Addressing America



George Washington's Farewell and the Making of National Culture, Politics, and Diplomacy, 1796–1852

Jeffrey J. Malanson

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Jeffrey J. Malanson

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For Katie

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Introduction

In 1847, author, academic, and pastor Joseph Alden wrote a book for children, *The Example of Washington Commended to the Young,* to illustrate the great importance of George Washington to the United States. Reading that book today, it is evident that even half a century after Washington's death, the man and his advice to the nation still held great relevance for the American people. One passage, presenting a conversation about George Washington between a Mr. Grayson and his two sons, John and George, is particularly instructive.

> "Now, John," Mr. Grayson asked, "do you know why [Washington] was born in America, instead of Europe or Africa?"
>
> "Because his father and mother lived here, I suppose," answered John.
>
> "I know what papa meant," said George.
>
> "What is your answer?" said Mr. Grayson.
>
> "He was born in America because the Lord willed to have it so."
>
> "Certainly. Suppose he had been born in Africa, he would have been a poor heathen—perhaps a poor slave. This country would never have been freed by his efforts. He would not have left his shining example for all coming time. God ordered as it was. It was part of his wise plan that Washington should be born when and where he was wanted to perform his appointed work. Did you ever think of that?"[1]

. . .

Both during his life and after his death, the American people revered George Washington. With the exception of a bitterly partisan interlude during Washington's second term as president, Americans placed complete faith in his judgment and wisdom. This fact, more than any other, explains why Washington's presidential Farewell Address had an enduring significance for the public at large and policy makers in particular. Historians have presented a wide variety of arguments as

to why Washington wrote a valedictory address and what he hoped to accomplish with it, describing his Farewell Address as serving purposes ranging from the political to the altruistic, and uses from the domestic to the diplomatic.[2] What historians have typically overlooked is how the American people themselves made sense of Washington's Farewell Address. This is an extremely important question: for more than half a century Americans believed that adherence to the tenets laid out in the Farewell Address were and would remain critical to their nation's growing power and prosperity. So seriously did they take the advice, principles, and wisdom proffered by Washington that they viewed his Farewell Address as being on the same plane as the nation's founding documents. The Declaration of Independence affirmed their ideals, the Constitution established their government, but it was the principles Washington expressed in the Address—especially those dealing with the conduct of U.S. foreign policy—that would ensure the nation's safety, security, and maturation into a world power.

Stated most simply, this book tells the history of those principles. In his Farewell Address, George Washington presented a series of general maxims to guide the construction of a wise foreign policy. The Farewell Address was carefully framed to present evolutionary principles rather than a permanent foreign policy. Washington believed, as did generations of his adherents, that should the American people stay true to these principles, the United States would eventually attain national greatness and international respectability. The most fundamental of these principles was the need to recognize the nature of the United States' best interests and always to allow those interests to shape U.S. foreign policy. America could not let love for one country or hatred for another direct its international relations; it could not let biases or traditions block its true course. In Washington's time, this meant the rapid expansion of commercial relations with the rest of the world and the minimization of political and military connections with Europe. Neutrality was the watchword of the day. Washington acknowledged that such policies were founded in the conditions of the world and America's relative weakness at the time he was writing. Changing conditions would change policies, but not adherence to the principle of identifying and pursuing the best interests of the country. As the United States grew stronger, for example, its leaders would need to redefine its interests and transform America's foreign policy to meet new challenges and realities.

Addressing America traces the formulation and evolution of Washington's principles from 1796 through 1852 from the perspective of their popular, political, and diplomatic uses. After Washington's death in 1799, the Farewell Address became a sacred, foundational text at the heart of any consideration of the first president's legacy. Washington's birthday became one of only two nationally celebrated holidays (Independence Day being the other), and the Address became a cornerstone of those celebrations. Every 22 February, citizens in cities and towns around the country gathered in town halls, city commons, and local churches to

remember Washington and his contributions and to extol the ongoing significance of the Farewell Address for America's future prosperity. These celebrations became an important avenue through which all Americans could gain a greater understanding of the Address and refresh their devotion to it.

Popular reverence for Washington and his principles ensured that they would continue to guide U.S. presidents and policy makers. In the years after Washington's death, a divergent conception of the Farewell Address emerged based on Thomas Jefferson's promise, in his 1801 inaugural address, that the nation would pursue "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none."[3] Washington's principles were intended as a set of ideals that would guide the continuous evolution of the country's foreign policy over time. "Entangling alliances with none" quickly became a rigid prescription for a permanent foreign policy of virtual isolation from the rest of the world. The phrase did not appear in the Farewell Address, but within a decade Americans were quoting it as a Washingtonian maxim. Over the next thirty years, the overarching story of U.S. foreign policy was the struggle between these two visions of the Farewell Address.

The Monroe Doctrine became a critical component of this struggle. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams framed the Doctrine as an expansion of Washington's Farewell Address to meet the new global challenges posed by an independent Latin America and an allied Europe, but most Americans quickly viewed it as a violation of Washington's principles. The relationship of the Monroe Doctrine to the Farewell Address, including its subsequent reinterpretation by men like James K. Polk as an un-Washingtonian declaration supportive of very aggressive foreign policies, is an integral part of this larger story. By the 1840s, the maxim of "entangling alliances with none" not only had won out as the dominant meaning of the Farewell Address, but also had come to be seen as the critical reason for the nation's rapid growth and development. Ironically, after the Mexican-American War, some Americans began to argue that the rigidity of Washington's principles was preventing the United States from fulfilling its true destiny as the defender of republicanism around the world.

Through its focus on the diplomatic, political, and cultural impacts of Washington's Farewell Address, *Addressing America* reasserts the fundamental importance of this critical document to the development of the United States in the first half of the nineteenth century. This story is told both through a reconsideration of the hallmark events of early U.S. history, such as the War of 1812, the enunciation of the Monroe Doctrine, and the Mexican War, but also by examining many largely overlooked episodes in that history. These include the Nootka Sound Controversy of 1790, the formation of Washington Benevolent Societies in the first two decades of the nineteenth century, the debate over U.S. participation at the Congress of Panama in 1825–26, the celebration of the centennial anniversary of Washington's birth in 1832, the consideration of intervention in Yucatan in early 1848, and the

U.S. tour undertaken by Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth in 1851–52. Such a far-reaching investigation is intended to help modern readers discover the variety of ways that Washington's legacy shaped life in the early republic.

Despite its influence in the first half of the nineteenth century, the significance of Washington's Farewell Address has since faded into the background of the history of this period. This is unfortunate but not surprising. In the realm of political culture, the Farewell Address only infrequently became a subject of special or protracted attention. Instead, discussion and celebration of the Address was simply built into people's lives as an essential part of Washington's birthday observations and Independence Day celebrations. In the realm of foreign policy, the Farewell Address typically became a subject of debate in instances when no significant action was ultimately taken. The interpretation linking the Address with Jefferson's promise to undertake "entangling alliances with none" turned it into a conservative bulwark against precipitous change in U.S. foreign policy. Historians typically do not spend much time poring over congressional debates wherein nothing consequential ultimately transpired, but it was in these debates that references to Washington's Farewell Address had the greatest impact—by ensuring that traditional policies were upheld.

The significance of this study is twofold. First, it allows for a much deeper assessment of the development of U.S. foreign policy over an extended period of time by placing that policy in the context of evolving American principles and ideals, while also highlighting the formative connection between popular views and diplomatic action. Second, it refocuses modern attention on the paramount importance Americans in the nineteenth century placed on the Farewell Address. People throughout the nation derived their understanding of the development of the United States, its relationship with the wider world, and ultimately its responsibilities on the global stage from Washington's Farewell Address.

Addressing America begins with the creation of the Farewell Address. The traditional narrative of Washington's presidency places a great deal of emphasis on developments in his second term in comprehending the foreign-policy portion of the Farewell Address, but consideration of the Confederation period and of Washington's first term allows for a more robust conversation about the evolution of his foreign-policy thought, as well as a more accurate understanding of his true objectives in the Address. Though it was widely praised at the time it was published, the Farewell Address became engrained in the American consciousness as a sacred document expressing principles of perpetual utility only after Washington's unexpected death in December 1799. The period of national mourning that followed, and Americans' widespread invocation of the Address as their departed Father's vital legacy, elevated it to the status of a foundational document for the nation.

Chapter 2 explores this process, as well as the immediate impact of Thomas Jefferson's 1801 inaugural pledge that the country would engage in "entangling al-

liances with none," on evolving conceptions of the Farewell Address. This chapter also examines the founding of Washington Benevolent Societies in the northern states during the presidencies of Jefferson and James Madison and the role played by these primarily Federalist organizations in making an explicit connection between adherence to the Farewell Address and America's continued peace and security. These societies largely faded away after the War of 1812, but the traditions and discourse they popularized had a lasting impact.

Chapter 3 focuses on John Quincy Adams's conduct of U.S. foreign policy, especially during his tenure as James Monroe's secretary of state. Next to Washington himself, Adams is the single most important individual to be considered in any extended discussion of the legacy of the Farewell Address, as he was the leading proponent of the interpretation of the Address uninfluenced by the rigidity of "entangling alliances with none." This chapter explores the development of Adams's foreign policy thought and his applications of Washington's principles in the years after the War of 1812. Making sense of Adams in this regard is critical to understanding the creation of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823. Adams framed the doctrine as an expansion of the Farewell Address to meet new global challenges. Where Washington had warned Americans to pursue neutrality toward Europe, Adams warned Europe to pursue a similar neutrality toward both American continents in the aftermath of Spanish American independence. Adams did not intend to fundamentally alter U.S. principles; rather, he believed that the changed conditions in the world required the United States to take a more assertive stance against European intervention in the affairs of the Western Hemisphere.

Initially hailed as a strong defense of American interests and principles, some critics soon began to question the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine, fearing that it envisioned a closer relationship with Spanish America and thus a threat to American neutrality and a violation of Washington's Farewell Address. For the first time, the competing interpretations of the Address came into direct conflict with one another. Chapter 4 examines the moment this conflict became a focus of national debate, during congressional consideration of President John Quincy Adams's proposal to send U.S. delegates to the Congress of Panama in 1826. This congress was intended as a meeting of the independent countries of the Americas, at which Adams hoped to see U.S. principles—specifically those of the Farewell Address—adopted internationally. At stake in the congressional debate over U.S. participation were the interpretations and legacies of both Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. Congress approved the Panama mission after five months of rigorous debate, but the manner in which the debate was carried out and the way it was covered in the press caused the American public to regard the United States' participation in the Congress of Panama as a failure for the country and for Adams. This legacy of failure carried with it rejection of the Monroe Doctrine and confirmation of "entangling alliances with none" as the dominant interpretation of the Farewell Address.

Chapter 5 explores the quarter-century after the Panama debate as a period of transition for American society and for the principles of U.S. foreign policy. The Panama debate was the first salvo in a renewed partisanship that gave rise to America's second party system and to an era of mass participatory politics. This upswing in political participation helped to turn the 1832 centennial anniversary of George Washington's birth into a grand national celebration unlike anything previously witnessed. As the sectional crisis began to deepen in the 1830s and 1840s, the Farewell Address only grew in importance as an expression of both foreign-policy principles and unionist sentiments. This chapter also examines the evolving diplomatic uses of the Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. The principles of the Monroe Doctrine reemerged in the early 1840s and were quickly manipulated by Presidents John Tyler and James K. Polk to justify the annexation of Texas and ultimately war with Mexico. Not only did these actions engraft entirely alien meanings on the Monroe Doctrine but the U.S. victory over Mexico also permanently changed the debate over the fundamental principles of U.S. foreign policy. After 1848, an increasingly vocal minority began advocating a more activist and interventionist foreign policy, and the debate over foreign policy moved away from competing interpretations of the Farewell Address and toward consideration of the Address's ongoing utility as a guide for American action.

These conflicting views of America's proper role in the world were put on national display between December 1851 and July 1852 with the U.S. tour of Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth, which is detailed in chapter 6. Kossuth came to the United States to secure economic, political, and potential military support for Hungarian independence, primarily in the form of a pledge by the United States government to prevent any other powers from intervening against Hungary—a promise to intervene to defend the principle of nonintervention. In order for Kossuth to convince the American government and people of the legitimacy of intervention for nonintervention, he had to argue against continued adherence to Washington's Farewell Address. In the wake of the Mexican War, some Americans felt that the United States now had a responsibility to defend republican principles abroad and thus endorsed Kossuth's call; most Americans, however, saw Kossuth's position as an attack on the Farewell Address, which only served to reinvigorate their interest in and allegiance to its principles. The great importance of Kossuth's tour is not just that it produced the most significant reevaluation of the Address to take place in the nation's history, but that this reevaluation was national, carried out both at the highest levels of government and by regular citizens in cities and towns throughout the country. When put to the test, Americans still chose Washington over any other alternative.

. . .

In 1808 or 1809, a rumor began circulating that a complete draft of the Farewell Address had been discovered in Alexander Hamilton's handwriting, and that this draft proved that Washington was not the author of the Address that bore his name. By 1859, the evidence clearly showed that Washington and Hamilton had worked together to draft the Farewell Address, but in the 1810s and 1820s all but the most devout supporters of Hamilton rejected as specious the rumors that Washington was not the sole author.[4] At the height of this authorship controversy, John Marshall, who was chief justice of the Supreme Court and a biographer of Washington, cautioned Washington's nephew Bushrod that the existence of the Hamilton draft could not be covered up. Whatever revelations might be made, Marshall concluded, "the public opinion of General Washington will remain unaltered." But he also warned that the Farewell Address would be an unfortunate casualty, since Hamilton's involvement in its drafting would cause the people's "respect" for it to "be changed."[5] In 1826, the Historical Society of Pennsylvania investigated the authorship controversy, and one of the society's witnesses echoed Marshall's conclusions. Philadelphia judge Richard Peters lamented that "our nation would suffer a serious injury, by having the fascinating name of *Washington* taken from the creed of every friend of his country."[6] The Farewell Address mattered because it contained Washington's wisdom and because its principles had clearly proven useful, but it was their attachment to the Father of their Country that confirmed most Americans in their complete devotion to his Farewell Address.[7]

It is impossible to know if, or how, the history of the early republic would have changed had Washington never written the Farewell Address. We cannot know what direction U.S. foreign policy would have taken, or how Americans would have conceived of their nation's relationship with the rest of the world. Maybe the only differences would have been rhetorical; maybe the Farewell Address really was as important as so many people claimed, and much would have changed. Washington, with the aid of Hamilton, did write the Address, though, and what we can say with certainty is that Americans understood their nation and their world through its principles and wisdom. The Farewell Address had a lasting impact on the United States—not because "'the Lord willed to have it so,'" but because George Washington did.[8]

1

Constructing the Farewell Address

On 19 September 1796, word quickly spread throughout Philadelphia of what many had suspected for months: George Washington would neither seek nor accept a third term as president of the United States. His closest friends and advisors knew that Washington had longed for retirement almost since the day he took office in 1789 and that he had attempted to step down at the end of his first term before reluctantly agreeing to stand for reelection. Republicans and Federalists alike had been plotting for months over whom they would support and where they could secure victory should Washington bow out. While the fact of his retirement did not surprise anyone, the form in which he chose to announce it did. Rather than issuing a simple statement to Congress or to the states declaring his intention, Washington produced a lengthy tract addressed directly to the people of the United States.[1] This valedictory, now known as the Farewell Address, did more than just announce his retirement; Washington used it to hand down "the disinterested warnings of a parting friend" and to offer "some sentiments; which are the result of much reflection . . . and which appear to me all important to the permanency of your felicity as a People."[2]

Washington touched on many aspects of American life in the Farewell Address, from the dangers of political parties to the fundamental importance of preserving and strengthening the union of the states, but his most impactful advice focused on the conduct of foreign policy and the country's relationship with the outside world. Formal diplomacy was primarily the responsibility of the federal government, but informally, Washington conceived of international relations as a national project carried out by the entire populace. He wrote about foreign policy in an expansive and sophisticated way, but this section of the Address can be boiled down to a few key principles. First among these was the principle of fairness in dealings with other nations. "Observe good faith and justice towds. all Nations," Washington urged. "Cultivate peace and harmony with all. . . . It will be worthy of a free, enlightened, and, at no distant period, a great Nation,

to give to mankind the magnanimous and too novel example of a People always guided by an exalted justice and benevolence."[3] Not yet a great nation, the United States would someday gain in stature, not only through economic and military advancement but also through fairness and justice. As one writer would later say of Washington himself, greatness would be accomplished only if America first demonstrated goodness.[4]

A second key principle, which Washington treated at length in the Farewell Address, was that of national interest. Proposing that the protection and advancement of the nation's best interests must necessarily underlie all foreign policy, he argued that a careful and honest determination of the nature of those interests was integral to the construction of such a foreign policy. For this reason, Washington cautioned that "permanent, inveterate antipathies against particular Nations and passionate attachments for others should be excluded." In their place, "just and amicable feelings towards all should be cultivated." A nation that "indulges towards another an habitual hatred, or an habitual fondness," he argued, is "in some degree a slave. It is a slave to its animosity or to its affection, either of which is sufficient to lead it astray from its duty and its interest." Antipathies caused people and nations to take up arms when wise policy would dictate peace. Passionate attachments encouraged "the illusion of an imaginary common interest, in cases where no real common interest exists," leading to actions that wise policy would likewise overturn. The appearance of favoritism especially concerned Washington; the "attachment of a small or weak, towards a great and powerful Nation," he warned, "dooms the former to be the satellite of the latter." The United States, at that time both small and weak, could not become the inferior party in a foreign partnership if it was to maintain its independence. "Excessive partiality for one foreign nation and excessive dislike of another," Washington concluded, confused the assessment of national interest by causing "those whom they actuate to see danger only on one side," while serving to "veil and even second the arts of influence on the other." When such attitudes are taken to the extreme, he added, "real Patriots, who may resist the intrigues of the favourite, are liable to become suspected and odious; while its tools and dupes usurp the applause and confidence of the people, to surrender their interests." As a result, the "jealousy of a free people ought to be *constantly* awake" to the "insidious wiles of foreign influence."[5] American interests cannot be protected if the people are serving the will of a foreign power.

Stemming from the principles of fairness and national interest, Washington developed a "great rule of conduct" for the United States. He advised that as the United States extended its "commercial relations" with foreign nations, it should "have with them as little *political* connection as possible." Antipathies and attachments aside, it was essential for Americans to remember that "Europe has a set of primary interests, which to us have none, or a very remote relation." These interests would cause Europe to "be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of

which are essentially foreign to our concerns." Given the gulf between European and American interests, "it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by artificial ties, in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships, or enmities." Policies of fairness toward and political separation from Europe were in the United States' best interest, given both the country's status and global conditions. One of America's greatest advantages was the wide ocean that physically separated the United States from Europe and that made political separation easier to maintain. "Our detached and distant situation," as Washington described it, "invites and enables us to pursue a different course." In arguably the most important passage of the Farewell Address, Washington predicted that if Americans could "remain one People, under an efficient government, the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel."[6] The protection of American interests would not only allow short-term survival and long-term greatness, but also enable the United States to increasingly make its own way in the world free from fear of foreign abuse. The United States should always be a just nation, but its interests would necessarily evolve as its position in the world changed over time. All of this would be possible, though, only if the American people diligently protected their country's interests by remaining separate from Europe.

Washington believed that protecting this separation should be a straightforward undertaking. With no interests at stake, what reason would Americans have to "forego the advantages of so peculiar a situation [of having an ocean between Europe and America]? Why quit our own to stand upon foreign ground? Why, by interweaving our destiny with that of any part of Europe, entangle our peace and prosperity in the toils of European Ambition, Rivalship, Interest, Humour or Caprice?" The United States relied on European commerce but should otherwise let the rest of the world alone. Washington concluded that it was the "true policy" of the United States to "steer clear of permanent Alliances, with any portion of the foreign world." Alliances were the primary mode through which America could be made to serve European interests and abandon its own, and given the wide expanse of the Atlantic Ocean, such an alliance could do little to safeguard the United States. Under these conditions, the United States should avoid permanent alliances at all costs. In "extraordinary emergencies," it could "safely trust to temporary alliances" for assistance, but even here it was incumbent upon Americans "to keep ourselves, by suitable establishments, on a respectably defensive posture." Near the end of the Address, Washington disclosed that a "predominant motive"

for him had been "to endeavour to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes." Washington believed with all of his being that with time—time free from foreign interference, time dedicated to the development of an American character and the strengthening of the American union, time spent staying true to these guiding principles—the United States would become a great power, equal, if not superior, to any in Europe.[7]

In the years after its publication, the Farewell Address took on a multitude of interpretations and vastly divergent meanings, but Washington's advice—as he intended it to be taken—can be distilled down to two core principles: fairness and interest. It was the responsibility of policy makers and all Americans to act with integrity toward the outside world and honestly identify the best interests of the United States in shaping relationships with it. In 1796, while the United States was still a small and weak nation, those interests were commercial expansion and political separation from Europe, as well as the avoidance of permanent alliances. As the nation grew and prospered, as its citizenry and institutions matured and solidified, and as the international context changed, those interests—and the specific policies that would best promote them—would change as well. The recognition of change over time, of the evolution of national interest, was an integral aspect of Washington's advice—one that would be largely forgotten by subsequent generations of Americans. Washington was not prescribing a permanent foreign policy, but rather permanent principles to guide the construction of wise foreign policies to meet evolving global challenges. Beyond suggesting that in the future the United States would more easily be able to force other nations to respect its rights and principles, Washington was careful not to predict what his nation's future interests or policies might be; to do so would necessarily undermine the entire point of the Farewell Address. Washington clearly believed that the avoidance of permanent alliances and the maintenance of neutrality in international affairs would be enduring ideals, but he urged their promotion not as ends in themselves but as the best means of protecting the nation's interests.

Washington did not possess the wisdom he expressed in the Farewell Address from the moment he took the oath of office in April 1789. While many of the ideas expressed in it were already present in his thinking on U.S. foreign policy at the outset of his presidency, they would be tested, refined, and revised over the ensuing eight years of his administration. To better understand the intent of the Farewell Address, it is instructive to explore the development of his guiding principles for the nation's foreign policy and place in the world.

The Evolution of Washington's Foreign-policy Thought

Historians of Washington's presidency and foreign policy have focused a great deal of attention on his second term—more than on his first. This is understandable given how critically important the crisis of the French Revolution was in shaping America's politics and relationship with Europe. Historians have also regularly linked these developments to specific recommendations in the Farewell Address. While the events occurring during Washington's second term clearly influenced his discussion of foreign policy in the valedictory, these events only served to solidify foreign-policy ideas and ideals that had been evolving in his mind since the end of the American Revolution. Lessons from the Confederation period and from his first term as president helped give specific shape to the foreign-policy principles Washington tested during his second term and expounded upon in the Farewell Address.[8]

A critical element in the development of these principles was Washington's conception of American government. His experience as the head of the Continental Army during the Revolution allowed him to see firsthand the weakness of the Confederation and its inability to provide the army with adequate men, supplies, and funds.[9] The ascendancy in the states of local viewpoints over national interests plagued both the war effort and the nascent government. At the end of 1778, Washington described the young country as being "on the brink of ruin," and he implored a fellow Virginian to send "your ablest and best Men to Congress; these characters must not slumber, nor sleep at home, in such times of pressing danger; they must not content themselves in the enjoyment of places of honor or profit in their own Country [Virginia], while the common interests of America are mouldering and sinking into irretrievable (if a remedy is not soon applied) ruin, in which theirs also must ultimately be involved."[10] Local interests would suffer greatly if the Revolution failed, yet the states consistently remained unwilling to give Congress the power necessary to successfully prosecute the war. In 1780, Washington lamented "that unless Congress speaks in a more decisive tone; unless they are vested with powers by the several States competent to the great purposes of War, or assume them as a matter of right . . . our cause is lost. . . . I see one head gradually changing into thirteen."[11] The independent nation they were fighting to create was crumbling before the task of completing it had even been accomplished.

Washington's aide-de camp throughout much of this period, Alexander Hamilton, shared the general's tremendous concern for the weakness of the central government. Hamilton was a masterful writer who expressed in compelling and persuasive ways the same concerns preoccupying Washington. The "fundamental defect" of the current government, Hamilton wrote in 1780, "is a want of power in Congress." This was felt as a "want of sufficient means at [Congress's] disposal to answer the public exigencies and of vigor to draw forth their means." The system

also suffered, Hamilton observed, from "an excess of the spirit of liberty which has made the particular states show a jealousy of all power not in their own hands." The danger was that the "uncontrollable sovereignty in each state . . . will defeat the other powers given to Congress, and make our union feeble and precarious."[12] As Washington had feared two years earlier, the interests of individual states were being allowed to trump national ones.

Yet despite the weakness and inefficiency of the war effort, the United States did successfully attain their independence from Great Britain, in no small part because of the monetary and military assistance of France, with whom the United States had negotiated a formal alliance in 1778 to bring about that country's entry into the war.[13] With the approach of peace in 1783, Washington wrote to Hamilton that the end of war marked an opportunity to effect the changes necessary to "make us a great, a respectable, and happy People," but cautioned that achieving such changes required "other means than State politics, and unreasonable jealousies and prejudices."[14] Independence had been secured, but the national project would work only if the states' individual interests could be subordinated to those of the confederation as a whole.

