romance." He says, [419] "It is obvious to apply what has been said to the case of the miracles of the Church, as compared with those in Scripture. Scripture is to us a garden of Eden, and its creations are beautiful as well as very good,' but when we pass from the Apostolic to the following ages, it is as if we left the choicest valleys of the earth, the quietest and most harmonious scenery, and the most cultivated soil, for the luxuriant

wildernesses of Africa or Asia, the natural home or kingdom of brute nature, uninfluenced by man." A more felicitous illustration can hardly be imagined. The contrast between the Gospels and the legends of the saints, is that between the divine and the human and even the animal; between Christ (with reverence be it spoken) and St. Anthony. Another principle on which these ecclesiastical miracles may be classified, is the design for which they were wrought or adduced. Some are brought forth as proofs of the sanctity of particular persons, or places, or things; some to sustain particular doctrines, such as purgatory, transubstantiation, the worshipping of the saints and of the Virgin Mary, etc., some for the identification of relics. It is no injustice to the authorities of the Church of Rome, to say, that whatever good ends these miracles may in any case be intended to serve, they have in the aggregate been made subservient to the accumulation of money and to the increase of power. The amount of money drawn from the single doctrine of purgatory and the assumed power of the keys over that imaginary place of torture, is beyond all computation. And the whole fabric of priestly power, the most absolute and the most dreaded ever exercised over men, would fall to the ground if it were not the belief of the people, founded mainly on "lying wonders," that the priests have power to forgive sin, to save or to destroy souls at will, or at discretion. If this doctrine be false, the whole Romish system is false. Romanists, therefore, have everything at stake on this question. Bishop Jeremy Taylor, writing to a lady "seduced to the Church of Rome," said long ago, "All the points of difference between us and your Church are such as do evidently serve the ends of covetousness and ambition, of power and riches." [420]

4. A fourth general remark on this subject is, that it is no just matter of reproach to the authorities and people of the Romish Church that they believed in these false miracles. Faith in the frequently recurring interference of supernatural influences in the affairs of men, was for ages universal. Even so late as the seventeenth century Protestants as well as Catholics, of all ranks, believed in ghosts, witches, necromancy, and demonocracy. Cotton Mather's "Magnalia" is a match for the Legends of the Saints.

5. It is not that Romanists believed in the frequent occurrence of miracles, but that they propagated reports of miracles, knowing them to be false; that this was done for the purposes of deceit; that this is persisted in to the present day; and that the honour, truth, integrity, and infallibility of the Church are pledged in support of their actual occurrence. The truth of Christianity depends on the historical truth of the account of the miracles recorded in the New Testament. The truth of Romanism depends on the truth of the miracles to which it appeals. What would become of Protestantism if it depended on the demonology of Luther, or the witch stories of our English forefathers. The Romish Church, in assuming the responsibility for the ecclesiastical miracles, has taken upon itself a burden which would crush the shoulders of Atlas. These "lying wonders" are endorsed, not only by the negative action of the authorities of the Church, by allowing them to be believed and cited in proof of its doctrines and divine mission; not only by the recognized expounders of its faith referring to them and asserting their truth; but also by solemn official action of the highest ecclesiastical dignitaries, including a long succession of popes. As no one could be canonized unless his saintship was sustained by at least four miracles, when any one was proposed for canonization a commission was appointed to ascertain the facts of his life, and especially of the miracles which he wrought. This commission reported to the Pope, who, if satisfied, decreed the enrolment of the candidate in the list of saints. These official

documents contain the record of the most trivial, and, on other grounds, most objectionable miracles. [421] And to such miracles the Church of Rome has given her sanction, and on the truth of these it must stand or fall.

There are, however, two special and standing miracles to which Romanists are fully committed, and which in the judgment probably of nine tenths of the educated men in Christendom are barefaced impostures. The Church of Rome by its highest dignitaries and representatives asserted and still continues to assert that the house in which the Virgin Mary dwelt in Nazareth was, when that city fell into the hands of the infidels, transported by angels and deposited at Loretto, a village a few miles from Ancona in Italy. The first step in this transportation occurred in 1291 from Nazareth to Dalmatia; the second in 1294 to the neighbourhood of Recanati; and the third in 1295 to its present location. The house is thirty feet long, fifteen wide, and eighteen high, and is built of wood and brick. It is now greatly adorned, having a silver door and a silver grating, and stands in the midst of a large church erected over and around it. Its shrine was enriched with offerings of priceless value, and is regarded as the Mecca of Italy; the number of pilgrims amounting sometimes to two hundred thousand in a single year. The annual income of the house, apart from presents, is stated to be thirty thousand dollars. [422] The original house is said to be a fac-simile of hundreds of others in the neighborhood of Ancona. It is obvious that such a frail building could not, without a miracle, have been preserved thirteen hundred years; another miracle would be required to identify it after so long a period; another stupendous miracle to account for its transportation to Dalmatia; and two more nearly as great to explain its reaching its present location. The only conceivable design of all these miracles, must be to sustain the doctrines and authority of the Romish Church, and to pour money into its treasury. Both these objects they have accomplished to a wonderful degree. No man who is not prepared to accept all these miracles without a particle of evidence, can rationally believe in the Church of Rome.

The other standing miracle for which the Romish Church is responsible before the whole world, is the annual liquefaction of the blood of St. Januarius at Naples. The tradition concerning him is, that he was thrown by his heathen persecutors into a heated oven, where he remained three days uninjured. He was afterwards exposed to wild beasts, who became as lambs in his presence. He was finally beheaded, A.D. 305. A woman is said to have caught and preserved a portion of his blood. This with other of his remains was carried to Naples, being identified as usual by a miracle, as it is said, "Neapolitani beatum Januarium revelatione commoti sustulerunt." The blood, preserved with great care in the cathedral, is contained in two crystal vials, a larger and smaller one. In its ordinary state it is a hard substance, sometimes represented as filling the vial, and sometimes as appearing in a hard round lump. The blood of other saints is said to liquefy on the anniversaries of their martyrdom, but the blood of Januarius becomes liquid whenever the vial containing it is brought near to the skull of the saint, which is still preserved. It turns readily when good is impending, and refuses to change when evil is at hand. It thus serves the purpose of an oracle. It is annually produced and exhibited to crowds of devotees gathered in the cathedral on the first Sunday of May, and also on the nineteenth day of September and twentieth of December, and at other times on extraordinary emergencies. To this miracle the Church of Rome is fully committed as it is exhibited every year under the eyes of the pope and the highest dignitaries of the Church. There is not a particle of evidence for the facts above stated concerning this saint, which may not be pleaded for any

one of the thousands of stories of fairies and witches with which the histories of all nations abound, except the liquefaction of the blood. As to that, however, it is to be said that there is no evidence that the substance contained in the vial is blood; or if blood, that it is human blood; or if human, that it is the blood of Januarius; or if his, that the cause of the liquefaction is bringing the vial into proximity to the saint's cranium. All that the people are allowed to see, the change of a dark-red solid substance into a fluid, any chemist could effect at five minutes notice. It is true, as Dr. Newman admits, that these miracles do not so much prove the truth of the Church, as the Church proves the truth of the miracles. Then what are they worth?

Relics.

Relics are the remains of sacred persons and things, which are not only to be cherished as memorials, but to which "cultus" or a certain degree of religious worship is due, and which are imbued with supernatural power. They heal the sick, restore sight to the blind, hearing to the deaf, soundness to the maimed, and even, at times, life to the dead. Of these the Catholic world is full. [423] Dr. Newman in his "Lectures on the Present Position of Catholics in England," delivered after his reconciliation with the Church of Rome, says, "At Rome there is the True Cross, the Crib of Bethlehem, and the Chair of St. Peter; portions of the Crown of Thorns are kept at Paris; the Holy Coat is shown at Treves; the Winding-sheet at Turin: at Monza the iron Crown is formed out of a nail of the Cross; and another nail is claimed for the Duomo of Milan; and pieces of Our Lady's habit are to be seen in the Escurial. The Agnus Dei, blest medals, the Scapula, the cord of St. Francis, all are the medium of divine manifestations and graces." [424]

There is here opened an illimitable field for pious fraud. First, in palming upon the credulous people spurious relics, and, secondly in falsely attributing to them supernatural power. It has been proved in many cases that remains passed off as relics of the saints were bones of animals. In other cases it is impossible that all should be genuine, as bodies, or the same parts of bodies, of one and the same man are exhibited in different places. There is, as has often been asserted, enough wood of the true cross, held sacred in different localities, out of which to construct a large building. Writing not long after the alleged discovery of the cross on which the Saviour died, Cyril of Jerusalem says, "Sanctum crucis lignum testatur, quod ad hodiernum usque diem apud nos conspicitur, ac per eos qui fide impellente ex eo frusta decerpunt orbem fere totum hinc jam opplevit." And again, he speaks of "crucis lignum, quod per particulas ex hoc loco per totum orbem distributum est." [425] St. Paulinas, who is one of the long list of witnesses quoted in defence of the veneration of relics, says "that a portion of the cross kept at Jerusalem gave off fragments of itself without diminishing." This is the only way in which the fact in question can be accounted for. If this solution be not admitted, then it must be acknowledged that, at least, the great majority of the portions of the cross now on exhibition must be spurious. There is no historical evidence of any value that any portion of the true cross has been preserved. Nothing was heard of it until A.D. 327. About that time, according to the legend, the Empress Helena, in searching for the Holy Sepulchre, found at the depth of thirty feet from the surface of the earth, three crosses, assumed to be those mentioned in the Gospels. The true cross was identified, some say, by its inscription; others, by a sick woman being touched by the one and the other without effect, but restored to perfect health the moment the true cross came in

contact with her body. Others say that a corpse was restored to life by the touch of the true cross. In reference to this account it may be remarked, (1.) That there is a strong antecedent improbability that the crosses used on Calvary were ever buried. The assumption that it was the custom of the Jews to bury those implements of torture, rests on a very precarious foundation. (2.) The cross was a very slight structure, as it could be borne by one man; and, therefore, if buried superficially, as it must have been at first, it could hardly have continued undecayed three hundred years, especially considering the ploughings and overturnings to which the Holy City was subjected. (3.) The historical evidence in support of this legend is of little account. Cyril of Jerusalem, twenty years after the date assigned to the discovery, does indeed say that the true cross was then in Jerusalem, as Jerome does some sixty years later, but neither of them makes any mention of Helena in connection with the cross or the sepulchre. It may, therefore, be admitted that what passed for the true cross was then in Jerusalem, but the account of its recovery and identification remains without support. (4.) The historian Eusebius, a contemporary and eye-witness, makes no mention of the finding of the cross, an event the belief in which agitated all Christendom, and led to the immense aggrandizement of the bishopric of Jerusalem. It is inconceivable that such an event, if within his knowledge, should have been passed over in silence by such a historian, who had so much at heart to enchance the glory of his patron the Emperor. (5.) Calvary and the sepulchre we know were without the city. The place where the cross is said to have been found is in the centre of the modern city. Whether the city has so changed its limits as to bring the place of the crucifixion and burial of Christ within its boundaries, is a much debated question. Dr. Robinson, one of the most reliable of explorers, says, "The hypothesis which makes the second wall so run as to exclude the alleged site of the Holy Sepulchre, is on topographical grounds untenable and impossible." [426] That is, assuming the truth of the statement of the Evangelists that Christ was crucified without the walls, it is topographically impossible that the alleged site of the Holy Sepulchre should be the true one. And thus the whole foundation of the legend of finding the cross on that spot falls to the ground. Dr. Robinson winds up his long discussion of this question in the following words: "Thus in every view which I have been able to take of the question, both topographical and historical, whether on the spot or in the closet, and in spite of all my previous prepossessions, I am led irresistibly to the conclusion, that the Golgotha and the tomb now shown in the Church of the Holy Sepulchre, are not upon the real places of the crucifixion and resurrection of our Lord. The alleged discovery of them by the aged and credulous Helena, like her discovery of the cross, may not improbably have been the work of pious fraud. It would perhaps not be doing injustice to the Bishop Macarius and his clergy, if we regard the whole as a well laid and successful plan for restoring to Jerusalem its former consideration, and elevating his see to a higher degree of influence and dignity." [427]

Dr. Newman says we must either admit the discovery of the cross, or believe the Church of Jerusalem guilty of imposture. [428] It is hard to decide how much is due in this matter to fraud, and how much to superstitious credulity. That both prevailed for ages in the Church is an undoubted historical fact. Are we to believe all that Gregory of Nyssa said of Gregory of Neo-Csarea, or what the fathers relate of St. Anthony; are we to admit all the legends of the saints, to avoid charging credulity or fraud against good men? It is lamentable that good men advocated the principle that it is right to deceive for a good end. It is undeniable that the doctrine of pious frauds has been avowed and acted upon in the

Church of Rome ever since it began to aspire to ecclesiastical supremacy. Was not the pretended donation of Italy by Constantine to the pope a fraud? Are not the Isidorian Decretals a fraud? Are not the miracles wrought in proof of the delivery of souls from purgatory, frauds? Is not the alleged house of the Virgin Mary at Loretto a fraud? Is not the foot-print (ex pede Hercules) on a marble slab in the Cathedral of Rouen, a fraud? Is not the feather from the wing of the Archangel Gabriel preserved in one of the Cathedrals of Spain, a fraud? The whole Catholic world is full of frauds of this kind; and the only possible ground for Romanists to take is, that it is right to deceive the people for their good. "Populus vult decipi," is the excuse a Romish priest once made to Coleridge in reference to this matter.

Secondly, pious frauds are practised, not only in the exhibition of false relics, but also in falsely attributing to them supernatural power. Dr. Newman says: "The store of relics is inexhaustible; they are multiplied through all lands, and each particle of each has in it at least a dormant, perhaps an energetic virtue of supernatural operation." [429] Bellarmin of course teaches the same [430] dootrine. Cyril of Jerusalem says, "Et Elis&#65533;um qui semel et iterum suscitavit, dum viveret, et post mortem: vivus resurrectionem per suam ipsius animam operatus est, ut autem non anim&#65533; solum justorum honorarentur, sed crederetur etiam in justorum corporibus jacere vim, projectus in monumentum Elis&#65533;i mortuus prophet&#65533; corpus attingens, vitam concepit, 4 Kin. iv. 13, ut ostenderetur, absente etiam anima inesse vim corpori sanctorum propter animam justam, qu&#65533; in eo habitaverat." [431] Dr. Newman says that miracles wrought by relics are of daily occurrence in all parts of the world. It is not that people are favourably affected by them through the imagination or feelings, but that the relics themselves are imbued with supernatural power. Thus Dr. Newman, one of the most cultivated men of the nineteenth century, has come round to the pure, simple, undiluted fetichism of Africa.

Our Lord warned his disciples against being deceived by lying wonders. The Bible (Deut. xiii. 1-3) teaches that any sign or wonder given or wrought in support of any doctrine contrary to the Word of God, is, without further examination, to be pronounced false. If, therefore, such doctrines as the supremacy of the pope; the power of priests to forgive sins; the absolute necessity of the sacraments as the only channels of communicating the merits and grace of Christ; the necessity of auricular confession; purgatory; the adoration of the Virgin and of the consecrated wafer: and the worship of saints and angels, are contrary to the Holy Scriptures, then to a certainty all the pretended miracles wrought in their support are "lying wonders;" and those who promulgate and sustain them are guilty of pious fraud. If, therefore, as Newman says, The Catholic Church, from east to west, from north to south, is, according to our conceptions, hung with miracles: so much the worse. It is hung all over with the symbols or ensigns of apostasy.

[389] Lord Broughman, according to the public papers, uttered these sentiments in vindication of the conduct of the famous Irish advocate Phillips, who on the trial of Courvoisier for the murder of Lord Russell, endeavored to fasten the guilt on the butler and housemaid, whom he knew to be innocent, as his client had confessed to him that he had committed the crime.

[390] Gerhard, Loci Theologici, xiii. 177; edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1766, vol. v. p. 346, Cotta's note.

[391] This definition is given by Dens, Theologia, De Mendacio, N. 242, edit. Dublin, 1832, vol. iv. p. 306.

[392] Ibid. N. 243, p. 308.

[393] "Confessarius interrogatus a tyranno an Titius confessus sit homicidium, respondere potest et debet: nescio;' quia confessarius id nescit scientia communicabili. Imo, etiamsi instaret tyrannus, et diceret, An hoc nescis scientia sacramentali?' Respondere adhuc posset: nescio.' Ratio est, quia tyrannus bene scit se de hoc jus interrogandi non habere, nec confessarius ut homo scit se scire, sed uti vicarius Dei et scientia incommunicabili.'" John Peter Gury, Compendium Theologi Moralis, new edit. Tornaci. vol. i. p. 201.

[394] De Mendacio, 3; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. p. 712, a.

[395] Ibid. 5, (iv.), p. 715, a.

[396] Aquinas, Summa, II. ii. 110, 2; edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 203, a, of third set. "Potest dividi mendacium, in quantum habet rationem culp, secundum ea qu aggravant, vel diminuunt culpam mendacii ex parte finis intenti. Aggravat autem culpam mendacii, si aliquis per mendacium intendat alterius nocumentum: quod vocatur mendacium perniciosum. Diminuitur autem culpa mendacii, si ordinetur ad aliquod bonum, vel delectabile, et sic est mendacium jocosum: vel utile, et sic est mendacium officiosum, quo intenditur juvamentum alterius, vel remotio nocumenti. Et secundum hoc dividitur mendacium in tria pr dicta." The first, according to Romanists, is a mortal sin, the two latter are regarded as venial.

[397] Gury, ut supra, vol. i. pp. 200, 201.

[398] Blaise Pascal, Lettres crites a un Provincial, edit. Paris, 1829, p. 180; Escobar, III. ex. iii. n. 48.

[399] De Wette did not approve of the assassination of Kotzebue in a moral point of view. His language was: "So wie die That geschehen ist, mit diesem Glauben, mit dieser Zuversicht, ist sie ein sch nes Zeichen der Zeit. -- Die That ist -- allgemein betrachtet -- unsittlich und der sittlichen Gesetzgebung zuwiderlaufend. Das B se soll nicht durch das B se berwunden werden, sondern allein durch das Gute. Durch Unrecht, List und Gewalt kann kein Recht gestiftet werden, und der gute Zweck heiligt nicht das ungerechte Mittel." Quoted in the Conversations-Lexicon, 7th edit. Leipzig, 1827, art. Wette (de). The letter, although thus guarded, led to the loss of his professorship in Berlin and his virtual banishment from the city.

[400] Dens, ut supra, vol. iv. N. 242, p. 307. "Mendacium officiosum dicitur, quod committitur solum causa utilitatis propri vel alien: v. g. quis dicit, se non habere pecunias, ne iis spolietur a militibus." And on the same page he says, "Officiosum autem et jocosum sunt ex genere suo peccatum veniale." See also Gury, vol. i. p. 199. "Mendacium efficiosum peccatum venale est, per se, quia in eo gravis deordinatio non apprehenditus."

[401] De Mendacio, 9, (vi.); Works, ut supra, vol. vi. p. 719 ff.

[402] Ecclesiastical History, I. ii. 2. 3. § 15; edit. New York, 1859, vol. i. p. 130.

[403] Contra Mendacium ad Consentium, 18; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. i. pp. 767, d, 768, a, b.

[404] Epistola, xlviii. [30 seu 50] 13. seu Liber Apologeticus ad Pammachium;

Works, edit. Migne, Paris, 1845, vol. i. p. 502.

[405] Collationes, xvii. 17; Magna Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum, tom. v. par. ii. Cologne, 1618, p. 189, f, g.

[406] A brief account of this much debated question is given by Uhlhorn in Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, art. "Ignatius." Neander says of these assumed letters of Ignatius, "Even the briefer revision, which is the one most entitled to confidence, has been very much interpolated. . . . . A hierarchical purpose is not to be mistaken." General History of the Christian Religion and Church, by Dr. Augustine Neander. Translated by Joseph Torrey, Professor in the University of Vermont, 2d edit. Boston, 1849, vol. i. p. 661.

[407] Gieseler, Ecclesiastical History, Per. III. ii. 1. 1. § 20; edit. Edinburgh, 1848, vol. ii. pp. 331-336.

[408] Ibid. p. 335, foot-notes.

[409] Quoted by Gieseler, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 337, from the Decreta Gratiani.

[410] Grotius in his annotations on Mark xvi. 17, says: "Cum vero multo etiam seriora secula plena sint testimoniis ejus rei, nescio qua ratione moti quidam id donum ad prima tantum tempora restringant; quibus ut uberiorem fuisse miraculorum copiam, ad jacienda tanti &#65533;dificii fundementa contra vim mundi, facile concedo, ita cum illis expirasse hanc Christi promissionem cur credamus non video. Quare si quis nunc etiam gentibus Christi ignaris (illis enim proprie miracula inserviunt 1 Cor. xiv. 22). Christum, ita ut ipse annuntiari voluit, annuntiet, promissionis vim duraturam arbitor. Sunt enim ametameleta tou Theou dora (sine poenitentia dona Dei). Sed nos cujus rei culpa est in nostra ignavia aut indifferentia id solemus in Deum rejicere." Works, edit. London, 1679, tome. II. vol. i. p. 328, b, 18-32.

[411] The Pope and the Council, by Janus. Authorized Translation from the German, Boston, 1870.

[412] See especially chap. III. § 7, pp. 76-122.

[413] Papal Infallibility Untenable. Three Letters by A. Gratry, Priest of the Oratory, and member of the French Academy. Hartford, 1870.

[414] It is perfectly intelligible that a man who admits the infallibility of general councils, may be able to subject his strongest personal convictions to the judgment of the Church. But not less than three oecumenical councils and twenty Popes had pronounced Honorious a heretic. How could the council of the Vatican reverse those decisions? Besides, Gratry and his Gallican and German coadjutors denied that the late council was either oecumenical or free. Father Hyacinth wrote to Gratry on his recantation, and said to him, "You speak of erasing what you have written, but how can you erase the facts which you have demonstrated, or the convictions you have produced in the minds of the faithful?"

[415] Criterion, or, the Rules by which the True Miracles recorded in the New Testament are distinguished from the Spurious Miracles of Pagans and Papists. 4th edit. Oxford, 1832, pp. 228-232. The author was Dean of Windsor, Bishop of Carlisle, and afterwards of Salisbury.

[416] In Epistolam I. ad Corinthios, Homilia, vi. 2; Works, edit. Montfaucon, Paris, 1837, vol. x. p. 53, a.

[417] De Civitate Dei, XXII. viii. 1; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1838, vol. vii.

p. 1057, d.

[418] Two Essays on Scripture Miracles and on Ecclesiastical. By John Henry Newman, formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford, 2d edit. London, 1870, p. 116. These Essays, it should be stated, were first published before Dr. Newman entered the Church of Rome. The former was written in 1825-26, and the latter in 1842-43. He was reconciled to Rome in 1845. In the second edition of the united essays published in 1870, he endorses them anew with slight qualification. His words are (p. viii.), "These distinct views of miraculous agency, thus contrasted, involve no inconsistency with each other; but it must be owned that, in the essay upon the Scriptural miracles, the author goes beyond both the needs and the claims of his argument, when, in order to show their special dignity and beauty, he depreciates the purpose and value of the miracles of Church history. To meet this undue disparagement in his first essay, of facts which have their definite place in the divine dispensation, he points out in his second the essential resemblance which exists between many of the miracles of Scripture and those of the later times; and it is with the same drift that, in this edition, a few remarks at the foot of the page have been added in brackets." This qualification was hardly necessary, as the fourth chapter of the second essay contains the most ingenious defence of ecclesiastical miracles anywhere to be found. It is generally understood that Prof. Newman was in heart a Romanist some years before his secession from the Church of England. Of his his famous Tract Number 90 of the Oxford series, is a sufficient proof.

[419] Ibid. p. 150.

[420] First Letter to One Seduced to the Church of Rome; Works, edit. London, 1828, vol. xi. p. 139.

[421] Accounts of these miracles may be found, not only in the original documents, but also in numerous works, as those of Bishop Stillingfleet and others, written to expose the impostures of the Romish Church. The Rev. John Cumming of London, in his Lectures on Romanism (Boston, 1854), has cited from these official records examples sufficiently numerous to satisfy any ordinary man. For example, it is said of Santa Rosa Maria of Lima, among many others, that the Virgin often appeared to her and talked with her, that the Saviour came to her in the form of a child leaning on his mother's arm, to collect roses scattered on the ground, and then the Divine infant took one of them and said "Thou art the rose." (Cumming, p. 629). When her tomb was opened fifteen years after death, her remains "exhaled the odor of roses." Of St. Philip Neri it is said that he was so agitated by the love of God, that the Lord broke two of his ribs to give freer action to his heart. (p. 634) Of Sister Maria Francisca, it is certified that when placing a holy Bambino (i.e., image of the infant Jesus) into the manger, such a light emanated from the Bambino as to blind her for three days. On another occasion, when dressing the image, she said, "My little child, if you do not stretch out your feet I cannot put on your shoes and stockings," and the wooden image immediately stretched out its feet. It is also asserted that she obtained from Christ permission to suffer vicariously for a limited time, in the place of some of her friends, the pains of purgatory, and accordingly endured for a month the most intense agonies. It is further said, that she had imparted to her the sufferings of Christ, his bloody sweat, the anguish of the crown of thorns, his scourgings and agonies on the cross, and his wounds visibly impressed upon her. (Cumming, pp. 649-653) Cardinal Wiseman edited a book

including the lives of several saints, and among them that of St. Veronica Giuliani, who was canonized so recently as 1839. Of this saint, he says, among many similar things, that God recompensed her readiness to drink of the chalice of suffering, by making her a partaker of the torments of Christ's passion. Christ accordingly appeared to her and took the crown of thorns and placed it on her head. (Cumming, pp. 665-675). Such are some of the miracles and which Rome rests her claims to be the only true Church and the infallible teacher of man.

[422] Conversations-Lexicon, 7th edit. Leipzig, 1827, art. "Loretto."

[423] The language of the Council of Trent in reference to the honour due to the relics of the saints has already been quoted when treating of the second commandment. Perrone in his Pr&#65533;lectiones Theologic&#65533;, De Cultu Sanctorum, iv. 71, edit. Paris, 1861, vol. ii. p. 112, b, adduces as one of his arguments in favour of the worship of relics the declaration of the Epistle of the Church of Smyrna, that the heathen feared "ne Christiani, relicto Christo, Polycarpum adorare inciperent; omni idcirco qua poterant ratione martyrum corpora, ne a Christianis colerentur, ethnici gladiatorum corporibus commiscebant; in amphitheatris feris, in aquis piscibus ut vorarentur exponebant; aut saltem igne illa cremabant, cinere dispergentes, uti ex martyrum actis constat." It was "adoration," "worship," that was to be rendered to these relics. The distinction between the different kinds of worship, had little effect on the popular mind. Perrone himself teaches that the "material heart of Christ" was to be adored latri&#65533; cultu. De Incarnatione, II. iv. 454; Ibid. p. 81, a.

[424] Quoted by Dr. Cumming in his Lectures on Romanism, p. 595.

[425] Catechesis Illuminandorum, x. 19, and xiii. 4; Opera, Venice, 1763, pp. 146, c, and 184, c.

[426] Biblical Researches in Palestine, Mount Sinai, and Arabia Petr&#65533;a. A Journal of Travels in the year 1838, by E. Robinson and E. Smith. Drawn up from the Original Diaries, etc. By Edward Robinson, Professor of Biblical Literature in the Union Theological Seminary, New York. Boston, 1841, vol. ii. p. 69.

[427] Ibid. p. 80.

[428] Essays on Miracles, p. 297.

[429] Lectures on the Position of Catholics in England, p. 284.

[430] See above pp. 300, 301.

[431] Catechesis Illuminandorum, xviii. 16; Opera, Venice, 1763, p. 293, a, b.

§ 14. The Tenth Commandment.

Is a general prohibition of covetousness. "Thou shalt not covet," is a comprehensive command. Thou shalt not inordinately desire what thou hast not; and especially what belongs to thy neighbour. It includes the positive command to be contented with the allotments of Providence; and the negative injunction not to repine, or complain on account of the dealings of God with us, or to envy the lot or possessions of others. The command to be contented does not imply indifference, and it does not enjoin slothfulness. A cheerful and contented disposition is perfectly compatible with a due appreciation of the good things of this world, and diligence in the use of all proper means to improve our condition in life.

Contentment can have no other rational foundation than religion. Submission to the inevitable is only stoicism, or apathy, or despair. The religions of the East, and of the ancient world generally, so far as they were the subject of thought, being essentially pantheistic, could produce nothing but a passive consent to be borne along for a definite period on the irresistible current of events, and then lost in the abyss of unconscious being. The poor and the miserable could with such a faith have little ground for contentment, and they would be under the strongest temptation to envy the rich and the fortunate. But if a man believes that there is a personal God infinite in power, wisdom, and love; if he believes that God's providence extends over all creatures and over all events; and if he believes that God orders everything, not only for the best on the whole, but also for the best for each individual who puts his trust in Him and acquiesces in his will, then not to be contented with the allotments of infinite wisdom and love must be folly. Faith in the truths referred to cannot fail to produce contentment, wherever that faith is real. When we further take into view the peculiar Christian aspects of the case; then we remember that this universal government is administered by Jesus Christ, into whose hands, as He himself tells us, all power in heaven and earth has been committed, than we know that our lot is determined by Him who loved us and gave Himself for us, and who watches over his people as a shepherd watches over his flock, so that a hair of our heads cannot perish without his permission. And when we think of the eternal future which He has prepared for us, then we see that the sorrows of this life are not worthy to be compared with the glory that shall be revealed in us, and that our light afflictions, which are but for a moment, shall work out for us a far more exceeding and an eternal weight of glory; then mere contentment is elevated to a peace which passes all understanding, and even to a joy which is full of glory. All this is exemplified in the history of the people of God as recorded in the Bible. Paul could not only say, "I have learned, in whatsoever state I am, therewith to be content" (Phil. iv. 11); but he could also say: "I take pleasure in infirmities, in reproaches, in necessities, in persecutions, in distresses for Christ's sake." (2 Cor. xii. 10.) This has measurably been the experience of thousands of believers in all ages. Of all people in the world Christians are bound in whatsoever state they are therewith to be content. It is easy to utter these words, and easy for those in comfort to imagine that they are exercising the grace of contentment; but when a man is crushed down by poverty and sickness, surrounded by those whose wants he cannot supply; seeing those whom he loves, suffering and wearing away under their privations, then contentment and submission are among the highest and rarest of Christian graces. Nevertheless, it is better to be Lazarus than Dives.

The second form of evil condemned by this commandment is envy. This is something more than an inordinate desire of unpossessed good. It includes regret that others should have what we do rot enjoy; a feeling of hatred and malignity towards those more favoured than ourselves; and a desire to deprive them of their advantages. This is a real cancer of the soul; producing torture and eating out all right feelings. There are, of course, all degrees of this sin, from the secret satisfaction experienced at the misfortunes of others, or the unexpressed desire that evil may assail them or that they may be reduced to the same level with ourselves, to the Satanic hatred of the happy because of their happiness, and the determination, if possible, to render them miserable. There is more of this dreadful spirit in the human heart, than we are willing to acknowledge. Montesquieu says that every man has a secret satisfaction in the misfortunes even of his dearest friends. As envy is the antithesis

of love, it is of all sins the most opposed to the nature of God, and more effectually than any other excludes us from his fellowship.

Thirdly, the Scriptures, however, make mention most frequently of covetousness under the form of an inordinate desire of wealth. The man of whom covetousness is the characteristic has the acquisition of wealth as the main object of his life. This fills his mind, engrosses his affections, and absorbs his energy. Of covetousness in this form the Apostle says it is the root of all evil. That is, there is no evil -- from meanness, deceit, and fraud, up to murder -- to the commission of which covetousness has not prompted men, or to which it does not always threaten to impel them. Of the covetous man in this sense of the word the Bible says, (1.) That he cannot enter heaven. (1 Cor. vi. 10.) (2.) That he is an idolater. (Eph. v. 5.) Wealth is his God, i.e., that to which he gives his heart and consecrates his life. (3.) That God abhors him. (Ps. x. 3.)

This commandment has a special interest, as it was the means, as St. Paul tells us, of leading him to the knowledge of sin. "I had not known lust, except the law had said, Thou shalt not covet." (Rom. vii. 7.) Most of the other commandments forbid external acts, but this forbids a state of the heart. It shows that no external obedience can fulfil the demands of the law; that God looks upon the heart, that He approves or disapproves of the secret affections and purposes of the soul; that a man may be a pharisee, pure outwardly as a whited sepulchre, but inwardly full of dead men's bones and of all uncleanness.

CHAPTER XX: THE MEANS OF GRACE

By means of grace are not meant every instrumentality which God may please to make the means of spiritual edification to his children. The phrase is intended to indicate those institutions which God has ordained to be the ordinary channels of grace, i.e., of the supernatural influences of the Holy Spirit, to the souls of men. The means of grace, according to the standards of our Church, are the word, sacraments, and prayer.

§ 1. The Word.

1. The word of God, as here understood, is the Bible. And the Bible is the collection of the canonical books of the Old and New Testaments.

2. These books are the word of God because they were written by men who were prophets, his organs, or spokesmen, in such a sense that whatever they declare to be true or obligatory, God declares to be true and binding. These topics have already been considered in the first volume of this work, so far as they fall within the limits of systematic theology.

3. The word of God, so far as adults are concerned, is an in dispensable means of salvation. True religion never has existed, and never can exist, where the truths revealed in the Bible are unknown. This point also has already been discussed when speaking of the insufficiency of natural religion.

4. The word of God is not only necessary to salvation, but it is also divinely efficacious to the accomplishment of that end. This appears, (a.) From the commission given to the Church. After his resurrection our Lord said to his disciples: "Go ye therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things, whatsoever I have commanded you: and, lo, I am with you alway, even unto the end of the world. Amen." (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20). The words as recorded in Mark xvi. 15, 16, are, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved, but he that believeth not shall be damned." The end to be accomplished, was the salvation of men. The means of its accomplishment was teaching. The disciples were to teach what Christ had taught them. That is, they were to teach the Gospel to every creature under heaven. All means derive their efficiency from the ordinance of God; as He has ordained the Gospel to be the means of salvation, it must be efficacious to that end. (b.) This appears further from the manner in which the Apostles executed the commission which they had received. They went everywhere, preaching Christ. They were sent to teach; and teaching was their whole work. "I determined," said Paul, "not to know anything among you, save Jesus Christ and him crucified." (1 Cor. ii. 2.) (c.) The power of the Word is proved from many direct assertions in the Bible. Paul tells the Romans that he was not ashamed of the Gospel of

Christ, because "it is the power of God unto salvation." (Rom. i. 16.) To the Corinthians he says, in view of the utter impotence of the wisdom of the world, that "it pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe." (1 Cor. i. 21.) The preaching of Christ crucified was "unto the Jews a stumbling-block, and unto the Greeks foolishness; but unto them which are called, both Jews and Greeks, Christ the power of God, and the wisdom of God." (Vers. 23, 24.) In the Epistle to the Hebrews it is said: "The word of God is quick, and powerful, and sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing even to the dividing asunder of soul and spirit, and of the joints and marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the heart." (Heb. iv. 12.)

The sacred writers, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, are exuberant in their praise of the Word of God, as its power was revealed in their own experience. "The law of the Lord," says the Psalmist, "is perfect, converting the soul." (Ps. xix. 7.) By the law of the Lord is meant the whole revelation which God has made in his Word to determine the faith, form the character, anu control the conduct of men. It is this revelation which the Psalmist pronounces perfect, that is, perfectly adapted to accomplish the end of man's sanctification and salvation. "Thy word." he says "is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my path." (Ps. cxix. 105.) "The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple: the statutes of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart: the commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes: the fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever: the judgments of the Lord are true and righteous altogether. More to be desired are they than gold, yea, than much fine gold; sweeter also than honey and the honeycomb." (Ps. xix. 7-10.) Almost every one of the hundred and seventy-six verses of the one hundred and nineteenth Psalm contains some recognition of the excellence or power of the Word of God. "Is not my word like as a fire? saith the Lord; and like a hammer that breaketh the rock in pieces?" (Jer. xxiii. 29.)

In the New Testament the same divine efficacy is attributed to ths Word of God. It is the gospel of our salvation, i.e., that by which we are saved. Paul said that Christ commissioned him to preach the Gospel to the Gentiles, saying, for this purpose I appeared unto thee to make thee minister and a witness, delivering thee from the Gentiles, "unto whom now I send thee, to open their eyes, and to turn them from darkness to light, and from the power of Satan unto God, that they may receive forgiveness of sins, and inheritance among them which are sanctified by faith that is in me." (Acts xxvi. 17, 18.) All this was to be effected by the Gospel. The same Apostle writing to Timothy says: "From a child thou hast known the Holy Scriptures, which are able to make thee wise unto salvation, through faith which is in Christ Jesus. All Scripture is given by inspiration of God, and is profitable for doctrine, for reproof, for correction, for instruction in righteousness." (2 Tim. iii. 15, 16.) The Apostle Peter says that men are "born again, not of corruptible seed, but of incorruptible, by the word of God which liveth and abideth forever." (1 Pet. i. 23.) Our Lord prayed, "Sanctify them through thy truth: thy word is truth." (John xvii. 17.)

Testimony of History.

There can, therefore, be no doubt that the Scriptures teach that the Word of God is the specially appointed means for the sanctification and the salvation of men. This doctrine of the Bible is fully confirmed by the experience of the Church and of the world. That experience teaches, -- First, that no evidences of sanctification, no indications of the saving influences of the Spirit are found where the Word of God is unknown. This is not saying that

none such occur. We know from the Bible itself, "That God is no respecter of persons; but in every nation he that feareth him, and worketh righteousness, is accepted with him." (Acts x. 34, 35.) No one doubts that it is in the power of God to call whom He pleases from among the heathen and to reveal to them enough truth to secure their salvation. [432] Nevertheless it remains a fact patent to all eyes that the nations where the Bible is unknown sit in darkness. The absence of the Bible is just as distinctly discernible as the absence of the sun. The declaration of the Scriptures is that "the whole world lieth in wickedness" (1 John v. 19); and that declaration is confirmed by all history.

A second fact on which the testimony of experience is equally clear is, that true Christianity flourishes just in proportion to the degree in which the Bible is known, and its truths are diffused among the people. During the apostolic age the messengers of Christ went everywhere preaching his Gospel, in season and out of season; proving from the Scriptures that Jesus is the Christ, the Son of the living God; requiring those to whom they preached to search the Scriptures; exhorting younger ministers to preach the Word; to hold forth the Word of life; to give attendance to reading, exhortation, and doctrine; to meditate upon these things and to give themselves wholly to them. During this period the Gospel made more rapid progress, and perhaps brought forth more abundant fruits than during any equally long period of its history. When, however, the truth began to be more and more corrupted by the speculations of philosophy, and by the introduction of the Jewish doctrines concerning ceremonies and the priesthood; when "reserve" in preaching came into vogue, and it was held to be both lawful and wise to conceal the truth, and awaken reverence and secure obedience by other means; and when Christian worship was encumbered by heathen rites, and the trust of the people turned away from God and Christ, to the virgin and saints, then the shades of night overspread the Church, and the darkness became more and more intense, until the truth or light was almost entirely obscured. At the Reformation, when the chained Bible was brought from the cloisters, given to the press, and scattered over Europe, it was like the bright rising of the sun: the darkness was dissipated; the Church arose from the dust, and put on her beautiful garments, for the glory of God had arisen upon her. Wherever the reading and preaching of the Word was unrestricted, there light, liberty, and true religion prevailed, in a proportionate degree. Wherever the Bible was suppressed and the preaching of its truths was forbidden, there the darkness continued and still abides.

A third important fact equally well established is, that true religion prevails in any community, in proportion to the degree in which the young are instructed in the facts and indoctrinated in the truths of the Bible. This, in one view, is included under the previous head, but it deserves separate notice. The question does not concern the reason why the religious education of the young is so important; or the way in which that education can most advantageously be secured; but simply the fact that where the young are from the beginning imbued with the knowledge of the Bible, there pure Christianity abides; and where they are allowed to grow up in ignorance of divine truth, there true religion languishes and loses more and more its power. Such is the testimony of experience.

It is, therefore, the united testimony of Scripture and of history that the Bible, the Word of God, is the great means of promoting the sanctification and salvation of men, that is, of securing their temporal and eternal well being. Those consequently who are opposed to religion; who desire the reign of indifferentism, or the return of heathen doctrines and

heathen morality, are consistent and wise in their generation, in endeavouring to undermine the authority of the Bible; to discourage its circulation; to discountenance attendance on its preaching; and especially to oppose its being effectually taught to the young. Those on the other hand who believe that without holiness no man can see God, and that without the light of divine truth, holiness is impossible, are bound as pastors, as parents, and as citizens to insist that the Bible shall have free course, and that it shall be faithfully taught to all under their influence or for whose training they are responsible.

To what is the Power of the Word to be attributed?

It being admitted as a fact that the Bible has the power attributed to it, the question arises, To what is that due? To this question different answers are given. Some say that its whole power lies in the nature of the truths which it contains. This is the doctrine held by Pelagians and Rationalists. On this subject it may be remarked, (1.) That all truth has an adaptation to the human mind and tends to produce an impression in accordance with its nature. If a mind could be conceived or destitute of all truth, it would be in a state of idiocy. The mind is roused to action and expanded, and its power is increased by the truth, and, other things being equal, in proportion to the amount of truth communicated to it. (2.) It is the tendency of all moral truth in itself considered, to excite right moral feelings and to lead to right moral action. (3.) It is further conceded that the truths of the Bible and the sources of moral power therein contained are of the highest possible order. The doctrine, for example, therein taught concerning God, that He is a Spirit, infinite, eternal, and unchangeable in being, wisdom, power, holiness, justice, goodness, and truth, is immeasurably above all that human reason ever discovered or human philosophy ever taught. There is more moral power in that single truth, than in all the systems of moral philosophy. The same may be said of what the Bible teaches of God's relation to the world. He is not merely its creator and architect, but also its constant preserver and governor; everywhere present, working with and by his creatures, using each according to its nature, and overruling all things to the accomplishment of the highest and most beneficent designs. To his rational creatures, especially to men, He reveals Himself as a father, loving, guiding, and providing for them; never afflicting them willingly, but only when it would be morally wrong to do otherwise. The Bible doctrine concerning man is not only true, conformed to all that man reveals himself to be, but it is eminently adapted to make him what he was designed to be: to exalt without inflating; to humble without degrading him. The Bible teaches that God made man out of the dust of the earth and breathed into him the breath of life, and he became a living soul conformed to the image of God in knowledge, righteousness, and holiness. Thus man is apparently the lowest of God s rational creatures, but made capable of indefinite progress in capacity, excellence, and blessedness. The actual state of man however exhibits a sad contrast with this account of his original condition. The Bible accordingly informs us that man fell from the state in which he was created by sinning against God. Thus sin was introduced into the world: all men are sinners, that is, guilty, polluted, and helpless. These are facts of consciousness, as well as doctrines of the Bible. The Scriptures however inform us that God so loved the world that He gave his only begotten Son, that whoso believeth on Him might not perish but have everlasting life. We are told that this Son is the image of God, equal with God. By Him were all things created that are in heaven, and that are in earth, visible and invisible, whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities or powers: all things were created

by Him and for Him; and He is before all things, and by Him all things consist. This divine Person, for us and for our salvation, took upon Him our nature, fulfilled all righteousness, bore our sins in his own body on the tree; and having died for our offences, rose again for our justification; and is now seated at the right hand of the majesty on high; all power in heaven and earth having been committed to his hands. There is more of power to sanctify, to elevate, to strengthen and to cheer in the single word Jesus, which means "Jehovah-saviour," than in all the utterances of men since the world began. This divine and exalted Saviour has sent forth his disciples to preach his Gospel to every creature, promising pardon, sanctification, and eternal life, including a participation in his glory, to every one, on the sole condition that he receive Him as his God and Saviour, and, trusting in Him alone for salvation, honestly endeavour to do his will; that is, to love God with all his heart and his neighbour as himself, and to do to others as he would have others do to him. In view of all these truths, God asks, "What could have been done more to my vineyard, that I have not done in it?" All the resources of moral power are exhausted in the Bible. Every consideration that can affect the intellect, the conscience, the feelings, and the hopes of man is therein presented: yet all in vain.

There are two conditions necessary for the production of a given effect. The one is that the cause should have the requisite efficiency; and the other, that the object on which it acts should have the requisite susceptibility. The sun and rain shed their genial influences on a desert, and it remains a desert; when those influences fall on a fertile plain, it is clothed with all the wonders of vegetable fertility and beauty. The mid-day brightness of the sun has no more effect on the eyes of the blind than a taper; and if the eye be bleared the clearest light only enables it to see men as trees walking. It is so with moral truth: no matter what may be its inherent power, it fails of any salutary effect unless the mind to which it is presented be in a fit state to receive it.

The minds of men since the fall are not in a condition to receive the transforming and saving power of the truths of the Bible and therefore it is necessary, in order to render the Word of God an effectual means of salvation, that it should be attended by the supernatural power of the Holy Spirit. The Apostle says expressly, "The natural man receiveth not the things of the Spirit of God: for they are foolishness unto him: neither can he know them, because they are spiritually discerned." (1 Cor. ii. 14.) In the preceding chapter he had said, that the same gospel which to the called was the power and wisdom of God, was to the Jews a stumbling-block, and to the Greeks foolishness. Our Lord said to the Jews: "Why do ye not understand my speech? even because ye cannot hear my Word. He that is of God heareth God's words: ye therefore hear them not because ye are not of God." (John viii. 43, 47.) Everything that the Scriptures teach of the state of men since the fall proves that until enlightened by the Holy Ghost they are spiritually blind, unable to discern the true nature of the things of the Spirit, and therefore incapable of receiving a due impression from them.

Experience confirms this teaching of the Bible. It shows that no mere moral power of truth as presented objectively to the mind is of any avail to change the hearts of men. There once appeared on earth a divine person clothed in our nature; exhibiting the perfection of moral excellence in the form of a human life: holy, harmless, undefiled, and separate from sinners; humble, disinterested, beneficent, tender, patient, enduring, and dispensing

blessings on all who approached him. Yet this person was to the men of his generation without form or comeliness. He came to his own and his own received him not. They rejected him and preferred a murderer. And in what respect are we better than they? How is Christ regarded by the mass of the men of this generation? Multitudes blaspheme Him. The majority scarcely think of Him. He is to them no more than Socrates or Plato. And yet there is in Him such a revelation of the glory of God, as would constrain every human heart to love and adore Him, had not the god of this world blinded the eyes of those who believe not. It is vain therefore to talk of the moral power of truth converting men.

There are some who throw a vail over this rationalistic doctrine, and delude themselves and others into the belief that they stand on more Scriptural ground than Rationalists, because they admit that the Spirit is operative in the truth. Every theist believes that God is everywhere present in the world and always sustaining and co﷯perating with physical causes in the production of their various effects. So the Spirit is in the world, everywhere present and everywhere active, co﷯perating with moral causes in producing their legitimate effects. There is nothing in the operation of physical causes transcending their legitimate effects; and there is nothing in the regeneration, conversion, and sanctification of men which transcends the legitimate effects of moral truth. The one series of effects is just as natural, and just as little supernatural, as the other. It has already been shown on a previous page, [433] that this is all that the most advanced rationalists require. It excludes the supernatural, which is all they demand. In the effects produced by physical causes guided by the providential efficiency of God, there is nothing which exceeds the power of those causes; and in the effects produced by the moral power of the truth under the co﷯peration of the Spirit, there is nothing which exceeds the power of the truth. The salvation of the soul is as much a natural process as the growth of a plant. The Scriptures clearly teach that there is an operation of the Spirit on the soul anterior to the sanctifying influence of the truth, and necessary to render that influence effective. A dead man must be restored to life, before the objects of sense can produce upon him their normal effect. Those spiritually dead must be quickened by the almighty power of God, before the things of the Spirit can produce their appropriate effect. Those spiritually blind must have their eyes opened before they can discern the things freely given, or revealed, to them of God. This influence being anterior to, cannot be through, the truth. Hence we find numerous prayers in every part of the Scriptures for this antecedent work of the Spirit; prayers that God would change the hearts, open the eyes, and unstop the ears of men; or that He would give them ears to hear, and eyes to see. The Spirit is everywhere represented as a personal agent, distributing his gifts to every one severally as He will. He arouses their attention, controls their judgments, and awakens their affections. He convinces them of sin, righteousness, and judgment. He works in the people of God both to will and to do. He teaches, guides, comforts, and strengthens. His influence is not confined to one activity producing an initial change, and then leaving the renewed soul to the influences of the truth and of the ordinances, it is abiding. It is not however the influence of a uniformly acting force co﷯perating with the truth; but that of a person, acting when and where He pleases; more at one time than at another, sometimes in one way and sometimes in another. He is a "Helper" who can be invoked, or who can be grieved and resisted. All these representations of the Scriptures, which are utterly inconsistent with the purely rationalistic doctrine, as well as with the doctrine which either confounds the operations of the Spirit

with the providential efficiency of God, or regards them as analogous, have impressed themselves on the general consciousness of the Church. Every believer feels that he stands to the Holy Spirit in the relation which one person sustains to another: a person on whom he is dependent for all good; whose assistance must be sought, and whose assistance may be granted or withheld at pleasure; and who may come or withdraw either for a season or forever. Such has been the faith of the Church in all ages, as is manifest from its creeds, its hymns, and its prayers. While all Christians admit that God's providential efficiency extends over all his works, and that all good in fallen man is due to the presence and power of his Holy Spirit, yet they have ever felt and believed, under the guidance of the Scriptures, that the divine activity in these different spheres is entirely different. The spheres themselves are different; the ends to be accomplished are different; and the mode of operation is different. In nature (especially in the external world) God acts by law; his providential efficiency is a "potentia ordinata;" in grace it is more a "potentia absoluta," untrammelled by law. It is personal and sovereign. He does not act continuously or in any one way; but just as He sees fit. He works in us "both to will and to do of his good pleasure." (Phil. ii. 13.) As just remarked, therefore, every Christian feels his dependence not upon law, but on the good-will of a person. Hence the prayers so frequent in Scripture, and so constantly on the lips of believers, that the Spirit would not cast us off; would not give us up; would not be grieved by our ingratitude or resistance: but that He would come to us, enlighten us, purify, elevate, strengthen, guide, and comfort us; that He would come to our households, renew our children, visit our churches, and multiply his converts as the drops of the morning dew; and that He would everywhere give the Word of God effect.

This sovereignty in the operations of the Spirit is felt and recognized by every parent, by every pastor, and by every missionary. It is the revealed purpose of God that it must be acknowledged. "See your calling brethren," says the Apostle; not the wise, the great, the good, but the foolish, those who are of no account, hath God chosen in order "that no flesh should glory in his presence." (1 Cor. i. 26-29.) No man is to be allowed to attribute his conversion or salvation to himself, to law, or to the efficiency of means. It is in the hands of God. It is of Him that any man is in Christ Jesus. (1 Cor. i. 30.) In like manner He so gives or withholds the influences of the Spirit that every minister of the Gospel, as the Apostles themselves did, should feel and acknowledge that his success does not depend on his official dignity, or his fidelity, or his skill in argument, or his power of persuasion, but simply and solely on the demonstration of the Spirit, given or withheld as He sees fit. Why was it that so few were converted under the ministry of Christ, and so many thousands under that of the Apostles? Why is it that a like experience has marked the whole history of the Church? The only Scriptural or rational answer that can be given to that question is, "Even so, Father: for so it seemed good in thy sight." We know indeed that the Spirit's sovereignty is determined in its action by infinitely wise and good reasons; and we know that his withholding his co[illegible]peration is often judicial and punitive, that He abandons individuals, churches, communities, and nations who have sinned away their day of grace. It is important that we should remember, that, in living under the dispensation of the Spirit, we are absolutely dependent on a divine Person, who gives or withholds his influence as He will; that He can be grieved and offended; that He must be acknowledged, feared, and obeyed; that his presence and gifts must be humbly and earnestly sought, and assiduously cherished, and that to Him all right thoughts and right purposes, all grace and goodness, all

strength and comfort, and all success in winning souls to Christ, are to be ascribed.

The Office of the Word as a Means of Grace.

Christians then do not refer the saving and the sanctifying power of the Scriptures to the moral power of the truths which they contain; or to the mere co﷿peration of the Spirit in a manner analogous to the way in which God co﷿perates with all second causes, but to the power of the Spirit as a divine Person acting with and by the truth, or without it, as in his sovereign pleasure He sees fit. Although light cannot restore sight to the blind, or heal the diseases of the organs of sight, it is nevertheless essential to every exercise of the power of vision. So the Word is essential to all holy exercises in the human soul.

In every act of vision there are three essential conditions -- 1. An object. 2. Light. 3. An eye in a healthful or normal state. In all ordinary cases this is all that is necessary. But when the object to be seen has the attribute of beauty, a fourth condition is essential to its proper apprehension, namely, that the observer have ﷿sthetic discernment or taste natural or acquired. Two men may view the same work of art. Both have the same object before them and the same light around them. Both see alike all that affects the organ of vision; but the one may see a beauty which the other fails to perceive; the same object therefore produces on them very different effects. The one it delights, elevates, and refines; the other it leaves unmoved if it does not disgust him. So when our blessed Lord was upon earth, the same person went about among the people; the same Word sounded in their ears; and the same acts of power and love were performed in their presence. The majority hated, derided, and finally crucified Him. Others saw in Him the glory of the only begotten Son of God full of grace and truth. These loved, adored, worshipped, and died for Him. Without the objective revelation of the person, doctrines, work, and character of Christ, this inward experience of his disciples had been impossible. But this outward revelation would have been, and in fact was to most of those concerned, utterly in vain, without the power of spiritual discernment. It is clear, therefore, what the office of the Word is, and what that of the Holy Spirit is in the work of sanctification. The Word presents the objects to be seen and the light by which we see; that is, it contains the truths by which the soul is sanctified, and it conveys to the mind the intellectual knowledge of those truths. Both these are essential. The work of the Spirit is with the soul. That by nature is spiritually dead; it must be quickened. It is blind; its eyes must be opened. It is hard; it must be softened. The gracious work of the Spirit is to impart life, to open the eyes, and to soften the heart. When this is done, and in proportion to the measure in which it is done, the Word exerts its sanctifying influence on the soul.

It is a clear doctrine of the Bible and fact of experience that the truth when spiritually discerned has this transforming power. Paul was full of pride, malignity, and contempt for Christ and his Gospel. When the Spirit opened his eyes to behold the glory of Christ, he instantly became a new man. The effect of that vision -- not the miraculous vision of the person of the Son of God but the spiritual apprehension of his divine majesty and love -- lasted during the Apostle's life, and will last to all eternity. The same Apostle, therefore, teaches us that it is by beholding the glory of Christ that we are transformed into his image, from glory to glory, by the Spirit of the Lord. (2 Cor. iii. 18.) Hence the Scriptures so constantly represent the heavenly state, as seeing God. It is the beatific vision of the divine glory, in all its brightness, in the person of the Son of God, that purifies, ennobles, and

enraptures the soul; filling all its capacities of knowledge and happiness. It is thus that we are sanctified by the truth; it is by the spiritual discernment of the things of the Spirit, when He opens, or as Paul says, enlightens the eyes of our understanding. We thus learn how we must use the Scriptures in order to experience their sanctifying power. We must diligently search them that we may know the truths therein revealed; we must have those truths as much as possible ever before the mind; and we must pray earnestly and constantly that the Spirit may open our eyes that we may see wondrous things out of his law. It matters little to us how excellent or how powerful the truths of Scripture may be, if we do not know them. It matters little how well we may know them, if we do not think of them. And it matters little how much we think of them, if we cannot see them; and we cannot see them unless the Spirit opens the eyes of our heart.

We see too from this subject why the Bible represents it as the great duty of the ministry to hold forth the Word of life; by the manifestation of the truth to commend themselves to every man's conscience in the sight of God. This is all they need do. They must preach the Word in season and out of season, whether men will hear, or whether they will forbear. They know that the Gospel which they preach is the power of God unto salvation, and that if it be hid, it is hid to them that are lost: in whom the God of this world hath blinded the minds of them which believe not, lest the light of the glorious Gospel of Christ, who is the image of God, should shine unto them. (2 Cor. iv. 4.) Paul may plant and Apollos water, but God only can give the increase.

Besides this general sanctifying power of the Word of God, when spiritually discerned, it is to be further remarked that it is the means of calling forth all holy thoughts, feelings, purposes, and acts. Even a regenerated soul without any truth before is, would be in blank darkness. It would be in the state of a regenerated infant; or in the state of an unborn infant in relation to the external world; having eyes and ears, but nothing to tall its faculties of sight and hearing into exercise. It is obvious that we can have no rational feelings of gratitude, love, adoration and fear toward God, except in view of the truths revealed concerning Him in his Word. We can have no love or devotion to Christ, except so far as the manifestation of his character and work is accepted by us as true. We can have no faith except as founded on some revealed promise of God; no resignation or submission except in view of the wisdom and love of God and of his universal providence as revealed in the Scriptures; no joyful anticipation of future blessedness which is not founded on what the Gospel makes known of a future state of existence. The Bible, therefore, is essential to the conscious existence of the divine life in the soul and to all its rational exercises. The Christian can no more live without the Bible, than his body can live without food. The Word of God is milk and strong meat, it is as water to the thirsty, it is honey and the honeycomb.

The Lutheran Doctrine.

This doctrine has already been briefly, and, perhaps, sufficiently discussed on a preceding page; [434] it cannot, however, be properly overlooked in this connection. The Lutherans agree in words with Rationalists and Remonstrants, in referring the efficiency of the Word of God in the work of sanctification to the inherent power of the truth. But Rationalists attribute to it no more power than that which belongs to all moral truth; such truth is from its nature adapted to form the character and influence the conduct of rational

creatures, and as the truths of the Bible are of the highest order and importance, they are willing to concede to them a proportionate degree of power. The Lutherans, on the other hand, teach, -- First, that the power of the Word which is inherent and constant, and which belongs to it from its very nature as the Word of God, is supernatural and divine. Secondly, that its efficiency is not due to any influence of the Spirit, accompanying it at some times and not at others, but solely to its own inherent virtue. Thirdly, that its diversified effects are due not to the Word's having more power at one time than at another; or to its being attended with a greater or less degree of the Spirit's influence, but to the different ways in which it is received. Christ, it is said, healed those who had faith to be healed. He frequently said: "According to your faith be it unto you," or "Thy faith hath saved thee." It was not because there was more power in the person of Christ when the woman touched his garment, than at other times, that she was healed, but because of her faith. Fourthly, that the Spirit never operates savingly on the minds of men, except through and in the Word. Luther in the Smalcald Articles says: "Constanter tenendum est, Deum nemini Spiritum vel gratiam suam largiri nisi per verbum et cum verbo externo et pr&#65533;cedente, ut ita pr&#65533;muniamus nos adversum enthusiastas, i.e., spiritus, qui jactitant se ante verbum et sine verbo Spiritum habere." [435] And in the Larger Catechism, [436] he says: In summa, quicquid Deus in nobis facit et operatur, tantum externis istius modi rebus et constitutionibus operari dignatur." Luther went so far as to refer even the inspiration of the prophets to the "verbum vocale," or external word. [437]

This divine power of the Word, however, is not, as before remarked, to be referred to the mere moral power of the truth. On this point the Lutheran theologians are perfectly explicit. Thus Quenstedt [438] says: "Verbum Dei non agit solum persuasiones morales, proponendo nobis objectum amabile; sed vero, reali, divino et ineffabili influxu potenti&#65533; su&#65533; gratios&#65533;." This influx of divine power, however, is not something occasional, giving the word a power at one time which it has not at another. It is something inherent and permanent. Quenstedt says: [439] "Verbo Dei virtus divina non extrinsecus in ipso usu demum, accedit, sed . . . . in se et per se, intrinsice ex divina ordinatione et communicatione, efficacia et vi conversiva et regeneratrice pr&#65533;ditum est, etiam ante et extra omnem usum." And Hollaz [440] says it has this power "propter mysticam verbi cum Spiritu Sancto unionem intimam et individuam."

Professor Schinid, of Erlangen, in his "Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche," quotes from the leading Lutheran theologians their views on this subject. Hollaz, for example, says that this "vis divina" is inseparably conjoined with the Word; that the Word of God cannot be conceived of without the Spirit; that if the Holy Spirit could be separated from the Word, it would not be the Word of God, but the word of man. [441] Quenstedt says that the action of the Word and of the Spirit is one and indivisible. Baier says: [442] "Nempe eadem illa infinita virtus, qu&#65533; essentialiter, per se et independenter in Deo est, et per quam Deus nomines illuminat et convertit, verbo communicata est: et tanquam verbo communicata, divina tamen, hic spectari debet." A distinction, says Quenstedt, is to be made between the natural instruments, such as the staff of Moses, or rod of Aaron, which God uses to produce supernatural effects, and those, as the Word and sacraments, which are "sua essentia supernaturalia. . . . . Illa indigent novo motu et elevatione nova ad effectum novum ultra propriam suam et naturalem virtutem producendum; h&#65533;c vero a prima institutione et productione sufficienti, hoc est, divina et

summa vi ac efficacia pr&#65533;dita sunt, nec indigent nova et peculiari aliqua elevatione ultra efficaciam ordinariam, jamdum ipsis inditam ad producendum spiritualem effectum." [443] That the Word is not always efficacious is not because it is attended by greater power in one case than another, but because of the difference in the moral state of those to whom it is presented. On this point Quenstedt says, "Quanquam itaque effectus Verbi divini pr&#65533;dicati nonnunquam impediatur, efficacia tamen ipsa, seu virtus intrinseca a verbo tolli et separari non potest. Et ita per accidens fit inefficax, non potenti&#65533; defectu, sed maliti&#65533; motu, quo ejus operatio impeditur, quo minus effectum suum assequatur." [444] A piece of iron glowing with heat, if placed in contact with anything easily combustible, produces an immediate conflagration. If brought in contact with a rock, it produces little sensible effect. So the Word of God fraught with divine power, when presented to one mind regenerates, converts, and sanctifies, and when presented to another leaves it as it was, or only exasperates the evil of its nature. It is true these theologians say that the operation of the Word is not physical, as in the case of opium, poison, or fire; but moral, "illustrando mentem, commovendo voluntatem," etc. Nevertheless the illustration holds as to the main point. The Word has an inherent, divine, and constant power. It produces different effects according to the subjective state of those on whom it acts. The Spirit acts neither on them nor on it more at one time than at another.

Remarks.

1. It is obvious that this peculiar theory has no support from Scripture. The Bible does indeed say that the Word of God is quick and powerful; that it is the wisdom of God and the power of God; and that it convinces, converts, and sanctifies. But so does the Bible say that Christ gave his Apostles power to work miracles; and that they went about communicating the Holy Ghost by the laying on of hands, healing the sick, and raising the dead. But the power was not in them. Peter was indignant at such an imputation. "Why look ye so earnestly on us," he said to the people, "as though by our own power or holiness we had made this man to walk?" If the Apostles working miracles did not prove that the power was in them, the effects produced by the Word do not prove that the power is in it.

2. This doctrine is inconsistent with the constant representations of the Scriptures, which set forth the Spirit as attending the Word and giving it effect, sometimes more and sometimes less; working with and by the truth as He sees fit. It is inconsistent with the command to pray for the Spirit. Men are not accustomed to pray that God would give fire the power to burn or ice to cool. If the Spirit were always in mystical, indissoluble union with the Word, giving it inherent divine power, there would be no propriety in praying for his influence as the Apostles did, and as the Church in all ages has ever done, and continues to do.

3. This theory cuts us off from all intercourse with the Spirit and all dependence upon Him as a personal voluntary agent. He never comes; He never goes; He does not act at one time more than at another. He has imbued the Word with divine power, and sent it forth into the world. There his agency ends. God has given opium its narcotic power, and arsenic its power to corrode the stomach, and left them to men to use or to abuse as they saw fit. Beyond giving them their properties, He has nothing to do with the effects which they produce. So the Spirit has nothing to do with the conviction, conversion, or sanctification of the people of God, or with illuminating, consoling, or guiding them, beyond once for all

giving his Word divine power. There it is: men may use or neglect it as they please. The Spirit does not incline them to use it. He does not open their hearts, as He opened the heart of Lydia, to receive the Word. He does not enlighten their eyes to see wondrous things out of the law.

4. Lutherans do not attribute divine power to the visible words or to the audible sounds uttered, but to the truth which these conventional signs are the means of communicating to the mind. They admit that this truth, although it has inherent in it divine power, never produces any supernatural or spiritual effect unless it is properly used. They admit also that this proper use includes the intellectual apprehension of its meaning, attention, aud the purpose to believe and obey. Yet they believe in infant regeneration. But if infants are incapable of using the Word; and if the Spirit never operates except in the Word and by its use, how is it possible that infants can be regenerated. If, therefore, the Bible teaches that infants are regenerated and saved, it teaches that the Spirit operates not only with and by the Word, but also without it, when, how, and where He sees fit. If Christ healed only those who had faith to be healed, how did He heal infants, or raise the dead?

5. The theory in question is contrary to Scripture, in that it assumes that the reason why one man is saved and another not, a simply that one resists the supernatural power of the Word and another does not. Why the one resists, is referred to his own free will. Why the other does not resist, is referred not to any special influence, but to his own unbiased will. Our Lord, however, teaches that those only come to Him who are given to Him by the Father; that those come who besides the outward teaching of the Word, are inwardly taught and drawn of God. The Apostle teaches that salvation is not of him that willeth or of him that runneth, but of God who showeth mercy. The Lutheran doctrine banishes, and is intended to banish, all sovereignty in the distribution of saving grace, from the dispensations of God. To those who believe that that sovereignty is indelibly impressed on the doctrines of the Bible and on the history of the Church and of the world, this objection is of itself sufficient. The common practical belief of Christians, whatever their theories may be, is that they are Christians not because they are better than other men; not because they co[illegible]perate with the common and sufficient grace given to all men; not because they yield to, while others resist the operation of the divine Word; but because God in his sovereign mercy made them willing in the day of his power; so that they are all disposed to say from the heart, "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto thy name give glory."

6. This Lutheran doctrine is inconsistent with the experience of believers individually and collectively. On the day of Pentecost, what fell upon the Apostles and the brethren assembled with them? It was no "verbum vocale;" no sound of words; and no new external revelation. The Spirit of God Himself, enlightened their minds and enabled them to remember and to understand all that Christ had taught, and they spoke every man, as the Spirit (not the Word) gave them utterance. Here was a clear manifestation of the Spirit's acting directly on the minds of the Apostles. To say that the effects then exhibited were due to the divine power inherent in the words of Christ; and that they had resisted that power up to the day of Pentecost, and then yielded to its influence, is an incredible hypothesis. It will not account for the facts of the cast. Besides, our Lord promised to send the Spirit after his ascension. He commanded the disciples to remain in Jerusalem until they were imbued with power from on high. When the Spirit came they were instantly enlightened, endowed with

plenary knowledge of the Gospel, and with miraculous gifts. How could the "verbum vocale" impart the gift of tongues, or the gift of healing? What according to the Lutheran theory is meant by being full of the Holy Ghost? or, by the indwelling of the Spirit? or, by the testimony of the Spirit? or, by the demonstration of the Spirit? or, by the unction of the Holy One which teaches all things? or, by the outpouring of the Spirit? In short, the whole Bible, and especially the evangelical history and the epistles of the New Testament, represents the Holy Spirit not as a power imprisoned in the truth, but as a personal, voluntary agent acting with the truth or without it, as He pleases. As such He has ever been regarded by the Church, and has ever exhibited himself in his dealings with the children of God.

7. Luther, glorious and lovely as he was -- and he is certainly one of the grandest and most attractive figures in ecclesiastical history -- was impulsive and apt to be driven to extremes. [445] The enthusiasts of his age undervalued the Scriptures, pretending to private revelations, and direct spiritual impulses, communicating to them the knowledge of truths unrevealed in the Bible, and a rule of action higher than that of the written Word. This doctrine was a floodgate through which all manner of errors and extravagances poured forth among the people and threatened the overthrow of the Church and of society. Against these enthusiasts all the Reformers raised their voices, and Luther denounced them with characteristic vehemence. In opposition to their pretensions he took the ground that the Spirit never operated on the minds of men except through the Word and sacraments; and, as he held the conversion of sinners to be the greatest of all miracles, he was constrained to attribute divine power to the Word. He was not content to take the ground which the Church in general has taken, that while the Word and sacraments are the ordinary channels of the Spirit's influence, He has left himself free to act with or without these or any other means, and when He makes new revelations to individuals they are authenticated to others by signs, and miracles, and divers gifts; and that in all cases, however authenticated, they are to be judged by the written Word as the only infallible rule of faith or practice; so that if an Apostle or an angel from heaven should preach any other gospel than that which we have received, he is to be pronounced accursed. (Gal. i. 8.) "We are of God:" said the Apostle John, "he that knoweth God heareth us; he that is not of God heareth not us. Hereby we know the spirit of truth and the spirit of error." (1 John iv. 6.) The Scriptures teach that not only the Holy Spirit, but also other spirits good and evil have access to the minds of men, and more or less effectually control their operations. Directions, therefore, are given in the Bible to guide us in discriminating between the true and false.

The power of individual men, who appear in special junctures, over the faith and character of coming generations, is something portentous. Of such "world controllers," at least in modern times, there are none to compare with Martin Luther, Ignatius Loyola, and John Wesley. Though so different from each other, each has left his impress upon millions of men. Our only security from the fallible or perverting influence of man, is in entire, unquestioning submission to the infallible Word of God.

[432] In the Second Helvetic Confession, chapter i., it is said: "Cum hodie hoc Dei verbum per pr&#xfffd;dicatores legitime vocatos annunciatur in ecclesia, credimus ipsum Dei verbum annunciari, et a fidelibus recipi, neque aliud Dei verbum fingendum vel coelitus esse expectandum. . . . . Agnoscimus interim, Deum illuminare posse homines etiam sine

externo ministerio, quos et quando velit: id quod ejus potenti&#65533; est. Nos autem loquimur de usitate ratione instituendi homines, et pr&#65533;cepto et exemplo tradita nobis a Deo." -- Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 467, 468.

[433] See vol. ii. p. 657, ff.

[434] See vol. ii. p. 656 f.

[435] II. viii. 3.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 1846, p. 331.

[436] IV. 30; Hase, p. 540.

[437] See Smalcald Articles, II. viii. 10, 11: "Quare in hoc nobis est, constanter perseverandum, quod Deus non velit nobiscum aliter agere, nisi per vocale verbum et sacramenta, et quod, quidquid sine verbo et sacramentis jactatur, ut spiritus, sit ipse diabolus. Nam Deus etiam Mosi voluit apparere per rubum ardentem et vocale verbum. Et nullus propheta, sive Elias, sive Elis&#65533;us, Spiritum sine decalogo sive verbo vocali accepit." Hase, p. 333.

[438] Theologia Didactio-Polemica, I. IV. ii. qu&#65533;st. xvi. echthesis, 4; edit. Leipzig, 1715, p. 248.

[439] Ibid. I. IV. ii. qu&#65533;st. xvi. fontes solutionum, 7; p. 268.

[440] Examen Theologicum Acroamaticum, III. ii. 1. qu&#65533;st. 4; edit. Leipzig, 1763, p. 992.

[441] Hollaz, Examen, III. ii. 1, 4, edit. Holmi&#65533; et Lipsi&#65533;; 1741, p. 987.

[442] Compendium Theologi&#65533; Positiv&#65533;, Prolegg. II. xxxix. d; edit. Frankfort and Leipzig, 1739, p. 106.

[443] Quenstedt, Theologia, I. IV. ii. qu&#65533;st. xvi. echthesis, 7, ut supra, p. 249.

[444] Ibid. qu&#65533;st. xvi. 9.

[445] No one knows Luther who has not read pretty faithfully the five octavo volumes of his letters, collected and edited by De Wette. These exhibit not only his power, fidelity, and courage, but also his gentleness, disinterestedness, and his childlike simplicity, as well as his joyousness and humour.

§ 2. The Sacraments. Their Nature.

Usage of the Word Sacrament.

1. In classical usage the word "sacramentum" means, in general, something sacred. In legal proceedings the money deposted by contending parties was called "sacramentum," because when forfeited it was applied to sacred purposes. "Ea pecunia, qu&#65533; in judiciuin venit in litibus, sacramentum a sacro." "Sacramentum &#65533;s significat, quod poen&#65533; nomine penditur, sive eo quis interrogatur sive contenditur." Then in a secondary sense it meant a judicial process. In military usage it expressed the obligation of the soldier to his leader or country; then the oath by which he was bound; and generally an oath; so that in ordinary language "sacramentum dicere" meant to swear. [446]

2. The ecclesiastical usage of the word was influenced by various circumstances. From its etymology and signification it was applied to anything sacred or consecrated. Then to anything which had a sacred or hidden meaning. In this sense it was applied to all

religious rites and ceremonies. This brought it into connection with the Greek word musterion, which properly means a secret; something into the knowledge of which a man must be initiated. Hence in the Vulgate "sacramentum" is used as the translation of musterion in Ephesians i. 9, iii. 9, v. 32; Colossians i. 27; 1 Timothy iii. 16; Revelation i. 20, xvii. 7. It was therefore used in the wide sense for any sign which had a secret import. Thus Augustine says, [447] "Nimis autem longum est, convenienter disputare de varietate signorum, qu cum ad res divinas pertinent, sacramenta appellantur." And again he says, [448] "Ista fratres dicuntur sacramenta, quia in eis aliud videtur, aliud intelligitur. Quod videtur speciem habet corporalem, quod intelligitur, fructum habet spiritualem." All religious rites and ceremonies, the sign of the cross, anointing with oil, etc., were therefore called sacraments. Augustine frequently calls the mystical or allegorical exposition of Scripture, a sacrament. Jerome [449] says, "Sacramenta Dei sunt prdicare, benedicere ac confirmare, communionem reddere, visitare infirmos, orare." [450] Lombard says, "Sacramentum est sacr rei signum." [451]

The Theological Usage and Definition of the Word.

3. It is evident that the signification of the word "sacrament" is so comprehensive and its usage so lax, that little aid can be derived from either of those sources in fixing definitely its meaning in Christian theology. Hence theologians soon began to frame definitions of the word more or less exact, derived from the teachings of the New Testament on the subject. The two simplest and most generally accepted of such definitions are the one by Augustine and the other by Peter Lombard. The former says, [452] "Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum;" the latter, [453] "Sacramentum est invisibilis grati visibilis forma." These definitions however are too vague.

It is obvious that the only safe and satisfactory method of arriving at the idea of a sacrament, in the Christian sense of the word, is to take those ordinances which by common consent are admitted to be sacraments, and by analyzing them determine what are their essential elements or characteristics. We should then exclude from the category all other ordinances, human or divine, in which those characteristics are not found. Baptism and the Lord's Supper are admitted to be sacraments. They are (1.) Ordinances instituted by Christ. (2.) They are in their nature significant, baptism of cleansing; the Lord's Supper of spiritual nourishment. (3.) They were designed to be perpetual. (4.) They were appointed to signify, and to instruct; to seal, and thus to confirm and strengthen; and to convey or apply, and thus to sanctify, those who by faith receive them. On this principle the definition of a sacrament given in the standards of our Church is founded. "A sacrament," it is said, "is an holy ordinance instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the New Covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." [454]

To the same effect the other Reformed Symbols speak. For example, the Second Helvetic Confession says: "Sunt sacramenta symbola mystica, vel ritus sancti, aut sacr actiones, a Deo ipso institut, constantes verbo suo, signis, et rebus significatis, quibus in ecclesia summa sua beneficia, homini exhibita, retinet in memoria, et subinde renovat, quibus item promissiones suas obsignat, et qu ipse nobis interius prstat, exterius reprsentat, ac veluti oculis contemplanda subiicit, adeoque fidem nostram, Spiritu Dei in cordibus nostris operante, roborat et auget: quibus denique nos ab omnibus aliis populis et religionibus separat, sibique soli consecrat et obligat, et quid a nobis requirat, significat."

[455]

The definition given in the Geneva Catechism is that a sacrament is "externa divin&#65533; erga nos benevolenti&#65533; testificatio, qu&#65533; visibili signo spirituales gratias figurat, ad obsignandas cordibus nostris Dei promissiones, quo earum veritas melius confirmetur." [456]

The Heidelberg Catechism says, that sacraments are "sacra et in oculos incurrentia signa, ac sigilla, ob eam causam a Deo instituta, ut per ea nobis promissionem Evangelii magis declarat et obsignet: quod scilicet non universis tantum, verum etiam singulis credentibus, propter unicum illud Christi sacrificium in cruce peractum, gratis donet remissionem peccatorum, et vitam &#65533;ternam." [457]

The Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England teach [458] that "Sacraments ordained of Christ be not only badges or tokens of Christian men's profession; but rather they be certain sure witnesses and effectual signs of grace, and God's will toward us, by the which He doth work invisibly in us, and doth not only quicken, but also strengthen and confirm our faith in Him."

Lutheran Doctrine.

The Lutheran definition of the sacraments agrees in all essential points with that of the Reformed churches. In the Augsburg Confession, its authors say: "De usu sacramentorum docent, quod sacramenta instituta sint, non modo ut sint not&#65533; professionis inter homines, sed magis ut sint signa et testimonia voluntatis Dei erga nos, ad excitandam et confirmandam fidem in his, qui utuntur, proposita. Itaque utendum est sacramentis ita, ut fides accedat, qu&#65533; credat promissionibus, qu&#65533; per sacramenta exhibentur et ostenduntur." [459]

In the Apology for that Confession it is said: "Si sacramenta vocamus ritus, qui habent mandatum Dei, et quibus addita est promissio grati&#65533;, facile est judicare, qu&#65533; sint proprie sacramenta. Nam ritus ab hominibus instituti non erunt hoc modo proprie dicta sacramenta. Non est enim auctoritatis human&#65533;, promittere gratiam. Quare signa sine mandato Dei instituta, non sunt certa sigua grati&#65533;, etiamsi fortasse rudes docent, aut admonent aliquid." [460]

"Dicimus igitur ad sacramenta proprie sic dicta duo potissimum requiri, videlicet verbum et elementum, juxta vulgatum illud Augustini: Accedit verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum.' Fundamentum hujus adsertionis ex ipsa natura et fine sacramentorum pendet, cum enim sacramenta id, quid in verbo evangelii pr&#65533;dicatur, externo elemento vestitum sensibus ingerere debeant, ex eo sponte sequitur, quod nec verbum sine elemento, nec elementum sine verbo constituat sacramentum. Per verbum intelligitur primo mandatum atque institutio divina, per quam elementum . . . . . separatur ab usu communi, et destinatur usui sacramentali; deinde promissio atque ea quidem evangelio propria, per sacramentum adplicanda et obsignanda. Per elementum non quodvis, sed certum et verbo institutionis expressum accipitur." [461] In all this the Reformed and Lutherans are agreed. The differences between them in relation to the sacraments do not concern their nature.

Romish Doctrine.

The distinctive doctrine of the Romish Church on this subject is that the sacraments contain the grace which they signify, and that such grace is conveyed "ex opere operato."

That is, they have a real inherent and objective virtue, which renders them effectual in communicating saving benefits to those who receive them. In a certain sense these words may be used to express the Lutheran doctrine; but that doctrine differs from the Romanist doctrine, as will appear when the efficacy of the sacraments comes to be considered. The language of the Council of Trent on this subject is: "Si quis dixerit sacramenta nov□ legis non continere gratiam, quam significant; aut gratiam ipsam non ponentibus obicem non conferre; quasi signa tantum externa sint accept□ per fidem grati□, vel justiti□, et not□ qu□dam Christian□ professionis, quibus apud homines discernuntur fideles ab infidelibus; anathema sit." [462]

The Roman Catechism defines a sacrament "Rem esse sensibus subjectam, qu□ ex Dei institutione sanctitatis et justiti□ tum significand□, tum efficiend□ vim habet." [463] As the task devolved on the Council of Trent was to present and harmonize the doctrines elaborated by the Schoolmen in opposition to the doctrines of the Reformers, the definitions and explanations given by the writers of the Middle Ages throw as much light on the decrees of the Council as the expositions of the later theologians of the Latin Church. On this point Thomas Aquinas says: "Oportet, quod virtus salutifera a divinitate Christi per ejus humanitatem in ipsa sacramenta derivetur. . . . . Sacramenta ecelesi□ specialiter habent virtutem ex passione Christi, cujus virtus quodammodo nobis copulatur per susceptionem sacramentorum." [464] Again: "Ponendo quod sacramentum est instrumentalis causa grati□, necesse est simul ponere, quod in sacramento sit qu□dam virtus instrumentalis ad inducendum sacramentalem effectum. . . . . Sicut virtus instrumentalis acquiritur instrumento, ex hoc ipso quod movetur ab agente principali, ita et sacramentum consequitur spiritualem virtutem ex benedictione Christi et applicatione ministri ad usum sacramenti." Thus Thomas's own opinion was adopted by the Council as opposed to that of the Scotists to which Thomas refers, in the same connection: "Illi qui ponunt quod sacramenta non causant gratiam, nisi per quandam concomitantiam ponunt quod in sacramento non sit aliqua virtus, qu□ operetur ad sacramenti effectum, est tamen virtus divina sacramento assistens, qu□ sacramentalem effectum operatur." [465] This is very nearly the doctrine of the Reformed Church upon the subject. Bellarmin's illustration of the point in hand is that as fire is the cause of combustion when brought into contact with proper materials, so the sacraments produce their effect by their own inherent virtue. "Exemplum," he says, "esse potest in re naturali. Si ad ligna comburenda, primum exsiccarentur ligna, deinde excuteretur ex silice, tum applicaretur ignis ligno, et sic tandem fieret combustio; nemo diceret, causam immediatam combustionis esse siccitatem aut excussionem ignis ex silice aut applicationem ignis ad ligna, sed solum ignem, ut causam primariam, et solum calorem seu calefactionem, ut causam instrumentalem." [466]

"Jam vero sacramenta gratiam, quam significant, continere, eamque conferre virtute sibi insita, seu ex opere operato, Scriptur□, patres, constansque Ecclesi□ sensus traditionalis luculentissime docent." [467] According to Romanists, therefore, a sacrament is a divine ordinance which has the inherent or intrinsic power of conferring the grace which it signifies.

Remonstrant Doctrine.

It has already been shown that it was the tendency of the Remonstrants to eliminate, as far as possible, the supernatural element from Christianity. They therefore regarded the

sacraments not properly as means of grace, but as significant rites intended to bring the truth vividly before the mind, which truth exerted its moral influence on the heart. "Sacramenta cum dicimus, externas ecclesi☐ ceremonias seu ritus illos sacros ac solennes intelligimus, quibus veluti foederalibus signis ac sigillis visibilibus Deus gratiosa beneficia sua, in foedere pr☐sertim evangelico promissa, non modo nobis repr☐sentat et adumbrat, sed et certo modo exhibet atque obsignat: nosque vicissim palam publiceque declaramus ac testamur, nos promissiones omnes divinas vera, firma atque obsequiosa fide amplecti, et beneficia ipsius jugi et grata semper memoria celebrare velle." [468]

"Restat, ut dicamus, Deum gratiam suam per sacramenta nobis exhibere, non eam actu per illa conferendo; sed per illa tanquam signa clara ac evidentia eam repr☐sentando et ob oculos ponendo non eminus aut sub figuris quibusdam tanquam multo post futuram, sed tanquam pr☐sentem: ut ita in signis istis tanquam in speculo quodam, exhibitionem iliam grati☐, quam Deus nobis concessit, quasi conspiciamus. Estque h☐c efficacia nulla alia quam objectiva, qu☐ requirit facultatem cognitivam rite dispositam, ut apprehendere possit illud, quod signum objective menti offert. Hinc videmus, quomodo sacramenta in nobis operentur, nimirum tanquam signa repr☐sentantia menti nostr☐ rem cujus signa sunt. Neque alia in illis qu☐ri debet efficacia." [469]

Zwingle alone of the Reformers seems inclined to this view of the sacraments: "Sunt . . . . . sacramenta," he says, "signa vel ceremoni☐, pace tamen omnium dicam, sive neotericorum sive veteram, quibus se homo Ecclesi☐ probat aut candidatum aut militem esse Christi, redduntque Ecclesiam totam potius certiorem de tua fide quam te. Si enim fides tua non aliter fuerit absoluta, quam ut signo ceremoniali egeat, fides non est: fides enim est, qua nitimur misericordi☐ Dei inconcusse, firmiter et indistracte, ut multis locis Paulus habet." [470] Elsewhere he says: "Credo, imo scio omnia sacramenta, tam abesse ut gratiam conferant, ut ne adferant quidem aut dispensent. . . . . Dux autem vel vehiculum Spiritui non est necessarium, ipse enim est virtus et latio qua cuncta feruntur, non qui ferri opus habeat: neque id unquam legimus in scripturis sacris, quod sensibilia, qualia sacramenta sunt, certo secum ferrent Spiritum, sed si sensibilia unquam lata sunt cum Spiritu, jam Spiritus fuit qui tulit, non sensibilia. Sic cum ventus vehemens ferretur, simul adferebantur lingu☐ venti virtute, non ferebatur ventus virtute linguarum." [471] It is obvious that all that Zwingle here says of the sacraments, might be said of the Word of God; and, therefore, if he proves anything he proves that the sacraments are not means of grace; he proves the same concerning the Word, to which the Scriptures attribute such an important agency in the sanctification and salvation of men.

[446] Freund's Lateinische W☐rterbuch.

[447] Epistola cxxxviii. (5); Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. vii. p. 615, c.

[448] Sermo cclxxii. (16); Ibid. vol. v. p. 1614, b, c.

[449] Works, tom. ix. p. 59. (?)

[450] See Gerhard, Loci Theologici, XIX. i. §§ 6, 9; edit. T☐bingen, 1768, vol. viii. pp. 204, 205.

[451] Lombard, Magister Sententiarum, lib. IV. dist. i. B. edit. (?) 1472.

[452] In Joannis Evangelium Tractatus, lxxx. 3; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. iii. 2290, a.

[453] Lombard, ut supra.

[454] Westminster Shorter Catechism, quest. 92.

[455] xix.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 512.

[456] v. de Sacramentis; Ibid. p. 160.

[457] lxvi., Niemeyer, p. 444.

[458] Art. XXV.

[459] I. xiii. 1, 2; Hase, Leipzig, 1840, p. 13.

[460] vii. 3; Hase, p. 200.

[461] Gerhard, Loci Theologici xix. 2. § 11; edit. T�bingen, 1768, vol. viii. p. 207.

[462] Sess. VII. De Sacramentis in genere, canon 6; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 39.

[463] II. i. qu�st. 6 (x. 11); Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 241.

[464] Summa, III. lxii. 5; edit. Cologne, 1640, p. 129, b, of fourth set.

[465] Aquinas, ut supra, lxii. 4; p. 129, a.

[466] Bellarmin, De Sacramentis, II. i.; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, vol. iii. p. 109, a.

[467] Joannes Perrone, Pr�lectiones Theologic�, De Sacramentis in genere, II. i. 39; edit. Paris, 1861, vol. ii. p. 221, a.

[468] Confessio Remonstrantium, xxiii. 1; Episcopii Opera, edit. Rotterdam, 1665, vol. ii. p. 92, a, of second set.

[469] Limborch, Theologia Christinia, V. lxvi. 31, 32; edit. Amsterdam, 1715, p. 606, b.

[470] De Vera et Falsa Religione, Works, edit. Schuler and Schultess, Turici, 1832, vol. iii. p. 231.

[471] Ad Carolum Rom. Imperatorum, Fidei Huldrychs Zwinglii Ratio, § 7; Niemeyer's Collectio Confessionum, p. 24.

§ 3. Nnmber of the Sacraments.

If the word sacrament be taken in the wide sense in which it was used in the early Church for any significant religious rite, it is obvious that no definite limit can be set to their number. If the word be confined to such divine ordinances as answer the conditions which characterize baptism and the Lord's Supper, then it is evident that they are the only sacraments under the Christian dispensation; and such is the view taken by all Protestants. It is true that in the Apology for the Augsburg Confession it is said: "Vere sunt sacramenta, baptismus, Coena Domini, absolutio, qu� est sacramentum poenitenti�. Nam hi ritus habent mandatum Dei et promissionem grati�, qu� est propria Novi Testamenti." The last was soon dropped out of the list of sacraments, although the Lutherans retained confession as a distinct Church institution. The confession however was to be general, an enumeration of sins not being required, and the absolution which followed was simply declarative, and not judicial, as among the Romanists. The Reformed symbols required private confession to be made to God, and general confession in the congregation of the people; and recommended in extraordinary cases, where the conscience is burdened ot the mind perplexed, private confession to the pastor or spiritual adviser.

The Romanists have seven sacraments, adding to baptism and the Lord's Supper, matrimony, orders, penance, confirmation, and extreme unction. Matrimony, however, although a divine institution, was not ordained for signifying, sealing, and applying to believers the benefits of redemption, and therefore, is not a sacrament. The same may be said of orders. And as to confirmation, penance, and extreme unction, in the sense in which Romanists use those terms, they are not divine institutions at all.

Confirmation.

Confirmation indeed, or a service attending the introduction of those baptized in infancy, into full communion in the Church, was early instituted and long continued among Protestants as well as among Romanists. Those who had been baptized in infancy, had their standing in the Church on the ground of the profession of faith and the engagements made in their name, by their parents or sponsors. When they came to years of discretion, they were examined as to their knowledge and conduct, and if found competently instructed and free from scandal, they assumed the obligation of their baptismal vows upon themselves, and their church membership was confirmed. In all this, however, there was nothing of a sacramental character.

This simple service the Romanists have exalted into a sacrament. The "material," they say, is the anointing with oil, or the imposition of hands; or as Thomas Aquinas and Bellarmin say, the two united. Perrone makes the anointing the essential thing. The gift or grace conveyed, "ex opere operato," is that supernatural influence of the Holy Ghost, which enables the recipient to be faithful to his baptismal vows. The administrator must be a prelate, as prelates only are the official successors of the Apostles, and, therefore, they only have the power of conveying the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands, which was one of the prerogatives of the apostleship.

Penance.

Romanists distinguish between "poenitentia," repentance or penitence, as a virtue and as a sacrament. As a virtue it consists in sorrow for sin, a determination to forsake it, and a purpose "ad sui vindictam in compensationem injuri&#xfffd; Deo per peccatum illat&#xfffd;" i.e., a purpose to make satisfaction to God. As a sacrament it is an ordinance instituted by Christ for the remission of sins committed after baptism, through the absolution of a priest having jurisdiction. The matter of the sacrament is the act of the penitent including contrition, confession, and satisfaction. The form is the act of absolution on the part of the priest. By contrition is meant sorrow, or remorse. It is not necessary that this contrition should be anything more than a natural, as distinguished from a gracious, exercise or state of mind; or as the Romanists express it, it is not necessary that contrition should be "caritate perfecta." The confession included in this assumed sacrament, must be auricular; it must include all mortal sins; a sin not confessed is not forgiven. This confession is declared by the Council of Trent to be necessary to salvation. "Si quis negaverit, confessionem sacramentalem vel institutam, vel ad salutem necessariam esse jure divino; aut dixerit, modum secreti confitendi soli sacerdoti, quem Ecclesia catholica ab initio semper observavit, et observat, alienum esse ab institutione et mandato Christi, et inventum esse humanum; anathema sit." [472] In sin there is both a "reatus culp&#xfffd;" and a "reatus poen&#xfffd;." The former, together with the penalty of eternal death, is removed by absolution; but "reatus poen&#xfffd;" as to temporal punishment, to be endured either in this life or in purgatory, remains or may remain. Hence

the necessity of satisfaction for sin in the sense above stated. The absolution granted by the priest, is not merely declaratory, but judicial and effective. On this point the Romish Church teaches "1° Christum delere peccata sacerdotum ministerio; 2° sacerdotes sedere judices in tribunali poenitenti°; 3° illorum sententiam ratam in coelis esse; 4° sacerdotes hac potestate pr°stare angelis et archangelis ipsis." [473] This doctrine that no real sin, committed after baptism, can be forgiven unless confessed to a priest; that the priest has the power to remit or retain; that he carries at his girdle the keys uot only of the visible Church on earth, but also of heaven and hell; and that he opens and no man shuts, and shuts and no man opens, is one of the strongest links of the chain by which the Church of Rome leads captive the souls of men. No wonder that she says that the power of a priest is above that even of angels and archangels.

Orders.

Orders or ordination is made a sacrament, because instituted or commanded by Christ, and because therein the supernatural power of consecrating the body and blood of Christ and of forgiving sin is conferred. It is thus defined: "Ordo sacer et sacramentum divinitus institutum, quo tribuitur potestas consecrandi corpus et sanguinem Domini, nec non remittendi et retinendi peccata." On this subject the Council of Trent says: "Si quis dixerit, per sacram ordinationem non dari Spiritum Sanctum, ac proinde frustra episcopos dicere: Accipe Spiritum Sanctum; aut per eam non imprimi characterem; vel eum, qui sacerdos semel fuit, laicum rursus fieri posse; anathema sit." [474] The right and power to ordain belong exclusively to prelates, for they alone possess the apostolical prerogative of communicating the Holy Spirit by the imposition of hands. The Apostles, however, had only the power of communicating miraculous gifts. They neither claimed nor pretended to exercise the power of conferring the sanctifying or saving influences of the Spirit. As the Church of Rome claims for its clergy a power far above that of angels or archangels, so it claims for its bishops powers far transcending those of the Apostles.

Matrimony.

Matrimony is declared to be a sacrament because, although not instituted by Christ, it was made by Him the symbol of the mystical union between the Church and its divine head; and because by its due celebration divine grace is conferred upon the contracting parties. It is thus defined: "Sacramentum nov° legis, quo significatur conjunctio Christi cum Ecclesia, et gratia confertur ad sanctificandam viri et mulieris legitimam conjunctionem, ad uniendos arctius conjugum animos, atque ad prolem pie sancteque in virtutis officiis et fide christiana instituendam." [475]

Extreme Unction.

This is defined to be a sacrament wherein by the anointing with oil (per unctionem olei benedicti) and prayer in the prescribed form, by the ministration of a priest, grace is conferred to the baptized dangerously ill, whereby sins are remitted and the strength of the soul is increased. "Si quis dixerit, sacram infirmorum unctionem non conferre gratiam, nec remittere peccata, nec alleviare infirmos; sed jam cessasse, quasi olim tantum fuerit gratia curationum; anathema sit." "Si quis dixerit, presbyteros Ecclesi°, quos B. Jacobus adducendos esse infirmum inunguendum hortatur, non esse sacerdotes ab Episcopo ordinatos, sed °tate seniores, in quavis communitate; ob idque proprium extrem° unctionis ministrum non esse solum sacerdotem; anathema sit." [476]

Reasons for fixing the Number of the Sacraments at Seven.

It is a work of supererogation for Romanists to assign any reason for making the number of the sacraments seven, and neither more nor less, other than the decision of the Church. If the Church be infallible her judgment on the question is decisive; if it be not infallible no other reason is of any avail. They admit that there is no authority from Scripture on this point, and on no subject in dispute between them and Protestants, can appeal be made with less show of reason to the testimony of tradition. Romish theologians, therefore, while they claim common consent in support of their doctrine on this subject, avail themselves of all the collateral aid they can command. Thomas Aquinas says that there is an analogy between the natural and spiritual life of man. He is born; he is strengthened; he is nourished; he needs means of recovery from illness; he needs to propagate his race; to live under the guidance of legitimate authority; and to be prepared for his departure from this world. The sacraments provide for all these necessities of his spiritual life. He is born in baptism; strengthened by confirmation; nourished by the Lord's Supper; recovered from spiritual illness by penance; the Church is continued by holy matrimony; the sacrament of orders provides for the Christian a supernaturally endowed guide; and extreme unction prepares him for death. Thus through the seven sacraments all his spiritual wants are supplied.

Then again as there are seven cardinal virtues, there should be seven sacraments. Besides seven is a sacred number: there are seven days in the week; every seventh year was Sabbatical; and there were seven golden candlesticks, and seven stars in the right hand of Christ. It is not wonderful therefore that there should be seven sacraments. It is obvious that all this amounts to nothing. The two sacraments instituted by Christ for the definite purpose of "signifying, sealing, and applying to believers," the benefits of redemption, stand alone in the New Testament. No other ordinance has the same characteristics or the same design. Admitting, therefore, that the Fathers and the Church were unanimous in calling any number of other sacred institutions sacraments, that would not prove that they belong to the same category as baptism, and the Lord's Supper.

It is, however, notorious that no such general consent can be pleaded in support of the seven sacraments of the Romanists. The simple facts on this subject are, -- (1.) As already remarked, in the early Church every sacred rite was called a sacrament. Then their number was indefinite. (2.) The preeminence of baptism and the Lord's Supper over all other sacred rites being recognized, they were called, as by Augustine, the chief sacraments. (3.) When attention was directed to the fact that something is true of baptism and the Lord's Supper, which is true of no other sacred ordinances or rites, that they, and they only, of external ceremonies were appointed to be "means of grace," then they were declared in this light to be the only Christian sacraments. Justin Martyr, [477] Cyril of Jerusalem, [478] and Augustine, [479] so speak of them. [480] (4.) As a ritualistic spirit increased in the Church, first one and then another rite was assumed to be a "means of grace," not always, however, the same rites, and thus the number of sacraments was increased. (5.) For centuries, however, no definite number was admitted by anything like general consent. Some made the number three; the Pseudo Dionysius in the sixth century made six. Peter Damiani, the friend of Gregory VII., made twelve. "Ratherius, Bishop of Verona (974), Fulbert, Bishop of Chartres (1028), Bruno, Bishop of Wurzburg (1045), Rupert, Abbot of Deutz (1135),

admitted only baptism and the Lord's Supper; others, as Theodulf, Bishop of Orleans (821), Agobard, Bishop of Lyons (840), Lanfranc, Bishop of Canterbury (1089), Hildebert, Bishop of Tours (1134), Hugo, of St. Victor (1141), call them duo sanct&#65533; ecclesi&#65533; sacramenta.'" [481] (6.) It is certain, says the writer just quoted, that Peter Lombard (1164) is the first who enumerated the seven sacraments as held by the Romanists. He gives no reason for fixing on the number seven; but that which was already on hand in the traditional sanctity, attributed to that number. It was regarded as the symbol of universality and perfection. This was sufficient for deciding on an arbitrary number. What has been said is enough to show that Romanists have not even any plausible ground for their appeal to common consent in support of their doctrine on this subject. Such appeal on their theory is unnecessary. If the Church be infallible, and if the Church testifies that Christ ordained matrimony, extreme unction, etc., to be sacraments; that testimony is decisive. If, however, the Church, in the papal sense of the word, be the very reverse of infallible, then its testimony, so far as the faith of Christians is concerned, amounts to nothing.

[472] Sess. xiv. canon 6; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 68.

[473] Perrone, Pr&#65533;lectiones Theologic&#65533;, De Poenitentia, V. i. 155; edit. Paris, 1861, vol. ii. p. 351, a.

[474] Sess. xxiii. canon 4; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 88.

[475] Perrone, ut supra, De Matrimonio, 1. vol. ii. p. 407.

[476] Conc. Trident. sess. xiv. "De sacramento extrem&#65533; unctionis," can. 2, 4; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 70, 71.

[477] Apologia I [II.] Ad Antoninum Pium, 65, 66; Works, edit. Commelinus, Heidelberg, 1593, p. 76.

[478] Catechesis Mystagogicoe Quinque, Schram, Analysis Patrum, Augsburg, 1789, vol. x. pp. 250-268.

[479] Enarratio in Psalmum ciii. 14; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. iv. p. 1626, d.

[480] Perrone in his Pr&#65533;lectiones Theologic&#65533;, De Sacramentis in genere, i. 14; edit. Paris, 1861, vol. ii. p. 217; refers to these and tries to explain the facts away.

[481] Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, Art. "Sacramente," vol. xiii., p. 241. The writer of the elaborate article in Herzog refers to the thorough investigation of this question in the Dissertation by G. L. Hahn, entitled, Doctrin&#65533; Rom. de numero Sacramentorum septenaris rationes historic&#65533;, Vratial. 1859.

§ 4. The Efficacy of the Sacraments.

Zwinglian and Remonstrant Doctrine.

According to the doctrine of Zwingle afterwards adopted by the Remonstrants, the sacraments are not properly "means of grace." They were not ordained to signify, seal, and apply to believers the benefits of Christ's redemption. They were indeed intended to be significant emblems of the great truths of the Gospel. Baptism was intended to teach the necessity of the soul's being cleansed from guilt by the blood of Christ and purified from the pollution of sin by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. They were further designed to be

perpetual memorials of the work of redemption, and especially to be the means by which men should, in the sight of the Church and of the world, profess themselves to be Christians. As a heathen, when he desired to be admitted into the commonwealth of Israel, received circumcision, which was the divinely appointed seal of the Abrahamic covenant, so participation in the Christian sacraments was the appointed means for the public profession of faith in Christ. Paul presents the matter in this light in 1 Corinthians x. 15-22, where he argues that participation in the sacred rites of a religion involves a profession of that religion, whether it be Christian, Jewish, or heathen. The sacraments, therefore, are "badges of Christian men's profession." This doctrine, however, attributes to them no other than what Zwingle calls in the passage above quoted, "an objective power;" that is, the objective presentation of the truth which they signify to the mind.

"Ex quibus hoc colligitur sacramenta dari in testimonium publicum ejus grati&#65533;, qu&#65533; cuique privato prius adest. . . . . Ob hanc causam sacramenta, qu&#65533; sacr&#65533; sunt cerimoni&#65533; (accedit enim verbum ad elementum et fit sacramentum), religiose colenda, hoc est in precio habenda, et honorifice tractanda sunt, ut enim gratiam facere non possunt, Ecclesi&#65533; tamen nos visibiliter sociant, qui prius invisibiliter sumus in illam recepti, quod cum simul cum promissionis divin&#65533; verbis in ipsorum actione pronunciatur ac promulgatur, summa religione suscipiendum est." [482] In his treatise on true and false religion, Zwingle says: "Impossibile est, ut res aliqua externa fidem hominis internam confirmet et stabiliat." [483] And again he says [484] that the sacraments as other memorials can only produce historical, but not religious faith. Zwingle in the use of such language, had doubtless more a negative, than an affirmative object before his mind. He was more intent on denying the Romish doctrine of the inherent power of the sacraments, than of asserting anything of their real efficacy. Nevertheless it is true that Zwingle has ever been regarded as holding the lowest doctrine concerning the sacraments of any of the Reformers. They were to him no more means of grace than the rainbow or the heaps of stone on the banks of the Jordan. By their significancy and by association they might suggest truth and awaken feeling, but they were not channels of divine communication.

Doctrine of the Reformed Church.

The first point clearly taught on this subject in the Symbols of the Reformed Church is that the sacraments are real means of grace, that is, means appointed and employed by Christ for conveying the benefits of his redemption to his people. They are not, as Romanists teach, the exclusive channels; but they are channels. A promise is made to those who rightly receive the sacraments that they shall thereby and therein be made partakers of the blessings of which the sacraments are the divinely appointed signs and seals. The word grace, when we speak of the means of grace, includes three things. 1st. An unmerited gift, such as the remission of sin. 2d. The supernatural influence of the Holy Spirit. 3d. The subjective effects of that influence on the soul. Faith, hope, and charity, for example, are graces.

The second point in the Reformed doctrine on the sacraments concerns the source of their power. On this subject it is taught negatively that the virtue is not in them. The word virtue is of course here used in its Latin sense for power or efficiency. What is denied is that the sacraments are the efficient cause of the gracious effects which they produce. The efficiency does not reside in the elements, in the water used in baptism, or in the bread and

wine used in the Lord's Supper. It is not in the sacramental actions; either in giving, or in receiving the consecrated elements. Neither does the virtue or efficiency due to sacraments reside in, or flow from the person by whom they are administered. It does not reside in his office. There is no supernatural power in the man, in virtue of his office, to render the sacraments effectual. Nor does their efficiency depend on the character of the administrator in the sight of God; nor upon his intention; that is, his purpose to render them effectual. The man who administers the sacraments is not a worker of miracles. The Apostles and others at that time in the Church, were endued with supernatural power; and they had to will to exercise it in order to its producing its legitimate effect. It is not so with the officers of the Church in the administration of the sacraments. The affirmative statement on this subject is, that the efficacy of the sacraments is due solely to the blessing of Christ and the working of his Spirit. The Spirit, it is to be ever remembered, is a personal agent who works when and how He will. God has promised that his Spirit shall attend his Word; and He thus renders it an effectual means for the sanctification of his people. So He has promised, through the attending operation of his Spirit, to render the sacraments effectual to the same end.

The third point included in the Reformed doctrine is, that the sacraments are effectual as means of grace only, so far as adults are concerned, to those who by faith receive them. They may have a natural power on other than believers by presenting truth and exciting feeling, but their saving or sanctifying influence is experienced only by believers.

All these points are clearly presented in the standards of our own Church. The sacraments are declared to be means of grace, that is, means for signifying, sealing, and applying the benefits of redemption. It is denied that this virtue is in them, or in him by whom they are administered. It is affirmed that their efficiency in conveying grace, is due solely to the blessing of Christ and the co&#65533;peration of his Spirit; and that such efficiency is experienced only by believers. Thus in the Shorter Catechism, the sacraments are said to be holy ordinances "instituted by Christ; wherein, by sensible signs, Christ and the benefits of the new covenant are represented, sealed, and applied to believers." [485] In the Larger Catechism the sacraments are said to be instituted "to signify, seal, and exhibit unto those that are within the covenant of grace, the benefits of his [Christ's] mediation." [486] The word "exhibit," as here used, means to confer, or impart, as the Latin word "exhibere" also sometimes means. That such is the sense of the word in our standards, is plain because the exhibition here spoken of is confined to those within the covenant; and because this word is interchanged and explained by the word "confer." Thus in the Confession of Faith [487] it is said, "The grace which is exhibited in, or by the sacraments, rightly used, is not conferred by any virtue in them." And again, [488] that by the right use of baptism "the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's own will, in his appointed time." With this view of the sacraments as means of grace all the other leading symbols of the Reformed Churches agree. Thus the First Helvetic Confession [489] says, "Asserimus, sacramenta non solum tesseras quasdam societatis Christian&#65533;, sed et grati&#65533; divin&#65533; symbola esse, quibus ministri, Domino, ad eum finem, quem ipse promittit, offert et efficit, cooperentur." The Gallican Confession says: "Fatemur talia esse signa h&#65533;c exteriora, ut Deus per illa Sancti sui Spiritus virtute, operetur, ne quicquam ibi frustra nobis significetur." [490] In the Geneva Catechism [491] it is said: "Quid est sacramentum? Externa divin&#65533; erga nos benevolenti&#65533; testificatio, qu&#65533; visibili signo

spirituales gratias figurat, ad obsignandos cordibus nostris Dei promissiones, quo earum veritas melius confirmetur. . . . . Vim efficaciamque sacramenti non in externo elemento inclusam esse existimas, sed totam a Spiritu Dei manare? Sic sentio: nempe, ut virtutem suam exerere Domino placuerit per sua organa, quem in finem ea destinavit." The language of the Belgic Confession [492] is to the same effect: "Sunt enim sacramenta signa, ac symbola visibilia rerum internarum et invisibilium, per qu&#65533;, ceu per media, Deus ipse virtute Spiritus Sancti in nobis operatur. Itaque signa illa minime vana sunt, ant vacua: nec ad nos decipiendos aut frustrandos instituta."

These symbols of the Reformed Churches on the continent of Europe agree with those of our own Church, not only in representing the sacraments as real means of grace, but also in denying that their efficacy is due to their inherent virtue, or to him who administers them, and in affirming that it is due to the attending operation of the Spirit, and is conditioned on the presence of faith in the recipient. This is plain from the quotations already made, which might be multiplied indefinitely. On this point Calvin says: "Neque sacramenta hilum proficere sine Spiritu Sancti virtute." And again: "Spiritus Sanctus (quem non omnibus promiscue sacramenta advehunt, sed quem Dominus peculiariter suis confert) is est qui Dei gratias secum affert, qui dat sacramentis in nobis locum, qui efficit ut fructificent." [493] Guerike [494] gives as one of the main points of difference between the Lutherans and Reformed on this subject, that the latter deny the inherent power of the sacraments, and insist that the "virtus Spiritus Sancti extrinsecus accidens" is the source of all their sanctifying influence.

There is, therefore, a strict analogy, according to the Reformed doctrine, between the Word and the sacraments as means of grace. (1.) Both have in them a certain moral power due to the truth which they bring before the mind. (2.) Neither has in itself any supernatural power to save or to sanctify. (3.) All their supernatural efficiency is due to the co&#65533;peration or attending influence of the Holy Spirit. (4.) Both are ordained by God to be the channels or means of the Spirit's influence, to those who by faith receive them. Nothing is said in the Bible to place the sacraments above the Word as a means of communicating to men the benefits of Christ's redemption. On the contrary, tenfold more is said in Scripture of the necessity and efficiency of the Word in the salvation of men, than is therein said or implied of the power of the sacraments.

Besides the points already referred to as characteristic of the Reformed doctrine on the sacraments, there is a fourth, which is, that the grace or spiritual benefits received by believers in the use of the sacraments, may be attained without their use. This, however may perhaps be more properly considered, when the necessity of the sacraments comes under consideration.

The Lutheran Doctrine.

There are two points specially insisted upon by Lutherans in reference to the efficacy of the sacraments. The first is, the absolute necessity of faith in order to any real sanctifying or saving benefit being derived from the use of those ordinances. On this point they are in perfect accord with the Reformed. Hase is right when he says that the idea, "That a sacrament can confer saving benefit without faith is utterly destructive of Protestantism." [495] Augustine had long ago taught the doctrine, "Unde ista tanta virtus aqu&#65533;, ut corpus tangat, et cor abluat, nisi faciente verbo: non quia dicitur, sed quia creditur." [496] And

Bernard of Clairvaux says: "Sacramentum enim sine re sacramenti sumenti mors est: res vero sacramenti, etiam, pr&#65533;ter sacramentum, sumenti vita &#65533;terna est." [497]

The Lutheran symbols on this point are perfectly explicit. In the "Augsburg Confession" [498] it is said: "Itaque utendum est sacramentum ita, ut fides accedat, qu&#65533; credat promissionibus, qu&#65533; per sacramenta exhibentur et ostenduntur. Damnant igitur illos, qui docent, quod sacramenta, ex opere operato justificent, nec docent fidem requiri in usu sacramentorum, qu&#65533; credat remitti peccata."

In the "Apology for the Augsburg Confession" [499] it is said. "Damnamus totum populum scholasticorum doctorum, qui docent, quod sacramenta non ponenti obicem conferant gratiam ex opere operato, sine bono motu utentis. H&#65533;c simpliciter Judaica opinio est, sentire, quod per ceremoniam justificemur, sine bono motu cordis, hoc est, sine fide. . . . . At sacramenta sunt signa promissionum. Igitur in usu debet accedere fides. . . . . Loquimur hic de fide speciali, qu&#65533; pr&#65533;senti promissioni credit, non tantum qu&#65533; in genere credit Deum esse, sed qu&#65533; credit offerri remissionem peccatoram."

