
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The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia

Nationalism and War in the Balkans

Aleksandar Pavkovic



The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia

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SLOBODAN JOVANOVIĆ: An Unsentimental Approach to Politics

The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia

Nationalism and War in the Balkans

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Second edition



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Preface to the Second Edition

The story which I set out to write was the story of how ideas – national ideologies – shaped the creation as well as the destruction of Yugoslavia, the common homeland of the South Slavs. Many years ago, when studying Yugoslav history, I thought that the emergence of Yugoslavia in 1918 presented a fine example of how nineteenth-century ideas shaped the political map of twentieth-century Europe; I could not have imagined, at that time, that its destruction would offer yet another example of the same kind. Only when I first wrote the story did I realise that it is a story of ideas and of war – of how national ideologies, through warfare, shaped the twentieth-century map of the Balkans.

The Yugoslav idea, one of the many national ideologies of the nineteenth-century Balkans, inspired the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in June 1914. The same idea influenced the war aims of the Kingdom of Serbia in World War I and provided the basis for the Corfu declaration of 1917, the wartime constitutional blueprint of the future Yugoslav state. National ideologies also shaped the war aims, policies and practices of the two, mutually opposed, resistance movements in as well as of the pro-Axis Croat Ustasha movement during the first fragmentation of Yugoslavia in World War II. National ideologies of a similar kind – but of quite different content – shaped the war aims and policies of various national movements and parties during the second fragmentation, which started in 1991 with the wars in Slovenia and Croatia and which, perhaps, has not ended as yet. A war, fought for the realisation of the Yugoslav national idea, created Yugoslavia in 1918 and a series of wars, starting in 1991, inspired by quite different national ideas and blueprints, destroyed it.

While the ideas and beliefs which inspired national leaders and, to some extent, fighters in these wars differ greatly in content, they all belong, I believe, to the same broad category – that of national liberation ideologies. Ideologies of this kind purport to identify the foreign oppressor or oppressors of the national group which they address and then call for its liberation, by armed force if necessary, from this foreign oppression. Living under foreign rule is regarded as an unbearable and continuous personal humiliation; the liberation from it, all the ideologies of this kind assume, is a primary duty of every individual. This focus on the (alleged) primary duty of individuals to act in defence of their (and their families') personal dignity and freedom makes the

national liberation ideologies powerful instruments of political mobilisation: these ideologies call upon every individual of a particular national group to support, by his or her action, a political programme which allegedly leads to the liberation from foreign oppression and thus to a free and dignified life for all the individuals in this group. In short, they identify the culprit for the key grievances (as defined by the ideology in question) and propose a plan of collective action for removing the culprit. This model of political action and thought is, for obvious reasons, highly suitable for war mobilisation as well: the principal culprit is always placed outside of the national group and is, thus, an easily identifiable target for the use of force; the destruction or removal of the culprit, so placed, presents no loss to the national group; and any action against such a culprit is always presented as an act of defence of freedom and dignity. Thus, the use of force to remove the foreign culprit responsible for national oppression is easily justified as an act of defence which can lead to no loss to the national group.

In this book I attempt to outline, briefly, the national liberation ideologies involved in the processes of the creation and fragmentation of Yugoslavia and to relate them, in a very general and thus imprecise manner, to the political and war aims of the political movements and parties which were engaged in warfare in former Yugoslavia. The ideologies with I outline are espoused – and sometimes constructed – by the leaders of the political movements and parties; I do not explore, in any systematic way, the extent to which these ideologies were accepted – and how they were interpreted – by their rank- and-file supporters. In particular, I fail to examine how and why in the late 1980s and early 1990s, the new political parties inspired by anti-communist dissident national ideologies came to draw such wide support among all the national groups in former Yugoslavia. This question, I think, warrants a separate comparative study of this crucial period in the spread of national ideologies.

Furthermore, I am attempting to provide only a partial framework for understanding the ideological motivations which political and/or military leaders had in pursuing their political programmes and policies. As a result, the book fails to address the central question in contemporary discussions of the disintegration of Yugoslavia: how to identify and how to rank the causal factors involved in the disintegration. As I am not attempting to offer a causal explanation either for the creation or the disintegration of Yugoslavia, my focus on national ideologies is not an attempt to rank them as a causal factor relative to other causal factors which could be used to explain the Yugoslav disintegration.

Moreover, I do not discuss the questions of responsibility for (and the morality of) war and the acts of violence against civilians and captured soldiers. The focus on national ideologies in Yugoslavia as well as the limitations of space restricted my examination of the politically motivated violence to its narrowly functional aspect: how such violence contributed to the realisation of the goals set by national ideologies. In evaluating the historical experience of 'its' national group, each dissident national ideology – articulated in the period between 1970 and 1989 – predictably minimised the extent and importance of the violence which the members of 'its' national group committed against civilians in World War II and other wars, and strongly condemned the violence committed against 'its' group. In this respect these national ideologies differ little from others of the same kind or from each other. But unlike some national ideologies of the World War II period, none of these dissident national ideologies – which helped to define the war aims of various parties since 1991 – offer an explicit justification for political violence against the civilians of the opposing national group. In consequence, these formerly dissident national ideologies offer no explicit justification of the forced expulsion of civilian populations so widespread in the most recent wars in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo. Other factors, including military objectives and motives, may be of more help in understanding the motivation for this and other kinds of violence against civilians than the national ideologies discussed in the book.

No political ideology nor military objective can easily explain, I think, many other aspects of violence – such as the widespread torture and sexual abuse of both civilians and soldiers – characteristic of some recent wars as well as of World War II; violence of this kind requires, I believe, explanations outside the scope of political science or history. This book, however, attempts no systematic account of any aspect of politically motivated violence against civilians in any period under study.

My approach – as well as the limitations of space – does not allow for the 'voices from below' to be heard – the opinions and sentiments of non-elite, ordinary men and women, who have suffered most from the fragmentation of, and wars in, Yugoslavia. The book does not tell their story and offers little if any insight into their attitudes and views. As a result, to most people who have lived through – and to those who are still living through – the horrors of the recent wars in former Yugoslavia, the story told in the book must appear somewhat unreal. This book is dedicated to the victims of the wars in Yugoslavia whose voices and suffering it fails to record.

Note on the second edition:

For this edition, chapters 10, 11, 12 and the epilogue of the first edition have been rewritten. Minor modifications and additions have been also made in the rest of the text.

In preparing the second edition, I received help from Steven Kosovich, Robert F. Miller, Peter Radan, Steven K. Pavlowitch, Dejan Dokić, Dejan Jović, Kyril Drezov and Bulent Gokay. Macquarie University provided a research grant and Clare Hall, Cambridge, a friendly ambience which both helped me to complete my work. As before, my family endured with patience my absences, both mental and physical, which the writing of this book entailed. To all my heartfelt thanks.

Aleksandar Pavković

Guide to Pronunciation

SERBO-CROATIAN

Č, č and Ć, ć are pronounced as 'ch' in *ch*eque or *ch*ew.

Dž, dž and Dj, dj or Đ, đ are pronounced as 'dz' in *j*azz or *j*oy (dj and đ are alternative transcriptions of the same letter; thus 'Tudjman' is often spelled as 'Tuđman').

Lj, lj is pronounced as 'lj' in mi*lli*on.

Nj, nj is pronounced as nj in o*ni*on.

Š, š is pronounced as 'sh' in *sh*e.

Ž, ž is pronounced as 'zh' in lei*s*ure or trea*s*ure.

ALBANIAN

C pronounced as 'ts' in ra*ts*.

Ç pronounced as 'ch' in *ch*urch.

Ë pronounced as 'a' in sof*a* (as well as in other ways, depending on the region).

R prounounced as 't' in ci*t*y.

X prounounced as 'dz' in a*dz*e or 'ds' in hea*ds*'.

Part I
A Common Homeland of the South Slavs

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1 Yugoslavia at the Crossroads of Competing National Myths

THE CREATION OF A UNITED KINGDOM

In the evening of 1 December 1918, in a small villa in the centre of Belgrade, the regent of the Kingdom of Serbia, Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević, flanked by ministers of the Serbian government and members of its general staff received the Delegation of the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from Zagreb. The National Council was the legislative body of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs, formed on 6 October 1918 out of the South Slav lands of the defeated and disintegrating Austria–Hungary. The vice-president of the Council and leader of the Delegation, the Croat deputy Dr Ante Pavelić,[1] read the Address of the Delegation to the Throne which informed the regent of the National Council's decision to pursue a union of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs with Serbia and Montenegro. The unified state, the Address stated, should be based on democratic, constitutional and parliamentary principles. The Address went on to note that 'large and precious parts' of the South Slav lands were now under Italian occupation and expressed the hope that the prince regent would endeavour to secure the final borders of the unified South Slav state in accordance with the principle of national self-determination proclaimed by president Wilson and the Entente Powers. In response, Prince Aleksandar declared:

> In accepting this announcement, I am convinced that by this act I am fulfilling my duty as a ruler, for I am thereby only at last carrying out that for which the best sons of our blood, of all three religions, all three names, on both sides of the Danube, Sava and Drina, began to work even during the reign of my grandfather of blessed memory Prince Alexander I and of Prince Michael, that which corresponds to the desires and views of my people, and so in the name of His Majesty King Peter I, I proclaim the unification of

> Serbia with lands of the independent State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in a single Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes.[2]

The first Yugoslav state was thus created by a royal proclamation in response to an address of Croat, Serb and Slovene politicians from the former lands of Austria–Hungary. The difference in the content of the two statements exhibits the differences in the conception of the new state which were to plague it from its inception. The regent spoke of the sons of 'our blood, of all three religions and all three names'; by this he (and many Serb politicians) meant the single nation whose members belong to the Eastern Orthodox and Roman Catholic (as well as Islamic) faiths and call themselves Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. The Delegation from Zagreb spoke not of a single nation but only of the idea of the national unity of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs which led them to seek union with Serbia and Montenegro. The former is the conception of unitary Yugoslavs which seeks to dissolve all national differences into one unified nation and to create, correspondingly, a unitary state. The latter is a conception of a South Slav kinship which preserves the national differences among the South Slavs and demands, accordingly, a federal state structure. The struggle between these two general conceptions of the Yugoslav state dominated the politics of the first Yugoslavia from 1918 to 1941. It reappeared in a different guise in the second, communist Yugoslavia and culminated in the late 1960s with the victory of the federalist conception advocated by the communist elites of the five (later, six) officially recognised constituent nations of Yugoslavia.

While the regent saw in the union the fulfilment of the struggle of several generations of Yugoslavs, the single issue which appeared to dominate the Zagreb Delegation's Address was the Italian occupation of South Slav lands and the urgent need to secure the ethnic borders of the new state. This brings to light the difference in the conception of the primary goal of the unified state: the regent and many Serb politicians regarded, as the principal achievement of the new state, the unification of all Serbs and other South Slavs in one state and under the Serbian crown, the goal for which several generations of Serbs had fought. Many Croat and Slovene politicians saw the primary role of the new state in the recovery and defence of Croat- and Slovene-populated territories from the domination of neighbouring states.

In 1990 the new Slovene and Croat political elites, which came to power through multiparty elections, saw in the common Yugoslav state not a protector from outside domination but a threat to their own newly won power. The only organ of the Yugoslav state which effectively re-

stricted their control over their republics was the federal armed force, the Yugoslav People's Army. This army, most of whose officers still stood for a common state of Yugoslavia, was the only Yugoslav force which could topple the new Slovene and Croat elites from power. To secure their power, the new Slovene and Croat regimes had to remove this last vestige of the Yugoslav state from their territory. In 1918 the Slovene and Croat politicians sought protection from outside powers in the creation of a common Yugoslav state. In 1991, when no such protection was needed, the Yugoslav state and its army became the last obstacle to the unfettered rule of the newly established Slovene and Croat political elites.

The new regimes of Slovenia and Croatia – as well as Serbia – sought justification in the national myths and ideologies of their separate nations which preceded the formation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia, as we have seen, arose from the differing versions of the Yugoslav national ideology. Before its creation and for the duration of its existence, this national ideology was competing with national ideologies of the separate South Slav nations – at first, of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes and, later, of Macedonians and Muslims. To understand how the state of Yugoslavia was destroyed in 1991 it would be useful to review the history of these competing national myths and ideologies.

THE COMPETING NATIONAL MYTHS

In the early nineteenth century, Serb and Croat historical myths, like numerous other East European national myths, formed the core around which their national liberation ideologies were constructed. East European national myths often originated as a response to attempts to justify the domination of the aristocracies in East European lands by an appeal to the latter's alleged historical rights. The right of the ruling aristocracies to lord over their populations, often of different ethnic and national background, both before and after the French revolution, was justified in terms of their alleged historic experience of rule and administration. The long history of their rule, it was thus argued, gave the lords both the necessary skill and the right to rule over others. This argument, somewhat generalised and modernised, introduced the right of 'historic nations' to rule over the 'non-historic' ones. The dominance of the German and, later, Hungarian, nations over other East European nations was, accordingly, explained as the right of the nations with a history – a history of being a sovereign state – to rule over others who have, allegedly, had no history of this kind. To counter this argument and to justify

their striving for national independence, patriotic historians and intellectuals of the emerging smaller nations of Eastern Europe started, in the eighteenth century, to search the history of their peoples for suitable independent and sovereign states which could be used to prove that they too have a history on a par with those of the dominant nations. In the process, these intellectuals came to interpret the history of their emerging nations as a mission of recovery of the freedom and independence which these nations possessed in the past.

While the Croat and Serb historical myths were of crucial importance in shaping Croat and Serb national identities and ideologies, the initial differentiation between these two national groups originated neither in these historical myths nor in the variety of dialects which the inhabitants of the South Slav lands speak. The Roman Catholic inhabitants of Croatia speak South Slav dialects which widely differ from each other or – such as kajkavian and štokavian – are barely mutually comprehensible. Yet the štokavian dialects which some of them speak are similar to the dialects of the Eastern Orthodox inhabitants of Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, and Serbia and Montenengro. In view of the similarity of these štokavian dialects, the difference in their religion provided a much better or more effective marker of national or ethnic identity than their vernacular language. In fact, each of the two churches, the Roman Catholic and the Serbian Eastern Orthodox, created distinctive customs, rituals and beliefs which shaped the everyday life of their followers. The separate calendars – Julian for the Eastern Orthodox, Gregorian for the Roman Catholic – prescribed a separate set of feast days even for the common Christian celebrations. In particular, Serb Eastern Orthodoxy developed two distinct cults: that of the medieval founder of the Serb Orthodox Church, St Sava, and that of the Kosovo martyrs. In addition, one of its central family rituals is the celebration of the family patron saint day (*slava*). The celebration of *slava* and of these two cults clearly mark off the Serb Orthodox from other Eastern Orthodox as well as Roman Catholic believers. In the areas of Croatia, southern Hungary and Bosnia-Hercegovina where Roman Catholics and Eastern Orthodox, speaking the same or similar dialects, lived side by side, Roman Catholicism thus became the defining mark of the Croats and Eastern Orthodoxy of the Serbs.

But the differences of religion and/or of language are not, among the South Slavs, necessary for the development of separate national identities. Montenegrins share with the Serbs both Serb Eastern Orthodoxy and the štokavian dialect. It was the distinctive way of life of the Montenegrins, based on the still surviving clan relations, and Montenegro's his-

tory of a separate struggle for independence and statehood, that provided the differentiating markers of a separate Montenegrin national identity. Of course, not all Montenegrins would feel that they belong to a nation different from the Serbs. But even those who regard themselves as Serbs, would still cite their history along with their customs and attitudes to show how different Montenegrins, as a branch of the Serb nation, are from other Serbs. In the Balkans, the markers which, according to some, distinguish simply two branches of the same nation are, according to others, the very markers which separate two nations. The indeterminacy of the nation-separating markers forces national ideologues to keep searching everywhere they can – in history, folklore, religion, legend and language – for further markers of national differences.

The differences in the way of life and religion, although sufficient to differentiate individuals and their communities one from another, are usually not sufficient to shape a fully-fledged national ideology which purports to explain what a nation is and what historical goal it has. By shaping the way of life, beliefs and attitudes of South Slavs, the three religions – Roman Catholicism, Eastern Orthodoxy and Islam – have provided only necessary but not sufficient conditions for the development of three distinct national identities – Croat, Serb (including Montenegrin) and Bosnian Muslim (or Bosniac).[3] The development of these and other national identities among the South Slavs was closely linked with the historical myths which were often quite unrelated to the respective religious dogmas.

The Croat historical myth is based on the medieval kingdom of kings Tomislav (tenth century) and Krešimir (eleventh century). The Croatian kingdom lost its independence in 1097 after the battle of Gvozd in which the Croatian forces were defeated by those of the King of Hungary. From 1102 the crown of Croatia passed to the kings of Hungary so that in assuming the Hungarian crown in the sixteenth century, the Austrian Habsburgs also gained the Croatian crown. Within the historical myth, the medieval Croat Diet (*Sabor*) is held to have continued the tradition of Croat statehood by freely electing (thrice in the span of almost a thousand years) kings other than the rulers of Hungary. In fact, the thousand-year-long history of the Croatian Diet is, within this myth, portrayed as a protracted political struggle for the preservation of old historic rights of the Croatian state against the encroachments of the Austrian Habsburgs and, later, the Hungarian parliament – both of which were aimed at assimilating Croats and Croatian lands. This protracted struggle, according to this myth, continued in the Yugoslav state in which the Serbs, like the Austrians and Hungarians before them,

denied the Croats their distinct national identity as well as sovereignty and political independence. The ultimate goal of this mythical struggle is clearly a sovereign and independent Croatian state, the very state which was created in 1991 by Croatia's 'disassociation' from the Yugoslav federation. The present day Croatia, like many other East European states, is partly a creation of an old historical myth.

The Serb historical myth harks back to the royal house of Nemanjići and their medieval state which flourished in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries on the territory of the present day Serbia, Hercegovina and Macedonia. Within the myth, the history of this medieval Serb state was viewed primarily as a liberation of Serb territories from foreign – in this case Byzantine – rule. Under Dušan the Mighty, crowned Tsar (Emperor) of the Serbs and Romans (Greeks) in 1346, the state reached its peak, extending over the areas of present-day Greece, Bulgaria and Albania. From this tale of a short-lived empire arose the myth of the historic mission of the Serbs to recover the glory of Dušan's and the Nemanjići state by freeing themselves from foreign rule. Soon after Dušan's death, his empire disintegrated into smaller principalities which were in turn conquered by the armies of the Islamic Ottoman empire. The battle on the field of Kosovo in 1389 against the Ottomans became the focus of another historical myth. In this battle, according to the legend, the cream of the Serb nobility sacrificed their lives for their faith and liberty: 'for the golden cross and an honourable freedom'. According to the legend, a Serb nobleman, Miloš Obilić, sacrificed his life by assassinating the Ottoman sultan. The Serb leader Prince Lazar Hrebljanović, who lost his life in the battle, was canonised as a saint in the Serbian Orthodox Church and the day of the battle, 28 June, St Vitus's day (*Vidovdan* in Serbo-Croatian) became one of the central feast days, the day of the Kosovo martyrs. A cycle of magnificent folk epics extolled their sacrifice and exhorted every self-respecting Serb to avenge the defeat at Kosovo. Serb children were thus able to learn by heart the stirring call of Prince Lazar – Prince Lazar's curse – to fight at Kosovo:

> Whoever is a Serb and of Serb blood,
> And he comes not to fight at Kosovo,
> May he never have any progeny
> His heart desires, neither son nor daughter;
> Beneath his hand let nothing decent grow
> Neither purple grapes nor wholesome wheat;
> Let him rust away like dripping iron
> Until his name shall be extinguished.[4]

During the nineteenth century Prince Lazar's legendary call for personal sacrifice on the field of Kosovo became transformed into an exhortation for the liberation of the Serbs from foreign rule.

In the nineteenth century the historical myths formed a basis for the development of political ideologies, ideologies whose projected national goals were to be achieved, not by the blind march of history, but by planned political action. Although articulated by intellectuals, the primary role of these political ideologies was to mobilise popular support for the emerging political parties or movements. The core of Croat historical myth – the unbroken line of Croat statehood from the early medieval Croatian kingdoms onwards – was articulated by a Croat nobleman[5] at the beginning of the eighteenth century in a polemic against Venetian claims on Dalmatia and in the hope of gaining Habsburg support. In addition to this historical myth, this nobleman propounded the territorial myth of Greater Croatia which, in his version extended from the region north of the Danube to Thrace in Greece.[6] While the myth of the historical continuity of the Croat state became the focus of Croat national ideologies in the nineteenth century, the myth of Greater Croatia came to characterise a particularly anti-Serb form of Croatian nationalism. This was the ideology of Ante Starčević for whom Croatia extended from the Julian Alps to the river Timok on the border of Serbia and Bulgaria. According to Starčević, this territory was populated only by Croats. Slovenes were highland Croats while Serbs were decatholicised Croats of lower classes (hence the name 'Serbs', he argued, from Latin *servus* for servant). For Starčević Serbs and Slovenes, as separate nations, simply did not exist.[7] In 1861 he helped found the Party of (Croat State) Right which stood for the full assertion of Croatian state rights, that is, for the independence of Croatia from Hungarian and Habsburg domination and for the unification of Croatia–Slavonia with Dalmatia (then a separate province).

The Serbian uprisings against Ottoman rule in 1804 and 1815, which brought autonomy to Serbia within the Ottoman empire, were, in the view of some of its educated participants and outside observers, attempts at national liberation from arbitrary and oppressive as well as foreign, Islamic rule. Accordingly, the Kosovo tradition of personal sacrifice in the struggle against foreign domination provided the Serb insurgents with the motivational framework for the uprising. Only in 1844 was the recovery of emperor Dušan's lands used as a legitimist justification in the first fully articulated Serb national liberation programme, the *Načertanije* of Ilija Garašanin. This secret government memorandum, presented to the prince of the then semi-independent

Principality of Serbia, laid out plans for the recovery of Serb-populated territories of the Ottoman empire, the present-day southern Serbia, Kosovo and Metohija, Macedonia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The choice of Ottoman-held territories appears to have been made on pragmatic grounds: the Ottoman empire, torn as it was by persistent provincial revolts both of its disadvantaged Christian population and its privileged Muslims, was regarded to be on the decline.[8] Only with the Austro-Hungarian occupation of the previously Ottoman-ruled province of Bosnia-Hercegovina in 1878 and the incorporation of most of the Austrian Military Frontier into Croatia-Slavonia in 1881, did the Serb-populated areas of the Habsburg empire come to be included in the plans of Serb national liberation. The Military Frontier, administered by the Austrian Imperial War Ministry, appeared to Serb political leaders in Austria-Hungary as the best protection of the special status which the Serbs enjoyed since the late seventeenth century. In 1690, following the largest migratory wave of Eastern Orthodox Serbs (the Great Migration of the Serbs)[9] from the Ottoman lands, the Habsburg emperor Leopold I granted these Serb refugees church self-government on condition that they enter imperial service as farmer-soldiers on the Military Frontier. This special status, their leaders thought, prevented the assimilation of the Serbs into the predominant Roman Catholic population of Croatia and Hungary. In contrast, Croat politicians regarded the existence of the Austrian Military Frontier as an infringement of Croatian state rights and sovereignty. The incorporation of the major portion of the Military Frontier (*Vojna Krajina* in Serbo-Croatian) into Croatia-Slavonia in 1881 – which made Serbs one quarter of the latter's population – forced the Serb political leaders in Croatia and in Hungary to look for protection elsewhere. At first their alliance with the Hungarian appointed governor (*ban*) of Croatia against the Croat national parties offered a semblance of continuity of the special status of their nation. But the favours and official patronage of the much hated governor made the Serbs look like traitors to the cause of Croatia's freedom and independence. Under these circumstances, Serb political leaders in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina turned to the ideology of Serb national liberation, promoting the unification of all Serb-populated regions of these two provinces with the (by then) independent Kingdom of Serbia.[10]

Thus in the late nineteenth century the Serb and Croat national liberation ideologies came into conflict over the question of the territory to be liberated from foreign rule. The ideology of Croat state rights claimed, on the basis of the historic rights and the continuity of the Croat medieval state, the whole of Croatia, Slavonia, Dalmatia and

Bosnia–Hercegovina as Croat lands which were to form the future independent Croatia. The Serb national liberation ideologies proclaimed (a rather non-historic) right of the Serbs living in the very same regions to be freed from foreign rule and unified with Serbs in Serbia. Although the boundaries of this latter claim had never been clearly demarcated, substantial portions of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia and the whole of Bosnia–Hercegovina were often included in the territories to be liberated by each side. Even before the national liberation of Serbs and Croats from foreign domination had started in earnest in the late nineteenth century, their two liberation ideologies were in competition over the same territory.

The Yugoslav idea – the idea of unity of the South Slav peoples – appeared to be a way of avoiding the competition over territory: if Serbs and Croats were one nation, it is their common homeland which they needed to liberate from foreign rule. The simplicity and ingenuity of this idea, as we shall see, could not hide its own rather mythical origins.

THE YUGOSLAV IDEA: A BELATED NATIONAL MYTH

The origins of the Yugoslav idea are traditionally sought in the myth of linguistic and cultural unity of the South Slav peoples which first gripped the imagination of a small student circle in Croatia in 1815. Influenced by Herder's view of language and folk customs as the expressions of the soul of each nation, a young law student from Zagreb, Ljudevit Gaj, set about to discover the soul of his nation as expressed in its folk poetry and customs. Searching for a name for the newly discovered nation, he settled on the term 'Illyrian' used earlier by Croat writers and the short-lived Napoleonic administration of South Slav-populated Habsburg provinces. Through his linguistic reforms and his newspaper (the first in a Croat native dialect), Gaj did his best to turn his Romantic myth of an Illyrian nation into reality. He chose the štokavian dialect spoken by both Serbs and Croats as the basis for what was to become the Croat literary standard and modelled the orthography of its Roman script on the orthography of spoken Serbian published in 1814 by the Serb linguistic reformer Vuk Stefanović Karadžić. In this way he hoped to facilitate the creation of a literary standard common to all South Slavs. Partially as a result of his efforts, Serb and Croat linguists and men of letters, including Karadžić, signed in 1850 in Vienna an agreement establishing the štokavian ijekavian dialect as the literary standard for both Serbs and Croats. Thus the

leading Serb and Croat men of letters laid the foundations for what promised to be the linguistic unity of their two respective nations. This unity never came about: while the Croat writers came to accept štokavian ijekavian as their literary standard, writers from Serbia have never done so.[11] Even after the creation of Yugoslavia, the differences between the Croat and the Serb literary standard were jealously preserved as symbols of the difference between the two peoples. In spite of this, for those South Slav intellectuals who wished to see cultural – and, later, political – unity of their nations, the Vienna agreement became a symbol of this unity or, even more, its living proof.

At its next stage of evolution, the idea entered the realm of practical politics. Roman Catholic bishop Josip Strossmayer and canon Franjo Rački were co-founders of the National Party in Zagreb which from 1860 propagated the principle of national self-determination in the Habsburg monarchy. In their view, the subject of self-determination in Croatia and Slovenia was the nation of South Slavs or Yugoslavs. The Serbs, Croats, Slovenes and Bulgarians were, in their terminology, the tribes or branches of 'our nation' (*naš narod*). As it happened, apart from the newly created literary standard, the branches of 'our nation' had little in common – least of all a sense of a common national or even cultural identity. However, from the linguistic unity, Rački suggested, a cultural unity would be built by the common efforts of the Yugoslav intelligentsia and this, in turn, could lead to a political unity in a common state. In this respect, the successful creation of common German and Italian cultures and, subsequently, of their nation-states offered the models which South Slavs should follow. To foster cultural unity, in 1866 Strossmayer founded the Yugoslav Academy of Arts and Sciences in Zagreb of which Rački was the first president; and then, in 1874, he opened the University of Zagreb. In spite of their efforts to forge alliances with the politicians of the Principality of Serbia, their Yugoslavism remained restricted to a small group of enthusiastic intellectuals. At the end of the century the mistrust and distaste of Serbs living in Croatia increased (partly as a result of Serb collaboration with the much hated Hungarian governor) leading, in 1903, to large anti-Serb riots in Zagreb. As the Serbs and their property came under attack in the capital of Croatia, the idea of South Slav or Croato-Serb political unity appeared to be a hollow intellectual dream.

However, in 1905 a coalition of five Serb and Croat parties in Croatia published a manifesto, committing itself to united political action and solidarity of 'both parts of our nation', that is, of Serbs and Croats. Apart from this implicit endorsement of the idea of Yugoslav unity, this was

the first document of a Croatian political party or parties in which the principle of national self-determination was presented as a fundamental political credo.[12] In 1906 the Croato-Serb Coalition won the elections for the Croatian Diet and was soon forced to fight the Hungarian government's attempts to impose the use of Hungarian in Croatia. Despite the persistent attempts of the Austrian and Hungarian governments to discredit its Serb and Croat members (through press campaigns and court proceedings), the Coalition retained its dominance in the Diet until 1918.[13] As the Coalition's platform made references to the 'national unity', the support of the electorate was perceived as an electoral mandate to foster the idea of Yugoslav national unity.

Yet this Croato-Serb political cooperation and resulting political union with Serbia in 1918 was clearly not based on the Yugoslav cultural unity which, according to Rački and Strossmayer, was a prerequisite for the political union of the South Slavs. On the contrary, in spite of the Yugoslav idea which they endorsed, the political unity achieved in 1918 was based on relatively short-term practical political interests. The Croat parties (both those which entered into the Croato-Serb Coalition in 1905 and those which joined it in voting for the union with Serbia in 1918) were primarily motivated by the need to defend Croatia from foreign domination. Once they decided that the defence of Croatia could be achieved outside the union with Serbia and without Serb cooperation, they were ready to abandon or renegotiate the union and the terms of cooperation. The Serb parties from Croatia saw in the union with Serbia not only a guarantee of the preservation of Serb cultural identity but a principal source of their political influence in Croatia and in the newly established kingdom. In the newly unified kingdom in 1918, Serb parties, instead of being political parties of a minority in Croatia, became parties of the largest nation in the new kingdom. Unlike the Croat parties, it was not in their interest to renegotiate the terms of the union to their own disadvantage nor were they ready to abandon the union with Serbia. The divergence of the political interests which led Croat and Serb parties in Croatia to cooperate and to vote for the creation of the Yugoslav state created a rather fragile political basis for the new state.

In contrast to Croatian politics, the idea of Yugoslav national unity played no significant role in the politics of Serbia from 1815, when the country was granted a limited de facto autonomy in the Ottoman empire, until 1878 when Austria–Hungary occupied the Ottoman province of Bosnia–Hercegovina. The liberation of the Serbs, living in the Ottoman, and later Austro-Hungarian empire was, by general political consensus, the main foreign policy goal of this small principality which

only in 1882 became a kingdom. While agreeing on the general goal, Serbian political parties naturally differed in their conception of the means to be employed in liberating their compatriots. As the Principality of Serbia gained its initial autonomy and expanded its territory within the Ottoman empire by a combination of military uprisings and international diplomacy, most Serbian politicians held that some such combination of military action and diplomacy would ensure a further expansion of the Serbian state into the Serb-populated areas of the Ottoman empire. In contrast to this idea of national liberation, the prominent Serbian socialist, Svetozar Marković, argued that Serbs, as well as other oppressed Balkan peoples, could gain their freedom only within the framework of a democratic Balkan federation.[14] This idea of a federation of Balkan peoples – which originated in the writings of Serb liberals active in south Hungary – never spread beyond the confines of liberal and left-wing intellectuals and small social democratic parties. Since prior to 1913 the population of Serbia was nationally homogenous, the federal system had little if any appeal to the political elites or to their peasant constituency. The issue of the relations of Serbs to other South Slavs – Bulgarians, Croats and Muslims – arose, however, at the point at which the way for further expansion of the Serbian state cut through the territory inhabited by non-Serb South Slavs.

The Austro–Hungarian occupation of the Ottoman province of Bosnia–Hercegovina in 1878 appeared to rule out the possibility of expansion of the Serbian state into this multinational region: unlike the declining Ottoman empire, Austria–Hungary was a major European power for which the small, agrarian Principality of Serbia was no match. In Bosnia–Hercegovina the Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Islamic religions provided a basis for the development of separate national identities. By 1878 the Eastern Orthodox and the Roman Catholics, under the influence of the respective national ideologies, had already formed distinct national groups of Serbs and Croats. In contrast, the native Bosnian Muslims – who spoke the same language as the Christian population – lacked a distinct national ideology on a par with the national liberation ideologies of the Serbs and Croats. Under the Ottoman regime, the Muslims had a legally privileged status which gave their local leaders considerable political and economic control of the whole province. In defending this privileged status and their political power, the native Muslim elites opposed (at times with armed force) the modernisation of the legal and political system promoted by the central Ottoman government in Istanbul. In defending their feudal privileges based on Ottoman rule of the province, the native Muslim

elite failed to develop a modern national ideology and national identity which would articulate the national goals of the Muslims independent of Ottoman rule. This only entrenched the view according to which they were a foreign occupier of the native Christian lands.

The majority Christian population of Bosnia–Hercegovina formed a class of indentured tenant farmers whose civil rights were restricted and who had no political rights. Until the middle of the nineteenth century, Christians could not occupy any administrative or judicial posts, were effectively barred from gaining legal titles to land and their access to Ottoman Islamic courts was restricted by procedures discounting their testimony. They had also no right to bear arms and were prohibited from wearing a certain form of dress. In this way they were visibly segregated from their Muslim rulers as well as ordinary Muslims. For the Christians, liberation from the rule of the Ottomans and their local Muslim masters appeared to be the only way to secure civil and political rights which their co-nationals in Austria–Hungary and in Serbia had already enjoyed for some time. In 1875 the Christian peasants in several areas of Bosnia–Hercegovina rose in arms against the Ottoman regime. In Hercegovina the Serbs and Croats joined forces to drive out Ottoman garrisons and local Muslim troops from several towns. In northeast Bosnia only the Serb peasantry rose against the Ottomans while central and east Bosnia, with its large Muslim population, was not affected by the fighting in other parts of the province.[15] The insurrection, sparked by increased taxation and tax abuses by the local Muslim landlords, was the largest rebellion in a series of uprisings against the Ottoman administration which both the Christians[16] and the local Muslim elites staged in Bosnia–Hercegovina during the nineteenth century.

Serbian, Montenegrin and Russian Panslavist public opinion supported the rebels who also attracted numerous volunteers (including the future king Petar I Karađorđević) from other South Slav lands and Russia. The Montenegrin government dispatched some of its units to Hercegovina and the Serbian government supplied arms to the rebels. In attempting to suppress the uprising, the local Muslim leaders as well as Ottoman military commanders imposed a reign of terror over the Christian population which resulted in massacres of Christians, both Serbs and Croats, and the consequent flight of hundreds of thousands of refugees to neighbouring countries. The reports in the European press of the large-scale pillage and massacres of the Christians in Bosnia–Hercegovina coincided with the news of similar massacres in Bulgaria. This was an issue – the so-called 'Bulgarian atrocities' – which contributed to Gladstone's election victory in Great Britain and

his abandonment of the traditional British policy of unconditional support of the Ottomans in the Balkans. The victory of Russia over the Ottomans in 1877 and the creation of a large Bulgarian state out of the former Ottoman territories forced the European powers, including Britain, to redraw the map of the Balkans at the Congress of Berlin in 1878. This was, one could say, the first instance of map-drawing of the Balkans which the popular media, in part, initiated by reporting wide-scale atrocities against civilians.

The Berlin Congress sanctioned the creation of several independent nation-states whose population was predominantly Christian out of the former territory of the Islamic Ottoman empire. In addition to Romania, Serbia and Montenegro were recognised as fully independent states. But Bosnia–Hercegovina, it was decided, was to exchange Ottoman for Austro-Hungarian rule. For the Serb political leaders both in Serbia and in Bosnia–Hercegovina, the Austro-Hungarian occupation was only a change of one foreign ruler for another, in spite of the fact that Austria–Hungary's laws brought to the Christians, for the first time, legal and political equality with the Muslims.[17] To counter the influence of Croat and Serb nationalisms and to legitimise their rule, the Austro-Hungarian authorities constructed yet another national identity: that of Bosnians encompassing all three faiths. Although this new Bosnian identity failed to take root, the attempt illustrates well the role national identities were (and still are) supposed to play in the politics of this region: their primary political role has been to prepare the ground for mass mobilisation in support of an existing or a prospective regime.

Confronted with the need to deny the Austro-Hungarian authorities the right to govern a province which was not populated only by Serbs, the Serb national ideologues came to adopt the idea of the national unity (*narodno jedinstvo*) of Serbs and Croats. The Muslim population, lacking a national identity tied to a national ideology, was considered to belong to this unity, as the Muslims were (in the eyes of the Serb ideologues) primarily Serbs who centuries ago converted to Islam. This idea of national unity was universally regarded as an instrument – or rather, a weapon – in the struggle for national liberation of these peoples. Its acceptance in this instrumental form spread even to the militant pan-Serbian journals such as *Pijemont*[18] which readily accepted that the unification and liberation of all Serbs needed to be based on the national unity of Serbs and Croats and brotherhood with the Bulgarians and Slovenes.[19] The liberation of all Serbs and their brothers, in the view of this weekly, could be carried out only by the armed force of Serbia and under its leadership.

The Balkan wars in 1912–13 appeared to many enthusiastic South Slav nationalists to be the beginning of the final liberation of their lands from foreign rule. Serbia, by the force of its arms, and in cooperation with its Balkan neighbours, liberated the areas of the present-day Kosovo–Metohija, south Serbia and Macedonia from Ottoman rule. But the Balkan wars also revealed the shortcomings of the ideologies of national liberation by armed force. The second Balkan war in 1913 was fought mainly between Bulgaria and Serbia over the territory – present-day Macedonia – which each state claimed by historic and national right. The Serbian government claimed that the territory was populated by Serbs and was part of Dušan's empire; the Bulgarian government staked its claim on the population's membership of the Bulgarian Orthodox church, its Bulgarian dialects and the borders of the medieval Bulgarian empire. In the process, each state claimed to be liberating the territory from a foreign ruler while neither was prepared to offer the population of the territory any voice in the decision whether it wanted to be thus liberated and by whom. The absence of the need for any democratic consultation of the liberated-to-be displays the first shortcoming of the dominant Serbian as well as other national liberation ideologies in the Balkans: it was not democratic.

Serbia won the second Balkan war and the Bulgarian government was thus forced to cede the territory of Macedonia (formerly held by the Ottomans) which it claimed. The Bulgarian national ideologues have, however, never acquiesced in the loss of this territory. A result of the Serbian expansion was that the Serbian state, for the first time, came to include a large number of Christian Slavs who had not considered themselves Serbs before as well as a large number of Slav and Albanian Muslims who could not have been regarded as Serbs. The ideology of Yugoslav national unity did not mobilise the support of these groups for liberation by the Serbs: the Albanians actively resisted while most Christian and Muslim Slavs in Macedonia failed to support the Serbian military campaign of liberation. After the Balkan wars the Serbian (and after 1918, the Royal Yugoslav) government planned to assimilate the Christian Slav population into the Serb nation while the political significance of the unassimilable Muslim population would be reduced by their emigration to Turkey and by Serb colonisation of the areas. These plans failed: the Christian Slavs of Macedonia resisted assimilation and from 1944 onwards were constituted into a separate nation of Macedonians. In spite of migrations to Turkey, the Muslim population of Serbia grew in number and under the Yugoslav communist regime in 1968 formally gained, along with their

Bosnian brethren, the status of a nation. In the same period, the Albanian population was virtually (but not formally) granted the same national status. This upgrading of the national status of these groups was, at least in part, a result of the Yugoslav communist ideology of national liberation which insisted on the equality of all nations in Yugoslavia.

In contrast, the 'national unity' ideology endorsed by many Serb politicians in 1912, was a 'dominant nation' type of ideology: it assumed the domination of the 'nationally unified' nation (whose core would be constituted by the Serbs) over other nations in a new state. This ideology could not justify Serbian rule to those who considered themselves neither Serbs nor Croats, or to those, such as Albanians, who were not Slavs. A national ideology which assumes the assimilation of one national group by another obviously offers no legitimation of the rule of the dominant nation to the unassimilated or unassimilable. This is the second shortcoming of this type of 'dominant nation' ideology: it offered no effective legitimation to those who were neither Serbs nor Croats (nor Slovenes). Both the undemocratic and the assimilationist aspects of the ideology of Yugoslav national unity as propagated by Serb national ideologues formed part of the general discourse of strident self-assertion which came to characterise European national ideologies in the late nineteenth century. These ideologies were used to legitimise territorial conquest and the use of armed force both within and outside Europe. Within this discourse only the stronger and thus 'naturally' dominant national groups could survive in the competition for the territory and allegiance of the smaller and undeveloped national groups.

The liberation from Ottoman rule in 1913 and from Austro-Hungarian rule in 1918 was a liberation of the national groups whose national identity had formed during the Romantic awakening of nations in the first half of the nineteenth century. The drive for the liberation of so-selected national groups triggered, by imitation, a similar drive for liberation or political autonomy of other ethnic or national groups whose national identity and political organisation was formed only later in the century. Thus the first Albanian political organisation, the League of Prizren, formed in 1878, initially demanded the unification of all Albanians in one state.[20] Similarly, the first political organisation promoting Slav Macedonian national self-determination, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO), established only in 1893, propagated the liberation and unification of all Macedonians in one autonomous state. The first Bosnian Muslim political organisation – the Muslim National Organisation – was established in 1906 in Sara-

jevo to promote the autonomy of the Bosnian Muslim population and of Bosnia–Hercegovina within the Austro-Hungarian empire. The political demands and territorial claims of all three of these organisations clashed with the demands of Serb national liberation ideology made in the early nineteenth century and endorsed later by the Serbian government. Prior to 1878 the Serbian national ideology had already claimed, on various grounds, the Ottoman-ruled territories of Kosovo and Metohija (claimed by the League of Prizren), of South Serbia or Macedonia (claimed by the IMRO) and Bosnia-Hercegovina (claimed by Bosnian Muslim political organisations). The Macedonian territorial demands also clashed with those of the Bulgarian and Greek national liberation movements whereas the Bosnian Muslim claims competed with those of the Croat national parties which demanded the whole of Bosnia–Hercegovina for Croatia.

By the beginning of the twentieth century, the Balkans and the South Slav lands of the Austro-Hungarian empire became an area of fierce competition for the same territory among numerous mutually conflicting national ideologies of the 'dominant nation' type. The social democratic vision of equal nations, first propagated in Serbia by Svetozar Marković and his followers, appeared at the time naive and unrealistically pacifist.[21] But its non-pacifist communist variant, which rejected national dominance and assimilation and treated all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia as ostensibly equal, proved, during and after World War II, to be a much more successful national liberation ideology than the traditional ideologies of the 'dominant nation' type. However, communist national elites in Yugoslavia, in their competition for economic and political power from the 1970s onwards, no longer had any use for this equalising ideology. In the 1980s national ideologies of the 'dominant nation' type were resurrected. By the 1980s, however, the number of such ideologies had increased: in addition to the Serb, Croat and Slovene ideologies, there were now Muslim, Albanian and Macedonian ideologies of the same type. Since each of these ideologies now claimed the dominance of one nation over others on a given territory and several of them competed over the same territory, the stage was set for a renewed conflict.

TOWARDS A YUGOSLAV STATE: WORLD WAR I

The assassination of the Austrian Archduke Franz Ferdinand on 28 June 1914 in the capital of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Sarajevo, precipitated

the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia, the first in the series of ultimata which started World War I. The Archduke's assassin and his comrades were members of the revolutionary youth organisation 'Young Bosnia' which was committed to the liberation of Bosnia–Hercegovina from Austro-Hungarian rule and its union with Serbia and other South Slav lands. The ideology of the national unity of South Slavs provided the underage assassin and his comrades with a vision of national liberation and unification of their peoples through armed struggle and terrorism while the Serbian secret organisation 'Unity or Death' (the Black Hand) provided them with arms.

The Serbian government (which attempted, rather vaguely, to alert the Austro-Hungarian government of the possibility of the assassination),[22] unprepared for a war with its powerful northern neighbour, accepted all the conditions of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum claiming, however, the protection of its national sovereignty as provided by international law.[23] The Austro-Hungarian government, intent on halting what it regarded as Serbia's persistent expansionism in the Balkans, declared war nonetheless. At the time, the leading Belgrade daily *Politika* argued that just as in 1859 the Austrian ultimatum to Piedmont led to Austrian defeat and the unification of Italy, so in 1914 the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia would lead to a similar defeat and the unification of the South Slavs.[24] The Serbian government, initially much more cautious, on 7 December 1914 issued a declaration, (against which voted only the two Social Democratic deputies)[25] stating that its principal war aim was the liberation and unification of 'their captive brethren Serbs, Croats and Slovenes' of Austria–Hungary. This first Serbian government programme of the national liberation of South Slavs was issued partly in an attempt to pre-empt any postwar allotment of the South Slav lands of Austria–Hungary to any of the neighbouring states (such as Italy). At the same time the Serbian government encouraged the creation of a committee of Croat, Slovene and Serb politicians who fled Austria–Hungary – the future Yugoslav Committee – which was to promote in allied capitals the cause of the national liberation of South Slavs from Austria–Hungary. In addition, the most prominent Serb historians, linguists and anthropologists were commissioned to prove that the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes are in fact a single nation with three names. This view not only became the principal plank of Serbian propaganda but provided a justification for the unitary constitutional arrangements of the future South Slav state which the ruling Serbian Radical party and its leader Nikola Pašić consistently advocated from 1914 onwards.

For more than a year the Serbian army was able to hold in check the superior Austro-Hungarian forces, severely defeating them in several battles on Serbian soil. But the Bulgarian attack on Serbia in 1915 and a joint German–Austro. Hungarian offensive forced the Serbian government, together with its army, to withdraw, with heavy losses, through the rugged mountains of Albania to the Adriatic coast and then to the Greek island of Corfu. Faced with the prospect of an unsatisfactory separate peace with Austria–Hungary and under pressure from the Allies to come to an agreement about their future state, the Serbian government and the Yugoslav Committee, after six weeks of negotiations, issued in July 1917 on Corfu a 14 point declaration concerning the future state of the three peoples. The Corfu declaration stated that the future Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes would be 'a constitutional, democratic and parliamentary monarchy headed by the [Serbian] Karađorđević dynasty' in which the two alphabets, three names (Serb, Croat and Slovene) and three major religions (Eastern Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Muslim) would be equal. Its constitution should be passed by 'a numerically qualified majority' in the future constituent assembly which is to be elected by universal and equal, direct and secret suffrage. The principle of free self-determination of the 'three-named people', the declaration stated, guaranteed the territorial indivisibility of the country.[26] This was primarily intended to annul the Allied promise of a large part of Dalmatia and its islands to Italy made in the secret clauses of the Treaty of London in 1915. The Yugoslav Committee, partly because a large number of its members, including its chairman, came from Dalmatia, considered the denial of Italian claims and the inclusion of Dalmatia and its islands in the future South Slav state its first priority. For Pašić and the Serbian government the first priority was the acceptance of the Serbian Karađorđević dynasty, its right to sanction the future constitution and the absence of any territorial or constitutional division along 'ethnic' or 'historic' lines.

However, once the National Council of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb on 29 October 1918 proclaimed the independence of the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from Austria–Hungary and declared its non-belligerence, it also attempted to renegotiate the terms of unification laid down in the Corfu declaration. The new declaration, signed by the representatives of the Serbian government and opposition, the Yugoslav Committee and the National Council on 9 November 1918, envisaged a confederal arrangement, with separate jurisdictions for the Serbian government and the National Council in Zagreb

as well as a joint cabinet with an equal number of ministers. As this arrangement went against the Serbian ruling Radical party's insistence on a unitary state, Pašić and his cabinet repudiated it a few days later and resigned. Thus the first, confederal attempt at the unification of the two states failed only a few days after it was made.

As Austria–Hungary started to disintegrate in autumn 1918, peasants in some parts of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina took to plundering their landlords' estates in the expectation of a new social order which would give them the land they tilled. The newly established regional national councils had no effective armed force to stem this unrest. Moreover, an increasing number of national councils in the Serb-populated areas of the former Austria–Hungary had already proclaimed their direct unification with Serbia and Montenegro. The regional assembly of Vojvodina as well a large number of district national councils of Bosnia–Hercegovina had done so before the regent proclaimed the new unified kingdom on 1 December 1918. The Italian army, apart from occupying parts of Dalmatia, started advancing, unopposed, on the capital of Slovenia, Ljubljana. The National Council of the Slovenes, Croats and Serbs in Zagreb was thus confronted with a rapid loss of territory from its newly established state as well as spreading social unrest. Having failed to win recognition for the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs from the major Allied powers, its Central Committee in Zagreb had literally no one else but the Serbian government to turn to for help. Well aware of this, in late November 1918 the Central Committee of the National Council elected a delegation to seek an immediate union with Serbia and Montenegro.

As the Council was the only elected body of South Slavs in Austria–Hungary in existence, the great majority of its Committee's members had no doubt that they had a popular mandate to seek this union. Yet both the need for a hasty union and the electoral mandate of the Council was questioned by Stjepan Radić the leader of one of the smaller parties in the Croatian Diet, the Croatian People's Peasant Party. At the very start of the deliberations on the union, he rejected unification under a Serbian royal house, proposing instead a transitional regency and a federation of four autonomous states (Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia and Montenegro) and three provinces (Bosnia–Hercegovina, Dalmatia and Vojvodina). Later, in an impassioned speech he argued that the union would also fail to accomplish the historical goal of the Croat nation, the achievement of independence through self-determination; while the Serbs could regard the united kingdom as a resurrection of Tsar Dušan's Serb empire.[27]

In spite of Radić's fiery but lone opposition, the Council's delegation was issued, in the best traditions of the past Croato-Hungarian parliamentary negotiations, a set of specific instructions concerning the terms of the union. These terms included the requirement of a two-thirds majority in the future Constituent Assembly for passing the constitution of a united state and a considerable legislative autonomy for the existing provincial governments and the Ban of Croatia.[28] As the Serbian ministers in Belgrade, instructed by the regent alone, took exception to some of the terms and imposed a very short timetable for the completion of the agreement on the union, the Zagreb delegation was forced to drop these two conditions. Thus the agreement on the terms of the union contained in their Address to the Throne accorded not with the terms set out by the National Council in Zagreb but with specifications of the 30-year-old Prince Aleksandar Karađorđević.


Although this second attempt at unification was greeted with violent protests in Zagreb,[29] neither the general public nor the negotiating parties wished to see the union only as an uneasy political deal. To many the union appeared to herald the triumph of the idea of Yugoslav national unity over separate national ideologies of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Having liberated their common homeland from foreign rule, and uniting in a common state, there was, it seemed, no further role for the separate national ideologies to play. In reality, however, the separate national ideologies quickly resumed their old role in the newly liberated homeland, the role of identifying the inequalities among the nations and, consequently, identifying new national oppressors. It was the largest and most dominant nation in the new kingdom, the Serbs, that, in the view of the Croat national ideology, assumed the role of the oppressor of other nations which was previously assigned to the Hungarians and Germans. In their endeavour to identify national inequalities and to find scapegoats for them, the separate Croat and Serb national ideologies retained their appeal as programmes of national liberation and proved to be a potent tool for political mass mobilisation. In contrast, the ideology of Yugoslav national unity, appeared to have exhausted its role as a national liberation ideology. After 1918 it certainly failed to develop a grassroots appeal comparable, in particular, to the Croat national ideologies. It also failed to provide the mass of Yugoslav citizens with a national identity replacing that of Serb, Croat or Slovene varieties. Moreover, it failed to offer a sense of historic mission which would go beyond that of liberation from foreign rule. Having provided an ideological legitimisation of the struggle for national liberation of the South Slavs, the Yugoslav national ideology

failed to provide a comparable legitimisation of the new constitutional and state structure which would be acceptable to the various national political elites. In short, the ideology of Yugoslav national unity failed to transform itself into an effective ideology for the legitimisation of the new state.

2 The First Yugoslavia

The devastation of World War I affected the new state unequally: while Serbia endured large-scale destruction of its fledgling industrial plants and railway communications as well as its livestock, the already more developed industries in the Slovenian and Croatian parts of the Kingdom were spared war damage and even expanded during the war. Out of Serbia's 4.5 million inhabitants, 28 per cent died in the First World and Balkan wars (including 62 per cent of its male population aged from 15 to 55) while the former

Map 1 Yugoslavia at the time of creation, 1918–20
Source: *A Short History of Yugoslavia*, ed. S. Clissold, Cambridge University Press, 1966.



Austro-Hungarian parts of the Kingdom lost less than 10 per cent of their pre-war population.[1] But even in the areas not affected by military operations, such as large parts of Bosnia–Hercegovina, a cycle of violence and terror had been set in train by the war. At the beginning of the war, the Austro-Hungarian auxiliaries, recruited from the local non-Serb population, mainly Muslims, spread terror among the Serbs by their indiscriminate killing and beatings. At end of the war, Serb irregulars in turn plundered and terrorised Muslim villagers in some parts of Bosnia–Hercegovina.

Apart from the uneven level of industrial development, there were huge differences in the pattern of landholding. In Serbia and Montenegro most agricultural land was held by smallholders, while in the former Austro-Hungarian provinces there were also large landholdings. In Croatia and Slovenia the large landholders were often non-Slavs while in Bosnia–Hercegovina the great majority of large landowners were members of the Bosnian Muslim aristocracy. As in other newly created East European national states, the government's agrarian reform, promulgated after the war, was intended, among other things, to benefit the poor peasantry of the new dominant nations. In accordance with this policy, the land from the large estates of German, Hungarian and Muslim owners was distributed to poor Serb, Croat and Slovene peasants; a considerable number of Serb war veterans were settled on lands of this kind. The break-up of large estates did not alleviate persistent rural overpopulation.[2] Poorer agricultural regions of Dalmatia, Hercegovina, Croatia and Macedonia experienced a high rate of migration to North America and West Europe. In addition, Muslims – Slavs as well as Turks and Albanians – continued to emigrate to Turkey.

As a whole, the new kingdom was an industrially underdeveloped country in which around 80 per cent of the inhabitants derived their income from agriculture. However, its politics from the very start was dominated by the issues deriving from its multinational and multiethnic composition rather than its relative economic underdevelopment. Out of less than 12 million inhabitants in 1918, around 2 million were members of national minorities, the largest of which were the Germans, Hungarians and Albanians (each with a population around half a million). In addition to the three constituent nations – Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – there were ethnic groups whose national status was not recognised. The Muslims of Bosnia–Hercegovina and the Sandžak region of Serbia were considered to be either Serbs or Croats of Islamic faith; the Slav inhabitants of South Serbia – later the federal republic of Macedonia – were regarded as Serbs, in spite of the closeness of the

dialects which they spoke to Bulgarian. The Eastern Orthodox inhabitants of Montenegro were generally acknowledged as Serbs.

The politics of the first provisional government and parliament of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, formed on 20 December 1918, displayed the pattern which became characteristic for the entire life of this state. Except for the social democratic parties (and the minuscule Republican party), all other parties in the parliament were national or ethnic parties. The Serb parties, although taking the largest number of deputies and cabinet portfolios, could never form an absolute and permanent majority in the parliament which would allow them to govern without the support of other national parties. As no single national group could dominate the parliament, the government had to be formed out of short-lived multinational coalitions, the partners of which frequently had highly divergent, often conflicting, political programmes. Moreover, one of the first acts of Prince (later King) Aleksandar as the regent was to reject the proposal by the newly convened provisional government to appoint the wartime Serbian premier, Nikola Pašić, the first premier of the new kingdom. This was a clear sign that he intended to take an active part in politics, not altogether suitable for a constitutional monarch.

In the November 1920 elections for the Constituent Assembly, 65 per cent of the eligible (only male) voters cast their ballots. From the 16 parties or groups which entered the Assembly (22 contested the election), the largest numbers of votes were cast for the Democratic (92 seats), the Radical (91), the Communist (59), the Croat Peasant (50), the Agrarian (39), the Slovene People's (27) parties and the Yugoslav Moslem Organisation (24 seats). The only party whose support was not limited primarily to one national group was the Communist party. Using its links with the Soviet-controlled Communist International as a pretext, the government banned the Communist party soon after the elections and later cancelled its seats. The bulk of the supporters and deputies of the largest party, the Democratic party, were Serbs, although it also had supporters among non-Serbs. The Radical and Agrarian parties drew their main support from Serbia and Serb-populated regions of Vojvodina and Bosnia–Hercegovina. The main Croat party became Stjepan Radić's Croat Peasant party which, at a rally in Zagreb in December 1920, declared itself for a Neutral Republic of Croatia, inserted 'Republican' in its title and decided to boycott the Constituent Assembly. The other surviving Croat parties, which voted for the union and participated in the provisional parliament were routed in this election.[3]

Among the constitutional drafts presented to the Assembly, the Croat and Slovene drafts urged, as expected, a federalist structure of

the state which was justified by reference to history and to national differences. As history had created borders among different provinces, it was argued, these borders should be maintained as borders between federal units. Further, a federal structure of the state would enable the nations of Yugoslavia to preserve and develop their different national cultures and traditions. In contrast, the Radical and Democratic parties proposed unitarist constitutional drafts which allowed for a limited self-government of smaller territorial units whose boundaries were not based on any historical frontiers. The new state, they argued, should overcome all past differences among cultures and traditions. As the historical boundaries were imposed by foreign oppressors and not freely chosen, they should not be allowed to threaten the unity of the new state. The draft of Radical and Democratic parties was rejected by the deputies of the Slovene People's party and the remaining Croat deputies; the Croat Peasant Party deputies had boycotted the Assembly from the start and the Communist party deputies left the Assembly before the vote. In consequence, out of 419 deputies, only 258 voted on the Radical-Democratic constitutional draft. Out of those voting, only 223 voted for, 35 against; 161 had abstained or boycotted the vote. Of those who voted in favour, 184 were Serbs, 18 were Muslims, 11 Slovenes and 10 Croats. The mainly Serb Radical and Democratic parties alone, without the deputies of Muslim and Slovene parties, would not have been able to carry through this constitution by the required qualified majority.[4] But since the constitution was submitted by the predominantly Serb parties, it was regarded as a basis for the Serb hegemony in the new state.

As no grouping of national parties from one nation could form a stable government, the politics of the country up to June 1928 was marked by short-lived coalition governments involving various national parties and frequent elections. Stjepan Radić and his Croat Peasant party at first boycotted the parliament but after his arrest in February 1925 on charges of anti-state activities, he agreed to enter a short-lived government with the Serbian Radical party and its leader Nikola Pašić. After the demise of this coalition in 1927, Radić formed an opposition block with various Serb opposition parties. From the beginning of 1928 this new Serbo-Croat opposition bloc endeavoured to obstruct the coalition government by inciting disorder in the parliament and street demonstrations outside it. In response, a group of Radical deputies led by Puniša Račić, unsuccessfully proposed that a panel of medical experts examine Radić to determine whether he was mentally fit to be a deputy, and if so, punish him for his persistent breach of parliamentary procedures and orders. At a later session on 20 June 1928, when confronted by the usual jeers

and insults from Croat Peasant party deputies, Račić opened fire with his pistol at the opposition deputies, killing two of them and gravely wounding Stjepan Radić among others.[5]

As large demonstrations in Zagreb were suppressed by police with a loss of life, the opposition bloc demanded a reconstitution of the country on a federalist model. To calm the situation the king asked the Slovene politician Anton Korošec to form yet another coalition government which lasted only until December 1928. After its resignation, King Aleksandar, in his consultation with party leaders, mooted the idea of a mutually agreed secession[6] of the Croat and Slovene lands from the rest of the country. As this idea had already been rejected by Stjepan Radić (who died two months after his wounding in the parliament), his successor Vladko Maček as well as other opposition leaders rejected it. The king refused the opposition's demand for a federal reorganisation of the state, and in January 1929 dissolved the parliament – as an unnecessary 'intermediary between the people and the king' – and proclaimed a personal regime. In addition, he banned all organisations, political or otherwise, based on national or religious foundations, vowing, in the name of Yugoslav national unity to banish all national or 'tribal' differences from the public life of the country which, in October 1929, he renamed the Kingdom of Yugoslavia.