The United States' first framework of government, the Articles of Confederation, did not provide the solution Washington had hoped for, proving just as ineffectual as the Continental Congress.[15] When a constitutional convention met in Philadelphia in May 1787, Washington once again hoped that that it would afford the opportunity for change. During the early days of debate, Washington, who had been chosen as the presiding officer of the convention, wrote to Thomas Jefferson, then serving as the American minister to France, predicting national ruin if something was not done soon. "That something is necessary, all will agree," Washington observed, "for the situation of the General Governmt (if it can be called a governmt) is shaken to its foundation—and liable to be overset by every blast. In a word, it is at an end, and unless a remedy is soon applied, anarchy & confusion will inevitably ensue."[16] The new country was at a dire crossroads. Hamilton, representing his state of New York at the convention, shared Washington's belief that this was "the critical opportunity for establishing the prosperity of this country on a solid foundation." Hamilton feared "that we shall let slip the golden opportunity of rescuing the American empire from disunion anarchy and misery. No motley or feeble measure can answer the end or will finally receive the public support."[17] By July, Washington had grown pessimistic about the prospect of success, writing to Hamilton that the progress of the convention revealed "little ground on which the hope of a good establishment can be formed. In a word, I *almost* dispair [*sic*] of seeing a favourable issue to the proceedings of the Convention, and do therefore repent having had any agency in this business." Washington was especially critical of the men "who oppose a strong & energetic government" as being "narrow minded politicians . . . under the influence of local views."[18] In

spite of the struggles the country had endured, national interests still were not being given their due.

When the Philadelphia Convention finished its work in September 1787, the constitution it produced established a stronger federal government than either Washington or Hamilton had anticipated. Even with the federal government placed on a stronger footing, though, Washington knew that future national success would depend on the will of the American people and their ability to maintain a national viewpoint. In the winter of 1787–88, war between Great Britain and France appeared to be imminent (although it would not arrive until 1793). Washington expressed the wish that "we shall have wisdom enough not to take a part in their quarrels," for in the event of a European war, "we shall feel more than ever the want of an efficient general Government to regulate our Commercial concerns, to give us a National respectability, and to connect the political views and interests of the several States under one head in such a manner as will effectually prevent them from forming separate, improper, or indeed any connection, with the European powers which can involve them in their political disputes."[19] The United States had to maintain a neutral posture in the affairs of Europe, but without "energy enough in Government" to define and enforce the national interest, Washington warned, "we shall certainly get involved."[20]

After the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1788, Washington finally began to strike a guardedly optimistic tone. Writing in late August, he declared his "hope" that the country would "be able to keep disengaged from the labyrinth of European politics & Wars." A period of peace, along with "the adoption of a good national government," would allow the United States to "become respectable in the eyes of the world so that none of the maritime Powers, especially none of those who hold possessions in the new world or the West Indies shall presume to treat [the United States] with insult or contempt." With regard to these European powers, Washington concluded, "it should be the policy of United America to administer to their wants, without being engaged in their quarrels." If the United States could achieve this balance—commercial engagement and political neutrality—it would not be "in the ability of the proudest and most potent people on earth to prevent us from becoming a great, a respectable & a commercial nation, if we shall continue united & faithful to ourselves."[21] If the United States could walk the tightrope between expansion and nonentanglement, it would achieve greatness in time.

With his election as the nation's first president a foregone conclusion, Washington regarded the task ahead as a daunting one. He had to preside over the formation of a government; he had to appoint virtually all of the people to serve in that government; and every action he took set a precedent for future presidents of the United States. As an even greater challenge, Washington also had to work to tighten the bonds of union between the states while simultaneously navigating

the muddy waters of international relations. The United States was a weak nation struggling to survive and prosper in a world of hostile empires, and the American people looked to Washington to set the course.[22]

What Washington's prepresidential correspondence reveals is that by 1789 he had already developed, at least in nascent form, the core principles of foreign policy that later found expression in his Farewell Address. These principles—the importance of a strong union, of defending the national interest, and of combining commercial expansion with political neutrality—are all stated in his letters of this period. While the events occurring during Washington's two terms as president developed and refined these principles, their formation predated his presidency.

Washington's First Crisis: The Nootka Sound Controversy

The first concrete foreign-policy crisis of Washington's administration, the Nootka Sound Controversy, is also the most instructive for understanding his conception of America's principles and the challenges facing the United States. In the spring of 1789, as the United States set up its government in New York City, across the continent Spain and Great Britain sought to expand their commercial empires. These empires already surrounded the United States, with the colonies of Spain to the south in Florida and west of the Mississippi River, and British Canada to the north. Moreover, to the east, Britain's insurmountable naval power dominated the Atlantic Ocean. After the American Revolution, Spain and Britain had peacefully coexisted in North America until each set its sights on the northwest coast as the ideal location to establish ports that would facilitate the fur trade with the region's native populations. Agents from both countries targeted Vancouver Island's Nootka Sound as a site for imperial expansion.[23]

John Meares, a retired British naval officer, landed at Nootka Sound in May 1788 as an outrider for a more permanent British settlement of the island. He lived there for roughly six weeks at the start and end of the summer before retreating to a warmer climate for the winter. The following May, the Spanish arrived at the sound, found no evidence of prior occupation by anyone other than the natives, and claimed Vancouver Island for Spain. When two British ships returned two months later to initiate trade with the Indians in what they believed was their own territory, the Spanish commander stationed at the port ordered both ships seized and sent as prizes to Mexico for violating Spain's territorial sovereignty. Britain was upset about what it viewed as a violation of its own rights and demanded satisfaction. Negotiations opened in February 1790 to resolve the dispute, but quickly faltered when neither side relented. Britain responded by beginning preparations for a military solution to the impasse.[24]

Two factors in this European conflict threatened to involve the United States. First, as part of its preparations, the British navy impressed thousands of sailors into service between March and September 1790, including several hundred Americans forcibly removed from American merchant vessels and accused of being British deserters. Impressment was a critical issue for American seamen and for the United States government and would become a growing point of contention between the two countries over the next quarter-century. Second, given that the Anglo-Spanish conflict originated in North America, most observers believed that any hostilities would probably play out there as well. In the event of war on its borders, the United States could be forced to take sides. Britain was a stronger military and naval power and a more important commercial partner than Spain, but the United States could not afford a rupture with the Spanish either, as that empire controlled the Mississippi River and the port of New Orleans. Continued access to both was vital to America's western trade and development. The greatest danger for the United States was that Britain would displace Spain on the North American continent, permanently endangering U.S. peace and security. As Gouverneur Morris, the U.S. minister to Great Britain put it, should Spain submit to British naval power, "she may as well give up her american Dominions."[25]

Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson framed a British victory over Spain in quite stark terms. "Should Great Britain possess herself" of the Floridas and Louisiana, it would "possess a territory equal to half ours, beyond the Missisipi" and would "seduce that half of ours which is on this side the Missisipi." Gaining such a significant foothold on America's western border would enable Britain to "take from the remaining part of our States the markets they now have for their produce by furnishing those markets cheaper, with the same articles." Britain would "encircle us compleatly, by these possessions on our land-board, & her fleets on our sea-board," and "instead of two neighbors balancing each other, we shall have one, with more than the strength of both." If Britain supplanted Spain, the continued existence of the United States as an independent nation would be in doubt. Given what was at stake in this Anglo-Spanish conflict, the question for Jefferson became, "Would the prevention of this be worth a war?"[26] The answer for Washington and his advisors was complicated. If they could be assured that joining Spain would guarantee the defeat of Great Britain, then war would be a reasonable option; however, America's inconsequential military and naval power alone would not tip the scales in Spain's favor. The sober reality for the United States was that unless France—bankrupt and by this point engaged in its own revolution—also threw its weight behind Spain, there was little chance of stopping the British if they chose to go to war.

Jefferson's assessment of the Nootka Sound Controversy and its implications for the United States illustrated for Washington the real dangers posed by Anglo-Spanish hostilities, but left him unsure of how to proceed. In July 1790, Washington's administration began to consider alternatives to war. One possibility was

to work with Spain to secure the independence of Louisiana and the Floridas, in the hope that Britain would then redirect its hostilities to more southern Spanish possessions away from U.S. borders. As Jefferson framed it, "might [Spain] not prefer their Independence to their Subjection to Grt Britain?" An option that Jefferson rejected was an alliance with either Britain or Spain. "In the event of a war," Jefferson wrote, echoing Washington's sentiments, "we are disposed to be strictly neutral. . . . We should view with extreme uneasiness any attempts of either power to seize the possessions of the other on our frontier, as we consider our own safety interested in a due balance between our neighbors."[27] In late July, in one of the most unusual turns of the crisis, Washington requested any available information on the geographies, populations, and military capabilities of Spanish Mexico and Portuguese Brazil. What precisely the president planned to do with this information is unknown, although several historians have speculated that he was entertaining the idea of a potential U.S. intervention in those colonies.[28] Such a plan would seem to go against Washington's belief in neutrality, and would not have solved the danger of an Anglo-Spanish war, but no further evidence of any discussion of the matter has been found. This makes it impossible to assess how seriously this option was considered or what Washington believed might be achieved by intervention. Even the preliminary consideration of such a step reveals how far afield the president's search for possible solutions went.

In early August 1790, Washington and Jefferson decided to take a different approach and use what they still believed to be an imminent war to create a diplomatic advantage for the United States. From the moment the United States gained its independence, it had repeatedly and unsuccessfully negotiated with Spain to win free navigation of the Mississippi River and the right of deposit at New Orleans. Given the great military and naval advantage Britain would have over Spain in any war, Washington and Jefferson planned to leverage an offer of American friendship into concessions from Spain on these points.[29] In support of his plan, Washington wrote to the Marquis de Lafayette, a prominent leader in France and a close personal friend dating back to the American Revolution, seeking to engage Lafayette's influence to encourage Spain to negotiate with the United States. In his letter, Washington described the United States as "patiently advancing in our task of civil government, unentangled in the crooked politics of Europe, wanting scarcely any thing but the free navigation of the Mississippi." In the event of war between Britain and Spain, the United States would "observe a strict neutrality," though he expected that their "friendship" would be "courted" by both sides. "Why will not Spain be wise and liberal at once?" Washington inquired. "It would be easy to annihilate all causes of quarrels between that Nation and the United States at this time. At a future period that may be far from being a fact." The not-so-subtle suggestion was that both nations had something to gain by an immediate negotiation.[30] The Lafayette letter is a fascinating example of a weak nation (the United

States) trying to wield the might of a strong power (Great Britain) to press a diplomatic advantage over a third party (Spain); any response, however, would take months to arrive from Europe. Even should the Lafayette plan work, it would not automatically diminish the danger posed to the United States by an Anglo-Spanish war—and there was no assurance that the plan would work (it did not).

By late August, more practical and immediate considerations came to the forefront. Washington had become convinced "that New Orleans and the Spanish Posts above it on the Mississippi will be among the first attempts of the [British], and that the reduction of them will be undertaken by a combined operation from Detroit." Writing to Jefferson, Hamilton, Vice President John Adams, Secretary of War Henry Knox, and John Jay, the chief justice of the United States Supreme Court, Washington asked for advice on how he should respond to the British minister "in case he should apply for permission to march Troops through the Territory of the said States from Detroit to the Mississippi." He also sought advice on an American response if the British marched without prior consent.[31] Washington had two concerns. First, what were the implications for American neutrality if the United States allowed British troops to move through its territory? Second, how should the United States respond if its territorial sovereignty was not respected? The answers Washington received to his queries hinged on the idea that the United States had to recognize the nature of its true interests, while also acknowledging the country's inability to defend itself militarily in support of those interests if they should be violated by Britain or Spain. The answers also revealed that the young country's greatest foreign-policy minds could not agree on what the proper course of action should be or why it should be pursued.

Chief Justice Jay, who had been secretary of foreign affairs under the Confederation government, favored allowing British troops to pass through American territory since the United States could do nothing militarily to stop them. While Jay conceded that ideally the United States "should declare and make it an invariable Maxim in their Policy never to permit the Troops of any Nation to pass thro' their country," he argued that such a stance was impractical in the immediate term, given the United States' current inability to enforce it. Jay feared that refusing to allow the passage of British troops would result either in war with Great Britain or in "submitting to the Disgrace and Humiliation of permitting them to proceed with Impunity."[32] In an effort to avoid such embarrassment, Jay advised that Washington make no move to stand in Britain's way. Jefferson, foreshadowing his own presidential response to British maritime hostilities, saw the same options as Jay. Jefferson recognized that if the British marched despite an American refusal, the United States would be forced to either "enter immediately into the war, or pocket an acknowledged insult in the face of the world: and one insult pocketed soon produces another." As neither result was desirable, Jefferson proposed a "middle course," in which the administration should "avoid giving any

answer," thereby not involving the United States in an immediate conflict while leaving open the option of seeking redress at a later date.[33]

Adams disagreed with the conclusions reached by Jay and Jefferson. Adams believed that the obligations of neutrality required the United States to oppose the troop movement regardless of the consequences. To grant the British "permission to march troops through the territory of the United States . . . would not only have an appearance offensive to the Spaniards, of partiality to the English, but would be a real Injury to Spain." The only option was to say no. Should Great Britain ignore America's refusal, the United States would face a decision over war, but rather than fight or sheepishly accept the insult, Adams argued, it should seek negotiation. "Nations are not obliged to declare War for every Injury or even Hostility," Adams asserted. "A tacit Acquiescence under such an Outrage, would be misinterpreted on all hands; by Spain as inimical to her and by Brittain, as the effect of Weakness, Disunion and Pusillanimity. Negotiation then is the only other Alternative." Adams admitted that negotiation was itself "attended with peculiar difficulties" and was not likely to yield a positive result, but it would keep the United States out of war and allow it to stand firmly by its avowed neutrality in the eyes of the world.[34]

Knox likewise agreed that passage should be refused, but maintained that the refusal should not be backed by force. "The true interests of the United States," Knox concluded, "dictate a state of neutrality in the affair between Spain and England." Neutrality was more important to America's long-term interests than was the British insult. Knox also introduced a new consideration into the proceedings by suggesting that the power the United States truly needed to worry about was France. Unlike America's relationship with Britain or Spain, the United States and France were bound by the Treaty of Alliance of 1778. This meant that while the United States was under no obligation to take sides in an Anglo-Spanish war, should France enter on Spain's behalf—a necessary occurrence, in Knox's view, for Spain to have any hope of victory—"every effort on the part of France will be employed to associate America in the War. And it is a question of great moment whether the United States could strictly comply with the treaty . . . entered into with France . . . and observe an exact Neutrality."[35] Because of a treaty signed a dozen years earlier, the United States could find itself at war regardless of its principles or true interests. Knox's letter represented an ominous warning of events to come later in Washington's presidency.

Hamilton pointed to the potential complications raised by treaty commitments, but seemed unconvinced that France would actually involve itself in the war. While Hamilton, like the rest of Washington's advisors, concluded that the United States was in no position to oppose the passage of British troops, his recommendations moved in an entirely different direction. If the troops were going to proceed regardless of the American response, Hamilton argued that granting permission to a British request would produce greater benefit for the United

States than refusal. If the United States did not hamper its war effort, for example, the British might be more inclined to acknowledge American rights of navigation on the Mississippi River. Of all the responses Washington received to his requests for advice, Hamilton's was the only one to point to possible advantages that could be derived from cooperation with the British and was the one most driven by a pragmatic reaction to realistic outcomes rather than a concern for larger principles or ideals that could not be defended.[36]

This flurry of letters on how to respond to a possible British troop movement, and the ramifications of that response for American principles and policy, proved to be the end point of documented discussions of the Nootka Sound Controversy. The seemingly imminent war never arrived. France could not commit to war against Britain in support of Spain, leaving Spain to either confront Britain's superior military and navy on its own or pursue a negotiated solution; Spain wisely chose the latter course. In light of the indecisive outcome, historians of Washington's presidency have tended to only give minimal consideration to this episode when assessing Washington's foreign-policy principles and mindset. The peaceful resolution of the controversy makes it virtually impossible to know whose counsel Washington was most persuaded by—especially given that he did not respond in writing to any of his advisors—but this does not mean that the crisis did not inform Washington's view of American interests and foreign policy. The Nootka Sound Controversy demonstrated that most of Washington's advisors wanted the United States to adamantly cling to its neutrality, but their specific and often competing recommendations also reveals a lack of consensus on the rationale for that neutrality. Was neutrality advisable from principle or out of weakness? Would idealism or pragmatism dictate U.S. foreign policy? These were questions that would confront Washington throughout the remainder of his presidency.

Despite the conflicting advice he received, the correspondence with his advisors likely clarified two thoughts for Washington. First, it illuminated the dangers posed by permanent alliances with foreign powers. Three years before the French Revolution burst outward as an international conflict, Knox presciently noted the looming danger posed by the Treaty of Alliance, which threatened to entangle the United States in Europe's wars. Second, the threat of an Anglo-Spanish war revealed to Washington that the conduct of American foreign relations was really about managing the country's weakness and pursuing policies that would minimize exposure while simultaneously fostering long-term growth and security. The disagreement over how to best respond to a British request to march troops through U.S. territory when the government could do nothing to prevent it emerged from differing viewpoints on this idea. This realization motivated Washington throughout his presidency. What is clear, then, is that while the Nootka Sound Controversy produced no concrete foreign policy, it did help to shape Washington's understanding of America's foreign-policy principles—principles

that guided him through the later crises of his presidency and served as the foundation for his Farewell Address.[37]

With few exceptions, Washington's first term was marked by peace and prosperity. Thanks to an eager Congress and Alexander Hamilton's carefully devised financial plan, the government, nation, and economy took shape much more rapidly than even the most optimistic observers had expected. Two seeds were planted in this period, though, that would sprout into problems for Washington and the nation almost as soon as his second term began. The first seed was the outbreak of revolution in France in the summer of 1789. Many Americans took great interest in the attempt of their friend and ally to throw off monarchical government and move toward, as they saw it, American-style republicanism. The challenge this posed for the Washington administration would quickly become that of balancing popular passions with national interests. The second seed was a growing rift in Washington's cabinet between Jefferson and Hamilton and the subsequent emergence of political parties in Congress and throughout the nation. Debates over Hamilton's financial plan had revealed that Republicans saw the Constitution as codifying narrowly defined limits on government power. For the Federalists, on the other hand, the Constitution was simply a starting point that could be molded and developed over time. The conflicts produced by these competing interpretations initially played out in the sphere of domestic politics, but they were ultimately influenced in important ways by foreign policy as well. For Hamilton and the Federalists, adopting successful British economic models and expanding commercial relations with their country's former colonial master were logical steps in the United States' development, but for Jefferson and the Republicans, these efforts represented the abandonment of revolutionary republican principles.[38] Such divisions had begun to arise even before France's revolution erupted into an international conflict that threatened to entangle the United States, but once it did, foreign policy and partisan development became inextricably linked.

Washington's Second Term

By spring 1792, Washington had his sights set on returning to the retirement he had only reluctantly given up three years earlier. He turned to James Madison, whom he often sought out when he needed assistance drafting important public messages, and set him to work on a "Valadictory [*sic*] address from me to the public" that would express "in plain & modest terms" his reasons for stepping down. It would also include a plea for national union and support of the federal government.[39] According to Madison, Washington believed that this additional component of the message was necessary because "a spirit of party in the Government was becoming a fresh source of difficulty." On a more personal level, he feared that

this spirit "was dividing some (alluding to the Secretary of State & Secry. of the Treasury) more particularly connected with him in the administration."[40] Despite Washington's very specific concerns, Madison's draft of an address avoided any overt discussions of partisanship. "We may all be considered as the children of one common country," Madison wrote. "We have all been embarked in one common cause. We have all our share in common sufferings and common successes." If the "common Government" established by the Constitution was "supported by wise councils, by virtuous conduct, and by mutual and friendly allowances, [it] must approach as near to perfection as any human work can aspire, and nearer than any which the annals of mankind have recorded."[41] These sentiments, along with some of Madison's language, would find their way into the Farewell Address four years later. Absent from Madison's draft was any discussion of foreign policy. By writing it directly to the American people, Washington intended the valedictory address as a reflection on the American experience to that point. With the Nootka Sound Controversy having been debated out of public view and with the internationalization of the French Revolution and the popular upheavals it would bring still a year away, Washington had no immediate context or need for a discussion of foreign-policy principles. He approved of the tone of Madison's draft, but the address became temporarily unnecessary when Washington agreed to stand for reelection.

Almost immediately after Washington relented, intelligence began to reach the United States of the outbreak of war between France and Austria; by March 1793 a general war in Europe seemed imminent. Washington did not want to see Europe overcome by war, but in that event he hoped that his fellow citizens would "have too just a sense of our own interest to originate any cause that may involve us in it," and he "ardently" wished that the United States would "not be forced into it by the conduct of other Nations."[42] It would be "unwise . . . in the extreme," Washington concluded, "to involve ourselves in the contests of European Nations, where our weight could be but Small—tho' the loss to ourselves would be certain."[43] By early April, Washington had learned definitively that France had declared war on Great Britain and Holland.[44] War between Great Britain and France was difficult for the United States because of its complex commercial and ideological connections with each country. America needed peaceful relations with both Britain and France if it was to maintain its rapid advancement toward prosperity. Upon receiving the news of the war, Washington wrote to Jefferson that "it behoves the Government of this Country to use every means in it's [*sic*] power to prevent the citizens thereof from embroiling us with either of those powers, by endeavouring to maintain a strict neutrality."[45] Less than two weeks later, after extensive cabinet debates, Washington issued his Proclamation of Neutrality, which declared that it was "the duty and interest of the United States . . . that they should with sincerity and good faith adopt and pursue a conduct friendly and impartial toward the

belligerent powers." The proclamation further exhorted and warned "the citizens of the United States to carefully avoid all acts and proceedings whatsoever which may in any manner tend to contravene such disposition."[46] The maintenance of American neutrality was the responsibility of every American citizen.

The proclamation declared a national approach to the war, but in its wake the administration became engulfed in Francomania. As many historians have documented, countless Americans in this period not only believed that France was following in their own nation's revolutionary footsteps, but felt that the United States owed loyalty and aid to the French because of their 1778 alliance.[47] While these views manifested themselves in a multitude of ways—almost all of them troubling to Washington in varying degrees—the most problematic in the summer of 1793 was privateering. Supporters of France armed their merchant vessels and preyed upon British shipping in American waters, leading to a seemingly endless stream of letters flowing to the president from governors and revenue officers seeking guidance on how to deal with the privateers and their captured British prizes.[48] The actions of these private citizens placed America's national neutrality on a precarious footing; even though the privateers were not state sponsored or government sanctioned, their actions gave Great Britain justifiable cause to complain that its vessels, sailing in supposedly neutral waters, were subject to attack.

Another aspect of the privateering was even more problematic for the U.S. government: the conduct of France's minister to the United States, Sir Edmond Charles Genet. It was Genet who had enlisted American citizens as privateers in the French cause. Genet had arrived in the United States to a cheering crowd in Charleston, South Carolina, two weeks before Washington issued the Proclamation of Neutrality, and he immediately commissioned four vessels as privateers of the French nation. After manning them with largely American crews and sending them to sea, Genet established courts under the control of the French consul in Charleston to condemn the British prizes the privateers brought back. Ten days later Genet set out on a month-long trek north to Philadelphia, courting the public as he went and caring little for how the U.S. government viewed his actions.[49] Later in the summer, after the government had made clear to Genet that the outfitting of French privateers in American ports was prohibited, the French minister pushed forward to begin equipping the *Petite Démocrate,* a captured British ship originally named the *Little Sarah,* to set out on a privateering mission of its own.[50] When Genet was ordered to stop, he threatened to "'appeal from the President to the People,'" claiming popular authority for his work.[51] This was an affront to the authority and the legitimacy of the federal government and to President Washington in particular, but Genet felt that he could engage in such behavior because of the enthusiastic crowds that received him throughout his travels. By August, Washington and the cabinet had agreed that they could no longer abide Genet's

insolence and demanded his recall by the French government.[52] Genet's actions and the larger privateering issue were a bleak demonstration of both the practical dangers of foreign influence being exercised domestically and the impact private citizens could have on America's foreign relations.

The government's insistence on national neutrality in the war between France and Great Britain, particularly in light of the popular American support for France fostered by Genet, caused the partisan development that Washington had lamented in 1792 to spiral out of control during the summer of 1793. Most disturbing to the president was the Republican press, which generally favored the cause of France and continually portrayed Washington's program of neutrality as an attempt to subvert the Franco-American treaties in deference to Great Britain. One writer, labeling himself "Veritas," wrote several public letters in May and June condemning Washington for "officially opposing the *national will,*" which he claimed supported France. Veritas predicted that "an attempt of this kind, at present, would be scouted with deserved contempt, and bring ruin on its author."[53] Another writer, calling himself merely "A Citizen," informed Washington that "the affections of thousands of your fellow-citizens are withdrawn from you, and suspicions are entertained, that you have, indignantly, cast behind you those endearing principles of republicanism, which are so congenial to the minds of your countrymen, and to a strict observance of which, you are, in a great measure, indebted for all your fame."[54] Washington's attempts to keep the nation out of a war in which it had no direct interests at stake were being depicted by those favoring France as being not only pro-British but also anti-American. While this was an extreme view of the president in 1793, it was the increasingly common view that many Republicans held of the Federalist program. Federalists similarly distrusted Republican motives in their seemingly unwavering devotion to France. Washington felt that the personal attacks were unwarranted and misguided but he was more concerned that the populace was turning against itself over a war in which he had hoped the United States would have no direct involvement.[55]

Partisan vitriol only worsened in the last two years of Washington's presidency as a result of the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. In early 1794, the United States found itself on the brink of war with Britain because of the convergence of several issues. Each country had unresolved complaints against the other stemming from the Treaty of Paris, which had ended the American Revolution.[56] More recently, seizures of British ships by Genet's privateers had angered the British while British seizures of American ships and impressment of American sailors as part of its more aggressive naval policy toward France had likewise outraged Americans. By the spring of 1794, tensions between the United States and Great Britain had reached such a height that an open rupture seemed likely if steps were not taken to avert it. While Francophiles might have welcomed a conflict with Britain, Washington understood that war was clearly not in America's best interest;

not only was the United States woefully unprepared to fight, but war would also significantly disrupt American commerce and widen the already substantial rift in public opinion. While all of these factors dictated peace, Washington could not let Britain continue to violate American rights with impunity just to avoid war.