The second point in the doctrine of Lutherans in regard to the efficacy of the sacraments is one in which they differ from the Reformed, and as Guerike, himself a strenuous Lutheran, correctly says, approximate to the Romanists. They hold that the efficacy of the sacraments is due to their own inherent virtue or power; a power independent, on the one hand, of the attendant influences of the Spirit (extrinsecus accidens), and, on the other hand, of the faith of the recipient. Faith, indeed, is necessary to any saving or sanctifying effect, but that is only a subjective condition on which the beneficial operation of the power, inherent in the sacraments, is suspended. Bellarmin's illustration is applicable to the Lutheran doctrine as well as to his own. Fire will not cause wood to burn unless the wood be dry; but its dryness does not give fire its power. Luther's own favourite illustration was drawn from the case of the woman who touched the Saviour's garment. There was inherent healing virtue in Christ. Those who touched him without faith received no benefit. The woman having faith was healed the moment she touched the hem of his garment. Her faith, however, was in no sense the source of the power which resided in Christ. Guerike complains that the Reformed teach that "the visible signs do not as such convey any invisible divine grace; that without the sacraments the Christian may enjoy through faith the same divine gifts which the sacraments are intended to convey, and hence do not admit their absolute necessity, much less that they are the central point of the Christian method of salvation (der christlichen Heilsanstalt)." [500]

Luther did not at first hold this inherent power of the sacraments, but seemed disposed to adopt even the low views of Zwingle. In his work on the Babylonish Captivity he says, "Baptismus neminem justificat, nec ulli prodest, sed fides in verbum promissionis, cui additur baptismus. . . . . Nec verum esse potest, sacramentis inesse vim efficacem justificationis seu esse signa efficacia grati&#65533;." [501] Melancthon uses much the same language: "Non justificant signa, ut Apostolus ait, Circumcisio nihil est: ita baptismus nihil est. Participatio mens&#65533; Domini nihil est: sed testes sunt kai sphragides divin&#65533; voluntatis erga te, quibus conscientia tua certa reddatur, si de gratia, de benevolentia Dei erga se dubitet. . . . . Qu&#65533; alii sacramenta, nos signa appellamus, aut si ita libet, signa sacramentalia. Nam sacramentum ipsum Christum Paulus vocat." [502] "Hinc apparet, quam nihil signa sint, nisi fidei exercend&#65533; mnemosuna." [503]

As, however, Luther understood our Lord's words in John iii 6, as teaching the necessity of baptism, he inferred that if the sacrament is necessary to salvation it must have saving power. But as the Bible teaches that no one can be saved without faith, he held that the sacraments could have no saving effect unless the recipient was a believer. We have thus the two essential elements of the Lutheran doctrine of the sacraments; they have inherent, saving, sanctifying power; but that power takes effect for good only upon believers.

The necessity of faith is clearly stated in the passages already quoted from the "Augsburg Confession" and the "Apology;" the inherent power of the sacraments in opposition to the Reformed doctrine is as clearly taught in the Lutheran standards. Both points are included in some of the proof passages which follow. Guerike says: "It is undoubtedly the Lutheran, in opposition to the Reformed doctrine of virtus Spiritus sancti extrinsecus accedens,' that the grace is in, and not merely with or by (mit oder neben), the sacraments." [504] He refers to the language of Luther in his Larger Catechism in reference to baptism. Luther says: "Interrogatus, quid baptismus sit? ita responde: non esse prorsus aquam simplicem, sed ejusmodi, qu&#65533; verbo et pr&#65533;cepto Dei comprehensa, et illi inclusa sit, et per hoc sanctificata ita ut nihil aliud sit, quam Dei seu divina aqua." He adds, however, "non quod aqua h&#65533;c per sese quavis alia sit pr&#65533;stantior, sed quod ei verbum ac pr&#65533;ceptum Dei accesserit. Quocirca mera sycophantia est et diaboli illusio, quod hodie nostri novi spiritus, ut blasphement et contumelia afficiant baptismum, verbum et institutionem Dei ab eo divellunt, nec aliter intuentur eum, quam aquam e putreo haustam ac deinceps ita blasphemo ore blaterant: Quid vero utilitatis manus aqu&#65533; plena pr&#65533;staret anim&#65533;? Quis vero adeo vecors et inops animi est, qui hoc ignoret, divulsis baptismi partibus, aquam esse aquam? Qua vero fronte tu tibi tantum sumis, ut non verearis ab ordinatione Dei pretiosissimum keimelion avellere, quo Deus illam constrinxit et inclusit, neque inde divelli vult aut sejungi? Quippe verbum Dei, aut pr&#65533;ceptum, item nomen Dei, in aqua ipse solet esse nucleus, qui thesaurus ipso coelo et terra omnibus modis nobilior est et pr&#65533;stantior." [505]

Lutherans are wont to refer to the analogy between the Word and sacraments. The difference between them and the Reformed as to the sacraments, is analogous to the difference between the two churches as to the Word. The Reformed refer the supernatural power of the Word, not to the literal Word as written or spoken; not to the mere moral truth therein revealed, but to the co&#65533;peration, or as Paul calls it, the demonstration, of the Spirit. The Lutherans, on the other hand, teach that there is inherent in the divine Word (not in the letters or the sound but in the truth), a supernatural, divine virtue, inseparable from it, and independent of its use; and which is the same to believers and unbelievers; sanctifying and saving the former, because of their faith, and not benefiting the latter, because of their voluntary resistance. So the sacraments have an inherent, divine power, certain of producing saving effects, if they meet with faith in those who receive them. "The Lutheran Church," says Guerike, "regards the sacraments as actions, wherein God, through external signs by Him appointed, offers and confers his invisible and heavenly gifts; they see in the sacraments visible signs, which in virtue of the divine word of promise pronounced over them, in such sense contain the invisible divine gifts they signify, that they communicate them (mittheilen) to all who partake of them, although only to believers to their good." [506]

This inherent divine virtue of the sacraments does not reside in the elements; nor does it flow from him who administers them; nor is it due to the concurrent operation of the Holy Spirit; but to the Word. The elements employed are in themselves mere elements; with the Word, they are divinely efficacious, because the divine Word, wherever it is, is fraught with this divine, supernatural, saving, and sanctifying power which always takes effect on those who have faith to receive it

Dr. Schmid of Erlangen, however, admits that there is a difference of view on this subject, between the earlier and later theologians of his Church. The former made the sacrament consist of the element and the Word, and referred its supernatural effect to the inherent divine power of the latter, agreeably to Luther's representation in his Larger Catechism, where, when speaking of baptism, he says, in words already quoted: "non tantum naturalis aqua sed etiam divina, coelestis, sancta et salutifera aqua (est) . . . . hocque nonnisi verbi gratia, quod coeleste ac sanctum verbum est." The later theologians, however, from the time of Gerhard, did not make the sacrament consist of the element and the Word; but of something terrestrial and something celestial. The former is the element or external symbol, "quod est res corporea visibilis . . . . ordinata ad hoc, ut sit rei coelestis vehiculum et medium exhibitivum." The latter, or "res coelestis," is "res invisibilis et intelligibilis, re terrena visibili, tanquam medio divinitus ordinato exhibita, a qua fructus sacramenti principaliter dependet." According to this view the efficacy of the sacrament does not depend upon the Word, but upon this "res coelestis," of which the "res terrena" is the vehicle and medium. The office of the Word is to unite the two. It is called the "aition poietikon, hoc est, efficere, ut du[illegible] ill[illegible] partes essentiales unum sacramentum constituant in usu sacramentorum." [507] This doctrine of the later Lutherans is attended with serious difficulties. It brings them into conflict with Luther and Lutherans of the older school who are strenuous in referring the efficacy of the sacraments to the Word. The elements without the Word, are mere elements. It is the Word in which the supernatural power resides which produces the effect the sacrament is intended to accomplish. But according to this later view there are in the sacraments two things, the sign and the thing signified; a "res terrena" and a "res coelestis." They are so united that where the one is given and received by faith, the other is received. This "res coelestis," however, is not the Word. In the case of the eucharist, for example, it is the real body and blood of Christ, and these being inseparably united with his soul and divinity, it is this marvellous gift, and not the Word, which makes the Lord's Supper the life-sustaining food of the soul.

So far as the efficacy of the sacraments is concerned, the main point of difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed is, that the latter attribute their sanctifying power to the attending influences of the Spirit; the former to the inherent, supernatural power of the Word which is an essential part of these divine ordinances. Even on this point Chemnitz expresses himself in a way to which any Reformed theologian may assent. "Recte Apologia Augustan[illegible] confessionis dicit, eundem esse effectum, eandem virtutem, seu efficaciam, et verbi et sacramentorum, qu[illegible] sunt sigilla promissionum. . . . . Sicut igitur Evangelium est potentia Dei ad salutem omni credenti: non quod magica qu[illegible]dam vis characteribus, syllabis, aut sono verborum inh[illegible]reat, sed quia est medium, organon seu instrumentum, per quod Spiritus Sanctus efficax est, proponens, offerens, exhibens, distribuens et applicans meritum Christi, et gratiam Dei, ad salutem omni credenti: ita etiam sacramentis tribuitur vis et efficacia: non quod in sacramentis extra sen pr[illegible]ter meritum Christi, misericordiam

Patris, et efficaciam Spiritus Sancti, qu❓renda sit gratia ad salutem; sed sacramenta sunt caus❓ instrumentales ita, quod per illa media seu organa, Pater vult gratiam suam exhibere, donare, applicare: Filius meritum suum communicare credentibus: Spiritus Sanctus efficaciam suam exercere, ad salutem omni credenti." [508]

The Lutheran doctrine as generally presented and as stated above, stands opposed, (1.) To the doctrine of the Romanists which denies the necessity of a living faith in the recipient in order to his experiencing the efficacy of the sacraments; and which not only represents them as imbued with an inherent power, but also teaches that they confer grace "ex opere operato." (2.) To the doctrine which makes the sacraments merely badges of a Christian profession. (3.) To the doctrine which represents them as mere allegories or significant exhibitions of truth. (4.) To the doctrine which regards them as merely commemorative, as a portrait or monument may be. (5.) To the doctrine which denies to them inherent efficacy and refers their sanctifying influence to the accompanying power of the Holy Spirit; and (6.) To the doctrine which assumes that they confer nothing which may not be obtained by faith without them. In all these points, with the exception of the last two, Lutherans and Reformed are agreed.

Doctrine of the Church of Rome on the Efficacy of the Sacraments.

It has already been stated that the Romanists teach, (1.) That the sacraments contain the grace which they signify. (2.) That they convey that grace "ex opere operato." (3.) That there is a certain efficacy common to all the sacraments. They all convey grace, i.e., "gratia gratum faciens, sanctificans;" and besides this common influence, in baptism, confirmation, and orders, there is conveyed an indelible character (quoddam indelebile) in virtue of which they can never be repeated. (4.) That the conditions of the efficacy of the sacraments on the part of the administrator are, first, that he have authority (this is limited in its application to baptism); and second, that he have the intention of doing what the Church designs to be done; and in regard to the recipient, that he does not oppose an obstacle. The sacraments are declared to be effectual "non ponentibus obicem."

In what Sense do the Sacraments contain Grace?

By this is meant that they possess in them inherent virtue of rendering holy those to whom they are administered. Their power in the sphere of religion is analogous to that of articles of the "materia medica" in the sphere of physics. Some have a narcotic power; some act on one organ and some on another; some are stimulants, and some are sedatives. Or to refer to the illustration so familiar with Bellarmin; the inherent virtue of the sacraments to confer grace, is analogous to that of fire to burn. Fire produces combustion because it is ordained by God and imbued with power to that end. The sacraments confer grace because they are endowed with grace-imparting efficacy and are ordained by God for that purpose. "Containing grace and "conferring grace" "virtute sibi insita," are explanatory forms of expression. The sacraments are said to contain grace because they confer it by their inherent virtue. This is intended as a denial that their efficacy is due to the moral, or to the supernatural power of the truth; or to the attending influences of the Spirit, or to the subjective state of those who receive them.

As to the peculiar effect ascribed to baptism, confirmation, and orders, little is said. These sacraments are never repeated. For this some reason was to be assigned, and, therefore, it was assumed that they left an indelible impression on the soul. What that is,

cannot be stated further than by saying that it is a "Signum quoddam spirituale et indelebile in anima impressum. Qui eo insigniti sunt, deputantur ad recipienda vel tradenda aliis ea, qu\u{fffd} pertinent ad cultum Dei." [509] The language of the Council of Trent sheds no light on the subject. It simply says: [510] "Si quis dixerit, in tribus sacramentis, baptismo scilicet confirmatione, et ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est signum quoddam spirituale et indelebile, unde ea iterari non possunt; anathema sit." The only passages of Scripture referred to by Perrone in support of this assumption, are 2 Corinthians i. 22, and Ephesians i. 13, in which the Apostle speaks of all believers being sealed by the Holy Spirit. In those passages there is not the slightest reference to any sacramental impression. In the second part of the Roman Catechism in answer to the question, What "character" in this connection signifies, it is said that it is something which cannot be removed, and which renders the soul fit to receive or to perform certain spiritual benefits or functions. Thus in baptism a certain something is impressed upon the soul by which it is prepared to receive the benefit of other sacraments, and by which it is distinguished from the souls of the unbaptized. In confirmation the soul is marked as a soldier of Christ and prepared to contend against all spiritual enemies. In orders something is received which fits the recipient to administer the sacraments, and which distinguishes him from all other Christians.

Ex Opere Operato.

The Council of Trent anathematizes, as we have seen, not only those who deny that the sacraments convey grace, but also those who deny that they convey it "ex opere operato." The meaning of this phrase is intelligible enough if left unexplained. It has been obscured by the explanations given by Romanists themselves, as well as by the conflicting views of Protestants on the subject. To say that the sacraments contain grace; that they convey it "virtute sibi insita," that they convey it "ex opere operato," all amount to the same thing. The simple meaning is that such is the nature of the sacraments that, when duly administered, they produce a given effect. There is no necessity and no propriety in looking beyond them to account for the effect produced. If you place a coal of fire on a man's hand, it produces a certain effect. That effect follows without fail. It follows from the very nature of the thing done and from the act of doing it. It makes no difference, whether we say that the coal contains heat; or, that it burns in virtue of its inherent nature; or that the effect is produced "ex opere operato."

Of course there are certain conditions necessary in order to the production of the effect. The hand must be alive, otherwise it is not the hand of a man; it is simply a lump of clay. There must be no obstacle. If you interpose a porcelain plate between the coal and the hand, the hand will not be burnt. The coal must be ignited, not simply a piece of carbon. So the thing done must be a real sacrament. It must have everything essential to the integrity of the ordinance. The coal, in the case supposed, must be brought into contact with the hand; but whether it be placed there by the use of a silver spoon, or of a pair of iron tongs, makes no difference. So it makes no difference whether the priest who administers the sacrament be a good man or a bad man, whether he be orthodox or heretical. He must, however, do the thing; and he cannot do it without intending to do it. If the man's hand is to be burnt, in a given time and place, the coal must be intentionally placed upon it.

Although the doctrine of the Church of Rome as to the way in which the sacraments

convey grace, seems to be thus simple, there is no little apparent diversity among the theologians of that Church in their views on the subject. This diversity, however, is really more in the mode of stating the doctrine, than in the doctrine itself. Lutherans agree with Romanists in denying that the efficacy of the sacraments is due to the attending influences of the Holy Spirit; and they agree with them in attributing to them an inherent supernatural power. The main point of difference between them is that the Lutherans insist on the presence and exercise of faith in the recipient. According to them the sacraments convey grace only to believers. Whereas Romanists, as understood by Lutherans and indeed by all Protestants, deny this necessity of faith or of good dispositions in order to the due efficacy of the sacraments. This, however, Bellarmin pronounces a deliberate falsehood on the part of the Protestants; and he uses language on this subject which Luther himself might have employed, "Est merum mendacium," he says, "quod Catholici dicant, sacramenta prodesse peccatoribus: omnes enim Catholici requirunt poenitentiam, tanquam dispositionem ad gratiam rocipiendam" "Falsum est Catholicos non habere pro obice incredulitatem: omnes enim Catholici requirunt necessario in adultis actualem fidem, et sine ea dicunt neminem justificari." [511] "Voluntas, fides, et poenitentia in suscipiento adulto necessario requiruntur, ut dispositiones ex parte subjecti, non ut caus&#65533; activ&#65533;: non enim fides et poenitentia efficiunt gratiam sacramentalem, neque dant efficaciam sacramento; sed solum tollunt obstacula qu&#65533; impedirent, ne sacramenta suam efficaciam exercere possent; unde in pueris, ubi non requiritur dispositio, sine his rebus fit justificatio." [512] Luther would not agree with this last clause about infants; but to the rest of the paragraph he could hardly object. Then follows in Bellarmin the illustration quoted above. [513] Fire does not owe its efficacy to the dryness of the wood; nevertheless the dryness is a necessary condition of combustion.

In another passage Bellarmin is still more explicit: "Igitur ut intelligamus, quid sit opus operatum, notandum est, in justificatione, quam recipit aliquis, dum percipit sacramenta, multa concurrere; nimirum ex parte Dei, voluntatem utendi illa re sensibili; ex parte Christi, passionem ejus; ex parte ministri potestatem, voluntatem, probitatem; ex parte suscipientis voluntatem, fidem, et poenitentiam; denique ex parte sacramenti ipsam actionem externam, qu&#65533; consurgit, ex debita applicatione form&#65533; et materi&#65533;. C&#65533;terum ex his omnibus id, quod active, et proxime atque instrumentaliter efficit gratiam justificationis, est sola actio illa externa, qu&#65533; sacramentum dicitur, et h&#65533;c vocatur opus operatum, accipiendo passive (operatum) ita ut idem sit sacramentum conferre gratiam ex opere operato, quod conferre gratiam ex [vi] ipsius actionis sacramentalis a Deo ad hoc institut&#65533;, non ex merito agentis vel suscipientis." [514]

Notwithstanding all this the Romanists do teach the very doctrine which the Reformers charged upon them, and which the Protestant Symbols so strenuously condemn. This is clear, --

1. Because the same words do not always mean the same thing. Bellarmin says that Romanists teach that faith on the part of the recipient is necessary in order to the efficacy of the sacraments, at least in the case of adults. Protestants say the same thing; and yet their meaning is entirely different. By faith, Protestants mean saving faith; that faith which is one of the fruits of the Spirit, which, if a man has, his salvation is certain. Romanists, however, mean by faith mere assent, which a man may have, and be in a state of condemnation, and

perish forever. This is their formal definition of faith, as given by Bellarmin himself; and the Council of Trent pronounces accursed those who say that the assent given by unrenewed men to the truth, is not true faith. Romanists do not hold that sacraments convey grace to avowed atheists or professed infidels; but that they exert saving power on those having the kind of faith in the Church which the bandits of Italy profess and cherish. So also the repentance required is not the godly sorrow of which the Apostle speaks, but that remorse which wicked men often experience. These points have been abundantly proved in the preceding pages. [515] A coal of fire will burn a man's hand; it is true the man must be alive, but whether he is a good or bad man makes no difference. The sacraments confer grace by their inherent efficacy. It is true the recipient must be a believer; but whether he has what St. Peter calls "the precious faith of God's elect," or the same kind of faith that Simon Magus had, makes no difference.

2. That this is the true doctrine of the Church of Rome is evident from the manner in which it is presented by its leading theologians. This appears from the great distinction which they make between the sacraments of the Old, and those of the New Testament. The former only signified, the latter confer grace. The latter are effectual "ex opere operato;" the former, as Thomas Aquinas says, were effectual only "ex fide et devotione suscipientis." Again, the necessity of anything good in the recipient is expressly denied. Thus Gabriel Biel (1495) says "Sacramentum dicitur conferre gratiam ex opere operato, ita quod ex eo ipso, quod opus illud, puta sacramentum, exhibitur, nisi impediat obex peccati mortalis, gratia confertur utentibus, sic quod pr&#xFFFD;ter exhibitionem signi foris exhibiti non requiritur bonus motus seu devotio interior in suscipiente." [516] In like manner also Duns Scotus declares, [517] "pr&#xFFFD;ter istam (primam causam meritoriam sc. Christum) non oportet dare aliam intrinsecam in recipiente, qua conjungatur Deo, antequam recipiat gratiam;" and Petrus de Palude, [518] "In sacramentis nov&#xFFFD; legis non per se requiritur, quod homo se disponat: ergo per ipsum sacramentum disponitur." The later Romish theologians teach the same doctrine. Thus Klee [519] says that the sacraments, when rightly dispensed, are of necessity effectual. And Moehler says: "The Catholic Church teaches that the sacrament works in us, in virtue of its character as an ordinance of Christ, appointed for our salvation (ex opere operato, scl. a Christo,' instead of quod operatus est Christus'), i.e., the sacraments bring from the Saviour a divine power, which can be caused by no human frame of mind (Stimmung), nor by any spiritual state or effort, but which is given by God for Christ's sake directly in the sacrament." [520] It is true, he immediately adds, "Man must receive them, and must be susceptible of their impression, and this susceptibility expresses itself in repentance, in sorrow for sin, in longing for divine help, and in trusting faith; nevertheless he can only receive them, and hence only have the requisite susceptibility." All this, however, according to the Romish system, the unrenewed man has, or may have. In the case of infants there is nothing but passivity: simple non-resistance; and this is all that is required in the case of adults.

3. One of the points of controversy between the Jansenists and Jesuits related to this very subject. The Jansenists maintained that the efficacy of the sacraments depended on the inward state of the recipient. If he were not in a state of grace, and in the exercise of faith when they were received, they availed nothing. This doctrine the Jesuits controverted, and their influence prevailed in the Church. Jansenism was condemned and suppressed.

4. Another argument is derived from the constant practice of the Romish Church. There is no pretence of her recognized ministers demanding the profession, or evidence of what Protestants understand by saving faith in order to the reception of the sacraments, or as the condition of their sanctifying influence. On the contrary, they act on the principle, that the sacraments confer grace in the first instance. They baptize crowds of uninstructed heathen, without the slightest pretence that they are penitents or believers. If faith be a fruit of regeneration, and if, as Romanists all teach, regeneration is effected in baptism, how can the presence of faith in the recipient be a condition of the efficacy of baptism. [521]

The Administrator.

Lutherans and Reformed agree in teaching, first, that the efficacy of the sacraments does not depend on anything in him who administers them; and second, that as the ministry of the Word and sacraments are united in the Scriptures, it is a matter of order and propriety that the sacraments should be administered by those only who have been duly called and appointed to that service. In the Second Helvetic Confession, [522] therefore, it is said, "Baptismus pertinet ad officia ecclesiastica." According to the Westminster Confession, [523] "There be only two sacraments ordained by Christ our Lord in the Gospel. That is to say, baptism and the supper of the Lord: neither of which may be dispensed by any, but by a minister of the Word, lawfully ordained."

The doctrine of the Lutheran Church is thus stated by Hollaz: "Jus dispensandi sacramenta Deus concredidit ecclesi&#65533;, qu&#65533; exsecutionem aut exercitium hujus juris, observandi ordinis et euschemosunes causa commendavit ministris verbi divini vocatis et ordinatis. In casu autem extrem&#65533; necessitatis, ubi sacramentum est necessarium nec nisi periculo salutis omitti potest, quilibet homo Christianus (laicus aut femina) sacramentum initiationis valide celebrare potest." [524] This is considered as not inconsistent with the Augsburg Confession, which says: [525] "De ordine ecclesiastico docent, quod nemo debeat in ecclesia publice docere, aut sacramenta administrare, nisi rite vocatus."

The doctrine of the Church of Rome on this subject is briefly stated in the canons enacted during the seventh session of the Council of Trent. [526] We read thus: "Si quis dixerit, Christianos omnes in verbo, et omnibus sacramentis administrandis habere potestatem; anathema sit." The Council say in "all" the sacraments; for the Church of Rome, although denying the power of any but canonically ordained priests to render the administration of the sacraments efficacious, admits of the efficacy of lay baptism. Again, "Si quis dixerit, in ministris, dum sacramentis conficiunt, et conferunt, non requiri intentionem saltem faciendi, quod facit ecclesia; anathema sit." Intention is defined to be the purpose of doing what Christ ordained and what the Church is accustomed to do. On this subject Bellarmin says, (1.) It is not necessary (in baptism at least) that the administrator should have an intelligent intention of doing what the Church does; for he may be ignorant of the doctrine of the Church; all that is required is that he intend to administer a Church ordinance. (2.) It is not necessary that he intend to do what the Church of Rome does; but what the true Church, whatever that may be, is accustomed to do. Hence, he says, the Catholic Church does not rebaptize those who have been baptized by the Geneva churches. "Non tollit efficaciam sacramenti error ministri circa ecclesiam, sed do fectus intentionis." (3.) That not actual intention, but only virtual, is required. "Virtualis dicitur, cum actualis intentio in pr&#65533;senti non adest ob aliquam evagationem mentis, tamen paulo ante adfuit et in

virtute illius sit operatio." [527] On this account the Roman Catechism says, that baptism administered by a heretic, a Jew, or a heathen, is efficacious: "Si id efficere propositum eis fuerit, quod ecclesia Catholica in eo administrationis genere efficit." [528] This agrees with the popular view of the doctrine of intention. The administrator must intend to produce the effect which the sacrament was designed to accomplish. If he baptizes, he must intend to regenerate; if he absolves, he must intend to absolve; if he consecrates the bread and wine, he must intend their transmutation; if he offers the host, he must intend it as a sacrifice; and if offered for a particular person, he must intend it to take effect for his benefit. According to this view everything depends on the will of the officiating priest.

[482] Zwinglii Fidei Ratio, Niemeyer, vol. i. pp. 25, 26.

[483] Works, edit. Schuler und Schultess. (?) See Strauss, Dogmatik, vol. ii. p. 519.

[484] Expositio Christian[?] Fidei, 70; Niemeyer, vol. i. p. 49.

[485] Ques. 92.

[486] Ques. 162.

[487] Chap. xxvii. 3.

[488] Chap. xxviii. 6.

[489] Art. XXI.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 120.

[490] Art. XXXIV.; Ibid. p. 337.

[491] V. De Sacramentis, 2 and 5; Ibid. pp. 160, 161.

[492] Art. XXXIII.; Ibid. p. 383.

[493] Institutio, IV. xiv. 9, 17; edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. pp. 355, 360.

[494] Allgemeine Christliche Symbolik, von H. E. Ferdinand Guerike, D. D., Leipzig, 1839, p. 378.

[495] Evangelische Dogmatik, II. ii. 1, § 213; 3d edit. Leipzig, 1842, p. 442.

[496] In Joannis Evangelische Tractatus, LXXX. 3; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1837, vol. iii. p. 2290, a.

[497] Guigo (attributed to St. Bernard); Works of St. Bernard, edit. Migne, Paris, 1859, vol. iii. p. 327, b, c (ii. 214).

[498] I. xiii.; Hase, Libri Symbolici, Leipzig, 1846, p. 12.

[499] VII. 18-21; Ibid. p. 203.

[500] Allgemeine Christliche Symbolik, § 54, Leipzig, 1839, pp. 375, 376.

[501] Luther, Captivitas Babylonica, de Sacramento Baptismi; Works, edit. Wittenberg (Latin), 1546, vol. ii. leaf 79, p. 2.

[502] Loci Communes; De Signis; edit. Strasburg, 1523, in Dodecas Scriptorum Theologicorum, Nuremberg, 1646, pp. 774, 775.

[503] Ibid., De Baptismo, p. 778.

[504] Symbolik, Leipzig, 1839, p. 393, note.

[505] Catechismus Major par. iv., De Baptismo; Hase, Libri Symbolici, edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 537.

[506] Guerike's Symbolik, p. 372.

[507] Schmid, Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche. Frankfort and Erlangen, 1853, pp. 415-417.

[508] Examen Concilii Tridentini, de Efficacia et Usu Sacramentorum, edit. Frankfort-on-the-Main, 1573, 1574, part ii. p. 22, b.

[509] Perrone, Pr&#65533;lectiones Theologic&#65533;, De Sacramentis in genere, cap. ii. 1, 2; edit. Paris, 1861, vol. ii. pp. 220, a, 224.

[510] Sess. vii. de Sacramentis in genere. canon 9; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 39.

[511] Bellarmin, De Sacramentis, I. 2; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, vol. iii. p. 6, b, c.

[512] Ibid. II. i.; pp. 108, d, 109, a.

[513] See. p. 490.

[514] De Sacramentis in genere, II. i.; ut supra, p. 108, c.

[515] See above, the chapter on Faith.

[516] Collectorium in IV. Libros Sententiarum, lib. iv. dis. 1, qu. 3; Basle, 1508, by count, p. 14, b, of the text of book iv.

[517] In Lib. IV. Sentent., lib. iv. dis. 4. qu. 2; Venice, 1506, by count, p. 34, b, of book iv.

[518] In his commentary on the Sentences, lib. iv. dis. 1. qu. 1; Paris, 1514, by count, p. 4, a, b, of book iv.

[519] Dogmatik, Specielle Dogmatik, III. i. 1, § 7; Mainz, 1835, vol. iii. p. 95.

[520] Symbolik oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegens&#65533;tze der Katholiken und Protestanten; von Dr. J. A. M&#65533;hler, IV. § 28; 6th ed. Mainz, 1843, p. 255.

[521] See Historischer Anhang &#65533;ber die Wirksamkeit der Sacramente "ex opere operato," vol. ii. § 107, p. 363, of K&#65533;llner's Symbolik. K&#65533;llner comes to the conclusion that there is no great difference between the Lutheran and Romish doctrines on the efficacy of the sacraments; a conclusion in conflict with the conviction of Luther and his associates.

[522] XX.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 518.

[523] Chap. xxvii. 4.

[524] Examen, III. ii. 3, qu&#65533;st. 6; edit. Leipzig, 1840, p. 518.

[525] I. 14; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 13.

[526] Sess. vii.; Canones de Sacramentis in genere, 10, 11; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 40.

[527] Bellarmin, De Sacramentis in genere, I. xxvii.; Disputationes, edit. Paris, 1608, vol. iii. pp. 94, d, 95.

[528] Catechismus Romanus, II. ii. 18 (xxii. 24), Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, vol. i. p. 270.

§ 5. The Necessity of the Sacraments.

The distinction between the necessity of precept and the necessity of means, is obvious and important. No one would be willing to say, without qualification, that it is unnecessary to obey an explicit command of Christ. And as He has commanded his disciples to baptize all who are received as members of his Church, in the name of the

Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, and required his disciples statedly to commemorate his death by the celebration of the Lord's Supper, the strongest moral obligation rests upon his people to obey these commands. But the obligation to obey any command, such as to observe the Sabbath, to visit the sick, and to relieve the poor, depends on circumstances. No opportunity may be offered; or the discharge of the duty may be hindered by external circumstances; or we may lack the ability to render the service required. So with regard to the command to be baptized and to commemorate the Lord's death at his table, it is evident that many circumstances may occur to prevent obedience even on the part of those who have the disposition and purpose to do whatever their Lord requires at their hands. And even where obedience is not prevented by external circumstances, it may be prevented by ignorance, or by unfounded scruples of conscience.

By the necessity of means is usually understood an absolute necessity, a "sine qua non." In this sense food is a necessity of life; light is necessary to the exercise of vision; the Word is necessary to the exercise of faith, for it is its object, the thing which is to be believed; and faith is, on the part of adults, necessary to salvation, for it is the act of receiving the grace of God offered in the Bible. And therefore times almost without number, it is said in Scripture, that we are saved by faith, that he that believeth shall be saved, and that he that believeth not shall not see life.

The question between the Reformed on the one hand, and Lutherans and Romanists on the other, is in which of these senses are the sacraments necessary. According to the Reformed they have the necessity of precept. The use of them is enjoined as a duty; but they are not necessary means of salvation. Men may be saved without them. The benefits which they signify and which they are the means of signifying, sealing, and applying to believers, are not so tied to their use that those benefits cannot be secured without them. Sins may be forgiven, and the soul regenerated and saved, though neither sacrament has ever been received. The Lutherans and Romanists, on the other hand, hold that the sacraments are necessary means of grace, in the sense that the grace which they signify is not received otherwise than in their use. There is no remission of sin or regeneration without baptism; no reception of the body and blood of Christ to our spiritual nourishment and growth in grace, without the Lord's Supper; and, according to Romanists, no forgiveness of post-baptismal sins without priestly absolution; no grace of orders without canonical ordination; and no special preparation for death without extreme unction. This question is of importance chiefly in reference to baptism, and will therefore come up when that sacrament is under consideration. At present it is only the general teachings of these several churches that need be referred to. The "Consensus Tigurinus" is the most carefully considered and cautiously worded exposition of the doctrine of the Reformed in relation to the sacraments, belonging to the period of the Reformation. It was drawn up to settle the differences on this subject between the churches of Geneva and those of Zurich. It contains the statements in reference to the sacraments to which both parties agreed. It teaches [529] (1.) That the sacraments are "not□ ac tesser□" of Christian fellowship and brotherhood; incitements to gratitude, faith, and a holy life, and "syngraph□" binding us thereto. They were ordained especially that therein God might testify, represent, and seal to us his grace. (2.) The things signified are not to be separated from the signs. Those who by faith receive the latter receive also the former. (3.) That respect is to be had rather to the promise to which our faith is directed; for the elements without Christ "nihil sint quam inanes larv□." (4.) The sacraments confer

nothing "propria eorum virtute;" God alone works in us by his Spirit. They are organs or means by which God efficaciously operates. (5.) They are sometimes called seals, but the Spirit alone is properly the seal as well as the beginner and finisher of our faith. (6.) God does not operate in all who receive the sacraments, but only in his own chosen people. (7.) Hence the doctrine is to be rejected that the sacraments convey grace to all who do not oppose the obstacle of mortal sin. The grace of God is not so bound to the signs, that all who have the latter have the former. (8.) Believers receive without the sacraments the blessings which they receive in their use. "Extra eorum usum fidelibus constat, qu\u00e9 illic figuratur veritas." Paul received baptism for the remission of sins; but his sins were remitted before he was baptized. Baptism was to Cornelius the layer of regeneration, but he had received the Spirit before he was thus externally washed. In the Lord's Supper we receive Christ, but Christ dwells in every believer, and we must have faith before we can acceptably approach the table of the Lord. (9.) The benefit of the sacraments is not confined to the time in which they are administered or received. God often regenerates long after baptism those baptized in infancy; some in early youth, some in old age. The benefit of baptism, therefore, continues through the whole life, because the promise signified therein continues always in force.

As to the Lutheran doctrine on this subject, Guerike says that the three churches, the Greek, Roman, and Lutheran, "are agreed in holding that in the sacraments the visible signs as such really convey the invisible divine things, and therefore, that a participation of the sacraments is necessary in order to a participation of the heavenly gifts (g\u00e9ttliche Sache) therein contained. While on the contrary the Reformed Church teaches that the visible signs as such do not convey the invisible grace, and that the Christian can by faith receive the same divine benefits without the use of the sacraments, and consequently that the sacraments are not absolutely necessary, much less the middle point of the Christian plan of salvation." [530] The language of the Lutheran Symbols justifies this strong language of Guerike. Thus the signers of the Augsburg Confession, [531] "Damnant Anabaptistas qui improbant baptismum puerorum et affirmant pueros sine baptismo salvos fieri." And in the comment on that article in the "Apology for the Confession," it is said, [532] "Nonus articulus approbatus est, in quo confitemur, quod baptismus sit necessarius ad salutem, et quod pueri sint baptizandi, et quod baptismus puerorum non sit irritus, sed necessarius et efficax ad salutem." The Lutheran theologians, however, in treating of the necessity of baptism, make a distinction between adults and infants. With regard to the former, regeneration should precede baptism. In reference to them, the design of baptism is to seal and confirm the grace already received. In regard to infants it is the organ or means of regeneration. Thus Baier says: [533] "Hic autem, quod ad finem proximum attinet, diversitas occurrit, respectu subjectorum diversorum. Nam infantibus quidem \u00e9que omnibus per baptismum primum confertur et obsignatur fides, per quam meritum Christi illis applicetur: Adultis vero illis tantum, qui fidem ex verbo conceperunt ante baptismi susceptionem, baptismus eam obsignat et confirmat." So also Gerhard says: "Infantibus baptismus principaliter est medium ordinarium regenerationis et mundationis a peccatis, etc. Secundario autem sigillum justiti\u00e9 et fidei confirmatio; adultis credentibus baptismus principaliter pr\u00e9stat usum obsignationis ac testificationis de gratia Dei, huiothesia et vita \u00e9terna; sed minus principaliter renovationem et dona Spiritus Sancti auget. Infantes, per baptismum primitias Spiritus et fidei accipiunt: adulti qui per verbum primitias fidei et

Spiritus Sancti acceperunt, per baptismum incrementa ejusdem consequuntur." [534]

The doctrine of the Church of Rome on this subject is, not that all tho seven sacraments are necessary to salvation, but that each is necessary to the reception of the gift or grace which it is intended to convey. There can be no "grace of orders" without canonical ordination, but it is not necessary that every man should be ordained. The sacrament of penance is necessary only in the case of post-baptismal sin, and even the eucharist, which they regard as far the greatest of their sacraments "in dignity and mystery," is not necessary to infants. Baptism, however, being the only channel through which remission of sins and regeneration are conveyed, is absolutely necessary to salvation, And priestly absolution is absolutely necessary for the remission of sins committed after baptism. Such revolting consequences would flow from carrying this principle rigorously out, that Romanists shrink from its assertion. It would exclude many confessors and martyrs from the kingdom of heaven. It is, therefore, taught that when circumstances render it impossible that these sacraments can be received, the purpose and desire to receive them secure their benefits. These cases are, however, exceptions, and are generally overlooked in the statement of the doctrine. This exception does not apply to infants, and, therefore, they cannot enjoy its benefits. It is the doctrine of the Church of Rome that all unbaptized persons fail of eternal life. This is included in their idea of the Church. None are saved who are not within the pale of the true Church. None are within the pale of the Church who have not been baptized, and who are not subject to canonical bishops, and especially to the bishop of Rome. The unbaptized, therefore, not being in the Church, as defined by Romanists, are of necessity excluded from the kingdom of heaven.

The language of the Roman standards is perfectly explicit. The Council of Trent says: [535] "Si quis dixerit, non dari gratiam per hujusmodi sacramenta semper, et omnibus, quantum est ex parte Dei, etiam si rite ea suscipiant, sed aliquando, et aliquibus anathema sit." And again: [536] "Si quis dixerit baptismum liberum esse, hoc est non necessarium ad salutem; anathema sit." In the Roman Catechism [537] we find the following: "Estne Baptismus ad salutem omnibus necessarius?" the answer is: "Sed cum ceterarum rerum cognitio, qu&#65533; hactenus exposit&#65533; sunt, fidelibus utillissima habenda sit, tum vero nihil magis necessarium videri potest, quam ut doceantur, omnibus hominibus baptismi legem a Domino pr&#65533;scriptam esse, ita ut, nisi per baptismi gratiam Deo renascantur, in sempiternam miseriam, et interitum a parentibus, sive illi fideles, sive infideles sint, procreentur." According to the Church of Rome, therefore, all the unbaptized, whether their parents be believers or infidels, are doomed to eternal misery and perdition. With regard to penance, the Council of Trent says: [538] "Est hoc sacramentum poenitenti&#65533; lapsis post baptismum ad salutem necessarium, ut nondum regeneratis ipse baptismus." It also teaches that full confession of all sins committed after baptism is "jure divino" necessary, because our Lord Jesus Christ, about to ascend into heaven, left his priests as his vicars, as "pr&#65533;sides et judices," to whom all mortal sins, into which Christians may fall, are to be communicated, and who are authorized to pronounce the sentence of remission or retention. It is said, moreover, that our Lord teaches that priests, who themselves are in a state of mortal sin, in virtue of the power of the Holy Spirit given them in ordination, exercise, as ministers of Christ, this function of remitting sins, and those err who contend that wicked priests have not this power. All this is reiterated in the canons and amplified and enforced in the Catechism. [539]

In this connection it is sufficient to remark, --

1. That the doctrine that the sacraments are necessary to salvation, on the ground that they are the only channels for conveying to men the benefits of Christ's redemption, is clearly contrary to the express teachings of the Bible. The Scriptures everywhere teach that God looks upon the heart; that He requires of fallen men simply faith in our Lord Jesus Christ and repentance toward God as the only indispensable conditions of salvation; that all men have free access to God, through the mediation of Christ, to obtain at his hands the remission of sins and all the benefits of redemption; that they need no intervention of priests to secure for them this access or the communication of those benefits; and that no external rites have power in themselves to confer grace. God so loved the world, that He gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him should not perish but have everlasting life. He that believeth on Him is not condemned; but he that believeth not is condemned already. Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ and thou shalt be saved. Whosoever calleth on the name of the Lord, shall be saved. Whoso believeth that Jesus is the Christ, is born of God. The Scripture cannot be broken. It cannot be that he who truly believes the record which God has given of his Son should fail of eternal life. We become the sons of God by faith in Jesus Christ. It is true we are commanded to be baptized, as we are commanded to confess Christ before men or to love the brethren. But these are duties to which faith secures obedience; they are not the means of salvation.

2. This ritual system is utterly inconsistent with the whole genius of Christianity. God is a Spirit, and He requires those who worship Him, to worship Him in spirit and in truth. External rites are declared to be nothing. Circumcision is nothing. and uncircumcision is nothing. "He is not a Jew, which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly; and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit, and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God." (Rom. ii. 28, 29.) This is not merely a fact, but a principle. What St. Paul here says of circumcision and of Jews, may be said, and is substantially said of St. Peter in reference to baptism and Christianity. A man who is a Christian outwardly only, is not a Christian; and the baptism which saves, is not the washing of the body with water, but the conversion of the soul. (1 Peter iii. 21.) The idea that a man's state before God depends on anything external, on birth, on membership in any visible organization, or on any outward rite or ceremony, is utterly abhorrent to the religion of the Bible. It did not belong to Judaism except in the corrupt form of Pharisaism. It is true, that under the old dispensation a man could not be saved unless he belonged to the commonwealth of Israel, and was one of the children of Abraham. But according to St. Paul (Rom. ix. 8; Gal. iii. 7 and 29), this only meant that they must believe in Abraham's God and the promise of redemption through his seed. If a man of heathen birth and culture came to the knowledge of the truth, believed the doctrines which God had revealed to his chosen people, relied on the promise of salvation through Christ, and purposed to obey the law of God, then he was a Jew inwardly and one of Abraham's seed. His circumcision was only "a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had, yet being uncircumcised." (Rom. iv. 11.) The doctrine that such a man, notwithstanding this thorough change in his inward state in knowledge, conviction, and character, is under the wrath and curse of God, until a little piece of flesh is cut from his body, never was a part of the religion of God. It is part and parcel of the religion of his great adversary. Any one, therefore, who teaches that no man can be saved without the rite of baptism, and that by

receiving that rite he is made a child of God and heir of heaven, is antichrist, and "even now are there many antichrists." (1 John ii. 18.)

3. This ritualistic system, which makes the sacraments the only channels of grace, and consequently absolutely necessary to salvation, naturally leads to the divorce of religion and morality. A man, according to this system, may be in the true Church a child of God, and assured of heaven, and yet utterly frivolous, worldly, and even immoral in his inward and outward life. This is illustrated on a large scale in every Roman Catholic country. In such countries some of the greatest devotees are openly wicked men. And wherever this system prevails we find its most zealous advocates among people of the world, who live at ease in full security of salvation, because they are in the Church and faithful in observing "days, and months, and times, and years;" and are punctiliously "subject to ordinances, touch not, taste not, handle not." [540] The great question at issue in the controversy with ritualism is, Whether a man's salvation depends on his inward state, or upon outward rites; or, as some would give it, Whether his state is determined by outward rites, or whether the rites depend for their value and efficacy on his inward state. In either form the question is, Are we saved by faith or by sacraments? The Apostle teaches us that "in Christ Jesus neither circumcision availeth anything nor uncircumcision, but a new creature." (Gal. vi. 15.)

4. The above remarks are not intended to apply, and it fact are not applicable to the Lutheran system. Lutherans do, indeed, teach the necessity of the sacraments, but as they also teach that true, living, saving faith is the indispensable condition of their efficacy; and, as they further teach that in the case of adults such faith produced by the Word precedes baptism, they do not make baptism the ordinary and indispensable channel for the communication of the saving influences of the Holy Spirit. They hold that all who, through the reading or hearing of the Word, are led to embrace the Lord Jesus Christ as their God and Saviour, are thereby made children of God and heirs of eternal life. They believe with the Apostle (Gal. iii. 26), that we "are all the children of God by faith in Christ Jesus." It is this doctrine of salvation by faith, or as Luther has it, "by faith alone," that has saved the Lutheran system from the virus of ritualism.

[529] Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 193-195.

[530] Symbolik, p. 374.

[531] Par. I. ix. 3; Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, p. 12.

[532] Apologia, iv. 51; Ibid. p. 156.

[533] Compendium Theologi Positiv, III. x. 10; edit. Frankfort and Leipzig, 1739, p. 648.

[534] Loci Theologici, XXI. vii. § 124; edit. Tbingen, 1769, vol. ix. p. 169.

[535] Sess. vii., De Sacramentis in genere, canon 7; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 39.

[536] Ibid., De Baptismo, canon 5; Ibid. p. 41.

[537] Par. II. cap. ii. qust. 25 (31, xxx.); Ibid. p. 274.

[538] Sess. xiv. cap. 2; Ibid. p. 55.

[539] Sess. xiv. cap. 5, 6; Ibid.

[540] A gentleman of discrimination and candour, not long since said to a friend, "You

are very pious, but you have no religion. I am religious, but I have no piety."

§ 6. Validity of the Sacraments.

That is valid which avails for the end intended. The question, therefore, as to the validity of the sacraments is a question as to what is necessary to their being that which they purport to be. The answer to this question is that they must conform to the prescriptions given in the Bible concerning them. The elements employed must be those which Christ ordained. The form, or the manner in which those elements are given and received, must be in accordance with his directions; and the ordinance must be administered with the intention of doing what He has commanded. Thus if baptism be a washing with water, then it is necessary that water should be the element employed in its administration. If it be a washing with water in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, then those words, or that form, must be used; and the ordinance must be administered and received in the faith of the Trinity. The general faith of the Church has been in favour of the validity of heretical baptism; but heresy was made to include other departures from the standard of faith, than the denial of the essential doctrines of the Gospel. Baptism is a Christian ordinance. It involves on the part of both the administrator and the recipient the profession of the Christian religion. It is perfectly evident that the same service, as to matter and form, performed by a heathen to a. heathen, who attached an entirely different meaning to what was done, could not be regarded as a Christian ordinance.

The other condition necessary to the validity of the sacraments concerns the intention of those engaged in the service. They must intend to do what Christ commanded. If a man receives the ordinance of baptism he must intend to profess his faith in the Gospel and to accept the terms of salvation therein presented. And the administrator must have the purpose to initiate the recipient into the number of the professed disciples of Christ. A sacrament, therefore, administered by an idiot, or a maniac, or in sport, or in mockery, is utterly null and void. It has no meaning and is entirely worthless.

The only question on which there is much diversity of opinion on this subject, is, Whether the validity of the sacraments depends on the official standing of the person by whom they are administered? We have seen that Romanists make canonical ordination or consecration absolutely essential. If any man but a bishop (in their sense of the word) should confirm or ordain, nothing is done. The service in either case is an empty one, conveying neither grace nor authority. If any other than a priest should absolve a penitent, no absolution takes place; and so of the Lord's Supper, the words of consecration pronounced by any lips but those of a canonically ordained priest, produce no change in the elements. The reason of this is, not merely that the officiator acts in such cases disorderly and improperly, but that he has neither the prerogative nor the power to render the sacraments effectual. They are invalid, because they do not avail to accomplish the end for which they were appointed. Romanists are guilty of a benevolent inconsistency in making baptism an exception to this rule. There is the same logical or theoretical reason that baptism should be invalid when administered by an unordained person, as that confirmation, ordination, or absolution, when thus administered, should be null and void. But as baptism is held to be essential to salvation, souls must often perish, when a priest is inaccessible, unless lay baptism be allowed. In cases of such emergency the Church of

Rome, therefore, pronounces baptism to be valid (i.e., efficacious) when administered by a layman, a woman, or even by a pagan, provided the administrator really intends to baptize, i.e., to do what the Church contemplates in the administration of that ordinance.

The standards of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches place preaching the Word and the administration of the sacraments on the same ground. They teach (1.) That Christ has appointed certain officers in his Church. (2.) That by his Spirit he calls and qualifies certain men for the discharge of the duties of those offices. (3.) That those who aspire to them are to be examined as to their call and qualifications. (4.) That if found competent they are to be set apart or ordained in an orderly manner to the office to which they deem themselves called. (5.) That the special functions of one class of these officers, are preaching and the administration of the sacraments. (6.) It follows from all this that for any one not thus called and ordained to undertake the exercise of either of these functions of the ministry, in a settled state of the Church, is wrong; it is a violation of the divinely constituted order of Christ's Church. According to this view, lay preaching and lay administration of the ordinances (in ordinary circumstances) are equally wrong. But are they invalid? That is a very different question. We know that Romanists, when they pronounce a sacrament invalid, mean that it is powerless. We know that when the old English law pronounced any marriage invalid if not solemnized by a man in holy orders, the meaning was, that the ceremony was null and void; that the parties were not married. But what can be meant by lay preaching being invalid? Is the Gospel invalid? Does it lose its truth, authority, or power? This cannot be. Neither its authority nor its power depend upon the clay lips by which it is proclaimed. Again, if a number of pious Christians assemble, where no minister can be had, to celebrate the Lord's Supper, in what sense is such a service invalid? Do they not commemorate the death of Christ? Are not the bread and wine to them the symbols of his body and blood? If faith be in exercise, may they not receive those symbols to their spiritual nourishment and growth in grace? Again, if baptism be a washing with water in the name of the Holy Trinity, to signify and seal our engrafting into Christ, does it cease to be, or to signify this if not administered by an ordained minister? Does not the man thus baptized make a profession of his faith in Christ? and does he not thereby become a member of that great body which confesses Him before men? Can it, therefore, be any more invalid than the Gospel, when preached by a laymen?

What the Bible, therefore, seems to teach on this subject is, that Christ having appointed certain officers in his Church to preach his Word and to administer his ordinances, for any man, under ordinary circumstances not duly appointed, to assume the functions of the ministry, is irregular and wrong, because contrary to the order of Christ's Church. Further than this the Reformed and Lutheran standards do not appear to have gone.

§ 7. Baptism.

"Baptism is a sacrament, wherein the washing with water, in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, doth signify and seal our engrafting into Christ and partaking of the benefits of the covenant of grace, and our engagement to be the Lord's." [541]

The Mode of Baptism.

According to the definition given above, baptism is a washing with water. By washing is meant any such application of water to the body as effects its purification. This may be done by immersion, affusion, or sprinkling. The command, therefore, to baptize is simply a command to wash with water. It is not specifically a command to immerse, to affuse, or to sprinkle. The mode of applying water as the purifying medium is unessential. The only necessary thing is to make such an application of water to the person, as shall render the act significant of the purification of the soul.

The first argument in favour of this view of the ordinance is an a priori one. As by common consent the design of the institution is either to symbolize or to effect the cleansing of the soul from the guilt and pollution of sin, by the blood and spirit of Christ, it would seem to follow that washing with water, however done, is all that is necessary to the integrity of the ordinance. The idea of purification is as clearly and as frequently signified by affusion as by immersion. Besides, to make anything so purely circumstantial as the manner in which water is used in the act of cleansing, essential to a Christian sacrament, which, according to some, is absolutely necessary to salvation, and, according to others, is essential to membership in the visible Church of Christ, is opposed to the whole nature of the Gospel. It is to render Christianity more Judaic than Judaism, even as understood by the Pharisees; for they purified themselves, their offerings, and holy places and utensils, by immersion, affusion, or sprinkling as was most appropriate or convenient.

Use of the Word in the Classics.

The second argument on this subject, is drawn from the usage of the word. In the Classics; in the Septuagint and the Apocryphal writings of the Old Testament; in the New Testament and in the writings of the Greek fathers, the words bapto, baptizo and their cognates, are used with such latitude of meaning, as to prove the assertion that the command to baptize is a command to immerse, to be utterly unauthorized and unreasonable.

Ever since the Reformation and the rise of the Baptists as a distinct denomination, who hold that "baptizing is dipping, and dipping is baptizing," the meaning of the Greek words in question has been a matter of dispute, on which hundreds of volumes have been written. It is evidently impossible to enter on that discussion in these pages. All that can be attempted is a brief statement of the conclusions believed to be established, while the proofs on which those conclusions rest must be sought in works devoted to the subject. As to the classic use of the words in question, it is clear that bapto means (1.) To dip. (2.) To dye by dipping. (3.) To dye without regard to the mode in which it is done; as a lake is said to be baptized (i.e., dyed) by the blood shed in it; a garment is spoken of as baptized by colouring matter dropping on it. (4.) It also means to gild; also to glaze, as when earthenware is covered with any vitreous matter. (5.) To wet, moisten, or wash. (6.) To temper, as hot iron is tempered; this may be done by plunging or pouring. "Tempered, hupo elaiou," does not mean plunged into oil. (7.) To imbue. The mind is said to be baptized with fantasies; not plunged into them, for it is hupo ton phantasion. [542]

A man is said to be "imbued with righteousness." This cannot mean "dipped." It is obvious, therefore, that a command to baptize, made in the use of the word bapto, cannot be limited to a command to dip, plunge, or immerse.

As to the classic use of baptizo, it means, (1.) To immerse, or submerge. It is very frequently used when ships are spoken of as sunk or buried in the sea. They are then said to

be baptized. (2.) To overflow or to cover with water. The sea-shore is said to be baptized by the rising tide. (3.) To wet thoroughly, to moisten. (4.) To pour upon or drench. (5.) In any way to be overwhelmed or overpowered. Hence men are said to be baptized with wine (hoi bebaptismenoi are the intoxicated), with opium, with debts, with puzzling questions. Wine is said to be baptized by having water poured into it. [543]

The word baptizo, as Dr. Dale so strenuously argues, belongs to that class of words which indicate an effect to be produced without expressing the kind of action by which that effect is to be brought about. In this respect it is analogous to the word "to bury." A man may be buried by being covered up in the ground; by being placed in an empty cave; by being put into a sarcophagus; or even, as among our Indians, by being placed upon a platform elevated above the ground. The command to bury, may be executed in any of these ways. So with regard to the word baptizo, there is a given effect to be produced, without any specific injunction as to the manner; whether by immersion, pouring, or sprinkling.

Use of the Words in the Septuagint and Apocrypha.

These words are of rare occurrence in the Greek version of the Old Testament. In the fifth chapter of Second Kings we have the history of Naaman the Syrian, who came to the prophet to be healed of his leprosy. And "Elisha sent a messenger unto him, saying, Go and wash in Jordan seven times" (ver. 10). "Then went he down and dipped himself (ebaptisato) seven times in Jordan" (ver. 14). The only special interest in this passage is the proof it affords that baptism and washing are identical. The command to wash was obeyed by baptizing himself. The Vulgate does not change the words in the two passages, "Vade et lavare septies in Jordane" (ver. 10). "Descendit et lavit in Jordane septies" (ver. 14). The Septuagint has lousai in verse 10, and ebaptisato in verse 14.

In Daniel iv. 33, it is said that the body of Nebuchadnezzar "was wet (baptized, ebaphe, [LXX. ver. 30]) with the dew of heaven." Here the idea of dipping is absolutely precluded.

The word bapto, when meaning to dip, does not necessarily include the idea of entire immersion. A mere touch or partial immersion is often all the word is intended to express; as in Leviticus iv. 17: "The priest shall dip (bapsei) his finger in some of the blood." Leviticus xiv. 6: "As for the living bird, he shall take it, and the cedar wood, and the hyssop, and shall dip (bapsei) them and the living bird in the blood of the bird that was killed over the running water." All these things could not be immersed in the blood of a bird. Boaz said to Ruth, at meal-time "dip (bapseis) thy morsel in the vinegar." (Ruth ii. 14.) Joshua iii. 15. "The feet of the priests that bare the ark were dipped (ebaphesan) in the brim of the water." 1 Samuel xiv. 27: Jonathan "dipped" (ebapsen) the end of the rod which was in his hand "in an honey-comb." Psalm lxviii. 23 (24), "That thy foot may be dipped (baphe) in the blood of thine enemies." These examples prove that even bapto, as used in the Septuagint, does not, when it means to dip, include the idea of complete immersion.

baptizo (according to Trommius), besides the passage already quoted from 2 Kings v. 14, occurs in the Septuagint only in Isaiah xxi. 4, where the Greek is he anomia me baptizei, "iniquity baptizes (or overwhelms) me." The English version, adhering to the Hebrew, reads, "Fearfulness affrighted me." The Vulgate has "Tenebr[illegible] stupefecerunt me." The word occurs twice in the Apocrypha, Judith xii. 7, and Sirach xxxiv. 27 [xxxi. 25]. Wahl, [544] referring to these two passages, defines "baptomai, me lavo = niptomai, "I wash myself." In

Sirach the expression is, baprizomenos apo nekrou, "baptized from a dead body," i.e., purified from the uncleanness contracted by touching a dead body. Or, as Fritzsche translates it, "Der sich w&#65533;scht von einem Todten, einer Leiche, sich reinigt von der Befleckung, die ihm die Ber&#65533;hrung des Leichen aus zugezogen, vrgl. 4 Moses xix. 11." [545] That is, "He that washes from a corpse purifies himself from the defilement occasioned by touching it." We learn from the passage referred to for illustration (Numbers xix. 11-13), that this purification was effected by sprinkling the ashes of a heifer. (See ver. 9, and compare Heb. ix. 13.) In Numbers xix. 13, it is said, "Whosoever toucheth the dead body of any one that is dead, and purifieth not himself, defileth the tabernacle of the Lord; and that soul shall be cut off from Israel, because the water of separation was not sprinkled upon him, he shall be unclean; his uncleanness is yet upon him." The water of separation was the water in which the ashes of a red heifer had been mingled as described in the preceding part of the chapter. And it was the sprinkling of that water which effected the baptism, or purification, of the defiled person.

The passage in Judith determines nothing either way as to the meaning of the word. It merely says, ebaptizeto en te parembole epi tes peges tou hudatos," she baptized herself in the camp at a fountain of water." If it be a settled point that baptizo always means to immerse, then this passage asserts that Judith immersed herself in the fountain. But if, as the vast majority of Christians believe, the word often means to wash, or purify, without regard to the way in which the purification is effected, then the passage cannot be proved to assert anything more than that Judith washed herself at the fountain. The circumstances of the case are all in favour of the latter interpretation. According to the narrative, the land had been invaded by an immense host of Assyrians under the command of Holofernes. Resistance seemed hopeless, and utter destruction was imminent. In this emergency Judith, a young, beautiful, and rich woman, inflamed with zeal for her country and her religion, determined to make a desperate effort for the salvation of her people. For this purpose, arrayed to the best advantage, she made her way into the enemies camp and presented herself to Holofernes and promised to aid him in the conquest of the land. The Assyrian general, captivated by her charms, treated her with great favour. She remained undisturbed in her tent for three days, but was permitted at night to resort to the fountain for purification. On the fourth day she was invited to a great feast, at which Holofernes drank to excess, so that when the guests had retired and the general was in a state of helpless intoxication, Judith, with the assistance of her maid, cut off his head and carried it to the camp of her own people. This led to the overthrow of the Assyrians and the deliverance of the land.

The circumstances in this case which favour the assumption that Judith went to the fountain not for immersion, but for ablution, are, (1.) It was within the camp, necessarily, for such a host, of large dimensions. But a camp filled with soldiers does not seem to be an appropriate bathing-place for a lady of distinction even at night. (2.) Dr. Conant says: "There was evidently no lack of water for the immersion of the body, after the Jewish manner, namely by walking into the water to the proper depth, and then sinking down till the whole body was immersed." [546] The probability, however, seems all the other way. It must have been an extraordinary fountain, if it allowed of immersion in any such way. If the word baptizo can only mean "to immerse," these considerations amount to nothing. But if the word means to wash or to purify as well as to immerse, then they are of sufficient weight to turn the scale in favour of the former explanation. Of itself, however, the passage

proves nothing.

The New Testament Usage.

The word baptein is used four times in the New Testament, in no one of which does it express the idea of entire immersion. In Luke xvi. 24, "That he may dip (bapse) the tip of his finger in water." The finger, when dipped in water, is not submerged. When placed horizontally on the water and slightly depressed, it retains more of the moisture than if plunged perpendicularly into it. John xiii. 26, speaks twice of dipping the sop (bapsas and embapsas). But a morsel held in the fingers, is only partly immersed. In Revelation xix. 13, the words peribeblemenos himatioi bebammenon haimati obviously mean clothed with a vesture stained or dyed with blood.' The allusion is probably to Isaiah lxiii. 1 ff. "Who is this that cometh from Edom, with dyed garments from Bozrah? . . . . Wherefore art thou red in thine apparel, and thy garments like him that treadeth in the wine-fat? I have trodden the wine-press alone; . . . . and their blood shall be sprinkled upon my garments, and I will stain all my raiment." In this case, therefore, the baptism was by sprinkling. Battizo occurs in the New Testament about eighty times; baptisma some twenty times; and baptismos four times. As every one admits that baptism may be effected by immersion, and as the purifications under the Old Testament (called by the Apostle, Hebrews ix. 10, in Greek, "diverse baptisms") were effected by immersion, affusion, and sprinkling, it would not be surprising if in some of these numerous passages, the baptism spoken of necessarily implied immersion. It so happens, or, it has been so ordered, however, that there is no such passage in the whole of the New Testament. The places in which these words occur may be arranged in the following classes: (1.) Those in which, taken by themselves, the presumption is in favour of immersion. (2.) Those in which the idea of immersion is necessarily excluded. (3.) Those which in themselves are not decisive, but where the presumption is altogether in favour of affusion.

To the first class belong those passages which speak of the persons baptized going into (eis) the water, and "coming up out of the water." (Matt. iii. 16; Acts viii. 38, 39.) Such passages, however, must be isolated in order to create a presumption in favour of immersion. According to ancient accounts, the common way of baptizing was for the person to step into water, when water was poured on his head, and then he came up out of the water, not in the least incommoded by dripping garments. And when we remember that it is said concerning John, that "Then went out to him Jerusalem, and all Judea, and all the region around about Jordan, and were baptized of him in Jordan, confessing their sins" (Matt. iii. 5, 6), it seems physically impossible that he should have immersed all this multitude. When all the circumstances are taken into view, the presumption in favour of immersion, even in this class of passages, disappears.

2. The second class of passages, those from which the idea of immersion is excluded, includes all those which relate to the baptism of the Spirit. The Spirit is frequently said to be poured out on men; but men are never said to be dipped or immersed into the Holy Spirit. Such an idea is altogether incongruous. When, therefore, it is said that men are baptized by the Holy Spirit, as is so often done, the reference must be to effusion, or affusion of the Spirit by which the soul is cleansed from sin. As the Holy Spirit is a person, and not a mere influence or force, the preposition en used in this connection (Matt. iii. 11; Mark i. 8; John i. 33; Acts i. 5, xi. 16; 1 Cor. xii. 13) must have its instrumental force. The

work performed in us by the Holy Spirit is a baptism. As water in the hands of John was the purifying medium for the body, so the Holy Spirit, as sent or given by Jesus Christ, purifies the soul. Some of the modern commentators are such purists that they are unwilling to allow of the slightest departure from classic usage in the Greek of the New Testament. They speak as though the sacred writers were Greek grammarians, instead of, as was in most cases the fact, unlettered men writing in what to them was a foreign language. Thus because the particle hina in classic Greek has always a telic force, they deny that it is ever used ecbatically in the New Testament, even in such cases as Luke xxii. 30, "I appoint unto you a kingdom, ... in order that ye may eat and drink at my table." John vi. 7, "Two hundred pennyworth of bread is not sufficient for them, in order that every one of them may have a little." Romans xi. 11, "Have they stumbled with the design that they should fall?" 1 Corinthians xiv. 13, "Let him that speaketh in an unknown tongue pray in order that he may interpret," etc., etc. Thus, also, because the words pisteuo, pistis, and pistos in the classics are rarely found in construction with the preposition en they give the most unnatural interpretation to many passages in order to avoid admitting that construction in the New Testament. This is done in the face of such passagee as Mark i. 15, pisteuete en to euangeli'o. Galatians iii. 26, "Ye are all the children of God, dia tes pisteos en Christo Iesou." Ephesians i. 15, "After I heard of your, pistin en to Kurio Iesiou," and many others of like kind. In like manner because the instrumental force of en is rare in the classics, it is avoided as much as possible in the Scriptures. Baptism en pneumati, instead of being understood as meaning a baptism by, or with the Spirit, is made to mean "in the sphere of the Spirit," and baptism en puri, baptism "in the sphere of fire." What this means, it would be difficult for most of those for whom the Bible is intended to understand. The baptism of John and that of Christ are contrasted. The one baptized with water; the other with the Holy Spirit. In Acts i. 5, it is said, "John truly baptized with water (hudati, the simple instrumental dative); but ye shall be baptized (en Pneumati hagio) with the Holy Ghost not many days hence." As to baptize hudati, cannot mean to immerse in water, so neither can baptising en to Pneumati mean immersing in the Spirit. The fact is baptizein does not express any particular mode of action. As to dye, expresses any kind of action by which an object is coloured; to bury, any kind of action by which an object is hidden and protected; so to baptize, expresses any act by which a person or thing is brought into the state of being wet, purified, or even stupefied, as by opium or wine.

Another passage in which this word occurs where the idea of immersion is precluded, is 1 Corinthians x. 1, 2, "All our fathers were under the cloud, and all passed through the sea; and were all baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea." The people went through the sea dry shod. As far as known not a drop of water touched them. The cloud referred to was doubtless the pillar of cloud by day and the pillar of fire by night which guided the people through the wilderness. The simple and generally accepted meaning of the passage is, that as a man is brought by Christian baptism into the number of the professed and avowed disciples of Christ, so the Hebrews were brought by the supernatural manifestations of divine power specified, into the relation of disciples and followers to Moses. There is no allusion to immersion, affusion, or sprinkling in the case.

Another passage belonging to this class is Mark vii. 4, "When they come from the market, except they wash (baptisontai), they eat not. And many other things there be, which they have received to hold, as the washing of cups, and pots, brazen vessels, and of tables

(klinon, couches)." To maintain that beds or couches were immersed, is a mere act of desperation. Baptism means here, as it does everywhere when used of a religious rite symbolical purification by water, without the slightest reference to the mode in which that purification was effected.

3. The third class of passages includes all those in which the idea of immersion, though not absolutely precluded, is to the last degree improbable. The late Dr. Edward Robinson, than whom there is no higher authority on all that relates to the topography and physical geography of Palestine and the habits of its inhabitants, so far as they are determined by the nature of the country, says: (1.) "The idea of private baths in families in Jerusalem and Palestine generally is excluded." (2.) "In Acts ii. 41, three thousand persons are said to have been baptized at Jerusalem apparently in one day at the season of Pentecost in June; and in Acts iv. 4, the same rite is necessarily implied in respect to five thousand more. Against the idea of full immersion in these cases there lies a difficulty, apparently insuperable, in the scarcity of water. There is in summer no running stream in the vicinity of Jerusalem, except the mere rill of Siloam a few rods in length; and the city is and was supplied with water from its cisterns and public reservoirs. [547] From neither of these sources could a supply have been well obtained for the immersion of eight thousand persons. The same scarcity of water forbade the use of private baths as a general custom; and thus also further precludes the idea of bathing" in such passages as Luke xi. 38; Mark vii. 28. He confirms his conclusion by further remarking, (3.) "In the earliest Latin versions of the New Testament, as, for example, the Itala, which Augustine regarded as the best of all, [548] which goes back apparently to the second century and to usage connected with the apostolic age, the Greek verb, baptizo, is uniformly given in the Latin form, "baptizo," and is never translated by "immergo," or any like word, showing that there was something in the rite of baptism to which the latter did not correspond. [549] (4.) The baptismal fonts still found [550] among the ruins of the most ancient Greek churches in Palestine, as at Tekoa and Gophna, and going back apparently to very early times, are not large enough to admit of the baptism of adult persons by immersion, and were obviously never intended for that use." [551]

It is, therefore, to the last degree improbable that the thousands mentioned in the early chapters of Acts were baptized by immersion. The same improbability exists as to the case of the centurion in C[illegible]sarea and the jailer at Philippi. With regard to the former, Peter said, "Can any man forbid water?" which naturally implies that water was to be brought to Cornelius, and not he be taken to the water. As to the jailer, it is said (Acts xvi. 33) that he and all his were baptized within the prison, as the narrative clearly implies, at midnight. There is the same improbability against the assumption that the eunuch, mentioned in Acts viii. 27-38, was baptized by immersion. He was travelling through a desert part of the country towards Gaza, when Philip joined him, "And as they went on their way they came unto a certain water (epi ti hudor, to some water)." There is no known stream in that region of sufficient depth to allow of the immersion of a man. It is possible, indeed, that there might have been a reservoir or tank in that neighbourhood. But that is not a fact to be assumed without evidence and against probability. It is said they "went down both into the water," and came "up out of the water." But that might be said, if the water were not deep enough to cover their ankles.

The presumption is still stronger against immersion in the case mentioned in Mark vii. 4. It is there said of "the Pharisees and all the Jews," that "when they come from the market, except they baptize themselves (ean me baptisontai) they eat not." Let it be here considered, (1.) That private baths were in Jerusalem very rare, from the necessity of the case. (2.) That what is said, is not said merely of men of wealth and rank who might be supposed to have conveniences and luxuries which the common people could not command. It is said of the "Pharisees," a large class, and not only of that class, but of "all the Jews" It is wellnigh incredible, under such circumstances, that "all the Jews" should immerse themselves every time they came from the agora, i.e., "a place of public resort in towns and cities; any open place, where the people came together either for business or to sit and converse. In oriental cities such open places were at the inside of the gates; and here public business was transacted, and tribunals held, as also markets." [552] That all the Jews immersed themselves every time they came from such a place of public resort, is very hard to believe, considering that the facilities for such immersion were not at their command. (3.) The words baptize and wash are interchanged in this whole connection in such a way as to show that, in the mind of the writer, they were synonymous expressions. The Pharisees complained that the disciples ate with unwashen (aniptois) hands; for they eat not unless they wash (nipsontai) their hands; and when they come from the market they do not eat unless they wash (baptisontai), and they hold to the washing (baptismous) of cups, and pots, of brazen vessels, and of tables or couches. To baptize the hands was to wash the hands, and the usual mode of ablution in the east is by pouring water on the hands (see 2 Kings iii. 11).

It is notorious that the various ablutions prescribed by the Mosaic law were effected sometimes by immersion, sometimes by affusion, and sometimes by sprinkling. And it is no less true that all these modes of purification are called by the sacred writers diaphoroi baptismoi, as in Hebrews ix. 10, and Mark vii. 4.

So far, therefore, as the New Testament is concerned, there is not a single case where baptism necessarily implies immersion, there are many cases in which that meaning is entirely inadmissible, and many more in which it is in the highest degree improbable. If immersion were indispensable, why was not the word katadu,w used to express the command? If sprinkling were exclusively intended, why was not rhaino or rhantizo used? It is simply because the mode is nothing and the idea everything, that a word was chosen which includes all the modes in which water can be applied as the means of purification. Such a word is baptizo, for which there is no legitimate substitute, and therefore that word has been retained by all the Churches of Christendom, even by the Baptists themselves.

The Patristic Usage.

This is a wide and densely wooded field, in which a man may find anything he chooses to look for, unless it be for proof that the fathers always used the word baptizo in the sense of immersion. They speak of the waters of chaos as baptized by the Spirit of God brooding over them; they were thereby sanctified and a sanctifying power was imparted to the waters. The only point of interest here is, that Tertullian, for example, regarded this as "baptismi figura," a figure of baptism. The point of resemblance assuredly was not immersion.

But besides this, Suicer gives and copiously illustrates, from the writing of the fathers,

no less than eight "significations of the word baptism (vocis baptisma significationes)." (1.) The deluge was a baptism, not only for the world, purging away its sins, but also for Noah and his family, as a means of salvation. As they were saved by the waters buoying up the ark, so are we saved by baptism. (2.) The baptism of Moses when he passed through the Red Sea. The sea was the symbol of the water of baptism; the cloud, of the Holy Spirit. (3.) That of the Hebrews, as among them any person or thing impure, eloueto hudati, was washed with water. This washing, however done, was baptism. (4.) The baptism of John, which was regarded as introductory, not spiritual, or conferring the Spirit, but simply leading to repentance. (5.) The baptism of Jesus. Baptizei Iesous, all' en tneumati. Here immersion is precluded. (6.) Of tears, dia dakruon. "I know a fifth," says Gregory Nazianzen, [553] "by tears, but very laborious, when a man washes (ho louon) his pillow and his bed every night with his tears." (7.) Of blood. The martyrs were baptized with blood. Christ's cross and death were called his baptism, because thereby purification was made for the sins of men. (8.) The baptism of fire. This is sometimes understood of the Holy Spirit, who purifies as fire does; at others of the final conflagration when the earth is to be purified by fire. With the fathers, therefore, the act of purification, and not simply or only the act of immersion, was baptism. [554]

It is not denied that baptizein means to immerse, or that it is frequently so used by the fathers as by the classic authors; it is not denied that the Christian rite was often administered, after the apostolic age, by immersion; it is not even denied that during certain periods of the history of the Church, and in certain regions, immersion was the common method in which baptism was administered. But it is denied that immersion is essential to baptism; that it was the common method in the apostolic Churches; that it was at any time or in any part of the Church the exclusive method; and more especially is it denied that immersion is now and everywhere obligatory or necessary to the integrity of Christian baptism. [555]

The Catholicity of the Gospel.

The third general argument on this subject is derived from the fact that the Gospel is designed for all classes of persons and for all parts of the earth. It is not intended exclusively for the strong and robust, but also for the weak, the sick, and the dying. It is not to be confined to the warm or temperate regions of the earth, but it is to be preached and its ordinances are to be administered wherever fallen men can be found. Baptism by immersion would be to many of the sick certainly fatal; to the dying impossible. To the inhabitants of Greenland, if possible, it would be torture and to those dwelling in the deserts of Arabia or Africa, it could be administered only at long intervals or at the end of a long pilgrimage. Yet baptism is an imperative duty. The command of Christ is, "Go ye, therefore, and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." It is not to be believed that our blessed Lord would have enjoined an external rite as the mode of professing his religion, the observance of which, under many circumstances, would be exceedingly difficult, and sometimes impossible.

Argument from the Design of the Ordinance.

This argument was adverted to in the beginning of this section. It requires, however, a more particular consideration. (1.) It is admitted that baptism is a sign, and that the blessing which it signifies is purification from sin. (2.) It is admitted that the theocratical

purifications, having the same general import, were effected by immersion, affusion, and sprinkling. (3.) It is admitted that the soul is cleansed from the guilt of sin by the blood of Christ. (4.) It is admitted that under the Old Testament the application of the blood of the sacrifices for sin was expressed by the act of sprinkling. It was sprinkled on the people (Ex. xxiv. 8) for whose benefit the sacrifices were offered; it was sprinkled upon the altar; and, by the High Priest, upon the mercy seat. In the New Testament the application of the blood of Christ is expressed by the same word. "Elect . . . . unto . . . . sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ." (1 Pet. i. 2.) "The blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel." (Heb. xii. 24.) (5.) It is admitted, further, that the purification of the soul from the moral pollution of sin is effected by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. (6.) It is admitted that the communication of the sanctifying influences of the Spirit is expressed in the use of two familiar figures, that of anointing with oil, and that of the pouring of water. Kings, priests, and prophets were anointed. The people of God are called his "anointed." The Apostle John says to believers: "Ye have an unction from the Holy One, and ye know all things. . . . . The anointing which ye have received of him abideth in you." (1 John ii. 20 and 27.) The other figure is no less familiar. (Is. xxxii. 15; Joel ii. 28.) The Spirit's influences are compared to rain which waters the earth, and to the dew which falls on the mown grass. From all this it appears that the truth symbolized in baptism may be signified by immersion, affusion, or sprinkling; but that the ordinance is most significant and most conformed to Scripture, when administered by affusion or sprinkling.

[541] Westminster Shorter Catechism, Ques. 94.

[542] There are two recent American writers whose works contain all that most students would be disposed to read on this subject. The one is the Rev. Dr. Conant, in his book, Meaning and Use of the Word Baptizein, New York, 1868; and the other the Rev. James W. Dale, in his Classic Baptism; Judaic Baptism; and Johannic Baptism; to be followed by Christian Baptism.

[543] Illustrations of some of these uses of the word may be found in Stephen's Thesaurus and Scapula's Lexicon, and of all the works of Dr. Conant and Dr. Dale, who discuss the bearing of each on the matter in debate from their respective stand-points.

[544] Clavis Librorum V. T. Apocryphorum Philologica, Auctore Christ. Abrah. Wahl, Philos. et Theol. Doctore, Leipzig, 1853.

[545] Kurzgefasstes exegetisches Handbuch zu den Apokryphen des Alten Testamentes, von Otto Fridolin Fritzsche, Leipzig, 1859, vol. v. p. 195.

[546] Meaning and Use of Baptizein. New York, 1868, p. 85.

[547] See Biblical Researches in Palestine, vol. i. pp. 479-516.

[548] De Doctrina Christiana, ii. 22 [xv.]; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. iii. p. 54, d.

[549] See Blanchini, Evangeliorum Quadruplex, etc., Rom. 1749.

[550] See Robinson's Biblical Researches in Palestine, edit. Boston, 1841, vol. ii. p. 182; vol. iii. p. 78.

[551] See Robinson's Lexicon of the New Testament, word baptizo, New York, 1850.

[552] Robinson, sub voce.

[553] Oratio, xxxix.; Opera, Cologne, 1680, vol. i. p. 634.

[554] Joh. Caspari Suiceri, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus e Patribus Gr□cis ordine alphabetico exhibens Qu□cunque Phrases, Ritus, Dogmata, H□reses, et hujusmodi alia spectant. Opus viginiti annorum indefesso labore adornatum, 2d edit., Amsterdam, 1728.

[555] See Hermann Cremer, Biblisch-Theologisches W□rterbuch der Neutestamentlichen Gr□sit□t, Gotha, 1866. After referring to the Old Testament ablutions the authors says, on p. 87: "We must, therefore, by baptizein understand a washing, the design of which, as of the theocratical washings and purifications, was the purification of the soul from sin (Ents□ndigung)." On p. 89 it is said, "We find the secondary meaning of baptizein in Matthew iii. 11: Bapt. en pneumati hagio kai puri, opp. en hudati eis metanoian. comp. Luke iii. 16, John i. 33. That is not the meaning of immersion, but of washing with the design of purification,' that is transferred, is plain from the antithesis between en hud. and en pn. whereby the two baptisms are distinguished."

§ 8. The Formula of Baptism.

This is authoritatively prescribed in Matthew xxviii. 19. Christ gave a command perpetually binding on his Church to baptize men "in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost." In this passage the preposition eis (eis to onoma) means unto, or, in reference to. Paul asks the Corinthians, "were ye baptized eis to onoma Paulou;" (1 Cor. i. 13. Did your baptism make you the disciples of Paul?) He tells them (1 Cor. x. 2) that the fathers, "were baptized unto Moses" eis to Mosen, they were made and professed to be the disciples of Moses. So in Romans vi. 3, it is said we "were baptized eis Christon Iesoun unto Jesus Christ." Galatians iii. 27, "Baptized into (eis) Christ." According to this formula, he who receives baptism as a Christian rite, thereby professes to stand in that relation to the Father, Son, and Spirit which those who receive the religion of Christ sustain. That is, he professes to receive God the Father, as his father; God the Son, as his Saviour, and God the Holy Ghost as his teacher and sanctifier; and this involves the engagement to receive the Word, of which the Spirit is the author, as the rule of his faith and practice. [556]

There are several cases in which baptism is said to have been administered en to onomati in, or on, the name of Christ, instead of eis to onoma into, or, in reference to. And in Acts ii. 38, the preposition epi is used, epi to onomati. It is doubtful whether anything materially different was intended to be expressed by this change of the prepositions and cases. To baptize, epi, or en onomati, means to baptize "upon the name," sc., of Christ, that is, upon the authority of Christ. The rite is administered in obedience to his command, in the form in which he prescribed, said with the intent for which he ordained it.

In the Acts it is repeatedly said that the Apostles baptized their converts in "the name of Christ." It is not to be inferred from this fact that they departed from the form prescribed in Matthew xxviii. 19, and administered the ordinance in the use of the words, I baptize thee in the name of Christ;' or, I baptize thee eis Christon unto Christ.' Such inference is unnecessary; as baptism administered in the way prescribed in Matthew xxviii. 19, is a baptism both in the name, or, by the authority of Christ, and unto or in reference to Him. As this inference is unnecessary so it is improbable. It is in the highest degree improbable that the Apostles would have departed from the form so solemnly prescribed by their Divine Master; and it is moreover improbable that any such departure took place from the fact that

the form prescribed in Matthew has been used in all ages and parts of the Church.

[556] Fritzsche on Romans vi. 3, says: Loquutio, baprizo tina eis tina (eis ti) per se non minus late patet, quam vernacula Jemandem auf Jemanden (aut etwas) taufen. Non enim nisi hanc generalem notionem complectitur: aliquem aqu&#65533; ita immergere, ut ejus cogitationes in aliquem (aliquod) dirigas, Jemanden unter Beziehung, Hindeutung auf jemanden (etwas) taufen. At multis de causis ei qui lavatur res memorabilis monstrari potest, v. c., ut in aliquo fidem collocet, ut aliquem ducem sequatur, ut aliquid pie revereatur, ut aliquid effectum reddat, ut aliquid sibi evenisse sciat et sic porro. . . . . Sic dubitare non potest quin baptizo tina eis Christon (Gal. iii. 27), aqu&#65533; aliquem sic immergere, ut animum ad Christum applicare eum jubeas, valeat ita aliquem aqua lustrare ut Christo fidem habendam esse ei significes (Act. xix. 4), et baptizo tina eis to onoma tou Patros, ktl. . . . . notet lustro aliquem reverentia, qu&#65533; Patris -- nomini debeatur, eum obstringens." Edit Halle, 1836, vol. i. pp. 359, 360.

§ 9. The Subjects of Baptism.

"Baptism is not to be administered to any that are out of the risible Church, till they profess their faith in Christ and obedience to Him: but the infants of such as are members of the visible Church are to be baptized." [557]

The question, Who are the proper subjects of baptism? is determined by the design of the ordinance and the practice of the Apostles. It has been shown that, according to our standards, the sacraments (and of course baptism) were instituted, to signify, seal, and apply to believers the benefits of the redemption of Christ. The reception of baptism, so far as adults are concerned, is an intelligent, voluntary act, which from its nature involves, (1.) A profession of faith in Christ, and (2) A promise of allegiance to Him.

This is clear, --

1. From the command of Christ to make disciples of all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost. A disciple, however, is both a recipient of doctrines taught, and a follower. Every one, therefore, who is made a disciple by baptism, enrolls himself among the number of those who receive Christ as their teacher and Lord, and who profess obedience and devotion to his service.

2. This is further clear from the uniform practice of the Apostles. In every case on record of their administering the rite, it was on the condition of a profession of faith on the part of the recipient. The answer of Philip to the eunuch who asked, What doth hinder me to be baptized? "If thou believest with all thine heart thou mayest," discloses the principle on which the Apostles uniformly acted in this matter.

3. This has in all ages been the practice of the Church. No man was admitted to baptism without an intelligent profession of faith in Christ, and a solemn engagement of obedience to Him. The practice of Romanist missionaries in baptizing the heathen in crowds, can hardly be considered as invalidating this statement.

Although this has been the principle universally admitted, there has been no little diversity as to its application, according to the different views of the nature of the faith, and of the character of the obedience required by the Gospel. In some points, however, there has ever been a general agreement.

Qualifications for Adult Baptism.

1. Faith supposes knowledge of at least the fundamental doctrines of the Gospel. Some may unduly enlarge, and some unduly restrict the number of such doctrines; but no Church advocates the baptism of the absolutely ignorant. If baptism involves a profession of faith, it must involve a profession of faith in certain doctrines; and those doctrines must be known, in order to be professed. In the early Church, therefore, there was a class of catechumens or candidates for baptism who were under a regular course of instruction. This course continued, according to circumstances, from a few months, to three years. These catechumens were not only young men, but often persons in mature life, and of all degrees of mental culture. Where Christian churches were established in the midst of large heathen cities, the Gospel could not fail to excite general attention. The interest of persons of all classes would be more or less awakened. Many would be so impressed with the excellence of the new religion, as to desire to learn its doctrines and join themselves to the company of believers. These candidates for baptism, being in many cases men of the highest culture, it was necessary that their teachers should be men thoroughly instructed and disciplined. We accordingly find such men as Pant&#65533;nus, Clemens, and Origen successively at the head of the catechetical school of Alexandria. [558] These schools, although primarily designed for converts from among the Jews and heathen, on account of their high character, soon began to be frequented by other classes, and especially by those who were in training for the ministry. When Christianity became the prevalent religion, and the ranks of the Church were filled up, not by converts of mature age, but by those born within its pale and baptized in their infancy, the necessity for such schools no longer existed. Their place, however, was supplied by the systematic instruction of the young in preparation for their confirmation or their first communion.

2. All churches are agreed in demanding of adults who are candidates for baptism, a profession of their faith in Christ and the Gospel of his salvation.

3. They agree in requiring of those who are baptized the renunciation of the world, the flesh, and the devil. This involves a turning from sin, and a turning to God.

Although these principles are, as just remarked, generally admitted, there is, in practice, great diversity in their application. Where the Church was pure and its ministers faithful, these requisitions were strenuously enforced; but where the reverse was the case, the most formal, and often evidently insincere, assent to the creed of the Church was taken for a profession of faith; and a renunciation of the world compatible with devotion to its pleasures and its sins, was accepted in the place of genuine repentance. It is well, however, to have a clear idea of what the Church has a right to demand of adults when they apply for baptism. It is evident from the teachings of Scripture, and from the avowed principles of all Christian churches, that we are bound to require of all such candidates, (1.) A competent knowledge of the Gospel. (2.) A credible profession of faith. (3.) A conversation void of offence.

The question, although thus simple in its general statement, in nevertheless one of great difficulty. As it is almost universally the fact that, so far as adults are concerned, the qualifications for baptism are the same as those for admission to the Lord's table, the question, What are the qualifications for adult baptism? resolves itself into the question, What are the qualifications for church-membership? The answer to that question, it is

evident, must be determined by the views taken of the nature and the prerogatives of the Church. We accordingly find that there are three general views of the qualifications for adult baptism, founded on the three generic views of the nature of the Church.

Romish Theory of the Church.

First, the theory derived from the ancient theocracy and from the analogy between the Church and a civil commonwealth. The theocracy, or the Church, under the old dispensation, was essentially an externally organized body. All the natural descendants of Abraham, through Isaac, were, in virtue of their birth, members of the "Commonwealth of Israel." As such, independently of their own moral character or that of their parents, they were entitled to all the privileges of the economy under which they lived. They were freely admitted to the services of the Temple, to the Passover, and to all the sacred festivals, and typical institutions of the Mosaic dispensation, even to those which were truly of a sacramental character. The Hebrews were, of course, subject to the laws of the theocracy under which they lived; for minor offences they forfeited this or that privilege, or were subjected to some specified penalty; and for graver offences they were excommunicated or cut off from among the people. All this finds a parallel in the kingdoms of this world. All native born Englishmen are subjects of the crown, and are entitled to all the privileges of Englishmen; they may be good or bad citizens, but their citizenship does not depend upon their character, they may be punished for their offences, but they cannot be deprived of their rights as citizens unless they are outlawed.

This theory has, by Romanists and Romanizers, been transferred bodily to the Church. The Church, according to them, is essentially an externally organized society. All born within its pale are "ipso facto" its members, and entitled to all its privileges. They are entitled to all its sacraments and ordinances, not in virtue of their character, but in virtue of their birthright. Thus Mr. Palmer, [559] of the Oxford Anglican School, says that the Scriptures make no mention of regeneration, sanctity, or real piety visible or invisible, as prerequisites for admission to the sacrament of baptism. [560] No doubt a pious Hebrew priest would exhort those who came to offer sacrifices or to celebrate the Passover, that they should attend on those services in a devout spirit and in the exercise of faith, assuring them that the mere external service was of no account. The Romanist, with his "ex opere operato" theory of the sacraments, could hardly go as far as that, but he would doubtless exhort the candidate for baptism, and all who come to the sacraments of the Church, to perform those duties in a proper spirit. But this has nothing to do with the right of approach. We may exhort citizens to exercise their civil rights conscientiously, and with a due regard to the interests of the country, but the rights themselves are not to be disputed.

The same result is reached, although on a different theory, in all those countries in which Church and State are so united that the head of the State is the head of the Church; and that membership in the Church is a condition of citizenship in the State. This was the case for centuries in England, and is so to a great extent to the present day. The reigning sovereign is still the head of the Church, the supreme authority in administering its government. The laws of the Church are acts of Parliament; every Englishman, unless he voluntarily makes himself an exception, has a right to all the services of the Church, including the right to be buried as a Christian "in the sure hope of a blessed resurrection." Until of late years no man could hold any important office, especially in the army or navy,

who was not in communion with the established Church. So also in Prussia, the head of the State governs the Church. No man, unless a Romanist or a Hebrew, can marry, become an apprentice, or enter on the practice of a profession without producing a certificate of baptism and confirmation.

Puritan Theory of the Church.

The second general theory of the nature of the Church is that, which for convenience sake, may be called the Puritan. The word Puritan has in history a much wider sense than that assigned to it in modern usage. In English history the designation Puritan was applied to all those, who under the reigns of Elizabeth and Charles I. were desirous of a further reformation of the Church. Many prelates, and thousands of Episcopalians and Presbyterians, were included in that class. Modern usage has confined the term to the Independents or Congregationalists, the followers of Brown and Robinson. They were, therefore, often called Brownists. According to them the visible Church consists of the regenerate; and it is the duty and the prerogative of the Church to sit in judgment on the question whether the applicant for admission to the sacraments is truly born of God. Hence in New England, there was a broad distinction made between the Church and the parish. The former consisted of the body of communicants; the latter of those who, though not communicants, frequented the same place of worship and contributed to the support of the minister and to other congregational expenses. "To join the Church," thus came to mean joining the number of those who were admitted to the Lord's Supper. This of course implies, that communicants only are in the Church. This view has gained ascendancy in this country even, to a great extent, among Presbyterians.

The Common Protestant Theory.

According to our standards the visible Church consists of all those who profess the true religion together with their children. The common Protestant theory of the Church agrees with that of the Puritans in the following points. (1.) That the true or invisible Church as a whole consists of the elect. This is the Church which Christ loved, for which He gave Himself, that He might sanctify it, and present it to Himself a glorious Church without spot or wrinkle. (Eph. v. 25-27.) (2.) That the true or invisible Church on earth consists of all true believers. (3.) That the profession of faith made by those who are baptized, or come to the table of the Lord, is a profession of true faith. That is, those baptized profess to be Christians. The point of difference between the theories concerns the duty and prerogative of the Church in the matter. According to the one view the Church is bound to be satisfied in its judgment that the applicant is truly regenerate; according to the other, no such judgment is expressed or implied in receiving any one into the fellowship of the Church. As Christ has not given his people the power to search the heart, He has not imposed upon them the duty which implies the possession of any such power. Both parties require a credible profession of faith on the part of the applicant for membership. But the one means by credible, that which constrains belief; the other, that which may be believed, i.e., that against which no tangible evidence can be adduced. If such applicant be a heretic, or if his manner of life contradicts his profession, he ought not to be received; and if already in the Church, he ought, as the Apostle says, to be rejected. The common Protestant doctrine is that nothing authorizes us to refuse a man admission to the Church, which would not justify his exclusion if already a member of it. If guilty of any "offence" or "scandal," he

ought to be excluded; and if chargeable with any such "offence" or "scandal," he ought not to be admitted to membership, no matter what his profession or detail of experience may be. The late Dr. John M. Mason clearly and forcibly expresses the common doctrine on this subject, when he says: "A credible profession of Christianity, is all that she [the Church] may require in order to communion. She may be deceived; her utmost caution may be, and often has been, ineffectual to keep bad men from her sanctuary. And this, too, without her fault, as she is not omniscient. But she has no right to suspect sincerity, to refuse privilege, or inflict censure, where she can put her finger upon nothing repugnant to the love or the laws of God." [561] And on the following page he says: "A profession of faith in Christ, and of obedience to Him, not discredited by other traits of character, entitles an adult to the privileges of his Church."

This is not the place for the discussion of the question concerning the nature of the Church. These theories are simply mentioned here because of their bearing on the subject of adult baptism. According to all these theories believing adults are, by the command of Christ, entitled to Christian baptism. Much more difficulty attends the question concerning

[557] Westminster Shorter Catechism, quest. 95.

[558] H. E. F. Guerike, De Schola qu Alexandri floruit catechetica, Halle, 1824.

[559] Palmer, On the Church, New York, 1841, vol. i. p. 377.

[560] This is not inconsistent with what was said above of all churches requiring as the conditions of adult baptism, competent knowledge, a profession of faith, and the renunciation of the world. What was there said concerned the reception of members into the Church ab extra. What is here said concerns those who are members of the Church by birth.

[561] Essays on the Church of God, by John M. Mason, D. D., New York, 1843, Essay III, p. 57.

§ 10. Infant Baptism.

The difficulty on this subject is that baptism from its very nature involves a profession of faith; it is the way in which by the ordinance of Christ, He is to be confessed before men; but infants are incapable of making such confession; therefore they axe not the proper subjects of baptism. Or, to state the matter in another form: the sacraments belong to the members of the Church; but the Church is the company of believers; infants cannot exercise faith, therefore they are not members of the Church, and consequently ought not to be baptized.

In order to justify the baptism of infants, we must attain and authenticate such an idea of the Church as that it shall include the children of believing parents. The word Church is used in Scripture and in common life, in many different senses, (1.) It means the whole body of the elect, as in Ephesians v. 25, and when the Church is said to be the body, or the bride of Christ, to be filled by his Spirit, etc. (2.) It means any number of believers collectively considered; or the whole number of believers residing in any one place, or district, or throughout the world. In this sense we use the word when we pray God to bless his Church universal, or his Church in any particular place. (3.) It is used as a collective term for the body of professed believers in any one place; as when we speak of the Church of Jerusalem, of Ephesus, or of Corinth. (4.) It is used of any number of professed believers

bound together by a common standard of doctrine and discipline; as the Church of England, the Church of Scotland, the Lutheran Church, and the Reformed Church. And (5.) It is used for all the professors of the true religion throughout the world, considered as united in the adoption of the same general creed and in common subjection to Christ.

It is evident that no one definition of the Church can include all the senses in which the word is legitimately used; and, therefore, that we may affirm of the Church in one sense of the word, what must be denied of it in a different sense; and the same person may be said to be, or not to be a member of the Church according to the meaning attached to the word. In the present discussion, by the Church is meant what is called the visible Church; that is, the whole body of those who profess the true religion, or, any number of such professors united for the purpose of the public worship of Christ, and for the exercise of mutual watch and care. With regard to infant baptism the following propositions may be maintained.

First Proposition. The Visible Church is a Divine Institution.

Concerning the Church in this sense, it is clearly taught in Scripture, that it is the will of God that such a Church should exist on earth. This no Christian denies. God has imposed duties upon his people which render it necessary for them thus to associate in a visible organized body. They are to unite in him worship; in teaching and propagating his truth; in testifying for God in all ages and in all parts of the world. He has prescribed the conditions of membership in this body, and taught who are to be excluded from its communion. He has appointed officers, specified their qualifications, their prerogatives, and the mode of their appointment. He has enacted laws for its government. Its rise, progress, and consummation are traced in history and prophecy, from the beginning to the end of the Bible. This is the kingdom of God of which our Lord discourses in so many of his parables, and which it is predicted is ultimately to include all the nations of the earth.

Second Proposition. The Visible Church does not consist exclusively of the Regenerate.

It is no less clearly revealed that it is not the purpose of God that the visible Church on earth should consist exclusively of true believers. This is plain, (1.) Because the attainment of such a result in any society or government administered by men is an impossibility. It would require that the officers of the Church or the Church itself should have the power to read the heart, and be infallible in judgments of character. (2.) The conditions which, under both dispensations, He has prescribed for admission into this visible society of his professed worshippers, are such as men not truly regenerated may possess. Those qualifications, as we have seen, are competent knowledge, and a credible profession of faith and obedience. (3.) Our Lord expressly forbids the attempt being made. He compares his external kingdom, or visible Church, to a field in which tares and wheat grow together. He charged his disciples not to undertake to separate them, because they could not, in all cases, distinguish the one from the other. Both were to be allowed to grow together until the harvest. (4.) Christ, to whom all hearts are known, admitted Judas to the number of his most favoured disciples, and even made him an Apostle. (5.) All attempts to make a Church consisting exclusively of the regenerate, have failed. So far as known, no such Church has ever existed on the face of the earth. This of itself is proof that its existence did not enter into the purpose of God.

Third Proposition. The Commonwealth of Israel was the Church.

(1.) It is so called in Scripture. (Acts vii. 38.) (2.) The Hebrews were called out from all the nations of the earth to be the peculiar people of God. They constituted his kingdom. (3.) To them were committed the oracles of God. They were Israelites to them pertained the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service, and the promises. (Rom. ix. 4.) Nothing more can be said of the Church under the new dispensation. They were selected for a Church purpose, namely, to be witnesses for God in the world in behalf of the true religion; to celebrate his worship; and to observe his ordinances. Their religious officers, prophets, and priests, were appointed by God and were his ministers. No man could become a member of the Commonwealth of Israel, who did not profess the true religion; promise obedience to the law of God as revealed in his Word; and submit to the rite of circumcision as the seal of the covenant. There is no authorized definition of the Church, which does not include the people of God under the Mosaic law.

Fourth Proposition. The Church under the New Dispensation is identical with that under the Old.

It is not a new Church, but one and the same. It is the same olive-tree. (Rom. xi. 16, 17) It is founded on the same covenant, the covenant made with Abraham. It has, indeed, often been said that it is to belittle the truth to put the idea of a covenant between God and man in the place of a general law or economy. It is, however, to be remembered that God is a person, capable of speaking with other persons, of promising and threatening. These promises are not merely announcements of the results of cosmical laws, physical or moral. That Christ should be born of the seed of Abraham, of the tribe of Judah, and of the house of David, is not to be attributed to the working of any general law. Nothing pertaining to his advent, his person, his work, or to the application of his redemption, is to be accounted for in any such way. Our Lord gives us an infinitely higher idea of God's relation to the world when He tells us that He feeds the young ravens when they cry; and that the hairs of our heads are all numbered; than when He is regarded as merely the author or source of the physical and moral order of the universe. A covenant is a promise suspended upon a condition. It is beyond controversy that God did make such a promise to Adam, to Abraham, and to the Hebrew nation through Moses; and these transactions are in Scripture constantly called covenants. It does not, therefore, seem very reverent to speak of God as belittling his truth by the form in which He presents it.

God, then, did enter into covenant with Abraham. In that covenant He promised that Abraham, although nearly a hundred years old, should have a son. He promised that his descendants, through Isaac, should be as numerous as the stars in heaven; that He would give them the land of Canaan for a possession; that He would be their national God, and that the Hebrews as a nation should be His peculiar people; and above all He promised the patriarch that in his seed all the nations of the earth should be blessed. By seed was not meant his descendants collectively, but one person, that is, Christ. (Gal. iii. 16.) The blessing promised, therefore, was the blessing of redemption through Christ, his promise to Abraham was a repetition of the promise made to our first parents after the fall, this promise was the Gospel. The Gospel or euangelion has a definite meaning in the Scriptures. It means the announcement of the plan of salvation through Christ, and the offer of that salvation to every one that believes. This Gospel, Paul says, was preached before

unto Abraham. The pious Hebrews are, therefore, described as (tous proelpikotas en to Christo) those who hoped in Christ before his advent. (Eph. i. 12.) This promise of redemption made to Abraham was that "unto which," Paul says, "our twelve tribes, instantly servmng God day and night, hope to come." (Acts xxvi. 7.) The condition of all these Abrahamic promises was faith. This the Apostle abundantly teaches, especially in the fourth chapter of Romans and the third chapter of Galatians. Abraham believed in the promise of the birth of Isaac. (Rom. iv. 19, 20.) Those of his descendants who believed in the promises of national blessings made to the Hebrews, received those blessings, those who believed in the promise of redemption through Christ were made partakers of that redemption.

Such being the nature of the covenant made with Abraham, it is plain that so far as its main element is concerned, it is still in force. It is the covenant of grace under which we now live, and upon which the Church is now founded. This cannot be doubted by any who admit the account just given of the Abrahamic covenant. This is clear because the promise is the same. Paul says (Gal. iii. 14) that the blessing promised to Abraham has come upon us. In his speech before Agrippa, he said: "I stand, and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers. . . . . For which hope's sake, king Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews." (Acts xxvi. 6, 7.) As the promise is the same, so also the condition is the same. The Apostle argues that men now must be justified by faith, because Abraham was thus justified. Christians, therefore, are said to be the sons or heirs of Abraham, because faith in the promise of redemption secures their redemption just as faith in the same promise secured his. And he tells the Galatians, "If ye be Christ's, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." (Gal. iii. 29.) This doctrine, that the Church now rests on the Abrahamic covenant, in other words, that the plan of salvation revealed in the Gospel was revealed to Abraham and to the other Old Testament saints, and that they were saved just as men since the advent of Christ are saved, by faith in the promised seed, is not a matter incidentally revealed. It is wrought into the very substance of the Gospel. It is involved in all the teachings of our Lord, who said that He came not to destroy, but to fulfil; and who commanded inquirers to search the Old Testament Scriptures if they would learn what He taught. The Apostles did the same thing. The Bereans were commended, because they searched the Scriptures daily to see whether the doctrines taught by the Apostles accorded with that infallible standard. (Acts xvii. 11.) The messengers of Christ constantly quoted the Old Testament in support of their teachings. Paul says that the Gospel which he preached had been taught already in the law and the prophets. (Rom. iii. 21.) He tells the Gentiles that they were grafted in the old olive-tree and made partakers of its root and fatness.

The conclusion is that God has ever had but one Church in the world. The Jehovah of the Old Testament is our Lord; the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, is our covenant God and Father; our Saviour was the Saviour of the saints who lived before his advent in the flesh. The divine person who delivered the Israelites out of Egypt; who led them through the wilderness; who appeared in his glory to Isaiah in the temple; towards whose coming the eyes of the people of God were turned in faith and hope from the beginning, is He whom we recognize as God manifest in the flesh, our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ. He, therefore, who was the head of the theocracy is the head of the Church. The blood which He shed for us, was shed from the foundation of the world, as much "for the redemption of the

transgressions which were under the first testament" (Heb. ix. 15), as for us and for our salvation. The promise unto which the twelve tribes, instantly serving God day and night, hoped to come (Acts xxvi. 7), is the promise on which we rely. The faith which saved Abraham was, both as to its nature and as to its object, that which is the condition of salvation under the Gospel. "The city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God" (Heb. xi. 10), is "Jerusalem the golden," the heaven to which we aspire.

Fifth Proposition. The terms of admission into the Church before the Advent were the same that are required for admission into the Christian Church.

Those terms were a credible profession of faith in the true religion, a promise of obedience, and submission to the appointed rite of initiation. Every sincere Israelite really received Jehovah as his God, relied upon all his promises, and especially upon the promise of redemption through the seed of Abraham. He not only bound himself to obey the law of God as then revealed, but sincerely endeavoured to keep all his commandments. Those who were Israelites only in name or form, or, as the Apostle expresses it, were "Jews outwardly," made the same professions and engagements, but did so only with the lips and not with the heart. If any from among the heathen assayed to enter the congregation of the Lord, they were received upon the terms above specified, and to a place equal to, and in some cases better than, that of sons and of daughters. If any Israelite renounced the religion of his fathers, he was cut off from among the people. All this is true in reference to the Church that now is. The Christian Church requires of those whom it receives to membership in visible communion, nothing more than a credible profession of faith, the promise of obedience to Christ, and submission to baptism as the rite of initiation. There has, therefore, been no change of the terms of admission to the Church, effected by the introduction of the Gospel.

Sixth Proposition. Infants were Members of the Church under the Old Testament Economy.

This is conclusively proved by the fact that infants, by the command of God, were circumcised on the eighth day after their birth. It is indeed said that circumcision was the sign of the national covenant between God and the Hebrews; and, therefore, that its administration to children was only a recognition of their citizenship in the commonwealth of Israel.

To this it may be answered, first, that under the old economy the Church and State were identical. No man could be a member of the one without being a member of the other. Exclusion from the one was exclusion from the other. In the pure theocracy the high priest was the head of the State as well as the head of the Church. The priests and Levites were civil as well as religious officers. The sacrifices, and the festivals, even the Passover, ever regarded as a sacrament, were national as well as religious services. If, therefore, circumcision was a sign and seal of membership in the Hebrew nation, it was a sign and seal of membership in the Hebrew Church. All this arose from the nature of God's covenant with Abraham. In that covenant, as we have seen, were included both national and religious promises. God selected the descendants of that patriarch through Isaac to be a people peculiar to himself, He constituted them a nation to be secluded and hedged around from other nations, He gave them the land of Canaan for a habitation, and He enacted for them a code of laws, embracing their civil, national, social, personal, and religious duties. All

these enactments were mingled together. The people were not regarded as bearing distinct relations to the magistrate and to God. All their obligations were to Him. They were a holy people; a Church in the form of a nation. The great promise, as we have seen, was the promise of the redemption of the world by the Messiah. To this everything else was subordinate. The main design of the constitution of the Hebrews as a distinct nation, and of their separation from all other people, was to keep alive the knowledge of that promise. Almost the whole significancy and value of the priesthood, sacrifices, and temple service, were to prefigure the person, offices, and work of the Messiah. To the Hebrews as a people were committed the "oracles of God;" this was their grand distinction. Those oracles had reference to the great work of redemption. To suppose a man to be a Jew, and not at least a professed believer in those promises and predictions, is a contradiction. A man, therefore, was a member of the Jewish commonwealth, only in virtue of his being a member of the Jewish Church; at least, he could not be the former without being the latter. Consequently, every child who was circumcised in evidence that he was one of the chosen people, was thereby sealed as a member of the Church of God as it then existed.

Secondly, that circumcision was not the sign exclusively of the national covenant with the Hebrews, is plain because it was enjoined upon Abraham and continued in practice hundreds of years before the giving of the law on Mount Sinai, when the people were inaugurated as a nation. It was instituted as the sign of the covenant (that is the Scriptural and proper word) made with Abraham. The essential features of that covenant we learn from such passages as Genesis xii. 3, "In thee shall all families of the earth be blessed." xvii. 7, "I will establish my covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee, in their generations, for an everlasting covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee." These passages are explained in the New Testament. They are shown to refer, not to temporal or national blessings, but to the blessings of redemption. Thus in Romans xv. 8, it is said, "Jesus Christ was a minister of the circumcision for the truth of God, to confirm the promises made unto the fathers." Christ has redeemed us from the curse of the law, that the blessing of Abraham might come on us. (Gal. iii. 14.) This covenant, the Apostle goes on to argue, "that was confirmed before of God in Christ, the law, which was four hundred and thirty years after, cannot disannul, that it should make the promise of none effect." In short, the whole New Testament is designed to show that the covenant made with Abraham, and the promises therein contained, were executed and fulfilled in Jesus Christ. Of that covenant circumcision was the sign and seal.

Thirdly, this is directly asserted by the Apostle in Romans iv. 9-12, where he proves that circumcision cannot be the ground of justification, because Abraham was justified before he was circumcised, and "received the sign of circumcision, a seal of the righteousness of the faith which he had being yet uncircumcised." This is saying that circumcision is the seal of the covenant which promises salvation on the condition of faith. That is, it is the seal of the covenant of grace, or of the plan of salvation which has been the only ground of hope for man since his apostasy. If, therefore, children were circumcised by the command of God, it was because they were included in the covenant made with their fathers.

Fourthly, that circumcision was not merely a civil or national institution, is further plain from its spiritual import. It signifies the cleansing from sin, just as baptism now does.

Thus we read even in the Old Testament of the circumcision of the heart. (Deut. x. 16; Jer. iv. 4; Ezek. xliv. 7.) Therefore uncircumcised lips are impure lips, and an uncircumcised heart is an unclean heart. (Ex. vi. 12; Lev. xxvi. 41. See, also, Acts vii. 51.) Paul says the true circumcision is not that which is outward in the flesh; but that which is inward, of the heart, by the Spirit. (Rom. ii. 28, 29) Therefore the Apostle speaking of himself and of other believers says, "We are the circumcision, which worship God in the Spirit, and rejoice in Christ Jesus, and have no confidence in the flesh." (Phil. iii. 3.) Such being the spiritual import of circumcision, its reference to the national covenant was a very subordinate matter. Its main design was to signify and seal the promise of deliverance from sin through the redemption to be effected by the promised seed of Abraham.

Children, therefore, were included in the covenant of grace as revealed under the old dispensation, and consequently were members of the Church as it was then constituted. In the sight of God parents and children are one. The former are the authorized representatives of the latter; they act for them; they contract obligations in their name. In all cases, therefore, where parents enter into covenant with God, they bring their children with them. The covenant made with Adam included all his posterity; the promise made to Abraham was to him and to his seed after him; and when the Mosaic covenant was solemnly inaugurated, it was said, "Ye stand this day all of you before the Lord your God; your captains of your tribes, your elders, and your officers, with all the men of Israel, your little ones, your wives, and thy stranger that is in thy camp, from the hewer of thy wood unto the drawer of thy water: that thou shouldst enter into covenant with the Lord thy God, and into his oath, which the Lord thy God maketh with thee this day." (Deut. xxix. 10-12.) It is vain to say that children cannot make contracts or take an oath. Their parents can act for them; and not only bring them under obligation, but secure for them the benefits of the covenants into which they thus vicariously enter. If a man joined the commonwealth of Israel he secured for his children the benefits of the theocracy, unless they willingly renounced them. And so when a believer adopts the covenant of grace, he brings his children within that covenant, in the sense that God promises to give them, in his own good time, all the benefits of redemption, provided they do not willingly renounce their baptismal engagements.

This is really the turning point in the controversy concerning infant church-membership. If the Church is one under both dispensations; if infants were members of the Church under the theocracy, then they are members of the Church now, unless the contrary can be proved. The next proposition, therefore, on this subject, to be established is, the

Seventh Proposition, that there is nothing in the New Testament which justifies the Exclusion of the Children of Believers from Membership in the Church.

The "onus probandi" rests on those who take the negative on this subject. If children are to be deprived of a birthright which they have enjoyed ever since there was a Church on earth, there must be some positive command for their exclusion, or some clearly revealed change in the conditions of membership, which renders such exclusion necessary. It need hardly be said that Christ did not give any command no longer to consider the children of believers as members of the Church, neither has there been any change in the conditions of church-membership which necessarily works their exclusion. Those conditions are now what they were from the beginning. It was inevitable, therefore, when Christ commanded his Apostles to disciple all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, of the Son, and

of the Holy Spirit, that they should act on the principle to which they had always been accustomed. When under the Old Testament, a parent joined the congregation of the Lord, he brought his minor children with him. When, therefore, the Apostles baptized a head of a family, it was a matter of course, that they should baptize his infant children. We accordingly find several cases of such household baptism recorded in the Acts of the Apostles. In Acts xvi. 15, it is said Lydia "was baptized, and her household," and of the jailer at Philippi (ver. 33), that "he and all his" were baptized; and in 1 Corinthians i. 16, Paul says that he baptized the household of Stephanas. The Apostles, therefore, acted on the principle which had always been acted on under the old economy. It is to be remembered that the history of the Apostolic period is very brief, and also that Christ sent the Apostles, not to baptize, but to preach the Gospel, and, therefore, it is not surprising that so few instances of household baptism are recorded in the New Testament. The same remark applies substantially to the age immediately succeeding that of the Apostles. The Church increased with great rapidity, but its accessions were from without; adult converts from among the Jews and Gentiles, who in becoming Christians, brought, as a matter of course, their children with them into the fold of Christ. Little, therefore, during this period is heard of the baptism of infants. As soon, however, as children born within the Church constituted the chief source of supply, then we hear more of baptisms for the dead; the ranks of the Church, as they were thinned by the decease of believers, being filled by those who were baptized to take their places. In the time of Tertullian and Origen infant baptism is spoken of, not only as the prevailing usage of the Church, but as having been practised from the beginning. When Pelagius was sorely pressed by Augustine with the argument in support of the doctrine of original sin derived from the baptism of infants, he did not venture to evade the argument by denying either the prevalence of such baptisms or the divine warrant for them. He could only say that they were baptized, not on account of what they then needed, but of what they might need hereafter. The fact of infant baptism and its divine sanction were admitted. These facts are here referred to only as a collateral proof that the practice of the New Testament Church did not in this matter differ from that of the Church as constituted before the advent of Christ.