The proclamation of King Aleksandar's personal regime ended the attempt at a unitarist parliamentary system based on the dominance of the Serb parties. The Serb parties were unable to create a stable and effective, let alone fully legitimate government, for two reasons. First, due to their disunity, they could rarely command a parliamentary majority without the support of non-Serb parties; and, second, the Croat Peasant party persistently questioned the legitimacy of the constitution and of parliamentary government based on this constitution. In their attempts to gain as much political independence for the Croats as possible, the Croat Peasant party and its leader Stjepan Radić used any means at their disposal; to many Serb politicians these maximalist tactics appeared treasonable. Many Croat politicians regarded the attempts of the two major Serb parties to secure parliamentary majorities and dominance in government not as a standard parliamentary practice but a policy of imposing political hegemony over non-Serbs. In view of such divergent views of parliamentary politics, it is not surprising that this first – and in effect the last – experiment in multiparty parliamentary politics in Yugoslavia failed as it did.

King Aleksandar's direct rule ended in September 1931 with the proclamation of a new constitution which was rejected by the Croat

Peasant party as well as by Slovene and Serb opposition politicians; to this the king's government responded by jailing opposition politicians from all national groups. Even before the regime embarked on repression of the opposition, the Croat politician Ante Pavelić emigrated to found a separatist Croat organisation – the *Ustasha* (meaning 'insurgents' in Serbo-Croatian) – which embarked on a terrorist campaign against the Yugoslav state. The organisation's aim was the creation of a greater Croatia, including Bosnia–Hercegovina, which would be then 'freed' of all Serbian rule. As his organisation aimed at the dismemberment of Yugoslavia, it received support from neighbouring governments – those of Hungary, Bulgaria and Italy – which made claims on parts of Yugoslav territory. It also found allies in an older terrorist organisation, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation (IMRO) which was by that time based in Sofia and fought for the separation of Macedonia from Yugoslavia and its incorporation into Bulgaria. With the support of the Ustashe, members of IMRO assassinated King Aleksandar during his visit to Marseilles in October 1934, thus ending his attempt to create a single nation of Yugoslavs by government *fiat*.

The regency, which was appointed to rule until the late king's son Petar came of age, had other more urgent tasks than promoting his ideology of unitary Yugoslavism; it faced serious economic problems arising from the rapid impoverishment of the rural population due to the worldwide depression, as well as the Croat Peasant party's rejection of the regime's legitimacy. The coalition cabinet consisting of the Bosnian Muslim party, the Slovene clerical party and a segment of the Serb Radicals, led by a successful banker and Radical politician Milan Stojadinović, appointed by the first regent Prince Pavle Karađorđević in 1935, succeeded in reducing rural indebtedness and improving the country's finances as well as in winning the elections of December 1938. It also changed the traditional Serbian policy of reliance on France by seeking accommodation with Mussolini's Italy and Hitler's Germany. Stojadinović's supporters, his political rivals pointed out, started to ape the style of the two dictators, parading in green uniforms and calling him 'the leader'. Whatever his ideological outlook might have been, his unbroken four years in office, proved that it was possible to govern Yugoslavia, relatively effectively, without the participation of the Croat Peasant party, provided that the government had the support of Bosnian Muslim and Slovene parties and of the major outside powers (in this case Italy and Germany).

It was probably Stojadinović's disinclination to seek a compromise with the Croat Peasant party that led Prince Pavle suddenly to dismiss

him in February 1939 and to replace his government with a cabinet of pliant minor politicians whose main task was to find such a compromise. The looming European war and Maček's lobbying of Mussolini's government in support of an independent Croatia made this task quite urgent. In August 1939 the cabinet signed an agreement with Maček which introduced a one-unit federalism into the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. The agreement (*Sporazum*) of 1939 created a large province (*banovina*) of Croatia, incorporating Dalmatia, a large part of Hercegovina and parts of Bosnia. This province was granted legislative and political autonomy on most internal matters while foreign policy, defence, transport, communications and monetary policy was conducted by the central government in Belgrade. In addition to governing this province, the Croat Peasant party was given five out of eighteen cabinet portfolios, including the post of vice-premier which was taken up by Maček. This was an agreement between a government appointed by the crown and the leader of the largest Croat political party; it was never endorsed by the Yugoslav parliament nor put to a referendum. In effect, it created a semisovereign Croat national state incorporating the great majority of Croats living in Yugoslavia as well as almost one million Serbs (out of the province's total population of four and a half million). By incorporating Serb-populated regions of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina into the Croat federal unit, this agreement virtually precluded the formation of a similar unit incorporating most Serbs in Yugoslavia.[7] Not surprisingly, most Serb opposition politicians (including many Radicals) rejected the agreement, regarding it as an undemocratic concession to the Croat demands in return for their acceptance of Yugoslavia. These concessions, they thought, were forced by the threatening developments abroad, such as Hitler's dismemberment of Czechoslovakia and Mussolini's increasing support for the Ustasha policy of an independent Croatia. In order to secure a politically united Yugoslavia, Prince Pavle and his government apparently had little choice but to grant the long-standing demands for Croat autonomy.

The concessions failed to preserve either Yugoslavia or Prince Pavle and his government. Yielding to intense pressure from Hitler and having no hope of any help from Britain, on 25 March 1941 Prince Pavle's government signed Yugoslavia's accession to Hitler's Tripartite Pact. Two days later, a group of Serb officers, supported by British intelligence agencies, staged a bloodless coup abolishing the regency and elevating Petar II Karađorđević, still a minor, to the throne. Mass demonstrations in support of the coup in Belgrade and other Serb cities appeared to confirm the unpopularity of pro-German policies at

least among the Serbs. After the coup, in the new coalition government formed, for the first time, of all the major parties Maček retained his vice-premiership. On 6 April 1941 Axis forces attacked Yugoslavia and bombed Belgrade. The poorly led and equipped royal Yugoslav military was defeated in twelve days. During this time the young king and government prepared to fly out to Cairo while vice-premier Maček returned to Zagreb. Even before the Yugoslav High Command capitulated to the Germans, on 10 April 1941 he broadcast a call to the Croats to obey the Ustasha regime which the Germans were installing in power in Croatia; on the same day, small groups of Ustashe, aided by the Croat Peasant party armed guards, took control of Zagreb whose populace turned out to welcome enthusiastically the German troops.

With the proclamation of the puppet Ustasha Croat state began the Axis carve-up of Yugoslavia. Slovenia was divided between Italy and the Third Reich, large parts of Macedonia and southern Serbia were incorporated into Bulgaria, a large part of Vojvodina into Hungary; much of Dalmatia and all of Montenegro went to Italy while Kosovo and western Macedonia were attached to the Italian-controlled Albania, creating for the first time a greater Albanian state. The whole of Bosnia–Hercegovina and Srem became a part of the Ustashe's Independent State of Croatia. Central Serbia with Belgrade was at first administered directly by the Nazis; later a quisling government led by a Serb general, Milan Nedić, was installed. Thus ended the first Yugoslavia.

During the twenty-two years of its existence, Yugoslavia had experienced three types of constitutional arrangement: a unitarist parliamentary system in which the Serb parties formed an unstable majority; a centralist system based on the dominance of the crown and on the suppression of nationally-based parties; and a one-unit federalism in which the province of Croatia had a privileged autonomous status. Each of the three was rejected by the political elite of at least one of the three constituent nations of the country. The Croat Peasant party, the largest Croat party, consistently denied the legitimacy of the first two models. The Slovene People's party, the largest Slovene party, intermittently did so too. The leaders of most Serb parties rejected the third, federalist arrangement partly because they regarded it as an undemocratic and unconstitutional political deal. This apparent conflict between a unitarist (or centralist) and federalist conception of the common state hid a rather crude competition for monopoly of political power. The unitarist parliamentary model was an instrument for maintaining the monopoly of power of the political leaders of the two major Serb parties and

restricting the access to power of all other parties, irrespective of their constituency. After 1929, under the Yugoslav centralist model the crown became the most powerful political agent in the country capable of forming and controlling governments irrespective of parliamentary majorities. Under the one-unit federalism, the Croat Peasant party leadership gained complete control of a large semisovereign state of Croatia and became the second most important political factor in Yugoslavia. Thus this ostensible federalist solution was in effect a power-sharing arrangement between the crown and the Croat Peasant party leaders from which the highly fragmented Serb parties had nothing to gain.

As the leaders of all the major parties saw no need to bring these constitutional arrangements to a parliament, whose rules of procedure would be accepted by all parties, or to a referendum, it appears that they regarded them primarily as arrangements for distribution of political power among themselves. As the benefits of a particular constitutional arrangement would accrue primarily to particular political and, to some extent, social elites of the three constituent nations, the national ideologies which were used to legitimise such arrangements were primarily instruments for mobilising mass support for these political elites in their struggle for power. The national ideology of the Radicals and Democrats which insisted on the need for a strong, centralised state to counter the ever-present threats from abroad appealed to their Serb constituency scarred as it was by the Balkan wars and World War I. But the party leaders conveniently overlooked the fact that their centralist ideology effectively weakened the new state as the Slovene and Croat parties denied the legitimacy of a centralised state from its very start. The Croat Peasant party's slogan of 'each to his own' likened the enjoyment which a peasant has (or should have) of his land to the need for the Croats to have full political control of the historic lands in which they live. This ideology of folksy self-government no doubt appealed to the party's rural constituency and ensured its continuing support for the party. In the wake of the outbreak of World War II, the Croat Peasant party finally came to enjoy a complete control over its constituency and over the civil service jobs and contracts patronage in an enlarged Croatia; what benefits, if any, this brought to their wider rural constituency is quite unclear.

The first Yugoslavia was destroyed by a formidable Axis military machine which was able to crush much larger and politically more stable countries than was Yugoslavia. The Axis attack would have had the same result irrespective of the country's constitutional arrangement

in 1941. However, the Axis occupation, resistance to this occupation and the civil war after April 1941 brought into play political movements whose political ideologies differed greatly from those of the major players in the pre-1941 period. The victory of the most revolutionary of these movements – the communist-led one – in the ensuing civil war precluded the restoration of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in any of its pre-1941 constitutional arrangements.

3 World War II

THE UPRISINGS AGAINST THE AXIS AND THE CIVIL WAR

The capitulation and surrender of over 300 000 men and officers of the royal Yugoslav military in April 1941 did not end the war in Yugoslavia. Colonel Dragoljub-Draža Mihailović disobeyed the orders of his superiors to surrender to the German army and in May 1941 raised an armed rebellion in central Serbia against the German occupying forces. In June 1941, following the German attack on the USSR, the underground Communist party of Yugoslavia issued as well a call for an uprising against the occupiers. The communist forces, called Partisans, were commanded by the Soviet-trained general secretary of the Communist party, Josip Broz Tito. The forces of colonel Mihailović took an older Serb appellation for guerilla fighters, Chetniks. These guerilla units, at times in co-ordinated attacks, cleared most of western Serbia, including several towns, from the weak German army of occupation. In November 1941 the royal Yugoslav government-in-exile in London, delighted at Mihailović's resistance, promoted him to the rank of general and appointed him commander-in-chief of the armed forces in the homeland and, later, minister for war. The first British Special Operations Executive mission arrived at Mihailović's headquarters a little earlier and the British wartime propaganda portrayed him as a great hero of the first resistance movement in Europe. While Tito was at the time unknown in the West, he maintained regular radio contact with the Comintern headquarters in Moscow.

In October 1941 fighting broke out between the Chetnik and Partisan forces, which, interrupted only by a brief truce, flared up again in December. This was the beginning of the civil war which effectively ended only in 1945 by the annihilation of the Chetnik forces by the victorious Partisans. In an operation lasting from September to December 1941, the German army (consisting of two front-line divisions brought over from the front in the USSR) assisted by quisling forces defeated the demoralised Partisan and Chetnik units. In an attempt to eradicate popular support for the guerillas the German army interned the entire population of several towns and undertook mass shooting of civilian hostages in reprisals for the killing of German soldiers.[1] In the face of defeat, Mihailović

allowed many of his units to transfer allegiance, at least nominally, to the German quisling administration of Serbia while he retained a small headquarters which he frequently moved to escape German pursuit.

In Montenegro a mass uprising against the Italian occupation in July 1941 was led by royal Yugoslav army officers as well as by the communists. In October the communists proclaimed a soviet republic on the territory they controlled and staged mass executions of their potential opponents among the resistance fighters. By December 1941 the royal officers who led the uprising declared their allegiance to Mihailović, drove out the Partisans from Montenegro and concluded an agreement with the Italian occupation authorities who, in addition to arms and ammunition, handed over to them full control of the countryside. There was no general uprising in Bosnia–Hercegovina and Croatia until the Croat Ustasha authorities in June 1941 embarked on its three-pronged campaign of forced conversion of the Serbs to Roman Catholicism, their deportation to Serbia and large-scale massacres. Although the Ustashe first eliminated the local Serb leaders – Orthodox priests, members of the intelligentsia and merchants – in August 1941 the Serb villagers rose in arms and cleared large parts of Serb-populated areas of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina of the Ustasha forces. In November, the civil war between Chetniks and Partisans spread to these areas as well and the Serb insurgent militias – split into Partisan and Chetnik detachments – started fighting each other. In Slovenia, Macedonia and Kosovo, there was no mass uprising; an underground resistance movement operated mainly in the Italian zone of occupation in Slovenia while the quisling Albanian militias equipped and supported by the Italian forces effectively controlled Kosovo.

The German offensive in autumn 1941 drove the Partisan high command out of Serbia, first to Montenegro and then into Bosnia. Disregarding the Comintern instructions, Tito, in December 1941 in a town in east Bosnia, formed his first proletarian brigade, commanded by a Spanish civil war veteran, Koča Popović, a Serb communist who was a noted surrealist poet; this small unit formed out of the remnants of the Serbian Partisan units was the nucleus of the future Partisan mobile army. With this unit, Tito marched, over the snow-covered mountains, to western Bosnia where the Partisans were able to recruit a large number of Serb peasants fleeing the Ustasha terror. Most of the remaining Partisan units in Serbia were destroyed by the Serbian quisling forces which incorporated many former Chetnik units.

By early 1942, the three principal[2] sides of the civil war in Yugoslavia were:

- the *Partisans:* a resistance movement led by the Communist party and recruiting from all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia;[3]
- the *Chetniks*: a resistance movement under the nominal command of general Mihailović, representing the government-in-exile in London; the movement was joined mostly by Serbs with only token participation of Croats, Muslims and Slovenes;
- the *Ustasha*: a pro-fascist movement ruling the puppet-state of Croatia whose armed forces were made up of Croats and Muslims, trained and equipped by the German army.[4]

Throughout the war all three sides fought against each other. Of the two resistance forces, the Chetniks came under sustained attack from the German army but generally collaborated with the Italian forces and with the quisling government officials in Serbia. In 1942 the Partisan forces were the smallest in number and operated under persistent attacks by all the Axis forces, the quisling forces and the Chetniks.

NATIONAL IDEOLOGIES AT WAR

The paradox of the civil war in Yugoslavia is that both the pro-fascist Ustasha and the resistance movements resorted to the national liberation ideologies in their efforts to mobilise the masses and recruit fighters for their armed forces.

In the *Ustasha*'s view Yugoslavia was an artificial creation which the Serbs imposed on the Croats to deny them their freedom; therefore, to attain their national liberty the Croats have to destroy this state and to free themselves from Serb domination. But the Serbs had not only robbed the Croats of their historical liberties but they also contaminated, with their presence, the purity of the Croat race. Following an older theory on the racial origin of the Croats, the Ustasha ideologues held that the Croats are by origin Goths and thus racially superior to their Slav neighbours, the Serbs. Serbs are thus an alien Oriental (that is, Byzantine) element in the Croat lands which needs to be eliminated. Like the Jews to the Nazis, the Serbs were for the Ustasha not only exploiters but representatives of degraded humanity. The hatred of Serbs came to be the core emotional element of the Ustasha ideology. Together with its racism, Ustasha ideology developed a mystical fascination with rituals of violence and terror similar to other extreme nationalist and racist ideologies of the 1930s. During the war, this symbolism was ritually acted out by gruesome methods of killing of their

Serb, Jewish and Gipsy victims. As in many similar ideologies, the hatred and rituals of violence co-existed with an ostensible respect for the Christian and patriarchal values of the peasant smallholder family. But unlike the German Nazis and the Italian Fascists, the Ustasha had initially no programme of social engineering. It was primarily their racism, their anti-Semitism, their fascination with violence and the cult of their leader or *poglavnik* Ante Pavelić, that linked them with the ideologies of their political patrons, the Nazis and the Fascists.

Most of the Croat government and police – as well as the Croat Peasant party members – initially heeded Maček's[5] call and cooperated with the Ustasha regime. The Croat opposition to the Ustasha came principally from the communists, the left wing of the Croat Peasant party and the Yugoslav-oriented intelligentsia, all of whom were brutally persecuted by the regime. As the Ustasha held Bosnian Muslims to be the descendants of Croat nobility who converted to Islam during Ottoman rule, their ideology attracted various strata of the Muslim population[6] including many of the Muslim (and Croat) peasants from the impoverished mixed population areas of Bosnia–Hercegovina. Their insistence on Croat (that is, Muslim/Croat) racial superiority over the Serbs apparently appealed to the latter group whose self-esteem was bruised not only by their hopeless economic plight but also by their life in royal Yugoslavia under Serb-dominated officialdom. Apart from the plunder which it produced, the systematic murder of Serbs to some of them might have appeared a way of asserting their superiority and recovering their self-esteem.

In contrast to the Ustasha, the *Chetnik* movement had no single ideology nor political programme. In raising the rebellion against the German occupiers, colonel Mihailović was continuing the Serb tradition of armed insurrection against foreign occupation under the rather old-fashioned slogan 'With faith in God, for the king and fatherland'. For most of the rank and file the Chetnik movement stood for the traditional peasant way of life as well as obedience to the traditional authority, the king; or, in other words, it stood for patriarchy and a return to the pre-war social order. This was reflected in the Chetnik methods of recruitment and chain of command: the local notables, usually middle-aged regular or reserve royal officers, recruited peasants in their region of birth thus forming militias of personal followers over which Mihailović had little effective control. The efforts of a few Serb intellectuals who joined his headquarters to form a central propaganda and political organisation was frustrated by the lack of interest of Mihailović and his military staff. Moreover, in late 1942, during

Mihalović's move to Montenegro and eastern Hercegovina, a Chetnik congress endorsed a radical Serb nationalist programme which envisaged a Chetnik military dictatorship after the war, total political dominance of the Serbs in a unitary Yugoslavia, expulsion of all minorities, the re-education of the Croats and a collective revenge for the massacres of the Serbs. Partisan propaganda and their supporters in the Allied capitals used this programme to portray the Chetniks as a fascist movement. To counter this, Mihailović, after protracted negotiations, convened, in January 1944, a congress in the Serbian village of Ba attended by representatives of the Radical, Democratic, Agrarian, Socialist and Republican parties as well as token Croat, Slovene and Muslim delegates. While endorsing the monarchy, the congress proposed the formation of a federal parliamentary state consisting of Serbian, Croat and Slovene units with wide economic, cultural and social autonomy. At the congress Mihailović publicly repudiated any dictatorial aspirations and rejected all collective revenge.[7] However, the absence of an effective political organisation from 1941 to 1944, the openly anti-democratic and Serb nationalist stance as well as the policy of collective revenge against the Croats and Muslims greatly narrowed the Chetnik political base, severely hindering their recruitment efforts and thus contributing to their ultimate defeat.

The *Partisan* movement – or, by its official appellation, the National Liberation Movement of Yugoslavia – was, in theory, a movement of Yugoslav patriots, regardless of their nationality, committed above all to the liberation of the country from foreign occupation. Led and controlled by the Communist party, this was obviously an anti-establishment, if not openly revolutionary, movement which promised a more egalitarian world for the peasants. In particular, the communists' propaganda emphasised the treachery and cowardice of the king and his politicians who fled the country and left the ordinary folk to be slaughtered by the enemy. The Partisans were clearly not fighting for the king and they had no faith in God. The principal Partisan slogan of 'the brotherhood and unity of the peoples of Yugoslavia' projected a vision of equality and harmony of all nations, and not of domination by one or more nations over others. In practical terms, this meant that the Partisans welcomed members of all nations and nationalities to their ranks and systematically opposed any collective revenge against any nation. In addition, the Partisan assembly AVNOJ[8] in 1943 elevated the Montenegrins and the Macedonians to the status of constituent nations of Yugoslavia, increasing the number of constituent nations to five. Their recognition was meant to give members of these nations a stake in the

liberation of the country and to recruit them for Partisan units. Apart from emphasising the distinctness and autonomy of Macedonians from both Serbs and Bulgarians, the Partisans took over the cause, propagated by the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation before the war, of the unification of all Macedonians into one state. This was a call for the creation of greater Macedonia, incorporating territories of Bulgaria and Greece where Slav-speaking Macedonians lived. The unification would offer this group both national recognition and a political voice denied to them in all the states, including royalist Yugoslavia, in which they lived.[9] In general, the Partisans' image as the only all-Yugoslav movement accorded well with the Allies' plans to re-establish Yugoslavia after the war.

In contrast to the Chetniks, the Partisan movement systematically organised national liberation committees in every liberated (and many as yet unliberated) village, putting their supporters in positions of power. In addition, there was a mass youth organisation, a women's organisation as well as various professional associations (for example, of doctors and teachers). A successful mobilisation of students and younger intelligentsia from poorer backgrounds provided the Partisans with an unconventional and youthful officer corps as well as dedicated propaganda and education workers. Education courses set up by the Partisans spread literacy and propaganda and trained half-literate peasant lads and girls for military and political tasks. Thus a variety of political organisations and education courses supplemented the Partisan units as conduits for the social mobility of peasant youths who were given an opportunity of a rapid military or Communist party career.[10] This grand endeavour of popular mobilisation raised the self-esteem and political consciousness of the peasantry in the backward, mountainous areas of Bosnia–Hercegovina and Croatia and enabled them to assume positions of power which previous political regimes had always denied to them. The 'brotherhood and unity' policy and the political emancipation and mobilisation of the peasantry probably explain why the Communist party, a small and clandestine organisation before the war, succeeded, during the war, in attracting the broadest segment of the population in Yugoslavia. The centralised and hierarchical organisational structure of the Communist party also enabled the Partisan high command to impose a high degree of control and discipline in its units, thus increasing its over-all military effectiveness.

In contrast to the Partisans' modernising ideology of 'equal nations' both the Chetnik and Ustasha movements appealed to the patriarchal values of the peasantry and claimed that their respective nations' survi-

val required the defeat (or, in the Ustasha case, the elimination) of the opposing national group. The conflict among these three movements during World War II could be viewed as a conflict between a modernising 'equal nations' type of nationalism and two mutually conflicting ideologies of the 'dominant nation' type.

THE PARTISANS AND THE ALLIES: TOWARDS VICTORY

As the Partisan proletarian brigades operating in 1942 in Bosnia–Hercegovina threatened the Axis communications and repeatedly captured towns from the Ustasha forces, the German and Italian military – together with Ustasha and, at times, Chetnik forces – launched a series of attacks, attempting to encircle and annihilate them. Having already broken through several encirclements, in 1943 the Partisan commander Tito attempted to stave off further Axis attacks by offering his cooperation to the Germans against the Chetniks. The German army command used the negotiations with Tito to prepare and launch its fiercest attack on the Partisan forces which annihilated several Partisan brigades and their central hospital but failed to net their high command.[11]

The British military missions, parachuted to the Partisan headquarters in 1943, could not fail to note their determination to fight and their military capabilities. In the same year the British government decided to supply the Partisans with arms and war material primarily in order to maintain their capability of tying up Axis forces which would otherwise be deployed against the Allies. But later British decisions to switch all of their aid to the Partisans and, finally, to abandon Mihailović altogether were influenced by other reasons as well. The British government, through its liaison officers in Mihailovićs units, was aware that he was evading large-scale actions against German forces in order to avoid German reprisals against the local Serb population (German official policy was to shoot 50 Serb hostages for every German soldier killed). Moreover, the British were also aware of his narrow Serb political base and of his commanders' collaboration with the Italian forces. Finally, a dedicated British communist, who was in charge of the Yugoslav desk in the Special Operations Executive in Cairo, promoted the Partisan cause by, among other things, suppressing British mission reports of Chetnik military activity.[12] But the British decision in late 1943 to cut aid to Mihailović was in effect a decision to abandon the Yugoslav royal government in exile, and its

Serb-dominated liberation movement, in favour of a communist-led movement which rejected the Serb royal house and its legitimist claims.

In their efforts to deny the legitimacy of the royal government in exile, the Partisan leaders convened, on 29 November 1943, the AVNOJ assembly which duly appointed a provisional government and banned the king's return to the country until at least the end of the war; at the same time the assembly promoted the Partisan leader Tito to the (previously non-existent) rank of marshal. In its turn, the British government in 1944 initiated the establishment of a coalition government consisting of Tito and his ministers and a few ministers from the royal government in London.[13] This initiative was intended to bestow international recognition on Tito's government which, after the Soviet and Partisan liberation of Belgrade in October 1944, in any case secured control over most of Yugoslavia.

At the end of the war, the Partisan army annihilated the remaining Chetnik forces in Bosnia–Hercegovina using British and Soviet supplied arms. Mihailović refused to leave the country and remained in hiding until 1946 when he was captured, put on a show trial for his alleged collaboration with the enemy and shot. The Ustasha leader Pavelić fled the advancing Partisan armies to find refuge in Spain. The military victory of the communists was, as expected, crowned by an election in November 1945. No opposition party contested the election and, as a result of widespread intimidation of voters and rigging, it produced the desired 90 per cent vote for the communist-controlled Popular Front.[14] From then on the communists were free to subject the country to their favoured experiment of social engineering.

THE LEGACY OF WAR

The war resulted in the victory of the Communist party and the establishment of a one-party state modelled on the Soviet Union. The war also brought much more extensive damage to the country than World War I: most of the communications and transport infrastructure as well as that of industry was destroyed. Millions of people were forced to abandon their homes or were rendered homeless and around one million (out of 16 million inhabitants of Yugoslavia in 1941) lost their lives during the war. The worst human losses were recorded in Bosnia–Hercegovina and Croatia where the Serb population was exposed to systematic massacres by the Ustasha and the Muslim population to Chetnik massacres. Around 300 000 Serbs (as well as smaller numbers of Jews and of

Gipsies) from Croatia and from Bosnia–Hercegovina were victims of the former massacres.[15] As this amounts to approximately every sixth Serb living in this region, it means that almost every Serb family had a member killed in the war, mostly by the Ustasha. The Ustasha massacres were unprecedented in this region or for that matter anywhere else in Yugoslavia; no regime or movement in Yugoslavia had ever attempted to wipe out a whole national or ethnic group. The only comparable atrocities, committed by the Ottoman and Bosnian Muslim forces during the 1875 uprising in Bosnia–Hercegovina, were an orgy of punishment of the rebellious Christians but not an attempt to annihilate the whole Christian population. Similarly, the policy of reprisals adopted by the German army in Serbia in 1941, which led to the death of around 100 000 Serbs from Serbia, was an attempt to terrorise and punish the population for its support of the resistance forces.

The sudden and unprovoked Ustasha assault on the acquiescent civilian population left deep traces in the collective memory of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina. In particular, it has produced a feeling of insecurity and fear of any government which, like the Ustasha one, insists on the Croat domination over Serbs. The communist regime was able to assuage these fears during and after the war, by enabling the Croatian and Bosnian Serbs to achieve full control of their local government and to have an influential voice in the Communist party as well as government in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina. This is why the Communist party, until its collapse in January 1990, had been regarded by many Serbs from Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina as the principal guarantor of their security in the region.

The Chetnik massacres of Muslims in eastern Bosnia as well as Muslim and Croat villagers elsewhere (allegedly carried out in revenge for the Ustasha massacres of Serbs) created a similar insecurity and fear of the Chetnik Serb forces, in spite of the attempts by Mihailović to conciliate local Muslim leaders. The Partisans, in contrast, not only welcomed Muslims and Croats into their units but formed Muslim and Croat brigades commanded by Muslim and Croat members of the Communist party. The Muslim population thus came to see the Partisan regime as its protector against the revenge of the Serbs. As the ultimate defeat of the Axis and the Ustashe was in sight, this is how many Croats came to see the Partisans as well.

In accordance with its 'brotherhood and unity' policy, the communists, after the war, attributed all war crimes to the Nazi and Fascist collaborators, arguing that it was their collaboration with the enemy that made them criminal and led them to commit those crimes. This

made the Partisans the only force allegedly untainted by war crimes and enabled the Partisans to taint any adversary during the war – Chetniks and Ustashe alike – as perpetrators of war crimes. While using the wartime massacres of civilians for purposes of its own propaganda, the postwar communist regime not only failed to carry out a systematic investigation of these crimes but also forbade the relatives to rebury and to pay their respects to the members of their families who fell victim in the massacres.[16] Although the Partisan forces refrained from any large-scale massacres of civilians during the war, they ruthlessly eliminated their enemies, real or potential, during and immediately after the war. In particular, they massacred tens of thousands of Croat and Slovene home guard conscripts as well as Chetnik fighters which the Allies handed over to them after the end of the war. During 1945 under the guise of the elimination of enemy collaborators, they executed a great number of merchants, wealthier peasants and members of the intelligentsia, in particular in Serbia, thus eliminating a potentially influential 'class enemy'.

The communist recipe for national reconciliation after the war was quite simple: national unity has been forged through the Partisan struggle of national liberation in which all the nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia equally participated and in which all the forces of national hatred and conflict were successfully defeated. To protect the newly forged national unity it is sufficient to cultivate its tradition and to continue to build socialism under the leadership of the Communist party, which will eliminate all inequalities, including national ones. National reconciliation was thus firmly tied to the myth of the national liberation struggle and the communist ideology. Once their ideology and the attendant myth of the national liberation struggle collapsed in the late 1980s, no other ground for postwar national reconciliation remained. In fact, the national ideologies which re-emerged in the late 1980s called not for a national reconciliation but for the final settling of old scores. The re-emerging Serb national ideologies assumed that Croats and Muslims were collectively responsible for the wartime massacres of Serbs and called for revenge and/or admission of guilt by the Croats and Muslims. In contrast, the Croat national ideologies, as we shall see in Chapter 7, minimise Croat responsibility for the massacres of Serbs and Jews, portraying them as minor and relatively normal wartime phenomena in which some Serbs and Jews willingly participated. The collapse of one, communist, mythical representation of the Yugoslav civil conflict during World War II thus led to the re-emergence of a score of old myths and the creation of new ones, all of which were in

turn used for the mass mobilisation during the civil wars which started in 1991–2.

The civil war among Chetniks, Partisans and Ustasha during World War II, was, in part, a struggle for the re-establishment of Yugoslavia as well as for the postwar control of the whole of the country. The civil wars in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina, which started in 1991–2, have been fought primarily for control over areas of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina with mixed Croat, Serb and Muslim population which had experienced both the heavy fighting as well as civilian massacres during the 1941–5 civil war. Prior to the outbreak of the recent civil wars, political leaders of these three nations mobilised their respective peoples' support by stirring up popular fears which are grounded in the experiences of the previous civil war. For this purpose, the old national myths and ideologies appeared particularly convenient: in the framework of each of these national ideologies, the other nation(s) living in the area is viewed as a permanent threat to the survival of 'one's own' nation or culture. In contrast to the 1941–5 period, in 1991 pan-national Yugoslavism, transcending the separate national ideologies, was so firmly linked to the collapsed regime that it attracted very little support anywhere. Not only did the nationalists of each nation blame the communist regime for the ills which allegedly befell their nation, but, more importantly, the pan-national and pro-Yugoslav parties (some of which were successors to the communists) were not able to dispel the rising fears of the electorate of yet another bloodbath and to assure, as the communists had done before them, the safety of all national groups in the mixed population areas. In the atmosphere of rising fears, the field was left to the parties promoting separate national ideologies as the only guarantors of the safety of the national groups which they targeted. It is these resurrected and opposing national ideologies which have fuelled the most recent civil wars (see Chapter 10).

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4 The Second Yugoslavia

A FEDERATION AND ITS INTERNAL BORDERS

The first post-World War II constitution, passed by the communist-dominated Constituent Assembly in January 1946, abolished the monarchy and proclaimed the Federal People's Republic of Yugoslavia, the first in the series of people's republics constituted on the Soviet model in Eastern Europe under Soviet control. True to its revolutionary ideology, the Communist party of Yugoslavia set out to create a new state and a new society which bore no relation to the Kingdom of Yugoslavia except for its name. Accordingly, the new state found its origins in the rather mythical acts of self-determination of its five constituent nations – Croats, Macedonians, Montenegrins, Serbs and Slovenes – allegedly performed at the meeting of the Partisan assembly, AVNOJ, on 29 November 1943, and at other meetings of regional national liberation committees. In this fictive account, the five nations – or their members, irrespective of the federal republic in which they lived in Yugoslavia – exercised once and for all their right of self-determination by uniting into the federation established in November 1945.[1]

Following the 1936 USSR constitution, the six republics – Croatia, Bosnia–Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia and Slovenia – held the honorific title of 'states', while Vojvodina was an autonomous province and Kosovo–Metohija an autonomous region within the republic of Serbia. In actual practice, political power, once again on the Soviet model, was concentrated in the highly centralised Communist party and its highest executive organ, the Politburo, whose members were chosen by the Party's general-secretary Tito. Since his appointment to this highest position in the Party by the Comintern in Moscow in 1937, Tito had picked for the top Party positions those members who were personally loyal to him. During the war, the Partisan propaganda created a 'personality cult' of Tito, extolling him, through various marching songs and propaganda sheets, as the great leader of the Yugoslav struggle for liberation. Until 1948, this cult of Tito was second only to the cult of Stalin; after the break with Stalin in 1948, Tito's cult had no rival. Likewise, from 1948 until his death in 1980 Tito had no serious political rival in the Yugoslav Communist party or in the

country at large: he was the undisputed Party leader who governed the country through a coterie of handpicked officials.

Like its model the USSR, Yugoslavia was a centralised one-party state displaying the trappings of a federation based on a fictive self-determination of its nations. In such a state, the borders between the federal units were of little practical political importance. This in fact was made clear by Tito in a speech during his first postwar visit to Zagreb:

> These [federal] borders . . . should be something similar to those white lines on a marble column . . . What is the meaning of federal units in today's Yugoslavia? We don't consider them a group of small nations; rather they have a more administrative character, the freedom to govern oneself. That is the character of independence of each federal unit, full independence in the sense of free cultural and economic development.[2]

Although there has been no official explanation of how the borders between the new republics were drawn in 1946, most (but not all) of them roughly follow the pre-1914 international as well as Austro–Hungarian provincial borders, almost none of which coincided with the boundaries between the national groups. Thus the border between Bosnia–Hercegovina and Serbia followed the international border between the Ottoman (later, Austro–Hungarian) empire, to which Bosnia–Hercegovina belonged, and the independent kingdom of Serbia. The borders between Bosnia–Hercegovina and Croatia followed, with only minor corrections, the border between the Ottoman and Austro–Hungarian empires, which, with the Austro–Hungarian annexation of Bosnia–Hercegovina in 1908, became a provincial boundary within Austria–Hungary.[3] In a few places the communist leaders substantially modified the old borders to take into account the nationality of the majority populations in the particular area. Thus the border between Croatia and Serbia (in the northern province of Vojvodina) was modified so as to allow some (but not all) Serb-majority areas (such as Srem) to be transferred to Serbia and a Croat-populated area, Baranja, to be transferred to Croatia. In a similar way the south Adriatic area of Boka Kotorska with a majority Serb or Montenegrin population was assigned to Montenegro. The former Austro–Hungarian province of Dalmatia and the pre-1945 Italian province of Istria were also incorporated into the federal republic of Croatia presumably on the ground that Dalmatians and Istrians belong to the Croat nation.[4] These modifications appear to have been rather arbitrary, given the range of similar modifications which could also have been made. In a similar

Map 2 Distribution of national groups by republic and province (1991)
Source: P. Mojzes, *Yugoslavia's Inferno*, New York: Comtimuum Publishing, 1994.



manner, for example, the Austro–Hungarian (or Ottoman) borders of Bosnia–Hercegovina could have been modified so as to include a few

TABLE 1 *National groups in Yugoslavia in 1991*

Total population:		*23 528 000**	*Percentage of the total*
Croats		4 636 000	19.7%
out of which in Croatia	3 708 000		
in Bosnia-Hecegovina	755 000		
in Serbia	130 000**		
(the remainder in other republics)			
Macedonians		1 372 000	5.8%
Montenegrins		539 000	2.3%
Muslims		2 353 000	10.0%
out of which in Bosnia-Hercegovina	1 905 000		
in Serbia	237 000		
(the remainder in other republics)			
Serbs		8 526 000	36.2%
out of which in Serbia	6 428 000		
in Bosnia-Hercegovina	1 369 000		
in Croatia	580 000		
(the remainder in other republics)			
Slovenes		1 760 000	7.5%
Yugoslavs		710 000	3.0%
out of which in Serbia	317 000		
in Bosnia-Hercergovina	239 000		
in Croatia	104 000		
the remainder in other republics			
(Yugoslavs are those persons who declared their nationality as Yugoslav in the census)			
Albanians***		2 178 000	9.3%
out of which in Serbia			
(Kosovo and other parts of Serbia)	1 686 000		
in Macedonia	427 000		
(the remainder in other republics)			
Hungarians		378 000	1.6%
Others and unknown		1 070 000	
(including other nationalities and those who refused to declare their nationality)			

* Figures rounded to a thousand.

** The figure includes Bački Bunjevci who were in the 1981 census counted as Croats.

*** Most Albanians boycotted this census. The figures are estimates by the federal census office.

Source: R. Petrović, 'The National Composition of Yugoslavia's Population', *Yugoslav Survey*, vol. 33, 1 (1992) pp. 3–22.

border areas of Croatia (such as Krajina) where Serbs predominate while the Croat-populated areas of west Hercegovina could have been easily incorporated into Croatia.[5] Perhaps the communist leaders made only a few modifications to the historical borders simply because, in drawing the federal borders, they obviously did not intend to create six nation states. In fact, all federal republics of Yugoslavia, except Slovenia, were left with nationally mixed populations in various proportions. As a consequence of following the borders of the multinational Austria–Hungary, approximately 30 per cent of Serbs and 20 per cent of Croats were in 1946 left out of 'their' respective republics, Serbia and Croatia.

In any case, the new federal structure ensured that the largest and most dispersed nation in the country, the Serbs, would not be given so large a republic[6] as to be able to dominate the others. The equality of all nations – which in a one-party state serves largely symbolic purposes – demanded that no nation, Serbs or others, could dominate the rest in any way. By appealing to the national pride either of the newly emergent nations, such as the Macedonians, or of the nations such as the Croats, who had in pre-war Yugoslavia sought to achieve autonomy, this ideology of equality of all nations was used to mobilise support among these national groups for the Communist party and its leaders.[7] As the regime allowed no public dissent on any issue, it is difficult to estimate how wide was the support in 1946 for the new communist federal structure. During the late 1940s, the regime faced the opposition of small bands of guerillas (which were routinely branded either as Chetniks or Ustashe) in the mountains of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Serbia and Croatia as well as of Albanians in the Kosovo–Metohija region, whose mass uprising against its reincorporation into Yugoslavia started in 1944 and was suppressed, by massive military force, only in 1946. In view of the unrest among Kosovo Albanians which re-emerged in 1968 and continued into the 1990s, it is doubtful that the federal structure which confined the Albanian population to the status of a national minority and Kosovo–Metohija (later Kosovo) to a sub-federal unit (province) ever won wide acceptance among Kosovo Albanians or their educated elites. Apart from this, it is now impossible to gauge the extent of Serb *ressentiment* in the late 1940s at the separation of Macedonia from the pre-1914 territory of Serbia and the creation of two autonomous provinces within Serbia. This *ressentiment*, especially over the creation of the two provinces, displayed openly only among a few dissident intellectuals in the 1960s, became the major driving force behind the spread of Serb nationalism in the 1980s. It is unlikely, however, that disaffection with the federal structure in 1946 was very widespread in the rest of Yugoslavia; after so

much bloodshed, most people accepted these federal arrangements as they would have any other ones which promised a modicum of peace.

The communist policy of national equality found its most successful implementation in the Party recruitment of its members and cadres. From a nominal membership of 12 000 in 1941 (of which 9000 died during the war) the Party expanded to around 140 000 by 1945 and to 500 000 in 1950.[8] The Party recruited its members and cadres (trusted party members appointed to supervisory and managerial posts at all levels) from all constituent nations more or less proportionally. As a result, the Party membership increased from 1949 to 1963 at a very similar rate in all republics and among all of the five constituent nations.[9] In fact, Party recruitment of new cadres could be regarded as both a channel of upward mobility of the under- and uneducated as well as a means of emancipation of the previously neglected strata and of unrecognised ethnic groups such as Macedonians, Muslims and, later, Kosovo Albanians. Although the number of Serbs and Montenegrins in the Party in the late 1950s grew out of proportion to their respective populations, this increase did not lead to their increased participation in the highest Party or federal government bodies. The recruited cadres were employed and promoted in their republic of origin while an attempt was made to achieve either proportional or equal representation of all nations in the federal representative bodies and in most federal ministries. From early on, a Party cadre or a budding official knew that his (or, more rarely, her) career was most likely to be tied to the cadres of his (or her) republic, even if he (or she) were to be temporarily transferred to a federal body. This policy created separate and well-defined political constituencies, consisting of Party cadres and officials from each republic with shared career and political interests. The cadre constituencies were the main beneficiaries from the communist regime and, therefore, its main pillar of support; they also formed a power-base for the future national and republican communist elites which came to the fore in the early 1960s. In this way, a successful policy of equal national recruitment and political representation led, in the long run, to the creation of national communist elites who in the late 1960s successfully dismantled the highly centralised Communist party structure and created, in the early 1970s, a semiconfederation of republics (see Chapter 5).

COMMUNIST MOBILISATION AND CONTROL OF THE POPULATION

The Yugoslav communists took effective control of large parts of the country even before the end of the war. The Party nominally shared

power with other parties until the elections of November 1945 when it dispensed with the need for any power-sharing arrangements. A small parliamentary opposition was effectively neutralised during 1946. From 1947 the Party established its control, through nationalisation and confiscation, over large industry, banking, transport and communications as well as in political life and education. Its drive to collectivise agriculture, started in 1948, was an attempt to extend its control over peasants who appeared to be the most recalcitrant group of all. Although the Party was able to mobilise, during the war, impoverished segments of the peasantry in some areas of Croatia and in Bosnia–Hercegovina, the smallholder peasants in other, agriculturally more developed, areas had nothing to gain from the compulsory sale of their produce to the communist government at the government-fixed prices or from the effective confiscation of their land through the collectivisation.

On the Soviet model, politics was practised as a form of administration from above. No public debate over any issue, including the nationalities policy, was needed or allowed. The debate, if any, was confined to the highest Party policy-making body, the Politburo or, at best in its Central Committee. All other bodies, including the legislatures, were in effect charged with the implementation of these policies. Every institution – from housing estates and municipal services to the army and government departments – had Party cells of varying size (in the immediate postwar days they were small – from three to ten members – but later they increased in size). Heads of the Party cells regularly received directives from and reported to their superiors, usually organisation secretaries of the district Party committees. Party directives, communicated to the members by their cell secretaries, ordered and exhorted members to perform specific tasks and offered explanations, in terms of the official ideology, of the current Party line and policies. Party members were, in turn, supposed to supervise and exhort non-members at their work, and, at times, at their place of residence.

While the principal task of Party members was to mobilise the population and supervise its work, the principal task of the secret police was to control the population by identifying and punishing recalcitrant citizens and by 'weeding out' enemies. Founded in 1943 by Aleksandar Ranković, a former tailor and a local cadre from Belgrade whom Tito personally promoted to the upper echelons of the Party in 1937, the secret police, at first known by its acronym OZNA,[10] was modelled on its Soviet counterpart. From its early days it created a network of informers in all places of work and residence and a vast archive of dossiers not only of suspects and enemies but also of loyal Party cadres;

apart from weeding out enemies of the communist regime, it served as a huge vetting organisation for all posts of importance.

THE YUGOSLAV ROAD TO SOCIALISM

In spite of their evident loyalty and obedience, Stalin and the Soviet Communist party early in 1948 accused the Yugoslav communist leaders of ideological deviation and sliding back into capitalism; while Tito and his colleagues denied the accusations, the Soviet party called on the Yugoslav communists to remove their leaders. In order to identify potential supporters of Stalin, each Yugoslav Party member was asked to declare his or her opinion of the Soviet Communist party's charges. Many of those who sided with the Soviets had no firm ideological reasons for doing so but simply could not bring themselves to denounce so suddenly the previous official idols, Stalin and the Soviet party. Ranković's secret police rounded up hundreds of thousands of suspected pro-Stalinists, many of whom were victims of false denunciations. Tens of thousands of them were sent to labour camps, set up by Yugoslav secret police, to undergo brutal re-education at the hands of their fellow inmates. In an unprecedented move, the Yugoslav Party Politburo in 1948 published their correspondence with the Soviet Communist party leaders, presenting their case as a defence of national independence from foreign interference. The clash with Stalin thus provided a second opportunity for the Yugoslav communists to mobilise popular support as defenders of national independence. Responding to the rallying call for the defence of the country, thousands joined the Party after 1948 and even those who did not, came to regard Tito's regime as a defender against the Soviet menace.

As the Soviet Union cut its extensive credits, exports and technical support after the break in 1948, the Yugoslav economy faltered. To exhibit its political and ideological correctness, the Yugoslav leadership attempted until 1950 to maintain Stalinist economic policies, including the highly unpopular and forced collectivisation of agriculture. The latter proved an utter disaster which, in addition to a severe drought, led to the Yugoslav request in 1950 for food aid from the US and its West European allies. As the grain sent to Yugoslavia averted a threatening famine, the Yugoslav government negotiated in 1951 an economic aid package with the USA, France and Britain and a military aid package with the USA; the latter involved the stationing of a US military assistance group in Belgrade. From 1950 to 1955 total US official economic

aid amounted to 598 million US dollars (only 55 million of which were in repayable loans and the rest in grants); US military aid totalled 588 million dollars.[11] Of course, the Western economic and military aid was at the time justified in geopolitical and geostrategic terms: at the height of the Cold War and in the midst of the Korean War, the US and its European allies were in this way propping up an ally against the USSR. In response, the Yugoslav government in 1953 signed a pact of military cooperation with two NATO members, Greece and Turkey, forming the so-called Balkan Pact and, sometime later, settled its dispute over the city of Trieste with Italy. As a result of the break with Stalin, Yugoslavia, of all East European countries, was the recipient of the largest amount of Western economic and military aid. Foreign aid in the period from 1951 to 1960 became the source of 42.6 per cent of the all investments in Yugoslavia.[12] This huge inflow of foreign investment, mostly in a non-repayable form, could not fail to boost the Yugoslav economy, probably causing its take-off in the early 1960s. A variety of trade agreements with Western countries had also opened Western markets to its mineral and, later, agricultural products.

In 1950 the juncture at which the Yugoslav economy, as a result of the Soviet economic blockade, reached a crisis point, the Yugoslav communist leadership halted its drive for the collectivisation of agricultural land and decided to involve its working class in the running and management of their enterprises. The law on self-management enacted in 1950, the first in a long series of legislative acts dealing with self-management, required all larger enterprises to elect a workers' council of between 15 and 120 members which, in turn, would elect a management or executive board charged with the daily running of the enterprise. The workers' council was supposed to exercise an overall supervisory role, reviewing all the plans of the enterprises and electing and dismissing the executive board, of which the enterprise director was the only non-voting member. In practice, the workers' council was dominated by Communist party members who would ensure their election to the key positions. Although in fact instruments for the implementation of Party policies, these self-managing bodies proved to be less coercive and more participatory than any other instruments of the communist regime. Moreover, elections to the workers' councils, regular meetings and briefing of the workers, instilled, over the years, a sense of participatory rights and of personal worth to most Yugoslav workers. Every worker was entitled to the honorific title of 'self-manager' which put him or her on a par with Party bosses and enterprise directors with whom he or she was now to rub shoulders at the workers' council or executive board meetings.

Probably because of its non-coercive and participatory nature, the system of self-management came to be regarded as an effective tool for increasing economic efficiency. The underlying idea appeared to be quite simple: as the workers, apparently by their own will, made decisions regarding their output and productivity as well as partial distribution of profits, it was in their interest to carry these decisions out themselves. In the process they were supposed to grasp how the growth of their income is related to their productivity and output. As workers' councils provided non-members and Party members alike with a forum to air their views on strictly local issues, the arena for debate on public issues was somewhat widened as well. The system of self-management also slowly changed the way Party cadres operated. As the Party had to procure the assent of elected bodies in which at times it had no absolute majority, Party cadres as well as enterprise managers had to learn how to achieve this without overt coercion. In response to this need, the local Party bosses created patronage networks: in return for personal favours, their 'men' (and women) with whom all the elected bodies would be stacked, would deliver the vote on demand. The local Party bosses and their cadres would join a similar patronage network of a district Party boss and so on up to the very top of the republican and the central Party leadership.

As part of these reforms, the Yugoslav Communist party at its sixth congress in November 1952, changed its name to the League of Communists of Yugoslavia[13] and ostensibly transformed itself from a 'direct operative manager and commander in economic, state and social life' to a mere guide and benevolent supervisor of these aspects of life. In fact, the Party never shed its role of 'commander' until its effective dissolution in January 1990. However, its 1952 statute and programme replaced its Soviet Stalinist organisation with a less coercive and more broadly based type of organisation. From 1953, the year Stalin died, the Party's and secret police's surveillance of everyday life became more selective as well. The death of Stalin appeared to eliminate the threat of Soviet subversion; in consequence, the convicted Stalinists were released from prison camps and the practice of summary non-judicial imprisonment largely discontinued. However, the relaxation of control of everyday life did not mean the relaxation of the Party elite's grip on political power. When in 1953 the chief Party ideologist Milovan Djilas, in a series of articles, attacked the Party elite of which he was a member, he was forced to recant and later expelled from the Party.[14]

After 1952 the Stalinist model in art and science was also rapidly abandoned. The prohibition of 'bourgeois' science and art was lifted, allowing Yugoslav scholars and writers not only to quote and imitate

freely Western authors and artists, but also to travel to study in the West, primarily Britain and France. The younger generation of writers and painters turned to Western artistic models, arguing for the autonomy of art from any political ideology. By the early 1960s the Party leadership relinquished control of artistic production, restricting itself only to prohibition of overly critical political works of art.

In addition to the relaxation of Party control, the Yugoslav road to socialism came to embody a foreign policy of nonalignment, which meant the refusal to align one's country to either of the two existing military and political blocs. The early adherents to these policies were found among the recently decolonised countries of Africa and Asia, such as Egypt, India and Indonesia. An active promoter of nonalignment, Tito travelled in state to nonaligned countries in an attempt to forge a movement of the nonaligned as a third, balancing force in the bi-polar world. In early 1961 his diplomatic activity was crowned with the first conference of the nonaligned movement held in Belgrade.[15] In the process he assumed his third public persona – the one of which he was obviously most fond – that of a world statesman. The previous two – the heroic resistance leader and a fiercely independent communist leader – were, in part, the roles he took on in order to gain and to maintain himself in power. The third – that of world statesman – was not instrumental in keeping him in power. It was, one may say, somewhat decorative, enabling him to mingle with foreign potentates and celebrities without bringing much tangible benefit to his countrymen.

THE YUGOSLAV ROAD TO DEFENCE

Confronted with the threat of Soviet military intervention, the Yugoslav government from 1948 to 1953 kept a half-million strong conscript army at a high degree of combat readiness. While the army's numbers and combat readiness decreased after the death of Stalin and Khruschev's retraction, in 1955, of Stalin's charges against Tito, Yugoslavia maintained a large armed force of over 250 000 men until the late 1970s. In keeping with its nonaligned policy it also developed self-reliance in armaments and military equipment. Even before US military aid was terminated in 1958, the Yugoslav arms industry had expanded considerably. Most of the military equipment from the 1960s onwards, except for heavy armour, advanced aircraft and missile defences, came to be home-produced.[16] Military planning in Yugoslavia based on the Partisan resistance experience envisaged a protracted war fought in the mountains

of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Montenegro and Serbia. Accordingly, large supplies of arms and ammunition were (in particular from 1968 onwards) stored, at times underground, in these and other locations throughout the country. At the early stages in the civil war in Bosnia–Hercegovina in 1992, most of the Yugoslav federal army (the Yugoslav People's Army as it was officially called) depots in that republic were either evacuated to Serbia or taken over by the Bosnian Serb military providing it with a formidable array of weaponry and ammunition.

In 1969, partly as a result of the threat posed by the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Yugoslav military devised a new concept of 'general national defence' to enable rapid and full mobilisation of the population in the event of a foreign invasion. Every person, including women, from 15 to 65 years of age was made subject to military or civil defence call-up. A second-tier territorial defence force was formed of reservists, commanded by local reserve officers and armed from their own local arms depots.[17] For this purpose the territorial defence depots, containing small arms as well mortars and light anti-aircraft and anti-tank weapons, were established at all larger industrial enterprises as well as municipal offices. All sides in the civil wars which started in 1991 were armed, at least in part, from these territorial unit depots. The Slovenian armed forces in June 1991 and the bulk of the Bosnian army formed in 1992 by the Bosnian Muslim government of Alija Izetbegović, were made up of the territorial defence units armed from such depots; so were the forces of Serbs from Croatia and from Bosnia–Hercegovina.

The Slovenian and Croatian governments in June 1991 proclaimed independence from federal Yugoslavia while commanding large, albeit lightly armed forces formed mainly from these territorial defence units or from reserve police units. Thus they were able not only to challenge the frontline federal defence forces – the much better armed Yugoslav People's Army – but also to exert effective control over their territory. Were the new Slovene and Croat national elites who came to power in April 1990 unable to create their own military forces using the territorial defence infrastructure and supplies, it is not clear whether they would have been ready to proclaim the independence of their republics so soon after their ascent to power. The system of a territorial defence force with its local supply base, however, merely facilitated the break-up of the federation and the subsequent civil wars. It was the fragmentation of Yugoslavia's constitutional structure and the devolution of power to the nationally-based political elites which started in the early 1960s, that had laid the constitutional and political groundwork for the final break-up of the federation in 1991.

Part II
The Homeland Fragmented

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5 From a Centralised State to a Semiconfederation

INTELLECTUALS AND THE REVIVAL OF OLD NATIONAL DEMANDS

During the 1950s Yugoslavia, in spite of its federal structure, was much more of a centralised state than it probably ever was since its creation in 1918. The introduction of self-management did not immediately change the centralism of the Party organisation nor did it lead to the devolution of decision-making onto the federal units. On the contrary, the Constitutional Law of 1953 which enshrined the first self-management principles and rights, abolished a separate Chamber of Nationalities in the Federal Assembly, no longer described the federal republics as 'sovereign' and deleted the right of national self-determination including secession.[1] These constitutional changes were part of a general abandonment of the Soviet state model on which the first constitution of 1946 was based. However, they clearly indicated that the Party leadership at the time did not plan any further federalisation of the country.

These constitutional changes provoked a debate about the nature of federalism in Yugoslavia. Some Croat jurists pointed out that the republics had no right to self-government and that they, in consequence, had no real powers. Their arguments hinted – but did not state openly – that federalism in Yugoslavia was a sham. They and their Macedonian colleagues found the rescission of even purely formal attribution of the republics' sovereignty undesirable.[2] This first postwar public debate on federalism, restricted as it was to the legal scholarly journals in 1952–4, indicated that there were highly divergent views on the issue even among communist legal scholars and that the old division between the centralists – usually Serbs – and the federalists – usually Croats – survived the communist takeover and was re-emerging.

While reducing the formal rights of the republics, in the early 1950s the Party leadership initiated a campaign to instil Yugoslav national consciousness and to create a common Yugoslav culture. At the time Yugoslav national consciousness was firmly tied to the Partisan ideology of 'brotherhood and unity', according to which a Yugoslav patriot can

identify himself or herself as a Macedonian or a Croat or a Serb or (...) *and* a Yugoslav, ready to sacrifice his or her life for the whole of the country. In this two-tiered approach to national identity, Yugoslavism was thus conceived as a rather vague supranational identity transcending but not abolishing basic national identities. In this vague form it provided no functional national markers: it was not possible to tell a Yugoslav from a Croat or a Macedonian or a member of any other established nationality. At the Party's seventh congress in 1958, Yugoslavism was further defined as a 'socialist Yugoslav consciousness' which is to be developed, in future, through the creation of a common Yugoslav culture. In attempting to create the latter, new all-Yugoslav cultural and professional organisations, providing new sinecures for approved intellectuals, had already been created and common Yugoslav school curricula and textbooks were planned. In 1954 in Novi Sad leading Yugoslav linguists had also concluded an agreement, establishing a common literary Serbo–Croat standard, with equal Eastern (Serbian) and Western (Croatian) variants. Apart from an official orthography guide, based on the agreement, the campaign for a common Yugoslav culture produced nothing of lasting value; no common Yugoslav school textbooks or school curricula were ever produced in Yugoslavia. Attempting to explain this apparent failure, in 1961 Dobrica Ćosić, one of the most prominent communist Serb writers – and the future president of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (1992–3) – hinted that the development of a common Yugoslav culture was hindered by the federal republics and their bureaucracies. In a brief but vitriolic polemic a prominent Slovene literary critic accused Ćosić of returning to the pre-war Serbian cultural unitarism and centralism (which, it was pointed out, was also endorsed by the Chetniks).[3] As in the nineteenth century and again in the interwar period, in 1961 many Croat and Slovene intellectuals obviously regarded Yugoslavism as a threat to their separate national identities. This is probably why they identified Yugoslavism with Serb hegemonism and dismissed it as a mask for Serb political and cultural domination.

Nationalist polemics in the early 1960s moved to the field of economics as well. Predictably, economists as well as politicians from the economically more developed Croatia and Slovenia argued that the decision-making on capital investments should be taken away from the federal government and that their republics should have control over their contributions to the economic development of the less developed republics. In this and all subsequent debates the Yugoslav economy was no longer viewed as a single economy but as a sum of its republics' economies. In this framework, the old question of economic 'exploita-

tion' of the developed regions – Croatia and Slovenia – by the less developed ones was easily resurrected as well.