For these reasons, Washington dispatched Chief Justice John Jay to Great Britain to negotiate a treaty that would bolster American commerce and prevent war. The Jay Treaty, formally entitled the Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation, between His Britannic Majesty; and the United States of America, was signed by both nations that November and ratified the following year. At best a mixed bag for the United States, the treaty contained commercial provisions that would prove moderately beneficial to American merchants and set aside a series of long-standing issues to be resolved by binding arbitration commissions. The treaty remained silent, however, on questions of American prestige such as impressment and neutral rights. The only unquestionably positive outcome of the negotiations was the preservation of peace between Great Britain and the United States.[57] Jay recognized the potential shortcomings of the treaty, but warned Alexander Hamilton, "If this Treaty fails, I dispair of another."[58] For those seeking to avert war, it was this treaty or it was nothing.

The treaty proved deeply unpopular. Republicans saw the treaty as the consummation of a de facto alliance with Great Britain and the refutation of American obligations to France. Rejecting peace at this price, they whipped up public opposition around the country. The first meetings opposing it were held before the text of the treaty had even been released. Washington acknowledged that the treaty was far from ideal, but believed that the Republicans had abandoned an unbiased assessment of practical realities in favor of partisan views, leaving him to complain of a press that had rendered "the most tortured interpretation" of the treaty and whose writings were "pregnant of the most abominable mis-representations."[59] The treaty only barely scraped passage by the Senate in June 1795, garnering the minimum number of votes necessary. The opposition initially aimed to dissuade the president from signing the treaty, but once he did, Washington became enemy number one in the Republican press.[60]

When Congress reconvened in December 1795, Republicans in the House of Representatives worked to stop the treaty's enactment. Constitutionally speaking, the House had no direct role to play in the treaty-making process, but Republicans sought to leverage the House's power to originate funding bills to block the appropriations necessary to put the treaty into effect. Despite an initial wave of popular support for the Republican efforts, Washington's endorsement of the treaty, combined with Federalist efforts to sway public opinion, put pressure on members of the House to give up their opposition and pass the appropriations. Writing in the aftermath of the of the treaty crisis, Washington reflected that the Republican members of the House had been motivated by "the partialities in favor of one

nation, and of the prejudices against . . . Another." The entire Jay Treaty debacle, and this sentiment in particular, solidified Washington in his decision to retire from the presidency, and weighed on him as he began drafting his Farewell Address.[61]

More personally troubling to Washington than the effect of these partialities and prejudices on the actions of Republicans was the impact they had on his cabinet. The split between Hamilton and Jefferson was unquestionably the most famous example, but the conduct of Washington's personal friend and trusted advisor, Edmund Randolph, perhaps illustrates the danger of such partialities and prejudices most clearly. Randolph had served as an aide-de-camp to Washington during the Revolutionary War and, while governor of Virginia, had been a pivotal member of the state's delegation to the Constitutional Convention in 1787. When Washington assembled his cabinet, he tapped Randolph to be the nation's first attorney general; when Jefferson resigned as secretary of state at the end of 1793, Randolph was the president's choice to replace him. Washington had complete confidence in Randolph, but that confidence proved to be misplaced. In July 1795, evidence—in the form of an intercepted dispatch from Joseph Fauchet, the French minister to the United States—surfaced that while Washington had been in Pennsylvania the previous October, attending to the Whiskey Rebellion, Randolph had disclosed information to Fauchet about the administration's dealings with the rebels. The dispatch also alleged that during their conversations Randolph had solicited a bribe from Fauchet in exchange for exerting influence over how the administration would handle the rebellion.[62]

Historians have generally concluded that Randolph did not actually demand a bribe, but that the overall direction and tone of his dealings with Fauchet were questionable, if not highly inappropriate. Randolph laid before the minister of a foreign country confidential insights into the nation's domestic discord, a violation of trust exacerbated by the fact that it was another French minister, Genet, who had been sowing his own seeds of discord just one year earlier. Historians Stanley Elkins and Erik McKitrick argue that Fauchet's dispatch "breathed malevolence and contempt for the United States government," and assert that "the confidences of Edmund Randolph had had a great deal to do with the way [Fauchet] had arrived at those sentiments. At the very least, there was something here profoundly disreputable to the government's good faith and character."[63] A week after receiving the dispatch, Washington, in front of the entire cabinet, confronted Randolph and demanded an explanation. Randolph denied the accusations against him, but ran from the president's house, embarrassed by what had transpired. He submitted his resignation later that day.[64]

James Monroe of Virginia likewise succumbed to his Republican partisanship and French leanings and suffered a similarly embarrassing end to his tenure as the U.S. minister to France. Like Randolph, Monroe had served with Washington during the Revolution and enjoyed the president's personal trust. Monroe was chosen

for the mission to France in the expectation that the French government would be more approving of someone known to have a favorable opinion of their country (as opposed to Monroe's predecessor, Gouverneur Morris, whom the French believed favored Great Britain). While stationed in France, Monroe repeatedly criticized Washington's administration, especially with regard to the Jay Treaty with Great Britain. In an effort to prevent the French government from taking action against the United States in response to perceived slights and violations, Monroe encouraged them to wait until the ensuing presidential election, when the public would turn the administration over to men more amenable to France. Many of the specific details of Monroe's conduct did not come to light until later, but as early as July 1795, Washington began complaining about "the conduct of Mr. M.," which he believed was "part of a premeditated system to embarrass the Executive government."[65] In 1796, Washington learned that Monroe had agreed to send intelligence from Europe favorable to France and harmful to Britain to be published in Republican newspapers.[66] When this information came to light, the cabinet resolved to recall Monroe.[67]

Foreign attachments and the spirit of party deeply affected the last years of Washington's presidency. Hamilton and Jefferson had become the heads of rival political factions; Washington had lost the counsel of Jefferson and James Madison; and Randolph and Monroe had betrayed the president's trust and embarrassed not only him but the nation as well. Washington wanted to remove himself as the target of what he perceived to be unwarranted partisan venom, but he could not walk away without addressing the dangers confronting the nation he had sacrificed so much to establish.

The Farewell

The events of Washington's second term made the project of constructing a valedictory address into a much different undertaking in spring 1796 than it had been in 1792. The roiling partisanship of the previous four years had distanced the president from his original draftsman, James Madison, so when he began his work anew he pulled out the original 1792 draft and turned for aid to Alexander Hamilton, who understood his views on American government, union, and foreign policy better than anyone else. Hamilton was simultaneously the ideal and the most problematic partner Washington could have chosen in this endeavor. On the one hand, Hamilton had emerged as Washington's most trusted and like-minded advisor. On the other hand, Hamilton was an extraordinarily divisive figure, especially to his political opponents. If the Republicans had discovered Hamilton's involvement, they would have dismissed Washington's Farewell Address as a political document aimed at influencing the upcoming presidential election, but

such concerns did not enter into Washington's thinking. He placed confidence in Hamilton and believed Hamilton when the latter stated his intent to "render this act *importantly* and *lastingly* useful."[68] Hamilton's impact on the form, scope, and specific content of Washington's Farewell Address has been widely debated by generations of historians, with each applying a slightly different analogy to describe the working relationship of the two men.[69] Forgoing a detailed discussion of each draft of the Address, what emerges from a close examination of them is that while Hamilton's involvement made it possible for Washington to figure out exactly what he wanted to say and how to best articulate it, the principles put forward were the same ones Washington had expressed in the 1780s, only refined and reinforced through Washington's experiences over eight years as president.[70]

A few key passages from the president's first draft of May 1796 illustrate this point. Washington expressed the wish "that we may avoid connecting ourselves with the Politics of any Nation, farther than shall be found necessary to regulate our own trade." He hoped "that every citizen would take pride in the name of an American, and act as if he felt the importance of the character by considering that we ourselves are now a distinct Nation the dignity of which will be absorbed if not annihilated, if we enlist ourselves (further than our obligations may require) under the banners of any other Nation whatsoever." He urged his fellow citizens to "guard against the Intriegues of *any* and *every* foreign Nation who shall endeavor to intermingle (however covertly and indirectly) in the internal concerns of our country." He admonished "that whatsoever and so long as we profess to be Neutral, let our public conduct whatever our private affections may be, accord therewith; without suffering partialities on one hand, or prejudices on the other to controul our Actions." Finally, Washington asserted that "without the gift of prophecy, it may safely be pronounced, that if this country can remain in peace for 20 years longer: and I devoutly pray that it may do so to the end of time; such in all probability will be its population, riches, and resources, when combined with its peculiarly happy and remote Situation from the other quarters of the globe, as to bid defiance, in a just cause, to any earthly power whatsoever."[71] These passages certainly lack the refinement and eloquence marking the published version of the Farewell Address discussed at the beginning of this chapter, but the ideas they express—even in this raw form—were the same core ideas at the heart of the later Farewell Address. Only with Hamilton's assistance could Washington give the fullest and best expression to the principles he regarded as essential for the nation's future progress and prosperity.

A larger question still looms over any consideration of Washington and his Farewell Address: what was he trying to accomplish by invoking these principles in this form? In the short term, the Address was written with successor concerns in mind. In the summer of 1796, it was an open secret in the nation's capital that Washington intended to retire and that John Adams and Thomas Jefferson were contending

to replace him.[72] Given that a basic premise of the Address was that passionate attachments for foreign countries bred unwise national policies, Washington was justifiably apprehensive about the outcome of the pending election and the impact that the next president's politics would have on America's relationship with Europe. Despite these successor concerns, though, it would be inaccurate to describe the Address, as several historians have done, as a mere campaign document.[73]

While the Farewell Address was intended to influence Americans' approach to the coming election, it had a greater purpose. Washington wrote it to transcend the immediate politics of the time and lay down principles applicable far into the future. The Address did express contemporary concerns and allude to recent experience, but Washington made a conscious decision to refrain from specific references to Great Britain and France and to the actions of particular people and parties. Earlier in his presidency, Washington had reprimanded Jefferson and Hamilton equally for their repeated mutual condemnations, and throughout his administration, Washington consistently strove to demonstrate that enduring national interests should trump temporary local or partisan ones. In transmitting his first draft of the Farewell Address to Hamilton, Washington stated, "My object has been, and must continue to be, to avoid personalities; allusions to particular measures, which may appear pointed; and to expressions which could not fail to draw upon me attacks which I should wish to avoid, and might not find agreeable to repel."[74] While he recognized that the Address could have a political impact and draw out a partisan response, he distinctly sought to avoid creating a partisan document.

Historians who present the Farewell Address as a campaign document point to Hamilton's unabashed partisanship as their main evidence, but it is a mistake to assume that Hamilton viewed the Farewell through a strictly partisan lens. It is also a mistake to place Hamilton's intentions ahead of Washington's when interpreting the Address. Washington specifically instructed Hamilton that even if he "should think it best to throw the *whole* [draft] into a different form," the subsequent version should still be "predicated on the Sentiments contained in the enclosed Paper."[75] Washington wanted Hamilton's help in best expressing his own sentiments; he did not want Hamilton to draft a new address more conformable to Hamilton's views. Hamilton honored Washington's request. He worked to avoid "all just cause of present exception, to embrace such reflections and sentiments as will wear well, progress in approbation with time, & redound to future reputation."[76] Just like Washington, Hamilton did not want the Address to be rooted in the politics of 1796. Even language in the Address that can be interpreted as being more overtly political when attributed to Hamilton must be read in light of Washington's views. When Hamilton alluded to the "tools & dupes" of the favorite nation (France), he was likely thinking of leading Republicans, such as Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.[77] When Washington kept the reference in the final draft, he more likely was thinking instead of Edmund Randolph and James Monroe. They were also Republicans, but,

much more importantly, they were trusted friends who had actively worked against Washington's government for the sake of that favorite nation.

Washington hoped that his Farewell Address would continue to influence people's behavior beyond the presidential election. Offering, as he put it, the "counsels of an old and affectionate friend," he dared "not hope they will make the strong and lasting impression, I could wish; that they will controul the usual current of the passions, or prevent our Nation from running the course which has hitherto marked the Destiny of Nations." Washington desired that these counsels "may be productive of some partial benefit, some occasional good; that they may now and then recur to moderate the fury of party spirit, to warn against the mischiefs of foreign Intriegue, to guard against the Impostures of pretended patriotism."[78] For the good of the country, Washington wanted the Address to have a lasting impact. In the short term, he hoped it would bring about a diminution of partisanship and the election of a successor who would dedicate himself to the principles of Washington's administration, not to mention a cooling of the rhetoric surrounding America's relationships with France and Britain.

In the longer term, Washington's objective was more nuanced. The Address set out fundamental ideas that should continue to guide the nation—union, fairness, neutrality, and the national interest—but, more than anything, it served as a reminder that the country was still young and developing and in need of time to mature. The best interest of the United States was to secure that time. In Washington's first draft, he had expressed the hope that "this country can remain in peace for 20 years longer."[79] This was an idea that was not new to Hamilton when he took up the task of reworking that draft. The previous summer, in writing a defense of the Jay Treaty, Hamilton had declared, "If we can avoid War for ten or twelve years more we shall then have acquired a maturity, which . . . will authorize us in our national discussions to take a higher & more imposing tone."[80] In the published version of the Farewell Address, specific timeframes were removed in favor of the more abstract declaration that "the period is not far off, when we may defy material injury from external annoyance; when we may take such an attitude as will cause the neutrality we may at any time resolve upon to be scrupulously respected; when belligerent nations, under the impossibility of making acquisitions upon us, will not lightly hazard the giving us provocation; when we may choose peace or war, as our interest, guided by justice, shall counsel."[81] In the final draft, Washington expanded on this point in a paragraph that had not appeared in any previous iteration. "With me," Washington wrote, "a predominant motive has been to endeavour to gain time to our country to settle and mature its yet recent institutions, and to progress without interruption, to that degree of strength and consistency, which is necessary to give it, humanly speaking, the command of its own fortunes."[82] If the United States was going to rise to equal the powers of Europe, it needed time to develop.

Time itself was not enough, though; that time needed to be well spent—time free

from foreign influence and partisan instability, time free from international conflict. Even at peace, time needed to be spent developing the means for self-defense; throughout his writings, Washington frequently reiterated the idea that "if we desire to avoid insult, we must be able to repel it."[83] For this time to be most beneficial, the citizens of America needed to start looking beyond their local attachments and partisan views and begin to come together as Americans. James Madison's 1792 draft of a valedictory contained language referring to Americans as "the children of one common country."[84] Four years later Washington expressed similar sentiments in his final draft.

The one portion of the Address on which Washington and Hamilton disagreed was a section dealing with the creation of a national military academy. For Hamilton, this was too specific a policy recommendation to merit inclusion in the president's valedictory. For Washington, such a military academy was more than just a school to teach the next generation of America's fighting men; it represented the central institution for cementing the union in the minds of the next generation of America's national leaders. Washington demanded of Hamilton, "What, but the mixing of people from different parts of the United States during the [Revolutionary] War rubbed off these [national] impressions? A century in the ordinary intercourse, would not have accomplished what the Seven years association in Arms did." With the war long since over, though, "prejudices are beginning to revive again, and never will be eradicated so effectually by any other means as the intimate intercourse of characters in early life, who, in all probability, will be at the head of the councils of this country in a more advanced stage of it."[85] If they could teach young men at an early age to overcome their local prejudices, the national union would forever be protected.

The interests of the United States were best served by maintaining peaceful, neutral relations abroad and by cementing the bonds of union at home. The achievement of these two goals would secure the time the nation needed to ensure its survival and prosperity. Washington hoped to instill all of this through his Farewell Address. By communicating these ideas directly to the American people, he sought to make them understand that shaping the country's future course rested in the hands of all Americans. Regardless of region, of party, or of foreign sympathy, the fate of the country should be determined by the willingness and ability of everyone to work together to defend America's best interests.

Toward Retirement

When George Washington left Philadelphia for Mount Vernon on the morning of 19 September 1796, leaving the scene before the public got hold of his valedictory, he believed that he had laid out a coherent set of foreign-policy principles to guide

the nation in the short term, and some basic but fundamental maxims that would lead the United States to future greatness. He hoped his Address would have a positive impact on Americans because he feared for the survival of the nation if affairs continued to progress as they had for the past four years. In the remaining years of Washington's life, both his hopes and his fears would be realized.

2

Washington's Farewell in the American Mind, 1796–1817

As Thomas Jefferson rose to deliver his inaugural address on 4 March 1801, he faced different challenges than those handled by his predecessors in the presidency. George Washington had confronted the daunting task of presiding over a new government, putting his reputation on the line to give it added authority and legitimacy. John Adams not only had had to lead in the wake of Washington, but also had faced fast-approaching storm clouds, both domestically and internationally, as mass partisanship increasingly defined American politics and as relations with France deteriorated after the Jay Treaty. By the time Jefferson took the reins, though, the government had been established, the Quasi-War with France was on the verge of resolution, and his Republican Party had soundly defeated the Federalists throughout much of the country. For Jefferson, at least at the beginning of his presidency, the challenge was not how to navigate the country between war and peace but rather how to mold the government and the nation into the Republican image; how to return the country to the principles of 1776. As Federalist Roger Griswold of Connecticut fretted a few months into Jefferson's presidency, "Under this administration nothing is to remain as it was, . . . every minutia is to be changed. When Mr. Adams was President, the door of the president's House opened to the East. Mr. Jefferson has closed that door and opened a new door to the West."[1]

Jefferson was eager to get to work putting the nation back on the right path after twelve years of Federalist diversions. As Jefferson stood before Congress on the day of his first inauguration, he sought to lay out the "essential principles of our Government . . . which ought to shape its Administration." He saw the United States as "a rising nation, spread over a wide and fruitful land, traversing all the seas with the rich productions of their industry, engaged in commerce with nations who feel power and forget right, advancing rapidly to destinies beyond the reach of mortal eye." As Washington had asserted on many occasions—a familiar trope in years to come—the United States had a great destiny, but this destiny would be attainable only if the people remained committed to forging a republican union. He

reminded Americans that although partisanship had marked recent years, "every difference of opinion is not a difference of principle. We have called by different names brethren of the same principle. We are all republicans, we are all federalists." On the subject of American foreign policy, Jefferson promised "equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever state or persuasion, religious or political; peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none." In discussing these principles, Jefferson declared that they formed "the bright constellation which has gone before us and guided our steps through an age of revolution and reformation. The wisdom of our sages and blood of our heroes have been devoted to their attainment. They should be the creed of our political faith, the text of civic instruction, the touchstone by which to try the services of those we trust; and should we wander from them in moments of error or of alarm, let us hasten to retrace our steps and to regain the road which alone leads to peace, liberty, and safety."[2] Jefferson's goal as president was to quickly regain that road.

Jefferson gave an underwhelming performance when he delivered this first speech as president. In the description of historian Forrest McDonald, the inaugural "was delivered in a voice so unprepossessing that few could even hear it, much less be inspired by it."[3] The address shone in print, though, as it circulated throughout the nation in newspapers, broadsides, and pamphlets. Jefferson's promise of "entangling alliances with none" had a special impact: it immediately became the phrase popularly used to describe the core principles of American foreign policy. When the phrase first appeared, it was seen as a nod to Washington's Farewell Address, a pithy restatement of that document's complex maxims for foreign policy. As the rest of this chapter and book will reveal, however, this phrase and its ultimate association with Washington's valedictory dramatically altered American perceptions of the Farewell Address and oversimplified its original message. "Entangling alliances with none" transformed the Address's pragmatic and flexible maxims for the conduct of American foreign relations into a rigid and permanent declaration of virtual isolation from the outside world. As this transformation in the meaning of Washington's Farewell Address took place, the phrase "entangling alliances with none" evolved from a dictum to avoid permanent alliances into a much broader restriction on any sort of noncommercial engagement with the international community. This transformation took many years, and its ramifications would not be fully realized until the 1820s and after, but its impact on popular understandings of the Farewell Address could be seen within a decade of Jefferson's inauguration.

Reactions to the Farewell Address

By the summer of 1796, Washington's impending retirement may have been the nation's worst kept secret, but this did not stop a rabid press from relaying the

valedictory address after its initial publication in *Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser* on 19 September of that year.[4] Philadelphia newspapers began reprinting it in their late editions that same day, and the text made its way throughout the nation over the ensuing days, weeks, and months.[5] As Victor Hugo Paltsits pointed out in his 1935 study of the physical history of the Farewell Address, there was surprisingly little commentary offered in most newspapers when it was first reprinted.[6] Commentaries did eventually appear, though, many heavily influenced by partisanship. Republicans who had come to paint Washington as a Federalist tended to dismiss the Farewell Address as a campaign document aimed at generating support for John Adams in the forthcoming election. Republican newspaperman William Duane, for example, wrote a scathing public letter to Washington, accusing the outgoing president of trying to present his partisan views in the guise of disinterested warnings, declaring, "You have discharged the loathings of a sick mind; you have collected the aggravating recollections of wounded pride, and warmed to the inveteracy of hatred, discharged the whole burthen of your blazing spirit at the object of your personal dislike, under the form of advice to your beloved country!" Duane was especially worked up over the Jay Treaty and how it brought the United States closer to Great Britain. "Whatever may have stimulated you to the execution of such a treaty," Duane argued, "it is evident the advice you have offered to your fellow citizens, with regard to foreign connexions, conveys a tacit condemnation of that measure, while it displays an attempt to defend your conduct, though deviating from the policy you recommend."[7] Many Republicans contended, just as Duane had, that Washington's warnings about foreign connections struck a hypocritical tone, given his seeming selection of Britain over France. Republican views of Washington's conduct toward Europe, to say nothing of the growing influence Alexander Hamilton had gained over the administration even after his retirement in January 1795, clouded Republican interpretations of Washington's Farewell Address and led them to see it as electioneering.

Despite the views of some partisans, it is important not to overstate the weight given to these opinions in the broader popular consciousness. The vast majority of Americans, regardless of partisan leanings, still had respect for and complete faith in Washington and greeted his valedictory with the sad acknowledgment that he was leaving public life. New York's *Daily Advertiser,* for example, remarked that "there is nothing we can say, that will fully express the estimation in which his illustrious and important services are held by the citizens of this much favoured country; or that will equally express their regret at being deprived of the continuance of his paternal watchfulness and care."[8] This respect and esteem for Washington led many Americans to immediately recognize the importance of Washington's message in his Farewell Address. As one orator in Salem, Massachusetts, commented, speaking at a local celebration of Washington's birthday in 1797, "But even when retired to private life, will our WASHINGTON continue

to bless his country, if his affectionate valedictory address is duly regarded. While it manifests the sincerest patriotism, it abounds with the wisest and best political maxims."[9] Oliver Wolcott Sr., whose son was the secretary of the treasury at the close of Washington's administration, described the Farewell's advice as "the best which could possibly be given."[10]

While there was a widespread hearty endorsement of the Address and its maxims, much of the positive commentary in 1796–97 was very general in nature. It is not a leap in logic to suggest that such approbation, at least in the short term, stemmed as much from the fact that the Address had come from Washington's pen as from its actual principles. One of the enduring facets of the popular approval of the Address has been the tension between belief in the wisdom of the principles it enunciated and faith in the sagacity of Washington and thus unquestioned support for his valedictory. This tension manifested itself most notably whenever questions arose about the true authorship of the Address and the possible involvement of Hamilton in its drafting.[11] Questions about the nature of American support for the Address aside, a demonstration of the immediate significance attached to it can be seen in how widely available the text became in the months after its initial publication. Paltsits, focusing only on the year 1796, compiled a list of more than 140 newspapers in which the Address was reprinted and identified at least forty-six separate pamphlet editions.[12] Before Washington had even left office, his Farewell Address was being put forward as an important contribution to the nation's past, present, and future.

The formal announcement of Washington's retirement also meant the beginning of the first contested presidential election. Adhering to contemporary political norms, neither John Adams nor Thomas Jefferson actively campaigned on his own behalf, leaving the proverbial "dirty work" to surrogates, newspaper editors, and local party functionaries. The vagaries of the Electoral College and the lack of any sort of popular vote in most states make it nearly impossible to assess what impact, if any, the Farewell Address had on the contest, but Adams won the presidency and Jefferson succeeded Adams as vice president.[13] When Adams took office, he committed himself to carrying out Washington's policies. In his inaugural address, Adams warned against "the pestilence of foreign influence" and expressed his "inflexible determination to maintain peace and inviolable faith with all nations, and that system of neutrality and impartiality among the belligerent powers of Europe."[14] In his first address to Congress, Adams announced his desire to "preserve peace and friendship with all nations" and reiterated the maxim that "we ought not to involve ourselves in the political system of Europe, but to keep ourselves always distinct and Separate from it if we can."[15] To further preserve the link to Washington, Adams retained his predecessor's cabinet, not fully appreciating the degree to which Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, Secretary of War James McHenry, and Treasury Secretary Oliver Wolcott Jr. would put their loyalty to the Federalist Party and Alexander Hamilton above their official obligations to Adams.