The conduct of our Lord in relation to children, in its bearing on this subject must not be overlooked. So far from excluding them from the Church in whose bosom they had always been cherished, He called them the lambs of his flock, took them into his arms, and blessed them, and said, of such is the kingdom of heaven. If members of his kingdom in heaven, why should they be excluded from his kingdom on earth? Whenever a father or mother seeks admission to the Christian Church, their heart prompts them to say: Here Lord am I and the children whom thou hast given me. And his gracious answer has always been: Suffer little children to come unto me and forbid them not.

Eighth Proposition. Children need, and are capable of receiving the Benefits of Redemption.

On this point all Christians are agreed. All churches -- the Greek, the Latin, the Lutheran, and the Reformed -- unite in the belief that infants need "the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ" and the renewing of the Holy Ghost in order to their salvation. The Reformed, at least, do not believe that those blessings are tied to the ordinance of baptism, so that the reception of baptism is necessary to a participation of the spiritual benefits

which it symbolizes; but all agree that infants are saved by Christ, that they are the purchase of his blood, and that they need expiation and regeneration. They are united, also, in believing that all who seek the benefits of the work of Christ, are bound to be baptized in acknowledgment of its necessity and of their faith, and that those who need, but cannot seek, are, by the ordinance of God, entitled to receive the appointed sign and seal of redemption, whenever and wherever they are presented by those who have the right to represent them.

§ 11. Whose Children are entitled to Baptism.

This is a very delicate, difficult, and important question. No answer which can be given to it can be expected to give general satisfaction. The answers will be determined by the views taken of the nature of the Church and the design of the sacraments. Probably the answer which would include most of the views entertained on the subject, is, that the children of the members of the visible Church, and those for whose religious training such members are willing to become responsible, should be baptized. But this leaves many questions undecided, and allows room for great diversity of practice.

Difference between the Jewish and Christian Usage.

We have already seen under the old dispensation, (1.) That God made a nation his Church and his Church a nation. (2.) Consequently that membership in the one involved membership in the other, and exclusion from the one, exclusion from the other. (3.) That the conditions of admission to the Church were, therefore, the same as the conditions of admission into the commonwealth. (4.) That those conditions were profession of faith in the true religion, and a promise of obedience to the will of God as revealed in his word. (5.) That the State exacted this profession and enforced this obedience so far as the external conduct was concerned. All the people were required to be circumcised, to offer sacrifices, to observe the festivals, and to frequent the temple services. And, (6.) That this was God's way of preserving the knowledge of the true religion in that age of the world. And it succeeded. When Christ came, the uncorrupted Scriptures were read in the synagogues; the sacrifices as divinely appointed were offered in the temple; the high priest in his offices and work still stood before the people, as the type of Him who was to come. Under this system there could be no question as to whose children were to be circumcised.

When Christ came and broke down the wall of partition between the Jews and Gentiles, and announced his Gospel as designed and adapted for all men, all this was changed. It followed from the fact that the Church was to embrace all nations. (1.) That the Church and State could no longer be united or identified as they had been under the theocracy. The Christian Church at the first was established in an enemy's country. For three centuries it was not only independent and separate from the State, but it was in every way opposed and persecuted by the civil power. It is still the fact that the Christian Church exists in Pagan and Mohammedan countries. (2.) From the necessity of the case it is a body independent of the State. It has its own organization, its own laws, its own officers, and its own conditions of membership. It has the right to administer its own discipline agreeably to the laws of Christ its king and head. (3.) As it was intended by Christ that his Church should be thus catholic or universal, existing under all forms of human government, civilized or savage, it was clearly his intention that it should be thus independent and

distinct from the State. He declared that his kingdom was not of this world. It is not of the same kind with worldly kingdoms; it has different ends to accomplish, and different means for the attainment of those ends. It is spiritual, that is, concerned with the religious or spiritual, as distinguished from the secular interests of men. It moves, therefore, in a different sphere from the State, and the two need never come into collision. (4.) As the Church, since the advent is identical with the Church which existed before the advent, although so different in its organization, in its officers, and in its mode of worship, the conditions of church-membership are now what they were then. Those conditions still are credible profession of faith, and obedience to the divine law. But it is no longer the duty of the State to require such profession or to enforce such obedience, so that every citizen of the State should be "ipso facto" a member of the Church. The two bodies are now distinct. A man may be a member of the one, and not a member of the other. The Church has the right to exercise its own discretion, within the limits prescribed by Christ, as to the admission or exclusion of members.

Doctrine of the Church of Rome on the Baptism of Children.

It has already been remarked that the Romish theory of the Church is founded on that of the ancient theocracy. That theory, however, is necessarily modified by the catholicity of the Church. Being designed for all nations, it could not be identified with any one nation. National citizenship is no longer the condition of church-membership. Rome, however, teaches, --

1. That the Church is, in its essential character, an external, organized society, so that no man can be a member of Christ's body and a partaker of his life, who is not a member of that society.

2. The Church is an institute of salvation. Its sacraments are exclusively the channels for conveying to men the benefits of the redemption of Christ.

3. As the sacraments are the only channels of grace, no gracious affections or fruits of the Spirit can be required of those who receive them. Being designed to make men good, goodness cannot be the condition of their reception or efficacy.

4. The sacraments, and especially baptism, being thus necessary to salvation, it is the duty of all men to apply that they should be administered to them and to their children.

5. With regard to those children whose parents, through ignorance or indifference, neglect to bring them to the Church for baptism, they may be presented by any one who takes an interest in their salvation, that they may be baptized on the faith of the Church, or on that of those who are willing to act as their sponsors. It is no matter, therefore, whether the parents of such children are Christians, Jews, Mohammedans, or Pagans, as they all need, so they are all entitled to the sacrament of baptism. To exclude them from baptism, is to exclude them from heaven.

The Roman Catechism [562] declares that the people must be taught that our Lord has enjoined baptism on all men, so that they will all perish eternally unless they be renewed by the grace of baptism, whether their parents be believers or unbelievers. In the answer to the next question the Scriptural authority for the baptism of infants is given; and in answer to the following question it is taught that infants, when baptized, receive the grace signified, not because they believe by the assent of their own mind, but because of the faith of their parents if believers, and if not, then by the faith of the Church universal; and they may be

properly offered for baptism by any one who is willing to present them, by whose charity they are brought into the communion of the Holy Spirit.

6. Although not identified with the State, the Church theoretically absorbs the State, and does so in fact wherever it has the ascendancy. The Church is a body which has two arms -- a spiritual and a secular. It demands that the State require all its subjects to profess its faith, to receive its sacraments, and to submit to its discipline; and where it has not the power thus to render the State its tool, it openly asserts its right to do so. One of the encyclical letters of the present pope so openly denied the liberty of conscience, the liberty of the press, and the lawfulness of tolerating any other religion than that of the Church of Rome, that the late Emperor of the French forbade its publication in France; yet the Archbishop of New York read it in his cathedral to an immense and approving audience.

The Roman Church, therefore, believing that baptism is essential to salvation, baptizes all children presented for that ordinance without regard to their immediate parentage or remote descent.

Theories on which many Protestants contend for the propriety of the baptism of children other than those of believing parents.

There are two principles on which the baptism of children whose parents are not members of the visible Church, is defended. The first is, that the promise is to parents and their children, and their children's children even to the thousandth generation. Children, therefore, whose immediate parents may have no connection with the Church, have not forfeited their privileges as children of the covenant. If the promise be to them, its sign and seal belongs to them. The second principle is, that of spiritual adoption. Children who are orphans, or whose parents are unfit or unwilling to bring them up in a Christian manner, may be so far adopted by those willing and qualified to assume the responsibility of their religious education as to become proper subjects of baptism. This principle is sanctioned in the Scriptures. In Genesis xvii. 12, God said to Abraham, "He that is eight days old shall be circumcised among you, every man child in your generations; he that is born in the house, or bought with money of any stranger, which is not thy seed." Our Church on the same principle in 1787 enjoined with regard to apprentices that "Christian masters and mistresses, whose religious professions and conduct are such as to give them a right to the ordinance of baptism for their own children, may and ought to dedicate the children of their household to God, in that ordinance, when they have no scruple of conscience to the contrary." In 18l6, it was decided, "(1.) It is the duty of masters who are members of the Church to present the children of parents in servitude to the ordinance of baptism, provided they are in a situation to train them up in the nurture and admonition of the Lord, thus securing to them the rich advantages which the Gospel provides. (2.) It is the duty of Christ's ministers to inculcate this doctrine, and to baptize all children of this description when presented by their masters." On the baptism of heathen children the Church in 1843 decided that such children are to be baptized, "who are so committed to the missions, or other Christian tuition, as to secure effectually their entire religious education." [563]

It was on the authority of the two principles above mentioned that many of the most distinguished theologians of Holland contend that foundlings, whose parents were unknown, illegitimate children, and the children of excommunicated persons, should be admitted to baptism. The question whether heathen children, committed to the care of Christian

missionaries, should be baptized was submitted to the Synod of Dort. There was a diversity of opinion on the subject among the members, but the majority decided against it; not, as would appear, from the language employed, because of either of the above principles being denied, but because of the uncertain tenure by which such children were held. It was feared that they might return to heathenism, and thus the scandal of baptized persons practising heathen rites be afforded. [564]

A second theory advanced on this subject was that of a twofold covenant; one external, the other internal; answering to the distinction between the Church visible and invisible. God, under the old dispensation, entered into a covenant with the Hebrew nation constituting them his visible Church, which covenant was distinct from that in which eternal life was promised to those that truly believe in the Redeemer who was to come. The conditions of admission into this external, visible society, were outward profession of the true religion, and external obedience. The condition of admission into the invisible Church, was true and saving faith. The sacraments were attached to the external covenant. All who made this external profession and yielded this outward obedience to the Mosaic law, were of right entitled to circumcision, to the passover, and to all the privileges of the theocracy. So it is now according to the theory in hand. Christ designed to form an external, visible Church, furnished with a constitution, laws, and proper officers for their administration. The conditions of admission into this visible society, were the profession of speculative, or historical faith in his religion, and external conformity to its laws and the laws of his Church. To this external body all the ordinances of his religion are attached. Those, therefore, who apply for baptism or the Lord's Supper, do not profess to be the regenerated children of God. They simply profess to be believers as distinguished from infidels or scorners, and to be desirous to avail themselves of Church privileges for their own benefit and for the good of their children. From this body Christ gathers the great majority of his own people, making them members of his mystical body.

De Moor gives a long account of the controversy. Vitringa, it appears, strenuously opposed this theory of a twofold covenant in its application to the New Testament economy. Marck as strenuously defended it. [565]

This seems substantially the ground taken by the Rev. Mr. Stoddard, grandfather of President Edwards. Mr. Stoddard published, in 1707, a sermon on the Lord's Supper, in which he maintained, "That sanctification is not a necessary qualification to partaking of the Lord's Supper," and "That the Lord' s Supper is a converting ordinance." This was answered in a "Dissertation" by Dr. Increase Mather. To this Mr. Stoddard replied in "An Appeal to the Learned; being a Vindication of the right of visible saints to the Lord's Supper, though they be destitute of a saving work of God's Spirit on their hearts; against the exceptions of Mr. Increase Mather." President Edwards succeeded his grandfather as pastor of the Church in Northampton, Mass., in 1727, and for twenty years continued to act on the same principle on this subject as his grandfather. Having become convinced that that principle was unscriptural, he published, in 1749, "An humble Inquiry into the Rules of the Word of God, concerning the qualifications requisite to a complete standing and full communion in the visible Christian Church." His design was to prove that no one should be admitted to the Lord's table who is not in the judgment of the Church truly regenerate. This doctrine was very obnoxious to the people of his charge, and opposed to the sentiment and

practice of the majority of the neighbouring churches. [566] The difficulty arising from this controversy was one of the principal causes which led to the dismission of President Edwards from his pastoral charge at Northampton. The views of Edwards soon gained the ascendancy in the Evangelical churches of New England, and to a great extent also among Presbyterians.

The Rev. John Blair, a prominent minister of our Church, took substantially the ground of a twofold covenant. Mr. Blair, as well as his more distinguished brother, Rev. Samuel Blair, took an active part with Whitefield and the Tennents in the great revival which occurred about the middle of the last century, and belonged to what were called the New Lights in the controversy which issued in the schism of 1741. He does not, indeed, admit of a twofold covenant, but he teaches the same doctrine which that expression was intended to assert. The Church of Christ, he says, is very properly distinguished as visible and invisible. By the former is meant "the whole number of true believers wherever they are." "The visible Church consists of all those who by an external profession of the doctrines of the Gospel, and subjection to the laws and ordinances of Christ, appear as a society separated from the world, and dedicated to God and his service. In this view, in the present imperfect state, the Church comprehends branches that are withered, as well as those that bear fruit. Now the covenant of grace subsists between the blessed God and the Church, as such a visible Society, [567] and is rendered visible by a visible transaction and external administration in various ordinances; and comprehends sundry external privileges for the advantage and spiritual edification of the Church. Here are not two covenants, one for the invisible Church and another for the visible." Gomarus, a leader in the Synod of Dort, says two covenants should be distinguished. That with the visible Church he calls hypothetical, that with the invisible Church absolute. In the main point, however, they agree, for Mr. Blair goes on to say: "It is [to] the covenant of grace in this view, namely, as visibly subsisting between God and his Church, considered as a visible society, a public body separated and distinguished from the world, and dedicated to God, that the sacraments are annexed as visible signs and seals thereof." [568] A man, therefore, in coming to the Lord's table, or in presenting himself or his children for baptism, does not profess to be a member of the invisible, but only of the visible Church. God has commanded men not to steal, and not to neglect their religious duties; He commands them to pray; to hear his word; to attend the assemblies of his saints gathered for his worship; to be baptized; and to commemorate the Redeemer's death in the way of his appointment. All these duties are obligatory; and they are all to be performed in a right spirit. But a man, argues Mr. Blair, is not to wait until he thinks himself regenerate and is so regarded by the Church, before he attempts to obey them. The sacraments, he says, [569] "are not instituted to be visible signs of persons opinion or judgment concerning the exercises of their own hearts." He no more professes to be regenerated when he comes to be baptized than when he prays. His prayer is from its nature a profession of faith in the divine existence and perfections, in the power of God to hear and answer his requests; it is a confession of his necessities and of his dependence. And this profession and confession are sincere; so sincere that it is not only his duty, but his right to pray a right which no man may take from him. In like manner a man may be, in the same sense, sincere in his belief of the truth of the Gospel; sincere in his desire to obey the command of Christ, and secure the benefits of his salvation. "When the sons of the stranger," says Mr. Blair, "are instructed in the doctrines of the Gospel, are convinced in

their judgment and conscience, they are true and exhibit the true religion; that they are bound by the authority of God to embrace it, and yield obedience to the divine laws; It is their immediate duty to embrace it, and that publicly and avowedly by joining themselves to the Lord, and his Church, in the sacrament of baptism; and thus make a public profession of the true religion, come under solemn obligations to walk in the ways of God's commandments, and under the care and discipline of the Church." [570] Such persons "are brought under the bond of the covenant. This should be early laid before them, to let them see that by this dedication to God, they are bound to perform all duties of religion for which they have capacity, to receive instruction and appear for religion as the professors thereof. As soon as they have a competency of knowledge, and are capable of the discipline of the Church, they are bound to commemorate the death of Christ, and renew their engagements to Him at his table, unless debarred by discipline for unchristian conduct. When they shall become parents, they are bound to dedicate their children to God in baptism." [571]

Such were the views on this subject entertained by some of the most evangelical ministers of our Church during the last century and long afterwards. The same views prevailed, to some extent, also in New England.

A third theory on which the baptism of children, whose parents are not communicants, is contended for, makes a distinction between baptism and the Lord's Supper. More is required for the latter than for the former; and, therefore, adults who are entitled to baptism for themselves and for their children, may not be entitled to admission to the Lord's table. This is one of the views on this general subject referred to by Vitringa and De Moor in the works above mentioned. The advocates of this theory appeal to the fact that the Apostles, who were no more able than other men to read the heart, baptized thousands on the on a simple external profession of faith. So Paul baptized the jailer at Philippi and his family "straightway," that is, as would appear, at midnight in the prison. Philip baptized the eunuch of Ethiopia as soon as he confessed that Jesus is the Son of God, although he knew nothing, so far as appears in the narrative, of his conduct either before or after. On the other hand, it is urged that these same Apostles required all who came to the Lord's Supper to examine themselves, and see whether they were in the faith, or whether Christ dwelt in them. This seems to have been the ground taken by Mr. Blair in the earlier part of his ministry; for he says in his preface [572] to his Essays: "Many of my friends will, probably, be surprised, to find I have changed may sentiments with respect to some subjects of one of the sacraments; for they know it was formerly my opinion, that the unregenerate ought not, by any means, to adventure to the Lord's table; though they ought to dedicate their children to God in baptism."

This is also the theory which was known in New England as the "Half-Way Covenant." Many were recognized as entitled to present their children for baptism, who were not prepared for admission to the Lord's Supper. The controversy on this subject began in Hartford, Connecticut, in 1654, 1655. Several councils were called, which failed to produce unanimity. The question was referred to a Synod of divines to meet in Boston. The Synod met and sat two or three weeks. "As to the case of such baptized persons as, without being prepared to come to the Lord's Supper, were of blameless character, and would own for themselves their baptismal obligations, it decided that they ought to be allowed to present their children for baptism. This assuming of baptismal obligations was

called by opponents, taking the Half-way Covenant." [573]

The Synod decided in favour of the following propositions: --

"1. They that, according to Scripture, are members of the visible Church, are the subjects of baptism.

"2. The members of the visible Church, according to Scripture, are confederate visible believers, in particular churches, and their infant seed, i.e., children in minority, whose next parents, one or both, are in covenant.

"3. The infant seed of confederate visible believers, are members of the same Church with their parents, and when grown up are personally under the watch, discipline, and government of that church.

"4. These adult persons are not, therefore, to be admitted to full communion, merely because they are, and continue members, without such further qualifications as the Word of God requireth thereunto.

"5. Church-members who were admitted in minority, understanding the doctrine of faith, and publicly professing their assent thereto, not scandalous in life, and solemnly owning the covenant before the Church, wherein they give up themselves and their children to the Lord, and subject themselves to the government of Christ in the Church, their children are to be baptized.

"6. Such church-members, who either by death, or some other extraordinary providence, have been inevitably hindered from publicly acting as aforesaid, yet have given the Church cause, in judgment of charity, to look at them as so qualified, and such as, had they been called thereunto, would have so acted, their children are to be baptized.

"7. The members of orthodox churches, being sound in the faith and not scandalous in life, and presenting due testimony thereof; these occasionally coming from one church to another may have their children baptized in the church, whither they come, by virtue of communion of churches. But if they remove their habitation they ought orderly to covenant and subject themselves to the government of Christ in the church where they settle their abode, and so their children to be baptized. It being the church s duty to receive such into communion, so far as they are regularly fit for the same." [574]

These propositions are founded on the following principles: --

1. That as under the old economy the Temple was one, it had its outer and inner courts, and those who had access to the former were not thereby entitled to enter the latter; so under the new dispensation the visible Church is one, but it includes two classes of members; baptized professors of the true religion, and those who, giving evidence of regeneration, are admitted to the Lord's Supper.

2. That the qualifications for baptism and for full communion are not identical. Many may properly be admitted to the former, who are not prepared for the latter.

3. That baptism being a sign and seal of the covenant of grace, all who are baptized, whether adults or infants, are properly designated "foederati," members of the visible Church, believers, saints, Christians.

4. That those baptized in infancy remain members of the visible Church until they are "discovenanted," as the Congregationalists express it; or, separated from it by a regular act of discipline.

5. That being members of the Church, if free from scandal and continuing their profession, they are entitled to present their children for baptism.

The decision of this Synod did not put an end to the controversy. It was, however, in accordance with the views of the majority of the New England churches. Its chief opponents were found among "the more conservative class of laymen. Its advocates among the clergy were from the first a majority, which went on increasing from generation to generation; and the Half-way Covenant, as it was opprobriously called, came to be approved by the general practice of the Congregational churches of New England." [575] Such, also, it is believed, although on somewhat different principles, was the general practice of the Presbyterian Church in this country until within a comparatively recent period of its history.

The Puritan Doctrine on this Subject.

The Puritans, in the restricted sense of that word, held, (1.) That the Church consists of the regenerate. (2.) That a particular church consists of a number of true believers united together by mutual covenant. (3.) That no one should be admitted to church-membership who did not give credible evidence of being a true child of God. (4.) They understood by credible evidence, not such as may be believed, but such as constrains belief. (5.) All such persons, and no others, were admitted to the Lord's Supper. They, therefore, constituted the Church, and to them exclusively belonged the privileges of church-membership, and consequently to them was confined the right of presenting their children for baptism. All other professors of the true religion, however correct in their deportment, were denied that privilege.

These principles, when introduced by the Brownists in England, were opposed by the great body of Protestants in Great Britain and upon the Continent. They were brought to this country by the disciples of Robinson, and controlled the New England churches for many years. They were gradually relaxed when the theory above stated gained the ascendancy, which it retained until President Edwards published his "Essay," to which we have referred, which gradually changed the opinions and practice of the Congregational churches throughout the land, and to a great extent those of Presbyterians also.

President Edwards, however, lays down one proposition, and devotes his whole treatise to proving another. The proposition which he undertakes to establish is, that none "ought to be admitted to the communion and privileges of members of the visible Church of Christ in complete standing, but such as are in profession, and in the eye of the Church's Christian judgment, godly or gracious persons." [576] What he proposes to prove, therefore, is that those only who, in the judgment of the Church, are godly or gracious persons are to be admitted to the sacraments. All his arguments, however, ten in number, are directed to prove that those who come to the Christian sacraments profess to be Christians. These propositions are very different. Many who assent to the latter, reject the former. The one has reference to the qualifications for church-membership in the sight of God; ths other concerns the legitimate power of the Church in receiving or rejecting those who apply for access to the ordinances which Christ has appointed as means of grace for the people. Edwards had far higher notions of Church power in this matter, than those entertained by the great body of Protestants. The reason why President Edwards confounded the propositions above mentioned, was, that those against whom he wrote did

not deny the prerogative of the Church to sit in judgment on those who applied for Church privileges; that, with them, was not the matter in dispute. The question concerned the divinely appointed qualifications for membership in the Christian Church. Did Christ intend and ordain that those only whom the Church judged to be truly regenerated should be admitted; or did He design the sacraments, as Stoddard contended, for the unconverted; they is well as preaching, being appointed as means of conversion. This being, then, the only matter of debate, to it Edwards naturally confined his attention.

Edwards is very explicit in his statement of the prerogative and duty of the Church in acting as a judge of the real character of those who profess to be Christians. He says: "By Christian judgment I intend something further than a kind of mere negative charity, implying that we forbear to censure and condemn a man, because we do not know but that he may be godly, and therefore forbear to proceed on the foot of such a censure or judgment in our treatment of him: as we would kindly entertain a stranger, not knowing but in so doing we entertain an angel or precious saint of God. But I mean a positive judgment, founded on some positive appearance, or visibility, some outward manifestations that ordinarily render the thing probable. There is a difference between suspending our judgment, or forbearing to condemn, or having some hope that possibly the thing may be so, and so hoping the best; and a positive judgment in favour of a person." [577]

Edwards is careful not to make any detail of religious experience the ground upon which the Church was to rest its judgment. This was one of the charges brought against his scheme which he earnestly resists. In reply to this objection [578] he quotes the following passage from his work on "Religious Affections:" "In order to persons' making a proper profession of Christianity, such as the Scripture directs to, and such as the followers of Christ should require in order to the acceptance of the professors with full charity, as of their society, it is not necessary they should give an account of the particular steps and method, by which the Holy Spirit, sensibly to them, wrought and brought about those great essential things of Christianity in their hearts. There is no footstep in Scripture of any such way of the Apostles, or primitive ministers and Christians requiring any such relation in order to their receiving and treating others as their Christian brethren, to all intents and purposes; or of their first examining them concerning the particular method and order of their experiences. They required of them a profession of the things wrought; but no account of the manner of working was required of them. Nor is there the least shadow in the Scripture of any such custom in the Church of God, from Adam to the death of the Apostle John."

According to this theory, therefore, the Church consists of those who are "judged" to be regenerate. None but those thus declared to be true believers are to be received as members of the Church. They alone are entitled to the sacraments either for themselves or for their children, and consequently only the children of communicants are to be admitted to baptism. It may be remarked on this theory, --

1. That it is a novelty. It had never been adopted or acted upon by any church on earth, until the rise of the Independents.

2. It has no warrant from Scripture either by precept or example. Under the old economy those who professed the true religion were admitted to the theocracy; but no body of men sat in judgment on the question of their regeneration. Those thus admitted, unless

excluded judicially, had a right to the sacraments of the Church for themselves and for their children. The Apostles acted upon precisely the same principle. It is impossible that they should have examined and decided favourably as to the regeneration of each of the five thousand persons added to the Church in one day in Jerusalem. The whole Church, for more than a thousand years, followed the example of the Apostles in this matter.

3. The attempt to make the visible Church consist exclusively of true believers must not only inevitably fail of success, but it must also be productive of evil. Dr. Cotton Mather, in defending the decision of the Synod of Boston, which allowed baptism to the children of non-communicants, quotes Par[illegible]us as saying, "In church reformation, 'tis an observable truth that those that are for too much strictness, do more hurt than profit the Church." And he, himself, says, "Baptism is a seal of the whole covenant of grace; but it is by way of initiation. Hence it belongs to all that are within the covenant or have the first entrance thereinto. And is there no danger of corruption by overstraining the subject of baptism? Certainly, it is a corruption to take from the rule, as well as add to it. Moses found danger in not applying the initiating seal, to such for whom it was appointed. Is there no danger of putting those out of the visible Church, whom our Lord would have kept in? . . . . . If we do not keep in the way of a converting, grace-giving covenant, and keep persons under those church dispensations, wherein grace is given, the Church will die of a lingering, though not violent, death. The Lord hath not set up churches only that a few old Christians may keep one another warm while they live, and then carry away the Church into the cold grave with them when they die; no, but that they might with all care, and with all the obligations and advantages to that care that may be, nurse up still successively another generation of subjects to our Lord, that may stand up in his kingdom when they are gone." [579]

4. Experience proves that it is a great evil to make the Church consist only of communicants and to cast out into the world, without any of that watch and care which God intended for them, all those together with their children, who do not see their way clear to come to the Lord's table. Admitting with gratitude all that can be said of the great advance made by the Church in this country within the last fifty or sixty years, there are loud and almost universal complaints made of the decay of family religion, of family training, and especially of the ecclesiastical instruction of the young. It is within the memory of many now living that in almost every Presbyterian and every Congregationalist family in the land, as a matter of course, the children were regularly taught the "Westminster Catechism." It is not so now. [580]

Doctrine and Usage of the Reformed Churches.

The language of the Reformed Churches as the proper subjects of infant baptism is perfectly uniform. In the "Second Helvetic Confession" it is said, [581] "Damnamus Anabaptistas, qui negant baptisandos esse infantulos recens natos a fidelibus. Nam juxta doctrinam evangelicam, horum est regnum Dei, et sunt in foedere Dei, cur itaque non daretur eis signum foederis Dei?"

The "Gallic Confession" says: [582] "Quamvis baptismus sit fidei et resipiscenti[illegible] sacramentum, tamen cum una cum parentibus posteritatem etiam illorum in ecclesia Deus recenseat, affirmamus, infantes sanctis parentibus natos, esse ex Christi authoritate baptizandos."

The "Belgic Confession" says: [583] "(Infantes e fidelibus parentibus natos)

baptizandos et signo foederis obsignandos esse credimus."

The "Westminster Confession" says: [584] "Now only those that do actually profess faith in, and obedience unto Christ, but also the infants of one or both believing parents are to be baptized."

The "Larger Catechism" says: [585] "Infants descending from parents, either both or but one of them, professing faith in Christ, and obedience to Him, are, in that respect, within the covenant, and are to be baptized."

The "Shorter Catechism" says: [586] "Baptism is not to be administered to any that are out of the visible Church, till they profess their faith in Christ and their obedience to Him; but the children of such as are members of the visible Church, are to be baptized."

The "Directory for Worship" says: [587] "The seed of the faithful have no less right to this ordinance, under the Gospel, than the seed of Abraham to circumcision."

It is, therefore, plain that according to the standards of the Reformed Church, it is the children of the members of the visible Church who are to be baptized. Agreeably to Scriptural usage such members are called "foederati," saints, believers, faithful, holy brethren, partakers of the heavenly calling. The Apostles in addressing professing Christians in the use of such terms did not express any judgment of their state in the sight of God. They designated them according to their profession. If they professed to be believers, they were called believers, and were treated as such; unless they gave tangible evidence to the contrary, and in that case they were excommunicated. The Reformed, as well as the Lutheran theologians, therefore, speak of the members of the visible Church as believers, and of their children as born of believing parents. All that is intended, therefore, by the language above cited is, that the sacraments of the Church are to be confined to members of the Church and to their children. It never entered the minds of the authors of those symbols that the visible Church consists exclusively of the regenerate, or of those who gave such evidence of their regeneration as to constrain a judgment in their favour.

It has already been stated that the common doctrine of Protestants on this whole subject is, --

1. That the visible Church has always consisted of those who professed the true religion, together with their children.

2. That the terms of church-membership under all dispensations have been the same, namely, profession of faith and promise of obedience.

3. The requirements for participation in the sacraments were the same. That is, any one entitled to the rite of circumcision, was entitled to partake of the passover; those, under the Christian dispensation, entitled to baptism, are entitled to the Lord's Supper. Those who, unbaptized, would be entitled to baptism for themselves, are entitled, and they only, to present their children for baptism. This is only saying that the privileges of the Church are confined to members of the Church.

4. The profession of faith required for admission to the Church or its ordinances is a profession of true faith; and the promise of obedience is a promise of the obedience of the heart as well as of the outward life. When a man professed to be a Jew he professed to be truly a Jew. It is inconceivable that God required of him only an insincere, hypocritical, or formal faith. This point is strenuously urged by President Edwards. He argues that those

who enter the Christian Church enter into covenant with God, because under the Mosaic economy all the people thus pledged themselves to be the sincere worshippers of God. He appeals to such passages as Deuteronomy vi. 13, x. 20, Thou shalt fear the Lord thy God; Him shalt thou serve, and to Him shalt thou cleave, and swear by his name." "This institution, in Deuteronomy, of swearing into the name of the Lord, or visibly and explicitly uniting themselves to Him in covenant, was not prescribed as an extraordinary duty, or a duty to be performed on a return from a general apostasy, and some other extraordinary occasions: but is evidently mentioned in the institution as a part of the public worship of God to be performed by all God's people." [588] This was an institution, he adds, belonging not only to Israel under the Old Testament, but also to Gentile converts, and to Christians under the New Testament. This explicit open covenanting with God, he argues, [589] ought to be required of persons before they are admitted to the privileges of adult members of the Church. Circumcision and the passover were not designed for the conversion of the Gentiles. Those only were admitted to these ordinances who professed to be converted. In like manner baptism and the Lord's Supper are not converting ordinances. They are to be administered only to those who profess to be Christians. It is plain, from the nature of the case, that those who partake of the Christian sacraments profess to be Christians. This is not so much asserted as assumed as self-evident by the Apostle, when he dissuades the Corinthians from frequenting the feasts given in the temples of idols. As, he says, those who partake of the bread and wine in the Lord's Supper thereby profess to be in communion with Christ; and as those who partake of the Jewish altar, thereby profess to be the worshippers of Jehovah; so those who partake of feasts given in honour of idols, thereby profess to be idolators. (1 Cor. x. 14-21.) In baptism the recipient of that ordinance publicly dedares that he takes God the Father to be his father; God the Son to be his Saviour; and God the Holy Ghost to be his sanctifier. More than this no Christian can profess. That this profession should not be insincere or hypocritical, or merely a matter of form, need not be argued. When a parent presents his child for baptism, he makes precisely these professions and engagements; and he can do no more when he comes to the Lord's Supper.

5. The prerogative of the Church is limited to the demand of a credible profession of faith and promise of obedience. And by a credible profession is to be understood, such as may be believed; that is, one against which no decisive, tangible evidence can be adduced. If a man professes faith who is an avowed heretic, or avows a purpose of obedience while leading an ungodly life, the Church is authorized and bound to refuse to receive him. Nothing, however, can consistently be made a ground of such refusal, which would not be regarded as a sufficient ground for the discipline of one already in the communion of the Church. Two things are to be considered, the one concerns the applicants for Church privileges. They are bound to obey the command of Christ to be baptized and to present their children for baptism, and they are bound to commemorate his death in the way of his appointment. They assume a grave responsibility who refuse to allow them to comply with those commands. It is moreover not only a duty, but a right, a privilege, and a blessing to receive the sacraments of the Church. They are divinely appointed means of grace. We must have good reasons if we venture to refuse any of our fellow sinners the use of the means of salvation which Christ has appointed. It is to be feared that many have come short of eternal life, who, had they been received into the bosom of the Church and enjoyed its guardian and

fostering care, might have been saved. (This is not inconsistent with the doctrine of election, as that doctrine is taught in Scripture.)

Besides the duties and rights of the people, the other thing to be considered in this matter, is the proper office of the Church. The Church has a solemn duty to perform. That duty is clearly laid down in the Word of God. It is bound to refuse to recognize as Christian brethren those who deny the faith, and those whose manner of life is inconsistent with the law of Christ. The Bible gives a list of offences which exclude those who commit them from the kingdom of heaven, and for which the Church is commanded to exclude men from her communion, In doing this it secures all the purity it is possible, in the present state of existence, to attain. Beyond this the Church has neither the right nor the power to go. It cannot legitimately assume the prerogative of sitting in judgment on the hearts of men. It has no right to decide the question whether those who apply for the privileges of Christ's house are regenerate or unregenerate. The responsibility as to their inward spiritual state rests upon those who seek to become members of the Church. They should be taught what it is they profess and promise.

That the Church is not called upon to pronounce a judgment as to the real piety of applicants for membership is plain, --

1. Because no such prerogative was assumed under the Old Testament. The terms of membership were then what they are now. The same inward sincerity was required then as now. This Edwards insists upon, yet he does not venture to assert that all Jews admitted to circumcision and the passover, were, in the judgment of charity, truly regenerate persons.

2. The New Testament contains no command to the Church to assume the prerogative in question. There is the command often repeated to recognize as brethren all who profess their faith in Christ. There are explicit directions given as to those who, although calling themselves brethren, are to be rejected. (1 Cor. v. 9, 10; Rom. xvi. 17; 2 Thess. iii. 6; Tit. iii. 10; Matt. vii. 15-17.) But there is no command to exclude those whom the Church or its officers do not in their hearts believe to be the true children of God. The gates of the kingdom of God are not to be opened or shut at the discretion of weak, fallible men. Every man has a right and is bound to enter those gates, except those whom Christ has commanded his Church to reject.

3. The Apostles, it is plain, never acted on the principle in question. This is clear, as remarked above, from their baptizing converts immediately after the profession of their faith. It is obviously impossible that there should have been any protracted examination of the religious experience of the three thousand converted on the day of Pentecost, or of the five thousand brought in by the sermon of Peter, recorded in the third chapter of Acts. The Acts of the Apostles and the Epistles of the New Testament afford abundant evidence that the early churches did not consist exclusively of those whom the Apostles "judged" to be regenerated persons. The Church of Jerusalem was filled with men who were so "zealous of the law," that Paul feared that they would not receive him even when he came to bring alms to the people. Paul charges the churches of Galatia with having turned aside to another gospel. He reproves the Corinthians with the grossest irregularities; and the Epistles of John are no less objurgatory.

4. Experience proves that all attempts to preserve the purity of the Church by being more strict than the Bible, are utterly futile. The tares cannot be separated from the wheat.

5. Such attempts are not only futile, they are seriously injurious. They contravene the plan of God. They exclude from the watch and care of the Church multitudes whom He commands his people to look after and cherish. In confining the visible Church to communicants, it unchurches the great majority even of the seed of the faithful.

6. There is an obvious inconsistency in having one rule for admission into the Church, and another for continued membership. If Christ requires us to reject all whom in the judgment of charity we are not constrained to believe to be regenerate, then He requires us to excommunicate all those of whom this belief is not entertained. But no Church acts, or can act on that principle. No man once admitted to Church privileges can be debarred from them, except after a trial and conviction on the charge of some "scandal" or "offence."

The sacraments as all admit are to be confined to members of the Church. But the Church does not consist exclusively of communicants. It includes also all who having been baptized have not forfeited their membership by scandalous living, or by any act of Church discipline. All members of the Church are professors of religion. They profess faith in Christ and are under a solemn vow to obey his laws. If they are insincere or heartless in this profession, the guilt is their own. The Church is, and can be responsible only for their external conduct; so long as that is not incompatible with the Christian character, and so long as the faith is held fast, the privileges of member ship continue.

This seems clearly the doctrine of the standards of our own Church. Those standards teach, (1.) That the sacraments are signs and seals of the covenant of grace. (2.) That consequently all who partake of them do thereby profess to accept of that covenant for their own salvation; they profess to receive the Lord Jesus Christ as He is offered to them in the gospel. (3.) That although a man may doubt of his being in Christ he may be a worthy partaker of the sacraments, if he "unfeignedly desires to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity." [590] (4.) That the Church has no authority to exclude from the sacraments any except those who, although they may profess faith, are ignorant or scandalous. In answer to the question, "May any who profess the faith, and desire to come to the Lord's Supper, be kept from it?" it is answered, "Such as are found to be ignorant or scandalous, notwithstanding their profession of the faith, and desire to come to the Lord's Supper, may and ought to be kept from that sacrament by the power which Christ hath left in his Church, until they receive instruction, and manifest their reformation." This, according to Presbyterians, is the extent of the power of the Church, in the matter of shutting the doors of the kingdom of God.

Those, therefore, who, having been themselves baptized, and still professing their faith in the true religion, having competent knowledge, and being free from scandal, should not only be permitted but urged and enjoined to present their children for baptism, that they may belong to the Church, and be brought up under its watch and care. To be unbaptized is a grievous injury and reproach; one which no parent can innocently entail upon his children. The neglect of baptism, which implies a want of appreciation of the ordinance, is one of the crying sins of this generation.

[562] II. ii. qu[?]s. 25 [31, xxx]; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 274.

[563] Baird's Digest of the Acts, Deliverance, and Testimonies of the Supreme Judicatory of the Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, pp. 106, 107; edit. 1856, pp. 82, 83.

[564] Doctrina Christian[?] Religionis per Aphorismos summatim Descripta. Editio

sexta. Cui nunc accedit Upotuposis Theologi Elenctic in usum Scholarum Domesticarum Campegii Vitring. Curante Martino Vitringa, cap. xxiv. Lyons, 1779, vol. vii. p. 153, note I. Bernhardini de Moor, Commentarius Perpetuus in Johannis Marckii Compendium Theologi Christian. Pars. V: cap. 30, § 19; Lyons, 1768, vol. v. pp. 500-502.

[565] De Moor, ut supra, cap. XXX. § xvi. vol. v. pp. 470-473.

[566] It is stated in the Life of President Edwards, by Sereno F. Dwight, prefixed to an edition of Edwards' Works, in ten vols., New York, 1829, vol. i. p. 307, that "All the churches in the country, except two, and all the clergy, except three, approved of the lax mode of admission." That is, were opposed to Edwards' doctrine on the subject.

[567] To this sentence Mr. Blair appends the following note: "In no other way can we conceive the covenant to subsist between God and believers as a Church. In the exercise of faith, believers have union to, and communion with Jesus Christ; but by this alone, they could have no fellowship with one another; for each one could only be conscious of his own exercise of faith, and could have no society with any other therein. Whatever real relation to each other is founded in their common union to Christ, yet they could not at all perceive it. They would be members of Christ, but utterly detached from each other, and so not formally a body. It is only as incorporated in the visible Church, that they are fitly placed in the body, and have any knowledge one of another, and so have fellowship."

[568] Essays on, I. The Nature, Uses, and Subjects of the Sacraments of the New Testament; II. On Regeneration, wherein the principle of Spiritual Life thereby implanted is particularly considered; III. On the Nature and Use of the Means of Grace. By John Blair, A. M., Pastor of the Church of Good-Will (alias Wallkill), in the Province of New York, New York: printed by John Holt, at the Exchange, 1771. Essay I. pp. 13-15.

[569] Ibid. p. 35.

[570] Blair, Essays, ut supra, p. 28.

[571] Ibid. p. 43.

[572] Ibid. p. 4.

[573] A History of New England, from the Discovery by Europeans to the Revolution of the Seventeenth Century, being an Abridgment of his "History of New England during the Stuart Dynasty" by John Graham Palfrey. New York, 1866, vol. ii. p. 19.

[574] Magnalia Christi Americana, by Rev. Cotton Mather, D. D., F. R. S., Hartford, 1853, vol. i. pp. 276-316. The passage referred to contains a full account of the controversy. The words above are on page 279.

[575] Palfrey, p. 103.

[576] Works, edit. New York, 1868, vol. i. p. 89.

[577] Works, edit. New York, 1868, vol. i. pp. 91, 92.

[578] Misrepresentations Corrected and Truth Vindicated, in a Reply to the Rev. Solomon Williams' Book; Works, edit. New York, 1868, vol. i. pp. 206, 207.

[579] Mather's Magnalia, vol. ii. p. 309.

[580] The venerable Mr. Spaulding, during his recent visit to this country, after spending thirty-five years as a missionary of the American Board in Ceylon, was so much

struck with the change in these respects which had taken place during his absence, that he said he thought the time would come when the Tamul people would be called upon to send missionaries to America.

[581] Cap. XX.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 518.

[582] Art. XXXV. Ibid. p. 338.

[583] Art. XXXIV. Ibid. p. 384.

[584] Chap. xxviii. 4.

[585] Quest. 166.

[586] Quest. 95.

[587] Chap. vii. 4.

[588] Works, edit. New York, 1868, vol. i. pp. 106, 107.

[589] Ibid. p. 109.

[590] Larger Catechism, answer to the 172d Question.

§ 12. Efficacy of Baptism.

Doctrine of the Reformed Churches.

In the section which treats of the efficacy of the sacraments in general, it was shown that according to the Reformed Church the sacraments (1.) Are ordinances of divine appointment. (2.) That they are means of grace, and therefore are not to be undervalued or neglected. (3.) That their efficacy does not depend upon any virtue in them or in him by whom they are administered, but upon the attending influence of the Holy Spirit. (4.) That their efficacy is not tied to the time of their administration; and that they are not the exclusive channels of the spiritual benefits which they signify, so that such benefits can be received only through and in the use of the sacraments. We have by faith alone, and by the free gift of God, all that the sacraments are made the means of communicating. The same may be said of reading and hearing the Word of God: neither is to be neglected, because either, or one without the other, may be made effectual. The sacraments are not to be neglected or undervalued, because men can be saved without them. (5.) That, so far as adults are concerned, true, living faith in those who receive the sacraments is the indispensable condition of their saving or sanctifying influence.

All these positions are affirmed to be true of baptism as well as of the Lord's Supper. Of the former the principal Reformed symbols use such language as the following: "Obsignantur h[illegible]c omnia baptismo. Nam intus regeneramur, purificamaur, et renovamur a Deo per Spiritum Sanctum: foris autem accipimus obsignationem maximorum donorum, in aqua, qua etiam maxima illa beneficia representantur, et veluti oculis nostris conspicienda proponuntur." [591]

"Baptismus nobis testificand[illegible] nostr[illegible] adoptioni datus, quoniam in eo inserimur Christi corpori, ut ejus sanguine abluti simul etiam ipsius Spiritu ad vit[illegible] sanctimoniam renovemur." [592]

"(Baptismi significatio) duas partes habet. Nam ibi remissio peccatorum, deinde spiritualis renovatio figuratur. . . . . Annon aliud aqu[illegible] tribuis nisi ut ablutionis tantum sit figura? Sic figuram esse sentio ut simul annexa sit veritas. Neque enim sua nobis dona

pollicendo nos, Deus frustratur. Proinde et peccatorum veniam et vit&#65533; novitatem offeri nobis in baptismo et recipi a nobis, certum est." [593]

"Baptism is not only a sign of profession, and mark of difference, whereby Christian men are discerned from others that be not christened; but it is also a sign of regeneration or new birth, whereby as by an instrument they who receive baptism rightly are grafted into the Church. The promises of the forgiveness of sins, of our adoption to be the sons of God by the Holy Ghost, are visibly signed and sealed; faith is confirmed and grace increased by virtue of prayer to God." [594]

The Heidelberg Catechism says: "Is then the external baptism of water, the washing away of sins? It is not: For the blood of Jesus Christ alone cleanses us from all sin. Why then does the Holy Spirit call baptism the washing of regeneration, and the washing away of sins? God speaks thus not without sufficient cause, not only that He may teach us, that just as pollution of the body is purged by water, so our sins are expiated by the blood and Spirit of Christ; but much more that He may assure us by this divine symbol and pledge, that we not less truly are cleansed from our sins by inward washing, than that we are purified by external and visible water." [595]

The Consensus Tigurinus is the most carefully prepared and guarded statement of the doctrine of the Reformed Church which has come down from the age of the Reformation. It was drawn up to adjust the difficulties arising from the diverging views on this subject between Calvin and the clergy of Geneva on the one hand, and the Zwinglian clergy of Zurich on the other. In the ninth article it is said, "that although we distinguish, as is proper, between the sign and the things signified; yet we do not disjoin the truth from the signs: moreover all who embrace by faith the promises therein offered, spiritually receive Christ together with his spiritual gifts; and so those who before had been made partakers of Christ, continue and renew that participation." In articles immediately following it is taught that regard is to be had, not to the naked signs, but to the promises annexed to them; that the signs without Christ are "inanes larv&#65533;" that if any good be conferred by the sacraments, it is not from their proper inherent virtue; for it is God alone who acts through his Spirit Article sixteenth is in these words, "Pr&#65533;terea sedulo docemus, Deum non promiscue vim suam exerere in omnibus qui sacramenta recipiunt, sed tantum in electis. Nam quemadmodum non alios in fidem illuminat, quam quos preordinavit ad vitam: ita arcana Spiritus sui virtute efficit, ut percipiant electi qu&#65533; offerunt sacramenta." Article nineteenth teaches that the benefits signified by the sacraments may be obtained without their use. Paul's sins were remitted before he was baptized. Cornelius received the Spirit before he received the external sign of regeneration. In the twentieth article it is taught that the benefit of the sacraments is not confined to the time of their administration. God sometimes regenerates in their old age those who were baptized in infancy or youth. [596]

In the Westminster Confession it is said: "Although it be a great sin to contemn or neglect this ordinance [baptism], yet grace and salvation are not so inseparably annexed unto it, as that no person can be regenerated or saved without it, or that all that are baptized, are undoubtedly regenerated. The efficacy of baptism is not tied to that moment of time wherein it is administered; yet, notwithstanding, by the right use of this ordinance the grace promised is not only offered, but really exhibited and conferred by the Holy Ghost, to such (whether of age or infants) as that grace belongeth unto, according to the counsel of God's

own will, in his appointed time." [597]

Calvin controverts the Romish doctrine that the Sacraments of the New Testament have greater efficacy than those of the Old. "Nihilo splendidius de illis Apostolus quam de his loquitur, quum docet patres eandem nobiscum spiritualem escam manducasse; et escam illam Christum interpretatur." (1 Cor. x. 3.) And again, in the same paragraph, "Nec vero baptismo nostro plus tribuere fas est, quam ipse alibi circumcisioni tribuit, quum vocat sigillum justiti fidei.' (Rom. iv. 11.) Quicquid ergo nobis hodie in sacramentis exhibetur, id in suis olim recipiebant Jud i, Christum scilicet cum spiritualibus suis divitiis. Quam habent nostra virtutem, eam quoque in suis sentiebant: ut scilicet essent illis divin erga se benevolenti sigilla in spem salutis tern." [598]

The doctrine of the Reformed Church, therefore, on the efficacy of baptism includes in the first place the rejection or denial of certain false doctrines on the subject. (1.) That baptism conveys grace "ex opere operato" in the sense which Romanists attach to those words, by any objective supernatural power belonging to the ordinance itself; or in virtue of the divine efficiency inherent in the word or promise of God connected with the sacrament. (2.) That the co peration of the Spirit, to which the efficacy of the ordinance is due, always attends its administration, so that those who are baptized, in all cases, if unresisting, experience the remission of sins and the renewing of the Holy Ghost. (3.) That baptism was appointed to be the ordinary means or channel of conveying, in the first instance, the merits of Christ's death and the saving influences of the Spirit, so that those benefits may not, except in extraordinary cases, be obtained before or without baptism.

In the second place the Reformed doctrine on this subject affirms, (1.) That baptism is a divine ordinance. (2.) That it is a means of grace to believers. (3.) That it is a sign and seal of the covenant of grace. (4.) That the ordinance was intended to be of perpetual obligation, in the sense that all, not baptized in infancy, are required to submit to baptism as the divinely appointed way of publicly professing their faith in Christ and their allegiance to Him as their God and Saviour; and that all such professors of the true religion are bound to present their children for baptism as the divinely appointed way of consecrating them to God. (5.) That God, on his part, promises to grant the benefits signified in baptism to all adults who receive that sacrament in the exercise of faith, and to all infants who, when they arrive at maturity, remain faithful to the vows made in their name when they were baptized.

Proof of the Reformed Doctrine.

As to the affirmations included in the doctrine of the Reformed churches concerning baptism, little need be said, as they are generally conceded. In all ages, since the apostolic, the tendency in the Church has been not to detract from the importance of the Christian sacraments, but unduly to exalt them. Nothing is plainer from the whole tenor of the New Testament than that the sacraments hold a place much below that of the truth. Whereas in all churches in a state of decay the reverse is the fact. The Jewish Church in the time of Christ, had become completely ritualistic. Rites and ceremonies had usurped the place of truth and holy living. A man might be proud, avaricious, unjust, and as our Lord expresses it, in every way a "child of the devil," yet if punctilious in the observance of church rites and church festivals, he esteemed himself and was esteemed by others, a saint so holy as to be contaminated by fellowship or contact with those who were the true children of God. This was the form in which corruption entered the Christian Church soon after the age of the

Apostles. This "mystery of iniquity" even in that age had begun to work, and when he that "did let" was taken out of the way, the evil was fully revealed, and the Christian Church became as thoroughly ritualistic as the Jewish Church had been when Christ came. The Reformation was in its essential character a protest against ritualism. It proclaimed salvation by a living faith which purified the heart, in opposition to the doctrine of salvation by rites and ceremonies. It insisted that religion was a matter of the heart, and therefore denounced as apostasy the Church returning to "weak and beggarly elements," to observing "days, and months, and times, and years," subjecting the people to "ordinances, touch not; taste not; handle not; which are all to perish with the using; after the commandments and doctrines of men." Ritualism is a broad, smooth, and easy road to heaven, and is always crowded. It was much easier in Paul's time to be a Jew outwardly than to be one inwardly; and circumcision of the flesh was a slight matter when compared to the circumcision of the heart. A theory which allows a man to be religious, without being holy; to serve both God and mammon; to gain heaven without renouncing the world, will never fail to find numerous supporters. That there is such a theory: that it has prevailed extensively and influentially in the Church; and that it is prevalent over a large part of Christendom, cannot be disputed. It does not follow, however, that all who are called ritualists, or who in fact attribute undue importance to external rites, are mere formalists. Many of them are, no doubt, not only sincere, but spiritual Christian men. This is no proof that the system is not false and evil, All Protestants cheerfully admit that many Romanists are holy men; but they no less strenuously denounce Romanism as an apostasy from the pure Gospel.

As the corruption of the Church of Rome consisted largely in making Christianity to consist in the punctual attendance on church rites; in teaching that the merits of Christ and the renewing of the Holy Ghost were conveyed in baptism even to unbelievers (i.e., to those destitute of saving faith); that when those blessings had been forfeited by sin, they could be restored by confession and absolution; that the eucharist is a true propitiatory sacrifice for the living and the dead; and that, in short, the religion of Christ is purely ritualistic, its benefits being conferred through external rites, and in no other way, so that those rites were indispensably necessary to salvation; it would have been natural had the Reformers gone to the opposite extreme, and unduly depreciated the importance of the sacraments which Christ himself had appointed. From this extreme, however, they were mercifully preserved. They taught, first, that in one sense, --

Baptism is a Condition of Salvation.

This is included in the commission which Christ gave to the Apostles, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature. He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." (Matt. xvi. 15, 16.) Baptism, therefore, has the necessity of precept, not that of a means. Our Lord does not say that he that is unbaptized shall be damned. That denunciation falls only on those who believe not. In this respect baptism is analogous to confession. Christ attributes the same necessity to the latter as to the former. In Matthew x. 32, it is written, "Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I confess also before my Father which is in heaven. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven." And St. Paul says (Rom. x. 9, 10), "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus, and shalt believe in thy heart that God hath raised Him from

the dead, thou shalt be saved. For with the heart man believeth unto righteousness; and with the mouth confession is made unto salvation." Confession does not make a man a Christian. It is the public avowal that he is a Christian; that he is a believer in Christ, in his divinity, in his incarnation, and in his being and doing all that He claimed to be, and that the Scriptures declare He did for us and our salvation. Such confession is a duty, a privilege, and a dictate of gratitude and loyalty, which cannot be repressed. His people will glory in confessing Him. While there is this desire and purpose to acknowledge Christ before men, due occasion for this confession may not he afforded, or it may be hindered by self-diffidence or ignorance. As our Lord intended not only to save men by the renewing of the Holy Ghost, and thus to bring them into membership in his mystical body, but also to constitute a visible church to consist of all those who confessed Him to be their God and Saviour, He appointed an outward visible sign by which they should be known and enrolled among his people. This was in accordance with the example set in the Old Testament. When God determined to organize Abraham and his descendants into a visible church, to be the depository of the truth and the treasure-house of his gifts, he appointed circumcision to be the sign of the covenant and the badge of membership in the commonwealth of Israel. This also is according to the common usage in human society. When a foreigner wishes to become a citizen of another state, he is called upon to take an oath of allegiance to his adopted country. When a man is elected or appointed to an important office, he must be duly inaugurated, and take the oath of fidelity. The oath taken by the President of the United States does not make him President; it neither confers the right to the office, nor does it confer the qualifications for the proper discharge of its duties. Circumcision did not make a man a Jew. It gave him neither the knowledge nor the grace necessary to his being one of the true children of Israel. It was the appointed means of avowing that he was a Jew; it was the sign of his being included among the worshippers of the true God; and it secured for him the privileges of the theocracy. In like manner, baptism does not make a man a Christian. It is the appointed means of avowing that he is a Christian; it is the badge of his Christian profession before men, it secures for him the privileges of membership in the visible Church, and it is a pledge on the part of God that, if sincere and faithful, he shall partake of all the benefits of the redemption of Christ. It is only in this sense that the Reformed Church teaches the necessity of baptism. It has the necessity of a divine precept. It is the condition of salvation, in the same sense in which confession is, and in which circumcision was. The uncircumcised child was cut off from among the people. He forfeitcd his birthright. But he did not forfeit his salvation. The Apostle teaches us that if an uncircumcised man kept the law, his uncircumcision was counted for circumcision. To this the Jews objected by asking, What profit then is there in circumcision? Paul answered, Much every way. It is not useless, because not essential. The same is true of baptism. Although not the means of salvation or necessary to its attainment, its benefits are great and manifold.

Baptism as a Duty.

The Reformed Church teaches that baptism is a duty. If a man wishes to be and to be regarded as a disciple of Christ, he is bound to be baptized. If he wishes to consecrate his children to God, he is bound to do it in the way of his appointment. This is plain, --

1. From the command of Christ. If He directed the Apostles to make disciples by baptizing them, He thereby commanded those who claimed to be disciples to submit to

baptism. After such a command, the refusal to be baptized, unless that refusal arises from mistake of the nature of the command or through ignorance, is tantamount to refusing to be a disciple at all.

2. This is further plain from the conduct of the Apostles Under the first sermon preached by the Apostle Peter after the effusion of the Spirit, multitudes were "pricked in their heart," and Peter "said unto them, Repent and be baptized." "Then they that gladly received the Word were baptized." When Philip preached the Word in Samaria, those who believed were baptized, both men and women; and when he was sent to join the "man of Ethiopia," and "preached unto him," in that short discourse, probably less than an hour long, he must have insisted on the duty of baptism, for the man said, "Here is water; what doth hinder me to be baptized." It is not probable that a minister of our day in his first brief discourse with an inquirer would urge upon him the duty of being baptized. As soon as Cornelius received the Spirit, Peter ordered water to be brought that he might be baptized. When Ananias came to Paul who was blind from his vision of the glory of Christ, he at once baptized him. And Paul himself, as soon as the jailer in Philippi professed his faith, baptized him and his straightway. It is obvious, therefore, that the Apostles regarded baptism as an imperative duty binding on all those who professed to be the disciples of Christ.

3. This is still further plain from the uniform practice of the Christian Church in all ages and in all parts of the world. All Christians have felt themselves bound by the authority of Christ to confess Him before men in the ordinance of baptism. It is incredible that they should be mistaken in such a matter as this; that they should regard an external rite as universally obligatory, if it had not in fact been enjoined by their divine Master. Those, therefore, who look upon baptism as an unimportant ceremony which may be neglected with impunity, are acting in opposition to the convictions of the Apostles as manifested by their conduct, and to the faith of the Church universal. It is not good for a man to have the people of God of all ages against him.

4. The duty of baptism may be argued from its manifold advantages. In the first place, it is a great honour and distinction. If among men it is a coveted distinction to wear the badge of the Legion of Honour, it is a far more desirable distinction to wear the badge of disciples of Christ, to be enrolled among his professed followers, and to be marked as belonging to Him and not to the world. In the second place, those who are baptized, unless they renounce their privilege, are members of the visible Church. The visible Church is an institution of God; it is his treasure-house. The Church under the new dispensation has great advantage over the ancient theocracy, and yet the Apostle speaks in glowing terms of the privileges of the Jews. "Who are Israelites; to whom pertaineth the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises." (Rom. ix. 4.) Notwithstanding, when in 2 Corinthians iii. 6-11, he compares the two dispensations, he says, "If the ministration of death, written and encrraven in stones, was glorious, ... how shall not the ministration of the Spirit be rather glorious? . . . . For even that which was made glorious had no glory in this respect, by reason of the glory that excelleth." This contrast between the Old and New Economies is presented in still stronger terms throughout the Epistle to the Galatians, and in that to the Hebrews. In Galatians he makes Hagar the slave the symbol of the one, and Sarah the free woman the symbol of the

other. And in Hebrews the Mosaic economy, with its temples, sacrifices, priesthood, and ritual, is declared to be the unsubstantial shadow, of which the gospel dispensation is the substance. If, then, it was such a distinction to belong to the old theocracy, what, in the view of Paul, must be the honour and blessedness of membership in the Christian Church.

Membership in the visible Church is not only a great honour, it is a great advantage. To the Church are committed the oracles of God. It is the depository of that truth which is able to make men wise unto salvation. It is the divinely appointed instrumentality for preserving and communicating that truth. Every one admits that it is a blessing to be born in a Christian, instead of in a heathen land. It is no less obviously true that it is a blessing to be within the pale of the Church and not cast out into the world. It is good to have the vows of God upon us. It is good to be under the watch and care of the people of God. It is good to have a special claim upon their prayers and upon their efforts to bring us into, or keep us in the paths of salvation. And above all, it is good to be of the number of those to whom God has made a special promise of grace and salvation. For the promise is unto us and to our children. It is a great evil to be "aliens from the commonwealth of Israel, and strangers from the covenants of promise." They, therefore, sin against God and their own souls who neglect the command to be baptized in the name of the Lord and those parents sin grievously against the souls of their children who neglect to consecrate them to God in the ordinance of baptism. Do let the little ones have their names written in the Lamb's book of life, even if they afterwards choose to erase them. Being thus enrolled may be the means of their salvation.

Baptism as a Means of Grace.

The Reformed Church teaches that baptism is a means of grace.

1. It is a sign. It signifies the great truths that the soul is cleansed from the guilt of sin by the sprinkling of the blood of Christ, and purified from its pollution by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. The Bible teaches that God sanctifies and saves men through the truth; that the Spirit works with and by the truth in conveying to men the benefits of redemption. It matters not whether that truth be brought before the mind by hearing or reading it, or in the use of significant divinely appointed emblems. The fact and the method of the deliverance of the children of Israel from their bondage in Egypt, were as clearly taught in the sacrament of the Passover, as in the written words of Moses. So the fundamental truths just mentioned are as clearly and impressively taught in the sacrament of baptism, as in the discourses of our blessed Lord himself. It is, therefore, just as intelligible how the Spirit makes the truth signified in baptism the means of sanctification, as how he makes that same truth, as read or heard, an effectual means of salvation. The Spirit does not always coperate with the truth as heard, to make it a means of grace; neither does He always attend the administration of baptism, with his sanctifying and saving power.

2. Baptism is a seal or pledge. When God promised to Noah that He would never again drown the world in a deluge, He set the rainbow in the heavens as a pledge of the promise which He had made. When he promised to Abraham to be a God to him and to his seed after him, He appointed circumcision as the seal and pledge of that promise. So when He promised to save men by the blood of Christ and by the renewing of the Holy Ghost, he appointed baptism to be, not only the sign, but also the seal and pledge of those exceeding great and precious promises. No believer in the Bible can look on the rainbow without

having his faith strengthened in the promise that a deluge shall never again destroy the earth. No pious Jew could witness the rite of circumcision administered, or advert to that sign in his own person, without an increased confidence that Jehovah was his God. And no Christian can recall his own baptism, or witness the baptism of others, without having his faith strengthened in the great promises of redemption. Every time the ordinance of baptism is administered in our presence, we hear anew the voice from heaven proclaiming, "The blood of Jesus Christ his Son cleanseth us from all sin;" "He saved us, by the washing of regeneration and renewing of the Holy Ghost."

3. Baptism, however, is not only a sign and seal; it is also a means of grace, because in it the blessings which it signifies are conveyed, and the promises of which it is the seal, are assured or fulfilled to those who are baptized, provided they believe. The Word of God is declared to be the wisdom and power of God to salvation; it is the means used by the Holy Spirit in conferring on men the benefits of redemption. Of course all who merely hear or read the Word of God are not saved; neither do all who receive the baptism of water experience the baptism of the Holy Ghost; but this is not inconsistent with the Word's being the means of salvation, or with baptism's being the washing of regeneration. Our Lord says we are sanctified by the truth. Paul says we put on Christ in baptism (Gal. iii. 27). When a man receives the Gospel with a true faith, he receives the blessings which the Gospel promises; when he receives baptism in the exercise of faith, he receives the benefits of which baptism is the sign and seal. Unless the recipient of this sacrament be insincere, baptism is an act of faith, it is an act in which and by which he receives and appropriates the offered benefits of the redemption of Christ. And, therefore, to baptism may be properly attributed all that in the Scriptures is attributed to faith. Baptism washes away sin (Acts xxii. 16); it unites to Christ and makes us the sons of God (Gal. iii. 26, 27); we arc therein buried with Christ (Rom. vi. 3); it is (according to one interpretation of Titus iii. 5) the washing of regeneration. But all this is said on the assumption that it is what it purports to be, an act of faith. The gospel of our salvation is, to those who believe not, a savour of death unto death. Circumcision to the unbelieving Jew was uncircumcision. Baptism, without faith, is without effect. Such being the case, it is plain that baptism is as truly a means of grace as the Word. It conveys truth to the mind; it confirms the promise of God; and it is the means in the hands of the Spirit of conveying to believers the benefits of redemption. Hence it is a grievous mistake and a great sin to neglect or undervalue it.

All this is plain so far as adults are concerned. But if the saving benefits of baptism are suspended on the condition of faith in the recipient, what benefit can there be in the baptism of infants? To this it may be answered, --

1. That it is the commandment of God. This should be enough. It might as well be asked what benefit could there be in the circumcision of infants under the law. Paul tells us that the benefit to them as well as to others was much every way. It secured their membership in the commonwealth of Israel, which was a greater honour and privilege than the highest peerage on earth. So baptism secures the membership of infants in the visible Church of God, which is a still greater distinction and blessing.

2. Infants are the objects of Christ's redemption. They are capable of receiving all its benefits. Those benefits are promised to them on the same conditions on which they are promised to their parents. It is not every one who says Lord, Lord, who shall enter into the

kingdom of God. It is not every baptized adult who is saved; nor are all those who are baptized in infancy made partakers of salvation. But baptism signs, seals, and actually conveys its benefits to all its subjects, whether infants or adults, who keep the covenant of which it is the sign. As a believer who recalls some promise of the Scriptures which he has read or heard, receives the full benefit of that promise; so the infant when arrived at maturity receives the full benefit of baptism, if he believes in the promises signified and sealed to him in that ordinance. Baptism, therefore, benefits infants just as it does adults, and on the same condition.

It does not follow from this that the benefits of redemption may not be conferred on infants at the time of their baptism. That is in the hands of God. What is to hinder the imputation to them of the righteousness of Christ, or their receiving the renewing of the Holy Ghost, so that their whole nature may be developed in a state of reconciliation with God? Doubtless this often occurs but whether it does or not, their baptism stands good; it assures them of salvation if they do not renounce their baptismal covenant.

Baptismal Regeneration.

Different meanings are attached to the words baptismal regeneration. It has been already stated, in a preceding chapter, that by regeneration is sometimes meant an external change, -- translation from the world, as the kingdom of darkness, into the Church, as the kingdom of light. In this sense it implies no subjective change. Sometimes it means the life-long process by which a soul is more and more transformed into the image of God. Sometimes it means the whole process which takes place in the consciousness when a sinner turns from sin through Christ unto God. It is then synonymous with conversion. In our day, in ordinary theological language, it means that supernatural change effected by the Spirit of God by which a soul is made spiritually alive. "You hath He quickened ezoopoiese)," (see Eph. ii. 1, 5), says the Apostle to the Ephesians. In their former state they were dead in trespasses and sins. Their regeneration consisted in their being made spiritually alive; or, in their having the principle of a new spiritual life imparted to them. Such being the diversity of meaning attached to the word in question, the phrase baptismal regeneration may be understood in very different senses. The sense in which it is to be here taken is that in which, as is believed, it is generally understood. According to the faith of the Church universal, Greek, Latin, and Protestant, all men since the fall are born in a state of sin and condemnation -- spiritually dead. It is a wide-spread belief that when baptism is administered to new-born infants, they are regenerated inwardly by the Holy Spirit; they are so born again as to become the children of God and heirs of his kingdom. The word, however, includes more than simply the renewing of the soul. Prior to baptism, according to the Catechism of the Church of England, infants are in a state of sin and the children of wrath; by baptism they are said to be made members of Christ, children of God, and inheritors of the kingdom of heaven. In other words, in baptism the blessings signified in that ordinance are conveyed to the soul of the infant. Those blessings are the cleansing from guilt by the blood of Christ, and purification from pollution by the renewing of the Holy Ghost.

The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, in this sense of the term, has been very extensively held in the Church. The passages of Scripture relied upon for its support, are principally the following: John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he

cannot enter into the kingdom of God." Our Lord is understood in these words to teach the necessity of baptism to salvation. But none of the fallen family of man can be saved without "the sprinkling of the blood of Jesus Christ," and "sanctification of the Spirit;" if baptism saves the soul, it must be by communicating to it those blessings; or, in other words, those blessings must attend its administration. The principal support of this interpretation is tradition. It has been handed down from age to age in the Church, until its authority seems firmly established. It may be remarked in reference to this passage, --

1. That if it be admitted that the words "born of water" are to be understood of baptism, the passage docs not prove the doctrine of baptismal regeneration. It asserts the necessity of baptism to admission into the kingdom of God, just as our Lord insists on the necessity of the public confession of his name. Confession is not a means of salvation. It does not convey the benefits of Christ's redemption. It is a duty which Christ imposes on all who desire to be confessed by Him in the last day. The Reformed acknowledge that baptism has this necessity of precept.

2. The phrase "kingdom of God" sometimes means heaven, the future state of blessedness; sometimes the external or visible Church, as consisting of those who profess to acknowledge Christ as their king; and sometimes the invisible Church, consisting of those in and over whom Christ actually reigns. At other times the phrase is used comprehensively as including, without discriminating, these several ideas. In this last sense the conditions of admission into the kingdom of God are the conditions of discipleship, and the conditions of discipleship are baptism and inward regeneration; precisely as under the old dispensation, for a man to become truly a Jew it was necessary that he should be circumcised and believe the true religion as then revealed. But this does not imply that circumcision of the flesh was circumcision of the heart; or that the latter uniformly attended the former. Neither does our Lord's language in John iii. 5, even, if understood of baptism, imply that the inward grace uniformly attends the outward ordinance. John the Baptist (Matt. iii. 11, 12) made a marked distinction, not only between his baptism and Christian baptism, but between baptism with water and baptism of the Holy Ghost. He could administer the former, Christ only could impart the latter. The two were not necessarily connected. A man might receive the one and not the other. Thousands did then, and do now, receive baptism with water who did not, and do not experience the renewing of the Holy Ghost.

3. There is no necessity for assuming that there is any reference in John iii. 5, to external baptism. The passage may be explained after the analogy suggested by what is said in Matthew iii. 11. There it is said that Christ would baptize with the Holy Ghost and with fire. No one understands this of literal fire. Fire was one of the familiar Scriptural emblems of purification. (Is. iv. 4; Jer. v. 14; Mal. iii. 2; Acts ii. 3.) To baptize with fire, was to effect a real, and not merely an outward purification. According to this analogy, to be born of water and of the Spirit, is to experience a cleansing of the soul analogous to that effected for the body by water. This is the interpretation generally adopted by the Reformed theologians. It is in accordance, not only with the passage in Matthew iii. 11, but with the general usage of Scripture. In that usage the sign and the thing signified are often united, often interchanged, the one being used for the other. Water, essential to the existence of all living creatures on the face of the earth, not only the means of cleansing and refreshment,

but also one of the elements of life, is familiarly used for the divine blessing, and especially for the saving, sanctifying, refreshing, and sustaining influences of the Holy Spirit. Thus in the gracious invitation of the prophet, "Ho, every one that thirsteth, come ye to the waters." (Is. lv. 1.) Before in chapter xii. 3, he had said, "With joy shall ye draw water out of the wells of salvation." Isaiah xxxv. 6, "In the wilderness shall waters break out, and streams in the desert." Isaiah xliv. 3, "I will pour water upon him that is thirsty." Ezekiel xxxvi. 25, "Then will I sprinkle clean water upon you, and ye shall be clean." Jeremiah ii. 13, God says, My people "have forsaken me, the fountain of living waters." Zechariah xiv. 8, "Living waters shall go out from Jerusalem." (Compare Ezekiel xlvii. 1-5.) Our Lord said to the woman of Samaria, "If thou knewest the gift of God, and who it is that saith to thee, Give me to drink; thou wouldest have asked of him, and he would have given thee living water." (John iv. 10.) On another occasion, he said, "If any man thirst, let him come unto me and drink. He that believeth on me as the Scripture hath said, out of his belly shall flow rivers of living waters. But this he spake of the Spirit." (John vii. 37, 38.) Revelation xxi. 6, "I will give unto him that is athirst of the fountain of the water of life freely." xxii. 17, "Whosoever will, let him take the water of life freely." It would be a sad mistake to understand by water in all these passages, the physical element, or even sacramental water. When God promises to sprinkle clean water upon us, He promises the renewing of the Holy Ghost; and when Christ says, we must be born of water, He explains it by saying, we must be born of the Spirit.

That our Lord, in John iii. 5, does not make baptism essential to admission into the kingdom of God, but regeneration by the Spirit, is the more probable, because Christian baptism was not instituted when the words there recorded were uttered. It is impossible that Nicodemus, or any who heard those words, could understand them of that sacrament. Christ, however, intended to be understood. He intended that Nicodemus should understand what was necessary to his salvation. He was accustomed to hear the sanctifying influence of God's grace called water; he knew what the Scriptures meant by being washed with clean water; and it was easy for him to understand that being "born of water" meant to be purified; but he could not know that it meant baptism. To make the passage refer to the baptism of John is out of the question, although sustained by the authority of Grotius, Episcopius, Bengel, Neander, Baumgarten-Crusius, Hofman, and others. The baptism of John was confined to the Jews. It admitted no man to the kingdom of Christ. Our Lord is laying down the conditions of salvation for all men, and therefore cannot be understood to refer to a baptism of which the Gentiles were not partakers, and of which, in the vast majority of cases, they had never heard. [599]

Another argument on this subject is derived from the fact that in the sixth and eighth verses of this chapter, where our Lord insists on the necessity of regeneration, he says nothing of being born of water. It is simply regeneration by the Spirit that He declares to be necessary. It cannot be supposed that one doctrine is taught in the fifth verse and another in the sixth and eighth verses; the former teaching that baptism and the renewing of the Holy Ghost are both necessary, and the latter insisting only on a new birth by the Spirit. If the two passages teach the same doctrine, then the fifth verse must teach that being born of water and being born of the Spirit are one and the same thing; the one expression being figurative, and the other literal, precisely as in Matthew iii. 11, where the baptism of the Holy Ghost and of fire are spoken of.

Again, if "born of water" means baptism, and "born of the Spirit," spiritual regeneration, then the two things are distinct. Accordingly L[illegible]cke says that being "born of water" is a figurative expression for repentance, which must precede regeneration by the Spirit. "The spirit of wisdom flees the sinful soul," as is said in the Book of Wisdom. Only the pure in heart can see God, our Lord himself teaches, and therefore L[illegible]cke argues only those who truly repent are susceptible of regeneration. [600] This disjoining the two things as distinct is natural, if the one refers to baptism and the other to inward regeneration, and therefore would indicate that regeneration is not by baptism, contrary to the doctrine of the advocates of baptismal regeneration. Hengstenberg also makes the two things distinct. Water, he says, signifies the remission of sins; this is effected in baptism; the new-birth by the Spirit follows after, which, in his view, is a slow process. [601]

All the arguments against the doctrine in question drawn from the general teachings of the Bible are, of course, arguments against the traditionary interpretation of this particular passage.

Another passage on which special reliance is placed as a support of the doctrine of baptismal regeneration is Titus, iii. 5. The Apostle there says, God saves us "by the washing of regeneration, and renewing of the Holy Ghost." By "the washing of regeneration" is understood baptism; and the Apostle is understood to assert two things, first, that baptism is necessary to salvation; and second, that baptism is, or is the means of, regeneration. It is, as the commentators say, the causa medians of an inward change of heart; or, as Bishop Ellicott says: "The genitive palingenesias apparently marks the attribute or inseparable accompaniments of the loutron, thus falling under the general head of the possessive genitive." [602] On this interpretation it may he remarked, --

I. That, taking the words loutron palingenesias by themselves, they may have the meaning attached to them. They may mean that baptism is the cause or means of regeneration; or, that regeneration is its inseparable accompaniment. But this is very far from proving that they either have or can have that sense in this connection.

2. Admitting that these words are to be understood of baptismal regeneration, they do not teach that regeneration is inseparably connected with baptism. When Paul speaks of the "gospel of your salvation," he does not mean to say that salvation is inseparable from the mere hearing of the Gospel. When he says, "Faith cometh by hearing," he does not mean that all who hear believe. When our Lord says, We are sanctified by the truth, He does not teach that the truth always has this sanctifying efficacy. The Bible teaches that the Word does not profit unless "mixed with faith in them that" hear it. So St. Paul teaches that baptism does not effect our union with Christ, or secure the remission of sins, or the gift of the Spirit, unless it be, and because it is an act of faith. This Bishop Ellicott admits. He says we must remember "that St. Paul speaks of baptism on the supposition that it was no mere observance, but that it was a sacrament in which all that was inward properly and completely accompanied all that was outward."

3. Still, admitting that the words refer to baptism, they may just as fairly be explained Baptism which is the sign and seal of regeneration,' as Baptism which is the means or invariable antecedent of regeneration.' The construction indicates the intimate relation between the two nouns, without determining what that relation is, whether it be that of cause and effect, or of a sign and the thing signified. Calvin's comment, "partam a Christo salutem

baptismus nobis obsignat," [603] is therefore fully justified.

4. There are, however, strong reasons for denying that there is any reference to baptism as an external rite in this passage.

First, the genitive palingenesias may be the simple genitive of apposition; the washing which is regeneration.' There are two kinds of washing, the outward and the inward. We are saved by that washing which is regeneration, namely, the renewing of the Holy Ghost. The latter clause being exegetical of the former. This interpretation is simple and natural. It does no violence to the meaning of the words or to the construction of the passage.

Secondly, if the latter clause be not exegetical, it must be accessary. It must express something new, something not expressed by the former clause. The Apostle would then be made to say, We are saved by the washing of regeneration, and also by the renewing of the Holy Ghost. Which amounts to saying, We are saved by regeneration and by regeneration. This argument can only be met by making regeneration mean the commencement, and the renewing of the Holy Ghost, the progress and development of the new life. But this is contrary to the analogy between this passage and that in John iii. 5. [604]

Thirdly, if the doctrine of baptismal regeneration can be shown to be thoroughly anti-scriptural, then it cannot be taught in Titus iii. 5. If any passage admit of two interpretations, one opposed to the analogy of Scripture, and the other in harmony with it, we are bound to adopt the latter.

The same remark applies to Acts xxii. 16, where it is recorded that Ananias said to Paul, "Arise, and be baptized, and wash away thy sins, calling on the name of the Lord." If it were the clear doctrine of the Bible that baptism does wash away sin, that such ablution can be effected in no other way, then we should be forced to admit that Paul's sins had not been remitted until he was baptized. But as this would contradict the plainest teachings of Scripture; as Paul himself says that God called him by his grace, and made him a true Christian by revealing his Son in him, by opening his eyes to see the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ, which revelation attended the vision he had on his way to Damascus; and as the effect of that spiritual revelation was to transform his whole nature and lead him to fall to the ground, and say, "Lord, what wilt thou have me to do?" no one can believe that he was under the wrath and curse of God, during the three days which intervened between his conversion and his baptism. He did not receive baptism in order that his sins should be washed away; but as the sign and pledge of their forgiveness on the part of God. He was to be assured of his forgiveness in the ordinance of baptism; just as a Gentile proselyte to Judaism was assured of his acceptance as one of the people of God, by the rite of circumcision; but circumcision did not make him a child of God. This passage is perfectly parallel to Acts ii. 38, where it is said, "Repent, and be baptized every one of you in the name of Jesus Christ for the remission of sins, eis aphesin hamartion." The remission of sins was that to which baptism was related; that of which it was the sign and seal. John's baptism was eis metanoian unto repentance. This does not mean that his baptism made men penitent. But it was a confession on the part of those who received it, that they needed repentance, and it bound them to turn from their sins unto God. In Luke iii. 3, it is said, John came "preaching the baptism of repentance for the remission of sins." No man understands this to mean that his baptism secured the remission, or the washing away, of sin in the experience of all the multitude who flocked to his baptism. Neither does the Bible

anywhere teach that Christian baptism effects either pardon or regeneration in those still out of Christ.

Direct Arguments against the Doctrine of Baptismal Regeneration.

It has been shown in the note on the preceding page that the word regeneration in the phrase "baptismal regeneration," is used in very different senses. The sense usually attached to it, in our day, is that inward change in the state of the soul wrought by the Holy Spirit, by which it passes from death unto life; by which it is born again so as to become a child of God and an heir of eternal life. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is the doctrine that this inward saving change is effected in baptism, so that those who are baptized are the subjects of that new birth which Christ declares to be necessary to salvation; and those who are not baptized have not experienced that new birth and are not in a state of salvation.

1. The first, the most obvious, and the most decisive argument against this doctrine is, that, so far as any work or act of the sinner is concerned, the Bible everywhere teaches that the only indispensable condition of salvation is faith in Jesus Christ. "As Moses lifted up the serpent in the wilderness, even so must the Son of man be lifted up: that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have eternal life. For God so loved the world, that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." (John iii. 14-16.) "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; and he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him" (ver. 36). "I am the bread of life: he that cometh to me shall never hunger; and he that believeth on me shall never thirst." (John vi. 35.) "This is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son, and believeth on him, may have everlasting life: and I will raise him up at the last day" (ver. 40). "He that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live: and whosoever liveth and believeth in me shall never die." (John xi. 25, 26.) These are the words of Jesus. This is the gospel which the Apostles preached, going everywhere and saying to every sinner whom they met, "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved." (Acts xvi. 31.) "Whosoever believeth that Jesus is the Christ is born of God." (1 John v. 1.) "Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that believeth that Jesus is the Son of God?" (ver. 5.) Heaven and earth shall pass away, but these words can never pass away. No man may add to them, or detract from them. Whosoever believes on the Son hath everlasting life. This stands firm. It matters not to what Church he may belong; it matters not whether he be Jew or Gentile, bond or free, learned or unlearned, good or bad, baptized or unbaptized whosoever believes shall be saved.

Not every one, however, who says he believes is a true believer; not every one who believes as the devils believe; but he who has that faith which works by love and purifies the heart, the precious faith of God's elect, every such believer is sure of eternal life. It does not follow from this that faith stands alone, that obedience is not necessary. But obedience is the fruit of faith. He that does not obey, does not believe. For any one, therefore, to say that although a man truly believes the record God has given of his Son, yet that he is not a Christian, unless he belongs to some particular church organization, unless he is baptized with water, unless he comes to the Lord's table, contradicts not the general teaching of the Bible only, but the fundamental principle of the gospel method of salvation. Even Gabriel would not dare to shut the gates of paradise on the thief converted on the

cross, because he had not been baptized.

2. It is plain that baptism cannot be the ordinary means of regeneration, or the channel of conveying in the first instance the benefits of redemption to the souls of men, because, in the case of adults, faith and repentance are the conditions of baptism. But faith and repentance, according to the Scriptures, are the fruits of regeneration. He who exercises repentance towards God and faith in our Lord Jesus Christ is in a state of salvation before baptism and therefore in a state of regeneration. Regeneration consequently precedes baptism, and cannot be its effect, according to the ordinance of God. That the Apostles did require the profession of faith and repentance before baptism, cannot be denied. This is plain, not only from their recorded practice but also from the nature of the ordinance. Baptism is a profession of faith in the Father, and the Son, and the Holy Spirit; not of a faith to be obtained through the ordinance, but of a faith already entertained. When the Eunuch applied to Philip for baptism, he said: "If thou believest with all thine heart thou mayest." Of those who heard Peter's sermon on the day of Pentecost it is said, "they that gladly received his word were baptized." (Acts ii. 41.) On this point, however, there can be no dispute. The only way in which Romanists and Romanizers evade this argument, is by denying that faith and repentance are the fruits of the Spirit, or of regeneration. They are in their view not gracious, but natural works, works done before regeneration; works which leave the soul in a state of perdition. But in this they contradict the express words of Christ, who says, whosoever believes shall be saved. And, in contradicting Christ, they contradict the whole Bible.

3. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration, in the sense above explained, is opposed to the whole nature of true religion as set forth in the Scriptures. The two great errors against which the Gospel, as taught by Christ and unfolded by his Apostles, was directed; were first the doctrine of human merit; the merit of good works, the doctrine that men are to be saved on the ground of their own character or conduct; and the second was ritualism, the doctrine of the necessity and inherent supernatural virtue of external rites and ceremonies. Our Lord taught that men were saved by looking to Him as the dying Hebrews in the wilderness were saved by looking to the brazen serpent. He further taught that unless a man, no matter how punctilious in observing the ceremonial law, was born of the Spirit, he could not enter into the kingdom of God. And the great burden of apostolic teaching was first, that we are saved, not by works but by faith, not for our own righteousness, but on the ground of the righteousness of Christ; and secondly, that religion is a matter of the heart, not of ritual or ceremonial observances. The Jews of that day taught that no uncircumcised man could be saved. Romanists and Romanizers teach that no unbaptized person, whether infant or adult, is saved. The Jews taught that "no circumcised person ever entered hell," provided he remained within the pale of the theocracy. Romanists and Romanizers say that no baptized person is ever lost, provided he remains within the pale of the Roman Church. The Jews believed that circumcision secured its benefits, not only as a seal of the covenant, but from its own sanctifying power. This was only one aspect of the doctrine of salvation by works, against which the sacred writers so earnestly protested. "He is not a Jew," says St. Paul, "which is one outwardly; neither is that circumcision, which is outward in the flesh: but he is a Jew, which is one inwardly and circumcision is that of the heart, in the spirit and not in the letter; whose praise is not of men, but of God." (Rom. ii. 28, 29.) The doctrine of the Bible, therefore, is that he is not a Christian who is one outwardly, but that he is a Christian

who is one inwardly; and the baptism which saves the soul is not baptism with water, but the baptism of the heart by the Holy Ghost. This doctrine of salvation by rites was, in the view of the Apostles, a much lower form of doctrine, more thoroughly Judaic, than the doctrine of salvation by works of righteousness.

It is evident that the doctrine of baptismal regeneration, as held by Romanists and their followers, changes the whole nature of religion. It makes mere external observances the conditions of salvation, assuming that outward rites are exclusively the channels through which the benefits of redemption are conveyed to the souls of men. It excludes from the hope of heaven men who truly believe, repent, and lead a holy life; and it assures those of their title to eternal life, who are unrenewed and unsanctified.

1. A fourth argument against the doctrine under consideration, is derived from the analogy between the Word and sacraments everywhere presented in the Bible. God, it is said, saves men by preaching; the gospel is declared to be the power of God unto salvation; faith is said to come by hearing: we are begotten by the Word: we are sanctified by the truth. No Christian, whether Romanist or Protestant, believes that all who hear the Gospel are saved; that it is always the vehicle of conveying the saving and sanctifying influences of the Spirit. Why then should it be assumed, because we are said to be united to Christ by baptism, or to wash away our sins in that ordinance, either that baptism "ex opere operato" produces these effects, or that the Spirit always attends its administration with his saving influences.

5. Again, all Christians admit that multitudes of the baptized come short of eternal life, but no regenerated soul is ever lost. Our Lord in teaching that none but those who are born of the Spirit, enter into the kingdom of heaven, thereby teaches that those who are thus new-born are certainly saved. This is included also in his repeated declarations, that those who believe in Him have eternal life; being partakers of his life, if He lives they shall live also. And the Apostle, in Romans viii. 30, expressly declares that all the regenerate are saved. Whom God predestinates, he says, them He also calls (regenerates), and whom He calls, them he also justifies; and whom He justifies, them he also glorifies. If baptism, therefore, is, in all ordinary cases, attended by the regeneration of the soul, then all the baptized will be saved. If they are not made the heirs of salvation, they are not made the subjects of regeneration.

6. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is contradicted by the facts of experience. Regeneration is no slight matter. It is a new birth; a new creation; a resurrection front spiritual death to spiritual life. It is a change, wrought by the exceeding greatness of God's power, analogous to that which was wrought in Christ, when He was raised from the dead, and exalted to the right hand of the majesty on high. It cannot therefore remain without visible effect. It controls the whole inward and outward life of its subject, so that he becomes a new man in Christ Jesus. The mass of those baptized, however, exhibit no evidence of any such change. There is no apparent difference between them and the unbaptized. The whole population of Europe, speaking in general terms, are baptized. Are they all regenerated? Then regeneration amounts to nothing. This doctrine, therefore, utterly degrades regeneration, the precious life-giving gift of the Holy Spirit. To say that those who receive regeneration by baptism in infancy fall away; that the principle of life imparted to them, being uncherished, remains undeveloped, is no satisfactory answer to this argument.

Life, especially the life of God in the soul, is not thus powerless. To say that a dead body is restored to life, when it exhibits no evidence of vitality; or, that a dead tree is made alive which puts forth no foliage and bears no fruit, is to say that it is alive and yet dead. It is true that a seed may have a principle of life in it which remains long undeveloped, but unfolds itself when placed under the normal conditions of growth. But the normal conditions of growth of the principle of spiritual life in an infant, are the development of the intelligence and the presence of the truth. If these conditions occur, the growth of the germ of spiritual life is certain. It is to be remembered that that germ is the Holy Spirit, who has life in Himself, and gives life to all in whom He dwells. The doctrine of baptismal regeneration is contradicted by facts. The baptized as a body remain unchanged in heart and life.

[591] Confessio Helvetica posterior, XX; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 517.

[592] Confessio Gallicana, Art. XXXV.; Ibid. p. 338.

[593] Catechismus Genevensis [V.], Niemeyer, pp. 162, 163.

[594] Thirty-nine Articles, XXVII.

[595] Ques. 72 and 73, Niemeyer, pp. 445, 446.

[596] Niemeyer, pp. 194, 195.

[597] Chap. xxviii. §§ 5, 6.

[598] Institutio, IV. xiv. 23, edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 364.

[599] That the baptism of John was not Christian baptism would seem plain, (1.) Because it belonged to the old dispensation. The Christian Church was not yet established. (2.) It bound no man to faith in Jesus Christ as the Son of God and Saviour of the world. (3.) He baptized all Judea, but all the people in Judea, pharisees and others, were not thereby made professing Christians. (4.) It was a baptism simply unto repentance, as a preparation for the coming of Christ. (5.) Those who were baptized by John were rebaptized when they professed to become Christians. Of the multitudes converted on the day of Pentecost and immediately after, many no doubt have been baptized by John, and yet they were baptized anew. And according to the interpretation, almost universally received in our day, of Acts xix. 1-6, Paul baptized in Ephesus "certain disciples" in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ, who had already been baptized by John.

[600] Commentar &#65533;ber das Evangelium des Johannes, von Dr. Friedrich L&#65533;cke, Professor der Theologie zu G&#65533;ttingen, 3d edit. Bonn, 1840; part i. p. 522.

[601] Das Evangelium des heiligen Johannes erl&#65533;utert, von E. W. Hengstenberg; Berlin, 1861, vol. i. pp. 186-189.

[602] A Critical and Grammatical Commentary on the Pastoral Epistles, with a revised Translation. By Rt. Rev. Charles J. Ellicott, D. D., Lord Bishop of Gloucester and Bristol, Andover, 1865, p. 213.

[603] In Novum Testamentum Commentari, edit. Berlin, 1831, vol. vi. p. 360.

[604] Bishop Ellicott refers to "the able treatise on this text by Waterland, a tract which, though extending only to thirty pages, will be found to include and to supersede much that has been written on this subject." The treatise thus commended furnishes an excellent illustration of the difficulty of those understanding each other, who differ

seriously in their modes of thinking and in their use of terms. To Waterland himself, and to those who agree with him in his theory of religion and in his use of words, this tract doubtless appears well ordered and consistent; by the majority of evangelical Christians of our day it can hardly fail to be regarded as full of confusion and contradictions. (This treatise may be found in Waterland; Works, edit. Oxford, 1843, vol. iv. pp. 425-458.) Waterland begins by saying, (1.) That Titus iii. 5, teaches that under the Christian dispensation, God saves men "by the sacrament of Christian baptism, considered in both its parts, the outward visible sign, which is water, and the inward things signified and exhibited, namely, a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness, therein wrought by the Holy Spirit of God." (Page 427.) (2.) The passage distinctly speaks both of a regeneration, and of a renovation, as two things, and both of them wrought ordinarily in one and the same baptism, here called the layer of regeneration and of renewing. (3.) "Regeneration," he says, "passively considered, is but another name for the new birth of a Christian: and that new birth, in general, means a spiritual change wrought upon any person, by the Holy Spirit in the use of baptism; whereby he is translated from his natural state in Adam, to a spiritual state in Christ." (Page 429.) Most persons in our day would understand this to mean that regeneration is a subjective change in the state of the soul; a change from spiritual death to spiritual life. This, however, is afterwards denied. Regeneration is not a change of mind. It is a change of state. It is a change in the relation which the sinner bears to God. "A translation from the curse of Adam into the grace of Christ. This change, translation, or adoption, carries in it many Christian blessings and privileges, but all reducible to two, namely, remission of sins (absolute or conditional), and a covenant claim, for the time being, to eternal happiness." (Page 433.) "Regeneration on the part of the grantor, God Almighty, means admission or adoption into sonship or spiritual citizenship: and on the part of the grantee, namely, man, it means his birth, or entrance into that state of sonship, or citizenship." (Page 432.) In this sense regeneration implies no subjective change. The soul remains precisely in the same inward state in which it was before. Adoption does not change a man's inward state. Waterland, therefore, maintains that Simon Magus was regenerated although it did him no good, leaving him in "the gall of bitterness and in the bond of iniquity." Sonship was granted him, but he did not accept it. He did not, however, need a second regeneration, but only to repent, then his regeneration or adoption in baptism would take effect. (Pages 442-444.) In this sense also he teaches that renovation or "the renewing of the Holy Ghost," must precede baptism, as well as attend and follow it. It must precede it to produce faith and repentance, without which regeneration or adoption does no good. (Page 434.) In infants, "their innocence and incapacity are to them instead of repentance, which they do not need, and of actual faith which they cannot have." (Page 439.) Infant baptism, however, effects no inward or subjective change. It leaves the soul in the same condition, not in the same state or relative position in which it was before. On page 433, in stating the difference between regeneration and renovation, the renewing of the Holy Ghost, he says, "Regeneration is itself a kind of renewal; but then it is of the spiritual state considered at large; whereas renovation is a "renewal of heart or mind," a "renewal, namely, of the inward frame, or disposition of the man." In proof of this difference between regeneration and renovation he says: Regeneration may be granted and received (as in infants) where that renovation has no place at all, for the time being: and therefore, most certainly, the notions are very distinct." Baptismal regeneration, therefore, involves no

change "of heart or mind," no change "of the inward frame or disposition." On page 443, in justifying the assumption that Simon Magus was regenerated by his baptism, he makes the benefits of baptism merely outward. He says that "As the Holy Spirit consecrates and sanctifies the waters of baptism, giving them an outward and relative holiness: so He consecrates the persons also in an outward and relative sense, whether good or bad, by a sacred dedication of them to the worship and service of the whole Trinity: which consecration is forever binding, and has its effect; either to the salvation of the parties, if they repent and amend, or to their greater damnation if they do not." Thus we have three, if not four different definitions of regeneration mixed up together in this treatise, and interchanged one for the other to suit emergencies. First, the word is taken in the sense which it now usually bears. It is the new birth, a change of heart, the commencement of spiritual life in the soul; a change from a state of spiritual death to that of spiritual life. The Christian is said to be the subject of three births. "Once he is born into the natural life, born of Adam; once he is born into the spiritual life, born of water and the Spirit; and once also into a life of glory, born of the resurrection at the last day." (Page 432.) In this sense regeneration and renovation differ as the commencement and the development of life differ; or, as in ordinary language, regeneration and the life-long process of sanctification differ. Secondly, regeneration is made to mean "the death unto sin." Romanists teach that in baptism there is the removal of sin both as to its guilt and power, and an infusion of new habits of grace. Waterland, on page 427, appears to confine it to the death of sin, which on page 439 he explains by the words "plenary remission." In words already quoted, God saves us "by the sacrament of Christian baptism considered in both its parts, the outward visible sign, which is water, and the inward things signified and exhibited, namely, a death unto sin, and a new birth unto righteousness." It will be observed he says "inward things," a death and a new birth, which he after distinguishes as regeneration and renovation. In baptism, therefore, we have simply "remission of sin," renovation precedes and follows it. Thirdly, he makes baptism to confer a covenant claim to the privileges or blessings all included under the heads of remission of sins and a title to eternal happiness. These are granted to adults conditionally, i.e., provided they have faith and repentance; and to infants absolutely, because in their case innocence supplies the place of faith and repentance. This implies no subjective change. It is simply adoption, such as Paul says, in Romans ix. 4, pertained to the Jews as a nation. And fourthly, be teaches that baptism confers on the recipient, whether good or bad, an outward and relative holiness, by consecrating him to the worship and service of God. (Page 443.) It would thus appear that every theory of baptism, whether Romanist or Protestant, High Church or Low Church, Evangelical or Ritual, can find support in this treatise. If the clear headed Bishop Ellicott has a clew through this labyrinth, he would do well to impart it to the public. The great characteristic of a large and representative class of the earned theologians of the Church of England during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, was that they derived their theology from the Bible through the medium of the Fathers. Whereas the theologians of the Continent drew their doctrines immediately from the Bible; and this makes the difference between biblical and patristical Christianity the difference, to common eyes, between twilight and noon.

§ 13. Lutheran Doctrine of Baptism.

Its Necessity.

On this point the Lutheran standards hold the following language. In the Augsburg Confession those who adopt that symbol say: "De baptismo docent, quod sit necessarius ad salutem, quodque per baptismum offeratur gratia Dei; et quod pueri sint baptizandi, qui per baptismum oblati Deo recipiantur in gratiam Dei. Damnant Anabaptistas, qui improbant baptismum puerorum et affirmant pueros sine baptismo salvos fieri." The Apology for that Confession repeats that declaration, and affirms "that the baptism of infants is not in vain but necessary and effectual to salvation." [605] The same doctrine is taught in the two catechisms of Luther, the larger and smaller.

This doctrine the Lutheran divines have softened down. They affirm that baptism is ordinarily necessary; yet that the necessity is not absolute, so that if its administration be prevented by unavoidable circumstances, the want of baptism is not fatal. Thus Gerhard, [606] says Docemus, "baptismum esse quidem ordinarium initiationis sacramentum et regenerationis medium omnibus omnino etiam fidelium liberis ad regenerationem et salutem necessarium; interim tamen in casu privationis sive impossibilitatis salvari liberos Christianorum per extraordinariam et peculiarem dispensationem divinam." Again [607] he says: "Infantes illos, qui vel in utero materno [608] vel repentino quodam casu ante baptismi susceptionem exstinguuntur, temere damnare nec possumus nec debemus, quin potius statuimus, preces piorum parentum, vel si parentes hac in parte negligentes fuerunt, preces Ecclesi&#65533; ad Deum pro his infantibus fusas clementer exaudiri, eosdemque in gratiam et vitam a Deo recipi." In this view the great body of Lutheran divines concur. Dr. Krauth says: "On God's part it is not so necessary that He may not, in an extraordinary case, reach, in an extraordinary way, what baptism is his ordinary mode of accomplishing. Food is ordinarily necessary to human life; so that the father who voluntarily withholds food from his child is at heart its murderer. Yet food is not so absolutely necessary to human life that God may not sustain life without it." [609]

Its Effects.

As Lutherans regard baptism as ordinarily the necessary means of salvation, they must hold that it communicates all that is essential to that end. It must be the ordinary means of conveying the merits of Christ for the remission of sin and the inward renovation or regeneration of the soul. Such is, therefore, the doctrine taught in the standards of the Lutheran Church. In Luther's Larger Catechism it is said, "Quare rei summam ita simplicissime complectere, hanc videlicet baptismi virtutem, opus, fructum et finem esse, ut homines salvos faciat. Nemo enim in hoc baptizatur, ut princeps evadat, verum sicut verba sonant, ut salvus fiat. C&#65533;terum salvum fieri scimus nihil aliud esse, quam a peccati, mortis et diaboli tyrannide liberari, in Christi regnum deferri, ac cum eo immortalem vitam agere." [610] Gerhard says all the effects of baptism may be included under the two heads mentioned in Titus iii. 5, regeneration and renovation. The former he says includes, (1.) The gift of faith. (2.) The remission of sins. (3.) Reception into the covenant of grace. (4.) Putting on Christ. (5.) Adoption into the number of the sons of God. (6.) Deliverance from the power of Satan, and, (7.) The possession of eternal life. Under the head of renovation he includes: the gift of the Holy Spirit, who begins to renew the intellect, the will, and all the powers of the soul; so that the lost image of God begins to be restored; the inward man is renewed, the old man put off, and the new man put on; the Spirit resists and gains

dominion over the flesh, that sin may not reign in the body. The same doctrine, in different words, is taught by all the leading Lutheran theologians. [611]

To what is this Efficacy of Baptism to be referred?

The effects attributed to baptism are not to be referred to any power inherent in the water; nor to the power of the Holy Spirit "extrinsecus accidens;" but to the power of the Spirit inherent in the Word. It has been repeatedly mentioned that Lutherans teach that there is a divine, supernatural power in the Word of God, which always produces a saving effect upon those who hear it, unless it is voluntarily resisted. In the case of infants there is no such voluntary resistance; and therefore to them baptism is always efficacious in conveying to them all the benefits of redemption, which, however, may be forfeited by neglect, unbelief, or bad conduct in after life. The word connected with baptism includes the command to baptize; the formula, the ordinance being administered in the name of the Holy Trinity; and especially the promise, "He that believeth and is baptized, shall be saved." In Luther's Shorter Catechism, in answer to the question, "Qui potest aqua tam magnas res efficere?" it is said, "Aqua certe tantas res non efficit, sed verbum Dei, quod in et cum aqua est, et fides, qu verbo Dei aqu addito credit. Quia aqua sine verbo Dei est simpliciter aqua, et non est baptismus: sed addito verbo Dei est baptismus, hoc est, salutaris aqua grati et vit, et lavacrum regenerationis in Spiritu Sancto, sicut Paulus ait ad Tit. iii. 5." [612] These ideas are expanded in the Larger Catechism. Among other things it is there said, "Ad hunc modum ita discerne, longe aliam rem esse baptismum, atque omnes alias aquas: non naturalis essenti gratia, sed quod huic aliquid prstantioris rei adjungitur. Ipse enim Deus baptismum suo honestat nomine, suaque virtute confirmat. Eam ob rem non tantum naturalis aqua, sed etiam divina, coelestis, sancta et salutifera aqua, quocunque alio laudis titulo nobilitari potest, habenda et dicenda est; hocque non nisi verbi gratia, quod coeleste ac sanctum verbum est, neque a quoquam satis ampliter, digne et cumulate laudari potest, siquidem omnem Dei virtutem et potentiam in se habet comprehensam. Inde quoque baptismus suam accipit essentiam, ut sacramenti appellationem mereatur, quemadmodum sanctus etiam docet Augustinus: Accedit, inquit, verbum ad elementum, et fit sacramentum, hoc est, res sancta et divina." [613] If the Word comprehends in itself, "all the virtue and power of God," and if that Word is united with the water of baptism, it is easy to understand how the ordinance has all the potency attributed to it.

The Condition on which the Efficacy of Baptism is suspended.

That condition is faith. It is the clearly pronounced doctrine of the Lutheran Church that baptism is altogether useless or void of any saving effect, unless the recipient be a believer. And by faith is not meant mere speculative assent, such as Simon Magus bad, but true, living, and saving faith. On these points the Lutheran standards are explicit. In the Larger Catechism, it is said: "Qui crediderit et baptizatus fuerit, salvus erit. Hoc est: sola fides personam dignam facit, ut hanc salutarem et divinam aquam utiliter suscipiat. Cum enim hoc in verbis una cum aqua nobis offeratur et proponatur, non alia ratione potest suscipi, quam ut hoc ex animo credamus. Citra fidem nihil prodest baptismus, tametsi per sese coelestis et instimabilis thesaurus esse negari non possit." And again it is said, "Absente fide, nudum et inefficax signum tantummodo permanet." [614]

From this it follows that in the case of adults, faith and therefore regeneration, must precede baptism. And consequently in their case the design and effect of baptism cannot be

to convey the remission of sin and renovation of the heart, but simply to confirm and strengthen a faith already possessed. Thus Gerhard and Baier as quoted above, say: [615] "Adultis credentibus principaliter pr&#65533;stat usum obsignationis ac testificationis de gratia Dei," and "Infantibus quidem &#65533;que omnibus per baptismum primum confertur et obsignatur fides, per quam meritum Christi applicatur. Adultis vero illis tantum, qui fidem ex verbo conceperunt ante baptismi susceptionem, baptismus eam obsignat et confirmat."

With regard to infants Lutherans teach that they have true faith. Gerhard says: "Nos non de modo fidei sumus solliciti, sed in illa simplicitate acquiescimus, quod infantes vere credant." [616] Chemnitz says: "Nequaquam concedendum est, infantes, qui baptizantur, vel sine fide esse, vel in aliena fide baptizari. . . . . Aliena quidem vel parentum vel offerentium fides, parvulos ad Christum in baptismo adducit Marc. x. 13, et orat, ut propria fide donentur. Sed per lavacrum aqu&#65533; in verbo, Christum Spiritu suo infantibus qui baptizantur, operari et efficacem esse, ut regnum Dei accipiant, non est dubium: licet, quomodo illud fiat, non intelligamus." Again, "Sicut enim circumcisio etiam parvulorum in V. T. fuit signaculum justiti&#65533; fidei, ita, quia in N. T. infantes baptizati Deo placent, et salvi sunt, non possunt, nec debent inter infideles rejici, sed recte annumerantur fidelibus." [617]

As the word produces faith in those who hear it, provided they do not resist its influence, so baptism in which the word is embodied (so that it is verbum visibile), produces faith in infants who are incapable of resistance. On this subject Dr. Krauth says: "That this grace is offered whenever baptism is administered, and is actually conferred by the Holy Spirit, whenever the individual receiving it does not present in himself a conscious voluntary barrier to its efficacy. This barrier, in the case of an individual personally responsible, is unbelief. In the case of an infant, there is no conscious voluntary barrier, and there is a divinely wrought receptivity of grace. The objector says, the infant cannot voluntarily receive the grace, therefore grace is not given. We reverse the proposition and reply, the infant cannot voluntarily reject grace, therefore the grace is given. When we speak of a divinely wrought receptivity of grace, we imply that whatever God offers in the Word or element bears with the offer the power of being received. When He says to the man with a withered arm, Reach forth thine arm!' that which was impossible by nature is made possible by the very word of command. The Word and Sacraments per se break up the absoluteness of the natural bondage; they bring an instant possibility of salvation. Grace is in them so far prevenient that he who has them may be saved, and if he be lost, is lost by his own fault alone." [618]

[605] Confessio, I. ix. et Apologia, IV. 51; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 12 and p. 156. "Quod baptismus puerorum non sit irritus, sed necessarius et efficax ad salutem."

[606] Gerhard, Loci Theologici, XXI. viii. 238; edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1769, vol. ix. p. 282.

[607] Ibid. p. 284.

[608] Romanists, when a child is in imminent peril, baptize it in utero.

[609] The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, as represented in the Augsburg Confession, and in the History and Literature of the Evangelical Lutheran Church. By Charles P. Krauth, D. D., Norton Professor of Theology in the Evangelical Lutheran Seminary, and Professor of Intellectual and Moral Philosophy in the University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1871, pp. 431. We are sorry to see that Dr. Krauth labours to prove that the Westminster Confession teaches that only a certain part,

or some of those who die in infancy, are saved; this he does by putting his own construction on the language of that Confession. We can only say that we never saw a Calvinistic theologian who held that doctrine. We are not learned enough to venture the assertion that no Calvinist ever held it; but if all Calvinists are responsible for what every Calvinist has ever said, and all Lutherans are responsible for everything Luther or Lutherans have ever said, then Dr. Krauth as well as ourselves will have a heavy burden to carry.

[610] Catechismus Major, IV. 24, 25; Hase, ut supra, p. 539.

[611] Gerhard, ut supra, vol. ix. pp. 148-157. For other Lutheran theologians see Schmid, Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, Frankfort and Erlangen, 1853.

[612] Catechismus Minor, IV. 9, 10; Hase, p. 377.

[613] Catechismus Major, IV. 17, 18; Ibid. pp. 537, 538.

[614] IV. 33, 34, and 73; Hase, pp. 541, 549.

[615] Pages 518, 519.

[616] Loci Theologici, XXI. viii. § 230; edit. T[illegible]bingen, 1769, vol. ix. pp. 275, 276.

[617] Loc. Theol. III. De Baptismo, edit. Frankfort and Wittenberg, 1653, p. 147, b, of third set.

[618] The Conservative Reformation and its Theology, p. 439.

§ 14. Doctrine of the Church of Rome.

The Canons of the Council of Trent on the subject of baptism are brief and comprehensive. The Canons anathematize those who teach that Christian baptism has no superior efficacy to that of John; that true, natural water is not essential in the administration of this sacrament, or that the language of our Lord in John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water," etc., is to be understood metaphorically; that heretical baptism if performed in the right way and with the intention of doing what the Church does is not valid; that baptism is a matter of indifference, and not necessary to salvation; and also those who deny the propriety, necessity, or efficacy of infant baptism, etc. The Roman Catechism enters much more fully on the subject. It defines baptism as the "sacramentum regenerationis per aquam in verbo." Its material is "omne naturalis aqu[illegible] genus, sive ea maris sit, sive fluvii, sive paludis, sive putei, aut fontis, qu[illegible] sine ulla adjunctione aqua dici solet." [619] The form prescribed by Christ in Matthew xxviii. 19, is to be observed. As baptism is an ablution it may be performed by immersion, affusion, or sprinkling. There should be sponsors to assume the responsibility of the religious education of the newly baptized. Sponsorship is such an impediment to marriage that if a sponsor should marry his or her godchild, the marriage would be null and void. Baptism by laymen or by women, in cases of necessity, is allowable. Infants receive in baptism spiritual grace; "non quia mentis su[illegible] assensione credant, sed quia parentum fide, si parentes fideles fuerint, sin minus, fide (ut D. Augustini verbis loquamur) univers[illegible] societatis sanctorum muniuntur.'" Those who are admitted to baptism must desire to be baptized. Hence the unwilling, the insane, the unconscious (nisi vit[illegible] periculum immineat), are not the proper subjects of baptism. In the case of infants, the will of the Church answers for their will. Faith also is necessary; for our Lord says, "He that believeth and is baptized shall be saved." So also is repentance.

"Cum baptismus ob eam rem expetendus sit, ut Christum induamus, et cum eo conjungamur, plane constat, merito a sacra ablutione rejiciendum esse, cui in vitiis et peccatis perseverare propositum est; pr&#65533;sertim vero, quia nihil eorum, qu&#65533; ad Christum, et Ecclesiam pertinent, frustra suscipiendum est: inanemque baptismum, si justiti&#65533;, et salutis gratiam spectemus, in eo futurum esse, satis intelligimus, qui secundum carnem ambulare, non secundum Spiritum cogitat: etsi, quod ad sacramentum pertinet, perfectam ejus rationem sine ulla dubitatione consequitur, si modo, cum rite baptizatur, in animo habeat id accipere, quod a sancta Ecclesia administratur." [620]

The first effect of baptism is the remission of sin. And by remission is meant not only pardon, but the removal of sin. The soul is so cleansed that nothing of the nature of sin remains in it. "Hoc primum tradere oportet, peccatum sive a primis parentibus origine contractum, sive a nobis commissum, quamvis etiam adeo nefarium sit, ut ne cogitari quidem posse videatur, admirabili hujus sacramenti virtute remitti, et condonari." The Catechism quotes the anathema pronounced by the Council of Trent on those who teach, "Quamvis peccata in baptismo remittantur, es tamen prorsus non tolli, aut radicitus evelli, sed quodam modo abradi, ita ut peccatorum radices animo infix&#65533; adhuc remaneant." [621] The language of the Council is, "In renatis nihil odit Deus, quia nihil est damnationis iis, qui vere consepulti sunt cum Christo per baptisma in mortem: qui non secundum carnem ambulant, sed veterem hominem exuentes, et novum, qui secundum Deum creatus est, induentes, innocentes, immaculati, puri, innoxii, ac Deo dilecti effecti sunt." [622] "Concupiscentia, qu&#65533; ex peccato est, nihil aliud est, nisi animi appetitio, natura sua rationi repugnans: qui tamen motus si voluntatis consensum, aut negligentiam conjunctam non habeat, a vera peccati natura longe abest." [623]

One of the propositions which Perrone lays down on this subject, is, that "Per D. N. J. C. gratiam, qu&#65533; in baptismo confertur, reatus originalis peccati remittitur, ac tollitur totum id, quod veram et propriam peccati rationem habet." [624]

Baptism, according to Romanists, avails not only for the remission and removal of all sin, but also for the inward sanctification of the soul. "Exponendum erit, hujus sacramenti virtute nos non solum a malis, qu&#65533; vere maxima dicenda sunt, liberari, verum etiam eximiis bonis augeri. Animus enim noster divina gratia repletur, qua justi, et filii Dei effecti, &#65533;tern&#65533; quoque salutis heredes instituimur." [625] It thus appears, that, according to the Church of Rome, all the benefits of the redemption of Christ are conveyed to the soul by baptism; and that there is no other divinely appointed channel of their communication.