History, the favourite field of national ideologues, was next. In 1963 in a polemic with a well-known communist Serb historian, Croat historians – including Franjo Tudjman, the future president of the Republic of Croatia (1990–) – sought to establish that the state sovereignty of Croatia was preserved in the process of the formation of the communist Yugoslav federation and to rehabilitate various Croat national movements as progressive.[4] Croatia has always had a distinct and unique sovereignty which, they argued, had been retained in the communist federation. This, of course, was the old ideology of Croat historic state rights adapted to the new circumstances. The Croatian Party's reprimand of the Croat historians – including Tudjman – for their attacks on the official history of the Communist party did not deter major Croat cultural organisations from issuing, in 1967, a declaration rescinding the 1954 Novi Sad agreement on the Serbo-Croat literary standard and demanding the constitutional separation of the Croat literary language from the Serbian. This was, in fact, a declaration of full Croatian cultural sovereignty and uniqueness which openly repudiated any common Yugoslav culture. The declaration provoked a response by Serbian writers who, while agreeing to the separation of the two languages, demanded that the Serbs in Croatia be free to use Serbian (and the Cyrillic alphabet) and that Cyrillic be adopted in Belgrade television broadcasts and print media. While the Party's official reaction to both declarations was predictably negative, already in 1964 the new Party programme dropped any reference to socialist (or any other) Yugoslav consciousness and to a common Yugoslav culture: as an official communist ideology, by 1964 Yugoslavism was dead.[5]

NEW COMMUNIST NATIONAL ELITES IN ACTION

As the intellectuals who signed the above declarations were only mildly punished for their transgression, it was obvious that at least some communist leaders found these new expressions of nationalism politically useful. By the early 1960s the communist leaders – members of Tito's old guard – in each republic had created their national clientele and patronage networks of middle- and lower-ranking communist cadres. As in the late 1950s younger university-educated Party cadres started to replace the older generation of Partisan cadres, they and the republics' leaders, their patrons, no longer shared the common experience of

Partisan struggle and endeavour. The only alternative experience they shared was that of cultural background, language and nationality. Thus from the early 1960s a budding Party cadre needed to share the nationality of his Party patron or at least be fully 'acculturated' in his nationality. As Yugoslavism was no longer the official communist ideology, those who declared themselves as Yugoslavs only, found that they were ineligible for any elective Party or government positions. In the late 1960s the Croatian Party leaders, launched a successful campaign to secure equal national representation in the non-elective professional positions in the federal Party and government administration as well. From then on in order to get a job as a professional – for example, an economist or a lawyer – in the federal administration, one had to belong to the approved national group whose representation quota had not been filled. This rule did not apply in two areas only: the middle- and lower-ranking posts in the foreign service and the Yugoslav People's Army, the two federal institutions under Tito's personal control.[6]

In this context, the traditional national demands, voiced primarily by Croat and Slovene intellectuals in the early 1960s, could be viewed as attempts to rally the support of the communist cadres, the intelligentsia and the general reading public in each republic for the communist elites emerging from the new nationally based clientele networks. As each of these elites aimed at the control of their own republic's economy, culture and police, any federal institution or ideology interfering with these aims was, by definition, hostile. In consequence, the ideology of a common Yugoslav culture as well as the federal secret police and federal planning and investment bodies were considered obstacles to their aims. In particular, the federal secret police under the Serb communist Ranković was interfering, through its system of security vetting, with the appointments and promotions of the Party cadres in the republics, which the republican Party bosses considered their exclusive domain.

At a special meeting of the Party's Central Committee at Tito's residence on the island of Brioni in July 1966, Ranković was accused not only of abuse of power through his secret police apparatus but of Serb nationalism masked under unitarist Yugoslavism as well as of bugging Tito's own bedroom. The last charge – which was denied by Ranković's deputies[7] – was brought in to alienate Tito from his trusted prewar comrade while the accusation of Serb nationalism was intended to discredit Yugoslavism by associating it with an aggressive nationalist ideology and a repressive secret police apparatus. In spite of the Serbian communists' dutiful support of the charges against Ranković, his fall was, at the time, generally viewed among communists and non-

communists alike, as a defeat of a Serbian bid to control the Yugoslav Party and the whole country. However, in the early 1980s many Serbs came to regard Ranković as the only Serb communist politician of Tito's era who protected Serb interests in Yugoslavia.[8]

As a result of his fall and the purge of his supporters from the secret police, the communist leaders of each republic gained full control of their own republic's secret police; each republic, through its secret police, became free to target its own internal enemies. In the late 1970s this devolution of secret policing made life somewhat easier for certain political dissidents: intellectual dissidents targeted by secret police in Croatia or Bosnia–Hercegovina often found refuge and employment in Serbia (but almost never the other way around) because the Serbian secret police did not see any danger in the political dissidents coming from these republics. As the reorganised secret police shed most of its huge informer network, life was also made easier for ordinary people and Party cadres alike who no longer had to fear retribution for any chance critical remark or a political joke they made. Moreover, with the abolition of secret police vetting of passport applications, every adult citizen became, in principle, entitled to a passport and to travel abroad. From the late 1960s an estimated one million persons, mostly as temporary 'guest workers', left the country, mainly for Germany, France and Sweden but also for North America and Australia. The emigration of labour – unprecedented among the communist-ruled countries at the time – not only relieved the country's unemployment problem but contributed to the further decrease in rural population. As a result of this wave of emigration as well as the industrialisation in the 1950s, by the late 1960s most of the Yugoslav population lived in urban centres and drew their income from non-agricultural employment. The unprecedented increase in the standard of living which all strata experienced at the time was probably a combined result of the increased government investment in consumer-oriented industries (often financed from foreign credits), the inflow of foreign currency earnings from Yugoslav 'guest workers' abroad; and a rapid expansion of tourism and hospitality industries in the Adriatic area (which, after the guest workers' remittances from abroad, was the largest source of foreign currency earnings).

NEW NATIONS AND NEW NATIONAL MOVEMENTS

In the late 1960s the new communist elites now firmly based on their national clientele networks, moved to consolidate and expand their power

in the republics and in the province of Kosovo and to increase their share of power at the federal level. Endeavouring to mobilise mass support for their policies, the new elites transferred old (and new) nationalist demands from the sphere of intellectual debates to that of mass politics.

The first to do so was the new Muslim communist elite: in May 1968 the Central Committee of the Communist party of Bosnia–Hercegovina proclaimed the Muslims a separate nation, the third constituent nation in this republic and sixth to be recognised in Yugoslavia.[9] The new constituent nation is a Slav ethnic group, speaking Serbo-Croat (or in Macedonia, Macedonian), whose members either profess Islam or who come from an Islamic background. After World War II they were encouraged to declare themselves as Yugoslavs, or to declare themselves as either Serbs or Croats or, if all fails, to state their nationality as undeclared. Only in the 1960s were they given the option of declaring themselves as 'Muslims in the ethnic sense'. As at the time they surpassed in number either Serbs or Croats in Bosnia–Hercegovina, they had formed their own communist intellectual and political elite in this republic. While the Muslim intellectuals offered marxist explanations of the evolution of the Muslims into a separate national group (see Chapter 7), their political elite sought to lobby Tito and his closest advisers for their recognition as a constituent nation.[10] This recognition ensured them compulsory representation in the administration and political bodies both in their republic and at the federal level. Tito's appointment of a self-declared Muslim from Bosnia–Hercegovina to the post of Yugoslav federal prime minister in 1971, indicated that yet another nation had arrived in Yugoslavia.

After the fall of Ranković, political power in the province of Kosovo-Metohija passed to a younger generation of Kosovo Albanian leaders who, freed from the restraint of Ranković's secret police, quickly expanded its new clientele network of Kosovo Albanian cadres. In November 1968, coinciding with Albania's National Day, well-coordinated and in some cases violent Albanian demonstrations broke out in a number of towns in Kosovo and in western Macedonia. Led in some cases by Albanian students from the newly established university faculty of Priština (which offered instruction in Albanian), the Albanian demonstrators demanded that their province Kosovo be transformed into a separate republic. This would also mean that, like the Muslims a few months earlier, the Albanians (at the time a national minority of around one million) should be elevated to the status of a constituent nation of Yugoslavia. In practice, this elevation would give the new Kosovo Albanian political elite – like the national elites in the existing republics – full control over

Kosovo's economy, education and secret police. Coordinated demonstrations on this scale could not have been organised without the knowledge and tacit support of the Kosovo Albanian communist leadership. But, as the suppression of the demonstrations led to a loss of life, the latter was forced to distance itself from the demonstrators' demands for a republic. The new communist leaders in Serbia – who were installed in power only in 1967 – responded to the Albanian national movement in Kosovo by increasing the level of industrial, educational and infrastructure investment in the province. In the view of the young and well-educated communist leaders, Latinka Perović and Marko Nikezić, Serbia as well as Kosovo needed a modern economy, based on large and profitable industrial firms as well as a modern, broadly based (albeit still one-party) political system. While undoubtedly modernising, their response did not change the Albanian demands for a republic of Kosovo nor stop their dissemination: small-scale Albanian demonstrations under the same slogan 'Kosovo – republic!' were organised in Kosovo several times[11] after 1968 and the Serbs and Montenegrins continued to emigrate from the province (see Chapter 6).

While the role of Kosovo Albanian communist leaders in the rise of the Albanian national movement in Kosovo was, at the time, not subjected to any scrutiny, the Croatian communist leaders in 1970 came to lead openly a mass national movement whose long-term aim was the attainment of sovereignty for Croatia and the confederalisation of Yugoslavia. Like its Serbian counterpart, the Croatian government and party leadership was at this time rejuvenated with the elevation of Mika Tripalo and Savka Dabčević-Kučar to top Party posts in the republic. Their patron, the senior Croatian Communist party boss Vladimir Bakarić initiated, in December 1969, a campaign against (Yugoslav) unitarism which, according to him, was still the main enemy of democratic socialism and of Croatian national interests. In defence of the latter, he made clear, the Croatian Communist party needed to mobilise the Croat masses.[12] Accordingly, the new Croatian leaders began a mass recruitment drive of Croats into the Communist party of Croatia and into various cultural organisations (such as *Matica Hrvatska* – the Croatian Hive) which were transformed into mass organisations[13] with a nationalist cultural and political agenda.

The rhetoric of the leaders of the new mass organisations in many respects resembled the rhetoric of the prewar Croat Peasant party with its slogan 'each to his own'. They argued that since Croatia had until recently been trampled upon, it needer to recover its true identity, by adopting not only its traditional state symbols (without

the red star) and its own separate language (purified of Serb influences) but also by having its own territorial army (with the proviso that Croat recruits to the federal army serve only in Croatia). In addition, the foreign currency earnings of Croatia and the Croats working abroad should be allocated to Croatia and not to the Yugoslav federation. Moreover, the overrepresentation of Serbs (from Croatia) in the Party, government, media, industry and police needed to be rectified by replacing Serbs with Croats. Although the Croatian Party leaders did not accept all these demands, they initiated an ethnic purge (called recounting) through which a significant number of Serbs from Croatia were dismissed from managerial posts and replaced by the ethnic Croat supporters of the Croatian Party leaders.

After Tito's endorsement of the Croatian leaders' new policies in September 1971, the nationalist leaders in the student organisation and in *Matica* stepped up their demands, (including the revision of the definition of Croatia's sovereignty to include the right of secession and the incorporation into Croatia of parts of Hercegovina and Montenegro)[14] and attacked Bakarić himself. Reacting to the increasing Croatisation of public life, the local Serbs in Croatia demanded guarantees of their continued links with Serbia and started, quite publicly, to arm their population in the Krajina region in expectation of a possible conflict. After Zagreb University students went on strike in support of their favourites, Tripalo and Dabčević-Kučar, their erstwhile patron Bakarić and other Croatian communist leaders, in late November 1971, persuaded Tito to dismiss the two. In the wake of violent demonstrations of Zagreb University students protesting their dismissal, the principal leaders of the mass national movement were arrested and later sentenced to prison terms. Thousands of Tripalo and Dabčević-Kučar supporters were purged from their Party and managerial posts. This time, however, the new Communist party leaders, sensitive to the issue of Serb domination, did not replace the purged Croats with Serbs from Croatia.

Having purged the Croatian Communist party, Tito turned to the Slovenian and Macedonian Party leaders whom he purged without much difficulty. The Serbian communist leaders, Perović and Nikezić, accused of 'liberalism' and 'technocratism', resisted the purge by rallying their communist cadres from all over Serbia. In October 1972, an enraged Tito confessed in a newspaper interview that during the four days of inconclusive meetings of the Serbian Party's Central Committee he was confronted not only by a united opposition but by 'unfavourable and impermissible' comments about himself. After the two leaders were replaced by Tito loyalists, around 6000 of their supporters throughout

the Party and managerial posts were also purged. Tito's purges of the younger generation of communist leaders and their clientele networks in these four republics in 1971–2 did not, however, result in the recentralisation of government and Party institutions but only in the recentralisation of political power in his hands and the hands of a coterie of officials which he selected and controlled. His reassertion of authority in this way, one can argue with the benefit of hindsight, set Yugoslavia on the road to its eventual disintegration if not to the civil war.

A SEMICONFEDERATION UNDER TITO'S PERSONAL RULE

The Yugoslavia which disintegrated in 1991 was in fact a semiconfederation constituted in 1974 by its fourth post-1945 constitution. The drafting of the constitution started in 1972, soon after the purges of the republics' leaderships were completed. Its avowed aim was to extend the principles of self-management into all aspects of political, economic and social life. In pursuit of this, the constitution – then the longest one in the world – created a pyramidal structure of self- managing bodies at the apex of which stood a two-chamber federal assembly whose deputies, elected in complex indirect elections, were primarily responsible to their republican or provincial electoral bodies.

The top decision-making body in Yugoslavia became the state presidency, consisting of one representative from each republic and province, which elected its president, in a pre-determined order, on a rotating yearly basis. A parallel but larger presidency had already been installed as the governing body of the Yugoslav Communist party. The office of president of the republic, to which Tito was duly elected for the duration of his natural life, was to expire with the death of its only holder and to be replaced by the state presidency. The constitution gave Tito an almost unlimited right to conduct foreign policy as well as to command the military forces. The few other areas of competence of the federal government – common monetary policy, custom duties collection, funding of undeveloped regions and federal transport and communications – were all controlled by the republics' leaders through the state presidency and federal cabinet. As the state presidency had to reach most of its decisions by consensus, each republic and province, regardless of its size and contribution to the federal budget, was virtually given the power of veto which could be effectively overridden only by Tito. The members of the first collective presidency, chosen by Tito from his old guard, were drawn together by the bonds of their

shared revolutionary struggle as well as their loyalty to Tito. In contrast to the loyalty binding all these leaders to Tito, the institutional bonds drawing the republics together were quite weak. Each republic had so wide a range of sovereign rights and powers that, in spite of the explicit attribution of some sovereign rights to the nations of Yugoslavia, the republics did appear to be both the sources of state sovereignty and centres of political power. The only areas over which the republican leaders exercised no control were those in Tito's personal domain, namely, the military and foreign affairs. By assigning only these two areas of state competence to an authority (that is, Tito) independent of the republics, the constitution of 1974 had made Yugoslavia into a semiconfederation of semisovereign republics.

Despite a complex web of self-managing bodies and councils, the way the Yugoslav president exercised his political power was likened to that of a semiconstitutional monarch. The ageing Tito (82 in 1974) aloof from daily politics for long periods, ruled through a small coterie of his old Partisan comrades and a few handpicked younger functionaries. While his chosen comrades ruled over their republics as their personal fiefdoms, the old marshal's undisputed domain was the military. In fact, in the late 1970s there was no Party or government body which could check or resist Tito in his exercise of power. Not only his exercise of power but also some aspects of his lifestyle came to resemble that of a monarch. In addition to his official residences in Belgrade and Zagreb, he used several hunting lodges (a few of which previously belonged to the Karađorđević dynasty) as well as an Adriatic island, (with a private zoo, among other amenities) in the Brioni group of islands to which Party and government bodies as well as individual officials would be often summoned for meetings.[15] It was there that Tito liked entertaining both foreign celebrities[16] – including film stars – and well-known Yugoslav intellectuals and artists. Often his travel from one of these residences to another resembled a royal progress during which the local populace and their leaders were expected to stage prolonged effusions of adulation. However, unlike other communist potentates, Tito had no use for nepotism; neither his two sons nor any of his relatives were given any high official posts.

THE SEMICONFEDERATION AND THE CONFLICTING NATIONAL DEMANDS

In spite of their constitutional equality, the uneven level of economic development among the six republics and two provinces created

persistent disagreements among their leaders about the allocation of economic aid for underdeveloped regions. The poorer republics and provinces – Macedonia, Bosnia–Hercegovina and Kosovo – continually demanded a higher allocation of aid from the central federal fund whereas the Croatian, and, in particular, Slovenian leaders, refused to countenance a continual drain on their resources for purposes of financing grandiose and often unprofitable economic projects in the underdeveloped republics (see Chapter 6). In addition the constitution of 1974 created a dual status for the autonomous provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo; these provinces were both constituent parts of the federation and of the republic of Serbia. In practice, the republic of Serbia was virtually federalised: the provinces had full legislative autonomy and their legislatures could, in principle, veto Serbian legislative acts by refusing to endorse them. Even Tito's obedient placemen who took the top posts in the Serbian Communist party in 1972 attempted to find some way of redressing this constitutional anomaly. Although their initial timid efforts intensified after Tito's death in 1980, the constitutional duality of the provinces' position remained unchanged. It was left to Slobodan Milošević in 1987 to make the reunification of a dismembered Serbia his battle-cry with which he swept Serbia and created a mass nationalist movement which surpassed anything seen in communist Yugoslavia (see Chapter 8).

While the constitutional confederalisation of Yugoslavia met many of the demands of the Croat and Slovene national movements, it raised in an acute form the Serb national question. As the Belgrade philosopher and legal theorist Mihailo Đurić wrote already in 1971:

> It is obvious that the borders of the present-day Socialist Republic of Serbia are neither the national nor the historic borders of the Serb people. In general, the borders of all present-day republics in Yugoslavia . . . have more of an administrative than a political character. When they are understood as the borders of national states it becomes evident that they are inappropriate, arbitrary, and untenable.[17]

Since the 1971 constitutional amendments (and their sequel, the 1974 constitution) aimed at creating national states out of republics, the Serbs, he argued, need to re-examine their fatuous attempt to create a single state for themselves in Yugoslavia and to struggle once again for their 'national integrity', that is, unification. For these views he was arrested and received one year in prison. This harshest sentence meted out to any Serb intellectual since the early 1950s probably indicated an awareness of how destabilising the idea of Serb unification was to the

communist regime in Yugoslavia. The idea of Serb unification in one state implied that Serb loyalty lies primarily with the state which they share with all other Serbs. If Yugoslavia is no longer a state which they share with other Serbs, Serbs in other republics (and even in Serbia) need no longer acknowledge the legitimacy of the communist leaderships of these republics (because their republics were not part of the state of all Serbs). Even more dangerously, in striving for their renewed unification, the Serbs may demand that the republics' borders be changed to reflect their desire to live in a single state. This would imply not only a considerable reduction in power and territorial control of the already well-established national communist elites in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina but would also create a huge and dominating republic. In 1988 the new communist leader of Serbia, Slobodan Milošević, incorporated this vision of Serb unification in his nationalist revival programme. As the opposition to his programme would show, no non-Serb political elite in Yugoslavia – whether communist or not – could agree to such a redistribution of power and territory.

Moreover, the traditional demand for the unification of all Serbs, conflicted with the traditional ideology of Croat historic state rights: the unified Serb state would naturally include Serb-populated territory of the republic of Croatia which, according to the Croat ideology, is a historical part of the Croat nation-state. The demand of each of the traditional national ideologies for a national state of its target nation would also require at least a partition of Bosnia–Hercegovina along national lines. The constitution of 1974 offered no mechanism for the resolution of the potential conflict of re-emerging national ideologies. On the contrary, one can argue that by abolishing any legal source of political power and legitimacy independent of the republics and provinces (except Tito's office of president) it ruled out the possibility of any effective arbiter of or check on their conflicting demands.

Further, the 1974 constitution exacerbated this potential conflict by leaving unclear who were the subjects of national self-determination in Yugoslavia. The constitution of 1974, like the first communist constitution of 1946, acknowledged the right of each (recognised) nation to self-determination 'including the right to secession' but then proceeded to state that on the basis of this right, the nations of Yugoslavia 'had united in a federal republic of free and equal nations and nationalities . . .'.[18] As with the 1946 constitution, this constitution also implied that this right had been exercised once and for all through the nations' unification in one federal state. The nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia, the constitution stated, exercise their sovereign rights in the republics and pro-

vinces in which they live, except for those rights which the federal constitution specifically identifies as coming under the federal jurisdiction. The right of national self-determination had been exercised, the constitution implied, by the Yugoslav nations prior to the establishment of the framework of the republics and is thus independent of this framework. As the Yugoslav federation was not created through a unification of republics but through a rather fictive national self-determination of its nations, the Yugoslav federation was never defined as an association of republics.[19] Thus the decision of the EC Arbitration Commission in December 1991 to assign the right of self-determination not to the six nations of Yugoslavia but to the nationally mixed population of each republic had no basis in the 1974 or any previous Yugoslav constitution (see Chapter 10). In asserting the right to national self-determination of the six constituent nations, the 1974 constitution suggested that any potential states to be formed on the territory of Yugoslavia could be based on the right of self- determination of these nations, irrespective of the republics in which they reside. This principle would, naturally, support the drive for integration of the dispersed nations such as the Serbs and the Croats and the consequent abolition of the existing federal units. But by attributing sovereignty and statehood to the federal units, that is republics, the constitution also appeared to suggest that they need to be regarded as sovereign nation-states, in spite of the nationally mixed populations of most of them. The conflict between the principle of sovereignty of individual nations and the principle of sovereignty of federal republics was neither brought into the open in the constitution nor was any suggestion made how it could be resolved. The constitution thus appeared to have suggested both the possibility of the formation of six independent states out of its six federal units and an alternative kind of state-formation which would not follow the federal units' borders and which would be based on the national self-determination of its dispersed nations. As the constitution did not address the possibility of the dissolution of the federation in any way whatsoever, it did not provide any legal or political mechanism for the resolution of conflicts either over these two kinds of state-formation or over the territory of the future independent states.

TITO'S FRAGMENTATION OF YUGOSLAVIA

In the constitution of 1974 the communist national elites and their leaders in each republic and province received constitutional guarantees of full control over their respective republics and provinces. The

fragmentation of Yugoslavia into six quasi-states and two lesser-than-a-state federal units thus appears to be directly linked to the evolution of the republics and provinces into powerbases for the leading Party officials. Naturally, the Communist party leaders, and Tito himself, could have tried to prevent this by creating an all-Yugoslav body of communist cadres – a constituency of communist managers and officials – capable of operating in all republics of Yugoslavia. Indeed, the promotion of Yugoslavism in the early 1950s might have been motivated by a desire to create such a body of Yugoslav cadres whose primary loyalty would be to the Yugoslav Communist party. This supranational Yugoslavism was, however, successfully suppressed and then finally discredited by its association with the effective head of the secret police Aleksandar Ranković.

The only leader who could have profited from the creation of an all-Yugoslav body of Party cadres – especially after the fall of Ranković – was Tito himself. However, he was so assured of the loyalty of the Party members and cadres of all national groups that he had no need to create a separate group of Party cadres with an all-Yugoslav national identification. He was also well aware of the opposition among most of his trusted, old guard comrades to Yugoslavism as a substitute national identity, and he clearly preferred using his old guard and their personal clientele networks as conduits of his power than antagonising them by the creation of an independent power base for himself alone. In order to replace the fragmented political elites with a single unified one, Tito would have needed a revolutionary political vision as well as revolutionary political energy such as he had displayed in his younger days. After the acknowledgment of his victory over Stalinism in the mid-1950s, Tito had lost both; by this time he ceased to be a revolutionary and transformed himself into an elder world statesman, the role which apparently gave him more satisfaction than any other. The constitutional fragmentation of the country presented no obstacle to his rule and entrenched him in power for life. Moreover, the 1974 constitution, by replacing the office of president, after his death, with the collective state presidency, assured him a unique place – that of the last president – in the history of the country which, however, disintegrated only eleven years after his death.

6 The Loss of Legitimacy 1980–89

THE TWILIGHT YEARS OF TITO'S RULE

The politics of Yugoslavia from 1974 until Tito's death in 1980 was marked by the continuity of the rule of his chosen coterie of functionaries as well as by a proliferation of legislation codifying increasingly arcane and complex self-managing practices. Thus in 1976 all institutions and enterprises (including the secret police) were broken up into 'basic units of associated labour' which were linked to other such units through self-managing agreements governing all exchanges of services, goods and money. Shielded from competition and the possibility of bankruptcy by interlocking agreements of this kind, unprofitable enterprises of all kinds were enabled to survive and even flourish. In this hierarchical world of self-management bodies all interests were to be 'harmonised' through discussion and agreement: the ultimate goal was harmony in a world of happy producers. The illusion of successful harmonisation was no doubt fostered by the absence of any overt friction among the republics' leaders belonging Tito's inner circle. Since Tito had made it quite clear, after the 1971–2 purges, that he would no longer tolerate any dissension, his obedient coterie obliged not only by avoiding disagreements among themselves but by denying any dissenting voices access to the public. In contrast to the period preceding the purges, in the 1970s contentious political views were barred from the official press.

The self-imposed harmony could not prevent the long-standing differences from reappearing in debates on the distribution of federal funds for economic development of undeveloped regions. The total transfers through federal funds to the undeveloped regions (comprising of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Montenegro, Macedonia and Kosovo), amounted to 3 per cent of the social product of the developed republics (Serbia, Croatia and Slovenia), which was deemed to impose a heavy burden on the latter.[1] In spite of this, in the 1970s and 1980s the undeveloped regions, with the exception of Macedonia, failed to improve their relative economic performance. This failure was due to the relatively high birth rate of the undeveloped regions (in particular, Kosovo) as

well as to the widespread mismanagement of the investment funds by recipient republican or provincial governments.[2] The latter was one of the reasons the Croatian and Slovenian governments demanded the abolition of the central federal fund for undeveloped regions; instead of the fund, they proposed that the donor republican governments retain control over their contributions by directly investing in selected development projects in the undeveloped republics.[3] In the late 1980s the failure to meet their demands for reform of this system was increasingly used as an argument for the full confederalisation of Yugoslavia or, failing that, for Slovenia's and Croatia's secession from Yugoslavia.

The last years of Tito's rule were, however, not marked by premonitions of disharmony among his chosen successors but by a petty intrigue at his 'court' which resulted in his separation from his third wife Jovanka. In removing her Tito's coterie clearly wanted to ward off any initiative to remove them from power before his death: their position in power at his death, they believed, would secure them continued enjoyment of the same thereafter. Indeed, Tito's prolonged illness – from January to May 1980 – enabled them to organise a smooth transfer of power to the collective state and Party presidencies which they dominated. The spontaneous outpouring of popular grief at the news of his death on 4 May 1980 in Ljubljana certainly surprised the critics of his regime. The mourning crowds in Zagreb, as the train with his cortege passed through on its way to the capital Belgrade and the hours people from all walks of life waited in Belgrade to pay their last respects to him, undeniably exhibited the extent of his personal popularity. This probably encouraged his successors to believe that the political system created while he was in power was equally popular. The role they chose to play was that of faithful guardians of the system: their main mission, well encapsulated in the slogan 'After Tito, Tito', was to keep the system unchanged. But the economic crisis in which the country plunged in 1980 and the escalating national conflict in the province of Kosovo appeared to be insoluble within the semi-confederal self-managing political system they wanted to preserve. By 1988 the great majority of Tito's chosen coterie of republics' leaders had been replaced with leaders who had no common loyalties (to Tito or to anyone else) and a rapidly diminishing number of political interests in common. By that time, however, both the Yugoslav federation and the Yugoslav Communist party – the League of Communists – which nominally ruled the country had lost much of their legitimacy.

THE ECONOMIC CRISIS AND THE LOSS OF LEGITIMACY

In his lucid account of this period, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, Harold Lydall points out that from 1979 to 1985, the economy of Yugoslavia, in all respects except employment, showed downward trends: while the real social product (the Yugoslav equivalent to gross domestic product), investment and productivity plunged, employment grew by 16.1 per cent. Not surprisingly, average net personal income per worker in the same period fell by over 26 per cent. The downward trend in the economy was aggravated by a large foreign debt which, in 1982, stood at over 18 billion US dollars, amounting to half of Yugoslavia's annual social product.[4] Most of the debt was owed to Western banks and governments which, after 1973, went on a lending spree to many countries of Eastern Europe including Yugoslavia. The massive waste of foreign loans (raised in the 1970s) in non-productive or unprofitable investments[5] made the repayment of so large a debt very difficult. In 1982 the Yugoslav federal government's belated reaction to the rapidly growing foreign debt was to impose wide and severe import restrictions. These restrictions reduced the already declining domestic production and exports, making the repayment of the debt even more difficult than before. From 1980 to 1987 the Yugoslav federation was able to pay the interest but very little of the principal from this debt. Unable to meet its interest payments in 1987, it asked for a rescheduling of its obligations which was granted in 1988. In addition to falling production and a huge foreign debt, from 1981 the Yugoslav economy suffered from accelerating inflation. Periodic but relatively brief price and/or income freezes imposed by the federal government only accelerated the pace of inflation and discredited the government. Only in late 1989 did the government impose the necessary restrictions on the money supply which belatedly ended the inflation (see Chapter 8).

While some of the economic difficulties Yugoslavia and other East European countries experienced in the early 1980s could be explained by the world recession and the resultant loss of markets and increasing interest rates, the major source of the continuing economic crisis in Yugoslavia was to be found in the combination of the semiconfederal constitutional structure and self-management at the local level. As Lydall succinctly put it:

> When socialist self-management is combined with federalism, it creates a whole range of new problems. For now each commune, with all its power over local enterprises, is combined with a 'national'

> (republican or provincial) one-party state. In Yugoslavia each of these states claims the right to direct its own economy, to formulate its own plans, to determine its own investment priorities, to raise its own taxes, to control its own national bank, and even to establish its own balance of payments with the outside world . . . The consequences of this 'feudal socialism' are disastrous for the Yugoslav economy. Investment projects are duplicated, enterprises in one republic or province are protected from competition from enterprises in other republics and provinces, there is more trade with the outside world than with other republics or provinces within the country, obstacles are put in the way of financial flows across republican and provincial borders, and each republic and province tries to hold on to as much as possible of the foreign exchange for 'its' exports.[6]

The fragmentation of the Yugoslav economy, however disastrous it may have been, was a necessary concomitant of the devolution of political power to national communist elites in control of each republic and province; these elites naturally refused to implement any economic reform which would have resulted in the loss of their control over the major sources of their patronage in jobs and sinecures. Only when threatened with massive social unrest in 1988 and the resultant loss of political control over the population, were they ready to implement an economic reform which, in March 1989, they entrusted to a new federal government under prime minister Ante Marković (see Chapter 8).

The protests against the economic conditions in the country were gathering pace after 1982. The number of sporadic workers' strikes was steadily increasing until 1987 at which point 1570 strikes involving 360 000 workers were recorded, four times more than in 1985.[7] In 1987, as a result of yet another round of income freezes, the strikers attempted primarily to adjust their incomes to the rising inflation. Their main demands were rises in pay (often from 50 to 100 per cent) and removal of incompetent or unpopular managers and directors. The strikes clearly exhibited the failure of the much vaunted self-managing system to deal with the workers' demands. As self-management was one of the principal sacred pillars of the Yugoslav political system, its obvious failure to fulfil even the minimal expectations of the working population seriously undermined its legitimacy.

The wave of strikes in 1987 were not the only factors undermining the legitimacy of the system and its ruling elites. A series of financial scandals culminated, in August 1987, in the largest recorded financial

scandal in communist Yugoslavia: the disclosure that promissory notes equivalent to 500 million US dollars had been issued without collateral by Agrokomerc, one of the largest firms in Yugoslavia, located in the towns of Bihać and Velika Kladuša in northwest Bosnia. The investigations into the scandal revealed a clientele network leading to the top Bosnian communist leader, the Muslim Hamdija Pozderac, which enabled the firm and the local bank to issue a seemingly limitless amount of promissory notes and thereby systematically to flout the law. Hamdija Pozderac was forced to resign after long and distinguished service to the Yugoslav Communist party while the director of Agrokomerc and a member of the Central Committee of the Communist party of Bosnia–Hercegovina, the Muslim Fikret Abdić, after a lengthy trial, was sentenced to two years imprisonment.[8] The Agrokomerc scandal, which received wide publicity in all Yugoslav media, undermined the legitimacy of the official political and financial institutions of Yugoslavia by exposing private and illegal institutional networks which top politicians used to enrich themselves and their supporters.

Faced with the continuing economic crisis, the Yugoslav state presidency, even before the Agrokomerc scandal, proposed to amend the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. The amendments – passed, after prolonged and bitter debate, in November 1988 – aimed at strengthening the legal guarantees of the unified Yugoslav market as well as federal control over the country's foreign currency dealings. As this largely symbolic exercise had no impact on economic performance, the Yugoslav constitutional arrangements no longer appeared to offer any way out of the worsening economic crisis which the country was experiencing since 1980. But the long-lasting economic decline and the resulting social unrest were not the only factors pointing to the possibility of the collapse of the Yugoslav political and constitutional system. More crucial was the rise of nationalisms which threatened to destroy the division and balance of power among the recognised national elites codified in the 1974 constitution.

In the March and April 1981 riots in Kosovo large numbers of ethnic Albanians, demanding the status of a republic for Kosovo, in effect demanded an unprecedented change in the Yugoslav constitutional structure. With hindsight, one could argue that the riots signalled the failure of the 1974 constitutional arrangements to satisfy the growing demands of the newly emergent communist elites and their constituencies, as in the case of the Kosovo Albanians, for political autonomy and control over 'their' territories.

KOSOVO: THE HARDEST TEST OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERATION

Since the late 1960s the province of Kosovo had an average annual natural increase in population of around 27 per 1000 inhabitants, the highest in Europe. This growth was recorded only among the Albanian population of the province which from 1948 to 1981 more than doubled in size.[9] However, the increase in the proportion of Albanians in the population of Kosovo (from 63.7 in 1948 to 77.4 per cent in 1981) was only partly attributable to its high rate of natural growth; since 1967 – and in particular since 1981 – the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province had also significantly accelerated. The communist authorities had never attempted to control the birthrate of the Albanian population, and until 1981, it did nothing to halt the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province. However, the Yugoslav federal government had, from 1967 onwards allocated to Kosovo the largest proportion of funds from the Yugoslav federal fund for undeveloped regions: in the peak period 1986–90 Kosovo was receiving over 48 per cent of the allocation of the whole fund.[10] As a result, Kosovo in the early 1970s recorded the fastest economic growth of all regions in Yugoslavia. However, in spite of later increases in the total federal allocation to Kosovo, its economic growth throughout the late 1970s and 1980s lagged behind the more developed Yugoslav republics. Because of slower growth and an extraordinary increase in population, Kosovo remained by far the least developed region of Yugoslavia with the highest rate of unemployment of all. In 1986, according to the official statistics, the unemployment rate stood at 55 per cent of the workforce employed in the 'socialist' (that is, state) sector.

The unemployment problem was not alleviated by the founding of a university faculty in 1967 and the University of Priština[11] in 1970 at which most subjects were taught in Albanian. While from 1967 to 1978 the number of tertiary students increased sevenfold,[12] two-thirds of the graduates were in nontechnical professions with limited employment opportunities outside government and the educational system. Thus, the least developed region in Yugoslavia had by the end of the decade probably the largest number of tertiary students per capita. One could imagine that many of the unemployed or underemployed Albanian humanities and social sciences graduates found their plight particularly insulting since, in their view, the Kosovo Albanians had only in 1966 – after the fall of Ranković – been freed from intellectual and political subservience to the Serbs.

Apart from endemic economic underdevelopment, the region has, since the middle of the nineteenth century, been exposed to recurrent cycles of political and ethnic violence. From that time until 1912 its Serb and Montenegrin inhabitants sent a steady stream of complaints, detailing continual pillage, rape, murder and kidnapping by unruly Albanian warlords and their tribal followers, to the Serbian and various European governments. The Serbian conquest of Kosovo, in the first Balkan war of 1912, against the armed opposition of its Albanian population, ended this cycle of violence but initiated a reverse one in which the Albanians were expelled and harassed as opponents of the new Serbian authorities. After a large uprising of several Albanian tribes was quelled by military force in 1918–20, the Belgrade government imposed a Serbian administration in the region and settled over 60 000 Serb colonists on the properties expropriated from Albanian landholders. This as well as continual harassment of Albanians and other Muslims was intended to 'encourage' them to emigrate to Turkey. During the Axis occupation of Yugoslavia 1941–5, tens of thousands of Serbs and Montenegrins were expelled from Kosovo by Albanian quisling militias under nominal Italian authority. In 1946 after the suppression of the Albanian mass uprising (see Chapter 4) the Yugoslav secret police took effective control over the province, bringing Serb and Montenegrin officials in, wiping out the small Albanian intelligentsia, and 'encouraging' once again Albanians and Muslims to emigrate.[13] The fall of Ranković in 1966 ended the Serb and Montenegrin domination, as the Albanian cadres rapidly took over the majority of official posts, including those of the security apparatus. At this point Serbs and Montenegrins started to emigrate from the province, alleging Albanian pressure and harassment.

The Albanian demonstrations first erupted in 1968 (see Chapter 5) and were then repeated every few years (though on a much smaller scale) until 1981 when the demonstrations, started in early March at the University of Priština, later spread to major industrial centres in the province. Throughout early April 1981 violent riots involving more than 20 000 Kosovo Albanians engulfed almost every district of Kosovo. As before the principal slogan was 'Kosovo – republic!' although demands for unification with Albania were also made.[14] In some cases, demonstrators exchanged shots with police and, in others, used small children as shields. In response, the Yugoslav federal government proclaimed a state of emergency in the province and sent armoured military units and police to suppress the riots; the final death toll was officially put at 9 persons while the unofficial figures go up to a thousand.[15]

Although the worsening economic situation and the attendant unemployment were generally recognised to have contributed to the riots, the Yugoslav Party presidency, on the initiative of the Macedonian leaders,[16] dismissed the top Albanian and Serb Party leaders in Kosovo, initiated the first in a series of purges of the Kosovo Party organisation and authorised a police crackdown which resulted in the imprisoning of around 1000 Albanians accused of participating in the riots. It appears likely that in March 1981 the Kosovo Albanian communist leaders, like their Croat counterparts in 1971, encouraged or at least condoned the demonstrations, in the hope that, under their impact, the republican status of Kosovo would be brought on to the agenda of Yugoslav Party bodies. However, as the protests got out of hand and were transformed into riots, the Yugoslav Party leaders were united in their rejection of the Albanian demand for a republic of Kosovo. They probably feared that the demand, if granted, would spark a whole series of similar demands for changes in the established federal and provincial boundaries and that, as a republic, Kosovo would gain the right to secede from Yugoslavia and unite with the adjacent Albania.

The continuing disturbances and violence led to an accelerated exodus of Serbs and Montenegrins from the province. As the Party and government bodies could no longer ignore this trend, the official media started to publish monthly statistics of the Serb and Montenegrin emigration from Kosovo along with stories of intimidation, beatings, rape, property and crop destruction as well as the desecration of graves of Serbs and Montenegrins. The Kosovo Party organisation was instructed to implement measures which would stop the migration and a special combined unit of police forces from all republics was sent to the province to end violence and guard state property. Kosovo Albanian communist leaders resented the attention paid to the alleged harassment of non-Albanians and to their emigration, arguing that non-Albanians were emigrating in search of better employment opportunities and not because of alleged harassment. But the Kosovo Albanian leaders' access to the media outside their province was limited and their denials, in view of the increasing emigration, appeared as an exercise in damage-control. Moreover, offensive (albeit private) remarks of one of the Kosovo Albanian leaders about Serb women, when published, gave a distinct impression that he and his colleagues were not concerned with the maltreatment of Kosovo Serbs.[17] Whether really concerned with the plight of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins or not, the Kosovo Albanian leadership did not succeed in slowing down, let alone halting, the emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins. And,

although they continued to prosecute Albanians for their participation in illegal demonstrations and underground opposition, until 1988 they successfully protected both the political autonomy of Kosovo and the dominance of the Albanian elites in the provincial Party bureaucracy. In the continuing purges of Albanians from managerial positions following the riots of 1981, dismissed Albanians were almost invariably replaced by other Albanians and not by Kosovo Serbs or Montenegrins. In this way, the Kosovo Albanian communist leadership preserved the support of its Albanian cadre constituency as well as the Albanian masses.

In 1985, however, the Serbs in Kosovo started to organise their protest movement outside the official Kosovo Party organisation. In early 1986 a petition of 2011 Kosovo Serbs to the presidency of the Serbian Communist party, demanding radical measures to stop the continuing harassment of non-Albanians, was published in a Belgrade literary weekly. After the first protest rally of a hundred Kosovo Serbs staged in 1986 in Belgrade, similar rallies, with greater numbers of participants, were organised in Belgrade as well as Kosovo and Serbian cities. The organisers of these protests were Serb and Montenegrin farmers, skilled workers, teachers and low-ranking communist officials.[18] This gave the movement the look of an anti-elite, grassroots movement of harassed Serb and Montenegrin minorities in Kosovo.[19] While the Belgrade media gave wide coverage to the protest rallies, the Serbian Party leadership, under Ivan Stambolić (see Chapter 8), was rather uneasy about them, because they reminded the public of the impotence of the Serbian Party to stop the harassment of Serbs and distracted attention from the officially set political agenda.[20] Naturally, the Kosovo Albanian communists strongly criticised the Serb protest rallies but, as the Serbian Party leaders did nothing to halt them, the Kosovo Serb movement went on to gather supporters and widespread sympathy among Serbs throughout Yugoslavia. The old grizzled Serbs in their poor peasant garb and distressed Serb mothers who travelled to the rallies became potent symbols of the suffering of the Serbs and the Party's indifference to their plight. In late 1986 their protests acquired a clear political turn as individual Kosovo Albanian politicians came to be targeted and demands made for the reintegration of Kosovo within Serbia.

In April 1987 this movement gained a most powerful supporter, the president of the Serbian Party's presidency, Slobodan Milošević.[21] As he arrived at a meeting with the Kosovo Party leadership in a small town near the capital Priština, around 15 000 Serbs and Montenegrins gathered to demand the end of their harassment. As the crowd surged

forward to storm the building, the police – mostly Kosovo Albanian – beat them back with batons. Responding to the cries 'They are beating us…' from the demonstrators, Slobodan Milošević uttered the words which, in retrospect, appear to have changed the nature and course of Yugoslav politics and political discourse: 'No one is allowed to beat you'.[22]

Ecstatic to find a protector, the crowd responded by chanting his first name (which in Serbo-Croatian means 'the one who is free'). Having delivered an unprepared and stirring speech (see Chapter 8), he spent almost 10 hours listening to their grievances and returned the next day to Belgrade, an emotionally changed man, to urge the Serbian Party presidency to enact immediate measures for the protection of Kosovo Serbs and Montenegrins. Symbolically, Milošević's guarantee 'no one is allowed to beat you' took these two national groups out of the political 'jurisdiction' of the Kosovo provincial Party leadership and thus broke the post-1974 division of power between the Serbian Communist Party leadership and the communist leaders of Kosovo and Vojvodina.[23]

Couldn't he also take all other Serbs in Yugoslavia – those of Bosnia–Hercegovina as well as Croatia – out of the political 'jurisdiction' of the communist leaders of these republics? Couldn't he become the protector of all Serbs in Yugoslavia? At the time the communist leaders in other republics did not raise these questions – at least not publicly – partly because, in 1987, Kosovo, with its prolonged history of political unrest, was generally considered to be a special case. As the increased policing of Kosovo and repeated purges of its Party organisation neither slowed down the Serb and Montenegrin emigration nor halted the Albanian political protests and violence, the Yugoslav Party leaders appeared to have no answer to the continuing Kosovo crisis. To some of them Milošević's move probably appeared to be an effective way of removing from the Yugoslav Party and its federal government any further responsibility for the crisis. However, the inability of the Yugoslav communist leaders to find solutions for the continuing crises both of Kosovo and of the Yugoslav economy greatly undermined the legitimacy of their regime. In this context Milošević's move might have been viewed as a bold measure to re-establish the trust in and the legitimacy of the Serbian Party leadership. Unlike the Yugoslav federal government and Party bodies, in April 1987 the Serbian Party under his leadership appeared ready to try to solve the most protracted and violent political crisis in the history of the second Yugoslavia.

7 The Rise of Nationalism: From Dissidence to Power 1980–90

In addition to rapid economic decline and the outbreak of violence in Kosovo, in the 1980s Yugoslavia experienced a veritable renaissance of nationalist ideologies of the 'dominant nation' type. As we have seen, arguments based on national ideologies of this type reappeared in intellectual and political debates in the late 1950s and 1960s. However, in the aftermath of the suppression of the mass national movement in Croatia in 1971, the publication of any texts of vaguely nationalist content was effectively banned in all parts of Yugoslavia, except in Kosovo. While ending public polemics by national ideologues, the ban confined nationalist polemics to the closely watched realm of intellectual dissidence. All intellectual dissidents aimed primarily at the delegitimisaton of the existing communist regime in Yugoslavia. Nationalist – as opposed to liberal – dissidents argued that this regime had betrayed the principal national goals of their respective nations and thereby lost the right to rule over that particular nation. Each of the national ideologies claimed that the communist regime intentionally belittled and disadvantaged 'its' nation and benefited its competitor nation or nations. However absurd these claims may appear when taken together, they reveal how limited was the target of each national ideology: it was targeting only 'its' nation in its attempt to prove that the communist regime had failed that nation alone and should not have the right to rule over it. Apart from nationalist dissidents, marxist academics, contributors to the international philosophy journal *Praxis,* which was banned in 1975, formed an internationally well-known group of dissidents both in Belgrade and Zagreb. A smaller group of liberal political theorists and writers was also active in these two capitals as well as in Ljubljana. Although they often held opposing views, all of them were in the early 1980s united in their rejection of the communist regime. Many of them – especially nationalists and marxists – in the 1970s and early 1980s attacked the communist regime with the same ardour with which they earlier – from 1945 to the middle 1960s – supported it as its official apologists.[1]

As the regime, after Tito's death, appeared to be losing popular support, the dissidents were able to raise their public profile again. Revisionist historical works were published questioning the official views of the National Liberation Struggle and of the immediate post-World War II period. A leading publishing house in Belgrade, by an oversight, published in 1981 a collection of poems including several with transparently anti-Tito verses. The Party officials reacted by banning the offending works and at times gaoling their authors. But these actions brought much wider publicity to the dissidents than they could have hoped otherwise. Although they never commanded a significant following, their target audience, the intelligentsia, developed a growing sympathy for their views, especially as their dissidence appeared to attract – at least in Slovenia and Serbia[2] – only limited punishment. Intellectual dissidents, however differing might have been their views, appeared to offer a fresh and different approach to the problems confronting Yugoslav society which the Yugoslav ideology of socialist self-management could hardly explain let alone solve.

From September 1987 when Milošević started to purge the Serbian communist elite, the position of most dissidents – first in Serbia and then in Slovenia and finally in Croatia – radically changed. First they were allowed access to the mainstream media and, then, their republican communist leaders and media started to use the rhetoric of the dissident – primarily nationalist – programmes. This takeover of nationalist rhetoric was clearly an attempt by the communist leaderships in almost all republics to regain legitimacy through a change in their ideological image. In this new field of nationalist politics, communists-turned-nationalists soon faced formidable opposition from the very dissidents who first articulated nationalist ideologies. In late 1989 and early 1990 dissidents of all persuasions turned into party politicians, becoming leaders and founders of new opposition parties. In the first multiparty elections of 1990, in all republics, except Serbia and Montenegro, former nationalist dissidents won power. In Serbia and Montenegro the communist parties were able to retain power, in part, by taking over the dissident nationalist programme first made public in 1986. In retrospect, the 1980s in Yugoslavia could be viewed as a slow but steady march of nationalist ideologies from dissidence to power.

KOSOVO ALBANIAN NATIONALISM

The Kosovo Albanian riots of 1981 were the first large-scale – and violent – manifestation of nationalism in Yugoslavia since the Croat mass

nationalist movement in 1971. Like Croat nationalism, Albanian nationalism is based on Albanian historic rights derived from the alleged direct descent of Albanians from the ancient tribe of Illyrians who populated the Balkans before the settlement of the South Slavs. This is the argument from historical precedence: Illyrians, that is, Albanians, were there first and all the others – in particular, Serbs – are later conquerors who do not rightly belong to the territory inhabited by Albanians.[3] Within the framework of this ideological conception, the patriotic Albanian historians in Kosovo since the early 1970s engaged in research aiming to demonstrate the main premise of the argument, that the Illyrians or Albanians preceded the Serbs and other South Slavs in Kosovo and in Macedonia. In addition, Kosovo Albanian historians also wanted to demonstrate that the Kosovo Albanian contribution to the Partisan struggle and to the liberation of Yugoslavia was proportionate to the other nations of Yugoslavia. These two historical arguments were intended to prove the right of the Albanians to Kosovo and the right of Kosovo to be a republic separate from Serbia. Since, by virtue of their historical precedence, Kosovo rightfully belongs to the Albanians, there is no reason for Kosovo to be part of Serbia. As they fought for the liberation of their province and of Yugoslavia as did all other constituent nations, they should form a constituent nation with its own homeland – the republic of Kosovo.

Another aspect of Albanian nationalism – the demand for the unification of all Albanians into one state, Albania – was, for obvious reasons, confined to underground or dissident groups. The demand for unification or for an integral Albania was regarded in Yugoslavia as irredentism and separatism and was officially banned. But if one grants that Albanians are direct descendants of the ancient Illyrians then should not the whole territory on which they live belong to Albanians and not to any allegedly later settlers like Serbs or Macedonians. If this is granted, Albanians should have a historic right to their own state on their own land which would include Albania, Kosovo and western Macedonia.

In the above form, this is an argument from the primordial settlers' rights which one finds in almost all Balkan – and not only Balkan – national ideologies. As it identifies the possession of land with possession of statehood and sovereignty, its primary target are smallholder farmers, until the early 1980s the most numerous segment of Kosovo's Albanian population. In addition, the argument aims to convince individuals of the target nation that a denial of their 'primordial settlers' rights' – that is, the denial of a sovereign state for their nation – personally humiliates them and makes them into second-class citizens. In the

context of Kosovo, the argument may also appear to justify any action taken to induce the 'later settlers' – Serbs and Montenegrins – to leave Kosovo; their emigration may help the alleged primordial settlers to get control over their land as well as over their state.

It was this emigration of Serbs and Montenegrins and not the spread of Albanian nationalism that provided a stimulus for the surge in dissident Serbian nationalism. As Albanian nationalism was confined to texts in Albanian, it was inaccessible to the great majority of Serbs. The extensive media coverage, in particular after the 1981 Kosovo Albanian riots, of the intimidation of and violence against Kosovo Serbs naturally demanded an explanation of these anti-Serb actions. The official Party explanation attributing these actions to fringe groups of extreme Albanian nationalists lost its plausibility as the violence appeared to spread and continue in spite of increased policing of the province. Serb nationalist ideologies appeared to many Serbs to provide a more appealing if not plausible explanation.

SERB NATIONALISM

In contrast to Albanian nationalism which was, in one of its aspects, officially sanctioned, Serb nationalism was, until 1987, confined to dissident circles. In its early 1950s form, the Serb nationalist stance was strongly anti-communist. The communist takeover, it was argued, negated major Serb historic achievements: it overthrew the Serbian dynasty and it took away from Serbia its medieval lands (Kosovo and Macedonia) which were regained 'by Serb blood', that is, as a result of military victories in the Balkan wars and World War I. According to patriotic Serb historiography, Serbs in these two wars liberated their South Slav brethren from foreign oppressors. In communist historiography, however, Serbs were transformed from liberators into oppressors and the World War II royalist resistance movement, the Chetniks, was often branded as collaborationist and fascist as the Croatian Ustasha movement. In the process, communist historiography allegedly played down the magnitude and scope of the Ustashe massacres of Serbs.

The principal complaint – that the Serbs were the greatest losers and victims of the communist regime – was further reinforced by the provisions of the 1974 constitution which attributed virtual statehood to the republics and equal federal status to Kosovo. The Serbs, Serb nationalists argued after 1974, were divided among three states – Croatia, Bosnia–Hercegovina and Serbia – and were virtually made into a minority

in their own ancestral land of Kosovo–Metohija while this province, under the truncated name 'Kosovo', had acquired a status equal to that of Serbia. The communist leaders further let the Albanians coerce Kosovo Serbs into leaving their land and thus helped create an overwhelmingly Albanian province 'ethnically cleansed'[4] of Serbs and Montenegrins. This systematic policy of revanchism against the Serbs was a result of a conspiracy of the top Yugoslav communist leaders, the Croat Tito and the Slovene Kardelj, against the Serbs. They simply continued the pre-1930s policy of the Comintern which branded the Serbs as the chief oppressor of other South Slavs. Moreover, the communists in fact collaborated with the Vatican in the subjugation of non-Catholic and anti-communist Serbs by the Catholic nations in Yugoslavia – Slovenes and Croats. In this framework, the forced emigration of Serbs from Kosovo was regarded as a continuation of World War II genocide against the Serbs: just as the Roman Catholic Ustashe and their Muslim allies massacred and expelled the Serbs, so the present-day Muslim Albanians are forcing the Serbs from their ancestral home of Kosovo–Metohija.

The main document of revived Serb nationalism in the 1980s, the draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences, elaborated on the two main nationalist themes – the victimisation of Serbia and Serbs and the conspiracy of non-Serb communist leaders against Serbia.[5] The document, originally intended for the highest Yugoslav and Serbian Party bodies, also proposed a return to the 'integrative democratic' federation originally established by the AVNOJ assembly in 1943. Although it firmly rejected the constitution of 1974, the draft argued for the reunification of Serbs within a reconstituted Yugoslavia still ruled by the Communist party. Only at its very end, did the document concede that if other nations in Yugoslavia do not accept this solution, Serbs should consider alternative options apart from the reintegration of Yugoslavia.

In 1988 the Serbian communist leader Slobodan Milošević and the new communist elite he brought to power took over the draft's diagnosis of the Serb predicament and its proposed cure. He pledged to undo the consequences of the alleged anti-Serb revanchism and to unify the Serbs, once again, into one state, if possible, a 'democratic integrative' Yugoslavia. However, in his mass mobilisation of Serbs through a series of rallies and mass 'celebrations' in 1988–89 Milošević used almost all available Serb nationalist themes and symbols, including religious rituals (see Chapter 8). A series of historical events – in particular the six-hundredth anniversary of the Kosovo battle in June 1989 – were officially celebrated with mass rallies, political speeches and religious

ceremonies bringing together 'The People, the State Authorities and the Church'.[6]

As the effect of the unification of Serbs in an 'integrative democratic' Yugoslav federation would be a Serb numerical predominance over the other nations, many non-Serbs regarded such demands as a transparent ploy for ensuring Serb political domination over other nations in Yugoslavia. Of course, this was not what most Serb dissidents – both liberals and nationalists – demanded in the early 1980s. However, the Bosnian Serb academic Dr Vojislav Šešelj in 1984 proposed a territorial division of Yugoslavia by its only three 'true' nations – Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes. This division would ensure Serb supremacy over large parts of Croatia, Bosnia–Hercegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia. This first open statement of 'dominant' Serb nationalism earned its author almost two years in jail. But, in 1988 Slobodan Milošević's rhetoric of resurgent pride in Serb military glory and historic achievement appeared to express the traditional Serb nationalist belief in Serb superiority over other Yugoslav nations, the belief on which the Serb claims to political dominance in Yugoslavia had been based in the past.

As communist Yugoslavia started to disintegrate early in 1990, the unification of Serbs outside the Yugoslav federation appeared to many Serbs as the option which was being forced on the Serbs by the separatism of Slovenes and Croats and not chosen by Serbs themselves. At that point Serb national ideologues started to argue that the creation of Yugoslavia in 1918 was a costly mistake embroiling the Serbs in a national conflict which could have been avoided by creating, in 1918, a Serb state out of the lands populated by the Serbs.[7] This mistake forced the Serb nation at the end of the twentieth century, to seek to establish a national state of its own while most other European nations already had such states for some time; in view of this, it was not surprising that the other nations strongly opposed the belated Serb moves towards Serb unification. In its insistence on a Serb nation state, Serb nationalism was returning to the nineteenth century idea of Serb unification of the Serbs in a national state, excluding their Croat and Slovene 'brethren'. As communist Yugoslavia started to disintegrate, the Yugoslav idea appeared to have finally lost its usefulness as a vehicle for Serb unification.

SLOVENE NATIONALISM

The basis for Slovene nationalism was, traditionally, the belief in the linguistic and cultural distinctness of the Slovene nation. This belief

was created in the nineteenth century by the Slovene men of letters who standardised the language and created a high-brow literature in the newly standardised tongue. The current Slovene men of letters – intellectuals – often considered themselves as successors to the creators of Slovene nationhood, whose main task was to guard, vigilantly, its cultural and linguistic distinctness. From their point of view the federal republic of Slovenia, and its legislative and political autonomy was the chief political instrument in this task.

A return to an 'integrative' Yugoslavia, as proposed in the leaked draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986, would – in the view of the intellectual guardians of Slovene autonomy – present not only a threat to the autonomy of Slovenia but also to the distinctness of the Slovene nation. Partially in response to the draft, in 1987 the editors of the Ljubljana journal *Nova Revija* requested from a diverse group of Slovene intellectuals their views on the Slovene national programme. In spite of obvious differences in approach, style and content, almost all of the 16 papers argued for a sovereign state of the Slovene nation. In addition to the traditional argument from the Slovene linguistic and cultural distinctness, various philosophical, historical, economic, social and even religious reasons were advanced in support of Slovenian statehood. As the clearest indication of the lack of Slovene sovereignty, several contributors pointed to the absence of Slovenian armed forces and argued for the need to assert Slovenia's sovereignty through its own armed forces.[8]

All authors – among whom the future minister Dimitrij Rupel and the future candidate for president of Slovenia Jože Pučnik stood out – took a fairly strong anti-communist stand, either criticising Bolshevism or simply dismissing it. However, for most authors the most important question was not 'Why has Slovenia not become a sovereign state as yet?' but, rather, 'How is Slovenia to become a sovereign state now or in the near future?' In this the Slovene essays radically differed from the Serbian Academy's draft: they were primarily dealing with the future and not with past wrongs. Moreover, some of the Slovene authors, anticipating possibly their role as opposition politicians, offered surprisingly detailed political programmes, outlining the type of civil society and liberal political institutions they would like Slovenes to develop. But none of them dwelt much on Slovenia's future relations with the other nations or republics in Yugoslavia. They all saw Slovenia more or less separated from Yugoslavia, evolving on its own as a sovereign state. In fact, this separatism appeared to be shared by all of these otherwise highly different contributions to the Slovene national programme.

In spite of the initial – and predictable – condemnation of the document by the Slovenian Party leaders, within a year of its publication, some of the arguments put forward by the *Nova Revija* contributors found their way into the Slovenian Party press and became part of official Party rhetoric and policy. Already in September 1988 the Slovenian Party initiated new legislation to assert Slovenia's sovereignty and started transforming its territorial defence units into a state army. By 1989 most of the contributors to this issue formed their own political groups or parties which were committed to making Slovenia a sovereign state. From April 1990, those *Nova Revija* contributors who became ministers in the first postcommunist government in Slovenia were also given the opportunity to put their separatist national programme into action and to create a sovereign Slovene state with its own armed forces.

CROAT NATIONALISM

In contrast to Slovene nationalism, which openly preached separatism, Croat nationalism, in the 1980s, mainly continued the tradition of the Croat nationalist movement from the 1970s in demanding a thorough confederalisation of Yugoslavia. Yugoslavia needed to be transformed into an association of truly equal and fully sovereign nations. Sovereignty for each nation demands its full control of all aspects of its life. Like their Slovene counterparts, Croat national ideologues viewed the creation of national armed forces as an essential aspect of national sovereignty. But unlike their Slovene counterparts, the Croat ideologues were also able to refer to the myth of the unbroken historical line of Croatian statehood, starting in the tenth century (see Chapter 1). In the 1980s this unbroken line came to include both the pro-fascist Independent State of Croatia (1941–5) and the post-1945 federal republic of Croatia. The argument of the unbroken line of Croatian statehood, in the past, was used to support the demands for outright Croatian independence and for a sovereign Croatia in a confederal association. While the former demand had never been abandoned, the principal national ideologues of the 1980s, such as Dr Franjo Tudjman,[9] opted for the latter, at least in the short term. As international factors – including the European Community countries – would not favour outright secession, Croatian sovereignty should be achieved through an association of nations and states modelled on the European Community.