One of the great ironies of Adams's presidency was that while he honestly strove to be nonpartisan, he presided over some of the bitterest party struggles the nation would witness until the Jacksonian period.[16] Republicans saw Adams as the nation's preeminent monarchist, motivated by Federalist and pro-British sympathies. At the same time, the Arch-Federalists allied with Hamilton distrusted Adams for not being fully committed to their agenda. For Adams, the decision-making process was always focused on what was best for the country, regardless of which group of politicians he would please or anger. The rampant distrust partisans had for their perceived opponents meant that Adams's decisions usually upset both groups in the long run. Adams's handling of the Quasi-War with France, which originated in the anger of the French over the Jay Treaty and their decision to retaliate by seizing American shipping, exemplifies the nearly impossible waters he had to navigate.[17] In the wake of the XYZ affair in 1798, Adams's decision to form the Additional Army under Washington's command was praised by the Arch-Federalists, who saw such preparations as a precursor to war with France, but condemned by the Republicans as yet another example of the Federalists choosing Britain over France. When Adams sent a second peace delegation to France in 1799 rather than putting the Additional Army to use, the Federalists heavily criticized him while Republicans still distrusted his motives. In reality, Adams never wanted war but understood, as Washington had counseled, that "an efficient preparation for war can alone insure peace."[18] When Adams saw an opportunity to secure peace without recourse to declared war he seized it, demonstrating the primacy of national over partisan interests in his thinking. In many ways, Adams's presidency acted as a strong confirmation of the wisdom of Washington's warnings about the dangers of foreign attachments; unfortunately the judgments of seemingly everyone but Adams, rather than being guided purely by national interest, were consistently clouded by allegiance to or antipathy for Britain or France.

Washington's Death and the Growing Significance of the Farewell Address

Given that war was ultimately avoided and a treaty with France signed (although not until Jefferson had taken office), the single most important event for the country during Adams's presidency took place not in the nation's capital, but at Mount Vernon, where, on 14 December 1799, George Washington died. Upon his retirement from the presidency, Washington had thrown himself back into the life of a private citizen, daily overseeing the work being carried out on his several plantations. The major exception was when he consented to take command of the Additional Army, formed as a precaution against war with France. Washington embraced this new challenge, but it often seemed that his enjoyment in reliving past military glories superseded his concern over the possible outbreak of war.[19] Throughout his retirement, Washington continued to emphasize the principles he

had espoused in his Farewell Address. Two and a half months after he left the presidency, Washington stated that "no policy, in my opinion, can be more clearly demonstrated than that we should do justice to *all* but have no political connexion with *any* of the European Powers," and urged the country to "maintain a strict Neutrality, to keep the United States out of the vortex of European Politics, and to preserve them in Peace."[20] Writing to the Marquis de Lafayette in December 1798, Washington declared his politics to be "plain & simple. I think every Nation has a right to establish that form of government under which *It* conceives It shall live most happy, provided it infracts no Right, or is not dangerous to others. And that, no governments ought to interfere with the internal concerns of another, except for the security of what is due to themselves."[21] Even in retirement, healed from the bruises partisanship had inflicted on him, Washington remained dedicated to the principles expressed in the Farewell Address.

Although by December 1799 Washington was no longer active on the public stage, he still featured prominently in Americans' lives. Even before his death, he had been the subject of eight biographies, and he was regularly the subject of toasts and orations throughout the country, especially during annual celebrations of his birthday and American independence.[22] "Not one town of any importance was there in the whole union," noted a tourist from Great Britain in 1796, "where some meeting did not take place in honor" of Washington's birthday.[23] Washington's continued significance in the popular mind made news of his death all the more shocking. Washington had not suffered from a protracted illness, and he was only 67 when he died. On 12 December 1799, Washington had undertaken his usual tour of his plantations; the weather was harsh, and he spent several hours on horseback in the midst of a storm of snow and freezing rain. He fell ill, and died two days later.[24] News of Washington's death spread outward from Alexandria, Virginia, in much the same way that the Farewell Address had circulated through the nation's newspapers three years earlier. The suddenness of Washington's death meant that the widespread expressions of sorrow that swept the nation were not filtered through a period of expectation or preparation; rather, they were the heartfelt outpourings of a grieving nation. Federalist congressman John Marshall of Virginia best expressed the sentiments of the nation when he stood before the House of Representatives and declared, "Our Washington is no more! The Hero, the Sage, and the Patriot of America—the man on whom in times of danger every eye was turned and all hopes were placed—lives now only in his own great actions, and in the hearts of an affectionate and afflicted people."[25] Congress officially declared Washington's upcoming birthday, 22 February 1800, to be a national day of remembrance, but cities and towns, churches and civic organizations held services throughout December, January, and February.[26]

In Boston, Massachusetts, 9 January was set aside as a day of "solemn Tribute" to Washington. The commemoration was organized around a grand procession, in-

volving one-fifth of all Bostonians, and the delivery of a eulogy at the Old South Meeting-House. All business in the city was suspended for the day, and men and women were instructed to wear black crape or ribbons from that day through Washington's birthday as a sign of mourning.[27] Historian Gary Laderman described similarly elaborate ceremonies in Providence, Rhode Island: "A funeral procession began on the morning of the seventh [of January], accompanied by the firing of sixteen cannons in quick succession. After the initial military display, a cannon was discharged every half-hour. Throughout the course of the procession minute guns were fired, and muffled bells tolled from morning until evening. The cortege included various military orders, a bier supported by four pallbearers, a riderless white horse, members of the local government, representatives from local trade associations and other societies, and officials from several agencies and organizations." At the end of the procession, "the empty bier was then deposited underneath the Episcopal church." Such "simulations of real burial" were a central part of many funeral services held for Washington throughout the country.[28] These public services are significant not just for what they say about the place Washington held in American hearts, but for their reinforcement of the importance attached to the Farewell Address in American minds. As François Furstenberg has argued, it was the civic texts that emerged after Washington's death, and specifically the eulogies and funeral orations pronounced during these services, that "made the Farewell Address a statement of inviolable political principles" and turned it into a "sacred text."[29]

Indeed, Furstenberg's observation that such texts were "instructions on how to read Washington's writings" is particularly insightful, as the eulogies inculcated the idea that the Farewell was Washington's great legacy to the American people, and that their nation's future depended on adherence to it.[30] Orators pronounced the Farewell as "worthy to be written in letters of gold, or, rather, to be inscribed on the hearts of an enlightened, free, and grateful people;" as the "polar star" that should guide America's policy makers; and as laying out America's "true policy as a nation."[31] Daniel Dana, a minister and future president of Dartmouth College, called on his listeners in Newburyport, Massachusetts, to "read his Legacy [the Farewell Address]. *There* is the wisdom, the counsel, the heart, the soul of your WASHINGTON. There are the precious rules for making our nation wise and great and happy. Treasure it in your memories. Let it live in your hearts. Let it shine in your conduct. And from the moment that your children begin to lisp the honored name of their country's Father, endeavor to prepare their minds for the reception of these invaluable maxims; that they may be handed down to the latest posterity."[32]

This conviction of the importance of the Address to future generations was frequently repeated. A speaker in Boston urged people to "preserve the sacred deposit; and lest posterity should forget the truth of its maxims, engrave them on his tomb, that they may read them when they weep before it." An orator at a different ceremony hoped that the Farewell would "descend, unsullied as its purity, to the

wonder and instruction of succeeding generations; and, should the mild philosophy of its maxims be ingrafted into the policy of nations, at no distant period will the departed hero, who now lives only in the spotless splendour of his own great actions, exist in the happiness and dignity of mankind." A third speaker asked those assembled to "teach [the Address] to your children, in the house, and by the way, lying down and rising up, going out and coming in. It is an invaluable legacy." Still another predicted that continued "obedience" to Washington's maxims "will lead us to the highest pinnacle of national glory."[33] A eulogist in Lunenburg, Massachusetts, went so far as to compare the Farewell Address in importance to scripture, urging Americans to "bind it in your Bibles next to the Sermon on the Mount that the lessons of the two Saviors can be read together."[34] Hundreds of these eulogies were printed as pamphlets and were either sold or freely distributed in communities throughout the United States; quite a few of the pamphlets also included complete copies of the Farewell Address.[35] Collections of eulogies were also bound together and sold as a way to spread the thoughts and ideas they expressed beyond the towns in which they were first pronounced.[36] The eulogies, both as oratorical performances and as texts to be read and studied, elevated the importance of Washington's principles in the popular mind to the point that the Farewell was frequently held up as a foundational document alongside the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution.

This elevation of the Farewell Address continued even after the nation stopped publicly mourning Washington's death. In *Mystic Chords of Memory,* historian Michael Kammen argued that Americans before the Civil War took very little interest in the nation's history, except as the occasional tool for illuminating present or even future concerns. Daniel Webster, for one, was famous for giving orations mythicizing America's past to address present circumstances.[37] The one genuine exception to this disinterest in history was George Washington, who remained a central character in the celebration of Independence Day, and whose birthday was the only other widely observed national holiday. Both holidays featured oratory dedicated to praising Washington and to asserting the fundamental importance of his Farewell Address to the ongoing progress of the United States.[38] As one modern observer put it, "the importance of Washington oratory lies in its impact upon the American people. . . . February 22 and the Fourth of July were annual occasions upon which [Washington] was sure to be eulogized in towns and hamlets all over the country, and public speakers found many other opportunities to focus attention upon him."[39] The continued interest in Washington, despite a lack of general interest in the nation's history, was further manifested in the realm of biography. A new or revised biography of Washington was published virtually every year from the 1790s through the 1850s, whereas the first real biography of Thomas Jefferson was not written until 1857.[40] As a result of the emphasis focused on Washington in all of these civic texts—eulogies, orations, biographies,

and other writings—the Farewell Address was elevated from the realm of American history and regarded as having ongoing significance. It would frequently be republished with the nation's founding documents, with state laws and constitutions, with local orations for civic holidays, and even in children's books for use in schools.[41] It was both part of the nation's great past and a vital element in what would surely be its glorious future.

"Entangling Alliances with None" and the Jeffersonian Reconceptualization

As a result of the broad and ongoing dissemination of the Farewell Address, whether through oratory or in print, Americans of all ages, occupations, and political leanings were very familiar with it in the years after Washington's death. Thus when Thomas Jefferson promised "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none" in his first inaugural address, people saw it as an allusion to Washington and his principles.[42] One editorialist, for example, after extensively quoting from the Farewell, stated that "such is the emphatic advice of our departed friend: in correspondence with which the present Chief Magistrate on his induction into office, in enumerating what he considered the essential principles of our government and such as ought to shape its administration, declares as one, 'peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'"[43] As previously mentioned, Jefferson's phrase, "entangling alliances with none," took on a fundamental role in the evolution of Americans' interpretations of the Farewell Address. While the phrase could be most directly linked to Washington's advice to "steer clear of permanent alliances," "entangling alliances with none" almost immediately entered the American lexicon as the shorthand to describe all of the principles underlying American foreign policy. Newspapers were strewn with references to it throughout the first decade of the nineteenth century. Often, such references were to celebrations involving toasts given to "foreign intercourse; 'Commerce and honest friendship with all, entangling alliances with none,'" or to "the king of Great-Britain and the chief consul of France; 'Peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations—entangling alliances with none.'"[44] Another toast offered to "commerce and friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none" preceded a poem hailing peace: "Full twenty years we've pass'd in peace, / And like so to remain; / While Europes clime by bloody wars, / May count her thousands slain."[45] One newspaper in Boston even adopted the phrase as part of its masthead.[46] In these early years, Americans recognized the phrase "entangling alliances with none" as Jeffersonian in origin but also generally saw it as relating to Washington's Farewell Address.

The distinction between Jefferson's phrase and the principles set out by Washington began to blur over time, and by the end of the decade people had begun to

directly attribute the phrase to Washington. This was never universally the case—even in 1852, the end point of this study, some people correctly identified its Jeffersonian origins—but as time passed an increasing number of Americans saw the phrase as originating with Washington. As early as 1810 there are examples of orators laying the phrase at Washington's feet. Lawyer and politician Tristam Burges, speaking in Providence, Rhode Island, during a July 4th celebration, discussed the establishment of the nation's government under Washington, and stated, "When the French . . . would have coiled us within the contaminating embrace of this revolution, the preserving angel of our country [Washington] said to the many headed faction, 'Peace; be still;' 'We will have honest friendship with all nations; entangling alliances with none.' And it was so. France, then, respected our neutrality."[47] Even before this date, many instances may be found where the phrase was incorrectly quoted and not attributed to anyone, signifying that it had become less grounded in its original Jeffersonian context and could, as a result, be more easily reattributed, consciously or not, to Washington.[48] By 1812, printers began referring to "Washington's Policy" of "'Peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'"[49]

If this were simply a question of the misattribution of Jefferson's phrase to Washington's pen, it would warrant only minor consideration, but much more proved to be at stake. As discussed in some detail in chapter 1, the principles Washington laid out in the Farewell Address were not intended to prescribe a permanent foreign policy for the nation to follow, but rather to guide Americans in constructing the wisest policies possible to meet evolving circumstances and interests. Washington urged the preservation of peace so as to allow the nation the time necessary to mature and prosper. He warned against foreign alliances, influences, and attachments because they could bind the nation to courses of action detrimental to the public good, and he stressed the fundamental importance of always maintaining the freedom to act in the nation's best interest. Washington recognized that the specific nature of this national interest would be different ten or twenty years later than when he wrote his Address in 1796. He expected the nation to grow in territory, population, and might; thus, while he discussed policy ideas that were essential in the short term, he understood that they might not remain germane over the long term. Washington therefore tried to set out larger, more enduring principles.

The Farewell Address was not simple in its conception of American foreign policy. It could be boiled down to a few basic ideas, but, taken as a whole, its long-term wisdom and utility stemmed from its nuanced and evolutionary approach. The great appeal of Jefferson's pledge of "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none, " on the other hand, was that it pithily laid out America's basic foreign-policy principles at the outset of Jefferson's presidency. The simplicity of the phrase "entangling alliances with none" made it

easy to quote and easy to remember, but while it succinctly described American interests in the short term, it overshadowed the real wisdom of the Farewell Address for the long term. Rather than stating general principles to guide the thoughtful construction of policy for meeting new global challenges, Jefferson's pledge became a rigid prescription for a permanent foreign policy of virtual isolation. Most troubling, the echoes resonating in Jefferson's phrase linked it in Americans' minds with Washington's Address just as its rigid application became less necessary and even less wise, and when Washington's more flexible appeal to act in America's best interests would have resulted in a broader foreign policy than the one that was ultimately pursued.[50]

Once the precept "entangling alliances with none" gained greater legitimacy as Americans increasingly associated it with the authority of Washington and his Farewell Address (a process discussed further in the next chapter), it became nearly impossible to convince the public that there were better alternatives than the virtual isolation it produced. Realistically, though, as much as Jefferson's prescription subverted Washington's original advice, it also likely underscored the fundamental importance of the Farewell Address for later generations. Americans continued to regard Washington as significant and to ascribe the nation's rising power and reputation to his clear and succinct foreign-policy principles. Francis Scott Key made clear the link between the Farewell Address and the nation's rising glory in 1814, stating: "In this address we have every thing to excite our veneration and affection. . . . No evil can befal [*sic*] us, against which, he has not guarded us—no temptation can come upon us, where his monitory voice has not supplied us with a caution. The remotest of our descendants, to whom the political blessings we have received, may be allowed to be transmitted, will find these parental counsels sanctioned by experience, and the impartial historian will note the invariable connection between the happiness of the nation and the observance of these hallowed precepts."[51] Without Americans' widespread familiarity with the phrase "entangling alliances with none," it is an open question as to whether the Farewell would have carried such great weight in public and policy debates over the ensuing decades. In introducing this Jeffersonian reconceptualization of the Farewell Address—that is, the association of "entangling alliances with none" with Washington and the resulting shift in the meaning of the Address—it is important to emphasize that Jefferson did not necessarily intend these long-term ramifications when he used the phrase in his inaugural speech; they were instead unintentional consequences of the initial popularity of his phrasing. Jefferson certainly believed in a foreign policy unencumbered by "entangling alliances," but he was not necessarily consciously recalling Washington, and he could not have anticipated that his phrase would produce a reconceptualization of Washington's Farewell Address.

Republican Foreign Policy

While many contemporaries saw a uniformity of foreign-policy principles between Washington and Jefferson, the latter's Republicanism clashed with the Federalist policies of Washington's and Adams's administrations. Two specific policy changes pursued by Jefferson illustrate the point. Both changes derived, at least in part, from Jefferson's extreme concern for economy in the operations of the federal government. Jefferson believed that the government had grown too big and that the people had been taxed too much for its support. One way Jefferson sought to reduce spending was by dismantling much of the military and naval establishment built up during the Quasi-War with France. Americans' distrust of standing armies, combined with the belief that state militias could defend the country in a moment of crisis until a regular army could be formed, made the military a logical target of retrenchment efforts.

The navy was a different question, especially since the nation's recent encounters with British and French maritime abuses had demonstrated its utility. In Washington's final annual message to Congress, he had preached that neutrality alone "is not a sufficient guard against the depredations of nations at war. To secure respect to a neutral flag requires a naval force organized and ready to vindicate it from insult or aggression."[52] John Adams likewise had repeatedly stressed the importance of a strong navy; in 1798, he had overseen the creation of the Department of the Navy. Jefferson, though, believed that the value of U.S. commerce to the countries of Europe was sufficient to regulate U.S. relations with them, rendering a large navy a waste of resources.[53] As Jefferson framed it in 1801, "The interest which European nations feel, as well as ourselves, in the mutual patronage of commercial intercourse, is a sufficient stimulus on both sides to insure that patronage."[54] One Jefferson supporter even suggested that the navy was more likely to provoke conflict with Europe than to prevent it, arguing that through the navy Americans would "transport our forests on to the water, and launch into all the extravagancies and follies of foreign kingdoms."[55]

Jefferson saw large armies and navies as more than merely a waste of resources; he saw them as unnecessary. Jefferson believed the primary concern of U.S. foreign policy to be the maintenance of peace. In 1798, as vice president, he argued that it would be better for the United States to "keep together as we are, hawl off from Europe as soon as we can & from all attachments to any portions of it, and if we feel their power just sufficiently to hoop us together, it will be the happiest situation in which we can exist. [I]f the game runs sometimes against us at home, we must have patience, till luck turns, & then we shall have an opportunity of wining back the *principles* we have lost. [F]or this is a game where principles are the stake."[56] Shortly after his inauguration, Jefferson similarly declared that he was "determined . . . to avoid, if possible, wasting the energies of our people in war &

destruction," and to achieve this result the United States should "avoid implicating ourselves with the powers of Europe, even in support of principles which we mean to pursue. [T]hey have so many other interests different from ours, that we must avoid being entangled in them."[57] Echoing Washington, Jefferson acknowledged that a temporary sacrifice of principle in order to preserve peace was preferable to a costly and dangerous war, especially when such principles could be won back at a future date. Given Jefferson's generally idealistic approach to U.S. foreign policy, statements about willingly sacrificing American principles seem out of character. In the context of achieving a more permanent separation from Europe, though, Jefferson seemed to see such a course as that of temporarily sacrificing a smaller principle in order to safeguard a paramount ideal.[58]

Beyond the army and navy, Jefferson also pointed to the diplomatic corps as an area in which to practice greater economy. In Jefferson's estimation, the number and extent of U.S. missions overseas outstripped their value or utility. This judgment involved more than the issue of expense: Jefferson believed that the United States' growing number of ministers was drawing the country toward too great an involvement in European affairs. In giving to Elbridge Gerry "a profession of my political faith" in 1799, Jefferson declared that "I am for free commerce with all nations, political connection with none, & little or no diplomatic establishment: and I am not for linking ourselves, by new treaties with the quarrels of Europe."[59] Jefferson endorsed a more all-encompassing isolation from the rest of the world than Washington or Adams had pursued. As president, he expressed a "wish to let every treaty we have drop off without renewal." If this was accomplished he would "call in our diplomatic missions, barely keeping up those to the most important nations." Even here, though, he saw "a strong disposition in our countrymen to discontinue" these as well, an outcome that he did not oppose.[60]

Republicans in Congress likewise supported a reduction of the diplomatic establishment. Near the end of John Adams's term in office, John Fowler of Kentucky complained that it cost $130,000 to manage the "diplomatic department." According to Fowler, "When General Washington wrote his Valedictory, we had ministers at Paris, Hague, London, Madrid, and Lisbon, and he lamented that we had so many, and cautioned the future government against an increase. . . . How has his successor regarded this wise and prudent council? Why by projecting embassies to the most despotic powers in Europe with whom we can never have any or but little commercial intercourse."[61] That Washington did not actually warn against an increase in the diplomatic establishment was beside the point: placing American ministers in foreign countries, especially those with which the United States was unlikely to have a thriving commerce, was a waste of resources. Such views were echoed two years later by Representative Thomas Sumter of South Carolina, who wrote proudly to his constituents that the Jefferson administration was "desirous also, in the spirit of a true American, to detach the United

States from a dangerous union by diplomatic ties with European powers," and had worked to suppress "two appointments of Ministers, the one to the Hague and the other to Berlin; suffering only three to remain, viz. those to London, Paris, and Madrid."[62] In February 1807, James Holland of North Carolina, hailed Jefferson for the "soundness of the course adopted" at the outset of his administration, principally "a 'strict impartiality to all nations, entangling alliances with none, a discontinuance of useless institutions and offices, and an economical expenditure of the public money.'"[63] For these congressmen, even maintaining basic diplomatic representation in foreign nations smacked of an entangling alliance. As far as Jefferson and his supporters were concerned, the only connection the United States should have with Europe was a commercial one.[64]

Jefferson's approach to the diplomatic establishment represented a departure from that of his predecessors. John Adams had addressed the question of American ministers abroad in his first message to Congress, stating that the best way to maintain neutrality was to keep abreast of possible threats to that neutrality. In order to maintain America's separation from Europe, he argued, "early, punctual, and continual information of the current chain of events and of the political projects in contemplation is no less necessary than if we were directly concerned in them. It is necessary, in order to the discovery of the efforts made to draw us into the vortex, in season to make preparations against them. . . . It is a natural policy for a nation that studies to be neutral to consult with other nations engaged in the same studies and pursuits."[65] This view had other adherents. One commentator writing about the United States and Europe in 1806 observed, "Nothing is now done in any quarter of the globe, which does not bear upon its farthest limits; and it behoves the people of the United States . . . to keep a steady, watchful eye upon the restless potentates of Europe. . . . We cannot exist an isolated member of the grand community of nations." Accordingly, it was the "bounden duty of those whom we have placed upon the seats of authority, to penetrate and to sound every movement in that quarter, that may affect the harmony and welfare of our country," as long as this was accomplished "without entering into the endless cabals and intrigues of the cabinets of Europe."[66] Jefferson and the Republicans fundamentally disagreed with this assessment of the import and implications of diplomatic connections.

At the start of his presidency, Jefferson clearly wanted to focus the nation's energy and resources on internal rather than external development. As Connecticut Federalist Roger Griswold had put it, Jefferson wanted to look west instead of east; however, the course of human events in Europe prevented Jefferson from fully turning away from the east and implementing an isolationist foreign policy. It was a sad irony that Jefferson's Republican economy and insistence on reducing the domestic tax burden actually increased rather than diminished U.S. dependence on Europe. While Jefferson's elimination of internal taxes certainly reduced the tax burden on the nation's farmers and planters, it also made the nation's coffers increasingly de-

pendent on import duties. As long as American commerce grew, Jefferson's government would be adequately funded, but uninterrupted growth relied on Europe—especially Britain and France—remaining at peace.[67] This dependence on European commerce undermined any hope that Jefferson had of effecting a greater separation from Europe—at least a separation that would not devastate the U.S. economy.

Jefferson's Success and Failure: Louisiana and the Embargo

Unquestionably the greatest success Jefferson achieved in the realm of foreign policy was the Louisiana Purchase of 1803.[68] The fact that the Purchase came on the heels of the great fear generated by the transfer of the territory from Spain to France only multiplied Americans' exuberance at the feat.[69] The Louisiana Purchase permanently eliminated France as a colonial power from mainland North America, and, with the exception of the Floridas, it moved Spain much further away from the population centers of the United States. "The advantages of this acquisition are too many to be enumerated, and too precious not to be a just cause of congratulation to every friend of America and free government," Representative Joseph Winston of North Carolina informed his constituents. "It secures us from the danger of ambitious neighbors and consequent wars—it prevents troublesome disputes, and saves our frontier from the troubles sometimes attempted to be fomented by the emissaries of foreign powers—it rescues us in a great measure from European connexions and jealousies, and obtains for us the respect of European nations."[70] The dilemmas that had plagued Washington during the Nootka Sound Controversy in 1790 were now largely removed.