The Council of Trent declared, "Si quis dixerit, in tribus sacramentis, baptismo scilicet, confirmatione, et ordine, non imprimi characterem in anima, hoc est signum quoddam spirituale, et indelebile, unde ea iterari non possunt; anathema sit." [626] What this internal spiritual something is, does not admit of explanation. It neither reveals itself in the consciousness nor manifests itself in the life. It is assumed to be something analogous in the spiritual sphere, to the insignia of merit or decorations of nobility in the sphere of civil or social life.

[619] II. ii. qu&#65533;s. 4, 6 [7]; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, vol. i. pp. 259, 260.

[620] II. ii. 27 [xxxiii.] 30 [xxxviii.]; Streitwolf, pp. 276, 279.

[621] Catechismus Romanus, II. ii. 31 [xlii.]; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 280, 281.

[622] Sess. v. 5; Ibid. vol. i. p. 19.

[623] Catechismus Romanus, II. ii. 32 [xliii.]; Ibid. pp. 281, 282.

[624] Pr&#65533;lectiones Theologic&#65533;, De Baptismo, cap. vi. 170, 5th edit. Turin, 1839, vol. vi. p. 59.

[625] Catechismus Romanus, II. ii. 38 [l.]; Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 286.

[626] Sess. vii. De Sacramentis in genere, canon 9; Streitwolf, pp. 39, 40.

§ 15. The Lord's Supper.

The passages of Scripture directly referring to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper are the following: Matthew xxvi. 26-28, "And as they were eating, Jesus took bread, and blessed it (eulogesas), and brake it, and gave it to the disciples, and. said, Take, eat; this is my body. And he took the cup and gave thanks (eucharistesas), and gave it to them, saying, Drink ye all of it: for this is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins."

Mark xiv. 22-24, "And as they did eat, Jesus took bread, and blessed, and brake it, and gave to them, and said, Take, eat; this is my body. And he took the cup; and when he had given thanks, He gave it to them: and they all drank of it. And he said unto them, This is my blood of the new testament, which is shed for many."

Luke xxii. 19, 20, "And he took bread, and gave thanks, and brake it, and gave unto them, saying, This is my body which is given for you: this do in remembrance of me. Likewise also the cup after supper, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood, which is shed for you."

1 Corinthians x. 15-17, "I speak as to wise men; judge ye what I say. The cup of blessing which we bless, is it not the communion of the blood of Christ? The bread which we break, is it not the communion of the body of Christ? For we being many are one bread, and one body; for we are all partakers of that one bread."

1 Corinthians xi. 23-29, "For I have received of the Lord that which also I delivered unto you, That the Lord Jesus, the same night in which he was betrayed, took bread: and when he had given thanks, he brake it, and said, Take, eat; this is my body, which is broken for you: this do in remembrance of me. After the same manner also he took the cup, when he had supped, saying, This cup is the new testament in my blood: this do ye, as oft as ye drink it, in remembrance of me. For as often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come. Wherefore, whosoever shall eat this bread, and drink this cup of the Lord, unworthily, shall be guilty of the body and blood of the Lord. But let a man examine himself, and so let him eat of that bread, and drink of that cup. For he that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh damnation to himself, not discerning the Lord's body."

Apart from matters of doubtful interpretation, these passages plainly teach, First, that the Lord's Supper is a divine institution of perpetual obligation. Second, that the material elements to be used in the celebration, are bread and wine. Third, that the important constituent parts of the service are, (1.) The consecration of the elements. (2.) The breaking of the bread and pouring out of the wine. (3.) The distribution and the reception by the communicants of the bread and wine. Fourth, that the design of the ordinance is, (1.) To

commemorate the death of Christ. (2.) To represent, to effect, and to avow our participation in the body and blood of Christ. (3.) To represent, effect, and avow the union of believers with Christ and with each other. And (4.) To signify and seal our acceptance of the new covenant as ratified by the blood of Christ. Fifth, the conditions for profitable communion are, (1.) Knowledge to discern the Lord's body. (2.) Faith to feed upon Him. (3.) Love to Christ and to his people.

The main points of controversy concerning this ordinance are: (1.) The sense in which the bread and wine are the body and blood of Christ. (2.) The sense in which the communicant receives the body and blood of Christ in this ordinance. (3.) The benefits which the sacrament confers, and the manner in which those benefits are conveyed. (4.) The conditions on which the efficacy of the ordinance is suspended.

The Lord's Supper is a divine Ordinance of perpetual Obligation.

This has never been doubted in the Christian Church. That Christ intended that the ordinance should continue to be observed in his Church until his second advent is plain, (1) From his express command given in Luke xxii. 19, and repeated by the Apostle in 1 Corinthians xi. 24. (2.) The design of the ordinance which is declared to be the commemoration of Christ; the constantly repeated proclamation of his expiatory death in the eats of men; and the communication of the benefits of that death to his people, necessarily assumes that it is to be observed so long as Christ, in the visible manifestation of his person, is absent from his Church. (3.) That the Apostles so understood the command of Christ is plain from their continuing to observe this ordinance to which such frequent reference is made in their writings, under the designations, "breaking of bread," "the Lord's Supper," and "The Lord's table." (4.) The uniform practice of the Church on this subject admits of no other solution, than the appointment of Christ and the authority of the Apostles.

The names given to this sacrament in the early Church were very various. It was called, (1.) Eucharistia, not only by the Greeks but also by the Latins, because as Chrysostom says, pollon estin euergetematon anamnesis. [627] It is a solemn thanksgiving for the blessings of redemption. This designation being so appropriate, all English speaking Christians are fond of calling it the eucharist. (2.) Eulogia, for the same reason. The words eucharisteo and eulogeo are interchanged. Sometimes the one and sometimes the other is used for the same act, and hence eucharistia and eulogia are used in the same sense. In 1 Corinthians x. 16, St. Paul calls the sacramental cup to poterion tes eulogias, "the cup of blessing," in allusion to the kvs hbdkh drunk at the paschal supper. (3.) Prosphora, "offering," because of the gifts or offerings for the poor and for the service of the Church made when the Lord's Supper was celebrated. (4.) Thusia, "sacrifice." Properly, the act of sacrificing; metonymically, the thing sacrificed or the victim; tropically of anything offered to God, as obedience or praise. In Philippians ii. 17, Paul speaks of "the sacrifice and service of faith;" and in iv. 18, he says that the contributions of the saints were "an odour of a sweet smell, a sacrifice acceptable, well pleasing to God. And in Hebrews xiii. 15 we read of a thusia aineseos, "a sacrifice of praise." The praise was the sacrifice or offering made to God. The Lord's Supper in this sense was at first called a sacrifice, both because it was itself a thank-offering to God and because attended by alms which were regarded as tokens of gratitude to Christ for the benefits of his redemption. Afterwards, it was so called, because it was a commemoration of the sacrifice of Christ upon the cross; and

finally because it came to be regarded by Romanists as itself an expiatory sacrifice. For this reason the consecrated wafer is by them called "hostia," the host, or victim, because it was assumed to be the true body of Christ offered to God in expiation of the sins of the faithful. (5.) Musterion, something secret, or having a sacred or secret import. As the Lord's Supper was a significant memorial of the greatest of all mysteries, the death of the Son of God upon the cross, it was appropriately designated musterion. This word, however, is applied in its general sense to both sacraments and even to other sacred rites. Another reason may be assigned for this designation. The Lord's Supper was celebrated in secret; in so far that the promiscuous body of attendants on Christian worship was dismissed before the sacrament was administered. (6.) Sunaxis, "the assembly," because from the nature of the service it implied the coming together of believers. (7.) "Sacramentum," in the general sense of musterion, by way of eminence applied to the Lord's Supper as "the" sacrament. It was also after the idea of the sacrificial character of the eucharist became prevalent, called "sacramentum altaris," the sacrament of the altar. This designation survived the doctrine on which it was founded, as it was retained by Luther, who earnestly repudiated the idea that the Lord's Supper is a sacrifice. (8.) "Missa," or mass. This word has been variously explained; but it is almost universally, at the present time, assumed to come from the words used in dismission of the congregation. "Ite, missa est," "Go, the congregation is dismissed." First the unconverted hearers were dismissed, and then the catechumens, the baptized faithful only remaining for the communion service. Hence there was in the early Church a "missa infidelium," a "missa catechumenorum," and finally a "missa fidelium." There seems to have been a different service adapted to these several classes of hearers. Hence the word "missa" came to be used in the sense of the Greek word leitourgia or service. As under the Old Testament the offering of sacrifices was the main part of the temple service, so in the Christian Church, when the Lord's Supper was regarded as an expiatory offering, it became the middle point in public worship and was called emphatically the service, or mass. Since the Reformation this has become universal as the designation of the eucharist as celebrated in the Church of Rome.

The Elements to be used in the Lord's Supper.

The word element, in this connection, is used in the same sense as the Latin word "elementum," and the Greek word stoicheia, for the component parts of anything; the simple materials or rudiments. Bread and wine are the elements employed in the celebration of the Lord's Supper, because they are the simple corporeal materials employed as the symbols of the body and blood of Christ.

As the Lord's Supper was originally instituted in connection with the Passover, there is no doubt that unleavened bread was used on that occasion. It is evident, however, from the apostolic history, that the Apostles used whatever kind of bread was at hand. There is no significancy either in the kind of bread or in the form of the loaf. It is enough that it is bread. This makes it the proper emblem of Him who declared Himself to be the true bread which came down from heaven.

Although it seems so obvious that it is a matter of indifference what kind of bread is used in the Lord's Supper, a serious controversy arose on this subject in the eleventh century between the Greek and Latin churches: the former condemning the use of unleavened bread as a remnant of Judaism, and the latter insisting not only on its propriety,

but on its being the only kind allowable, because used by Christ himself when He instituted the sacrament. The two churches adhere to their ancient convictions and practice to the present day. The Lutherans in this matter side, in their practice, with the Romanists. The Reformed regard it as a matter of indifference; although they object to the "placentul orbiculares," or round wafers, used by Romanists in this ordinance; because flour and water or flour and some glutinous substance is not bread in the ordinary sense of the word. It is not used for nourishment. The use, therefore, is inconsistent with the analogy between the sign and the thing signified. The eucharist is a supper; it represents our feeding upon Christ for our spiritual nourishment and growth in grace. Besides, the use of the wafer was introduced with the rise of the doctrine of transubstantiation. The consecrated bread being regarded as the real body of Christ, it was natural that it should be made in a form which precluded the danger of any particle of it being profaned. [628]

Some of the Reformed theologians raise the question whether in places where bread and wine cannot be obtained, it is lawful to use in their stead other articles of nourishment, the most allied to them in nature? This question they answer affirmatively; while they insist that the command of Christ and the practice of the Apostles should be strictly adhered to where such adherence is possible.

By wine as prescribed to be used in this ordinance, is to be understood "the juice of the grape;" and "the juice of the grape" in that state which was, and is, in common use, and in the state in which it was known as wine. The wine of the Bible was a manufactured article. It was not the juice of the grape as it exists in the fruit, but that juice submitted to such a process of fermentation as secured its preservation and gave it the qualities ascribed to it in Scripture. That oinos in the Bible, when unqualified by such terms as new, or sweet, means the fermented juice of the grape, is hardly an open question. It has never been questioned in the Church, if we except a few Christians of the present day. And it may safely be said that there is not a scholar on the continent of Europe, who has the least doubt on the subject. Those in the early Church, whose zeal for temperance led them to exclude wine from the Lord's table, were consistent enough to substitute water. They were called Tatiani, from the name of their leader, or Encratit, Hydroparastat, or Aquarii, from their principles. They not only abstained from the use of wine and denounced as "improbos atque impios" those who drank it, but they also repudiated animal food and marriage, regarding the devil as their author. [629] They soon disappeared from history. The plain meaning of the Bible on this subject has controlled the mind of the Church, and it is to be hoped will continue to control it till the end of time. [630]

In most churches, the wine used in the Lord's Supper is mixed with water. The reasons assigned for this custom, are, (1.) That the eucharist having been instituted at the table of the Paschal supper, and the wine used in the Passover being mixed with water, it is morally certain that the wine used by Christ when instituting this sacrament, was also thus mixed. Hence it was inferred that his disciples in all ages should follow his example. That the Paschal cup contained wine mixed with water rests on the authority of Jewish writers. "It was the general practice of the Jews to dilute their wine with water. Their wine was very strong,' says an ancient Jewish writer, [631] and not fit for drinking unless water was mixed with it.'" [632] It is certain, from the writings of the fathers, that this custom prevailed extensively in the primitive Church. As the Greeks and Romans were in the habit of mixing

water with their wine on all ordinary occasions, it is the more natural that the same usage should prevail in the Church. It is still retained, both by Romanists and by the Oriental Church. (2.) Besides this historical reason for the usage in question, it was urged that it adds to the appropriate significance of the ordinance. As water and blood flowed from the side of our Lord on the cross, it is proper, it is said, that water should be mixed with the wine in the service intended to be commemorative of his death. This being the case, the quantity of the water used was declared to be a matter of indifference. In the First Book of Edward VI. prepared for the Church of England, the minister was ordered to put into the cup "a little pure and clean water." This order was omitted from the rubric, and has never been restored. Merati, of the Church of Rome, says: "A little water ought to be mixed by the priest with the wine on the altar, not . . . . . for necessity of the sacrament or divine precept, ... but only of ecclesiastical precept obliging under mortal sin." [633]

The Sacramental Actions.

The first of these is the introductory and consecrating prayer. The object of this prayer is threefold: --

1. To give thanks to God for the gift of his Son, whose death we are about to commemorate.

2. To prepare the hearts of the communicants for the solemn service on which they are attending. To this end the prayer must be appropriate. And to be appropriate, it should be well considered. This is a matter of great importance. It often happens that the prayers offered on such occasions are long and rambling. Petitions are offered for all classes of men, for the young and old; for the sick and afflicted; for Sunday-schools; for missions, and all the other objects usually embraced in the long prayer before the sermon. The consequence is, that the minds of the people are distracted. Their attention is turned away from the service before them; and they are much less prepared to celebrate the Lord's death when the prayer is ended, than they were before it began. This is as inappropriate and as hurtful as it would be for a minister to spend his strength in praying for the conversion of the heathen or the Jews, when kneeling at the bedside of a dying sinner. The officiating clergyman little thinks of the pain he inflicts by such desultory prayers. He not only puts himself out of sympathy with the people, Out there is a constant antagonism between him and them during the progress of the prayer, and when it is over there is a painful effort to collect their scattered thoughts, and to suppress the feelings of disapprobation, displeasure, and sense of injury awakened by the want of thought or want of tact on the part of the pastor.

3. The third object of this introductory prayer, is the consecration of the elements. Bread and wine in themselves, or as found in common use, are not the symbols of the body and blood of Christ. They become such only by being set apart for that purpose. This is an important part of the service; and therefore, is made prominent in the liturgies of all Churches, and especially enjoined not only in our Directory for Worship, but also in the Confession of Faith and in our Larger Catechism. [634]

In all these points there is an analogy between this prayer and "the grace before meat," used at an ordinary meal. In that service we recognize the goodness of God in providing food for our bodies; we prepare our minds for the thankful reception of his gifts; and we pray that the portion received may be set apart or rendered effectual for the renewal of our strength. When, therefore, it is said that our Lord gave thanks or blessed the cup and the

bread, it is to be understood that He not only thanked God for his mercies, but that He also invoked his blessing, or, in other words, prayed that the bread and wine might be, what He intended them to be, the symbols of his body and blood, and the means of spiritual nourishment to his disciples. This is also taught by the Apostle in 1 Corinthians x. 16 where he speaks of "the cup of blessing," i.e., the cup which has been blessed, or consecrated by prayer to a sacred use; as is explained by the following words, "which we bless."

Breaking the Bread.

This is the second of the prescribed sacramental actions. It is an important, because it is a significant, part of the service. Christ broke the bread which He gave to his disciples. The bread is the symbol not merely of Christ's body, but of his body as broken for us. "The bread which we break," says the Apostle, thereby showing that the breaking was a constituent part of the service. So significant is this act that it was used as a designation of the sacrament itself, which was called the "breaking of bread," Acts ii. 42. The breaking of the bread enters into the significancy of the ordinance not only as referring to the broken body of Christ, but also as the participation of one bread is the symbol of the unity of believers. There is one bread, and one body. This significance is lost, when separate wafers are distributed to the communicants. Above all it is expressly commanded. It is recorded that Christ blessed, broke, and gave the bread; and then added: "This do." The command includes the blessing, the breaking, and the giving.

This important part of the service continued to be observed in the Church until the doctrine that the bread after consecration is the real body of Christ began to prevail. Then the use of the wafer was introduced, which is placed unbroken in the mouth of the communicant. This is clearly a departure from apostolic usage, and evinces a departure from apostolic doctrine.

The Distribution and Reception of the Elements.

It is recorded that Christ after having blessed the bread and broken the bread, gave it to his disciples, saying: "Take, eat." And in like manner after having blessed the cup. he gave it to them, saying: "Drink ye all of it." All this is significant. Christ gives; the disciples, each one for himself, receive and partake of the offered gifts.

From all this it is clear, (1.) That it is contrary to the rule prescribed in Scripture when the communicant does not for himself, receive with his own hand the elements of bread and wine. (2.) That it is utterly inconsistent with the nature of the sacrament, when, as in the private masses of the Romanists, the officiating priest alone partakes of the consecrated bread or wine. (3.) That it is against the nature of the sacrament, when instead of the two elements being distributed separately, the bread is dipped into the wine, and both are received together. This mode of administering the Lord's Supper, was, it is said, introduced at first, only in reference to the sick; then it was practised in some of the monasteries; and was partially introduced into the parishes. It never, however, received the sanction of the Roman Church. In the Greek and the other oriental churches it became the ordinary method, so far as the laity are concerned. The bread and wine are mixed together in the cup, and, by a spoon, placed in the mouth of the recipient. Among the Syrians the usual custom was for the priest to take a morsel of bread, dip it in the wine and place it in the mouth of the communicant. From the East this passed for a time over to the West, but was soon superseded by a still greater departure from the Scriptural rule. [635] (4.) The most flagrant

violation of the integrity of this sacrament is that of which the Church of Rome for the last seven hundred years has been guilty, in withholding the cup from the laity. This is inconsistent not only with the command of Christ, and the example of the Apostles, but also with the practice of the Universal Church for eleven hundred years. This is not denied by Romanists themselves. They do not pretend to claim the authority of antiquity for this custom. They fall back on the authority of :the Church. They deny, indeed, that the words of Christ include a command that the wine as well as the bread should be distributed in the Lord's Supper; but they affirm that after consecration, the whole substance of the bread is transmuted into the substance of Christ's body; and that as his body and blood are inseparable, they who receive the bread do thereby receive his blood; and, therefore, that the whole benefit of the sacrament is experienced by the laity although the cup be withheld from them. This being the case, they maintain that it is wise in the Church, for prudential reasons, especially to avoid the danger of the blood of Christ being spilled and profaned, to confine the administration of the cup to the clergy. On the principle that the whole Christ is in the bread, the language of the Council of Trent is: [636] "Si quis negaverit, in venerabili sacramento eucharisti sub unaquaque specie, et sub singulis cujusque speciei partibus, separatione facta, totum Christum contineri; anathema sit." The comment of Perrone on these words is as follows: "Hc porro veritas est corollarium dogmatis de transubstantione; panis enim et vinum per consecrationem convertuntur in illud Christi corpus et sanguinem, qui in coelis est, et in eodem statu glorioso; jam vero corpus illud inseparabile est a sanguine, anima et divinitate, et e converso pariter sanguis separari nequit a corpore, anima, et divinitate, ergo sub quavis specie totus Christus prsens fiat necesse est." [637] Withholding the cup from the laity is therefore founded on the doctrine of transubstantiation, and must fall with it. The custom was introduced gradually, and it was not until the Council of Constance, A.D. 1415, that it was made a law in the Latin Church. And that Council admits that its action was contrary to the primitive practice, for it says: "Although in the primitive Church this sacrament was received under both kinds, yet has this custom been introduced, that it should be taken by the celebrants under both kinds, and by the laity under the kind of bread only. Wherefore since this custom has been introduced by the Church and the holy fathers on reasonable grounds, and has been very long observed, it is to be accounted for a law, etc." [638]

The Design of the Lord's Supper.

As the death of the incarnate Son of God for us men and for our salvation is of all events the most important, it should be held in perpetual remembrance. It was to this end that our blessed Lord instituted this sacrament, and accompanied the institution with the command, "This do in remembrance of me." And the Apostle in 1 Corinthians xi. 26, tells his readers, "As often as ye eat this bread, and drink this cup, ye do shew the Lord's death till he come." This itself is of great importance. The fact that the Lord's Supper has been celebrated without interruption in the Church, from the day of the crucifixion to the present time, is an irresistible proof of the actual occurrence of the event which it is intended to commemorate. It is, therefore, just as certain that Christ died upon the cross as that Christians everywhere celebrate the Lord's Supper. It is not only, however, the fact of Christ's death, which this sacrament thus authenticates; but also its design. Our Lord declared that He died as a substitute and sacrifice. "This is my body which is given for you;" or, as the Apostle reports it, "broken for you." "This is my blood of the New

Testament, which is shed for many for the remission of sins." Redemption, therefore, is not by power, or by teaching, or by moral influence, but by expiation. It is this truth which the Lord's Supper exhibits and authenticates. Still further, as Christ affirms that his body was to be broken and his blood shed for the remission of sin, this from the nature of the case involves on his part the promise and pledge, that the sins of those who receive and trust Him, shall certainly be forgiven. The sacrament thus becomes not only a sign but also a seal It is the handwriting and signet of the Son of God attached to the promise of redemption. As, therefore, the truth revealed in the Word has the highest power that can belong to truth in its normal influence on the human mind; so even the natural effect of the truths symbolized and authenticated in the Lord's Supper, is to confirm the faith of the believer. But as the natural or objective power of the truth as revealed in the Word is insufficient for conversion or sanctification without the supernatural influences of the Spirit, so the truths set forth in the eucharist avail nothing towards our salvation unless the Spirit of all grace gives them effect. On the other hand, as the Word when attended by the demonstration of the Spirit, becomes the wisdom and power of God unto salvation; so does the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, when thus attended, become a real means of grace, not only signifying and sealing, but really conveying to the believing recipient, Christ and all the benefits of his redemption.

In the Lord's Supper, therefore, the believer receives Christ. He receives his body and blood. The Apostle asserts that the bread which we break is a participation (koinonia) of the body of Christ, and that the cup which we bless is a participation of the blood of Christ. (1 Cor. x. 16.) Our Lord in John vi. 53 says, "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." There must be a sense therefore, in which believers receive the body and blood of Christ. The effect of this reception of Christ is two fold. First, lie and his people become one; and secondly, all true believers in virtue of this union with Christ become one body "and every one members one of another." Christ and his people are one in such a sense that it is not they that live, but Christ that liveth in them. (Gal. ii. 20.) He dwells in them; his life is their life; because He lives they shall live also. (John xiv. 19.) They are one in a sense analogous to that in which the head and members of the human body are one. The Holy Spirit given to Him without measure is communicated to his people so that they become one body fitly joined together. (Eph. iv. 16.) By one Spirit they are all baptized into one body. (1 Cor. xii. 13.) This union between Christ and his pecple is also illustrated by the union between the vine and its branches. The life of the vine and of its branches is one. (John xv.) Again, Christ and his people are one, as husband and wife are one flesh. "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones." (Eph. v. 30.)

In being thus united to Christ as their common head, believers become one body, in a mystical sense. The Holy Spirit dwelling in each and in all constitutes them one. They have one principle of life. The Spirit works in all alike "both to will and to do." They have, consequently, one faith, and one religious experience, as well as one Lord, and one God and Father. They are so bound together that if one member suffer, all the members suffer with it; or if one member be honoured, all the members rejoice with it. (1 Cor. xii. 26.) So far as this all churches seem to agree. They all admit that in the Lord's Supper believers are thus united to Christ and to one another.

Qualifications for the Lord's Supper.

It is plain from the preceding account of the nature and design of this sacrament, that it is intended for believers; and that those who come to the table of the Lord do thereby profess to be his disciples. If sincere in this profession, they receive the inestimable gifts which it is intended to convey. If insincere, they eat and drink judgment to themselves. The Apostle, therefore, argues that as those who partook of the Jewish altars did thereby profess to be Jews; and as those who participated in the heathen sacrifices, did thereby profess to be heathen; so those who partake in the Lord's Supper, do thereby profess to be Christians. But to be a Christian a man must have competent knowledge of Christ and of his gospel. He must believe the record which God has given of his Son. He must believe that Christ died for our sins; that his body was broken for us. He must accept of Christ is He is thus offered to him as a propitiation for sin. All this, or, the profession of all this is involved in the very nature of the service. The faith, however, of those who would acceptably partake of the Lord's Supper, is faith not only in Christ, but also in the sacrament itself. That is, faith in its divine appointment, and in its being what in the New Testament it is declared to be. We must not look upon it as a mere human device, as a mere ritual observance or ceremony; but as a means ordained by God of signifying, sealing, and conveying to believers Christ and the benefits of his redemption. The reason why believers receive so little by their attendance on this ordinance is, that they expect so little. They expect to have their affections somewhat stirred, and their faith somewhat strengthened; but they perhaps rarely expect so to receive Christ as to be filled with all the fulness of God. Yet Christ in offering Himself to us in this ordinance, offers us all of God we are capable of receiving. For we are complete (pepleromenoi) filled, i.e., filled with the fulness of God in Him. (Col. ii. 10.)

It is impossible that the faith which this sacrament demands should exist in the heart, without producing supreme love and gratitude to Christ, and the fixed purpose to forsake all sin and to live devoted to his service. Our Church, therefore, teaches that it is required of them who would worthily partake of the Lord's Supper, that they examine themselves, of their knowledge to discern the Lord's body, of their faith to feed upon Him, of their repentance, love, and new obedience.

It is, however, not to be inferred from this that a man must be assured that he is a true believer before he can properly approach the Lord's table. It often happens that those who are most confident that they are Christians, have the least of Christ's Spirit. And therefore we are taught in the Larger Catechism, [639] that "One who doubteth of his being in Christ, or of his due preparation to the sacrament of the Lord's Supper, may have true interest in Christ, though he be not assured thereof; and in God's account hath it, if he be duly affected with the apprehension of the want of it, and unfeignedly desires to be found in Christ, and to depart from iniquity; in which case (because promises are made, and this sacrament is appointed, for the relief even of weak and doubting Christians) he is to bewail his unbelief, and labour to have his doubts resolved; and so doing, he may and ought to come to the Lord's Supper, that he may be further strengthened."

It is no valid objection to the doctrine that faith, love, and new obedience are the qualifications for an acceptable approach to the Lord's table, that under the Old Testament all the people were allowed to partake of the Passover. This only shows the difference

between what God demands, and what fallible men are authorized to enforce. It cannot be doubted that it was required of the Jews in coming to the paschal supper that they should believe the fact of their miraculous deliverance out of Egypt that they should be duly grateful to God for that great mercy and that they should have faith in the promise of that still greater redemption through Him of whom their paschal lamb was the divinely appointed type. All this was implied in an intelligent and sincere attendance on the Jewish Passover. The priests, however, were not authorized to sit in judgment on the sincerity of the worshippers, and to exclude all whom they deemed insincere. So while faith, love, and the purpose of new obedience are clearly required of all who come to the table of the Lord, all that the Church can demand is a credible profession; that is, a profession against which no tangible evidence can be adduced. Even to acceptable prayer, faith and love and the purpose of obedience are demanded, and yet we cannot exclude from access to God all whom we do not deem true believers. Confounding the Church and the world is a great evil, but the Church cannot be kept pure by any human devices. Men must be so instructed that they will be kept back from making profession of a faith they do not possess, by their own consciences; and those who act unworthily of their Christian profession should be subjected to the discipline of the Church. Further than this the Bible does not authorize us to go, and all attempts to improve upon the Bible must be productive of evil. According to our Directory for Worship, the minister "is to warn the profane, the ignorant, and scandalous, and those that secretly indulge themselves in any known sin, not to approach the holy table." To these classes his power of exclusion is confined. "On the other hand, he shall invite to this holy table, such as, sensible of their lost and helpless state of sin, depend upon the atonement of Christ for pardon and acceptance with God; such as, being instructed in the Gospel doctrine, have a competent knowledge to discern the Lord's body, and such as desire to renounce their sins, and are determined to lead a holy and godly life." [640]

Although all churches substantially agree as to the natare and design of the Lord's Supper, so far as the general statements above given are concerned, they differ essentially in their explanations of those statements; just as all profess to receive what the Scriptures say of this ordinance, while they differ so widely as to what the Bible really teaches. So far as these differences of views concern the qualifications for participating in the Lord's Supper; the benefits the ordinance is intended to convey; and the nature of the efficacy attributed to it, they have been already sufficiently considered when teaching of the sacraments in general. There are, however, certain points in reference to this sacrament in particular, which are so important that they have determined the course of ecclesiastical history. Those points are all intimately related. (1.) In what sense are the bread and wine in the eucharist the body and blood of Christ. (2.) In what sense are his body and blood received in that ordinance by the communicant. (3.) In what sense is Christ in the Lord's Supper. These points are so related that they cannot well be considered separately. These are the points as to which the Reformed, the Lutheran, and the Roman Churches are opposed to each other.

[627] In Mattheum Homilia, xxv. [xxvi.] 3; Works, edit. Montfaucon, Paris, 1836, vol. vii., p. 352 [310. d].

[628] The question of the kind of bread used in the eucharist at different times and in different churches is discussed with great minuteness of detail in the recent work, Notitia

Eucharistica, a Commentary, Explanatory, Doctrinal and Historical on the Order for the Administration of the Lord's Supper or Holy Communion, according to the Use of the Church of England. By W. E. Scudamore, M. A., Rector of Ditchingham and formerly Fellow of St. John's College, Cambridge; Rivingtons, London, Oxford and Cambridge, 1872, pp. 749-765.

[629] Suicer, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, sub voce Sunaxis; edit. Amsterdam, 1728, vol. ii. p. 1123.

[630] This is not the place for the discussion of what, in this country, is called "The Wine Question." The reader will find it amply ventilated in the Princeton Review for April and October, 1841, in two articles from the pen of Rev. John Maclean, D. D., and more recently by the Rev. Lyman H. Atwater, D. D., in the same Review, October, 1871, and January, 1872.

[631] Gloss in Lightfoot, Hor□ Hebraic□, in St. Matthew xxvi. 27, n. v. Opp. tom. ii. p. 380.

[632] Scudamore, ut supra, p. 350.

[633] Note by Merati in Gavanti. Commentaria in Rubricas Missalis Romani, pars. III. tit. iv. n. vi.; Thesaurus Sacrorum Rituum. auctore Gavanto. Augsburg, 1763, vol. i. p. 333, b.

[634] Directory, viii. 5; Confession, xxix. 3; Larger Catechism, Q. 169.

[635] Suicer, Thesaurus Ecclesiasticus, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 1127. Scudamore, Notitia Eucharistica, ut supra, pp. 614-618.

[636] Sess. xiii. canon 3; Streitwolf, Libri Symbolici, vol. i. p. 51.

[637] Pr□lectiones Theologic□, 5th edit. Turin, 1839, vol. vi. p. 168.

[638] Notitia Eucharistica, ut supra, p. 624.

[639] Ques. 172.

[640] Westminster Directory, chap. viii. p. 4.

§ 16. Doctrine of the Reformed Church on the Lord's Supper.

It is a very difficult matter to give an account of the Reformed doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper satisfactory to all parties. This difficulty arises partly from the fact that words have changed their meaning since the days of the Reformation. The Reformed as well as Lutherans asserted that there is "a real presence" of Christ in the Lord's Supper; and that the believer receives the true body and blood, or the substance of the body and blood of Christ. Such expressions would be understood in our day very differently from what they were then. Another source of difficulty on this subject is that the statements of the Reformed had for one great object the prevention of a schism in the ranks of the Protestants. They did all they could to conciliate Luther. They adopted forms of expression which could be understood in a Lutheran sense. So far was this irenical spirit carried that even Romanists asked nothing more than what the Reformed conceded. Still another difficulty is that the Reformed were not agreed among themselves. There were three distinct types of doctrine among them, the Zwinglian, the Calvinistic, and an intermediate form, which ultimately became symbolical, being adopted in the authoritative standards of the Church.

Zwinglian Statements.

It was the tendency of the Zwinglian element of the Reformed Church, to make less of the supernatural aspect of the sacraments than their associates did. There was, however, no essential difference, as afterwards appeared between the Churches of Zurich and those of Geneva. Zwingle taught that "The Lord's Supper is nothing else than the food of the soul, and Christ instituted the ordinance as a memorial of Himself. When a man commits himself to the sufferings and redemption of Christ he is saved. Of this He has left us a certain visible sign of his flesh and blood, both of which He has commanded us to eat and drink in remembrance of Him." This is said in a document presented to the council of Zurich in 1523.

In his "Expositio Christian[illegible] Fidei," written just before his death, and published by Bullinger in 1536, he says: "The natural substantial body of Christ in which He suffered, and in which He is now seated in heaven at the right hand of God, is not in the Lord's Supper eaten corporeally, or as to its essence, but spiritually only. . . . . Spiritually to eat Christ's body is nothing else than with the spirit and mind to rely on the goodness and mercy of God through Christ. . . . . Sacramentally to eat his body, is, the sacrament being added, with the mind and spirit to feed upon Him." [641]

The Confessions most nearly conformed to the views of Zwingle are the "Confessio Tetrapolitana," the "First Basil," and the "First Helvetic." These are all apologetic. The last mentioned protests against the representation that the Reformed regard the sacraments as mere badges of profession, and asserts that they are signs and means. The Lord's Supper is called "coena mystica" "in which Christ truly offers his body and blood, and hence Himself, to his people; not as though the body and blood of Christ were naturally united with the bread and wine, locally included in them, or sensibly there present, but in so far as the bread and wine are symbols, through which we have communion in his body and blood, not to the nourishment of the body, but of the spiritual or eternal life." [642]

In "The Sincere Confession of the Ministers of the Church of Zurich," dated 1545, we find the following precise statement of their doctrine: "We teach that the great design and end of the Lord's Supper, that to which the whole service is directed, is the remembrance of Christ's body devoted, and of his blood shed for the remission of our sins. This remembrance, however, cannot take place without true faith. And although the things of which the service is a memorial, are not visible or present after a visible or corporal manner, nevertheless believing apprehension and the assurance of faith renders them present in one sense to the soul of the believer. He has truly eaten the bread of Christ . . . . who believes on Christ, very God and very man, crucified for us, on whom to believe is to eat, and to eat is to believe. . . . . Believers have in the Lord's Supper no other life-giving food than that which they receive elsewhere than in that ordinance. The believer, therefore, receives both in and out of the Lord's Supper, in one and the same way, and by the same means of faith, one and the same food, Christ, except that in the supper the reception is connected with the actions and signs appointed by Christ, and accompanied with a testifying, thanksgiving, and binding service. . . . . Christ's flesh has done its work on earth, having been offered for our salvation; now it no longer benefits on earth and is no longer here."

Calvin's Doctrine.

While Calvin denied the real presence of the body and blood of Christ in the eucharist, in the sense in which that presence was asserted by Romanists and Lutherans, yet he affirmed that they were dynamically present. The sun is in the heavens, but his light and heat are present on earth. So the body of Christ is in heaven, but from that glorified body there radiates an influence, other than the influence of the Spirit (although through his agency), of which believers in the Lord's Supper are the recipients. In this way they receive the body and blood of Christ, or, their substance, or life-giving power. He held, therefore, that there was something not only supernatural, but truly miraculous, in this divine ordinance.

He says: [643] "We conclude that our souls are fed by the flesh and blood of Christ, just as our corporal life is preserved by bread and wine. For the analogy of the signs would not hold, if our souls did not find their aliment in Christ, which, however, cannot be the case, unless Christ truly coalesce into one with us, and support us through the use of his flesh and blood. It may seem incredible indeed that the flesh of Christ should reach us from such an immense local distance, so as to become our food. But we must remember how far the power of the Holy Spirit transcends all our senses, and what folly it must be even to think of reducing his immensity to our measure. Let faith then embrace what the understanding cannot grasp, namely, that the spirit truly unites things which are totally separated. Now this sacred communication of his flesh and blood, by which Christ transfuses his life into us, just as if He penetrated our bones and marrow, He testifies and seals in the holy supper; not by the exhibition of a vain and empty sign, but by putting forth such an energy of his Spirit as fulfils what He promises."

In 1561 Calvin wrote in answer to the Lutheran Hesshuss, and with an irenical purpose, his tract "De participatione carnis et sanguinis Christi in sacra coena." In an appendix to that Tract, he says, "The same body then which the Son of God once offered in sacrifice to the Father, he daily offers to us in the supper, that it may be our spiritual aliment. Only that must be held which was intimated as to the mode, that it is not necessary that the essence of the flesh should descend from heaven in order that we may feed upon it; but that the power of the Spirit is sufficient to penetrate through all impediments and to surmount all local distance. At the same time we do not deny that the mode here is incomprehensible to human thought; for flesh naturally could neither be the life of the soul, nor exert its power upon us from heaven; and not without reason is the communication, which makes us flesh of his flesh, and bone of his bones, denominated by Paul a great mystery. In the sacred supper we acknowledge it a miracle, transcending both nature and our understanding, that Christ's life is made common to us with Himself, and his flesh given to us as aliment." [644]

Again, "These things being disposed of, a doubt still appears with respect to the word substance'; which is readily allayed if we put away the gross imagination of a manducation of the flesh, as though it were corporal food, that, being taken into the mouth, is received into the stomach. For if this absurdity be removed, there no reason why we should deny that we are fed with Christ's flesh substantially, since we truly coalesce with Him in one body by faith, and are made one with Him. Whence it follows that we are joined with Him in substantial connection, just as substantial vigour flows down from the head into the members. The definition there must stand that we are made to partake of Christ's flesh substantially; not in the way of carnal mixture, or as if the flesh of Christ drawn down from

heaven entered into us, or were swallowed by the mouth; but because the flesh of Christ, as to its power and efficacy, vivifies our souls, not otherwise than the body is nourished by the substance of bread and wine." [645]

The Reformed symbols which most nearly conform to the peculiar views of Calvin are the Gallican, the Belgian, and the early Scottish. The first mentioned teaches [646] "Quamvis [Christus] nunc sit in coelis, ibidem etiam mansurus donec veniat mundum judicaturus: credimus tamen, eum arcana et incomprehensibili Spiritus sui virtute per fidem apprehensa, nos nutrire et vivificare sui corporis et sanguinis substantia. Dicimur autem hoc spiritualiter fieri, non ut efficaci&#xF; et veritatis loco imaginationem aut cogitationem supponamus, sed potius, quoniam hoc mysterium nostr&#xF; cum Christo coalitionis tam sublime est, ut omnes nostros sensus totumque adeo ordinem natur&#xF; superet: denique quoniam sit divinum ac coeleste, non nisi fide percipi ac apprehendi potest."

"Credimus, sicut antea dictum est, tam in coena quam in baptismo, Deum nobis reipsa, id est, vere et efficaciter donare quicquid ibi sacramentaliter figurat, ac proinde cum signis conjungimus veram possessionem ac fruitionem ejus rei, qu&#xF; ita nobis offertur. Itaque affirmamus eos qui ad sacram mensam Domini puram fidem tanquam vas quoddam afferunt, vere recipere quod ibi signa testificantur, nempe corpus et sanguinem Jesu Christi, non minus esse cibum ac potum anim&#xF;, quam panis et vinum sunt corporis cibus."

In the Scotch Confession of 1560, it is said, "We confess that believers in the right use of the Lord's Supper thus eat the body and drink the blood of Jesus Christ, and we firmly believe that He dwells in them, and they in Him, nay, that they thus become flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones. For as the eternal Deity gives life and immortality to the flesh of Christ, so also his flesh and blood, when eaten and drunk by us, confer on us the same prerogatives." [647]

ln the Belgic Confession adopted in 1563, it is said, "Ut iis nobis [Christus] testificatur, quam vere accipimus et tenemus manibus nostris hoc sacramentum, illudque ore comedimus (unde et postmodum vita h&#xF;c nostra sustentatur), tam vere etiam nos fide (qu&#xF; anim&#xF; nostr&#xF; est instar et manus et oris) recipere verum corpus et verum sanguinem Christi, in animis nostris, ad vitam spiritualem in nobis fovendam. . . . . Dicimus itaque id quod comeditur esse ipsissimum Christi corpus naturale, et id quod bibitur verum ipsius sanguinem: at instrumentum seu medium quo h&#xF;c comedimus et bibimus non est os corporeum, sed spiritus ipse noster, idque per fidem." [648]

Confessions in which Zwinglians and Calvinists agree.

The most important of these, as already mentioned, is the "Consensus Tigurinus," because drawn up for the express purpose of settling the disputes between the two parties, and because it was adopted by both. It was written by Calvin and published under the title "Consensio mutua in re Sacramentaria Ministrorum Tigurin&#xF; Ecclesi&#xF;, et D. Joannis Calvini Ministri Genevensis Ecclesi&#xF;, jam nunc ab ipsis authoribus edita." This "Consensus" was vehemently attacked by the Lutherans; and Calvin, four years after its publication, felt called upon to publish an explanation and defence of it. In his letter prefixed to that defence and addressed to the ministers of Zurich and other Swiss churches, he says: The Lutherans now see that those whom they denounced as Sacramentarians agree, and then adds: "Nec vero si superstites hodie essent optimi et eximii Christi servi Zwinglius et Oecolampadius, verbulum in ea sententia mutarent." [649] No document,

therefore, can have a higher claim to represent the true doctrine of the Reformed Church than this "Consensus." This document has already been quoted on a previous page to prove that its authors, (1.) Did not regard the sacraments as mere signs, or as simply badges of a Christian profession. (2.) But as means of grace, appointed, not only to signify and seal, but also to convey the benefits of redemption. (3.) That their saving and sanctifying efficacy is not due to any virtue in them or in him that doth administer them, but solely to the blessing of God and the working of his Spirit. (4.) That the sacraments are not means of grace to all indiscriminately, or to all who are their passive recipients, but only to believers or the chosen people of God. (5.) That their efficacy is not tied to the time of their administration. (6.) That the grace or saving gifts which the sacraments, when God so wills, are made the channels of communicating, may be, and in fact are, received before and without their use.

The last seven articles of the "Consensus" concern the Lord's Supper. In the twenty-first the local presence of Christ in that sacrament is denied. "Pr&#65533;sertim vero tollenda est qu&#65533;libet localis pr&#65533;senti&#65533; imaginatio. Nam quum signa hic in mundo sint, oculis cernuntur, palpentur manibus: Christus quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in coelo, nec aliter quam mente et fidei intelligentia qu&#65533;rendus est. Quare perversa et impia superstitio est, ipsum sub elementis hujus mundi includere."

The twenty-second article teaches that the words, "This is my body," in the form of institution, are to be understood figuratively. "Proinde, qui in solennibus Coen&#65533; verbis, Hoc est corpus meum, Hic est sanguis meus: pr&#65533;cise literalem, ut loquuntur, sensum urgent, eos tanquam pr&#65533;posteros interpretes repudiamus. Nam extra controversiam ponimus, figurate accipienda esse, ut esse panis et vinum dicantur id quod significant. Neque vero novum hoc aut insolens videri debet, ut per metonymiam ad signum transferatur rei figurat&#65533; nomen, quum passim in Scripturis ejusmodi locutiones occurrant: et nos sic loquendo nihil asserimus, quod non apud vetustissimos quosque et probatissimos Ecclesi&#65533; scriptores extet."

Article twenty-third relates to spiritual manducation. "Quod autem carnis su&#65533; esu et sanguinis potione, qu&#65533; hic figurantur, Christus animas nostras per fidem Spiritus sancti virtute pascit, id non perinde accipiendum, quasi fiat aliqua substanti&#65533; vel commixtio vel transfusio: sed quoniam ex carne semel in sacrificium oblata et sanguine in expiatione effuso vitam hauriamus."

Article twenty-fourth is directed against transubstantiation and other errors. "Hoc modo non tantum refutatur Papistarum commentum de transubstantione, sed crassa omnia figmenta atque futiles arguti&#65533;, qu&#65533; vel coelesti ejus glori&#65533; detrahunt vel veritati human&#65533; natur&#65533; minus sunt consentane&#65533;. Neque enim minus absurdum judicamus, Christus sub pane locare vel cum pane copulare, quam panem transubstantiare in corpus ejus."

Article twenty-fifth teaches that Christ's body is locally in heaven. "Ac ne qua ambiguitas restet, quum in coelo quarendum Christum dicimus, h&#65533;c locutio locorum distantiam nobis sonat et exprimit. Tametsi enim philosophice loquendo supra coelos locus non est; quia tamen corpus Christi, ut fert humani corporis natura et modus, finitum est et coelo, ut loco, continetur, necesse est a nobis tanto locorum intervallo distare, quanto coelum abest a terra."

Article twenty-sixth, the last of the series, is directed against the adoration of the host,

or consecrated wafer. [650]

The Heidelberg Catechism was prepared at the command of Frederick III., Elector of the Palatinate, by Caspar Olevian, a disciple of Calvin, and by Ursinus, a friend of Melancthon, and adopted by a General Synod held at Heidelberg in 1563. This Catechism, having symbolical authority both in the German and in the Dutch Reformed Churches, is entitled to special respect as a witness to the faith of the Reformed Church.

The sacraments are declared to be "Sacred, visible signs, and seals, instituted by God, that through them He may more clearly present and seal the promise of the gospel, namely, that He, for the sake of the one offering of Christ accomplished on the cross, grants not to all only but even to separate believers the forgiveness of sin and eternal life."

"How art thou reminded and assured, in the Holy Supper, that thou art a partaker of the one offering of Christ on the cross, and of all his benefits?"

"Thus, that Christ has commanded me and all believers, to eat this broken bread, and to drink this cup in remembrance of Him; adding these promises: that his body was offered and broken on the cross for me, and his blood shed for me, as certainly as I see with my eyes the bread of the Lord broken for me, and the cup communicated to me: and further, that He feeds and nourishes my soul to everlasting life, with his crucified body and shed blood, as assuredly as I receive from the hands of the minister, and take with my mouth, the bread and cup, as certain signs of the body and blood of Christ."

"What is it then to eat the crucified body, and drink the shed blood of Christ?"

"It is not only to embrace with a believing heart all the sufferings and death of Christ, and thereby to obtain the pardon of sin and eternal life; but also, besides that, to become more and more united to his sacred body by the Holy Ghost, who dwells at once both in Christ and in us; so that we, though Christ is in heaven, and we on earth, are notwithstanding, flesh of his flesh and bone of his bone; and we live and are governed forever by one Spirit, as the members of the same body are by one soul."

"Do then the bread and wine become the very body and blood of Christ?"

"Not at all: but as the water in baptism is not changed into the blood of Christ, neither is the washing away of sin itself, being only the sign and pledge of the things sealed to us in baptism; so the bread in the Lord's Supper is not changed into the very body of Christ; though agreeably to the nature and properties of sacraments, it is called the body of Christ Jesus." [651]

The Confession of Faith of the Reformed Dutch Church was revised by the Synod of Dort in 1618 and 1619. In the thirty-fifth article of that Confession, it is said that as man has a natural life common to all men, so believers have besides, a spiritual life given in their regeneration; and as God has provided food for our natural life, He has in like manner provided food for our spiritual life. That food is Christ, who is the true bread which came down from heaven; "who nourishes and strengthens the spiritual life of believers, when they eat Him, that is to say, when they apply and receive him by faith in the Spirit." As we receive the bread and wine by the mouth "we also do as certainty receive by faith (which is the hand and mouth of our soul.) the true body and blood of Christ our only Saviour in our souls for the support of our spiritual life." The manner of this reception is hidden and incomprehensible. "In the mean time we err not, when we say, that what is eaten and drunk

by us is the proper and natural body, and the proper blood of Christ. But the manner of our partaking of the same, is not by the mouth, but by the Spirit through faith."

The Second Helvetic Confession is, on some accounts, to be regarded as the most authoritative symbol of the Reformed Church, as it was more generally received than any other, and was sanctioned by different parties. It was drawn up by Bullinger in 1562. In 1565, the Elector Frederick, distressed at the contentions respecting the sacraments which agitated the Church, wrote to Bullinger to send him a confession which might if possible unite the conflicting parties, or, at least meet the objections of the Lutherans. Bullinger sent him this Confession which he had prepared some years before; with which the Elector was perfectly satisfied. To give it the greater authority it was adopted by the Helvetic churches. As it was drawn up by Bullinger the successor of Zwingle at Zurich, it cannot be supposed to contain anything to which a Zwinglian could object. The nineteenth chapter treats of the sacraments in general, and teaches, (1.) That they are mystic symbols, or holy rites, or sacred actions, including the word, signs, and thing signified. (2.) That there were sacraments under the old, as well as under the new economy. (3.) That God is their author, and operates through them. (4.) That Christ is the great object presented in them, the substance and matter of them, the lamb slain from the foundation of the world, the rock from which all the fathers drank, etc. (5.) Therefore, as far as the substance is concerned, the sacraments of the two dispensations are equal; they have the same author, the same significancy, and the same effects. (6.) The old have been abolished, and baptism and the Lord's Supper introduced in their place. (7.) Then follows an exposition of the constituent parts of a sacrament. First, the word, by which the elements are constituted sacred signs. Water, bread, and wine, are not in themselves, apart from the divine appointment, sacred symbols; it is the word of God added to them, consecrating, or setting them apart, which gives them their sacramental character. Secondly, the signs, being thus consecrated, receive the names of the things signified. Water is called regeneration; the bread and wine are called the body and blood of Christ. They are not changed in their own nature. They are called by the names of the things signified, because the two are sacramentally united, that is, united by mystical significance and divine appointment. (8.) In the next paragraph, this Confession rejects, on the one hand the Romish doctrine of consecration, and on the other, the idea that the sacraments are mere empty signs. (9.) The benefits signified are not so included in the sacraments or bound to them, that all who receive the signs receive the things which they signify; nor does their efficacy depend on the administrator; nor their integrity upon the receiver. As the Word of God continues his Word whether men believe or not; so is it with the sacraments.

The twenty-first chapter is devoted to the Lord's Supper. It contains the following passages: "Ut autem rectius et perspicacius intelligatur, quomodo caro et sanguis Christi sint cibus et potus fidelium, percipianturque a fidelibus ad vitam ◆ternam, paucula h◆c adjiciemus. Manducatio non est unius generis. Est enim manducatio corporalis, qua cibus in os percipitur ab homine, dentibus atteritur, et in ventrem deglutitur. . . . . Est et spiritualis manducatio corporis Christi, non ea quidem, qua existimemus cibum ipsum mutari in spiritum, sed qua, manente in sua essentia et proprietate corpore et sanguine Domini, ea nobis communicantur spiritualiter, utique non corporali modo, sed spirituali, per Spiritum Sanctum, qui videlicet ea, qu◆ per carnem et sanguinem Domini pro nobis in mortem tradita, parata sunt, ipsam inquam remissionem peccatorum, liberationem, et vitam

�ternam, applicat et confert nobis, ita ut Christus in nobis vivat, et nos in ipso vivamus, efficitque ut ipsum, quo talis sit cibus et potus spiritualis noster, id est, vita nostra, vera fide percipiamus. . . . . Et sicut oportet cibum in nosmetipsos edendo recipere, ut operetur in nobis, suamque in nobis efficaciam exerat, cum extra nos positus, nihil nobis prosit: ita necesse est nos fide Christum recipere, ut noster fiat, vivatque in nobis, et nos in ipso. . . . . Ex quibus omnibus claret nos, per spiritualem cibum, minime intelligere imaginarium, nescio quem, cibum, sed ipsum Domini corpus pro nobis traditum, quod tamen percipiatur a fidelibus, non corporaliter, sed spiritualiter per fidem. . . . . Fit autem hic esus et potus spiritualis, etiam extra Domini coenam, quoties, aut ubicunque homo in Christum crediderit. Quo fortassis illud Augustini pertinet, Quid paras dentem et ventrem? crede, et manducasti."

"Pr�ter superiorem manducationem spiritualem, est et sacramentalis manducatio corporis Domini, qua fidelis non tantum spiritualiter et interne participat vero corpore et sanguine Domini, sed, foris etiam accedendo ad mensam Domini, accipit visibile corporis et sanguinis Domini sacramentum." [652]

It is a remarkable fact that the confessions of the Church of England conform more nearly to the Zwinglian than to the Calvinistic ideas and phraseology in respect to the Lord's Supper. This may be accounted for by the fact that it was less important for the English than for the German churches to conciliate the Lutherans. In the articles adopted by the Synod of London in 1552, and approved by Edward VI., the first clause of the statement of the doctrine of the Lord's Supper is in the language of Scripture: "To those who receive it worthily and with faith, the bread which we break is the communion of the body of Christ." The second clause rejects transubstantiation. The third is directed against the Lutheran doctrine, and asserts that as Christ is in heaven; "non debet quisquam fidelium carnis ejus et sanguinis realem et corporalem (ut loquuntur) pr�sentiam in eucharistia vel credere vel profiteri."

Article twenty-eight of the Thirty-nine Articles adopted in 1562, contains the first three clauses substantially as they appeared in the article of Edward VI., and then adds: "The body of Christ is given, taken, and eaten in the supper only after a heavenly and spiritual manner; and the mean whereby the body of Christ is received and eaten in the supper, is faith. The sacrament of the Lord's Supper was not by Christ's ordinance reserved, carried about, lifted up, and worshipped." In the early edition of these articles, the clause against transubstantiation was amplified as follows: "Forasmuch as the truth of man's nature requireth, that the body of one and the selfsame man cannot be at one time in divers places, but must needs be in one certain place; therefore the body of Christ cannot be present at one time in many and divers places: and because as Holy Scripture doth teach, Christ was taken up into heaven, and there shall continue unto the end of the world; a faithful man ought not either to believe, or openly confess the real and bodily presence, as they term it, of Christ's flesh and blood in the sacrament of the Lord's Supper." [653] All this is implied in the form in which the article now stands. It affords clear evidence what were the sentiments of the English Reformers on this subject. It is principally interesting as it repudiates the idea of the "real presence" of the flesh and blood of Christ in the sacrament; which even Zwingle was willing to allow. He, however, used the word "real" in a very different sense from that in which it is used by either Romanists or Lutherans.

The Sense in which Christ is present in the Lord's Supper.

The extracts from the symbols of the Reformed Church enable us to answer, First, the question in what sense according to that Church, Christ is present in the Lord's Supper. The Reformed theologians are careful to explain what they mean by the word presence. Anything is said to be present when it operates duly on our perceiving faculties. A sensible object is present (pr\u2022 sensibus) when it affects the senses. A spiritual object is present when it is intellectually apprehended and when it acts upon the mind. It is said of the wicked, "God is not in all their thoughts." They are without God. They are "far off." On the other hand, God is present with his people when He controls their thoughts, operates on their hearts, and fills them with the sense of his nearness and love. This presence is not imaginary, it is in the highest sense real and effective. In like manner Christ is present when He thus fills the mind, sheds abroad his love in our hearts by the Holy Ghost given unto us; and not only communicates to us the benefits of his sufferings and death, that is, the remission of our sins and reconciliation with God, but also infuses his life into us. Nothing is plainer from Scripture than that there is this communication of life from Christ to his people. It is not only directly asserted as when Paul says, "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me" (Gal. ii. 20); and, He "is our life" (Col. iii. 4); but it is also illustrated in every way. As the body derives life from this head (Col. ii. 19) and the branches from the vine, so do believers derive their life from Him: on this point there is no dispute among Christians. This, again, is a presence to us and in us which. is not imaginary, but in the highest sense real and effective.

But what is meant by the word Christ when He is said to be thus present with us? It does not mean merely that the Logos, the eternal Son of God, who fills heaven and earth, is present with us as He is with all his creatures; or, simply that He operates in us as He operates throughout the universe. Nor does it mean merely that his Spirit dwells in believers and works in them both to will and to do of his good pleasure. Something more than all this is meant. Christ is a person; a divine person with a human nature; that is with a true body and a reasonable soul. It is that person who is present with us. This again does not mean, that Christ's human nature, his body and soul are ubiquitous; but it does mean that a divine person with human affections and sympathies is near us and within us. We have now a high-priest who can be touched with a sense of our infirmities. (Heb. iv. 15.) He and we are one in such a sense that He is not ashamed to call us brethren. (Heb. ii. 11.) In all things He was made like unto his brethren that He might be what He still is, a merciful and faithful high priest. (Heb. ii. 17.) Of this every Christian is assured. [654] The prayers and hymns of the Church addressed to Christ all assume that He has human sympathies and affections which make his relation to us entirely different from what it is to any other order of beings in the universe. If any one asks, How the humanity of Christ, his body and soul in heaven, can sympathize with his people on earth? the answer is, that it is in personal union with the Logos. If this answer be deemed insufficient, then the questioner may be asked, How the dust of which the human body is formed can sympathize with the immortal spirit with which it is united? Whether the mystery of this human sympathy of Christ can be explained or not, it remains a fact both of Scripture and of experience. In this sense, and not in a sense which implies any relation to space, it may be said that wherever the divinity of Christ is, there is his humanity, and as, by common consent, He is present at his table, He is there in the fulness of his human sympathy and love.

But this presence of Christ in the eucharist is predicated, not of his person only, but also of his body and blood. This presence the Reformed, as Zwingle said, "if they must have words," were willing to call real. But then they explained the word "real" as the opposite of "imaginary." The negative statements concerning this presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper are, --

1. That it is not local or corporeal. It is not material or of the matter.

2. It is not to the senses.

3. It is not peculiar to this sacrament. Christ and his benefits, his body and blood, and all their influences on the believer, are said to be accessible to him, and as truly received by him out of the supper as in it.

On this point the Confessions, even those signed by Calvin, are perfectly explicit. In the Zurich Confession, A.D. 1545, it is said, "Believers have in the Lord's Supper no other life-giving food than that which they receive elsewhere than in that ordinance." In the Second Helvetic Confession this is taught at length, and the doctrine vindicated from the objection that it renders the sacrament useless, that if we can receive without it what we receive in it, the importance of the sacrament is gone. The answer is, that as we continually need food for the body, so we continually need food for the soul; and that the sacraments as well as the Word are divinely appointed means for conveying that spiritual nourishment. That the sacraments are means of grace, does not render the Word unnecessary; neither does the Word's being effectual and sufficient unto salvation, render the sacraments useless. Calvin teaches the same doctrine: [655] "The verity which is figured in the sacraments believers receive our side of the use of them. Thus in baptism, Paul's sins were washed away, which had already been blotted out. Baptism was to Cornelius the layer cf regeneration, although he had before received the Spirit. And so in the Lord's Supper, Christ communicates Himself to us, although He had already imparted Himself to us and dwells within us." The office of the sacraments, he teaches, is to confirm and increase our faith. In his defence of this "Consensus," he expresses surprise that a doctrine so plainly proved by Scripture and experience should be called into question. [656] In the decree of the French National Synod of 1572, it is said, "The same Lord Jesus both as to his substance and gifts, is offered to us in baptism and the ministry of the word, and received by believers."

The Church of England teaches the same doctrine, for in the office for the communion of the sick, the minister is directed to instruct a parishioner who is prevented from receiving the sacrament "that if he do truly repent him of his sins, and steadfastly believe that Jesus Christ hath suffered death upon the cross for him, and shed his blood for his redemption, earnestly remembering the benefits he hath thereby, and giving Him hearty thanks therefor, he doth eat and drink the body and blood of our Saviour Christ profitably to his soul's health, although he do not receive the sacrament with his mouth." On this point there was no diversity of opinion in the Reformed Church. There is no communion with Christ, no participation of his body and blood in the Lord's Supper, which is not elsewhere offered to believers and experienced by them.

4. There is still another position maintained by the Reformed which is especially important as determining their doctrine on this subject. They not only deny that believers receive the body and blood of Christ in the Lord's Supper otherwise than these are received

through the Word, but they deny that believers receive anything in the eucharist that was not granted and communicated to the saints under the Old Testament. This of course is decisive. Under the old dispensation it was only the sacrificial efficacy of his broken body and shed blood that could be enjoyed. He died for the remission of sins "under the first testament." (Heb. ix. 15.) Therefore the fathers as well as we, and they as fully as we, are cleansed by the sprinkling of his blood; to them, as well as to us, He was the true bread which came down from heaven; they all drank of that Spiritual Rock which was Christ. Calvin devotes several pages to the refutation of the doctrine of the Romanists that the sacraments of the Old Testament only signified grace, while those of the New actually convey it. He maintains that, though different in form, they are the same in nature, object, and effect. "Scholasticum autem illud dogma, quo tam longum discrimen inter veteris ac nov[illegible] Legis sacramenta notatur, perinde acsi illa non aliud quam Dei gratiam adumbrarint, h[illegible]c vero pr[illegible]sentem conferant, penitus explodendum est. Siquidem nihilo splendidius de illis Apostolus quam de his loquitur, quum docet patres eandem nobiscum spiritualem escam manducasse: et escam illam Christum interpretatur (1 Cor. x. 3). . . . . Quicquid ergo nobis hodie in sacramentis exhibetur, id in suis olim recipiebant Jud[illegible]i, Christum scilicet cum spiritualibus suis divitiis. Quam habent nostra virtutem, eam quoque in suis sentiebant; ut scilicet essent illis divin[illegible] erga se benevolenti[illegible] sigilla in spem [illegible]tern[illegible] salutis." He quotes freely from Augustine to prove that that eminent father taught "Sacramenta Jud[illegible]orum in signis fuere diversa: in re qu[illegible] significatur, paria, diversa specie visibili, paria virtute spirituali." [657]

With these negative statements agree all the affirmations concerning the presence of the body and blood in the Lord's Supper. What is affirmed to be present is not the body and blood of Christ absolutely, but his body as broken, and his blood as shed. It is he sacrifice which He offered that is present and of which the believer partakes. It is present to the mind, not to our bodies. It is perceived and received by faith and not otherwise. He is not present to unbelievers. By presence is meant not local nearness, but intellectual cognition and apprehension, believing appropriation, and spiritual operation. The body and blood are present to us when they fill our thoughts, are apprehended by faith as broken and shed for our salvation, and exert upon us their proper effect. [658] "The body of Christ is in heaven at the right hand of God," says the Helvetic Confession. "Yet the Lord is not absent from his Church when celebrating his supper. The sun is absent from us in heaven, nevertheless it is efficaciously present with us; how much more is Christ, the sun of righteousness, though absent as to the body, present with us, not corporally in deed, but spiritually, by his vivifying influence." Calvin says, "Every imagination of local presence is to be entirely removed. For while the signs are upon earth seen by the eyes and handled by the hands, Christ, so far as He is a man, is nowhere else than in heaven; and is to be sought only by the mind and by faith. It is, therefore, an irrational and impious superstition to include Him in the earthly elements." He likewise teaches that Christ is present in the promise and not in the signs. [659] Ursinus, one of the principal authors of the Heidelberg Catechism, in his Exposition of that formulary, says: "These two, I mean the sign and the thing signified, are united in this sacrament, not by any natural copulation, or corporal and local existence one in the other; much less by transubstantiation, or changing one into the other; but by signifying, sealing, and exhibiting the one by the other; that is, by a sacramental union, whose bond is the promise added to the bread, requiring the faith of the receivers. Whence

it is clear, that these things, in their lawful use, are always jointly exhibited and received, but not without faith of the promise, viewing and apprehending the thing promised, now present in the sacrament; yet not present or included in the sign as in a vessel containing it; but present in the promise, which is the better part, life, and soul of the sacrament. For they want judgment who affirm that Christ's body cannot be present in the sacrament except it be in or under the bread; as if, forsooth, the bread alone, without the promise, were either a sacrament, or the principal part of a sacrament." [660]

There is, therefore, a presence of Christ's body in the Lord's Supper; not local, but spiritual; not to the senses, but to the mind and to faith; and not of nearness, but of efficacy. If the presence is in the promise, then the body of Christ is present, offered to and received by the believer whenever and wherever he embraces and appropriates the promise. So far the doctrine of the Reformed Church is clear.

Manducation.

Our Lord in John vi. 53-58, expressly and solemnly declares that except a man eat of his flesh, and drink his blood, he has no life in him; and that whoso eateth his flesh and drinketh his blood, hath eternal life. It is here taught that the eating spoken of is necessary to salvation. He who does not eat of the flesh of the Son of Man, has no life in him. He who does thus eat, shall live forever. Now as no Christian Church, not even the Roman, maintains that a participation of the Lord's Supper is essential to salvation, it is plain that no such Church can consistently believe that the eating spoken of is that which is peculiar to that ordinance. Again, the Scriptures so clearly and variously teach that those who believe in Christ; who receive the record God has given of his Son; who receive Him; who flee to Him for refuge; who lay hold of Him as their God and Saviour, shall never perish but have eternal life; it is plain that what is expressed in John vi. by eating the flesh of Christ and drinking his blood, must be the same thing that is elsewhere expressed in the various ways just referred to. When we eat our food we receive and appropriate it to the nourishment of our bodies; so to eat the flesh of Christ, is to receive and appropriate him and his sacrificial work for the life of our souls. Without this appropriation of Christ to ourselves we have no life; with it, we have life eternal, for He is our life. As this appropriation is an act of faith, it is by believing that we eat his flesh and drink his blood. We accordingly find that this is recognized in all the leading Confessions of the Reformed Church. Thus in the Zurich Confession it is said, "Eating is believing, and believing is eating." The Helvetic Confession, as quoted above, [661] says, that this eating takes place as often as and wherever a man believes in Christ. The Belgic Confession says, [662] "God sent Christ as the true bread from heaven which nourishes and sustains the spiritual life of believers, if it be eaten, that is, if it be applied and received by the Spirit through faith." Faith, as shown above, is, in all these Confessions, declared to be the hand and the mouth by which this reception and appropriation are effected. A distinction may be, and often is, made between spiritual and sacramental manducation. But the difference between them is merely circumstantial. In the former the believer feeds on Christ to his spiritual nourishment, without the intervention and use of the elements of bread and wine; in the latter, he does the same thing in the use of those elements as the divinely appointed sign and seal of the truth and promise of God.

Although the Confessions are thus uniform and clear in their assertion, "that eating is

believing," the theologians, in some instances, make a distinction between them. Thus Calvin says: [663] "There are some who define in a word, that to eat the flesh of Christ, and to drink his blood, is no other than to believe on Christ Himself. But I conceive that in that remarkable discourse, in which He recommends us to feed upon his body, He intended to teach us something more striking and sublime; namely, that we are quickened by a real participation of Him, which he designates by the terms eating and drinking, that no person might suppose the life which we receive from Him to consist in simple knowledge. . . . . At the same time, we confess there is no eating but by faith, and it is impossible to imagine any other; but the difference between me and those whose opinion I now oppose is this, ... they consider eating to be faith itself, but I apprehend it to be rather a consequence of faith." Among the moderns Dean Alford makes much the same distinction. "What is this eating and drinking? Clearly, not merely faith: for faith answers to the hand reached forth for the food, -- but not the act of eating. Faith is a necessary condition of the act: so that we can hardly say, with Augustine, Crede, et manducasti;' but crede et manucabis.'" [664] Eating, he says, implies the act of appropriation. This is a distinction without a difference. It concerns simply the extent given to the meaning of the word faith. If faith be merely knowledge and assent, then there is a difference between believing and eating, or appropriating. But if by faith we not merely receive as with the hand, but appropriate and apply what is thus received, the difference between believing and eating disappears. When we are commanded to eat the flesh and to drink the blood of Christ, we are commanded to act; and the act required is an act of faith; the act of receiving and appropriating Christ and the benefits of his redemption. The language of Calvin above quoted is to be taken in connection with his explicit declaration already cited, that the Christian receives and feeds on Christ whenever he truly believes; and with the fact that he admits that the believer eats Christ as fully elsewhere as in the Lord's Supper; and especially with the fact that the saints under the old dispensation ate of the same spiritual meat and drank of the same spiritual drink as fully and as really as believers now do. The Reformed understood that "eating and drinking," as used in John vi. 51-58, must be understood "figuratively of the spiritual appropriation of Christ by faith," because our Lord makes such eating and drinking essential to salvation. On this point the Lutherans are of one mind with the Reformed, in so far as their leading theologians understand all that is said in John vi. of eating his flesh and drinking his blood, of the appropriation of his sacrificial death by the act of believing.

What is received in the Lord's Supper.

The question, What is the act we perform in eating? and, What it is we eat? are distinct, though the answer to one may determine the answer to the other. If the manducation is not with the mouth but by faith, then the thing eaten must be spiritual and not material. Nevertheless our Lord says we must eat his flesh and drink his blood; and all the Reformed Confessions teach that we receive the body and blood of Christ, although not "after a corporal or carnal manner." In answer to the question, What is here meant by the body and blood of Christ? the almost uniform answer is, (1.) That it is not the matter of his body and blood. (2.) That it is not his body and blood as such. (3.) That it is not his glorified body now in heaven. His body and blood were received by the disciples before his death, and consequently before his ascension and glorification, and it is not disputed that believers since the apostolic age receive what the Apostles received when this sacrament was instituted. (4.) That we receive Christ's body as broken, or as given unto death for us. and

his blood as shed for the remission of sins. (5.) That therefore to receive the body and blood as offered in the sacrament, or in the Word, is to receive and appropriate the sacrificial virtue or effects of the death of Christ on the cross. And, (6.) That as Christ and his benefits are inseparable, they who receive the one receive also the other; as by faith through the indwelling of the Holy Ghost we are united to Christ so as to be members of that body of which He is the head and the perpetual source of life. By faith, therefore, we become one with Him, so as to be flesh of his flesh, in a sense analogous to that in which husband and wife are no more two, but one flesh.

Although Calvin admitted all these propositions, he nevertheless, at times, teaches that what the believers receive is specifically an influence from the glorified body of Christ in heaven. Thus he says: "We admit without circumlocution that the flesh of Christ is life-giving, not only because in it once our salvation was obtained, but because now, we being united to Him in sacred union, it breathes life into us. Or, to use fewer words, because, being by the secret power of the Spirit engrafted into the body of Christ, we have a common life with Him; for from the hidden fountain of divinity, life is, in a wonderful manner, infused into the flesh of Christ, and thence flows out to us." [665] Again, "Christ is absent from us as to the body; by his Spirit, however, dwelling in us, He so lifts us to Himself in heaven, that he transfuses the life-giving vigour of his life into us, as we grow by the vital heat of the sun." [666] If by the word "flesh," in this connection, we understand the humanity of Christ, there is a sense in which the passages above quoted may be understood in accordance with the common doctrine not only of the Reformed, but of all Christian churches. When Paul said "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me," he no doubt meant by Christ the incarnate Son of God clothed in our nature at the right hand of God. It is a divine-human Saviour, He who is both God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever, in whom and by whom we live, and who dwells in us by his Spirit. Unless we are willing to accuse the illustrious Calvin of inconsistency, his meaning must be made to harmonize with what he says elsewhere. In the "Consensus Tigurinus," he says: "Christus quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in coelo, nec aliter quam mente et fidei intelligentia qu\u{fffd} rendus est;" and again, "Quod autem carnis su\u{fffd} esu et sanguinis potione, qu\u{fffd} hic figurantur, Christus animas nostras per fidem Spiritus sancti virtute pascit, id non perinde accipiendum, quasi fiat aliqua substanti\u{fffd} vel commixtio vel transfusio: sed quoniam ex carne semel in sacrificium oblata et sanguine in expiationem effuso vitam hauriamus." [667] It is here expressly said that what the believer receives in the Lord's Supper is not any supernatural influence flowing from the glorified body of Christ in heaven; but the benefits of his death as an expiation for sin. It is to be remarked that Calvin uses the very words of the twenty-third article of the Consensus in explanation of what he meant by saying, "ex abscondito Deitatis fonte in Christi carnem mirabiliter infusa est vita, ut inde ad nos flueret." [668] To preserve the consistency of the great Reformer his language must be interpreted so as to harmonize with the two crucial facts for which he so earnestly contends; first, that believers receive elsewhere by faith all they receive at the Lord's table; and secondly, that we Christians receive nothing above or beyond that which was received by the saints under the Old Testament, before the glorified body of Christ had any existence. It is also to be remembered that Calvin avowed his agreement with Zwingle and Oecolampadius on all questions relating to the sacraments. [669]

The Efficacy of the Lord's Supper as a Sacrament.

This includes two points, first, The effect produced; and second, The agency or influence to which the effect is due. In the Lord's Supper we are said to receive Christ and the benefits of his redemption to our spiritual nourishment and growth in grace. As our natural food imparts life and strength to our bodies, so this sacrament is one of the divinely appointed means to strengthen the principle of life in the soul of the believer, and to confirm his faith in the promises of the gospel. The Apostle teaches that by partaking of the bread and wine, the symbols of Christ's body and blood given for us, we are thereby united to him as our head, and with all our fellow believers as joint members of his mystical body. The union between the head and members of the human body and between the vine and its branches, is a continuous union. There is a constant flow of vital influence from the one to the other. In like manner the union between Christ and his people is continuous. He constantly imparts his life-giving influence to all united to Him by faith and by the indwelling of his Spirit. It has often been stated already that the Bible teaches, (1.) That Christ and his people are one; that this union is not merely a union of congeniality or feeling, but such as constitutes them one in a real but mysterious sense. (2.) That the bond of union is faith and the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, who dwelling in Him without measure is communicated from Him to all his members. As God is everywhere present and everywhere operative by his Spirit, so Christ dwells in our hearts by faith through or in virtue of the indwelling of the Holy Ghost. (3.) He is thus our life. He works in us to will and to do according to his own good pleasure. As God works everywhere throughout nature continually controlling all natural causes each after its kind, to produce the effects intended; so does Christ work in us according to the laws of our nature in the production of everything that is good; so that it is from Him that "all holy desires, all good counsels, and all just works do proceed." It is not, therefore, we that live, but Christ that liveth in us.

As our Lord in addressing the Apostles and through them all his disciples, said this is my body and blood given for you, He says the same in the most impressive manner in this ordinance to every believing communicant: "This is my body broken for you." "This is my blood shed for you." These words when received by faith fill the heart with joy, confidence, gratitude, love, and devotion; so that such a believer rises from the Lord's table refreshed by the infusion of a new life.

The efficacy of this sacrament, according to the Reformed doctrine, is not to be referred to any virtue in the ordinance itself, whether in its elements or actions; much less to any virtue in the administrator; nor to the mere power of the truths which it signifies; nor to the inherent, divine power in the word or promise by which it is attended; nor to the real presence of the material body and blood of Christ (i.e., of the body born of the Virgin), whether by the way of transubstantiation, consubstantiation, or impanation; [670] nor to a supernatural life-giving influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven, nor to the communication of the theanthropic nature of Christ, but only to "the blessing of Christ, and the working of his Spirit in them that receive" the sacrament of his body and blood.

By some of the early fathers the resurrection of the body was regarded as a specific effect of the Lord's Supper, which was therefore called, as by Ignatius, [671] pharmakon athanasias, antidotos tou apothanein. This idea was connected in their minds with the doctrine of impanation referred to in the foregoing foot-note. Of this there is little trace in

the theology of either the Reformed or Lutheran Church. In the Scotch Confession of 1560, it is indeed said: "As the eternal deity gives life and immortality to the flesh of Christ, so also his flesh and blood, when eaten and drunk by us, confer on us the same prerogatives;" and in the confession adopted by the Lutherans in 1592 it is said, the body of Christ is received by the mouth "in pignus et certificationem resurrectionis nostrorum corporum ex mortuis;" on which Philippi remarks that those words do not imply any "immediate corporeal operation or any implanting in us of a germ of a resurrection body. They only teach that this sacrament is a pledge of our resurrection; and as this idea is introduced only in one place in the acknowledged standards of the Church, and there only incidentally, it is to be considered as a subordinate matter. The main point is the pledge of the pardon of sin and of eternal life which includes an assurance of the resurrection of the body." [672]

According to the standards of the Reformed Church, therefore: The Lord's Supper is a holy ordinance instituted by Christ; as a memorial of his death, wherein, under the symbols of bread and wine, his body as broken and his blood as shed for the remission of sins, are signified, and, by the power of the Holy Ghost, sealed and applied to believers; whereby their union with Christ and their mutual fellowship are set forth and confirmed, their faith strengthened, and their souls nourished unto eternal life.

Christ is really present to his people in this sacrament, not bodily, but in spirit; not in the sense of local nearness, but of efficacious operation. They receive Him, not with the mouth but by faith; they receive his flesh and blood, not as flesh, not as material particles, not its human life, not the supernatural influence of his glorified body in heaven; but his body as broken and his blood as shed. The union thus signified and effected is not a corporeal union, not a mixture of substances, but a spiritual and mystical union due to the indwelling of the Holy Spirit. The efficacy of this sacrament, as a means of grace, is not in the signs, nor in the service, nor in the minister, nor in the word, but in the attending influence of the Holy Ghost.

[641] "In coena domini naturale ac substantiale istud corpus Christi, quo et hic passus est et nunc in coelis ad dexteram patris sedet, non naturaliter atque per essentiam editur, sed spiritualiter tantum. . . . . Spiritualiter edere, corpus Christi, nihil est aliud quam spiritu ac mente niti misericordia et bonitate Dei per Christum. . . . . Sacramentaliter edere corpus Christi, cum proprie volumus loqui, est, adjuncto sacramento, mente ac spiritu corpus Christi edere." Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 44, 47.

[642] "Coenam mysticam, in qua dominus corpus et sanguinem suum, id est, seipsum suia vere ad hoc offerat, ut magis, magisque in illis vivat, et illi in ipso. Non quod pani et vino corpus et sanguis domini vel naturaliter uniantur: vel hic localiter includantur, vel ulla huc carnali pr&#xfffd;sentia, statuantur. Sed quod panis et vinum ex institutione domini symbola sint, quibus ab ipso domino per ecclesi&#xfffd; ministerium vera corporis et sanguinis ejus communicatio, non in periturum ventris cibum, sed in &#xfffd;tern&#xfffd; vit&#xfffd; alimoniam exhibeatur." Art. xxii.; Niemeyer, pp. 120, 121.

[643] Institutio IV. xvii. 10; edit. Berlin, 1834, part II. p. 407. "Summa sit, non aliter animas nostras carne et sanguine Christi pasci, quam panis et vinum corporalem vitam tuentur et sustinent. Neque enim aliter quadraret analogia signi, nisi alimentum suum anim&#xfffd; in Christo reperirent: quod fieri non potest, nisi nobiscum Christus vere in unum coalescat nosque reficiat carnis su&#xfffd; esu et sanguinis potu. Etsi autem incredibile videtur, in tanta

locorum distantia penetrare ad nos Christi carnem, ut nobis sit in cibum, meminerimus, quantum supra sensus omnes nostros emineat arcana Spiritus sancti virtus et quam stultum sit, ejus immensitatem modo nostro velle metiri. Quod ergo mens nostra non comprehendit, concipiat fides, Spiritum vere unire, qu&#65533; locis disjuncta sunt. Jam sacram illam carnis et sanguinis sui communicationem, qua vitam suam in nos transfundit Christus non secus acsi in ossa et medullas penetraret, in coena etiam testatur et obsignat; et quidem non objecto inani aut vacuo signo, sed efficaciam Spiritus sui illic proferens, qua impleat quod promittit."

[644] Works, Amsterdam, 1667; vol. viii. p. 744, a, b.

[645] At the meeting of the national Synod of France in 1571, Beza being president, an application was made by certain deputies to have the clause in Article 37 of the Confession altered, which asserts that we are nourished with "the substance of Christ's body and blood." The Synod refused to make the alteration, and explained the expression by saying they did not understand by it, "any confusion, commixture, or conjunction, ... but this only, that by this virtue all that is in Him that is needful to our salvation, is hereby most freely given and communicated to us. Nor do we agree with those who say we communicate in his merits and gifts and Spirit, without his being made ours; but with the Apostle (Eph. v. 23), admiring this supernatural, and to us, incomprehensible, mystery, we believe we are partakers of his body delivered to death for us, and of his blood shed for us, so that we are flesh of his flesh and bone of his bones, and that we receive Him together with his gifts by faith, wrought in us by the incomprehensible virtue and efficacy of the Holy Spirit." This decision offended the Zurich ministers.

[646] Art. xxxvi. xxvii.; Niemeyer, p. 338.

[647] Art. xxi.; Niemeyer, p. 352.

[648] Art. xxxv.; Ibid. pp. 385, 386.

[649] See his Letter to the Swiss Churches prefixed to his Consensionis Capitum Expositio, Niemeyer, ut supra, p. 201.

[650] Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 196.

[651] Ques. lxvi. lxxv. lxxvi. lxxviii.; Niemeyer, pp. 444-447.

[652] See Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, pp. 512-521.

[653] See Exposition of Thirty-Nine Articles by Gilbert [Burnet], 6th edit. Dublin, 1790, p. 403.

[654] The late Dr. Cutler, of precious memory, formerly rector of St. Ann's Church, Brooklyn, a short time before his death, met the writer in Chestnut Street, Philadelphia, and without a word of salutation, said, "Have you ever thought of the difference between communion with God and communion with Christ?" and passed on without adding a word. These were the last words the writer ever heard from lips which the Spirit had often touched with a coal from the altar.

[655] "Extra eorum [sacramentorum] usum fidelibus constat, qu&#65533; illic figuratur veritas. Sic baptismo abluta sunt Pauli peccata, qu&#65533; jam prius abluta erant. Sic idem baptismus Cornelio fuit lavacrum regenerationis, qui tamen jam Spiritu Sancto donatus erat. Sic in coena se communiat Christus, qui tamen et prius se nobis impertierat et perpetuo manet in nobis." Consensus Tigurinus, art. xix.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 195.

[656] Niemeyer, p. 212. "Quod deinde prosequimur, fidelibus spiritualium bonorum effectum qu&#xfffd; figurant sacramenta, extra eorum usum constare, quando et quotidie verum esse experimur et probatur Spiritur&#xfffd; testimoniis, mirum est si cui displiceat."

[657] See Institutio, IV. xiv. §§ 20-26, especially §§23, 26; edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. pp. 362-367.

[658] "Corpus Christi in coelis est ad dextram patris. Sursum ergo elevanda sunt corda, et non defigenda in panem, nec adorandus dominus in pane. Et tamen non est absens ecclesi&#xfffd; su&#xfffd; celebranti coenam dominus. Sol absens a nobis in coelo, nihilominus efficaciter pr&#xfffd;sens est nobis: quanto magis sol justiti&#xfffd; Christus, corpore en coelis absens nobis, pr&#xfffd;sens est nobis, non corporaliter quidem, sed spiritualiter per vivificam operationem. (XXI.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, Leipzig, 1840, p. 522.) Calvin says (Consensus Tigurinus, XXI.; Ibid. p. 196): "Pr&#xfffd;sertim vero tollenda est qu&#xfffd;libet localis pr&#xfffd;senti&#xfffd; imaginatio. Nam quum signa hic in mundo sint, oculis cernantur, palpentur manibus: Christus quatenus homo est, non alibi quam in coelo, nec aliter quam mente et fidei intelligentia qu&#xfffd;rendus est. Quare perversa et impia superstitio est, ipsum sub elementis hujus mundi includere."

[659] Consensus Tigurinus, X.; p. 194.

[660] Summe of Christian Religion, by Zacharias Ursinus, London, 1645; Catechism of Christian Religion, quest. 77, p. 434.

[661] Page 636.

[662] "Deus panem vivificum misit, qui de coelo descendit, nempe Jesum Christum: is nutrit et sustentat vitam fidelium spiritualem, si comedatur, id est, applicetur et recipiatur Spiritu per fidem." XXXV.; Niemeyer, Collectio Confessionum, p. 385.

[663] "Sunt enim qui manducare Christi carnem, et sanguinem ejus bibere, uno verbo definiunt, nihil esse aliud, quam in Christum ipsum credere. Sed mihi expressius quiddam ac sublimius videtur voluisse docere Christus in pr&#xfffd;clara illa concione, ubi carnis su&#xfffd; manducationem nobis commendat: nempe vera sui participatione nos vivificari, quam manducandi etiam ac bibendi verbis ideo designavit, ne, quam ab ipso vitam percipimus, simplicii cognitione percipi quispiam putaret. Quemadmodum enim non aspectus, sed esus panis corpori alimentum sufficit, ita vere ac penitus participem Christi animam fieri convenit, ut ipsius virtute in vitam spiritualem vegetetur. Interim vero hanc non aliam esse, quam fidei manducationem fatemur, ut nulla alia fingi potest. Verum hoc inter mea et isotrum verba interest, quod illis manducare est duntaxat credere: ego credendo manducari Christi carnem, quia fide noster efficitur, eamque manducationem fructum effectamque esse fidei dico." Institutio, IV. xvii. 5; edit. Berlin, 1834, pp. 403, 404.

[664] Greek Testament, John vi. 53; edit. London, 1859, vol. i. p. 723.

[665] See his Consensionis Capitum Expositio, Niemeyer, pp. 213, 214.

[666] Ibid. p. 215.

[667] Art. xxi. xxiii.; Niemeyer, p. 196.

[668] Niemeyer, p. 214.

[669] See page 631.

[670] One of the numerous theories concerning the eucharist prevalent more or less in

the early church, was that which is known in the history of doctrine as impanation. As in man the soul is united to the body imparting to it life and efficiency without itself becoming material, or rendering the body spirit; and as the Eternal Logos became flesh by taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul, without receiving anything human into his divine nature, or imparting divinity to his humanity; so the same Logos becomes united with the consecrated bread, without any substantial change in it or in Him. His relation to the bread, however, is analogous to that of the soul to the body in man and of the Logos to humanity in the person of our Lord. As the assumption of our nature by the Son of God is expressed by the word "incarnation," so his assumption and union with the bread in the Lord's Supper is called "impanation." The only distinguished modern theologian (as far as known to the writer), who advocated this doctrine, was the late Dr. August Hahn of the University if Leipzig. "Bread and wine," he says, "in the Lord's Supper, are what the human body formerly was when the Son of God (the divine Logos) was here on earth; that is, the means of his perceptible presence and efficiency on those who receive Him in a penitent and believing heart; they are therefore = the body and blood of Christ; since in them the Lord, who is the Light, the Life, and the Resurrection, communicates Himself actually, truly, and essentially (wirklich und wahrhaftig und wesentlich) to his people, and makes this bread, the bread of eternal life." See Lehrbuch des Christlichen Glaubens, von August Hahn, Leipzig, 1828, p. 602. On page 603, he says, Luther was right in rejecting the doctrine of transubstantiation, and "he would have been right had he taught that with in, with, and under the bread and wine in the Holy Supper, we actually and essentially or really (wirklich und wesentlich) receive the present person of Jesus Christ or the Logos, and hence this bread and this wine are the body and blood of Christ, wherein He now communicates the bread which is from heaven to believers, as formerly when He came in literal flesh and blood He gave Himself to them. But Luther erred when he asserted that with, in, and under the bread and wine, the real body which suffered for us, and the blood of Jesus Christ which was shed for us, are communicated, because according to the Scriptures (1 Cor. xv. 45-50), the spiritual, heavenly body of our glorified Lord, is not flesh and blood; and a body, whatever be its nature, cannot as body be ubiquitous."

[671] Ad Ephesios, XX.; Epistles, edit. Oxford, 1709, p. 19.

[672] Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, von D. Fr. Ad. Philippi, ordentlichem Professor der Theologie zu Rostock, Gtersloh, 1871, vol. v. p. 266.

§ 17. Modern Views concerning the Lord's Supper.

The modern philosophy has introduced certain principles as to the nature of God and his relation to the world, and as to the nature of man and his relation to God, which when applied to Christian doctrines have produced a revolution in theology. It has already been shown that the principles of this philosophy in their application to the origin and present state of man, to the person and work of Christ, and to the way in which men are made partakers of his salvation, have introduced a method of presenting the gospel utterly unintelligible to those unacquainted with the modern speculations. The word philosophy is to be understood in a sense wide enough to include a great diversity of systems, which although they have certain principles in common, differ widely from each other. They belong to two general classes, the pantheistic and theistic, which merge off into each other

in every variety of form, and in different degrees of approximation towards identity.

According to the pantheistic theory, the world is the ever varying and unfolding existence form of God; and man is the form in which He comes to consciousness on this earth. According to the theistic theory, the world owes its existence to the will of God, in which He is immanent and of which He is the life. Man is the form in which generic humanity is manifested in connection with a given corporeal organization. On neither view is there any real dualism between God and the world, or God and man except as occasioned by sin. The oneness of God and man is affirmed by both classes, by Cousin and Ullman for example, with equal earnestness. This is a oneness which admits of diversity; it is a unity in plurality; but it is a oneness of life; and such a unity of nature that God may become man, and man God.

The individuality or personality of man depends on the body. Generic humanity is not in itself a person. It becomes personal only by its union with an organized body. It loses its personality when it has nobody; and therefore the immortality of the soul, as distinct from the body, is pronounced by Olshausen an anti-Christian or pagan idea. Whatever of conscious existence the soul has between death and the resurrection must be connection with its body, which is not the prison, or garment, or shell, or hull of the soul; it is not in any way one form of existence and the soul another; both form one life. The soul to be complete to develop itself, as a soul, must externalize itself, throw itself out in space; and this externalization is the body. All is one process, one and the same organic principle, dividing itself only that its unity may become the more free and intensely complete. The soul and body are one; one and the same organic principle. [673]

The same principles are applied to the explanation of the doctrine of the person of Christ. According to the decisions of the ecumenical councils of Chalcedon and Constantinople, which have been accepted by all Christendom, the Eternal Son of God became man by taking to Himself a true body and a reasonable soul, and so was, and continues to be, both God and man in two distinct natures and one person forever. By nature (phusis) is meant substance (ousia), as these words are used interchangeably. By the one nature He is consubstantial with us men; and by the other He is consubstantial with the Father.

This dualism, this hypostatic union of two distinct substances in the person of Christ, involves, as taught by those councils and believed by all Christendom, two energeiai, two operations, two wills. There is no mixture or confusion of these two natures; no transfer of the properties of the one to the other, but each retains its own peculiar attributes.

On the other hand, the modern German theology rejects this distinction of natures in Christ. It denies all dualism in the constitution of his person. It teaches that Christ did not assume, "a reasonable soul" into personal union with Himself, but either that He himself became, by a process of self-limitation, such a soul, or that He assumed generic humanity, so that He did not become a man, but the man. His assumption of humanity was something general, and not merely particular. The Word became flesh; not a single man only as one of many; but flesh of humanity in its universal conception; otherwise He could not be the principle of a new order of existence for the human world as such. By this assumption of humanity, the divine and human, God and man, become one in such a sense as to exclude all dualism. There are not a divine and a human, but there is a theanthropic, or divine-human

nature or life. As in man there is not one life of the body and another of the soul, but the two are one and the same organic principle, so in the case of Christ the divine and human are one and the same. The divine nature of Christ is at the same time human in the fullest sense. Humanity is never complete till it reaches his person. It includes in its very constitution a struggle towards the form in which it is here exhibited, and can never rest until this end is attained. Our nature reaches after a true and real union with the nature of God, as the necessary complement and consummation of its own life. The idea which it embodied can never be fully actualized under any other form. The incarnation, then, is the proper completion of humanity. Christ is the true ideal man. Here is reached ultimately the highest summit of human life, which is of course the crowning sense of the word, or that in which it finds its last and full significance.

The first man, Adam, is to be viewed under a twofold character. In one respect he was simply a man; in another, he was the man, in whose person was included the whole human race. His individual personality was limited wholly to himself; but a whole world of like separate personalities lay involved in his life, at the same time, as a generic principle or root. All these in a deep sense, form at last but one and the same life. Adam lives in his posterity as truly as he ever lived in his own person. They participate in his whole nature, soul and body, and are truly bone of his bone and flesh of his flesh. So the life of Christ is to be viewed under the same twofold aspect. He, as was Adam, is an individual person. But as Adam included in himself the race, he included all other human persons in his life; so Christ, having assumed generic humanity into personal union with Himself, includes in a still higher sense a world of other personalities. "He was Himself the race." He has assumed generic humanity into personal union with Himself and thereby rendered it divine; it is indeed a true human life, but it is nevertheless divine. It is one life; not the life of the Logos separately considered, but the life of the Word made flesh. He was man more perfectly than Adam Himself, before the fall; humanity stood revealed in Him under its most perfect form. The humanity which He assumed was not new, but the humanity of Adam raised to a higher character, and filled with new meaning and power, by its union with the divine nature, The identity of Adam and his race is not material. Not a particle of Adam's body has come into ours. The identity resolves itself into an invisible law; and it is not one law for the body and another law for the soul; but one and the same law involves the presence of both, as the power of a common life. Where the law works, there Adam's life is reproduced, body and soul together. And still the individual Adam is not blended with his posterity in any such way as to lose his own personality or to swallow up theirs. His identity with his posterity is generic; but none the less real or close on that account. The case in regard to Christ and his people is analogous. His life, generic humanity as united in one life with the divine in his person passes over to his people. And as the race of individual men is developed by a regular, natural, organic process from the generic humanity in the person of Adam, so the life of Christ rests not in his separate person, but passes over to his people; this takes place in the way of history, growth, or regular living development. In regeneration we become partakers of this new principle of life, that is, of generic humanity as united with the divine nature, which involves a participation of the entire humanity of Christ. We are not joined in a real life unity with the everlasting Logos, apart from Christ's manhood, in the way of direct personal in-being. This would make us equal with Christ. The mystical union would then be the hypostatical union itself repeated

in the person of every believer. It is not the divine life of the Logos as such, but the theanthropic life of Christ which passes over to his people. "The personality of the Son," says Olshausen [674] "as comprehensive, includes in itself all the personalities of his people and pervades them with his own life, as the living centre of an organism, from which life flows forth and to which it returns."

The life which is thus conveyed to us is a true human life, controlling not only the soul but also the body. It is corporeal as well as incorporeal. It must put on an outward form and project itself in space. It is to be remembered that human life is not to be split into two lives, one of the body and another of the soul, thus constituting a dualism in our nature, instead of the absolute unity which belongs to it in fact. Soul and body, are, in their ground, but one life; identical in their origin; bound together by interpenetration subsequently at every point, and holding together in the presence and power of the same organic law. The life of Christ, lodged in us, works in us according to the law which it includes in its own constitution. That is, it works as a human life; and as such becomes the law of regeneration in the body as truly as in the soul. This does not suppose any actual approach of Christ's body to the persons of his people; nor any ubiquity or idealistic dissipation of that body; nor any fusion of this personality with ours. We must distinguish between the simple man and the universal man, here joined in the same person. Adam was an individual and the whole race. There is no dissipation of Christ's personality into the general consciousness of the Church involved in the affirmation that his person forms the ground, out of which and in the power of which only, the whole life of the Church continually subsists. In this view Christ is personally present always in the Church, that is, of course, in the power of his divine nature. But his divine nature is at the same time human, in the fullest sense, and wherever his presence is revealed in a real way, it includes the person necessarily under the one aspect as well as under the other; with all this, however, which is something very different from the conception of a proper ubiquity in the case of Christ's body, we do not relinquish the thought of his separate human individuality. We distinguish between his universal humanity in the Church, and his humanity as a particular man, whom the heavens have received till the time of the restitution of all things. His glorified body, we doubt not, is possessed of qualities, attributes, and powers, that transcend immeasurably all we know or can think of a human body here. Still it is a body, a particular human body, having organized parts and an outward form. As such of course it must be defined and circumscribed by local limits, and cannot be supposed to be present in different places at the same time.

The life of Christ as communicated to his people is a true human life; and all life, in the case of man, is actualized, and can be actualized, only in the way of process or gradual historical development. All that belongs, then, to the new life of the Christian, conceived as complete at the last day, must be allowed to be involved in it as principle and process from the beginning. In every stage of its progress it is a true human life answerable to the nature of its organic root, and to the nature also of the subject in which it is lodged. The bodies of the saints in glory will be only the last result, in organic continuity, of the divine life of Christ implanted in their souls at their regeneration. There is nothing abrupt in Christianity. It is a supernatural constitution indeed; but as such it is clothed in a natural form, and involves in itself as regular a law of historical development, as the old creation itself. The resurrection body will be simply the ultimate outburst of the life that had been ripening for

immortality under cover of the old Adamic nature before. The winged psyche has its elemental organization in the worm, and does not lose it in the tomb-like chrysalis. The resurrection of the body is, therefore, as much a natural process as the development of the butterfly from the grub, or the flower from the seed. [675]

Applications of these Principles to the Lord's Supper.

It is obvious that as the principles above stated must modify the whole method, and, so to speak, theory of salvation, se they must also determine the view taken of the Lord's Supper. They necessarily exclude the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation; and the Lutheran doctrine that the real natural body and blood of Christ are present in, with, and under the bread and wine in this sacrament, and received after a corporal manner ("corporaliter") by the mouth. No less obviously do they exclude the doctrine of Calvin that what is received by the believer in the Lord's Supper is a supernatural influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven. In like manner they exclude the Reformed doctrine that what is received are the sacrificial benefits of the broken body of Christ, which benefits are not only the forgiveness of sins and reconciliation with God, but the indwelling of the Holy Spirit by which we are united to Christ and made partakers of his salvation. As our redemption, according to this theory, is effected by introducing into the centre of our being a new principle of life, a new organic law, which by its operation and gradual development works out our salvation; and as this new life is generic humanity united with the divine nature of Christ so as to become truly divine while it is still truly human, and yet only one and the same life, it follows that it is not the body and blood of Christ, but his theanthropic nature that we receive in the Holy Communion.

We are therefore told that the real communication which believers have with Christ in the Holy Supper, extends to his whole person. To be real and not simply moral, it must be thus comprehensive. We may divide Christ in our thoughts, abstracting his divinity from his humanity, or his soul from his body. But no such dualism has place in his actual person -- that is, no dualism between his divinity and humanity, or, between his soul and body If therefore He be received by us at all, He must be received in a whole way. We partake not of certain rights and privileges only, which have been secured for us by the breaking of his body and the shedding of his blood, but of the veritable substantial life of the beloved Immanuel Himself, as the fountain and channel by which alone all these benefits can be conveyed into our souls. We partake not of his divinity only, nor yet of his Spirit as separate from Himself, but also of his true and proper humanity. Not of his humanity in a separate form, his flesh and blood disjoined from his Spirit; but of the one life which is the union of both -- Spirit in such connections seems to stand not for the Holy Spirit, but for the divine nature of Christ, for the life of Christ is not the union of the Holy Spirit with his humanity -- and in virtue of which the presence of the one must ever involve in the same form, and to the same extent, the presence of the other. What we receive is therefore his whole life, as a single undivided form of his existence, by one and the same process. The participation of Christ's life in the sacrament is in no sense corporeal, but altogether spiritual, as the necessary condition of its being real. It is the soul or spirit of the believer that is immediately fed with the grace which is conveyed to it mystically in the holy ordinance. But this is in fact a fruition which belongs to the entire man, for the life made over to him under such central form, becomes at once in virtue of its own human character, and of the

human character of the believer himself, a renovating force which reaches out into his person on all sides, and fills with its presence the totality of his nature.

The same system substantially is unfolded by Ebrard in his "Christliche Dogmatik." What is taught concerning the Lord's Supper presupposes what is taught of the nature of man and of the person of Christ. In the sacrament of the supper we are united to Christ; but the nature of our union with Christ depends upon the nature of the parties to that union. Humanity as a generic life developed from Adam as its root and centre, being corrupted by sin, is healed by its union with the divine nature in the person of Christ, or according to Ebrard's mode of representation, by the Logos becoming a man by a process of self-limitation. Every man from the first moment of his existence possesses "ein substantielles Centrum seines mikrokosmischen Lebens, ... ein Centrum, welches da war, ehe der Mensch bewusste Gedanken hatte, und welches bleiben wird, wenn der Leib dem Tode verfllt, welches also an sich weder Gedanke (mens) noch materieller Stoff ist." [676] That is, every man has from the commencement of his being "a substantial centre of life, which precedes conscious mental activity, and which will remain when the body dies, and therefore in itself is neither mind (mens) nor matter." This life-centre is instinct with a force which develops itself as mind and body, physically and psychologically. It is the Ego, the personality. It is the seat of regeneration which consists in introducing into this substantial centre of our being a new organic law which gives rise to a new development. This new law, or principle of life is the substance of Christ. Herein consists the mystical union. "This union is a central, that is, an organic union between the soul-centre, (seelischen Centrum) of the exalted incarnate one and our soul-centre, so that Christ from our centre pervades, controls, and sanctifies, both our physical-somatic, and our noetic life." [677] A few lines further on it is said, "This communication is real, not imaginary in that before all our thought, the substantial centre of our physical and noetic life is organically united with Christ's centre, [so that in the Lord's Supper] we receive a new communication of the substance (Substanzmittheilung) of the glorified Son of man." [678] What is communicated is sometimes said to be "the person of Christ," sometimes "the whole Christ," sometimes "his life," sometimes "his whole human life," and sometimes the "organic law of Christ's human life." The Lord's Supper, therefore, is by Ebrard declared to be an ordinance "wherein Christ renews the mystical union, the real life-bond, with his people, in that He renewedly implants Himself, his person, and glorified humanity in them, objectively, really, and centrally, and thus confirms and renews their participation in the benefits of his death." [679]

This theory repudiates the doctrine of transubstantiation, the Lutheran doctrine of oral manducation of the true, natural body and blood of Christ; the Calvinistic idea of an emanation from the glorified body of Christ, the Reformed doctrine of the reception of the benefits of Christ's sacrificial death, and of Christ Himself by the indwelling of his Spirit, and insists on the communication of the divine humanity of Christ to the soul of the believer as a new organic law, somewhat in the same way as magnetism is added to iron as a new controlling law. Philippi [680] reviews the exhibitions of the doctrine of the eucharist given by the leading German theologians from Schleiermacher to Lange. The epithet of "mystic-theosophical," which he applies to the doctrine of Lange, applies with more or less propriety to all the modern German theories. They are unintelligible to the majority of educated men, and as to the poor, for whom the gospel is especially designed, they are

absolutely meaningless.

Remarks.

As the theory above referred to, in its main features has been repeatedly brought under review in these pages, there is the less need for any remarks in its application to the doctrine of the Lord's Supper. It may be sufficient to call attention to the following points: --

1. If there be no such thing as generic humanity, no such objective reality; if Adam were not the human race; if he and his posterity are not identical in such a sense that his acts were their acts as truly as they were his own; in other words, if the scholastic doctrine of realism, which until of late, has been regarded as utterly exploded, be not true, then this whole theory collapses. Its foundation is gone.

2. If it be not true that in man the soul and body are one, one living substance developing itself under two aspects, so that there can be no soul without a body; if in the person of Christ there are two substances or natures hypostatically united, and not only one nature and life, so that his divine nature is in the fullest sense human, and his human, divine, then again the whole foundation of the theory is gone; then there can be no communication of his divine humanity or theanthropic life to his people to be in them the germ of a new life, noetic and somatic, to be historically developed as was the nature derived from Adam, until it issues in the resurrection and final consummation.

3. It is to be remembered that it is said that this generic humanity which constitutes the identity between Adam and his race which is the analogue of the mystical union between Christ and his people, resolves itself into "an invisible law." Now what does that mean? What is a law? In the lips of philosophers and scientists the word law often means nothing more than a fact. What are the laws of Kepler but facts? By the laws of nature is often meant nothing more than generalizations concerning the orderly sequence of events. At other times a law means a uniformly acting force. An organic law is a force uniformly acting to produce a given organic result. The germ of a bird and of a fish are undistinguishable by the microscope or by chemical agents; yet by an organic law, a uniformly acting force, the one develops into a bird, the other into a fish. What then is meant by saying that generic humanity resolves itself in a law? Can it mean anything more than a uniformly acting force? Then when it is said that generic humanity as united with the divine nature, so as to become itself divine while it continues human, is communicated to us, does it mean anything more than that a new uniformly acting force is implanted in our nature, as when the magnetic force is introduced into a piece of iron -- an illustration, obviously imperfect indeed, used by the advocates of the theory? Then what becomes of a personally present Christ? All Christ does for us is to implant a new law in our nature, which by its natural, historical development works out our salvation. It is this aspect of the case that made the German opposers of Schleiermacher, say that after all he had a Christ that was, but is not now. Christ appeared in the world, and produced a certain effect, and then passed away, leaving nothing but his memory. It is not said that the advocates of the theory in question view the matter in this light; but it is said that some of the first minds among his countrymen regarded this as the logical consequence of Schleiermacher's system. That system passed in Germany for what it was worth, an ingenious philosophical theory. In this country it is propounded as the truth of God.

4. It is a part of the theory under consideration that we become partakers of Christ's redemption only in virtue of our participation of his life. His life brings with it his merit and his power. He is our wisdom, righteousness, sanctification, and redemption only so far as, and only because, we become subjectively wise, righteous, holy, and free from the consequences of our sins. It is the Christ within us and not the Christ without us and above us, that is our confidence and glory. It is hard to see on this theory what meaning there is in praying to Christ for his intercession, his guidance, his protection, or his love. He has implanted a new law within us which works out our salvation by just as natural a process of development, as that by which a seed expands into plant and flower. It is not for other men to say how a theory lies in the minds of its advocates, or to sit in judgment on their religious experience; but they have the right to protest against any theory which, in their apprehension of it, takes away their personal Saviour and gives them nothing but a new invisible law in their members; which substitutes for the Incarnate Son of God "the organic law of Christ's human life."

5. This new doctrine is a philosophy; and philosophy we know from an infallible authority, is a vain deceit. It is vain (kene) empty; void of truth, weightless and worthless. It is moreover, a deceit; it disappoints and misleads. This is not said of natural philosophy, which concerns itself with the facts and laws of nature; nor of moral philosophy, which treats of the phenomena and laws of our moral nature; nor of intellectual philosophy, which deals with the operations and laws of mind as revealed in consciousness. But it is said of speculative philosophy; of every system which undertakes to determine on a priori speculative principles, the nature of God, the origin and constitution of the universe, the nature of man and of his relation to God, or to use common language, of the finite to the infinite. It was the oriental philosophy which the Spirit of God by the pen of St. Paul, in his Epistle to the Colossians, pronounced "a vain deceit." He says the same thing in the Epistle to the Corinthians of the Greek philosophy, whether Eleatic or Platonic. This judgment of inspiration is confirmed by experience. Who now cares a straw for the speculations of the ancients, of the schoolmen, or of their modern successors. Who is now a Hegelian? Forty years ago, who was not? We were told then, as we are told now, that certain scientific principles have a right to be respected and employed in the exposition of the doctrine of the Bible. But what is called science -- in the sphere of speculation -- in one age, is repudiated as nonsense in another. No philosophy has the right to control or modify the exposition of the doctrines of the Bible, except the philosophy of the Bible itself; that is, the principles which are therein asserted or assumed.

[673] The commonly received distinction of mind and matter on this theory must be given up. They are not distinct substances having distinct and incompatible properties or attributes.

[674] John xiv. 20; Commentar, 3d edit. Königsberg, 1838, vol. ii. p. 352.

[675] To avoid the danger of misrepresentation the exhibition of the principles of this modern aspect of theology has been given in great measure in the language of its advocates. No reference to names is given, so that no one is made responsible for the views expressed. Experience teaches that quoting a man's words is no security against the charge of misrepresentation. The writer was grieved to learn that his friend of more than forty years standing, Dr. John W. Nevin, considers himself to be unjustly charged by us with holding

doctrines which he earnestly repudiates. On page 429 of the second volume of this work he is quoted as saying that Hegel's Christological ideas, "are very significant and full of instruction." This has been construed as charging him with being a thorough Hegelian. As to this construction, we would say, first, that nothing was further from this writer's mind than the intention of making such an imputation; and secondly, that the language used gives no fair ground for such an interpretation. On the preceding pages (428) Dorner is quoted as saying that "the foundations of the new Christology were laid by Schelling, Hegel and Schleiermacher." Dorner certainly did not mean to intimate that all the modern Christologists, himself included, were Hegelians. Neither did we intend to intimate that Dr. Nevin adopted Hegel's philosophy as a system, which we know, from his own authority, he abhors. Again, it is said that Dr. Nevin is represented as denying the divinity of Christ, because he is quoted as saying that our lord was the ideal, or perfect man, that "his divine nature is at the same time human in the fullest sense." (Mystical Presence, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 174.) Those who understand this language as necessarily involving the denial of the divinity of Christ are forgetful of the fact that the oneness of God and man is the primary principle of the New Theology. Even Lutherans hold that the humanity of Christ is capable of receiving the attributes of divinity, that as a man He is omniscient, omnipresent, and almighty. Schleiermacher, as we understand him, had no other personal God, than Christ. We doubt not, and have never intimated anything to the contrary, that Dr. Nevin, although he makes Christ the ideal or perfect man, attributes to Him in his theory and in his heart, all the perfections with which the most devout believer in his divinity invests the adorable Redeemer. How he reconciles this with his representing Him as the Ideal man; and with the assertion that He has but one life in the fullest sense human, it is not for us to say. The same thing, however, is done by many others beside Dr. Nevin.

[676] Christliche Dogmatik, III. iii. 2, § 444; K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 316.

[677] Christliche Dogmatik, III. iii. 2. 2. B. § 545; K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 651.

[678] On page 322, Ebrard, when treating of regeneration and of the mystical union with Christ thereby effected, quotes the following passage from The Mystical Presence, by Dr. J. W. Nevin, Philadelphia, 1846, p. 160, as expressing his own views on the subject. "Christ's person is one, and the person of the believer is one; and to secure a real communication of the whole human life of the first over into the personality of the second, it is only necessary that the communication should spring from the centre of Christ's life and pass over the centre of ours."

[679] Christliche Dogmatik, III. iii. 2. 2. B. § 545; K&#65533;nigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 650.

[680] Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, von D. Fr. Ad. Philippi, G&#65533;tersloh, 1871, vol. v. pp. 364-380.

§ 18. The Lutheran Doctrine concerning the Lord's Supper.

Protestants at the time of the Reformation agreed on all the great doctrines of the Gospel. Luther was as thorough an Augustinian as Calvin. There would have been no schism had it not been for the difference of views which gradually arose on the true nature of the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. And even on this point, such was the desire to avoid division, and such the spirit of concession manifested by the Reformed, that a schism would

have been avoided, had it not been that Luther insisted on the adoption of the very words in which he stated his doctrine on the subject. That there was a real difference between the parties must be admitted, but that difference was not such as to justify a division in the ranks of Protestants; and the Reformed were willing to adopt a mode of stating the doctrine which both parties could receive without a violation of conscience. One attempt after another designed to effect a compromise failed, and the Lutherans and Reformed separated into two ecclesiastical denominations, and so remain at the present time. In the Evangelical Church of Prussia under the pressure of the government, the two parties have been brought into one Church which comprehends the greater part of the people. But beyond the limits of Prussia the two Churches remain distinct, though no longer in a state of mutual alienation.