But if the Ustasha state is included in the unbroken line of Croat statehood, then one could argue that the future sovereign Croatia, like

the Ustasha state, should also include Bosnia–Hercegovina. While this claim was rarely made in public statements, there was no doubt that at least Croat-populated areas of this republic were ear-marked as part of the planned Croatian state.[10] But even if limited to the minimal claim of the Yugoslav federal republic of Croatia, the planned national state would include a sizeable Serb minority. This Serb minority, in the eyes of Croat nationalists, in communist Yugoslavia was given a privileged status in Croatia on the grounds that it was in World War II a target of Croatian Ustashe genocide. This privileged status was not only codified in the Croatian constitution – according to which both Serbs and Croats were the constituent nations of Croatia – but manifested in the highly disproportionate numbers of Serbs in the Croatian Communist party. In order to establish the Croatian right to treat Serbs as any other national minority, it appeared necessary to refute the claim that Serbs were a special target of the Croatian Ustashe genocide during World War II. One of the leading Croat dissidents, the historian Dr Franjo Tudjman, from the early 1970s took it upon himself to refute this claim. His argument was that the total number of victims of the Ustashe terror during World War II was not more than 60 000 and that most of the victims were of non-Serb nationality – Jews, Gipsies and anti-fascist Croats. While Ustashe terror was undoubtedly criminal, it did not differ much from either the Chetnik or Partisan terror nor from the Allied bombing of the German and Japanese cities.[11] This explanation of the Ustashe terror is, in Dr Tudjman's work, embedded in a general philosophy of history according to which mass terror and genocide are permanent features of human history: a nation, such as the Jews, which was once a target of genocide, often proceeds to commit genocide against others (Jews against Palestinians).[12] Neither were the Serbs the unique target of Ustashe terror nor was this terror in its historical context unique. Anyone who argues to the contrary, Dr Tudjman claims, is a Serb nationalist attempting to denigrate the Croat nation.

In the view of Dr Tudjman and his followers, this argument disposes of any special rights which Croatian Serbs could claim on the basis of their historical experience. Serbs in Croatia, in their view, have always been a minority like any other. Since no minority in European states has a right of self-determination, Serbs in Croatia – whatever its final borders – have no such right either. For example, to claim for the Serbs of Croatia a right to choose to unite with their co-nationals in Bosnia and Serbia – or even to form their own mini-state within Croatia – is only an attempt to expand the state of Serbia beyond its historical and

'natural' borders on the river Drina. Thus, any right of self-determination of Croatian Serbs is regarded only as a cover for greater Serbian expansionism. In Croatia, however defined, only the Croat nation has the right of self- determination or the right to statehood.

Through this re-evaluation of the Croatian Ustashe past and removing the stigma of genocide Dr Tudjman was also recovering the rightful dignity of the Croat nation: no longer will a Croatian child have any reason to say 'I do not want to be a Croat' from shame at the Ustashe crimes.[13] But such a re-evaluation of the past also revives the memory of the (alleged) genocide committed against the Croats by the Chetniks and Partisans. This memory, in turn, warns of the need for a sovereign state with an armed force capable of protecting the Croat nation. But unlike Serb nationalism of the 1980s, Croat nationalism went beyond the re-evaluation of the past in its project for a future confederation of equal and sovereign nations modelled on the European Community.

Upon his election as president of Croatia, in May 1990, Dr Franjo Tudjman and his government proceeded to carry out the nationalist political programme contained in his earlier writings. First, the Croatian government instituted a thorough purge of Serbs in governmental, managerial and media positions. Then it proceeded to change the constitution, deleting the reference to Serbs as a constituent nation of Croatia and returning the historic symbols of Croatian statehood, also used by the Ustasha regime. Finally, it began creating its own national armed forces while at the same time proposing, together with the Slovenian government, the transformation of Yugoslavia into a full confederation of sovereign states.

MUSLIM NATIONALISM

In Bosnia–Hercegovina Muslim national ideologies developed in two quite distinct forms. The first was an officially sanctioned non-religious ideology which explained and vindicated the belated recognition of the Muslim nation as the sixth constituent nation in Yugoslavia in 1968. The second was a pan-Islamist national ideology which continued the tradition of the religious and political movement Young Muslims (*Mladi muslimani*) formed in March 1941 in Sarajevo. Unlike the first, the second form was officially banned and its adherents imprisoned in the 1980s.

According to the officially sanctioned ideology, the Muslims 'affirmed their socio-ethnic identity through the creation of a synthesis of spiritual

traditions and new spiritual, literary, political and cultural features',[14] The process of affirmation culminated in communist Yugoslavia with the recognition of Muslims, first through the introduction, in 1948, of the census category of 'Muslims of undeclared nationality', which was finally transformed into the 1971 census category of 'Muslims' under the 'stated nationality' rubric. Without the support of the Yugoslav Communist Party, the official account implied, the Muslims of Yugoslavia would not have achieved their nationhood nor the recognition it required. But since on a marxist account, the religious affiliation could not be the key or persistent marker of a national group, Islam could have only served as an initial stimulus in the genesis of this nation.

In contrast to the official version, the pan-Islamist version of Muslim nationalism regarded Islam as the immutable core of Muslim national and political identity. From its beginning in 1941 in the Young Muslims, this ideology emphasised the education of Muslims in the correct Islamic spirit, the creation of a true Islamic society and the liberation and unification of the Islamic world.[15] While the communist authorities were able to suppress the organisation in the late 1940s by imprisoning and even executing some of its members, two of them, Alija Izetbegović[16] and Omer Behman, emerged in the late 1960s as leaders of informal discussion groups consisting mainly of students of Muslim *medresa* or seminaries. In 1970 Izetbegović wrote and circulated among members of this circle a short treatise entitled *The Islamic Declaration: A Programme of the Islamisation of Muslims and Muslim peoples*.[17]

The aim of this program was to emancipate Muslim peoples from foreign – communist (Eastern) and capitalist (Western) – influences through a revival of an authentic Islamic consciousness. The main premise of the work is that Islam offers a comprehensive and distinct model of individual, social and political life which the Muslim faithful should embrace without having to look for any other non-Islamic models. In its insistence on the revival of the original Islamic model, the programme resembles other fundamentalist Islamic programmes as well as revivalist nationalist programmes in other parts of the world. Although the details of Islamic political organisation are left quite vague, the following three 'republican' principles of political order are deemed to be essential: '(1) The electibility of the head of state (2) the accountability of the head of state to the people (3) the obligation of solving communally general and social issues.'[18] However, the 'attainment of the Islamic order /is/ a sacrosanct goal which cannot be overridden by any vote'. In other words, while the above 'republican' principles are applicable in an Islamic state, the ultimate goal of establishing such a state is not

subject to a democratic procedure of any kind; the institution of an Islamic state is a divinely proclaimed historical goal.

But an Islamic movement can take over political power only when it is morally and numerically sufficiently strong not only to overthrow the existing non-Islamic authority but also to build a new Islamic one.[19] The Islamic order would prohibit all forms of 'alcoholic intoxication of the people', public and secret prostitution, all forms of pornography, casinos, night and dancing clubs as well as other forms of entertainment which are incompatible with Islamic moral precepts.[20] Given the treatise's insistence on the introduction of Islamic law, it is not clear whether it envisaged any political participation of non-Muslims in an Islamic state; its application of Islamic legal and moral precepts would obviously restrict non-Muslims' civil rights and liberties. For the main principle of Islamic order, the unity of faith and politics, leads, among others, to the following 'first and most important' conclusion:

> There is no peace or coexistence between the 'Islamic faith' and non-Islamic social and political institutions. The non-functioning of these institutions and the instability of regimes in Muslim countries, which is manifested in frequent changes and coups d'etat, is most frequently a consequence of their a priori opposition to Islam. Claiming its right to order its own world alone, Islam clearly rules out the right and the possibility of the application of any foreign ideology in its own region. There is, therefore, no lay principle, and the state ought to be a reflection of and to support the moral concepts of the religion.[21]

Since Islam is a supranational religion, an Islamic state would not be a national state. Yet it is to be established in any country – such as Pakistan – in which Muslims form a majority.[22] In 1970 in Bosnia–Hercegovina Muslims formed a relative but not an absolute majority of slightly less than 40 per cent of the population. But as the Muslim birth rate was the highest of all three principal national groups in Bosnia–Hercegovina and the Serb and Croat rates of emigration from the republic were much higher than the Muslim one, the Muslims could be expected to reach an absolute majority in the foreseeable future.[23]

But regardless of any demographic predictions, Izetbegović's programme linked Muslim national identity with politics in a simple and easily intelligible way. It is a person's Muslim religion which defines their national identity; and as it defines the core of their identity, it also defines their political preferences. A Muslim's true allegiance is to an Islamic movement which aims at the affirmation of Muslim religious and moral conceptions in all spheres of life, including politics.

In 1990, Izetbegović and the members of his circle founded the Islamic political movement which Islam, in their opinion, required. This was the Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije – SDA*) which in the elections of 1990 in Bosnia-Hercegovina won a relative majority in the parliament enabling its leader Izetbegović to be elected the president of the republic's collective presidency (see Chapter 8). While affirming Islamic values, this party avoided any commitment to the creation of an Islamic state in Bosnia–Hercegovina. Its goals were restricted to the spiritual regeneration of the Muslim nation, its political and social organisation and to the takeover of positions of power in all Muslim-populated areas of Yugoslavia. This 'takeover of power'[24] was to serve further affirmation of the Muslim nation and its Islamic values in all spheres of life. In terms of the *Islamic Declaration* (reprinted, in 1990, in 10 000 copies), this is the work preparatory to the creation of an Islamic society. The affirmation of Muslim religious and moral conceptions within a project for the creation of an Islamic society was, for many Serbs and Croats in Bosnia–Hercegovina, associated with the Ottoman social order in which the Muslims held political power and owned most of the land. In this Islamic society, the non-Muslims – Serbs and Croats – were second-class citizens with no political and restricted civil rights. In this context, the affirmation of an Islamic religiously-defined identity in politics was viewed, by many Serbs and Croats, as a drive towards renewed political and economic dominance by the Muslims in Bosnia–Hercegovina.

THE CONFLICT OF NATIONALISMS

One of the primary aims of each of the dissident national ideologies was to reaffirm the sovereignty of 'its' nation over the territory that was claimed for it. The Croat and Slovene national ideologues saw the reaffirmation of sovereignty necessitating the creation of national armed forces within a new Yugoslav confederation or outside Yugoslavia. The reaffirmation of the sovereignty of the Muslims was to be carried out first through the reintroduction of Islamic values in public life and politics and eventually in the creation of an Islamic state. Albanian sovereignty was to be achieved first in a separate Yugoslav republic and then, possibly, in unification with Albania. Serb sovereignty was to be reaffirmed in the unification of all Serbs in a reorganised 'democratic integrative' Yugoslav federation; if this proved to be impossible, in a Serb state without other Yugoslav nations. All these programmes were in

effect asserting the right of a single nation to dominate within 'its' territory. Moreover, from the point of view of all non-Serb national ideologies, the proposal to return to a 'democratic integrative' Yugoslavia, within which Serbs would be in a relative majority, was regarded as a denial of 'their' nation's fundamental right to self-determination and independence. In fact, any unification of all Serbs in one state – whether an 'integrative' Yugoslav federation or a state of Serb-populated lands – would appear to deny the Croat, Albanian and Muslim inhabitants of these lands the right to form their own state on the same territory.

Thus the conflict of national ideologies became a conflict over the control of territory which each ideology claimed for 'its' nation. The Croat, Albanian and, later Muslim, ideologues claimed territory populated by the Serbs on the basis of 'their' nations' alleged historic rights: they were the lands which either belonged to the medieval kingdoms believed to be the precursors of their national states or the lands which their nations, allegedly, settled before the Serbs. This 'historical' view of national rights clashed with the Serb claim to the 'democratic' right of national self-determination of the Serbs on territory which they inhabited for centuries. This conflict of claims was further complicated by the Serb ideologues' claims to territories from which Serbs had been forcibly expelled in recent history – during World War II and under communist rule. These were territories in Croatia, Bosnia–Hercegovina and Kosovo–Metohija.

Within the framework of the Croat, Albanian and even Slovene 'dominant nation' ideologies,[25] the Serbs and their political demands were perceived as the principal obstacle to the reaffirmation of sovereignty of these nations. This perception then easily generated a fear of Serb domination over other nations – the fear which also fuelled nationalist polemics in pre-1941 Yugoslavia: the Serbs thus became, once again, the prime target of fear, and, later, of hate. Under the rule of the communist 'equal nations' ideology, such fears of domination were mostly out of place, since the resulting federal system prevented the domination of any single nation over others. With the delegitimisation of the communist ideology and its 'equal nations' approach in the late 1980s, the stage was set for the generation of fears of the domination not only of the Serbs but of other nations (for example, of Croats over Serbs in Croatia). These fears, generated by the 'dominant nation' type of ideologies, were then successfully utilised in the drive for the mobilisation of popular support for nationalist parties in all republics of Yugoslavia. What started as a revival of romantic or traditional nationalism within dissident delegitimising ideologies in the 1970s, became, in the late 1980s, a powerful tool for political mobilisation.

Once these ideologies won the support of the majority of its target nations in the multiparty elections of 1990 (Kosovo Albanians' elections were clandestinely held in May 1992), the demographics of Yugoslavia made the armed conflict among the nations in question highly likely. Each national ideology demands the domination of 'its' nation over the territory which was contested by at least one and sometimes two other nations. For example, at the time Serbs formed majorities in parts of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina; Croats formed a majority in western Herzegovina. Thus each national ideology denies the right of the other national groups – Muslims in Bosnia–Herzegovina and Croats in Croatia – to dominate over them. Moreover, each national ideology asserts the right of its target nation to resist the territorial claims of other national groups by any means, including force.

The use of force is justified in at least two ways. First, the use of force to defend one's own territory is a simple case of self-defence against the attempts of a foreign power to dominate. Any other national group contesting this territory is regarded as a foreign power. Second, the use of force is viewed as almost inevitable in the fulfilment of the historically predetermined goals. From this point of view, it is not individual political leaders who command the force to be used but rather the will of history (or perhaps, divine will). The political leaders and their followers, in this rather deterministic view, are simply fulfilling the destiny of their nations in fighting for their freedom from foreign domination. The old nineteenth-century call for the national liberation of the oppressed Balkan nations thus found a powerful echo in their late twentieth-century national ideologies.

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8 The Rise of New National Elites 1987–90

ECONOMIC REFORM IN A DISINTEGRATING FEDERATION

Unable to control galloping inflation and massive labour unrest, the Yugoslav state presidency in March 1989 appointed Ante Marković, a Croat electrical engineer and a leading Croatian politician, as the federal prime minister. Circumventing the established republican Party networks he chose a cabinet of technocrats – economists, engineers and managers like himself – committed to radical economic reform and pushed through the federal parliament a package of long-term economic reforms whose ultimate aim was the introduction of a free market of goods and labour and privatisation. As the reduction of the federal budget and restrictions on federal borrowing in the first part of 1989 failed to curb hyperinflation – reaching 3000 per cent – in December 1989 Marković implemented a 'shock therapy' based on an economic model partly drawn up by the Harvard economist Jeffrey Sachs. While introducing a price and wage freeze, Marković's government imposed strict monetary and credit restrictions, pegged the local currency, the dinar, to the German mark and made it convertible into foreign currency. The competition from less expensive foreign imports – allowed by Marković – started to break up the long-established monopolies and led, as expected, to a spate of bankruptcies among the established loss-makers in most republics.

The most vociferous opposition to these reforms came from Milošević's government in Serbia, which organised large-scale demonstrations in Belgrade against Marković's policies, portraying him as a pawn of Slovenian and Croatian communist leaders. In fact, Marković's principal support in 1989 came from the Slovene president of the Yugoslav state presidency Dr Janez Drnovšek[1] and the Slovene communist leaders to whom Marković's promotion of a free market and integration into Europe was particularly appealing. At the time Marković apparently held that successful economic reform and modernisation, together with political and economic integration into Europe, might counter the processes of disintegration of the Yugoslav federation which

were, by the middle of 1989, in full swing. When in January 1990 the Slovene and Croatian Party delegations walked out of the fourteenth extraordinary congress of the Yugoslav Communist party thus effectively dissolving the Party, there was no all-Yugoslav political party remaining to support the Yugoslav federation. Apparently unconcerned Marković claimed that the end of the Communist party of Yugoslavia did not mean the end of Yugoslavia.[2] One reason for his lack of concern was, perhaps, a phenomenal surge in his personal popularity. As the annual inflation rate dropped from 3000 per cent to around zero in mid-1990, Marković became the most popular politician in Yugoslavia.[3] As the opinion polls made clear, his policies had most support among the educated and managerial strata of the population.[4] Marković's reforms, by dismantling the old self-management system of decision-making, freed enterprise managers and the technical expert teams from the shackles of self-management bodies and agreements and effectively gave them control over the running of their enterprises. Moreover, Marković's second-tier package of reforms lifted all restrictions on private ownership of companies (while retaining the limit of 30 hectares for individual land ownership), enabling more than 50 000 private firms to be set up in the first year of his term. The standard of living of the primary beneficiaries of these reforms – the middle-class managers, professionals and entrepreneurs – rose dramatically as the convertibility of the dinar and the free imports of consumer goods gave them a full taste of West European lifestyle.

But by May 1990 the political support for Marković was rapidly eroding: Dr Drnovšek was replaced by a Milošević appointee and the new postcommunist governments of Slovenia and Croatia, elected in the April–May multiparty elections (see below), began their boycott of the Yugoslav federal fiscal bodies, by refusing to transfer their tax allotment to the federal treasury. As a result of the boycott, many citizens, fearing the end of the local currency's convertibility, made a run on the banks changing the local into foreign currency and transferring it abroad. Forced repeatedly to devalue the dinar, in the autumn of 1990 Marković's anti-inflationary policies appeared to crumble. By June 1990 Marković's government was caught in a cross-fire between the Serbian government's insistence on reaffirming the powers of the federation and the Croatian and Slovenian governments' insistence on their republics' sovereignty.

It was only at this point that Marković decided to mobilise his natural constituency – the middle-class beneficiaries of his reforms throughout Yugoslavia – into a political party, the Alliance of Reform

Forces of Yugoslavia – a rare all-Yugoslav party among the multitude of separate national parties. Unlike the latter, his party stood for a Yugoslavia with 'a unified market, currency, foreign policy, frontiers and defence of the country'.[5] However, Marković's party, like its founder, left the constitutional arrangements of Yugoslavia completely open, to be decided by some future 'democratic agreement of its citizens'. Being an all-Yugoslav party it appeared well placed to contest any future multiparty elections for the Yugoslav federal assembly. However, the republican leaders – first those of Slovenia and, later, from Serbia and the other republics – repeatedly blocked Marković's proposals to hold multiparty elections for the Yugoslav federal parliament. Founded after the April–May 1990 multiparty elections in Slovenia and Croatia and denied legal registration in Croatia, Marković's party, split into separate republican branches, contested elections in Bosnia–Hercegovina, Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia. Many Serb politicians regarded Marković's party as a part of a Croat plot to divert the vote of Serbs and (self-declared) Yugoslavs from the Serb national parties in Bosnia–Hercegovina and in Serbia. Apart from a television station he founded himself, and a daily newspaper with a very limited audience, principally in Serbia, no other media outlet offered support to his party. The local leaders of his party, often members of the ex-communist intelligentsia, lacked the requisite electioneering skills and clientele networks. Its relative success in Bosnia–Hercegovina (8.46 per cent of the vote and 11 seats) and, in particular, in Macedonia (9.17 per cent of the vote and 11 seats)[6] was explicable, at least in part, by its reliance on the clientele network of its ex-communist local leaders. Finally, the main beneficiaries of Marković's reforms formed a very small stratum of the urban population. To all others, facing the uncertainty of the imminent collapse of the federation and the prospect of unemployment and even civil war, Marković's party, like his government, offered little if anything. The dismal failure of Marković to transform his high popularity rating into electoral success thus appears to be due to his party's restricted electoral appeal and the lack of a grassroots organisation.[7]

MILOŠEVIĆ'S MASS MOBILISATION OF THE SERBS

The first communist politician to make use of the re-emerging nationalist ideologies was Slobodan Milošević, then the president of the Communist party of Serbia. In using Serb nationalism to gain control first of the Serbian party apparatus and then of the Kosovo, Vojvodina

and Montenegro Party apparata, he effectively purged the communist elites of Serbia and Montenegro and replaced them with new elites.

In 1984 Ivan Stambolić – who was Milošević's friend and patron – was elected to the post of president of the Communist party of Serbia, previously held by his uncle, Petar Stambolić, a member of Tito's old guard. Starting from his family patronage network Ivan Stambolić promoted members of the Belgrade communist intelligentsia – academics and journalists – to important Party positions while giving, at the same time, considerable access to the media to Party deliberations and political decision-making. As in 1986 Stambolić was elected president of the presidency of Serbia, Milošević replaced him as president of the Serbian Party. At the time Milošević's political style – with the obligatory self-management jargon and monotonous delivery – did not differ from other communist cadres. But in his unplanned response to the Serb demonstrators (see Chapter 6) who burst into the meeting-hall near the Kosovo capital Priština on 24 April 1987, Milošević suddenly adopted the rhetoric of Serb national and historical responsibility:

> This is your land, your houses, your fields and gardens, your memories. Surely, you will not leave your land, because life is difficult on it, because you are oppressed by injustice and humiliations. It was never characteristic of the spirit of the Serb and Montenegrin nations to halt in the face of obstacles, to demobilise when they ought to be fighting, to be demoralised when they find it hard going. You should remain here for the sake of your ancestors and of your descendants.[8]

No communist politician in Yugoslavia, before or after World War II, openly appealed to the national traditions and national pride of the Serb and Montenegrin nations. As Milošević's appeal proved an instant success, he spread, during 1988, his message of the restoration of Serb national pride throughout Serbia. It was a novel, simple and directly personal appeal breaking the 45 years of communist-imposed taboos. The glorious past of the Serb nation and its pride was, he stressed in his speeches, the inalienable patrimony of every individual Serb, which demands of every Serb individually to prove themselves worthy of their ancestors. In the context of the alleged humiliation of Serbdom by the Kosovo Albanians – in Kosovo, the scene of the first traumatic Serb historical humiliation in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389 – this personal appeal proved to be very potent.

The encounter with the Serb demonstrators near Priština convinced Milošević of the need to take quick and resolute action to resolve the Kosovo crisis, by coercion if necessary. The Stambolić faction – in par-

ticular, one of Stambolić's closest aides, Dragiša Pavlović – opposed such measures, preferring to continue using the Kosovo Albanian Party leaders to stabilise the crisis. In September 1987 Milošević organised an unprecedented, fully televised, ritualistic verbal bashing of Pavlović at a Central Committee meeting in which 91 speakers participated. Totally demoralised, the Stambolić group was ousted without a fight; in December 1987 Ivan Stambolić was finally dismissed from his post of president of the Serbian presidency. Milošević's coup led to a small-scale Party revolution. The Central Committee members from the provincial posts who were recruited for the assault on the Stambolić faction, rapidly replaced the Belgrade party elite in top Party posts and the media. The smooth Belgrade drawl – which by the 1960s had become the dominant speech of the politicians and journalists – was replaced by the uneducated speech of the new communist cadres from central and south Serbia. The sole source of power and influence of this new elite was Milošević and his network. In carrying out his orders they proved to be obedient, resolute and ruthless – the qualities which Milošević needed in his drive to reshape the constitutional structure of Serbia and, eventually, of Yugoslavia.

Soon after the coup the Serbian media started to run stories regarding the corruption under Tito's regime as well as injustice and discrimination against the Serbs during and after World War II. Under the guise of revealing the secrets of the past, the popular press ran a coordinated campaign of delegitimisation of Tito's rule and its constitutional foundations. As part of this campaign, Belgrade intellectual journals were allowed to discuss many former taboo questions and, as a result, in 1988 open anti-communism or anti-Titoism became the latest intellectual fashion. Leading dissident intellectuals were given access to the popular media to air their – previously banned – criticism of the communist rule of Yugoslavia. By enthusiastically participating in this campaign of delegitimisation of Tito's rule, many nationalist and neomarxist dissidents as well as previous apologists of Tito's regime offered open or tacit support for Milošević's 'new course'.[9] Moreover, Milošević systematically incorporated former dissident ideas – nationalist as well as neomarxist ones – into the official rhetoric. Thus 'united, single Serbia' – one of the major tenets of the draft memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences – became the principal slogan of Milošević's campaign of mass rallies lasting from May until November 1988. The mass rallies, organised by local Party committees and the Kosovo Serb protest movement, were held in all major towns of Serbia. Hundreds of thousands of people participated,

carrying Serbian and Yugoslav flags and pictures of Milošević, Lenin and Tito. As the series of rallies progressed, Tito's and Lenin's pictures were replaced by those of Serb national heroes and the Yugoslav insignia were replaced by Serb national emblems. New patriotic songs, in particular the militant 'Who says, who dares to lie that Serbia is little?' as well as chants extolling Slobodan Milošević as a national hero provided the required emotional foci, while extensive media coverage, full of human interest stories, aimed to show that Milošević's mass support came from all strata of the Serbian population, young and old, educated and uneducated.

The rally fever, called the 'happening of the people', was crowned by a rally in Belgrade in October 1988 which, according to the official accounts, was attended by more than a million people.[10] The rallies were unprecedented in Yugoslav and Serbian history, greatly exceeding in the numbers of participants and their geographic spread similar mass rallies held by the Croatian Communist party leaders in Croatia in 1971. The campaign placed Milošević in the pantheon of Serb national heroes – to which no Serb communist politician ever belonged – and established him as the most powerful Serb politician in the post-1945 period. Apart from entrenching his rule in Serbia, the rallies were obviously intended to intimidate and demoralise his opposition, primarily the communist leaders of the provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina. In October 1988 a 'happening of the people' was organised by Milošević loyalists in the capital of Vojvodina, Novi Sad. After several days of siege of their Party headquarters, the province's Party leaders resigned *en masse* to be replaced by Milošević's appointees (who had organised the demonstrations). With the support of Serb demonstrators in Kosovo's capital, in November 1988 Milošević was able to engineer the replacement of the entrenched Kosovo Albanian leadership – led by one of Tito's favourite youth leaders, Azem Vllasi – by new Kosovo Albanian leaders loyal to him. This, in turn, sparked widespread Kosovo Albanian demonstrations throughout the province in support of their deposed communist leaders.

Similar mass demonstrations – dubbed 'street democracy' – were organised in August and November 1988 in the capital of the Republic of Montenegro and two of its major cities. Unlike their counterparts in the provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo, the leaders of the Republic of Montenegro controlled the republic's police, which they repeatedly used to disperse tens of thousands of demonstrators demanding their resignations. But by January 1989, Milošević loyalists were able to sway Montenegro's police chiefs and so, in the face of a second wave of

demonstrations, the Montenegrin communist leaders, bereft of police protection, resigned. This was the first instance in post-1945 Yugoslavia that a communist leader from one republic was able to replace the leadership of another republic by his appointees. Already in 1988 the communist leaders of the as yet unaffected republics – primarily Slovenia and Croatia – attempted, in vain, to rein in Milošević. After unsuccessful attempts to discredit his policies and appointees at the federal level, in February 1989, the Slovenian press and communist leaders took up the cause of Kosovo Albanian miners striking in support of their deposed communist leaders. At a mass political meeting, organised by the Slovene communists together with their new opposition parties, the Slovene communist leader Milan Kučan[11] argued that the Kosovo Albanian miners were defending the very foundations of Yugoslavia, established by the AVNOJ assembly in 1943, which Milošević had been undermining. Thanks to direct television coverage of the meeting, Belgrade students immediately reacted to Kučan's statement by organising huge demonstrations at Belgrade University which drew hundreds of thousands of demonstrators. The demonstrators' demands were conveniently channelled into a demand for the arrest of the deposed Kosovo Albanian communist leader Azem Vllasi which was duly carried out.[12] This incident signalled an almost total breakdown of relations between the Slovene and Serbian communist leaderships.

Milošević's handling of this incident followed the pattern already emerging in his deployment of 'street democracy' against his political opponents. He used every conflict, whether or not provoked by his actions, to rally popular support through organised rallies and media campaigns and to threaten his opponents with coercion. This type of intimidatory and coercive style of politics could neither be contained nor controlled within the framework of the consensus-seeking federal bodies of Yugoslavia. As each republic was 'sovereign' in its 'internal' affairs, the federal bodies, including the federal Party bodies, had no jurisdiction over each republic's leadership and its policies. Ironically, it was a Serbian leader who was the first to exploit in this way the republics' 'sovereignty' which was promoted by the Slovenian and Croatian communist leaders from the 1960s on. In April 1989 Milošević's government passed amendments to the constitution of Serbia effectively reintegrating Kosovo and Vojvodina into Serbia and stripping the two provinces of their political and legislative autonomy. This act of overt defiance of the Yugoslav constitution of 1974, which granted a dual status to the two provinces (see Chapter 5), was followed, in July 1989, by proposals from a Serbian reform commission which would in effect enable the Serb deputies in the federal

parliament, together with any allies from smaller national groups, to outvote Croatian and Slovenian deputies.[13]

Milošević's advocacy of a unified Yugoslavia in 1989 was complemented by mobilisation of Serbs outside Serbia. During 1988-9 his supporters, through their contacts with local Serb intelligentsia and notables in Croatia and in Bosnia–Hercegovina, helped to organise local Serb rallies and Serb cultural organisations which by the end of 1989 formed a loosely-organised pan-Serb national movement. Like the leaders of the Kosovo Serb movement of 1986-8 (see Chapter 6), its leaders were usually prominent local Serb professionals – teachers, doctors, lawyers and the like – who were neither members of the republican communist elites in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina nor professional politicians. In their view, the republic's boundaries artificially divided the Serb nation; only by crossing these boundaries, would the Serb nation be able to achieve the political unity it needed. As the new non-communist governments in Slovenia and Croatia moved towards secessions, in mid-1990 the movement for the political unification of the Serbs took on the form of a national liberation movement: its overriding aim became the liberation of the Serbs from foreign rule – the rule of non-Serbs – primarily in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, even then Milošević and the local Serb leaders of the movement never came to an agreement on the desirable form for Serb political unification. And as the conflict in Yugoslavia in 1991 turned into open warfare, the liberation of the Serbs through armed struggle took precedence over their political unification; later attempts by the local Serb political leaders to unify the Serb-populated parts of Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina (under their control from 1991 to 1995) with Serbia, all failed. However unclear the concept of Serb political unification appeared in 1988 or later, any kind of pan-Serb political movement in Yugoslavia posed a serious threat to the non-Serb national elites in each republic and province in which the Serbs lived.[14]

The first to oppose Milošević's ascendancy were the Slovene communist leaders who saw in his campaign for a 'unified Yugoslavia' a bid to take over power and recentralise the state; if successful, he would not only have been able to oust the Slovene communist elites but also to strip Slovenia of the political and cultural autonomy it had enjoyed so far. To pre-empt Milošević's bid the Slovenian communist leaders were, in 1988, ready to ally themselves with the new Slovene opposition parties the and to start the process of gradual 'disassociation' of Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation.

SLOVENIA: THE RISE OF THE DISSIDENTS

In the early 1980s two distinct groups of political dissidents emerged in Slovenia. The first, the Alternative movement – a conglomerate of single-issue groups (such as the Peace and Ecology movement, a feminist and a gay rights group) – was part of an alternative youth scene of various rock bands and art groups. As the latter were following the latest Western fashions in music and the arts, so the Alternative movement followed the latest fashions in the Western alternative political movements, trying to adapt them to the Slovenian political conditions of one-party rule. Their main outlet was the youth weekly *Mladina* and the student radio station *Radio Študent* both of which were financed and run by the official communist-controlled youth organisation.

The second focus of dissidence in Slovenia was the Society of Slovene Writers,[15] a semi-official organisation which in the early 1980s undertook to promote the concept of a single and distinct Slovene cultural space, embracing all native Slovene speakers. The distinctness and uniqueness of Slovene cultural space would enable Slovenes to disassociate themselves from the 'Balkan Southerners' – primarily Serbs – who lacked the European culture and customs of the Slovenes.[16] In the 1987 issue of *Nova Revija* (see Chapter 7) the idea of a linguistically and culturally defined Slovene space found its political expression in the demand for Slovenia's full sovereignty and independence. In 1986 the Society successfully blocked the election of a Serbian writer as president of the League of Writers of Yugoslavia and in 1988 it severely chastised Serbian writers for their alleged lack of support for the rights of Kosovo Albanians.[17]

In early 1988 *Mladina* started to target the Yugoslav federal army by exposing its arms sales to impoverished Third World countries and its corruption. In early March 1988 just as the weekly was preparing to publish transcripts of Party and military meetings discussing the arrest of Slovene dissidents, the Yugoslav federal army arrested three of its journalists and a Slovene sergeant-major who procured the secret documents for them. One of the journalists, Janez Janša,[18] was a prominent activist of the Alternative movement's peace branch. His friends from the Alternative movement, immediately upon his arrest, founded the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, consisting of dissidents from the youth Alternative movement and from the Slovene Society of Writers.[19] The Committee, with the active support of the Slovene Communist party, the communist-controlled media and the Roman Catholic church, organised a widespread campaign of protests

against the arrest of the 'Ljubljana four' as they came to be called. According to one of its members, the Committee in a short time gained over 100 000 members from all walks of life and organised daily demonstrations against the Yugoslav federal army.[20] These continuous protests reached a crescendo with the decision of the Yugoslav federal army military court to conduct its proceedings in Serbo-Croatian, the language of military command in the army. Although the Yugoslav constitutional court ruled the decision to be constitutional, the Slovene Communist party leader, Milan Kučan strongly remonstrated against it saying that 'Slovenes cannot regard as their own any state that does not secure the use of their mother tongue and its equality, and in which the freedom, sovereignty and equality of the Slovene people is not guaranteed'.[21]

The trial – at which the four were found guilty and sentenced to prison terms ranging from four years to five months – brought together not only the Slovene communist leadership and the dissident groups but also all strands of Slovene nationalist symbolism: the arrest and sentencing of Slovene citizens by the Yugoslav military authorities symbolised the breach of Slovene state sovereignty by a 'foreign' force while the use of Serbo-Croatian symbolised the 'foreign' oppression of Slovene culture and a denial of Slovene sovereignty. The astounding success of the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights in creating a mass national movement and mobilising Slovene public opinion encouraged various groups within the Committee to form their own 'political identities' and, ultimately, separate political parties. The first alternative political party, the Slovene Democratic Alliance, was established already in January 1989. Its founder Dimitrij Rupel, in his contribution to the 1987 *Nova Revija* issue on the Slovene national programme, argued for Slovenia's political as well as cultural independence (see Chapter 7). Soon afterwards another *Nova Revija* contributor, Jože Pučnik, formed the Slovene Social Democratic Alliance, committed to the drafting of a new Slovene constitution and institutionalising the republic's sovereignty. They were followed by the Slovene Christian Democratic party, the Green Alliance and the Slovene Craftsmen's party and, later, the Slovene Farmers' Alliance. As many of the leaders of these new parties had already worked together in the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights, they had no difficulty in forming, in January 1990, the opposition coalition bloc known by its Slovene acronym DEMOS.

As a result of its participation in the national movement in 1988, the Communist party of Slovenia rapidly transformed itself into a Slovene

national party. As one member of the Committee points out, in the process the Communist party appears to have 'highjacked' the national cause from the Committee for the Defence of Human Rights for its own purposes.[22] Already in December 1988, the communist leader Milan Kučan had asserted Slovenia's right to secede from the Yugoslav federation.[23] This was followed, in September 1989, by a series of constitutional amendments passed by the Assembly of the Republic of Slovenia enabling the republic's organs to proclaim a state of emergency in the republic (independently of the Yugoslav state organs) and codifying the Slovenian state organs' duty to defend and protect the republic against any federal organs.[24] This was the first in the series of legislative moves asserting full Slovenian sovereignty over its affairs and 'disassociating' the republic from the Yugoslav federation.

In November 1989 the multiparty political system was finally legalised and the stage set for the first multiparty elections in April 1990. The Slovene Communist party delegation walked out of the fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the Communist party of Yugoslavia in January 1990, refusing to be outvoted on its proposal to confederalise the Yugoslav Communist party. The Slovene Communist party, immediately upon its delegation's return, abandoned marxism, changed its name, programme, flag and image. Under its new slogan 'Europe now' it presented itself as a national party of all Slovenes which was ready to find a place for Slovenia, as a fully sovereign state, within a new confederal Yugoslavia. While the opposition DEMOS parties differed greatly among themselves in their ideological programmes, they were united in their rejection of Yugoslavia as an 'exhausted concept'. In the elections for the lower chamber of the Slovenian assembly in April 1990 (in which 80 per cent of the electorate turned out to vote), the ex-communist Party of Democratic Renewal got the most votes by a single party (17 per cent) followed by the ex-communist Liberals (15 per cent). They were followed by the parties of the opposition bloc DEMOS: the Christian Democrats (12.9 per cent), the Farmers' Alliance (12.5 per cent), the Slovene Democratic Alliance (9.9 per cent), the Greens (8.9 per cent), the Slovene Social Democratic Alliance (7.3 per cent) and the Slovene Craftsmen's party (3.5 per cent). As the DEMOS coalition parties together gathered 55 per cent of the vote, in April 1990 the coalition formed the first postcommunist government in Yugoslavia with the prime minister Lojze Peterle (the leader of the Slovene Christian Democrats) and most other ministers former dissidents. However, in the second round of voting for the president of the republic the ex-communist leader Milan Kučan won against the ex-dissident

Jože Pučnik (with 58.3 per cent against the latter's 41.7 per cent of the vote).

The former dissidents now in government, while holding widely divergent political views, were primarily united in their principled commitment to Slovenia's independence and secession from Yugoslavia. For them this was an article of faith which allowed no compromise. They set about to achieve it with all the organisational ingenuity which they displayed in their dissident days.

THE DISSIDENTS' TAKEOVERS IN OTHER REPUBLICS

Croatia

In contrast to the Slovene communists, the Croatian Communist party leaders neither supported the dissident movement's drive towards Croatian independence nor did they successfully 'highjack' the Croatian national cause. The Croatian communist leaders in the late 1980s belonged to the anti-nationalist wing of the Croatian Party which came to power in 1971 to replace the nationalist communists purged by Tito. Remaining true to their anti-nationalist stand, up to 1988 they continued to persecute and discredit the Croatian dissidents. However, in the prolonged conflict between the Slovene communist leaders and the Milošević elite in Serbia, the Croatian communist leadership rather reluctantly took the side of their Slovene colleagues. Like their Slovene comrades, they must have perceived Milošević's programme of recentralisation of Yugoslavia and his pan-Serb mobilisation as a direct threat to their hold on power; in an attempt to widen their popular support, they, like their Slovenian counterparts, found in late 1988 a new tolerance for nationalist dissidents.

The Croat nationalist dissidents quickly followed in the steps of their Slovenian counterparts and on 28 February 1989 Dr Franjo Tudjman founded the first opposition party – the Croatian Democratic Union, widely known under its Croatian acronym HDZ.[25] Although the great majority of its founders were university educated (proudly noting their degrees), there was a significant number of entrepreneurs – for example, restaurant owners – and a small number of tradesmen.[26] These strata of self-employed entrepreneurs and tradesmen would provide the financial and organisational backbone to the party in its march to power in April–May 1990. Its initial platform called for the development of Croat national consciousness, unifying all its past diverse

strands,[27] and for a confederal reorganisation of Yugoslavia on the basis of the existing AVNOJ borders among the republics. It also advocated the development of a free market economy, a democratic political system reintegrating the Croat diaspora abroad and Christian (that is, Roman Catholic) family values. While the party was declared open to Serbs and other nationalities, it emphasised that all other nationalities need to respect their common homeland – Croatia.[28] From the very start the HDZ claimed that for the Serbs in Croatia there is only one homeland – Croatia – and thus denied to them any territorial autonomy or the right to consider Yugoslavia as their homeland.

Focusing on the writings and speeches of some of its founders, the communist-controlled media in Croatia and Serbia attacked the HDZ, routinely linking it with the Croat mass national movement in the 1970s and pro-Ustasha revisionism. Its anti-communist reputation firmly established, the party gained the largest following amongst emigré Croats who belonged to a variety of nationalist and anti-communist political organisations. Tudjman's semi-rehabilitation of the Ustasha Croat state (1941–5) as 'not only a quisling creation and fascist crime, but also an expression of the historical strivings of the Croat nation'[29] was widely acclaimed among Croat emigrés as a reflection of their common political principles. Having found in the HDZ the party of their unity and purpose, Croat emigrés poured millions of dollars into its campaign coffers.

The principal leaders of the Croat national mass movement of the early 1970s did not join the HDZ but formed their own parties – Croatian Social Liberal party, Croatian Democratic party, Croatian Peasants' party, and the Social Democratic party of Croatia. On 1 March, together with four other parties, they formed an eight-party Coalition of National Accord which emphasised the need for a peaceful restructuring of the Yugoslav federation into a confederation.[30] The Serb Democratic party, founded in February 1990 by Dr Jovan Rašković, a psychiatrist and author, initially demanded Serb cultural autonomy and 'ethnic sovereignty' within Croatia and strongly opposed the separation of the Serb-populated areas of Croatia from Yugoslavia. In addition to the Serb party with its power based in Serb-populated regions of Krajina and Slavonia, Istrian and Dalmatian regional parties were formed as well. After their walk-out from the Yugoslav Communist Party Congress in January 1990, the Croatian communists quickly changed their name and, like their Slovene counterparts, transformed themselves into a non-marxist social democratic party. In the elections of April–May 1990, the reformed communists faced two coalitions: the

eight-party Coalition of National Accord, led by the prominent leaders of the 1970s Croat mass national movement and the most nationally assertive grouping, the six-party Croatian Democratic Bloc led by Dr Franjo Tudjman and his HDZ. The latter's election campaign with huge rallies, the prominent display of national symbols and the cult of its leader resembled Milošević's style of populist mobilisation.

The electoral system, approved by the communist-controlled Croatian Diet before the elections, required an absolute majority of votes in the first round or a relative majority of votes in the second round of balloting to win a seat in the Diet. Under this system of voting, the HDZ with 44 per cent of the vote secured 205 (or 58 per cent) of the 386 seats in all three chambers of the Croatian Diet. The ex-communists together with their allies secured only 101 seats. In the Socio-Political Chamber of the Diet, the most important of the three, with 42 per cent of the vote the HDZ won a two-thirds majority of 54 seats (out of 80). The runners-up, the ex-communists with 34 per cent of the vote got only 19 seats. The Coalition of the National Accord, trailing a poor third, split almost immediately after the elections. The Serb Democratic party won 5 seats altogether.

Thus the first-past-the-post system enabled the HDZ-led coalition to win an absolute majority in parliament without winning an absolute majority of votes. However, HDZ's impressive margin of votes over the ex-communists could be explained, at least in part, by its superior organisation and marketing. During more than a year of its existence, it created an effective clientele network in almost all districts of Croatia, often nominating for its candidates well-known local businessmen who were supported by systematic door-to-door canvassing. Its advertising campaign, generously financed by its Croat supporters abroad, conveyed a simple message: this was a truly Croat party which knew how to take care of Croat interests. With the rising threat of Milošević's domination over Yugoslavia and the continuing Slovenian–Serbian tension, this was a very effective message. The HDZ's success was a victory not only of a nationally-assertive political platform which its dissident leader had propagated for almost two decades but of the social strata – self-employed farmers, entrepreneurs and tradesmen as well as Croat emigrés – which previously had little if any impact in the politics of Croatia. Dr Franjo Tudjman, whom the Croatian Diet proclaimed the President of Croatia (with 281 out of 386 votes), resurrected for them Croat pride in their past and a hope for their future in a state they could call their own. For many of the HDZ faithful he was the true father of their nation.[31]

Having lost power, the ex-communists almost immediately lost a great number of its former supporters and cadres to the HDZ. Many Party cadres – of all ranks – declared themselves to be long-standing HDZ moles in the Party while others sought whatever positions they could get from the new government. Soon after the elections the reformed communists split and gradually became a marginal political force. By the end of 1990 the HDZ, having placed its supporters in almost all key positions in most Croatian institutions, including the media, successfully marginalised all other political forces in Croatia except for the Serb Democratic Party in its Serb-populated Krajina powerbase and the regional party in Istria.

Bosnia–Hercegovina

Throughout the 1980s the Bosnian Communist party continued to repress its dissidents most severely, punishing any critics of the communist regime – intellectuals and non-intellectuals alike – with long prison sentences. As a result, in 1988 there were, apart from the Islamic groups (whose leaders, including Alija Izetbegović, had just been released from prison), no other intellectual dissident groups in Bosnia–Hercegovina. In 1988 the purge following the *Agrokomerc* scandal (see Chapter 6) brought to power a younger generation of communist leaders who, following their counterparts elsewhere in Yugoslavia, proved to be more tolerant of dissidence. However, in legalising the formation of other political parties, they attempted to prohibit the formation of political parties based on national or religious affiliation (which in Bosnia–Hercegovina largely coincided) arguing that this would irreparably split the republic. As the republic's constitutional court overruled the prohibition, the Islamic dissidents were the first to found such a party – the Party of Democratic Action (*Stranka demokratske akcije* – SDA) led by Alija Izetbegović. It defined itself as an association of citizens of Yugoslavia who belong to the 'Muslim cultural and historical circle' as well as of others who endorse its programme. In its programme, democracy was defined as the rule of just laws (in contradistinction to the rule of majorities) and it included an 'efficacious restriction of several social ills: the diseases of addictions, trashy literature and pornography'.[32] While granting the Serbs and Croats the right to live in Bosnia–Hercegovina, the party claimed that Muslims are the autochthonous Bosnian nation and, as a Muslim party, it declared its special interest in preserving the republic's unity. In one of the largest election rallies, in the stronghold of former

communist party boss Fikret Abdić (see Chapter 6), Izetbegović declared that the Muslims, together with other nations, would defend Bosnia from partition with armed force if necessary.[33] In his interviews Izetbegović and other leaders of his party – among whom there were several prominent Muslim clerics – reiterated both the party's commitment to a state of equal citizens and their demand for a society based on Islamic norms.[34] However, the tension between these two irreconcilable aims apparently led to the split in October 1990 in which one of its founders Adil Zulfikarpašić, left the SDA to form a secular party of Muslims.[35]

The Serb Democratic Party (SDS) was founded by Dr Radovan Karadžić, a psychiatrist, minor poet and businessman who was, in the communist era, imprisoned for alleged embezzlement. The party was committed to the integrity of federal Yugoslavia; if the latter failed, the party would 'seek a democratic response of the Serb nation to any possible new situation'.[36] From the start, it demanded a new administrative division of Bosnia's municipalities (communes) which would not disadvantage its highly dispersed Serb population. Aiming to unite all Serbs in Bosnia–Hercegovina, communists and Orthodox believers alike, it was part of the pan-Serb movement in Yugoslavia supported by Milošević's government and by its twin party in Croatia.

Its Croat counterpart, HDZ for Bosnia–Hercegovina, was a branch of the Croatian HDZ in Zagreb which controlled its finances, personnel and policies. The Bosnian HDZ aimed primarily at 'securing the right of the Croat nation to self-determination up to the right of secession'[37] within a sovereign republic; in practice, this meant securing a desired level of Croat self-government in the predominantly Croat areas. In contrast to the Serb party, the Bosnian HDZ propagated the confederalisation of Yugoslavia within which the republic would be sovereign and independent. Before the November 1990 elections, the Muslim SDA leaders refused to endorse either the Croat confederal or the Serb federal project of Yugoslavia, preferring to keep their options open. The reformed Bosnian Communist party took a similarly ambiguous stand. In opposition to the national parties, the reformed communists came out against any form of nationalism and against the 'political instrumentalisation of national and religious sentiments'.[38] They and Ante Marković's Alliance of Reform Forces were the only major parties not based on national affiliation; pre-election opinion-polls and media commentators predicted their victory. In November 1990 the electorate, however, returned an overwhelming majority to the three national parties, each of which secured a proportion of the

vote which roughly reflected the 1991 census figures for the respective national groups:

- SDA (Muslims): 37.8 per cent of the vote (43.5 per cent of the population)
- SDS (Serbs): 26.5 per cent of the vote (31.3 per cent of the population)
- HDZ (Croats): 14.7 per cent of the vote (17.5 per cent of the population)

The reformed communists got only 6 per cent (7.6 per cent with their socialist allies) and Marković's Alliance 5.6 per cent of the votes cast, while numerous smaller pan-national parties got most of the remaining votes.

With the Yugoslav federation disintegrating and the new Slovenian and Croatian governments set on achieving independence, the major electoral issue in Bosnia–Hercegovina was how to achieve security and peace in a republic with such sharp national cleavages. Given that no national group in the republic commanded either the numbers or the level of force sufficient to ensure its own supremacy and the maintenance of law and order on its own, without any help from outside, the electorate chose the parties which had each already obtained substantial support from outside the republic. Even the Muslims – with no large neighbouring co-national group in Yugoslavia – probably felt assured of support for the Islamic SDA from the Islamic countries with which their leaders had already established close ties. Alija Izetbegović's studious references to his party's ties with the Islamic world, which his political opponents had used in their propaganda against him, probably helped him to attract even the secularised segments of the Muslim electorate. The two principal pan-national parties, the Alliance and the communists, had no backing from any major political players in Yugoslavia or abroad. Izetbegović's SDA was the only political force which seemed capable of protecting the position and security of the Muslims, faced with the two other national parties backed by their co-national sponsors from outside the republic.

After the elections, the three national parties formed a coalition government in which the portfolios were divided roughly according to the election results. The leader of the strongest party, the Muslim Alija Izetbegović, was elected the president of the seven-member presidency of the republic. The prime ministership went to a Croat and the president of the parliament was a Serb. The coalition partners agreed to resolve all major issues, such as those relating to the equality of nations in the

republic, by consensus through the already established parliamentary procedure.[39] The distribution of political offices and the consensus-seeking political decision-making procedure aimed at ensuring the avoidance of political conflicts. However, after the outbreak of violence and fighting in neighbouring Croatia, each of the national parties, early in 1991, started to supply its members with arms; in consequence, criminal gangs, engaged in arms smuggling and protection rackets, sought to ally themselves with local leaders of all the three main national parties. The division of political offices enabled these political leaders to protect criminal suspects of their own nationality from the police and the judiciary. As the power of state institutions was undermined, many functions of the state were transferred to the apparata of the three national parties. In fact, in those municipalities (communes) in which a single national party gained a majority, that party took over almost all the functions of the local government. In addition to the distribution of political and high administrative offices by national affiliation, this take-over of local government by national parties assured that political power and administration of the republic was effectively partitioned among the national parties even before the civil war erupted in April 1992.

Already in October 1991, less than a year after the elections, the principle of consensus in major decision-making was breached as the Muslim and Croat parties proceeded to adopt the Memorandum of Sovereignty of the republic in spite of its rejection by the Serb party (see Chapter 11). As Yugoslavia was disintegrating into separate nation-states, the three national parties of unequal electoral strength were not very likely to maintain the consensus required to keep their coalition government working.

Macedonia

As in Bosnia–Hercegovina, the formation of new parties in Macedonia followed the break-up of the Yugoslav Communist party in January 1990. The first nationalist party, the Movement for all-Macedonian Action (MAAK) was founded in February 1990 by a writer who was the president of the Union of Macedonian Writers. It pledged to defend the interests of all Macedonians, including those from the Aegean and Pirin parts of Macedonia (that is, of Greece and Bulgaria).[40] Another writer, the 25-year-old Ljupčo Georgijevski founded, in June 1990, another nationalist party – the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organisation–Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (IMRO–DPMNU). Continuing the tradition of its namesake, the IMRO founded by Goce

Delčev in 1893, this party was committed to the formation of an independent Macedonian state and for the unification of all (Slav) Macedonians in one state by non-violent means. It demanded a confederal Yugoslavia, the creation of a Macedonian national army and a Macedonian passport to be issued to all Macedonians in the diaspora who were forced to use Greek or Bulgarian passports.

The Albanian national party – Party for Democratic Prosperity in Macedonia – was also founded by intellectuals but of Albanian nationality. Opposed to Macedonian nationalist parties, this party regarded Macedonia as a state of Macedonians, Albanians and other nationalities living in it; accordingly it demanded the right to Macedonian citizenship of all its residents, irrespective of their national or religious affiliation as well as the right of public education in one's mother tongue. The leaders of the Albanian minority – which probably numbered over 21 per cent[41] of the republic's population at the time – had long complained of the paucity of primary and secondary schools with instruction in Albanian and of the denial of citizenship to the Albanians who had emigrated to Macedonia. Like its counterparts in other Yugoslav republics, the Communist party of Macedonia, after January 1990, changed its name, abandoned marxism and promoted a sovereign Macedonia. Already in 1989, the Party initiated a change in the constitution of Macedonia, making it a 'nation-state of the Macedonian nation' and deleting any reference to national minorities; on the eve of the November 1990 elections, the Party initiated a further constitutional amendment which made Macedonia the protector of Macedonians living in other countries.[42] The 'left' parties' bloc also included Ante Marković's Alliance and a Socialist party.

Only after three rounds of voting in November and December 1990, did the nationalist IMRO emerge as the largest party with 38 out of 120 seats in the unicameral parliament. The reformed communists came second with 31 seats; the Albanian party was third with 17 and Marković's Alliance fourth with 11 seats. All other seats were taken up by smaller parties, most of them either of Albanian or Macedonian nationalist orientation. With no party achieving an absolute majority, the early coalition governments were quite short-lived. After prolonged haggling, in late January 1991 the parliament elected Kiro Gligorov, a Macedonian communist leader who was a member of Tito's chosen coterie, president of Macedonia; in March a cabinet consisting mainly of non-party experts was formed to tackle the dire economic crisis which befell Macedonia's underdeveloped economy. The failure of the nationalist parties to win outright control of the government and

the inclusion of Albanian party leaders in successive Macedonian governments probably prevented the escalation of interparty conflict into an interethnic conflict between the Macedonian government and the Albanian minority. Its ex-communist president and government were not supportive of the nationalist parties' moves to proclaim the independence of the republic; only after the fighting escalated in Croatia in July 1991 did the former proceed to organise a referendum, held in September 1991, on independence. On the basis of the pro-independence vote in the referendum, the Macedonian government, in December 1991, requested EC recognition of its independence (see Chapter 10). Following an agreement with the Yugoslav army's High Command, in March 1992 the Yugoslav federal army left the republic without any incident and, in April 1993, the republic, under its temporary name the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, was admitted to the UN. Partly because of its government's conciliatory stance, Macedonia was the only republic whose secession from the Yugoslav federation did not cause an armed conflict.

SERBIA AND MONTENEGRO: THE VICTORY OF EX-COMMUNIST PARTIES

Until mid-1990 Milošević and his supporters from Montenegro attempted, in vain, to revive the the Yugoslav Communist party which effectively dissolved in January 1990. In spite of his attempts to keep the one-party system going, the first opposition political parties started to form in Serbia early in 1990. Among the first were the Serb Renewal Movement led by a popular novelist and dissident Vuk Drašković, and the Democratic party, continuing the traditions of its pre-1941 namesake.[43] The former attempted to create a mass anti-communist movement among various strata of the population based on a radical nationalist programme of reunification of the Serb lands into one state while the latter, founded by Belgrade liberals and (former) neomarxists, promoted parliamentary liberalism primarily among the urban intelligentsia. Under pressure to call multiparty elections, in July 1990 Milošević went to a referendum with a proposal to introduce a new constitution for Serbia which stripped the autonomous provinces of their political autonomy and entrenched the supremacy of the president of the republic (the post he held) over any parliamentary bodies.[44]

As expected, the parliament of Kosovo, dominated by Kosovo Albanian communist deputies, refused to endorse the proposed change in the

status of Kosovo. Having been locked out of the parliament building, in July 1990 Kosovo Albanian deputies passed their own constitutional declaration at its entrance (see Chapter 12).

Most Kosovo Albanians boycotted the first multiparty elections in Serbia, which were held in December 1990 and contested by more than 50 parties and a large number of independent candidates. The major opposition parties – including the Serbian Renewal Movement and the Democratic party – failed to form a united opposition until the second round of voting. As in Croatia, the first-past-the-post system (in two rounds) ensured that with 45.8 per cent of the vote, Milošević's (ex-communist) Socialist party gained 77.6 per cent of seats in the unicameral parliament (194 out of 250). The ex-communists were followed by the Serbian Renewal Movement with 19 seats and the Democratic party with 7 seats. The remaining seats went to 14 smaller parties. In direct elections for the president of Serbia, Milošević, once again, proved his personal popularity by gaining 65.35 per cent of the votes (among 32 candidates running for the office). Milošević's 'Serbia unite' rallies begun in early 1988 and crowned by the rally commemorating the six-hundredth anniversary of the Kosovo battle in June 1989, in retrospect, appear to have served as his prolonged election campaign. In addition to Milošević's personal popularity, his Socialist party's victory could be explained by its use of the already existing communist clientele networks, its almost total control of the electronic (but not the print) media, the fragmentation of the opposition parties and the Socialists' superior marketing. Their slogan 'With us there is no uncertainty' captured the Serbian – in particular provincial – electorate in the midst of a severe political and economic crisis. Moreover, Drašković's attempts to outbid Milošević's Socialists with his own nationalist programme badly backfired as the electorate came to regard the Socialists as the party of stability and moderation.

Milošević's supporters in Montenegro did not even trouble to change the name of the Communist party; they won 83 out of 125 seats in the parliament, under their old name of the League of Communists of Montenegro, while their leader won the presidency of this, the smallest Yugoslav republic with 42.2 per cent of the vote.

THE OUTCOME OF THE ELECTIONS

The introduction of nationalist political moblisation in Yugoslav politics thus brought new elites and parties to power. The Communist party

which pioneered this process – that of Serbia – was able to retain its power and its dominant position in the politics of its republic. The ex-communist parties which refused to transform themselves into single nation parties – such as the ex-communists of Bosnia–Hercegovina and of Croatia – were decisively defeated. Those communists who embraced the national cause early, allowing them to show a good record in fighting for it – like the Slovene ones – were able to retain a share of power. Even those which came to embrace the national cause relatively late, such as the Macedonian communists, could – partly due to the fragmentation of their opposition – retain substantial power.

The multiparty elections not only brought to or confirmed in power the new political elites but they completed the process of the political fragmentation of the Yugoslav federation commenced in the early 1960s. Instead of national communist elites, each of the republics by late 1990 was ruled by non-communist (or no-longer-communist) national elites. The national communist elites in the past shared an all-Yugoslav communist ideology as well as common political interests and loyalties. These shared political interests and loyalties kept the highly fragmented semiconfederation together as a common state. The new non-communist national elites had neither an ideology nor political interests (let alone loyalties) in common. On the contrary, they professed separate national ideologies which were in conflict not only regarding the desirable constitutional structure for their respective nations but also regarding their nation's territorial claims.

Each of the national ideologies called for the liberation of the claimed territory from the rule of the foreigners, that is, of anyone not belonging to the 'target' nation. In the absence of any other foreign rulers, the armed force – for example, of the Yugoslav federal army or of the Croatian government police forces – commanded from outside the territory, was deemed to be the foreign oppressor who should be expelled. Like other national liberation ideologies, these demanded the use of any available means – including armed force – to achieve the desired liberation: the cause of national liberty, within their framework, is the most sacred one. Since several of the national liberation ideologies claimed the same territory and justified the use of force in upholding these claims, the ascent to power of the elites, espousing ideologies such as these, clearly increased the likelihood of armed conflict. Most of the electorates who voted the new elites into power – as well as the European governments – probably hoped that their territorial and ideological conflicts could be resolved within the framework provided by the Yugoslav constitution of 1974. The constitution, however flawed it appeared by

1990, also appeared to provide the institutional framework – the state presidency and the presidents of each republic and province – for negotiation among national elites. But while it provided the institutional framework for such negotiations, the 1974 constitution offered no mechanism for a peaceful resolution of the conflicts over territorial claims; for example, the constitution provided no set procedure for the dissolution of the federation (as demanded by the Slovene and Croat national elites) or for a peaceful change of the republics' borders (as demanded by the Serb elites). And, as the leaders of the new national elites failed to agree on any procedure or framework for the resolution of these conflicts, the use of force to resolve the conflicts over territory increasingly appeared to them as the only way to achieve their goals of national liberation.