The Louisiana Purchase was the high point of Thomas Jefferson's foreign policy. Within a few years, the country's international relations would once again be marred by the escalating harassment of American shipping by both Britain and France. Historians and Jefferson's contemporaries alike argued that what troubled the president most about this treatment was the disrespect toward America it revealed: the European powers simply did not see the United States as an equal on the world stage. As historian Marie-Jeanne Rossignol put it, "Americans felt that the hostile attitude of the British navy and government . . . proved that the former colonizing power did not accord the United States its true value."[71] Joseph Desha, a congressman from Kentucky during and after Jefferson's administration, believed that "Britain, revengeful in her temper, has never forgiven our independence, and apparently yet entertains the mad design of reducing the United States to colonial subjection."[72] The best demonstration of the value Britain and France placed on the United States was their willingness to prey upon U.S. ships and ultimately sacrifice American trade in order to advance their goals in their wars against each other.

The fact that Jefferson was not in a position to force Europe to respect American rights only added to the difficulty of the situation. International trade was not only the main source of government revenue but also the basis of the livelihood of merchants up and down the eastern seaboard. Jefferson also faced the impossible predicament of needing to see foreign trade continue while simultaneously shielding American ships from the theft of their cargoes and the impressment of their sailors by the British navy. The limited navy at Jefferson's disposal only further constrained the president's options. A treaty negotiated with Great Britain in 1806 by James Monroe and William Pinkney presented an opportunity to ease tensions with that country, but Jefferson rejected it out of hand because it failed to address the issue of impressment, the greatest persistent sign of British disrespect for the United States. Jefferson believed that a solution was possible that would preserve both American principles and American shipping—possibly including an alliance with either Britain or France against the other—but he could never find that solution.[73] Jefferson's best option was brought to him by Secretary of State James Madison in 1807: an embargo. The United States would close all of its ports to foreign commerce and recall its commercial vessels abroad until such time as Britain and France accorded the United States and its shipping proper respect. Jefferson and Madison were confident that the impact of this economic coercion would be felt almost immediately by their European counterparts.

Jefferson's supporters in Congress hailed the measure. John Rhea of Tennessee described it as "a cautious provident measure of internal police, to preserve the liberty of seafaring citizens, to save the property of citizens from capture on the ocean, to manifest neutrality, and to maintain peace."[74] Burwell Bassett of Virginia argued that it "makes us more secure by making our opponents less able to agress upon us."[75] Another Virginian, William A. Burwell, was likewise convinced that it would "produce serious effects on France and England," adding that it would also aid the United States domestically by "forc[ing] us to manufacture the articles we want." He went on, "While she [England] loses for ever the most profitable branch of export, we shall become really independent, and furnish within our country every requisite for convenience and comfort. It will no longer be in the power of a foreign nation to disturb our prosperity."[76] All of this hopeful confidence proved misplaced: the embargo was a dramatic failure on all fronts. Britain and France did not change their policies, and American merchants and producers languished without access to international commerce. In summarizing the effects of the embargo, historian Forrest McDonald concluded that "some Nova Scotia fishermen and a good many West Indian slaves went hungry during much of the year, and there was some unemployment in English factory towns, but the general effect upon the international economy was so slight that the French and British could regard the American policy with contemptuous amusement."[77] This was certainly not the coercive effect that Jefferson and Madison had anticipated.

Jefferson's two failings throughout this period were that he forgot the warnings contained in Washington's Farewell Address and that he grossly overestimated the importance of the United States to Europe. The United States was still an infant compared to the old giants in Europe, yet Jefferson saw America as equal to the Old World empires. Jefferson's messages to Congress overflowed with language celebrating the rising tide of American greatness and the wisdom of a republican government that valued peace, especially when compared to the "exterminating havoc" of Europe.[78] In his Farewell Address, Washington had likewise described the United States as a rising power, but intrinsic in his prediction of future greatness was the admission that the nation was not yet great—that it was, in fact, still quite weak. A corollary to Washington's warning to always act in the nation's best interests was the recognition that the United States needed to constantly and honestly assess the nature of those interests, even if they clashed with American hopes and principles. Washington had seen the Jay Treaty with Great Britain as far from ideal, for example, conceding that it did not address most of the causes of conflict between the two countries and that it required the United States to sacrifice some of its principles. However, he believed that the peace the treaty secured more than made up for its deficiencies, because peace was of greater importance to the country at that point in time. Jefferson was faced with a similar decision—peace or principles—in 1806 when presented with the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty. In the decade after the Jay Treaty and the Farewell Address, the United States had grown in stature and prosperity and had doubled in size, but it remained a weak nation with a limited army and navy. For such a nation, the assurance of peace might have been more valuable than adherence to a principle it could not defend, but Jefferson put principles first, refusing to send the treaty to the Senate for ratification, and later imposing the embargo, which failed in its objects. The embargo was a tactic suitable for a much stronger nation, one better able to enforce it at home and give it weight abroad.

George Washington and the War of 1812

Many of these same issues carried over into the presidency of James Madison. Jefferson repealed the embargo on the last day of his term, but its failure did not stop Madison from pursuing a foreign policy that repeatedly risked entanglement with Britain or France and ultimately fell back on tactics of economic coercion better suited to a more powerful nation.[79] National dissatisfaction began to set in midway through Madison's first term. One administration critic, writing in 1810, bemoaned the abandonment of the principles of the Father of his Country, proclaiming, "Had we taken the sage counsel of Washington, 30 millions of dollars would have been saved to the nation, which has been recently confiscated by the despotic

belligerents of Europe; the republic would not have been on the brink of dis-union; and counts, and dukes, and earls, and lords, and the Lord knows what, would not have laughed at the imbecility of our government."[80] That same year, the turnover of more than half the members of the House of Representatives in the midterm elections ushered in a new generation of political leaders for the country. Historian Robert Rutland argued that the new leadership emerging at this time was significant because "these men had no memory of the Revolution; they had not helped to found the new nation, but they intended to preserve it" in the face of the current crisis.[81] By the summer of 1812, Madison felt that war could no longer be avoided and he asked Congress for an official declaration against Great Britain.[82]

Many Americans—in what has become a recurring theme in prewar discourse that endures to the present day—were supremely confident that the war with Great Britain would be won quite quickly, despite America's relative ill preparedness and Britain's unquestioned strength. Madison shared in this overconfidence: expecting the war to force Britain's hand in negotiations, he believed that diplomacy would quickly take precedence over combat. Such expectations did not match the reality, however, and by the summer of 1814, the United States had launched three failed invasions of Canada, lost territory in Maine, and suffered a series of embarrassing military defeats, failures only sporadically offset by military or naval success.[83]

A sharp increase in public interest in and discussion of George Washington and his Farewell Address further complicated domestic reactions to the war. Federalists fueled much of the interest in Washington, and saw their own electoral fortunes improve as a result. During Washington's presidency, Federalists had presented Washington's principles and agenda as being their principles and agenda in the hope and expectation that public veneration for the president would perpetuate Federalist supremacy in government.[84] After their defeat at the hands of Jefferson and the Republicans in 1800 and the resulting collapse of any national Federalist organization, the Federalists redoubled their efforts to present Washington's principles as Federalist. They also criticized Republicans for their abandonment of those principles. For the first seven years of Jefferson's presidency, despite the Federalists' best efforts, the public was not generally interested in their attacks and warnings. That began to change in December 1807, with the enactment of Jefferson's embargo. As early as 1808, signs of a Federalist revival were visible throughout the United States. As Philip J. Lampi demonstrated, this resurgence was evident not just in Federalist electoral victories but also in Federalist competitiveness in most parts of the country and at all levels of government. The Federalists never regained the presidency or Congress, but they did retake some state governments, and for the first time in years the voting public listened to what the Federalists had to say.[85]

One of the ways the Federalist resurgence manifested itself was the creation of Washington Benevolent Societies, dedicated to upholding Washington's example and wisdom, throughout the northern half of the country.[86] The first organization

to take Washington's name in this manner was the Washington Society of Alexandria, Virginia, which formed one month after Washington's death.[87] Four years later, a group of young Federalists in Augusta, Maine, emulated the model, and four years after that, the first official Washington Benevolent Society was founded in New York City. By 1812, such societies had formed in eleven states, and by 1816, according to historian David Hackett Fischer, 208 societies could be documented, although "there were probably many more."[88] The timing of the rise of these societies, and of the Federalist resurgence more generally, was directly related to the foreign-policy failures of the Madison administration. It is thus no coincidence that the Washington Benevolent Societies gained the most support in commercial centers like Philadelphia, New York, and Boston, which had been hit hardest by the Republicans' approach to Europe's wars.

The Washington Benevolent Societies left behind a rich literature as a testament to their beliefs and goals. When the Washington Society of Maryland formed in 1810, it described its central goal as being "to support extend and carry into effect the political principles and system of Washington, as disclosed in his farewell address to the people of the United States, and exemplified in his administration of the federal government."[89] The Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania was formed in the fall of 1812 by people who had "avowed their attachment to the character and principles of Washington," and who formally declared "that we are firmly attached to the Constitution of the United States and to that of Pennsylvania; to the principles of a free Republican Government, and to those which regulated the publick conduct of George Washington."[90] To facilitate this attachment, the Pennsylvania society provided each new member with copies of its constitution and Washington's Farewell Address, a practice followed by most Washington Benevolent Societies around the country.[91]

The Washington Benevolent Society of Worcester County, Massachusetts, declared that "adopting the political doctrines of our great prototype the Immortal Washington and carrying them into practical effect, are the objects, and we hope will be the end of this Society."[92] Reflecting back on its creation, the Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts wrote in 1813 that it had been "founded by a number of patriotick young men, who, venerating the memory of the illustrious 'Father of His Country,' were desirous to cherish and disseminate those sound political maxims which under his auspices raised the United States to distinction and prosperity in a space of time unexampled in the history of nations. For this purpose they determined to exert themselves to restore the reign of Washington principles and measures, and to unite their efforts for this great and laudable object." More than 1,740 of the Bay State's citizens joined the cause, among them Edward Everett, John Hancock, Benjamin Lincoln, Harrison Gray Otis, and Josiah Quincy.[93] The multitude of Washington Benevolent Societies in Massachusetts grew so strong that in February 1811, a group of Young Republicans in Boston formally changed their

organization's name to the Washington Society and adopted a constitution declaring their "prime object" to be "to encourage, disseminate and support such sentiments as are contained in that correct standard of American political principles 'Washington's Farewell Address to the people of the United States.'"[94] Boston's Republicans would not let the Federalists have a monopoly on Washington's legacy.[95]

While they met fairly regularly throughout the year, most Washington Benevolent Societies organized major public events on Washington's birthday, the anniversary of his first inauguration as president (30 April), and Independence Day. Throughout the War of 1812, these annual celebrations regularly featured lengthy orations, sometimes aimed at decrying the Republican abandonment of Washington's principles but always focused on reminding listeners of Washington's enduring wisdom and significance. One orator, speaking in February 1812, reminded his audience that "towards foreign nations, the maxim of Washington was, *A liberal intercourse with all; alliances, with none,*" while another warned that "it is neither manly or profitable to condemn the course of national, or individual conduct, without showing that a better conduct might have been pursued. We look to the counsels of WASHINGTON."[96] This speaker heavily criticized Jefferson, specifically for his rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty, believing that it would have adjusted the nation's difficulties with Britain without recourse to war.

The following year a speech delivered at a celebration of Washington's birthday called on those assembled, "Let us be Americans, and impress on the minds of our children the love of virtue and patriotism. Teach them to pronounce the name of Washington: and as soon as they can read, let them study the history of the Father of his country. Teach them, like him, to be guarded against foreign influence: and, like him, to love their country, and to be brace in its defence."[97] Another orator, speaking near the end of the war, reflected on Republican foreign policy and concluded, "Thus early was abandoned the wise policy of Washington; 'to exclude passionate attachments and aversion towards foreign nations; to avoid entangling our peace and prosperity in the toils of European ambition and rivalship; . . . ' Thus early were prostrated the hopes which [Washington] raised of our approaching greatness. Thus early was our youth precipitated into a needless, a disastrous, and a fruitless war." Just as devastating as the war itself, Jefferson and Madison had to "answer for having, in defiance of the solemn warning of Washington, 'alienated any portion of our country from the rest,' . . . On *them* the responsibility rests."[98] A plethora of orations like these were printed as pamphlets to increase the spread and impact of their ideas.

One of the unfortunate ironies of the War of 1812—and the main reason that Washington Benevolent Societies spread like wildfire throughout the north—was that the region most harmed by the embargo and most opposed to the war, the north, was also the region asked to bear the brunt of the fighting. The first two years of the war were fought on the lands and waterways along the Canadian border.

Some New Englanders reacted by engaging in illicit trade with Great Britain.[99] Others responded by calling a convention at Hartford, Connecticut, in December 1814, to discuss potential means of resolving the war and preventing another one from occurring. These Federalists went so far as to raise secession from the union, before proposing a series of constitutional amendments.[100] The nation faced its most embarrassing and demoralizing moment in August 1814, when British forces marched into Washington, DC, and burned half the city to the ground, including the White House and the Capitol, with almost no resistance from the American military. As the darkest clouds were gathering over the nation, the Battle of Plattsburgh, a stunning and decisive naval victory on Lake Champlain, together with the successful repulsion of British forces from Baltimore and Fort McHenry, provided a hint of blue sky. These events, as well as the ending of the Napoleonic wars in Europe, contributed to a British desire to see the War of 1812 brought to an end. In Ghent, Belgium, where peace negotiations had been ongoing but largely stalled for months, the two sides came together to sign a treaty on Christmas Eve 1814 that accomplished peace but little else.[101] The war was thus formally over when General Andrew Jackson led the United States to its most convincing and overwhelming military victory at the Battle of New Orleans in January 1815. Reports of Jackson's victory arrived in Washington only days before news of the Treaty of Ghent, suddenly turning their depressing failure into a spectacular success in the minds of most Americans.

In another quirk of timing, the Federalists sounded their own death knell when they published the proceedings of the Hartford Convention just days before news of Jackson's victory and of the peace treaty arrived in Washington, DC. What had been well-intentioned recommendations quickly came to be viewed as un-American protests. As one member of the Republican Washington Society of Boston later toasted, "*The Hartford Convention.* An incendiary who endeavored to fire the Temple of Liberty while its defenders were at its gates opposing a foreign enemy."[102] The popularity and influence of the Washington Benevolent Societies quickly waned after 1815 as the Federalists once again lost their influence and electoral relevance.[103] While many of the larger societies survived into the middle of the next decade, and the Society of Pennsylvania remained active into the 1830s, their moment had clearly passed.[104] The Washington Benevolent Societies may not have left a significant mark on history, but their rise and spread spoke volumes about the place George Washington occupied in American society during the War of 1812. More than two hundred local organizations formed, counting thousands of Americans among their members, almost all of whom supported the idea that the United States needed to rededicate itself to the principles of Washington's Farewell Address. The Washington Benevolent Societies were largely partisan organizations, to be sure, but that did not diminish the sincerity of their attachment to Washington's principles. If anything, the multitude of constitutions and speeches they printed revealed how deeply dedicated they were to seeing the

country return to the path staked out by the Father of his Country. In no small part because of the Washington Benevolent Societies, oratory about Washington had remained largely the domain of the Federalists through the end of the War of 1812; however, the demise of the Federalists and the stronger national union that resulted from the United States' "victory" in the war soon returned Washington to his status as a national figure standing above party.[105]

Almost everywhere in the United States, Americans received the news of the end of the war enthusiastically. Coming on the heels of Jackson's victory at New Orleans, news of the peace treaty—even though it had been signed three weeks before the battle took place—served to eclipse two years of embarrassing defeats in the war and to elevate the significance of victory in the minds of most Americans. Letters written by two congressmen to their constituents best exemplify this view. Israel Pickens of North Carolina was gratified to be writing that "peace has been concluded with Great Britain, on terms highly honorable to the United States. . . . Thus gloriously has terminated this second war for our independence."[106] John Rhea of Tennessee heaped even more praise on the country, declaring that in the short duration of the war "the American character has unfolded itself in a blaze of effulgent glory not excelled by any nation, and has raised itself to the highest rank of nations." Rhea described the treaty itself as "an honorable treaty of peace" that "confirmed their independence never to be shaken."[107] For these observers, the end results justified the long and costly war.

Blazes of "effulgent glory" aside, the terms of the Treaty of Ghent were not universally greeted with acclaim. Of central concern was the fact that the treaty did not address many of the issues that had caused the war in the first place. As Joseph Pearson, a Federalist from North Carolina, complained, "To say what we have obtained [as a result of the treaty] is impossible, unless it be *peace,* and that we had before the war; but to say what we have *not* obtained, is easy—we have *not obtained one single solitary object, for which the war was professedly declared and prosecuted.* On the contrary, those rights and those objects, held by the administration to be so important and so indispensible to our national independence, are, by the doctrines of those very men, *abandoned* and forever lost to the nation." Impressment, which had been one of the central points of contention between Britain and the United States for more than two decades, was the key issue. Republicans had derided Washington for signing the Jay Treaty when it failed to address impressment and Jefferson had rejected the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty for the same reason; yet the Treaty of Ghent, likewise silent on the issue, was cheered throughout the nation. Pearson marveled that "it is perhaps the first and only treaty that ever was made, which did not contain some reference, some distant allusion to the causes which produced the war, and the objects intended to be effected." Indeed, the main object of the treaty was to return both nations to the status quo ante bellum and to leave open to future negotiation all other concerns. Such a treaty was possible not as a

result of any great American accomplishment but because the end of the Napoleonic wars in Europe removed the need to harass American shipping. Pearson concluded that despite the treaty's silence on many issues, it was still "a blessing to the nation—it has saved us from impending destruction, and whatever may be the *condemnation* it seals on the *administration and their war,* the people have cause to rejoice."[108] Even a critic could celebrate the return of peace.

In a war and era filled with ironies, perhaps the greatest was the impact the War of 1812 had on the place Washington's Farewell Address occupied in the American mind. Thomas Jefferson and James Madison had made a number of foreign-policy decisions that seemed to contradict the counsel and example of Washington, culminating in the determination to forgo peace in favor of war. Republican policies led Federalists to bemoan the abandonment of Washington's principles and to found societies dedicated to seeing their return. Despite all of this, the American "victory" in the war ultimately produced the stronger national union that Washington had called for much more quickly than it might otherwise have been achieved. As Albert Gallatin, the former secretary of the treasury, put it in 1816, "The war has renewed and reinstated the national feelings and character which the Revolution had given, and which were daily lessened. The people have now more general objects of attachment with which their pride and political opinions are connected. They are more American; they feel and act more as a nation; and I hope that the permanency of the Union is thereby better secured."[109]

The end of the war also marked a return to normal commercial relations with Europe and to many of the Washingtonian foreign and domestic policies abandoned by Jefferson fifteen years earlier. Orators continued to view the Farewell Address as an explication of the ideal American approach to foreign policy, although their view of the Address increasingly conformed to Jefferson's rigid reconceptualization of it. In perhaps the best indication of the place held by the Farewell Address in America's consciousness after the war, Jerome Loring, speaking on 4 July 1815, warned that "the clouds of war are again thickening in Europe, portending a fearful storm. . . . No doubt every art will be employed to draw us into the vortex." Loring urged his audience to "hear the monitory voice of Washington and beware," to follow the admonitions of the Farewell Address and "'cultivate peace with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'"[110]

3

John Quincy Adams and the Legacy of the Farewell Address

The Jeffersonian reconceptualization of Washington's Farewell Address had gained widespread acceptance by the time James Monroe was sworn in as the nation's fifth president in March 1817. One man who remained dedicated to the original flexibility of Washington's vision, rather than to the rigidity of "entangling alliances with none," was Monroe's secretary of state, John Quincy Adams. Adams had been a devoted follower of Washington throughout Washington's presidency and an adherent of the Farewell Address from the moment he first read it while stationed as a foreign minister in the Netherlands. The Address's principles guided Adams in his dealings with foreign courts, influenced his decisions as a U.S. senator from 1803 to 1808, and formed the basis of his diplomatic approach while secretary of state. Adams's perspective on foreign policy served the United States well during the profound world changes that followed the end of the War of 1812 in North America and of the Napoleonic wars in Europe. Europe was at peace, and a system of continental alliances replaced the havoc and violence of the previous quarter-century. Closer to home, Spain's American colonies from Mexico to Argentina, which had been embroiled in revolution since 1807, would achieve independence during Monroe's second term. It fell largely to Adams to navigate the United States through the challenges posed by these changes.

Given all these shifts in the world order, when Adams was asked to deliver a Fourth of July address in Washington, DC, in 1821, he took it as an opportunity to reflect on the principles that had so far guided America's foreign policy. "In the lapse of nearly half a century, without a single exception," Adams proclaimed, the United States had "respected the independence of other nations while asserting and maintaining her own." Alluding to both the French Revolution of decades earlier and the ongoing revolutions in Spanish America, Adams pointed out that the United States had "abstained from interference in the concerns of others, even when the conflict has been for principles to which she clings, as to the last vital

drop that visits the heart." This neutrality would remain important, for Adams predicted "that probably for centuries to come, all the contests of that Aceldama the European world, will be contests of inveterate power, and emerging right." Americans would continue to sympathize with peoples struggling for freedom, Adams asserted. "Wherever the standard of freedom and Independence, has been or shall be unfurled," he declared, "there will her heart, her benedictions and her prayers be." Yet despite these sympathies, he added, the United States "goes not abroad, in search of monsters to destroy. She is the well-wisher to the freedom and independence of all. She is the champion and vindicator only of her own. She will recommend the general cause by the countenance of her voice, and the benignant sympathy of her example." Americans understood, Adams stated, "that by once enlisting under other banners than her own, were they even the banners of foreign Independence, [the United States] would involve herself beyond the power of extrication, in all the wars of interest and intrigue, of individual avarice, envy, and ambition, which assume the colors and usurp the standard of freedom." In such an event, "the fundamental maxims of her policy would insensibly change from *liberty* to *force*."[1] If Americans were to defend their principles abroad, they would jeopardize those principles at home, and that was a cost too steep to pay. While Adams never mentioned Washington by name, his 1821 Fourth of July speech was a forceful and eloquent discourse on the wisdom of Washington's principles in fostering America's rapid growth and rising glory. It presented a strong defense of neutrality and a foreign policy defined by the protection of America's fundamental interests. In short, the speech upheld the principles outlined in the Farewell Address as Washington originally intended them: as guiding maxims of American diplomacy.

Next to Washington, John Quincy Adams was the most influential individual for anyone seeking to trace the history of the principles of the Farewell Address. At a time when most other statesmen were guided by the isolationist tendencies embodied in "entangling alliances with none," Adams forcefully demonstrated the wisdom of the more flexible and evolutionary approach Washington had actually advocated in his Address. Nowhere was this more clearly seen than in Adams's most impressive—but also most misunderstood—accomplishment: the Monroe Doctrine. The Doctrine was the ultimate restatement of Washington's principles to meet the new global challenges posed by a (largely) united Europe and an independent Latin America. While the Monroe Doctrine was initially hailed as a bold defense of U.S. rights and principles, Americans adhering to Jefferson's reconceptualization of the Farewell Address quickly began to question whether it violated Washington's teachings.

The Education of John Quincy Adams

John Quincy Adams, born in 1767 to John and Abigail Adams, was expected to accomplish great things. Too young to take up pen or arms during the American Revolution, he contributed in a way denied other American adolescents, traveling to Paris in 1778 with his father, John Adams, as the latter negotiated the treaty of alliance that brought France into the war. After serving the elder Adams at postings in Spain and the Netherlands, in 1781 John Quincy became Francis Dana's secretary on a mission to Russia. By the time the younger Adams returned to the United States in 1785, to enroll at Harvard University, he had already seen more of the world than most Americans did during their entire lives. Adams graduated second in his class two years later, trained to become a lawyer, and in 1790 opened his own law practice in Boston, Massachusetts. Adams had no designs on political office during his first years in Boston, but this did not stop him from taking an interest in political events. One of the earliest events to draw his attention was the publication in 1791 of Thomas Paine's defense of the French Revolution, *The Rights of Man,* and the controversy caused by Thomas Jefferson's introductory note to the American edition. In what was intended as a private letter, Jefferson lauded Paine's work and criticized the "political heresies which have sprung up among us," a phrase many readers interpreted to be a condemnation of the Federalists and of Vice President John Adams in particular. Feeling the need to defend his father and his own political views, John Quincy Adams published a series of eleven articles in the Boston *Columbian Centinel,* under the pseudonym "Publicola," that were highly critical of both Paine and Jefferson.[2]

Despite the notoriety arising from this first publishing effort, even if his authorship did not become widely known, Adams preferred maintaining a private life outside of politics. "I have been really apprehensive of becoming politically known, before I could establish a *professional* reputation," he remarked early on. "I knew that my independence and consequently my happiness in life depended upon this, and I have sincerely wished rather to remain in the shade than to appear as a politician without any character as a lawyer."[3] With the publication of President Washington's Proclamation of Neutrality in April 1793, though, Adams once again took up his pen in defense of the administration. Writing under the pen name "Marcellus," Adams attempted to demonstrate "what line of conduct ought to be pursued by the United States as a nation, and by their citizens as individuals, in relation to" France and Great Britain.[4] Adams believed that it was the "duty" of the United States to maintain "an impartial and unequivocal neutrality." "As the citizens of a nation at a vast distance from the continent of Europe," he continued, "of a nation whose happiness consists in a real independence, disconnected from all European interests and European politics, it is our duty to remain, the peaceable and silent, though sorrowful spectators of the sanguinary

scene."[5] Hold on to sympathy, he advised, but do not let it turn into dangerous action. Later in the year, writing as "Columbus," Adams voiced his approval of the administration's handling of the Genet affair, lamenting the evils of foreign influence and praising the president for having the French minister recalled.[6] Three years before Washington would publish his Farewell Address, Adams was already defending what would become its core principles.