Luther took his stand on the words of Christ, "This is my body," which he insisted must be understood literally. He would admit of no figure in the subject, copula, or predicate. Christ affirmed that "This," that which I hold in my hand, and which I give you to eat, is my body. [681] This position having been assumed it necessarily led to a statement of what is meant by the body and blood of Christ; in what sense the bread is his body and the wine his blood; how they are given and received; and what are the effects of such reception. On all these points the surest sources of information on the real doctrine of the Lutheran Church is to be found in its authorized symbols.

Statement of the Doctrine in the Symbolical Books.

The tenth article of the first part of the Augsburg Confession is very short, and is couched in language which Calvin would not, and did not, hesitate to adopt. "De Coena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in Coena Domini, et improbant secus docentes." [682]

The language of the Apology is more explicit: "Decimus articulus approbatus est, in quo confitemur, nos sentire, quod in Coena Domini vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi, et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus, qu videntur, pane et vino, his, qui sacramentum accipiunt." "Non negamus recta nos fide caritateque sincera Christo spiritualiter conjungi; sed nullam nobis conjunctionis rationem secundum carnem cum illo esse, id profecto pernegamus, idque a divinis Scripturis omnino alienam dicimus." [683]

In the Smalcald Articles [684] it is said: "De sacramento altaris sentimus, panem et vinum in Coena esse verum corpus et sanguinem Christi, et non tantum dari et sumi a piis, sed etiam impiis christianis."

"De transubstantione subtilitatem sophisticam nihil curamus, qua fingunt, panem et vinum relinquere et amittere naturalem suam substantiam, et tantum speciem et colorem panis, et non verum panem remanere. Optime enim cum sacra Scriptura congruit, quod panis adsit et maneat, sicut Paulus ipse nominat Panis quem frangimus. Et: Ita edat de pane."

In the Smaller Catechism it is asked: "Quid est sacramentum altaris? Responsio. Sacramentum altaris est verum corpus et verus sanguis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, sub pane et vino, nobis Christianis ad manducandum ac bibendum ab ipso Christo institutum. Quid vero prodest, sic comedisse et bibisse? Responsio. Id indicant nobis hc verba: Pro vobis datur; et: Effunditur in remissionem peccatorum. Nempe quod nobis per verba illa in sacramento remissio peccatorum, vita, justitia et salus donentur. Ubi enim remissio peccatorum est, ibi est et vita et salus. Qui potest corporalis illa manducatio tantas res

efficere? Responsio. Manducare et bibere ista certe non efficiunt, sed illa verba, qu&#65533; hic ponuntur: Pro vobis datur, et: Effunditur in remissionem peccatorum; qu&#65533; verba sunt una cum corporali manducatione caput et summa hujus sacramenti. Et qui credit his verbis, ille habet, quod dicunt, et sicut sonant, nempe remissionem peccatorum." [685]

Luther in his Larger Catechism enlarges on all these points; answers various objections to his doctrine; insists upon the necessity of faith in order to the profitable reception of the ordinance; and exhorts to frequent attendance on the ordinance.

The Form of Concord gives the affirmative statement of the doctrine; and then the negation of all the opposing views. It affirms: First, the true and substantial presence of the body and blood of Christ in this sacrament. Second, that the words of institution are to be understood literally, so that the bread does not signify the absent body, nor the wine the absent blood of Christ, but on account of the sacramental union "panis et vinum vere sint corpus et sanguis Christi." Third, that the cause of this presence is not the consecration by man, but is due solely to the omnipotent power of our Lord Jesus Christ. Fourth, the prescribed words of institution are on no account to be omitted. Fifth, the fundamental principles on which the doctrine rests are, (1.) That Jesus Christ is inseparably true, essential, natural, perfect God and man in one person. (2.) That the right hand of God is everywhere, and, therefore, Christ, "ratione humanitatis su&#65533;," being truly and actually at the right hand of God is, as to his humanity, everywhere present. (3.) "Quod verbum Dei non est falsum, aut mendax." (4.) That God knows, and has in his power various modes of presence, and is not bound to that particular mode which philosophers are accustomed to call local or circumscriptive. Sixth, that the body and blood of Christ are received not only spiritually by faith, but also by the mouth, yet not "capernaitice," but in a supernatural and celestial way, as sacramentally united with the bread and wine. Seventh, that not only the worthy and believing, but also the unworthy and unbelieving communicants received the body and blood of Christ in this sacrament. [686] Such are the most important affirmations concerning the Lord's Supper.

The Form of Concord, on the other hand, denies or rejects, (1.) The papal doctrine of transubstantiation. (2.) The doctrine of the sacrifice of the Mass. (3.) The withholding the cup from the laity. (4.) The figurative interpretation of the words of institution. (5.) The doctrine that the body of Christ is not received by the mouth. (6.) That the bread and wine are only symbols or signs of a Christian profession. (7.) That the bread and wine are only symbols, signs, or types of the absent body of Christ. (8.) That they are merely signs and seals by which our faith is confirmed, by being directed heavenward, and there made partaker of the body and blood of Christ. (9.) That our faith is strengthened by receiving the bread and wine and not by the true body and blood really present in the supper. (10.) That in the sacrament only the virtue, efficacy, and merit of the absent body and blood are dispensed. (11.) That the body of Christ is so shut up in heaven, that "nullo prorsus modo" can it be present at one and the same time in many or all places where the Lord's Supper is celebrated. (12.) That Christ could not have promised or offered the presence of his body in the eucharist, because such presence is inconsistent with the nature of a body. (13.) That God cannot by his omnipotence make the body of Christ to be present in more than one place at the same time. (14.) That faith and not the omnipotent word of Christ, is the cause of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the supper. (15.) That believers are to

seek the Lord's body in heaven and not in the sacrament. (16.) That the impenitent and unbelievers do not receive the body and blood of Christ, but only the bread and wine. (17.) That the dignity of the communicants in this ordinance is not alone from true faith in Christ, but from some human source. (18.) That true believers may eat the Lord's Supper to condemnation if imperfect in their conversation. (19.) That the visible elements of bread and wine in this sacrament should be adored. (20.) Pr&#65533;ter h&#65533;c justo Dei judicio relinquimus omnes curiosas, sannis virulentis tinctas, et blasphemas qu&#65533;stiones, qu&#65533; honeste, pie et sine gravi offensione recitari nequeunt, aliosque sermones, quando de supernaturali et coelesti mysterio hujus sacramenti crasse, carnaliter, capernaitice, et plane abominandis modis, blaspheme, et maximo cum ecclesi&#65533; offendiculo, Sacramentarii loquuntur. (21.) Finally any corporal manducation of the body of Christ is denied, as though it was masticated by the teeth or digested as ordinary food. A supernatural manducation is again affirmed; a manducation which no one by his senses or reason can comprehend. [687]

Although the Lutheran doctrine on this subject may be regarded as stated with sufficient clearness in the Epitome of the Form of Concord, it becomes still plainer by the more expanded and controversial exposition in the second, and much more extended portion of that document, called the "Solida Declaratio." the seventh chapter of that Declaration, in giving the "Status Controversi&#65533;" between the Lutherans and the Reformed, says that although the Sacramentarians (as the Reformed were called) laboured to come as near as possible to the language of the Lutherans and used the same forms of expression, yet when pressed, it became apparent that their true meaning was very different. They admitted the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the supper, but it was a presence to faith. The real body of Christ is in heaven and not on earth; therefore they denied that his body and blood, "in terra adesse," and taught that nothing in the sacrament is received by the mouth but the bread and wine. This is one point of difference between the Lutherans and the Reformed. The former teaching that the literal, natural body of Christ, born of the Virgin Mary, is actually present in, with, and under the bread, and his blood shed upon the cross and which was the life of his body while on earth, is present in, with, and under the consecrated wine. The latter teach that the natural body of Christ is in heaven, and is not on earth, and therefore is not present in the elements of bread and in the supper of the Lord. What is present, according to Calvin, is not the natural body and blood of Christ, but a supernatural, life-giving influence emanating from his glorified body in heaven, and conveyed to the believer by the power of the Holy Ghost. According to the Reformed generally, it is not this supernatural power of the glorified body of Christ that is present and received, but the sacrificial efficacy of his body broken and his blood shed for the remission of sins.

Secondly, as the thing received, according to the two doctrines, is different, so are the mode and organ and condition of reception. According to the Lutherans the body and blood are received "corporaliter;" the organ is the mouth; the only condition is the actual reception of the bread and wine. The body and blood of Christ are received equally by believers and unbelievers; although to their spiritual good only by the former. According to the Reformed, the mode of reception is not corporeal, but spiritual; the organ is not the mouth, but faith; and the condition of reception is the presence and exercise of faith on the part of the communicant. This point of difference is clearly recognized in the Form of Concord, when it says that the Reformed think that the body and blood of Christ, "tantum in

coelis, et pr&#65533;terea nullibi esse, ideoque Christum nobis cum pane et vino verum corpus et verum sanguinem manducandum et bibendum dare, spiritualiter, per fidem, sed non corporaliter ore sumendum." [688]

Manducation.

Thirdly? another point of difference, which the Form of Concord points out between the two Churches, concerns the manducation or eating which takes place in the Lord's Supper. Our Lord in the sixth chapter of St. John's Gospel, although not there treating of the Eucharist, says, that He is the true bread which came down from heaven, and that whosoever eateth of that bread shall live forever. And in the same chapter, with a change of language but not of meaning, He says, "The bread that I will give is my flesh." "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you. Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day." Such being the language of Christ, every Christian must admit that there is a sense in which the believer may properly be said to eat the flesh and to drink the blood of the Son of man. The only question is, What does such language mean? According to the Reformed the meaning is that it is the indispensable condition of eternal life, that we should receive Christ as He is offered to us in the gospel; and as He is there offered to us as a sacrifice for our sins, his body broken and his blood shed for us, we must receive and appropriate Him in that character. To receive Him as the true bread, and to eat of that bread, is to receive and appropriate Him as being to us the source of eternal life; and to eat his flesh and drink his blood is to receive and appropriate Him as the broken and bleeding sacrifice for our sins. In other words, to eat is to believe. The Form of Concord correctly recognizes this as the doctrine of the Reformed Church. It says, [689] that the Reformed in rejecting the literal sense of the words "eat, this is my body," teach "ut edere corpus Christi nihil aliud ipsis significet, quam credere in Christum, et vocabulum corporis illis nil nisi symbolum, hoc est, signum seu figuram corporis Christi denotet, quod tamen non in terris in sacra coena pr&#65533;sens, sed tantum in coelis sit." That the Reformed are right in this matter may, in passing, be argued, (1.) From the fact that our Lord in John vi. interchanges as equivalent the words "eating" and "believing." He says, "if any man eat of this bread, he shall live forever;" and, "he that believeth on me hath everlasting life. I am that bread of life." The same specific effect is ascribed to eating and believing, and therefore the two words express the same act. (2.) The eating spoken of is declared to be the indispensable condition of eternal life. "Except ye eat the flesh of the Son of man, and drink his blood, ye have no life in you." But it is the clear doctrine of the Bible, and the common doctrine of the Lutheran and Reformed Churches, that the only eating which is necessary to eternal life is that which consists in believing. Lutherans are as far as the Reformed from making the sacramental eating of the body and blood of Christ in the supper essential to salvation. (3.) Nothing is essential to salvation under the new dispensation that was not essential under the old. This also is a part of the common faith of both Churches. But under the Old Testament there could be no other eating of the flesh of Christ, than believing on Him as the passover, or, lamb of God that taketh away the sins of the world. (4.) Any corporal eating of the flesh of Christ's body and drinking of his blood, as He sat at table with his disciples, would seem to be inconceivable. (5.) Our Lord Himself, in opposition to the sense put upon his words by the people of Capernaum, said: "It is the Spirit that quickeneth; the flesh profiteth nothing; the words that I speak unto you, they are spirit, and they are life." It was not his

literal flesh that He was to give us to eat, for that would profit nothing. His words, on that subject, were to be understood in a spiritual sense. [690]

But although the Lutherans reject the doctrine of the Reformed who teach that the eating of the body of Christ in the sacrament is spiritual and by faith, and assert that it is corporal (corporaliter) and by the mouth, yet they strenuously resist the idea that it is after the manner of ordinary food. They maintain that the manner is supernatural and incomprehensible. The Lutherans distinguish between a spiritual manducation, of which says the Form of Concord, Christ treats especially in the sixth chapter of St. John, and which is by faith, and a sacramental manducation which is by the mouth, when in the Lord's Supper, "verum et substantiale corpus et sanguis Christi ore accipiuntur atque participantur ab omnibus, qui panem illum benedictum et vinum in coena Dominica edunt et bibunt." The words of Christ, it is said, "non potest nisi orali, non autem de crassa, carnali, capernaitica, sed de supernaturali et incomprehensibili manducatione corporis Christi intelligi." [691] Being incomprehensible, it is of course inexplicable.

However, although the Lutherans reject the idea that the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper is eaten after the manner of ordinary food, yet the language of Luther on this subject, adopted or defended by his followers, can hardly be understood in any other sense. In his instruction to Melancthon, [692] he says, "Of our doctrine this is the sum, that the body of Christ is truly eaten in and with the bread, so that what the bread does and suffers, the body of Christ does and suffers; it is distributed, eaten, and masticated (zerbissen) by the teeth." On this passage Philippi [693] remarks that as Luther says that this is propter unionem sacramentalem, it is not inconsistent with the language of the Form of Concord which denies that the body of Christ is lacerated by the teeth and digested as ordinary food. He says it is analogous to the proposition, God died, not as to his divine nature but as to his assumed human nature. The language of Luther on this subject is seldom now heard from the lips of Lutherans.

Mode of Presence.

A thing is present where it is perceived and where it acts. The nature of that presence varies with the nature of the object of which it is affirmed. A body is present where it is perceived by the senses or acts upon them. The soul is present where it perceives and acts. It is somewhere, and not everywhere. God is present everywhere, as He fills immensity. There is no portion of space from which He is absent as to his essence, knowledge, or power. [694] As the Lutherans affirm the presence of the substance of Christ's natural body and blood in the Lord's Supper, of that body which was born of the Virgin and suffered on the cross; and as that body was and is material, it would seem to follow that the presence affirmed is local. It is a presence in a definite place. The Reformed, therefore, always understood the Lutherans to assert the local presence of the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper. The Lutherans, however, deny that they teach any such presence. This after all may be a dispute about words. [695] The parties may take the word "local" in different senses. The Lutherans say that the body and blood of Christ are with, in, and under the bread and wine. They are held in the hand and taken into the mouth. This is all the Reformed mean when they speak of a local presence; a presence in a definite portion of space. Magnetism is locally present in the magnet; electricity in the Leyden jar. The soul is locally present in the body. The man is locally present in mind and body where he perceives and acts and

where he is perceived and acted upon. Lutherans appear to take the word "local" in a sense in which it characterizes the presence of a body which is present exclusively, i.e., both in the sense of excluding all other bodies from the same portion of space, being bounded by it, and of being nowhere else. The Reformed say that it is contrary to the nature of such a body as that which belongs to man, that it should be in many places at the same time, much less that it should fill all space. The idea that the flesh and blood of Christ are omnipresent, seems to involve a contradiction. It is in vain to appeal to the omnipotence of God. Contradictions are not the objects of power. It is no more a limitation of the power of God to say that He cannot do the impossible, that He cannot make right wrong, or the finite infinite, than it is a limitation of his wisdom that He cannot teach the untrue or the unwise. All such assumptions destroy the idea of God as a rational Being. If the body and blood of Christ be everywhere present, then they are received in every ordinary meal as well as in the Lord's Supper. The answer which Lutherans give to this objection, namely, that it is one thing for the body of Christ to be omnipresent, and another for it to be accessible, or everywhere given, is unsatisfactory; because the virtue resides in the body and blood, and if they are everywhere present and received they are everywhere operative, at least to believers. If this omnipresence of the body of Christ was actual only after his ascension, then, as M[illegible]ller [696] argues, the Apostles must, at the institution of the Lord's Supper, have partaken of his body and blood in a manner peculiar to that one occasion, and Christ, so far as other Christians are concerned, only foretold that his body would be ubiquitous and therefore present in the eucharist. Luther, therefore, says, "If Christ at the Last Supper had not uttered the words this is my body,' yet the words, Christ sits at the right hand of God, prove that his body and blood may be in the Lord's Supper as well as everywhere else." [697] As Christ in his human nature and therefore in his human body sits at the right hand of God; and as the right hand of God is everywhere, his body must be everywhere, and therefore in the bread as used in the sacrament. The current representations, however, of the Lutheran theologians on this point are, that the presence of the body of Christ in the Lord's Supper is peculiar, something which occurs there and nowhere else. This presence is due, not to the words of consecration as uttered by the minister, but to the almighty power which attended the original utterance of the words, This is my body, and continues to operate whenever and wherever this sacrament is administered.

This presence of the body and blood of Christ in, with, and under the bread and wine has been generally expressed by non-Lutherans by the word consubstantiation, as distinguished from the Romish doctrine of transubstantiation. The propriety of this word to express the doctrine of Luther is admitted by Philippi, if it be understood to mean, what in fact is meant by it when used by the Reformed, "das reale Zusammensein beider Substanzen," i.e., the real coexistence of the two substances, the earthly and the heavenly. But Lutherans generally object to the word because it is often used to express the idea of the mixing two substances so as to form a third; or the local inclusion of the one substance by the other. [698]

The Lutheran doctrine of the mode of the presence of the body and blood of Christ in the eucharist, is thus carefully stated by Gerhard: [699] "Quam vere in sacra coena pr[illegible]sens est res terrena, panis et vinum: tam vere etiam pr[illegible]sens res coelestis, corpus et sanguis Christi: proinde credimus, docemus et confitemur in eucharisti[illegible] sacramento veram, realem et substantialem corporis et sanguinis Christi pr[illegible]sentiam, exhibitionem,

manducationem et bibitionem, qu&#65533; pr&#65533;sentia non est essentialis conversio panis in corpus et vini in sanguinem Christi, quam transubstantionem vocant, neque est corporis ad panem, ac sanguinis ad vinum extra usum coen&#65533; localis aut durabilis, neque est panis et corporis Christi personalis unio, qualis est divin&#65533; et human&#65533; natur&#65533; in Christo unio, neque est localis inclusio corporis in panem, neque est impanatio, neque est incorporatio in panem, neque est consubstantio, qua panis cum corpore Christi, et vinum cum ipsius sanguine in unam massam physicam coalescat: neque est naturalis inexistentia, neque delitescentia corpusculi sub pane, neque quidquam hujusmodi carnale aut physicum; sed est pr&#65533;sentia et unio sacramentalis, qu&#65533; ita comparata est, ut juxta ipsius salvaroris nostri, veracis, sapientis, et omnipotentis institutionem, pani benedicto tanquam medio divinitus ordinato corpus: et vino benedicto tanquam medio itidem divinitus ordinato, sanguis Christi modo nobis incomprehensibili uniatur, ut cum illo pane corpus Christi una manducatione sacramentali et cum illo vino sanguinem Christi una bibitione sacramentali in sublimi mysterio sumamus, manducemus ac bibamus. Breviter non apousian absentiam, non enousian inexistentiam, non sunousian consubstantionem, non metousian transubstantionem, sed parousian corporis et sanguinis Christi in sacra coena statuimus."

The whole doctrine of the Lutheran Church on the Lord's Supper is briefly and authoritatively stated in the "Articuli Visitatorii" issued in 1592 for the Electorate and northern provinces of of Saxony, which all church officers and teachers were required to adopt. The first Article is as follows: "Pura et vera doctrina nostrarum Ecclesiarum de Sacra Coena. (1.) Quod verba Christi: Accipite et comedite, hoc est corpus meum: Bibite, hic est sanguis meus simpliciter, et secundum literam, sicut sonant, intelligenda sint. (2.) Quod in sacramento du&#65533; res sint, qu&#65533; exhibentur et simul accipiuntur: una terrena, qu&#65533; est panis et vinum; et una coelestis, qu&#65533; est corpus et sanguis Christi. (3.) Quod h&#65533;c unio, exhibitio et sumptio fiat hic inferius in terris, non superius in coelis. (4.) Quod exhibeatur et accipiatur verum et naturale corpus Christi, quod in cruce pependit, et verus ac naturalis sanguis, qui ex Christi latere fluxit. (5.) Quod corpus et sanguis Christi non fide tantum spiritualiter, quod etiam extra coenam fieri potest, sed cum pane et vino oraliter, modo tamen imperscrutabill, et supernaturali, illic in coena accipiantur, idque in pignus et certificationem resurrectionis nostrorum corporum ex mortuis. (6.) Quod oralis perceptio corporis et sanguinis Christi non solum fiat a dignis, verum etiam ab indignis, qui sine poenitentia et vera fide accedunt; eventu tamen diverso. A dignis enim percipitur ad salutem, ab indignis autem ad judicium." [700]

The Benefit received at the Lord's Supper.

In the Augsburg Confession, in the Apology, in the Shorter and Larger Catechism, and in the Form of Concord, the benefits conferred upon believers in this sacrament are declared to be forgiveness of sin and confirmation of faith. These are said to be its special and intended effects. Thus in the Shorter Catechism the question is asked, "Quid vero prodest, sic comedisse et bibisse?" The answer is "Id indicant h&#65533;c verba: Pro vobis datur; et: effunditur in remissionem peccatorum. Nempe nobis per verba illa in sacramento remissio peccatorum, vita, justitia et salus donentur. Ubi enim remissio peccatorum est, ibi est et vita et salus." The next question is, "Qui potest corporalis illa manducatio tantas res efficere?" To which the following answer is given: "Manducare et bibere ista certe non efficiunt, sed illa verba, qu&#65533; hic ponuntur: Pro vobis datur, et: Effunditur in remissionem

peccatorum; qu&#65533; verba sunt una cum corporali manducatione caput et summa hujus sacramenti. Et qui credit his verbis, ille habet, quod dicunt, et sicut sonant, nempe remissionem peccatorum." [701] To the same effect in the Larger Catechism, after referring to the words of institution it is said that in coming to the Lord's Supper we receive the remission of sins. "Quare hoc? Ideo, quod verba illic extant et h&#65533;c dant nobis. Siquidem propterea a Christo jubeor edere et bibere, ut meum sit, mihique utilitatem afferat, veluti certum pignus et arrhabo, imo potius res ipsa, quam pro peccatis meis, morte et omnibus malis ille opposuit et oppignoravit. Inde jure optimo cibus anim&#65533; dicitur, novum hominem alens atque fortificans." [702]

All that is here said is in perfect accord with the Reformed doctrine both as to the benefits to be derived from this sacrament and as to the source from which those benefits are to be received. The believing communicant receives at the Lord's table the benefits of his redeeming death, and his faith is confirmed by the divinely appointed seals and pledge of the promises of God. And the sacrament has these effects, because through the grace of the Holy Spirit the worthy communicant embraces by faith the offer of pardon and acceptance made in the ordinance. This implies the ignoring or repudiation of the idea that the benefits conferred are to be attributed to any magical or supernatural influence from the actual, natural body and blood of Christ, which, according to the Lutheran doctrine, are orally received in this ordinance; or to a divine influence emanating from the glorified body of Christ in heaven; or to the theanthropic life of Christ conveyed into the believer as a new organic law. Nevertheless there is another mode of representation occurring in the writings of Luther and of Lutherans. According to this representation there is a divine, supernatural power inherent in the body and blood of Christ, which being received in the Lord's Supper conveys to the believer, as to his soul and body, a new spiritual and immortal life. Thus, in his Larger Catechism, in answer to the question how bread and wine can have the power attributed to the Lord's Supper, he says it is not bread as such which produces the effect, "but such bread and wine which are the body and blood of Christ, and which have the words [of institution] connected with them." To this he adds: "Quin etiam illud pro certo constat, Christi corpus et sanguinem nequaquam rem otiosam et infrugiferam esse posse, qu&#65533; nihil fructus aut utilitatis afferat." [703] Luther's Catechisms have symbolical authority, having been adopted by the whole Lutheran Church. The same authority does not belong to his private writings, in which the idea advanced of the life-giving power of the body and blood of Christ as received in the sacrament is (at least as often understood) more fully expanded. In his work entitled "Das diese Worte Christi, das ist mein Leib u. s. w.,' noch fest stehen wider die Schwarmgeister," published in 1521, [704] he says Christ gives us his own body and blood as food "in order that with such a pledge he may assure and comfort us, that our body shall live forever, because it here on earth enjoys eternal living food." [705] "The mouth, which corporeally eats Christ's flesh, knows not, it is true, what it eats, but the heart knows: by itself it would gain nothing, for it cannot comprehend the word [of promise]. But the heart knows well what the mouth eats. For it comprehends the word and eats spiritually, what the mouth eats corporeally." But since the mouth is a member of the heart, it must live forever, on account of the heart, which through the word lives forever, because the body corporeally eats the same everlasting food, which the soul with it spiritually eats. Again: [706] "The heart cannot eat corporeally, and the mouth cannot eat spiritually. God, however, has arranged it, that the mouth eats for the heart corporeally, and

the heart eats for the body spiritually, so both are satisfied with the same food and are saved. For the body having no understanding, knows not that it eats such food whereby it shall live forever. Because it feels it not, but dies and moulders away, as though it had eaten other food, as an irrational brute. But the soul sees and understands, that the body must live forever, because it is a partaker of an everlasting food; which will not allow it to decay and waste away in the grave." [707] Still more strongly is this idea expressed in such passages as the following. When a man eats this food [708] "it changes (verd&#65533;ut) and transmutes his flesh, so that it becomes spiritual, that is, endued with immortal life and blessed, as Paul, 1 Corinthians xv. 44, says: It is raised a spiritual body." Luther gives what he calls a gross illustration. He supposes a wolf to devour a sheep and the flesh of the sheep to have power enough to transmute the wolf into a sheep. "So we, when we eat Christ's flesh corporeally and spiritually, the food is so strong that it changes us into itself, so that out of carnal, sinful, mortal men, we are made spiritual, holy, and living men; such we already are, but hidden in faith and hope, and not yet revealed; at the last day we shall see it." Again: [709] "God is in this flesh. It is divine and spiritual (a weak translation of ein Gottesfleisch, ein Geistfleisch), it is in God, and God is in it, therefore it is living and gives life both as to soul and body to all who eat it." Again: [710] "If we eat Him corporeally, so He is in us corporeally, and we in Him. He is not digested and assimilated, but He continually transmutes us, the soul into righteousness, the body into immortality." After quoting these and similar passages, Philippi admits that they teach that "the body of Christ is not only the pledge of our resurrection, but also that it is the life-giving, operative power through which our bodies are prepared for our final resurrection." [711]

There were two views of the benefit of the Lord's Supper in the mind of Luther. He commonly represents its special benefit to be the forgiveness of sins, which is received whenever faith in the gospel is exercised. This effect is due, not to what is in the sacrament received by the mouth, but to the Word as received by faith. According to this view, as Dorner [712] says, the Lord's supper is a sign and pledge of the forgiveness of sin. To this view, he adds, the Lutheran Church has adhered. Therefore, the Apology says: "Idem effectus est verbi et ritus, sicut pr&#65533;clare dictum est ab Augustino, sacramentum esse verbum visibile, quia ritus oculis accipitur, et est quasi pictura verbi, idem significans, quod verbum. Quare idem est utriusque effectus." [713]

At other times, however, Luther, as appears from the passages above quoted, attributes to the Lord's Supper a peculiar effect due to the real, natural body of Christ therein received, which, in virtue of its union with his divine nature, is imbued with a supernatural, life-giving power. To this power he refers the glorious future resurrection of the believer. In this he made some approximation to the modern doctrine that the redemptive work of Christ consists in the infusion into our nature of a new force, or organic law which, by a process of natural, historical development, works out the salvation of soul and body. Julius M&#65533;ller rejoices that this view did not take root in the Lutheran Church, as it is, as he says, plainly contrary to Scripture. If the resurrection of believers be due to the body of Christ as received in the Lord's Supper, what is to become of children, of confessors and martyrs, and of all the Old Testament saints, who never partook of the Lord's Supper. [714]

[681] Lutherans lay great stress on the fact that in Matthew xxvi. 26, touto (this) is neuter, and artos (bread) is masculine, and therefore that the meaning cannot be This bread

is my body,' but This that I give you to eat is my body.' It must be admitted that the neuter pronoun cannot be referred to the masculine noun grammatically, but it evidently does refer to it ad sensum. This thing which I hold in my hand and which I give you to eat is my body.' But the thing which Christ gave his disciples was the bread which he had taken and broken; and therefore it was the bread which He affirmed was, either literally or figuratively, his body. Lutherans themselves cannot avoid saying and admitting that the bread in the Lord's Supper is the body of Christ. Thus Luther (Larger Catechism, v. 12, 13; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 554) tells his catechumen to say, "Though infinite myriads of devils and all fanatics should impudently demand, How bread and wine can be the body and blood of Christ? I know that all spirits and all learned men put together have not as much intelligence as Almighty God has in his little finger." The bread therefore he teaches is the body of Christ. And Dr. Krauth (p. 609) says, "Just as it would be blasphemy to say, Man is God,' and is yet literally true of Christ, This man is God,' so would it be blasphemy to say, Bread is Christ's body,' and yet it is literally true, This bread is Christ's body.'" It is conceded, therefore, that after all, the pronoun "This" (touto), in the words of institution, does refer to the noun "bread," and that if the language of Christ is to be understood literally, He affirms that the bread in the Lord's Supper is his body. On this concession it may be remarked, (1.) That it seems to yield everything to the Romanists. If the bread is literally the body of Christ, it is no longer bread; for no one asserts that the same thing can be bread and flesh at the same time. If, therefore, the words of Christ are to be taken literally, they teach the doctrine of transubstantiation. (2.) It will not do to say that the bread remains bread and that the body of Christ is in, with, and under it, for that makes the language figurative, and the literal interpretation, the main, if not the only, prop of the Lutheran doctrine, is given up. When Christ says, "This cup is the New Testament," it is admitted that the cup is used metonymically for the wine in the cup. And if the language of our Lord, This bread is my body,' means, This bread is the vehicle of my body, then He spoke figuratively and not literally; and whether the figure used be metonymy or metaphor is a question to be determined by the nature of the proposition, the context, and the analogy of Scripture. But the advocates of the metonymical sense are not entitled to charge those who adopt the metaphorical meaning, with giving up the literal sense. That is done by the one party as well as by the other. A great deal of discussion has been expended on the meaning of the substantive verb "is," in the proposition, "This is my body." The Reformed are wont to say that it means, "signifies," "represents," or "symbolizes" my body. The Lutherans maintain that it is the mere copula between the subject and predicate, and never has, or can have the meaning assigned to it by the Reformed; and in this they are right. Yet it seems to be a dispute about words. There is no real difference between the parties. When the Reformed say that "is" means or may mean "signifies," all they intend is that the one word, in the case in question, may be properly substituted for the other. The idea intended to be expressed by the words, "The seven ears are seven years," may be expressed by saying, The seven ears signify seven years.' This does not imply that "are" means "signify." Dr. Krauth tells us that Luther in his version of the Bible employs forty-six different substitutes for the substantive verb as used in the Hebrew and Greek. It would hardly be fair to say that Luther gives forty-six different lexicographical meanings to the Hebrew word hyh, or the Greek eimi. Whether the proposition "This is my body" is to be understood literally or figuratively is an open question; but there can be no question as to the lexicographical meaning of the word

"is." No one doubts that such propositions as "I am the living bread," That rock was Christ," "The seven candlesticks . . . are the seven churches," and hundreds of others of like kind occurring in the Bible and in ordinary language, are to be understood figuratively. The fact that they have been understood literally by so large a part of Christendom, is to be accounted for by other reasons than any ambiguity in the words themselves.

[682] Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 12.

[683] IV. 54-56; Hase, pp. 157, 158. Cyril on John xv.

[684] VI. 1, 5; Hase, p. 330.

[685] V. 1-8; Hase, pp. 380, 381.

[686] Epitome, VII. 1-16; Hase, pp. 599, 600.

[687] Epitome, VII. 22-42; Hase, pp. 602-604.

[688] Solida Declaratio, VII. 6; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 727. See also Dr. Julius M[illegible]ller, Vergleichung der Lehren Luthers und Calvins vom heiligen Abendmahl, in his Dogmatische Abhandlungen, Bremen, 1870, p. 425.

[689] VII. 7; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 727.

[690] There are two modes of interpreting the passage John vi. 50-58. According to the one, it is to be understood as referring to a participation of the benefit of Christ's sacrificial death, according to the other of the reception of his body and blood in the Supper. A large portion of the Lutheran theologians adopt the former.

[691] Form of Concord, VII. 63, 64; Hase, Libri Symbolici, pp. 744, 745.

[692] Works, edit. Walch, 1745, vol. xvi. p. 2489.

[693] Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, vol. v. p. 350.

[694] Luther and Lutherans speak of three modes of Christ's presence: First, that in which He was present when here on earth; "raumerf[illegible]llende und vom Raum umschollene," space-filling and by space circumscribed; Second, that which is in space, but does not fill any portion of it, and is not circumscribed by it. In this state of Christ's body rose from the grave and passed through closed doors. This kind of presence belongs to angels. Third, the divine and celestial mode of presence, according to which Christ, in virtue of the union of the two natures in his person, is present in his humanity, in his soul and body, wherever God is present. It is specially in the second and third modes (the definitive and the repletive) that Luther asserted the presence of Christ's body in the eucharist; although he asserted that the first was possible, "Denn er wolle in keiner Weise, l[illegible]ugnen, dass Gottes Gewalt nicht scllte so viel verm[illegible]gen, dass ein Leib zugleich an vielen Orten sein m[illegible]ge, auch leiblicher, begreiflicher Weise." Philippi, ut supra, vol. v. p. 346.

[695] On this word Gerhard remarks: "Terminum localis pr[illegible]senti[illegible] esse ambiguum. Corpus Christi pr[illegible]sens esse dicimus in illo loco, in quo celebratur coena, sed modo locali et circumscriptivo pr[illegible]sens esse negamus. Si pr[illegible]sentiam localem sensu posteriori intelligunt habent nos sibi consentientes; si priori, repugnamus." Loci Theologici, XXII. xi. § 106, edit. T[illegible]bingen, 1770, vol. x. p. 186.

[696] Dogmatische Abhandlungen, Bremen, 1870, p. 455, note.

[697] Das diese Worte, etc., § 118; Works, edit. Walch's, vol. xx. p. 1011.

[698] Philippi, ut supra, vol. v. p. 356, and Krauth, ut supra, pp. 130, 339.

[699] John Gerhard, Loci Theologici, XXII. x. § 69; edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1769, vol. x. pp. 116, 117.

[700] Hase, Libri Symbolici, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1846, pp. 857, 858.

[701] v. 5-8; Hase, Libri Symbolici, pp. 381, 382.

[702] v. 22, 23; Ibid. pp. 555, 556.

[703] v. 28-30; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 557.

[704] Das diese Worte, etc., edit. Walch, vol. xx.

[705] Ibid., § 186, p. 1045.

[706] Ibid. p. 1046.

[707] Philippi, Kirchliche Glaubenslehre, vol. v. p. 267. Philippi admits that these passages appear to teach that the seeds of immortality are implanted in the bodies of believers by the corporeal participation of the body of Christ, though he endeavours to explain them as teaching that the Lord's Supper is pledge of the believer's resurrection. On p. 268, however, he admits that there are other passages which cannot be thus explained.

[708] Das diese Worte, §§ 207, 208, pp. 1055, 1056.

[709] Das diese Worte, p. 125. (?)

[710] Ibid. p. 132. (?)

[711] See Philippi, ut supra, p. 269. So also Loci Theologici, XXII. xi. § 103, edit. T&#65533;bingen, 1770, vol. x. p. 175, says that the fathers teach that our bodies "suscipiant ex contactu carnis Christi vim quandam ad gloriosam resurrectionem et vitam &#65533;ternam;" an opinion to which Gerhard accedes. Calvin (Institutio, IV. xvii. 32, edit. Berlin, 1834, part ii. p. 426) uses language of similar import: "De carnis etiam nostr&#65533; immortalitate securos nos reddat, siquidem ab immortali ejus carne jam vivificatur et quodammodo ejus immortalitate communicat." There is, however, an essential difference, as to this point between Luther and Calvin. Luther held that what is received in the Supper is the true, natural body of Christ; that it is received corporeally, by the mouth, that it is received by unbelievers as well as by the believers; and that it is to the natural body thus received that the believer owes the glorious resurrection that awaits him. All these points Calvin denies. It is not the natural body of Christ, which hung upon the cross, that is received. It is not received corporeally by the mouth, but only by the soul through faith. It is received out of the Lord's Supper as well as in that ordinance. The resurrection of believers therefore, according to Calvin, is due to our union with Christ, effected by faith and not to eating his true, natural body.

[712] Geschichte der protestantischen Theologie, Munich, 1867, p. 152.

[713] VII. 5; Hase, Libri Symbolici, p. 201.

[714] Dogmatische Abhandlungen, pp. 417, 418.

§ 19. Doctrine of the Church of Rome on the Lord's Supper.

Romanists regard the eucharist under two distinct aspects as a sacrament and as a sacrifice. The latter in their system is by far the more important. M&#65533;hler in his "Symbolik" almost entirely overlooks its sacramental character. And in the worship of the Romish

Church the sacrifice of the mass is the central point. In the symbolical books, however, the two views are kept distinct. It is a sacrament inasmuch as it signifies, contains, and conveys grace. It includes an external sign and things signified. The external signs are bread and wine, which retain their form after consecration and after the change in their substance thereby affected. The things signified are, (1.) The passion of Christ. (2) The grace of God given in the sacrament. (3.) Eternal life. [715] It has virtue to produce grace. "On voit," says Cardinal Gousset in the place referred to, "que le signe eucharistique est un signe qui a la vertu de produire la grace; mais il n'a cette vertu que par l'institution de Jesus Christ."

The grace bestowed is not spiritual life, for that is communicated in baptism, and is presupposed in those who receive the eucharist as a sacrament. On this point the language of the Roman Catechism and other Roman authorities is explicit, and in tone evangelical and Protestant. Thus the Catechism says, "Constat quemadmodum mortuis corporibus naturale alimentum nihil prodest, ita etiam anim&#65533;, qu&#65533; spiritu non vivit, sacra mysteria non prodesse, ac propterea panis, et vini speciem habent, ut significetur, non quidem revocand&#65533; ad vitam anim&#65533;, sed in vita conservand&#65533; causa instituta esse." [716] The benefits received are analogous to those which the body receives from its natural food. Bread and wine strengthen and refresh the body; so the eucharist strengthens and refreshes the soul. And more than this, the food of the body is transmuted into the body; whereas the divine food received in this sacrament transmutes the soul into its own nature. "Neque enim hoc sacramentum in substantiam nostram, ut panis, et vinum, mutatur; sed nos quodam modo in ejus naturam convertimur: ut recte illud D. Augustini ad hunc locum transferri possit: [717] Cibus sum grandium; cresce, et manducabis me. Nec tu me in te mutabis, sicut cibum carnis tu&#65533;; sed tu mutaberis in me.'" [718]

Lutherans make the forgiveness of sins, a blessing which the believer constantly needs, the great benefit of this ordinance. This is not its design in the view of Romanists, for they teach that for a man to approach the altar in a state of mortal sin, is a dreadful profanation. They enjoin, therefore, confession and absolution in the sacrament of penance, as a necessary preparation for this ordinance. Only venial sins are remitted by receiving the sacrament of the Lord's Supper. Nevertheless, as according to Romanists, Christ is really in both natures present in the eucharist, they say "necessario fons omnium gratiarum dicenda est, cum fontem ipsum coelestium charismatum, et donorum, omniumque sacramentorum auctorem Christum dominum admirabili modo in se contineat." [719] The virtue of the eucharist, both as a sacrament and as a sacrifice, rests, according to Romanists, in the doctrine of

Transubstantiation.

Christ is present in this ordinance, not spiritually as taught by the Reformed, nor by the real presence of his body and blood in, with, and under the bread and wine, but by the bread and wine being by the almighty power of God changed into his body and blood. As at the feast in Cana of Galilee, the water was changed into wine, so in the eucharist, the bread and wine are changed into, and remain the body and blood of Christ. This doctrine is thus set forth in the Canons of the Council of Trent: --

"1. Si quis negaverit, in sanctissim&#65533; eucharisti&#65533; sacramento contineri vere, realiter, et substantialiter corpus et sanguinem una cum anima, et divinitate Domini nostri, Jesu Christi, ac proinde totum Christum, sed dixerit tantummodo esse in eo, ut in signo, vel

figura aut virtute; anathema sit.

"2. Si quis dixerit in sacrosancto eucharisti&#65533; sacramento remanere substantiam panis, et vini, una cum corpore et sanguine Domini nostri, Jesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius substanti&#65533; panis in corpus, et totius substanti&#65533; vini in sanguinem, manentibus duntaxat speciebus panis, et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica ecclesia aptissime transubstantionem appellat; anathema sit.

"3. Si quis negaverit, in venerabili sacramento eucharisti&#65533; sub unaquaque specie, et sub singulis cujusque speciei partibus, separatione facta, totum Christum contineri; anathema sit.

"4. Si quis dixerit, peracta consecratione, in admirabili eucharisti&#65533; sacramento non esse corpus, et sanguinem Domini nostri Jesu Christi, sed tantum in usu dum sumitur, non autem ante, vel post; et in hostiis, seu particulis consecratis, qu&#65533; post communionem reservantur, vel supersunt, non remanere verum corpus Domini; anathema sit.

"5. Si quis dixerit, vel pr&#65533;cipuum fructum sanctissim&#65533; eucharisti&#65533; esse remissionem peccatorum, vel ex ea non alios effectus provenire; anathema sit.

"6. Si quis dixerit, in sancto eucharisti&#65533; sacramento Christum, unigenitum Dei filium, non esse cultu latri&#65533;, etiam externo, adorandum; atque ideo nec festiva peculiari celebritate venerandum; neque in processionibus, secundum laudabilem, et universalem ecclesi&#65533; ritum, et consuetudinem, solemniter circumgestandum, vel non publice, ut adoretur, populo proponendum, et ejus adoratores esse idololatras; anathema sit.

"7. Si quis dixerit, non licere sacram eucharistiam in sacrario reservari, sed statim post consecrationem adstantibus necessario distribuendam, aut non licere, ut illa ad infirmos honorifice deferatur; anathema sit.

"8. Si quis dixerit, Christum, in eucharistia exhibitum, spiritualiter tantum manducari, et non etiam sacramentaliter, et realiter; anathema sit.

"9. Si quis negaverit, omnes, et singulos Christi fideles utriusque sexus, cum ad annos discretionis pervenerint, teneri singulis annis, saltem in paschate, ad communicandum, juxta pr&#65533;ceptum sanct&#65533; matris ecclesi&#65533;; anathema sit.

"10. Si quis dixerit, non licere sacerdoti celebranti seipsum communicare; anathema sit.

"11. Si quis dixerit, solam fidem esse sufficientem pr&#65533;parationem ad sumendum sanctissim&#65533; eucharisti&#65533; sacramentum, anathema sit. Et ne tantum sacramentum indigne atque ideo in mortem, condemnationem sumatur, statuit, atque declaret ipsa sancta synodus, illis, quos conscientia peccati mortalis gravat, quantumcunque etiam se contritos existiment, habita copia confessoris, necessario pr&#65533;mittendam esse confessionem sacramentalem. Si quis autem contrarium docere, pr&#65533;dicare, vel pertinaciter asserere, seu etiam publice disputando defendere pr&#65533;sumpserit eo ipso excommunicatus existat." [720]

From this statement it appears, first, as concerns the elements of bread and wine, that in and by the act of consecration, their whole substance is changed. Nothing of the substance or essence of either remains. The accidents, or sensible properties, however, continue as they were. The form, colour, taste, odour, the specific gravity, their chemical affinities, and their nutritive qualities remain the same. So far as the senses, chemical analysis, and physics are concerned or are to be trusted, no change has taken place. As the

sensible properties of the bread and wine do not and cannot inhere in the substance of Christ's body and blood, and as their own substance no longer exists, those properties do not inhere in any substance. "Cum antea demonstratum sit, corpus Domini, et sanguinem vere in sacramento esse, ita nulla amplius subsit panis, et vini substantia; quoniam ea accidentia Christi corpori, et sanguini inh€rere non possunt: relinquitur, ut supra omnem natur€ ordinem ipsa se, nulla alia re nisa, sustentent, h€c perpetua, et constans fuit catholic€ Ecclesi€ doctrina." [721]

Secondly, as to what is said to be present under the species of bread and wine, it is the body and blood of Christ; the body which hung upon the cross; the blood which flowed from his side; with the nerves, bones, and whatever pertains to the completeness of man. ("Ossa, nervi, et qu€cumque ad hominis perfectionem pertinent.") [722] As, however, the body of Christ is inseparably connected with his soul, so that where the one is, the other must be and as his soul is in like manner connected with his divinity, it follows that the whole Christ, body, soul, and divinity, is presents and is received orally, i.e., by the mouth, by the communicant. "Docere autem oportet, Christum nomen esse Dei, et hominis, unius scilicet person€, in qua divina, et humana natura conjuncta sit, quare utramque substantiam, et qu€ utriusque substanti€ consequentia sunt, divinitatem, et totam humanam naturam, qu€ exanima, et omnibus corporis partibus, et sanguine etiam constat, complectitur: qu€ omnia in sacramento esse credendum est, nam cum in coelo tota humanitas divinitati, in una persona, et hypostasi conjuncta sit, nefas est suspicari, corpus, quod in sacramento inest, ab eadem divinitate sejunctum esse." [723]

Thirdly, the whole Christ is in the bread and the whole Christ as in the wine: [724] and not only so, but in each and every particle of both species. Thus the Catechism, says "non solum in utraque specie, sed in quavis utriusque speciei particula totum Christum contineri."

Fourthly, Lutherans teach that the presence of the body and blood of Christ in, with, and under the bread and wine, is confined to the time of the administration of the sacrament. Romanists, on the other hand, teach that as there is an entire change of the substance of the elements into the substance of the body and blood of Christ, that change is permanent. From this it is inferred, (1.) That the consecrated wafer as containing the whole Christ, may be preserved. (2.) That it may be carried to the sick. (3.) That it may be borne about in processions. (4.) That it should be adored.

It is well known that Romanists distinguish between the "cultus civilis," or worship (i.e., respect) due to our superiors among men; douleia, due to saints and angels; huperdouleia, due to the Virgin Mary, and latreia, due to God alone. The ground of this worship is the real or supposed possession of divine perfections in its object. When our Lord was upon the earth He was the proper object of this divine worship, because He was God manifested in the flesh. The worship terminated on the person; and that person is and was divine. If Christians err in believing that the person known in history as Jesus of Nazareth, was, and is the Eternal Son of God clothed in our nature, then their worship of Him is idolatry. They ascribe divine perfections and render divine honours to a creature, and therein consists the essence of idolatry. In like manner Romanists teach that latreia, the worship due to God alone, is to be rendered to the host, or consecrated wafer. This worship, of course, is not rendered to the wafer as such, any more than the worship of

Christians was rendered to the body and blood of Christ, when He was here on earth. But Romanists worship the host on the assumption that it is the body of Christ, with which his soul and divinity are inseparably connected. If their doctrine of transubstantiation be false; if the host be no more the body of Christ than any other piece of bread; if his soul and divinity be no more present in it than in other bread, then they must admit that the worship of the host is as pure and simple idolatry as the world has ever seen. As all Protestants believe the doctrine of transubstantiation to be utterly unscriptural and false, they are unanimous in pronouncing the worship of the consecrated elements to be idolatry.

Proof of the Doctrine.

The arguments urged by Romanists in support of the fearful dogma of transubstantiation, are derived partly from Scripture and partly from tradition. Without the latter, the former, to all appearance, even in the estimation of Romanists themselves, would be of little account. The Scriptural passage principally relied upon, is John vi. 48-65. As to this discourse of our Lord, Cardinal Gousset lays down two propositions: first, that it is to be understood of the Lord's Supper; and second, that the eating of which it speaks is oral, by the mouth, and not merely spiritual, by faith. If these points be granted, then it follows that our Lord does speak of a literal eating of his flesh, and therefore that his flesh must be in the literal sense of the words eaten at the Lord's Supper. Such eating it must be conceded necessitates the admission of the doctrine of transubstantiation. It is enough, in this place, to say of this argument, that it proves too much. Our Lord expressly declares that the eating of which He speaks is essential to salvation. If, therefore, his words are to be understood of the Lord's Supper, then a participation in that sacrament is essential to salvation. But this the Church of Rome explicitly denies, and must in consistency with its whole system, insist on denying. Romanists teach that spiritual life is as necessary to an experience of the benefits of this sacrament, as natural life is to the body's being nourished by food. [725]

They further teach that baptism, which precedes the eucharist, conveys all the saving benefits of Christ's redemption; they therefore cannot make the eucharist essential, and consequently they cannot, without contradicting Christ or themselves, interpret John vi. 48-65 as referring to the Lord's Supper. [726]

Appeal, of course, is also made to the words of institution, "This is my body." In this argument enough has already been said. There is no more necessity for understanding those words literally than the declaration of Christ, "I am the true bread," or, "I am the door." The elements are declared to be bread and wine both by Christ and by the Apostles, after as well as before consecration.

Romanists, however, teach that there are many doctrines which Christ and his Apostles taught, which are either not revealed at all, or but very imperfectly in Scripture, and which are to be received on the authority of tradition. On that authority they rely for the support of all their peculiar doctrines. As to that argument, as urged in behalf of the doctrine of transubstantiation, Protestants say, first, that the Scriptures are the only infallible rule of faith and practice, and, therefore, that no doctrine, which cannot be proved from the Bible, can be received as an article of faith. And as the doctrine of transubstantiation cannot be so proved, it is to be rejected as a mere human theory. And, secondly, that even admitting the authority of tradition, it can be demonstrated that the doctrine in question has no claim to support from the rule, "quod semper, quod ubique,

quod ab omnibus." The rise and gradual development of this doctrine can be historically traced. The conflicts attending its introduction as an article of faith are matters of record, and it can no more be proved, even by tradition, than the doctrine of purgatory and extreme unction. This is the conclusion reached after years of controversy, and it is not likely ever to be shaken. It was on this point that the leading divines of the Church of England laid out their strength in their controversy with the Church of Rome. [727]

It is a valid objection to this doctrine that it involves an impossibility. The impossible cannot be true, and, therefore, cannot, rationally, be an object of faith. It is impossible that the accidents or sensible properties of the bread and wine should remain if the substance be changed. Such a proposition has no more meaning in it than the assertion that an act can be without an agent. Accidents or properties are the phenomena of substance; and it is self-evident that there can be no manifestations where there is not something to be manifested. In other words nothing, a "non-ens" cannot manifest itself. Romanists cannot turn to the theory that matter is not a substance; for that is not their doctrine. On the contrary, they assert that the substance of the bread is transmuted into the substance of Christ's body. Nor can they help themselves by resorting to the pantheistic doctrine that all accidents are phenomena of God, for that would upset their whole system.

It is moreover impossible that the well-attested testimony of our senses should be deceptive. If it once be assumed that we cannot trust to the laws of belief impressed on our nature, of which faith in our sense perceptions is one of the most important, then the foundation of all knowledge, faith, and religion is overturned. What has Catholicism to say for itself, if the people cannot trust their ears when they hear the teachings of the Church, or their eyes when they read its decrees? It has nothing to stand upon. It is engulfed with all things else in the abyss of nihilism. To believe in transubstantiation we must disbelieve our senses, and this God requires of no man. It involves disbelief in Him who is the author of our nature and of the laws which are impressed upon it. There is no more complete and destructive infidelity than the want of faith in the veracity of consciousness, whether it be consciousness of our sense perceptions, or of the truths involved in our rational, moral, or religious nature.

It is another objection to this doctrine that it logically leads, and in fact has led, to the greatest practical evils. It has led to superstitious, in the place of rational and Scriptural reverence for the sacrament; to the idolatrous worship of the consecrated wake; to attributing to it magical, or supernatural virtue contrary to Scripture; to perverting a simple sacrament into a propitiatory sacrifice, and to investing the ministers of Christ with the character of sacrificing priests, empowered to offer, for money, a propitiatory oblation securing forgiveness even for the aims of the departed. It has been made a mine of wealth to the priesthood and the Church. It was principally the popular belief in this great error, that secured the transfer of the greater part of the land and wealth of Europe into the hands of the clergy and gave them almost unlimited power over the people.

Withholding the Cup from the Laity.

The Romish Church admits that this is contrary to the original institution of the ordinance, and to the usage of the primitive Church. It is defended, (1.) On the ground that the cup is unnecessary to the completeness of the sacrament. The blood is in the body; he therefore who receives the latter receives the former. And as the whole Christ, as to his

body, soul, and divinity is not only in each species, but in every particle of both, he who receives the consecrated bread receives the whole Christ, and derives all the benefit from communing, the sacrament is capable of affording. (2.) That there is great danger in passing the cup from one communicant to another that a portion of its contents should be spilt; and as the cup after consecration contains the real blood of Christ, its falling to the ground and being trodden under foot, is a profanation, by every means to be avoided. (3.) The Church did not of its own motion introduce this innovation. It was introduced and had become general, before the Church saw fit, for sufficient reasons, to interfere and change a custom into a law.

The Lord's Supper as a Sacrifice.

On this subject the Church of Rome teaches, according to the Council of Trent, --

"1. Si quis dixerit, in missa non offerri Deo verum, et proprium sacrificium; aut quod offerri non sit aliud, quam nobis Christum ad manducandum dari; anathema sit.

"2. Si quis dixerit, illis verbis, Hoc facite in meam commemorationem;' Christum non instituisse Apostolos sacerdotes; aut non ordinasse, ut ipsi, aliique sacerdotes offerent corpus, et sanguinem suum; anathema sit.

"3. Si quis dixerit, miss sacrificium tantum esse laudis, et gratiarum actionis, aut nudum commemorationem sacrificii in cruce peracti, non autem propitiatorium; vel soli prodesse sumenti; neque pro vivis, et defunctis, pro peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus, et aliis necessitatibus offerri debere; anathema sit.

"4. Si quis dixerit, blasphemiam irrogari sanctissimo Christi sacrificio, in cruce peracto, per miss sacrificium; aut illi per hoc derogari; anathema sit.

"5. Si quis dixerit, imposturam esse, missas celebrare in honorem sanctorum, et pro illorum intercessione, apud Deum obtinenda, sicut ecclesia intendit; anathema sit.

"6. Si quis dixerit, canones miss errores continere, ideoque abrogandum; anathema sit.

"7. Si quis dixerit, cremonias, vestes, et externa signa, quibus in missarum celebratione ecclesia catholica utitur, irritabula impietatis esse, magis quam officia pietatis; anathema sit.

"8. Si quis dixerit, missas, in quibus solus sacerdos sacramentaliter communicat, illicitas esse, ideoque abrogandas; anathema sit.

"9. Si quis dixerit, ecclesi Roman ritum, quo summissa voce pars canonis, et verba consecrationis proferuntur, damnandum esse; aut lingua tantum vulgari missam celebrari debere; aut aquam non miscendam esse vino in calice offerendo, eo quod sit contra Christi institutionem; anathema sit." [728]

From this it appears, --

1. That, according to the Church of Rome, the eucharist is a real, propitiatory sacrifice, for the expiation of sin, for reconciliation with God, and for securing providential and gracious blessings from his hands.

2. That what is offered is Christ, his body, soul, and divinity, all which are present under the form of bread and wine. The sacrifice of the mass is the same, therefore, as the sacrifice of the cross; the former being a constant repetition of the latter. "Unum itaque et

idem sacrificium esse fatemur, et haberi debet, quod in missa peragitur, et quod in cruce oblatum est: quemadmodum una est et eadem hostia Christus, videlicet Dominus noster, qui se ipsum in ara crucis semel tantummodo cruentum immolavit. Neque enim cruenta, et incruenta hostia, du sunt hosti, sed una tantum, cujus sacrificium, postquam Dominus ita pr cepit, Hoc facite in meam commemorationem,' in eucharistia quotidie instauratur." [729]

3. As the sacrifice is the same, so also is the priest. Christ offered Himself once on the cross, and He offers Himself daily in the mass. "Sed unus etiam atque idem sacerdos est Christus dominus, nam ministri, qui sacrificium faciunt, non suam, sed Christi personam suscipiunt, cum ejus corpus et sanguinem conficiunt, id quod et ipsius consecrationis verbis ostenditur, neque enim sacerdos inquit, Hoc est corpus Christi, sed, Hoc est corpus meum:' personam videlicet Christi domini gerens, panis, et vini substantiam, in veram ejus corporis, et sanguinis substantiam convertit." [730] On this statement it may be remarked in passing, that if the ministers are not the real offerers, they are not real priests. A priest is one appointed to offer sacrifices. But according to the theory, the officiating minister in the service of the mass, does not offer the sacrifice. He is a supernumerary. He has no function. There is no reason why without his intervention, Christ should not when his people meet to commemorate his death, offer Himself anew to God. The Roman theory in this, as in many other points, is not self-consistent. Romanists represent ministers as true priests; mediators between God and the people, without whose intervention, no sinner can have access to God or obtain pardon or acceptance. They are not only invested with priestly authority and prerogatives, but imbued with supernatural power. The words of consecration pronounced by other than sacerdotal lips, are inoperative. The mass unless performed by a priest is no sacrifice. All this supposes that their office is a reality, that ministers are really priests; but according to the passage just quoted, they are not priests at all. According to the common mode of representation, however, the minister in the mass as truly offers the body and blood of Christ, as the priests under the Old Testament offered the blood of lambs or of goats. Cardinal Gousset, for example, says: "According to the faith of the Catholic Church, the mass is a sacrifice of the new law, in which the priest offers to God the body and blood of Jesus Christ under the form of bread and wine. The mass is a true sacrifice instituted by Jesus Christ." "A sacrifice, from its nature, is an act of supreme worship, due to God alone. Hence when a mass is celebrated in the name of a saint, it is not to be believed that the sacrifice is offered to the saint; but simply in his memory, to implore his protection, and to secure his intercession. It is a sacrifice in which is offered the body and blood of Christ Jesus Christ, whose body and blood are present under the forms of bread and wine, is Himself the victim. Finally, the eucharistic sacrifice is made by the hands of the priest, but Jesus Christ is the principal minister; He is at once priest and victim, offering himself to God the Father by the ministry of his priests." [731]

4. As under the Old Testament some of the sin offerings availed for those who brought the victims, and for whose benefit hey were offered; and others, as the morning and evening sacrifices, and those offered on the feast days, and especially that on the great day of atonement, were intended for the whole nation, so according to Romanists, the propitiatory sacrifice, in the ordinary public service, is offered for the sins of the faithful in general, while at other times it is offered for particular individual. And as it matters not whether such individuals be living or dead, it is obvious that such masses may be indefinitely

multiplied. As according to the Church of Rome the great majority of those dying within the pale of the Church, pass into purgatory, where they remain in a state of suffering for a period to which there is no certainly known termination before the day of judgment; for their benefit, to alleviate or shorten their sufferings, masses may be, and should be offered by their surviving friends. It has ever been found that men at the approach of death, or the affectionate relatives of the departed, are willing to appropriate money at their command, to pay for masses for their benefit. This, as just remarked, has proved an inexhaustible mine of wealth to the Church. "Hujus sacrificii eam vim esse, parochi docebunt, ut non solum immolanti, et sumenti prosit, sed omnibus etiam fidelibus, sive illi nobiscum in terris vivant, sive jam in Domino mortui, nondum plane expiati sint. Neque enim minus ex Apostolorum certissima traditione, pro his utiliter offertur, quam pro vivorum peccatis, poenis, satisfactionibus, ac quibusvis calamitatibus, et angustiis." [732]

Remarks.

No doctrine of the Church of Rome is more portentous or more fruitful of evil consequences than this doctrine of the mass; and no doctrine of that Church is more entirely destitute of even a semblance of Scriptural support. The words of Christ, "This do in remembrance of me," are made to mean, "Offer the sacrifice which I myself have just offered" (Offrez le sacrifice que je vien d'offrir moi-meme). [733] These words constituted the Apostles and all their successors priests. The Council of Trent even anathematizes all who do not put that preposterous interpretation on those simple words. [734] Romanists also appeal to the fact that Christ is said to be a priest forever after the order of Melchizedek, from which they infer that He continually repeats the sacrifice once offered on the cross. They even argue from such passages as Malachi i. 11, in which the universal spread of the true religion is predicted by saying that from the rising of the sun to the going down of the same, "in every place incense shall be offered unto my name, and a pure offering." [735]

Protestants reject the doctrine that the eucharist is a true propitiatory sacrifice, --

1. Because it is not only destitute of all support from tue Scriptures, but is directly contrary to the whole nature of the ordinance, as exhibited in its original institution and in the practice of the apostolic church. There it is set forth as a sacred feast commemorative of the death of Christ.

2. Because it is founded on the monstrous doctrine of transubstantiation. If the whole substance of the bread be not changed into the substance of Christ's body, and the whole substance of the wine into the substance of his blood, and if the whole Christ, body, soul, and divinity be not really and truly present under the form (or species) or appearance of the bread and wine, then the priest in the mass has nothing to offer. He in fact offers nothing, and the whole service is a deceit. Just so certainly, therefore, as the impossible and the unscriptural cannot be true, just so certain is it, that the mass is not a propitiatory sacrifice.

3. The Romish doctrine is that the Apostles were priests, and were invested with authority and power to continue and perpetuate in the Church the priestly office by ordination and the imposition of hands by which the supernatural gifts of the Holy Spirit are conveyed. All this is unscriptural and false. First, because a priest is a man appointed to be a mediator between God and other men, drawing near to Him in behalf of those who have not liberty of access for themselves, and whose function it is to offer gifts and sacrifices for

sin. But there is no such office under the Christian dispensation, save in the person of Jesus Christ. He is our only, and all sufficient priest; everywhere present and everywhere accessible, who has opened for us a new and living way of access to God, available to all sinners of the human race without the intervention of any of their fellow sinners. Every believer is as much a priest under the Gospel, as any other believer, for through Christ they all have equal freedom of access unto God. It subverts the whole nature of the gospel, to make the intervention of any human priest necessary to our reconciliation with God. Secondly, Christian ministers are never called priests in the New Testament. Every title of dignity, every term expressive of the nature of their office, is bestowed on them, but the title priest, so familiar to Jewish and Gentile ears, is never given to them. Nor is any priestly function ascribed to them. They are not mediators. They are not appointed to offer sacrifices for sin. Every priest is a mediator, but it is expressly declared that Christians have but one mediator, the man Christ Jesus. There is but one sacrifice for sin, the all sufficient sacrifice of Christ upon the cross, who died once for all to bring us near to God. Thirdly, Christ Himself and the Apostles after Him in all their addresses to the people, instead of directing them to go to ministers as priests to obtain the benefits of redemption, uniformly assume that the way is open for the return of every sinner to God without human intervention. "Come unto me" is the invitation of Christ to every heavily laden sinner. "Believe on the Lord Jesus Christ, and thou shalt be saved," is the gospel preached by the Apostles both to Jews and Gentiles. The emancipation of the Christian world effected by the Reformation, consisted in large measure in freeing man from the belief that Christian ministers are priests through whom alone sinners can draw near to God. It was preaching deliverance to captives, and the opening of the prison to those who were bound, to announce that believers through Christ are all made kings and priests unto God; subject to no authority but the authority of God (and of course to such as He has ordained), and all having access by one Spirit unto the Father. If then ministers are not priests, the eucharist is not a sacrifice.

4. The Romish doctrine is derogatory to the sacrifice of the cross. It supposes that the work of Christ in making satisfaction for the sins of men, needs to be constantly repeated. This is directly contrary to Scripture, which teaches that by the one offering of Himself, He has forever perfected them that believe. His one sacrifice has done all that need be done, and all that a sacrifice can do. Romanists say that the same sacrifice which was made or the cross, is made in the mass. The only difference between the two is modal. It concerns only the manner of oblation. Then why is the latter needed? Why does not the one offering of Christ suffice? Certain it is the Bible refers us to nothing else: and the believer craves nothing else.

5. The doctrine of the sacrificial character of the eucharist, is an integral part of the great system of error, which must stand or fall as a whole. Romanism is another gospel. It proposes a different method of salvation from that presented in the word of God. It teaches that no one can be saved who is out of the pale of that visible society of which the pope of Rome is the head; and that all are saved who die within that pale. It teaches that no one can be regenerated who is not baptized; and that there is no forgiveness for post-baptismal sins, except by the sacrament of penance and absolution at the hands of a priest. It teaches that no one can have the benefit of the Lord's Supper, who does not receive it at the hands of a properly ordained officer of the Church of Rome. It teaches that there is no valid ministry,

and that there are no valid ordinances except in the line of the apostolic succession as recognized by the pope. It follows men beyond the grave. It teaches that the souls in purgatory are still under the power of the keys; that their stay in that place or state of torment, can be prolonged or shortened at the will of the Church. The pope assumes, and has often pretended to exercise, the power of granting indulgences for even a thousand years. This whole theory hangs together. If one assumption be false, the whole is false. And if the theory in its primary principle of a perpetual apostleship, infallible in teaching and of plenary power in government and discipline, be false, then every particular doctrine involving that principle must be false.

Moehler, whose philosophical and mitigated Romanism, has called down upon him no little censure from his stricter brethren, represents the doctrine of the eucharist as the point in which all the differences between Romanists and Protestants converge. On the view taken of this doctrine depends the question whether the Christian Church has a true living "cultus" or not. With him the Church, of course, is the body, which, professing the true religion, is united in the reception of the same sacraments, in subjection to bishops canonically consecrated, and especially to the pope of Rome. For him, and all Romanists, this Church is Christ. He dwells in it; animates it; operates through it exclusively in the salvation of men. The teaching of the Church is his teaching; its commands are his commands; He regenerates only through its sacrament of baptism; He remits sin only through the sacrament of penance; He strengthens in confirmation; He nourishes his people with his body and blood in the eucharist; and in the ordination of priests. He appoints the organs through which all this is done by his ceaseless activity. "The Church," says Moehler, "is vicariously (auf eine abbildlich-lebendige Weise) Christ manifested and working through all time. The Redeemer did not merely live eighteen hundred years ago, and then disappear, to be remembered only as a historical person as any other of the departed; on the contrary He is ever living in the Church." [736] Romanists, therefore, practically take away Christ, and give us the Church in his stead. It is to be remembered that by the Church they do not mean the body consisting of true believers, but the external, organized body of which the pope is the head. It is this body represented in history by the Hildebrands, the Borgias, and the Leos, which Romanism puts in the place of Christ, clothing it with his prerogatives, and claiming for it the obedience, the reverence, and the confidence due to God alone. It is against this theory, which practically puts man in the place of God, that the most fearful denunciations of the Scriptures are pronounced.

[715] Theologie Dogmatique. Par. S. E. Le Cardinal Gousset, Archeveque de Reims. De l'Eucharistie , I. i. 695, 10th edit. Paris, 1866, vol. ii. p. 452.

[716] Catechismus Romanus, II. iv. qu&#65533;st. 40 [60, li.]; Streitwolf, G&#65533;ttingen, 1846, vol. i. p. 344.

[717] Confessionum, VII. x. 16; Works, edit. Benedictines, Paris, 1836, vol. i. p. 241, c.

[718] Catechismus Romanus, ut supra, qu&#65533;st. 39; p. 343.

[719] Ibid. p. 342.

[720] Council of Trent, Sess. xiii. canones; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 50-52.

[721] Catechismus Romanus, II. iv. qu&#65533;st. 37 [45, xliv.]; Ibid. p. 341.

[722] Ibid. qu&#65533;st. 27 [33, xxxi.], p. 333.

[723] Catechismus Romanus, ut supra, qu&#65533;st. 27 [33, xxxi.], p. 334.

[724] Romanists teach that even after consecration, it is proper to call the elements bread and wine, because, although the substance is changed, the accidents of bread and wine remain. Catechismus Romanus, ut supra, qu&#65533;st. 30 [xxxv. 36], p. 335.

[725] Catechismus Romanus, II. iv. 40 [li. 50], Streitwolf, vol. i. p. 344.

[726] "Le sacrement de l'eucharistie n'est point n&#65533;cessaire au salut, d'une necessit&#65533; de moyen; on peut &#65533;tre sauv&#65533; sans avoir re&#65533;u la communion. La raison, c'est que se sacrement n'a point &#65533;t&#65533; institu&#65533; comme moyen de conf&#65533;rer la premi&#65533;re grace sanctifiante ou de remettre le p&#65533;ch&#65533; mortel, ce qui est r&#65533;serv&#65533; aux sacrements de bapt&#65533;me et de p&#65533;nitence." Gousset, Theologie, Paris, 1866, vol. ii. p. 516.

[727] In Herzog's Real-Encyklop&#65533;die, vol. xvi., there is, under the head of "Transubstantation," an elaborate article of fifty-five royal octavo pages on the history of this doctrine, in which its rise through the patristical and medi&#65533;val periods is minutely traced.

[728] Sess. xxii. canones; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 81, 82.

[729] Catechismus Romanus, par. II. cap. iv. qu&#65533;st. 60 [lxxxii. 76], Ibid. p. 359.

[730] Catechismus Romanus, II. iv. qu&#65533;st. 61 [lxxxiii. 77], Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 359, 360.

[731] Gousset, Th&#65533;ologie, ut supra, vol. II. p. 522.

[732] Catechismus Romanus, par. II. cap. iv. qu&#65533;st. 63 [86, xxxvi], Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 360, 361.

[733] Gousset, Th&#65533;ologie, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 538.

[734] See Sess. xii. canon 2; quoted above on page 685.

[735] In this passage the words mqtr mgs, correctly rendered in the English version "incense shall be offered," in the Vulgate are translated "sacrificatur." In the Septuagint it is thumiama prosagetai. Luther's version is "ger&#65533;uchert." Even if the Vulgate version were correct, and the prophet had said that "in every place sacrifice should be made," that would prove nothing to the point. The Old Testament prophets predicted the spread of the true religion under the Gospel dispensation in the use of terms borrowed from the Old Testament ritual.

[736] Symbolik, von Dr. J. A. Moehler, 6th edit. Mainz, 1843, p. 300.

§ 20. Prayer.

Prayer is the converse of the soul with God. Therein we manifest or express to Him our reverence, and love for his divine perfection, our gratitude for all his mercies, our penitence for our sins, our hope in his forgiving love, our submission to his authority, our confidence in his care, our desires for his favour, and for the providential and spiritual blessings needed for ourselves and others. As religion, in the subjective sense of the word, is the state of mind induced by the due apprehension of the character of God and of our relation to Him as our Creator, Preserver, and Redeemer; so prayer is the expression, uttered or unuttered, of all the feelings and desires which that state of mind produces or

excites. A prayerless man is of necessity, and thoroughly irreligious. There can be no life without activity. As the body is dead when it ceases to act, so the soul that goes not forth in its actions towards God, that lives as though there were no God, is spiritually dead.

Prayer takes a great deal for granted. It assumes, in the first place, the personality of God. Only a person can say I, or be addressed as Thou; only a person can be the subject and object of intelligent action, can apprehend and answer, can love and be loved, or hold converse with other persons. If God, therefore, be only a name for an unknown force, or for the moral order of the universe, prayer becomes irrational and impossible. [737] Secondly, God, however, although a person, may dwell far off in immensity, and have no intercourse with his creatures on earth. Prayer, therefore, assumes not only the personality of God, but also that He is near us; that He is not only able, but also willing to hold intercourse with us, to hear and answer; that He knows our thoughts afar off; and that unuttered aspirations are intelligible to Him. Thirdly, it assumes that He has the personal control of all nature, i.e., of all things out of Himself; that He governs all his creatures and all their actions. It assumes that He has not only created all things and endowed matter and mind with forces and powers, but that He is everywhere present, controlling the operation of such forces and powers, so that nothing occurs without his direction or permission. When it rains, it is because He wills it, and controls the laws of nature to produce that effect. When the earth produces fruit in abundance, or when the hopes of the husbandman are disappointed, these effects are not to be referred to the blind operation of natural laws, but to God's intelligent and personal control. There is no such reign of law as makes God a subject. It is He who reigns, and orders all the operations of nature so as to accomplish his own purposes.

This does not suppose that the laws of nature are mutable, or that they are set aside. There is scarcely any effect, either in nature or in the acts of men, due to the operation of any one natural force. We produce effects by combining such forces, so that the result is due to this intelligent and voluntary combination. In like manner, in the ordinary operations of nature, God accomplishes his purpose by a similar intelligent and voluntary combination of natural causes. When He wills that it should rain, He wills that all the secondary causes, productive of that effect, should be brought into operation. The doctrine of providence only supposes that God does, on the scale of the universe, what we do within the limited sphere of our efficiency. We, indeed, so far as effects out of ourselves are concerned, are tied to the use of secondary causes. We can act neither against them, nor without them. God is not thus limited. He can operate without second causes as well as with them, or against them. There seems to be no little confusion in the minds of many writers on this subject. They insist on the immutability of the laws of nature, and some times speak of God as constantly controlling their operation by combining and directing their forces, and yet they resolve all second causes into the divine efficiency; that is, an efficiency directed by intelligence and will. "It is but reasonable," says Sir John Herschel, "to regard the force of gravitation as the direct or indirect result of a consciousness or will existing somewhere." [738] "It may be that all natural forces are resolvable in some one force, and indeed in the modern doctrine of the correlation of forces, an idea which is a near approach to this, has already entered the domain of science. It may also be that this one force, into which all others return again, is itself but a mode of action of the Divine Will." [739] It is a common remark that the only force of which we have any direct knowledge is mind-force, and hence that it is unphilosophical to assume any other. From this it is inferred that all the forces operating in

nature are the energy of the one Supreme Intelligence. This doctrine, as shown when treating of the doctrine of Providence, almost inevitably leads to pantheism. But it is difficult to see how those who take this view can consistently speak of the immutability of law, or of God's being free only within its limits. It is essential to the idea of mind-power, that it should be free; that it should act when, where, and how it pleases. In the case of God, indeed, it cannot act unwisely or unjustly. But if all the forces of nature are only manifestations of the divine efficiency, what meaning can be attached to the proposition that He operates with, and through, and never independently of natural law?

The Scriptural doctrine is that God is an extra-mundane, personal Being, independent of the world, who has created it, and endowed all things material with their several properties or powers, which He in his omnipresent, and infinitely wise omnipotence, constantly controls. This doctrine is presupposed in prayer; for "prayer and the answer of prayer, are simply . . . . the preferring of a request upon the one side, and compliance with that request upon the other. Man applies, God complies. Man asks a favour, God bestows it. These are conceived to be the two terms of a real interchange that takes place between the parties -- the two terms of a sequence, in fact, whereof the antecedent is a prayer lifted up from earth, and the consequent is the fulfilment of that prayer in virtue of a mandate from heaven." [740]

Prayer also supposes that the government of God extends over the minds of men, over their thoughts, feelings, and volitions, that the heart is in his hands, and that He can turn it even as the rivers of water are turned.

It is evident, therefore, that not only atheism, pantheism, materialism, and every other system of philosophy which involves the denial of the existence or the personality of God, but also all other theories, whether scientific or philosophical, which do not admit of the control of God over the operations of nature and the character and conduct of men, are inconsistent with prayer. According to all these systems there is either no one to pray to, or nothing to pray for. If there be no personal God, there is no one to pray to; and if God, supposing such a Being to exist, has no control over nature or man, then there is no rational motive for prayer; there is nothing to be accomplished by it. The idea that the service would still be of value for its subjective effect is irrational, because its subjective effect is due to faith in its objective efficiency. If a man believes that there is no God, he cannot make himself a better man by acting hypocritically, and pouring forth his prayers and praises to a nonentity. Or, if a believer in the existence of God, if he has such a theory of his nature or of his relation to the world, as precludes the possibility of his hearing, or if He hears, of his answering our prayers, then prayer becomes irrational. Candid men, therefore, who in their philosophy hold any of the theories referred to, do not hesitate to pronounce prayer superstitious or fanatical. Kant, although a theist, regards all as unphilosophical enthusiasts who assume that God hears or answers prayer. [741]

Professor Tyndall, one of the representative scientific men of the age, says, "One by one natural phenomena have been associated with their proximate causes; and the idea of direct personal volition, mixing itself in the economy of nature, is retreating more and more." Science, he tells us "does assert, for example, that without a disturbance of natural law, quite as serious as the stoppage of an eclipse, or the rolling the St. Lawrence up the Falls of Niagara, no act of humiliation, individual or national, could call one shower from

heaven, or deflect towards us a single beam of the sun." [Man may deflect the beams of the sun at pleasure, but God cannot. Man, according to Professor Espy, can make it rain, but God cannot.] "Those, therefore, who believe that the miraculous is still active in nature, may with perfect consistency join in our periodic prayers for fair weather and for rain: while those who hold that the age of miracles is past, will refuse to join in such petitions." [742] With Professor Tyndall and the large class of scientists to which he belongs, there never has been an event in the external world due to the exercise of any other force than the undirected operation of physical causes. "Nothing has occurred to indicate that the operation of the law [of gravity] has for a moment been suspended; nothing has ever intimated that nature has been crossed by spontaneous action, or that a state of things at any time existed which could not be rigorously deduced from the preceding state. Given the distribution of matter and the forces in operation in the time of Galileo, the competent mathematician of that day could predict what is now occurring in our own." [743] What is meant by "spontaneous action"? Spontaneous is antithetical to necessary. Spontaneous action, therefore, is free action; the action of intelligence and will; such action as Professor Tyndall displays in writing or delivering his lectures. His assertion, therefore, is that there has never occurred in nature any effect which may not be referred to necessary, i.e., to blind, unintelligent causes. This of course precludes the possibility of miracles. For a miracle is an event in the external world which cannot be referred to any natural cause, but which must from its nature be ascribed to the immediate efficiency, or the "spontaneous action" of God. When Christ said, "I will; be thou clean," and the leper was cleansed, the only cause, or efficient antecedent of the cure, was his will a volition. So when He said," Lazarus come forth," or when He "said unto the sea, Peace, be still. And the wind ceased and there was a great calm." The scientific man has no idea how small he looks, when, in the presence of Christ, he ventures to say that nature has never been crossed by "spontaneous action," that Christ's will was not a cause, when he healed the sick, or opened the eyes of the blind, or raised the dead, by a word; or when He himself rose by his own power from the grave. To say that these facts never occurred, simply because, according to the ephemeral theory of the hour, they could not occur, is the infinite of folly. It is a thousand fold more certain that they occurred than that the best authenticated facts of history are true. For such facts we have only ordinary historical evidence; for the truth of Christ's miracles, and especially of his resurrection, we have the evidence of all the facts of history from his day to the present. The actual state of the world, and the existence of the Church, necessitate the admission of those facts, to which God himself bore witness of old in signs, and wonders, and divers miracles, as He does still in a manner absolutely irresistible, in the gift of the Holy Ghost. To hear the whole gospel, even constructively, pronounced a lie, is a sore trial to those who have even a glimmer of the faith of Paul, and who can only say with quivering lips, what he said with the fulness of assurance, "I know whom I have believed." [744] Scientific men are prone to think that there is no other evidence of truth, than the testimony of the senses. But the reason has its intuitions, the moral nature its a priori judgments, the religious consciousness its immediate apprehensions, which are absolutely infallible and of paramount authority. A man might as easily emancipate himself from the operation of the laws of nature, as from the authority of the moral law, or his responsibility to God. When, therefore, men of science advance theories opposed to these fundamental convictions, they are like bats impinging against the everlasting rocks.

But apart from the case of miracles, it may be safely said, that so far from its being true that nature has never been "crossed by spontaneous action," such action in nature is familiar, constant, and almost universal. What is an organism, but the product of spontaneous action? that is, of the intelligent (and therefore voluntary) selection and application of appropriate means for the accomplishment of a foreseen and intended end? If the world is full of the evidences of spontaneous action on the part of man, nature is full of evidence of such action on the part of God. The evidence is of the same kind, and just as palpable and irresistible in the one case as in the other. It is admitted of necessity by those who deny it. Darwin's books, for example, are full of such expressions as "wonderful contrivance," "ingenious device," "marvellous arrangements." These expressions reveal the perception of spontaneous action. They have no meaning except on the assumption of such action. "Contrivance," "device," imply design, and would not be used if the perception of intention did not suggest and necessitate them. Some twenty times already, in the course of this work, it has been shown that in many cases, those who begin with denying any spontaneous action in nature, end with asserting that there is no other kind of action anywhere; that all force is mind-force, and therefore spontaneous as well as intelligent.

Spontaneous action cannot be got rid of. If denied in the present, it must be admitted in the past. If, as even Professor Huxley teaches, "Organization is not the cause of life; but life is the cause of organization," [745] the question is, Whence comes life? Not out of nothing, surely. It must have its origin in the spontaneous, voluntary act of the ever, and the necessarily Living One.

The theory of the universe which underlies the Bible, which is everywhere assumed or asserted in the sacred volume, which accords with our moral and religious nature, and which, therefore, is the foundation of natural, as well as of revealed religion, is that God created all things by the word of his power, that He endowed his creatures with their properties or forces; that He is everywhere present in the universe, co<?>perating with and controlling the operation of second causes on a scale commensurate with his omnipresence and omnipotence, as we, in our measure co<?>perate with, and control them within the narrow range of our efficiency. According to this theory, it is not irrational that we should pray for rain or fair weather, for prosperous voyages or healthful seasons; or that we should feel gratitude for the innumerable blessings which we receive from this ever present, ever operating, and ever watchful benefactor and Father. Any theory of the universe which makes religion, or prayer, irrational, is self-evidently false, because it contradicts the nature, the consciousness, and the irrepressible convictions of men. As this control of God extends over the minds of men, it is no less rational that we should pray, as all men instinctively do pray, that He would influence our own hearts, and the hearts of others, for good, than that we should pray for health.

It is also involved in the assumptions already referred to that the sequence of events in the physical and moral world is not determined by any inexorable fate. A fatalist cannot consistently pray. It is only on the assumption that there is a God, who does his pleasure in the army of heaven and among the inhabitants of the earth, that we can rationally address Him as the hearer of prayer.

In like manner it is assumed that there is no such foreordination of events as is inconsistent with God's acting according to the good pleasure of his will. When a man

enters upon any great enterprise, he lays down beforehand the plan of his operations; selects and determines his means, and assigns to each subordinate the part he is to act; he may require each to apply continually for guidance and directions; and may assure him that his requests for assistance and guidance shall be answered. Were it possible that every instance of such application or request could be foreseen and the answer predetermined, this would not be inconsistent with the duty or propriety of such requests being made, or with the liberty of action on the part of the controller. This illustration may amount to little; but it is certain that the Scriptures teach both foreordination and the efficacy of prayer. The two, therefore, cannot be inconsistent. God has not determined to accomplish his purposes without the use of means; and among those means, the prayers of his people have their appropriate place. If the objection to prayer, founded on the foreordination of events, be valid, it is valid against the use of means in any case. If it be unreasonable to say, If it be foreordained that I should live, it is not necessary for me to eat,' it is no less unreasonable for me to say, If it be foreordained that I should receive any good, it is not necessary for me to ask for it.' If God has foreordained to bless us, He has foreordained that we should seek his blessing. Prayer has the same causal relation to the good bestowed, as any other means has to the end with which it is connected.

The God of the Bible, who has revealed himself as the hearer of prayer, is not mere intelligence and power. He is love. He feels as well as thinks. Like as a father pitieth his children, so the Lord pitieth them that fear Him. He is full of tenderness, compassion, long-suffering, and benevolence. This is not anthropomorphism. These declarations of Scripture are not mere "regulative truths." They reveal what God really is. If man was made in his image, God is like man. All the excellences of our nature as spirits belong to Him without limitation, and to an infinite degree. There is mystery here, as there is everywhere. But we are all used to mysteries, the naturalist as well as the theologian. Both have been taught the folly of denying that a thing is, because we cannot tell how it is. It is enough for us to know that God loves us and cares for us; that a sparrow does not fall to the ground without his notice, and that we are, in his sight, of more value than many sparrows. All this for the believer is literal truth, having in its support the highest kind of evidence. The "how" he is content to leave unexplained.

It is an objection often urged against the propriety of addressing prayer to God, that it is inconsistent with his dignity as an infinite Being to suppose that He concerns Himself with the trifling affairs of men. This objection arises from a forgetfulness that God is infinite. It assumes that his knowledge, power, or presence, is limited; that He would be distracted if his attention were directed to all the minute changes constantly occurring throughout the universe. This supposes that God is a creature like ourselves; that bounds can be set to his intelligence or efficiency. When a man looks out on an extended landscape, the objects to which his attention is simultaneously directed are too numerous to be counted. What is man to God? The absolute intelligence must know all things; absolute power must be able to direct all things. In the sight of God, the distinction between few and many, great and small, disappears. In Him all creatures live, and move, and have their being.

The Object of Prayer.

As prayer involves the ascription of divine attributes to its object, it can be properly

addressed to God alone. The heathen prayed to imaginary beings, or to idols, who had eyes that saw not, and hands that could not save. Equally unscriptural and irrational are prayers addressed to any creature of whose presence we have no knowledge, and of whose ability either to hear or answer our petitions we have no evidence.

In the Old Testament, the prayers therein recorded are urnformly addressed to God, as such; to the one Divine Being, because the distinction of the persons in the Godhead was then but imperfectly revealed. In the New Testament, prayer is addressed either to God, as the Triune God, or to the Father, to the Son, and to the Holy Spirit, as distinct persons. In the Christian doxology, used wherever the Bible is known, the several persons of the Trinity are separately addressed. The examples of prayer addressed to Christ, recorded in the New Testament, are very numerous. As prayer, in the Scriptural sense of the term, includes all converse with God either in the form of praise, thanksgiving, confession, or petition; all the ascriptions of glory to Him, as well as all direct supplications addressed to Him, come under the head. The Apostles prayed to Him while He was yet with them on earth, asking of Him blessings which God only could bestow, as when they said, "Lord, increase our faith." The dying thief, taught by the Spirit of God, said, "Lord, remember me when thou comest into thy kingdom." The last words of the first martyr, Stephen, were, "Lord Jesus, receive my spirit." Paul besought the Lord thrice that the thorn in his flesh might depart from him. So in 1 Timothy i. 12, he says, "I thank Christ Jesus our Lord, who hath enabled me, for that He counted me faithful, putting me into the ministry." In Revelation i. 5, 6, it is said, "Unto him that loved us, and washed us from our sins in his own blood, and hath made us kings and priests unto God and his Father; to Him be glory and dominion for ever and ever. Amen." Revelation v. 13, "Every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, and all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honour, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever.'" As the Bible so clearly teaches that Christ is God manifest in the flesh; that all power in heaven and earth is committed to his hands; that He is exalted to give repentance and the remission of sins; as He gives the Holy Ghost; and as He is said to dwell in us, and to be our life; it does thereby teach us that He is the proper object of prayer. Accordingly, as all Christians are the worshippers of Christ, so He has ever been the object of their adoration, thanksgivings, praises, confessions, and supplications.

Requisites of Acceptable Prayer.

1. The first and most obviously necessary requisite of acceptable prayer, is sincerity. God is a Spirit. He searches the heart. He is not satisfied with words, or with external homage. He cannot be deceived and will not be mocked. It is a great offence, therefore, in his sight, when we utter words before Him in which our hearts do not join. We sin against Him when we use terms, in the utterance of which the angels veil their faces, with no corresponding feelings of reverence; or use the formulas of thanksgiving without gratitude; or those of humility and confession without any due sense of our unworthiness; or those of petition without desire for the blessings we ask. Every one must acknowledge that this is an evil often attending the prayers of sincere Christians; and with regard to the multitudes who, in places of public worship, repeat the solemn forms of devotion or profess to unite with those who utter them, without any corresponding emotions, the service is little more than

mockery.

2. Reverence. God is an infinitely exalted Being: infinite in his holiness as well as in knowledge and power. He is to be had in reverence by all who are round about Hun. This holy fear is declared to be the first element of all true religion. His people are designated as those who fear his name. We are required to serve Him with reverence and godly fear. And whenever heaven is opened to our view, its inhabitants are seen prostrate before the throne. We offend God, therefore, when we address Him as we would a fellow creature, or use forms of expression of undue familiarity. Nothing is more characteristic of the prayers recorded in the Bible, than the spirit of reverence by which they are pervaded. The Psalms especially may be regarded as a prayer-book. Every Psalm is a prayer, whether of worship, of thanksgiving, of confession, or of supplication. In many cases all these elements are intermingled. They relate to all circumstances in the inward and outward life of those by whom they were indited. They recognize the control of God over all events, and over the hearts of men. They assume that He is ever near and ever watchful, sustaining to his people the relation of a loving Father. But with all this, there is never any forgetfulness of his infinite majesty. There is a tendency sometimes in the best of men, to address God as though He were one of ourselves. Luther's familiar formula was, Lieber Herr, or Lieber Herr Gott (dear Lord, dear Lord God). As Lieber Herr is the usual mode of address among friends (equivalent to our Dear Sir), it sounds strangely when God is thus addressed. In Luther it was the expression of faith and love; in many who imitate him it is the manifestation of an irreverent spirit.

3. Humility. This includes, first, a due sense of our insignificance as creatures; and secondly, a proper apprehension of our ill-desert and uncleanness in the sight of God as sinners. It is the opposite of self-righteousness, of self-complacency and self-confidence. It is the spirit manifested by Job, when he placed his hand upon his mouth, and his mouth in the dust, and said, I abhor myself, and repent in dust and ashes; by Isaiah when he said, Woe is me! because I am a man of unclean lips, and I dwell in the midst of a people of unclean lips; and by the publican, who was afraid to lift up so much as his eyes unto heaven, but smote upon his breast, and said, God be merciful to me a sinner. Such language is often regarded as exaggerated or hypocritical. It is, however, appropriate. It expresses the state of mind which cannot fail to be produced by a proper apprehension of our character as sinners in the sight of a just and holy God. Indeed there is no language which can give adequate expression to that rational sense of sin which the people of God often experience.

4. Importunity. This is so important that on three different occasions our Lord impressed its necessity upon his disciples. This was one evident design of the history of the Syrophenician woman, who could not be prevented from crying, "Have mercy on me, O Lord, thou son of David." (Matt. xv. 22.) Thus also in the parable of the unjust judge, who said, "Because this widow troubleth me, I will avenge her, lest by her continual coming she weary me. And the Lord said, Hear what the unjust judge saith. And shall not God avenge his own elect, which cry day and night unto Him, though He bear long with them? I tell you that He will avenge them speedily." (Luke xviii. 5-8.) Again in Luke xi. 5-8, we read of the man who refused to give his friend bread, of whom Christ said, "Though he will not rise and give him, because he is his friend, yet because of his importunity he will rise and give him as many as he needeth." God deals with us as a wise benefactor. He requires that we

should appreciate the value of the blessings for which we ask, and that we should manifest a proper earnestness of desire. If a man begs for his own life or for the life of one dear to him, there is no repressing his importunity. He will not be refused. If the life of the body is to be thus earnestly sought, can we expect that the life of the soul will be granted to those who do not seek it with importunate earnestness.

5. Submission. Every man who duly appreciates his relation to God, will, no matter what his request be disposed to say, "Lord, not my will but thine be done." Even a child feels the propriety of subjecting his will in all his requests to his earthly father. How much more should we submit to the will of our Father in heaven. He alone knows what is best; granting our request might, in many cases, be our destruction. Our Lord in the garden of Gethsemane set us an example in this matter, that should never be forgotten.

6. Faith. We must believe. (a.) That God is. (b.) That He is able to hear and answer our prayers. (c.) That He is disposed to answer them. (d.) That He certainly will answer them, if consistent with his own wise purposes and with our best good. For this faith we have the most express assurances in the Bible. It is not only said, "Ask, and ye shall receive; seek and ye shall find," but our Lord says explicitly, "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do." (John xiv. 13.) And again, "If two of you shall agree on earth, as touching anything that they shall ask, it shall be done for them of my Father which is in heaven." (Matt. xviii. 19.) All the promises of God are conditional. The condition, if not expressed; is implied. It cannot be supposed that God has subjected Himself in the government of the world, or in the dispensation of his gifts, to the shortsighted wisdom of men, by promising, without condition, to do whatever they ask. No rational man could wish this to be the case. He would of his own accord supply the condition, which, from the nature of the case and from the Scriptures themselves, must be understood. In 1 John v. 14, the condition elsewhere implied is expressed. "This is the confidence that we have in Him, that if we ask anything according to his will, He heareth us." The promise, however, gives the assurance that all prayers offered in faith, for things according to the will of God, will be answered. The answer, indeed, may be given, as in the case of Paul when he prayed to be delivered from the thorn in the flesh, in a way we do not expect. But the answer will be such as we, if duly enlightened, would ourselves desire. More than this we need not wish. Want of confidence in these precious promises of God; want of faith in his disposition and readiness to hear us, is one of the greatest and most common defects in the prayers of Christians. Every father desires the confidence of his children, and is grieved by any evidence of distrust; and God is our Father; He demands from us the feelings which children ought to have towards their earthly parents.

7. The prayers of Christians must be offered in the name of Christ. Our Lord said to his disciples: "Hitherto have ye asked nothing in my name: ask, and ye shall receive." (John xvi. 24.) "I have chosen you . . . . that whatsoever ye shall ask of the Father in my name, He may give it you." (xv. 16.) "Whatsoever ye shall ask in my name, that will I do." (xiv. 13.) By "the name of God" is meant God himself, and God as manifested in his relation to us. Both ideas are usually united. Thus to believe "in the name of the only begotten Son of God" is to believe that Christ is the Son of God, and that as such He is manifested as the only Saviour of men. To act in the name of anyone is often to act by his authority, and in the exercise of his power. Thus our Lord speaks of the works which He did "in his Father's

name;" that is, by the Father's authority and in the exercise of his efficiency. And of the Apostles it is frequently said that they wrought miracles in the name of Christ, meaning that the miracles were wrought by his authority and power. But when one asks a favour in the name of another, the simple meaning is, for his sake. Regard for the person in whose name the favour is requested, is relied on as the ground on which it is to be granted. Therefore, when we are told to pray in the name of Christ, we are required to urge what Christ is and what He has done, as the reason why we should be heard. We are not to trust to our own merits, or our own character, nor even simply to God's mercy; we are to plead the merits and worth of Christ. It is only in Him, in virtue of his mediation and worth, that, according to the Gospel, any blessing is conferred on the apostate children of men.

Different Kinds of Prayer.

As prayer is converse with God, it includes those spiritual exercises, those goings forth of the soul towards God in thought and feeling, which reveal themselves in the forms of reverence, gratitude, sorrow for sin, sense of dependence, and obligation. In this sense, the man who lives and walks with God, prays always. He fulfils to the letter the injunction "Pray without ceasing." It is our duty and high privilege to have this constant converse with God. The heart should be like the altar of incense, on which the fire never went out.

It is, however, a law of our nature that we should clothe our thoughts and feelings in words. And therefore, prayer is in one form speech. Even when no audible utterance is given, words as the clothing or expression of inward states are present to the mind. There is power, however, in articulate words. The thought or feeling is more distinct and vivid even to ourselves, when audibly expressed. Prayer, in this sense, is usually distinguished as secret, social, and public. It would be a great mistake, if a Christian should act on the assumption that the life of God in his soul could be adequately preserved by that form of prayer, which consists in habitual communion with God. The believer needs, in order to maintain his spiritual health and vigour, regular and stated seasons of prayer, as the body needs its daily meals. "When thou prayest," is the direction given by our Lord, "enter into thy closet, and when thou hast shut thy door, pray to thy Father which is in secret; and thy Father, which seeth in secret, shall reward thee openly." (Matt. vi. 6.) The Bible presents to us the example of the people of God, and of our blessed Lord himself, as a rule of conduct on this subject. We read that Christ often retired for the purpose of prayer, and not unfrequently spent whole nights in that exercise. If the spotless soul of Jesus needed these seasons of converse with God, none of his followers should venture to neglect this important means of grace. Let each day, at least, begin and end with God.

Social prayer includes family prayer, and prayer in the assemblies of the people for social worship. As man's nature is social, he must have fellowship with his fellow men in all that concerns his inward and outward life. No man lives, or can live for himself, in religion any more than in any other relation. As the family is the most intimate bond of fellowship among men, it is of the utmost importance that it should be hallowed by religion. All the relations of parents, children, and domestics are purified and strengthened, when the whole household is statedly assembled, morning and evening, for the worship of God. There is no substitute for this divinely appointed means of promoting family religion. It supposes, indeed, a certain amount of culture. The head of the family should be able to read the Scriptures as well as to lead in the prayer. Those, however, who cannot do the former,

may at least do the latter. All persons subject to the watch or care of the Church should be required to maintain in their households this stated worship of God. The character of the Church and of the state depends on the character of the family. If religion dies out in the family, it cannot elsewhere be maintained. A man's responsibility to his children, as well as to God, binds him to make his house a Bethel; if not a Bethel, it will be a dwelling place of evil spirits.

When and where the mass of the people were so ignorant as to be incompetent profitably to maintain religious services in their families, it was natural and proper for the Church daily to open its doors, and call the people to matins and vespers. It was far better to have this opportunity for daily worship, than that such stated service should be neglected. It is not wise, however, to continue a custom when the grounds on which it was introduced no longer exist; or to make a church ordinance the substitute for a divine institution.

Public Prayer.

The public services of the sanctuary are designed for worship and instruction. The former includes prayer and singing; the latter, the reading the word of God and preaching. These elements should be preserved in due proportion. In some churches instruction is made entirely subordinate to worship; twice the time being devoted to the latter that is allotted to the former. This seems to be contrary to the Scriptural rule. Knowledge in the Bible is represented as the essential element of religion. There can be no true worship of God without adequate knowledge of God; there can be no repentance, faith, or holy living unless the truths on which these exercises and this living are dependent are understood, and are present to the mind. Religion is a reasonable, that is (logike) a rational service, with which ignorance is incompatible. Christian ministers, therefore, are always in the New Testament called didaskaloi, teachers. Their great commission received from Christ was "to teach all nations." The Apostles, therefore, went everywhere, preaching. Paul says Christ did not send him to baptize, or to perform mere religious services, but to preach tho Gospel, which he declared to be the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation. No human authority could have transformed Paul from a preacher into an offerer of prayers. It was not until pagan ideas of worship began to pervade the Church, and ministers were transmuted from teachers into priests, that the teaching element was made so entirely subordinate to that of worship, as it has been for ages in the Church of Rome.

While teaching should be, as it clearly was during the apostolic age, the prominent object in the services of the Lord's day, the importance of public prayer can hardly be overestimated. This, it is often said, is the weak point in the Presbyterian Sabbath service. This is probably true. That is, it is probably true that there are more good preachers than good prayers. The main reason for this is, that the minister devotes a great part of the labour of the week to the preparation of his sermon, and not a thought to his prayers. It is no wonder, therefore, that the one should be better than the other.

In order that this part of divine service should be conducted to the edification of the people, it is necessary, (1.) That the officiating minister should have a truly devout spirit; that the feelings and desires, of which the prayers are the utterance, should be in exercise in his own heart. (2.) That his mind and memory should be well stored with the thoughts and language of Scripture. Holy men of old spake as they were moved by the Holy Ghost. Their utterances, whether in adoration, thanksgiving, confession, or supplication, were controlled

by the Spirit of God. Hence they express the mind of the Spirit; they are the most appropriate vehicles for the expression of those feelings and desires which the Spirit awakens in the minds of God's people. No prayers, therefore, are more edifying, other things being equal, than those which abound in the appropriate use of Scriptural language. (3.) The prayer should be well ordered, so as to embrace all the proper parts and topics of prayer in due proportion This will prevent its being rambling, diffuse, or repetitious. (4.) It should also be suited to the occasion, whether that be the ordinary service on the Lord's day, or the administration of the sacraments, or the special service on days of thanksgiving or of fasting and humiliation. (5.) It is hardly necessary to say that the language employed should be simple, solemn, and correct. (6.) The prayers should be short. Undue length in this service is generally owing, not more to diffuseness than to useless repetitions.

Prayer as a Means of Grace.

Means of grace, as before stated, are those means which God has ordained for the end of communicating the life-giving and sanctifying influences of the Spirit to the souls of men. Such are the word and sacraments, and such is prayer. It has not only the relation which any other cause has to the end for which it was appointed, and thus is the condition on which the blessings of God, providential or spiritual, are bestowed; but it brings us near to God, who is the source of all good. Fellowship with Him, converse with Him, calls into exercise all gracious affections, reverence, love, gratitude, submission, faith, joy, and devotion. When the soul thus draws near to God, God draws near to it, manifests his glory, sheds abroad his love, and imparts that peace which passes all understanding. Our Lord says, "If a man love me, he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." (John xiv. 28.) In such fellowship, the soul must be holy and must be blessed.

The Power of Prayer.

The course of human events is not controlled by physical force alone. There are other powers at work in the government of the world. There is the power of ideas, true or false; the power of truth; the power of love and human sympathy; the power of conscience; and above all, the Supreme Power, immanent in the world as well as over it, which is an intelligent, voluntary, personal power, co-perating with and controlling the operations of all creatures, without violating their nature. This Supreme Power is roused into action by prayer, in a way analogous to that in which the energies of a man are called into action by the entreaties of his fellow-men. This is the doctrine of the Bible; it is perfectly consistent with reason, and is confirmed by the whole history of the world, and especially of the Church. Moses by his prayer saved the Israelites from destruction; at the prayer of Samuel the army of the Philistines was dispersed; "Elias was a man subject to like passions as we are, and he prayed earnestly that it might not rain: and it rained not on the earth by the space of three years and six months. And he prayed again, and the heavens gave rain, and the earth brought forth her fruit." These facts are referred to by the Apostle James, for the purpose of proving that the prayer of a righteous man availeth much. Paul constantly begged his Christian brethren to pray for him, and directed that prayer should "be made for all men: for kings, and for all that are in authority; that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty." This of course supposes that prayer is a power. Queen Mary of Scotland was not beside herself, when she said she feared the prayers of John Knox, more

than an army. Once admit the doctrine of theism, that is of the existence of a personal God, and of his constant control over all things out of Himself, and all ground for doubt as to the efficacy of prayer is removed, and it remains to us, as it has been to the people of God in all ages, the great source of spiritual joy and strength, of security for the present and confidence for the future. The Forty-sixth Psalm still stands: "The Lord of Hosts is with us; the God of Jacob is our refuge."

[737] Philosophers, says Dr. Chalmers, "look on the Supreme Principle to be in every way as inflexible and sure as they have uniformly found of the subordinate principles; and that He is as unfit to be addressed by a petition or the expression of a wish, as any fancied spirit that may reside in a volcano or a storm, in any other department of nature's vast machinery -- that the cries of urgency and distress are of no more avail when sent up to Him who wields the elements of the world, as if they were only lifted to the elements themselves -- that the same unchangeableness which pervades all nature, is also characteristic of nature's God: and so they deem to be an aberration from sound philosophy, both the doctrine of a special providence and the observation of prayer." Chalmers, Works, ed. New York, 1844, vol. ii. p. 319.

[738] Outlines of Astronomy, 5th ed. p. 292.

[739] The Reign of Law, by the Duke of Argyle, 5th ed. London, 1867, p. 129.

[740] Chalmers, ut supra, p. 321.

[741] Kant's Leben, von Borowsky, p. 199 (Bchner's Biblische Real-und Verbal-Concordanz, word "Bitte"); Halle, 1840, 6th ed. p. 560.

[742] Fragments of Science for Unscientific People, by John Tyndall, LL. D., F. R. S., London, 1871, pp. 31, 32, and 36.

[743] Ibid. pp. 63, 64.

[744] In the volume above referred to, there is an article entitled, "Miracles and Special Providences," being a review by Professor Tyndall of the Rev. Mr. Mozley's Bampton Lectures on Miracles. In that review "magic, miracles, and witchcraft" are placed in the same category.

[745] Elements of Comparative Anatomy, pp. 10, 11.

PART IV: ESCHATOLOGY.

CHAPTER I: STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH.

§ 1. Protestant Doctrine.

THE Protestant doctrine on the state of the soul after death includes, first of all, the continued conscious existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body. This is opposed, not only to the doctrine that the soul is merely a function of the body and perishes with it, but also to the doctrine of the sleep of the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection.

The former doctrine belongs to the theory of materialism, and stands or falls with it. If there be no substance but matter, and no force but such as is the phenomenon of matter; and if the form in which physical force manifests itself as mind, or mental action, depends on the highly organized matter of the brain, then when the brain is disorganized the mind ceases to exist. But if the soul and body are two distinct substances, then the dissolution of the latter does not necessarily involve the end of the conscious existence of the former.

There is another view on this subject adopted by many who are not materialists, but who still hold that mind cannot act or manifest itself without a material organ. Thus, for example, the late Isaac Taylor says that as extension is an attribute of matter, the soul without a body cannot be extended. But extension is a relation to space; what is not extended is consequently nowhere. "We might as well," he says, "say of a pure spirit that it is hard, heavy, or red, or that it is a cubic foot in dimensions, as say that it is here or there, or that it has come, and is gone." "When we talk of absolute immateriality, and wish to withdraw mind altogether from matter, we must no longer allow ourselves to imagine that it is, or that it can be, in any place, or that it has any kind of relationship to the visible and extended universe." In like manner, he argues that mind is dependent upon its corporeity, or union with matter, for its relationship to time. A pure spirit could not tell the difference between a moment and a century; it could have no perception of the equable flow of duration, for that is a knowledge drawn from the external world and its regular motions. To its union with matter, mind is indebted also for its sensibility or sensations, for its power over matter, for its imaginative emotions, and for its "defined, recognizable individuality," and of course for its personality. The soul after death, therefore, must either cease its activity, at least in reference to all out of itself, or be furnished at once with a new body. The latter assumption is the one commonly adopted. "Have the dead ceased to exist?" he asks, "Have those who are fallen asleep perished? No; -- for there is a spiritual body, and another vehicle of human nature, as well as a natural body; and, therefore, the dissolution of this animal structure leaves the life untouched. The animal body is not itself the life, nor is

it the cause of life; nor again is the spiritual body the life, nor the cause of it; but the one as well as the other are the instruments of the mind, and the necessary medium of every productive exercise of its faculties." [746]

On this theory of the dependence of mind on matter, "for every productive exercise of its faculties," for its individuality, and its susceptibilities, it may be remarked, (1.) That the theory is admitted to be untrue in relation to God. He has no body; and He can act and be acted upon, and his activity is productive. If such be the case with God who is a pure spirit, it is altogether arbitrary to deny that it is true with regard to the human soul. Man as a spirit is of the same nature with God. He is like Him in all that is essential to the nature of a spirit. (2.) The theory has no support from Scripture, and, therefore, has no right to intrude itself into the explanation of Scriptural doctrines. The Bible never attributes corporeity to angels; yet it ascribes to them a "ubi"; speaks of their coming and going;. and of their being mighty in power to produce effects in the material and spiritual worlds. It never speaks of man's having any other body besides his earthly tabernacle, and the body which he is to have at the resurrection. And yet it speaks of the soul as active and conscious when absent from the body and present with the Lord. (3.) If the soul is a substance it has power, power of self-manifestation, and productive power according to its nature. Electricity may be a force in nature manifested to us, in our present state, only under certain conditions. But that does not prove that it is active only under those conditions, or that beings constituted differently from what we are, may not be cognizant of its activity. It is enough, however, that the theory in question is extra-scriptural, and therefore has no authority in matters of faith.

It is no less evident that according to the pantheistic theory, in all its phases, which regards man as only one of the transient forms of God's existence, there is no room for the doctrine of the conscious existence of the soul after death. The race is immortal, but the individual man is not. Trees and flowers cover the earth from generation to generation; yet the same flower blooms but once. The mass of men whose convictions, on such subjects, are founded on their moral and religious nature, have in all ages believed in the continued existence of the soul after death. And that universality of belief is valid evidence of the truth believed. But men whose opinions are under the control of the speculative understanding, have never arrived at any settled conviction on this subject. To be, or not to be? was a question speculation could not answer. The dying Hume said he was about to take a leap in the dark. The continued existence of the soul after death is a matter of divine revelation. It was part of the faith of the Church before the coming of Christ. The revelation of all the great doctrines which concern the destiny and salvation of men has been indeed progressive. It is not, therefore, a matter of surprise that the doctrine of the future state is much less clearly unfolded in the Old Testament than in the New. Still it is there. When the Apostle Paul (2 Tim. i. 10) speaks of "Our Saviour Jesus Christ, who hath abolished death, and hath brought life and immortality to light through the Gospel," he is not to be understood as saying that the future life was unknown, as Archbishop Whately argues, before the coming of Christ. This would be inconsistent with the most explicit declarations elsewhere. It is often said that Christ came to preach the Gospel, to make propitiation for sin, and to reveal the way of reconciliation with God. Paul says in Galatians iii. 23, "before faith came we were kept under the law." Yet he strenuously insists that the Gospel, or plan of salvation which he taught, was taught by the law and prophets (Rom. iii. 21); and that the patriarchs

were saved by faith in the same promise on which sinners are now called upon to rely. What was imperfectly revealed under the old economy, is clearly revealed under the new. This is all that those passages which speak of the Gospel bringing new truths to light, are intended to teach. Christ shed a flood of light on the darkness beyond the grave. Objects before dimly discerned in that gloom, now stand clearly unveiled; so that it may well be said He brought life and immortality to light, he revealed the nature of this future state, and showed how, for the people of God, that state was one of life. It may be observed in passing, that many Christian writers who speak of the doctrine of a future life being unknown, at least to the patriarchs, and to the writers of the Psalms, mean "the Christian doctrine" on that subject. They do not intend to deny that the people of God from the beginning believed in the conscious existence of the soul after death. This Hengstenberg, for example, distinctly asserts concerning himself. [747]

Doctrine of a Future Life revealed under the Old Testament.

1. The first argument on this subject is an a priori one. That the Hebrews, God's chosen people, the recipients and custodians of a supernatural revelation, should be the only nation on the face of the earth, in whose religion the doctrine of a future state had no place, would be a solecism. It is absolutely incredible, for it supposes human nature in the case of the Hebrews to be radically different from what it is in other men.

2. Instead of the Hebrews having lower views of man than other nations, they alone were possessed of the truth concerning his origin and nature. They had been taught from the beginning that man was created in the image of God, and, therefore, like God, of the same nature as a spirit, and capable of fellowship with his maker. They had also been taught that man was created immortal, that the death even of the body, was a punishment; that the sentence of death (in the sense of dissolution) concerned only the body. "Dust thou art, and unto dust shalt thou return." The soul is not dust, and therefore, according to the earliest theology of the Hebrews, was not to return to dust; it was to return to God who gave it.

3. We accordingly find that throughout the Old Testament Scriptures the highest views are presented of the nature and destiny of man. He is the child of God, destined to enjoy his fellowship and favour; the possessions and enjoyments of earth are always represented as temporary and insignificant, not adapted to meet the soul's necessities; they were taught not to envy the wicked in their prosperity, but to look to God as their portion they were led to say, "Whom have I in heaven but thee? and there is none upon earth that I desire besides thee;" and "I had rather be a door-keeper in the house of my God, than to dwell in the tents of wickedness." In the Old Testament, the righteous are always represented as strangers and pilgrims upon the earth, whose home and whose reward are not in this world; that their portion is in another world, and, therefore, that it is better to be the humblest and most afflicted of God's people than to be the most prosperous of the wicked. The judgments of God are represented as falling on the wicked in a future state, and thus effectually vindicating the justice of God in his dealings with men. The Psalmist said, he was envious at the foolish, when he saw the prosperity of the wicked, until he went into the sanctuary of God and understood their end. In contrasting his own state and prospects with theirs, he said, "I am continually with thee. . . . . Thou shalt guide me with thy counsel, and afterward receive me to glory." (Ps. lxxiii. 23, 24.) Such is the drift and spirit of the Old Testament Scriptures. Their whole tendency was to raise the thoughts of the people from the present

and turn them towards the future; to make men look not at the things seen, but at the things unseen and eternal.