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9 On the Road to War 1990–91

ON THE ROAD TO SECESSION: SLOVENIA AND CROATIA

The new Croatian and Slovenian governments were committed to extricating their republics from the Yugoslav federation either by transforming the federation into an alliance of sovereign states, or by unilaterally declaring independence. The ex-communist elites brought to power by Milošević in Serbia and Montenegro, the communist elites in the Yugoslav federal army and the new pan-Serb national movement and its elites in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina strongly opposed these plans. All three groups were, in various degrees, ideologically committed to the existing Yugoslav state as their common homeland and as their protector from foreign domination. In addition, Milošević saw in Yugoslavia the possibility of extending his power even further; the new Serb elites in Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina found in Yugoslavia the protection from domination by the Croat or Muslim governments of their republics and a common state with other Serbs. The military elites saw in Yugoslavia the source of their pay and status as well as the legitimation of their role.

A unilateral declaration of independence by these two republics would have breached the territorial integrity of the Yugoslav state which the Yugoslav federal army was obliged, by the constitution of 1974, to defend. The Serb elites of the Krajina region in Croatia would have opposed by the force of arms – as they did later – any attempt to compel them to break their links with other Serbs in Yugoslavia. In May 1990 the new Slovenian and Croatian governments had no military forces capable of countering the opposition of either the army or, in the case of Croatia, an armed rebellion of the Serbs supported by the Yugoslav army. In consequence, the new Croatian and Slovenian governments proposed to negotiate with other republican leaders the transformation of Yugoslavia into a confederation of sovereign states while, at the same time, building up their own military forces for any future showdown with their opponents.

Before reopening negotiations with the other republican leaders, in May–July 1990 the Croatian and Slovenian parliaments adopted a series of declarations and constitutional amendments asserting the sovereignty of their republics and legally enabling their own governments to

counter any move by Yugoslav federal organs. As expected, the leaders of the Serb Democratic party in Croatia rejected the Croatian constitutional amendments. Amidst increased unrest and violence in the Serb populated areas of Croatia, in October 1990 the Slovenian and Croatian governments submitted to the Yugoslav state presidency an official proposal for the restructuring of Yugoslavia entitled 'A Model of Confederation'. According to the proposal, the existing republics should constitute themselves as independent and sovereign states, based on the right of national self-determination, and, then, as independent states enter into a confederal agreement with other republics or federations which would be based on international law governing relations among independent states.[1] Confederation was thus conceived as an instrument for gaining recognition of independence for the Yugoslav republics. The counterproposal submitted by the Yugoslav state presidency a few weeks later, entitled 'A Concept for the Federal Organisation of Yugoslavia' would have established 'the federal republic' of Yugoslavia on the basis of the sovereignty of its individual citizens. No special rights were attributed to nations as collective entities, except for the declaration that the nations as well as federal units were in the new federal republic deemed to be equal.[2] According to the Slovenian and Croatian proposal, former federal units would become independent states while the Yugoslav state presidency proposal – almost identical to the Serbian and Montenegrin proposal submitted in February 1991 – regarded the federal units as separate but equal units in a single state administration.

The negotiations, started in January 1991 at the expanded sessions of the Yugoslav state presidency, were widely publicised in expectation that they would soon resolve the continuing constitutional crisis which was paralysing the functioning of the state. Neither side, however, showed any willingness to modify its constitutional proposal and the Yugoslav state presidency soon became deadlocked over the election of a Croat HDZ nominee as its next president.[3] On 25 March 1991 presidents Tudjman and Milošević met in Tito's old hunting lodge of Karađorđevo ostensibly to discuss the constitutional impasse. According to rumours originating from various sources, they principally discussed a possible partition of Bosnia–Hercegovina between Serbia and Croatia.[4] Whatever the subject of their discussion, their talks brought no change in their previous positions. In April 1991 the negotiations on the future of Yugoslavia were transferred directly to the presidents[5] of the six republics who, in spite of meeting fortnightly until June, likewise failed to reach any agreement. Early in June 1991 the president of the

presidency of Bosnia–Hercegovina, Alija Izetbegović, and the president of Macedonia, Kiro Gligorov, submitted their 'Platform concerning the Future of the Yugoslav State' which avoided using either of the terms 'confederal' or 'federal'. However, their 'Platform' attributed the original state sovereignty to the republics and not to the citizens and defined Yugoslavia as an 'alliance of republics'.[6] In this new alliance, the republics could establish mutual relations of varying closeness; some could form a federation while others would establish only confederal ties. Their proposal explicitly denied the right of national self-determination to the each of these nations as a whole which inhabited more than one republic. According to this, the Serb nation would have its right of self- determination restricted to its 'titular' homeland, Serbia. In this way, the Izetbegović–Gligorov proposal attempted to prevent a possible secession of the Serbs from Bosnia-Hercegovina and the republic's eventual fragmentation. A few weeks later Marković's federal government endorsed a very similar concept of a 'community of sovereign republics'. In retrospect these compromise proposals look like belated attempts to stave off the disintegration of the Yugoslav state by those who would lose most from it. Ante Marković would lose a state of which he was the prime minister; the Macedonian president a state which provided external security and financial support for his small, land-locked and poor republic; and Alija Izetbegović a state which until then provided a common homeland both for the Serbs and Croats of Bosnia–Hercegovina. With the disappearance of their common Yugoslav homeland, Bosnian Serbs and Croats could expect to join their newly created homeland states.

Although all the other presidents initially offered guarded support for the proposal, the Slovenian and the Croatian governments were not prepared to postpone their respective declarations of independence which they jointly planned for late June 1991. In the May 1991 referendum on the future of Croatia (which Serbs from Krajina had boycotted), 94.7 per cent of voters (in an 83 per cent turn out) declared for an independent and sovereign Croatia. After a year-long media campaign for an independent Croatia, in which any dissenting opinion had been effectively excluded, no other result could have been expected. In a similar plebiscite in December 1990 in Slovenia, 86 per cent voted for a sovereign and independent Slovenia. The last-minute tripartite talks between Tudjman, Milošević and Izetbegović on 12 June 1991 could not halt the planned declarations. Neither could they be halted by a last-minute warning from the US Secretary of State, James Baker, on 21 June 1990, that the US would not recognise unilateral acts of

secession. The unanimous vote of the European Community representatives on 23 June that they would not recognise the unilateral secession of Slovenia and Croatia had no more impact either. On 25 June 1991 the Slovenian parliament declared Slovenia an independent state which was no longer a part of the Yugoslav federation while the Croatian Diet declared Croatia an independent and sovereign state which was beginning the process of 'disassociation' from Yugoslavia and of gaining international recognition.

But the secession of Croatia and Slovenia from Yugoslavia had been preceded by another secession – the secession of the Serb-held territories of Krajina and Slavonia from Croatia and their proclaimed 'unification' with Serbia.

THE SERB INSURRECTION IN CROATIA

The Serbs formed an absolute majority in 11 municipalities (communes) of the Krajina region, bordering Bosnia–Hercegovina and substantial minorities – of close to 40 per cent of the inhabitants – in 14 municipalities in western and eastern Slavonia.[7] In consequence, in the municipal elections in 1990 the Serb Democratic party gained control of local governments in most Serb-majority municipalities. In June 1990 the Krajina Serb municipalities attempted to form a regional grouping which the Croatian government immediately declared illegal. Instead of the special administrative status and 'cultural autonomy' (including Serb electronic and print media) demanded by the Serb Democratic party, the Croatian government offered the Serbs in Serb-majority municipalities the right to form cultural organisations and to use the Cyrillic alphabet in education and official correspondence as well as having a Serb in one of the posts of deputy speaker of the Croatian Diet. The Serb party leaders deeply mistrusted the motives and intentions of the Croat HDZ leadership because of the latter's partial rehabilitation of the Croat Ustasha state and its state emblems. After the failure of talks between the Serb party leader Dr Rašković and president Tudjman in June 1990, the Croatian government, in a bid to undermine Dr Rašković's position in his constituency, released the secretly taped transcripts of the talks thus breaching the agreement to keep the talks confidential. This led to a complete breakdown in relations between the two parties.

In response to a series of Croatian constitutional changes passed by the Croatian Diet in July 1990, the Serb parties in Croatia called a general

Serb assembly, formed the Serb National Council and passed a Declaration on the Sovereignty and Autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia. In August, four months before a similar Slovenian plebiscite, the newly formed Serb National Council organised a referendum of Serbs – but not of Croats or any other nationalities – in Croatia. According to its organisers, an overwhelming majority of the votes were cast in support of the proposition that the Serbs be granted cultural autonomy in Croatia and that if Croatia left the Yugoslav federation, the Serbs should be granted political autonomy.[8] The Croatian government proclaimed the referendum illegal, accusing Milošević and the Serbian leadership of instigating the referendum and the ensuing insurrection as part of their expansionist plans for a Greater Serbia which was to include parts of Croatia.

In response to the attempts of the Croatian police to gain control of Serb-held towns and police stations, in late August Serbs took over police stations and armouries in several Serb-populated municipalities, erecting barricades and check-points on the roads leading in to them. This was variously described as an insurrection (harking back to Serb insurrections against Ottoman rule) or a 'log revolution' in reference to the logs felled to barricade the roads. In January 1991, the four Serb-controlled areas in Croatia formed the Serb Autonomous Region of Krajina, with its own police force independent of the Croatian government; to this the Croatian government responded by a full mobilisation of police reserves. Alarmed by the Croatian government's response, in early January the Yugoslav state presidency ordered the dissolution of all illegally formed and armed units in Yugoslavia. The Croatian and Slovenian governments at first refused to carry out the order but, faced with continuing threats from the Yugoslav federal army, the Croatian government demobilised a part of its mobilised police force, refusing, however, to hand over any weapons to the army. While the Croatian government continued clandestinely to purchase arms abroad for its armed forces, Milošević's government continued to arm Serb insurgents. At the same time opposition parties from Serbia, including the revived Chetnik movement of Dr Šešelj, began dispatching volunteers to Krajina to be organised into various paramilitary formations.

On 16 March 1991 the Serb National Council declared the 'dis-association' of Krajina region from Croatia and its intention of remaining within Yugoslavia. The Yugoslav state presidency also ordered the Yugoslav federal army to interpose itself between the Serb militias and the Croatian forces. As the Yugoslav army's intervention blocked the Croatian government's attempt to establish its authority by force, the Croatian government saw this, as well as all previous

such interventions, as hostile acts. As skirmishes between the Croat and Serb armed forces continued in mixed-population areas of Krajina and Slavonia, in May 1991 large demonstrations erupted in various Croatian cities against both the Serbs and Yugoslav federal army. Serb properties were destroyed and many Serbs forced to flee to Serbia and Serb-controlled areas; Yugoslav army conscripts also came under attack. The Croat inhabitants who remained in the Serb-controlled areas in spite of the earlier pressures to leave, were at that time also forced to flee from their homes. As the Yugoslav state presidency's efforts at mediation through a joint Croat and Serb commission produced no results, the stage was set for a further escalation of fighting in July and August and the outbreak of war in Croatia in September 1991 (see Chapter 10).

Calling for a boycott of the referendum for the independence of Croatia scheduled for 19 May 1991, the Serbs of Krajina in May unanimously voted, in their own referendum, for the unification of Krajina with Serbia. Although Milošević's government had from 1990 on aided the Serb authorities in Krajina in various ways, the Serbian parliament (which he controlled) never officially accepted the unification of Krajina with Serbia. Unlike the Croatian and Slovenian secessions, this act of Serb secession from Croatia, which mirrored the former,[9] has never been internationally recognised. A similar secession of Kosovo Albanians from Serbia, who, on 30 September 1991, in a clandestine referendum declared for a sovereign and independent state of Kosovo, also failed to gain international recognition. The principal reasons for the absence of recognition in these two cases was the view, adopted by the European Community and other Western countries (see Chapter 10), that only the former Yugoslav republics have the right of self-determination and not any single national group within Yugoslavia. This, of course, did not stop the leaders of these national groups from pursuing their secessionist claims. In both cases the leaders' ability to mobilise their respective electorates for secession was greatly facilitated by the refusal of the governments of Serbia and of Croatia to grant their demands for cultural and political autonomy and by the two governments' attempts to establish their authority through the use of force.

THE FRAGMENTATION OF THE YUGOSLAV FEDERAL ARMY

From 1971 the Croat and Slovene dissident nationalists regarded the existence of a unified armed force in Yugoslavia, the Yugoslav People's Army, as the principal obstacle to the achievement of their goals – the

sovereignty of their nations within or without a Yugoslav confederation. In contrast, some Serb nationalists regarded the army as the ultimate safeguard of Serb interests within Yugoslavia. According to the Yugoslav Communist party doctrine, the army, continuing the tradition of the communist-led Partisans, was an all-Yugoslav institution, defending the integrity of the country and the interests of all its nations. In the late 1980s, however, the rising nationalism among Slovene, Croat and Kosovo Albanian youth – as well as deteriorating pay and conditions of army officers – led to a virtual halt in the recruitment of cadet officers from these national groups. In keeping with its all-Yugoslav doctrine, the Yugoslav military authorities, in the words of one Western expert, 'bent its rules to try to maintain ethnic proportionality'[10] but to no effect. From 1986 the youth weekly *Mladina* in Slovenia systematically targeted the Yugoslav federal army as a corrupt and foreign body; the latter's arrest and trial of four Slovenes led to the formation of a mass movement demanding sovereignty for Slovenia (see Chapter 8). By 1989 the Yugoslav federal army was viewed in Slovenian official as well as youth media as a foreign – primarily Serb – force imposing a foreign, communist system on Slovenia. As an increasing number of young Slovenes had already refused to serve in the Yugoslav army, in March 1991 the Slovenian parliament proclaimed a moratorium on the dispatch of Slovene conscripts and in April it withdrew all Slovene conscripts from the Yugoslav army. In early 1990 for similar reasons the number of Croat and Muslim conscripts in the Yugoslav army significantly declined as well.

With the effective dissolution of the Yugoslav Communist party in January 1990, the army officer corps, left without the political and ideological guidance it had before, had to look for the legitimation and definition of their task elsewhere. In late 1990 the largest number of the army's High Command officers were Croats (38 per cent), followed by Serbs and Montenegrins (33 per cent), Slovenes (8.3 per cent), Macedonians (8.3 per cent) and Muslims (4.1 per cent).[11] Of the nine highest commanding officers of the Yugoslav federal army, four were Croats, there were two Slovenes, one Serb, one Macedonian and one – the Minister for Defence Veljko Kadijević – came from a mixed Croato-Serb marriage.[12] With the exception of a few who defected to the Slovenian and Croatian government forces (see below), most of the High Command officers remained aloof from politics and committed to a single Yugoslavia in one form or another. As only a few of them offered political support to Milošević,[13] they were ultimately dismissed from their posts either during the Croato-Serb war in 1991 or in the final purge of the Yugoslav federal army by Milošević in April 1992. The figures for offi-

cers of all ranks in the army (excluding the navy – which had a higher proportion of Croats – and air force) were Serbs (42.63 per cent of the officer corps; 36.5 per cent of the total population), followed by Croats (14.21 per cent; 19.7 per cent of the total population), self-declared Yugoslavs (10 per cent; 3 per cent of the total population), Montenegrins (9.45 per cent; 2.3 per cent of the total population), Slovenes (6.4 per cent; 7.5 per cent of the total population), Macedonians (6.3 per cent; 5.8 per cent of the total population), Muslims (5.6 per cent; 10 per cent of the total population), Albanians (3.15 per cent; 9.3 of the total population).[14] The most obvious disproportion, compared to the their percentage of the total population, was among Montenegrins and self-declared Yugoslavs (a larger number of officers than in the total population) and among Albanians, Muslims and Croats (a smaller number of officers than in the total population).

Already in late 1989 a number of Croat and Slovene officers found a new allegiance in the nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia. Thus the retired Yugoslav general Croat Martin Špegelj, the first HDZ minister of defence, organised separate Croatian armed forces. Following the public scandal in January 1991 in which he was exposed as the initiator of the Croatian purchase of arms in Hungary and elsewhere, the Yugoslav army authorities issued a warrant for his arrest which he, with the help of the Croatian government security service, successfully avoided. In August–September 1991, prior to the outbreak of the war in Croatia, several thousand Croat officers, including the commander-in-chief of the Yugoslav air force general Anton Tus and vice-admiral Pavle Grubišić, defected to the Croatian government forces.[15] Many of those who changed sides at that time probably did so not out of a newly found Croat patriotism but because they could foresee that the Yugoslav federal army, on the eve of the war against the Croatian government, would probably dismiss them in any case. According to Slovene sources, a significant number of Slovene officers in the Yugoslav federal army worked for the Slovenian defence ministry even before the war broke out in Slovenia in June 1991. Many middle-ranking and non-commissioned Serb officers, who came from Bosnian Serb or Krajina Serb background, had aided the Bosnian Serb Democratic party as well as Krajina Serb authorities with arms, supplies and advice long before the outbreak of hostilities in these regions. At the outbreak of the hostilities several thousand proceeded to join the Serb military formed in Croatian Krajina and in Bosnia–Hercegovina. For example, colonel Ratko Mladić, as a commanding officer of the Knin garrison in 1991, helped the Krajina Serb authorities with arms and logistic sup-

port to organise their armed resistance against the Croatian government. Promoted to a major-general after the Croato-Serb war in 1991, he chose to remain in his native Bosnia and in May 1992 became the head of the High Command of the Bosnian Serb military.

In November 1990 a group of retired Serb and Croat generals together with Serb, Muslim, Macedonian and Croat communist politicians of pro-Yugoslav orientation resurrected the Yugoslav Communist party under the name of League of Communists – Movement for Yugoslavia. In spite of the support that the party got from Milošević (through his wife, Mirjana Marković, one of its founders) and a few serving generals, the majority of the High Command generals and the officers corps stood aloof from this or any other political party. However, the secession of Slovenia and Croatia as well as the outbreak of hostilities in Serb-populated regions of Croatia presented a severe test of allegiance for the politically uncommitted self-declared Yugoslav, Serb and Montenegrin officers. The Croatian and Slovenian secessions threatened to destroy their homeland, Yugoslavia, and the Croatian government's use of armed force to subdue the Serbs of Krajina were for many Serbs and Montenegrins – in particular the Serbs from outside Serbia proper – a re-enactment of the Croatian Ustashe policy of extermination of Serbs which was deeply embedded in their families' memories. While many of the officers had earlier shown no sympathy for Milošević's Serb nationalist rhetoric and mass mobilisation and rallies, in the period from 1990 to 1991 he was the only politician in Yugoslavia whose programme of preservation of Yugoslavia had any appeal to them. This probably explains why the Belgrade garrison command in March 1991, on Milošević's request, sent out tanks and soldiers into the streets of Belgrade, after the violent opposition demonstrations erupted against his government. In a way, Milošević's government won the allegiance of these officers by default.

In contrast, many pro-Yugoslav army officers viewed the refusal of the federal prime minister, Ante Marković, and his government to order any action against the Croatian and Slovenian governments' creation of their own armed forces and their clandestine import of arms, as a betrayal of Yugoslavia. In addition, many officers viewed his policy of severe budget cuts on army expenditure as part of the Slovene and Croat conspiracy to emasculate the capacity of the Yugoslav federal army to protect Yugoslavia.[16] While still accepting the authority of the Yugoslav federal bodies at the time of Slovenia's and Croatia's declarations of independence in June 1991, the Yugoslav army's High Command no longer had any trust in Marković's

government and in the Croatian and Slovenian members of the Yugoslav state presidency.[17]

In June 1991 the High Command carried out the orders of the minister for defence and Marković's government to secure the border posts in Slovenia, as well as orders of the Yugoslav state presidency, in July 1991, to evacuate from Slovenia. However, as the Croat armed forces started to blockade and attack the Yugoslav federal army units in Croatia, Ante Marković demanded the resignation of his defence minister, general Kadijević, and his deputy, the Slovene admiral Brovet, charging them with conducting secret talks with their Soviet counterparts, in March 1991, in Moscow. By refusing to resign and accusing the prime minister of treason in September 1991, the High Command officers finally repudiated the authority of Marković and his federal government.[18] The High Command, however, continued to accept the authority of the Yugoslav state presidency, which was, in October 1991, reduced to four members, the representatives of Serbia, Montenegro, Vojvodina and Kosovo, all of whom were controlled by Milošević. It was only at this point that the Yugoslav federal army came under Milošević's direct control. At that point it still retained a good number of pro-Yugoslav officers who were not of Serb origin and a significant number of conscripts of Hungarian, Macedonian, Albanian and Bosnian Muslim origin.

In retrospect, it is quite surprising for how long the Yugoslav federal army recognised the authority of the constitutional federal bodies – Marković's government and the Yugoslav state presidency – in the face of both the progressive loss of Yugoslav federal authority in all parts of Yugoslavia and severe disagreements between the High Command and the prime minister and members of the Yugoslav state presidency.

10 Wars for Independence: Slovenia and Croatia 1991–95

SLOVENIA

National Liberation through a Public Relations Campaign

National independence, within the framework of Balkan national ideologies, should be achieved through a struggle for national liberation from a foreign occupier. Not surprisingly, the leaders of the nationalist parties, which came to power in Slovenia and in Croatia in mid-1990, started to plan for a military action against the Yugoslav federal

Map 3 Yugoslavia in 1991
Source: J. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 270, London, 1992.



army – which they regarded as an occupier – well in advance of their co-ordinated proclamations of independence in June 1991. Yet the two governments failed to co-ordinate their military preparations or actions, possibly because the Croatian government, engaged in its fruitless attempts to take over areas under Croatian Serb control, was initially at pains to avoid or to minimise the intervention of the Yugoslav federal army in the rest of Croatia. In contrast to the Croatian government, the Slovenian government planned a military confrontation with the Yugoslav federal army immediately following its proclamation of independence.[1] Through its intelligence network in the Yugoslav army's headquarters, the Slovenian government learned of the army's plans to counter the Slovenian take-over of Yugoslav federal institutions in Slovenia. The Yugoslav army high command viewed Slovenia's planned secession as part of a foreign, primarily German, plot to partition federal Yugoslavia and thus to weaken its armed forces; in its view, the Yugoslav army's constitutional duty was to preserve the territorial integrity of the country and thus to prevent, by force, any such partition.

The benefits of military confrontation for the Slovenian government were to be both symbolic and practical: the struggle against the previously rather invisible occupier would unite the Slovenian nation in its determination to achieve full independence from the Yugoslav state and, more importantly, would lead to a European intervention and an international recognition of independence. The refusal of the US and the EC to recognize any unilateral secession of Yugoslav republics was at the time seen as the principal obstacle to the international recognition of Slovenia's independence.[2] But the Slovenian government, through its contacts in Austria, Germany and other European countries, was assured that the EC would not refuse to intervene and mediate in a military conflict that would endanger peace in Europe.[3] Any such mediation was bound to recognize the Slovenian government as an independent party to the conflict and thus break the EC resistance to its international recognition. The Slovenian campaign for independence, including the military confrontation, was thus conceived as a co-ordinated public relations campaign aimed at the domestic patriotic audience, European governments and their media-exposed electorates as well as the allegedly hostile forces – the officers and conscripts of the Yugoslav federal army.

While a few influential Slovenian politicians disapproved of the plans for a military action, preferring a negotiated path to independence, they suspended their opposition to the plans partly as they were

assured, by the Slovenian defence ministry, of the success of the planned military operations. The Slovenian defence ministry had indeed good reason to be confident of success: the Yugoslav federal army, unaware of the Slovenian forces' deployment and clandestinely imported weaponry, was not planning for a military campaign but rather for a show of force. They had no premonition of the role that the military operations were to play in the public relations campaign of the Slovenian government.

The initial Slovenian operations – the take over of the international border crossings in Slovenia and the erection of a border crossing with the federal republic of Croatia – were carried out on 25 June, the day of the proclamation of independence, without major opposition. Aided by their intelligence from the Yugoslav federal army's headquarters, the next day the Slovenian forces were initially able to halt almost all of the Yugoslav army's lightly armed units which moved out of their barracks in Slovenia to regain control over these border crossings; taken by surprise at the Slovenian resistance, the Yugoslav federal army ordered a second wave of tanks under the cover of helicopter gunships, to break through the Slovenian barricades and to take over the international and inter-republic border crossings.

The Yugoslav army's tanks reached their targets, in spite of the spirited opposition of some Slovenian units, and the border crossings were retaken by the Yugoslav federal military and internal affairs officials. However, this military success turned out to be a total public relations debacle. In the operation, several Yugoslav helicopters were shot down and a number of tanks set on fire; this provided the television footage needed to reassure the Slovenian audience of the superiority of its armed forces over a much better equipped enemy.

More importantly, the Yugoslav army's tanks – both firing and on fire – and strafing airplanes became symbols of a brutal military invasion and a gallant resistance to it – the first one in Europe since the Soviet invasion in Hungary in 1956. The television images of the alleged invasion presented to the audiences abroad followed a set pattern:

- destruction of civilian property by brutal, anonymous, 'non-European' forces in Soviet-type tanks
- civilian dead and injured, victims of the same brutal force
- civilians terrorised by air strikes and bombardment
- gallant young resisters, in immaculate uniforms, speaking to foreign journalists in English or German and thus appearing as genuine Europeans.

A civilised, peaceful and a European country was thus, in the television images broadcast to the world, invaded by a mechanised and brutal force, coming to impose a foreign and communist rule. The large contingent of foreign journalists, invited by the Slovenian government to witness the invasion was, during their regular press briefings, warned of the dire danger peaceful civilians faced from this brutal force. The warnings of civilian massacres – which never took place – were duly punctuated by regular air-raid warnings in the capital announcing the air raids which also never came (and which the Slovenian authorities knew were not coming).

Meanwhile, the brutal invader of the television images was surrounded and isolated in its barracks and in deployed positions and at times exposed, through the megaphones, to attractive offers to quit the battle (which for most Yugoslav conscripts had not started as yet) and to surrender. Thousands of Yugoslav federal army soldiers surrendered, often on their own initiative, without ever firing a shot. At least one Yugoslav officer blew up himself and an arms depot rather than surrender. But most of the 30 000 strong Yugoslav federal army stationed in Slovenia remained in their barracks, awaiting orders and firing at the surrounding Slovenian forces only when fired upon.[4]

Faced with the stalemate and the wave of international protests against the alleged invasion, the Yugoslav federal prime minister, Ante Marković, and the Yugoslav presidency, halted further military action and started negotiations with the Slovenian government for a ceasefire. However, responding to continuous attacks by the Slovenian units, the Yugoslav army launched a combined air and armour operation against Slovenian units blocking its garrisons.[5] As the Slovenian units gave way under the combined air and armoured assault, a further series of ceasefires was broken until the EC-negotiated ceasefire took effect on 7 July 1991.

The EC's Quick Intervention

The truce negotiated in early July 1991 by the EC troika – the foreign affairs ministers of the Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy – marked the highest point of foreign intervention in the Slovenian war as well as the war's end. Direct European intervention in the conflict began in May/June 1991 with the clandestine delivery of several thousand infantry weapons as well as communications equipment to the Slovenian defence forces from a still unnamed European country.[6]

The Slovenian government, immediately upon the outbreak of the conflict, asked the EC and the Council for Security and Coopera-

tion in Europe (CSCE) to intervene.[7] Its request was restricted to diplomatic intervention and mediation and did not include military assistance. Both organisations promptly obliged: within two days of the outbreak of the conflict the EC sent its troika to negotiate to Belgrade and the CSCE entrusted the EC with its peacekeeping mission in Slovenia.

The first ceasefire negotiated by the troika broke down almost immediately and the troika returned to Tito's former private island of Brioni to negotiate a peace agreement which, in fact, *de facto* recognized Slovenia's independence. The Brioni declaration, endorsed by all six republics and the federal presidency, required the Yugoslav army and federal government to hand over the international border crossings in Slovenia to the Slovenian government and order the army units back to their bases in Slovenia and Croatia. In return, the Slovenian government was to lift the blockade of the army's units, deactivate its defence forces and, together with the Croatian government, proclaim a three-month moratorium on its declaration of independence. The EC, acting on behalf of the CSCE, also sent an observer mission of white-clad and unarmed officials, which was to monitor the ceasefire and the compliance with the military aspects of the agreement.

'Is this what we fought for?' asked many Slovenes and their members of parliament. For them the moratorium and the renewed negotiations among the six republics meant that Slovenia was being forced, by the EC, to remain within Yugoslavia against its will. The Slovenian government successfully argued that three months is not a long time to wait for the long awaited independence. In the final vote, only 11 members of the Slovenian parliament voted against the Brioni declaration and seven abstained.[8]

While refraining from granting Slovenia independence, in agreeing to the Brioni declaration, the Yugoslav federal government in effect gave up its remaining jurisdiction – its control over the international borders and the collection of customs duties – in the republic. As the Yugoslav army had no further function to perform in Slovenia, the Yugoslav state presidency, under the chairmanship of the Croat representative, decided on 18 July, to withdraw unilaterally all army units from the republic. The country the last units left by sea, on 26 October 1991, was already an independent country: the Slovenian government (as well as the Croatian one), after the expiry of the EC-negotiated moratorium on 8 October, had reiterated its initial declaration of independence.

The Outcome: National Liberation with a Little Struggle?


This brief war resulted in the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army from Slovenia and the international recognition of Slovenia's *de facto* independence only weeks after its first declaration of independence. While in retrospect it appears that the Slovenian government could have eventually achieved both objectives without going to war, by demonstrating to the Slovene population the alleged hostility of the Yugoslav federal government and the Serbs, the war unambiguously removed any remaining allegiance to the Yugoslav state[9] and focused national allegiance exclusively on the new Slovenian state. The process of Slovene nation-building appears thus to have been duly completed through a war of national liberation.

But the relatively small number of casualities – estimated at 45 Yugoslav conscripts and 12 Slovenian defence forces soldiers killed – indicates that, in spite of the display of firepower by both sides, neither side was attempting to destroy the opponents' forces and thus to 'liberate' the contested territory. In fact, the Yugoslav federal army contested no territory except the symbolic space of the international border crossings. In this respect, the war appears to have been a feigned war in which both sides went through a series of bellicose gestures, each with a different audience in mind.[10]

However feigned, the war set a model which the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim nationalist parties attempted to emulate in their subsequent wars of national liberation. The principal achievement of the war in Slovenia – independence and the removal of the opposing military forces – appeared to have been a direct result of the EC intervention in the war: by securing the withdrawal of the Yugoslav army to the barracks and the supervision of the ceasefire by the EC troika effectively neutralised the opposing military force. The principal instrument for securing such an effective intervention appeared to be a public relations campaign through which the brutality of the opposing force was displayed. The opposing forces needed to be televised not only as invading a peaceful and civilised country but also as bent on massacring civilians. The Slovenian model for the presentation of the opposing force, containing the four types of images mentioned above, appeared to be the most effective one; the same pattern of representation, but with increasing veracity, is to be found in the wars in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The effectiveness of this model of national liberation warfare assumed the capacity of the international bodies – in the present case

Map 4 Serbs in the population of Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina, by Commune (1981)
Source: L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds* Boulder: Westview Press, 1995.



the EC – to neutralise the opposing military force by peaceful means; this, in turn, assumes the willingness of the opposing military and political leadership – in the present case, the Yugoslav federal army and government – to hand over the contested territory to the new national authorities. This, as we shall see, was lacking in the subsequent, real, wars of national liberation.

CROATIA

Croatia and Serb Krajina: Two Homelands, Two Liberation Wars?

The war in Croatia started with the secession, in early 1991, of the Republic of Serb Krajina from Croatia and ended with the military conquest of these areas by the Croatian army in May and August 1995. However, during this period the combatants and their war aims signific-

antly changed. As a result, one could very broadly speaking, distinguish the following three phases of war: first, the conflict between the Croatian Serb militias and the Croatian government forces over the control of the Serb-held territories (September 1990–September 1991); second, the war between the Yugoslav federal army, the Serb militias and Serbian paramilitary forces, on the one hand, and the Croatian army and its paramilitaries, on the other (September 1991–January 1992); and, third, the attack of the Croatian army on the remaining Serb forces (May/August 1995).

In the first phase, the main aim of the Croatian government was to disarm Serb militias and take control of several towns in the Serb-controlled areas of Slavonia and Krajina; as the clashes escalated, the Yugoslav state presidency ordered the Yugoslav federal army to interpose its units between the combatants in order to stop the fighting (see Chapter 8). Both the Serb and the Croatian media prepared their target audiences for the campaign of violence and armed conflict by regularly running, long before the conflict broke out, stories of World War II atrocities committed by the forces representing the opponents' national group: the Chetniks (or, as the occasion demanded, the Partisans) represented the Serbs and the Ustasha, the Croats. When the conflict broke out, the Croatian media routinely referred to Serb militias as Chetniks and, in the Serb media, 'Ustasha' was the label used for the Croatian forces throughout the conflict. These were hate-labels, branding each national group as perpetrators of gruesome atrocities.[11] But apart from hate – which the media campaigns aimed to create – media reports of violence and of atrocities no doubt instilled fear[12] as well. Both the media campaign and the armed clashes thus contributed to the increasing exodus of Serbs and of Croats from the territory controlled respectively by the Croat and Serb political authorities; each political authority increasingly regarded members of the opponents' nationality as citizens of a hostile state and exposed them to (or, at best, left them unprotected from) abuse and harassment.

The series of armed clashes culminated in an ambush, on 2 May 1991, of a large detachment of Croatian police by local Serb militia and volunteers from Serbia at Borovo Selo in Eastern Slavonia in which 12 Croatian policemen died. In the aftermath, the Croatian government mounted an intensive media campaign, aimed both at the local and international audiences, aiming to demonstrate the brutality of its opponents, by displaying photos of the corpses and alleging torture and mutilation. The clash and the attendant publicity led to the spread of intermittent fighting in eastern Slavonia and to attacks on and

blockades of the Yugoslav federal army (which was not involved in this particular clash). Yet the inability of the Croatian forces to dislodge the Serb militias encouraged the Serb Krajina leaders to conquer further areas, in which the Serbs no longer commanded a majority, primarily to improve the strategic and economic viability of the state they hoped to establish.[13] By interposing its units between the Serb militias and the Croatian police, after the former had taken over a new area or town, the Yugoslav federal army was in fact aiding the Serb militias' conquest of new territory. The Croatian government thus came to regard the Yugoslav federal army – and increasingly the Yugoslav state presidency – as undisguised supporters of the Krajina Serb militias.

While the negotiations with the Yugoslav state presidency succeeded in ending the Croatian blockades of the Yugoslav army bases in May 1991, the attempts of the Yugoslav presidency to establish and monitor a ceasefire between the Croat and Serb forces ended in July, with the walk-out of the Croatian representative (and president of the presidency) in protest at the appointment of a Serb chairman to the ceasefire monitoring commission. With the repudiation of the Yugoslav state presidency mediation in this conflict, the Croatian government speeded up the mobilisation of the Croat National Guard, the future Croatian army and, at the same time, ostensibly offered the Serbs in Croatia the 'political and territorial autonomy' which until then it had consistently refused even to discuss.

The second phase of the conflict started on 22 August 1991, with the Croatian president's ultimatum to the Yugoslav state presidency to halt the federal army's aid to the Serb militias and to disarm them; failing to do so, he claimed, would make the federal army an army of occupation.[14] As expected, the Yugoslav state presidency was rather evenly divided on its response and, accordingly, a few days later the Croatian prime minister called for general mobilisation in the anticipation of a 'war of liberation'.[15] On 14 September 1991 over one hundred Yugoslav army barracks throughout Croatia were blockaded by the Croatian forces. While the Croatian governments' strategy emulated, perhaps belatedly, the Slovenian government's blockade of the Yugoslav army bases in June 1991, the Croatian forces were not that well prepared for the operation; their training and deployment was inferior to that of the Slovenian forces and, more importantly, unlike the Slovenian defence ministry, the Croatian leaders had no intelligence of the Yugoslav army's planning and intentions.

In contrast to the Slovenian operation which was restricted to the securing of the international border crossing, the Yugoslav army high

command initially planned to contest almost all of Croatia in order to sever its communications with the outside world and to defeat its armed forces.[16] And, unlike its Slovenian operation, its campaign in Croatia was, initially, not authorised by the Yugoslav federal government and the state presidency: the president of the Yugoslav state presidency and the federal prime minister, both Croats, opposed the campaign but to no avail. The army's planned campaign in Croatia, however, required a massive call-up of reservists in Serbia and Montenegro and the activation of reserve officer personnel. Faced with a widespread resistance to this call-up, desertion of its reservists,[17] its own poor command and communications, and unexpectedly stiff resistance from the Croatian forces, the Yugoslav army high command quickly abandoned its initial plans and restricted its operations to the following areas:

- a concentrated assault on western and eastern Slavonia and Baranja, including the cities of Vukovar and Osjek (with substantial Serb populations);
- an assault on the seaside town of Dubrovnik and its hinterland;
- a naval blockade of the largest ports in Croatia and the extrication of the Yugoslav federal navy's equipment from those ports;
- the withdrawal of personnel and heavy weapons from its garrisons in Croatia, including the central garrison in Zagreb.

Apart from its drive to enlarge the territories already controlled by Serb militias, the Yugoslav federal army was also attempting to secure Serbia's and Montengro's communication links. The city of Vukovar, for example, (with a mixed Serb and Croat population of almost equal proportions), controls access to the Danube and the mountainous hinterland of the Adriatic city of Dubrovnik (with a very small Serb population) controls the communication links to the main Yugoslav navy base at Kotor in Montenegro.

While not deployed or armed to counter an attack of such a magnitude, the Croatian army, police units, various volunteer units as well as foreign mercenaries (probably over 120 000 in number)[18] were able to slow down and stop the Yugoslav army's initial advance. In particular, the volunteer units (such as those of the ultra-right wing Croatian Defence League – HOS) provided the backbone of resistance to the Yugoslav army's onslaught on Vukovar and elsewhere. However, the Croatian forces were not able to stop the much better equipped and trained army from achieving most of its objectives: the army occupied

the hinterland of Dubrovnik almost unopposed and, after a three-month siege and artillery bombardment, in November 1991, it took the ruins of Vukovar as well; most of the army's personnel and equipment was retrieved from the blockaded garrisons and port facilities. While the fighting continued into November 1991, by the end of October the frontline – roughly following the borders of Serb-settled areas of Krajina, Lika, Banija, Kordun and East and West Slavonia – had been stabilised.

In these areas the Croatian forces faced the Serb militias who were defending their own homes and families from the Croat forces who, they believed, were intent, like the Ustasha of the past, on their annihilation. For those Serb conscripts and volunteers their primary homeland were the regions in which they grew up. In a wider sense, they regarded Yugoslavia and not Croatia as their homeland; and, as non-Serb parts of Yugoslavia were seceding from it, Yugoslavia came to mean simply the Serb-populated lands of former Yugoslavia. In defending their primary homeland, many Krajina Serbs believed they were also defending their wider homeland of the Serb lands of former Yugoslavia.

Outside the Serb-controlled areas, the Yugoslav federal army was confronting the Croat conscripts and volunteers who equally firmly believed that they were defending their own homes and families from a brutal, foreign army. However, the homeland they were defending was Croatia, as home for all Croats, including possibly, the Croatian patriots of Orthodox faith or Serb origin. According to the generally accepted, official Croatian national ideology, the Serbs who do not accept Croatia as their homeland simply have no place in Croatia. The insurgent Serbs were thus regarded as instruments of the enemy – of the Belgrade government intent on subjugating Croatia and the Croats to its rule. Each of the two views presented the conflict as a defence of one's homeland from foreign rule and one's right to live in the homeland of one's own; the conceptions of the homeland were, however, mutually exclusive.

For the Yugoslav federal army's conscripts and officers – the Serbians from Serbia as well as other nationalities – this was not a contest over a territory which they could call their homeland in the same sense; they were not defending their homes or the regions in which they grew up. The old Partisan vision of Yugoslavia as a common homeland to all of its nations, which, until 1991, presented the Yugoslav federal army as the defender of Yugoslavia, could provide no justification for the army's role in this war. The Yugoslav army's high command belatedly

realised this and removed, in the later stages of the war, the Partisan army red star insignia and replaced it with a Yugoslav tricolour flag. The removal of the red star symbolised the end of the Partisan pan-Yugoslav vision as the national liberation ideology of the South Slavs. In fact, many members of the Yugoslav army had no clear ideological or patriotic conception of their role in Croatia: many did not see the conflict as a defence of the Serb lands of former Yugoslavia. This could explain, at least in part, the widespread desertion and relatively low morale in many of its units deployed in Croatia.

The stand-off reached in November 1991 was probably, at least to some extent, due to the problems of morale on both sides. Because of the resistance to the call-up and the low morale of its conscript units, the Yugoslav army did not have sufficient manpower to engage the Croatian forces outside the Serb-settled areas. The Croatian volunteers and conscripts, while committed to the defence of their homes and homeland, were in 1991 not (as yet) a force capable of engaging the Serb defenders of their homes in their homeland, backed by the Yugoslav army and its heavy weaponry. Realising that it cannot, for the time being, conquer these areas, the Croatian government moved to consolidate its gains and to remove, like the Slovenian government, the remnants of the Yugoslav federal army from Croatia. Failing to secure this through the EC, the Croatian government accepted the UN-negotiated plan for the cessation of hostilities (see below). The Yugoslav army's high command, having extricated its personnel from the Croat-controlled areas and secured the borders of the Republic of Serb Krajina, could declare its objectives achieved; this would allow it to withdraw its conscript units while leaving some of its weaponry as well its officers in command of the Serb Krajina militias.

In contrast to the war in Slovenia, the second phase of the war in Croatia resulted in the death of more than 10 000 Croatian service personnel and civilians,[19] in the injury of many more and in the large-scale destruction of towns and villages. Many regions were cleared of their Serb or their Croat inhabitants (as well as of their minorities such as the Ukrainians) making hundreds of thousands of people refugees. Yet, in spite of failing to conquer the Serb-controlled areas, the Croatian government could safely proclaim itself a victor in what it called 'The Homeland War'. The war, in its second phase, ended the threat of the Yugoslav federal army to the Croatian government (as it was replaced by the UN forces in the Serb Krajina) and contributed, mainly as the focus of a public relations campaign, to the gaining of international recognition for Croatia's independence. As in the Slovenian case, in ret-

rospect it appears that both objectives could have been eventually achieved without going to war with the Yugoslav federal army. But, as in Slovenia, the war shifted the focus of Croat national allegiance exclusively to the Croatian state: the war appears to have demonstrated what the Croatian president, Dr Tudjman, had argued in his dissident days (see Chapter 7), that only the Croatian state and its armed forces could guarantee peace and freedom to the Croats faced with an enemy – the Serbs – within as well as outside Croatia.

While the unpopularity of this war in Serbia eroded electoral support for Milošević's government, it enabled him to sideline and dismiss many Yugoslav army officers, of any nationality, who opposed the army's engagement in Croatia. The war in Croatia thus helped to transform the Yugoslav army, originally a multinational force, into a Serbian force increasingly under the control of Milošević's government (see Chapter 9).

The Urge to Intervene: the Media, the EC and the UN

The assault of the Yugoslav federal army on Croatian forces in September 1991, enabled the Croatian government to counter it using the Slovenian model, by a media campaign in which the television images of brutal destruction of homes and of indiscriminate bombardment of civilians became the dominant media representation of the war in the Western media. In contrast to the Slovenian campaign, where the actual destruction of urban and rural settings was minimal, the three months of large-scale fighting in Croatia provided the television viewers with real-life images of large-scale destruction as well. As the Croatian government focused its media campaign on the Yugoslav army's shelling of Dubrovnik, a medieval city and popular tourist destination, the Croatian forces used the medieval city ramparts as gun and sharpshooter's positions to draw fire from the Yugoslav army's artillery on the surrounding hills.[20] This provided foreign media crews with close-up pictures of shelling, and, aided by a flurry of highly publicised visits of celebrities and politicians, kept the European and the US media attention on the alleged destruction of a well-known cultural icon; fortunately Dubrovnik suffered relatively little damage.[21] In addition to the selected pictures of destruction, the image of atrocities – committed, allegedly, by the Serb forces – against the civilians came to be a regular part of the media presentation of the war.

With the help of the international public relations firm Rudder Finn,[22] the Croatian government succeeded in presenting Croatia as a

victim of aggression, targeting its peaceful inhabitants and its centuries-old cultural heritage. Once this image came to dominate the media presentation of conflict, the Croat forces – once again presented as gallant defenders – and their conduct of war were exempt from Western media scrutiny,[23] in spite of the attempts of the Serbian government and the Serbian Orthodox church to present evidence – at times in the form of glossy brochures – of the destruction of Serb cultural monuments, churches and villages as well as of atrocities committed by the Croat forces. More importantly, the dominant media image made international – primarily the EC – intervention on the side of the alleged victim a moral imperative, and provided both a motive and a justification for the EC intervention, first as a mediator in the conflict and then as a supporter of the victim country.

As in Slovenia, the EC proceeded to negotiate ceasefires between the combatants and to send its white-clad unarmed monitors to monitor them.[24] As the ceasefires were repeatedly broken, the EC member states could not agree on any alternative measures – such as an EC or Western European Association (WEA) military intervention or an immediate recognition of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence (as proposed by the German government). After the failure of the coup in Moscow against Gorbachev, on 27 August 1991, the EC foreign ministers issued a declaration on Yugoslavia, announcing the convening of a Peace Conference on Yugoslavia whose aim would be an over-all political settlement in the country. In addition to this, the EC ministers issued an ultimatum to the Serb forces and the Yugoslav army demanding their observance of the latest ceasefire and threatening an 'international action' (a code word for military intervention) against them, unless they comply. The declaration inaugurated the model of international conflict management in former Yugoslavia in which an international mediator threatens one or, more rarely, all parties to the conflict with military action unless it (or they) cease military action, while at the same time it invites all sides, without any particular threat or incentive, to accept what it deems a compromise solution.

The Peace Conference opened on 7 September 1991 at The Hague, chaired by the former British foreign secretary Lord Carrington, at first aimed at a constitutional reconstruction of the Yugoslav federation into a confederation or alliance of states. Accordingly, the EC mediators offered the negotiating parties – the Yugoslav state presidency, the presidents of the six republics and the Yugoslav federal government – a series of proposals on the 'General Settlement of the Yugoslav crisis'. Their first proposal resembled the Slovenian and Croatian govern-

ments' 'Model for a Confederation' (of October 1990) while the last one resembled the last Yugoslav proposal, the compromise Izetbegović-Gligorov asymmetric confederation plan (of June 1991) (see Chapter 9).

Unlike the previous Yugoslav plans, the EC proposals envisaged a special status to various national minorities in the areas in which they constitute a majority; this would include a separate legislature and judiciary and the right to display separate national emblems as well as international monitoring of these provisions. The special status provisions were an attempt to accommodate the demands of the Serb leaders in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina as well as of the Albanian leaders in Kosovo for independence from their respective republics.[25] But, since the breakdown of the negotiations among the Yugoslav leaders in June 1991, Slovenia had achieved *de facto* independence while the Serb militias had established exclusive control over the Serb-majority areas in Croatia. The EC proposals, however accommodating, required of these two parties to abandon their much-cherished gains and of the governments of Serbia and Croatia to give up their exclusive control over their minority areas and allow international monitoring. The EC constitutional proposals demanded of these parties, in fact, to abandon their exclusive control of territory which they claimed in order to avoid further violent conflict. But as all the parties (except the Kosovo Albanian leaders at the time, see Chapter 12) either used force, or were ready to use it, to attain exclusive control over the contested areas, the avoidance of further violent conflict, at that stage, was not for them a sufficient incentive or reason to abandon their territorial claims or gains.

Faced with the absence of agreement on the above proposals for a reconstruction of the Yugoslav state (as well as with the continued fighting in Croatia), the EC foreign ministers decided to deconstruct Yugoslavia into independent states. For this there was no need for any agreement from the negotiating parties; legal opinions of the Arbitration Commission of the Conference on Yugoslavia established by the EC declaration of 27 August under the chairmanship of the French jurist Robert Badinter,[26] appeared quite sufficient for the purpose. On 29 November 1991 the Commission in its opinion no. 1 conveniently proclaimed Yugoslavia to be 'in the process of dissolution' (a term previously unknown in legal literature) as of 8 October, the date on which Slovenia and Croatia reiterated their declarations of independence. In opinions no. 2 and no. 3, the Commission proclaimed the internal borders – the borders of the six federal units – international (state) borders on the basis of the principle of the territorial *status quo* and thus inviol-

able. In support of this, the Commission referred to the principle of *uti possedetis juris* (until then used to settle disputes over the borders of former European colonies in America and Africa) as a universal principle which overrides any principle of national self-determination: 'self determination must not involve changes to the existing frontiers at the time of independence (*uti possedetis juris*)'.[27] But the border dispute principle of *uti possedetis juris* could not easily fit the newly invented legal category of dissolving states: if the state could be in the process of dissolution, without any mutual agreement that this is so, why couldn't its internal borders equally 'dissolve' or be changed without a mutual agreement?[28]

The Commission's opinions were, however, implemented with unprecedented alacrity: all Yugoslav republics were, on 17 December, invited to submit by 23 December, requests for recognition to be evaluated by the commision on the basis of the EC guidelines on the recognition of the new states in Eastern Europe (issued on 17 December as well). Out of the four applicants, Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina, Macedonia and Slovenia,[29] the Arbitration Commission found that only Slovenia and Macedonia satisfy the EC guidelines. The Commission held that 'the expression of the will of the people of Bosnia and Herzegovina to constitute the SRBIH as a sovereign and independent state cannot be held to have been fully established'[30] and that Croatia failed to grant special status to minority groups (the Serbs) as required by the earlier EC draft proposals. But, contrary to these opinions of its Arbitration Commission, the EC ministerial meeting on 15 January 1992 recognized the independence of both Slovenia and Croatia and declined to recognize the independence of Macedonia, because the Greek government objected to the use of the name of Macedonia and to its flag.

The shift toward the selective recognition of independence, resulting primarily from the German government's pressure,[31] also reflected the growing realisation of the EC's impotence in the conflict in Yugoslavia. Having arranged 14 ceasefires, all of which broke down, having issued several ultimata, none of which were carried out, and having imposed economic sanctions on the whole of Yugoslavia, with no effect on the continuing fighting, the EC gave up its attempts to reconstruct Yugoslavia and turned over its peacemaking role in Croatia to the UN. Instead, it assumed a new role – the role of the grantor of independence to new states – which incurred little, if any, cost to its member states.

In its new role, the EC legitimised the nationalist territorial claims of the dominant national groups and their political leaders in each Yugo-

slav republic and denied, to all other non-dominant groups, the right to choose a state in which they wanted to live.[32] The EC also ignored the opposition to this carve-up from militant nationalist movements of the non-dominant groups – such as those of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and of the Albanians in Kosovo – and failed to provide military assistance or aid to the governments it recognized, necessary to suppress their opposition. In this way, the EC ensured the continuation of the violent conflict in the region for the next decade.

The UN take-over of the EC peacemaking role started in October 1991, when the UN secretary-general appointed the former US secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, as his personal envoy to Yugoslavia. As the Yugoslav state presidency, reduced to four members controlled by Milošević, on 9 November, requested the deployment of the UN peacekeeping troops and the Croatian government agreed to the UN mediation as well, in December 1991 Vance negotiated an implementing accord for the cessation of hostilities. The accord, unlike the previous EC-brokered ceasefires, detailed provisions for preventing possible violations and provided the basis for the deployment of around 14 000 UN military and civilian personnel in four United Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs) in Croatia. The UNPAs were defined as areas 'in which Serbs constitute the majority or substantial minority of the population and in which inter-communal tensions led to armed conflict in the recent past' and were established in eastern Slavonia, western Slavonia, and south and north Krajina.[33]

The UN forces' mandate was, first, to demilitarise the UNPAs, and, second, to keep the peace while protecting human rights of all groups and facilitating the return of displaced persons.[34] The restriction of the UN mandate to peacekeeping was crucial to its success: in view of the military stand-off reached in mid-November, the Croatian government and its counterpart in Belgrade appeared ready to accept a peacekeeping force which did not prejudge the key question of the sovereignty over these areas. In fact, the opposition to the UN peacekeeping plan came from the Serb Krajina leader Babić and his followers who argued that the withdrawal of the Yugoslav federal army from the Republic of Serb Krajina would leave the Serbs living there unprotected against any future Croatian attack. The assurances of the Bosnian Serb leaders that the Yugoslav federal army in the adjacent areas of western Bosnia under their control would protect Serb Krajina as well, failed to convince Babić and his followers. In the end, Milošević[35] overrode Babić's objections and openly asserted his dominance over the Serb Krajina's political leadership. In striving to escape the dominance of the Croat or Bosnian

Muslim nationalist parties in their republics, the Serb political leaders were forced to contend, ultimately to their detriment, with the dominance of their own Serbian leader; as a result of the contest, as we shall see in Chapter 11, the movement for the unification of Serb lands, started in 1988, finally split in 1994.

The withdrawal of the Yugoslav federal army, under the UN plan, from the Serb Krajina removed a major threat to the Croatian government and a symbol of Belgrade dominance while the demilitarisation of the UNPAs would have made the eventual Croatian military conquest of the areas much easier. The UN forces, in spite of the withdrawal of the Yugoslav federal army, did not succeed in completely demilitarising the UNPAs: the Serb militias preserved their military infrustructure and chain of command while their heavy weapons were stored in depots over which the UN often had only nominal control. The UN presence, however, ensured that these militias no longer presented a threat to the Croatian government which, now unchallenged, could start the training and equipping of its much larger armed forces.

The UN peacekeeping plan initially presupposed that a political settlement should be negotiated at the EC-sponsored Hague conference. But as the conference collapsed and the war broke out in Bosnia-Hercegovina, no negotiations took place until 1994. Apart from modest accord in December 1994 on economic matters, a new negotiating group, consisting of the representatives of the EU, the US, Russia and the International Conference on Yugoslavia, in late 1994 also produced a detailed plan for the integration of the Republic of Serb Krajina as a special status area within Croatia. The plan dubbed 'Z-4' envisaged, along the lines of the EC-draft proposals at The Hague conference in 1991, a wide autonomy, including a separate judiciary and legislative organs, as well as international monitoring of its implementation. But, on the presentation of the plan, the Serb Krajina president sought guarantees that the UN forces will remain as a protection force in the UNPAs until any such plan is considered or implemented.

This was, however, out of the question: in March 1995 the UN Security Council, under the pressure of the Croatian government, agreed to change the mandate and the name of the UN forces in Croatia; and the UN forces, reduced in number and under a changed name, remained in the UNPAs only as observers. At the same time, the US vice-president publicly pledged the US support for the Croatian government's bid to integrate the four UNPAs into Croatia. The most explicit US endorsement of the Croatian claims to the Serb-populated regions to date[36] reflected the US administration's earlier choice of the

Croatian government as its principal ally in the Balkans: the latter offered both political co-operation and armed forces which would be instrumental in securing a US-preferred settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina.[37] Thus, in return for the Croatian government's help in the creation, on the US initiative, of the Croat–Muslim federation in Bosnia-Hercegovina in March 1994 (see Chapter 11), the US began supplying equipment and training for the Croatian army; a US–Croatian military co-operation agreement, signed in November 1994, gave the ongoing US military assistance an official sanction.[38] Having secured the US military support, the Croatian government could be quite confident of taking over the UNPAs without the need to reach any political settlement with the Serb Krajina representatives.[39]

A Homeland Destroyed: the End of Serb Krajina

In a 48-hour operation, starting on 1 May 1995, the Croatian army conquered the whole of western Slavonia (UNPA–Sector West). In spite of the concentration of more 15 000 Croatian troops, the Serb defenders (outnumbered three to one) appeared to be caught by surprise and offered only sporadic resistance. The UN forces were brushed aside and an unknown number of Serb civilians killed. The Croatian government had, however, good reason to believe that Milošević, in his efforts to obtain the lifting of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, would refuse any aid to the Krajina Serb forces.[40] In defiance of Milošević's policy, the Krajina Serb leader Babić ordered the launching of several unguided surface-to-surface missiles on Zagreb and his forces shelled several towns in Croatia within the reach of their artillery. His action brought a sharp rebuke from the US government which, however, condemned neither the Croatian army's attack nor the expulsion of almost the whole Serb population of western Slavonia (around 15 000) to Bosnia and Serbia.

In fact, this operation appears to have been a dress rehearsal for a series of much larger operations which the Croatian army launched in August and September across the Krajina region and western Bosnia. Its operations in Bosnia were part of the US plan of pacification of Bosnia-Hercegovina and the imposition of the Contact group plan for the partition of the republic into the Bosnian Muslim/Croat and Serb 'entities' (see Chapter 11). However, in July 1995, the Croatian army had already entered into southwest Bosnia and conquered the Grahovo-Glamoč area, burning the villages and forcing its entire Serb population to flee. Having thus secured a much less defended, southwest approach to Krajina, it was ready to start its final assault on the region.

The Croatian army's operation 'Storm', planned and executed with the assistance of the US officers,[41] was launched on 4 August 1995, with 150–70 000 troops supported by armour and heavy artillery as well as NATO air strikes aginst Serb communications centres in the Serb Krajina. As in the May operation, the Croatian forces – which greatly outnumbered the defendents – brushed the UN forces aside and completed the operation in four days. In this operation, Milošević's government severely restricted Krajina Serb forces' attempts to retaliate or to resist: a few weeks before the attack it replaced the Krajina Serb top commanders with reliable officers from Serbia and issued sealed orders to unit commanders to withdraw their units and to evacuate the Serb population on prearranged routes to Bosnia and Serbia. As the Krajina Serb leaders had feared since December 1992, Miloševic abandoned their cause of independence from Croatia; in return for his co-operation in the Croatian conquest of Krajina and, later, with the NATO-supported offensive in Bosnia, the US supported the partial lifting of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia in December 1995 (see Chapter 11).

In a few days between 150 and 200 000 Serbs – almost the whole of the Serb population – had retreated from the towns and villages under heavy Croat bombardment, first to Bosnia and then to Serbia. Some of the remaining, mostly elderly Serbs, fell victim to the 'scorched earth' policy which involved looting and burning of the abandoned villages.[42] As a result, the dominant media image of the Serbs as brutal aggressors favoured by the Croatian government, was very briefly replaced on television screens by the image of Serb refugees from Krajina as victims of the Croatian army; the Western media could have hardly failed to record the largest single operation of forced expulsion of civilians in the Yugoslav conflict to date, carried out this time with the US support[43] and without opposition from its European allies.

This four-day operation realized for the first time the nineteenth-century nationalist dream of an independent and pure Croatia. As most of its Serb inhabitants from other areas had already left, Croatia would soon reach a rare level of national purity, paralleled in this part of the world only by Slovenia: by 1998, when the last UNPA area, Eastern Slavonia, was transferred to Croatia,[44] Croatia had 94 per cent of its population declared to be Croat.

International Management of National Liberation Wars: a Model

In contrast to Slovenia, whose war for national liberation was hardly a war, Croatia experienced two concurrent wars for national liberation:

the war for the liberation of Croatia from the Yugoslav federal army and Serb militias and the war for the liberation of the Republic of Krajina from Croatian government rule. For most of its duration, this was a war over the same piece of territory – the Republic of Serb Krajina or the four United Nations Protected Areas. Although presented to its target national groups as wars of national liberation, these were in effect wars for political control over the territory between the two newly established authorities – the HDZ-dominated Croatian government which had never established its authority in the contested area until its conquest in 1995 and the Serb Democratic Party government, formed in this territory for the first time in February 1991.

The removal of the Yugoslav federal army was the crucial issue in all three wars: the national liberation of both Slovenia and Croatia could be achieved only through the removal of this force and, without it, the Serb Krajina could not maintain its independence from Croatia. The Slovenian and the Croatian governments, neither jointly nor separately, had the military capability to remove the Yugoslav federal army by their own forces: for this they were entirely dependent on outside help. Since the Yugoslav federal army was not threatening any state outside Yugoslavia, the Slovenian and Croatian governments could not hope for outside military intervention which would force the Yugoslav army to withdraw from the two republics. Instead they needed to neutralise the army by restricting its movements through international monitoring and, then, by international mediation or pressure, to effect its peaceful withdrawal.