Whether aiming for a career in politics or not, Adams came to George Washington's attention when his father shared these pseudonymous essays with the president. Washington approved of what he read and appointed Adams as the United States' minister to the Netherlands in May 1794. Stationed in Europe until the end of his father's administration, John Quincy Adams was in a position to see the other side of U.S. foreign-policy decisions and principles. This perspective gave him a greater appreciation for the wisdom of neutrality and it became a frequent topic in his correspondence. Writing to his father in 1795, Adams observed, "The President of the United States has so decidedly adopted and maintained the policy of neutrality, and it has proved so advantageous to the country, that it is perhaps an idle apprehension that can imagine it will again be endangered."[7] Adams echoed these sentiments later in the year in a letter to Secretary of State Timothy Pickering, declaring, "The system of policy pursued by the President since the commencement of the present European war has been encountered by so many difficulties and embarrassments, which the wisdom of his government has removed and overcome, that I feel encouraged in the hope that it will be successfully pursued to the end."[8] From his European vantage point, Adams observed that France was actively attempting to draw the United States into a war with Great Britain, clearly demonstrating that neutrality was important not just in principle but also in practice. "The policy of the French government at present," Adams informed his father in May 1795, "is to make *use* of the United States . . . as an instrument for the benefit of France, as a passive weapon in her hands against her most formidable enemy." Stated more directly, the French government intended "to involve the United States in a war with Britain."[9] Only a strict adherence to Washington's principle of neutrality saved the United States from this French threat.

Valuing both the intelligence and the keen insights his son sent him from Europe, John Adams frequently passed his son's letters on to the president. Washington confided to his vice president that John Quincy "must not think of retiring from the walk he is now in: his prospects if he pursues it are fair: and I shall be much mistaken, if in as short a time as can well be expected, he is not found at the head of the Diplomatique Corps."[10] Such approbation was not unidirectional, either: Adams not only defended the wisdom of the president's foreign policy, but also asserted how essential Washington himself was to its maintenance and success. "At the present moment if our neutrality be still preserved, it will be due to the President alone," Adams confided to an associate in late 1795. "Nothing but

[Washington's] weight of character and reputation, combined with his firmness and political intrepidity, could have stood against the torrent that is still tumbling with a fury that resounds even across the Atlantic."[11] In a time when "men who court popularity in America, dare to speak openly of their devotion to the interests of France . . . and lose none of their influence by the barefaced avowal of such a partial foreign attachment," it was only through Washington's strength that the nation could persevere.[12] John Quincy Adams placed so much faith in Washington that he felt confident in predicting, "If his system of administration now prevails, ten years more will place the United States among the most powerful and opulent nations on earth."[13] While the time frame was optimistic, it revealed that Adams saw Washington's principles, just as the president himself did, as being essential not just for America's present but also for its future.

John Quincy Adams's consistent endorsement of Washington's approach to foreign policy was confirmed and strengthened by Washington's publication of his Farewell Address, which Adams saw as a vital legacy to a wise administration. After reading the Address for the first time, Adams wrote to Washington, expressing his fervent prayer that the people of the United States "may not only impress all its admonitions upon their hearts, but that it may serve as the foundation upon which the whole system of their future policy may rise." Adams hoped "that your warning voice may upon every great emergency recur to their remembrance with an influence equal to the occasion; that it may control the fury of domestic factions and check the encroachments of foreign influence; that it may cement with indissoluble force our national Union, and secure at once our dignity and our peace."[14] That Adams would passionately approve of the Farewell Address was not surprising. He had long been an outspoken proponent of Washington's foreign policy and understood in a way that few other Americans could the importance of that policy in regulating America's relationship with Europe. Washington's valedictory enunciated principles that Adams himself had repeatedly expressed, especially with regard to the dangers of foreign influence and the importance of neutrality for a weak nation.

So much did Washington's and Adams's principles of foreign policy overlap that historian Samuel Flagg Bemis has suggested that the latter's writings influenced Washington when he drafted the Farewell Address. According to Bemis, "Adams's contributions to the American press and his subsequent letters from The Hague to his father had an appreciable influence upon the mind of the President as he thought over what he desired to say in the Address." Bemis has traced a surprising volume of specific ideas and "even little traces of [Adams's] phraseology" in the Farewell to these sources—so much so "that one may wonder whether Washington may not have had still before him the letters of 'Columbus' when he drew up the first draft of that document." Bemis does not point out these similarities in principle and phrasing to claim any sort of authorship credit for Adams,

conceding that the Address "would have been given out, in somewhat the same form, if Adams had never lived." However, Bemis does assert that "John Quincy Adams shared these principles of foreign policy [with Washington] and validated them from his observation, on the spot, of the wars of the French Revolution. Thus validated, they had reinforced Washington's own opinions and even shaped their expression a little."[15] To extend Bemis's argument, it can be said that Washington and Adams mutually reinforced and validated each other in their conception of the principles of American foreign policy. It was easy for Adams to endorse Washington's principles, and their expression in the Farewell Address, because they already were his principles.

Upon returning to the United States in 1801, Adams found a very different country than the one he had left behind seven years earlier. George Washington was dead, Adams's father had retired from public life for the first time since the Revolution, Thomas Jefferson's Republican Party was ascendant throughout the United States, and the once-dominant Federalists were now angrily in the minority. Adams returned to Boston to resume his legal practice, but was elected to the Massachusetts state legislature, and in 1803 the legislature chose him to represent Massachusetts in the United States Senate. Adams arrived in Washington, DC, one day after the Senate ratified the Louisiana Purchase, an outcome that he fully supported. While other Federalists had opposed the Purchase both from principle and for partisan reasons, Adams believed that the treaty-making power of the Constitution gave the president the ability to acquire any territory for which he could successfully negotiate. He also believed that American interests were best served by the territory being in American hands.[16]

Adams's after-the-fact endorsement of the Louisiana Purchase alienated him from his Federalist colleagues, and that relationship only soured with time. In 1806, Adams was the only Federalist senator to vote in favor of Jefferson's Non-Importation Agreement against Great Britain, and a year later he was the only one to vote for the embargo.[17] Adams viewed the embargo as the only way to guarantee the maintenance of American neutrality and to keep the United States out of the war between Great Britain and France. Just days after voting in favor of the measure, Adams wrote to his father that "we had no other alternative left but this, or taking our side at once in the war. I do not believe indeed that the embargo can long be continued; but if we let our ships go out without arming them and authorizing them to resist the decrees, they must go merely to swell the plunder of the contending parties."[18] The following August, Adams still believed that "the true and only alternative was this—embargo or war," and he remained "unshaken in that opinion." He readily acknowledged that the embargo had proved to be "a distressing calamity" for the United States, "yet in comparison with *war,* either with Britain or France, I still esteem it as no more than the bite of a flea to the bite of a rattlesnake." Adams ardently hoped that Great Britain and France would

stop preying on American shipping and that the United States would be "released from the pressures of the embargo, without being driven into the war." This would not only ease the country's heavy economic burdens, but also allow for the preservation of "the great system of American neutrality in European wars, which Washington with so much difficulty established, and which it has always been so difficult to maintain."[19] Adams looked past the embargo's negative impacts on his native Massachusetts and concluded that maintaining neutrality and preserving peace were the primary interests needing protection.

While Adams was prioritizing national interests over local ones in the Senate, the Massachusetts legislature was electing Adams's replacement in June 1808, eight months earlier than normal. Unwilling to accept this implicit condemnation of his conduct, Adams resigned a few days later.[20] Adams's time out of public service was again brief. Shortly after being sworn in as president, James Madison appointed Adams as America's first minister to Russia. This new commission allowed Adams to return to the diplomatic service to which he was best suited, but it also meant that he had to watch from afar as his country moved toward war with Great Britain. Should war come, Adams prayed "that we may not undertake it presumptuously, nor impelled by passion, nor without a precise and definite object for which to contend."[21] If the United States had to go to war, let it be borne not out of attachment or antipathy for any foreign country but out of a cold calculation of national interest.

As a representative of the United States abroad, Adams was deeply concerned with how foreign courts regarded his country. America was neutral in foreign affairs and treated the rest of the world with justice, and Adams expected the same in return. He thus fumed at repeated demonstrations of disrespect by the British government after the commencement of the War of 1812. A British rejection of a Russian offer to mediate a resolution to the conflict particularly incensed Adams. It was not that he necessarily wanted Russian assistance but that the British were treating the United States differently than it would any other power. "It has been so uniformly and invariably the policy of the United States to keep themselves aloof from all the political combinations of Europe," Adams remarked, "that the British government seems to have taken it for granted that their controversies with us might always be managed upon principles not applicable to their intercourse with other powers, and that what they might be compelled to submit to as law of nations with the rest of Europe, they might break through with impunity in their relations with America." Fairness would dictate Britain's actions—except when it came to the United States. Adams was especially critical of the fact that "as a motive for declining the Russian mediation [the British] have alleged that it was a dispute involving principles of internal administration, as if the United States were a mere appendage to the British dominions."[22] For a nation that had fought so hard to achieve and sustain its independence, this was the ultimate insult.

When Britain finally did agree to peace negotiations at Ghent in 1814, Adams was appointed as a peace commissioner to serve alongside James Bayard, Henry Clay, Albert Gallatin, and Jonathan Russell. Adams intended to achieve a just and honorable peace that would reflect well upon the United States in the eyes of the world. Adams's view of national interests had changed dramatically since 1808. Before the war, he had believed that the nation would be best served by staying at peace, but now that war had come, peace could be concluded only on beneficial terms. "I would sooner look forward to the chance of ten successive wars, to be carried on ten times more weakly than we have the present one," Adams raged to his father, "than concede one particle of our principle by a treaty stipulation."[23] When negotiations began in August 1814, the British presented extreme demands that would have forced the United States to give up much in both territory and principle. By November, many of the most onerous demands had been dropped, but the British commissioners still clung to several points that Adams felt could not be conceded, including the relinquishment of "a few hundred acres of land." Adams admitted to his wife that "the objects upon which they still insist, and which we cannot yield, are in themselves so trifling and insignificant that neither of the two nations would tolerate a war for them. We have everything but peace in our hands. But in these trifles, in the simple consideration of interest, they have left involved principles to which we cannot accede." The small cession of territory the British were demanding "we can no more give up, than we could a whole state in our union." There remained "other points totally unimportant, but implicating our national honor," that could likewise not be abandoned.[24] The United States could not sacrifice its principles or diminish the meaning of its independence for the sake of peace.

Adams's insistence on the maintenance of U.S. principles, along with the efforts of his fellow commissioners, finally produced a treaty that protected American interests and preserved American principles by leaving unresolved most of the issues at stake in the war. Both sides agreed to bring the war to an end and to continue negotiations on all of the more difficult questions once the cloud of war had been lifted. Despite the large body of work remaining to be done, Adams was proud of what the American commissioners had accomplished. In the Treaty of Ghent the United States had "abandoned no essential right, and if we have left everything open for future controversy, we have at least secured to our country the power at her own option to extinguish the war."[25] "We have obtained nothing but peace, and we have made great sacrifices to obtain it," Adams admitted in a letter to his wife. "But our honor remains unsullied; our territory remains entire. The peace in word and in deed has been made upon terms of *perfect reciprocity,* and we have surrendered no one right or pretension of our country."[26] Reflecting on the war and the peace more than a year later, Adams echoed the judgments of many Republicans back home in declaring the war to have been "much more beneficial than injurious to our country. It has raised our national character in the

eyes of all Europe. It has demonstrated that the United States are both a military and a naval power, with capacities which may hereafter place them in both these respects on the first line among the nations of the earth."[27] Principles had been defended, respect had been gained, and the United States was now that much closer to achieving the national greatness Washington had predicted.[28]

America's Postwar Foreign-policy Challenges

From the time John Quincy Adams first left the United States with his father at the age of ten until his return from Britain in 1817 at the age of fifty to take up his post as James Monroe's secretary of state, he had spent more time in Europe than he had in America.[29] When Adams returned from his first European trip to enroll at Harvard, he had feared "that by having received so large a share of my education in Europe, my attachment to a republican government would not be sufficient for pleasing my countrymen." He was quite surprised to discover, though, "that I am the best republican here, and with my classmates, if I ever have any disputes on the subject, I am always obliged to defend that side of the question."[30] Being a firsthand witness to the operation of different political systems and principles over a forty-year period had given Adams a unique appreciation for both republicanism and George Washington's foreign-policy principles. Adams came into the State Department with a clear understanding of the importance of these principles, both for their past impacts and as a guide for the future. Having such a guide was vital given the new global challenges faced by the United States after the return of peace to America and Europe.

Various European heads of state came together after the defeat of Napoleon Bonaparte in a concerted effort to ensure a permanent restoration of order after more than two decades of war. The French Revolution and its long-felt ramifications had alerted Europe's rulers to the dangers of popular uprisings as well as to the need to reassert legitimate authority over the continent. In September 1815, the sovereigns of Austria, Russia, and Prussia formed a Holy Alliance founded on their mutual belief in the nature of legitimate authority in government and specifically the divine right of kings.[31] Eventually signed by all of the sovereigns of Europe except for those of Great Britain, Turkey, and the Vatican (as those governments did not feature traditional monarchies), the Holy Alliance quickly became a driving force in European politics. In November 1815, Austria, Russia, and Prussia also inaugurated an alliance with Great Britain—the Quadruple Alliance—that was tasked with maintaining peace and a "just balance of power" in the wake of decades of upheaval.[32] Both alliances posed interesting new challenges for the United States. Adams described the Holy Alliance as "of a character entirely new and unexampled in the history of the world."[33] Rather than looking

east to a series of competitive European nations, the view was now of a continent aligned in common purpose.

It was what Adams saw when he looked to the south that proved to be the bigger test for U.S. foreign policy and principles. With the exception of the United States, Canada, and Brazil, Spain exerted colonial control over the Americas. Since 1808, Spain's colonies had been engaged in a series of revolutionary movements geared toward securing their independence. The process of revolution had commenced slowly and haphazardly throughout Spanish America, but by 1815 it had begun to cause problems for the United States.[34] Privately the American government strongly approved of these revolutionary movements. The replacement of Spanish colonies with independent nations represented a significant opportunity for the growth of American commerce and the elimination of a far-reaching European colonial presence from much of the Western Hemisphere. Despite this private approval, however, the United States could not outwardly support these revolutions. A public endorsement of the Spanish American revolutionaries was not the conduct of a neutral nation and would anger Spain and potentially other European powers as well. Beyond a general sympathy for popular revolt, the United States did not have a vested interest in the outcome of the revolutions and could not jeopardize its relations with Europe for the sake of republican sympathies.[35]

Given these considerations, President Madison described the U.S. position on the Spanish American revolutions as one of "scrupulous neutrality," and in September 1815 issued a proclamation calling for neutrality to be official U.S. policy.[36] Secretary of State James Monroe saw the revolutions as becoming "daily more interesting to the United States," and in a dispatch to John Quincy Adams (then serving as minister to Great Britain) he predicted that the colonies would successfully "separate from the mother country." In Monroe's estimation, these emerging countries required "the acknowledgement of their governments by the United States." In weighing the impact on the United States of Spanish America's continuation as colonies versus their separation and independence, Monroe concluded, "there is no cause to doubt in which scale our interest lies."[37] Unquestionably that interest favored American continents populated by independent countries free of European interference. However, because Monroe's 1815 prediction of the successful separation of Spain's colonies consisted, at least in the short term, more of optimistic thinking than realistic expectation, the United States needed to proceed cautiously.

Monroe brought this positive outlook on Spanish America with him into his presidency. In September 1817, at one of the first cabinet meetings attended by Adams, the president raised the possibility of recognizing Buenos Aires (now Argentina) as an independent country, and in late October Adams "explicitly avowed" to the president his opinion that such a course of action was "not now expedient."[38] Adams believed that a premature recognition would yield no tangible benefits for the United States, and might well complicate U.S. relations with Europe. This was

a decision where a rigorous assessment of American interests had to determine American action. If Europe chose to retaliate against the United States for its recognition of Buenos Aires, the United States stood to lose far more in trade with Europe than it could gain from Spanish America (especially at that moment in time). More importantly, recognition would neither hasten the actual accomplishment of independence nor produce other positive outcomes beyond satiating the American desire to express political sympathies. The larger political objective of seeing European influence diminished in the Americas could be advanced only by more tangible aid to the revolutionaries, not by recognition alone, and the United States was not prepared to offer that aid. National interests dictated preserving American neutrality and beneficial commercial relations with Europe.[39]

American interests aside, as long as the outcomes of the various revolutionary movements were in doubt, recognition of Spanish American independence would be both premature and a violation of U.S. neutrality. By taking sides, the United States would be interjecting itself into the conflict between Spain and its colonies. "In every question relating to the independence of a nation two principles are involved, one of *right,* and the other of *fact,*" Adams explained. "The former depending upon the determination of the nation itself, and the latter resulting from the successful execution of that determination." A people could declare independence, but until they actually achieved independence it would be an aspiration rather than a reality. In the case of Spanish America, the United States had maintained an "impartial neutrality" and would continue to do so until such time as recognition had become "the mere acknowledgment of existing facts."[40] Despite Monroe's sympathy, until Buenos Aires could adequately demonstrate the fact of independence, the question would remain, "by what *right* could we take sides?"[41] As the United States had learned during the French Revolution, sympathy was not a sufficient reason to abandon neutrality.

In linking recognition to American interests, Adams revealed the ongoing role played by Washington's Farewell Address in shaping his foreign policy; however, Adams's was not the only definition of American interest being asserted in the debate over recognition of Spanish American independence. Henry Clay, Speaker of the House of Representatives and one of the nation's most vocal supporters of Spanish American independence, advocated recognition as being in the nation's interests. Clay expressed his first concern for the progress of Spanish American independence in January 1813 and issued his first extended call for U.S. support three years later.[42] In that 1816 speech, Clay "boldly declared" that should the United States "be called on to decide the question whether we would or would not lend them our aid," it would "undoubtedly be good policy to take part with the patriots of South America." Clay fully believed it to be in America's "interest to take part with them, and that our interposition in their favor would be effectual." Giving greater definition to his understanding of U.S. interests, Clay "considered the release of any part

of America from the dominions of the old world, as adding to the general security of the new."[43] Clay's vision of American interest contrasted sharply with that of John Quincy Adams, who at the end of 1817 bemoaned that the Speaker had "already mounted his South American great horse."[44] Clay represented a perpetual thorn in Adams's side on the question of recognition, repeatedly opposing efforts to enact stronger neutrality laws and speaking out against the administration's determination not to act. That Clay's measures were consistently defeated in Congress did not discourage him. The one resolution he succeeded in passing was a generic and tepid endorsement of some future move toward recognition.[45]

Despite Clay's persistence and a more general popular support for the idea of liberal revolution, Adams held by his belief in the necessity of maintaining U.S. neutrality. The allied sovereigns of Europe, despite their strong opposition to liberal revolution, had likewise remained neutral, leaving Spain to resolve its colonial problems alone; however, Adams learned in early 1818 that the Quadruple Alliance was considering a proposal of mediation between the colonies and Spain. To Adams, such an offer would represent "a departure from that line of neutrality" in favor of Spain, because the allies certainly would not be stepping forward on behalf of the colonies. "Upon what principle of justice," Adams questioned, "can the allies consider . . . themselves as justifiable in taking side with Spain against [the colonies]?"[46] Adams and the allies were basing their conduct on very different definitions of justice.

The proposed mediation further angered Adams because the United States had not been consulted. In instructions to the U.S. minister to Russia, Adams emphasized that the European courts must "understand that the interests of this nation are so deeply concerned, and the feelings of the country are so much excited on this subject that we have a just claim to be informed of the intentions as well as the acts of the European alliance concerning it." Adams stressed that the United States hoped "to pursue a course for the future in harmony with that of the allies," but would not "participate in and cannot approve any interposition of other powers" in Spanish American affairs "unless it be to promote the total independence, political and commercial, of the colonies."[47] Beyond the somewhat hypocritical position that mediation was inappropriate unless it favored Spanish American independence, Adams's language suggested an important shift in the United States' approach to Spanish America. Adams still advocated neutrality, but the argument that the United States had a deeper interest than the Quadruple Alliance in the outcome of the revolutions hinted that he envisioned the establishment of a different relationship with independent Spanish America than the United States had with Europe. Adams, influenced by Washington's Farewell Address, seemed to be dividing the world into American and European spheres of interest and influence. In Washington's time, these were a very narrow American sphere and a very broad European sphere that stretched around the world, but by 1818 the spheres

were changing. American interests were expanding and Europe's were contracting, a fact that Adams wanted Europe to acknowledge.

Reordering the Western Hemisphere

Despite American protests and without American participation, the Quadruple Alliance held a congress at Aix-la-Chapelle, France, in October 1818 with mediation on the agenda. A more pressing motive for the congress was to admit France to the alliance and to determine what role the expanded alliance would play in Europe. Russia envisioned a new political system that would preserve the postwar settlement agreed to in 1815. Great Britain objected to Russia's plan on the grounds that it could be construed to authorize military intervention by the allies in the internal affairs of other countries under the guise of safeguarding that settlement. Intervention could be permissible only if the safety of other countries was jeopardized. Britain's objections swayed the other powers and no interventionist system was enacted. On the question of mediation, all five countries also agreed that there was little likelihood of permanently reducing Spanish America to its former colonial status. As one delegate concluded, "force could under no circumstances be employed" to forestall independence.[48] Spain remained on its own.[49]

With no European mediation in the offing, Spain turned its attention to the United States in the hopes of staving off recognition of the revolutionaries' independence. Spain was prepared to offer East and West Florida in exchange for a U.S. pledge not to recognize Spanish American independence. The United States had long been interested in acquiring the Floridas, especially after the Louisiana Purchase, but Spain had been unwilling to negotiate. The potential loss of an empire, to say nothing of General Andrew Jackson's 1818 invasion of East Florida and its ramifications for the U.S. use of force more generally in the region, pushed Spain to the negotiating table.[50] Adams used Spain's reversal of fortunes in the Americas to extract significant concessions from the Spanish minister to the United States, Luis de Onís. Under the basic framework of the treaty negotiated by Adams and Onís, the United States would gain clear title to the Floridas, Spain would officially recognize the Louisiana Purchase, a clear border between U.S. and Spanish territory, running from the Gulf of Mexico to the Pacific Ocean, would be agreed to by both nations, and Spain would cede to the United States all claimed territory north of the 42nd parallel. In exchange, Spain would be relieved of five million dollars in indemnities held against it by American citizens.

Within this framework, two points proved more difficult to settle. First was Adams's effort to convince Onís that the United States had acquired all of Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase. Both Adams and Onís knew that such a claim was tenuous at best, and Adams ultimately relinquished U.S. claims to Texas in the last

stages of the negotiations at the behest of Monroe and the cabinet, who feared that Onís would break off the talks if Adams persisted. The final question at stake in the negotiations focused on Spanish American independence. As a condition of the treaty, Onís insisted that the United States refuse to recognize any of Spain's former colonies as independent countries; Adams rejected this demand out of hand, later explaining in his diary that a "stipulation not to recognize the South Americans would be a breach of neutrality, and as such we could not accede to it."[51] To bargain away recognition would be to take sides in the conflict between Spain and its colonies as surely as would premature recognition of their independence. The United States would recognize Spanish American independence when justice and its own interests dictated—not before and not after.[52]

With these final points settled, the Transcontinental Treaty was signed on 22 February 1819, giving the United States possession of the Floridas and territory running across the continent to the Pacific Ocean. Adams considered the treaty to be one of his greatest triumphs, and described the day it was signed as "perhaps, the most important day of my life." Adams was glad to have finally acquired the Floridas, and he viewed the "acknowledgment of a definite line of boundary to the South Sea [Pacific Ocean]" as forming "a great epocha in our history." In a bit of simultaneous foreshadowing and understatement, Adams acknowledged that there was "some discontent" at the loss of Texas and predicted that "the Floridas will be found, in all probability, less valuable in possession than when merely coveted."[53] Nevertheless, Adams still deemed the treaty a magnificent success for the United States, and historians have generally agreed with this assessment. Samuel Flagg Bemis described the treaty as the "greatest diplomatic victory ever won by an American Secretary of State," and Dexter Perkins called it "the most successful negotiation ever carried on in the annals of American diplomacy."[54]

Not all Americans were as impressed with the Transcontinental Treaty, however. William Archer, a congressman from Virginia, described it as "the worst treaty the country had ever made. . . . [W]e should get by it nothing but Florida, and gave away for it a country [Texas] worth fifty times as much."[55] Representative David Trimble of Kentucky echoed Archer's Texas complaint and informed Adams that he should "set the treaty aside and . . . insist upon" receiving the entire Texas territory. An angered Adams replied, "The treaty gives us the Mississippi and all its waters—gives us Florida—gives us an acknowledged line to the South Sea, and seventeen degrees of latitude upon its shores—gives our citizens five millions of dollars of indemnity—and barely gives up to Spain the colorable claim" to any portion of Texas. With rising temperature, Adams reminded Trimble that "negotiation implies some concession upon both sides. If after obtaining every object of your pursuit but one, and that one weak in principle and of no present value, what would you have offered to Spain to yield that also?"[56] Stated in these terms, it is easy to understand why the cabinet pressured Adams to give up on Texas in order to ensure these other

gains. At the same time, one can only imagine Adams's frustration that he was being raked over the coals in some quarters for giving up Texas when he had done so only at Monroe's insistence. However much the decision made sense in the context of the negotiations, the Texas question would not go away.