4. The dead in the Old Testament are always spoken of as going to their fathers, as descending into "Sheol," i.e., into the invisible state, which the Greeks called Hades. Sheol is represeated as the general receptacle or abode of departed spirits, who were there in a state of consciousness; some in a state of misery, others in a state of happiness. In all these points the pagan idea of Hades corresponds to the Scriptural idea of Sheol. All souls went into Hades, some dwelling in Tartarus, others in Elysium. That the Hebrews regarded the souls of the dead as retaining their consciousness and activity is obvious from the practice of necromancy, and is confirmed by the fact of the appearance of Samuel to Saul, as recorded in 1 Samuel xxviii. The represennation given in Isaiah xiv. of the descent of the King of Babylon, when all the dead rose to meet and to reproach him, takes for granted and authenticates the popular belief in the continued conscious existence of departed spirits.

5. In several passages of the Old Testament, the doctrine of a future life is clearly asserted. We know upon the authority of the New Testament that the Sixteenth Psalm is to be understood of the resurrection of Christ, with which, the Apostle teaches us that of his people is inseparably connected. His soul was not to be left in Sheol; nor was his body to see corruption. In Psalm xvii. 15, after having described the cruelty and prosperity of the wicked, the Psalmist says, in regard to himself: "I will behold thy face in righteousness: I shall be satisfied, when I awake, with thy likeness." Isaiah xxvi. 19, says: "Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust, for my dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." (Dan. xii. 2.) "And many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake; some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise, shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars forever and ever." These prophetic declarations are indeed often explained as referring to the restoration of the nation from a state of depression to one of prosperity and glory. But the language employed, the context in which there is clear reference to the Messianic period, and the sanction given by Christ and his Apostles to the doctrine taught by the literal sense of the words here used, are considerations decisive in favour of the ordinary interpretation, which is adopted by Delitzsch, [748] Hengstenberg, [749] Oehler, [750] and many others of the modern interpreters. Even Mr. Alger, in his elaborate work on the doctrine of a future life, concedes the point so far as the passage in Daniel is concerned. "No one," he says, "can deny that a judgment, in which reward and punishment shall be distributed according to merit, is here clearly foretold." [751] Those German writers whose views of inspiration are so low as to enable them to interpret each book of the Bible as the production of an individual mind, and to represent the several writers as teaching different doctrines, in many cases take the ground that in the early books of the Scriptures, the simple fact of a future life is taken for granted, but not taught, and that nothing was made known as to the nature of that life. Thus Schultz says, "That all the books of the Old Testament assume that men are in some way or other to live after death. Even in the Pentateuch this is taken for granted. It is not taught, but assumed as a self-evident truth, immanent in the consciousness of the people." [752]

6. It is to be remembered that we have in the New Testament an inspired, and,

therefore, an infallible commentary on the Old Testament Scriptures. From that commentary we learn that the Old Testament contains much which otherwise we should never have discovered. Not only is the compass of the truths revealed to the fathers shown to be far greater than the simple words would suggest, but truths are declared to be therein taught, which, without divine assistance, we could not have discovered. There is another thing concerning the faith of the Old Testament saints to be taken into consideration. They may have understood, and probably did understand their Scriptures far better than we are disposed to think possible. They had the advantage of the constant presence of inspired men to lead them in their interpretation of the written word, and they enjoyed the inward teaching of the Holy Spirit. What that spiritual illumination availed in their case, we cannot tell; but we know that now the humble Christian who submits himself to the teachings of the Spirit, understands the Bible far better than any mere verbal critic.

We have then in the New Testament the most explicit declarations, not only that the doctrine of a future state was revealed in the Old Testament, but that from the beginning it was part of the faith of the people of God. Our Lord in refuting the Sadducees, who denied not only the resurrection of the body, but also the conscious existence of man after death, and the existence of any merely spiritual beings, appeals to the fact that in the Pentateuch, the authority of which the Sadducees admitted, God is familiarly called the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob; but as He is the God not of the dead but of the living, the designation referred to proves that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob are now living, and living too in the fellowship and enjoyment of God. "Christ," says Mr. Alger, whom we quote the rather because he belongs to the class of men who call themselves liberal Christians, [753] "Christ once reasoned with the Sadducees as touching the dead, that they rise;' in other words, that the souls of men upon the decease of the body pass into another and an unending state of existence: -- Neither can they die any more; for they are equal with the angels, and are the children of God, being children of the resurrection.' His argument was, that God is the God of the living, not of the dead; that is, the spiritual nature of man involves such a relationship with God as pledges his attributes to its perpetuity. The thought which supports this reasoning penetrates far into the soul and grasps the moral relations between man and God. It is most interesting, viewed as the unqualified affirmation by Jesus, of the doctrine of a future life which shall be deathless." [754] The reasoning of Christ, however, is not only an affirmation of the truth of the doctrine of a future deathless life, but an affirmation also that that doctrine is taught in the Old Testament. The words which He quotes are contained in the book of Exodus; and those words, as explained by Him, teach the doctrine of the blessed and unending life of the righteous.

That the Jews when Christ came, universally, with the exception of the sect of the Sadducees, believed in a future life, is beyond dispute. The Jews at this period were divided into three sects: the Sadducees, who were materialistic skeptics, believing neither in the resurrection, nor in angels, nor in spirits; the Essenes, who were a philosophical and ascetic sect, believing that the souls of the just being freed at death from the prison of the body, rejoice and are borne aloft where a happy life forever is decreed to the virtuous; but the wicked are assigned to eternal punishment in a dark cold place; [755] and the Pharisees, who, as we know from the New Testament, believed in the resurrection of the body in the sense in which Paul believed that doctrine (Acts xxvi. 6), for he claimed in his controversy with the Sadducees, that the Pharisees were on his side. They believed that the

soul was in its nature immortal; that the righteous only are happy after death, and that the wicked are eternally miserable. That the Jews derived their doctrine from their own Scriptures is plain, (1.) Because they admitted no other source of religious knowledge. The Scriptures were their rule of faith, as those Scriptures had been understood and explained by their fathers. (2.) There is no other known source from which the doctrine of a future state as held by the Jews in the time of Christ, could have been obtained. The doctrines, whether religious or philosophical, of their heathen neighbours were antagonistic to their own. This is true even of the doctrines of Zoroaster, which in some points had most affinity with those of the Jews. (3.) The inspired writers of the New Testament teach the same doctrines. and affirm that their knowledge was derived not from men, but from the revelation of God as contained in the Old Testament, and as made by Christ.

A few of the passages in which the Apostles teach that the doctrine of a future life was known to the patriarchs before the coming of Christ, are the following: Paul was arraigned before the council in Jerusalem, and "when Paul perceived that the one part were Sadducees, and the other Pharisees, he cried out in the council, Men and brethren, I am a Pharisee, the son of a Pharisee: of the hope and resurrection of the dead I am called in question." (Acts xxiii. 6.) He here declares that in the dispute between these two parties, on the question whether the doctrine of a future life and of the resurrection of the dead was taught in the Scriptures which both parties acknowledged, he sided with the Pharisees. Again in his speech before Agrippa, be said: "I stand, and am judged for the hope of the promise made of God unto our fathers: unto which promise our twelve tribes instantly serving God day and night, hope to come. For which hope's sake, King Agrippa, I am accused of the Jews. Why should it be thought a thing incredible with you, that God should raise the dead?" (Acts xxvi. 6-8.) The promise to which he refers is the promise of redemption through the Messiah, which redemption includes the deliverance of his people from the power of death and other evil consequences of sin. This was the promise to which the twelve tribes hoped to come. The belief, therefore, in a future life is thus declared to have been a part of the religion of the whole Hebrew nation.

In Galatians iii. 8, the Apostle says, God "preached before the gospel unto Abraham." The Gospel, however, in the Apostle's sense of the term, is the glad tidings of salvation; and salvation is deliverance from the penalty of the law and restoration to the image and favour of God. This of necessity involves the idea of a future life; of a future state of misery from which the soul is delivered, and of a future state of glory and blessedness into which it is introduced. In teaching, therefore, that men before the coming of Christ needed and desired salvation, in the Christian sense of the word, the Apostle assumed that they had a knowledge of the evils which awaited unpardoned sinners in the world to come. The evidence, however, that the New Testament affords of the fact that the Hebrews believed in a future state, is not found exclusively in direct assertions of that fact, but in the whole nature of the plan of salvation therein unfolded. The New Testament takes for granted that all men, since the apostasy of Adam, are in a state of sin and condemnation; that from that state no man can be delivered except though the Messiah, the Lord Jesus Christ, who is the only Saviour of men. It is, therefore, taught that the knowledge of this Redeemer was communicated to our race from the beginning, and in express terms in the promise made to Abraham; that the condition of salvation was then, as it is now, faith in Christ; that the blessings secured for believers were enjoyed before the advent of the Son of God in the

flesh, as well as since. The heaven of believers is called the bosom of Abraham. All this of course assumes that the truths made known in the New Testament are in their germs revealed in the Old; just as all the doctrines unfolded in the Epistles are contained in the words of Christ as recorded in the Gospels.

The Epistle to the Hebrews is specially devoted to the object of unfolding the relation between the Old Dispensation and the New. The former was the shadow, or image, of the latter. What in the New is taught in words, in the Old, was taught through types. That men are sinners, and as such under condemnation; that sin can only be cleansed by blood, or that the expiation of guilt by a vicarious sacrifice is necessary in order to forgiveness; that men therefore are saved by a priest appointed to draw near to God in their behalf and to offer gifts and sacrifices for sin; and that the effect of this priestly intervention is eternal salvation, are said to be the truths which underlie the religion of the Old Testament, as they constitute the life of the religion of the New. Faith was to the saints of old as it is to us, "the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen." They walked by faith, and not by sight. They lived with their eyes fixed on the unseen and eternal. It was the future that filled their vision and elevated them above the present. They "died in faith, not having received the promises, but having seen them afar off, and were persuaded of them, and embraced them, and confessed that they were strangers and pilgrims on the earth. For they that say such things declare plainly that they seek a country. And truly, if they had been mindful of that country from whence they came out, they might have had opportunity to have returned; but now they desire a better country, that is, an heavenly; wherefore God is not ashamed to be called their God: for he hath prepared for them a city." (Heb. xi. 13-16.) Moses by faith chose rather "to suffer affliction with the people of God, than to enjoy the pleasures of sin for a season." It was through faith, the belief and hope of a better life hereafter, that the saints of old "subdued kingdoms, wrought righteousness, obtained promises, stopped the mouths of lions, quenched the violence of fire, escaped the edge of the sword, out of weakness were made strong, waxed valiant in fight, turned to flight the armies of the aliens. Women received their dead raised to life again: and others were tortured, not accepting deliverance; that they might obtain a better resurrection: and others had trial of cruel mockings and scourgings, yea, moreover of bonds and imprisonment: they were stoned, they were sawn asunder, were tempted, were slain with the sword: they wandered about in sheep-skins and goat-skins; being destitute, afflicted, tormented (of whom the world was not worthy); they wandered in deserts, and in mountains, and in dens and caves of the earth." Nothing more than this can be said of Christian confessors and martyrs. The faith of the Old Testament saints in the unseen and eternal was, therefore, as strong as that of any set of men since the creation. It has been said that the opinion of the New Testament writers is of no weight in a matter of criticism, and, therefore, it is of no consequence what they thought about the teachings of the Old Testament. This is true, if those writers were ordinary men; but if they spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, then what they said, God said. We have, therefore, the sure word of inspiration that the people of God from the beginning of the world have believed in a state of conscious existence beyond the grave. That such is the doctrine of the New Testament is not disputed, and therefore need not be argued.

The Intermediate State.

As all Christians believe in the resurrection of the body and a future judgment, they all believe in an intermediate state. That is, they believe that there is a state of existence which intervenes between death and the resurrection; and that the condition of the departed during that interval is, in some respects, different from that which it is to be subsequent to that event. It is not, therefore, as to the fact of an intermediate state, but as to its nature, that diversity of opinion exists among Christians.

The common Protestant doctrine on this subject is that "the souls of believers are at their death, made perfect in holiness, and do immediately pass into glory; and their bodies, being still united to Christ, do rest in their graves till the resurrection." According to this view the intermediate state, so far as believers are concerned, is one of perfect freedom from sin and suffering, and of great exaltation and blessedness. This is perfectly consistent with the belief that after the second coming of Christ, and the resurrection of the dead, the state of the soul will be still more exalted and blessed.

In support of the Protestant doctrine as thus stated, it may be remarked,

1. That it is simply a question of fact. What do the Scriptures teach as to the state of the soul of a believer immediately after death? It is not legitimate to decide this question on psychological grounds; to argue that such is the nature of the soul that it cannot retain its individuality, or personality, when separated from the body; or, that it is a mere function of the brain; or, that it cannot act or be acted upon -- can neither perceive nor be perceived except through and by means of the senses; or, that as vegetable and animal life are only manifest and active in connection with some form of matter, in other words, as there must be a physical basis of life, so the soul necessarily requires a material basis for its manifestation and activity. All these speculations, or theories, are, for the Christian, of no account, if the Bible teaches the fact of the continued, personal, individual existence of the soul after the death and dissolution of the body. The Bible does not formally teach anthropology in either of the branches of physiology or psychology, as a department of human science, but it assumes a great deal that falls under these several heads. It assumes that soul and body in man are two distinct substances united in a vital union so as to constitute the man, in the present state of existence, one individual person. It assumes that the seat of this personality is the soul. The soul is the self, the Ego, of which the body is the organ. It assumes that the soul continues its conscious existence, and its power of acting and of being acted upon after its separation from the body. This we have seen to be the doctrine of the whole Bible. The dead, according to the Scriptures, do not cease to be; they do not cease to be conscious and active.

There is, therefore, nothing in the psychology of the Scriptures, which is that of the vast majority of men, learned or unlearned, inconsistent with the doctrine that the souls of believers do, at death, immediately pass into glory.

2. According to the Scriptures and the faith of the Church, the probation of man ends at death. As the tree falls, so it lies. He that is unjust let him be unjust still, and he that is righteous let him be righteous still. When the bridegroom comes, they that are ready enter in, and the door is shut. According to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, there is no passing after death from one state to another; there is a great gulf between the righteous and the wicked from that time for evermore. It is appointed unto all men once to die, and after that the judgment The destiny of the soul is decided at death.

3. There is no satisfaction to be rendered in the future life for the sins done in the body. The Romish doctrine of satisfactions renders necessary the assumption of a purgatorial state after death for those who have not in this life made full expiation for their sins. But if the one offering of Christ forever perfects them that believe; if his sacrifice be a perfect satisfaction for our sins, then there is no reason why believers should be kept out of blessedness until they have expiated their sins by their own sufferings.

4. There is nothing contrary to Scripture, or to analogy, in the assumption of a sudden and immediate change from imperfect to perfect holiness. The Protestant doctrine is that the souls of believers are at death made perfect in holiness. But it is asked, what sanctifying power is there in death? Progress in moral excellence is gradual; as no one becomes thoroughly evil by one act, or in a moment, so, it is said, it is unreasonable to suppose that a sudden change from imperfect to perfect moral excellence takes place at the moment of death. This objection supposes that the salvation of men is a natural process; if it be a supernatural work, the objection has no force. Curing a man of leprosy was a slow process; but when Christ said to the leper "I will be thou clean." he was healed in a moment. The change which takes place in a believer at death, can hardly be much greater than that instantaneously produced in Paul on his journey to Damascus. Paul, in Galatians i. 16, attributes that change to the revelation of the Son of God to him. If the momentary vision of the divine glory of Christ produced such an effect upon the Apostle, is it strange that the Scriptures should teach that the souls of believers, when separated from the world and the flesh, and redeemed from the power of the devil, and bathed in the full brightness of the glory of the blessed Redeemer, should in a moment be purified from all sin?

If, therefore, there be nothing in the nature of the soul inconsistent with its separate existence; if the body be not a necessary condition of its consciousness or activity; if its probation terminates at death; if the perfection of Christ's work precludes all necessity of future satisfaction for sin; and if the immediate change from imperfect to perfect holiness be consistent with the analogy of faith, then there is no  prioriobjection to the doctrine that the souls of believers at death do immediately pass into glory.

5. That such is the doctrine of Scripture may be argued from the general drift of the sacred volume, so far as this subject is concerned. The Bible constantly speaks of the present life as a state of conflict, of labour, and of suffering; and of death as the entrance into rest. There remains a rest for the people of God. That rest follows the state of labour and trial. Believers then cease from their works. The rest on which they enter is not merely a rest from conflict and sin, but a rest which arises from the attainment of the end of their being, from their restoration to their proper relation to God, and all their capacities being satisfied and filled.

6. Besides these general considerations the doctrine in question is taught in many passages of Scripture with more or less distinctness. Thus, in Revelation xiv. 13, the Apostle says, "I heard a voice from heaven saying unto me, Write, Blessed are the dead which die in the Lord from henceforth: Yea, saith the Spirit, that they may rest from their labours; and their works do follow them." The simple meaning of this passage is that those who die in the Lord are, from that moment onward, in a state of blessednesss; because they cease from their labours, and enter on the reward of the righteous. Death is for them emancipation from evil, and the introduction into a state of happiness.

Our Lord constantly teaches concerning those who believe in Him, (1.) That they are not condemned. They are no longer under the sentence of the law. (2.) That they have eternal life. That the effect of the union between Himself and them, consummated by faith, is that they partake of his life in a sense analogous to that in which the branch partakes of the life of the vine. As He lives always, those who partake of his life can never perish. And as He lives unto God, so the life of his people is a holy and divine life. That life, from its nature, is an unfailing source of blessedness. It purifies, exalts, and glorifies. It is impossible that the souls in which Christ thus lives should remain is a state of misery and degradation, or in that dreamy state of existence in "the under-world" which so many of the fathers imagined to be the abode of the departed spirits of believers, awaiting the second coming of Christ. (3.) Our Lord promised that He would raise his people from the dead on the last day. It would seem, therefore, to be involved in the nature of the redemption of Christ, and of the union between Him and his people, that when absent from the body they are present with the Lord. It is inconceivable that with the Spirit of God dwelling in them, which is the Spirit of holiness and of glory, they should sink at death into a lower state of existence than that which they enjoyed in this world. We accordingly find that in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus, Christ says: "The beggar died, and was carried by the angels into Abraham's bosom." (Luke xvi. 22.) The implication is undeniable that in his case the transition was immediate from earth to heaven. Still more explicit is the declaration of our Lord to the penitent thief, "To-day shalt thou be with me in paradise." (Luke xxiii. 43.) The word paradise occurs in two other places in the New Testament. In 2 Corinthians xii. 4, Paul says he was caught up into paradise, which he explains by saying that he was caught up into the third heaven. And in Revelation ii. 7, Christ says: "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches: To him that overcometh will I give to eat of the tree of life, which is in the midst of the paradise of God." There can, therefore, be no doubt that paradise is heaven, and consequently when Christ promised the dying thief that he should that day be in paradise, he promised that he should be in heaven. It would, therefore, seem impossible that any who do not rest their faith on the fathers rather than on the Bible, should deny that the souls of believers do at death immediately pass into heaven. The fathers made a distinction between paradise and heaven which is not found in the Scriptures. Some of them regarded the former as one division of Hades, corresponding to the Elysium of the pagans; others located it somewhere on the earth, while others regarded it as a locality high up above the earth, but below the dwelling-place of God. These are mere fancies. The word heaven is indeed a term of wide application in the Bible as it is in common life. We speak of the fowls of heaven; of the stars of heaven; of our Father who is in heaven; and of believers being the citizens of heaven. In each of these cases the word has a different sense. Whether paradise and heaven are the same is a mere dispute about words. If the word heaven be taken in one of its legitimate senses, they are the same; if it be taken in another of its senses, they are not the same. It would not be in accordance with Scriptural usage to say that believers are now in, paradise; but the Apostle does say they are now en tois epouraniois (Eph. ii. 6), i.e., in heaven. Paradise, as the word is used by Christ and his Apostles, is the place where Christ now is, and where He manifests his presence and glory. Whether it is the place where He will finally establish his kingdom; and whether all the redeemed, clothed in their resurrection bodies, shall there be gathered together, is a matter of which we have no knowledge, and in which we need take no interest. All we need know

is that it is where Christ is; that it is a place and state in which there is neither sin nor sorrow, and where the saints are as exalted and happy as, in the existing circumstances of their being, it is possible for them to be. Whether any, in obedience to patristic usage, choose to call this paradise a department of Hades, is a matter of no concern. All that the dying believer need know is that he goes to be with Christ. That to him is heaven.

In 2 Corinthians v. 2, the Apostle says: "We know, that if our earthly house of this tabernacle were dissolved, we have a building of God, an house not made with hands, eternal in the heavens." There are three ways in which these words, in connection with those which follow, are interpreted. (1.) According to one view, the house not made with hands into which the believer is received at death, is heaven. (2.) According to another view the meaning of the Apostle is, that when our present body is dissolved the soul will not be found naked, but will be immediately clothed with another and more spiritual body suited to the altered state of its existence. (3.) That the new house or body intended is the resurrection body. The second of these interpretations is founded on a gratuitous assumption. It assumes that the soul is furnished with a body of which the Scriptures make no mention, and of the existence of which we have no evidence. The Bible knows nothing of any human body save that which we now have, and that which we are to have at the resurrection; the one natural, the other spiritual. The third interpretation assumes that the Apostles erred not only in their own convictions, but in their teaching. It assumes that what they taught could be true only on the condition that the second coming of Christ was to occur while the men of that generation were alive. The point, however, in which all these views of this passage agree, is the only one which concerns the question under consideration. They all suppose that the soul is received into a state of blessedness immediately after death. This the Apostle clearly teaches. As soon as our earthly house is destroyed, the soul, instead of being left houseless and homeless, is received in that house which is eternal in the heavens. "We are always confident," he says, "knowing that, whilst we are at home in the body, we are absent from the Lord: we are confident, I say, and willing rather to be absent from the body, and to be present with the Lord."

In Philippians i. 23, he expresses the same confidence: "For," he says, "I am in a strait betwixt two, having a desire to depart, and to be with Christ; which is far better: nevertheless, to abide in the flesh is more needful for you." Two things are here perfectly plain; first, that Paul regards the state of the soul after death as more exalted than its condition while in the flesh. This he distinctly asserts. And, secondly, that this change for the better takes place immediately after death. He was confident that as soon as he departed he would be with Christ. Both these points are conceded, even by those who deny the doctrine which they evidently involve. Some say that Paul, finding that Christ did not come as soon as he expected, changed his opinion, and held that the souls of believers were admitted at death into heaven, instead of awaiting the second advent in the underworld. The fathers said that while the great body of believers at death went into Hades, some few, especially the martyrs, were admitted at once into heaven. Mr. Alger conjectures that "we may assume . . . . that Paul believed there would be vouchsafed to the faithful Christian during his transient abode in the under world a more intimate and blessed spiritual fellowship with his Master than he could experience while in the flesh." [756] All this is floundering. The simple fact is that the inspired Apostle confidently anticipated for himself, and evidently for his fellow-believers, immediate admission at death to the presence of

Christ. The ancients regarded the "under-world" or Hades, as "a gloomy prison," as Mr. Alger himself calls it. That Paul should have desired death in order that he should be thrust into a dungeon, no man can believe.

The Scriptures represent Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob as being in heaven. The good, at death, are carried by angels to Abraham's bosom. Moses and Elijah appeared in glory on the mount of transfiguration, conversing with Christ. In the Epistle to the Hebrews, it is said, "Ye are come unto Mount Sion, and unto the city of the living God, the heavenly Jerusalem, and to an innumerable company of angels, to the general assembly and church of the first born, which are written in heaven, and to God the Judge of all, and to the spirits of just men made perfect, and to Jesus the mediator of the new covenant, and to the blood of sprinkling, that speaketh better things than that of Abel." Nothing can be more utterly inconsistent with the nature of the Gospel, than the idea that the fire of divine life as it glows in the hearts of God's elect, is, at death, to be quenched in the damp darkness of an underground prison, until the time of the resurrection.

[746] Physical Theory of Another Life. By Isaac Taylor. New York, 1852, p. 23, and the whole of chap. ii.

[747] Commentar ☐ber die Psalmen, von G. W. Hengstenberg.Abhandlung No. 7. Zur Glaubenslehre der Psalmen, edit. Berlin, 1847, vol. iv. part 2. On p. 321, he says, "When we deny the doctrine of immortality to the writers of the Psalms, it is in the Christian sense" of the word.

[748] Commentar ☐ber den Psalter, Leipzig, 1860, vol. ii. p. 420.

[749] Commentar ☐ber die Psalmen, Abhandlung No. 7. Berlin, 1847, vol. iv. part 2, p. 273 ff.

[750] Veteris Testamenti Sententia de Rebus post Mortem Futuris. G. A. Oehler, Stuggart, 1846, p. 50.

[751] A Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life, with a Complete Bibliography of the Subject. By William Rounseville Alger. Philadelphia, 1846, p. 149. The Appendix is an instructive volume, being "A Catalogue of Works relating to the Nature, Origin, and Destiny of the Soul. The Titles classified and arranged chronologically, with Notes and indices of Authors and Subjects. By Ezra Abbot," is a marvel of ability and learning.

[752] Die Voraussetzungen der christlichen Lehre von der Unsterblichkeit dargestellt, von Hermann Schultz, Dr. der Philosophie, Licent. der Theologie, etc. G☐ttingen, 1861, p. 207.

[753] On page 438, he says: "The essence of rationalism is the affirmation that neither the fathers, nor the Church, nor the Scriptures, nor all of them together, can rightfully establish any proposition opposed to the logic of sound philosophy, the principles of reason, and the evident truth of nature. Around this thesis the battle has been fought and the victory won; and it will stand with spreading favour as long as there are enslaved and cultivated minds in the world. This position is, in logical necessity, and as a general thing in fact, that of the large though loosely-cohering body of believers known as Liberal Christians;' and it is tacitly held by still larger and evergrowing numbers nominally connected with sects that officially eschew it with horror." Mr. Alger doubtless considered

this as simply a declaration of independence of human authority in matters of religion. To other, and perhaps to wiser men, it sounds like a declaration of independence of God, the Infinite Reason; as an assertion that the Infinite God can teach him nothing; or, at least, the He cannot so authenticate his teachings as to render them authoritative. The men are to be pitied who have no better knowledge of the mysteries of the present and the future than is to be found in themselves.

[754] Alger, ut supra, p. 340.

[755] Josephus, De Bello Judaico, II. viii. 11; Works, edit. Leipzig, 1827, vol. v. pp. 215, 216, [165.]

[756] Alger, ut surpa, p. 290.

§ 2. The Sleep of the Soul.

The doctrine that the soul exists, during the interval between death and the resurrection, in a state of unconscious repose, properly supposes the soul to be a distinct substance from the body. It is therefore to be distinguished from the materialistic theory, which assumes that as matter in certain states and combinations exhibits the phenomena of magnetism or light, so in other combinations it exhibits the phenomena of life, and in others the phenomena of mind, and hence that vital and mental activity are as much the result or effect of the molecular arrangements of matter, as any physical operations in the external world. As in this view it would be absurd to speak of the sleep or quietude of magnetism or light when the conditions of their existence are absent, so it would be equally absurd, on this theory, to speak of the sleep of the soul after the dissolution of the body.

The doctrine of the sleep of the soul, moreover, is not identical with that which assumes that, although matter is in none of its combinations the cause of mental activity, yet that it is the necessary condition (so far as man is concerned) of its manifestation. The best of scientific men teach with regard to life, or vital force, that it is not the result of material combinations, but that such combination is necessary to its manifestation. "We recognize that these [vital] phenomena," says Professor Nicholson, "are never manifested except by certain forms of matter, or, it may be, by but a single form of matter. We conclude, therefore, that there must be an intimate connection between vital phenomena and the matter of life;' but we can go no further than this, and the premises do not in any way warrant the assertion that life is the result of living matter, or one of its properties." "The more philosophical view as to the nature of the connection between life and its material basis, is the one which regards vitality as something superadded and foreign to the matter by which vital phenomena are manifested. Protoplasm is essential as the physical medium through which vital action may be manifested; just as a conductor is essential to the manifestation of electric phenomena, or just as a paint-brush and colours are essential to the artist. Because metal conducts the electric current, and renders it perceptible to our senses, no one thinks of therefore asserting that electricity is one of the inherent properties of a metal, any more than one would feel inclined to assert that the power of painting was inherent in the camel's hair or in the dead pigments. Behind the material substratum, in all cases, is the active and living force; and we have no right to assume that the force ceases to exist when its physical basis is removed, though it is no longer perceptible to our senses. It is, on the contrary,

quite conceivable theoretically that the vital forces of an organism should suffer no change by the destruction of the physical basis, just as electricity would continue to subsist in a world composed universally of non-conductors. In neither case could the force manifest its presence, or be brought into any perceptible relation with the outer world; but in neither case should we have the smallest ground for assuming that the power was necessarily non-extant." [757]

This view when transferred to the soul, or mental phenomena, may be applied in three different forms to the doctrine of the state of man after death. First, God may be regarded as the universal mind-force which manifests itself through the human brain as electricity does through a conductor. When the brain is disintegrated, the mind-force remains, but not the individual man. Secondly, we may assume the realistic doctrine of generic humanity, manifesting itself in connection with proper corporeal organizations. Here again, it would seem to follow that when any individual human body is dissolved, the generic human life remains, but not the man. This is nearly the doctrine of Olshausen, before referred to. He held that the individuality of man depends on the body; so that without a body there can be no soul; that the only existence of the soul of man possible between death and the resurrection must be the scattered dust of its human frame. Thirdly, we may take the doctrine of Swedenborg, who taught that man has two bodies, an exterior and interior, a material and spiritual, and that it is the former only that dies; the latter remains as the organ of the soul. Or, as others believe, the new, or spiritual, or resurrection body is provided at the moment of death, so that the soul passes from ifs earthly to its heavenly tabernacle in a moment. In none of these forms, however, is this theory of the absolute dependence of the soul for its power of self-manifestation properly applicable to the doctrine of the sleep of the soul after death. It is nevertheless probable that those who advocated this doctrine, in different periods in the history of the Church, had some such theory underlying their views.

Eusebius [758] mentions a small sect of Christians in Arabia who held that the soul remained unconscious from death to the resurrection. At the time of the Reformation there was such a revival of that doctrine that Calvin deemed it expedient to write an essay devoted to its refutation. Socinus also taught that the soul after death perceived and received nothing out of itself, although it remained self-conscious and self-contemplative. Archbishop Whately [759] says that, so far as the Scriptures are concerned, it is an open question whether the soul remains in a conscious state after death or not. In the third lecture he gives reasons which favour the view of continued consciousness; and in the fourth, those which seem to teach the opposite doctrine. To the understanding, he says, there is no difference between the two views; although to the imagination, the difference is great. In the consciousness of the soul of the believer, in either case, entrance into heaven would instantaneously succeed death. An interval of which the soul was unconscious, would, for it, have no existence. The archbishop for himself thinks that the arguments on the one side are as strong as those on the other. The two considerations which seem to him to favour the doctrine of the sleep of the soul between death and the resurrection, are, first the fact that death is so often called a sleep. The dead are those who are asleep. (1 Thess. xiv. 4.) This expression cannot properly be understood of the body. A dead body can no more be said to sleep than a stone. The fair intimation, therefore, is, as the Archbishop thinks, that the soul sleeps when the body dies. The second consideration is that the New Testament clearly teaches that there is a solemn final judgment at the last day, when the destiny of each soul

will be decided for eternity. But this appears inconsistent with the doctrine that the fate of the soul is decided immediately after it leaves the body. He admits that, according to the Scriptures, probation ends with this life, and therefore if the righteous at death pass into a state of happiness and the wicked into a state of misery, they are thereby judged; and there is no apparent necessity for a future judgment. It is obvious that these arguments have little force against the clear teachings of the Bible, and the faith of the Church universal, and indeed of all mankind. As to the first of the above mentioned arguments, it is enough to say, that as a dead body and a body asleep are so much alike in appearance, it is the most natural thing in the world to speak of death as an unending sleep. This is done continually by those who are firm believers in the continued conscious activity of the soul after death. The other argument has, if possible, still less weight. Although the fate of every man should be decided for himself and to his knowledge at the moment of death, there may be important and numerous reasons why there should be a public, solemn adjudication at the last day, when the secrets of all hearts shall be made known, and the justice of God revealed in the presence of men and angels.

[757] Introduction to the Study of Biology, by H. Alleyne Nicholson, M. D., D. Sc., Ph. D., F. R. S. E., F. G. S., etc. Professor of Natural History and Botany in University College, Toronto, etc., etc. Edinburgh and London, 1872, pp. 8 and 11.

[758] Ecclesiastica Historia, VI. xxxvii.; edit. Cambridge, 1720, p. 299.

[759] A View of the Scripture Revelations concerning a Future State, by Richard Whately, D. D., Archbishop of Dublin. Philadelphia, 1856.

§ 3. Patristic Doctrine of the Intermediate State.

Although the true doctrine concerning the state of the dead was, as has been shown, revealed in the Old Testament, it was more or less perverted in the minds of the people. The prevalent idea was that all souls after death descended into Sheol, and there remained in expectation of the coming of the Messiah. When He came it was expected that the Jews, or at least, the faithful, would be raised from the dead, and made partakers of all the glories and blessedness of the Messiah's reign. The views presented in the writings of the Rabbins of the condition of the souls in Sheol are not only diverse but inconsistent. The common representation was that Sheol itself was a gloomy, subterraneous abode, whose inhabitants were shades, weak and powerless, existing in a dreamy state; the best of them not in a state of suffering, and yet with no other enjoyment than the anticipation of deliverance when the Messiah should come. At other times, however, more life was attributed to the souls of the departed; and Sheol was represented as divided into two departments, Paradise and Gehenna. In the former were, according to some, all Jews, according to others only those who had faithfully observed the law; and in the other, the Gentiles. The common opinion was that all the Jews would be raised from the dead, when the Messiah came, and all the Gentiles left forever in the abode of darkness. Paradise, according to this view, was a place of positive enjoyment, and Gehenna a place of positive suffering. It is evident that there is no great difference between this Jewish doctrine in its essential features, and the true doctrine as presented by our Lord in the parable of the rich man and Lazarus. Both are represented as going into Sheol or Hades. The one was comforted, the other tormented.

There was an inseparable barrier between the two. So far both doctrines agree. When the Rabbi Jochanan was dying, he said, "Two paths open before me, the one leading to bliss, the other to torments; and I know not which of them will be my doom." [760] "Paradise is separated from hell by a distance no greater than the width of a thread." [761]

According to many modern interpreters the New Testament writers adopted this Jewish doctrine not only in substance but in its details. (1.) They are represented as teaching that all the people of God who died before the advent of Christ, were confined in Sheol, or the under-world. Sheol or Hades, as stated above, is constantly spoken of "as the gloomy realm of shades, wherein are gathered and detained the souls of all the dead generations." The soul at death is said to be dismissed "naked into the silent, dark, and dreary region of the under-world." (2.) That when Christ died upon the cross, He descended "ad inferos," into Hades, or Hell, for the purpose of delivering the pious dead from their prison; and that they were the redeemed captives of whom the Apostle speaks in Ephesians iv. 8-l0, as led by Christ into heaven. (3.) That those who die in the Lord since his advent, instead of being admitted into heaven, pass into the same place and the same state into which the patriarch passed at death before his coming. (4.) And as the Old Testament saints remained in Sheol until the first coming of the Messiah, so those who die under the New Testament, are to remain in Hades, until his second coming. Then they are not only to be delivered from Sheol, but their bodies are to be raised from the dead, and soul and body, reunited and glorified, are to be admitted into heaven.

Such is the scheme of doctrine said to be taught in the New Testament. Our Lord is regarded as giving it his sanction in the parable concerning Lazarus. Paul is made to teach it when he speaks of Christ as descending to "the lower parts of the earth," which is said to mean "the parts lower than the earth," that is, the under-world. His object in thus descending was, according to the theory, to deliver the souls confined in the gloomy prison of Sheol. Christ's triumph over principalities and powers is referred to the same event, his descent into Hades. Mr. Alger, representing a large class of writers, says that according to Paul's doctrine, "Christ was the first person clothed with humanity and experiencing death, admitted into heaven. Of all the hosts who had lived and died, every one had gone down into the dusky under-world. They were all held in durance waiting for the Great Deliverer." [762] The fate of those who die since the advent is no better, for they, as Paul is made to teach, are "all to remain in the under-world" until the second coming of Christ, "when they and the transformed living shall ascend together with the Lord." [763]

St. Peter is made to teach the same doctrine in still more explicit terms. In his discourse delivered on the day of Pentecost, he argued that Jesus is the Christ from the fact that God raised Him from the dead. That He was thus raised he argued from the sixteenth Psalm, where it is written, "Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell, neither wilt thou suffer thine Holy One to see corruption." That these words cannot refer to David, Peter argued, because he did see corruption, and his sepulchre remained until that day. The words of the Psalmist, therefore, must be understood of Christ, whose soul was not left in hell (Sheol), neither did his flesh see corruption. As for David, he "is not ascended into heaven." (Acts ii. 34.) Something, therefore, happened to Christ that did not happen to David or to any other man. Christ was not left in hell; David and all other men were thus left. Christ did ascend to heaven; David did not; and if David did not, then other saints of his time did not.

Thus it is that Peter is made to teach that the souls of the pious dead do not ascend to heaven, but descend to the gloomy abode of Sheol, Hades, or Hell, all these terms being equivalent. This exposition of the Apostle's teaching is plausible, and if consistent with other parts of Scripture, might be accepted. But as it contradicts what the Bible clearly teaches in many other places, it must be rejected. Peter's object was to prove the Messiahship of Christ from the fact of the resurrection of his body. The essential idea of "rising from the dead" was the restoration of the body to life. The soul does not die, and is not raised. The Apostle proved that Christ's body did not see corruption, but was restored to life; first, because it was a historical fact of which he and his brethren were witnesses; and secondly, from the prediction of the Psalmist that the Messiah was not to remain in the grave. That the sixteenth Psalm does not refer to David, he argued, because David died and was buried; his body did see corruption; his sepulchre remained among them; he, his body, he, as a man composed of soul and body, had not ascended to heaven. The whole argument concerns the body; because it is true only of the body, that it dies, is buried, sees corruption, and does not ascend to heaven. The simple meaning of Psalm xvi. 10, is that the person there spoken of was not to remain under the power of death. He was to rise from the dead before his body had time to see corruption. This is all that the passage teaches. This is true of Christ; it was not true of David or of any of the saints who died before the advent; and it is not true of those who have died since the advent. In this respect, as in so many others, Christ stands gloriously alone.

The difficult passage 1 Peter iii. 18, 19, however it may be interpreted, proves nothing against the Protestant doctrine that the souls of believers do at death immediately pass into glory. What happens to ordinary men happened to Christ when He died. His cold and lifeless body was laid in the tomb. His human soul passed into the invisible world. This is all that the creed, commonly called the Apostles', means, when it says Christ was buried, and descended into Hell, or Hades, the unseen world. This is all that the passage in question clearly teaches. Men may doubt and differ as to what Christ did during the three days of his sojourn in the invisible world. They may differ as to who the spirits in prison were to whom he preached, or, rather, made proclamation (ekeruxen); whether they were the antediluvians; or, the souls of the people of God detained in Sheol; or, the mass of the dead of all antecedent generations and of all nations, which is the favorite hypothesis of modern interpreters. They may differ also as to what the proclamation was which Christ made to those imprisoned spirits; whether it was the gospel; or his own triumph; or deliverance from Sheol; or the coming judgment. However these subordinate questions may be decided, all that remains certain is that Christ, after his death upon the cross, entered the invisible world, and there, in some way, made proclamation of what He had done on earth. All this is very far from teaching the doctrine of a "Limbus Patrum," as taught by the Jews, the Fathers, or the Romanists.

It is a great mistake in interpretation of the New Testament, to bring down its teachings to the level of Jewish or Pagan ideas. Because the Jews expected the Messiah to establish an earthly kingdom, it is inferred that the kingdom of God, as proclaimed by Christ and his Apostles, was to be realized in this life. Because they expected that the Messiah was to deliver the souls of their fathers from Sheol, it is assumed that this was the work actually effected by Christ. Because the Jews regarded imprisonment in the under-world as the special penalty of sin, it is inferred that deliverance from that imprisonment was the

redemption our Lord actually effected. This is to interpret the Scriptures by the Talmud and Cabala, and not Scripture by Scripture. This is historical interpretation "en o[illegible]tre." It is true that Christ proclaimed that the kingdom of God was at hand; but his kingdom was not of this world. It is true that He came to open the prison doors and proclaim liberty to the captives; but his prison was not Sheol, and the captives were not the souls of departed patriarchs. It is true that He came to redeem his people; but the redemption which He effected was from the curse of God's violated law, and not deliverance from the gloomy land of Shades.

We all know that the great evil with which the Apostles had to contend in the early Church, and the great source of corruption in the Church in after ages, was a Judaizing spirit. Most of the early Christians were Jews, and most of the converts from the Gentiles were proselytes imbued with Jewish doctrines. These doctrines, moreover, were congenial with what the Apostle calls "the carnal mind." It is not wonderful, therefore, that they were transferred to the Christian Church, and proved in it a permanently corrupting leaven. Modern critics are going back to the beginning, and doing in our day what the Judaizers did in the age of the Apostles. They are eliminating Christianity from the Gospel, and substituting Judaism, somewhat spiritualized, but still essentially Judaic.

It is notorious that the Jewish doctrines of the merit of works; of the necessity and saving efficacy of external rites; of a visible kingdom of Christ of splendour and worldly grandeur; of an external church out of whose pale there is no salvation; of the priestly character of the ministry; and of a church hierarchy, soon began to spread among Christians, and at last became ascendant. This being the case it would be strange if the Jewish doctrine of Sheol, or of an intermediate state, had not been adopted by many of the fathers, together with the other elements of the corrupt Judaism of the apostolic age. We accordingly find that as the Jews, contrary to the teaching of their own Scripture, held that the souls of those who died before the coming of the Messiah descended into Sheol, and there awaited the advent of the Redeemer, so the Christians began to believe, contrary to the teaching of their Scriptures, that the souls of believers at death, instead of passing into glory, are shut up in Hades, awaiting the second coming of Christ. It is true there were varying and inconsistent notions entertained of the nature of this intermediate state; and the same is true also with regard to the views on this subject which long prevailed in the Church. There are two facts which stand out so plainly in the New Testament Scriptures that they could not be always overlooked or denied. The one is that Christ, forty days after his resurrection, ascended into heaven, and is now seated at the right hand of the Majesty on high. The other is that the souls of believers when absent from the body are present with the Lord. As many of the Jews, therefore, assumed that in Sheol there were two departments, Paradise and Gehenna, the one the abode of the righteous, the other of the wicked; so the Christians, in many cases, made the same distinction with regard to the intermediate state; the souls of believers went to paradise; the souls of the wicked into hell. And they often so exalted the blessedness of the former as to make it a mere dispute about words whether they went to heaven or into an intermediate state. The real controversy. so far as any exists, is not as to whether there is a state intermediate between death and the resurrection in which believers are less glorious and exalted than they are to be after the second advent of Christ, but what is the nature of that state. Are believers after death with Christ? Do their souls immediately pass into glory? or, are they in a dreamy, semi-conscious state, neither happy nor miserable, awaiting

the resurrection of the body. That this latter view was for a long time prevalent in the Church may be inferred, (1.) From the fact that this was the view of the intermediate state commonly adopted by the Jews. (2.) It is the view attributed to the writers of the New Testament. (3.) It is the doctrine avowed by many of the patristic and medi&#65533;val writers. (4.) There would otherwise be no ground for the opposition manifested to the doctrine of Protestants on this subject. Daill&#65533; says, "The doctrine that heaven shall not be opened till the second coming of Christ, -- that during that time the souls of all men, with few exceptions, are shut up in the under-world, -- was held by Justin Martyr, Iren&#65533;us, Tertullian, Augustine, Origen, Lactantius Victorinus, Ambrose, Chrysostom, Theodoret, OEcomenius, Aretas, Prudentius, Theophylact, Bernard, and many others, as is confessed by all. . . . . This doctrine is literally held by the whole Greek Church at the present day; nor did any of the Latins expressly deny any part of it until the Council of Florence, in the year of our Lord 1439." [764]

Fl&#65533;gge [765] says in reference to the early fathers, that they "were not in doubt as to the fate of the soul when separated from the body until the resurrection, because they rested on the Jewish doctrine on that subject." Justin Martyr speaks in this way: [766] [Phemi:] Tas men [psuchas] ton eusebon en kreittoni poi choro menein, tas de adikous kai poneras en cheironi, ton tes kriseos ekdechomenas chronon tote, that is, "I say, that the souls of the pious dwell in some better place, and ungodly and wicked souls in a worse place, thus awaitng the time of judgment."

The fathers say but little about Hades. Hippolytus, however, gives an account of it which is in substance as follows: [767] Hades, in which the souls of the righteous and unrighteous are detained, was left at the creation in a state of chaos, to which the light of the sun never penetrates, but where perpetual darkness reigns. This place is the prison of souls, over which the angels keep watch. In Hades there is a furnace of unquenchable fire into which no one has yet been cast. It is reserved for the banishment of the wicked at the end of the world, when the righteous will be made citizens of an eternal kingdom. The good and the bad, although both in Hades, are not in the same part of it. They enter the under-world by the same gate. When this gate is passed, the guardian angels guide the souls of the departed different ways; the righteous are guided to the right to a region full of light; the wicked are constrained to take the left hand path, leading to a region near the unquenchable fire. The good are free from all discomfort, and rejoice in expectation of their admission into heaven. The wicked are miserable in constant anticipation of their coming doom. An impassable gulf separates the abode of the righteous from that of the wicked. Here they remain until the resurrection, which he goes on to explain and defend.

Fl&#65533;gge admits that there was no uniformity of representation on this subject in the early Church. The same general idea, however, is constantly reproduced; the Latins agreeing substantially with the Greeks. Tertullian represents the under-world as the general receptacle of departed spirits who retain their consciousness and activity. In this unseen world there are two divisions, both called "Inferi." "Nobis inferi non nuda cavositas, nec subdivalis aliqua mundi sentina creduntur: sed in fossa terr&#65533; et in alto vastitas, et in ipsis visceribus ejus abstrusa profunditas." [768] In this region there are two divisions; the one called "infernum," by way of eminence, or Gehenna, "qu&#65533; est ignis arcani subterraneus ad poenam thesaurus;" the other is the bosom of Abraham or paradise, "divin&#65533; amoenitatis

recipiendis sanctorum spiritibus destinatum, materia [maceria] quadam igne illius zon a notitia orbis communis segregatum." [769] According to this mode of representation, the intermediate state was itself a state of reward and punishment; at other times, however, this was denied; all retribution being reserved to the day of judgment. In the early Greek Church, this latter view was the more prevalent; [770] but later both the Greeks and Latins agreed in regarding the state of the righteous after death as far more favourable than that of the wicked.

The common views on this subject are perhaps fairly represented in the elaborate work of the Honourable Archibald Campbell, on "the doctrine of a middle state between death and the resurrection." [771] He thus sums up the points which he considers himself to have proved to be the doctrine of the Bible, of the Fathers, and of the Church of England.

"First. That the souls of the dead do remain in an intermediate, or middle state between death and the resurrection."

"That the proper place appointed for the abode of the righteous during the interim between death and the resurrection, called paradise, or Abram's bosom, is not the highest heavens where alone God is at present, fully to be enjoyed, but it is, however, a very happy place, one of the lower apartments or mansions of heaven, a place of purification and improvement, of rest and refreshment, and of divine contemplation. A place whence our Blessed Lord's humanity is sometimes to be seen, though clouded or veiled if compared with the glory He is to appear with, and be seen in, at, and after his second coming. Into which middle state and blessed place, as they are carried by the holy angels, whose happy fellowship they there enjoy; so afterward at the resurrection, after judgment, they are led into the beatific vision by the captain of our salvation, Jesus Christ Himself, where they shall see Him fully as He is, and there they shall enjoy God forever and ever, or sempiternally."

The souls of the wicked at death do not go into hell, but into a middle state, "which state is dark, dismal, and uncomfortable, without light, rest, or any manner of refreshment, without any company but that of devils and such impure souls as themselves to converse with, and where these miserable souls are in dismal apprehensions of the deserved wrath of God."

"Secondly, That there is no immediate judgment after death, no trial on which sentence is pronounced, of neither the righteous nor the wicked, until Christ's second coming. And that, therefore, none of any age or class from the beginning of the world to the glorious appearing of our blessed Saviour at his second coming, are excepted from continuing in their proper middle state, from their death until their resurrection, whether they be patriarchs, prophets, Apostles, or martyrs."

"Thirdly, That the righteous in their happy middle state, do improve in holiness, and make advances in perfection, and yet they are not for all that carried out of that middle state into glory, or into the beatific vision, until after their resurrection."

"Fourthly, That prayers for those who are baptized according to Christ's appointment, and who die in the pale and peace of his Church, which the ancients called dying with the sign of faith, I say that prayers for such are acceptable to God as being fruits of our ardent charity, and are useful both to them and to us, and are too ancient to be popish."

"Lastly, That this doctrine for an intermediate state between death and the resurrection,

as I have proved it, does effectually destroy the popish purgatory, invocation of the saints departed, popish penances, commutations of those penances, their indulgences, and treasures of merits purchased by supererogation."

As an example of the prayers for the dead he gives the following extract from the Office to be used at the Burial of the Dead in the first Liturgy of King Edward the Sixth: [772] "O Lord, with whom do live the spirits of them that be dead, and in whom the souls of them that be elected, after they be delivered from the burden of the flesh be in joy and felicity; grant unto this thy servant that the sins which he committed in this world be not imputed unto him, but that he, escaping the gates of hell and pains of eternal darkness, may ever dwell in the region of light, with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, in the place where is no weeping, sorrow, nor heaviness; and when that dreadful day of the general resurrection shall come, make him to rise also with the just and righteous, and receive this body again to glory, then made pure and incorruptible."

Jeremy Taylor, bishop of Down and Connor, says: [773] Paradise is distinguished from the heaven of the blessed; being itself a receptacle of holy souls, made illustrous with visitation of angels, and happy by being a repository for such spirits, who, at the day of judgment, shall go forth into eternal glory."

Again, he says: [774] "I have now made it as evident as questions of this nature will bear, that in the state of separation, the spirits of good men shall be blessed and happy souls, -- they have an antepast or taste of their reward; but their great reward itself, their crown of righteousness, shall not be yet; that shall not be until the day of judgment. . . . . This is the doctrine of the Greek Church unto this day, and was the opinion of the greatest part of the ancient Church both Latin and Greek; and by degrees was, in the west, eaten out by the doctrine of purgatory and invocation of saints; and rejected a little above two hundred years ago, in the Council of Florence."

It appears, therefore, that there is little difference between the advocates of an intermediate state and those who are regarded as rejecting that doctrine. Both admit, (1.) That the souls of believers do at death pass into a state of blessedness. (2.) That they remain in that state until the resurrection. (3.) That at the second coming of Christ, when the souls of the righteous are to be clothed with their glorified bodies, they will be greatly exalted and raised to a higher state of being. Bishop Hickes in his highly commendatory review of the work of the Honourable Archibald Campbell just referred to, which is appended to that volume, although he lays great stress on the doctrine in question, says that those who call the state into which the righteous enter, heaven; and that into which the wicked are introduced when they die, hell, may continue to do so, provided they mean by heaven a state which is less perfect than that which awaits them after the coming of Christ; and by hell, a condition less miserable than that which will be assigned to the wicked.

The Church of England agrees with other Protestant churches in its teachings on this subject. In the Liturgy of Edward VI. just quoted, it is said, (1.) That the spirits of all the dead live after the dissolution of the body. (2.) That the righteous are with God in a state of joy and felicity. (3.) That they have escaped the gates of hell and the pains of eternal darkness into which, as is necessarily implied, the souls of those who die unreconciled to God immediately enter. All the members of that Church are taught to say daily: "The glorious company of the Apostles praise thee. The goodly fellowship of the Prophets praise

thee. The noble army of Martyrs praise thee." These, therefore, are all with God, and engaged in his service. In one of the prayers appointed to be used in the visitation of the sick, these words occur: "O Almighty God, with whom do live the souls of just men made perfect, after they are delivered from their earthly prisons." The souls of the just, therefore, are made per fect when they are delivered from the body.

[760] Talmud, Tract. Barachoth; quoted by Alger, p. 167.

[761] Eisenmenger, Entdecktes Judenthum, Knigsberg, 1711; II. cap. v. p. 315.

[762] Alger, ut supra, p. 284.

[763] Ibid. p. 288.

[764] De Usu Patrum, II. iv.; edit. Geneva, 1656, pp. 290, 291.

[765] Geschichte des Glaubens an Unsterblichkeit, Auferstehung, Gericht und Vergeltung, von W. Flgge, Universittsprediger in Gttingen, III. i. 3; Leipzig, 1799, vol. iii. part 1, p. 87.

[766] Dialogus cum Tryphone Judo, 5; edit. Commelinus, Heidelberg, 1593, p. 172, 16-19.

[767] Against Plato on the Cause of the Universe, (fragment): Ante-Nicene Christian Library, Edinburgh, 1869, vol. ix. Hippolytus, vol. ii. p. 46 ff.

[768] Tertullian, De Anima, 55; Works, edit. Basle, 1562, p. 685.

[769] Tertullian, Apologeticus, 47; ut supra, p. 892.

[770] Flgge, III. i. 4; ut supra, pp. 215, 216.

[771] The Doctrines of a Middle State between Death and Resurrection, of Prayers for the Dead, etc., etc., by Honourable Archibald Campbell, London, 1721, folio, p. 44.

[772] Published at London in the year 1549, folio, cxlix. p. 2.

[773] Life and Death of Jesus Christ, III. xvi. ad. 1; 3d edit. London, 1657, p. 533.

[774] Sermon at Funeral of Sir George Dalston; Works, edit. London, 1828, vol. vi. pp. 553, 557.

§ 4. Doctrine of the Church of Rome.

Although Romanists reject the doctrine of an intermediate state in the sense of the ancient Church, they nevertheless divide the world into which the souls of men enter at death, into many different departments.

The Limbus Patrum.

They hold that the souls of the righteous before the coming of Christ descended into Sheol, where they remained in a state of expectancy awaiting the coming of the Messiah. When Christ came and had accomplished his work of redemption by dying upon the cross, He descended into Hades, or the under-world, where the souls of the patriarchs were confined, delivered them from their captivity, and carried them in triumph to heaven. In other words they hold the common Jewish doctrine as to the state of the dead, so far as the saints of the Old Testament period are concerned. Their views on that subject have an intimate relation, whether causal or inferential is uncertain and unimportant, with their doctrine of the sacraments. Holding, first, that the sacraments are the only channels by

which the saving blessings of redemption are conveyed to men; and, secondly, that the sacraments of the Old Testament signified but did not communicate grace, they could not avoid the conclusion that those who died before the coming of Christ were not saved. The best that could be hoped concerning them was that they were not lost, but retained in a salvable state awaiting the coming deliverer. Whether they inferred that the Old Testament saints were not saved because they had no grace-bearing sacraments, or concluded that their sacraments were ineffectual, because those who had no others were not saved, it is not easy to determine. The latter is the more probable; as most naturally they received the doctrine of Sheol from the Jews, as they did so many other doctrines; and being led to believe that the patriarchs were not in heaven, they could not avoid the conclusion that circumcision and the passover were very far inferior in efficacy to the Christian sacraments.

The Limbus Infantum.

This is the name given to the place and state pertaining to the departed souls of unbaptized infants. As this class includes, perhaps, a moiety of the whole human race, their destiny in the future world is a matter of the deepest interest. The doctrine of the Church of Rome on this subject is that infants dying without baptism are not at death, or ever after it, admitted into the kingdom of heaven. They never partake of the benefits of redemption. This doctrine is explicitly stated in the symbols of that Church, and defended by its theologians. Cardinal Gousset, for example, says that original sin, of which all the children of Adam are partakers, is the death of the soul. Its consequences in this life are ignorance or obscuration of the understanding, feebleness of the will which can do nothing spiritually good without the assistance of divine grace, concupiscence or revolt of our lower nature, infirmities, sorrow, and the death of the body. Its consequences in the life to come are exclusion from the kingdom of heaven, privation of life eternal, of the beatific vision; "no one can enter into the kingdom of God unless he be born again in Jesus Christ by baptism; Except a man be born of water and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God.' This is what faith teaches, but it goes no further. The Church leaves to the discussions of the schools the different opinions of theologians touching the fate of those who are excluded from the kingdom of heaven on account of original sin; infants, for example, who die without having received the sacrament of baptism." [775]

Perrone speaking on this subject says, "We must distinguish the certain from the uncertain. What is certain, yea, a matter of faith, we have from the decisions of the Second Council of Lyons and the Council of Florence, both of which declare concerning infants and idiots: Credimus . . . . illorum animas, qui in mortali peccato vel cum solo originali decedunt, mox in infernum descendere, poenis tamen disparibus puniendas.' Ita quidem Florentinum in decreto Unionis,' quod descripsit verba Lugdunensis in fidei professione. De fide igitur est, (1.) parvulos ejusmodi in infernum descendere seu damnationem incurrere; (2.) poenis puniri disparibus ab illis quibus puniuntur adulti. Qu proinde spectant ad hunc inferni locum, ad poenarum disparitatem, seu in quo hc disparitas constituenda sit, ad parvulorum statum post judicii diem incerta sunt omnia, nec fidem attingunt. Hinc vari de his sunt patrum ac theologorum sententi." [776] Perrone goes on to show that the Latin fathers represent infants as suffering "poenam sensus;" while most of Greek fathers say that they incur only "poenam damni," a sense of loss in being deprived of

the blessedness of heaven. What that involves, however, he says is much disputed among theologians.

The Scriptural proof of this doctrine, as argued by Romanists is principally twofold; the first is derived from the doctrine of original sin. They admit that the sin of Adam brought guilt and spiritual death upon all mankind. Baptism is the only means appointed for the deliverance of men from these dreadful evils. Hence it follows that the unbaptized remain under this guilt and pollution. The second great argument is founded upon John iii. 5, "Except a man be born of water, and of the Spirit, he cannot enter into the kingdom of God." This Romanists understand as an explicit declaration that the unbaptized cannot be saved. On this, however, as on all other subjects, their main dependence is upon the decision of Councils and the testimony of the fathers. Besides the Councils of Lyons and Florence, both regarded as ecumenical by Romanists, appeal is made to the canons of the Council of Trent, "Si quis parvulos recentes ab uteris matrum baptizandos negat, etiam si a baptizatis parentibus orti; aut dicit in remissionem quidem peccatorum eos baptizari, sed nihil ex Adam trahere originalis peccati, quod regenerationis lavacro necesse sit expiari ad vitam ◆ternam consequendam.. . . . . anathema sit." [777] The Synod of Carthage, A. D. 416, is also quoted, which decided: [778] "Quicunque negat, parvulos per baptismum Christi a perditione liberari, et salutem percipere posse; anathema sit." Although the councils declare that the souls of unbaptized infants descend immediately into hell, Cardinal Gousset remarks, it is to be remembered that there are many departments in hell. There was one for the impenitent who died before the coming of Christ, and another for the souls of the righteous who awaited the advent of the Messiah; so there is no reason for denying that there is still another for the souls of unbaptized infants. "We repeat," he says, [779] "that neither the Council of Florence nor that of Lyons pronounces on the nature of the punishment of those who die with only the guilt of original sin, except to show that they are forever excluded from the kingdom of heaven." We can, therefore, without going counter to the decisions of the Church, maintain the sentiment which exempts such unfortunates from the punishment of hell, and the rather because the opposite opinion is generally abandoned, and this abandonment is in accord with Pope Innocent III., who, distinguishing between the punishment of original and of actual sin, makes the latter to be the pain of eternal fire; the former, the simple loss of the beatific (or intuitive) vision: "Poena originalis peccati est carentia visionis Dei, actualis vero poena peccati est gehenn◆ perpetu◆ cruciatus." [780] On the following page he says, "We will go still further, and say with St. Thomas, that although unbaptized infants are deprived forever of the happiness of the saints, they suffer neither sorrow nor sadness in consequence of that privation." It is a matter of rejoicing that the doctrine of Romanists on the condition of unbaptized infants in a future life has admitted of this amelioration, although it is hard to reconcile it with the decisions of councils which declare that the souls of such infants do at death immediately descend into hell, if that word be understood according to the sense in which it was generally used when those decisions were made. The current representations of the theologians of the Latin Church are against this modified form of the doctrine. The Council of Trent anathematizes those who say that baptism is not necessary for the expiation of original sin; as that of Carthage those who affirm that it does not save infants from perdition. Romanists, however, of our day, have the right to state their doctrine in their own way, and should not be charged with holding sentiments which they repudiate.

Hell.

Hell is defined by Romanists as the place or state in which the fallen angels and men who die in a state of mortal sin, or, as it is also expressed, of final impenitence, suffer forever the punishment of their sins.

That the punishment of the wicked is unending they prove from the express declarations of Scripture, from the faith of the Church universal, and from the general belief of men. As to the nature of the sufferings of those who perish, they say they are those of loss; they are deprived of the favour, vision, and presence of God; and those "of sense," or of positive infliction. To this latter class are to be referred such sufferings as arise from wicked passions, from remorse and despair, as well as those which spring from the external circumstances in which the finally condemned are placed. Whether the unquenchable fire of which the Bible speaks, is to be understood literally or figuratively, is a question about which Romanists differ. Gousset proposes the question, and says that it is one on which the Church has given no decisions. "It is of faith," he says, "that the condemned shall be eternally deprived of the happiness of heaven, and that they shall be eternally tormented in hell; but it is not of faith that the fire which causes their suffering is material. Many doctors, whose opinion has not been condemned, think that as the worm which never dies' is a figurative expression, so also is the fire that is never quenched;' and that the fire means a pain analogous to that by fire rather than the real pain produced by fire. Nevertheless the idea that the fire spoken of is real material fire is so general among Catholics, that we do not venture to advance a contrary opinion." [781]

Into this place and state of endless misery do pass, at death, all who die out of the pale of the Catholic Church; all the unbaptized (at least among adults); all schismatics; all heretics; all who die impenitent, or in a state of mortal sin, that is, sin the penalty of which is eternal death, which has not been remitted by priestly absolution.

Heaven.

Heaven, on the other hand, is the place and state of the blessed, where God is; where Christ is enthroned in majesty, and where are the angels and the spirits of the just made perfect. Those who enter heaven are in possession of the supreme good. "The happiness of the saints above is complete; they possess God, and in that possession they find perfect rest, and the enjoyment of all good." Their blessedness is perfect because it is everlasting. They see God face to face. They will eternally love Him and be loved by Him. "Beatitudo, qu&#65533; etiam summum bonum aut ultimus finis nuncupatur, a Boetio [782] definitur: status bonorum omnium congregatione perfectus;' a S. Augustino, [783] Bonorum omnium summa et cumulus;' a scholasticis autem: 'summum bonum appetivus rationalis satiativum.'" [784] It is, therefore, heaven in the highest sense of the term, into which the saints are said to enter.

There are, however, degrees in this blessedness. "The elect," says Cardinal Gousset, "in heaven, see God in a manner more or less perfect, according as they have more or less of merit, pro meritorum diversitate,' as it is expressed by the Council of Florence, which agrees with the words of our Lord, who says, In my Father's house are many mansions.'" [785] Into this only a few, however, even of true believers, according to Romanists, enter at death. The advocates of the doctrine of an intermediate state, as has been shown, assert that none of the human family, whether patriarch, prophet, Apostle, or martyr, is admitted to the vision of God when he leaves the body; and that none of the wicked goes into the place of

final retribution. Both the righteous and the wicked remain in a middle state, awaiting their final doom and location at the second coming of Christ. As to both these points, Romanists are more nearly agreed with the great body of Protestants.

On this point the Council of Florence says: "Credimus . . . . illorum animas, qui post baptismum susceptum nullam omnino peccati maculam incurrerunt, illas etiam animas qu post contractam peccati maculam vel in suis corporibus, vel eisdem exut corporibus sunt purgat in coelum mox recipi, et intueri clare ipsum Deum trinum et unum sicuti est." This doctrine Romanists assert not only in opposition to those who teach that the soul dies with the body and is revived at the resurrection, but also to those who say that the souls even of the perfectly purified "in aliqua requie degere, donec post corporum resurrectionem adipiscantur ternam beatitudinem, quam interim expectant." This error, Perrone says, widely disseminated among the Greeks, was adopted by Luther and Calvin. [786]

Two classes of persons, therefore, according to this view, enter heaven before the resurrection; first, those who are perfectly purified at the time of death; and second, those who, although not thus perfect when they leave this world, have become perfect in purgatory.

Purgatory.

According to Romanists, all those who die in the peace of the Church, but are not perfect, pass into purgatory; with regard to which they teach, (1.) That it is a state of suffering. The commonly received traditional, though not symbolical, doctrine on this point is, that the suffering is from material fire. The design of this suffering is both expiation and purification. (2.) That the duration and intensity of purgatorial pains are proportioned to the guilt and impurity of the sufferers. (3.) That there is no known or defined limit to the continuance of the soul in purgatory, but the day of judgment. The departed may remain in this state of suffering for a few hours or for thousands of years. (4.) That souls in purgatory may be helped; that is, their sufferings alleviated or the duration of them shortened by the prayers of the saints, and especially by the sacrifice of the Mass. (5.) That purgatory is under the power of the keys. That is, it is the prerogative of the authorities of the Church, at their discretion, to remit entirely or partially the penalty of sins under which the souls there detained are suffering.

This doctrine is deeply rooted in the whole Romish system. According to that system, (1.) Christ delivers us only from the "reatus culp," and exposure to eternal death. (2.) For all sins committed after baptism the offender must make satisfaction by penance or good works. (3.) This satisfaction must be complete and the soul purified from all sin, before it can enter heaven. (4.) This satisfaction and purification, if not effected in this life, must be accomplished after death. (5.) The eucharist is a propitiatory sacrifice intended to secure the pardon of post-baptismal sins, and takes effect according to the intention of the officiating priest. Therefore, if he intends it for the benefit of any soul in purgatory, it inures to his advantage. (6.) The pope, being the vicar of Christ on earth, has full power to forgive sin; that is, to exempt offenders from the obligation to make satisfaction for their offences.

Moehler, and other philosophical defenders of Romanism, soften down the doctrine by representing purgatory simply as a state of gradual preparation of the imperfectly sanctified for admission into heaven, making no mention of positive suffering, much less of material fire. Cardinal Gousset does not go so far as this, yet he says: [787] " It is of faith, (1.) That

the righteous who die without having entirely satisfied divine justice, must make satisfaction after this life by temporary pains, which are called pains of purgatory; (2.) That the souls in purgatory are relieved by the prayers of the Church. This is what the faith teaches; but it stops there. Is purgatory a particular place rather than a state, or a state rather than a particular place? Are the pains of purgatory due to fire, or are the pains those which arise from the consciousness of having offended God? What are the severity and duration of those pains? These and other questions of like kind, are not included in the domain of Catholic doctrine. These are questions about which there exists no decision or judgment of the Church. Nevertheless it should be known that in the opinion of the majority of theologians the torments of purgatory consist in part on those of fire, or, at least, in such as are analogous to the pain produced by fire. We will add that, according to Saint Augustine and Saint Thomas, whose opinion is generally adopted (dont le sentiment est assez suivi), the pains of purgatory surpass those of this life: "Poena purgatorii," says the angelic Doctor, [788] "quantum ad poenam damni et sensus, excedit omnem poenam istius vit﷿."

Cardinal Wiseman, [789] in his lecture on this subject, speaks in the mildest terms. He says nothing of the pains of purgatory except that they are pains. The satisfaction for sin demanded by the Church of Rome, to be rendered in this world, consists of prayers, fastings, almsgiving, and the like; and we are told that if this satisfaction be not made before death, it must be made after it. This is all that the Cardinal ventures to say. He has not courage to lift the veil from the burning lake in which the souls in purgatory are represented as suffering, according to the common faith of Romanists. Although it is true that the Church of Rome has wisely abstained from any authoritative decision as to the nature and intensity of purgatorial sufferings, it does not thereby escape responsibility on the subject. It allows free circulation with ecclesiastical sanction, expressed or implied, of books containing the most frightful exhibitions of the sufferings of purgatory which the imagination of man can conceive. This doctrine, therefore, however mildly it may be presented in works designed for Protestant readers, is nevertheless a tremendous engine of priestly power. The feet of the tiger with the claws withdrawn are as soft as velvet; when those claws are extended, they are fearful instruments of laceration and death.

Arguments used in favour of the Doctrine.

1. Romanists make comparatively little use of Scripture in defence of their peculiar doctrines. [790] Their main support is tradition and the authority of the Church. Cardinal Wiseman cites but two passages from the New Testament in favour of the doctrine of purgatory. The first is our Lord's saying that the sin against the Holy Ghost shall never be forgiven either in this world or in the world to come. This is said to imply that there are sins which are not forgiven in this life which may be forgiven hereafter; and therefore that the dead, or at least a part of their number, are not past forgiveness when they die. This is a slender thread on which to hang so great a weight. The words of Christ contain no such implication. To say that a thing can never happen either here or hereafter, in this world or in the world to come, is a familiar way of saying that it can never happen under any circumstances. Our Lord simply said that blasphemy of the Holy Ghost can never be forgiven. The other passage is from Revelation xxi. 21, where it said that nothing that defileth shall enter heaven. But as very few, if any of the human family, are perfectly pure when they die, it follows that, if there be no place or process of purification after death,

few if any of the sons of men could be saved; or, as Cardinal Wiseman puts the argument, "Suppose that a Christian dies who had committed some slight transgression; he cannot enter heaven in this state, and yet we cannot suppose that he is to be condemned forever. What alternative, then, are we to admit? Why, that there is some place in which the soul will be purged of the sin, and qualified to enter into the glory of God." [791] But does not the blood of Christ cleanse from all sin? Were not the sins of Paul all forgiven the moment he believed? Did the penitent thief enter purgatory instead of paradise? To minds trained under the influence of evangelical doctrine, such arguments as the above cannot have the slightest weight.

2. Great stress is laid upon the fact that the custom of praying for the dead prevailed early and long in the Church. Such prayers take for granted that the dead need our prayers; and thin supposes that they are not in heaven. But if not in heaven where can they be except in a preparatory or purgatorial states To this it may be answered, (1.) That praying for the dead is a superstitious practice, having no support from the Bible. It was one of the corruptions early introduced into the Church It will not do to argue from one corruption in support of another. (2.) Those who vindicate the propriety of praying for the dead are often strenuous opposers of the doctrine of purgatory. Dr. Pusey, or example, says: "Since Rome has blended the cruel invention of purgatory with the primitive custom of praying for the dead, it is not in communion with her that any can seek comfort from this rite." [792] The early Christians prayed for the souls of Apostles and martyrs, whom they assuredly believed were already in heaven. It was not, therefore, for any alleviation of their sufferings, as Dr. Pusey argues, that such prayers were offered, but for the augmentation of their happiness, and the consummation of their blessedness at the last day.

3. The argument of most logical force to those who believe the premises whence it is derived, is drawn from the doctrine of satisfaction. The Romish doctrine on this subject includes the following principles: "(1.) That God, after the remission of sin, retains a lesser chastisement in his power, to be inflicted on the simmer. (2.) That penitential works, fasting, alms-deeds, contrite weeping, and fervent prayer, have the power of averting that punishment. (3.) That this scheme of God's justice was not a part of the imperfect law, but the unvarying ordinance of his dispensation, anterior to the Mosaic ritual, and amply confirmed by Christ in the gospel. (4.) That it consequently becomes a part of all true repentance to try to satisfy this divine justice by the voluntary assumption of such penitential works as his revealed truth assures have efficacy before Him." [793] In connection with this is to be taken the doctrine of indulgences. This doctrine, we are told, rests on the following grounds: (1.) "That satisfaction has to be made to God for sin remitted, under the authority and regulation of the Church. (2.) That the Church has always considered herself possessed of the authority to mitigate, by diminution or commutation, the penance which she enjoins; and she has always reckoned such a mitigation valid before God, who sanctions and accepts it. (3.) That the sufferings of the saints, in union with, and by virtue of Christ's merits, are considered available towards the granting this mitigation. (4.) That such mitigations, when prudently and justly granted, are conducive toward the spiritual weal and profit of Christians." [794]

We have thus a broad foundation laid for the whole doctrine of purgatory. God in the forgiveness of sin remits only the penalty of eternal death. There remain temporal pains to

be endured in satisfaction of divine justice. If such satisfaction be not made in this world, it must be rendered in the next. The Church has the power of regulating these satisfactions, of directing what they shall be, of mitigating or commuting them in this life, and of lessening their severity or duration in the life to come. The infinite merit of Christ, and the superfluous merits of all the saints, gained by works of supererogation, form an inexhaustible treasury, from which the Pope and his subordinates may draw at discretion for the mitigation, or plenary dispensation, of all the satisfaction due for sin in the way of penance in this life, or the pains of purgatory in the life to come. Now when it is considered that the pains of purgatory are authoritatively and almost universally represented by Romanists to be intolerably severe, it will be seen that no such engine of power, no such means of subjugating the people, or of exalting and enriching the priesthood has ever been claimed or conceded by man. Men really invested with this power, of necessity, and of right, are the absolute masters of their fellow men; and those who wrongfully claim it, who assume without possessing it, are the greatest impostors (consciously or unconsciously) and the greatest tyrants the world ever saw.

4. With Romanists themselves the greatest argument in favour of the doctrine of purgatory is tradition. They claim that it has always been held in the Church; and in support of that claim they quote from the fathers all passages which speak of purification by fire, or of praying for the dead. They usually begin with the Second Book of Maccabees xii. 43, where it is said that Judas Maccabeus sent "2,000 drachmas of silver to Jerusalem for sacrifice, to be offered for the sins" of the dead. They cite Tertullian [795] who advised a widow to pray for her husband, and to offer oblations for him on the anniversary of his death; Cyprian, [796] who says that if a man committed a certain offence, "no oblation should be made for him, nor sacrifice offered for his repose;" Basil, who says of Isaiah ix. 19, "The people shall be as the fuel of the fire," ouk aphanismon apeilei, alla ten kaitharsin hupophainei, that is, "it does not threaten extermination, but denotes purification;" [797] Cyril of Jerusalem, who says: "Deinde et pro defunctis sanctis patribus et episcopis, et omnibus generatim, qui inter nos vita functi sunt, oramus, maximum hoc credentes adjumentum illis animabus fore, pro quibas oratio defertur, dum sancta et tremenda coram jacet victima;" [798] that is, "Then we pray for the holy fathers and the bishops that are dead; and, in short, for all those who are departed this life in our communion; believing that the souls of those for whom the prayers are offered, receive very great relief while this holy and tremendous victim lies upon the altar;" Gregory of Nyssa, [799] who says that in this life the sinner may "be renovated by prayers and by the pursuit of wisdom;" but when he has quitted his body, "he cannot be admitted to approach the Divinity till the purging fire shall have expiated the stains with which his soul was infected;" Ambrose, [800] who thus comments upon 1 Corinthians iii. 15, "He . . . . shall be saved, yet so as by fire." The Apostle says, "Yet so as by fire,' in order that his salvation be not understood to be without pain. He shows that he shall be saved indeed, but he shall undergo the pain of fire, and be thus purified; not like the unbelieving and wicked man, who shall be punished in everlasting fire;" Jerome, [801] who says: "As we believe the torments of the devil, and of those wicked men, who said in their hearts, There is no God,' to be eternal; so, in regard to those sinners, impious men, and even Christians, and whose works will be proved and purged by fire, we conclude that the sentence of the judge will be tempered by mercy;" and Augustine, [802] who says: "The prayers of the Church, or of good persons, are heard in

favour of those Christians who departed this life not so bad as to be deemed unworthy of mercy, nor so good as to be entitled to immediate happiness. So, also, at the resurrection of the dead, there will some be found to whom mercy will be imparted, having gone through those pains to which the spirits of the dead are liable. Otherwise it would not have been said of some with truth, that their sin shall not be forgiven, neither in this world, nor in the world to come, unless some sins were remitted in the next world." And again: "If they had built gold and silver, and precious stones, they would be secure from both fires; not only from that in which the wicked shall be punished forever, but likewise from that fire that purifies those who shall be saved by fire. But because it is said shall be saved, that fire is thought lightly of; though the suffering will be more grievous than anything man can undergo in this life." "These passages," says Cardinal Wiseman, "contain precisely the same doctrine as the Catholic Church teaches;" they may be found in great abundance in all the standard works of Catholic theologians.

With regard to this argument from the fathers, it may be remarked, (1.) That if any one should quote D[illegible]llinger, Dupanloup, Wiseman, and Manning in favour of any Christian doctrine, it would have more weight with Protestants than the same number of these early writers; not only because they are, speaking generally, men of far more ability and higher culture, but because they are in more favourable circumstances to learn the truth. The fathers looked at everything through an atmosphere filled with the forms of pagan traditions and ideas. The modern leaders of the Church of Rome are surrounded by the light of Protestant Christianity. (2.) All the ancient writers, quoted in support of the doctrine of purgatory, held doctrines which no Romanist is now willing to avow. If they discard the authority of the fathers when teaching a Jewish millennium, or sovereign predestination, once the doctrine of the universal Church, they cannot reasonably expect Protestants to bow to that authority when urged in favour of the pagan idea of a purification by fire. (3.) The witnesses cited in support of the doctrine of purgatory come very far short of proving the universal and constant belief of the doctrine in question. And. according to Romanists themselves, no doctrine can plead the support of tradition that cannot stand the crucial test, "quod semper, quod ubique, quod ab omnibus." (4.) That purgatory is, what Dr. Pusey calls it, "a modern invention," has been demonstrated by tracing historically its origin, rise, and development in the Church.

Arguments against the Doctrine.

1. The first, most obvious, and, for Protestants, the most decisive argument against the doctrine is, that it is not taught in the Bible. This is virtually admitted by its advocates. The most that is pretended is, that having adopted the doctrine on other grounds, they can find in Scripture here and there a passage which can be explained in accordance with its teachings. There is no passage which asserts it. There is no evidence that it formed a part of the instructions of Christ or his Apostles.

2. It is not only destitute of all support from Scripture, but it is opposed to its clearest and most important revelations. If there be anything plainly taught in the Bible, it is that if any man forsakes his sins, believes in the Lord Jesus Christ as the eternal Son of God, trusts simply and entirely to Him and his work, and leads a holy life, he shall certainly be saved. This the doctrine of purgatory denies. It rests avowedly on the assumption that notwithstanding the infinitely meritorious sacrifice of Christ, the sinner is bound to make

satisfaction for his own sins. This the Bible declares to be impossible. No man does or can perfectly keep the commandments of God, much less can he not only abstain from incurring new guilt, but also make atonement for sins that are past.

The doctrine moreover assumes the merit of good works. Here again it is clearer than the sun that the New Testament teaches that we are saved by grace and not by works; that to him that worketh, the reward is a matter of debt; but to him who simply believes, it is a matter of grace; and that the two are incompatible. What is of grace is not of works; and what is of works is not of grace. There is nothing more absolutely incompatible with the nature of the Gospel than the idea that man can "satisfy divine justice" for his sins. Yet this idea lies at the foundation of the doctrine of purgatory. If there be no satisfaction of justice, on the part of the sinner, there is no purgatory, for, according to Romanists, purgatory is the place and state in which such satisfaction is rendered. As the renunciation of all dependence upon our own merit, of all purpose, desire, or effort to make satisfaction for ourselves, and trusting exclusively to the satisfaction rendered by Jesus Christ, is of the very essence of Christian experience, it will be seen that the doctrine of purgatory is in conflict not only with the doctrines of the Bible but also with the religious consciousness of the believer. This is not saying that no man who believes in purgatory can be a true Christian. The history of the Church proves that Christians can be very inconsistent; that they may speculatively adhere to doctrines which are inconsistent with what their hearts know to be true.

It is, however, not only the doctrine of satisfaction, but also the absolutely preposterous doctrine of supererogation which must be admitted, if we adopt the creed of the Church of Rome in this matter. The idea is that a man may be more than perfect; that he may not only do more than the law requires of him, but even render satisfaction to God's justice so meritorious as to be more than sufficient for the pardon of his own sins. This superfluous merit, is the ground on which the sins of those suffering in purgatory may be forgiven. This is a subject which does not admit of argument. It supposes an impossibility. It supposes that a rational creature can be better than he ought to be; i.e., than he is bound to be. Romanists moreover strenuously deny the possibility that Christ's righteousness can be imputed to the believer as the ground of his justification; and yet they teach that the merits of the saints may be imputed to sinners in purgatory as the ground of their forgiveness.

Another antiscriptural assumption involved in the doctrine is that the pope, and his subordinates, have power over the unseen world; power to retain or to remit the sins of departed souls; to deliver them from purgatorial fire or to allow them to remain under its torments. This is a power which could not be trusted in the hands of an angel. Nothing short of infinite knowledge and infinite rectitude could secure it from fatal abuse. No such power we may be assured has ever been committed to the hands of sinful men.

There are two entirely different things involved in this priestly power to forgive sins. There are two kinds of punishment denounced against sin. The one is the sentence of eternal death; the other is the temporary punishment to which the sinner remains subject after the eternal penalty is remitted. [803] With regard to both the priest interferes. Neither can be remitted without his intervention. The eternal penalty is remitted in the sacrament of penance The latter is exacted, mitigated, or dispensed with at the discretion of the Church, or its organs. As to the remission of the eternal penalty the intervention of the priest is

necessary because he alone can administer the sacrament of penance, which includes contrition, confession, and satisfaction. All are necessary. It is not enough that the sinner be penitent in heart and truly turn from sin unto God; he must confess his sins to the priest. The Church "maintains that the sinner is bound to manifest his offences to the pastors of his Church, or, rather, to one deputed and authorized by the Church for that purpose; to lay open to him all the secret offences of his soul, to expose all its wounds, and in virtue of the authority vested by our Blessed Saviour in him, to receive through his hands, on earth, the sentence which is ratified in heaven, of God's forgiveness." Christ also "gave to the Church power of retaining sins, that is, of withholding forgiveness, or delaying it to more seasonable time." [804] "Here is a power, in the first place, truly to forgive sin. For this expression to forgive sins,' in the New Testament, always signifies to clear the sinner of guilt before God." "The Apostles, then, and their successors, received this authority; consequently, to them was given a power to absolve, or to cleanse the soul from its sins. There is another power also: that of retaining sins What is the meaning of this? clearly the power of refusing to forgive them. Now, all this clearly implies -- for the promise is annexed, that what sins Christ's lawful ministers retain on earth, are retained in heaven -- that there is no other means of obtaining forgiveness, save through them. For the forgiveness of heaven is made to depend upon that which they forgive on earth; and those are not to be pardoned there, whose sins they retain. [805] This is sufficiently explicit. It is to be remembered the power of forgiveness here claimed has reference, not to the temporary punishment imposed in the way of penance or satisfaction, but to the remission of "the eternal debt." Now, as to the temporary punishment, which, as we have seen, may last thousands of years and exceed in severity any sufferings on earth, Romanists teach, (1.) That "they are expiatory of past transgression." [806] (2.) That they are of the same nature with the penances imposed by the discipline of the early Church. That discipline was naturally, perhaps necessarily, very severe; the Church was then surrounded by heathenism, and many of its members were heathen converts. What tendencies, and what temptations to unchristian conduct, were unavoidable under such circumstances, may be learned from the state of the Church in Corinth as depicted in Paul's epistles. The great danger was that Christians should be involved, intentionally or unintentionally, in the idolatrous services to which they had been accustomed. As the worship of idols in any form, was a renunciation of the Gospel, it was against that offence the discipline of the Church was principally directed. One party contended that the "lapsed" ought never to be restored to Christian fellowship; another, which allowed their readmission to the Church, insisted that they should be restored only after a long and severe course of penance. Some were required "to lay prostrate for a certain period of months or years before the doors of the Church, after which they were admitted to different portions of the divine service; while others were often excluded through their whole lives from the liturgical exercises of the faithful, and were not admitted to absolution until they were at the point of death." These penances Romanists pronounce "meritorious in the sight of God," they "propitiate his wrath." This is the doctrine of satisfaction; and such satisfaction for sin is the necessary condition of its forgiveness. (3.) As these penances or satisfactions are imposed by the Church, they can be mitigated or remitted by the Church. (4.) As the pains of purgatory are of the nature of satisfactions, "expiatory," "meritorious," and "propitiatory," they are as much under the control of the Church, as the penances to be endured in this life

This is the true, and it may be said, the virtually admitted genesis of the doctrine of purgatory in the Church of Rome. It is a perversion of the ecclesiastical discipline of the early Christians. To be sure, the genesis, or birth, is spurious; there is no legitimate connection between the premises and the conclusion. Admitting the fact that the early Church imposed severe penances on offenders before restoring them to fellowship; admitting that this was right on the part of the Church; admitting that such penances were of the nature of satisfactions, so far as they were designed to satisfy the Church that the repentance of the offender was sincere; and admitting that these penances being matters of Church discipline were legitimately under the power of the Church, how does all this prove that they were "expiatory in the sight of God, that "they satisfied divine justice," or that they were the necessary conditions of forgiveness at his bar? Satisfactory to the Church as evidences of repentance, and satisfactory to God's justice, are two very different things, which Romanists have confounded. Besides, how does it follow, because the visible Church has control of the discipline of its members, in this life, that it has control of the souls of men in the life to come? Yet Romanists reason from the one to the other.

3. Another decisive argument against the doctrine of purgatory is drawn from the abuses to which it has led, and which are its inevitable, being its natural consequences. It is priorievident that a power committed to weak and sinful men which is safe in no other hands but those of God Himself, must lead to the most dreadful abuses. The doctrine, as we have seen, is, (1.) That the priest has power to remit or retain, the penalty of eternal death denounced against all sin. (2.) That he (or the appropriate organ of the Church) has power to alleviate, to shorten, or to terminate, the sufferings of souls in purgatory. That this power should fail to be abused, in the hands of the best of men, is impossible. Vested in the hands of ordinary men, as must be generally the case, or in the hands of mercenary and wicked men, imagination can set no limit to its abuse; and imagination can hardly exceed the historical facts in the case. This is not a matter of dispute. Romanists themselves admit the fact. Cardinal Wiseman acknowledges that "flagrant and too frequent abuses, doubtless, occurred through the avarice, and rapacity, and impiety of men; especially when indulgence was granted to the contributors towards charitable or religious foundations, in the erection of which private motives too often mingle." [807] The reader must be referred to the pages of history for details on this subject. The evils which have in fact flowed from this doctrine of purgatory and of the priestly power of retaining or remitting sin, are such as to render it certain that no such doctrine can be of God.

4. Romanists, however, confidently appeal, in support of their doctrine, to the express declaration of Christ, "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted unto them; and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained." (John xx. 23.) To the same effect it is said, in Matthew xvi. 19, "I will give unto thee the keys of the kingdom of heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever thou shalt Loose on earth, shall be loosed in heaven." The first remark to be made on these passages is, that whatever power is granted in them to the Apostles, is granted in Matthew xviii. 18 to all Christians, or, at least, to every association of Christians which constitutes a Church. "If thy brother shall trespass against thee, go and tell him his fault between thee and him alone: if he shall hear thee, thou hast gained thy brother. But if he will not hear thee, then take with thee one or two more, that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every word may be established. And if he neglect to hear them, tell it unto the Church: but if he neglect to hear

the Church, let him be unto thee as an heathen man and a publican. Verily, I say unto you, whatsoever ye shall bind on earth, shall be bound in heaven: and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth shall be loosed in heaven." This power, therefore, of binding and loosing, whatever it was, was not vested exclusively in the Apostles and their successors, but in the Church. But the true Church to which the promises and prerogatives of the Church belong, consists of true believers. This is not only the doctrine of the Bible and of all Protestants at the time of the Reformation, but would seem to be a matter of course. Promises made to the Apostles were made to true apostles, not to those who pretended to the office, and were false apostles. So the promises made to Christians are made not to nominal, pretended, or false Christians, but to those who truly are what they profess to be. If this be clear, then it is no less clear that the power of binding and loosing, of remitting or retaining sin, was never granted by Christ to unregenerated, wicked men, no matter by what name they may be called. This is a great point gained. The children of God in this world are not under the power of the children of the devil, to be forgiven or condemned, saved or lost, at their discretion. Therefore, when Luther was anathematized by the body calling itself the Church, as Athanasins had been before him, it did not hurt a hair of his head.

Secondly, the power granted by Christ to his Church of binding and loosing, of forgiving or retaining sin, is not absolute, but conditional. The passages above quoted are analogous to many others contained in the Scriptures, and are all to be explained in the same way. For example, our Lord said to his disciples; They who hear you, hear me. That is, the people were as much bound to believe the gospel when preached by the disciples, as though they heard it from the lips of Christ Himself. Or, if these words are to be understood as addressed exclusively to the Apostles, and to include a promise of infallibility in teaching, the meaning is substantially the same. Men were as much bound to receive the doctrines of the Apostles, as the teachings of Christ, for what they taught He taught. St. John, therefore, says, "He that knoweth God heareth us; he that is not of God, heareth not us." (1 John iv. 6.) Nevertheless, although Christ required all men to hear his Apostles as though He himself were speaking; yet no man was bound to hear them unless they preached Christ's gospel. Therefore St. Paul said, "Though we, or an angel from heaven, preach any other gospel unto you than that which we have preached unto you, let him be accursed." (Gal. i. 8.) If the Apostles taught anything contrary to the authenticated revelation of God, they were to be rejected. If they undertook to bind or loose, to remit or retain sin on any other terms than those prescribed by Christ, their action amounted to nothing; it produced no effect. In teaching and in absolution their power was simply declarative. In the one case, they, as witnesses, declared what were the conditions of salvation and the rule of life prescribed in the gospel; and in the other case, they simply declared the conditions on which God will forgive sin, and announced the promise of God that on those conditions He would pardon the sins of men. A child, therefore, may remit sin just as effectually as the pope; for neither can do anything more than declare the conditions of forgiveness. It once required the heroism of Luther to announce that truth which emancipated Europe; now it is an every-day truth.

There is, of course, a great difference between the Apostles and other Christian teachers. Christ bore witness to the correctness of their testimony as to his doctrines, and sanctioned their declarations, by signs, and wonders, and gifts of the Holy Ghost, thus giving the seal of infallibility to their teachings as uttered by the lips and as we have them

recorded in the Bible. And, there is also a difference between the official ministers of the gospel and other men, in so far as the former are specially called to the work of preaching the word. But in all cases, in that of the Apostles, in that of office-bearers in the Church, and in that of laymen, the power is simply declaratory. They declare what God has revealed. What difference does it make in the authority of the message, whether the gospel be read at the bed of a dying sinner, by a child, or by an archbishop? None in the world.

There is another class of passages analogous to those under consideration. When our Lord says, Ask and ye shall receive, Whatsoever ye ask in my name I will do it, no one understands these promises as unconditional. No one believes that any prayer of the Christian is ever heard, if it be not for something agreeable to the will of God. When then it is said, "Whosesoever sins ye remit, they are remitted," why should it be inferred that no condition is implied? The language is not more explicit in the one case than in the other. As no man's prayers are heard unless he asks for things agreeable to the will of God; so no man's sins are remitted unless he truly repents and truly believes in the Lord Jesus Christ. One man has no more power to forgive sins, than another. The forgiveness of sin is the exclusive prerogative of God.

Thirdly, there is another remark to be made about this power of binding and loosing. Christ has ordained that the terms of admission to the Church, should be the same as those of admission into heaven; and that the grounds of exclusion from the Church, should be the same as those of exclusion from heaven. He, therefore, virtually said to his disciples, Whom ye receive into the Church, I will receive into heaven; and whom ye exclude from the Church, I will exclude from heaven. But this, of course, implies that they should act according to his directions. He did not bind Himself to sanction all their errors in binding and loosing; any more than He was bound by his promise to hear their prayers, to grant all the foolish or wicked petitions his people might offer; or by his promise in reference to their teaching, to sanction all the false doctrines into which they might be seduced. If we interpret Scripture by Scripture, we escape a multitude of errors.

Fourthly, Romanists rest their doctrine of absolution and of the power of the keys over souls in purgatory, very much upon the special gifts granted to the Apostles and to their successors. In reference to this agreement it may be remarked, --

1. That the Apostles never claimed, never possessed, and never pretended to exercise, the power assumed by Romanists, in the remission of sins. They never presumed to pronounce the absolution of a sinner in the sight of God. Christ could say "Thy sins be forgiven thee;" but we never hear such language from the lips of an Apostle. They never directed those burdened with a sense of sin to go to the priest to make confession and receive absolution. They had no authority in this respect above that which belongs to the ordinary officers of the Church. They could declare the terms on which God had promised to forgive sins; and they could suspend or excommunicate members, for cause, from the communion of the visible Church. In the case of the incestuous man whom the Church in Corinth allowed to remain in its fellowship, Paul determined to do what he censured the Church for not doing; that is, in virtue of his apostolic jurisdiction extending over all the churches, he excommunicated the offender, or, delivered him to Satan, that he might repent. (1 Cor. v.) When the man did repent, the Apostle exhorted the Corinthians to restore him to their fellowship, saying, "To whom ye forgive anything, I forgive also." (2 Cor. ii. 10.) He

claimed for himself no power which he did not recognize as belonging to them. It was a mere matter of Church discipline from beginning to end. This power of discipline, which all Churches recognize and exercise, the Romanists have perverted into the priestly power of absolution.

2. Admitting, what, however, is not conceded, that the Apostles had special power to forgive sin, that power must have rested on their peculiar gifts and qualifications. They were infallible men; not infallible indeed in reading men's hearts, or in judging of their character, but simply infallible as teachers; and they had authority to organize the Church, and to lay down laws for its future government and discipline. These gifts and prerogatives, indeed, in no way qualified them to sit in judgment on the souls of men, to pardon or condemn them at discretion; but, such as they were, they were personal. Those who claim to be their official successors, and arrogate their peculiar prerogatives, do not pretend to possess their gifts; they do not pretend to personal infallibility in teaching, nor do they claim jurisdiction beyond their own dioceses. As no man can be a prophet without the gifts of a prophet, so no man can be an Apostle without the gifts of an Apostle. The office is simply authority to exercise the gifts; but if the gifts are not possessed what can the office amount to?

But even if the impossible be admitted; let it be conceded that the prelates have the power of remitting and retaining sin, as claimed by Romanists, in virtue of their apostleship, how is this power granted to priests who are not Apostles? It will not do to say that they are the representatives and delegates of the bishop. The bishop is said to have this power because he has received the Holy Ghost. If this means anything, it means that the Holy Spirit dwells in him, and so enlightens his mind and guides his judgment, as to render his decisions in retaining or remitting sin, virtually the decisions of God; but this divine illumination and guidance can no more be delegated than the knowledge of the lawyer or the skill of the surgeon. How can a prophet delegate his power to foresee the future to another man? It is impossible to believe that God has given men the power of forgiving or retaining sin, unless He has given them the power of infallible judgment; and that such infallibility of judgment belongs to the Romish priesthood, no man can believe.

It has already been urged as valid arguments against the Romish doctrine of purgatory, (1.) That it is destitute of all Scriptural support. (2.) That it is opposed to many of the most clearly revealed and most important doctrines of the Bible. (3.) That the abuses to which it always has led and which are its inevitable consequences, prove that the doctrine cannot be of God. (4.) That the power to forgive sin, in the sense claimed by Romanists, and which is taken for granted in their doctrine of purgatory, finds no support in the words of Christ, as recorded in John xx. 23, and Matt. xvi. 19, which are relied on for that purpose. (5.) The fifth argument against the doctrine is derived from its history, which proves it to have had a pagan origins and to have been developed by slow degrees into the form in which it is now held by the Church of Rome.

History of the Doctrine.

The details on this subject must be sought in the common books on the history of doctrine. Here only the most meagre outline can be expected. A full exposition on this subject would require first an account of the prevalence of the idea of a purification by fire among the ancients before the coming of Christ, especially among the people of central

Asia; secondly, an account of the early appearance of this idea in the first three centuries in the Christian Church, until it reached a definite form in the writings of Augustine; and thirdly, the establishment of the doctrine as an article of faith in the Latin Church, principally through the influence of Gregory the Great.

Fire is the most effectual means of purification. It is almost the only means by which the dross can be separated from the gold. In the Scriptures it is frequently referred to, in illustration of the painful process of the sanctification of the human soul. In Zechariah xiii. 9, it is said, "I will bring the third part through the fire, and will refine them as silver is refined, and will try them as gold is tried: they shall call on my name, and I will hear them: I will say, It is my people; and they shall say, The Lord is my God." It is in allusion to the same familiar fact, that afflictions are so often compared to a furnace, and the trials of God's people are said to be by fire. "The fire," says the Apostle, "shall try every man's work, of what sort it is. With the ancient Persians fire was sacred. It became an object of worship, as the symbol of the divinity; and elemental fire was even for the soul the great means of purification. In the Zendavesta, Ormuz is made to say to Zoroaster, "Thine eyes shall certainly see all things live anew. -- For the renovated earth shall yield bones and water, blood and plants, hair, fire and life as at the beginning. -- The souls will know their bodies. -- Behold my father! my mother! my wife! Then will the inhabitants of the universe appear on earth with mankind. Everyone will see his good or evil. Then a great separation will occur. Everything corrupt will sink into the abyss. Then too through the fierceness of the lire all mountains shall melt; and through the flowing stream of fire, all men must pass. The good will go through as easily as through flowing milk. The wicked find it real fire; but they must pass through and be purified. Afterward the whole earth shall be renewed." [808]

With the Greek Stoics also, fire was the elementary principle and soul of the world, and they also taught a renovation of the world through fire. With the Stoics, "The universe is one whole, which comprises all things; yet contains a passive principle, matter, to paschon, and an active principle, to poiou, which is reason, or God. The soul of man is part of this divine nature, and will be reabsorbed into it and lose its individual existence. The Deity in action, if we may so speak, is a certain active ether, or fire, possessed of intelligence. This first gave form to the original chaos, and, being an essential part of the universe, sustains it in order. The overruling power, which seems sometimes in idea to have been separated from the Absolute Being, was heimarmene, fate, or absolute necessity. To this the universe is subject, both in its material and divine nature. Men return to this life totally oblivious of the past, and by the decrees of fate are possessed of a renovated existence, but still in imperfection and subject to sorrow as before." [809] This is an inchoate form of the pantheism of the present day. The system as stated is not self-consistent; as it says that the souls of men are to be absorbed into the soul of the world, and yet that they are to return to this life, although oblivious to the past; which amounts to saying that there will be a new generation of men.

The idea of a purification by fire after death became familiar to the Greek mind, and was taken up by Plato, and wrought into his philosophy; he taught that no one could become perfectly happy after death, until he had expiated his sins; and that if they were too great for expiation, his sufferings would have no end. [810] That this doctrine passed from the Gentiles to the Jews may be inferred not only from the fact already mentioned that Judas

Maccabeus sent money to Jerusalem to pay for sacrifices to be offered for the sins of the dead; but also from the doctrine of the Rabbins, that children, by means of sin offerings, could alleviate the sufferings of their deceased parents. [811] Some of them also taught that all souls, not perfectly holy, must wash themselves in the fire-river of Gehenna; that the just would therein be soon cleansed, but the wicked retained in torment indefinitely. [812] It was in this general form of a purification by fire after death that the doctrine was adopted by some of the fathers. Nothing more than this can be proved from the writings of the first three centuries. Origen taught first that this purification was to take place after the resurrection. "Ego puto," he says, "quod et post resurrectionem ex mortuis indigeamus sacramento eluente nos atque purgante: nemo enim absque sordibus resurgere poterit: nec ullam posse animam reperiri qu\u0000 universis statim vitiis careat." [813] And secondly, that in the purifying fire at the end of the world, all souls, and all fallen angels, and Satan himself, will ultimately be purged from sin, and restored to the favour of God. In his comment on Romans viii. 12, he says: "Qui vero verbi Dei et doctrin\u0000 Evangelic\u0000 purificationem spreverit, tristibus et poenalibus purificationibus semetipsum reservat, ut iguis gehenn\u0000 in cruciatibus purget, quem nec apostolica doctrina nec evangelicus sermo purgavit." [814] This doctrine was condemned in the Church; but, as Fl\u0000gge [815] says: "This anathema was the less effective because the eastern views on this subject differed so much from the western or Church doctrine. The former, or Origen's doctrine, contemplated the purification of the greatest sinners and of the devil himself; the Latin Church thought only of believers justified by the blood of Christ. The one supposed the sinner to purify himself from his desire of evil; the other, asserted expiation by suffering. According to the former, the sinner was healed and strengthened; according to the latter, divine justice must be satisfied." It is not to be inferred from this, that the Greek Church adopted Origen's views as to "the restoration of all things;" but it nevertheless maintained until a much later period the views by which it was distinguished from the Latins on the doctrine of the future state.

It was, therefore, in the western Church that the development of the doctrine of purgatory took place. Augustine first gave it a definite form, although his views are not always consistently or confidently expressed. Thus he says: It is doubtful whether a certain class of men are to be purified by fire after death, so as to be prepared to enter heaven; "utrum ita sit," he says, "qu\u0000ri potest: et aut inveniri, aut latere, nonnullos fideles per ignem quemdam purgatorium; quanto magis minusve bona pereuntia dilexerunt, tanto tardius citiusque salvari." [816] In other places, however, he teaches the two essential points in the doctrine of purgatory, first, that the souls of a certain class of men who are ultimately saved, suffer after death; and secondly, that they are aided through the eucharist, and the alms and prayers of the faithful. [817]

It was, however, Gregory the Great who consolidated the vague and conflicting views circulating through the Church, and brought the doctrine into such a shape and into such connection with the discipline of the Church, as to render it the effective engine for government and income, which it has ever since remained. From this time onward through all the Middle Ages, purgatory became one of the prominent and constantly reiterated topics of public instruction. It took firm hold of the popular mind. The clergy from the highest to the lowest, and the different orders of monks vied with each other in their zeal in its inculcation; and in the marvels which they related of spiritual apparitions, in support of

the doctrine. They contended fiercely for the honour of superior power of redeeming souls from purgatorial pains. The Franciscans claimed that the head of their order descended annually into purgatory, and delivered all the brotherhood who were there detained. The Carmelites asserted that the Virgin Mary had promised that no one who died with the Carmelite scapulary upon their shoulders, should ever be lost. [818] The chisel and pencil of the artist were employed in depicting the horrors of purgatory, as a means of impressing the public mind. No class escaped the contagion of belief; the learned as well as the ignorant; the high and the low; the soldier and the recluse; the skeptic and the believer were alike enslaved. [819] From this slavery the Bible, not the progress of science, has delivered all Protestants.

[775] Th□ologie Dogmatique, par S. E. le Cardinal Gousset, Archeveque de Reims, 10th edit Paris, 1866, vol. ii. pp. 95, 96.

[776] Pr□lectiones Theologic□, edit. Paris, 1861, vol. i. p. 494.

[777] Sess. v., canon 4; Streitwolf, vol. i. pp. 18, 19.

[778] Quoted by Perrone, Pr□lectiones Theologic□, III. vi. 599; edit. Paris, 1861, vol. i. pp. 496, 497.

[779] Gousset, ut supra, p. 96.

[780] Innocent III. Caput "Majores" de Baptismo.

[781] Gousset, ut supra, p. 160.

[782] Consolatio Philosophi□, Lib. iii, prosa 2; Lyons, 1671, p. 107.

[783] Enarratio in Psalmum, ii. 11; Works, Paris, 1835, vol. iv. p. 8, c.

[784] Perrone, ut supra, vol. i. p. 467.

[785] Gousset, p. 132.

[786] Ut supra, p. 473.

[787] Gousset, ut supra, vol. ii. 143.

[788] See Aquinas, Summa, III. xlvi. 6, 3.

[789] Lectures on the Principal Doctrines and Practices of the Catholic Church. By Cardinal Wiseman. Two volumes in one. Sixth American from the last London edition. Revised and Corrected. Baltimore, 1870. Lecture XI. On Satisfaction and Purgatory.

[790] Cardinal Wiseman says: "I have more than once commented on the incorrectness of that method of arguing which demands that we prove every one of our doctrines individually from the Scriptures. I occupied myself, during my first course of lectures, in demonstrating the Catholic principle of faith that the Church of Christ was constituted by Him the depositary of his truths, and that, although many were recorded in his holy word, still many were committed to traditional keeping, and that Christ Himself has faithfully promised to teach in his Church, and has thus secured her from error." Lectures, ut supra, xi. vol. ii. p. 45. This resolves all controversies with Romanists into two questions. First, what is the prerogative of the Church as a teacher; and secondly, is the Church of Rome, or any other external organized body, the body of Christ to which the prerogatives and promises of the Church belong?

[791] Lectures, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 49.

[792] An earnest Remonstrance to the author of the "Pope's Pastoral Letter to Certain

Members of the University of Oxford," London, 1836, p. 25. The Hon. Archibald Campbell, whose work is quoted above, says that all the authorities to which he refers from among the English Bishops and theologians, side with him in defending prayers for the dead and in denouncing purgatory.

[793] Wiseman, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 40. It will be observed that the Cardinal, in detailing the kind of satisfaction to be made, mentions fasting, alms-giving, and prayer, but says nothing of scourgings, hair shirts, spiked girdles, and all other means of self-torture so common and so applauded in the Romish Church. In this way he softens down and understates all "Catholic Doctrines and Practices," to render them less revolting to the reason and conscience of his readers. Purgatory with him is a bed of roses with here and there a thorn, instead of the lake of real fire and brimstone which glares through all Church history.

[794] Ibid. vol. ii. p. 70.

[795] De Monogamia, 10; Works, edit. Basle, 1562, p. 578.

[796] Ep. xlvi. p. 114. (?)

[797] In Esai�, ix. 19; Works, edit. Paris, 1618, vol. i. p. 1039, d.

[798] Catechesis Mystagogica, v. 9; Opera, Venice, 1763, p. 328, a, b.

[799] Oratio de Mortuis; Works, Paris, 1615, vol. ii. pp. 1066-1068.

[800] "Dixit: Sic tamen quasi per ignem,' ut salus h�c non sine poena sit: . . . . estendit salvum illum quidem futurum; sed poenas ignis passurum, ut per ignem purgatus fiat salvus, et non sicut perfidi �terno igne in perpetuum torqueatur." Works, edit. Paris, 1661, vol. iii. p. 351, a.

[801] Comment in c. lxv. Isai. Opera, Paris, 1579, tome iv., p. 502, d, e.

[802] "Nam pro defunctis quibusdam, vel ipsius Ecclesi�, vel quorumdam piorum exauditur oratio: sed pro his quorum in Christo regeneratorum nec usque adeo vita in corpore male gesta est ut tali misericordia judicentur digni non esse, nec usque adeo bene, ut talem misercordiam reperiantur necessariam non habere. Sicut etiam facta resurrectione mortuorum non deerunt quibus post poenas, quas patiuntur spiritas mortuorum, impertiatur misericordia, ut in ignem non mittantur �ternum. Neque enim de quibusdam veraciter diceretur, quod non eis remittatur neque in hoc s�culo, neque, in futuro, nisi essent quibus, etsi non in isto, tamen remittetur in futuro." De Civitate Dei, XXI. xxiv. 2; Works, 2d. Benedictine edition, Paris, 1838, vol. vii. p. 1028, c. d. "�dificarent autem aurum, argentum, lapides pretiosos, et de utroque igne securi essent; non solum de illo �terno qui in �ternum cruciaturus est impios, sed etiam de illo qui emendabit eos qui per ignem salvi erunt . . . . Et quia dicitur, 'salvus erit,' contemnitur ille guis. . . . . Gravior tamen erit ille ignis quam quidquid potest homo pati in hac vita." Enarratio in Psalmum, xxxvii. 2, 3; Works, vol. iv. pp. 418, d. 419, a.

[803] In the passage quoted in part on a preceding page, Cardinal Wiseman says: "No fasting, no prayers, no alms-deeds, no works that we can conceive to be by man, however protracted, however expensive or rigorous they may be, can, according to the Catholic doctrine, have the most infinitesimal weight for obtaining the remission of sin, or of the eternal punishment allotted to it. This constitutes the essence of forgiveness, of justification, and in it we hold that man has no power. Now, let us come to the remaining part of the

sacrament [of penance]. We believe that upon this forgiveness of sins, that is, after the remission of that eternal debt, which God in his justice awards to transgressions against his law, He has been pleased to reserve a certain degree of inferior or temporary punishment appropriate to the guilt which had been incurred; and it is on this part of the punishment alone, that, according to the Catholic doctrine, satisfaction can be made to God." Lectures, ut supra, vol. ii. p. 35.

[804] Wiseman, Lectures vol. ii. p. 15.

[805] Ibid. pp. 19, 20.

[806] Ibid. p. 39.

[807] Lectures, ut supra, xii.; vol. ii. p. 75.

[808] Kleuker's Zendavesta im Kleinem, 2 Thl. s. 128.

[809] The Mutual Influence of Christianity and the Stoic School. By James Henry Bryant, B. D., St. John's College, Cambridge, Incumbent of Astley, Warwickshire. The Halsean Dissertation for the year 1865. London and Cambridge, 1866, p. 22. Sir Alexander Grant, in his Ethics of Aristotle, Essay vi., The Ancient Stoics (first and Oxford Essay, 1858), London, 1866, vol. i. p. 246, remarks: "If we cast our eyes on a list of the early Stoics and their native places, we cannot avoid noticing how many of this school appear to have come of an Eastern and often of a Semitic stock. This circumstance in connection with affinity in doctrine, goes to show the eastern origin of the Stoic system. It includes the pantheism of the Orientals with some of the elements peculiar to the religion of the Semitic race as we find them in the Bible.

[810] Hoepfner, De Origine Dogmatis de Purgatorio, Halle, 1792-98; quoted by Fl[illegible]gge, ut supra, p. 323.

[811] Eisenmenger, Endecktes Judenthum, II. vi.; K[illegible]nigsberg, 1711, pp. 357, 358.

[812] Kabbala Denudata, edit. Frankfort, 1684, vol. ii. part 1, pp. 108, 109, 113.

[813] Homil. xv. in Luc. Works, edit. Delarue, Paris, 1740, vol. iii. p. 948, B, a.

[814] Ibid. Paris, 1759, vol. iv. p. 640, B, b, c.

[815] Ut supra, p. 327.

[816] Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate, 69; Works, Paris, 1837, vol. vi. p. 382, b.

[817] De Civitate Dei, XXI. xiii.; Ibid. vol. vii., p. 1015, d. Enchiridion de Fide, Spe et Charitate, 110; Ibid. vol. vi. p. 403, b, c.

[818] Mosheim, Historia Ecclesi[illegible], S[illegible]culum XIII. pars ii. 2, 29; edit. Helmstadt, 1764, p. 454.

[819] All experience proves that infidelity is no protection against superstition. If men will not believe the rational and true, they will believe the absurd and the false. When the writer was returning from Europe, he had as a fellow passenger a distinguished French diplomatist. One evening when admiring the moon shining in its brightness, that gentleman adverted to the idea of creation, and pronounced it absurd, avowing himself an atheist. But he added immediately, "Don't misunderstand me. I am a good Catholic, and mean to die in the faith of the Catholic Church. You Protestants are all wrong. You tell every man to think for himself. Ho! then I'll think what I please. I want a religion which tells me I shan't think; only submit. Well! I mean to submit, and be buried in consecrated ground."

CHAPTER II: THE RESURRECTION.

§ 1. The Scriptural Doctrine.