The first operation of neutralisation in Slovenia was smooth and quick: the EC's ceasefire monitors first restricted the movements of the Yugoslav federal army (which had already disengaged from its opponents) and the Yugoslav state presidency then ordered the army to leave Slovenia. In order, however, to carry out this operation, the Slovenian government had to provide a pretext for the EC intervention and mediation. For this purpose the Slovenian defence forces attacked the Yugoslav federal army units and blockaded their barracks in Slovenia while the Slovenian government presented this operation to the international media as an invasion of Slovenia by brutal forces bent on destruction.

The second operation in Croatia was neither smooth nor quick: the Yugoslav federal army, already engaged in supporting the Serb militias in Krajina against the Croatian forces, responded to the Croatian blockade of its garrisons in September 1991 by a large-scale assault on Croatian territory and refused to be neutralised by the EC ceasefire

monitors. Only when a military stand-off was reached in November 1991, was it possible for the UN to negotiate a cessation of hostilities and to neutralise the Yugoslav army, replacing it with its own peacekeeping forces.

However different these two cases are, in both the international management of the conflict exhibited the same pattern: first, an international mediator negotiated a ceasefire or cessation of hostilities which was followed by the deployment of an international monitoring or peacekeeping force; second, the alleged invading force, the Yugoslav federal army, disengaged from its opponents; and, third, it withdrew from the contested territory. This pattern, which demanded the neutralisation and withdrawal of the allegedly invading forces under the cessation of hostilities provisions, could not be applied to the native Serb forces remaining in the Serb Krajina or the four UNPAs. In order to expel these forces, the Croatian government had to use its own armed force. But any prolonged fighting in the region – as in September–November 1991 – could have reactivated the peacemaking role of the UN which, in turn, could have prevented the expulsion of the Serb forces and population. The training, equipping and logistic support of the Croatian army by the US ensured that this operation was carried out with the required speed.

The US intervention thus introduced the following, fourth, element in to the international management of this conflict: military and diplomatic assistance to the chosen combatant so as to enable it to remove its opponents' forces and populations from the contested territory. The above model of international management of national liberation wars – consisting of the above three or four elements – failed in Bosnia-Hercegovina, as the Bosnian Serb forces proved resistant to the pattern of neutralisation successfully used in the first two wars. This led the US government to initiate a NATO military action and an invasion by a proxy ground force, the Croatian army, in support of its chosen combatant – the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government. The US military intervention in Bosnia-Hercegovina, one could argue, introduced a new model of direct intervention in national liberation wars, which was then followed in Kosovo in March–June 1999.

11 Bosnia-Hercegovina: an Unfinished National Liberation?

FROM SECESSION(S) TO WAR

At the outset of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in early April 1992, the territory of the republic was virtually divided among the three national parties – the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and the Croat Democratic Union (HDZ) – which, upon coming to power in 1990, formed the governing coalition (see Chapter 8). In spite of the tenuous coalition maintained by the Croat and Muslim parties, the three parties by that time held fundamentally different constitutional conceptions of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Muslim party advocated a united and centralised Bosnia-Hercegovina, independent from the remaining Yugoslav republics. The Serb party advocated the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina along national lines, while the Croat party supported the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina provided that its exclusive control over the Croat-populated parts, primarily in west Hercegovina, remained uncontested. Each of the three positions was as a result of a mixture of ideological and pragmatic considerations. The Muslim party claimed to represent the autochthonous population, the Muslims (from 1993 on, called 'Bosniacs') who formed a relative majority of voters in Bosnia-Hercegovina; accordingly, it aimed at establishing its political dominance over the whole republic. Its insistence on the republic's independence and its rejection of any territorial division of Bosnia-Hercegovina along national lines reflected this aim. The Serb party aimed primarily at consolidating and expanding its power base in the Serb-populated areas; from October 1991 its primary aim became the creation of its own state, within the boundaries which its leaders deemed viable, which would be linked, in some form of union, with the Republic of Serbia and the Serb Krajina in Croatia. The Croat party, or at least one part of its leadership, had ultimately very similar aims: the detachment of the Croat-populated parts and linking them with the newly independent

Republic of Croatia. But in contrast to the Serb party, the Croat party pursued this aim by supporting the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and by allying itself with the Muslim party.

Neither the Serb nor the Muslim political leaders were ready to modify their constitutional conceptions because each group feared, probably with good reason, that their opponents were aiming at the political subordination of their party or its elimination from political life. The division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, along national lines, would, even on the best terms, leave the resulting Muslim state small, land-locked and surrounded by much stronger neighbouring states which would be in a position to subordinate or eliminate its political leaders. The alternative – favoured up until October 1991 by the Serb party – of Bosnia-Hercegovina remaining in the federal Yugoslavia, would be even worse, given the outright Serb dominance of that federation. As Milošević's removal of the Kosovo Albanian leadership, as well as those of Vojvodina and Montenegro showed, his government would not tolerate any political party or group with a separate constituency or power-base, which could challenge the Serbian government's political dominance.[1] The Muslim party's grip on political power thus appeared to depend on its gaining control over most of Bosnia-Hercegovina and preserving the republic's territorial unity. On the other hand, in an independent Bosnia-Hercegovina in which the Muslim party on its own commanded a relative majority and, in coalition with the Croat party, an absolute majority in the Bosnian assembly, the position of the Serb party would be precarious: the Muslim–Croat coalition would be able to outvote the Serb party (as it did in October 1991) and, if it resisted, eliminate it from political life altogether.

Like the governments of Slovenia and Croatia, in 1991 the Muslim and Croat parties in Bosnia-Hercegovina found that the only way to secure their hold on power was to secede from the Yugoslav federation. Following the Croatian Diet's proclamation of the disunion from Yugoslavia, the Muslim party proposed, in February 1991, the declaration of the sovereignty of Bosnia-Hercegovina. As expected, the Serb party immediately rejected this as well as all later declarations of intent by the Muslim party leaders to secede from Yugoslavia. However, following the reiterated declarations of independence by Slovenia and Croatia, on 10 October 1991 the Muslim and Croat parties tabled in the assembly 'The Memorandum of Sovereignty' and a supporting platform; the memorandum envisaged the withdrawal of the republic's representatives from the Yugoslav federation and stated that Bosnia-Hercegovina will remain in the Yugoslav 'community' only if Serbia

and Croatia were both members of it. Since Croatia had just reiterated its declaration of independence, the Memorandum in effect seceded Bosnia-Hercegovina from the Yugoslav federation. The Serb party tabled a set of rival proposals which envisaged the exercising of the right of national self-determination of the three constituent nations of Bosnia-Hercegovina, leading to the secession of Serb-controlled parts from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serb party's response to the planned secession of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the secesssion of Serb-controlled parts from Bosnia-Hercegovina itself, was in line with its policy of establishing autonomous regions within Bosnia-Hercegovina, on the model of the Serb autonomous regions within Croatia. By the end of September 1991, most of the Serb-controlled parts of the republic – East Hercegovina, Romanija, Northeast Bosnia and Bosanska Krajina – were proclaimed Serb autonomous regions.[2] This was followed by the proclamation of Croat autonomous regions in western Herzegovina and in northern Bosnia; the former region, in July 1992, proclaimed its independence from Bosnia-Hercegovina.

In the debate on the Memorandum of Sovereignty, the Muslim–Croat majority refused to refer the Memorandum to the assembly's Council dealing with the questions of national equality as provided by Amendment LXX[3] of the republic's constitution. As the procedure under this amendment required a two-thirds majority, which the Muslim and Croat parties did not command, a referral to the Council (which had not been constituted as yet) would have not only delayed but probably blocked the Memorandum. At a late stage in the debate, the Serb party leader Karadžić, warning of the prospects of war in Bosnia-Hercegovina, told the Muslim party deputies, 'Do not think that you will not lead Bosnia-Hercegovina into hell, and do not think that you will not perhaps lead the Muslim people into annihilation, because the Muslim people cannot defend themselves if there is a war...'[4] As the Muslim and Croat parties refused to yield on the point of constitutional order, the Serb deputies of the assembly walked out, leaving the Croat and Muslim parties to pass the Memorandum with a simple majority. The Serb party deputies then moved to establish their own Serb national assembly in Bosnia-Hercegovina, which in November 1991 organised a referendum of the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina; according to its organisers, 98 per cent of those voting in the referendum, voted for the Serb people of Bosnia-Hercegovina to remain in Yugoslavia. On the basis of this referendum, the Serb party leaders claimed that the Serbs in Bosnia-Hercegovina were opposed to its secession from Yugoslavia and proceeded to prepare for their counter-secession – that of the Republic of the Serb people in

Bosnia-Hercegovina (later renamed the 'Serb Republic'), consisting of the Serb autonomous regions, from Bosnia-Hercegovina – which was proclaimed on 7 April 1992, on the same day that the EC and US recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence became effective.

The effective secession of Bosnia-Hercegovina from federal Yugoslavia, enacted by the Memorandum and the accompanying documents, was carried out by a coalition of two national parties – the Muslim and the Croat – against the opposition of the third, the Serb party, which then proceeded to secede the areas it controlled from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Croat–Muslim coalition considered the latter secession illegal and was ready to suppress it by force, if possible. Like its counterpart, the Serb Democratic Party in Croatia, the Serb party was ready not only to resist its suppression by force, but also to use its armed forces, supported by the Yugoslav military, to extend its control over the areas where the Serb were not in the majority; its aim was to carve out of Bosnia-Hercegovina a Serb-dominated state. The conflict over Bosnia-Hercegovina's secession from Yugoslavia and the Serb secession from Bosnia-Hercegovina thus set a stage for an armed conflict over the control of territory.

The preparation for the armed conflict started almost a year before it broke out. In September 1991, after the war broke out in Croatia, the three national parties started systematically to arm their militant supporters through gun-running criminal syndicates[5] and the already established clandestine militia organisations. The largest *Muslim* militia, the Patriotic League, organised in mid-1991, merged in February 1992 with a smaller urban-based group the Green Berets; together with territorial defence reservists loyal to the Muslim-dominated government, these two militias formed in 1992 the Bosnian army, the single largest military force in Bosnia-Hercegovina with more than 100 000 personnel. The *Croat* Defence League (HOS), by mid-1991, had already recruited tens of thousands of volunteers from western Hercegovina, many of whom went to Croatia to fight against the Serb militias and the Yugoslav federal army. In 1992 the HOS units were merged into the Croat Defence Council forces (HVO) under the control of the Bosnian Croat party and its patrons in Zagreb; their combined strength was estimated at around 45 000 personnel.[6] The *Serb* party used the existing territorial defence infrastructure to organise its supporters into an armed militia supplied primarily from the Yugoslav federal army depots. In addition, in early 1992, various groups of Serb paramilitary volunteers, including those from Serbia, became active in Bosnia. With the help of the officers from the Yugoslav federal army (which in May

1992 was renamed the Yugoslav military or *Vojska Jugoslavije)*, these militias were, in May 1992, merged into the Bosnian Serb military, with an overall strength of around 60 000 personnel.[7]

Fighting broke out in Bosnia-Hercegovina, immediately after the referendum on independence organised by the Muslim–Croat coalition on 29 February–1 March 1992, which, as expected, the Serb party rejected as unconstitutional. The referendum was proposed by the EC Arbitration Commission in December 1991 as a condition of the EC's recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina (see Chapter 10). According to the organisers, 63.4 per cent of the registered voters voted, with 99.8 of those voting for independence. Following a shooting of Serbs at a wedding party on 1 March in Sarajevo, Serb militias set up barricades throughout the city. This was followed by an outbreak of fighting between the Croat militias and the Yugoslav federal army and Serb militias, in northern Bosnia and in Hercegovina.

In protest against the escalating violence, peace demonstrations were organised in Sarajevo and Mostar, and, probably as a result of these protests, the Serb barricades in Sarajevo were removed and the immediate threat of violence appeared to have subsided. However, as the EC and the US moved to recognize the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina, fighting broke out again in eastern Bosnia, triggering, on 5 April 1992, demonstrations in Sarajevo and other cities, which attracted tens of thousands of demonstrators protesting against violence and demanding peace. As the peace demonstrations in Sarajevo were broken up by unidentified gunmen (who killed 8 and wounded over 50 people),[8] the country was facing a full-scale war. Prior to the outbreak of war, the republic's presidency, overruling the two Serb party representatives, issued, on 3 April 1992, a general call-up of all reservists; and, on 7 April, following the EC and US recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence, all Serb party officeholders withdrew from the republic's government, leaving the government and presidency under the domination of the Muslim party.

NATIONAL LIBERATION OR CONQUEST (OR BOTH): MILITARY OPERATIONS 1992–94

Unlike the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, the wars in Bosnia-Hercegovina were fought over the existence and constitutional set-up of the very state of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Muslim party fought for an independent, centralised and united state of Bosnia within its pre-1991 borders. The

Serb party rejected the Muslim vision of a united Bosnia-Hercegovina (which was shared by some non-Muslims as well), and fought for a Bosnian Serb state carved out of Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Croat party was first allied with the Muslim party in its fight for Bosnia's independence, but in 1993 it attempted to carve out, by force, a Bosnian Croat state as well. In early 1994, however, under the pressure of the Croatian government, it rejoined the alliance and formed a Croat–Muslim federation.

As in the war in Croatia, each party used armed force to expel the opposing military forces as well as hostile populations from the areas which each claimed for itself. In order to mobilise their target populations for such a war, the parties presented their former coalition partners and their supporters as foreign enemies: for the Serb party, the Muslim party and its supporters became Islamic fundamentalists, while the Croat party and its supporters became the Croat Ustasha; both were, in the view of the Serb party propaganda machine, aiming to impose, by force, foreign religions – Islam and Catholicism – on the Serbs and thus to destroy the Serb people and their national identity. The Muslim and Croat parties presented the Serb party and its supporters as Serbian Chetnik terrorists,[9] whose aim was to exterminate all other national groups of Bosnia-Hercegovina or subjugate them to a foreign rule: the rule from Belgrade. Like the wars in Slovenia and Croatia, the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina came to be presented to each national group as a war for its national liberation from foreign rule or oppression. And, as in Slovenia and Croatia, the wars were actually fought for political control over territory. However, the war in Slovenia was fought over the symbolic space of border crossings and in Croatia over a relatively small area, comprising around one fourth of the republic's territory. In Bosnia-Hercegovina, during the three-and-a-half years of warfare, virtually the whole republic came to be contested in one way or another. As in the war in Croatia, the combatants and their war aims in Bosnia-Hercegovina changed during the war. In view of this, one could distinguish the following three phases: (1) the war between the Muslim–Croat coalition and the Serb forces (1992–93); (2) the Muslim–Croat war and Muslim–Muslim war (1993–94); (3) the Muslim/Croat offensives, culminating in the joint NATO/Muslim/Croatian offensive against the Serb forces (March–October 1995).

The initial war aim of the Serb party was to secure a continuous territory within Bosnia-Hercegovina, bordering with Serbia and with Serb Krajina in Croatia. This involved expanding the land links between the west and east Bosnia under its control as well as conquering border areas with Serbia and Serb Krajina. For this purpose, on 5

April 1992, the Serb forces, aided by the volunteer paramilitaries (including the Serb Guard of the notorious criminal Željko Ražnatović-Arkan) from Serbia, started the conquest of the Muslim-majority areas of eastern Bosnia; most of eastern Bosnia, with the exception of several towns, quickly fell to the combined Serb forces. However, they were unable to extend their corridor on the northern borders of Bosnia with Croatia, around the town of Brčko; and under pressure from the Bosnian Croat forces and the Croatian army, the Yugoslav army and Serb militias were forced to retreat from western Hercegovina.

In contrast to the 1991 war in Croatia, the Yugoslav federal army was not directly engaged in support of the Bosnian Serb forces in Bosnia.[10] By April 1992, the former had already transferred a large amount of its heavy weaponry as well as some of its officers to the latter; in consequence there was no need for support from the Yugoslav federal army units, in particular as some of its commanding officers in Bosnia-Hercegovina were opposed to its engagement in the war. At the outbreak of the fighting the Yugoslav federal army in the Bosnian cities stood aside, while the Muslim political leaders attempted to negotiate its peaceful withdrawal or its transformation into a Bosnian army. However, in early May 1992 a group of Muslim party leaders apparently decided[11] to follow the Slovenian and Croatian model and to blockade and attack the Yugoslav army's barracks and withdrawing convoys. Like its counterpart in Croatia in August 1991, the Muslim-dominated presidency of the republic on 20 May 1992, declared the Yugoslav federal army an occupation force. This forced the Yugoslav federal army to withdraw from the Muslim-controlled cities – such as Sarajevo and Tuzla – under attack.

After failing, in April and May, to split the city of Sarajevo into a Serb- and a Muslim-held part, the Serb forces held only its eastern and northern suburbs. However, using the Yugoslav federal army's artillery positioned, before the war, on the mountains around the city, from early April on they started a regular, almost daily bombardment of Sarajevo. While its military rationale (if any) is still unclear, the bombardment terrorised the remaining inhabitants, forcing many to leave the city, and exposed the precariousness of the Muslim party's control over the capital. Under pressure from the UN – concerned with the disastrous consequences of the Serb siege of Sarajevo on the remaining civilian population – the Serb political leaders, against the advice of their military commanders, in late June 1992, handed over Sarajevo airport to the UN forces already stationed in the capital. The UN takeover of

the airport made possible not only a huge airlift of humanitarian aid to the inhabitants of Sarajevo, but also an influx of Western television crews and journalists. A continuous focus of the Western media on the suffering of the city's inhabitants under siege and bombardment provided, as we shall see, the Muslim party with a major asset in the war against the Serb party and its leaders.

While aware of the Serb party's preparations for military action, the Muslim party was caught unprepared for the Serb attack in eastern Bosnia as well as on Sarajevo. In contrast, the Bosnian Croat militias with the support of the Croatian army from Croatia expelled the Serb forces (and the Serb inhabitants) from western Hercegovina and resisted the Serb attacks in northern Bosnia. This left the Croat party in uncontested control of Croat-majority areas in western Hercegovina, which, on 2 July 1992, under the name of the Croat community of Herceg-Bosna, proclaimed its independence from Bosnia-Hercegovina.[12]

Having reorganised its forces in late May 1992, the Muslim-dominated government – aided by the Croatian government under the terms of their military co-operation agreement[13] – expelled the Serb forces from central Bosnia, consolidated its grip on central Bosnian cities, including Sarajevo, and retook several towns in eastern Bosnia. In late June, however, the Serb forces counterattacked, regained some of the territory in central and east Bosnia and, by the autumn of 1992, conquered the whole of western Bosnia, except for the Bihać enclave (Cazinska krajina) which was under the rule of a leading Muslim politician, Fikret Abdić. By late 1992 the Serb party had achieved most of its initial war aims: it established control over a continuous territory (with a narrow corridor around the town of Brčko) from the borders of Serb Krajina in Croatia to the borders of Serbia. As a result of its military operations, the Serb party came to control close to 70 per cent of Bosnia-Hercegovina; at the outbreak of the war, as the majority party in the Serb-populated communes, it had controlled less than 50 per cent. Having secured the high ground, the Serb forces were able to compensate for their inferior numbers by the heavy artillery and armour supplied by the Yugoslav federal army. The frontline between them and the forces of the Muslim–Croat alliance, stabilised in late 1992, did not change significantly until the NATO-supported offensive of the Croatian army and the Muslim forces in September 1995.

The second phase – the Croat–Muslim war – started in January 1993 with the Croat attacks on the Muslim-held territories in central Bosnia – adjacent to the Croat-controlled western Hercegovina – which

were assigned, in the second international (Vance–Owen) peace plan, to the Bosnian Croats (see next section). The fighting between the two forces then spread from south-central Bosnia to the north and west of Sarajevo in the Lašva vallley. In May 1993 the Croat forces attacked the Muslim forces in the capital of Hercegovina, Mostar, laying the siege to the Muslim parts of the city; during the nine months of the Croat siege Mostar endured a level of destruction unparalleled in Sarajevo or any other Bosnian city.[14] However, by the end of 1993, the Muslim forces succeeded in driving the Bosnian Croat forces out of the Lašva valley as well as parts of south-central Bosnia, seizing in this campaign several towns in which Croats were a majority. In order to aid the Bosnian Croat forces, the Croatian army units crossed over from Croatia into central Bosnia, prompting the UN Security Council, on 3 February 1994, to threaten sanctions against Croatia which, however, were never imposed.

In the area of Croat–Muslim clashes, the local Serb forces co-operated with the Croat and at times with the Muslim forces against their new opponents. However, in eastern Bosnia, the Serb forces attacked the towns remaining under Muslim control, such as Srebernica, cut off the supply routes from Sarajevo to Goražde, and took over the south-west approaches to Sarajevo from the Muslim forces. Unlike the Croat–Muslim fighting which the Western media largely ignored and the UN made no attempt to stop, the Serbs attacks, accompanied by heavy shelling of civilian areas in eastern Bosnia and around Sarajevo, became a focus for continuous Western media coverage and led the UN and US to threaten to use NATO airstrikes to stop them. The Serb attacks ended in the summer of 1993 with an agreement requiring the UN peacekeeping troops to enter and demilitarise the Muslim-held areas under Serb attack. However, the Muslim–Croat fighting continued until February 1994, when the US negotiated a ceasefire between the Croatian government and the Muslim-dominated Bosnian government.

In October 1993, a new front opened in the Bihać enclave when the local Muslim leader Abdić, accepted the third international (Owen–Stoltenberg) peace plan and proclaimed his Autonomous Republic of West Bosnia independent from Izetbegović's government in Sarajevo. In response, the Muslim forces loyal to Izetbegović stationed in the enclave attacked Abdić's forces . The fighting between the two Muslim forces continued throughout 1994, with a short ceasefire in January–February. In August 1994, Izetbegović's forces pushed Abdić's militia – and tens of thousands of Muslim refugees – into Serb-held areas of

Croatia and defeated the Serb forces supporting Abdić. However, in November 1994, the Serb forces supporting Abdić, counterattacked, pushed Izetbegović's forces back into the city of Bihać and enabled Abdić and his supporters to regain the enclave. The Serb attack on Bihać – one of the UN protected safe areas – in November 1994 led the UN commanders to order NATO airstrikes against the Serb forces, which were not carried out (see next section). The Bihać enclave remained under Abidić's control until the NATO-supported offensive in September 1995 when the forces loyal to Izetbegović finally forced Abidić and his supporters to flee to Croatia.

The third phase of the war started in March 1994 with the establishment of the Muslim–Croat federation within Bosnia-Hercegovina, under the sponsorship of the US government (see next section); the federation's constitution envisaged a joint Muslim and Croat army. While the merger of the two forces had not been achieved, Croatia, in early 1994, provided a secure route for the weapons and volunteers from various Islamic countries destined for the Muslim forces and the former US officers started training Muslim as well as Croatian forces.[15]

The balance of military forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina, however, changed in favour of the Muslim party even before the Muslim forces were re-equipped and trained in preparation for their offensive in March 1995. In return for the suspension of the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, on October 1994 Milošević's government imposed an internationally monitored blockade of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina. As a result, the flow of military supplies to the Bosnian Serb military substantially decreased; the realisation that they now faced the Muslim–Croat alliance alone, without support from Serbia, probably affected the Bosnian Serb forces' morale as well. In March 1995, before the expiry of the truce between the Serb and Muslim forces, negotiated by the former US president Carter in December 1994, the Muslim forces launched, in northern Bosnia-Hercegovina, the first in a series of offensives which continued throughout May and June in northern Bosnia and around Sarajevo. In spite of their new weaponry and battle tactics, the Muslim forces alone were not able to make any significant inroads into the Bosnian Serb defences or to break through the Serb semi-encirclement of Sarajevo. In July 1995 the Serb forces attacked the two isolated UN safe areas – the Muslim-populated areas protected by the UN – in Srebrenica and Žepa, and, in spite of retaliatory but limited NATO airstrikes, quickly overran them. However, the massacre of thousands of Muslim men in Srebrenica and

the expulsion of many more Muslims from these areas attracted the attention of the Western media; the media coverage highlighted the inability of the UN forces to protect the Muslim population from Serb attacks and the failure to resolve the conflict through negotiation alone. This contributed to the US government's decision to launch the largest military operation to date in Bosnia-Hercegovina – the NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serb republic and a combined Croatian/ Muslim ground offensive against the Serb forces – which is discussed below.

The war substantially changed the demographic picture of Bosnia-Hercegovina: during the war the areas with nationally mixed populations had rapidly became nationally homogenised. The process started with the first armed clashes in March 1992 in northern Bosnia and western Hercegovina when the Serbs as well as Croats were forced to leave the areas taken over by the Croat and Serb forces respectively. During the Serb conquest of eastern Bosnia in April–May 1992 and of parts of western Bosnia later in the year, the Muslim population of these areas was forced to leave. During the Muslim–Croat war 1993–94, each side expelled members of the opposing nationality from the area which it conquered. For each of the three warring parties, members of the opposing nationality were, in effect, citizens of a hostile state who supported the enemy forces and were therefore enemies as well. As citizens of a hostile state, they were expected to oppose the new regime politically, and if and when given the chance to do so, to impede the establishment of the new regime on the conquered territory and its eventual international recognition. Finally, the homes and properties of the expelled hostile populations were used to settle refugees, expelled from elsewhere, for the loyal national group.

The Muslim party, which stood for a united and multinatinal Bosnia-Hercegovina, rejected any national division among Bosnia's citizens, professing to protect everyone equally; in line with this, it allowed employment and protected those Serb and Croat middle-class city dwellers (in particular, in Sarajevo) who shared the vision of an undivided and multinational Bosnia. However, other Serb inhabitants of Muslim-controlled cities, whose loyalty and usefulness was less obvious, were subject to harassment and violence from criminal gangs allied to the local Muslim-controlled authorities and were forced to leave during the war.[16] In contrast to the Muslim party, which, until its offensive in September 1995, mainly used local criminals to expel the Serbs from the cities, the Serb and Croat parties used their armed forces in large-scale expulsions of the opposing national groups from the territory under their

control; however, the Muslim armed forces also expelled Serbs during the fighting in eastern Bosnia and, during the Muslim–Croat war, a large number of Croats from central and southwest Bosnia. As a result of these policies, between 1.4 and 2 million, out of a total 4.36 million inhabitants of Bosnia-Hercegovina, were displaced during the war and forced to seek refuge either outside the country or within the territory under the control of the national party of the group to which they belonged.[17]

In spite of these huge forced movements of population, no party could, by its armed forces alone, or even with the support of one of the regional powers such as Serbia or Croatia, impose its political concept on the others. While the Serb party with its superior armed forces could conquer large areas of Bosnia-Hercegovina and expel the Muslim or Croat inhabitants, this failed to force the others to accept the resulting national division of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Not only did the other two political parties continue to reject the division but, more importantly, the EC member states and US government did so as well. As in the case of Croatia, the outside intervention – however limited it was initially – prevented the Serb party from imposing its preferred political solution. But in intervening in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the EC and the UN did not aid the Muslim party to impose its political concept on the Serbs either; the EC and the UN intervention aimed only at stopping the war and finding a compromise constitutional settlement. As we shall see in the next section, even in this limited aim, their intervention failed.

NATIONAL LIBERATION ON HOLD: THE LIMITS OF HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION?

Initially, international intervention in Bosnia-Hercergovina followed the pattern already traversed by the EC in the case of federal Yugoslavia: first, the EC sought to negotiate a compromise constitutional arrangement for Bosnia-Hercegovina; second, while these negotiations were taking place, the EC and, even more vehemently, the US government was threatening to recognize the country's independence, primarily to deter what they saw as Serb aggression against the new state; finally, upon the failure of the negotiations and of deterrence, the UN was called in. Despite the failure of the EC-sponsored conference on Yugoslavia to provide a compromise settlement for Yugoslavia, in Feburary 1992, its chairman, Lord Carrington, initiated a similar conference for

Bosnia-Hercergovina. The EC mediators, headed by the Portuguese ambassador Jose Cutileiro, in early February 1992 presented a plan of a regionalisation, primarily along national lines, of Bosnia-Hercegovina which would, thus regionalised, become an independent state. The Serb party accepted the plan in principle but the Bosnian Croat leaders, followed by the Muslim leader Izetbegović, rejected it. Since the Muslim party rejected any kind of division of Bosnia-Hercegovina, it had nothing to gain from the acceptance of the EC plan of regionalisation and consequent devolution of power to the regions; from his consultations with the US ambassador Zimmerman, Izetbegović realised that the US government would recognize the independence of Bosnia-Hercegovina and his government unconditionally, without his agreement to any constitutional plan.[18]

As in the case of Croatia, the US and the EC, on 7 April 1992, recognized a government of an independent Bosnia-Hercegovina, dominated by a nationalist party whose claim to represent all of the country's population was rejected by a militant Serb nationalist movement. But, unlike the Croatian government in January 1992, the government of Bosnia-Hercegovina at the time of its recognition effectively controlled less than a half of the territory of the country and was unable to ward off the imminent armed takeover of further territory by its Serb opponents.[19] Following the recognition, its principal aim became the defeat of the Serb armed forces as the only way to secure its control over the country which it was claiming to represent. But, unlike the Croatian government, the Muslim party in Bosnia-Hercegovina lacked both the industrial resources and trained military personnel necessary to build up a military force matching the Serb forces. And, unlike the Serb forces, the Muslim army, due to their lack of a direct outlet to the sea, had no secure access to the delivery of military supplies from its supporters abroad. As a result, only a military intervention from outside would have enabled it to tilt the balance of power in its own favour; and this is what the Muslim party and the Bosnian government it controlled sought throughout the ensuing war.

As in the case of Croatia, the EC member states were not ready to back their recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina and its Muslim-dominated government by military intervention or even military aid. In consequence, the principal sources of financial and military support for the Muslim party were found in the Islamic countries – Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Iran as well as Turkey – with which its leaders had established contacts. Prior to the outbreak of hostilities, the US administration

supported the Bosnian Muslim party's claim, as a majority party, to political dominance over the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina.[20] In spite of this, initially, the US government's support, did not extend to military aid for the Muslim dominated-government. In order to extend aid to the Muslim party and its involvement in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the US government needed to appear to be responding to public opinion pressure. This led the US secretary of state, James Baker, in April 1992, to suggest, via intermediaries, that the Bosnian Muslim leaders use the Western media to build up pressure for their cause.[21] For this purpose, like their Croatian counterparts, the Bosnian Muslim leaders hired international public relations firms.[22]

Upon the outbreak of the war, the model of media presentation used with success in Croatia was extended to Bosnia-Hercegovina: the country and its Muslim population were presented as victims of brutal and impersonal aggression from outside; the outside aggressors, as in the case of Croatia, were the Serbs. To the already standard repertoire of television images of destroyed buildings, artillery shelling and refugee convoys, familiar from the war in Croatia, two highly effective sets of images were added: the immediate aftermath of massacres of civilians and of emaciated inmates (or, rather, an inmate) in what was alleged to be a Serb concentration camp.[23] Of the former, the three televised massacres in Sarajevo, attributed to the Bosnian Serb shells, served as catalysts (or, perhaps, pretexts) for the UN and NATO actions against the Yugoslav government and Bosnian Serb forces. In this respect, the television images of massacres proved to be even more effective weapons of war than, for example, the images of the shelling of cultural icons such as Dubrovnik.

The UN Security Council responded to the outbreak of fighting in April 1992 with a series of resolutions calling for ceasefires and a negotiated settlement. However, on 27 May, the gruesome aftermath of the bombing of a civilian queue for bread in Vasa Miskina street in Sarajevo was televised to the world. The revulsion that these pictures produced among political leaders, in particular those of Russia,[24] enabled the EC and US to push through, on 30 May 1992, a UN Security Council resolution imposing economic sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, (consisting of Serbia and Montenegro) for its alleged failure to withdraw (or disarm) the units of the Yugoslav federal army in Bosnia-Hercegovina. But the sanctions, which remained in force until their suspension in October 1994, had little effect on the course of the war and provided little more than symbolic help to the Muslim party and its government. Further UN Security Council resolutions in

August and September authorised the UN forces already deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina to ensure and protect the delivery of humanitarian relief in the country. The UN military intervention in the war thus started as an operation to protect the delivery of humanitarian relief and not as an intervention in support of the Muslim-dominated government.

However, as the war continued, the UN, with the help of NATO aircraft, proceeded to restrict the Serb forces' use of aircraft and artillery and to provide protection to the civilians in Muslim-controlled cities (and, unintentionally, to the Muslim armed forces as well). Thus, responding to the use of air force in support of the Bosnian Serb forces, the UN Security Council in October 1992 imposed a ban on unauthorised military flights in Bosnia-Hercegovina.[25] Further, responding to the Bosnian Serb shelling of the eastern Bosnian town of Srebrenica in April 1993, UN Security Council proclaimed Srebrenica a 'safe area' – 'an area free from any armed attack or any other hostile act' – to be protected by the UN forces. In May 1993 all major towns and cities within the range of Bosnian Serb artillery – Goražde, Žepa, Tuzla, Bihać and Sarajevo – were proclaimed safe areas. As Tuzla, Bihać and Sarajevo housed the headquarters as well as a substantial number of Muslim forces, the UN was in effect offering protection to the Muslim military as well as civilians from the Bosnian Serb attack. While the protection of the civilians at times proved to be quite ineffective, the Muslim forces fired on or attacked, from the safe areas, the surrounding Serb forces in order to provoke a retaliatory response. The Serb artillery attacks on safe areas, whether retaliatory or not, attracted a continuous and at times dramatic media coverage and thus offered a good pretext for expanded NATO military intervention against the Serb forces.

Thus in February 1994, in response to the second televised massacre in Sarajevo, at the Markala market,[26] the UN secretary general authorised NATO to launch air strikes against the artillery positions around the UN safe areas which endangered civilians; for this purpose, the UN established a 20 kms exclusion zone for heavy weapons around Sarajevo and later extended the zone over other safe areas. In May 1995, following further Bosnian Serb shelling of Sarajevo, NATO aircraft launched the heaviest strikes thus far against Serb forces when they failed to honour the UN established exclusion zones. And, as the Serb forces took UN personnel hostage[27] to avert further air strikes, in July 1995 NATO started deploying a heavily armed contingent of 14 000 troops, called the UN Rapid Reaction Force, which, unlike the

24 000 strong UN force already deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina, was intended to engage the Serb forces in combat and so not only offer protection for the civilians and humanitarian relief. By the end of July 1995 NATO was prepared for an air and ground intervention in support of the Muslim and Croat forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina.

The slow and tortuous transformation of the UN intervention as protection for the delivery of humanitarian relief into a NATO military intervention in support of the Muslim forces took place not only under continuous and often intense media coverage of the war – aiming primarily to expose the brutality of the Serb attacks on unarmed civilians and the inadequacy of the UN response to this – but also under an increasing scrutiny of human rights abuses and breaches of international law by several agencies specially established by the UN for this purpose. In September 1992 the UN Commission on Human Rights appointed a special rapporteur on human rights for former Yugoslavia who, in a series of reports, presented detailed accounts of a variety of human rights abuses, including massacres, torture, sexual abuse, murder and the disappearance of civilians, maltreatment of prisoners, unlawful detention and various forms of ethnic discrimination. Already in one of his early reports, he noted that the Muslims in Bosnia-Hercegovina felt that they were threatened with extermination.[28] After investigating human rights abuses against Muslim civilians, following the Bosnian Serb forces' conquest of the UN safe areas of Srebrenica and Žepa in July 1995, he called for NATO air strikes against the Serb forces and, as his call went unheeded, resigned his position in protest. Apart from the special rapporteur and a commission of experts (which concluded its work on the violations of humanitarian law in April 1994), the UN Security Council, on 25 May 1994, established an International Tribunal, consisting of two trial and one appeal chambers with 11 judges in all, charged with prosecuting those responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in former Yugoslavia, as of 1 January 1991. The Tribunal, inaugurated in November 1994 in The Hague, enacted its own rules of procedure and evidence and began working under a statute approved by the UN Security Council.[29] By the end of hostilities in Bosnia-Hercegovina, in October 1995, the Tribunal had brought no one to trial as yet and had, by mid-1999, secured only a few convictions. Like the reports of the special rapporteur, the Tribunal's work appears to have had little, if any, impact on the treatment of civilians or on the respect of humanitarian law in the ensuing wars. But its indictment, in July 1995, of the president of the Serb republic, Radovan Karadžić and the chief of staff of

the Serb forces, Ratko Mladić, for war crimes, had a significant impact on political developments in the Serb Republic. The indictment facilitated the removal of the two leaders from the Dayton negotiations over political settlement in Bosnia-Hercegovina in October 1995[30] and, then, under the agreements reached in these negotiations, ensured their removal from their posts; this, in turn, facilitated the removal of Karadžić's party, the Serb Democratic Party, from power in the Serb Republic and its replacement with a more compliant government (see below).

While the UN was in the later stages of the war distributing humanitarian aid to over 2.28 million people in Bosnia-Hercegovina and attempting to protect their human rights, it also engaged, together with the EC negotiators, in a series of protracted and inconclusive peace negotiations. After the failure of the EC talks in March 1992, in August 1992, the UN and EC convened the International Conference on Former Yugoslavia, whose two co-chairmen, the UN general secretary's personal envoy to Yugoslavia and the EC representative, became the principal negotiators until April 1994. In late 1992 they produced the second international settlement proposal, the Vance–Owen plan (named after the two negotiators at the time) which envisaged a single, demilitarised state of ten provinces, each with a high degree of autonomy. As before, the negotiators attempted to accommodate opposing territorial claims of all three parties; in this plan, the Serb demand for a linked set of Serb-dominated provinces or for a continuous Serb territory within Bosnia-Hercegovina was not met. In spite of intense pressure from Milošević, in April 1993 the Bosnian Serb assembly rejected the plan. The third proposal, the Owen–Stoltenberg plan, attempted to accommodate the Serb demand for a separate and continuous Serb-controlled territory, by envisaging Bosnia-Hercegovina as a union of three territorially compact republics. While the Serb party accepted it,[31] the Muslim-dominated Bosnian assembly demanded more territory for the Muslim-held republic and, thus, in effect, rejected this plan. As in the previous EC negotiations over the constitutional framework of Yugoslavia in 1991, no party had sufficient incentive to modify its original position: the Serb leaders had carved out, by force, a would-be state which they were unwilling to abandon; the Muslim leaders, assured of the continuous support of the US government, had no incentive to abandon their drive for a unified Bosnia-Hercegovina.

However, the US offer of military aid (and its threat of UN economic sanctions, in case of non-compliance), proved sufficent to induce the Croatian government to agree to a US plan for the creation of a

Muslim–Croat federation in Bosnia-Hercegovina. After intense US-sponsored negotiations, the agreement setting up the federation was signed, on 18 February 1994, in Washington, in the presence of Izetbegović, Tudjman, and the US president Clinton. According to its constitution, the federation was made up of cantons each of which would have a majority of either Muslims (Bosniacs) or Croats. The office of president with a one-year term would be held by a Croat and a Muslim alternately; one-third of ministerial portfolios would go to the Croats and all decisions of vital interest to either of the two constituent peoples should be reached by consensus; there was no provision for the participation of Serbs or any other nationalities in the executive. The federal government would be in charge of foreign affairs, national defence (with a joint Muslim–Croat army), economic policy, currency and customs, while police, education and public services would be relegated to the cantons. This federation was to enter into a confederation with the Republic of Croatia, the scope and nature of which was at the time left open.

In return for the US military and diplomatic support, each side to this agreement made considerable concessions: instead of a unified structure for the country (or a non-national division) the Muslim party agreed to a division into federal cantons along national lines and an equal power-sharing arrangement with the Croats, whereas the Bosnian Croat leaders (chosen by the Croatian government) abandoned the secession of the Croat Herceg-Bosna from Bosnia-Hercegovina. This model of offering incentives in return for concessions was then followed in the next, fourth international proposal, the Contact group plan. The Contact group, consisting of US, Russian, French, German and British representatives, took over negotiations on Bosnia-Hercegovina from the UN and EC in April 1994. The group, led by the US representatives, offered, in July 1994, a map of the division of Bosnia-Hercegovina in which 51 per cent of the territory was assigned to the Muslim–Croat federation and 49 per cent to the Bosnian Serbs. As the proposed map broke the Serb territory in half, awarding the key town of Brčko to the federation, the Bosnian Serb assembly swiftly rejected it; the Muslim party accepted it, knowing that the Serb party would reject it. However, Milošević's government, in return for the US-supported offer to suspend the UN sanctions against Yugoslavia, accepted the plan, broke its relations with the Bosnian Serb leaders and, in October 1994, imposed a blockade[32] of the Bosnian Serb territory.

Milošević's move against the Serb leaders in Bosnia-Hercegovina, followed by a virulent media campaign against them in the Yugoslav

government-controlled media, not only completed the isolation of the Serb party but marked the end of the movement for the political unification of Serb lands which Milošević himself had initiatied in 1988 (see Chapter 8) and which presented itself as a movement for the liberation of the Serb-populated lands from foreign rule. The disagreements between the local Serb leaders and Milošević, its titular head, surfaced in late 1991, when he overrode the objections of the Krajina Serb leaders to the replacement of the Yugoslav federal army in Croatia with the UN peacekeeping force (see Chapter 10). The defiance of Milošević, which the Bosnian Serb leaders showed first by rejecting the second (Vance–Owen) plan, which he accepted, culminated in their rejection, a year later, of the fourth, Contact group plan which Milošević also accepted. These two international plans broke up the territory under Bosnian Serb control into two or more parts and thus threatened to cut off communications with the Serb-held western Bosnia. In rejecting them, the Bosnian Serb leaders not only put the security interests of their constituency (as they saw it) above the interests of Serbia and Montenegro, but also defied Milošević's claim to the overall leadership of the Serb movement. In this way, the imposition of the UN sanctions on Serbia and Montengro in May 1992 created the conditions for the split within the Serb unification movement; the incentive of suspending the sanctions, offered by the Contact group in 1994 to Milošević's government, precipitated the final split in October 1994.

Unlike Milošević, the Bosnian Serb leaders proved unresponsive to the incentives of relatively minor territorial adjustments in the Contact group plan offered to them after July 1994. As a result, the Contact group members increasingly looked at the use of force as the only alternative way to compel them to accept the plan. This force was assembled in July and August 1995: the Croatian army was poised to enter western Bosnia from the newly conquered Krajina region while the Muslim forces were assembled for the same purpose in central Bosnia; the NATO troops of the UN Rapid Reaction force had been deployed around Sarajevo and the NATO air force ready for action. The pretext was provided by the third televised Sarajevo massacre, again at the Markala market, on 28 August, where a mortar shell killed 30 people. A day before the massacre, the chief US negotiator Richard Holbrooke had already warned of 'more active NATO air involvement' in pursuit of the Contact group plan. At the end of the day of the massacre the UN had officially announced that the Serb gunners were responsible and the Serb forces were ordered to withdraw their artillery to outside the exclusion zone.[33] As they, predictably, refused, on 30 August 1995

NATO launched its operation 'Deliberate Force' which it had been planning from early 1995 and which the UN command in Bosnia-Hercegovina had approved in early August.

NATO MILITARY INTERVENTION: TO IMPOSE A PARTITION?

The first waves of air strikes, carried out by NATO aircraft flying from bases in Italy and an US aircraft carrier in the Adriatic, targeted the Bosnian Serb command and communication centres, troop barracks, ammunition depots and weapons factories around Sarajevo and other UN safe areas, while the NATO artillery of the UN Rapid Reaction Force, in place around Sarajevo, kept up a steady bombardment of Bosnian Serb arms depots and artillery positions. The air strikes were suspended twice – on 1 and 5 September 1995 – to allow for negotiations for the withdrawal of Serb artillery, but as they failed the strikes were continued until 14 September when the UN brokered a 'framework agreement' for a ceasefire with the Bosnian Serb military, in accordance with which the latter withdrew its heavy weapons from the Sarajevo exclusion zone and NATO ceased its offensive operations.

Apart from the Bosnian Serb military communications and command centres, artillery and air defence emplacements, ammunition depots and military maintenance facilities, in the later stages of the operation, NATO aircraft bombed bridges and civilian communication installations in almost the whole of Bosnian Serb territory.[34] As relatively few Serb artillery positions around Sarajevo were targeted at all,[35] it appears that the principal goal of the NATO air strikes was to destroy the communication facilities and ammunition storage of the Bosnian Serb military and thus decrease both its mobility and firepower in the face of the impending ground offensive. While the NATO aircraft bombed targets all over Serb-held territory, in mid-September the Croatian army (entering Bosnia from Croatia) jointly with the Muslim forces surged through northwest and west Bosnia, taking in quick succession Donji Vakuf, Drvar, Jajce and Prijedor with a total of around 3900 sq. kms of land.[36] Serb units were often ordered to withdraw without fighting, followed or preceded by a huge number of Serb refugees; it appears that, as in Krajina a month before, the withdrawal orders came from the Yugoslav military command in Belgrade. The principal resistance to the Croat–Muslim attack seems to have come from units under the direct command of Dr Karadžić or from various paramilitaries. By the end of September, the Croatian army and the

Muslim forces started their assault on central Bosnia and its capital Banja Luka. At this point, apparently under pressure from the US chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke,[37] the Croatian army halted its offensive; left without the support of the Croatian artillery and logistics, the Muslim forces faced with Serb counterattacks, supported at times by Yugoslav air force, followed suit.[38] This lightning offensive led to an influx of the entire Serb population of west and northwest Bosnia into Serb-held central Bosnia where they were stranded under appalling conditions. But it also reduced the Bosnian Serb control of territory to roughly 49 per cent of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the very percentage which the Contact group plan had set for the Bosnian Serbs. While the Russian government criticised the air strikes from the very start and later branded them as a 'genocide of the Serb people', it offered no military support to the Bosnian Serb forces. Milošević's government co-operated fully with the US and NATO and showed no signs, until the central Bosnian city of Banja Luka was threatened, to come to the aid of the Bosnian Serb forces.

Parallel with the preparation for the NATO air strikes against the Bosnian Serbs, the US chief negotiator Richard Holbrooke started, in early August 1995, a round of intensive negotiations in Zagreb, Sarajevo and Belgrade, aiming at a comprehensive peace settlement based on the Contact group plan of division. Prior to the NATO attack, on 29 August 1995, he secured the agreement of Milošević to represent Bosnian Serbs in further negotiations (to which the leaders of the Serb Republic in Bosnia-Hercegovina formally agreed). As the Bosnian Croats were to be represented by the Croatian government, this made the Muslim-dominated government of Bosnia-Hercegovina, and the governments of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)[39] and of Croatia, the only negotiating parties. While the NATO air strikes against Bosnian Serb positions were in full swing, on 8 September Holbrooke got the three negotiating parties to agree to the 'Basic Principles', (followed by 'Further Agreed Basic Principles' on 28 September) which reaffirmed the Contact group's 49:51 per cent division between the two 'constituent entities' of Bosnia-Hercegovina – Republika Srpska (the Serb Republic) and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (the Muslim–Croat federation, see above). The recognition of the Serb Republic as a constituent entity of the country was a major concession on the part of the Muslim party and the US government: previously both had denied the right of the Serbs to political and territorial autonomy within Bosnia-Hercegovina. The 'Basic Principles' were followed by the start, on 26 October, of 'proximity' peace talks between Izetbegović, Tudjman and Milošević at a US Air Force base in Dayton, Ohio. After intensive

Map 5 Dayton Agreements division of Bosnia–Hercegovina
Source: US Department of Defense, Washington, DC.



negotiations (or, rather, haggling)[40] primarily over territory, the US negotiators (the representatives of the other four Contact group governments and the EU acted only as observers) got the three negotiating parties to initial, on 22 November 1995, a comprehensive settlement, including a new constitution for Bosnia-Hercegovina and separate agreements for its internal division and for the deployment of a NATO-commanded peacekeeping force;[41] this 'General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina' was signed in Paris on 14 December by Milošević, Izetbegović and Tudjman, as well as by the heads of state or government of the five Contact group countries and a EU representative.

The new constitution of the state renamed 'Bosnia and Herzegovina' (instead of the 'Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina') envisaged a two-chamber parliament; in both two-thirds of its delegates originate from the Muslim-Croat Federation and one-third from the Serb Republic (the three constituent nations, Bosniacs/Muslims, Croats and Serbs delegate five members each to the smaller chamber, the House of Peoples). For any legislation to be passed at least one third of delegates

from each entity would have to vote in favour (Article IV, 3 (e)) and a majority of Bosniac or Croat or Serb delegates could declare a proposed decision of the parliament 'destructive of a vital interest' of their respective peoples; if the issue could not be resolved by a Joint Commission of the House of Peoples, it is to be decided by the Constitutional Court, one third of whose members were to be foreign jurists appointed by the president of the European Court of Human Rights (Article IV, 3 (f)); the foreign jurists thus hold the balance of power in decisionmaking over contested parliamentary issues. Foreign policy, foreign trade, customs and immigration policy, as well common communications and air traffic control are the responsibility of the central institutions of Bosnia-Hercegovina; all other matters, including defence and intra-entity law enforcement, are the responsibility of each of the two entities. Each entity has the right to grant its own citizenship (which is automatically the citizenship of the whole country), to issue passports of Bosnia-Hercegovina as well as the right 'to establish a special parallel relationship' with a neighbouring state (Article III, 2 (a)).

A three-person presidency (in which each member would take up the post of president for a year), the ministerial council, and the parliament, are, according to the Dayton constitution, the only central institutions of Bosnia-Hercegovina which have no foreign members appointed by international bodies. The central bank, the provisional electoral commission and the commissions on human rights, for displaced persons and refugees, for the preservation of national monuments and for public corporations are chaired during a transition period (of six years or less) by an appointee of an international organisation who is not a citizen of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In addition, the UN Security Council appoints a high representative to supervise the civilian aspects of the implementation of the Dayton agreements and the international civil administration of the country. The international organisations appointing office-holders to all these institutions (including the constitutional court) were, in effect, taking on not only the supervision of the principal legal, economic and humanitarian aspects of civilian life in Bosnia-Hercegovina but were also charged with the interpretation of the country's constitution and decisionmaking on contested political issues.

All military forces in the country were under the supervision first of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and, later, under its successor the Stabilisation Force (SFOR) under NATO command.[42] IFOR's mandate was to enforce the zones of separation between opposing sides, the withdrawal of their troops and weaponry to the barracks, the demobil-

isation of excess troops and the overall cessation of hostilities. As IFOR was given the right to use force to ensure compliance with its orders – which no other authority in Bosnia-Hercegovina could countermand – the IFOR (later SFOR) commanding officer was effectively in control of all military forces in the country. Thus the Dayton agreements created two layers of confederation within Bosnia-Hercegovina: each of the two 'entities' which make up Bosnia-Hercegovina is organised as a national homeland and retains significant sovereign powers including the right of self-defence; one of the entitites, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, is, in effect, a confederation as well, in which each of the two national groups, through its federal and cantonal officers, exercises equal sovereign powers. However, above the double structure of confederative power sharing, stand an international civil administration, controlling the key aspects of Bosnia-Hercegovina's political and economic life, and a NATO officer in effective command of all military forces.

Such a constitutional set-up, drafted by the US officials, failed to satisfy the principal political objectives of any one of the three parties. The Muslim party failed to get the unified state structure which would enable it to assert its political dominance; the Serb and Croat parties failed in their bids to secede from Bosnia-Hercegovina. The Serb party appeared to have gained a semi-sovereign state with its own legislature and executive as well as an army and police force. However, the IFOR's decommissioning of Bosnian Serbs' heavy weaponry and demobilisation of its forces in compliance with the Dayton agreements finally ended the Bosnian Serb military superiority in Bosnia-Hercegovina and neutralised its forces. Moreover, the UN high representative was, by 1998, able to remove from power the Serb Democratic Party, which dominated the Serb Republic until 1995. First, as the Dayton agreements excluded persons indicted by the Hague International Tribunal (see above) from holding office and from public life, its president, Dr Karadžić, was removed in early 1996 and went into hiding. Second, in 1997 the UN high representative successfully split the Serb Democratic Party into two factions, one of which, led by the then president of the Serb Republic, Mrs Biljana Plavšić, was ready to co-operate with him. As a result, the uncooperative faction lost elections in 1997 for the Serb Republic's assembly[43] and then the co-operative faction's leader, Mrs Plavšić, lost the election in 1998 for the president of this 'entity'. [44] This enabled the UN high representative, first, to appoint a minority government headed by a little known but co-operative politician from the social democratic party,[45] and then, in March 1999 to dismiss the

legally elected but uncooperative president of the Serb Republic (for his alleged obstruction of the Dayton agreements).[46] The control exercised by the UN high representative over the political life and by the NATO commanders over the military forces of the Serb Republic shows that the sovereign powers and political autonomy, granted by the Dayton constitution to each 'entity', are largely symbolic.

While the UN high representative exercised no comparable control over the politics of the Muslim–Croat Federation – which continues to be dominated by the pre-war Muslim and Croat parties – the power-sharing arrangements of the Dayton constitution and their implementation by the UN special representative have so far prevented the Muslim party from achieving political dominance over Bosnia-Hercegovina. However, the US training and equipping of the Muslim forces – carried out from 1996 on by the US military under a generously funded US government programme – enabled the Muslim forces to achieve the superiority over the Serb forces which was denied to them throughout the war.[47] This would enable the Muslim forces, together with their Croat allies, or even alone, to translate their military superiority into political dominance, either by threats to use their armed forces to conquer the Serb Republic or by an actual conquest. Ironically, the only power which can prevent the Muslim party from taking over the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina in this way, the US, had, until September 1995, supported the Muslim party's claim to political dominance over the whole of Bosnia-Hercegovina.

UNDER NATO'S PROTECTION: AN UNFINISHED NATIONAL LIBERATION?

From 1992 to 1995 Bosnia-Hercegovina appears to have undergone three national liberation wars, each of which was allegedly fought for the liberation of one of its national groups – the Croats, Muslims (Bosniacs) and the Serbs – from foreign rule. In this narrow sense each was victorious: as a result of the political partition of Bosnia-Hercegovina into two nationally-defined entities and of the Muslim–Croat federation into nationally-defined cantons, no national group in Bosnia-Hercegovina politically dominates or rules over the other or others. This constitutional arrangement could have been achieved without war: the first international settlement proposal, the EC plan put forward in February 1992 before the outbreak of hostilities, envisaged a similar partition and power-sharing arrangements. In February 1992 only one side,

the Serb party, initially accepted this type of arrangement, because it suited its concept of a country divided along national lines.

In the armed struggle which ensued, the Muslim party, although it commanded the largest armed force, appeared to be the least well prepared for it. In fact, the model of neutralisation of superior military forces, followed in Slovenia and Croatia, did not require the Muslim party to be prepared to counter its opponents' military forces or even defend the territory it controlled from those forces. On the contrary, in order to induce international intervention in Slovenia and Croatia it appeared necessary to present one side as a peaceful victim of outside aggression. However, the model of neutralisation of superior military forces through outside intervention, followed in the Slovenian and Croatian cases, proved to be ineffective in Bosnia-Hercegovina for several reasons.

First, the Bosnian Serb leaders, having realised the dangers of the neutralisation of the Yugoslav federal army, arranged for the transfer of heavy weaponry and officers to the armed forces at least ostensibly under their own command. As the Bosnian Serb military was composed mostly of natives of Bosnia-Hercegovina, the Muslim party failed to have this force recognised by the UN or any other international body as a foreign occupation force or even as a foreign aggressor. Second, the remaining Yugoslav federal army units left Bosnia-Hercegovina relatively quickly after the outbreak of war in 1992, thus pre-empting any need for an outside – the EC or UN – intervention to neutralise it. Third, and perhaps most importantly, the Bosnian Serb political leaders and their military commanders resisted any neutralisation of their armed forces on the model followed in Slovenia and Croatia. They systematically resisted and evaded the UN demands and threats to disengage and withdraw their forces from the areas which they were contesting; for example, they resisted and evaded the UN and NATO enforced exclusion zones for heavy weapons around the UN protected safe areas.

The failure to neutralise superior armed forces through an internationally supervised agreement to disengage and withdraw, left the Muslim party with no choice but to seek military intervention from outside: its own forces, although superior in number, throughout the wars lacked the weapons, training and command structures needed for a sustained, large-scale assault on the Serb defences. Until early 1995 – after three-and-a-half years of intermittent warfare – the Muslim party's efforts to secure any military intervention against the Bosnian Serb forces appeared to be futile. The principal obstacles were twofold: on the one hand, the French and British governments (as well as other EC governments) were, throughout most of the war, against any milit-

ary intervention in support of the Muslim party and its government. On the other hand, the principal supporter of the Muslim party, the US government, while ready to use its air power against Bosnian Serb forces, was not prepared to commit its own troops to any combat role.

In mid-1995, once it became clear that the Muslim forces alone were not capable of breaking through the Bosnian Serb defences, the US government decided to use the US-trained and equipped Croatian army as the ground force which the US and its NATO allies had refused to provide. The new strategy of neutralisation required: first, that no outside military support to the Bosnian Serb forces be available; this was achieved, as in the Croatian operation against Krajina, through an agreement with Milošević's government. Second, that the Bosnian Serbs' forces firepower and mobility be reduced through NATO bombing of its military and communication facilities and, third, that the Croatian army be deployed together with the Muslim forces in a co-ordinated and large-scale campaign in western and northern Bosnia. This strategy aimed, on the one hand, at the Muslim–Croat conquest of territory needed to achieve the 49:51 per cent division envisaged by the Contact group plan and, on the other, at compelling the Bosnian Serb leaders to agree to the neutralisation of its armed forces by a NATO-commanded peacekeeping force. The linchpin of this strategy was the deployment of proxy ground forces – the Croatian army; the absence of a proxy force for NATO in Kosovo in March–May 1999 forced NATO to bomb extensively non-military targets in Yugoslavia and enabled the Yugoslav military to withdraw from Kosovo with relatively little loss.

The effect of this complex strategy was similar to the one achieved in Croatia in the period 1992–95: the Bosnian Serb forces were, in accordance with the Dayton agreements, disengaged and, instead of being withdrawn, demobilised and their heavy weaponry mostly impounded. Like the Serb militias in Krajina, under the UN mandate of 1992–95, they presented no threat to its opponent. Moreover, due to the training and equipment received from the US after 1995, the Muslim forces like its counterpart, the Croatian army, gained the military capability of defeating them.[48]

The NATO-led operation compelled the conflicting national liberation movements – the Serb one by force, the Muslim and the Croat ones by the threat of the withdrawal of essential support – to accept constitutional arrangements short of their original political objectives as well as a form of international protectorate over the territory they contested. However, none of the three national parties had abandoned

its original objectives;[49] each has accepted the Dayton constitutional arrangements out of necessity. Even if the Serb Democratic Party has been removed from power in the Serb Republic, the achievement of Serb independence from Bosnia-Hercegovina is the desired – if suppressed – objective of the politicial parties which still command the majority of votes in the Serb Republic. Continued suppression of the objective – as being contrary to the Dayton agreements – by the UN high representative is unlikely to eradicate it; the same, of course, applies to the ultimate objective of the Muslim and Croat parties which are still in power in the other entity, the Federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. Obviously, this model of managing national liberation movements, involving the establishment of international protectorates, can only contain but not resolve the conflict between them.

12 Kosovo[1]: National Liberation Through Foreign Intervention


NATIONAL LIBERATION THROUGH PASSIVE RESISTANCE: THE DEMOCRATIC LEAGUE OF KOSOVO

The presently dominant Kosovo Albanian national liberation movement, led by the Kosovo Liberation Army, claims its origins in the aftermath of the Kosovo Albanian riots of 1981 (see Chapter 6). Partly as a result of the suppression of the riots and the continuous purge of the Kosovo Albanian cadres from the province's communist party, clandestine Kosovo Albanian organisations, committed to Kosovo's independence, sprouted both in Kosovo and in the Kosovo Albanian diaspora in Western Europe. The official Yugoslav news agency claimed that, in the period of two years after the riots, the Yugoslav police had uncovered 72 such organisations, having more than 1000 members. Most of the clandestine organisations which came to life in the aftermath of the 1981 riots were committed to the cause of Kosovo's independence; some engaged in terrorist attacks on Yugoslav officials in Western Europe and in smuggling arms to Kosovo, while others restricted themselves to political propaganda and organisation, thus rejecting violence.