While the Transcontinental Treaty was silent on the recognition of Spanish American independence, the United States ultimately waited more than three years to make any public pronouncement on the subject. In the interim, Henry Clay continued to push for recognition in Congress, and at various points the administration did give it serious consideration, but Adams's interpretation of U.S. interests continued to dictate patience.[57] Paramount in Adams's calculations was Spain's foot-dragging in approving the treaty, as final ratifications were not exchanged until February 1821.[58] Adams feared that any public discussion of recognition would antagonize Spain and lead to the treaty being permanently set aside. Adams objected to passages in Monroe's annual message to Congress for 1820 that expressed support for Spanish America, arguing that since the "system" of the United States was one of "professed neutrality," it followed that "any avowal of partiality for the South Americans was inconsistent with it, and liable to raise doubts of our sincerity." Adams confided to his diary a belief "that these paragraphs of the [annual] message have been the principal real cause of the delay of Spain to ratify the Florida Treaty."[59] In weighing America's interests and obligations, Adams determined that preserving good relations with Spain at least until the Transcontinental Treaty was ratified took precedence over the formal recognition of Spanish American independence.

The ongoing debate over recognition served as the immediate backdrop for Adams's 4 July 1821 speech. Viewed in this context, the speech revealed how seriously Adams took Washington's call for American neutrality as the most important means of safeguarding national interests. The great irony of the speech was that less than a year later Adams took the first tentative steps toward a revised foreign policy built upon Washington's precepts, steps that provoked allegations that Adams had abandoned Washington and the Farewell Address. With the final ratification of the Transcontinental Treaty, recognition became a viable policy choice, and by early 1822 even Adams could offer no legitimate reason to forestall an acknowledgment of what by that point had become an established fact. On 8 March 1822, President James Monroe announced a new policy toward Spain's former colonies. When the United States government considered "the great length of time which this war has been prosecuted, the complete success which has attended it in favor of the Provinces, the present condition of the parties, and the utter inability of Spain to produce any change in it," Monroe proclaimed, "we are compelled to conclude that its fate is settled, and that the Provinces which have declared their independence and are in the enjoyment of it ought to be recog-

nized."[60] The first formal act of recognition was carried out three months later, when Adams presented Manuel Torres to Monroe as chargé d'affaires from the republic of Colombia.[61]

Adams liked to frame the decision for recognition as being directly linked to America's obligations as a neutral nation. If independence was an established fact, then it would be a violation of the principles of justice and neutrality to not acknowledge it. That the powers of Europe refused this acknowledgment—that they still hoped to see the colonies restored to Spain—was a secondary concern for Adams; he had stayed true to American principles. Recognition signified a strong defense of U.S. interests, which were best served by seeing European rule and influence eliminated from the American continents. By waiting until independence was assured, the act of recognition became a declaration by the United States that European rule over Spanish America was at an end. It was also another clear step toward treating Latin America as a distinct sphere separate from Europe, as a region toward which the United States would have to create a new foreign policy. The question was how Europe would respond to this new American approach.

John Quincy Adams had two overarching objectives as secretary of state and often pursued both with the same measures. These objectives were the elimination of European influence in the Americas and westward expansion—or at least the preservation of future opportunities for westward expansion. Both objectives were predicated on the idea that European colonialism would naturally give way to U.S. dominion. As Washington had suggested in his Farewell Address, it was only a question of time. The Transcontinental Treaty and the recognition of Spanish American independence had been two important steps in this larger process. So too was the Convention of 1818 with Great Britain. That treaty clarified the United States–Canada border between the Mississippi River and the Rocky Mountains, and provided for joint occupation of a wide swath of land claimed by both countries along the northwest coast of North America—what would eventually be called Oregon. Through the Convention, Adams preserved American claims to the northwest while also acknowledging that full-scale American settlement was still years or even decades away.[62]

While all of these foreign policies fell under the umbrella of protecting America's best interests, they also embodied Washington's warning that the United States and Europe had distinct and separate interests. An unwavering neutrality was one way to preserve this separation, but the actual removal of European influence from the Americas was a more effective long-term strategy. Given Adams's expansionist view of America's future, the elimination of European rivalry throughout North America was especially important. Adams believed so deeply in this project that in 1821 he famously yelled at a British minister that Great Britain should "keep what is yours, but leave the rest of this continent to us."[63]

The Noncolonization Principle

A new challenge to eventual American dominion over the continent emerged in September 1821 in the form of an imperial ukase (decree) by Tsar Alexander I of Russia. The ukase extended Russia's territorial claims "from [the] Behring Straits down, to the 51° of Northern Latitude," and prohibited "all Foreign Vessels, not only to land on the Coast and Islands belonging to Russia, as stated above, but also to approach them within less than 100 Italian miles."[64] Prior to the ukase Russia had made no claim to this territory, but it was now declaring much of the Oregon territory jointly occupied by the United States and Great Britain as being off-limits to both countries. Adams, understandably upset, protested to Russian minister Pierre de Poletica, that "this ordinance affects so deeply the rights of the United States . . . that I am instructed to inquire whether you are authorized to give explanations of the grounds of right, upon principles generally recognized by the laws and usages of nations, which can warrant the claims and regulations contained in it."[65] Adams and Poletica exchanged diplomatic letters to little effect until a dispatch arrived in August 1822 from the U.S. minister to Russia, Henry Middleton, who reassured Adams that "the provisions of the ukase would not be persisted in. It appears to have been signed by the Emperor without sufficient examination, and may be fairly considered as having been surreptitiously obtained." "There can be little doubt," Middleton assured Adams, "that with a little patience and management it will be molded into a less objectionable shape."[66] With the crisis of the ukase proving to not be much of a crisis after all, Baron von Tuyll, the new Russian minister to the United States, proposed in early 1823 that the two countries' differences be "terminated by means of a friendly negotiation."[67] Adams agreed and informed Tuyll that Middleton would be given instructions on how to proceed.[68]

On 17 July 1823, Tuyll approached Adams to inquire about the general content of Middleton's instructions and was greeted by the boldest declaration of American principles ever issued by a U.S. secretary of state to that point in the nation's history. The United States "should contest the right of Russia to *any* territorial establishment on this continent," Adams announced to Tuyll, adding "we should assume distinctly the principle that the American continents are no longer subjects for *any* new European colonial establishments."[69] This new noncolonization principle—Adams's strongest statement yet on the separation of the American and European spheres of influence—did far more than dispute Russian claims on the Pacific coast of North America; it warned all of Europe to stay out of *both* American continents. Adams put the European empires on notice that they should no longer look to the Americas as an outlet for their expansionist impulses.

Adams expanded on this noncolonization principle in his instructions to Middleton, observing, "the future peace of the world, and the interests of Russia herself, cannot be promoted by Russian settlements upon any part of the American conti-

nent. With the exception of the British establishments north of the United States [Canada], the remainder of both the American Continents must henceforth be left to the management of American hands."[70] The ukase had given Adams his best opportunity to reframe Washington's guiding principles into a concrete statement of American expectations for Europe. In 1796, Washington would not have imagined issuing such a bold directive, but much had changed in nearly thirty years' time.[71]

Less than a week after declaring the noncolonization principle to Tuyll, Adams wrote new instructions to the U.S. minister to Great Britain, Richard Rush, explaining the new policy. "It is not imaginable," Adams wrote, "that, in the present condition of the world, *any* European nation should entertain the project of settling a *colony* on the Northwest Coast of America. That the United States should form establishments there, with views of absolute territorial right and inland communication, is not only to be expected, but is pointed out by the finger of nature, and has been for many years a subject of serious deliberation in Congress." The United States would expand westward, and Europe would not stand in the way. In Adams's new worldview, "the American continents, henceforth, will no longer be subjects of colonization. Occupied by civilized independent nations, they will be accessible to Europeans and to each other on that footing alone, and the Pacific Ocean in every part of it will remain open to the navigation of all nations, in like manner with the Atlantic."[72] The noncolonization principle, as it was expressed to Tuyll, Middleton, and Rush, represented a dramatic step forward for the United States in eliminating European influence in the Americas. U.S. statesmen had long believed that their country would eventually control the continent, but this declaration was the first occasion on which this belief was framed as a matter of principle, as a directive to the European powers to abstain from future colonization of the Americas. What made the noncolonization principle all the more surprising and daring, though, was that Adams presented it as pertaining to both American continents, as a mandate that Europe had an obligation to respect American independence in its entirety.[73]

In March 1823, four months before Adams's declaration to Tuyll, a French military intervention in Spain jeopardized Adams's vision of American continents free of European influence. A civil war had erupted in Spain in 1820 between royalists loyal to King Ferdinand VII and advocates of liberal reform. In November 1822, the Quadruple Alliance gathered at the Congress of Verona to endorse French intervention in Spain early the next year, although Britain refused to consent to intervention and did not attend. The decision of the other allies, all of whom also belonged to the Holy Alliance, to push forward over British objections opened an irreparable rift within the Quadruple Alliance.[74] Incensed by the allies' willingness to violate the territorial sovereignty of another country, Britain's foreign minister, George Canning, sent a dispatch to France on the eve of the invasion threatening war if that country should attempt to permanently occupy Spain,

extend its invasion into Portugal, or move to appropriate any of Spain's American colonies for itself.[75]

Canning did not believe that France would seek to permanently occupy Spain or Portugal, but he was distressed by the possibility of French intervention in Spanish America. Canning's concern was less ideological than it was economic, as he expected significant growth in an already profitable trade with Spanish America upon a formal recognition of independence. Britain had withheld recognition only from a desire to maintain good relations with Spain.[76] In his dispatch to France, Canning came to the same conclusions reached by the United States the previous year and argued that since the Spanish American colonies had "thrown off their allegiance to the Crown of Spain, time and the course of events appear to have substantially decided their separation from the Mother Country." The king of England disclaimed "in the most solemn manner any intention of appropriating to Himself the smallest portion of the late Spanish Possessions in America," and he hoped "that no attempt will be made by France, to bring under Her Dominion any of those Possessions, either by Conquest, or by Cession, from Spain."[77] Canning's dispatch, which was widely published throughout Europe and the United States, sent a clear message to the statesmen of the world that Great Britain stood opposed to European intervention in the New World.

The Monroe Doctrine

When France began its invasion of Spain in March 1823, Americans looked on with despairing interest as the forces of monarchy and aristocracy put down another European people striving for liberty. Before long, interest turned to apprehension and fear when rumors started to circulate that France would send its army on to Spanish America once it achieved victory in Spain. In August 1823, George Canning inaugurated a series of conversations with Richard Rush, the U.S. minister to Great Britain, on the potential French intervention in Spanish America. In the course of these conversations, Canning asked Rush what the United States government "would say to going hand in hand with his" in expressing a mutual opposition to intervention. Canning believed that "the simple fact of our being known to hold the same sentiment would, . . . by its moral effect, put down the intention on the part of France, admitting that she should ever entertain it."[78] Rush understood the significance of Canning's proposal—Great Britain's naval power on the side of Spanish America would surely deter intervention by France and the Holy Alliance—and immediately wrote to his government for guidance.[79]

A few days after suggesting a joint declaration, Canning presented Rush with a document outlining five points that would form its framework. As his first point, Canning acknowledged that Britain viewed "the recovery of the Colonies by Spain

to be hopeless." Second, Britain saw "the question of the Recognition of [the colonies], as Independent States, to be one of time and circumstances." However, Canning asserted as his third point that until circumstances dictated recognition, Britain would not "throw any impediment in the way of an arrangement between" Spanish America "and the mother country by amicable negotiation." Most significant for the United States were Canning's final two points, which declared that Britain did not aim to take "possession of any portion of [the colonies] ourselves" and that it "could not see any portion of them transferred to any other Power, with indifference."[80] Beyond the fact that the United States had already recognized Spanish American independence, Rush saw much common ground between the two countries. Given Adams's recently announced noncolonization principle, Rush felt that it was important to strengthen the language of Canning's final point. In Rush's revised framework, he asserted that the United States "would regard as highly unjust, and fruitful of disastrous consequences, any attempt on the part of any European power to take possession of [the former colonies] by conquest, or by cession; or on any ground or pretext whatever."[81] There could be no confusion about U.S. opposition to any efforts to extend European influence in the Americas. Reflecting many years later on his negotiations with Canning, Rush described it as a unique moment. "Seldom, perhaps, at any time among nations," Rush wrote, "had an opportunity occurred when so small an effort of two friendly governments might produce so unequivocal a good, and prevent such extensive calamities."[82]

The magnitude of this opportunity—and the potential negative consequences if it was lost—weighed on Rush's mind as his wait for instructions dragged into September and October 1823, especially once word reached Britain in September of France's victory over Spain. Canning repeatedly pressured Rush to agree to a joint declaration, but Rush could not overcome the fear of pledging his government in violation of its long-standing policy of noninvolvement "in the political connexions of Europe." Canning waved off such hesitations, arguing in mid-September that the question of allied intervention was "as much American as European. . . . It concerned the United States under interests as immediate and commanding, as it did or could any of the states of Europe."[83] In Canning's worldview, the distant spheres and interests of Europe and the Americas overlapped to a greater degree than Adams or Washington had contended, but Rush remained unconvinced and unwilling to act.

Considering all of the buildup and wrangling, it came as a great surprise to Rush when, in October, Canning suddenly ended all substantive discussions of a joint declaration. In a dispatch to Adams, Rush described the "termination of the discussion" as "sudden, not to say abrupt, considering how zealously as well as spontaneously it was started."[84] What Rush would not find out until weeks later was that the British foreign secretary had simply grown tired of waiting for an American response. As Canning later reflected to a biographer, "'Had Mr. Rush

felt himself authorized to have entertained any formal proposition, and to have decided upon it without reference to his Government, an eminently beneficial practical result,' might have been produced by the correspondence." But, given the delay while waiting for instructions, "the progress of events might have rendered any such proceedings nugatory." When "this plan of publishing our sentiments" failed, "it became advisable to have recourse to some other means of openly declaring them, for the purpose of thwarting the designs of France." Without the cooperation of the United States, Canning informed "the French Government, by a direct communication, that it could not prosecute its designs on Spanish America, except at the expence of a war" with Great Britain.[85] On 9 October 1823, Canning entered into discussions with the French minister to Great Britain, the Prince de Polignac, and together they produced the aptly titled Polignac Memorandum. In this Anglo-French version of a joint declaration, Britain reiterated its belief in Canning's five points and France pledged to not "appropriate to herself any part of the Spanish possessions in America." France also foreswore "any design of acting against the Colonies by force of arms."[86] The Polignac Memorandum brought the crisis of European intervention in Spanish America to an end.

The slow pace of transatlantic communications meant that Rush's initial dispatches from August outlining the proposed joint declaration and Canning's five points did not arrive in a largely deserted Washington, DC, until October. President Monroe was about to leave the city for his home in Louden County, Virginia, and Secretary of State Adams was already on his father's farm in Quincy, Massachusetts, when the dispatches reached the capital. Monroe was unprepared for what he read. Not only could an armed intervention in Spanish America begin at any moment (or so he believed), but his minister to Britain might have already committed the United States to a joint declaration and joint action to stop it. Unable to effectively communicate with Adams, Monroe sought advice from former presidents and fellow Virginians Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.

Monroe frequently sought out Jefferson's counsel when confronting difficult questions. Earlier that year Monroe had written to Jefferson out of a general uncertainty on America's place in the world. Monroe described the situation of the United States as "peculiarly critical, as respects the present state of the world, & our relations with the acting parties in it, in Europe, & in this hemisphere."[87] Jefferson, as if channeling Washington's Farewell Address, replied that the United States should not take part "in the quarrels of Europe. Their political interests are entirely distinct from ours. Their mutual jealousies, their balance of power, their complicated alliances, their forms and principles of government, are all foreign to us."[88] Such guidance had a stabilizing influence on Monroe's outlook, and he believed that Jefferson's perspective on Canning's proposals would be vital.

Consideration of the proposal for a joint declaration boiled down to three questions for Monroe, all of which related to America's long-standing principles of

foreign policy. First, Monroe asked Jefferson if the United States should "entangle ourselves, at all, in European politicks, & wars, on the side of any power, against others . . . ?" To do so would be contrary to Washington's Farewell Address but might be warranted in their particular situation. "If a case can exist," Monroe asked, "in which a sound maxim may, & ought to be departed from, is not the present instance, precisely that case?" Finally, Monroe wondered if the "epoch" had arrived "when G. Britain must take her stand, either on the side of the monarchs of Europe, or of the UStates, & in consequence, either in favor of Despotism or of liberty [?]" If this was that occasion, "may it not be presum'd that . . . her government has seiz'd on the present occurrence, as . . . the most suitable to announce & mark the commenc'ment of that career [?]" Monroe concluded that the United States "ought to meet the proposal" and declare that "we would view an interference on the part of the European powers, and especially an attack on the Colonies, by them, as an attack on ourselves."[89] Monroe recognized that, strictly speaking, agreeing to the joint declaration would be a violation of Washington's call for neutrality—not to mention Jefferson's "entangling alliances with none"—but suggested that such a departure was necessary in order to defend American interests and security.

Jefferson heartily endorsed Monroe's assessment. Jefferson agreed that the United States should never "entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe" or "suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs." Once again recalling the Farewell Address, he declared that "America, North and South, has a set of interests distinct from those of Europe, and peculiarly her own. She should therefore have a system of her own, separate and apart from that of Europe. While the last is laboring to become the domicil of despotism, our endeavor should surely be, to make our hemisphere that of freedom." Here, stated quite explicitly, the author of "entangling alliances with none" emphasized the concurrence of interests between the American continents and argued for an American sphere separate from Europe. In light of these considerations, Jefferson recommended that Monroe assent to the joint declaration; to join with Great Britain in this endeavor would be "to maintain our own principle, not to depart from it."[90] To Jefferson's way of thinking, the only negative consequence of agreeing to Canning's five points was that the United States would have to pledge itself against a future acquisition of the long-coveted island of Cuba, but Great Britain would likewise be pledged in return, permanently preventing a grave threat to American interests.[91]

Madison's assessment concurred with Monroe's and Jefferson's. He believed that the nation's consistent support of Spanish America's "liberties & independence" practically obligated the United States to join with Britain in issuing a warning against European intervention. Echoing Canning's original premise, Madison reasoned that while American cooperation "must ensure success, in the event of an appeal to force, it doubles the chance of success without that appeal."[92] A joint declaration with Britain was a small price to pay to ensure the continuation

of peaceful relations between Europe and the Americas. With this encouragement from Jefferson and Madison, Monroe returned to Washington, DC, in early November intending to instruct Rush to agree to a joint declaration with Canning.

Adams returned to Washington before Monroe and remained unaware of Rush's dispatches or Canning's proposal. His attention was occupied by another communication, from the Russian minister to the United States, Tuyll, that struck at the heart of American prestige and principle. Tuyll informed Adams that the tsar had derived great "satisfaction" from the declaration that, despite the United States' recognition of Spanish American independence, "it was not their intention to deviate from the neutrality which they had until then observed, in the contests between Spain and her American Colonies." The tsar hoped that the United States would "persevere in that course of neutrality." Interpreting Tuyll's statement as a not-too-subtle suggestion that the United States should remain uninvolved even in the event of allied intervention, Adams warned Tuyll that America's policy of neutrality "had been made under the observance of a like neutrality by all the European Powers," and issued his own not-so-subtle rejoinder that the United States would not sit idly by if Europe took action against Spanish America. If "one or more of the European powers should depart from their neutrality," Adams countered, "that change of circumstances would necessarily become a subject of further deliberation in this Government, the result of which it was not in my power to foretell."[93] The lag time in transatlantic communications was now troubling the United States on multiple fronts.

When Adams finally learned of Canning's proposal at the beginning of November, his recent dealings with Russia and a personal distrust of the British foreign secretary led him to take a very different view from Monroe's of the suggested joint declaration. Despite his recent exchange with Tuyll, Adams doubted the validity of the reports of imminent French intervention. "I no more believe that the Holy Allies will restore the Spanish dominion upon the American continent," Adams declared in one cabinet meeting, "than that the Chimborazo will sink beneath the ocean."[94] There was no reason for the United States to commit to a joint declaration with Great Britain or for Canning to have proposed one in the first place. Adams attributed more sinister motives to Canning than Monroe did, suggesting that Canning's real purpose was to "obtain some public pledge from the Government of the United States . . . against the acquisition . . . of any part of the Spanish-American possessions," especially Cuba. By joining with Great Britain, the United States would "give her a substantial and perhaps inconvenient pledge against ourselves, and really obtain nothing in return." Instead, the United States needed to be "free to act as emergencies may arise, and not tie ourselves down to any principle which might immediately afterwards be brought to bear against ourselves."[95]

Monroe and the rest of the cabinet were reluctant to accept Adams's interpretation of events until they learned that Canning had broken off talks with Rush.

Monroe saw the abrupt change of course as a sign that Canning "was less alarmed" and that "probably some inducements had been presented . . . to quiet his apprehensions," but for Adams it only justified his suspicions. This development was "confirmation that the alarm was affected" and that Canning's "object was to obtain by a sudden movement a premature commitment of the American Government against any . . . acquisition of [Cuba] by ourselves." When Rush did not acquiesce quickly enough, Canning "returned to the old standard of British belligerent policy."[96]

The convergence of recent foreign-policy developments presented Adams with an opening to reconceive Euro-American relations to meet new global realities and U.S. expectations. Adams argued that Canning's proposal and his own recent exchanges with Tuyll "afforded . . . a very suitable and convenient opportunity for us to take our stand against the Holy Alliance, and at the same time to decline the overture of Great Britain." The United States could "avow our principles explicitly" and it would be "more candid, as well as more dignified" to take independent action rather than "come in as a cock-boat in the wake of the British man-of-war." This was the moment for the United States to announce to the world its principles of foreign policy as they had evolved in recent years. Adams recommended bringing replies to Tuyll and Canning, diplomatic instructions to various foreign ministers, and the noncolonization principle together as "parts of a combined system of policy."[97] This "system" would eventually become known as the Monroe Doctrine.[98]

Adams only grew more convinced of the necessity of this approach when Tuyll presented him with another communication from the Russian government espousing the principles of the Holy Alliance. Adams described this new declaration as "an exposition of principles . . . in a tone of passionate exultation" in response to "the impending success of the French army in Spain; an 'Io Triumphe' over the fallen cause of revolution; with sturdy promises of determination to keep it down."[99] Here, in a few brief lines, was the stark contrast between despotic Europe and independent America, between monarchy and republicanism, between the Old World and the New. Adams believed that a reply to this statement should be the cornerstone of his system of policy. "In a moderate and conciliatory manner, but with a firm and determined spirit," Adams wanted to "declare our dissent from the principles avowed in those communications; to assert those upon which our own Government is founded." The United States disclaimed "all intention of attempting to propagate [their principles] by force," and continued to maintain that they would not interfere "with the political affairs of Europe." In the new state of the world, though, it was America's "expectation and hope that the European powers will equally abstain from the attempt to spread their principles in the American hemisphere, or to subjugate by force any part of these continents to their will."[100] In a brief passage of his own, here was Adams's fully evolved system of policy.

This was Adams's earlier idea of separate European and American spheres taken to its logical end. This doctrine of two spheres was a forceful restatement

and expansion of the principles of Washington's Farewell Address. The challenges to American interests had morphed in ways Washington could not have predicted in 1796, and the defense of those interests required a bolder approach. Where Washington had cautioned Americans to be wary of Europe influence being exercised in the United States, Adams extended this into a warning to Europe not to exert that influence in the first place. The United States could remain neutral, but it now demanded the same neutrality from Europe.[101]

Despite the strength of Adams's convictions, the rest of the administration was hesitant to frame the U.S. responses to Russia and Great Britain as a declaration of American principles. They were especially reticent about making bold statements that could lead the United States into war if the allies disregarded them.[102] Adams had no such concerns. He agreed with Jefferson that the United States and Britain shared a common interest in preventing European interference in Spanish America. Rather than seeing this shared interest as justification for coordinated action, though, Adams argued that it actually made it easier for the United States to take an independent, principled course. If Great Britain, the world's strongest naval power, opposed a transatlantic assault on Spanish America, then it would not happen; Rush signing his name next to Canning's gained nothing for the United States but an "inconvenient pledge against ourselves." Adams urged the United States to use this opportunity to assert American principles, secure in the knowledge that the country would not have to militarily defend them. Monroe ultimately acceded to Adams's view, but insisted that he use a moderate tone in his dealings with foreign ministers.

Adams put his new system of policy into motion on 27 November with a formal reply to Russia's most recent communication. Adams informed Tuyll that "the sphere of [European] operations was not intended to embrace the United States of America, nor any portion of the American Hemisphere." Adams further warned "that the United States of America . . . could not see with indifference, the forcible interposition of any European Power, other than Spain, either to restore the dominion of Spain over her emancipated Colonies in America, or to establish Monarchical Governments in those Countries." The United States would also object to the transfer of "any of the possessions heretofore or yet subject to Spain in the American Hemisphere, to any other European Power."[103] This was both an explicit enunciation of the doctrine of two spheres and a restatement of the noncolonization principle. Two days later, Adams sent instructions to Rush officially rejecting the joint declaration. In doing so, Adams linked the interests of the United States to the stability of Latin America. "American affairs," he argued, "whether of the Northern or of the Southern Continent, *can,* henceforth, not be excluded from the interference of the United States. All questions of policy relating to them, have a bearing so direct upon the rights and interests of the United States themselves, that they cannot be left at the disposal of European Powers,

animated and directed, exclusively, by European principles and interests."[104] The U.S. sphere now included Latin America, which would no longer be connected to the European sphere. American interests, broadly defined, would now govern the American continents.