By the resurrection is not meant the continued existence of the soul after death. The fact that the Sadducees in the time of Christ, against whom most of the arguments found in the New Testament in favour of the doctrine of the resurrection were directed, denied not only that doctrine, but also that of the continued existence of the soul after death, sufficiently accounts for the sacred writings combining the two subjects. Thus our Lord, in reasoning with the Sadducees, said: "As touching the dead, that they rise; have ye not read in the book of Moses, how in the bush God spake unto him, saying, I am the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob? He is not the God of the dead, but the God of the living." (Mark xii. 26.) All that this passage directly proves is that the dead continue alive after the dissolution of the body. But as this is Christ's answer to a question concerning the resurrection, it has been inferred that the resurrection means nothing more than that the soul does not die with the body, but rises to a new and higher life. Thus also the Apostle in the elaborate argument contained in 1 Corinthians xv. evidently regards the denial of the resurrection as tantamount with the denial of the future life of the soul. Hence many maintain that the only resurrection of which the Bible speaks is the resurrection of the soul when the body dies. The first position, therefore, to be defended, in stating the Scriptural doctrine on this subject is, that our bodies are the subjects of the resurrection spoken of in the Scriptures.

The Bodies of Men are to rise again.

This is denied, first, by those who take the word resurrection in a figurative sense, expressing the rising of the soul from spiritual death to spiritual life. At the grave of Lazarus Martha said to our Lord, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." To which our Lord, according to Mr. Alger, replies substantially, "You suppose that in the last day the Messiah will restore the dead to live again upon the earth. I am the Messiah, and the last days have therefore arrived. I am commissioned by the Father to bestow eternal life upon all who believe on me; but not in the manner you have anticipated. The true resurrection is not calling the body from the tomb, but opening the fountains of eternal life in the soul. I am come to open the spiritual world to your faith. He that believeth in me and keepeth my commandments, has passed from death unto life become conscious that though seemingly he passes into the grave, yet really he shall live with God forever. The true resurrection is, to come into the experience of the truth that, God is not the God of the dead but of the living; for all live unto Him.' Over the soul that is filled with such an experience, death has no power. Verily, I say unto you, the hour is coming, and now is, when the dead, the ignorant and guilty, buried in trespasses and sins, shall lay hold of the

life thus offered, and be blessed." [820]

Secondly, the resurrection of the body is denied by those who, with the Swedenborgians, hold that man, in this life, has two bodies, an external and internal, a material and psychical. [821] The former dies and is deposited in the grave, and there remains never to rise again. The other does not die, but in union with the soul passes into another state of existence. The only resurrection, therefore, which is ever to occur, takes place at the moment of death.

Thirdly, it is denied by those who assume that the soul as pure spirit, cannot be individualized or localized; that it cannot have any relation to space, or act or be acted upon, without a corporeity of some kind; and who, therefore, assume that it must be furnished with a new, more refined, ethereal body, as soon as its earthly tabernacle is laid aside. The resurrection body is according to this view also furnished at the moment of death.

That the Scriptures, however, teach a literal resurrection of the body is proved, (1.) From the meaning of the word. Resurrection signifies a rising again; a rising of that which was buried; or a restoration of life to that which was dead. But the soul, according to the Scriptures, does not die when the body is dissolved. It, therefore, cannot be the subject of a resurrection except in the sense antithetical to spiritual death, which is not now in question. The same is true of the psychical body, if there be such a thing. It does not die, and, therefore, cannot rise again. The same may also be said of a new body furnished the soul when its earthly house of this tabernacle is dissolved.

(2.) Those who are in the dust of the earth; those "that are in the graves" are said to rise. But it is only of the body that it can be said, it is in the grave; and, therefore, it is of the body the resurrection spoken of, must be understood.

(3.) It is "our mortal bodies" which are to rise again. This form of expression is decisive of the Apostle's meaning. "He that raised Christ from the dead shall also quicken your mortal bodies, by his Spirit that dwelleth in you." (Rom. viii. 11.) It is "our vile body" which is to be fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body. (Phil. iii. 21.)

(4.) This also is clearly the doctrine taught in the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians. There were certain errorists in Corinth who denied the fact and the desirableness of the resurrection of believers. Paul's argument is directed to both those points. As to the fact that the dead can rise, he refers to what no Christian could deny, the rising of Christ from the dead. This, as a historical fact, he supports by historical evidence. He then shows that the denial of the resurrection of Christ, is the denial of the whole Gospel, which rests on that fact. "If Christ be not risen, then is our preaching vain, and your faith is also vain." But if Christ rose from the dead, all his people must. Christ rose as the first fruits of them that sleep. There is in Paul's view, the same divinely appointed, and therefore necessary connection between the resurrection of Christ and that of his people, as between the death of Adam and that of his descendants. As surely as all in Adam die, so surely shall all in Christ be made alive. And finally, on this point, the Apostle condescends to argue from the faith and practice of the Church. What is the use, he asks, of being baptized for the dead, if the dead rise not? The whole daily life of the Christian is founded, he says, on the hope of the resurrection; not of the continued existence of the soul merely, but of the glorious existence of the whole man, soul and body, with Christ in heaven. As to the second point,

the desirableness of the resurrection of the body, he shows that all objections on this score are founded on the assumption that the future is to be like the present body. He says that the man who makes that objection is a fool. The two are no more alike than a seed and a flower, a clod of earth and a stare the earthly and the heavenly. "It [the body of course] is sown in corruption. it is raised in incorruption: it is sown in dishonour, it is raised in glory: it is sown in weakness, it is raised in power: it is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body." This whole discourse, therefore, is about the body. To the objection that our present bodies are not adapted to our future state of existence, he answers, Granted; it is true that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; this corruptible must put on incorruption, and this mortal must put on immortality. It would seem that the Apostle in this chapter must have had in his eye a host of writers in our day who make themselves merry with the doctrine of the resurrection, on much the same grounds as those relied upon by the errorists of Corinth, whose fragments he scattered to the winds eighteen centuries ago.

(5.) Another argument on this subject is drawn from the analogy constantly presented, between the resurrection of Christ and that of his people. The sacred writers, as we have seen, argue the possibility and the certainty of the resurrection of our bodies, from the fact of Christ's resurrection; and the nature of our future bodies from the nature of his body in heaven. There would be no force in this argument if the body were not the thing which is to rise again.

(6.) Finally, as Paul argued from the faith of the Church, we cannot err in following his example. The Bible is a plain book, and the whole Christian world, in all ages, has understood it to teach, not this or that, but the literal rising from the dead of the body deposited in the grave. All Christians of every denomination are taught to say, I believe in "The forgiveness of sins; The resurrection of the body; And the life everlasting."

The Identity of the Future with our Present Body.

There are two distinct questions to be here considered. First, Do the Scriptures teach that the resurrection body is to be the same as that deposited in the grave? Second, Wherein does that sameness or identity consist? The first of these questions we may be able to answer with confidence; the second we may not be able to answer at all.

The arguments to prove that we are hereafter to have the same bodies that we have in the present life, are substantially the same as those already adduced. Indeed, identity is involved in the very idea of a resurrection; for resurrection is a living again of that which was dead; not of something of the same nature, but of the very thing itself. And all the passages already quoted as proving the resurrection of the body, assume or declare that it is the same body that rises. It is our present "mortal bodies;" "our vile body;" it is "this corruptible," "this mortal;" it is that which is sown, of which the resurrection and transformation is predicted and promised. Our resurrection is to be analogous to that of Christ; but in his case there can be no doubt that the very body which hung upon the cross, and which laid in the tomb, rose again from the dead. Otherwise it would have been no resurrection. This identity was the very thing Christ was anxious to prove to his doubting disciples. He showed them his pierced hands and feet, and his perforated side. On this subject, however, there is little difference of opinion. Wherever the resurrection of the body is an article of faith the identity of the present and future body has been admitted. The usual form of Christian burial, in the case of the faithful, has ever been, "We commit this

body to the grave in the sure hope of a blessed resurrection."

Wherein does this Identity consist?

It is obvious that identity in different cases depends on very different conditions. First, in the case of unorganized matter, as a clod of earth or a stone, the identity depends on the continuity of substance and of form. If the stone be reduced to powder and scattered abroad, the same substance continues, but not in the same combination; and therefore the identity is gone. In what sense is water in a goblet the same from hour to hour, or from day to day? It is the same substance resulting from the combination of oxygen and hydrogen, and it is the same portion of that substance. If that goblet be emptied into the ocean, what becomes of the identity of the water which it contained? If you separate the water into its constituent gases, the elementary substances continue, but they are no longer water. You may change its state without destroying its identity. If frozen into ice and again thawed, it is the same water. If evaporated into steam, and then condensed, it is the same water still. This sameness, of which continuance of the same substance is the essential element, is the lowest form of identity. In the Church it has often been assumed that sameness of substance is essential to the identity between our present and future bodies. This idea has been pressed sometimes to the utmost extreme. Augustine seems to have thought that all the matter which at any period entered into the organism of our present bodies, would in some way be restored in the resurrection body. Every man's body, however dispersed here, shall be restored perfect in the resurrection. Every body shall be complete in quantity and quality. As many hairs as have been shaved off, or nails cut, shall not return in such vast quantities as to deform their original places; but neither shall they perish; they shall return into the body into that substance from which they grew. [822] Thomas Aquinas was more moderate. He taught that only those particles which entered into the composition of the body at death, would enter into the composition of the resurrection body. This idea seems to have entered into the theology of Romanists, as some at least of the theologians of the Church of Rome labour to remove the objection to this view of the subject derived from the fact that the particles of the human body after death are not only dispersed far and wide and mingled with the dust of the earth, but also enter into the composition of the bodies of plants, of animals, and of men. To this Perrone answers, "Difficile Deo non est moleculas omnes ad corpus aliquod spectantes, etiam post innumeros transitus ex uno in aliud colligere. H[illegible]c mutatio seu transitus accidentalis est, minime vere essentialis, ut ex physiologia ac zoobiologia constat universa." [823] It is true, as our Lord teaches us: "With God all things are possible;" and if sameness of substance be essential to that identity between our present and future bodies, which the Bible asserts, then we should have to submit to these difficulties, satisfied that it is within the power of omniscient omnipotence to do whatever God has promised to effect.

Others assume that it is not necessary to the identity contended for that all the particles of the body at death should be included in the resurrection body. It is enough that the new body should be formed exclusively out of particles belonging to the present body. But as the body after the resurrection is to be refined and ethereal, a tenth, a hundredth, or a ten thousandth portion of those particles would suffice. It would take very little of gross matter to make a body of light. Tertullian thought that God had rendered the teeth indestructible in order to furnish material for the future body. Many others also suppose that there is somewhere an indestructible germ in our present body, which is to be developed into the

body of the future. [824]

Secondly, in works of art sameness of substance holds a very subordinate part. The Apollo Belvidere once lay dormant in a block of marble. The central portion of that block containing every particle of matter in the statue was not the Apollo of the artist. Could every particle clipped off, be restored, the substance would remain, but the statue would be gone. Here form, expression, the informing idea are the main constituents of identity. If a penitentiary should be taken down, and the materials be employed in the construction of a cathedral, the substance would be the same, but not the building. When you look into a mirror the image reflected remains the same, but not the substance; for that is changed with every new reflection. And if it were possible, or proved, that in like manner the Madonna del Sixti of Raphael had a thousand times changed its substance, it would remain the same picture still. The soul here informs the body. The character is more or less visibly impressed upon the face. We know the former by looking at the latter. If this be so, if the soul have power thus to illuminate and render intelligent the gross material of our present frames, why may it not hereafter render its ethereal vestment so expressive of itself as to be at once recognized by all to whom it was ever known. Thus we may at once recognize Isaiah, Paul, and John. It is not said that this will be so; that herein lies the identity of their heavenly and earthly bodies; but should it prove to be true, we should not stop to inquire or to care how many particles of the one enter into the composition of the other.

Thirdly, identity in living organisms is something still higher, and more inscrutable than in works of art. The acorn and the oak are the same; but in what sense? Not in substance, not in form. The infant and the man are the same, through all the stages of life; boyhood, manhood, and old age; the substance of the body, however, is in a state of perpetual change. It is said this change is complete once every seven years. Hence if a man live to be seventy years old, the substance of his body has, during that period, been entirely changed ten times. Here, then, is an identity independent of sameness of substance. Our future bodies, therefore, may be the same as those we now have, although not a particle that was in the one should be in the other.

The object of these remarks on the different kinds of identity, is not to explain anything. It is not intended to teach wherein the identity of the earthly and heavenly consists; whether it be an identity of substance; or of expression and idea, as in works of art; or of the uninterrupted continuity of the same vital force as in the plant and animal through their whole progress of growth and decay; or whether it is a sameness which includes all these; or something different from them all. Nothing is affirmed. The subject is left where the Bible leaves it. The object aimed at is twofold; first, to show that it is perfectly rational for a man to assert the identity between our present and our future bodies, although he is forced to admit that he does not know wherein that identity is to consist. This is no more than what all men have to admit concerning the continued sameness of our present bodies. And, secondly, to stop the mouths of gainsayers. They ridicule the idea of a resurrection of the body; asking if the infant is to rise as an infant; the old man, wrinkled and decrepid; the maimed as maimed; the obese with their cumbrous load; and by such questions think they have refuted a Scripture doctrine. The Bible teaches no such absurdities; and no Church goes beyond the Scriptures in asserting two things, namely: that the body is to rise, and that it is to be the same after the resurrection that it was before; but neither the Bible nor the

Church determines wherein that sameness is to consist.

With regard to our present bodies, the fact of their continued identity is not denied. According to one view the principle of this identity is in the body and perishes, or ceases, with it. According to another, although in the body, it does not perish with it, but remains united to the soul, and under appropriate circumstances fashions for itself a new body. According to others, this vital principle is in the soul itself. Agassiz, as a zoologist, teaches that with every living germ there is an immaterial principle by which one species is distinguished from another, and which determines that the germ of a fish develops into a fish; and that of a bird, into a bird, although the two germs are exactly the same (i.e., alike) in substance and structure. When the individual dies, this immaterial principle ceases to exist. This is Agassiz's doctrine. Dr. Julius Mller [825] thinks that this vital organizing force continues in union with the soul, but is not operative between death and the resurrection. He says, "it is not the sarx, the mass of earthly material, ... but the soma, the organic whole, to which the Scriptures promise a resurrection. . . . . The organism, as the living form which appropriates matter to itself, is the true body, which in its glorification becomes the soma pneumatikon. But he understands the Apostle in 2 Corinthians v. 4, as clearly teaching that the soul during the interval between death and the resurrection remains unclothed. Dr. Lange, whose imagination often dominates him, teaches that the soul was created to be incarnate; and therefore was endowed with forces and talents to that end. In virtue of its nature, it as certainly gathers from surrounding matter the materials for a body, as a seed gathers from the earth and air the matter suited to its necessities. He assumes, therefore, that there is in the soul "a law or force, which secures its forming for itself a body suited to its necessities and sphere or more properly," he adds, "the organic identity" may be characterized as the "Schema des Leibes," which is included in the soul, or, as the "Incarnationstrieb des Geistes;" a "nisus formativus" which belongs to the human soul. [826] The soul while on earth forms for itself a body out of earthly materials; when it leaves the earth it fashions a habitation for itself out of the materials to be found in the higher sphere to which it is translated; and at the end of the world, when the grand palingenesia is to occur, the souls of men, according to their nature, will fashion bodies for themselves out of the elements of the dissolving universe. "The righteous will clothe themselves with the refined elements of the renovated earth; they shall shine as the sun. The wicked shall be clothed with the refuse of the earth; they shall awake to shame and everlasting contempt." [827]

Leaving out of view what is fanciful in this representation, it may be readily admitted by those who adhere to the generally received doctrine that man consists of soul and body (and not of spirit, soul, and body), that the soul, besides its rational, voluntary, and moral faculties, has in it what may be called a principle of animal life. That is, that it has not only faculties which fit it for the higher exercises of a rational creature capable of fellowship with God, but also faculties which fit it for living in organic union with a material body. It may also be admitted that the soul, in this aspect, is the animating principle of the body, that by which all its functions are carried on. And it may further be admitted that the soul, in this aspect, is that which gives identity to the human body through all the changes of substance to which it is here subjected. And finally it may be admitted, such being the case, that the body which the soul is to have at the resurrection, is as really and truly identical with that which it had on earth, as the body of the man of mature life is the same which he had when

he was an infant. All this may pass for what it is worth. What stands sure is what the Bible teaches, that our heavenly bodies are in some high, true, and real sense, to be the same as those which we now have.

Nature of the Resurrection Body.

It is obvious that this is a subject of which we can know nothing, except from divine revelation. We are of necessity as profoundly ignorant of this matter, as of the nature of the inhabitants of the planets or of the sun. The speculations of men concerning the nature of the future body have been numerous; some merely fanciful, others, revolting.

There are two negative statements in the Bible on this subject, which imply a great deal. One is the declaration of Christ, That in the resurrection men neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God. The other is the words of Paul in 1 Corinthians xv. 50, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God." There seem to be plainly three things implied or asserted in these passages. (1.) That the bodies of men must be specially suited to the state of existence in which they are to live and act. (2.) That our present bodies, that is, our bodies as now organized, consisting as they do of flesh and blood, are not adapted to our future state of being. And (3.) That everything in the organization or constitution of our bodies designed to meet our present necessities, will cease with the life that now is. Nothing of that kind will belong to the resurrection body. If blood be no longer our life, we shall have no need of organs of respiration and nutrition. So long as we are ignorant of the conditions of existence which await us after the resurrection, it is vain to speculate on the constitution of our future bodies. It is enough to know that the glorified people of God will not be cumbered with useless organs, or trammeled by the limitations which are imposed by our present state of existence.

The following particulars, however, may be inferred with more or less confidence from what the Bible has revealed on this subject, --

1. That our bodies after the resurrection will retain the human form. God, we are told, gave to all his creatures on earth each its own body adapted to its nature, and necessary to attain the end of its creation. Any essential change in the nature of the body would involve a corresponding change in its internal constitution. A bee in the form of a horse would cease to be a bee and a man in any other than a human form, would cease to be a man. His body is an essential element in his constitution. Every intimation given in Scripture on this subject, tends to sustain this conclusion. Every time Christ appeared to his disciples not only before, but also after his ascension, as to Stephen, Paul, and John, it was in human form. Origen conceited that, because the circle is the most perfect figure, the future body will be globular. But a creature in that form would not be recognized either in earth or heaven as a man.

2. It is probable that the future body will not only retain the human form, but that it will also be a glorified likeness of what it was on earth. We know that every man has here his individual character, -- peculiarities mental and emotional which distinguish him from every other man. We know that his body by its expression, air, and carriage more or less clearly reveals his character. This revelation of the inward by the outward will probably be far more exact and informing in heaven than it can be here on earth. How should we know Peter or John in heaven, if there were not something in their appearance and bearing corresponding to the image of themselves impressed by their writings on the minds of all

their readers?

3. This leads to the further remark that we shall not only recognize our friends in heaven, but also know, without introduction, prophets, apostles, confessors, and martyrs, of whom we have read or heard while here on earth. (a.) This is altogether probable from the nature of the case. If the future body is to be the same with the present, why should not that sameness, whatever else it may include, include a certain sameness of appearance. (b.) When Moses and Elias appeared on the mount with Christ, they were at once known by the disciples. Their appearance corresponded so exactly with the conceptions formed from the Old Testament account of their character and conduct, that no doubt was entertained on the subject. (c.) It is said that we are to sit down with Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob in the kingdom of heaven. This implies that Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob will be known; and if they are known surely others will be known also. (d.) It is promised that our cup of happiness will then be full; but it could not be full, unless we met in heaven those whom we loved on earth. Man is a social being with a soul full of social affections, and as he is to be a man in heaven, is it not likely that he will retain all his social affections there? God would hardly have put this pure yearning in the hearts of his people if it were never to be gratified. David weeping over his dead son, said, "I shall go to him, but he shall not return to me." And this has been the language of every bereaved heart from that day to this. (e.) The Bible clearly teaches that man is to retain all his faculties in the future life. One of the most important of those faculties is memory. If this were not retained there would be a chasm in our existence. The past for us would cease to exist. We could hardly, if at all, be conscious of our identity. We should enter heaven, as creatures newly created, who had no history. Then all the songs of heaven would cease. There could be no thanksgiving for redemption; no recognition of all God's dealings with us in this world. Memory, however, is not only to continue, but will doubtless with all our faculties be greatly exalted, so that the records of the past may be as legible to us as the events of the present. If this be so, if men are to retain in heaven the knowledge of their earthly life; this of course involves the recollection of all social relations, of all the ties of respect, love, and gratitude which bind men in the family and in society. (f.) The doctrine that in a future life we shall recognize those whom we knew and loved on earth, has entered into the faith of all mankind. It is taken for granted in the Bible, both in the Old Testament and in the New. The patriarchs always spoke of going to their fathers when they died. The Apostle exhorts believers not to mourn for the departed as those who have no hope; giving them the assurance that they shall be reunited with all those who die in the Lord.

4. We know certainly that the future bodies of believers are to be, -- (a.) Incorruptible; not merely destined never to decay, but not susceptible of corruption. By the certain action of physical laws, our present body, as soon as deserted by the soul, is reduced to a mass of corruption, so revolting that we hasten to bury our dead out of our sight. The future body will be liable to no such change; neither, as we learn from Scripture, will it be subject to those diseases and accidents which so often mar the beauty or destroy the energy of the bodies in which we now dwell. Being unsusceptible of decay, they will be incapable of, or at least, carefully preserved from, suffering, by Him who has promised to wash all tears from our eyes.

(b.) The future body is to be immortal. This is something different from, something

higher than incorruptible; the latter is negative, the other positive; the one implies immunity from decay; the other not merely immunity from death, but perpetuity of life. There is to be no decrepitude of age no decay of the faculties; no loss of vigour; but immortal youth.

(c.) The present body is sown in weakness, it will be raised in power. We know very well how weak we now are, how little we can effect; how few are our senses; how limited their range; but we do not yet know in what ways, or in what measure our power is to be increased. It is probable that however high may be our expectations on this subject, they will fall short of the reality; for it doth not yet appear, it is not revealed in experience or in hope, what we shall be. We may have new senses, new and greatly exalted capabilities of taking cognizance of external things, of apprehending their nature and of deriving knowledge and enjoyment from their wonders and their beauties. Instead of the slow and wearisome means of locomotion to which we are now confined, we may be able hereafter to pass with the velocity of light or of thought itself from one part of the universe to another. Our power of vision, instead of being confined to the range of a few hundred yards, may far exceed that of the most powerful telescope. These expectations cannot be extravagant, for we are assured that eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither has it entered into the heart of man to conceive the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him.

(d.) The body is sown in dishonour, it shall be raised in glory. Glory is that which excites wonder, admiration, and delight. The bodies of the saints are to be fashioned like unto Christ's glorious body. We shall be like Him when we see Him as He is. More than this cannot be said; what it means we know not now, but we shall know hereafter. We already know that when the body of Christ was transfigured upon the mount, the Apostles fainted and became as dead men in its presence; and we know that when He shall come again the second time unto salvation the heavens and the earth shall flee away at the sight of his glory. Let it suffice us to know that as we have borne the image of the earthly, we shall also bear the image of the heavenly. Well might the Apostle exhort believers not to mourn for the pious dead, whom they are to see again, arrayed in a beauty and glory of which we can now have no conception.

(e.) It is sown a natural body, it is raised a spiritual body. When words are used thus antithetically, the meaning of the one enables us to determine the meaning of the other. We can, therefore, in this case learn what the word "spiritual" means, from what we know ot the meaning of the word "natural." The psuchikon, translated "natural," as every one knows, is derived from psuche, which means sometimes the life; sometimes the principle of animal life which men have in common with the brutes; and sometimes the soul in the ordinary and comprehensive sense of the term; the rational and immortal principle of our nature; that in which our personality resides; so that to say "My soul rejoices," or, "My soul is exceeding sorrowful," is equivalent to saying, "I rejoice," or, "I am sorrowful." Such being the signification of the psuche, it is plain that soma psuchikon, the psychical, or natural, body, cannot by possibility mean a body made out of the psuche. In like manner it is no less plain that soma pneumatikon cannot by possibility mean a body made of spirit. That indeed would be as much a contradiction in terms, as to speak of a spirit made out of matter. Again, we know that man has an animal as well as a rational nature; that is, his soul is endowed not only with reason and conscience, but also with sensibilities, or faculties which enable it to take cognizance of the appetites of the body, as hunger and thirst, and of

its sensations of pleasure and pain. These appetites and sensations are states of consciousness of the soul. The soma psuchikon, or natural body, therefore, is a body adapted to the soul in this aspect of its nature; and the soma pneumatikon, or spiritual body, is a body adapted to the higher attributes of the soul. We know from experience what the former is; it is an earthly body, made of the dust of the earth. The chemist can analyze it, and reduce it to its constituents of ammonia, hydrogen, carbon, etc.; and in the grave it soon becomes undistinguishable from other portions of the earth's surface. It is a body which, while living, has constant need of being repaired; it must be sustained by the oxygen of the air, and by the chemical elements of its food. It soon grows weary, and must be refreshed by rest and sleep. In a little more than seventy years, it is worn out, and drops into the grave. The reverse of this is true of the spiritual body; it has no such necessities, and is not subject to such weariness and decay. It is no doubt involved in the fact, that while our present bodies are adapted to the lower faculties of our nature, and the spiritual body to our higher faculties, that the latter must be more refined, ◆therial, and, as Paul says, heavenly, than the other. Even now the soul, in one sense, pervades the body. It is in every part of it; it is sensible of all its changes of state; it gives to it a look and carriage which reveal man as the lord of this world. To a far greater degree may the soul permeate the refined and glorified body which it is to receive at the resurrection of the just; and thus render it to a degree now incomprehensible, in its very nature spiritual. If the face of man formed out of the dust of the earth often beams with intelligence and glows with elevated emotions, what may be expected of a countenance made like unto that of the Son of God.

If then our future bodies are to retain the human form; to be easily distinguished by those who knew and loved us on earth; if they are to be endued with an unknown power; if they are to be incorruptible, immortal, and spiritual; if we are to bear the image of the heavenly, we may well bow down with humble and joyful hearts and receive the exhortation of the Apostle: "Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord, forasmuch as ye know that your labour is not in vain in the Lord."

[820] Alger, ut supra, p. 324.

[821] Bonnet, Paling◆n◆sie Philosophique. Essai Analytique sur l'Ame, chap. xxiv., par. xxii., Neufchatel, 1783, vol. xiv. p. 205 ff., especially p. 230 ff., and vol. xvi. p. 481 ff. Lange, Beitr◆ge zu der Lehre von den letzten Dingen, Meurs, 1841. Lange's doctrine, however, as will appear in thie sequel, is not that of Swedenborg.

[822] De Civitate Dei, XXII., xx.; Works, Paris, 1838, vol. vii. pp. 1085-1089.

[823] Pr◆lectiones, edit. Paris., 1861, vol. i. p. 503.

[824] See Essay on the Identity and General Resurrection of the Human Body, by Samuel Drew, chapter vi. section 7, Brooklyn, 1811, p. 315 ff.

[825] Studien und Kritiken, 1835, pp. 777, 785.

[826] Beitr◆ge zu der Lehre von den Letzten Dingen. Meurs, 1841, p. 235.

[827] Ibid. p. 251.

§ 2. History of the Doctrine.

The doctrine of the resurrection of the body is not exclusively a doctrine of the Bible. It is found, in different forms, in many of the ancient religions of the world. This is the more remarkable as it is in itself so improbable, and so much out of the analogy of nature. One generation of plants and animals succeeds another in uninterrupted succession; but the same individuals never reappear. The case is the more remarkable when we consider the difficulties with which the doctrine is beset; difficulties so great that it is rejected and even ridiculed by all in this generation who do not recognize the sacred Scriptures as an authority from which they dare not dissent. When such doctrines are found not only in the Bible but also in the religions of heathen nations it may be assumed that the Hebrews borrowed then, from their heathen neighbours. This is the hypothesis adopted generally by rationalists. They urge in its support that the doctrine of Satan, of the resurrection of the body, and of the destruction and renovation of the earth, do not appear in those portions of the Scriptures which were written before the Babylonish captivity. To carry out this argument they refer Job, Daniel, and a large portion of Isaiah to a period subsequent to the exile, contrary to evidence both external and internal in favour of the greater antiquity of those books. Even if it be conceded that the doctrines do not appear distinctly in any but the later writings of the Old Testament, that would not justify the assumption of their heathen origin, provided that their genesis can be traced in the earlier books of Scripture. Nothing is more obvious, or more generally admitted than the progressive character of the divine revelations. Doctrines at first obscurely intimated are gradually developed. This is the case with the doctrines of the Trinity, of the personality of the Holy Spirit, of the divinity of Christ, of the nature of his redemption, of the future state; and, as might be expected, of the resurrection of the dead. It is just as unreasonable and as unhistorical to say that the Church received the doctrine of the resurrection of the body from the heathen, as that it received from Plato the doctrine of the Trinity. There is another consideration on this subject, which for the Christian is decisive. The doctrines which in the New Testament are declared to be part of the revelation of God, are thereby declared not to be of heathen origin. The heathen may have held them, as they hold the doctrine of the existence of God and of the immortality of man; that does not prove that such doctrines have only a human origin and human authority.

These things being premised, it is admitted as a remarkable fact that belief in the resurrection of the body did prevail among the ancients prior to the advent of Christ. Reference is sometimes made to the Brahminic doctrine of the constant succession of cycles of countless ages in the history of the universe, one cycle being a reproduction or renewal of another, as having an analogy to the Christian doctrine of the resurrection. "The first appearance of this notion of a bodily restoration," says Mr. Alger, [828] "which occurs in the history of opinions, is among the ancient Hindus. With them it appears as a part of a vast conception, embracing the whole universe in an endless series of total growths, decays, and exact restorations. In the beginning the Supreme Being is one and alone. He thinks to himself I wills become many' [This is a figure of speech; for according to the Hindu system the Supreme Being, the Absolute, cannot think]. Straight way the multiform creation germinates forth, and all beings live. Then for an inconceivable period -- a length of time commensurate with the existence of Brahma, the Demiurgus [This again is a mixture of ideas, for Brahma of the Hindus does not correspond with the Demiurgus of the Greeks] -- the successive generations flourish and sink. At the end of this period all forms of matter,

all creatures, sages, and gods, fall back into the Universal Source whence they arose. Again the Supreme Being is one and alone. After an interval the same causes produce the same effects, and all things recur exactly as they were before." [829] According to the Hindu system men have not to wait for the conclusion of one of these great cycles to be absorbed in the Supreme Being. By a life strictly conformed to prescribed rules, and by a process of complete self-abnegation, they attain a state in which they are lost in the Infinite as drops of rain in the ocean. As individuals they can never be reproduced, any more than the drops of rain can be recovered from the ocean. The ocean, by evaporation may produce other clouds which shall fall in other drops of rain; but this is not a reproduction of those which fell a thousand years ago. There is therefore no analogy between this theory and the Christian doctrine of the resurrection.

"The same general conception," continues Mr. Alger, [830] "in a modified form was held by the Stoics of later Greece, who doubtless borrowed it from the East, and who carried it out in greater detail. God is an artistic fire, out of which the cosmopoeia issues.' This fire proceeds in a certain fixed course, in obedience to a fixed law, passing through certain intermediate gradations, and established periods, until it returns into itself and closes with a universal conflagation. . . . . The Stoics supposed each succeeding formation to be perfectly like the preceding. Every particular that happens now, has happened exactly so a thousand times before, and will happen a thousand times again. This view they connected with astronomical calculations making the burning and recreating of the world coincide with the same position of the stars as that at which it previously occurred. This they called the restoration of all things. The idea of these enormous revolving identical periods -- Day of Brahm, Cycle of the Stoics, or Great Year of Plato -- is a physical fatalism, effecting a universal resurrection of the past, by reproducing it over and over forever." [831]

In the first volume of this work the attempt was made to show that the Brahminical and several Grecian systems of philosophy, were only different modifications of the pantheistic theory of the Infinite by fixed and necessary laws manifesting itself in the finite in all its endless diversities of forms. This endless succession of individuals, however, has no affinity with the Bible doctrine of the resurrection of the dead. The flora and fauna of this are not a resurrection of the plants and animals of the geologic periods.

In the religion of Zoroaster there is a far nearer approach to the doctrines of the Bible. [832] As the Scriptures teach that God at first created all things good, and made man after his own image, and placed him upon probation in Eden; so Zoroaster taught that Ormuzd created all things good, and that all were sinless and happy, and fitted for immortality. And as the Bible teaches that through the seduction of Satan man fell from his original state, and became the subject of sin, misery, and death; so in the religion of the ancient Persians it is taught, that Ahriman, the personal principle of evil, co-eternal with Ormuzd the principle of good, effected the ruin of man for this world and the next. Such was the origin of evil; such was the beginning of the conflict between good and evil, of which our earth has been the theatre. Both systems teach the ultimate triumph of the good, and the redemption of man; both teach a future state, the resurrection of the body, and the renewal of the earth, or, that there are to be a new heaven and a new earth. It is certain from the teachings of the New Testament that the Hebrews did not derive these doctrines from the Persians; it is, therefore,

in the highest degree probable that the Persians derived them from their neighbours of the family of Shem, who were the depositaries of the revelations of God.

It has already been seen that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body was clearly taught in the Old Testament, and in the apocryphal books of the Jews; that it was a cardinal article of faith among the Jews when Christ came into the world; and that it was emphatically asserted by Christ and his Apostles. We have also seen that the Bible teaches nothing on this subject beyond (1.) That the body is to rise again. (2.) That its identity will be preserved. And (3.) That it is to be so changed and refined as to adapt it to the high state of existence to which it is destined. In this simple form the doctrine has ever been held by the Church, which is not responsible for the fanciful theories adopted by many of its members.

The philosophical theologians of the Alexandrian school, in the early Church, were disposed to spiritualize all the Bible says of the resurrection of the body, and of its future state. The Latins, on the other hand, adhered to a literal interpretation of Scriptural language, often to the grossest extremes. Augustine, as we have seen, thought the resurrection body was to be composed of all the matter that ever belonged to it in this world, and Jerome asks: "If men are not raised with flesh and bones, how can the damned gnash their teeth in hell?" [833]

During the Middle Ages, the faith of the Church, on this subject, remained unchanged. The speculations of individual writers were diverse, inconsistent, and of little interest, because of no authority.

At the time of the Reformation the simple doctrine of the Bible was reaffirmed; and theologians beyond those limits were left to their own guidance. The form in which the doctrine was usually presented by the theologians of the seventeenth century, was: (1.) That the resurrection body is to be numerically and in substance, one with the present body. (2.) That it is to have the same organs of sight, hearing, etc., as in this life. (3.) Many held that all the peculiarities of the present body as to size or stature, appearance, etc., are to be restored. (4.) As the bodies of the righteous are to be refined and glorified, those of the wicked, it was assumed, would be proportionately repulsive. The later Protestant theologians, as well Lutheran as Reformed, confine themselves more strictly within the limits of Scripture.

Rationalism, as far as it prevailed, swept the whole doctrine away. Reason does not teach the doctrine, and cannot explain it; therefore, it has no title to recognition. Deistical rationalists admitted that the doctrine was taught in the Scriptures, but this was to them only an additional reason for denying their divine origin. The more moderate rationalists, who admitted the Bible to be a revelation of the truths of reason, or of natural religion, explained away all that it teaches concerning the resurrection, making it refer to the rising of the soul from a state of sin to a state of holiness; or, as relating not to the resurrection of the body, but to the continued life of the soul in a future state.

Of course the modern speculative, or pantheistic theology, ignores the doctrine of a resurrection. It does not even admit of the existence of the soul after the dissolution of the body. The race is immortal, but the individuals of which it is composed are not. Scientific materialism admits of no other resurrection than the reappearance of the same chemical elements which now form our bodies, in the bodies of future plants, animals, or men. The

lime in our bones may help to form the bones of those who come after us. Thus philosophy and science, when divorced from the Bible, lead us only to negations, darkness, and despair.

[828] Alger, ut supra, p. 488.

[829] Wilson, Lectures on the Religion of the Hindus, London, 1862, vol. ii. pp. 91, 95, 100, 108.

[830] Alger, ut supra, p. 489.

[831] Ritter's Geschichte d. Philosophie d. Alt. Zeit, 3ter Th. xi. 4; Hamburg, 1831, p. 582.

[832] See Ten Great Religions; an Essay on Comparative Theology. By James Freeman Clarke. Boston, 1872, ch. v., specially p. 200.

[833] See Jerome. Contra Joannem Hierosolymitanum, 33, Works, edit. Migne, vol. ii. pp. 384, 385 [441].

CHAPTER III: SECOND ADVENT.

§ 1. Preliminary Remarks.

This is a very comprehensive and very difficult subject. It is intimately allied with all the other great doctrines which fall under the head of eschatology. It has excited so much interest in all ages of the Church, that the books written upon it would of themselves make a library. The subject cannot be adequately discussed without taking a survey of all the prophetic teachings of the Scriptures both of the Old Testament and of the New. This task cannot be satisfactorily accomplished by any one who has not made the study of the prophecies a specialty. The author, knowing that he has no such qualifications for the work, purposes to confine himself in a great measure to a historical survey of the different schemes of interpreting the Scriptural prophecies relating to this subject.

The first point to be considered is the true design of prophecy, and how that design is to be ascertained. Prophecy is very different from history. It is not intended to give us a knowledge of the future, analogous to that which history gives us of the past. This truth is often overlooked. We see interpreters undertaking to give detailed expositions of the prophecies of Isaiah, of Ezekiel, of Daniel, and of the Apocalypse, relating to the future, with the same confidence with which they would record the history of the recent past. Such interpretations have always been falsified by the event. But this does not discourage a certain class of minds, for whom the future has a fascination and who delight in the solution of enigmas, from renewing the attempt. In prophecy, instruction is subordinate to moral impression. The occurrence of important events is so predicted as to produce in the minds of the people of God faith that they will certainly come to pass. Enough is made known of their nature, and of the time and mode of their occurrence, to awaken attention, desire, or apprehension, as the case may be; and to secure proper effort on the part of those concerned to be prepared for what is to come to pass. Although such predictions may be variously misinterpreted before their fulfilment; yet when fulfilled, the agreement between the prophecy and the event is seen to be such as to render the divine origin of the prophecy a matter of certainty. Thus with regard to the first advent of Christ, the Old Testament prophecies rendered it certain that a great Redeemer was to appear; that He was to be a Prophet, Priest, and King; that He would deliver his people from their sins, and from the evils under which they groaned; that He was to establish a kingdom which should ultimately absorb all the kingdoms on earth; and that He would render all his people supremely happy and blessed. These predictions had the effect of turning the minds of the whole Jewish nation to the future, in confident expectation that the Deliverer would come; of exciting earnest desire for his advent; and of leading the pious portion of the people to prayerful preparation for that event. Nevertheless, of all the hundreds of thousands to whom these

predictions of the Hebrew Scriptures were made known, not a single person, so far as appears, interpreted them aright; yet, when fulfilled, we can almost construct a history of the events from these misunderstood predictions concerning them. Christ was indeed a king, but no such king as the world had ever seen, and such as no man expected; He was a priest, but the only priest that ever lived of whose priesthood he was Himself the victim; He did establish a kingdom, but it was not of this world. It was foretold that Elias should first come and prepare the way of the Lord. He did come; but in a way in which no man did or could have anticipated.

It follows, from what has been said, that prophecy makes a general impression with regard to future events, which is reliable and salutary, while the details remain in obscurity. The Jews were not disappointed in the general impression made on their minds by the predictions relating to the Messiah. It was only iu the explanation of details that they failed. The Messiah was a king; He did sit upon the throne of David, but not in the way in which they expected; He is to subdue all nations, not by the sword, as they supposed, but by truth and love; He was to make his people priests and kings, but not worldly princes and satraps. The utter failure of the Old Testament Church in interpreting the prophecies relating to the first advent of Christ, should teach us to be modest and diffident in explaining those which relate to his second coming. We should be satisfied with the great truths which those prophecies unfold, and leave the details to be explained by the event. This the Church, as a Church, has generally done.

§ 2. The Common Church Doctrine.

The common Church doctrine is, first, that there is to be a second personal, visible, and glorious advent of the Son of God. Secondly, that the events which are to precede that advent, are

1. The universal diffusion of the Gospel; or, as our Lord expresses it, the ingathering of the elect; this is the vocation of the Christian Church.

2. The conversion of the Jews, which is to be national. As their casting away was national, although a remnant was saved; so their conversion may be national, although some may remain obdurate.

3. The coming of Antichrist.

Thirdly, that the events which are to attend the second advent are: --

1. The resurrection of the dead, of the just and of the unjust.

2. The general judgment.

3. The end of the world. And,

4. The consummation of Christ's kingdom.

§ 3. The Personal Advent of Christ.

It is admitted that the words "coming of the Lord" are often used in Scripture for any signal manifestation of his presence either for judgment or for mercy. When Jesus promised to manifest Himself to his disciples, "Judas saith unto Him, not Iscariot, Lord, how is it that thou wilt manifest thyself unto us, and not unto the world? Jesus answered and said unto

him, If a man love me he will keep my words: and my Father will love him, and we will come unto him, and make our abode with him." (John xiv. 22, 23.) There is a coming of Christ, true and real, which is not outward and visible. Thus also in the epistle to the Church in Pergamos it is said: "Repent; or else I will come unto thee quickly." (Rev. ii. 16.) This form of expression is used frequently in the Bible. There are, therefore, many commentators who explain everything said in the New Testament of the second coming of Christ, of the spiritual manifestation of his power. Thus Mr. Alger, to cite a single example of this school, says: "The Hebrews called any signal manifestation of power -- especially any dreadful calamity -- a coming of the Lord. It was a coming of Jehovah when his vengeance strewed the ground with the corpses of Sennacherib's host; when its storm swept Jerusalem as with fire, and bore Israel into bondage; when its sword came down upon Idumea and was bathed in blood upon Edom. The day of the Lord' is another term of precisely similar import. It occurs in the Old Testament about fifteen times. In every instance it means some mighty manifestation of God's power in calamity. These occasions are pictured forth with the most astounding figures of speech." [834] On the following page he says he fully believes that the evangelists and early Christians understood the language of Christ in reference to his second coming, as predictions of a personal and visible advent, connected with a resurrection and a general judgment, but he more than doubts whether such was the meaning of Christ Himself. (1.) Because he says nothing of a resurrection of the dead. (2.) The figures which He uses are precisely those which the Jewish prophets employed in predicting "great and signal events on the earth." (3.) Because He "fixed the date of the events He referred to within that generation." Christ he thinks, meant to teach that his "truths shall prevail and shall be owned as the criteria of Divine judgment. According to them," he understands Christ to say, "all the righteous shall be distinguished as my subjects, and all the iniquitous shall be separated from my kingdom. Some of those standing here shall not taste death till all these things be fulfilled. Then it will be seen that I am the Messiah, and that through the eternal principles of truth which I have proclaimed I shall sit upon a throne of glory, -- not literally, in person, as you thought, blessing the Jews and cursing the Gentiles, but spiritually, in the truth, dispensing joy to good men and woe to bad men, according to their deserts." It is something to have it admitted that the Apostles and early Christians believed in the personal advent of Christ. What the Apostles believed we are bound to believe; for St. John said "He that knoweth God, heareth us." That the New Testament does teach a second, visible, and glorious appearing of the Son of God, is plain: --

1. From the analogy between the first and second advents. The rationalistic Jews would have had precisely the same reasons for believing in a more spiritual coming of the Messiah as modern rationalists have for saying that his second coming is to be spiritual. The advent in both cases is predicted in very nearly the same terms. If, therefore, his first coming was in person and visible, so his second coming must be. The two advents are often spoken of in connection, the one illustrating the other. He came the first time as the Lamb of God bearing the sins of the world; He is to come "the second time, without sin, unto salvation." (Heb. ix. 28.) God, said the apostle Peter, "shall send Jesus Christ, which before was preached unto you: whom the heaven must receive until the times of restitution of all things, which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began." (Acts iii. 20, 21.) Christ is now invisible to us, having been received up into

heaven. He is to remain thus invisible, until God shall send him at the restitution of all things.

2. In many places it is directly asserted that his appearing is to be personal and visible. At the time of his ascension, the angels said to his disciples: "Ye men of Galilee, why stand ye gazing up into heaven? This same Jesus, which is taken up from you into heaven, shall so come in like manner as ye have seen him go into heaven." (Acts i. 11.) His second coming is to be as visible as his ascension. They saw Him go; and they shall see him come. In Matt. xxvi. 64, it is said, "Hereafter shall ye see the Son of Man sitting on the right hand of power, and coming in the clouds of heaven;" Matt. xxiv. 30, "Then shall all the tribes of the earth mourn, and they shall see the Son of Man coming in the clouds of heaven with power and great glory." Luke xxi. 27, "Then shall they see the Son of Man coming in a cloud."

3. The circumstances attending the second advent prove that it is to be personal and visible. It is to be in the clouds; with power and great glory; with the holy angels and all the saints; and it is to be with a shout and the voice of the archangel.

4. The effects ascribed to his advent prove the same thing. All the tribes of the earth shall mourn; the dead, both small and great are to arise; the wicked shall call on the rocks and hills to cover them; the saints are to be caught up to meet the Lord in the air; and the earth and the heavens are to flee away at his presence.

5. That the Apostles understood Christ to predict his second coming in person does not admit of doubt. Indeed almost all the rationalistic commentators teach that the Apostles fully believed and even taught that the second advent with all its glorious consequences would occur in their day. Certain it is that they believed that He would come visibly and with great glory, and that they held his coming as the great object of expectation and desire. Indeed Christians are described as those who "are waiting for the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. i. 7); as those who are "looking for that blessed hope, and the glorious appearing of the great God and our Saviour Jesus Christ" (Tit. ii. 13) (it is to them who look for Him, He is to "appear the second time, without sin unto salvation," Heb. ix. 28); as those who are expecting and earnestly desiring the coming of the day of God. (2 Pet. iii. 12.) It is a marked characteristic of the apostolic writings that they give such prominence to the doctrine of the second advent. "Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come. (1 Cor. iv. 5.) "Christ the first-fruits; afterwards they that are Christ's at his coming." (1 Cor. xv. 23.) Ye are our rejoicing "in the day of the Lord Jesus." (2 Cor. i. 14.) "He . . . . will perform it until the day of Jesus Christ." (Phil. i. 6.) "That I may rejoice in the day of Christ." (ii. 16.) "Our conversation is in heaven, from whence also we look for the Saviour, the Lord Jesus Christ." (iii. 20.) "When Christ, who is our life, shall appear, then shall ye also appear with Him in glory." (Col. iii. 4.) "To wait for his Son from heaven, whom he raised from the dead, even Jesus, which delivered us from the wrath to come." (1 Thess. i. 10.) "What is our hope, ... are not even ye in the presence of our Lord Jesus Christ at his coming?" (ii. 19.) "Unblamable in holiness . . . . at the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ with all his saints." (iii. 13.) "We which are alive and remain unto the coming of the Lord . . . . shall be caught up . . . . in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord." (iv. 15-17.) In his second epistle he assures the Thessalonians that they shall have rest, "when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven." (2 Thess. i. 7.) The

coming of Christ, however, he tells them was not at hand; there must come a great falling away first. Paul said to Timothy, "Keep this commandment without spot, unrebukable, until the appearing of our Lord Jesus Christ." (1 Tim. vi. 14.) "There is laid up for me a crown of righteousness, which the Lord, the righteous judge, shall give me at that day: and not to me only, but unto all them also that love his appearing." (2 Tim. iv. 8.) The epistles of Peter afford the same evidence of the deep hold which the promise of Christ's second coming had taken on the minds of the Apostles and of all the early Christians. He tells his readers that they "are kept by the power of God through faith unto salvation, ready to be revealed in the last time . . . . that the trial of your faith. . . . might be found unto praise, and honour, and glory, at the appearing of Jesus Christ." (1 Pet. i. 5-7.) Men are to "give account to Him that is ready to judge the quick and the dead." (iv. 5.) "Rejoice that, when his glory shall be revealed, ye may be glad also with exceeding joy." (verse 13.) "When the chief Shepherd shall appear, ye shall receive a crown of glory." (v. 4.) " We have not followed cunningly devised fables, when we made known unto you the power and coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, but were eye-witnesses of his majesty." (2 Pet. i. 16). The transfiguration on the mount was a type and pledge of the glory of the second advent. The Apostle warns the disciples that scoffers would come "saying, Where is the promise of his coming? for since the fathers fell asleep, all things continue as they were from the beginning of the creation." In answer to this objection, he reminds them that the threatened deluge was long delayed, but came at last; that time is not with God as it is with us; that with Him a thousand years are as one day, and one day as a thousand years. He repeats the assurance that "the day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night; in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat; the earth also and the works that are therein, shall be burned up." (2 Peter iii. 3-10.)

From all these passages, and from the whole drift of the New Testament, it is plain, (1.) That the Apostles fully believed that there is to be a second coming of Christ. (2.) That his coming is to be in person, visible and glorious. (3.) That they kept this great event constantly before their own minds, and urged it on the attention of the people, as a motive to patience, constancy, joy, and holy living. (4.) That the Apostles believed that the second advent of Christ would be attended by the general resurrection, the final judgment, and the end of the world.

As already intimated, it is objected to this view of the prophe cies of the New Testament referring to the Second Advent, --

1. That the first advent of Christ is predicted in the Old Testament in nearly as glowing terms as his second coming is set forth in the New Testament. He was to come in the clouds of heaven; with great pomp and power; all nations were to be subject to Him; all people were to be gathered before Him; the stars were to fall from heaven; the sun was to be darkened, and the moon to be turned into blood. These descriptions were not realized by the event; and are understood to refer to the great changes in the state of the world to be effected by his coming. It is unreasonable, therefore, as it is agreed, to expect anything like a literal fulfilment of these New Testament prophecies. To this it may be answered, (1.) That in the Old Testament the Messianic period is described as a whole. The fact that the Messiah was to come and establish an everlasting kingdom which was to triumph over all opposition, and experience a glorious consummation, is clearly foretold. All these events

were, so to speak, included in the same picture; but the perspective was not preserved. The prophecies were not intended to give the chronological order of the events foretold. Hence the consummation of the Messiah's kingdom is depicted as in immediate proximity with his appearance in the flesh. This led almost all the Jews, and even the disciples of Christ themselves, before the day of Pentecost, to look for the immediate establishment of the Messiah's kingdom in its glory. Such being the character of the Old Testament prophecies, it cannot be fairly inferred that they have as yet received their full accomplishment; or that they are now being fulfilled in the silent progress of the Gospel. They include the past and the present, but much remains to be accomplished in the future more in accordance with their literal meaning. (2.) The character of the predictions in the New Testament does not admit of their being made to refer to any spiritual coming of Christ or to the constant progress of his Church. They evidently refer to a single event; to an event in the future, not now in progress; an event which shall attract the attention of all nations, and be attended by the resurrection of the dead, the complete salvation of the righteous, and the condemnation of the wicked. (3.) A third answer to the objection under consideration is, that the Apostles, as is conceded, understood the predictions of Christ concerning his second coming, in the way in which they have been understood by the Church, as a whole, from that day to this.

2. A second objection to the common Church view of the eschatology of the New Testament is, that our Lord expressly says that the events which He foretold were to come to pass during that generation. His words are, "Verily, I say unto you, This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled." This objection is founded upon the pregnant discourse of Christ recorded in the twenty-fourth and twenty-fifth chapters of Matthew. It is to be remarked that those chapters contain the answer which Christ gave to three questions addressed to Him by his disciples; first, when the destruction of the temple and of Jerusalem was to occur second, what was to be the sign of his coming; and third, when the end of the world was to take place. The difficulty in interpreting this discourse is, to determine its relation to these several questions. There are three methods of interpretation which have been applied to this passage. The first assumes that the whole of our Lord's discourse refers but to one question, namely, When was Jerusalem to be destroyed and Christ's kingdom to be inaugurated; the second adopts the theory of what used to be called the double sense of prophecy; that is, that the same words or prediction refer to one event in one sense, and to a different event in a higher sense; the third assumes that one part of our Lord's predictions refers exclusively to one of the questions asked, and that other portions refer exclusively to the other questions.

The rationalistic interpreters adopt the first method and refer everything to the overthrow of the Jewish polity, the destruction of Jerusalem, and the inauguration of the Church which is to do its work of judgment in the earth. Some evangelical interpreters also assume that our Lord answers the three questions put to Him as one, as they constituted in fact but one in the minds of his disciples, since they believed that the three events, the destruction of Jerusalem, the second coming of Christ, and the end of the world, were all to occur together. Thus Luthardt says: "There are three questions according to the words; but only one in the minds of the disciples, as they did not consider the three events, the destruction of Jerusalem, the second coming of Christ, and the end of the world, as separated chronologically; but as three great acts in the final drama of the world's history." [835] In this sense our Lord, he adds, answered their inquiries. He does not separate the

different subjects, so as to speak first of one and then of another; but he keeps all ever in view. "It is the method," he says, "of Biblical prophecy, which our Lord observes, always to predict the one great end and all else and what is preparatory, only so far as it stands in connection with that end and appears as one of its elements." [836] Although, therefore, the prophecy of Christ extends to events in the distant future, He could say that that generation should not pass away until all was fulfilled; for the destruction of Jerusalem was the commencement of that work of judgment which Christ foretold.

According to this view, the first method of interpretation differs very little from the second of those above mentioned. Both suppose that the same words or descriptions are intended to refer to two or more events very different in their nature and in the time of their occurrence. Isaiah's prediction of the great deliverance which God was to effect for his people, was so framed as to answer both to the redemption of the Jews from their captivity in Babylon, and to the greater redemption by the Messiah. It was in fact and equally a prediction of both events. The former was the type, and the first step toward the accomplishment of the other. So also in the fourteenth chapter of Zechariah, the prophecy of the destruction of Jerusalem, the spiritual redemption, and the final judgment, are blended together. As, therefore, in the Old Testament the Messianic prophecies took in the whole scope of God's dealings with his people, including their deliverance from Babylon and their redemption by Christ, so as to make it doubtful what refers to the former and what to the latter event; so this discourse of Christ may be considered as taking in the whole history of his kingdom, including his great work of judgment in casting out the Jews and calling the Gentiles, as well as the final consummation of his work. Thus everything predicted of the final judgment had its counterpart in what was fulfilled in that generation.

The third method of interpretation is greatly to be preferred, if it can be successfully carried out. Christ does in fact answer the three questions presented by his disciples. He told when the temple and the city were to be destroyed; it was when they should see Jerusalem compassed about with armies. He told them that the sign of the coming of the Son of Man was to be great defection in the Church, dreadful persecutions, and all but irresistible temptations, and that with his coming were to be connected the final judgment and the end of the world; but that the time when those events were to occur, was not given unto them to know, nor even to the angels of heaven. (Matt. xxiv. 36.)

If this be the method of interpreting these important predictions, then the declaration contained in Matt. xxiv. 34, "This generation shall not pass, till all these things be fulfilled," must be restricted to the "all things spoken of, referring to the destruction of Jerusalem and the inauguration of the Church as Christ's kingdom on earth. There is, however, high authority for making he genea haute, here and in the parallel passages, Mark xiii. 30 and Luke xxi. 32, refer to Israel as a people or race; in this case the meaning would be that the Jews would not cease to be a distinct people until his predictions were fulfilled. [837] There is nothing, therefore, in this discourse of Christ's inconsistent with the common Church doctrine as to the nature and concomitants of his Second Advent.

[834] Alger's Critical History of the Doctrine of a Future Life. Philadelphia, 1864, p. 319.

[835] Die Lehre von den letzen Dingen in Abhandlungen und Schriftauslegungen dargestellt, von Chr. Ernst Luthardt, der Theologie Doktor und Professor zu Leipzig.

Leipzig, 1861, p. 87.

[836] Ibid. pp. 87, 88.

[837] Dorner. De Oratione Christi Eschatologica, Tractatus Theologicus. Stuttgart, 1844, pp. 76-86. C. A. Auberlen, The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelations of St. John. Translated by Rev. Adolph Saphir, Edinburgh, 1856, p. 354. "The Lord Jesus himself," says Auberlen, "prophesied (Matthew xxiv. 34), that Israel was to be preserved during the entire Church-historical period."

§ 4. The Calling of the Gentiles.

The first great event which is to precede the second coming of Christ, is the universal proclamation of the Gospel.

1. The first argument in proof of the position that the Gospel must be preached to all nations before the second advent, is founded on the predictions of the Old Testament. It is there distinctly foretold that when the Messiah appeared the Spirit should be poured out on all flesh, and that all men should see the salvation of God. The Messiah was to be a light to lighten the Gentiles, as well as the glory of his people Israel. The feet of those who brought the glad tidings and published peace, were to be beautiful upon the mountains. God said in Hosea ii. 23, "I will say to them which were not my people, Thou art my people; and they shall say, Thou art my God." And in Isaiah xlv. 22, 23, "Look unto me, and be ye saved, all the ends of the earth: for I am God, and there is none else. I have sworn by myself . . . . that unto me every knee shall bow, every tongue shall swear." That is, the true religion shall prevail oyer the whole earth. Jehovah shall everywhere be recognized and worshipped as the only true God. It is to be remembered that these and many other passages of like import are quoted and applied by the Apostle to the Gospel dispensation. They are enforced on the attention of those to whom they wrote as showing the Gentiles that the Gospel was designed for them as well as for the Jews; and to impress upon the Church its obligation to preach the Gospel to every creature under heaven.

2. Christ repeatediy taught that the Gospel was to be preached to all nations before his second coming. Thus in Matt. xxiv. 14, it is said, "This gospel of the kingdom shall be preached in all the world for a witness unto all nations; and then shall the end come." (Mark xiii. 10) "The gospel must first be published among all nations."

3. Accordingly our Lord after his resurrection, in giving his commission to the Church, said: "Go ye therefore and teach all nations, baptizing them in the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost; teaching them to observe all things whatsoever I have commanded you: and lo, I am with you always, even unto the end of the world." (Matt. xxviii. 19, 20.) In Mark xvi. 15, the commission reads thus: "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature." This commission prescribes the present duty of the Church; one that is not to be deferred or languidly performed until a new and more effective dispensation be inaugurated. The promise of Christ to be with his Church, as then commissioned, to the end of the world, implies that its obligation to teach the nations is to continue until the final consummation.

4. Having imposed upon his Church the duty to preach the Gospel to every creature under heaven, He endowed it with all the gifts necessary for the proper discharge of this

duty, and promised to send his Spirit to render their preaching effectual. "He gave some, Apostles; and some, prophets; and some, evangelists; and some, pastors and teachers." Of these officers some were temporary, their peculiar function being the founding and organizing the Church; some were permanent. Their common object was the perfecting of the saints. Their mission and duties were and are to continue until "all come in the unity of the faith, and of the knowledge of the Son of God, unto a perfect man, unto the measure of the stature of the fulness of Christ." (Eph. iv. 11-13.) The duties of the ministry, therefore, are to continue until all, that is, all believers, the whole Church, or, as our Lord says, all the elect, are gathered in and brought to the stature of perfection in Christ.

5. The Apostles understood their commission in this sense and entered on their duties with a clear view of the task set before them. Our Lord, in his high-priestly prayer said concerning them, "As thou hast sent me into the world, even so have I also sent them into the world." He would not leave them alone; He promised to send the Paraclete, the Helper, who should bring all things to their remembrance; He would give them a mouth and a wisdom which all their adversaries should be unable to gainsay or resist. The Spirit was to abide with them and dwell in them, so that it would not be they who spoke, but the Spirit of the Father who spoke in them; that Spirit was to convince the world of sin, righteousness, and judgment; He was to render their preaching the wisdom and power of God unto salvation. Their simple duty was to teach; their commission was, "Go teach all nations." One of the great elements of the Papal apostasy was the idea derived from paganism, that the main design of the Church is "cultus," worship, and not instruction. The Apostles, as Peter teaches (Acts i. 22), and as is everywhere else taught in Scripture, were to be witnesses of Christ; to bear testimony to his doctrines, to the facts of his life, to his death, and especially to his resurrection, on which everything else depended. As, however, of themselves they could do nothing, they were required to attempt nothing, but to abide in Jerusalem, until they were imbued with power from on high. When thus imbued they began at once to declare the wonderful works of God to "Parthians, and Medes, and Elamites, and the dwellers in Mesopotamia, and in Judea, and Cappadocia, in Pontus and Asia, Phrygia, and Pamphylia, in Egypt, and in the parts of Libya about Cyrene, and strangers of Rome, Jews and proselytes, Cretes and Arabians;" thus making the first proclamation of the Gospel after the resurrection of Christ typical of its design and destiny as the religion of the whole world.

The Apostles accordingly "went everywhere;" and everywhere taught (1.) That God is not the God of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles; that He is rich in mercy towards all who call upon him, justifying the circumcision by faith and the uncircumcision through faith. (2.) That the Gospel, therefore, was designed and adapted for the whole world; for all classes of men; not only for Jews and Gentiles, but also for the learned and unlearned, the young and the old, for the wicked and the righteous. It is the power of God to salvation to every one that believeth. (3.) Being thus suited to all men, it should be preached to all men. "How shall they call on Him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe in Him of whom they have not heard? and how shall they hear without a preacher? and how shall they preach, except they be sent?" (Rom. x. 14, 15.) Paul magnified his office: he thanked God for giving him the grace to be the Apostle of the Gentiles. He said that he was under obligation to preach the Gospel both to the Greeks and to the Barbarians, to the wise and to the unwise. He devotes no small portion of his Epistle to the Romans and the greater

portion of the doctrinal part of that to the Ephesians, to setting forth the purpose of God to bring the Gentiles into his Church, and to make them equally with the Jews partakers of the redemption of Christ. He teaches that the middle wall of partition between the two had been broken down, and that the Gentiles were no more "strangers and foreigners, but fellow citizens with the saints, and of the household of God." (Eph. ii. 19.) The great object of the Epistle to the Hebrews is to show that the Gospel is the substance of which the old dispensation was the shadow; that nothing more glorious, real, and effectual was to be, or could be, so far as the salvation of sinners is concerned. The eternal Son of God, the brightness of the Father's glory, and the express image of his person, had assumed our nature to become the Apostle and High Priest of our profession. There was no hope for those who neglected the great salvation which he announced, and no more sacrifice for sin remained for those who refused to be cleansed by his most precious blood. The final revelation of God's truth, the offering of the infinitely meritorious sacrifice for sin, and the cooperation of the everywhere present and almighty Spirit of God are all made known in the Gospel; and the Bible knows nothing of any other arrangements for the salvation of men. It is evident that the Apostles considered the dispensation of the Spirit under which we are now living, as the only one which was to intervene between the first advent of Christ and the end of the world.

6. In 2 Corinthians iii. the Apostle contrasts the new and old dispensations, showing that the former excels the latter, (1.) Because the one used the ministration of the latter, the other uses that of the spirit. (2.) Because the one was the ministration of death and of condemnation, the other is the ministration of the Spirit and of righteousness; and (3.) Because the one was transient and the other is permanent. "If that which is done away was glorious, much more that which remaineth is glorious." (verse 11.)

7. In Romans xi. 25, Paul teaches that the national conversion of the Jews is not to take place "until the fulness of the Gentiles be come in." The pleroma ton ethnon, is that which makes the number of the Gentiles full; the full complement which the Gentiles are to render to make the number of the elect complete.

This ingathering of the heathen is the special work of the Church. It is a missionary work. It was so understood by the Apostles. Their two great duties were the propagation and defence of the truth. To these they devoted themselves. While they laboured night and day, and travelled hither and thither through all parts of the Roman world, preaching the Gospel, they laboured no less assiduously in its defence. All the epistles of the New Testament, those of Paul, Peter, John, and James, are directed towards the correction of false doctrine. These two duties of propagating and of defending the truth, the Apostles devolved on their successors. During the apostolic age and for some time after it, the former had the ascendancy; to preach the Gospel to all nations, to bring all men to the knowledge of the truth, was felt to be the special vocation of the Church. Gradually, and especially after the conversion of Constantine and the establishment of Christianity as the religion of the Roman empire, the mind of the Church was directed principally to securing what had been attained; in perfecting its organization and in stating its creed and defending it against the numerous forms of error by which it was assailed.

From this time for long centuries the Church found its hands filled with its internal affairs. Its energies were expended mainly in three directions, in building up a hierarchy

with a supreme pontiff, surrounded by ecclesiastical princes, which sought to concentrate in itself all power over the bodies and souls of men; in founding numerous orders of monks; and in the subtleties of metaphysical discussions. The work of missions during this period was almost entirely neglected.

When the Reformation came, the Protestants had as much as they could do to live. They had arrayed against them everywhere the tremendous power of the Romish Church, and in most cases all the power of the State. They had to defend their doctrines against the prejudices and learning of the age; to organize their Churches, and alas! they were distracted among themselves. Under these circumstances it is not to be wondered at that the command, "Go ye into all the world, and preach the gospel to every creature," was almost forgotten. It is only within the last fifty years that the Church has been brought to feel that its great duty is the conversion of the nations. More, probably, has been done in this direction during the last half century than during the preceding five hundred years. It is to be hoped that a new effusion of the Spirit like that of the day of Pentecost may be granted to the Church whose fruits shall as far exceed those of the first effusion as the millions of Christians now alive exceed in number the one hundred and twenty souls then gathered in Jerusalem.

That the conversion of the Gentile world is the work assigned the Church under the present dispensation, and that it is not to fold its hands and await the second coming of Christ to accomplish that work for it, seems evident from what has already been said, (1.) This is the work which Christ commanded his Church to undertake. (2.) He furnished it with all the means necessary for its accomplishment; He revealed the truth which is the power of God unto salvation; He instituted the ministry to be perpetuated to the end of the world, and promised to endow men from age to age with the gifts and graces necessary for the discharge of its duties, and to grant them his constant presence and assistance. (3.) The Apostles and the Church of that age so understood the work assigned and addressed themselves to it with a devotion and a success, which, had they been continued, the work, humanly speaking, had long since been accomplished. (4.) There is no intimation in the New Testament that the work of converting the world is to be effected by any other means than those now in use. (5.) It is to dishonour the Gospel, and the power of the Holy Spirit, to suppose that they are inadequate to the accomplishment of this work. (6.) The wonderful success of the work of missions in our day goes to prove the fact contended for. Barriers deemed insurmountable have been removed; facilities of access and intercourse have been increased a hundred fold; hundreds of missionary stations have been established in every part of the world; many thousands of converts have been gathered into churches and hundreds of thousands of children are under Christian instruction; the foundations of ancient systems of idolatry have been undermined; nations lately heathen have become Christian, and are taking part in sending the Gospel to those still sitting in darkness; and nothing seems wanting to secure the gathering in of the Gentiles, but a revival of the missionary spirit of the apostolic age in the churches of the nineteenth century.

§ 5. Conversion of the Jews.

The second great event, which, according to the common faith of the Church, is to precede the second advent of Christ, is the national conversion of the Jews.

First, that there is to be such a national conversion may be argued, --

1. From the original call and destination of that people. God called Abraham and promised that through him, and in his seed, all the nations of the earth should be blessed. He entered into a solemn covenant with him engaging to be his God and the God of his posterity to the latest generations; and that they should be his people. These promises have been hitherto fulfilled; God preserved the Hebrews, although comparatively few in numbers amid hostile nations, from destruction or dispersion until the promised seed of Abraham appeared and accomplished his redeeming work. This is an assurance that the other promises relating to this people shall be fully accomplished.

2. The second argument is from the general drift of the Old Testament concerning the chosen people. Those prophecies run through a regular cycle often repeated in different forms. The people are rebuked for their sins and threatened with severe punishment; when that punishment has been inflicted, and the nation brought to repentance, there uniformly follow promises of restoration and favour. Isaiah predicted that for their idolatry the people should be carried into captivity, but that a remnant should be restored to their own land, and their privileges secured to them again. Joel and Zechariah predicted that for their rejection of the Messiah, they should be scattered to the ends of the earth, but that God would bring them back, and that his favour should not be finally withdrawn from them. Thus it is with all the prophets. As these general predictions are familiar to all the readers of the Bible, they need not be specified.

3. There are in the Old Testament express predictions of their national conversion to faith in Him whom they had rejected and crucified. Thus in Zechariah xii. it is said; "I will pour upon the house of David and upon the inhabitants of Jerusalem, the spirit of grace and of supplications; and they shall look on me whom they have pierced, and they shall mourn for him, as one mourneth for his only son, and shall be in bitterness for him, as one that is in bitterness for his first-born." This is to be a national conversion, for it is said "the land shall mourn" every family apart.

4. The most decisive passage, however, bearing on this subject, one which may be taken "instar omnium," is the eleventh chapter of the Epistle to the Romans. Paul had taught, (1.) That God had cast off the Jews as a nation because they as a nation, represented by the Sanhedrim, the High Priest, the scribes and the Pharisees, by their rulers of every class, and by the popular voice, had rejected Christ. "He came unto his own, and his own received him not." Therefore, as a nation, God rejected them. (2.) This rejection, however, he here teaches, was not entire. There was "a remnant according to the election of grace" who believed in Christ and were received into his kingdom. (3.) This national rejection of Israel, as it was not entire, so neither was it to be final. It was to continue until the bringing in of the Gentiles. God had made a covenant with Abraham that his posterity should be his people; and "the gifts and calling of God are without repentance." Therefore, although broken oft from the olive-tree for the present, they were to be grafted in again. (4.) Thus "all Israel shall be saved." Whether this means the Jews as a nation, or the whole elect people of God including both Jews and Gentiles, may be doubtful. But in either case it is, in view of the context, a promise of the restoration of the Jews as a nation. There is, therefore, to be a national conversion of the Jews.

Second, this conversion is to take place before the second advent of Christ. This the

Apostle teaches when he says, that the salvation of the Gentiles was designed to provoke the Jews to jealousy, verse 11; and that the mercy shown to the Gentiles was to be the means of the Jews obtaining mercy, verse 31. The rejection of the Jews was the occasion of the conversion of the Gentiles; and the conversion of the Gentiles is to be the occasion of the restoration of the Jews. On this point Luthardt says: "As our Lord (Matt. xxiii. 39) said: Ye shall not see me henceforth, till ye shall say, Blessed is he that cometh in the name of the Lord' -- so it is certain that, when Jesus comes, who will be visible to all the world, as the lightning which cometh out of the east, and shineth even unto the west, whom all eyes, even of those who pierced Him and all kindreds of the earth shall see (Rev. i. 7; Zech. xii. 10), -- the Jews must have been converted and have become a Christian nation. . . . . And further when Peter (Acts iii. 19-21) exhorts to repentance and conversion until the times of refreshing from the presence of the Lord shall come; so it appears to be to me beyond all doubt that the conversion of Israel is to precede the Second Advent of Christ." [838]

Are the Jews to be restored to their own Land?

According to one view, the Jews after their conversion are to be restored to the land of their fathers and there constituted a distinct nation. According to another, their restoration to their own land is to precede their conversion. And according to a third view there is to be no such restoration, but they are to be amalgamated with the great body of Christians as they were in the times of the Apostles.

In favour of a literal restoration it is urged, --

1. That it is predicted in the Old Testament in the most express terms. Luthardt says a man must "break" the Scriptures who denies such restoration. To him it is certain and undeniable that the Jews are to be brought back to their own land and reestablished as a nation. [839]

2. It is argued that the promise of God to Abraham has never yet been fully accomplished. God promised to give to him and to his seed after him all the land from the river of Egypt (understood to be the Nile) to the river Euphrates. They were, however, during all their national history pent up m the narrow strip between the Jordan and the Mediterranean Sea, except for a while when the two and a half tribes dwelt on the eastern side of Jordan. As the promise cannot fail, the time must yet come when the whole region granted to Abraham shall be occupied by his descendants.

3. A presumptive argument is drawn from the strange preservation of the Jews through so many centuries as a distinct people. They have often been compared to a river flowing through the ocean without mingling with its waters. There must be some purpose in this wonderful preservation. That people must have a future corresponding to its marvellous past.

4. Reference is also made to the fact that the land promised to the Jews is now empty, as though waiting for their return. It once teemed with a population counted by millions; and there is no reason why it may not in the future be as densely inhabited.

The arguments against the assumed restoration of the Jews to the Holy Land are, --

1. The argument from the ancient prophecies is proved to be invalid, because it would prove too much. If those prophecies foretell a literal restoration, they foretell that the temple is to be rebuilt, the priesthood restored, sacrifices again offered, and that the whole

Mosaic ritual is to be observed in all its details. (See the prophecies of Ezekiel from the thirty-seventh chapter onward.) We know, however, from the New Testament that the Old Testament service has been finally abolished; there is to be no new temple made with hands; no other priest but the high-priest of our profession; and no other sacrifice but that already offered upon the cross. It is utterly inconsistent with the character of the Gospel that there should be a renewed inauguration of Judaism within the pale of the Christian Church. If it be said that the Jews are to return to their own land as Jews, and there restore their temple and its service, and then be converted; it may be answered that this is inconsistent with the prophetic representations. They are to be brought to repentance and faith, and to be restored to their land, or, to use the figure employed by the Apostle, grafted again into their own olive-tree, because of their repentance. When Christ comes, "He shall send his angels with a great sound of a trumpet, and they shall gather together his elect from the four winds, from one end of heaven to the other." (Matt. xxiv. 31.) But further than this, in Zechariah xiv., it ia predicted that after the restoration, all the nations of the earth "shall go up from year to year to worship the King, the Lord of hosts, and to keep the feast of tabernacles." In Isaiah lxvi. 22, 23, it is said, "As the new heavens and the new earth, which I will make, shall remain before me, saith the Lord, so shall your seed and your name remain. And it shall come to pass, that from one new moon to another, and from one Sabbath to another, shall all flesh come to worship before me, saith the Lord." The literal interpretation of the Old Testament prophecies relating to the restoration of Israel and the future kingdom of Christ, cannot by possibility be carried out, and if abandoned in one point, it cannot be pressed in regard to others.

2. It is undeniable that the ancient prophets in predicting the events of the Messianic period and the future of Christ's kingdom, borrowed their language and imagery from the Old Testament institutions and usages. The Messiah is often called David; his church is called Jerusalem, and Zion, his people are called Israel; Canaan was the land of their inheritance; the loss of God's favour was expressed by saying that they forfeited that inheritance, and restoration to his favour was denoted by a return to the promised land. This usage is so pervading that the conviction produced by it on the minds of Christians is indelible. To them, Zion and Jerusalem are the Church and not the city made with hands. To interpret all that the ancient prophets say of Jerusalem of an earthly city, and all that is said of Israel of the Jewish nation, would be to bring down heaven to earth, and to transmute Christianity into the corrupt Judaism of the apostolic age.

3. Accordingly in the New Testament it is taught, not in poetic imagery, but didactically, in simple, unmistakable prose, that believers are the seed of Abraham; they are his sons; his heirs; they are the true Israel. (See especially Romans iv. and ix. and Galatians iii.) It is not natural descent, that makes a man a child of Abraham. "They which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God; but the children of the promise are counted for the seed." (Rom. ix. 8.) The Apostle asserts that the promises are made not to the Israel kata sarka, but to the Israel kata pneuma. He says in the name of believers, "We are the circumcision." (Phil. iii. 3.) "We are Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." (Gal. iii. 29.) The promise to Abraham that he should be the father of many nations, did not mean merely that his natural descendants should be very numerous; but that all the nations of the earth should have the right to call him father (Rom. iv. 17); for he is "the father of all them that believe, though they be not circumcised." (Rom.

iv. 11.) It would turn the Gospel upside down; not only the Apostle's argument but his whole system would collapse, if what the Bible says of Israel should be understood of the natural descendants of Abraham to the exclusion of his spiritual children.

4. The idea that the Jews are to be restored to their own land and there constituted a distinct nation in the Christian Church, is inconsistent not only with the distinct assertions of the Scriptures, but also with its plainest and most important doctrines. It is asserted over and over again that the middle wall of partition between Jew and Gentile has been broken down; that God has made of the two one; that Gentile believers are fellow-citizens of the saints and members of the household of God; that they are built up together with the Jews into one temple. (Eph. ii. 11-22.) "As many of you as have been baptized into Christ have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither bond nor free, there is neither male nor female: for ye are all one in Christ Jesus. And if ye be Christ s, then are ye Abraham's seed, and heirs according to the promise." (Gal. iii. 27-29.) There could not be a more distinct assertion that all difference between the Jew and Gentile has been done away within the pale of the Christian Church. This, however, is not a mere matter of assertion, it is involved in the very nature of the Gospel. Nothing is plainer from the teachings of Scripture than that all believers are one body in Christ, that all are the partaker. of the Holy Spirit, and by virtue of their union with Him are joint and equal partakers of the benefits of his redemption; that if there be any difference between them, it is not in virtue of national or social distinctions, but solely of individual character and devotion. That we are all one in Christ Jesus, is a doctrine which precludes the possibility of the preeminence assigned to the Jews in the theory of which their restoration to their own land, and their national individuality are constituent elements.

5. The Apostles uniformly acted on this principle. They recognize no future for the Jews in which the Gentile Christians are not to participate. As under the old dispensation proselytes from the heathen were incorporated with the Jewish people and all distinction between them and those who were Jews by birth, was lost, so it was under the Gospel. Gentiles and Jews were united in undistinguished and undistinguishable membership in the same Church. And so it has continued to the present day; the two streams, Jewish and Gentile, united in the Apostolic Church, have flowed on as one great river through all ages. As this was by divine ordinance, it is not to be believed that they are to be separated in the future.

6. The restoration of the Jews to their own land and their continued national individuality, is generally associated with the idea that they are to constitute a sort of peerage in the Church of the future, exalted in prerogative and dignity above their fellow believers; and this again is more or less intimately connected with the doctrine that what the Church of the present is to look forward to is the establishment of a kingdom on earth of great worldly splendour and prosperity. For neither of these is there any authority in the didactic portions of the New Testament. There is no intimation that any one class of Christians, or Christians of any one nation or race, are to be exalted over their brethren; neither is there the slightest suggestion that the future kingdom of Christ is to be of earthly splendour. Not only are these expectations without any foundation in the teachings of the Apostles, but they are also inconsistent with the whole spirit of their instructions. They did not exhort believers to look forward to a reign of wealth and power, but to long after

complete conformity to the image of Christ, and to pray for the coming of that kingdom which is righteousness, joy, and peace in the Holy Ghost. Any Christian would rejoice to be a servant of Paul, or of John, of a martyr, or of a poor worn-out missionary; but to be servant to a Jew, merely because he is a Jew, is a different affair; unless indeed such should prove to be the will of Christ; then such service would be an honour. It is as much opposed to the spirit of the Gospel that preeminence in Christ's kingdom should be adjudged to any man or set of men on the ground of natural descent, as on the ground of superior stature, physical strength, or wealth.

The Scriptures, then, as they have been generally understood in the Church, teach that before the Second Advent, there is to be the ingathering of the heathen; that the Gospel must be preached to all nations; and also that there is to be a national conversion of the Jews; but it is not to be inferred from this that either all the heathen or all the Jews are to become true Christians. In many cases the conversion may be merely nominal. There will probably enough remain unchanged in heart to be the germ of that persecuting power which shall bring about those days of tribulation which the Bible seems to teach are to immediately precede the coming of the Lord.

[838] Lehre von den letzten Dingen, pp. 71, 72.

[839] Lehre von den letzten Dingen, p. 71.

§ 6. Antichrist.

That Antichrist is to appear before the second coming of Christ, is expressedly asserted by the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians ii. 1-3, "We beseech you . . . . that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled . . . . as that the day of Christ is at hand. . . . . For that day shall not come, except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition." This is clear; but as to who or what Antichrist is, there is no little diversity of opinion.

1. Some understand by that term any antichristian spirit, or power, or person. The Apostle John says, "Little children, it is the last time: and as ye have heard that antichrist shall come, even now are there many antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time . . . . Who is a liar but he that denieth that Jesus is the Christ? He is antichrist, that denieth the Father and the Son." (1 John ii. 18 and 22.) And again, "Every spirit that confesseth not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is not of God: and this is that spirit of antichrist, whereof ye have heard that it should come; and even now already is it in the world." (iv. 3.) And in 2 John 7, it is said, "Many deceivers are entered into the world, who confess not that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh. This is a deceiver and an antichrist (ho planos kai ho antichristos, the deceiver and the antichrist)." Thus our Lord had predicted, "There shall arise false Christs, and false prophets, and shall show great signs and wonders; insomuch that, if it were possible, they shall deceive the very elect." (Matt. xxiv. 24.) And the Apostle Paul in 1 Timothy iv. 1, says. "The Spirit speaketh expressly, that in the latter times some shall depart from the faith, giving heed to seducing spirits, and doctrines of devils." These passages refer to a marked characteristic of the period between the apostolic age and the second coming of Christ. There were to be many antichrists; many manifestations of malignant opposition to the person and to the work of Christ; many attempts to cast off his

authority and to overthrow his kingdom.

2. Besides this general reference to the antichristian spirit which was to manifest itself in different forms and with different degrees of intensity, many believe that there is yet to be a person, in whom the power of the world shall be concentrated, and which will exert all his energies to overthrow Christianity, and to usurp the place of Christ on earth. This is the Antichrist of prophecy; of whom it is assumed that Daniel, Paul, and St. John in the Apocalypse speak. This is the view generally adopted by Romanists and by many eminent evangelical Protestant theologians.

3. The common opinion, however, among Protestants is, that the prophecies concerning Antichrist have special reference to the papacy. This conviction is founded principally on the remarkable prediction contained in Paul's second epistle to the Thessalonians. The Apostle knew that the Thessalonians, in common with other Christians of the early Church, would be exposed to grievous persecutions; to comfort them under their sufferings, to give them patience and to, sustain their faith, he referred to the promised second coming of Christ. When the Lord should come all their sorrows would be ended; those who in the meantime had fallen asleep, would not lose their part in the blessing of his second advent. For "we which are alive, and remain unto the coming of the Lord, shall not prevent them which are asleep. For the Lord himself shall descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel, and with the trump of God: and the dead in Christ shall rise first: then we which are alive and remain shall be caught up together with them in the clouds, to meet the Lord in the air: and so shall we ever be with the Lord. Wherefore, comfort one another with these words." (1 Thess. iv. 15-17.) These words it seems had been perverted and misinterpreted, by some who were "disorderly, working not at all, but" were "busybodies;" unsettling the minds of the people, turning them off from present duties, as though the day of the Lord were at hand. To correct this abuse, the Apostle writes his second epistle. He does not set the doctrine of the second advent in the background, or say anything to weaken its power as a source of consolation to the suffering believers. On the contrary, he sets forth the glory of that advent and the richness of the blessings by which it should be attended, in more glowing terms than ever before. "We ourselves," he says, "glory in you in the churches of God, for your patience and faith in all your persecutions and tribulations that ye endure; which is a manifest token of the righteous judgment of God, that ye may be counted worthy of the kingdom of God. for which ye also suffer; seeing it is a righteous thing with God to recompense tribulation to them that trouble you; and to you, who are troubled, rest with us, when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ: . . . . when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe." (2 Thess. i. 4-10.) All this stands true. Nevertheless the Thessalonians were not to be deceived. The great day of deliverance was not at hand. They had much to do, and much to suffer before that day should come. The time of the second advent was not revealed. In his first epistle he had said, "Of the times and the seasons, brethren, ye have no need that I write unto you. For yourselves know perfectly that the day of the Lord so cometh as a thief in the night." (1 Thess. v. 1, 2.) That being conceded, they should know that great things must occur before that day could come. First, there was to be a great apostasy. As the Church was then in its infancy, and had just begun to make progress among the nations, such language naturally presupposes a much more

extended propagation of the Gospel, than had as yet taken place. The second event that was to precede the second advent was the coming of Antichrist, or, in other words, the man of sin was to be revealed.

The first question, to be determined in the interpretation of this prophecy, is, Whether Antichrist is a particular individual, or an institution, a power, or a corporation. Protestants generally adopt the latter view; because they do not regard any one pope, but the papacy, as the Antichrist of Scripture. In favour of this view it may be urged, (1.) That it is according to the analogy of prophecy to speak of nations, institutions, or kingdoms, as individuals. In Daniel, the ten kings are ten kingdoms or dynasties; the several beasts which he saw in vision, were not the symbols of particular men, but of nations. When therefore the Apostle speaks of Antichrist as "the man of sin," and "the son of perdition," it is perfectly consistent with Scriptural usage to understand him to refer to an order of men, or to an institution. (2.) The work assigned to Antichrist in prophecy, extends over far too long a period to be accomplished by one man. (3.) Those who insist that the antichrist here predicted, is an individual man, are forced to admit that what is said in 2 Thessalonians ii. 7 ("He who now letteth, will let, until he be taken out of the way") is to be understood of a power. It is generally understood of the Roman power. Luthardt understands it of the moral power which sustains the right, and therefore is opposed to the reckless disregard of all law, which is one of the characteristics of Antichrist. It is true that he supposes that reference is also made to one of the guardian or protecting angels spoken of by the prophet Daniel. But such an angel is not to be "taken out of the way." And there is nothing in the context or in Paul's writings anywhere to justify the assumption that reference is here had to any angelic personage.

The second question is, Whether the antichrist here described is an ecclesiastical or civil power; whether it is to arise in the Church or in the world. The considerations which are in favour of the former of these assumptions are, --

1. That the designations "man of sin" and "son of perdition" have a religious import, and are more appropriate to an ecclesiastical than to a worldly power or potentate.

2. Antichrist was to have the seat of his power in the "temple of God." It is there he sits. This seems clearly to indicate that it is an ecclesiastical usurping, tyrannical, and persecuting power, that is here depicted. By the temple of God in this passage is generally understood the Church which is so often elsewhere called, and especially by Paul, God's temple. Some, however, suppose that the reference is to the literal temple in Jerusalem; but this supposes, (a.) That the Jews are to be restored to their own land. (b.) That they are to be restored as Jews, or unconverted, and that the temple is to be there rebuilt. (c.) That the Thessalonians knew all this and would understand the Apostle as referring to the temple made with hands; which is to the last degree improbable.

3. His coming is after the working of Satan, with all power and signs and lying wonders. This is not the way in which worldly potentates gain their power; they rely on force. But this is the way, as though traced by the pen of history rather than by the pencil of prophecy, in which the papacy has attained and maintained its fearful ascendancy in the world. Its power has been achieved mainly by fraud, "by the deceivableness of unrighteousness;" by forged documents and false pretences, by claiming that Peter was made primate over the whole Church and the vicar or plenipotentiary of Christ on earth;

that he was the bishop of Rome; that his successors in that office were his successors in that primacy; and that as the vicar of Christ he was superior to all earthly potentates, not merely as the spiritual is above the temporal, but as lord of the conscience, authorized to decide what was right and what was wrong for them to do in all their relations as men and as rulers; which is a claim of absolute dominion. This, however, is a small matter so far as it concerns the things of this world. It was to the mass of the people of little moment whether their absolute sovereign was a bishop or a prince; whether he resided at Rome or in Paris, whether his authority extended over one nation or over all nations. It is the false claim of the papacy to have supreme authority over the faith of men, to decide for them what they must believe on the pain of eternal perdition, that is the most fearful power ever assumed by sinful men. To this is to be added the false claim to the power to forgive sin. This is, as we have seen, a twofold power, answering to the twofold penalty attached to sin, namely, the eternal penalty as a violation of the divine law, and the penances still due after the remission of the eternal penalty, as satisfactions to divine justice. The former can be obtained only through the intervention or absolution of the priest; and the latter can be imposed or remitted at the discretion of the Church. This includes power over purgatory, the pains of which are represented as frightful and of indefinite duration. These pains the pope and his subordinates falsely claim the power to alleviate or remit. These claims have no parallel in the history of the world. If such pretensions as these do not constitute the power which makes them Antichrist, then nothing more remains. Any future antichrist that may arise must be a small affair compared to the papacy.

Then again, the Apostle tells us, these portentous claims, these unrighteous deceits, were to be supported by "signs and lying wonders." These have seldom, if ever, been appealed to by worldly powers to support their pretensions. They ever have been and still are among the chief supports of the papacy. There is not a false doctrine which it teaches, or a false assumption which it makes, which is not sustained by "lying wonders." Its whole history is a history of apparitions of the Virgin Mary or of saints and angels; and of miracles of every possible description from the most stupendous to the most absurd. It has ever acted on the principle "populus vult decipi," and that it in right to deceive them for their own good, or, the good of the Church. The whole system, so far as it is distinctive, [840] is a system of falsehood, or false pretensions, supported by deceit.

4. Antichrist is to be a persecuting power. Is not this true of the papacy? It has been drunk with the blood of the saints. It not only persecutes, but it justifies persecution, and avows to this day its purpose to enforce its dominion by the rack and the stake wherever it has the power. This is involved in its justification of the past, and in its making it a duty to suppress every form of religion but that of Rome. The thirty years' war in Germany; the persistent attempts to exterminate the Piedmontese; the massacres by the Duke of Alva in the Netherlands; the horrors of the inquisition in Spain; the dragonnades and the massacre of St. Bartholomew in France, over which Te Deums were sung in Rome, show that the people of God can hardly have more to suffer under any future antichrist than they have already suffered, and perhaps have yet to suffer, under the papacy.

5. Antichrist, according to the Apostle, was to oppose and exalt himself above all that is called God or is worshipped; "so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God, shewing himself that he is God." This is true of no worldly power. It was not true of Antiochus

Epiphanes, who is regarded as the type whence the prophetic portrait of Antichrist was drawn. It was not true of any of the Roman emperors. Some of them allowed themselves to be enrolled among the thousand gods of the Pantheon; but this falls very far short of the description here given. It is, however, all true of the papacy, and it is true of no other power which has yet appeared upon earth. Paul does not concern himself with theories, but with facts. It is not that the popes openly profess to be superior to God; or, that in theory they claim to be more than men. It is the practical operation of the system which he describes. The actual facts are first, that the popes claim the honour that is due to God alone; secondly, that they assume the powers which are his exclusive prerogatives; and thirdly, that they supersede the authority of God, putting their own in its place. It is thus they exalt themselves above God.

They assume the honour which belongs to God not merely by claiming to be the vicars of Christ on earth, and by allowing themselves to be addressed as Lord and God, but by exacting the submission of the reason, the conscience, and the life, to their authority. This is the highest tribute which a creature can render the Creator; and this the popes claim to be their due from all mankind. They claim divine prerogatives as infallible teachers on all questions of faith and practice, and as having the power to forgive sin. And they exalt their authority above that of God by practically setting aside his word, and substituting their decrees and what they put forth as the teachings of the Church. It is a simple and undeniable fact that in all countries under the effective dominion of the pope, the Scriptures are inaccessible to the people, and the faith of the masses reposes not on what the Bible teaches, but on what the Church declares to be true.

Even such a writer as John Henry Newman, in an essay written before his formal adhesion to the Church of Rome, uses such language as the following: The question is, "Has Christ, or has He not, appointed a body representative of Him in earth during his absence?" This question he answers in the affirmative, and says, "Not even the proof of our Lord's divinity is plainer than that of the Church's commission. Not even the promises to David or to Solomon more evidently belong to Christ, than those to Israel, or Jerusalem, or Sion, belong to the Church. Not even Daniel's prophecies are more exact to the letter, than those which invest the Church with powers which Protestants consider Babylonish. Nay, holy Daniel himself is in no small measure employed on this very subject. He it is who announces a fifth kingdom, like a stone cut out without hands,' which broke in pieces and consumed' all former kingdoms, but was itself to stand forever' and to become a great mountain,' and to fill the whole earth.' He it is also who prophesies that the Saints of the most High shall take the kingdom and possess the kingdom forever.' He saw in the night visions and behold one like to the Son of Man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the Ancient of Days, and there was given Him dominion and glory and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve Him.' Such too is Isaiah's prophecy, Out of Zion shall go forth the law, and the word of the Lord from Jerusalem, and He shall judge among the nations and rebuke many people.' Now Christ Himself was to depart from the earth. He could not then in his own person be intended in these great prophecies; if He acted it must be by delegacy." [841] According to the Romanists, therefore, these prophecies, relating to Christ and his kingdom, refer to the papacy. It is the stone cut out of the mountain without hands, which is to break in pieces and consume all other kingdoms; which is to stand forever; which is to fill the whole earth, to which is given dominion, and

glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages should serve. If this be not to put itself in the place of God, it is hard to see how the prophecies concerning Antichrist can ever be fulfilled.

No more conclusive argument to prove that the papacy is Antichrist, could be constructed, than that furnished by Dr. Newman, himself a Romanist. According to him the prophecies respecting the glory, the exaltation, the power, and the universal dominion of Christ, have their fulfilment in the popes. But who is Antichrist, but the man that puts himself in the place of Christ; claiming the honour and the power which belong to God manifest in the flesh, for himself? Whoever does this is Antichrist, in the highest form in which he can appear.

6. Another argument to prove that the Antichrist described by the Apostle is an ecclesiastical power is that his appearance is the consequence of a great apostasy. That the apostasy spoken of is a defection from the truth is plain from the Scriptural usage of the term (Acts xxi. 21), and from the connection in which it here occurs. When God brought the heathen upon the people as conquerors, in punishment of their idolatry, their sufferings were a judicial consequence of their apostasy, but it cannot be said that the power of Chaldean or Egyptian oppressors was the fruit of their defection from the truth. In this case, however, Antichrist is represented as the ultimate development of the predicted apostasy. If a simple minister should claim to be a priest, and then one priest assume dominion over many priests, and then one prelate over other prelates, and then one over all, and then that one claim to be the ruler of the whole world as vicar of Christ, clothed with his authority, so that the prophecy that all peoples, nations, and languages should serve the Son of Man, is fulfilled in him, then indeed we should have a regular development, from the first step to the. last. Bishop Ellicott, though believing Antichrist to be "one single personal being, as truly man as He whom he impiously opposes," and that he is to be hereafter revealed, still admits that Antichrist is to be "the concluding and most appalling phenomenon" of the great apostasy. But if so, he must be an ecclesiastical, and not a worldly power.

7. Again the Apostle says that "the mystery of iniquity doth already work." That is, the principles and spirit had already begun to manifest themselves in the Church, which were to culminate in the revelation of the Man of Sin. How could this be said of a person who was to be a worldly prince, appearing outside of the Church, separated, not only chronologically by ages from the apostolic age, but also logically, from all the causes then in operation. If Antichrist is to be a single person, concentrating in himself all worldly power as a universal monarch, to appear shortly before the end of the world, as is assumed by so many expounders of prophecy, it is hard to see how he was to be the product of the leaven already working in the times of the Apostles.

If however, as Protestants have so generally believed, the papacy is the Antichrist which the Apostle had in his prophetic eye, then this passage is perfectly intelligible. The two elements of which the papacy is the development are the desire of preeminence or lust of power, and the idea of a priesthood, that is, that Christian ministers are mediators whose intervention is necessary to secure access to God, and that they are authorized to make atonement for sin; to which was added the claim to grant absolution. Both these elements were at work in the apostolic age. The papacy is the product of the transfer of Jewish and Pagan ideas to the Christian system. The Jews had a high priest, and all the ministers of the

sanctuary were sacrificing priests. The Romans had a "Pontifex Maximus" and the ministers of religion among them were priests. Nothing was more natural and nothing is plainer as a historical fact than that the assumption of a priestly character and functions by the Christian ministry, was one of the earliest corruptions of the Church. And nothing is plainer than that to this assumption the power of the papacy is in a large measure to be attributed. And as to the desire of preeminence, we know that there was, even among the twelve, a contention who should be the greatest. The Apostle John (3 Epistle 9) speaks of Diotrephes, "who loveth to have the preeminence;" and in all the Epistles there is evidence of the struggle for ascendancy on the part of unworthy ministers and teachers. The leaven of iniquity, therefore, was at work in the apostolic age, which concentrated by degrees into the portentous system of the papacy.

8. According to this view, the difficult passage in verses 6 and 7 admits of an easy interpretation. The Apostle there says: "Now ye know what withholdeth, that he might be revealed in his time. For the mystery of iniquity doth already work only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way." There was, therefore, at that time an obstacle which prevented the development of the Man of Sin, and would continue to present it, as long as it remained as it then was. It is to be noticed that Paul says, "Now ye know what withholdeth." How could the Thessalonians know to what he referred? only from the Apostle's instructions, or from the nature of the case. The fact however is that they did know, and, therefore, it is probable that knowledge was communicated to others, and was not likely to be soon forgotten. This consideration gives the more weight to the almost unanimous judgment of the early fathers that the obstacle to the development of Antichrist was the Roman empire. While that continued in its vigour it was impossible that an ecclesiastic should become the virtual sovereign of the world. It is a historical fact that the conflict between the Emperors and the Popes for the ascendancy, was continued for ages, and that as the power of the former decreased that of the latter increased.

On the assumption that the Antichrist of which Paul speaks in his Epistle to the Thessalonians, is a powerful worldly monarch hereafter to appear, these verses, the 6th and 7th, present the greatest difficulty. The causes which are to bring such a monarch into the possession of his power were not then in operation; there was then no obstacle to his manifestation so obvious as to be generally known to Christians, and the removal of which was to be followed at once by his revelation. Even on the assumption that the obstacle of which the Apostle speaks, was not the Roman empire, but rather the regard to law and order deeply fixed in the public mind, which stood in the way of the revelation of the Man of Sin, this difficulty is scarcely lessened. How could the Thessalonians have known that? How foreign to their minds must have been the thought that a regard for law must be taken out of the way before the lawless one could appear. It seems plain that the early fathers were right in their interpretation of the Apostle's language; and that he meant to say that the appearance of ecclesiastical claimants to universal dominion, was not possible until the Roman empire was effectually broken.

According to Paul's account, Antichrist was to arise in the Church. He was to put forth the most exorbitant claims; exalt himself above all human authority; assume to himself the prerogatives of God, demanding a submission due only to God, and virtually setting aside the authority of God, and substituting his own in its place. These assumptions were to be

sustained by all manner of unrighteous deceits, by signs, and by lying wonders. This portrait suits the papacy so exactly, that Protestants at least have rarely doubted that it is the Antichrist which the Apostle intended to describe.

Dr. John Henry Newman says, that if Protestants insist on making the Church of Rome Antichrist, they thereby make over all Roman Catholics, past and present, "to utter and hopeless perdition." [842] This does not follow. The Church of Rome is to be viewed under different aspects; as the papacy, an external organized hierarchy, with the pope, with all his arrogant claims, at its head; and also as a body of men professing certain religious doctrines. Much may be said of it in the one aspect, which is not true of it in the other. Much may be said of Russia as an empire that cannot be said of all Russians. At one time the first Napoleon was regarded by many as Antichrist; that did not involve the belief that all Frenchmen who acknowledged him as emperor, or all soldiers who followed him as their leader, were the sons of perdition. That many Roman Catholics, past and present, are true Christians, is a palpable fact. It is a fact which no man can deny without committing a great sin. It is a sin against Christ not to acknowledge as true Christians those who bear his image, and whom He recognizes as his brethren. It is a sin also against ourselves. We are not born of God unless we love the children of God. If we hate and denounce those whom Christ loves as members of his own body, what are we? It is best to be found on the side of Christ, let what will happen. It is perfectly consistent, then, for a man to denounce the papacy as the man of sin, and yet rejoice in believing, and in openly acknowledging, that there are, and ever have been, many Romanists who are the true children of God.

Admitting that the Apostle's predictions refer to the Roman pontiffs, it does not follow that the papacy is the only antichrist. St. John says there are many antichrists. Our Lord says many shall come in his name, claiming in one form or another his authority, and endeavouring to take his place by dethroning him. The Apostle John tells us this "is the last time" (1 John ii. 18) in which many antichrists are to appear. This "last time" extends from the first to the second advent of Christ. This long period lay as one scene before the minds of the prophets. And they tell what was given them to see, not as though they were writing a history, and unfolding events in their historical order, but as describing the figures which they saw, as it were, represented on the same canvass. As Isaiah describes the redemption from Babylon and the redemption by the Messiah as though they were contemporary events, so Joel, in almost the same sentence, connects the effusion of the spirit which attended the first advent of Christ with the great elemental changes which are to attend his second coming. How long the period between the first and second advents of the Son of God is to be protracted is unrevealed. It has already lasted nearly two thousand years, and, for what we know, may last two thousand more. As this long period, crowded with great events, was presented as a whole to the minds of the prophets, it is not surprising that, under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, one should fix on one prominent feature in the scene, and others upon another. Under the divine guidance granted to these holy seers, there could be no error and no contradiction, but there could hardly fail to be great variety. It would not, therefore, invalidate the account given of Paul's description of Antichrist, if it should be found to differ in some respects from the antichrists of Daniel and of the Apocalypse.

The Antichrist of Daniel.

The reader of the prophecies of Daniel has, at least in many cases, the advantage of a

divine interpretation of his predictions. The prophet himself did not understand the import of his visions, and begged to have them explained to him; and his request was, in a measure, granted. Thus in the seventh chapter we read: "I saw in my vision by night, and behold, ... four great beasts came up from the sea, diverse one from another. The first was like a lion; . . . . a second like to a bear; another like a leopard; (and) a fourth beast dreadful and terrible, and strong exceedingly, ... and it had ten horns . . . . And behold there came up among them another little horn, before whom there were three of the first horns plucked up by the roots: and, behold, in this horn were eyes like the eyes of a man, and a mouth speaking great things."

These beasts were, as the explanation states, the symbols of four kingdoms, the Babylonish, the Medo-Persian, the Greek, and the Roman. This last was to be divided into ten kingdoms. That kings in this prophecy mean kingdoms, not individuals, but an organized community under a king, is plain from the nature of the predictions and from the express declaration of the prophet; for he says, in verse 17, that the four beasts are four kings; and in verse 23, that the fourth beast is the fourth kingdom. King and kingdom, therefore, are interchanged as of the same iport, After, or in the midst of these ten kingdoms signified by the ten horns, there was to arise another kingdom or power symbolized by the little horn. Of this power it is said: (1.) That it was to be of a different kind from the others. Perhaps, as they were civil or worldly kingdoms, this was to be ecclesiastical. (2.) He was to gain the ascendancy over the other powers; at least three of them were to be plucked up by the roots. (3.) He was to speak great things, or be arrogant in his assumptions. (4.) He was to set himself against God; speaking "great words against the Most High." (5.) He was to persecute the saints; prevail against them and wear them out; and they shall be given into his hands. (6.) This antichristian power was to continue until the judgment, i.e., "until the Ancient of Days came, and judgment was given to the saints of the Most High." (Dan. vii. 22.) In all these particulars the Antichrist of Daniel answers to the description given by St. Paul in 2 Thessalonians. In one point, however, they appear to differ. According to Daniel, the power of Antichrist was to last, or at least his persecution of the saints, only "a time and times and the dividing of a time;" that is, three years and a half. (Compare Rev. xiii. 5, and xi. 2, 3.) This is the interpretation generally adopted. Calvin adopts the principle that in the prophecies definite periods of time are used for periods of indefinite duration. In his Commentary on Daniel he makes the little horn spoken of in the seventh chapter to be Julius Csar, and says: "Qui annum putant hic notari per tempus, falluntur meo judicio . . . . Annus sumetur figurate pro tempore aliquo indeterminato." [843] He significantly says: "In numeris non sum Pythagoricus." [844]

There are two answers to this difficulty. The word antichrist may be a generic term, as it seems to have been used by St. John, not referring exclusively to any one individual person, or to any one organization, but to any and every antichristian power, having certain characteristics. So that there may be, as the Apostle says, many Antichrists. Hence Daniel may describe one, and Paul another. Secondly, the same power, retaining all its essential characteristics, may change its form. If republican France, during the first revolution, was an antichristian nation, it did not necessarily change its character when it became an empire; and what was, or might have been, said of it in prophecy under the one form, might not have answered to what it was under the other form. During the Middle Ages, bishops were sometimes princes and warriors. A prophetic description of them, while giving their

general characteristics suited to both their ecclesiastical and worldly functions, might say some things of them as warlike princes which did not belong to them as bishops. However, we do not pretend to be experts in matters of prophecy; our object is simply to state what Paul said of the Antichrist which he had in view, and what Daniel said of the Antichrist which he was inspired to describe.

In the eleventh chapter of Daniel, from the 36th verse to the end, there is a passage which is commonly understood of Antichrist, because what is there said is not true of Antiochus Epiphanes, to whom the former part of the chapter is referred, and is true of Antichrist as described in other places in the Scriptures. It is not true of Antiochus Epiphanes that he abandoned the gods of his fathers. On the contrary, his purpose was to force all under his control, the Jews included, to worship those gods. What is said in verse 36 is in substance what Paul says, in 2 Thessalonians ii. 4, of the Man of Sin. Daniel says that "the king," whom he describes, "shall do according to his will; and he shall exalt himself, and magnify himself above every god, and shall speak marvellous things against the God of gods, and shall prosper till the indignation be accomplished: for that that is determined shall be done." This exalting himself "above all that is called god" is the prominent characteristic of Antichrist as he is elsewhere presented in Scripture.

The Antichrist of the Apocalypse.

The Apocalypse seems to be a summing up and expansion of all the eschatological prophecies of the Old Testament, especially of those of Ezekiel, Zechariah and Daniel. The same symbols, the same forms of expression, the same numbers, the same cycle of events, occur in the New Testament predictions, that are found in those of the Old. Everyone knows that commentators differ not only in their interpretation of the details, but even as to the whole structure and design of the book of Revelation. Some regard it as a description in oriental imagery of contemporaneous events; others as intended to set forth the different phases of the spiritual life of the Church; others as designed to unfold the leading events in the history of the Church and of the world in their chronological order; others again assume that it is a series, figuratively speaking, of circles; each vision or series of visions relating to the same events under different aspects; the end, and the preparation for the end, being presented over and over again; the great theme being the coming of the Lord, and the triumph of his Church. [845]

The most commonly accepted view of the general contents of the book by those who adopt the chronological method is that so clearly presented in the admirable little work of Dr. James M. Macdonald (now of Princeton, New Jersey). [846] According to this view, the introduction is contained in chapters i.-iii.; part second relates the Jewish persecutions, and the destruction of that power, in chapters iv.-xi. 14, part third relates the Pagan persecutions, and the end of the Pagan persecuting power, in chapters xi. 15-xiii. 10; part fourth relates the Papal persecutions and errors, and their end, in chapters xiii. 11-xix.; and part fifth relates the latter day of glory, the battle of Gog and Magog, the final judgment, and the heavenly state, in chapters xx.-xxii.

Luthardt may be taken as a representative of the advocates of the theory that the historical sequence of events is not designed to be set forth in the Apocalypse. The three works of the Apostle John contained in the New Testament, the Gospel, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse, according to Luthardt, form a beautiful, harmonious whole; as faith, love,

and hope mingle into one, so do these writings of St. John, though each has its characteristic; faith is prominent in the Gospel, love in the Epistles, and hope in the Apocalypse. The theme of the Book of Revelation is, "Behold, He comes." Luthardt admits that commentators differ greatly as to their views of its meaning, and that, at first, it appears very full of enigmas; but he adds, [847] "Whoever is familiar with the ancient prophecies, and gives himself with loving confidence to this book, will soon find the right way, which will lead him safely through all its labyrinths." This is the experience of every commentator so far as he himself is concerned, however he may fail to satisfy his readers that his way is the right one. The main principle of Luthardt's exposition is, "That the Revelation of John does not contemplate the events of history, whether of the Church or of the world. It contemplates the end. We find that the antagonism of the Church and the world, and the issue of the conflict are its contents; the coming of Christ is its theme. The events of history preceding the consummation are taken up only so far as they are connected with the final issue. This consummation is not chronologically unfolded, but is ever taken up anew, in order to lead us by a new way to the end." [848] One thing is certain, namely, that the Apocalypse contains the series of predictions common to all the prophets; the defections of the people of God; persecutions of their enemies; direful judgments on the persecutors; and the final triumph and blessedness of the elect. Under different forms, this is the burden of all the disclosures God has seen fit to make of the fate of his Church here on earth and this is the burden of the Apocalypse. According to Luthardt, the first vision i. 9-iii. 22, concerns the present state of the Church; the second vision, iv. 1-viii. 1, concerns God and the world; the third vision, viii. 2-xi. 19, concerns the judgment of the world and the consummation of covenant fellowship with God; the fourth vision, xii.-xiv. concerns the Church and the antichristian world power; this contains the vision of the woman, which brought forth the man child; and in xii. 18-xiii. 18, Antichrist and the false prophet; and in xiv. the Church of the end, and the judgment of the antichristian world; and the fifth vision, xv.-xxii. concerns the outpouring of wrath upon the world and the redemption of the Church.

It is characteristic of the Apocalypse that it takes up and expands the eschatological predictions of the earlier portions of Scripture. What in the Old Testament or in the Epistles of the New Testament, is set forth under one symbol and in the concrete, is in the Apocalypse presented under two or more symbols representing the constituent elements of the whole. Thus the Antichrist is predicted in Daniel under the symbol of "the little horn," and in Paul's Epistle to the Thessalonians under the title of the Man of Sin. Antichrist, as thus portrayed, includes an ecclesiastical and a worldly element; an apostate Church invested with imperial, worldly power. In the Apocalypse these two elements are represented as separate and united; a woman sitting on a beast with ten horns. The woman is the apostate Church; the beast is the symbol of the world-power by which it is supported. The destruction of the one, therefore, does not involve the destruction of the other. According to the prediction in the eighteenth chapter, the kings of the earth, wearied with the arrogance and assumption of the apostate Church, shall turn against it, waste, and consume it; that is, despoil it of its external power and glory. The destruction of Babylon, therefore, here predicted, is understood by that diligent student of prophecy, Mr. D. N. Lord, not as implying the overthrow of the Papacy, but its "denationalization" and spoliation. [849]

Throughout the Scriptures the relation between God and his people is illustrated by

that of a husband to his wife; apostasy from God, therefore, is in the ancient prophets called adultery. In the Revelation, the Church, considered as faithful, is called the woman; as apostate, the adulteress or harlot; and as glorified, the bride, the Lamb's wife. It is in accordance with the analogy of Scripture that the harlot spoken of in chapters xvii. and xviii. is understood to be the apostate Church. Of this woman it is said: (1.) That she sits on many waters. This is explained in xvii. 15, of her wide spread dominion: "The waters which thou sawest, where the whore sitteth, are peoples, and multitudes, and nations, and tongues." (2.) That she seduced the nations into idolatry; making the inhabitants of the earth drunk with the wine of her fornication. (3.) That she is sustained in her blasphemous assumption of divine prerogatives and powers by the kings and princes of the earth. She is seen sitting on a scarlet-coloured beast, full of the names of blasphemy, having seven heads and ten horns. In verse 12, these ten horns are said to be ten kings, i.e., in the language of prophecy, ten kingdoms. (4.) That she takes rank among and above the kings and princes of the earth. She is "arrayed in purple and scarlet colour, and decked with gold and precious stones and pearls." (5.) That her riches are above estimate. This is dwelt upon at length in the eighteenth chapter. (6.) That she is a persecuting power, "drunken with the blood of the saints, and with the blood of the martyrs of Jesus." (7.) That the claims of this persecuting power, as appears from Revelation xiii. 3, 14, are to be sustained by lying wonders. "He doeth great wonders, so that he maketh fire come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men, and deceiveth them that dwell on the earth by those miracles which he hath power to do in the sight of the beast." We find, therefore, in this description all the traits which in Daniel and the Epistle to the Thessalonians are ascribed to the Man of Sin, or, ho antikeimenos, the Antichrist. It matters not what this power may be called. "Wheresoever the carcass is, there will the eagles be gathered together." Any man; any institution; any organized power which answers to this prophetic description, comes within the prophetic denunciations here recorded. [850] Neither does it matter what is to happen after this judgment on the mystical Babylon. Should another Antichrist arise, essentially worldly in his character, as so many anticipate, who shall attain universal dominion, and set himself against God and his Christ with more blasphemous assumptions, with a more malignant hatred of the Church, and a more demoniacal spirit than any of his predecessors, this would not at all disprove the correctness of the interpretation given above of St. John's predictions concerning Babylon. On this point, Maitland says: "The two great powers whose names stand foremost in prophecy come into historical contact at a single point. Where Babylon ends, Antichrist begins: the same ten kings that destroy the first, give their power to the second. When the ten kings shall have burnt Rome, so complete will be the ruin, that no sign of life or habitation will again be found in her. Here, then, is a decisive landmark; Rome is still standing, therefore, Antichrist has not yet come: we are still in the times of Babylon, whether tasting or refusing her golden cap." In this view, that is, in assuming that the Scriptural prophecies respecting Antichrist, have not their full accomplishment in any one anti-christian power or personage exclusively, many of the most distinguished eschatologists, as Auberlen and Luthardt, substantially agree. The ancient prediction that Japhet should dwell in the tents of Shem, had its fulfilment every time the descendants of the latter participated in the temporal or spiritual heritage of the children of the former; and had its final and great accomplishment in the sons of Japhet sharing the blessings of redemption, which were to be realized in the line of Shem. In like manner the predictions

concerning Antichrist may have had a partial fulfilment in Antiochus Epiphanes, in Nero and Pagan Rome, and in the papacy, and, it may still have a fulfilment in some great anti-christian power which is yet to appear. So much, at least, is clear, in the time of Paul there was in the future a great apostasy and an antichristian, arrogant persecuting power, which has been realized, in all its essential characteristics, in the papacy, whatever may happen after Antichrist, in that form, is utterly despoiled and trodden under foot. [851]

Roman Catholic Doctrine of Antichrist.