One organisation which engaged in both was the Popular Movement for Kosovo (Levizja Popullore e Kosovës), founded in West Germany in 1982 through the merger of one nationalist and two orthodox Marxist-Leninist groups. The organisation split in the early 1990s, when some of the Marxists left it; soon after the split, in 1992, its armed wing Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) – Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës or UÇK – was formed.[2] By forming its armed wing, this tiny and clandestine group did not restrict its activities to terrorist acts and propaganda; it aimed, improbably at the time, at becoming a mass movement for the national liberation of Kosovo Albanians, to lead an armed struggle against the foreign, Serbian, rule.

The Yugoslav authorities treated all of the clandestine organisations as illegal separatist organisations and punished severely any associa-

Map 6 Map of Kosovo/Kosova



tion with them.[3] But until late 1987 the Yugoslav and Serb Communist party leaders restricted their measures against these organisations to police action and made no attempt to restrict the political autonomy of the province nor to challenge the Kosovo Albanian communist elites control over the province. They also made no attempt to suppress the incipient movement of Kosovo Serbs, outside the Communist party framework, which from 1986 staged a series of public demonstrations in Serbia, in protest at the harassment which, they alleged, Kosovo Serbs suffered in Kosovo, demanding the political and constitutional unification of the autonomous province of Kosovo with the republic of Serbia (see Chapter 6). This demand was taken up, in early 1987 by Slobodan Milošević, the president of the Serbian Communist party, who, from late 1987 on, initiated a series of acts suspending, and later, abolishing the political and legal autonomy of the province. Parallel to these acts, he replaced the established Kosovo

Albanian communist leaders with Kosovo Albanian politicians who appeared ready to co-operate with his policy of the unification of Kosovo with Serbia. In protest against these acts and the replacement of the Kosovo Albanian political elites, Kosovo Albanians staged, in November 1988, large and violent demonstrations and, then, in February 1989, a miners' strike followed by a brief general strike throughout the province. Thus, in response to the Serbian rulers' efforts to subordinate and control the Kosovo Albanian political elites, a mass popular movement of Kosovo Albanians against the Serbian rule came into existence. Large demonstrations, both violent and peaceful, in April 1989 and in early 1990 indicated the growing strength and organisation of this movement, in spite of increased police repression.

The foundation, on 23 December 1989 of the Democratic League of Kosovo, (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës) gave the growing national movement its first non-clandestine organisational structure. Like its chairman, Dr Ibrahim Rugova, a well known literary critic,[4] most of its founders were (or had been) members of the official Communist party of Kosovo. But as the League presented itself as a movement for the achievement of national equality of Albanians within a future Yugoslav confederation and as the guardian of the Albanians' national interests in Kosovo, it soon gained a large, both communist and non-communist, following.[5] Its first programme called for a democratic, multi-party system and the rule of law; and, accordingly, the League restricted itself to legal and political means of achieving its national goals, rejecting violence and armed struggle against the Serbian rule.

The Democratic League of Kosovo and its supporters came to embrace the cause of outright independence for Kosovo from Yugoslavia only under the impact of the secessions of Slovenia and Croatia. Thus, in response to the draft of the new constitution of the Republic of Serbia in 1990, the Kosovo Albanian deputies of the Kosovo assembly, who were elected under the one-party rule of the Kosovo communist party, meeting on the steps of the assembly building[6] on 2 July 1990, proclaimed the sovereignty of the Republic of Kosovo and its secession from Serbia but not from Yugoslavia. These same deputies, meeting in September 1990 in Kačanik, adopted the constitution of the new republic which asserts the right for national self-determination of the Albanian people 'to the point of secession' but leaves the Republic of Kosovo within the Yugoslav 'Federation-Confederation'.[7] However, after the secessions of Croatia and Slovenia from the Yugoslav federation, in September 1991 the same deputies adopted a declaration of

independence and put it to a referendum. According to the organisers 87.01 per cent of all eligible voters in Kosovo voted in the referendum; of which 99.87 voted in favour of independence.[8] After the reiterated declarations of independence of Croatia and Slovenia in October 1991, the same deputies proclaimed independence for Kosovo and appointed the secretary of the Democratic League, Dr Bujar Bukoshi, as its prime minister.

Like the Serb republics which seceded from Croatia and Bosnia, the Republic of Kosovo gained no recognition from the EC or the US.[9] But unlike the secession of the Serb republics, the secession of Kosovo was neither preceded nor followed by the seceding party's takeover of local government and police. The earlier purges of Albanians from the Kosovo police, territorial defence units and local government carried out by Milošević's government, left the Democratic League of Kosovo and other Kosovo Albanian parties with no access to any government organs or armed forces; the Serbian police and Yugoslav military were at that time in complete control of Kosovo.[10] Instead of a takeover of power, the Albanian political parties built a parallel government together with the educational, health and trade union institutions which, for the most part, the Serbian authorities tolerated, while still subjecting many of its less prominent activists to police harassment and violence.

The mass dismissal of Kosovo Albanians from state-sponsored institutions and commercial enterprises by the Serbian authorities, from 1990 onwards, left several hundred thousand Albanians unemployed. An independent trade union organisation – the Alliance of Independent Trade Unions – as well as other solidarity organisations soon emerged to provide aid to the unemployed and to organise the still employed. With the introduction of the Serbian curricula in Kosovo schools in August 1990, many Albanian teachers who opposed this move were dismissed; they organised a parallel education system for the Albanian pupils in Albanian, often using textbooks from Albania. From October 1991, the parallel Kosovo Albanian state in Kosovo had a prime minister and a skeleton cabinet, which, in May 1992, organised the first multi-party parliamentary and presidential elections in Kosovo. Quite predictably, out of the 20-odd Albanian parties which contested the election, the Democratic League won 96 seats (with 76.44 per cent of the vote) while all other Albanian parties and independents won 29 seats.[11] Its leader, Dr Rugova, won the presidential elections unopposed, with 99.5 per cent of the vote. The election only confirmed the League's domination of Kosovo Albanian

politics; in view of this, the League had no need to convene the parliament until July 1998.[12]

By 1995 Dr Rugova and members of his government had been officially received as Kosovo Albanian representatives in most European capitals as well as in Washington. Yet their intensive diplomatic activity and official recognition abroad appeared not to bring the independence of Kosovo any closer. The failure of the international negotiations at Dayton even to address the issue of Kosovo and its independence clearly indicated that the US and its European allies were not ready to consider that issue at all. As a result, several prominent politicians and intellectuals, such as Adem Demaçi, the leader of the Parliamentary Party of Kosovo and Redxep Qosja, another literary critic and writer, intensified, after the Dayton agreements, their attacks on the League's policies. While in this period Demaçi advocated a Balkan confederation as a framework within which Kosovo could gain independence and Qosja advocated unification with Albania,[13] both rejected the League's policy of passive resistance as futile and even counterproductive. The first visible result of the League's international diplomacy, the education accord, signed separately by Milošević and Rugova in September 1996, was meant to enable Albanian students to use educational facilities until then under Serbian government control; neither side appeared ready to implement the accord, which, in any case, failed to address the key political question of Kosovo's status within or without Serbia.[14] By the end of 1996 it appeared that neither the League's international diplomacy nor its negotiations with the Serbian government had made any progress towards the liberation of Kosovo Albanians from Serbian rule.

NATIONAL LIBERATION THROUGH ARMED STRUGGLE: THE KOSOVO LIBERATION ARMY IN ACTION

In early 1996, however, an upsurge of armed attacks on Serbs and Serb officials in Kosovo signalled a more serious challenge to the League's pacifist policies and to Serbian rule. In February 1996 the National Movement for the Liberation of Kosovo claimed responsibility for bomb attacks on five camps for Serb refugees from Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. In March and April 1996 the KLA went into action with a series of attacks on Serbs, civilians as well as police officers. In a letter to the BBC, the KLA proclaimed this action to be a part of its

'struggle for the liberation of Kosovo that would continue until complete victory'.[15] This pattern of attacks continued throughout the summer; but on 28 September the KLA attacked, for the first time, a Yugoslav military barracks; this was followed, in November, with a warning to all Kosovo Albanians not to collaborate with the Serbian authorities. In January 1997, a car bomb in Priština nearly killed the Serbian rector of the university and was followed by a series of assassinations of Kosovo Albanians accused of collaborating with the Serbian government. To the very end of 1996, the Democratic League leaders denied the existence of the KLA, suggesting that Serbian *agents provocateurs* may be behind the terrorist acts. [16]

The anarchy which spread through Albania, following the collapse of the pyramid saving schemes in early 1997, enabled the KLA to acquire a large quantity of infantry weapons from the looted Albanian army armories and to establish several secure training and supply bases in northern Albania close to its borders with Kosovo. From the newly established bases the KLA started sending to Kosovo a steady flow of weapons as well as newly trained fighters, recruited in the Albanian diaspora and in Kosovo and trained in Albania. As a result, during 1997 the KLA's campaign of attacks against Serb security forces and of assassinations of the alleged Kosovo Albanian collaborators widened and intensified. Crowning its campaign, in early December 1997, the KLA made its first public appearance at the funeral of an Albanian teacher killed by the Serbian police: one of the three armed and masked KLA fighters declared, to the cheering of thousands of mourners at the funeral that 'Serbia is massacring Albanians. The Kosovo Liberation army is the only force fighting for the freedom of Kosovo. . .'.[17]

The move of Serbian special police units, in February 1997, to the western region of Drenica to arrest a convicted criminal from the Jashari family, who had claimed to be a member of the KLA, and to search for weapons gave the KLA a chance to prove both. As the Jashari family compound was strongly defended, the Serb forces proceeded to destroy it by artillery shelling, killing around 40 members of the family, including women and children. The massacre, or rather its aftermath, received wide media coverage and in response many young Albanians from all over Kosovo and, more importantly, the notables of the region, vowed revenge.[18] As a result, the KLA was flooded with new recruits; and the KLA underground infrastructure in Kosovo and supply bases in northern Albania, built-up during the previous year, proved quite adequate in providing arms and a rather rudimentary

organisational stucture for its new units. In the spring of 1998, the KLA transformed itself from a clandestine terrorist group into a mass guerilla force and found itself leading an armed uprising in the west and northwest of Kosovo against the Serbian rule. As its newly formed and uncoordinated units set up roadblocks around urban areas in this region, in late June 1998, its commanders claimed that the KLA controlled over 50 per cent of Kosovo's territory.[19] The Serb authorities initially made no attempt to counter the KLA spread, concentrating instead on guarding the cities and towns and communication links among them. But in order to establish its provisional government and thus assert its wider authority in Kosovo, the KLA needed to capture a town; accordingly, in July 1998 it attacked and almost captured the town of Orahovac.[20] The response of the Serb authorities this time was swift and devasting: having driven the KLA out of Orahovac, it launched a massive offensive, with armour and air support, forcing the KLA units to withdraw into the hills, out of the range of the Yugoslav artillery, and thus to abandon the territory they held. Together with the KLA units, in August 1998, tens of thousands of Albanians fled the Yugoslav military onslaught and the devastation it brought to their villages.

THE FIRST INTERNATIONAL INTERVENTION: TO MONITOR A CEASEFIRE OR TO EXPOSE ATROCITIES?

The television images of Kosovo Albanian refugees – crying babies, distraught mothers and elderly men, huddling in the open or fleeing on foot or tractors into the hills – brought swift international intervention to contain the Yugoslav armed forces. After the fall of the KLA last stronghold, Junik, in September 1998 the UN Security Council, in its Resolution 1119 called for a ceasefire, the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces and the return of refugees to their homes, threatening to take other measures if the resolution was ignored. These threats were backed in October 1998 by a NATO 'activation order' for air strikes against Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro). The threats were supposed to force Milošević's government to withdraw its forces and thus enable a safe return of the refugees before the onset of winter, averting a 'humanitarian catastrophe' in Kosovo. The agreement which the US special envoy Holbrooke reached with Milošević in late October 1998, apparently averted this catastrophe. The Yugoslav military and police units which had recently been brought into the province withdrew, allowing the Albanian refugees (and the KLA units with them) to

return to their villages. The ceasefire between the Yugoslav forces and the KLA, in accordance with the agreement, was monitored by 2000 unarmed 'verifiers' from the US and West European countries, under the nominal control of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), as well as by NATO reconnaissance aircraft.

As a result of the US-initiated negotiations, the KLA – which was, less than a year before still a small, clandestine terrorist group – became a partner to an internationally monitored ceasefire agreement. In his first meetings with the KLA commanders, in early 1998, Holbrooke found that the organisation had no political spokesperson empowered to represent it in negotiations with the US. But by July the KLA had speedily appointed as their spokesman a veteran Kosovo Albanian politician, Jakup Krasniqi. In one of his first interviews he stated that KLA's ultimate political goal is the unification of all Albanians in the Balkans in one state.[21] This set the KLA sharply apart from the Democratic League of Kosovo, which held fast to its earlier goal of Kosovo's independence, both from Yugoslavia and Albania.[22]

The KLA's leaders agreed to the US-negotiated ceasefire because it allowed the KLA to retake unchallenged the territory from which the Yugoslav forces had withdrawn. The OSCE 'verifiers', deployed in the province, did not prevent the KLA redeployment and protected its units from Yugoslav forces' attacks; this enabled it to regroup and train for offensive operations in the coming spring. From October 1998 the KLA reorganised and centralised its command structure, setting up a separate political directorate and a general staff with operational and sectional commands. In addition, it set up its own military academy, trying, through short-term courses, to increase its number of trained military personnel. The major boost to its military capabilities were the military supplies, which the Albanian government, with the tacit agreement of the NATO forces stationed in Albania, channeled to the KLA through its already established bases around the towns of Kukes and Trpoje, near the border with Kosovo.

While, during the winter of 1998/99, the ceasefire continued to be broken by both sides, the US negotiators engaged in an intensive but ultimately futile search for a political settlement: Milošević did not want to hand over Yugoslav sovereignty over Kosovo to any party and the KLA, true to its earlier goals, unconditionally rejected Yugoslav or Serbian sovereignty over Kosovo. As the US intelligence reports had warned immediately after the October ceasefire agreement, the presence of the OSCE verifiers in Kosovo also enabled the KLA to draw

NATO into the conflict with the Yugoslav government by 'provoking Serbian forces into further atrocities'.[23]

The fighting which broke out in early 1999 soon provided this kind of opportunity: after a short engagement of the KLA and the Serbian special police unit in the village of Račak in western Kosovo, the KLA, on 16 January 1999, displayed the bullet-ridden bodies of several dozen men in a ditch outside the village (as well as others found in the village itself, 45 in all) to the invited Western press and OSCE verifiers.[24] The US head of the OSCE verifiers condemned this, on the spot, as a cold-blooded massacre of civilians, implying that the Serbian forces were responsible for it; his condemnation provided an authoritative commentary to the pictures of the massacred civilians which were then widely broadcast. In response to this televised massacre, the US and its NATO allies decided to send a NATO contingent into Kosovo and to induce, by further threats of air strikes, an almost total withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces from Kosovo. For this purpose the US-led Contact group, with the addition of Italy, summoned the Yugoslav government (under a renewed threat from NATO air strikes) and the Albanian political representatives to negotiations on 6 February 1999 at the Rambouillet chateau near Paris.

The Albanian delegation was headed by the new political head of the KLA, the 29-year-old Hashim Thaçi, while the elected president of the Republic of Kosovo, Dr Rugova, was demoted to being his deputy.[25] On the model of the Dayton negotiations over Bosnia, the sponsors – this time, the French and British ministers for foreign affairs – provided the draft of an agreement, suitably called the 'Rambouillet accords', which, like the Dayton agreement, contained a detailed constitution for Kosovo as well a military implementation agreement. Following the Dayton agreement model, the chief of international administration and the NATO commander would have retained complete control over, respectively, civilian and military affairs of the province (see Chapter 11). The NATO forces would have replaced the Yugoslav army and police units, except for a small number of Yugoslav border guards and Serbian police officers. The military implementation agreement, in addition, granted the NATO forces the right of unrestricted movement within the whole of Yugoslavia, raising the possibility of NATO military operations in Serbia outside of Kosovo.[26] But, in contrast to the Dayton negotiations, at Rambouillet the negotiators repeatedly and publicly warned one side – the Yugoslav government – that it faced NATO bombing unless it signed the accords.

By 23 February, the parties came to a broad agreement over the constitutional structure of Kosovo, which, much as the Dayton constitu-

tion did for Bosnia, contained safeguards against political domination of one national group over the other(s). However, the Albanian delegation insisted on a referendum on independence to be held within three years; and the Yugoslav delegation objected to NATO's exclusive control of the international military and civilian administration, proposing, instead, a lightly armed force under the UN command. Faced with this impasse, the NATO negotiators granted the KLA's request for an adjournment until 15 March, ostensibly in order that the Albanian delegation could consult its constituency in Kosovo; soon after the adjournment, the KLA head Hashim Thaçi was appointed the prime minister of the provisional government, apparently replacing Dr Bukashi of the Democratic League. Holbrooke's attempts, during the adjournment, to get Milošević to waive his government's objections to NATO's exclusive control over the military and civilian administration in Kosovo failed; and on 15 March 1999 the Kosovo Albanian delegation could safely sign the Rambouillet accords, knowing that, as a result of the Yugoslav government's refusal to sign them, NATO was very likely going to bomb Yugoslavia and thus facilitate the KLA's liberation of Kosovo.

MAKING KOSOVO SAFE FOR KOSOVO ALBANIANS: NATO'S LIBERATION OF KOSOVO

The avowed aims of NATO's bombing campaign were to 'deter further attacks on civilians', to decrease Yugoslavia's military capacity to wage war, as well as to punish the Yugoslav government for refusing to sign the Rambouillet accords.[27] The bombing started on 24 March 1999 with fully televised aeroplane and cruise missile attacks on Yugoslav military airfields and military installations near Belgrade as well as Priština. By the third week of bombing, however, NATO started to target factories, unrelated to the war effort, including food processing plants,[28] electric power plants as well as roads and bridges. After four weeks of bombing, television stations and the political party offices of Milošević's suporters as well as Milošević's private residences became, in NATO's jargon, 'legitimate targets'.[29] As NATO aircraft were forced to fly at high altitudes to avoid the Yugoslav air defences, NATO pilots had serious difficulties in finding and hitting military targets on the ground. As a result, the US pilots repeatedly mistook Kosovo Albanian refugee convoys for convoys of military vehicles; this cost several hundred Kosovo Albanian refugees their lives. Highly restricted in

their capacity to attack Yugoslav military forces, NATO commanders broadened their range of targets as well as the objectives of their bombing campaign. Thus, the bombing of Milošević's private residences and the dropping, over Serbia millions of propaganda leaflets directed against Milošević's regime, suggested that NATO was also aiming at removing Milošević from power. At the later stages of the bombing campaign, the Hague International Tribunal, on 23 May 1999, indicted Milošević and four of his aides for crimes against humanity, charging them, among other things, with organising and executing the mass expulsion, as well as killing, of Kosovo Albanians during the two months of war (see below). This was followed, after the ending of one bombing campaign, by the bounty of US$ 5 million, offered by the US government, on 25 June 1999, for information leading to their arrest or capture.

The bombing campaign, however, did not hinder the course of the wide-ranging offensive which the Yugoslav military had already launched against the KLA in mid-March 1999, before the bombing started. As before, this offensive displaced thousands of Kosovo Albanians, many of whom fled over the border to Macedonia and Albania. After the bombing started, the Yugoslav military and the Serbian paramilitaries systematically expelled Kosovo Albanian civilians, directing them towards Macedonia and Albania, at times in specially provided trains and buses. As a result, within a month of the start of the bombing, around 700 000 Kosovo Albanians had been forced across the borders and many more displaced within the province. This was the single largest forced expulsion of population in former Yugoslavia to date, exceeding the number of persons expelled in a similar operation carried out in September 1995 by the Muslim forces and the Croatian army against the Serbs in western Bosnia; unlike the latter, the Kosovo operation attracted continuous and widespread media coverage and was thus used to justify NATO's continued bombing of Yugoslavia. After the NATO bombing started, the Serb paramilitaries apparently carried out a series of random massacres of Kosovo Albanian civilians as well.[30]

Unaffected by NATO bombing, the Yugoslav forces, a few days after it started, took the KLA command centres in the Drenica and Podujevo regions[31] and, in the next two weeks, cut the KLA units off completely from their bases in Albania. Left without civilian support (as a result of the mass expulsion of Kosovo Albanians), short of ammunition, and under constant pursuit, the KLA dispersed into smaller units.[32] In spite of the KLA's help provided in guiding NATO's bombers

to their targets in Kosovo, its hopes that the NATO bombing campaign would enable it to enlarge and consolidate its territory were soon completely shattered:[33] its presence was reduced to its training and supply bases in Albania and scattered units hiding in the hills of Kosovo. However, by the end of May 1999, the KLA was reported to have more than 8000 troops in its bases in Albania, recruited from the Albanian diaspora in the US, Canada and Germany and armed by the Albanian government.[34] At that stage, a Croatian army general, of Kosovo Albanian background, was appointed as the KLA commander-in-chief.[35] Yet, in spite of systematic NATO air support, involving bombing by B-52 bombers, the KLA units from their bases in Albania failed to break through the Yugoslav forces defences on the Albanian border and, as a result, the KLA was not able to use its troops from Albania in the liberation of Kosovo.

After more than two months of bombing, NATO failed to decrease Yugoslav military capacity to wage war against the KLA and to undermine Milošević's regime. The political leaders of NATO member states, however, could not agree on a NATO ground invasion of Kosovo: while the more bellicose British and US governments appeared to favour it, the German Chancellor, on 21 May, ruled it out. A way out of this impasse was found in the peace agreement negotiated on 3 June 1999 by the Russian envoy Victor Chernomydin and the EU envoy Martti Arthisaari[36] which allowed both NATO's leaders and Milošević to claim victory. The agreement required the withdrawal of all Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the establishment of 'an international security and civilian presence' under the authority of the UN Security Council. The 'security presence' would consist of NATO forces as well as forces from other countries, including Russia, under a unified command.[37] The 'civilian presence', headed by the special representative appointed by the UN Secretary General was to establish an interim international administration which should ensure 'a substantial autonomy of Kosovo ... within the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia'. Moreover, the agreement which Milošević accepted, makes no mention of 'the future status of Kosovo' and of any political process which should determine it.[38] The guarantees of the territorial integrity of Yugoslavia, including the province of Kosovo, and the reassertion of the UN authority in Kosovo were, Milošević claimed, a victory for his country.[39] The withdrawal of Yugoslav forces from Kosovo and the deployment of the international forces called 'KFOR' under NATO command were, on the other hand, deemed to be a victory for NATO.[40]

The 78 days of bombing, which cost the NATO countries involved, on average, £62 million per day,[41] caused widespread damage to the

Yugoslav industrial and transport infrastructure while it failed to decrease significantly the Yugoslav armed forces movements or capability.[42] The war took the heaviest toll on those whom NATO sought to protect: early estimates suggest that many more Kosovo Albanians, both KLA fighters and civilians, were killed in the war than Yugoslav soldiers or civilians.[43] Nonetheless, NATO troops entering Kosovo were joyously greeted by Kosovo Albanians as liberators. The KLA fighters, free at last to take control of the cities and the countryside, started to kill Kosovo Serbs as well as Kosovo Albanians whom they regarded as Serb collaborators. As many Kosovo Albanian refugees followed the advancing NATO forces from Macedonia into Kosovo, so the Serbs from Kosovo, together with their clergy, were following the withdrawing Yugoslav military units into Serbia. As before, the liberation for one national group meant enforced exile for another.

KOSOVO BETWEEN THE KLA AND NATO: FROM NATIONAL LIBERATION TO AN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTORATE

Like the post-communist nationalist parties in Slovenia and Croatia, the Democratic League of Kosovo was led by dissident – mostly ex-communist – intellectuals and it appealed, as a defender of the national cause, to both communist and non-communist Kosovo Albanians. Unlike the Slovenian and Croatian nationalist parties, the Democratic League had no legal or parliamentary means of gaining power in Kosovo: Serbia's constitution of 1990 had removed the legal powers of Kosovo's assembly and Milošević's government barred from political office anyone who would contest its rule over Kosovo. The League's response was to establish a parallel if somewhat limited government of Kosovo Albanians and attempt to change Milošević's policies by peaceful protest and pressure from foreign governments. But, unlike the Slovenian and Croatian movements upon their ascent to power in 1990, the Kosovo Albanian parallel government had no armed forces nor military infrastructure through which it could build an armed force. Moreover, its leaders avoided armed confrontation of any kind with Milošević's government, believing – as it turned out correctly – that their Kosovo Albanian constituency would suffer most from such a confrontation.

After the Dayton agreement in 1995, it became clear that the Democratic League's passive resistance policy was not making any advance in the national liberation of Kosovo Albanians, partly because the US

and the EC were not ready to threaten to use force or to use force against Milošević's government in order to advance this cause in any form. At that time, the US government and the EC member states were not ready to consider introducing an international UN protectorate for Kosovo which Kosovo Albanian intellectuals had been proposing since the early 1990s.[44]

Unlike the Democratic League, the Kosovo Liberation Army was a small, clandestine group whose leaders were not intellectuals but professional revolutionaries; its members and supporters were initially recruited among the Kosovo Albanian guest workers in West Europe as well as the marginalised and unemployed youth in Kosovo, embittered by the years of what they regarded as Serbian oppression. In contrast to the Democratic League for Kosovo, the KLA's leaders were committed to an armed struggle for liberation from the Serbian rule, regardless of its human or any other cost. The KLA's sudden transformation from a clandestine group to a mass armed movement in early 1998 appears to have taken both the Democratic League and the Serbian government by surprise: neither expected that armed struggle would find so wide an appeal among the Albanian population.

In its first major campaign in June/July 1998, the KLA relied mostly on its own forces and supplies, financed by the Kosovo Albanian diaspora and channeled through its Albanian bases. However, the failure of this campaign and the consequent Serbian re-conquest of its territory, probably convinced its leadership of the need to seek outside intervention. The previous cases of outside intervention from Slovenia to Bosnia-Hercegovina provided an obvious model: refugee crises and atrocities against civilians, suitably presented on television, were increasingly followed by the UN or, preferably, NATO intervention . Indeed, following the suitable media coverage of the refugee crisis and the killings by the Serbian police (during the Serbian counter-offensive in August/September 1998), the OSCE, sponsored by NATO, did intervene. Yet, like their counterparts, the UN forces in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the OSCE verifiers were highly restricted in their mandate and thus not in a position to prevent atrocities or to protect civilians in any effective way. But, apart from monitoring the ceasefire and admonishing those who breach it, their principal role, as it turned out, was thus to provide a seemingly impartial but authoritative judgement – similar to that of the UN forces in Sarajevo – on the televised aftermath of atrocities. Media presentation of the aftermath of the massacre at Račak in January 1999, with the participation of the OSCE verifiers, followed the model of the coverage of the Sarajevo massacres, in

particular the massacre of 28 August 1995 which provided a pretext for NATO bombing of the Serb Republic.

While the Račak massacre did not trigger the bombing of Yugoslavia, it triggered the US decision to deploy NATO troops in Kosovo, even without the agreement of the Yugoslav government.[45] It was the KLA's military attacks and the subsequent media campaign, not the Democratic League's diplomacy that secured US and NATO intervention in support of the Kosovo Alabanian national movement; partly as a result of this, the KLA formally took over the leadership of the movement from the Democratic League, by replacing the latter's appointee as the prime minister of the provisional government. Yet the KLA failed to liberate any part of Kosovo from the Yugoslav forces. Like the Muslim forces in 1995 in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the KLA was simply not a match, in terms of its weapons and training, to the forces of its opponents; more importantly, unlike the Muslim forces in western Bosnia in September 1995, it had no well-trained and well-armed allied ground force to support to it. The absence of a proxy ground force made it necessary for NATO to rely exclusively on its bombing campaign to effect the withdrawal of the Yugoslav forces. Unlike the Bosnian Serb military in 1995, the Yugoslav forces withdrew from Kosovo as a consequence of a negotiated agreement and not of military action by its opponents.

As a result of this, the neutralisation of the Yugoslav armed forces in Kosovo did not follow the Dayton agreement model of disengagement and demobilisation, but rather the earlier model of the UN deployment in Croatia in 1992 negotiated by the UN envoy Cyrus Vance. Similarly to the UN-negotiatied accord in Croatia in 1992, the UN Security Council Resolution 1244 required that all Yugoslav military and police forces withdraw from the region and that all the local forces be 'demilitarised'. The agreement on the demilitarisation of the KLA which NATO and the KLA commanders reached in June 1999 envisaged an eventual transformation of the KLA into a territorial defence force,[46] quite similar to the role of the Serb militias in the four UNPAs in Croatia after the deployment of the UN forces in February 1992 (see Chapter 10). Like the Serb militias in Croatia, the KLA was commanded by a professional officer of its own national group but from a friendly army – in this case, the Croatian army.

Unlike the UN forces in the four UNPAs in Croatia, however, KFOR in Kosovo was given a civilian counterpart – the UN special representative – in charge of an international administration. If the UN special representative in Kosovo is granted the same powers as the

UN high representative in Bosnia- Hercegovina, he may yet undermine the KLA's political domination and allow other Kosovo Albanian parties a voice in the political life of the province.

In short, as in Bosnia-Hercegovina, the international administrator and its military force could determine which party or parties will rule over Kosovo. In this sense, the liberation of Kosovo, like that of Bosnia-Hercegovina, is unfinished. Yet in Kosovo, the NATO military intervention aided an armed secessionist movement which was supported by a neighbouring state, Albania, and which aimed at unification of its seceding province with that state. In Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Croatia, the US and NATO intervened to suppress similar Serb secessionist movements which were supported by a neighbouring state, Serbia, and aimed at the unification of their regions with that state. The end result, in Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina, at least in the short-term, may be quite similar: a 'substantial autonomy', under a strict supervision of the international administration, for each national group within the very state from which they wanted to secede.[47] However, at the time of writing, while the US government is committed to suppression, by force, of any secession from Bosnia-Hercegovina it would be highly unlikely that the US would use force to suppress a Kosovo Albanian secession from Yugoslavia.

In view of the systematic efforts of the US government to depose Milošević from power in Yugoslavia, it appears that, apart from Kosovo and Bosnia-Hercegovina, other regions of the Balkans – Serbia, perhaps – may come under some sort of international protectorate or control. In any case, the US and NATO intervention in Croatia, Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo may have inaugurated a new era in international management of national liberation movements through the establishment of international protectorates, an era which may yet last well into the twenty-first century.

Epilogue: National Liberations: is there an end to them?

The most recent round of national liberations, starting in 1991 with the liberation of Slovenia and Croatia, was the fourth[1] round of national liberations in former Yugoslavia this century. This process has now lasted two centuries: the first round of national liberation in the territory of former Yugoslavia started in 1804 with the first Serbian uprising against Ottoman rule. As the fourth round appears not to have ended as yet, it is difficult to say whether it will be the final one, after which there would be no national group left still in need of liberation from foreign rule. The history of the national liberations in this century suggests, however, that this may not be the final round: at least two previous rounds were, erroneously, thought to be the final ones.

The first round, the liberation of Kosovo and 'old Serbia' – the present-day Macedonia – from the Ottoman rule by the Serbian and Montenegrin armies during the first Balkan war in 1912, was certainly not thought to be the final round. For the Serbian political and military leaders who planned and executed it in alliance with the governments of Greece, Bulgaria, Montenegro and Romania, there were, after 1912, other Serbs as well as the Serb 'brethren' – the Croats and Slovenes – under the Habsburg rule who were still awaiting liberation by the Serbian army.

The first round of liberation was bitterly contested: first by the Albanians in Kosovo, who resisted, together with the Ottoman troops, the Serbian army, and then by the Bulgarian government who claimed a part of the territory of the present-day Macedonia on the ground that its inhabitants are in fact Bulgarians. Thus the first round in this century set the following pattern of contested liberations, which was then repeated in the next three rounds, including the recent one: the liberation of one national group was regarded by another national group (or, rather, by its putative or actual political leaders) living on the same territory as occupation and imposition of foreign rule. The pattern ensured further continuation and repetition of national liberations, as the

contesting national group would, at the earliest opportunity, attempt to liberate itself from the new foreign ruler. In the case of Kosovo Albanians, this happened four times after 1912: the Kosovo Albanians staged unsuccessful uprisings against the Yugoslav authorities in 1918 and 1944/45 and were able to overthrow the Yugoslav government rule, first, after the latter's defeat by the Axis in 1941 and, then, with the help of NATO, in 1999.

The second round of national liberations started with the Serbian government's declaration of December 1914, in which the liberation of the 'enslaved brethren' from the Habsburg rule was proclaimed one of the principal war aims of the small kingdom. It ended with the unification of the South Slav lands of the dissolved Austria–Hungary with the Kingdom of Serbia (with which the Kingdom of Montenegro had already been united) in December 1918: the Croats and Slovenes, as well as the Serbs, appeared to have found freedom from foreign rule, for the first time since the Middle Ages, in a new kingdom under the ruling Serbian dynasty. As the enthusiastic speeches of regent Aleksandar and the Croatian politicians at the time of unification testify, to many the creation of the new kingdom – the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes – appeared to be the final liberation of the South Slavs from foreign rule.

This appearance soon turned out to be an illusion. As the protests of the Croat soldiers of an Austro–Hungarian regiment in Zagreb after the unification (see Chapter 1) anticipated, many Croats came to regard the Serbian politicians and administrators in the new kingdom as their new foreign rulers. The Croat national movement, led by the Croat Peasant party, advocated liberation from the Serbian rule through the establishment of full sovereignty of the Croatian Diet over Croatia and a confederal union of Croatia with Serbia and other South Slav lands. That goal was attained, on the eve of World War II, when the Serbian regent created a semi-sovereign province of Croatia within the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. But, meanwhile, the goal of complete independence of Croatia from Yugoslavia had not been abandoned: a small, right-wing and terrorist group, the Croat Ustasha, from 1929 had propagated an armed struggle against the Serb occupier.

The Croat national movement was not the only movement which contested the national liberation of 1918 as an imposition of foreign rule: the Kosovo Albanians rose in rebellion against the new rulers in 1918 and another terrorist anti-Yugoslav organisation, the Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organistion (or VMRO in Macedonian), based in Bulgaria, found some supporters among the Slav Macedo-

nians who were, in the Kingdom of Yugoslavia, not recognized as a separate national group.

The defeat of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia by the Axis powers in 1941 led to another, third, round of national liberations. The Axis powers presented their occupation and dismemberment of Yugoslavia as the final liberation from Serb rule; thus the Croat Ustasha were able, with Nazi help, to take power in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and to proceed to liberate, in their own gruesome way, these lands from the Serbs; Kosovo was liberated, with the help of Italian troops and united with Albania, also under Italian rule. The Bulgarian troops liberated Macedonia, whose inhabitants they regarded as Bulgarians and the Hungarian ones parts of Vojvodina in northern Serbia, with a substantial Hungarian population.

The resistance movements in Yugoslavia, both the Chetniks loyal to the Serbian dynasty and the communist-led Partisans, aimed, of course, at the liberation from the Axis powers and their rule. But, unlike that of the royalist Chetniks, the Partisans' aim was to liberate all nations and nationalities of Yugoslavia from the rule of the Serbian royal house and the Serbian bourgeoisie as well. Accordingly, their programme called for the liberation of previously unrecognized national groups – the Macedonians, Albanians and Muslims – as well as the recognized national groups, such as the Croats – all of whom were oppressed by the previous (mainly, but not exclusively, Serb) rulers. In short, they promised both what the Axis had already delivered – the liberation from the previous foreign rulers, the Serbian royal house and its politicians – and the liberation from the Axis and their 'domestic lackeys'. The result of so comprehensive a national liberation was to be a federal Yugoslavia, reconstituted finally as a free and common homeland of all its equal nations and nationalities.

While the Partisan programme of national liberation for all nations and national groups had a much wider appeal than the old fashioned and Serb-centered royalist ideology of the Chetniks, its wider appeal cannot fully account for the Partisans' victory over the rival royalist resistance movement. It was the switch of British military assistance and political recognition in 1943/44 from the royalist Chetniks to communist Partisans that enabled the latter, as the principal British ally in Yugoslavia, to recruit and arm a significantly larger number of fighters and, at the close of the war, to wipe out the remnants of the royalist forces. Winning the support of a major Allied power was, in this contest among national liberation movements, a necessary prerequisite for victory.

As they reconstituted Yugoslavia as a federation of six republics and five equal constituent nations, the Yugoslav communists systematically suppressed not only rival national liberation movements – such as the one that led the Kosovo Albanians to an uprising in 1944/45 – but also attempted to eradicate any rival national ideologies as remnants of the superseded bourgeois ideologies. However, as the local communist elites started to expand their power bases within each of the six republics, they found, in the mid-1960s, that some of the previously discarded national liberation ideologies still retained their mass appeal: the liberation of Croatia from the rule of Belgrade, the battle cry of the Croatian national movement in the period 1918–39, reappeared as the slogan of the Croat national movement from 1967 onwards. Moreover, the new ideologies – those of the Muslims, Macedonians and Kosovo Albanians – were in the late 1960s constructed on the same model of national liberation from the rule of centralising and Belgrade-based state apparatus. At the point at which the new national movements appeared to threaten the rule of the established communist elites and Tito himself, they were – like the Croatian one in 1971 – suppressed. But the non-threatening national ideologies of the emergent and smaller national groups were allowed to thrive under the guise of their cultural and national revival.

This appeared to be a somewhat incoherent policy of 'encourage and suppress' aiming at containing politically undesirable or threatening nationalisms: while various national ideologies, considered to be threatening to the ruling political elite, were suppressed and their advocates jailed or banned from employment, other, supposedly non-threatening, national ideologies were encouraged. However, the suppression of the Croat and the Serb national ideologies as reactionary and violent doctrines failed to eradicate them; instead, it relegated them to the realm of political dissidence and protest. The dissident intellectuals who continued to articulate the suppressed national ideologies interpreted the communist policy of 'encourage and suppress', as a systematic attempt to humiliate 'their' national groups and to deny their rightful share of power and influence at the expense of other, more favoured nations. This not only heightened their sense of grievance but also served to fuel mistrust and, later, hate, of the national groups, which the communist policy allegedly favoured.

In an attempt to widen their appeal and thus secure their hold on power, the communist political leaders first in Serbia in 1987 and, then, a year later in Slovenia, expropriated the rhetoric of the dissident national ideologies and thus brought them into the mainstream

political discourse. As before, these national ideologies proved to be convenient instruments for channeling popular grievances away from the local elites in power: the culprits for various national woes were found among other national groups who were increasingly portrayed as foreign oppressors.

The emergence of national liberation ideologies advocating separate national liberation of various nations and nationalities into the mainstream politics indicated that the third round of national liberation, completed in 1945, was not as previously thought, the last. In retrospect, one could argue that the fourth round of national liberation in fact started with the ascent to power of the political parties advocating the need for renewed liberation of their national groups. The first political campaign in the new liberation style was Milošević's campaign, started in 1987, for the unification of Serbia as well as for political unification of the Serbs in Yugoslavia: only by achieving the desired political unification, it was then argued, could the Serbs be – finally – liberated from the rule of non-Serbs. This political campaign both triggered and served as a model for similar campaigns in other Yugoslav republics. The end-result of the renewed national liberations was no longer to be Yugoslavia – a common homeland of South Slavs – but a separate nation-state for each national group: the idea of a common homeland for the South Slavs appeared, in the late 1980s, to have finally exhausted its role as a nationally liberating ideology.

The outbreak of violence and war which followed the political campaigns of the new national parties in various Yugoslav republics was easily explicable in the terms of the national liberation ideologies which they advocated. Anyone who is thought to oppose the liberation of a particular group is, within the framework of a national liberation ideology, a foreign enemy or an instrument of such an enemy; the use of force against foreign enemies is, within this framework, not only justified but, at times, necessary. Accordingly, the political leaders in Yugoslavia, who came to power on various national liberation platforms in 1990, proceeded to fight against those whom they labelled as foreign enemies. In 1990 the Croatian government and its police forces became the foreign enemy of the Serb Krajina political leaders while they and their militias became, for the Croatian government, instruments of a foreign government in Belgrade. In 1991 the Yugoslav federal army became the foreign occupying force first for the Slovenian, and, later, for the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim governments as well.

Moreover, like their nineteenth-century predecessors, in the 1980s the dissident national ideologies had already drawn mutually incompatible

maps of their desired nation-states: different nation-states appeared, on those imagined maps, to claim one and the same piece of territory. What started as an ideological contest over territory, in 1991 turned into a war or series of wars over the same contested territories.

The combatants in these wars greatly differed in their command of armed force, partly because the largest and the best equipped force, the Yugoslav federal army, failed to fragment itself completely into national components and its officers and high command retained, for much longer than any political movement in the country, an allegiance to Yugoslavia as a common homeland for all national groups. As such the Yugoslav federal army was considered a major obstacle to the national liberation movements which aimed at the partition of Yugoslavia into separate nation states. The neutralisation and withdrawal of this foreign occupying force became the primary objective of the secessionist governments of Slovenia, Croatia and of Bosnia-Hercegovina, as well as the national liberation movement of the Kosovo Albanians.

As neither of these three governments – separately or jointly – initially commanded the armed forces matching the Yugoslav federal army, all called for an international intervention to neturalise it and its successors in Bosnia-Hercegovina and Kosovo. In this task, the EC succeeded in Slovenia but failed in Croatia; the UN succeeded in Croatia, but failed in Bosnia-Hercegovina. And to complete the task in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Kosovo, NATO had first to launch an air bombing campaign and then to deploy its ground troops. This pattern of outside intervention and the increasing use of armed force to subdue the successors of the Yugoslav federal army in Bosnia-Hercegovina and in Kosovo reflected the transformation of the Yugoslav federal army into an armed force of the Serb national liberation movements and of the Serbian government: as it transformed itself into a force or forces of a national movement, the Yugoslav federal army became increasingly resistant to international neutralisation.

In this process of intervention, the outside powers – first the EC and then the US – adopted the policies of support for selected national liberation movements, similar to the 'encourage and suppress' policies of the Yugoslav Communist party in the past. Thus the EC supported the Slovenian, Croatian and Bosnian Muslim national liberation movements by recognizing their territorial claims, while ignoring the territorial claims of similar movements of the Serbs in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina and of the Albanians in Kosovo (as well as of the Muslims from Sandžak). The US government, in 1994, extended military assistance to the Croatian and Bosnian Muslim movements, and,

in 1999, to the Kosovo Albanian liberation movement as well; in this way the US government, through its military assistance and NATO military intervention, aided the suppression of the Serb liberation movements in Croatia and in Bosnia-Hercegovina and initiated the removal of the Serb leader Milošević from power. The objectives of the US policy of selective support and suppression of national movements in former Yugoslavia obviously differ from those of the Yugoslav Communist party in the past. Yet the US government and its European allies believed – as did the Yugoslav communist leaders – that their policy would lead to long-term political stability and peace in the region. The Yugoslav communist party leaders, as we have seen, proved to be wrong. There are at least three reasons why the US government's belief may yet prove to be wrong as well.

First, the suppression of national liberation movements and removal of their advocates from power and influence does not eradicate the national ideologies which inspire them; on the contrary, the suppression only enhances the sense of grievance which fuels national liberation ideologies. This was, as we have pointed out, the result of the Yugoslav Communist party's suppression of selected national ideologies. Hence the suppression of the Serb national movements is unlikely to eradicate the idea of Serb unification or of Serb liberation from foreign rule.

Second, the military and diplomatic support of selected national movements raises the expectation of other national movements: they hope to receive military assistance or to benefit from a foreign intervention in their striving for a nation-state of their own or a unification with what they consider to be their homeland. As their state-building aspirations clash with those of the already established or supported national movements, this may lead to further conflict and renewed bouts of national liberation. In former Yugoslavia, there are several such aspiring national movements; for example, the movement of Albanians in Macedonia which aims, ultimately, at the unification with Albania and Kosovo, and the movement of the Muslims of the Sandžak region in Serbia and Montenegro, which aims at an independent state or unification with the Muslim state in Bosnia-Hercegovina. The aspiration of the former threaten the territorial integrity and possibly the very existence of the Republic of Macedonia; and the aspiration of the latter, the territorial integrity of Serbia as well as Montenegro.

Third, arming and supporting two or more national movements which harbour mutually conflicting territorial claims and aspirations increases the likelihood of violent conflict among them. Thus, in spite of accepting the US-sponsored Muslim–Croat federation, some

Bosnian Croat political leaders as well political leaders in Croatia itself have not abandoned the idea of the unification of its Croat-majority cantons in Bosnia with Croatia. At the time of writing, the principal obstacle to the realisation of this idea are the NATO-commanded SFOR troops in Bosnia-Hercegovina. But any attempt to realise this idea, once SFOR troops leave the country, would almost certainly lead to conflict with the Muslim party and its military forces.

The need for an indefinite and increasing deployment of foreign troops to keep the peace in the region also suggests that the present policy of supporting selected national liberation movements and suppressing others does not without considerable military presence lead to the desired political stability. At the time of writing it is far from clear whether, in time, this policy will yield stability and peace without the need for a continuous foreign military presence.

While it is at this stage entirely speculative to suggest alternatives to the present US policies, it is perhaps important to note that there are alternative ways of approaching national liberation movements and the grievances on which they thrive, to the 'encourage and suppress' approach favoured so far.

The main grievance which the national liberation movements address is the personal humiliation and physical insecurity brought about by foreign rule; to remove that grievance, it is necessary to escape from foreign rule. But national liberation through armed struggle is surely not the only way to achieve this: each national group could be given an opportunity to choose, through a suitably conducted referendum or plebiscite, a state within which it wants to live, even if this leads to a proliferation of small states.[2] The EC decision to extend recognition only to the federal units within Yugoslavia denied this opportunity to many national groups in former Yugoslavia, including the Muslims of the Sandžak region and the Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia, and left the field open to the national liberation movements which promised to achieve liberation through armed struggle.

The alternative way of addressing the issue of national self-determination was to organise, prior to the outbreak of war in 1991, internationally supervised plebiscites in all contested regions of former Yugoslavia which would allow each national group to choose a state in which it wants to live. At that time, perhaps, such a task appeared impossible, both because of its apparent technical complexity and because

it appeared to breach the sovereignty of several emerging states in the region. But in retrospect, the task of identifying the contested regions and designing appropriate referendum procedures is no more complex than the many military and refugee relief operations carried out since at a huge cost in human life, displacement and destruction of property. And, in retrospect, the repeated breaches of sovereignty of various states of the region that have taken place since 1991 appear to be much more serious and costly than the suggested plebiscites would have been.

In the course of huge displacement of population, resulting from the successive wars, large numbers of people in former Yugoslavia had been further denied the choice of the state in which they wanted to live while still living in their original homelands. This wrong – the denial of the choice of a state – could still be redressed by organising such plebiscites both among the present inhabitants of the contested regions and those who have been expelled from them. By attempting to redress the wrongs committed in the name of national liberation, this kind of plebiscite could initiate a wider process of reconciliation among the peoples of former Yugoslavia. The plebiscites and a sustained effort at reconciliation would address, I believe, the grievances on which the national liberation movements thrive and thus pre-empt the need for further national liberation: freedom from foreign rule would be achieved in a peaceful way and the neighbouring national groups would no longer be regarded as foreign enemies. No attempt has ever been made at reconciliation of the peoples of former Yugoslavia; as we have seen, they were only subject to repeated cycles of national liberations. There is no guarantee that any such attempt would be successful or that it would end the cycle of national liberations. But, as the fourth round of national liberation appears to be continuing in former Yugoslavia, it may be worthwhile to try what has not been tried before.[3]

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Further Reading

A useful collection of legal documents in English relating to Yugoslav history and the dissolution of the country is found in S. Trifunovska (ed), *Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution*, Vols. 1 and 2, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994, 1999).

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L. Karchmar, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941–2*, Vols 1 and 2, (London: Garland Publishing, 1987).

P. Shoup, 'The Yugoslav Revolution: The First of a New Type,' *Studies on the Soviet Union*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (1971) 215–43.

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H. Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis*, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989).
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S. L. Burg and P. S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, (London: M.E. Sharpe, 1999) (The most comprehensive account of the war in Bosnia-Hercegovina published so far.)
J. Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure*, (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993).
V. Gligorov, *Why do Countries Break Up? The Case of Yugoslavia*, (Uppsala: Acta Universitatis Uppsaliensis – Uppsala Studies on Eastern Europe, Vol. 2, 1994). (A theoretical explanation of the break-up of Yugoslavia by a liberal political theorist from Belgrade.)
R. Thomas, *Serbia under Milošević: Politics in the 1990s*, (London: Hurst, 1999)
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M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, (London: Hurst, 1998) (By far the most reliable account of the recent history of Kosovo.)
Susan L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War*, (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995). (The most comprehensive account published of the latest dissolution of Yugoslavia.)

Notes and References

1 Yugoslavia at the Crossroads of Competing National Myths

1. Not related to Ante Pavelić, the later Ustashe leader.
2. M. B. Petrovich, *A History of Modern Serbia*, vol. 2 (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1975) p. 682.
3. In 1993 the Bosnian Muslim leaders started using the term 'Bosniac' to refer to Bosnian Muslims who were in the Yugoslav censa and terminology referred to as 'Muslims' (*Muslimani*). Since at the present the term is not widely known (and it is still unclear whether it will become widely accepted), I shall continue using 'Bosnian Muslim' to refer to this national group. My doing so indicates no preference for any particular view put forward on the nature of the Bosnian Muslims' or Bosniacs' nationhood and national origins.
4. From the epic poem 'Musić Stevan'; translated by Radmila Gorup.
5. Pavao Ritter Vitezović (1652–1713) in his *Croatia rediviva: egnante Leopoldo Magno Caesare* (Agram, 1700).
6. See I. Banac, *The National Question in Yugoslavia: Origins, History, Politics* (London: Cornell University Press, 1985) pp. 72–3.
7. Ibid, pp. 87–8
8. See P. N. Hehn, 'The Origins of Modern Pan-Serbism – The 1844 *Načertanije* of Ilija Garašanin: Analysis and Translation', *East European Quarterly*, vol. 9 (1975) 153–71.
9. Eastern Orthodox populations, speaking various dialects, including štokavian, had resided in the Habsburg lands well before the Great Migration of Serbs. Many of them (already identified as Serbs) migrated to these lands prior to the Ottoman conquest of the last remnants of the Serbian kingdom in 1459.
10. For the politics of the period see N. J. Miller, *Between Great Serbianism and Yugoslavism: Serbian Politics in Croatia* (Ann Arbor: UMI, 1991, doctoral dissertation, Indiana University 1991).
11. Although they remained mutually fully comprehensible, the two literary standards developed in divergent ways: the Croat standard expanded its vocabulary through the construction of Slav calques while the Serbian resorted to direct foreign borrowings, mainly from French.
12. See W. D. Behschnitt, *Nationalismus bei Serben und Croaten 1830–1914: Analyse und Typologie der nationalen Ideologie* (Munich: R. Oldernbourg, 1980) pp. 206–7.
13. Due to a very high tax qualification for the right to vote, the Croatian electorate was a very small proportion of the total population. The electoral law of May 1910 increased the number of enfranchised males from 50 000 to 190 000 in a province which had around 2 500 000

inhabitants. See F. Šišić, *Pregled povjesti Hrvatskog naroda* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1962) p. 468.

14. See W. D. Behschnitt, op. cit. pp. 106–7.
15. D. Djordjevic and S. Fischer-Galati, *The Balkan Revolutionary Tradition* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1981) p. 150. In 1991 the Bosnian Serbs and Croats proclaimed their respective autonomous states in the very same regions in which they rose in arms against the Ottomans in 1875. These were the regions in which Bosnian Serbs and Bosnian Croats, respectively, form majority populations.
16. Ibid., pp. 92–3 and 118–9.
17. The Austro-Hungarian occupation was resisted by Bosnian Muslim leaders who took over command of the native Ottoman regiments and recruited irregulars. In some areas the Bosnian Muslims were joined by Serb fighters. The Croat population and Roman Catholic clergy in general welcomed the Austrian takeover. In autumn 1878 the Austrian army, at its peak strength of 268 000 men, crushed the much smaller and ill-equipped Bosnian Muslim forces. R. J. Donia and J. V. A. Fine, Jr, *Bosnia–Hercegovina: A Tradition Betrayed* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994) p. 94.
18. This weekly was started in 1911 as an unofficial organ of the secret organisation 'Unity or Death', popularly known as the 'Black Hand', which was committed to Serb unification by armed force.
19. See W. D. Behschnitt, op. cit., pp. 118–24
20. See S. Skendi, *The Albanian National Awakening 1878–1912* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967) pp. 36–9
21. For a concise account of the policies and actions of the Balkan socialist parties see L. S. Stavrianos, *Balkan Federation: A History of the Movement toward Balkan Unity in Modern Times* (Hamden: Archon Books, 1964, originally published 1942) pp. 182–202.
22. The extent to which the Serbian government and its premier Nikola Pašić knew of the assassination plot is still debated among historians. See W. D. Behschnitt, op. cit., note 346, pp. 307–9. See also M. B. Petrovich, op. cit., pp. 618–20 and M. Cornwall, 'Serbia' in K. Wilson (ed.), *Decisions for War, 1914* (London: University of California Press, 1995) pp. 56–60. In reviewing recent literature on the subject, John W. Langdon writes:

> The Serbian government did not inspire the plot and made well-intentioned but ineffective efforts to forestall it. The argument that governments are responsible for terrorist actions launched from their jurisdictions is technically correct but hopelessly abstract . . . Serbia bears responsibility, in the limited sense just outlined, for the Sarajevo crime. It does not bear responsibility for the outbreak of a general war, for which the murder of Franz Ferdinand was only a pretext.

J. W. Langdon, *July 1914: The Long Debate 1918–90* (New York: Berg, 1991) p. 176.

23. See M. B. Petrovich, op. cit., pp. 613–8.
24. D. Janković, 'O Niškoj deklaraciji 1914' in *Naučni Skup u povodu 50-godišnjice raspada Austro-Ugarske monarhije i stvaranja jugoslavenske države* (Zagreb: Jugoslavenska akademija znanosti i umjetnosti, 1969) p. 133.

25. They rejected the declaration on the grounds that there was no public debate on it. The Serbian Social Democrats opposed the war as an imperialist war and advocated a democratic Balkan federation of equal peoples. Ibid., p. 139.
26. See M. B. Petrovich, op.cit., pp. 644–5 and S. Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its Creation to its Dissolution* (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) pp. 141–2.
27. For the text of the speech see I. Mužić, *Hrvatska politika i jugoslavenska ideja* (Split: author's edition, 1969) pp. 135–44.
28. For the list of terms see M. B. Petrovich, op. cit. pp. 676–7 and S. Trifunovska (ed.) op. cit. pp. 151–2.
29. On 5 December 1918 a group of Croat non-commissioned officers and soldiers from a former Austro-Hungarian regiment took to the streets of Zagreb in armed protest against the union. A volunteer force under the orders of the National Council, armed with machine-guns, quickly dispersed the demonstrators (13 people, mainly soldiers from the Austro-Hungarian regiment, were killed). This demonstration entered the Croat nationalist mythology as an armed rebellion against the Serb hegemony. See F. Čulinović, *Jugoslavija između dva rata*, Vol. 1 (Zagreb: Izdavački zavod JAZU, 1961) pp. 160–9.

2 The First Yugoslavia

1. See J. Tomasevich, *Peasants, Politics and Economic Change in Yugoslavia* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1955) pp. 170–4. B. Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije* Vol. 1 (Beograd: Nolit, 1988) p. 56.
2. W. E. Moore, *Economic Demography of Eastern and Southeastern Europe* (Geneva: League of Nations, 1945) pp. 63–4.
3. A. N. Dragnich, *The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable Political System* (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1983) pp. 21–2.
4. Ibid., p. 24. This is the *Vidovdan* constitution, promulgated on St Vitus's day (*Vidovdan*), 28 June 1921, the anniversary of the Kosovo battle.
5. See F. Čulinović, *Jugoslavijai izmedju dva rata*, Vol. 2., pp. 519–31.
6. In the political jargon of the time, this was called the 'amputation'.
7. As the Croatian *banovina* was set up by a royal (regency) decree, its constitutionality was questioned at the time. Its model appeared to be the agreement (*Ausgleich*) of 1867 between the Habsburg and Hungarian governments on the dualist constitutional arrangement in Austria–Hungary. See A. Djilas, *The Contested Country: Yugoslav Unity and the Communist Revolution 1919–1953* (London: Harvard University Press, 1991) pp. 216–7, note 27 and A. N. Dragnich, op. cit., p. 123.

3 World War II

1. L. Karchmar, *Draža Mihailović and the Rise of the Chetnik Movement 1941–2*, Vol. 2, (London: Garland Publishing, 1987) pp. 272–5.
2. In addition to these principal forces, in Serbia the military formations of the pro-fascist organisation *Zbor*, the Chetniks of the renegade Kosta

Pečanac and the forces of the German-installed quisling government all fought both Partisans and Mihailović's Chetniks. In Slovenia, the German-trained quisling forces and in Kosovo Italian-supported quisling Albanian militias were also fighting the Partisans.

3. With Serbs forming the majority of its rank-and-file and officer corps.
4. Some of the Ustashe officers and officials claimed to be of Serb origin. This was used by the Ustasha authorities in attempts to pacify the Serb population after 1942.
5. Whom the Ustasha interned because he refused to participate in their government.
6. Some Muslim notables and religious leaders rejected the Ustasha ideology and publicly protested against the massacres of Serbs.
7. L. Karchmar, op. cit. vol. 2, pp. 602–5.
8. AVNOJ is the acronym for Anti-fašističko Veće Narodnog Oslobodjenja Jugoslavije – the Anti-fascist Council of National Liberation of Yugoslavia.
9. P. Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) pp. 144–5.
10. The effects of the Partisan emancipation of the peasantry are most visible in the families of split Chetnik and Partisan loyalties. Almost invariably, those members who joined the Partisans early on (for example, in the period from 1941 to 1943) were commissioned as officers and rapidly promoted while those who joined the Chetniks remained in the ranks.
11. This operation is known in Partisan historiography as the battle on the river Sutjeska.
12. The role of this British officer, Major Klugmann, and his circle is the topic of continuing controversy. See M. Lees, *The Rape of Serbia: The British Role in Tito's Grab for Power 1943–1944* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) and D. Martin, *The Web of Disinformation: Churchill's Yugoslav Blunder* (London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1990) chapters 12, 13 and 18.
13. As only a few Serb politicians would agree to enter a coalition government with the communist usurper Tito, the British government selected Ivan Šubašić, a Croat Peasant party leader and the last *ban* of the autonomous province of Croatia, to negotiate with Tito. Thus two Croats, Tito and Šubašić, formed a government of a country in which not only the largest nation but also the great majority of the resistance fighters were Serbs.
14. Many scholars have argued that in view of Tito's and the Partisans' popularity, the communist Popular Front would have won, albeit with a smaller majority, even in a free and fair election. See A. Djilas, op. cit., p. 159 and S. Clissold (ed.), *A Short History of Yugoslavia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1966) p. 238. However, had the parties opposing the communists been allowed to campaign freely, probably the communists would not have won free elections either in Serbia or in Croatia (let alone Kosovo) where they had only limited popular support.
15. The total number of Muslim victims in World War II was calculated to be around 86 000 or 7.9 per cent of their population in 1941; after the Jews, Gipsies, Montenegrins and Serbs, the Muslims suffered the largest

demographic loss in the war of all peoples in Yugoslavia. See B. Kočović, *Žrtve drugog svetskog rata u Jugoslaviji* (London: Naše Delo, 1985) p. 126. Although it is difficult to estimate the total number of Muslims who were victims of Chetnik massacres, it would probably be safe to assume that most of the Muslim victims in World War II died in these massacres.

16. As a result neither has the number of the civilian victims of massacres by any side been ascertained with sufficient accuracy nor were comprehensive lists of the victims' names and burial sites ever collated under the communist regime.

4 Second Yugoslavia

1. See P. Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) pp. 115–16.
2. *Borba*, 22 May 1945, p. 1. Quoted in ibid., p. 116.
3. It is somewhat ironic that this revolutionary communist regime, intent on creating a new state and a new society, chose in 1946 to use the borders of the two empires which had disintegrated at the end of World War I.
4. The northern part of Istria with a Slovene-speaking population was assigned to Slovenia.
5. In fact, there was no substantial modification to the historical borders of Bosnia–Hercegovina with the republic keeping nominal access to the Adriatic in the tiny strip of land around the small town of Neum.
6. Serbia was also the only republic which had an autonomous province or an autonomous region.
7. P. Shoup, op. cit., p. 120. He argues that the federal structure '. . . helped satisfy important psychological needs of the Yugoslav peoples for recognition of their national individuality. . . and it gave each nationality the assurance, for the first time, of enjoying a truly equal status with the other national groups.' P. Shoup, op. cit., p. 119. As noted above, this assurance must have been largely symbolic.
8. B. Petranović, *Istorija Jugoslavije 1918–78*, 2nd edn (Beograd: Nolit, 1981) p. 414. Every time it faced a Soviet military threat, the Yugoslav Party proceeded to recruit as many new members as possible. Thus its recruitment drive of 1948 was repeated in 1968 after the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia.
9. P. Shoup, op. cit., pp. 120–2 and pp. 269–70.
10. *Odeljenje za zaštitu naroda*, Department for the Protection of the People. The acronym proved suitable for various instructive rhymes such as 'OZNA sve dozna' – 'OZNA gets to know everything'.
11. At their 1955 value. D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974* (London: C. Hurst & Co, 1977) p. 46. The total aid coming from the USA, appears to have been much larger, totalling close to 2200 million US dollars. See S. K. Pavlowitch, *Yugoslavia* (London: Ernest Benn, 1971) p. 224, note 2.

12. Lj. Madžar, 'The Economy of Yugoslavia' in J. B. Allcock, J. J. Horton and M. Milivojevic (eds), *Yugoslavia in Transition* (New York: Berg, 1992) p. 84.
13. *Savez komunista Jugoslavije*. I shall retain the earlier name of the Communist party or, shortened, 'the Party' throughout the monograph.
14. Three years later he was gaoled for his dissident views and became one of the first and most famous ex-communist dissidents.
15. See A. Z. Rubinstein, *Yugoslavia and the Nonaligned World* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970).
16. According to the US estimates, by 1990 Yugoslav defence industries were providing 80 per cent of Yugoslav military equipment. *Army Area Handbooks: Yugoslavia* (Washington: US Department of the Army, 1993) Chapter 5.06 'Defense and National Economy' (electronic distribution).
17. See J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992) pp. 45–9.

5 From a Centralised State to a Semiconfederation

1. D. Rusinow, *The Yugoslav Experiment, 1948–1974* (London: C. Hurst Co., 1977)
2. P. Shoup, *Communism and the Yugoslav National Question* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968) p. 192.
3. Ibid., p. 197.
4. Ibid., p. 200.
5. For recent histories of the Yugoslav idea see J. R. Lampe, 'The Failure of the Yugoslav National Idea', *Studies in East European Thought*, vol. 46 (1994) 69–89; A. Pavković, 'Yugoslavism – A National Identity Which Failed?' in P. Murray and L. Holmes (eds), *Citizenship and National Identity in Europe*, (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999) 147–58.
6. This was one of the reasons why the proportion of Serb, Montenegrin and (self-declared) Yugoslav middle-ranking and non-commissioned officers in the Yugoslav People's Army was allowed to exceed the proportion these groups had in the population of the country (see Chapter 9).
7. D. Rusinow, op. cit., p. 187.
8. His funeral in Belgrade in 1983, which was not announced in the press, drew a huge number of mourners (reports range from 30 000 to 100 000). The funeral thus became a political manifestation of loyalty to a Serb politician.
9. S. L. Burg, *Conflict and Cohesion in Socialist Yugoslavia*: *Political Decision Making Since 1966* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983) p. 71.
10. For an account of Muslim nation-building in this period see W. Hopken, 'Yugoslavia's Communists and the Bosnian Muslims' in A. Kappeler, G. Simon, G. Brunner and E. Allworth (eds), *Muslim Communities Reemerge* (London: Duke University Press, 1994) pp. 214–50.
11. Small Albanian demonstrations were staged in 1974 and in 1975. During the 1970s the police claimed to have discovered several clandestine

groups of Albanians working for the overthrow of the regime. See A. J. Day (ed.), *Border and Territorial Disputes* (London: Longman, 1982) p. 9.

12. D. Rusinow, op. cit., pp. 277–9.
13. In only one year from 1970 to 1971, this organisation increased from 2300 to 41 000 members. S. L. Burg, op. cit., p. 121.
14. D. Rusinow, op. cit., p. 305.
15. The potentially most dangerous Party meetings were held at his 'royal' residences. The 1966 meeting ousting Ranković was held at Brioni and the meeting dismissing the Croatian Party leaders in 1971 was held at Karađorđevo, a hunting residence of the Karađordević dynasty outside Belgrade.
16. Indeed, one could argue that Tito was one of the world celebrities who attracted favourable publicity in Western media. This helped to create an image of a benign ruler and an elder statesman which he had cultivated since the late 1950s.
17. M. Đurić, 'Smišljanje smutnje,' *Anali Pravnog fakulteta u Beogradu*, vol. 19, no. 3 (1971) 230–3, quoted in A. H. Budding, 'Dilemmas of Decentralization: The Serbian National Question 1966–72' (presented at Contemporary History Workshop, History Department, Harvard University, 12 February 1995).
18. *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia*, Introductory Part, Basic Principles I (Belgrade, 1974) p. 53.
19. Article 1 states that Yugoslavia is '. . . a federal state having the form of a state community of voluntarily united nations and their Socialist Republics, and of the Socialist Autonomous Provinces of Vojvodina and Kosovo . . .': *The Constitution of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade, 1974) p. 79.

6 The Loss of Legitimacy 1980–89

1. H. Lydall, *Yugoslavia in Crisis* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1989) p. 198.
2. The republican governments often spent the federal funds on status-enhancing projects such as large public buildings instead of on commercially viable industrial projects. Ibid., pp. 192–4.
3. S. P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia 1962–91*, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) p. 196.
4. H. Lydall, op. cit., pp. 40–8.
5. According to one estimate, less than one-third of these loans was used for productive purposes, that is, invested in industry or infrastructure. Ibid., p. 53.
6. Ibid., p. 81.
7. V. Goati, *Jugoslavija na prekretnici: od monizma do građanskog rata* (Beograd: Jugoslovenski institut za novinarstvo, 1991) p. 23.
8. In late 1990 Abdić brought over this large constituency to the main Muslim party, the Party of Democratic Action led by Alija Izetbegović with whom he parted in 1993, thus provoking the first Muslim–Muslim conflict in the civil war (see Chapter 11). Abdić's personal popularity and his well-organised network of supporters thus survived not only his arrest

and trial but two major shifts in his political affiliation. His ability to maintain so firm a grip on his constituency is without parallel in the countries of former Yugoslavia. After the surrender of his militia to the Croatian army in August 1995, he was reported to be residing in Zagreb.

9. From 483 000 in 1948 to 1 226 736 in 1981.
10. S. P. Ramet, op. cit., p. 147. Ramet presents a whole range of statistics on the problem of underdevelopment.
11. Prishtine in Albanian. The geographical names used in the book are given in their official form at the time of writing. Hence the use of Serbian spelling for this city and the whole province which in 1995 was more than 90 per cent Albanian.
12. From 8000 to 47 000. This was later downgraded to only a fivefold increase. L. J. Cohen, *The Socialist Pyramid: Elites and Power in Yugoslavia* (Oakville: Mosaic Press, 1989) p. 361.
13. L. J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 350. This time, however, there was no attempt at the 'colonisation' of Serbs and Montenegrins and the pre-war Serb and Montenegrin colonists were effectively prevented from returning to their properties.
14. E. Biberaj, *Albania: A Socialist Maverick* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990) p. 124. In this sympathetic account, the riots are called 'a popular uprising'.
15. S. P. Ramet, op. cit., p. 196.
16. As in 1968, the demonstrations of Albanians spread to the Albanian-populated towns of Macedonia. As the Albanian population of Macedonia, had reached around 20 per cent of the total population, the Macedonian leaders were particularly anxious to halt the spread of Albanian nationalism to Macedonia.
17. In October 1986 Fadil Hoxha, one of the top Kosovo Albanian communist leaders, at a lunch with reserve officers said that, given the Albanian women's refusal to work as prostitutes, Serb and other women should be allowed to do the work; this, he implied, would reduce the number of Serb women raped by Albanians. This statement, widely publicised in September 1987, was used to whip up Serb protest demonstrations, demanding his punishment. The whole incident and its political ramifications are discussed in some detail in D. Hudelist, *Kosovo: bitka bez iluzija* (Zagreb: Centar za informacije i publicitet, 1989) pp. 41–55.
18. Ibid., pp. 35–45.
19. Nebojša Popov, a sociologist and a politician strongly opposed to Milošević, argued that this movement was, after 1987, taken over by the secret police. N. Popov, 'Srpski populizam: od marginalne do dominante pojave', *Vreme*, No. 135 (24 May 1993) p. 20.
20. This unease is evident in the memoirs of Dragiša Pavlović, the first Serbian communist official from the Stambolić faction to be ritually dismissed by Milošević (see Chapter 8). D. Pavlović, *Olako obećana brzina* (Zagreb: Globus, 1988) pp. 90–3.
21. Born in 1941 in Požarevac, Serbia. Both of his parents were teachers (his father migrated from Montenegro to Serbia) and both, separately, committed suicide. He started his Party career in the 1960s at Belgrade Univer-

sity's Law Faculty where he completed a law degree and met his future patron Ivan Stambolić. As one of the Ivan Stambolić's closest friends, Milošević rapidly advanced in his career, serving as the director of the largest state bank in Serbia and the head of the Belgrade Party Committee. In the late 1970s he also spent some time in the USA ostensibly studying the US financial system. In 1986 he replaced Stambolić as the president of the presidency of the Communist Party of Serbia and in 1987 he purged the Serbian Party of Stambolić's supporters (see Chapter 8). Even before the first multiparty elections in December 1990 – in which he was elected president of Serbia – he established himself as the undisputed ruler of Serbia and leader of a loosely organised pan-Serb movement in the Yugoslav federation. As in October 1994 he broke with the leaders of the Bosnian Serbs and imposed an internationally monitored blockade on the Bosnian Serb territory, he split the pan-Serb movement he had himself initiated in the late 1980s (see Chapter 11).

22. In Serbo-Croatian 'Niko ne sme da vas bije, vas niko ne sme da bije' has the tone of a paternal prohibition and assurance. As Slavoljub Đukić notes in his political biography of Milošević, *Između slave i anateme: politička biografija Slobodana Miloševića* (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1994) p. 51, this is exactly what the demonstrators yearned to hear.
23. The pattern of division of power is well documented in L. J. Cohen, op. cit., pp. 369–75.

7 The Rise of Nationalism: From Dissidence to Power 1980–90

1. For an outline of dissidence in Serbia see A. Pavković, 'Intellectual dissidence and the Serb national question' in A. Pavković' H. Koscharsky, A. Czarnota (eds), *Nationalism and Postcommunism: A Collection of Essays* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) pp. 121–8.
2. As a result of the fragmentation of secret police apparatus (see Chapter 5), the punishment differed from one republic to another. In Slovenia intellectual dissidents had to fear, at most, dismissal from their jobs (also the favourite punishment in Serbia). In the 1980s in Serbia a few lesser known dissidents were also sentenced to prison terms. In Croatia and Bosnia–Hercegovina, however, nationalist dissidence was punished with longer prison terms; especially severe prison sentences were meted out to renegade ex-communists such as Dr Tudjman or recidivists such Alija Izetbegović (see below).
3. For an array of similar arguments see S. S. Juka, *Kosova: The Albanians in Yugoslavia in Light of Historical Documents* (New York: Waldon Press, 1984).
4. The infamous term 'ethnic cleansing' (*etničko čišćenje* in Serbo-Croatian) was first used in the Yugoslav communist-controlled press to describe the forced emigration of Kosovo Serbs from Kosovo.
5. This draft was leaked in 1986 to the Belgrade Party-controlled press which proceeded to attack it as a counter-revolutionary and nationalist document. An authorised version was first published in 1995 in K. Mihailović and V. Krestić, *'Memorandum SANU' odgovori na kritike* (Beograd:

SANU, 1995); the English translation in K. Mihailović and V. Krestić *Memorandum of the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, Answers to Criticisms* (Beograd, Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts, 1995). For a discussion of the document see A. Pavković, op. cit., pp. 128–31.

6. S. Naumović, 'Upotreba tradicije: politička tranzicija i promena odnosa prema nacionalnim vrednostima u Srbiji 1987–90' in M. Prošić-Dvornić (ed.), *Kulture u tranziciji* (Beograd: Plato, 1994) pp. 95–120.
7. See A. Pavković, op. cit., pp. 133–4.
8. For example, I. Urbančič, 'Jugoslavanska "nacionalistička kriza" in Slovenci v perspektivi konca nacija', p. 56, and F. Bučar, 'Pravni ureditev položaja Slovencev kot naroda', p. 159 in *Nova Revija* (1987).
9. Born in 1922 in Veliko Trgovišće in Croatia, Tudjman joined the Partisans in 1941 where, as a political commissar, rose to the rank of major. In 1961, with the rank of major-general, he retired from the army to become the director of a history institute in Zagreb. In 1964, with a Party reprimand for 'bourgeois-nationalist deviation' his reputation as a nationalist historian was firmly established; in 1965 he earned his doctorate in history at the University Faculty of Zadar. In the late 1960s he became one of the leaders of the nationalist organisation *Matica Hrvatska*, and in the purges of nationalist leaders in 1972 was sentenced to two years in prison. For his continued dissident activity including interviews to foreign journalists, he was arrested in 1981 and sentenced to three years in prison. During his extensive travels in the USA, Canada and Europe in 1987, he established contacts in the Croat emigre communities and organisations. In 1989 he founded the first postwar Croatian opposition party – the Croat Democratic Union – and after its electoral victory in 1990, was elected president of Croatia (see Chapter 8). He was re-elected, in direct presidential elections, in 1992 and in 1995 was proclaimed 'vrhovnik' (generalissimo) of the Croatian armed forces. He died in December 1999.
10. In his *Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi*, originally published in English in 1981, Dr Tudjman claimed that Bosnia–Hercegovina constitutes 'geographically. . . an economic and transport whole with south and southwestern Croatia' and is also 'linked with [Croatia] historically as well as by an ethnic and linguistic sameness'. *Izabrana djela Franje Tuđmana*, Vol. 2 (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1990) p. 164. By his criteria this provides good grounds for the incorporation of at least a part of Bosnia–Hercegovina into the future sovereign Croatia.
11. F. Tudjman, *Bespuća povijesne zbiljnosti* (first published in 1989), in *Izabrana djela Franje Tuđmana* (Zagreb: Matica Hrvatska, 1990) Vol. 3, pp. 158–62.
12. F. Tudjman, op. cit., p. 160.
13. For an example of this kind see F. Tudjman, op. cit., p. 118.
14. A. Purivatra, 'On the National Phenomenon of the Moslems of Bosnia–Herzegovina' in *Nations and Nationalities of Yugoslavia* (Belgrade: Medjunarodna Politika, 1974) p. 311.
15. See X. Bougarel, 'Le Parti de l'Action Democratique: De la Marginalité à la Hegemonie' (Paris: unpublished thesis, 1993) pp. 24–5.
16. Born in 1925 in Bosanski Samac in Bosnia–Hercegovina, he joined the Young Muslims during World War II. In 1946 he was sentenced to three

years in prison for his participation in this nationalist movement. After his release from prison, he completed a law degree and worked as a lawyer for state firms. In 1983 he was arrested for nationalist dissident activity (including the writing of his *Islamic Declaration*) and with a group of fellow Muslims sentenced, on appeal, to six years in prison (of which he served four). His *Islam between East and West*, 2nd edn (Indianopolis: American Trust, 1989) was originally published in Serbo-Croatian in Belgrade in 1984. In 1989 he founded the first opposition party in Bosnia–Hercegovina, the Party of Democratic Action, and in 1990 was elected president of the presidency of Bosnia–Hercegovina.

17. In Serbo-Croatian: *Islamska deklaracija: Jedan program islamizacije Muslimana i muslimanskih naroda*, 2nd edn (Sarajevo: Bosna, 1990).
18. Ibid., p. 29.
19. Ibid., p. 43.
20. Ibid., p. 30. These are some of the social ills which the Muslim Party of Democratic Action, in its programme of 1990 pledged to eliminate. See Chapter 8.
21. Ibid., p. 22.
22. Ibid., p. 37.
23. In 1971 and 1981 Muslims formed around 39.5 per cent of the population of the republic while in 1991 their share increased to 43.5 per cent. In this period the proportion of Serbs dropped from 32 to 31.3 per cent and the proportion of Croats from 18.4 to 17.5 per cent. The figures are from the official Yugoslav censa in S. Bogisavljević, V. Goati, Z. Grebo, J. Hasanbegović, D. Janjić, B. Jojić, Z. Slavujević and P. Shoup, (eds), *Bosna i Hercegovina između rata i mira* (Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1992) p. 34. This rate of growth and the decrease in the proportion of Serbs and Croats, visible already in the early 1980s, could have resulted, by the end of the century, in a Muslim majority.
24. In Serbo-Croatian: 'preuzimanje vlasti'. This was an explicitly set goal in the Muslim party's 'Resolution on Internal Policies, Justice and Administration' ('Rezolucija o unutrašnjoj politici, pravosuđu i upravi'), *Bilten 'Kongres' 1991* (Sarajevo: Stranka demokratske akcije, 1991) p. 51.
25. Izetbegović's treatise and his public statements, prior to October 1991 when the Serb political leaders opposed the Memorandum of Sovereignty proposed by his party (see Chapter 12), did not target any nation as an enemy of the Muslims.

8 The Rise of New National Elites 1987–90

1. Later the leader of the Slovene Liberal party and the prime minister of the independent Republic of Slovenia 1994–.
2. M. Crnobrnja, *The Yugoslav Drama* (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queens University Press, 1994) p. 149.
3. In an all-Yugoslav poll almost 49 per cent expressed *complete* and 36 per cent *partial* agreement with his policies while only 3 per cent *disagreed* (the rest having no opinion). Lj. Bašević et al., *Jugoslavija na kriznoj prekretnici*

(Beograd: Institut društvenih nauka, 1991) pp. 58–9. The lowest level of support for his policies was recorded in Slovenia and in Kosovo.

4. Ibid. The researchers warned, however, that there were no large differences between supporters and critics of Marković's policies in terms of their social status.
5. 'Savez reformskih snaga Jugoslavije,' *Stranke u Jugoslaviji* (Beograd: Novinska agencija TANJUG, 1990) p. 24.
6. V. Goati, *Jugoslavija na prekretnici* (Beograd: Jugoslovenski institut za novinarstvo, 1991) p. 92 and p. 94. Apart from these two republics, Marković's party failed to win a seat anywhere else.
7. On Marković's deteriorating relations with the Yugoslav federal army's High Command see Chapter 9. On Marković's policies see also M. Crnobrnja, op. cit., p. 150 and P. Simić, 'Civil War in Yugoslavia and the Roots of Disintegration', in M. van den Heuvel and J. G. Siccama (eds), *The Disintegration of Yugoslavia* (Amsterdam: Rodopi, 1992) p. 92.
8. S. Đukić, *Između slave i anateme: politička biografija Slobodana Miloševića* (Beograd: Filip Višnjić, 1994) p. 51.
9. The liberal dissidents, who rejected Milošević's rule from its outset, were not given access to the popular media.
10. All official figures of rally attendance were brought into doubt by Milošević's opponents who implied, for example, that the crowning rally did not gather more than 300 000 people. See N. Popov, 'Srpski populizam: od marginale do dominantne pojave', *Vreme*, no. 135 (24 May 1993) p. 20. Even if the latter figure is correct, these numbers outstrip the turnout at rallies during Tito's era.
11. Later president of the independent Republic of Slovenia, 1990–.
12. Vllasi was acquitted and released in 1990, apparently in exchange for the release of a jailed Serb activist from Croatia.
13. L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd edn (Boulder: Westview, 1995) pp. 55–9.
14. And, as many non-Serbs pointed out, potential dominance over other nations in Yugoslavia.
15. A. Bibič, 'The Emergence of Pluralism in Slovenia,' *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, vol. 26, no. 4 (1993) 370–1.
16. See M. Bakić-Hayden and R. M. Hayden, 'Orientalist Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent Yugoslav Cultural Politics', *Slavic Review*, vol. 51, no. 1 (1992) 1–16.
17. See A. H. Budding, 'End of Dialogue: Serbs, Slovenes, and the Collapse of the League of Writers of Yugoslavia,' unpublished paper, Harvard University.
18. The future defence minister of Slovenia. See Chapter 10.
19. J. Janša, *The Making of the Slovenian State 1988–92: The Collapse of Yugoslavia* (Ljubljana: Založba Mladinska knjiga, 1994) p. 26.
20. T. Mastnak, 'Civil Society in Slovenia: From Opposition to Power,' *Studies in Comparative Communism*, vol. 23, 3/4 (1990) p. 305–17.
21. S. P. Ramet, *Nationalism and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962–1991*, 2nd edn (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992) p. 211.
22. T. Mastnak, op. cit., p. 312.
23. S. P. Ramet, op. cit., p. 211.

24. These amendments as well as constitutional changes by Serbia and other republics were subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court (whose jurisdiction the Slovenian government refused to recognise in this case). R. M. Hayden, *The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian Amendment Crisis of 1989* (Pittsburgh: The Centre for Russian and East European Studies, The Carl Beck Papers No. 1001, 1992) pp. 11–20.
25. The official translation of Hrvatska demokratska zajednica is 'Croatian Democratic Union'. Partly to avoid confusion with various translations, I shall be using its widely used Croatian acronym 'HDZ.'
26. *Hrvatska demokratska zajednica: Bilten za članstvo br. 1* (Zagreb, 1989) pp. 108–10.
27. Including the nineteenth-century 'father of the Croatian nation', Ante Starčević. On Starčević see Chapter 1.
28. Ibid., p. 6.
29. See V. Radovic, 'Croatia Orders Inquiry into Rising Nationalist Party', *Reuters* (27 February 1990).
30. L. J. Cohen, op. cit., p. 98
31. The obvious similarities with Milošević's image among his followers were noted by many commentators as well as political rivals.
32. *Stranke u Jugoslaviji* (Beograd: Tanjug, 1990) pp. 40–1. For the parallel with Izetbegović's *Islamic Declaration*, see Chapter 7.
33. 'Građanska republika ili građanski rat' in *Izbori '90: Stranke, programi, ličnosti* (Sarajevo: Oslobođenje, 1990) p. 21.
34. Ibid.
35. Called the 'Muslim Bosniac Organisation.' Zulfikarpašić has argued for decades (while living in exile in Switzerland) that 'Bosniac' is a correct appellation for Bosnian Muslims (Izetbegović's government adopted this term only in 1993).
36. *Izbori '90: Stranke, programi, ličnosti*, op. cit. p. 74.
37. *Stranke u Jugoslaviji*, op. cit., p. 45
38. Ibid., p. 33.
39. This procedure was enshrined in Amendment LXX, clause 10 to the Constitution of the Republic which envisaged the creation of a Council for issues relating to the equality of nations and nationalities of the republic. The Council had the power to recommend legislation concerning such issues to be adopted by a special procedure of the parliament requiring a two-thirds majority. *Službeni list Socijalističke Republike Bosne i Hercegovine*, vol. 46, no. 21 (31 July 1990).
40. *Stranke u Jugoslaviji*, op. cit., p. 203–4.
41. Some Albanian leaders in Macedonia claimed the figure to be around 40 per cent.
42. H. Poulton, *Who are the Macedonians?* (London: Hurst, 1995) p. 172.
43. The bearded and long-haired Drašković was formerly a minor communist apparatchik who in the early 1980s came to prominence with his novels about the wartime Croat and Muslim Ustashe terror over the Serbs. The founders of the Democratic party were also dissidents but their primary orientation was not nationalist. See A. Pavković, 'Intellectual dissidence and the Serb national question' in Pavković *et al.* (eds),

Nationalism and Postcommunism: A Collection of Essays (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1995) pp. 122–8.

44. See K. Čavoški, 'Nationalism and Constitutionality: the National and the Universal in the Constitutions of Serbia and Croatia', University of Belgrade, Faculty of Law, unpublished manuscript, 1994.

9 On the Road to War 1990–91

1. 'Model konfederacije,' *Vjesnik*, Zagreb, 6 October 1990.
2. 'Koncept federativnog uẑedjeuja Jugoslavije,' *Borba*, Beograd, 18 October 1990.
3. From March to May 1990 Milošević unsuccessfully attempted to pressure the Yugoslav state presidency into military action against the Slovenian and Croatian governments. First, in March he engineered the resignation of the Serb president of the presidency and, then in May 1990, with the four representatives in the presidency whom he controlled, he blocked the election of the Croatian representative, a HDZ leader Stipe Mesić, to the rotating office of the president of the presidency. Yielding to pressure from the European Community and West European governments after the war in Slovenia, Milošević in July 1991 agreed to the election of Mesić (see Chapter 10).
4. For the rumour originating from the British politician Paddy Ashdown see M. Evans, 'Tudjman unveils plan for land carve-up,' *The Times*, 8 August 1995, reproduced in *The Australian* 8 August 1995, 10. This rumour comes with a map, allegedly drawn by Tudjman, allotting a larger portion of Bosnia–Hercegovina to Croatia. See also L. J. Cohen, *Broken Bonds: Yugoslavia's Disintegration and Balkan Politics in Transition*, 2nd edn (Boulder: Westview, 1995) p. 207–9.
5. These were: Milan Kučan (ex-communist, Slovenia), Franjo Tudjman (ex-communist and ex-dissident, Croatia), Miomir Bulatović (communist, Montenegro), Kiro Gligorov (ex-communist, Macedonia), Slobodan Milošević (ex-communist, Serbia), Alija Izetbegović (ex-dissident, Bosnia–Hercegovina).
6. *Borba*, Beograd, 4 June 1991. Partial translation into English in *Focus*, Special Issue (1992) 82–7.
7. See Map 4, p. 139.
8. As there were no outside observers of this referendum, the claims of the organisers could not verified.
9. The procedure of the Serbs in Krajina closely mirrored the actions of the Slovenian and Croatian governments: first, the declaration of sovereignty of the Serb nation within Croatia; second, the referendum on the issue of autonomy; third, the creation of its own police and militia enabling them to resist police actions of the Croatian government; and, finally, in March 1991, the decision to 'disassociate' from Croatia.
10. J. Gow, *Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis* (New York: St Martin's Press, 1992) p. 110.
11. J. Gow, 'The Yugoslav Crisis and the Role of the Military: In Search for Authority,' *South Slav Journal*, vol. 13, 1–2 (1990) 54–9.

12. The Croats were Commander of the Third Military Area (Bosnia and Hercegovina), general A. Luketić; Commander of the Navy, admiral S. Letica; Commander of the Maritime Area, admiral P. Grubišić; and Commander of the Yugoslav Air Force, general A. Tus. The Slovenes were: Commander of the Fifth Military Area (Croatia and Slovenia), general K. Kolšek, and Federal Deputy Defence Minister, admiral Stane Brovet. The Commander of the First Military Area (Serbia) was a Macedonian general A. Spirovski; the Chief of the General Staff was a Serb from Croatian Krajina, general Blagoje Adžić and the Minister of Defence (the highest position of all) was general Veljko Kadijević, who was of a mixed Croato-Serb parentage.
13. The much criticised speech of the minister of defence, general Kadijević, on the eve of Serbian elections in December 1990, was a call to support socialism – and thus Milošević's ex-communist Socialist party – rather than Milošević himself.
14. The figures concerning the Yugoslav federal army were taken from J. Gow, op. cit., p. 59. The percentages of the total population are based on the 1991 census, see Table 1.
15. J. Zametica, *The Yugoslav Conflict*, Adelphi Paper 270, International Institute of Strategic Studies (London: Brassey's, 1992) p. 43.
16. Marković's minister of defence also accused him of betraying state secrets to foreign diplomats. V. Kadijević, *Moje viđenje raspada* (Beograd: Politika, 1993) p. 109.
17. Ibid., p. 118–20.
18. Marković later accused Kadijević of trying to murder him when, in October 1991, the office of Croatian president Tudjman was bombed while Marković was in conference with Tudjman. The Yugoslav federal army denied bombing the office; the government-controlled press in Belgrade suggested that Marković, a Croat, was receiving instructions from Tudjman. Marković resigned his office only in December 1991 in protest against the high allocation of the federal budget for the Yugoslav federal army. His antagonism towards the Yugoslav army's High Command obviously fuelled the generals' suspicions that he was covertly working for their opponents in Slovenia and Croatia.

10 Wars for Independence: Slovenia and Croatia, 1991–95

1. J. Janša, *The Making of the Slovenian State 1988–1992,* (Ljubljana: Mladinska Knjiga, 1994), pp. 101–13.
2. See B. Bučar 'The International Recognition of Slovenia' in D. Fink-Hafner and J. R. Robbins (eds) *Making a New Nation: The Formation of Slovenia,* (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997).
3. For Slovenian planning and requests for mediation see D. Rupel 'Slovenia's Shift from the Balkans to Central Europe' in J. Benderly and E. Kraft (eds) *Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects*, (London: Macmillan, 1994), pp. 190–1.

4. The estimates of the number of Yugoslav conscripts actually deployed in the operation of taking over the border crossings vary from 2000 to 3000.
5. Janša, *op.cit.* p. 183
6. Janša, *op.cit.* pp. 142.
7. Rupel, *op.cit.* p. 191.
8. For an account of these debates see *Slovenija od vojne do priznanja*, (Ljubljana: Zankarjeva založba, 1992), p. 12.
9. J. Robbins, 'Epilogue: The Attainment of Viability', in *Making a New Nation: the Formation of Slovenia*, p. 287.
10. I am not implying that the Yugoslav federal army and the Slovenian defence forces agreed in advance to feign a war. For an interesting hypothesis that the federal prime minister Marković and the Slovenian president Kučan in fact agreed to do so, see S. L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy: Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War,* (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995), pp. 166–7. As Woodward points out, this hypothesis at the present cannot be substatianted.
11. For media presentation of the main themes of Serb and Croat nationalism see D. Trickovic, 'Yugoslavia and the Rise of *Volkgeist*' in H. G. De Soto and D. G. Anderson (eds), *The Curtain Rises: Rethinking Culture, Ideology, and the State in Eastern Europe*, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1993) pp. 150–81.
12. See I. Kotnik, 'Characterization of the Opposing Sides in the War in Croatia' in M. Malešić (ed.), *The Role of Mass Media in the Serbian-Croatian Conflict*, (Stockholm: Psykologiskt Forsvar, 1993) p. 77.
13. For demographic account of the Serb-populated regions and the effects of early armed clashes, see P. Shoup, 'The Future of Croatia's Border Regions,' *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, No. 48 (1991) 26–33.
14. 'Franjo Tudjman interview: reads out Croatian ultimatum to SFRY Presidency', *Summary of World Broadcasts, Eastern Europe*, (London: BBC Monitoring Service), 24 August 1991.
15. 'Croatian ministers call for general mobilisation: threat of "war of liberation"', *Summary of World Broadcasts,* 28 August 1991.
16. V. Kadijević, *Moje vidjenje raspada*, (Beograd: Politika, 1993), p. 135. Kadijević, who was the minister of defence at the time, also claims that once the Serb-held areas in Croatia were fully secured, the army was planning to withdraw from Croatia. As with most of the memoirs written by the participants in the conflict, it is not clear to what extent their writers benefit from the hindsight in describing the events in which they participated.
17. *Ibid.*, pp. 136–7.
18. For an estimate of their total strength as well as an account of all military formations in the war see J. Gow, 'Military-Political Affiliations in the Yugoslav Conflict', *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 1, No. 20, (1992) 16–25. The Croatian general Špegelj, who was the Croatian minister of defence until July 1991, estimated that the total strength of the Yugoslav federal army in Slovenia, Croatia and parts of Bosnia-Hercegovina (the Fifth Army Area and parts of the First Army Area) was 36 000 men and officers, out of whom 50 per cent were of non-Serb origin. M. Špe-

gelj, 'The Disposition of former Yugoslavia's Military in the Northwest Theater on the Eve of the Conflicts in Slovenia and Croatia', *Journal of Croatian Studies,* Vol. 32–33 (1991–92), pp. 61–67 at 62.

19. President Tudjman, in his address to the nation of 16 January 1996, gave the figure of 10 668 killed, 2915 missing and 37 180 injured Croats (www.predsjednik.hr/addr.htm). I am not aware of any official count of the Serb causalities; the Yugoslav federal army's official count of 1279 of its soldiers and officers killed is probably an understimate.
20. See S. Poggioli, 'Scouts Without Compasses: War in the Balkans is Forcing Correspondents to Rewrite Their Guidelines', *Nieman Reports,* Vol. 47, No. 3 (1993), 16–19; M. Glenny *The Fall of Yugoslavia: Third Balkan War,* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1992) p. 136. P. Knightley, 'Women In The War Zone', *The Independent Monthly*, (October 1993) 10–16.
21. In contrast, the unknown city of Vukovar, completely destroyed by the Yugoslav army artillery, received, during its siege, comparatively little media attention.
22. See J. Merlino, *Les vérités Yougoslaves ne sont pas toutes bonnes à dire*, (Paris: Albin Michel, 1993) pp. 125–6.
23. For the suppression of stories of the atrocities committed by the Croat forces see P. Knightley, *op. cit.* p. 16.
24. And, as in Slovenia, the intervention of the European governments in the war in Croatia started with the clandestine export of weapons – from Hungary, Austria and Germany – to the Croatian government before the second phase of the conflict started.
25. For a critical account of the EC's attempts to find an overall settlement see J. Eyal, *Europe and Yugoslavia: Lessons from a Failure,* (London: Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, 1993).
26. And staffed by lawyers from the EC-member states.
27. S. Trifunovska (ed.), *Yugoslavia Through Documents: From its creation to its dissolution*, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1994) p. 474. For an account of the Commission's reasoning see P. Radan 'The Badinter Arbitration Commission and the Partition of Yugoslavia' *The Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1997), pp. 537–59.
28. The Commission offered no answers to questions of this kind. Without noting the irony, the Commission also argued that goal of the *uti possedetis juris* is 'to prevent the independence and stability of the new states being endangered by fratricidal wars.' S. Trifunovska, *op.cit.*, p. 480
29. The governments of Serbia and Montenegro declined to apply for recognition, pointing out that their independence was recognized by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. The Yugoslav state presidency, consisting now only of the representatives of these two republics and of Serbia's two provinces, claimed to represent the sole successor of the Yugoslav state, arguing that the other four republics had (unconstitutionally) seceded.
30. S. Trifunovska, *op. cit.* p. 488.
31. The German government argued that a 'preventive recognition' of Slovenia and Croatia would deter the Serb aggression on Croatia (as it saw it) by transforming the war in Croatia into an inter-state conflict. In fact, several issues in German domestic politics, including the desire of the German foreign minister Genscher to assert his leadership in the

EC sphere, appeared to have influenced the German government's continuing insistence on the EC's recognition of Slovenia's and Croatia's independence. See S. L. Woodward, *Balkan Tragedy Chaos and Dissolution after the Cold War,* Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1995, pp. 183–9; M.Thumann. 'Between Ambition and Paralysis: Germany's Policy Toward Yugoslavia, 1991–1993', *The Nationalities Papers*, Vol. 25, No. 3 (1997), pp. 575–85. While the French and British governments rejected the 'preventive recognition' argument, they eventually yielded to German pressure in order, it appears, to ensure Germany's co-operation in the wake of the signing, in December 1991, of the Treaty on the European Union in Maastricht. See also H. Stark, 'Dissonance franco-allemandes sur fond de guerre serbo-croate,' *Politique étrangére*, (1992) No. 2, 339–47.

32. For a theoretical discussion of the problems arising from the secession of the Yugoslav republics see my 'Recursive secessions in former Yugoslavia: too hard a case for theories of secession?' *Political Studies*, forthcoming, 2000.
33. *The United Nations and the Situation in the Former Yugoslavia,* (New York: UN Department for Public Information, 15 March 1994), p. 3
34. *Ibid.* For an account of the UN peacekeeping mission see J. Gow and J. D. D. Smith, *Peace-making, Peace-keeping: European Security and the Yugoslav Wars,* (London: Centre For Defence Studies, 1992)
35. Milošević agreed to the replacement of the Yugoslav federal army with the UN forces probably in order to re-enter the international negotiations over the future of Yugoslavia as a credible and flexible participant and to avert any possible EC or WEA intervention in the conflict; the UN plan and the UN's strict neutrality in the conflict appeared to him preferable to anything that the EC or any European government could offer.
36. The last US ambassador to former Yugoslavia, Warren Zimmerman, even before the outbreak of the war, held that the Serbs have neither moral nor historical right to self-determination outside Serbia (cf. Lj. Smajlović, 'Intervju Voren Zimerman: Moja uloga u Bosni' *Vreme*, No. 144, (27 June 1994), pp. 16–18). As we have seen in Chapter 7, this was the principal tenet of traditional Croatian nationalist ideology, as articulated by Dr Tudjman.
37. R. F. Miller 'Tudjman's Victory: Croatia, the U.N., NATO and the U.S.' *The Nationalities Papers,* Vol. 25, No. 3,(1997) pp. 501–17
38. US Defense Department, Press Advisory No. 300–P, 28 November 1994.
39. In his memoirs of the negotiations, *Svi moji tajni razgovori sa Slobodanom Miloševićem* (Zagreb:Globus International, 1999) p. 266, H. Šarinić, Tudjman's former chief of staff, in charge of the negotiations on the Serb side, indicates that the Croatian government sabotaged the negotiations with the Serb Krajina leaders because it was planning a military conquest of Krajina.
40. H. Šarinić, *op.cit.* pp. 199–203.
41. 'Ex-US Generals Help Croatia', *Associated Press,* (8 August 1994).
42. M. Heinrich, 'UN Officials Seek Inquiry into Krajina Killings', *Reuter*, Zagreb, (18 August 1995); 'UN Reports Summary Executions, Possible

Mass Graves in Krajina', *Agence France Presse,* Zagreb, (18 August 1995) (electronic distribution).

43. The then US Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke in his *To End a War* (New York: Random House, 1998, p. 73) quotes, with approval, a note about the Croatian government campaign from his deputy Robert F. Frasure: 'Dick: We "hired" these guys [the Croatian government, A.P.] to be our junkyard dogs because we were desperate. . . . But this is not time to get squeamish about things. This is the first time the Serb wave have been reversed. That is essential for us to get stability, so we can get out.' H. Šarinić, *op.cit.* pp. 266–7, appears to be well aware of the role of 'junkyard dogs' assigned to his government and, apart from resenting it, shows his government's determination to make as much use of this role as possible.

44. The handover of the fourth area, UNPA-Sector East or Eastern Slavonia, to the Croatian government was negotiated between Tudjman and Milošević in Dayton, Ohio, in November 1995 and carried out in January 1998. See Chapter 11.

11 Bosnia-Hercegovina: an Unfinished National Liberation?

1. In view of this, I find no evidence for Burg's and Shoup's 'surmise' that 'the Muslims would have become a political force to be reckoned in the new Yugoslavia' or for Bosnia-Hercegovina to enjoy many of the powers of the old Yugoslav federation. See S. L. Burg and P. S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: Ethnic Conflict and International Intervention*, (London: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), p. 72.
2. Milan Andrejevich 'Bosnia and Herzegovina Move towards Independence,' *Report on Eastern Europe*, Vol. 2, no. 43, 25 October 1991, pp. 24–6.
3. See Chapter 8, note 39.
4. 'Radovan Karadzic and Alija Izetbegovic differ over future of Bosnia-Hercegovina', *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 17 October 1991.
5. For gun-running see E. Štitkovac and J. Udovički, 'Bosnia-Hercegovina: The Second War' in J. Udovički and J. Ridgeway (eds), *Yugoslavia's Ethnic Nightmare: The Inside Story of Europe's Unfolding Ordeal*, (Chicago: Lawrence Hill, 1995) pp. 175–7.
6. See J. Gow, 'One Year of War in Bosnia and Herzegovina' *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, 23 (1993), pp. 1–13, for estimates of the strength of the armed forces of each.
7. In order to make clear the national party affiliation of these military formations, in this chapter I use 'the Muslim forces' to refer to the Bosnian army and its paramilitary formations, the Bosnian Serb military as well as its paramilitaries will be called 'the Serb forces' and the Croat Defence Council, 'the Croat forces'. Conscripts of the opposing nationalities served in both Serb and Muslim forces; only the Muslim forces, however, employed Serb and Croat officers as well.
8. The allegations that the gunmen belonged to the Serb party were, predictably, denied by its leaders.

9. Thus, soon after the outbreak of the war, in June 1992, the Muslim-dominated constitutional court banned the Serb party (SDS) as 'a classic terrorist organisation'. Edgar O'Ballance, *Civil War in Bosnia, 1992–94*, (London: Macmillan, 1995), p. 53.
10. In Hercegovina, however, the Yugoslav federal army came under attack from the Croat Defence Forces and the Croatian army.
11. In an early incident on 3 May, these Muslim leaders – including Izetbetović's deputy Ejup Ganić – ordered an attack on a Yugoslav army convoy which was withdrawing under UN forces protection and in the presence of Izetbegović (who had been kidnapped by the Yugoslav army to ensure its safe passage). For a rather vivid account of this incident see L. Silber and A. Little *The Death of Yugoslavia*, (London: Penguin and BBC Books, 1996), p. 260–8.
12. The proclamation of independence was never acknowledged by the Croatian government; and it did not prevent the Bosnian Croat party co-operating with the Bosnian Muslim party until the outbreak of the Croat–Muslim war in late 1993.
13. The military co-operation agreement was signed in June by Izetbegović and Tudjman.
14. There was no direct television coverage and little of any other media coverage of the Mostar siege. N. Gowing, 'The One-Eyed King of Real-Time Coverage', *New Perspectives Quarterly*, Vol. 11, No. 3 (Fall 1994) 45–55. The exception was the coverage of the destruction of a picturesque tourist attraction – the sixteenth-century bridge – which the Bosnian Croat artillery finished in November 1993.
15. For a discussion and sources see S. L Burg and P. S. Shoup, *The War in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention*, pp. 338–9.
16. Around 130 000 Serb inhabitants of Sarajevo left the city during the war. Continuous Serb bombardment of Sarajevo also contributed to their departure.
17. For a detailed account of the highly varied pattern of what came to be called 'ethnic cleansing' see *ibid.* pp. 171–83.
18. In a letter to the *The New York Times, (*30 September 1993, p.A24) a year later, Zimmerman claimed that he did not encourage Izetbegović to renege on his previous agreement to the EC plan. From his later account of the same conversation (W. Zimmerman, *The Origins of Catastrophe*, p. 190) it is clear that he did not make the US recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina's independence conditional on Izetbegovićs acceptance of this or any other constitutional plan.
19. As R. M. Hayden noted, in April 1992 Bosnia-Hercegovina hardly satisfied any of the conditions set out by the EC Arbitration Commission for the recognition of independence. With a virtual secession of a large part of its territory, it was obviously in as much of 'the process of dissolution' as the Yugoslav federation had been a few months earlier. R. M. Hayden, 'The Partititon of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 1990–1993,' *RFE/RL Research Report*, Vol. 2, No. 22 (28 May 1993) 1–15.
20. As the last US ambassador Zimmerman put it, the Muslim party commanded a relative majority and the Serb party only a minority; in his

view the Serb party was trying to dictate the terms to a majority. W. Zimmerman, *The Origins of a Catastrophe*, p. 187.

21. J. A. Baker III, *Politics of Diplomacy*, New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1995. pp. 643–4.
22. See S. L. Burg and P. S. Shoup, *op. cit.* p. 202 (their source is *New Europe*, 17–23 September 1995, p.2)
23. The British ITN in August 1992 broadcast a documentary featuring footage of an emaciated Muslim prisoner in a Serb detention camp at Trnopolje. In the first report, the camp was called 'a concentration camp', but the follow-up reports transformed it into 'a death camp' and explicitly likened it to Nazi camps. An examination of the footage, however, easily showed that not all prisoners pictured were starving and no evidence was ever produced of mass executions or mass starvation in the camp. While there was evidence of murder and torture of prisoners within the camp, the British journalists who broke the story later rejected the 'death camp' comparison. P. Knightley, 'Women in the war zone', *The Independent Monthly*, October 1993, pp. 11–12.
24. Reports quoted in Burg and Shoup, *op. cit.* p. 205.
25. The Serb forces repeatedly breached the ban until February 1994 when NATO aircraft, enforcing the ban, shot down four Serb planes over Bosnia-Hercegovina.
26. Sixty-nine people were killed and nearly 200 injured in this attack. As in the first televised massacre in Vasa Miskina street, the Western television crews were at the site within minutes and they and their colleagues immediately attributed the massacres to the Serb forces; the UN final report on the massacres left the responsibility for the attack undetermined. See D. Binder, 'Anatomy of a Massacre', *Foreign Policy*, No. 97 (Winter 1994/5) 70–8. See Burg and Shoup, *op. cit.* pp. 166–7.
27. Around 300 people were taken hostage; all were released at the end of June 1995.
28. *The United Nations and the Situation in Former Yugoslavia*, (New York, UN Department of Public Information) 15 March 1994, p. 40.
29. The Tribunal was empowered to take over the cases of suspects from other states' legal jurisdictions and to pass only prison sentences.
30. The president of the Tribunal, Antonio Cassesse, in an interview with an Italian journal, made it clear that, in his opinion, the purpose of the indictment was to remove the Serb leaders from international negotiations. 'Karadzic a pariah, says war crimes tribunal chief', *Reuter*, 26 July 1995, (electronic distribution).
31. In this case, the Serb leaders agreed to lose around 20 per cent of the territory they then held in return for the creation of a Serb republic with a continuous territory within a loose federation of Bosnia-Hercegovina. In respect of the division of territory and its constitutional arrangements, this third plan is quite similar to the Dayton agreement, signed in December 1995.
32. Which was far from total, allowing a certain amount of war material and fuel to be passed on to the Bosnian Serb forces.
33. As with the other two televised massacres, the responsibility for this one was contested. In contrast to the previous two, this time the rather hasty UN official inquiry squarely blamed the Serb forces for the attack.

However, Russian, Canadian, US and British officers on the ground voiced serious doubts concerning this allegation as well. For a review of their arguments see David Binder 'Bosnia's Bombers', *The Nation*, 2 October 1995. Also S. L. Burg and P. S. Shoup, *op.cit.*, pp. 167–9.

34. During the operation aircraft from eight NATO countries (US, UK, Germany, Italy, France, Netherlands, Spain and Turkey) flew 3515 sorties and dropped 1026 bombs. In addition to a variety of high-tech weapons used by the aircraft, the US air forces also fired Tomahawk cruise missiles against air defence installations in northern Bosnia. 'Operation Deliberate Force', NATO document, 6 November 1995, NATO WWW home page.
35. *The Economist*, 9 September 1995, p. 53.
36. *Ibid.*, 30 September 1995, p. 60.
37. R. Cohen, 'Taming the Bullies of Bosnia', *The New York Times Magazine*, 17 December 1995, p. 21.
38. In the later stages of the offensive, fighting broke out between the Muslim forces and Croatian army over the major cities in western Bosnia. *The New York Times*, 9 October 1995, p.A8. The US envoy, Richard Holbrooke, in his memoirs, admits that the Muslim forces were not capable of taking territory independently of the Croatian army (*To End the War*, New York: Random House, 1998, p. 191) but still suggests that his pressure (and colourful rhetoric) induced Izetbegović to halt the offensive (*ibid.* p.195).
39. Although he was the president of only one of its two federal units, Serbia, Milošević represented Yugoslavia.
40. This is the picture which, perhaps unintentionally, Holbrooke paints in his memoirs *To End the War*, pp. 288–312.
41. In Dayton Milošević and Tudjman agreed in principle on the transfer of Eastern Slavonia, still under Serb control, to Croatia, after a transitional period of one to two years. The UN Security Council later authorised the creation of a special UN transitonal administration and peacekeeping force. The UN forces withdrew in January 1998 and the last piece of the Serb Republic of Krajina was transferred to the Republic of Croatia.
42. The initial IFOR consisted 60 000 troops from 35 countries, including a 20 000 strong US contingent, all of them under NATO command, exercised by a US general. It was renamed SFOR (Stabilisation Force) in December 1996 and its strength reduced to 31 000 persons. While originally deployed for one year, in 1998 it was given an indefinite mandate to remain in the country.
43. 'Bosnia's Serbs. A carrot nibbled', *The Economist* 29 November 1997.
44. 'Bosnia. Putting it right', *The Economist*, 21 November 1998.
45. With a total of two seats in the republic's parliament. 'Bosnia. The tide turns', *The Economist*, 24 January 1998.
46. To the delight of the co-operative prime minister whose main rival was thus easily removed. 'Bosnia's Serbs. Two on the chin', *The Economist*, 13 March 1999.

47. In the period 1996–98, over US $400 million was spent on training and equipping the Bosnian army which has now significant superiority in armour and artillery as well as training over its Serb counterpart.
48. Whether the Muslim forces will follow the example of the Croatian army and actually defeat and expel the Serb forces from the Serb Republic, is, at the time of writing, still unclear.
49. In his article 'The Bitter Taste of Peace' (*The Turkish Daily News*, 14 September 1995, Bosnews digest 400, 17 September 1995, p. 5) Izetbegović wrote that 'the process of a peaceful reintegration of part of Bosnia currently under Chetnik control could begin. This is a painstaking task for the next two generations.' After listing the damage that the war did to Bosnia and the disadvantages of continuing war at this stage, he concluded 'if necessary, we will wage war, but then we must be sure that there was no other choice.'

12 Kosovo: National Liberation Through Foreign Intervention

1. 'Kosova' in Albanian. The Serbian version is used here only because most international documents and scholarly works in English, at least at the time of writing, still use the Serbian version.
2. J. Harding, 'Europe's War' *London Review of Books,* Vol. 21, No. 9, 29 April 1999, p. 6.
3. M. Vickers. *Between Serbs and Albanian : A History of Kosovo* (London: Hurst, 1998), p. 224–5.
4. Educated in Priština and in Paris, Dr Rugova, as the president of the official Association of the Writers of Kosovo, in 1988 contributed to the drafting of a Kosovo Albanian national programme, which became a focus for Kosovo Albanian national mobilisation; in this capacity he proceeded to act as a spokesman of an unofficial national movement, until his election to the chairmanship of the Democratic League. See S. Maliqi, 'The Albanian Movement in Kosova', D. A. Dyker and I. Vejvoda, *Yugoslavia and After: A Study in Fragmentation, Despair and Rebirth* (London: Longman, 1996), p. 144.
5. According to one of its leaders, the League soon gained more than 400 000 members. See D. Kostovicova, *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia*, 1986–1996, (Keele: Keele European Research Centre, 1997), p. 27. S. Maliqi, *op. cit.,* discounts such figures as inflated.
6. The Serbian authorities had locked them out of the assembly building, anticipating their move.
7. B. Cani and C. Milivojević (eds) *Kosmet ili Kosova*, (Beograd, NEA, 1996), pp. 265–6.
8. According to the organisers only 167 voters voted against while 993 ballots were invalid. See D. Kostovicova, *Parallel Worlds: Response of Kosovo Albanians to Loss of Autonomy in Serbia, 1986–1996,* p. 136.
9. Only Albania recognized Kosovo's independence.
10. Dr Rugova offered the lack of any armed force as a partial explanation of the Democratic League's commitment to non-violent means of

struggle for independence. See M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian,* p. 264.

11. Apart from four Muslim Slav seats, which were filled, there were 14 seats left for the Serb and Montenegrin deputies; no one from these groups contested the elections.
12. See note 22 below.
13. See R. Elsie (ed.), *Kosovo: in the heart of the powder keg,* (New York: East European Monographs, 1997), p. 492 and p. 504.
14. M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian: A History of Kosovo*, p. 306,
15. M. Vickers, *op. cit.* p. 293.
16. In turn, in mid-1997 the KLA appears to have issued a proclamation against the Democratic League and other parties; in the proclamation, 'The Pristina headquarters calls on all Albanians to stop being obedient to Ibrahim Rugova's rotten and treasonous policy and join the struggle of the Kosovo Liberation Army, the struggle of enslaved Albanians against whom stand only the enemy and the treacherous Albanian intelligentsia.' As the source for this proclamation is the Belgrade *Nedeljni Telegraf*, (21 May 1997, p. 14, *BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts*). Its authenticity is open to doubt.
17. M. Vickers, *Between Serb and Albanian,* p. 313.
18. T. Judah, 'KLA growing pains', B. Gokay, K. Drezov and D. Kostovicova (eds) *Kosovo: myths, conflict and war*, (Keele: Keele European Research Centre, Keele University, 1999) pp. 21–5. Judah explains, in part, the large and sudden influx of recruits by the revival of the *kačak* tradition – an old custom of local armed resistance to the authorities (a form of brigandage) for which western Kosovo was known in the past.
19. Interview with Naim Maloku, *Koha Ditore,* 9 July 1999, *BBC Monitoring Service, Summary of World Broadcasts, 11 July 1999, (Q1:119)*.
20. 'Rahovec' in Albanian.
21. 'Kosovo Rebel Forces Want Unification of All Albanians in Balkans – Spokesman', *BBC Worldwide Monitoring, Summary of World Broadcasts,* 7 July 1998, (Q1:122), interview of Jakup Krasniqui in *Der Spiegel*, 6 July 1998.
22. This is clear from the proclamation, calling for all political forces to unite in the struggle for the independence of Kosovo, which the Kosovo Albanian parliament, dominated by the Democratic League, issued at its first meeting, on 24 July 1998, since it was elected in May 1992. 'Parallel "Parliament" Issues Declaration Calling for Independence', *ibid,* 25 July 1998 (Q1:119).
23. B. Gellman, 'The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its Allies Went to War', *International Herald Tribune,* 19 April 1999, p. 2.
24. As in the case of the similarly televised Sarajevo massacres, there were some doubts that the massacre in Račak was staged. French journalists at the scene suggested that the KLA might have moved their dead fighters (or their supporters) who were killed in battle, and placed them in rows to suggest a premeditated massacre. See C. Chatlot 'Les morts de Racak, ont-ils vraiment été massacrées froidmant?' *Le Monde,* 21 January 1999 and the denials by T. Walker 'Observers deny Racak Masssacre was fabricated' *The Times,* 21 January 1999.

25. The Yugoslav delegation was headed, as at the Dayton negotiations by the president of Serbia, not Yugoslavia. This time, however, the Serbian president was Milutin Milutinović; on the expiry of his second and last term as the president of Serbia, in 1997 Milošević took up the post of the president of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).
26. 'NATO personnel shall enjoy, together with their vehicles, vessels, aircraft, and equipment, free and unrestricted passage and unimpeded access throughout the FRY including associated airspace and territorial waters. This shall include, but not be limited to, the right of bivouac, maneuver, billet, and utilization of any areas or facilities as required for support, training, and operations.' 'Interim Agreement for Peace and Self-Government in Kosovo', Appendix B, Article 8, *Le Monde,* 23 April 1999.
27. 'The West versus Serbia', *The Economist,* 27 March 1999, p. 43
28. 'Germans Propose 24–hour Cease-Fire', *International Herald Tribune,* 15 April 1999, p. 4.
29. After seven weeks of bombing, NATO also started targeting the electric grid, shutting down electricity supplies over the whole of Serbia and thus depriving many city inhabitants of water supplies as well.
30. S. Erlanger, 'NATO Bombing Sparked Butchery, Survivors Say', *International Herald Tribune,* 21 June 1999, p. 5. Other reports of massacres indicate that they started after the NATO bombing began.
31. C. Gall, 'Fierce Fighting rages all over Kosovo. . .' *International Herald Tribune,* 30 March 1999, p. 2.
32. C. Gall 'Kosovo Rebel Leader Pleads for NATO Weapons,' *ibid.*, 5 April 1999, p. 4.
33. R. J. Smith and D. Priest, 'Serbs Met their Goals in Kosovo, Experts Say', *ibid*, 12 May 1999, p. 1.
34. B. Stewart 'Kosovo Patriotic All Lures the Albanians in US', *ibid.,* 15 April, p. 5, and picture captions. Also P. Finn and R. J. Smith ' Kosovo's Hit-and-Run Ground War', *ibid.,* 24–25 May, p. 5.
35. Agim Ceku, a general in the Croatian army, was born in Peč in 1961 and trained in the Yugoslav federal army military academy. He was decorated nine times and promoted to the rank of brigadier for his role in the war in Croatia from 1992–95. *International War and Peace Report,* No. 38, 26 May 1999. According to the *Sunday Times*, (10 October 1999) he was under investigation by the Hague International Tribunal for war crimes committed during the compaign against Krajina Serbs.
36. Respectively, the former Russian prime minister and the president of Finland.
37. The total number of troops to be deployed was put at 50 000, including 3600 from Russia. In comparison with the IFOR's 60 000 troops initially deployed in Bosnia-Hercegovina, this appears to be a large number for a province whose territory is only one fourth the size of Bosnia-Hercegovina.
38. Clause 11:(e), of the UN Security Council Resolution 1244, specifying that the international civilian presence will be '[f]acilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo's future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648)' is not mentioned or re-

ferred to in the agreement Milošević accepted, which is reproduced in Annex 2 of the Resolution.

39. 'We have not given up Kosovo', *The Guardian,* 11 June 1999, p. 5.
40. In his victory speech of 10 June 1999, the US president Clinton called upon the Serb people to remove Miloševic, who was indicted for war crimes, from power if they wanted to get any reconstruction aid for Serbia. See S. Schmemann 'Declaring Victory, Clinton Warns Serbs That Milošević Must Go', *International Herald Tribune*, 12–13 June 1999, p. 5. This suggests that the US government was still aiming at Milošević's removal from power. It is not clear, however, whether NATO forces deployed in Kosovo will be used to this end.
41. During 78 days of bombing, NATO warplanes flew 12 000 bombing missions, dropping more than 25 000 bombs. 'Allied Force: the audit', *The Guardian*, 11 June 1999, p. 4.
42. S. L. Myers 'NATO Air War May Have Done less Damage than Alliance Thought', *International Herald Tribune,* 29 June 1999, p. 4.
43. Early estimates, based on guesswork, put the number of massacred civilians at 10 000. *International Herald Tribune,* 18 June 1999, 'Kosovo Massacre Toll is Estimated at 10 000', p. 1.
44. Ironically, only after a year of warfare and dozens of massacres in Kosovo, were the US and its European allies ready, in early 1999, to impose such a protectorate by force.
45. B. Gellman, 'The Path to Crisis: How the United States and its Allies Went to War', *International Herald Tribune*, 19 April 1999, p. 2.
46. S. L. Myers, 'NATO to Consider New Kosovo Army: Rebels, Agreeing to Disband, Win Concession With U.S. Help', *ibid.*, 22 June 1999.
47. In Croatia, of course, the secessionist population was expelled, thus removing the need for a substantial autonomy or international supervision.

Epilogue: National liberations: is there an End to Them?

1. If we count the seven-day long Ilinden uprising against the Ottoman rule in 1903 in the present-day Republic of Macedonia, as a single round of national liberation, then, of course, there were five rounds so far.
2. For a proposal of this kind see H. Beran 'A democratic theory of political self-determination: for a new political order' in P. B. Lehning, (ed.), *Theories of Secession*, (London, Routledge, 1998), 32–60
3. For further discussion of this topic see A. Pavković, 'A Model of Reconciliation in Former Yugoslavia', *Peace Review*, forthcoming 2000.

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