The general opinion in the early Church was that Antichrist was a man of Satanic spirit endowed with Satanic power who should appear before the second coming of Christ. Jerome says, in his Commentary on Daniel: "Let us say what all ecclesiastical writers have handed down, namely, that at the end of the world, when the Roman empire is destroyed, there will be ten kings who will divide the Roman world amongst them; and there will arise an eleventh little king, who will subdue three of the ten kings, that is, the king of Egypt, of Africa, and of Ethiopia, as we shall hereafter show. And on these being slain the seven others will also submit. And behold,' he says, in the ram were the eyes of a man.' This is said that we may not suppose him to be a devil or demon, as some have thought, but a man in whom Satan will dwell utterly and bodily. And a mouth speaking great things,' for he is the man of sin, the son of perdition, who sitteth in the temple of God, making himself as God.'" [852]

Substantially the same view prevailed during the Middle Ages. Some however of the theologians of the Latin Church saw that the development of the Man of Sin was to take place in the Church itself and be connected with a general apostasy from the faith. They were therefore sufficiently bold to teach that the Church of Rome was to fall away, and that the Papacy or some individual pontiff was to become the Antichrist spoken of in Scripture. The abbot Joachim of Floris (died 1202), a Franciscan, put himself in opposition to the worldly spirit of the Church of his time, and his followers, called "Spirituales," came to denounce the Church of Rome as the mystical Babylon of the Apocalypse. This was done with great boldness by John Peter of Oliva (died 1297), whose works were formally condemned as "blasphemous and heretical." Among the passages thus condemned are the following: "The woman here stands for the people and empire of Rome, both as she existed formerly in a state of Paganism, and as she has since existed, holding the faith of Christ, though by many crimes committing harlotry with this world. And, therefore, she is called a great harlot; for, departing from the faithful worship, the true love and delights of her Bridegroom, even Christ her God, she cleaves to this world, its riches and delights; yea, for their sake she cleaves to the devil, also to kings, nobles, and prelates, and to all other lovers of this world." "She saith in her heart, that is, in her pride, I sit a queen: -- I am at rest; I rule over my kingdom with great dominion and glory. And I am no widow: -- I am not destitute of glorious bishops and kings." [853]

Not only the poets Dante and Petrarch denounced the corruptions of the Church of Rome, but down to the time of the Reformation that Church was held up by a succession of theologians or ecclesiastics, as the Babylon of the Apocalypse which was to be overthrown and rendered desolate.

When the Reformers with one voice pronounced the same judgment, and, making little distinction between Babylon and Antichrist, held up the Papacy as the antichristian power

predicted by Daniel, by St. Paul, and by St. John, the Romanists laid out their strength in defending their Church from this denunciation. Bellarmin, the great advocate of the cause of Romanism, devotes an extended dissertation to the discussion of this subject, which constitutes the third book of his work, "De Romano Pontifice." The points that he assumes are: First, that the word "Antichrist" cannot mean, as some Protestants thought, "substitute or vicar" of Christ, but an opponent of Christ. In this all parties are now agreed. Second, that Antichrist is "unus homo," and not "genus hominum." The Magdeburg Centuriators [854] said: "Docent [Apostoli] Antichristum non fore unam aliquam tantum personam, sed integrum regnum, per falsos doctores in templo Dei, hoc est in Ecclesia Dei pr&#65533;sidentes, in urba magna, qu&#65533; habet regnum super reges terr&#65533; id est, in Romana civitate, et imperio Romano, opera diaboli, et fraude, et deceptione comparatum." This view Bellarmin undertakes to refute, controverting the arguments of Calvin and Beza in its support. In this opinion also the leading Protestant interpreters of the present day, as above stated, agree. According to the views already advanced, there may be hereafter a great antichristian power, concentrated in an individual ruler, who will be utterly destroyed at the coming of the Lord, and at the same time the belief may be maintained that the Antichrist described by Daniel and St. Paul is not a man, but an institution or organized power such as a kingdom or the papacy.

The third position assumed by Bellarmin is that the Antichrist is still future. In this way he endeavours to make it plain that the papacy is not Antichrist. But, as just said, even if an Antichrist, and even the Antichrist kat' exochen, is yet to come, that would not prove that the papacy is not the power predicted by the Apostle as the Man of Sin, and the mystical Babylon as predicted in the Apocalypse.

Bellarmin says that the Holy Spirit gives us six signs of Antichrist, from which it is plain that he has not yet appeared. Two of these signs precede his coming, the universal proclamation of the Gospel, and the utter destruction of the Roman Empire, two are to attend it, namely, the preaching of Enoch and Elias, and persecutions so severe as to cause the cessation of all public worship of God; and two are to follow his appearance; his utter destruction after three years and a half; and the end of the world. The passages on which he relies to prove that Enoch and Elias are to come and oppose themselves to Antichrist, and to preserve the elect, are Malachi iv., Ecclesiasticus xliv. and xlviii., Matthew xvii. 11 (Jesus said, "Elias truly shall first come and restore all things"), and Revelation xi. 3, where the appearance of the two witnesses, who were to prophesy two thousand two hundred and sixty days, is foretold. As modern evangelical interpreters agree with Bellarmin in so many other points, so they agree with him in teaching that there is to be a second appearance of Elias, before the second advent of Christ. Luthardt understands Matthew xvi. 11 as predicting such reappearance of the Old Testament prophet. He was to be one, and Moses the other of the two witnesses spoken of in Revelation xi. 3. Of course, says Luthardt, Elias and Moses are to reappear in the sense in which Elias appeared in the person of John the Baptist. [855]

Fourthly, according to Bellarmin, Antichrist is to be a Jew, and probably of the tribe of Dan. He is to claim to be the Messiah, and this claim is to be recognized by the Jews. In virtue of his Messiahship he sets himself against Christ, and puts himself in his place, and arrogates the reverence, the obedience, the universal dominion and the absolute authority,

which rightfully belong to the Lord Jesus Christ. The seat of his dominion is to be Jerusalem. In the Temple restored in that city, he is to take his seat as God, and exalt himself above all that is called God. He is called "the little horn," because the Jews are comparatively a small nation. But he is to subdue one kingdom after another until his dominion as a worldly sovereign becomes absolutely universal. The authority urged for this view is principally that of the fathers, many of whom taught that Antichrist was to be a Jew of the tribe of Dan. Appeal was made by those fathers as by their followers to Genesis xlix. 17, where it is said, "Dan shall be a serpent by the way, an adder in the path, that biteth the horse-heels, so that his rider shall fall backward." And also to Revelation vii., because in the enumeration of the tribes from which the hundred and forty and four thousand were sealed, the name of Dan is omitted. Bellarmin argues that Antichrist is to be a Jew from John v. 43: "I am come in my Father's name and ye (Jews) receive me not: if another shall come in his own name, him ye (Jews) will receive." That is, will receive as the Messiah; but the Jews, as Bellarmin argues, would never receive as the Messiah any one who was not himself a Jew. The principal Scriptural ground of the opinion that Antichrist is to be a Jew is founded on Revelation xi. 8, where the seat of his dominion is said to be the great city "where also our Lord was crucified." In answer to this argument it may be said, first, that admitting that the literal Jerusalem is to be the seat of the kingdom of Antichrist, it does not follow that either he or his kingdom is to be Jewish. Many interpreters hold that the Jews, instead of being the supporters of Antichrist, are to be the principal objects of his malice, and that it is by persecuting and oppressing them that he is to get possession of their holy city and profane their temple far more atrociously than it was profaned by Antiochus Epiphanes. And secondly, interpreters so different as Hengstenberg and Mr. David N. Lord, agree in understanding the predictions in Revelation xi. to refer not to the literal Jerusalem and its Temple, but to that of which they were the symbols. The New Jerusalem is the symbol of the purified and glorified Church; the city where our Lord was crucified, the symbol of the worldly and nationalized Church. [856]

Fifthly, as to the doctrine of Antichrist, everything follows, from the assumption that he claims to be Christ. In claiming to be the Messiah predicted by the prophets, he is to claim to be the only object of worship. That he is to admit of no other God, whether true or false, nor of any idols, Bellarmin infers from 2 Thessa1onians ii. 2, "He opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God or is worshipped." "Certum est," says Bellarmin, "Antichristi persecutionem fore gravissimam et notissimam; ita ut cessent omnes public religionis ceremoni et sacrificia . . . . [Daniel xii. docet] Antichristum interdictdurum omnem divinum cultum, qui in ecclesiis Christianorum exercetur." [857] Thus also Stapleton says: "Pelli sane potent in desertam ecclesia, regnante Antichristi, et illo momento temporis in deserta, id est, in locis abitis, in speluncis, in latibulis quo sancti se recipient, non incommode qu retur ecclesia." [858] During the reign of Antichrist, according to the notes to the Romish version of the New Testament on 2 Thessalonians ii., "The external state of the Romish Church, and the public intercourse of the faithful with it, may cease. Yet the due honour and obedience towards the Roman see, and the communion of heart with it, and the secret practice of that communion, and the open confession thereof, if the occasion require, shall not cease." Again on verse 4th it is said, "The great Antichrist who must come towards the world's end, shall abolish all other religions, true and false; and put down the blessed sacrament of the altar, wherein consisteth principally the worship

of the true God, and also all idols of the Gentiles." "The oblation of Christ's blood," it is said, "is to be abolished among all the nations and churches in the world."

Finally, concerning the kingdom and wars of Antichrist, the Roman cardinal teaches, (1.) That from small beginnings, he is by fraud and deceit, to attain the kingdom of the Jews. (2.) That he is to subdue and take possession of the three kingdoms of Egypt, Libya, and Ethiopia. (Dan. xi.) (3.) That he is then to reduce to subjection the other seven kingdoms spoken of by the prophet; and (4.) That with an innumerable army, he shall make for a time successful war against all Christians in every part of the world, and finally be overthrown and utterly destroyed, as described in the twentieth chapter of Revelation.

From this review it appears that the doctrine of the Romish theologians concerning Antichrist, agrees with that of a large body of modern Protestant writers in the following points: (1.) That he is to be an individual, and not a corporation, or "genus hominum." (2.) That he is to be a worldly potentate. (3.) That he is to attain universal dominion. (4.) That he is to be, in character, godless and reckless, full of malignity against Christ and his people. (5.) That by his seductions and persecutions he is to succeed for a time in almost banishing true religion from the world. (6.) That his reign is to be brief.

The principal difference between the early Protestants and the modern evangelical interpreters, is, that the former identify Babylon and Antichrist; that is, they refer to one and the same power the prophecies of Daniel referring to the little horn; the description given by the Apostle in 2 Thessalonians ii.; and the account of the beast in chapter xiii. of the Apocalypse and that given in chapter xvii. Whereas, the moderns for the most part distinguish between the two. The papacy they regard as set forth under the symbol of Babylon; and Antichrist, as a worldly potentate, under the beast which came up out of the abyss. [859]

The great truth set forth in these prophecies is, that there was future in the time, not only of Daniel, but also of the Apostles, a great apostasy in the Church; that this apostasy would be Antichristian (or Antichrist), ally itself with the world and become a great persecuting power; and that the two elements, the ecclesiastical and the worldly, which enter into this great Antichristian development, will, sometimes the one and sometimes the other, become the more prominent; sometimes acting in harmony, and sometimes opposed one to the other; and, therefore, sometimes spoken of as one, and sometimes as two distinct powers. Both, as united or as separate, are to be overtaken with a final destruction when the Lord comes. So much is certain, that any and every power, be it one or more, which answers to the description given in Daniel vii. and xi. and in 2 Thessalonians ii. is Antichrist in the Scriptural sense of the term.

According, then, to the common faith of the Church, the three great events which are to precede the second advent of Christ, are the universal proclamation of the Gospel or the conversion of the Gentile world; the national conversion of the Jews; and the appearance of Antichrist.

[840] This qualification is necessary. Papists of course hold the truths of natural religion; and many of the distinguishing doctrines of the Gospel. This is to be acknowledged. We are not to deny that truth is truth, because held by Romanists; nor are we to deny, that where truth is, there may be its fruits. While condemning Papacy, Protestants can, and do joyfully admit that there are among Romanists such godly men as St. Bernard,

F&#65533;n&#65533;lon, and Pascal, and doubtless thousands more known only unto God.

[841] Essays Critical and Historical. By John Henry Newman, formerly Fellow of Oriel College, Oxford. London, 1871. The Protestant Idea of Antichrist. vol. ii. pp. 173-175.

[842] The Protestant Idea of Antichrist, in vol. ii. of his Essays Critical and Historical, p. 148.

[843] In Danielem vii. 20, 25; Works, Amsterdam, 1667, vol. v. pp. 109, 113.

[844] In Danielem xii. 12; Ibid., p. 205 b.

[845] The Prophecies of Daniel and the Revelations of St. John, viewed in their Mutual Relation, with an Exposition of the Principal Passages. By Carl August Auberlen, Dr. Phil., Licentiate and Professor Extraordinarius of Theology in Basil. Edinburgh, 1856. Auberlen says, on page 859: "The interpretation of the Apocalypse may be reduced to three grand groups. First, the church-historical view regards the Revelations as a prophetic compendium of Church history." This was the early Church view. Its principal representative in Germany is Bengel. It is generally adopted by the British and French interpreters. To this class belong Elliot's Hor&#65533; Apocalyptic&#65533;, or a Commentary on the Apocalypse, Critical and Historical, second edition, London; 1846; four volumes; and the work of Gaussen of Geneva, entitled Daniel le Proph&#65533;te. The second class includes the modern German interpreters, who, denying any real prediction of the future, confine the views of Daniel and John to their contemporary history. To this class belong Ewald, De Wette, L&#65533;cke, and others. The third group includes those who admit the divine inspiration of the prophecies and acknowledge the prediction of even minute events, but deny that the Apocalypse was designed to be a detailed history of the future. "Its object is to represent the great epochs and leading principal powers in the development of the kingdom of God viewed in its relation to the world-kingdoms." (p. 361.) To this class Auberlen himself belongs, and he has carried out the theory with singular clearness and ability. His work is excellently translated by the Rev. Adolph Saphir.

[846] A Key to the Book of Revelation; with an Appendix. By James M. Macdonald, Minister of the Presbyterian Church, Jamaica, L. I. Second edition. New London, 1848.

[847] Die Lehre von den letzten Dingen, pp. 165-173; see page 173.

[848] Ibid., p. 171.

[849] An Exposition of the Apocalypse. By David N. Lord. New York, 1859, p. 502.

[850] Auberlen, 293, quotes with approbation the following passage from John Michael Hahn (Briefe und Lieder &#65533;ber die Offenbarung. Works, vol. v. § 6, T&#65533;bingen, 1820): "The harlot is not the city of Rome alone, neither is it only the Roman Catholic Church, to the exclusion of another, but all churches and every church, ours included, namely, all Christendom that is without the Spirit and life of our Lord Jesus, which calls itself Christian and has neither Christ's mind nor Spirit." While giving the prophecy this wide scope, Auberlen, nevertheless, adds, "The Roman Catholic Church is not only accidentally and de facto,' but in virtue of its very principle a harlot; she has the lamentable distinction of being the harlot kat' exochen, the metropolis of whoredom, the mother of harlots (Rev. vii. 5); it is she, who, more than others, boasts of herself; I sit a queen, and am no widow, and shall see no sorrow (xviii. 7), whereas the evangelical (Protestant) Church

is, according to her principle and fundamental creed, a chaste woman; the Reformation was a protest of the woman against the harlot."

[851] The Apostles' School of Prophetic Interpretation: with its History down to the Present Time. London, 1849, p. 41. Mr. Maitland, on p. 42, presents the differences between Babylon and Antichrist in the following manner: --

"Babylon is Described. Antichrist is Described As a feminine power. As a masculine power.

Seductive and abandoned, prevaling through her golden cup.

Ferocious and warlike, enforcing his laims by the sword. Is succeeded by ten antichristian kings.

A final apostasy provoking Christ's second coming in vengence.

Is burnt by the ten kings, who afterwards fight against the Lamb.

Destroyed, together with the kings, in the great battle with the Lamb. Is bewailed by her accomplices to the crime. Leaves none to lament his fall. Contains some of the God's people even to the end. Fatal to salvation of all his followers. Established on the seven hills. Reigns in Jerusalem." The undue size which this volume has already reached forbids a fuller discussion of this subject. The reader is referred to the American edition of Smith's Dictionary of the Bible, under the word "Antichrist," for an elaborate exhibition of the different views which have prevailed in the Church, and for an exhaustive statement of the literature of the subject. Doctor William Smith's Dictionary of the Bible. Revised and edited by Professor H. B. Hackett, D. D., with the cooperation of Ezra Abbot, LL. D., Assistant Librarian of Harvard College. New York, 1870.

[852] "Dicamus quod omnes scriptores ecclesiastici tradiderunt: in consummatione mundi, quando regnum destruendum est Romanorum, decem futuros reges, qui orbem Romanum inter se dividant, et undecimum surrecturum esse regem parvulum, qui tres reges de decem regibus superaturus sit, id est, ◆gyptiorum regem, et Afric◆ et ◆thiopi◆, sicut in consequentibus manifestius dicemus. Quibus interfectus, etiam septem alii reges victori colla submittent. 'Et ecce,' ait, 'oculi quasi oculi hominis erant in cornu isto.' Ne eum putemus juxta quorumdam opinionem, vel diabolum esse, vel d◆monem: sed unum de hominibus, in quo totus satanas habitaturus sit corporaliter. 'Et os loquens ingentia (2 Thess. ii.).' Est enim homo peccati, filius perditionis, ita ut in templo Dei sedere audeat, faciens se quasi Deum." In Danielum, vii. 8; Works, edit. Migne, vol. v. p. 531, a, b [667, 668.]

[853] Maitland, The Apostles' School of Prophetic Interpretation, p. 340; see also Guericke, Kirchengeschichte, 6th edit., Leipzig, 1846, vol. ii. pp. 223-226.

[854] De Antichristo, cent. I. lib. ii. cap. iv.; Basle, vol. i. pp. 434, 435, of second set.

[855] Luthardt, Lehre von den letzten Dingen, p. 46.

[856] Mr. Lord says: "The place where Christ was crucified, was an open elevated space without the walls of Jerusalem, and on one of the principal entrances to the city. The street where the dead body of the witnesses is to be placed, represents parts thereof of the ten kingdoms, bearing a relation to conspicuity and importance to the apostate hierarchies, like that which the great entrance to Jerusalem that passed along by the foot of Calvary bore to that city; -- parts of those kingdoms from which those hierarchies largely derived their sustenance, wealth, and worshippers." An Exposition of the Apocalypse, p. 297.

[857] Bellarmin, De Romano Pontifice, III. vii.; Disputationes, Paris, 1608, vol. i. pp. 721 a, 723 c.

[858] Princip. Doct. cap. 2.

[859] Ebrard says, "The Reformers and the early theologians, erred only in this, that they identified the beast that was to remain three and one half years mentioned in Rev. xiii. with that mentioned in chap. xvii. That is, they identified the papacy and the Antichristian kingdom." Christliche Dogmatik, Konigsberg, 1852, vol. ii. p. 736.

CHAPTER IV: THE CONCOMITANTS OF THE SECOND ADVENT.

THE events which according to the common doctrine of the Church are to attend the second coming of Christ, are first, the general resurrection of the dead; second, the final judgment; third, "the end of the world;" and fourth, the consummation of the kingdom of Christ.

§ 1. The General Resurrection.

That there is to be a general resurrection of the just and of the unjust, is not, among Christians, a matter of doubt. Already in the book of Daniel xii. 2, it is said, "Many of them that sleep in the dust of the earth shall awake, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as stars for ever and ever." This prediction our Lord repeats without any limitation. "Marvel not at this: for the hour is coming, in the which all that are it the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." (John v. 28, 29.) Again: "When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy angels with him, then shall he sit upon the throne of his glory: and before him shall be gathered all nations." (Matt. xxv. 31, 32.) Paul, in his speech before Felix (Acts xxiv. 15), avowed it as his own faith and that of his fathers that "there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust." John (Rev. xx. 12, 13) says: "I saw the dead, small and great, stand before God; and the books were opened: and another book was opened, which is the book of life: and the dead were judged out of those things which were written in the books, according to their works. And the sea gave up the dead which were in it, and death and hell gave up the dead which were in them."

The Time of this General Resurrection.

The uniform representation of Scripture on this subject is that this general resurrection is to take place "at the last day," or, at the second coming of Christ. The same form of expression is used to designate the time when the people of Christ are to rise, and the time when the general resurrection is to occur. The Bible, if the doubtful passage Revelation x. 4-6 be excepted, never speaks of any other than one resurrection. The dead, according to the Scriptures, are to rise together, some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt. When Christ comes, all who are in their graves shall come forth, some to the resurrection of life, and others to the resurrection of damnation. When in 1 Thessalonians iv. 16, it is said, "The dead in Christ shall rise first," it does not mean that there are to be two resurrections, one of those who are in Christ, and the other of those who

are not in Him. The Apostle is speaking of a different subject. He comforts the Thessalonians with the assurance, that their friends who sleep in Jesus shall not miss their part in the glories of the second advent. Those then alive should not prevent, i.e., precede, those who were asleep; but, the dead in Christ should rise before those then living should be changed; and then both should be caught up to meet the Lord in the air. The parallel passage is in 1 Corinthians xv. 51, 52, "We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed, in a moment, in the twinkling of an eye, at the last trump: for the trumpet shall sound, and the dead shall be raised incorruptible, and we shall be changed."

In 1 Corinthians xv. 23, 24, the Apostle, when speaking of the resurrection, says: "Every man in his own order: Christ the first fruits; afterward they that are Christ's at his coming. Then cometh the end." This passage is often understood to teach that the resurrection takes place in the following order: (1.) That of Christ. (2.) That of his people. (3.) Then that of the rest of mankind. And as the resurrection of Christ and that of his people are separated by a long interval; so the resurrection of the people of God and the general resurrection may also be separated by an interval of greater or less duration. This interpretation supposes that the word "end," as here used, means the end of the resurrection. To this, however, it maybe objected, (1.) That it is opposed to the constant "usus loquendi" of the New Testament. The "end," when thus used, always elsewhere means the end of the world. In 1 Peter iv. 7, it is said: "The end of all things is at hand." Matthew xxiv. 6, "The end is not yet;" verse 14, "Then shall the end come." So in Mark xiii. 7, Luke xxi. 9. In all these passages the "end" means the end of the world. (2.) The equivalent expressions serve to explain the meaning of the term. The disciples asked our Lord, "What shall be the sign of Thy coming and of the end of the world?" In answer to that question Christ said that certain things were to happen, but, "the end is not yet;" and afterwards, "then cometh the end." (Matt. xxiv. 3, 6, 14.) The same expression occurs in the same sense, Matthew xiii. 39, xxviii. 20, and elsewhere. (3.) What immediately follows in verse 24, seems decisive in favour of this interpretation. The end spoken of is when Christ shall have delivered up his kingdom; that is, when the whole work of redemption shall have been consummated. (4.) It is further to be remarked that in 1 Corinthians xv. Paul does not make the slightest reference to the resurrection of the wicked, from the beginning to the end of the chapter. The whole concerns the resurrection of believers. That was what the errorists in Corinth denied; and that was what the Apostle undertook to prove to be certain and desirable. Christ certainly rose from the dead; so all his people shall rise; but each in his order; first, Christ, then they who are Christ's; then comes the end; the end of all things. To make this refer to another and general resurrection, would be to introduce a subject entirely foreign to the matter in hand.

Meyer, although he makes telos in the 24th verse refer to the resurrection, nevertheless says [860] "That it is the constant doctrine of the New Testament (leaving the Apocalypse out of view), that with the coming of Christ the finis hujus sculi' is connected, so that the Second Advent is the termination of the ante-messianic, and the commencement of the future world-period."

Luthardt says, [861] "Then, not before the resurrection, . . . comes the end; the end, not of the resurrection, that is the resurrection of others than believers, but the absolute end; the end of history." Whether the end of all things is to follow the resurrection of believers immediately, or long afterwards, is, in his view, a different question. He admits that the

common view is that the coming of Christ, the general resurrection of the dead, the general judgment, the end of the world, and the new heavens and new earth, are to occur contemporaneously. His own view is different.

That the New Testament does teach that the general resurrection is to occur at the time of the Second Advent appears: --

1. From such passages as the following; In the passage in Daniel, quoted above, it is said, that the righteous and the wicked are to rise together; the one to life, the other to shame and everlasting contempt. This passage our Lord reiterates, saying that "the hour is coming, in the which all that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil, unto the resurrection of damnation." (John v. 28, 29.) In Matthew xxv. 31, 32, it is said, that when the Son of Man shall appear in his glory all nations shall stand before him. The same is said in Revelation xx. 12, 13. In 2 Thessalonians i. 7-10, it is taught that when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven, it will be to take vengeance on those who obey not the Gospel, and to be glorified in all them that believe. In all these passages the resurrection of the righteous is declared to be contemporaneous with that of the wicked.

2. There is another class of passages which teach that the resurrection of the righteous is to take place at "the last day," and, therefore, not a thousand years before that event. Thus Martha, speaking of her brother Lazarus, said, "I know that he shall rise again in the resurrection at the last day." (John xi. 24.) Our Lord, in John vi. 39, says that it is the Father's will "that of all which He hath given me, I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day." This declaration is repeated in verses 40, 44, 54, comp. xii. 48: "The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day." It is true that the expressions "the last time," "the last day," "the end of days," "the end of the world," are often used very indefinitely in Scripture. They often mean nothing more than "hereafter." But this is not true with the phrase en te eschate hemera as used in these passages. "In the last day," is a known and definite period. It is to be remembered also that what is predicted to happen on "the last day," is elsewhere said to take place when Christ shall appear in his glory.

3. A third class of passages teach that the resurrection of the saints is to take place at the day of judgment and in connection with that event. According to the common representations of Scripture, when Christ shall come the second time, the dead are to rise, all nations are to be judged, and the present order of things is to cease. The heavens are to retain Christ, "until the time of restitution of all things." (Acts iii. 21.) This apokatastasis "die Wiederherstellung aller Dinge in ihren fr&#65533;hern vollkommnern Zustand," [862] the restoration of all things to their original perfect condition. "This consummation may be called a restitution,' in allusion to a circle which returns into itself, or more probably because it really involves the healing of all curable disorder and the restoration to communion with the Deity of all that He has chosen to be so restored. Till this great cycle has achieved its revolution, and this great remedial process has accomplished its design, the glorified body of the risen and ascended Christ not only may, but must, as an appointed means of that accomplishment, be resident in heaven, and not on earth." [863]

The general resurrection is represented as connected with the final judgment, in Matthew xxiv. 30, 31, and xxv. 31-46, 2 Thessalonians i. 7-10, and elsewhere. On this

point Dr. Julius M[?]ller says: "It is the plain doctrine of Scripture that the general resurrection of the dead contemporaneous with the transfiguration of believers then living on earth is to occur at the end of the world (or of history), at the reappearance of Christ for judgment and for the glorification of his kingdom. . . . . With this consummation of Christ's kingdom, and the therewith connected apolutrosis tou somatos hemon apo tes douleias tes phthoras, the Apostle, in the profound passage, Romans viii. 19-23, sets forth, as also connected with these events, the renovation of the nature of the earth and its exaltation to a participation in the glory of the children of God. As the body of man stands in intimate relation with nature, ... it is scarcely possible to form any idea of the resurrection of the body . . . . without assuming a corresponding exaltation of the external world as the theatre of his new life. This renovation of nature, the new heavens and the new earth, takes for granted, according to the Apostle, the destruction of the world as it now is." [864] With these views, which accord with the common doctrine of the Church, Lange avows his entire agreement. [865]

The only passage which seems to teach that there is to be a first and second resurrection of the body, the former being confined to martyrs and more or fewer of the saints, and the latter including "the rest of the dead," is Revelation xx. 4-6. It must be admitted that that passage, taken by itself, does seem to teach the doctrine founded upon it. But --

1. it is a sound rule in the interpretation of Scripture that obscure passages should be so explained as to make them agree with those that are plain. It is unreasonable to make the symbolic and figurative language of prophecy and poetry the rule by which to explain the simple didactic prose language of the Bible. It is no less unreasonable that a multitude of passages should be taken out of their natural sense to make them accord with a single passage of doubtful import.

2. It is conceded that the Apocalypse is an obscure book. This almost every reader knows from his own experience; and it is proved to be true, the few who imagine it to be plain to the contrary notwithstanding, by the endless diversity of interpretations to which it has been subjected. This diversity exists not only between commentators of different classes, as rationalistic and orthodox, but between those of the same class, and even of the same school. This remark, which applies to the whole book, applies with special force to the passage under consideration.

3. The Bible speaks of a spiritual, or figurative, as well as of a literal resurrection. This figure is used both in reference to individuals and in reference to communities. The sinner, dead in trespasses and sins, is said to be quickened and raised again in Christ Jesus. (Rom. vi. and Eph. ii.) Whole communities when elevated from a state of depression and misery, are in prophetic language said to be raised from the dead. (Rom. xi. 15; Is. xxvi. 19.) "Thy dead men shall live, together with my dead body shall they arise. Awake and sing, ye that dwell in dust; for thy dew is as the dew of herbs, and the earth shall cast out the dead." (Ez. xxxvii. 12.) "I will open your graves, and cause you to come up out of your graves, and bring you into the land of Israel." More than this, Elias is said to have lived again in John the Baptist; and, according to a common interpretation, the two witnesses spoken of in the Apocalypse are Moses and Elias, who are to rise not in person, but as represented by men filled with the same spirit, endued with similar gifts, and called to

exercise the same offices. It would, therefore, not be inconsistent with the analogy of prophecy if we should understand the Apostle as here predicting that a new race of men were to arise filled with the spirit of the martyrs, and were to live and reign with Christ a thousand years. According to Hengstenberg, the Apostle saw the souls of the martyrs in heaven. There they were enthroned. This was their first resurrection. "There can be no doubt," he says, "that by the first resurrection we are here primarily to understand that first stage of blessedness." [866]

4. John does not say that the bodies of the martyrs are to be raised from the dead. He says: "I saw the souls of them that were beheaded for the witness of Jesus." The resurrection of the dead is never thus spoken of in Scripture. There is a sense in which the martyrs are said to live again, but nothing is said of their rising again from their graves. The first resurrection may be spiritual, and the second literal. There may be a time of great prosperity in the Church, in which it will be a great blessing to participate. It is said that there is no force in this argument, as the Apostle does not speak of a resurrection of souls. He simply says he saw the souls of the martyrs; as in chapter vi. 9, it is said: "I saw under the altar the souls of them that were slain for the word of God." The prophet, according to xx. 4, first saw the martyrs in the state of the dead, and then he saw them alive. The argument, however, is not founded merely on the use of the word "souls," but on the fact that the resurrection of the dead is never spoken of in the Scriptures in the way in which the living again of the martyrs is here described.

5. The common millenarian doctrine is, that there is to be a literal resurrection when Christ shall come to reign in person upon the earth, a thousand years before the end of the world, and that the risen saints are to dwell here and share with Christ in the glories of his reign. But this seems to be inconsistent with what is taught in 1 Corinthians xv. 50. Paul there says: "Now this I say, brethren, that flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God; neither doth corruption inherit incorruption." It is here expressly asserted that our bodies as now constituted are not adapted to the state of things which shall exist when the kingdom of God is inaugurated. We must all be changed. From this it follows that the spiritual body is not adapted to our present mode of existence; that is, it is not suited or designed for an earthly kingdom. Luthardt admits this. He admits that the renovated, or transfigured, body of necessity supposes a renovated earth. He admits also that when the bodies of believers are thus changed they are to be caught up from the earth, and are to dwell with Christ in heaven. When Christ appears, his people are to appear with Him in glory. Bengel, and after him others, endeavour to reconcile these admissions with the theory of an earthly kingdom of glory, by assuming that risen saints are, to rule this kingdom, not from the literal Jerusalem, but from heaven. This, however, is to introduce an extra-scriptural and conjectural idea.

6. It has already been said, when speaking of the restoration of the Jews to their own land, that this whole theory of a splendid earthly kingdom is a relic of Judaism, and out of keeping with the spirituality of the Gospel. [867]

All this is said with diffidence and submission. The interpretation of unfulfilled prophecy experience teaches is exceedingly precarious. There is every reason to believe that the predictions concerning the second advent of Christ, and the events which are to attend and follow it, will disappoint the expectations of commentators, as the expectations

of the Jews were disappointed in the manner in which the prophecies concerning the first advent were accomplished.

[860] Commentar ☐ber das Neue Testament, 2d edit., G☐ttingen, 1849, vol. v. p. 323.

[861] Lehre von den letzten Dingen, Leipzig, 1861, p. 127.

[862] De Wette, Exegetisches Handbuch zum Neuen Testament, Leipzig, 1845, vol. i. part 4, p. 48.

[863] The Acts of the Apostles Explained. By Joseph Addison Alexander. New York. 1857, vol. i. p. 118.

[864] Studien und Kritiken, 1835, pp. 783-785.

[865] Lehre von den letzten Dingen, Meurs, 1841, pp. 246, 247.

[866] The Revelation of St. John Expounded, edit. Edinburgh, 1852, vol. ii. p. 281.

[867] The interpretation of this whole passage (Rev. xx. 1-6) is thoroughly discussed in the very able work of the Rev. David Brown, of St. James' Free Church, Glasgow, entitled Christ's Second Coming: Will it be Pre-Millenial? chapter x. edit. New York, 1851, p. 218 ff.

§ 2. The Final Judgment.

The Scriptures abound in passages which set forth God as the moral ruler of men; which declare that He will judge the world in righteousness. The Bible represents Him as the judge of nations and of individuals; as the avenger of the poor and the persecuted. It abounds also in promises and in threatenings, and in illustrations of the righteous judgments of God. Nothing, therefore, is plainer than that men in this world are subject to the moral government of God. Besides this, the Bible also teaches that there is a future state of reward and punishment, in which the inequalities and anomalies here permitted shall be adjusted. According to some, this is all that the Bible teaches on the subject. What is said of the punishment of the wicked and of the reward of the righteous is to be understood in this general way. This is the doctrine of the common school of Rationalists. [868] Bretschneider [869] admits, however, that reason has nothing to object to the Church doctrine on this subject properly understood.

A second view of the last judgment assumes it to be a process now m progress. In the Old Testament the Messianic period is spoken of as the "last day," "the last time," "the end of days," "the end of the world," and is represented as a time of conflict and of judgment. The Jews expected that when the Messiah came, the severest judgments would fall upon the heathen, and that the chosen people would be greatly exalted and blessed. This was the day of judgment. Those who give substantially the same interpretation to the Old Testament prophecies, hold that the day of judgment covers the whole period between the first and second advents of Christ.

A third doctrine is that the world in its progress works out all possible manifestations of God, so that according to the stereotyped dictum of Schelling, Die Weltgeschichte ist das Weltgericht; the history of the world is the judgment of the world. Premillenarians use precisely the same words, although not in the same philosophical sense. With them "to

judge" is to reign; and when Christ comes to establish his personal reign upon earth, the last judgment will begin, and "the judgment of God is the administration of the government of God." [870]

A fourth theory may be mentioned. There are certain immutable laws, either independent, as some say, of the will of God, or dependent on his voluntary constitution, which secure that the righteous shall be happy and the wicked miserable; and this is all that either reason or Scripture, properly understood, teaches of rewards and punishment.

A fifth doctrine is that the day of judgment is a protracted future dispensation, as just mentioned, to commence with the second advent of Christ, and to continue during the thousand years of his personal reign upon the earth. This theory is connected with the doctrine of the pre-millenial advent of Christ.

The Church Doctrine.

By the Church doctrine is meant that doctrine which is held by the Church universal; by Romanists and Protestants in the West, and by the Greeks in the East. That doctrine includes the following points: --

1. The final judgment is a definite future event (not a protracted process), when the eternal destiny of men and of angels shall be finally determined and publicly manifested. That this is the doctrine of the Bible, is proved by such passages as the following: Matthew xi. 24, "It shall be more tolerable for the land of Sodom in the day of judgment, than for thee;" Matthew xiii. 30, "Let both grow together until the harvest: and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the taxes, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn;" verse 39, "The harvest is the end of the world, and the reapers are the angels;" verse 49, "So shall it be at the end of the world: the angels shall come forth, and sever the wicked from among the just;" John xii. 48, "The word that I have spoken, the same shall judge him in the last day;" Acts xviii. 31, God "hath appointed a day in the which He will judge the world in righteousness;" Romans ii. 5, "The day of wrath and revelation of the righteous judgment of God;" and 1 Corinthians iv. 5, "Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come." It is true that the word "day" in Scripture is often used for an indefinite period; as "the day of the Lord," is the time of the Lord. And, therefore, it does not follow from the use of this word, that the judgment is to be commenced and ended in the apace of twenty-four hours. Nevertheless, the way in which the word is used in this connection, and the circumstances with which the judgment is connected, show that a definite and limited period, and not a protracted dispensation, is intended by the term. The appearance of Christ, the resurrection of the dead, and the gathering of the nations, are not events which are to be protracted through years or centuries.

2. Christ is to be the judge. John v. 22, 23, "The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all judgment unto the Son; that all men should honour the Son, even as they honour the Father;" verse 27, "And hath given Him authority to execute judgment also, because He is the Son of Man." Peter, in Acts x. 34-43, says that God "anointed Jesus of Nazareth with the Holy Ghost and with power;" had "raised" Him from the dead "and shewed him openly," and "commanded us to preach unto the people, and to testify that it is He which was ordained of God to be the Judge of quick and dead." Paul, in his speech on Mars Hill, tells the Athenians that God "hath appointed a day, in the which He will judge

the world in righteousness, by that man whom He hath ordained; whereof He hath given assurance unto all men, in that He hath raised Him from the dead." (Acts xvii. 31.) And in 2 Corinthians v. 10, he says, "We must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ." Our Lord says that He will say to the wicked, "Depart from me, ye that work iniquity." (Matt. v. 28; Luke xiii. 27.) In all the graphic descriptions gives in the New Testament of the process of the final judgment, Christ is represented as acting as the judge. On this point it is to be observed: (1.) That He is set forth as acting on his own authority; and not merely as the "Bevollm[illegible]chter," or plenipotentiary of God. Everywhere in the New Testament, our responsibility is said to be to Him. We are to stand before his judgment-seat. He will say, "Depart from me, ye cursed." It is He, who is to bring every secret thing into judgment. (2.) He is qualified thus to sit in judgment on men and angels; because He is omniscient, and infinite in justice and mercy. (3.) It is especially appropriate that the man Christ Jesus, God manifest in the flesh, should be the judge of all men. He has this authority committed to Him because He is the Son of man; because, although in the form of God, and thinking it no robbery to be equal with God, He humbled Himself to be found in fashion as a man. This is part of his exaltation, due to Him because He consented to become obedient unto death. It is meet that He who stood condemned at the bar of Pilate, should sit enthroned on the seat of universal judgment. It is a joy and ground of special confidence to all believers, that He who loved them and gave Himself for them, shall be their judge on the last day.

3. This judgment is to take place at the second coming of Christ and at the general resurrection. Therefore it is not a process now in progress; it does not take place at death; it is not a protracted period prior to the general resurrection. A few of the passages bearing on this point are the following: In the parable of the wheat and the tares (Matt. xiii. 37-43), already referred to, we are taught that the final separation between the righteous and the wicked is to take place at the end of the world, when the Son of Man shall send forth his angels to gather out of his kingdom all things that offend. This implies that the general resurrection, the second advent, and the last judgment, are contemporaneous events. The Bible knows nothing of three personal advents of Christ: one at the time of the incarnation; a second before the millennium; and a third to judge the world. He who came in the flesh, is to come a second time without sin unto salvation. Matthew xvi. 27, "The Son of Man shall come in the glory of his Father, with his angels; and then He shall reward every man according to his works." Matthew xxiv. 29-35, teaches that when the sign of the Son of Man appears in the heavens, all the tribes of the earth shall mourn, and the elect shall be gathered in Matthew xxv. 31-46 sets forth the whole process of the judgment. When the Son of Man shall come in his glory, all nations shall be gathered before Him, and He shall separate them as a shepherd divideth the sheep from the goats; and then shall He say to those on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father; and to those on the left, Depart from me, ye cursed. 1 Corinthians iv. 5, "Judge nothing before the time, until the Lord come, who both will bring to light the hidden things of darkness, and will make manifest the counsels of the hearts: and then shall every man have praise of God." When Christ comes, the general judgment is to occur. In 2 Thessalonians i. 7-10, it is taught that when the Lord Jesus Christ shall be revealed from heaven, it will be for the double purpose of taking vengeance on them that know not God, and of being glorified in all them that believe. In 2 Timothy iv. 1, it is said: The Lord Jesus Christ "shall judge the quick and the dead at his appearing, and his kingdom." In the fifteenth chapter of First Corinthians, the Apostle

expressly teaches that corruption cannot inherit incorruption, that our present vile bodies must be changed before they can enter the kingdom of God; and this change from the natural to the spiritual, from mortal to immortal, is to take place at the last trump; and in Philippians iii. 20, 21, he says it is to occur when Christ comes from heaven, who shall fashion our bodies like unto his own glorious body. In all these different ways it is taught that the general judgment is to take place at the second coming of Christ.

4. The persons to be judged are men and angels. In several passages already quoted it is said that Christ is to come to judge "the quick and the dead;" in others it is said, "all nations are to stand before Him;" in others, that "we must all appear before the judgment-seat of Christ ;" in others again it is said that "He will render to every man according to his works." This judgment, therefore, is absolutely universal; it includes both small and great; and all the generations of men. With regard to the evil angels, it is said that God "delivered them into chains of darkness, to be reserved unto judgment." (2 Pet. ii. 4.) Satan is said to be the God of this world. The conflict in which believers are engaged in this life, is with principalities and powers and spiritual wickedness in heaven, en tois epouraniois. This conflict is to continue until the Second Advent, when Satan and his angels are to be cast into the pit.

The older theologians speculated on the manner in which the judgment is to be arranged, so as to admit of the countless millions of human beings who shall have lived from the beginning of the world to the final consummation being so congregated as to be all gathered before the throne of the Son of Man. The common answer to that difficulty was that the throne is to be so exalted and so glorious as to be visible, as are the sun and moons from a large part of the earth's surface at the same time. These, however, are questions about which we need give ourselves no concern; these descriptions of the judgment are designed to teach us moral truths, and not the physical phenomena by which the solemn adjudication on the destiny of men is to be attended.

5. The ground or matter of judgment is said to be the "deeds done in the body," men are to be judged "according to their works;" "the secrets of the heart" are to be brought to light. God's judgment will not be founded on the professions, or the relations of men, or on the appearance or reputation which they sustain among their fellows, but on their real character and on their acts, however secret and covered from the sight of men those acts may have been. God will not be mocked and cannot be deceived; the character of every man will be clearly revealed. (1.) In the sight of God. (2.) In the sight of the man himself. All self deception will be banished. Every man will see himself as he appears in the sight of God. His memory will probably prove an indelible register of all his sinful acts and thoughts and feelings. His conscience will be so enlightened as to recognize the justice of the sentence which the righteous judge shall pronounce upon him. All whom Christ condemns will be self-condemned. (3.) There will be such a revelation of the character of every man to all around him, or to all who know him, as shall render the justice of the sentence of condemnation or acquittal apparent. Beyond this the representations of Scripture do not require us to go.

Besides these general representations of Scripture that the character and conduct of men is the ground on which the final sentence is to be pronounced, there is clear intimation in the Word of God, that, so far as those who hear the Gospel are concerned, their future

destiny depends on the attitude which they assume to Christ. He came to his own, and his own received Him not; but to as many as received Him, to them gave He power to become the sons of God. He is God manifest in the flesh; He came into the world to save sinners; all who receive Him as their God and Saviour, are saved; all who refuse to recognize and trust Him, perish. They are condemned already, because they have not believed in the name of the only begotten Son of God. He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life; he that believeth not the Son shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him. Whosoever shall confess me before men, him will I also confess before my Father who is in heaven. But whosoever shall deny me before men, him will I also deny before my Father which is in heaven. When the Jews asked our Lord, What shall we do that we might work the works of God? his answer was, "This is the work of God, that ye believe on him whom He hath sent." In the solemn account given of the last judgment in Matthew xxv. 31-46, the inquest concerns the conduct of men towards Christ. And the Apostle says, If any man love not the Lord Jesus Christ let him be Anathema Maranatha. The special ground of condemnation, therefore, under the Gospel is unbelief; the refusal to receive Christ in the character in which He is presented for our acceptance.

6. Men are to be judged according to the light which they have severally enjoyed. The servant that knew his Lord's will, and did it not, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knew it not, shall be beaten with few stripes. "For unto whomsoever much is given, of him shall be much required." Our Lord says that it shall be more tolerable, in the day of judgment, for Tyre and Sidon, than for the men of his generation. Paul says that the heathen are inexcusable, because that when they knew God, they glorified him not as God; and he lays down the principle that they who sin without law, shall be judged without law; and that they who have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law.

7. At the judgment of the last day the destiny of the righteous and of the wicked shall be unalterably determined. Each class shall be assigned to its final abode. This is taught in the solemn words: "These shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal."

How far the descriptions of the process of the last judgment, given in the Bible, are to be understood literally, it is useless to inquire. Two things are remarkable about the prophecies of Scripture, which have already been accomplished. The one is that the fulfilment has, in many cases, been very different from that which a literal interpretation led men to anticipate. The other is, that in some cases they have been fulfilled even to the most minute details. These facts should render us modest in our interpretation of those predictions which remain to be accomplished; satisfied that what we know not now we shall know hereafter.

[868] J. A. L. Wegscheider, Institutiones Theologic, IV. ii. 99; 5th edit. Halle, 1826, p. 614 ff.

[869] Dogmatik der evangelischen Kirche, § 172, 3d edit. Leipzig, 1828; vol. ii. p. 445.

[870] The Last Times, by Joseph A. Seiss, D. D., Philadelphia, 1866, p. 141.

§ 3. The End of the World.

The principal passages of Scriptures relating to the final consummation or the end of the world, are the following: Psalm iii. 25, 26, "Of old hast thou laid the foundation of the earth; and the heavens are the work of thy hands. They shall perish, but thou shalt endure; yea, all of them shall wax old as a garment; as a vesture shalt thou change them, and they shall be changed." Isaiah li. 6, "Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the heavens shall vanish away like smoke, and the earth shall wax old like a garment." Isaiah lxv. 17, "Behold, I create new heavens, and a new earth: and the former shall not be remembered nor come into mind." Luke xxi. 33, "Heaven and earth shall pass away: but my words shall not pass away." Romans viii. 19-21, "The earnest expectation of the creature (ktisis, creation) waiteth for the manifestation of the sons of God. For the creature was made subject to vanity, not willingly, but by reason of him who hath subjected the same in hope, because the creature itself also shall be delivered from the bondage of corruption into the glorious liberty of the children of God." 2 Peter iii. 6-13, "The world that then was, being overflowed with water, perished: but the heavens and earth which are now, by the same word are kept in store, reserved unto fire against the day of judgment and perdition of ungodly men. . . . . The day of the Lord will come as a thief in the night, in the which the heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat; the earth also, and the works that are therein shall be burned up. . . . . Nevertheless we, according to his promise, look for new heavens and a new earth, wherein dwelleth righteousness." Revelation xx. 11, "I saw a great white throne, and Him that sat on it, from whose face the earth and the heaven fled away; and there was found no place for them." Revelation xxi. 1, "I saw a new heaven and a new earth: for the first heaven and the first earth were passed away; and there was no more sea."

Remarks.

1. These passages are not to be understood as predicting great political and moral revolutions. It is possible that some of them might bear that interpretation; but others are evidently intended to be understood in a more literal sense. This is especially the case with 2 Peter iii. 6-13, in which the Apostle contrasts the destruction of the world by the waters of the deluge with the destruction by fire which is still future. If the fact be established that the Scriptures anywhere clearly predict the destruction of the world at the last day, that fact becomes a rule for the interpretation of the more doubtful passages. There is nothing in this predicted destruction of our earth out of analogy with the course of nature. Stars once clearly visible in the firmament, after a brief period of unusual splendour, have disappeared; to all appearance they have been burnt up. Scientific men tell us that there is abundant evidence that the earth was once in a state of fusion; and there are causes in operation which are adequate to reduce it to that state again, whenever God sees fit to put them unto operation.

2. The destruction here foretold is not annihilation. (a.) The world is to be burnt up; but combustion is not a destruction of substance. It is merely a change of state or condition. (b.) The destruction of the world by water and its destruction by fire are analogous events; the former was not annihilation, therefore the second is not. (c.) The destruction spoken of is elsewhere called a palingenesia, regeneration (Matt. xix. 28); an apoka tastasis, a restoration (Acts iii. 21); a deliverance from the bondage of corruption (Rom. viii. 21). The Apostle teaches that our vile bodies are to be fashioned like unto the glorious body of

Christ, and that a similar change is to take place in the world we inhabit. There are to be new heavens and a new earth, just as we are to have new bodies. Our bodies are not to be annihilated, but changed. (d.) There is no evidence, either from Scripture or experience, that any substance has ever been annihilated. If force be motion, it may cease; but cessation of motion is not annihilation, and the common idea in out day, among men of science, is that no force is ever lost; it is, as they say, only transformed. However this may be, it is a purely gratuitous assumption that any substance has ever passed out of existence. In all the endless and complicated changes which have been going on, from the beginning, in our earth and throughout the universe, nothing, so far as known, has ever ceased to be. Of course He who creates can destroy; the question, however, concerns the purpose, and not the power of God; and He has never, either in his word or in his works, revealed his purpose to destroy anything He has once created.

Many of the old theologians, especially among the Lutherans, understood the Bible to teach the absolute annihilation of our world. Schmid [871] states as the Lutheran doctrine that the world is to be reduced to nothing (in Nichts sich aufl&#65533;sen). He quotes Baier, Hollaz, and Quenstedt in support of this view. Quenstedt [872] says: "Forma consummationis hujus non in nuda qualitatum immutatione, alteratione seu innovatione, sed in ipsius substanti&#65533; mundi totali abolitione et in nihilum reductione consistit." Gerhard [873] takes the same view: "Formam consummationis dicimus fore non nudam qualitatum alterationem, sed ipsius substanti&#65533; abolitionem, adeoque totalem annihilationem, ut sic terminus a quo consummationis sive destructionis sit esse,' terminus vero ad quem non esse' sive nihil." He admits, however, that many of the fathers and Luther himself were on the other side. He quotes Iren&#65533;us, Cyril of Jerusalem, Jerome, Augustine, and Chrysostom, as in favour of mutation and against annihilation. Luther was wont to say: "The heavens have their work-day clothes on; hereafter they will have on their Sunday garments." Most of the Reformed theologians generally oppose the idea of annihilation. Turrettin certainly does. [874] One of his questions is: "Qualis futuris sit mundi interitus? An per ultimam conflagrationem sit annihilandus, an instaurandus et renovandus?" He argues throughout in favour of the latter.

3. The subject of the change which is to take place at the last day is not the whole material universe, but our earth and what pertains to it. (a.) It is true the Bible says: "Heaven and earth are to pass away," and by heaven and earth the Scriptures often mean the universe; and it would therefore be consistent with the language of Scripture to hold that the whole universe is to be changed at the last day. It was natural that this interpretation should be put upon the language of the Bible so long as our earth was regarded as the central body of the universe and sun, moon, and stars as subordinate luminaries, intended simply for the benefit of the inhabitants of our world. "Wenn der Tanz," says Strauss, [875] "zu Ende ist, bl&#65533;st der Wirth die Lichter aus." The case however assumes a different aspect when we know that our earth and even our solar system is a mere speck in the immensity of God's works. It is one of the unmistakable evidences of the divine origin of the Scriptures, that they are written on such a high level that all the mutations of human science take place beneath them without ever coming into collision with their teachings. They could be read by those who believed that the sun moves round the earth, without their convictions being shocked by their statements; and they can be read by us who know that the earth moves round the sun, with the same satisfaction and confidence. Whether the heaven and earth

which are to pass away are the whole material universe, or only our earth and its atmospheric heavens, the language of the Scripture leaves undecided. Either view is perfectly consistent with the meaning of the words employed. The choice between the two views is to be determined by other considerations. (b.) The a priori probability is overwhelming in favour of the more limited interpretation. Anything so stupendous as the passing away of the whole universe as the last act of the drama of human history would be altogether out of keeping. (c.) The Bible concerns man. The earth was cursed for his transgression. That curse is to be removed when man s redemption is completed. The ktisis that was made subject to vanity for man's sin, is our earth; and our earth is the ktisis which is to be delivered from the bondage of corruption. The change to be effected is in the dwelling-place of man. (d.) According to the Apostle Peter, it is the world which once was destroyed by water, that is to be consumed by fire. But although the predictions of Scripture concern only our earth, it does not follow that the material universe is to last forever. As it is not from eternity, it probably will not last forever. It may be only one of the grand exhibitions of the wonderful working of God in the field of infinite space, and in the course of unending ages.

4. The result of this change is said to be the introduction of a new heavens and a new earth. This is set forth not only in the use of these terms, but in calling the predicted change "a regeneration," "a restoration," a deliverance from the bondage of corruption and an introduction into the glorious liberty of the Son of God. This earth, according to the common opinion, that is, this renovated earth, is to be the final seat of Christ's kingdom. This is the new heavens; this is the New Jerusalem, the Mount Zion in which are to be gathered the general assembly and church of the first-born, which are written in heaven; the spirits of just men made perfect; this is the heavenly Jerusalem; the city of the living God; the kingdom prepared for his people before the foundation of the world.

5. It is of course, in itself, no matter of interest what portion of space these new heavens and new earth are to occupy, or of what materials they are to be formed. As the resurrection bodies of believers are to be human bodies they must have a local habitation, although it be one not made with hands eternal in the heavens. All we know about it is that it will be glorious, and adapted to the spiritual bodies which those in Christ are to receive when He comes the second time unto salvation.

[871] Die Dogmatik der evangelisch-lutherischen Kirche, von Heinrich Schmid, Professor de Theologie in Erlangen; Frankfort and Erlangen, 1853; p. 506.

[872] Theologia Didactico-Polemica, edit. Leipzig, 1715.

[873] Loci Theologici, XXX. v. 37; T□bingen, 1779, vol. xx. pp. 51, 52.

[874] Institutio, XX. v.; edit. Edinburgh, 1847, vol. iii. p. 506.

[875] Dogmatik, 104; T□bingen, vol. ii. p. 665.

§ 4. The Kingdom of Heaven.

In the account given of the final judgment in Matthew xxv. 31-46, we are told that the King shall "say to those on his right hand, Come, ye blessed of my Father, inherit the kingdom we prepared for you from the foundation of the world."

1. In the Old Testament it was predicted that God would set up a kingdom, which was

to be universal and everlasting.

2. Of this kingdom the Messiah was to be the head. He is everywhere in the Old Testament set forth as a king. (See Gen. xlix. 10; Num. xxiv. 17; 2 Sam. vii. 16; Is. ix. 6, 7; xi.; lii.; liii.; Mich. iv.; and Psalms ii.; xlv.; lxxii.; and cx.)

3. It is called, for obvious reasons, in the Scriptures, indifferently, the kingdom of God, the kingdom of Christ, the kingdom of the Son of Man (Matt. xiii. 41) and the kingdom of heaven.

4. It is described in the prophets in the most glowing terms, in figures borrowed partly from the paradisiacal state of men, and partly from the state of the theocracy during the reign of Solomon.

5. This kingdom belongs to Christ, not as the Logos, but as the Son of Man, the Theanthropos; God manifest in the flesh.

6. Its twofold foundation, as presented in the Bible, is the possession on the part of Christ of all divine attributes, and his work of redemption. (Heb. i. 3; Phil. ii. 6-11.) It is because He being equal with God, "humbled Himself, and became obedient unto death, even the death of the cross," that "God also hath highly exalted Him, and given Him a name which is above every name: that at the name of Jesus every knee should bow, of things in heaven, and things in earth, and things under the earth; and that every tongue should confess that Jesus Christ is Lord, to the glory of God the Father." All power in heaven and earth has been given into his hands; and all things, ta panta, the universe, put under his feet. Even the angels are his ministering spirits, sent by Him to minister to those who shall be heirs of salvation.

7. This messianic or mediatorial kingdom of Christ, being thus comprehensive, is presented in different aspects in the Word of God. Viewed as extending over all creatures, it is a kingdom of power, which, according to 1 Corinthians xv. 24, He shall deliver up to God even the Father, when his mediatorial work is accomplished. Viewed in relation to his own people on earth it is the kingdom of grace. They all recognize Him as their absolute proprietor and sovereign. They all confide in his protection, and devote themselves to his service. He rules in them and reigns over them, and subdues all their and his enemies. Viewed in relation to the whole body of the redeemed, when the work of redemption is consummated, it is the kingdom of glory, the kingdom of heaven, in the highest sense of the words. In this view his kingdom is everlasting. His headship over his people is to continue forever, and his dominion over those whom He has purchased with his blood shall never end.

8. As this kingdom is thus manifold, so also it is, in some of its aspects, progressive. It is represented in Scripture as passing through different stages. In prophecy it is spoken of as a stone cut out without hands, which became a great mountain and filled the whole earth. In Daniel vii. 14, it is said of the Messiah that to Him "there was given dominion, and glory, and a kingdom, that all people, nations, and languages, should serve Him." So, too, in Psalm ii. 8, it is written of Him, "Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for the inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession; in Psalm lxxii. 11, "All nations shall serve Him;" verse 17, "All nations shall call Him blessed;" in Psalm lxxxvi. 9, "All nations whom thou hast made shall come and worship before thee, O Lord; and shall glorify thy name;" in Isaiah xlix. 6, "I will also give thee for a light to the Gentiles, that thou

mayest be my salvation unto the end of the earth;" in Habakkuk ii. 14, "The earth shall be filled with the knowledge of the glory of the LORD, as the waters cover the sea;" and in Malachi i. 11, "From the rising of the sun even unto the going down of the same, my name shall be great among the Gentiles." The Scriptures abound with passages of similar import. It is not only asserted that the kingdom of Christ is to attain this universal extension by slow degrees, but its gradual progress is illustrated in various ways. Our Lord compares his kingdom to a grain of mustard-seed, which is indeed the least of all seeds, but when it is grown it is the greatest among herbs; and to heaven which a woman took, and hid in three measures of meal, till the whole was leavened.

9. Although God has always had a kingdom upon earth, yet the kingdom of which the prophets speak began in its messianic form when the Son of God came in the flesh. John the Baptist, the forerunner of Christ, came preaching that the kingdom of God was at hand. Our Lord Himself, it is said, went from village to village, preaching the kingdom of God. (Luke iv. 43; viii. 1.) When asked by Pilate whether He was a king, he "answered, Thou sayest that I am a king. To this end was I born, and for this cause came I into the world." (John xviii. 37). The Apostles wherever they went "testified the kingdom of God." (Acts xxviii. 23.) Their business was to call upon men to receive the Lord Jesus as the Christ, the anointed and predicted Messiah or king of his people, and to worship, love, trust and obey Him as such. They were, therefore, accused of acting contrary to "the decrees of C[illegible]sar, saying that there is another king, one Jesus." (Acts xvii. 7.) Men are exhorted to seek first the kingdom of God, as a present good. It is compared to a pearl or treasure, for which it were wise for a man to sacrifice everything. Every believer receives Christ as his king. Those who receive Him in sincerity constitute his kingdom, in the sense in which the loyal subjects of an earthly sovereign constitute his kingdom. Those who profess allegiance to Christ as king constitute his visible kingdom upon earth. Nothing, therefore, can be more opposed to the plain teaching of the New Testament, than that the kingdom of Christ is yet future and is not to be inaugurated until his second coming. This is to confound its consummation with its commencement.

10. As to the nature of this kingdom, our Lord Himself teaches us that it is not of this world. It is not analogous to the kingdoms which exist among men. It is not a kingdom of earthly splendour, wealth, or power. It does not concern the civil or political affairs of men, except in their moral relations. Its rewards and enjoyments are not the good things of this world. It is said to consist in "righteousness, and peace, and joy in the Holy Ghost." (Rom. xiv. 17.) Christ told his hearers, "The kingdom of God is within you." The condition of admission into that kingdom is regeneration (John iii. 5), conversion (Matt. xviii. 3), holiness of heart and life, for the unrighteous shall not inherit the kingdom of God; nor thieves, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor extortioners (1 Cor. vi. 9, 10; Gal. v. 21; Eph v. 5).

11. This kingdom, in the interval between the first and second advents of Christ, is said to be like a field in which the wheat and tares are to grow together until the harvest, which is the end of the world. Then "the Son of Man shall send forth his angels, and they shall gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity; and shall east them into a furnace of fire: there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth. Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." (Matt. xiii. 41-43.) Experience concurs with Scripture in teaching that the kingdom of Christ passes through

many vicissitudes; that it has its times of depression and its seasons of exaltation and prosperity. About this in the past, there can be no doubt. Prophecy sheds a sufficiently clear light on the future to teach us, not only that this alternation is to continue to the end, but, more definitely, that before the second coming of Christ there is to be a time of great and long continued prosperity, to be followed by a season of decay and of suffering, so that when the Son of Man comes he shall hardly find faith on the earth. It appears from passages already quoted that all nations are to be converted; that the Jews are to be brought in and reingrafted into their own olive-tree; and that their restoration is to be the occasion and the cause of a change from death unto life; that is, analogous to the change of a body mouldering in the grave to one instinct with joyous activity and power. Of this period the ancient prophets speak in terms adapted to raise the hopes of the Church to the highest pitch. It is true it is difficult to separate, in their descriptions, what refers to "this latter day of glory" from what relates to the kingdom of Christ as consummated in heaven. So also it was difficult for the ancient people of God to separate what, in the declarations of their prophets, referred to the redemption of the people from Babylon from what referred to the greater redemption to be effected by the Messiah. In both cases enough is plain to satisfy the Church. There was a redemption from Babylon, and there was a redemption by Christ; and in like manner, it is hoped, there is to be a period of millenial glory on earth, and a still more glorious consummation of the Church in heaven. This period is called a millennium because in Revelation it is said to last a thousand years, an expression which is perhaps generally understood literally. Some however think it means a protracted season of indefinite duration, as when it is said that one day is with the Lord as a thousand years. Others, assuming that in the prophetic language a day stands for a year, assume that the so-called millennium is to last three hundred and sixty-five thousand years. During this period, be it longer or shorter, the Church is to enjoy a season of peace, purity, and blessedness such as it has never yet experienced.

The principal reason for assuming that the prophets predict a glorious state of the Church prior to the second advent, is, that they represent the Church as being thus prosperous and glorious on earth. But we know that when Christ comes again the heavens and earth are to pass away, and that no more place will be found for them. The seat of the Church, after the second coming, is not to be the earth, but a new heavens and a new earth. As therefore the Scriptures teach that the kingdom of Christ is to extend over all the earth; that all nations are to serve Him; and that all people shall call Him blessed; it is to be inferred that these predictions refer to a state of things which is to exist before the second coming of Christ. This state is described as one of spiritual prosperity; God will pour out his Spirit upon all flesh; knowledge shall everywhere abound; wars shall cease to the ends of the earth, and there shall be nothing to hurt or destroy in all my holy mountain, saith the Lord. This does not imply that there is to be neither sin nor sorrow in the world during this long period, or that all men are to be true Christians. The tares are to grow together with the wheat until the harvest. The means of grace will still be needed; conversion and sanctification will be then what they ever have been. It is only a higher measure of the good which the Church has experienced in the past that we are taught to anticipate in the future. This however is not the end. After this and after the great apostasy which is to follow, comes the consummation.

The Consummation.

12. When Christ comes again it will be to be admired in all them that believe. Those who are then alive will be changed, in the twinkling of an eye; their corruptible shall put on incorruption, and their mortal shall put on immortality. Those who are in the graves shall hear the voice of the Son of Man and come forth to the resurrection of life, their bodies fashioned like into the glorious body of the Son of God. Thus changed, both classes shall be ever with the Lord.

The place of the final abode of the righteous is sometimes called a house; as when the Saviour said: "In my Father's house are many mansions" (John xiv. 2); sometimes "a city which hath foundations, whose builder and maker is God." (Heb. xi. 10.) Under this figure it is called the new or heavenly Jerusalem, so gorgeously described in the twenty-first chapter of the Apocalypse. Sometimes it is spoken of as "a better country, that is an heavenly" (Heb. xi. 16); a country through which flows the river of the water of life, and "on either side of the river was there the tree of life, which bare twelve manner of fruits, and yielded her fruit every month: and the leaves of the tree were for the healing of the nations. And there shall be no more curse: but the throne of God and of the Lamb shall be in it; and his servants shall serve Him: and they shall see his face, and his name shall be in their foreheads. And there shall be no night there: and they need no candle, neither light of the sun, for the Lord God giveth them light: and they shall reign for ever and ever." (Rev. xxii. 2-5.) Sometimes the final abode of the redeemed is called a "new heavens and a new earth." (2 Pet. iii. 13.)

As to the blessedness of this heavenly state we know that it is inconceivable: "Eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, neither have entered into the heart of man, the things which God hath prepared for them that love Him." (1 Cor. ii. 9.)

"We know not, O we know not,

What joys await us there;

What radiancy of glory,

What bliss beyond compare."

We know however: (1.) That this incomprehensible blessedness of heaven shall arise from the vision of God. This vision is beatific. It beatifies. It transforms the soul into the divine image; transfusing into it the divine life, so that it is filled with the fulness of God. This vision of God is in the face of Jesus Christ, in whom dwells the plenitude of the divine glory bodily. God is seen in fashion as a man; and it is this manifestation of God in the person of Christ that is inconceivably and intolerably ravishing. Peter, James, and John became as dead men when they saw his glory, for a moment, in the holy mount. (2.) The blessedness of the redeemed will flow not only from the manifestation of the glory, but also of the love of God; of that love, mysterious, unchangeable, and infinite, of which the work of redemption is the fruit. (3.) Another element of the future happiness of the saints is the indefinite enlargement of all their faculties. (4.) Another is their entire exemption from all sin and sorrow (5.) Another is their intercourse and fellowship with the high intelligences of heaven; with patriarchs, prophets, apostles, martyrs, and all the redeemed. (6.) Another is constant increase in knowledge and in the useful exercise of all their powers. (7.) Another is the secure and everlasting possession of all possible good. And, (8.) Doubtless the outward circumstances of their being will be such as to minister to their increasing blessedness.

§ 5. The Theory of the Pre-millennial Advent.

The common doctrine of the Church stated above, is that the conversion of the world, the restoration of the Jews, and the destruction of Antichrist are to precede the second coming of Christ, which event will be attended by the general resurrection of the dead, the final judgment, the end of the world, and the consummation of the Church. In opposition to this view the doctrine of a pre-millennial advent of Christ has been extensively held from the days of the Apostles to the present time. [876] According to this view, (1.) The nations are not to be converted, nor are the Jews to be restored to their standing in the Church, until the second coming of Christ. (2.) His advent is to be personal and glorious. (3.) He will establish Himself in Jerusalem as the head of a visible, external kingdom. (4.) When He comes, the martyrs, as some say, or, as others believe, all who sleep in Jesus, shall be raised from the dead and associated with Him in this earthly kingdom. (5.) The Jews are to be converted, restored to their own land, invested with special honours and prerogatives, and made the instruments of the conversion of the world. (6.) This kingdom is to be one of great splendour, prosperity, and blessedness, and is to continue a thousand years; which, however, as stated above, is understood in different senses. (7.) After the expiration of the millennium, the general resurrection of the dead, the end of the world, and the final consummation of the Church are to occur. Such are the general features of the scheme which., with many modifications as to details, is known as the pre-millenial advent theory.

The leading objections to this doctrine have been already presented in the discussions of the several topics included under the general head of eschatology. They may be summarily stated as follows: --

1. It is a Jewish doctrine. The principles adopted by its advocates in the interpretation of prophecy, are the same as those adopted by the Jews at the time of Christ; and they have led substantially to the same conclusions. The Jews expected that when the Messiah came He would establish a glorious earthly kingdom at Jerusalem; that those who had died in the faith should be raised from the dead to share in the blessings of the Messiah's reign; that all nations and peoples on the face of the whole earth should be subject to them; and that any nation that did not serve them should be destroyed. All the riches and honours of the world were to be at their disposal. The event disappointed these expectations; and the principles of prophetic interpretation on which those expectations were founded were proved to be incorrect.

2. This theory is inconsistent with the Scriptures, inasmuch as it teaches that believers only are to rise from the dead when Christ comes; whereas the Bible declares that when He appears all who are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation.

3. The Bible teaches that when Christ comes all nations shall appear at his bar for judgment. This theory teaches that the final judgment will not occur until after the millennium. It may be said that the judgment is to commence at the second advent and continue during the reign of a thousand years. But the general judgment cannot occur before the general resurrection, and as the general resurrection, according to this theory, is not to take place until after the millennium, so neither can the general judgment.

4. The Scriptures teach that when Christ comes the second time without sin unto

salvation, then the Church shall enter on its everlasting state of exaltation and glory. Those in Christ who have departed this life shall be raised from the dead and be clothed with their spiritual bodies, and those who are alive shall be changed in a moment, and thus they shall be ever with the Lord. According to this theory, instead of heaven awaiting the risen saints, they are to be introduced into a mere worldly kingdom. [877]

5. It is inconsistent with all the representations given of the glory and blessedness of departed saints, to assume that at the resurrection they are to be brought down to a lower state of existence, degraded from heaven to earth. The millennium may be a great advance on the present state of the Church; but, exalt it as you may, it is far below heaven. This argument bears, at least, against the patristic doctrine of the millennium.

6. The view presented by pre-millennarians of the kingdom of Christ on earth is, in many respects, inconsistent with the Scriptural account of its nature. (a.) It is to be a worldly kingdom. (b.) Its blessedness is to consist largely in worldly prosperity. Although the modern advocates of the doctrine have eliminated the grosser elements included in the theory of many of the fathers on this subject, nevertheless the essential earthly character of the kingdom remains. Men are not to be like the angels. Births and deaths are to go on, not only during the millennium, but without end. Not that the glorified believers who have been raised from the dead are to marry and be given in marriage, but the race of men is to continue indefinitely to increase in the future as it has increased in the past. [878] (c.) The Bible teaches that the distinction between the Jews and Gentiles is abolished in the kingdom of Christ. This theory teaches that after the second advent that distinction is to continue and to be made greater than ever before. The temple at Jerusalem is to be rebuilt; the sacrifices restored; and all the details of the Mosaic ritual, as described in Ezekiel, again introduced. (d.) The Bible teaches that after the end of the world, as described in 2 Peter iii. 10 and in the Apocalypse, there are to be a new heavens and a new earth. This theory teaches the "earth's eternal perpetuity." [879] "The dissolving fires of which Peter speaks," we are told, "are for the perdition of ungodly men;' and not for the utter depopulation and destruction of the whole world Men and nations will survive them and still continue to live in the flesh." [880]

7. This theory disparages the Gospel. "The more common opinion," says Dr. McNeile, "is, that this is the final dispensation, and that by a more copious outpouring of the Holy Spirit it will magnify itself, and swell into the universal blessedness predicted by the prophets, carrying with it Jews and Gentiles, even the whole world, in one glorious flock under one shepherd, Jesus Christ the Lord. This is reiterated from pulpit, press, and platform. It is the usual climax of missionary exhortation, or rather missionary prophecy." [881] "The universal prevalence of religion hereafter to be enjoyed," says Mr. Brooks, "is not to be effected by any increased impetus given by the present means of evangelizing the nations, but by a stupendous display of Divine wrath upon all the apostate and ungodly." [882] Wrath, however, never converted a single soul, and never will. "The Scriptures," according to Mr. Tyso, "do state the design of the Gospel, and what it is to effect; but they never say it is to convert the world. Its powers have been tried for eighteen hundred years, and it has never yet truly converted one nation, one city, one town, nor even a single village." [883] In the work of Rev. David Brown on the Second Advent, [884] abundant evidence is advanced from the writings of Mr. Brooks, Dr. McNeile, and the Rev. Mr.

Bickersteth, to show that those gentlemen teach that the Scriptures "are to be superseded" in the millennium. Other means, probably, as they say, other revelations are to be made for the salvation of men. Any theory which thus disparages the gospel of the grace of God must be false. Christ's commission to his Church was to preach the Gospel to every creature under heaven; Paul says, the Gospel is the power of God unto salvation; that, though a stumbling block to the Jew and foolishness to the Greek, it is the wisdom of God and the power of God; that it has pleased God by the foolishness of preaching to save them that believe; and he plainly teaches (Rom. x. 11-15) that there is no other means of salvation. Wrath, judgments, displays of visible glory, and miracles are not designed for the conversion of souls, nor are they adapted to that end.

8. Another objection to the pre-millennial theory is the want of consistency in its advocates and the conflicting conclusions to which they come. They profess to adopt the principle of literal interpretation. They interpret literally the prophecies relating to the return of the Jews to their own land; which promise to them as a nation dominion over all the other nations of the earth, the rebuilding of the Temple and the restoration of the Temple-service, the greatest worldly prosperity, and even the everlasting perpetuity of their nation in the highest state of blessedness here on earth and "in the flesh." Yet they are forced to abandon their literalism when they come to the interpretation of the prophecies which predict that all the nations of the earth are to go up to Jerusalem every month, and even on every Sabbath. And more than this, they go to the extreme of figurative or spiritual interpretation in explaining the prophecies which refer to the end of the world. The Apostle Peter says in express terms: "The heavens shall pass away with a great noise, and the elements shall melt with fervent heat, the earth also and the works that are therein shall be burned up." This they deny. They say that it is only certain nations who are to be destroyed; that the earth is not to be depopulated; that the final conflagration will produce less change or injury than the deluge did. [885]

The utmost confusion also prevails in the views of pre-millennarians as to the nature of the kingdom of Christ. According to one view Christ and his risen and glorified saints are to dwell visibly on the earth and reign for a thousand years; according to another, the risen saints are to be in heaven, and not on earth my more than the angels now are; nevertheless the subjects of the first resurrection, although dwelling in heaven, are to govern the earth; according to another it is the converted Jewish nation restored to their own land, who are to be the governors of the world; according to another, the Bible divides men into three classes: the Gentiles, the Jews, and the Church of God. The prophecies relating to the millennium are understood to refer to the relative condition of the Jews and Gentiles in this world, and not to the risen and glorified believers. Another view seems to be, that this earth, changed no more by the fires of the last day than it was by the waters of the deluge, is to be the only heaven of the redeemed. Dr. Cumming and Dr. Seiss say they wish no better heaven than this earth free from the curse and from sin. The latter says: [886] "My faith is, that these very hills and valleys shall yet be made glad with the songs of a finished redemption, and this earth yet become the bright, blessed, and everlasting homestead of men made glorious and immortal in body and in soul." Still another view is that there are two heavens, one here and one above; two Jerusalems, both to continue forever, the one on earth and the other in heaven; the one made with hands, the other without hands; both glorious and blessed, but the earthly far inferior to the heavenly; they are like

concentric circles, one within the other; both endless. Men will continue forever, on earth, living and dying; happy but not perfect, needing regeneration and sanctification; and, when they die, will be translated to the kingdom which is above.

It seems therefore that the torch of the literalist is an "ignis fatuus," leading those who follow it, they know not whither. Is it not better to abide by the plain doctrinal teaching of the Bible, rather than to trust to the uncertain expositions of unfulfilled prophecies? What almost all Christians believe is: (1.) That all nations shall be converted unto God. Jesus shall reign from the rising to the setting of the sun. (2.) That the Jews shall be reingrafted into their own olive-tree and acknowledge our Lord to be their God and Saviour. (3.) That all Antichristian powers shall be destroyed. (4.) That Christ shall come again in person and with great glory; the dead shall be raised, those who have done good unto the resurrection of life, those who have done evil unto the resurrection of damnation; and, (5.) That the righteous clothed in their glorified bodies shall then inherit the kingdom prepared for them from the foundation of the world; and the wicked be consigned to their final doom.

Did the Apostles expect the Second Advent in their Day?

The simple facts on this subject are: (1.) That the coming of the Messiah and the establishment of his kingdom was the great object of expectation and desire for the people of God from the beginning of the world. It was the great subject of prophecy and promise under the old dispensation. The ancient saints are described (as Christians now are) as those who were constantly hoping for the coming of the Lord. (Eph. ii. 12; Acts xxvi. 6, 7.) The dying thief said: "Lord, remember me, when thou comest into thy kingdom." The last question put to our Lord by his disciples was: "Lord wilt thou at this time restore again the kingdom to Israel." (2.) As the Messiah came at first as a man of sorrows, to make Himself a sacrifice for sin, He promised to come a second time without sin unto salvation, to raise the dead and to gather all his people into his everlasting home. His second coming therefore was to Christians what his first coming was to the Old Testament saints; the constant object of expectation and desire. (3.) As the time of the second advent was unrevealed either to men or angels, the early Christians hoped it might occur in their day. The Apostles themselves no doubt at first cherished that expectation. (4.) To the Apostle Paul, however, it was revealed that the day of the Lord was not to come until a great apostasy had occurred. (5.) Nevertheless as the Apostolic Christians did not know how long that apostasy was to continue, their constant prayer was, O Lord come quickly. The Apostles continued to hold up the second advent as an impending event, the moral impression of which ought to be to raise the affections of the people from the world and fix them on the things unseen and eternal. Those who urge the fact that the New Testament writers speak of the day of the Lord as at hand, and exhort believers to watch and pray for his advent, as a proof that the Apostles believed that it might occur at once, that no events then future must come to pass before Christ came, forget that what inspired men said God said. If God, who knew that Christ was not to come for at least eighteen centuries after his ascension, could say to his people: "The day of the Lord is at hand." "Watch therefore, for ye know neither the day nor the hour wherein the Son of Man cometh," then that language was appropriate even on the assumption that those who used it knew that the second advent was not to occur for thousands of years; for a thousand years are with God as one day, and one day as a thousand years. The Church waited four thousand years for the fist advent; we may be content to wait

God's time for the second. [887]

[876] There recently appeared in the Presbyterian, a series of articles signed "Twisse," understood to be from the pen of the Rev. Dr. Duffield of Princeton, New Jersey, designed to sustain the doctrine of the pre-millennial advent of Christ, and especially to disprove "the doctrine of a millennial era of universal righteousness and peace on earth before" the second coming of Christ. The arguments summarily stated by the writer as the following: "(1.) Were the doctrine true, it would undoubtedly be prominent in the New Testament, and especially in the Apostolical Epistles. The fact is, it is not only just prominent, but, so far as we are informed, the advocates of the doctrine do not pretend to find in the Epistles the slightest allusion to it. (2.) The uniform and abundant teaching of the New Testament as to the condition of the Church and of the world during the present dispensation -- that is, until the advent -- forbid the expectation of such a millennium. (3.) The advent itself, not the millennium, is prominently presented in the New Testament as the blessed hope' of the Church, and is uniformly referred to as an event near at hand, ever imminent, to be looked for' with longing expectation. (4.) The Saviour's repeated command to watch' for his coming, because we know not the hour,' is inconsistent with the idea of a millennium intervening. (5.) The New Testament teaches repeatedly and unequivocally that the advent and the manifestation of the Messianic kingdom are to be synchronous events. (6.) The Apostolic Church, under the instruction of those holy men who spoke and wrote as they were moved by the Holy Ghost, was millennarian. (7.) The Church, for two centuries immediately succeeding the Apostles was millennarian. (8.) The doctrine of a millennium before the advent is not to be found in the standards of any of the Churches of the Reformation; by several it is expressly repudiated. It is a modern novelty, suggested but one hundred and fifty years ago by Whitby, and avowedly as a new hypothesis.'"

[877] It is true that pre-millennialists differ very much on this point. The common opinion in the early Church was that the risen saints are to live and reign a thousand years with Christ on earth; but some say that the glorified believers are to be in heaven; others, that they are to appear from time to time on earth, as Christ did, during the forty days which intervened between his resurrection and ascension; and others appear to teach that glorified saints are to rule over unglorified humanity without being revealed to those over whom they reign.

[878] See passages cited from distinguished millennarians on this point in Rev. David Brown's Christ's Second Coming, pp. 167-173. Mr. David N. Lord devotes to this subject two chapters of his book on The Coming and Reign of Christ. New York, 1858. He says (p. 151), that the Scriptures teach that the earth is "to continue forever, and that mankind are forever to occupy it, and multiply in an endless succession of generations; and that it is to be the scene of Christ's everlasting kingdom and reign." He argues this from the covenant made from Noah; from the promise made to Abraham that his seed should forever possess the land of Canaan; and from the promise made to David that his seed should sit on his throne and reign forever. This perpetuity of the human race on the earth and in the flesh, he considers one of the most clearly revealed purposes of God concerning the family of man. Instead of the number of the redeemed being nearly made up, he holds that they are to go on multiplying through all eternity.

[879] The Last Times and the Great Consummation. By Joseph A. Seiss, D. D.

Philadelphia and London, 1866. p. 73. On p. 75, the author says, "The earth shall not pass away."

[880] Seiss, ut supra, p. 211.

[881] Lectures on the Prophecies Relative to the Jewish Nation, 1st ed., 1830, p. 72.

[882] Elements of Prophetic Interpretation, pp. 227, 228.

[883] Defence of the Personal Reign of Christ, 1841, p. 41, 42.

[884] pp. 311-315.

[885] The Last Times, J. A. Seiss, D. D. p. 74.

[886] The Last Times, p. 72.

[887] Millennarians are not consistent in urging the objection considered in the text, as some at least of their own number teach that important events yet future must occur before the establishment of Christ's kingdom. For example, Rev. John Cox, Minister of the Gospel, Woolwich, in his Thoughts on the Coming and Kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ, devotes the third chapter of that work to prove that the entire destruction of the Papacy, of Mohammedanism, and of the tyrannical kingdoms of the world, and the restoration of the Jews to their own land, must precede the kingdom of Christ. See The Literalist, vol. v. p. 26 ff. The Literalist is a collection, in five octavo volumes, of the publications of the leading English pre-millennarians. Published by Orrin Rogers, Philadelphia, 1840 and 1841.

§ 6. Future Punishment.

Our Lord in his account of the final judgment says, that the wicked shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal.

The sufferings of the finally impenitent, according to the Scriptures, arise: (1.) From the loss of all earthly good. (2.) From exclusion from the presence and favour of God. (3.) From utter reprobation, or the final withdrawal from them of the Holy Spirit. (4.) From the consequent unrestrained dominion of sin and sinful passions. (5.) From the operations of conscience. (6.) From despair. (7.) From their evil associates. (8.) From their external circumstances; that is, future suffering is not exclusively the natural consequences of sin, but also includes positive inflictions. (9.) From their perpetuity.

There seems to be no more reason for supposing that the fire spoken of in Scripture is to be literal fire, than that the worm that never dies is literally a worm. The devil and his angels who are to suffer the vengeance of eternal fire, and whose doom the finally impenitent are to share, have no material bodies to be acted upon by elemental fire. As there are to be degrees in the glory and blessedness of heaven, as our Lord teaches us in the parable of the ten talents, so there will be differences as to degree in the sufferings of the lost: some will be beaten with few stripes, some with many.

The Duration of Future Punishment.

On this subject the following opinions have been held: --

1. It is assumed that the design of punishment is reformation, and that it is effective to that end. The time will, therefore, come when all sinful creatures, whether men or angels, shall be purged from all corruption, and restored to the image and favour of God. This was the doctrine of Origen in the early Church. Other restorationists rest their hope of the

ultimate salvation of all men, not on the purifying effect of suffering, but on the efficacy of the death of Christ. If He died for all, they infer, all will be saved.

2. Others hold that future punishment is only hypothetically everlasting. That is, the wicked will suffer forever if they continue to sin forever. But, if the Spirit continues to strive with men m the world to come, or, as others believe, if plenary ability belongs to the very nature of a rational creature, then we may assume that some, perhaps many, perhaps all, in the course of ages, will repent and turn unto God and live.

3. Others again teach that the sufferings of the impenitent are only relatively endless; that is, it will forever be true that their condition will be inferior to what it would have been had they been better men.

4. Others hold that the life promised to the righteous is immortality, and that the death threatened against the wicked is the extinction of life, or, the cessation of conscious existence. The soul will die in the future world, just as the body dies here. It ceases to act; it ceases to feel; it ceases to be. This death of the soul is called eternal, because life is never to be restored. The punishment of the wicked is, therefore, in a sense, everlasting. It is a final and everlasting forfeiture of all good. Thus Cicero [888] calls death "sempiternum malum," and Lucretius [889] speaks of a "mors immortalis." This second death may be very painful and protracted. The finally impenitent, may, and doubtless will, suffer for a longer or shorter period, and to a less or greater degree, before the final extinction of their being. And thus there shall be a future retribution, answering all the ends of justice. [890]

5. The common doctrine is, that the conscious existence of the soul after the death of the body is unending; that there is no repentance or reformation in the future world; that those who depart this life unreconciled to God, remain forever in this state of alienation, and therefore are forever sinful and miserable. This is the doctrine of the whole Christian Church, of the Greeks, of the Latins, and of all the great historical Protestant bodies.

It is obvious that this is a question which can be decided only by divine revelation. No one can reasonably presume to decide how long the wicked are to suffer for their sins upon any general principles of right and wrong. The conditions of the problem are not within our grasp. What the infinitely wise and good God may see fit to do with his creatures; or what the exigencies of a government embracing the whole universe and continuing throughout eternal ages, may demand, it is not for such worms of the dust as we are, to determine. If we believe the Bible to be the Word of God, all we have to do is to ascertain what it teaches on this subject, and humbly submit.

1. It is an almost invincible presumption that the Bible does teach the unending punishment of the finally impenitent, that all Christian churches have so understood it. There is no other way in which this unanimity of judgment can be accounted for. To refer it to some philosophical speculation which had gained ascendancy in the Church, such as the dualism of good and evil as two coeternal and necessary principles, or the Platonic doctrine of the inherent immortality and indestructible nature of the human soul, would be to assign a cause altogether inadequate to the effect. Much less can this general consent be accounted for on the ground that the doctrine in question is congenial to the human mind, and is believed for its own sake, without any adequate support from Scripture. The reverse is the case. It is a doctrine which the natural heart revolts from and struggles against, and to which it submits only under stress of authority. The Church believes the doctrine because it

must believe it, or renounce faith in the Bible and give up all the hopes founded upon its promises. There is no doctrine in support of which this general consent can be pleaded, which can be shown not to be taught in the Bible. The doctrines of the Trinity, the divinity of Christ, the personality of the Holy Spirits the sinfulness of men, and others of a like kind, are admitted to be Scriptural even by those who do not believe them. The argument now urged, does not suppose the Church to be infallible; nor that the authority of the Church is the ground of faith; it only assumes that what the great body of the competent readers of a plain book take to be its meaning, must be its meaning.

It is unreasonable to account for the general reception of the doctrine in question on the ground of church authority. It was universally received before the external Church arrogated to itself the right to dictate to the people of God what they must believe and it continued to be received when, at the Reformation, the authority of the Church was repudiated, and the Scriptures were declared to be the only infallible rule of faith and practice. Any man, therefore, assumes a fearful responsibility who sets himself in opposition to the faith of the Church universal.

2. It is admitted that the doctrine of the perpetuity of the future punishment of the wicked was held by the Jews under the old dispensation, and at the time of Christ. Neither our Lord nor his Apostles ever contradicted that doctrine. They reproved the false teachers of their day for doctrinal errors on many points, but they never corrected their faith in this doctrine. They never teach anything inconsistent with it. Their recorded instructions give no ground for a belief either of the final restoration of all rational creatures to the favour of God, or of the annihilation of the wicked. The passages which are appealed to by Universalists in support of their doctrine admit of a natural and simple interpretation in harmony with the general teaching of the Bible on this subject. For example, in Ephesians i. 10, it is said to be the purpose of God to bring into one harmonious whole (or, as it is expressed in Colossians i. 20, to reconcile unto Himself) all things, i.e., all, who are in heaven and who are on earth. The question is, who, or what are the all, who are to be reconciled unto God? This question must be answered by a reference to the nature of the thing spoken of, and to the analogy of Scripture. It cannot mean absolutely "all things," the whole universe, including sun, moon, and stars, for they are not susceptible of reconciliation to God. For the same reason it cannot mean all sensitive creatures, including irrational animals. Nor can it mean all rational creatures, including the holy angels; for they do not need reconciliation. Nor can it mean all fallen rational creatures, for it is expressly taught, Hebrews ii. 16, that Christ did not come to redeem fallen angels. Nor can it mean all men, for the Bible teaches elsewhere that all men are not reconciled to God; and Scripture cannot contradict Scripture; for that would be for God to contradict Himself. The "all" intended is the "all" spoken of in the context; the whole body of the people of God; all the objects of redemption.

Restorationists appeal also to Romans v. 18: "As by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life." This is made to mean, that as all men are condemned for Adam's offence, so all men are justified for the righteousness of Christ. The same interpretation is put upon the parallel passage in 1 Corinthians xv. 22: "As in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive." In both these passages, however, the "all" is

necessarily limited by the context. It is the all who are in Adam, that die; and the all who are in Christ, that are made alive. Restorationists limit the word to all men, or to all fallen creatures, in obedience to what they suppose to be the analogy of Scripture; and this is all that is done by the orthodox. The only question is, What do the Scriptures elsewhere teach? If they clearly teach that all men and fallen angels are to be saved, then these passages must be interpreted accordingly; but if they teach that all men are not saved, then these passages cannot be understood to assert the contrary. Of themselves they decide nothing. They may be understood in two ways; which is their real meaning depends on what is taught elsewhere.

The same remark may be made in reference to other passages which Universalists rely upon. Thus in 1 Corinthians xv. 25, it is said that Christ "must reign, until He hath put all enemies under his feet." This may mean that He must reign until all sin and misery are banished from the universe; but this is not its necessary meaning, for Satan may be subdued without being either converted or annihilated. In like manner, in 1 Timothy ii. 4, it is said God "will have all men to be saved;" if the word will, thelei, here means to purpose, then the passage teaches that all men shall ultimately be certainly saved. But if the word means here what it does in Matthew xxvii. 43, to have complacency in, (ei thelei auton,) then it teaches only what the Bible everywhere else teaches, namely, that God is love; that He delights not in the death of sinners. It is to pervert, and to misinterpret the Word of God, to make one passage contradict another simply because the language used admits of an explanation which brings them into conflict. The question is not, What certain words may mean? but, What were they intended to mean as used in certain connections?

If Christ and his Apostles did not teach that all men are to be saved, neither did they teach that the wicked are to be annihilated Mr. Constable, in his work above referred to, lays down the principle that the language of the Scriptures, especially of the New Testament, is to be interpreted according to the "usus loquendi" of the Greek writers. We are to go to our classical dictionaries to learn the meaning of the words they use. From this principle he infers that as the word zoe, life, in ordinary Greek, means continued existence, and thanatos, death, the cessation of existence, such is their meaning in the Scriptures. Therefore, when in the Bible eternal life is promised to the righteous, immortality is promised to them; and when eternal death is threatened against the wicked, annihilation is declared to be their doom. A Greek-speaking people, he says, could attach no other meaning to such language. In like manner as the words which we translate to destroy, or cause to perish, mean to blot out of existence, the inference is that when the wicked are said to be destroyed, or to perish, it can only mean that they are annihilated.

On this it may be remarked, --

1. That the rule of interpretation here laid down is obviously incorrect, and its application would reduce the doctrines of the Bible to the level of heathenism. If Greek words as used in Scripture express no higher ideas than on the lips of Pagans, then we can have only the thoughts of Pagans in the Bible. On this principle, how could the Gospel be preached to heathen? to the Hindoos, for example, if they were forbidden to attach to the words God, sin, repentance, and a holy life, no other ideas than those suggested by the corresponding terms of their own language? The Bible, so far as written in Greek, must be understood as Greek. But the "usus loquendi" of every language varies more or less in

different ages, and as spoken by different tribes and nations. Every one admits that Hellenistic Greek has a usage distinguishing it from the language of the classics. The language of the Bible must explain the language of the Bible. It has a "usus loquendi" of its own. It is, however, not true that the words life and death (zoe, and thanatos) are in any language used only in the limited sense which Mr. Constable's argument would assign to them. When the poet said, "dum vivimus vivamus," he surely did not mean to say, while we continue to exist, let us continue to exist.' The Scriptures written in the language of men use words as men are accustomed to use them, literally or figuratively, and in senses suited to the nature of the subjects to which they are applied. The word life means one thing when used of plants, another when used of animals, and another when spoken of in reference to the soul of man. The death of a plant is one thing, the death of an immortal soul is something entirely different. That the words life and death are not confined to the limited sense in which annihilationists would take them, hardly needs to be proved. The Scriptures everywhere recognize the distinction, in reference to men, between animal, intellectual, and spiritual life. A man may have the two former and be destitute of the latter. God quickens those dead in trespasses and sins; that is, he imparts spiritual life to those who are in the full vigour of their animal and intellectual being. Therefore we are told that the favour of God is life; that to know God is eternal life; that to be spiritually minded is life and that to be carnally minded is death. The Apostle tells the Colossians: "Ye are dead, and your life is hid with Christ in God." He says to the Galatians: "I live; yet not I, but Christ liveth in me." Those who "live in pleasure" are said to be "dead while they live." No one believes that the word life in such Scriptural phrases as "the bread of life," "the water of life," "the tree of life," "the crown of life," means only continued existence. The word, when used of the soul of man, means not only conscious being, but a normal state of being in the likeness, fellowship, and enjoyment of God. And in like manner the word death, when spoken of the soul, means alienation or separation from God; and when that separation is final it is eternal death. This is so plain that it never has been doubted, except for the purpose of supporting the doctrine of the annihilation of the wicked.

2. The same remark applies to the use of the words destroy and perish. To destroy is to ruin. The nature of that ruin depends on the nature of the subject of which it is predicated. A thing is ruined when it is rendered unfit for use; when it is in such a state that it can no longer answer the end for which it was designed. A ship at sea, dismasted, rudderless, with its sides battered in, is ruined, but not annihilated. It is a ship still. A man destroys himself when he ruins his health, squanders his property, debases his character, and renders himself unfit to act his part in life. A soul is utterly and forever destroyed when it is reprobated, alienated from God, rendered a fit companion only for the devil and his angels. This is a destruction a thousandfold more fearful than annihilation. The earnestness with which the doctrine of the unending punishment of the wicked is denounced by those who reject it, should convince them that its truth is the only rational solution of the fact that Christ and his Apostles did not condemn it.

3. But Christ and the Apostles not only failed to correct the teachings of the Jews of their day concerning the everlasting punishment of the wicked, but they themselves also taught that doctrine in the most explicit and solemn manner. It is asserted affirmatively that future punishment is everlasting; in the negative form that it can never end; that there is in the future world an impassable gulf between the righteous and the wicked; and that there are

sins which can never be forgiven either in this life or in the life to come. Thus if words can teach this doctrine it is taught in the Bible from the beginning to the end. In the Old Testament, the prophet says (Is. xxxiii. 14): "The sinners in Zion are afraid; fearfulness hath surprised the hypocrites; who among us shall dwell with the devouring fire? who among us shall dwell with everlasting burnings." In Isaiah lxvi. 24 it is said of those who should be excluded from the new heavens and the new earth which the prophet had predicted, "that their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched." "Hell," however, "is of both worlds, so that in the same essential sense, although in different degrees, it may be said both of him who is still living but accursed, and of him who perished centuries ago, that his worm dieth not and his fire is not quenched." [891] The prophet Daniel (xii. 2) says of the wicked, that they "shall awake . . . . to shame and everlasting contempt." In Luke iii. 17 it is said that Christ shall "gather the wheat into his garner; but the chaff He will burn with fire unquenchable." In Mark ix. 42-48 our Lord says that it is better "to enter into life maimed, than, having two hands, to go into hell, into the fire that never shall be quenched: where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." These awful words fell three times, in one discourse, from the lips of mercy, to give them the greater effect. Christ wept over Jerusalem. Why did He not avert its doom? Simply because it would not have been right. So He may weep over the doom of the impenitent wicked; and yet leave them to their fate. It is no more possible that the cup should pass from their lips than that it should have been taken from the trembling hand of the Son of God himself. The latter spectacle was far more appalling in the eyes of angels than the lake of fire prepared for the devil and his angels.

The Judge on the last day, we are told, will say to those on the left hand: "Depart from me, ye cursed, into everlasting fire." "And these shall go away into everlasting punishment: but the righteous into life eternal." The same word is used in both clauses; the wicked are to go eis kolasin aionion; and the righteous eis zoen aionion; it must have the same sense in both. (Matt. xxv. 41, 46.) In John iii. 36 it is said: "He that believeth on the Son hath everlasting life: and he that believeth not the Son, shall not see life; but the wrath of God abideth on him." Paul teaches us in 2 Thessalonians i. 9 that when Christ comes the wicked "shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power." Jude (verse 6) says that the angels which kept not their first estate are "reserved in everlasting chains under darkness, unto the judgment of the great day. Even as Sodom and Gomorrah . . . . are set forth for an example, suffering the vengeance of eternal fire." Of apostates, he says (verses 12, 13) there is reserved for them "the blackness of darkness forever." In Revelation xiv. 9-11, those who worship the beast and his image or receive his mark, shall "be tormented with fire and brimstone in the presence of the holy angels, and in the presence of the Lamb: and the smoke of their torment ascendeth up forever and ever: and they have no rest day nor night." Nearly the same words are repeated in chapters xix. 1-3, 20; xx. 10.

It is objected to the argument founded on these passages that the word "everlasting" is sometimes used in Scripture of periods of limited duration. In reference to this objection it may be remarked, (1.) That the Hebrew and Greek words rendered in our version eternal, or everlasting, mean duration whose termination is unknown. When used in reference to perishable things, as when the Bible speaks of "the everlasting hills," they simply indicate indefinite existence, that is, existence to which there is no known or assignable limit. But when used in reference to that which is either in its own nature imperishable, or of which

the unending existence is revealed, as the human soul or in reference to that which we have no authority from other sources to assign a limit to, as the future blessedness of the saints, then the words are to be taken in their literal sense. If. because we sometimes say we give a man a thing forever, without intending that he is to possess it to all eternity, it were argued that the word forever expresses limited duration, every one would see that the inference was unfounded. If the Bible says that the sufferings of the lost are to be everlasting, they are to endure forever, unless it can be shown either that the soul is not immortal or that the Scriptures elsewhere teach that those sufferings are to come to an end. No one argues that the blessedness of the righteous will cease after a term of years, because the word everlasting is sometimes used of things which do not continue forever. Our Lord teaches that the punishment of the wicked is everlasting, in the same sense that the blessedness of the saints is everlasting. (2.) It is to be remembered, that admitting the word "everlasting" to be ever so ambiguous, the Bible says that the worm never dies, and the fire is never quenched. We have therefore the direct assertion of the word of God that the sufferings of the lost are unending. All the modes of expression used to set forth the perpetuity of the salvation of believers and the everlasting duration of the kingdom of Christ, are employed to teach the perpetuity of the future punishment of the wicked. If that doctrine, therefore, be not taught in the Scriptures, it is difficult to see how it could be taught in human language.

4. A fourth argument on this subject is drawn from passages in which the doctrine is implied, although not directly asserted. This includes those passages which teach that there is no repentance, no forgiveness, no change of state in the future world. This is done, for example, in our Lord's parable of the rich man and Lazarus, in which He teaches that there is no possibility of passing from hell to heaven. So, also, we are taught that those who die in sin remain sinful forever. And our Lord says, it would be better for a man had he never been born, than that he should incur the guilt of offending any of the little ones who believe on Him. This, at least, is conclusive against the doctrine of universal salvation; for if, after any period of suffering, an eternity of happiness awaits a man, his being born is an unspeakable blessing.

Rationalists say that it is very impolitic for Christians to represent the everlasting punishment of the wicked as a doctrine of the Bible. This is undoubtedly true. And so Paul felt that it was very impolitic to preach the doctrine of the Cross. He knew that doctrine to be a stumbling-block to the Jew and foolishness to the Greek. He knew that had he preached the common sense doctrine of salvation by works, the offence of the cross would have ceased. Nevertheless, he knew that the doctrine of Christ crucified was the wisdom of God and the power of God unto salvation. He knew that it was not his business to make a Gospel, but to declare that Gospel which had been taught Him, by the revelation of Jesus Christ. It would be well if all who call themselves Christians, should learn that it is not their business to believe and teach what they may think true or right, but what God in his Holy Word has seen fit to reveal.

Objections.

It is urged that it cannot be consistent with the justice of God to inflict a really infinite penalty on such a creature as man. It is very obvious to remark on this subject: --

1. That we are incompetent judges of the penalty which sin deserves. We have no adequate apprehension of its inherent guilt, of the dignity of the person against whom it is

committed, or of the extent of the evil which it is suited to produce. The proper end of punishment is retribution and prevention. What is necessary for that end, God only knows; and, therefore, the penalty which He imposes on sin is the only just measure of its ill desert.

2. If it be inconsistent with the justice of God that men should perish for their sins, then redemption is not a matter of grace, or undeserved mercy. Deliverance from an unjust penalty, is a matter of justice. Nothing, however, is plainer from the teaching of Scripture, and nothing is more universally and joyfully acknowledged by all Christians, than that the whole plan of redemption, the mission, the incarnation, and the sufferings and death of the Son of God for the salvation of sinners, is a wonderful exhibition of the love of God which passes knowledge. But if justice demand that all men should be saved, then salvation is a matter of justice; and then all the songs of gratitude and praise from the redeemed, whether in heaven or on earth, must at once cease.

3. It is often said that sin is an infinite evil because committed against a person of infinite dignity, and therefore deserves an infinite penalty. To this it is answered, that as sin is an act or state of a finite subject, it must of necessity be itself finite. Men are apt to involve themselves in contradictions when they attempt to reason about the infinite. The word is so vague and so comprehensive, and our ideas of what it is intended to express are so inadequate, that we are soon lost when we seek to make it a guide in forming our judgments. If the evil of a single sin, and that the smallest, lasts forever, it is in one sense an infinite evil, although in comparison with other sins, or with the whole mass of sin ever committed, it may appear a mere trifle. The guilt of sin is infinite in the sense that we can set no limits to its turpitude or to the evil which it is adapted to produce.

4. Relief on this subject is sought from the consideration that as the lost continue to sin forever they may justly be punished forever. To this, however, it is answered that the retributions of eternity are threatened for the sins done in the body. This is true; nevertheless; it is also true, first, that sin in its nature is alienation and separation from God; and as God is the source of all holiness and happiness, separation from Him is of necessity the forfeiture of all good; secondly, that this separation is from its nature final and consequently involves endless sinfulness and misery. It is thus final, unless on the assumption of the undeserved and supernatural intervention of God as in the case of the redemption of man; and thirdly, it is also true that from the nature of the case "the carnal mind is death." Degradation and misery are inseparably connected with sin. As long as rational creatures are sinful, they must be degraded and miserable. There is no law of nature more immutable than this. If men do not expect God to reverse the laws of nature to secure their exemption from wanton transgression of those laws, why should they expect Him to reverse the still more immutable laws of our moral constitution and of his moral government? The doom of the fallen angels teaches us that one act of rebellion against God is fatal, whether we say that all they have suffered since, and all they are to suffer forever, is the penalty of that one act, or the inevitable consequence of the condition into which that one act brought them, makes no difference.

The Goodness of God.

A still more formidable objection is drawn from the goodness of God. It is said to be inconsistent with his benevolence that He should allow any of his creatures to be forever miserable. The answer to this is: --

1. That it is just as impossible that God should do a little wrong as a great one. If He has permitted such a vast amount of sin and misery to exist in the world, from the fall of Adam to the present time, how can we say that it is inconsistent with his goodness, to allow them to continue to exist? How do we know that the reasons, so to speak, which constrained God to allow his children to be sinful and miserable for thousands of years, may not constrain Him to permit some of them to remain miserable forever? If the highest glory of God and the good of the universe have been promoted by the past sinfulness and misery of men, why may not those objects be promoted by what is declared to be future?

2. We have reason to believe, as urged in the first volume of this work, and as often urged elsewhere, that the number of the finally lost in comparison with the whole number of the saved will be very inconsiderable. Our blessed Lord, when surrounded by the innumerable company of the redeemed, will be hailed as the "Salvator Hominum," the Saviour of Men, as the Lamb that bore the sins of the world.

3. It should constrain us to humility, and to silence on this subject, that the most solemn and explicit declarations of the everlasting misery of the wicked recorded in the Scriptures, fell from the lips of Him, who, though equal with God, was found in fashion as a man, and humbled Himself unto death, even the death of the cross, for us men and for our salvation.

[888] Tusculanarum Disputationum, I. xlii. 100; Works, edit. Leipzig, 1850, p. 1057, b.

[889] See Lucretius, De Rerum Natura, iii. 517-519, edit. London, 1712, p. 144.

[890] This theory is advocated with confidence, as well as with ability and learning, by Henry Constable, A. M., Prebendary of Cork, in his tract on The Duration and Nature of Future Punishment, Reprinted from the Second London Edition, New Haven, Conn., 1872. And much more elaborately in Debt and Grace as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life. By C. F. Hudson. Fifth Edition. Boston: 1859.

[891] The Prophecies of Isaiah Translated and Explained. By Joseph Addison Alexander. New York, 1865, vol. ii. p. 482.

Table of Contents

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. I
- INTRODUCTION
  - CHAPTER I: ON METHOD
  - CHAPTER II: THEOLOGY
  - CHAPTER III: RATIONALISM.
  - CHAPTER IV: MYSTICISM.
  - CHAPTER V: ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE RULE OF FAITH.
  - CHAPTER VI: THE PROTESTANT RULE OF FAITH.
- PART I: THEOLOGY PROPER.
  - CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD.
  - CHAPTER II: THEISM.
  - CHAPTER III: ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.
  - CHAPTER IV: THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
  - CHAPTER V: NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
  - CHAPTER VI: The Trinity.
  - CHAPTER VII: THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER VIII: THE HOLY SPIRIT.
  - CHAPTER IX: THE DECREES OF GOD.
  - CHAPTER X: CREATION.
  - CHAPTER XI: PROVIDENCE.
  - CHAPTER XII: MIRACLES.
  - CHAPTER XIII: ANGELS.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. II
- PART II: ANTHROPOLOGY
  - CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER II: NATURE OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER III: THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.
  - CHAPTER IV: UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.
  - CHAPTER V: ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER VI: COVENANT OF WORKS.
  - CHAPTER VII: THE FALL.
  - CHAPTER VIII: SIN.
  - CHAPTER IX: FREE AGENCY.
- PART III: SOTERIOLOGY.
  - CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF SALVATION.
  - CHAPTER II: THE COVENANT OF GRACE.
  - CHAPTER III: PERSON OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER IV: THE MEDIATORIAL WORK OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER V: PROPHETIC OFFICE.
  - CHAPTER VI: PRIESTLY OFFICE.

CHAPTER VII: SATISFACTION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER VIII: FOR WHOM DID CHRIST DIE?
CHAPTER IX: THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.
CHAPTER X: INTERCESSION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XI: KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XII: HUMILIATION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XIII: THE EXALTATION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XIV: VOCATION.
CHAPTER XV: REGENERATION
CHAPTER XVI: FAITH
CHAPTER XVII: JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER XVIII: SANCTIFICATION
CHAPTER XIX: THE LAW
CHAPTER XX: THE MEANS OF GRACE
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. III
PART IV: ESCHATOLOGY.
CHAPTER I: STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH.
CHAPTER II: THE RESURRECTION.
CHAPTER III: SECOND ADVENT.
CHAPTER IV: THE CONCOMITANTS OF THE SECOND ADVENT.

Table of Contents

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. I
- INTRODUCTION
  - CHAPTER I: ON METHOD
  - CHAPTER II: THEOLOGY
  - CHAPTER III: RATIONALISM.
  - CHAPTER IV: MYSTICISM.
  - CHAPTER V: ROMAN CATHOLIC DOCTRINE CONCERNING THE RULE OF FAITH.
  - CHAPTER VI: THE PROTESTANT RULE OF FAITH.
- PART I: THEOLOGY PROPER.
  - CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF THE IDEA OF GOD.
  - CHAPTER II: THEISM.
  - CHAPTER III: ANTI-THEISTIC THEORIES.
  - CHAPTER IV: THE KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
  - CHAPTER V: NATURE AND ATTRIBUTES OF GOD
  - CHAPTER VI: The Trinity.
  - CHAPTER VII: THE DIVINITY OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER VIII: THE HOLY SPIRIT.
  - CHAPTER IX: THE DECREES OF GOD.
  - CHAPTER X: CREATION.
  - CHAPTER XI: PROVIDENCE.
  - CHAPTER XII: MIRACLES.
  - CHAPTER XIII: ANGELS.

SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. II
- PART II: ANTHROPOLOGY
  - CHAPTER I: ORIGIN OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER II: NATURE OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER III: THE ORIGIN OF THE SOUL.
  - CHAPTER IV: UNITY OF THE HUMAN RACE.
  - CHAPTER V: ORIGINAL STATE OF MAN.
  - CHAPTER VI: COVENANT OF WORKS.
  - CHAPTER VII: THE FALL.
  - CHAPTER VIII: SIN.
  - CHAPTER IX: FREE AGENCY.
- PART III: SOTERIOLOGY.
  - CHAPTER I: THE PLAN OF SALVATION.
  - CHAPTER II: THE COVENANT OF GRACE.
  - CHAPTER III: PERSON OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER IV: THE MEDIATORIAL WORK OF CHRIST.
  - CHAPTER V: PROPHETIC OFFICE.
  - CHAPTER VI: PRIESTLY OFFICE.
  - CHAPTER VII: SATISFACTION OF CHRIST.

CHAPTER VIII: FOR WHOM DID CHRIST DIE?
CHAPTER IX: THEORIES OF THE ATONEMENT.
CHAPTER X: INTERCESSION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XI: KINGLY OFFICE OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XII: HUMILIATION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XIII: THE EXALTATION OF CHRIST.
CHAPTER XIV: VOCATION.
CHAPTER XV: REGENERATION
CHAPTER XVI: FAITH
CHAPTER XVII: JUSTIFICATION
CHAPTER XVIII: SANCTIFICATION
CHAPTER XIX: THE LAW
CHAPTER XX: THE MEANS OF GRACE
SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY Vol. III
PART IV: ESCHATOLOGY.
CHAPTER I: STATE OF THE SOUL AFTER DEATH.
CHAPTER II: THE RESURRECTION.
CHAPTER III: SECOND ADVENT.
CHAPTER IV: THE CONCOMITANTS OF THE SECOND ADVENT.