The final and most public portion of Adams's new system of policy was issued to the world on 2 December 1823 as part of James Monroe's seventh annual message to Congress. Early in the message, in discussing American foreign relations during the preceding year, Monroe reiterated Adams's noncolonization principle. Adopting the language Adams had used in his diary almost verbatim, the president announced that "the occasion has been judged proper for asserting, as a principle in which the rights and interests of the United States are involved, that the American continents, by the free and independent condition which they have assumed and maintain, are henceforth not to be considered as subjects for future colonization by any European powers."[105] Later in the address, Monroe brought the various elements of the doctrine of two spheres together in its fullest exposition. The principle had evolved in recent years and was now being asserted as an integral part of American foreign policy. "In the wars of the European powers in matters relating to themselves," Monroe began, "we have never taken any part, nor does it comport with our policy to do so. It is only when our rights are invaded or seriously menaced that we resent injuries or make preparation for our defense." Henceforth, the situation with regard to "the movements in this hemisphere" to which the United States was "immediately connected" would be treated as fundamentally different.[106]

With this foundation in place, Monroe offered a vision of American principles and expectations unparalleled in the young nation's history. "We owe it to candor and to the amicable relations existing between the United States and [the European powers]," he stated, "to declare that we should consider any attempt on their part to extend their system to any portion of this hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety." Monroe was careful to point out that "with the existing colonies or dependencies of any European power we have not interfered and shall not interfere." Canada excepted, these dependencies now occupied but little space on the American continents; colonies had been replaced with "governments who have declared their independence and maintained it, and whose independence we have, on great consideration and on just principles, acknowledged." Given this reality, the United States "could not view any interposition for the purpose of oppressing them, or controlling in any other manner their destiny, by any European power in any other light than as the manifestation of an unfriendly disposition toward the United States." A threat to any independent state in the American sphere would be treated as a threat to the United States themselves. The United States would remain neutral "in the war between those new Governments and Spain" so long as "no change shall occur which . . . shall make a corresponding change on the part of the United States

indispensable to their security."[107] The warning contained in Monroe's message was clear: Europe was to abstain from all future involvement in American affairs, and if it failed to do so it would be met with resistance by the United States. What form this resistance would take was left unstated.[108]

Taken as a whole, the Monroe Doctrine was a careful reformulation and recapitulation of the principles handed down by Washington in his Farewell Address and developed by Adams as secretary of state. The United States still clung to the neutrality Washington had worked so hard to cultivate, and the government continued to believe in the wisdom of remaining uninvolved in European affairs. In both the noncolonization principle and the doctrine of two spheres, Adams converted Washington's moderate cautions to Americans themselves into a warning to European rulers to pursue their own policy of neutrality toward the Americas. Washington had not known what the future would hold and had thus cautioned Americans that the best means of protecting the nation's interests would change over time. With his new system of policy, Adams expanded the Farewell Address's principles in a way that he believed was conformable to Washington's expectations and advice. Adams had not been swayed by the rigid isolationism of "entangling alliances with none"; nor did he advocate the abandonment of America's long-standing neutrality. Instead, he argued that the United States shared greater common interests with Latin America than it ever had with Europe and that it needed to reframe its foreign policy accordingly. The Farewell Address remained the guiding statement of America's foreign policy maxims; it just needed to be understood in a nineteenth-century context.

4

America's Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy and the Panama Congress of 1826

On 6 December 1825, John Quincy Adams delivered his first annual message to Congress as president of the United States. Adams was a divisive figure in Washington, DC, and throughout the nation because of the alleged "corrupt bargain" with Henry Clay that propelled him into office. The supporters of Adams's chief rival, General Andrew Jackson, still harbored ill will for the man they saw as having stolen the presidency. The vagaries of the government's calendar meant that the first annual message, despite coming nine months after inauguration day, was Adams's first real opportunity to move the nation past the bad feelings and to begin the work of governing. Adams had much work he wanted to accomplish. As historian Lynn Hudson Parsons explained, the president believed that "the time had come for Americans to embark on a bold course of action that would prove to the rest of the world that liberty and power were no longer in opposition. . . . The Annual Message was a great opportunity, perhaps his only opportunity, to persuade, to inspire, and to move the nation forward to new ground rather than to restate and reinforce the 'prevailing doctrine.'"[1] Boldness in action and principle had defined Adams's tenure as secretary of state, and he was not going to retreat to moderation as president.

Adams laid out an aggressive and unexpected agenda in his first annual message. Historians have described it as "the most amazing annual message of the antebellum era," a call "for the use of federal power in almost every area of American life," and "a bold, courageous, and statesmanlike assertion of the government's responsibility to assist the advancement of the nation's intellectual and economic well-being." Not all Americans viewed the message through such a positive lens, however. The message presented a program that "horrified states' rights advocates," who saw it as "one gigantic grab for power." Worst of all, it revealed Adams to be "closer to the Hamilton than to the Jeffersonian principles of government."[2] Despite the far-reaching implications of Adams's message for his domestic policy, it was Adams's discussion of the United States' evolving relationship with the "independent South American States"

that generated the most sustained national attention. "Among the measures which have been suggested to [the Latin American countries] by the new relations with one another, resulting from the recent changes in their condition," Adams stated, "is that of assembling at the Isthmus of Panama a congress, at which each of them should be represented." The goal of the congress was "to deliberate upon objects important to the welfare of all." Colombia, Mexico, and Central America had "already deputed plenipotentiaries to such a meeting, and they have invited the United States to be also represented there by their ministers." The Adams administration had accepted this invitation, "and ministers on the part of the United States will be commissioned to attend at those deliberations." Adams assured Congress that the United States would participate only "so far as may be compatible with that neutrality from which it is neither our intention nor the desire of the other American States that we should depart," but he provided no additional details or explanations of what issues would be discussed or what the United States hoped to achieve. Adams also failed to explain how the United States could participate in a congress of nations, some of whom were still at war with Spain, without violating U.S. neutrality.[3]

The Congress of Panama quickly became a nightmare for the administration and its supporters. In the estimation of one historian, the debate surrounding the mission was "one of the severest parliamentary battles in [Congress's] history."[4] The debate was also the first extended deliberation on the meaning of America's principles of foreign policy in the wake of the Monroe Doctrine. Most importantly, the question that had bubbled under the surface from the moment Thomas Jefferson had promised "entangling alliances with none" now dominated a highly principled and highly partisan debate: what did Washington's Farewell Address mean? Adams saw the Panama Congress as both a venue at which to clarify and reinforce America's continued adherence to Washington's recently expanded principles and an opportunity to have those principles adopted internationally. Adams's opponents, taking an entirely different view of American principles, interpreted U.S. involvement in the Panama Congress as an abandonment of Washington's sacred maxims rather than a defense of them. The debate over Panama enabled the U.S. Congress to sit in judgment of John Quincy Adams's foreign policy as well as to define the salient legacies of Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. The debate's outcomes would shape the direction of American foreign policy for the next quarter-century.

Reactions to the Monroe Doctrine

Upon its publication in December 1823, the American press greeted President James Monroe's annual message to Congress, in which he outlined the noncolonization principle and doctrine of two spheres, with almost universal acclaim.

The *New York Evening Post* applauded the message for "its wisdom as well as its spirit."[5] The *Boston Gazette* praised both Monroe, for speaking "the language of a patriot, statesman, and philanthropist," and the message itself, whose "impulse will be felt by every worthy American who shall read it."[6] The *National Gazette* of Philadelphia predicted that the Monroe Doctrine would be "hailed by the *liberal* politicians of Europe as shedding from an exalted spring of light principles and lessons not only just and appropriate . . . but general and inspiring and luminous for civilized society in general. . . . Such language will serve to apprise the Allies that we are alive, *feelingly* alive, to their probable designs on this hemisphere here, and that they would experience from this republic, a kind of resistance very different from that which the French met in Spain."[7] The *Richmond Enquirer* anticipated that the "conclusion of the Message [the doctrine of two spheres] will rivet every one's attention. The policy chalked out towards South America breathes a generous and lofty spirit, which is worthy of the Chief Magistrate of the nation."[8] These newspaper editors heartily endorsed Monroe's stand against Europe in defense of American interests writ large.

These positive responses were especially understandable given that many were accompanied by intelligence of imminent intervention in Latin America by the Holy Alliance. The day before Monroe delivered his message, the *Daily National Intelligencer* of Washington, DC, published a report that the "opinion seems to be gaining ground that France, Spain, and Portugal, have it in contemplation to restore the American colonies of the two latter to the *legitimate* sway of their respective mother countries. Transports, it is said, were preparing at Lisbon, to carry troops to Brazil, and Governors have been appointed for Maranham and Para."[9] The editors of the *Richmond Enquirer* argued that the "strong language" of Monroe's message "induces us to believe, that the President is actuated to use it, at this time, by some extraordinary information which he has received."[10] Monroe had been willing to go along with Adams's new system of policy because he believed in a diminished likelihood of intervention, but the boldness of the message convinced many Americans that the risk of intervention by the Holy Alliance had increased.

Most private citizens had a similarly positive view of the Monroe Doctrine. William Plumer, a former U.S. senator and New Hampshire governor, described Monroe's message as "the best communication he has ever made to Congress. The sentiments are manly and independent. As an individual, I am proud of such language from the Chief Magistrate of the nation to the Legislature."[11] Hezekiah Prince of Maine confided in his private journal that Monroe's message was a "paper of much interest. . . . [E]very true-born American" supported the assertion "that any interference of the Holy Alliance with the concerns of the Mexican and South American governments . . . , or any attempts of the powers of Europe to establish the Spanish authority over those countries would be considered as hostile to the peace and happiness of this government and would be resisted as

such."[12] Even Henry Clay, the Monroe administration's main antagonist on Spanish American affairs, conceded that "the part [of Monroe's address] relating to foreign affairs was . . . the best part of the message."[13]

Clay so approved of the Monroe Doctrine that in January 1824 he introduced a resolution in Congress to give official sanction to its principles. The resolution declared "that the people of these States could not see, without serious inquietude, any forcible interposition by the Allied powers of Europe, in behalf of Spain, to reduce to their former subjection those parts of the Continent of America which have proclaimed and established for themselves, respectively, Independent Governments, and which have been solemnly recognized by the U. States."[14] Despite the popularity of Monroe's message, Clay's resolution was never brought to a vote.[15] The initial popularity of the Monroe Doctrine comes as no surprise. As historian Albert Bushnell Hart wrote, it "was bound to be popular because it not only paid a pleasing tribute to the enlightenment of Americans, but because it expressed a national sense of importance in the new western world."[16] The doctrine confirmed for most Americans their belief that the United States held a critical place in the world.

Support for the Monroe Doctrine was widespread, but it was not universal. In a pamphlet pertaining to the upcoming presidential election in 1824, pseudonymous writer "Philo-Jackson" announced that he "opposed . . . the sanction and guarantee that was made by our government" in Monroe's message. His opposition stemmed from "the recommendation of our immortal Washington, that we should form entangling alliances with no nation." Philo-Jackson feared that if the Holy Alliance intervened in Spanish America, the only logical step the United States could take in light of the Monroe Doctrine would be to depart "from the counsels of our great political father" and to "form an alliance with our ancient enemy, Great Britain."[17] Rather than being a bold stand in the face of European action, the doctrine was, in Philo-Jackson's view, a foolish departure from Washington's wise advice.

The hesitancy of Congress to give official sanction to the principles of the Monroe Doctrine by endorsing Clay's resolution makes sense in light of global developments in the early months of 1824. By that time, the threat of intervention had almost entirely dissipated. With an international crisis no longer looming, some Americans began to question the doctrine's long-term utility and wisdom. Representative Lewis Williams of North Carolina wrote to his constituents that it would only be with "extreme reluctance" that "I should see the United States engage in any contest not immediately and essentially connected with the defence of our own soil. The first duty of a nation is to itself, and upon this principle we should avoid all foreign collisions."[18] In response to the announcement "to the world that we would protect South America or espouse her quarrel under all circumstances of interference by Europeans to prevent the establishment of liberty in that part of our hemisphere," North Carolina Representative John Long

Jr. deemed it his duty "to oppose every movement or inclination which might deprive us of the high stand of just and moderate neutrality." Long did not believe that the American people "would be willing to bear the sufferings and calamities of another war, for any thing short of the actual defence of their rights and liberties. It is our duty, then, to make no gratuitous pledges; to menace other nations with no threat of interference. Let us be watchful to preserve ourselves."[19]

Representative John W. Taylor of New York expressed this evolving reaction against the doctrine most clearly when he urged his constituents to remember that "it is essential that our national motto should be verified to the people of all climes and religions. 'Justice to all nations and entangling alliances with none,' must be faithfully observed."[20] In May 1824, Henry Clay readily acknowledged that in the current state of world affairs, with the Holy Alliance having determined not to intervene in Latin America, it was better to leave his resolution on the table. "To pass the resolution, after all that has occurred," Clay announced in Congress, "in the absence of any sufficient evidence of [the Holy Alliance] cherishing inimical designs on this continent—might be construed by them as unfriendly, if not offensive. . . . [I] should continue to abstain from pressing upon the attention of the House, this resolution; and should allow it to sleep where it now reposes."[21] With Clay's resolution remaining on the table, Congress never formally sanctioned the Monroe Doctrine.

This sea change of opinion on the Doctrine in the space of just a few months demonstrates how seriously Americans had taken the threat of intervention. Bold declarations were welcome when they were seen as defending American interests against imminent danger, but once that danger had passed and calmer heads prevailed, the long-standing attachment to traditional principles, and especially to the Jeffersonian reconceptualization of Washington's Farewell Address, once again took hold. For most Americans, the existence of free nations in the western hemisphere did not change the relationship of the United States with the rest of the world. The reaction against the Monroe Doctrine also made clear that most Americans understood foreign policy in a fundamentally different way than did John Quincy Adams. While Adams intended his new system of policy as a bold statement of American principles and as an expansion of the Farewell Address to meet new challenges, most people saw the new policy as a strong response to a specific crisis that threatened to undermine the nation's adherence to Washington's precepts in the future. This disagreement over the proper interpretation of American principles portended future conflicts over the meanings of the Monroe Doctrine and the Farewell Address, and over the relationship the United States was to have with the rest of the world.

One of the great ironies of the Monroe Doctrine was that the portion of the world to which it was directed—Europe—took the least notice of it. The occasional European editorial questioned what right the United States had to instruct

European powers on how they would treat the Americas, but even this interest was short-lived.[22] Europe's refusal to take seriously the Monroe Doctrine—and, indeed, the United States—was facilitated by George Canning, the British foreign secretary, who had a special concern for the effects of Monroe's declarations on Britain's relationship with the Holy Allies and with Latin America. Canning convinced Richard Rush to keep their negotiations over a joint declaration secret, and when news of the Doctrine reached Europe, Canning immediately published the Polignac Memorandum in an attempt to reframe the story. In Canning's version of events, Monroe and the United States, far from having boldly confronted the Holy Alliance, had merely "'assisted' [Canning] in safeguarding Latin America"; it was Great Britain that had held France in check.[23] Canning once again deflected attention away from the United States in early 1825, when Great Britain officially recognized the independence of Mexico, Colombia, and Rio de la Plata. "Contemplating Spain, such as our ancestors had known her," Canning asserted, "I resolved that if France had Spain, it should not be Spain '*with the Indies.*' I called the New World into existence, to redress the balance of the Old."[24] The United States' earlier recognition of Spanish American independence was irrelevant. For Canning and the rest of Europe, the actions and pronouncements of the United States were easily ignored.

Despite European dismissiveness, some American statesmen defended the ongoing benefits of the Monroe Doctrine. For example, Henry Clay, as secretary of state, regularly asserted that Monroe's message "had a powerful effect in disconcerting and arresting [allied] progress" toward intervention in Spanish America.[25] This assertion was demonstrably untrue: the Polignac Memorandum had a far greater impact on the Holy Alliance than the Monroe Doctrine ever could, but this was neither the first nor the last time Americans would overstate their influence on global affairs. In this sense, Canning was correct to rate his own efforts more highly than those of the United States in safeguarding Spanish America. The most direct impact of the Monroe Doctrine on Euro-American relations was on planned tripartite negotiations between the United States, Great Britain, and Russia over the northwest coast of North America. When Canning received the Monroe Doctrine, he notified Rush that he would "decline joining [the United States] in the negotiation with Russia," since he was reluctant to bring the noncolonization principle "into discussion at present, as England must necessarily object to it."[26] Russia, on the other hand, gave so little notice to the Monroe Doctrine that it very willingly and amicably negotiated the Russo-American Treaty of 1824 to settle the northwest coast controversy.[27]

Unlike Europe, the recently independent countries of Latin America took an active interest in the Monroe Doctrine. By the end of James Monroe's presidency, the United States had officially recognized five former Spanish colonies and the former Portuguese colony of Brazil as independent countries. Reaction to the Monroe Doctrine in each of these countries was mixed. Conservative factions,

which were usually in the minority and distrusted both republicanism and U.S. motives, similarly distrusted the Monroe Doctrine. The more liberal elements, however, greeted the Doctrine with greater enthusiasm. Brazil and Colombia, for example, officially endorsed its tenets, while the government of the United Provinces of Rio de la Plata praised the United States for having "'made an appeal to our national honor by supposing us capable of contending single-handed with Spain.'" More tellingly, that government further hailed the U.S. for having "'constituted itself the guardian of the field of battle in order to prevent any foreign assistance from being introduced to the aid of our rival.'"[28] This was the primary reason why most Latin American governments applauded the Monroe Doctrine: despite Monroe's explicit declaration of neutrality in the ongoing conflicts between mother country and (former) colony, the Latin American governments interpreted the Monroe Doctrine as a pledge by the United States to keep Europe out of the Americas, if not to defend their independence outright.

James Monroe and John Quincy Adams were pleased with the positive reception of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, but they were unprepared for how this approval manifested itself. In the three years after Monroe first stated the Doctrine, Latin American governments made five separate proposals under the Doctrine's auspices looking for a concrete commitment—often in the form of an alliance—from the United States. The first proposal was informally made in 1824 to the U.S. minister to Chile, Heman Allen, when it was revealed that the Chilean minister to the United States "intended to propose an alliance with [the U.S.], to oppose any attempt upon the rights of either, by foreign powers."[29] In July, the Colombian minister expressed a similar hope to Secretary of State Adams. "Colombia is resolved to defend at every hazard its independence and liberty against every foreign influence and power," the minister announced, but his government "has seen with the greatest pleasure the Message of the President . . . that the Government of the United-States endeavours to oppose the policy and ultimate views of the Holy Alliance." Colombia's government wanted to know "in what manner the Government of the United States intends to resist on its part any interference of the Holy Alliance for the purpose of subjugating the new Republics or interfering in their political forms." The minister also wondered if the United States would "enter into a Treaty of Alliance with the Republic of Colombia to save America in general from the calamities of a despotic system [?]"[30] The free nations of Latin America were calling on the United States to exert the same moral force as George Canning had previously, and to back it up with military alliances.

The United States had paid considerably less attention to Brazil during the intervention crisis, but in January 1825, fearing a potential war with Portugal, the Brazilian minister approached Adams to inquire what the United States would do should Portugal "take possession of any point in" Brazil? Would the president "declare himself allied with the Government of Brazil in an offensive and deffensive

alliance, marching with his pourful means to the camp of Battle and help to extricate the intruders . . . ?"[31] Mexico and Rio de la Plata made similar proposals in 1825 and 1826, respectively.[32] Latin America's leaders had read Monroe's message and took the president at his word that the United States intended to defend the independence of the American sphere. They saw new alliances as the logical outcome of this pledge and as the most effective means of achieving their ends.

Contrary to Latin America's expectations, however, the United States still defined alliances as a dangerous violation of George Washington's principle of neutrality. Days after receiving the Colombian dispatch in July 1824, Adams noted in his diary the cabinet's determination that Colombia must "maintain its own independence." The Monroe administration hoped "that France and the Holy Allies will not resort to force against [Colombia]," but if they did, "the power to determine resistance is in Congress."[33] In his official reply to the Colombian minister, Adams carefully noted that "the Sentiments of the President remain as they were expressed in his last annual message to Congress," but the "ultimate decision of this question belongs to the Legislative Department of the Government." Congressional approval was not the only limitation on U.S. action, though, as under "a deliberate and concerted system of the allied Powers to exercise force against the freedom and Independence of your Republic; . . . the United States could not undertake resistance to them by force of Arms, without a previous understanding with those European Powers [Great Britain], whose Interests and whose principles would secure from them an active and efficient co-operation in the cause."[34] The United States on its own was not powerful enough to ward off intervention. If the allies did act, the United States would await legislative approval and British assistance before committing itself to Colombia's defense. This was not a rejection of the Monroe Doctrine, but these caveats rendered it a far less grand proclamation.

With the inauguration of Adams as president in March 1825, it was left to the new secretary of state, Henry Clay, to respond to the remaining proposals. Clay affirmed to the Brazilian chargé d'affaires that President Adams "adheres to the principles of his predecessor," but cautioned that "there does not appear, at present, any likelihood of Portugal being able to draw to her aid other powers to assist her in resubjugating the Brazils," and, as a result, "there would not seem to be any occasion for a Convention founded upon that improbable contingency." Clay further asserted that any formal alliance with Brazil "would be inconsistent with the policy which the United-States have heretofore prescribed to themselves."[35] Regardless of what Monroe seemed to be announcing in his Doctrine, the United States was not going to depart from its traditional principles by forming permanent or preemptive alliances with Latin America. If Europe intervened, the United States would consider action, but not until that point.

The Latin American response to the Monroe Doctrine highlighted two salient but little considered points. First, for as much as both the noncolonization principle

and the doctrine of two spheres bore on the new Latin American countries, little thought had been given by Adams or Monroe as to how they would be received or interpreted there. Adams's efforts and the cabinet debates had been focused on altering Europe's approach to the Americas; they did not signify a departure from America's fundamental principles of foreign policy. Adams had partially justified his bold new system of policy on the grounds that the Holy Alliance would not intervene, and thus the United States would not have to back its declarations by force. The possibility that Latin America might call upon the United States to put weight behind the Monroe Doctrine had not entered into Adams's calculations.

The second salient point was that the world might have been too quick to bring the noncolonization principle and doctrine of two spheres together as a single Doctrine. In her excellent study of the use of the Monroe Doctrine in popular fiction to advance narratives of U.S. empire throughout the nineteenth century, Gretchen Murphy made the straightforward but vitally important observation that "the two portions [of the Monroe Doctrine] are not linked by any reference made by Monroe either inside or outside of the document. . . . Connections between the two passages were made only in later interpretive processes that perceived in Monroe's Message a broad statement of foreign policy."[36] Their separate enunciation in time (the noncolonization principle was announced in July, and the doctrine of two spheres in December) and their separation in the document itself strongly suggested that the two ideas were intended as distinct parts of John Quincy Adams's foreign policy. The inclusion of the noncolonization principle in Monroe's annual message may have suggested a connection to the doctrine of two spheres and Adams's new system of policy, but in the other diplomatic instructions and messages delivered as part of this system, Adams only expounded the doctrine of two spheres. Both principles sought to widen the separation between Europe and the Americas, but they accomplished this end in dramatically different ways and Adams conceived of them as distinct principles.

There is one final consideration revealed by the global reactions to the Monroe Doctrine: perhaps John Quincy Adams was too smart for his own good. For Adams, the noncolonization principle was five months old when Monroe introduced it in his annual message to Congress. Adams also knew that there existed virtually no chance of Allied intervention in Latin America. These pieces of information were in the hands of only a small number of people. For most Americans, the principles Monroe introduced were not grounded in a Washingtonian past but were entirely new and bore directly on what they assumed was an impending European intervention in the Americas. The possibility of U.S. military action—a possibility largely baseless to Adams—was a primary concern for the rest of the Western Hemisphere. Adams had also focused so intently on Europe that he neglected to realize that Latin American leaders—for whom the threat of intervention, or at least protracted warfare, was all too real—would take his words seriously. These

statesmen saw the Monroe Doctrine as a pledge of military support, and by mid-1824, many in the United States understood it the same way. Viewed in this light, the Monroe Doctrine was not a logical extrapolation of Washington's Farewell Address; rather, it directly contradicted that immortal document by calling for military alliances and direct U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of other countries. Adams understood exactly what he did and what he meant, but he did not count on the rest of the world having a contradictory interpretation.

President John Quincy Adams

Timing and circumstance both blessed and cursed Adams's career. Adams began and ended his term as a United States senator by supporting the Louisiana Purchase and Jefferson's embargo. His stance on those issues alienated him from the Federalists that elected him, but also earned him the respect of Secretary of State James Madison. When Madison became president he returned Adams to the diplomatic service in Russia, at Ghent, and in Great Britain. The convergence of global events at the end of 1823 allowed Adams to forcefully assert America's foreign-policy principles to the world, but by 1825 his association with those very principles seemed to doom his presidency to failure almost before it began. Adams also had the misfortune to run for president just as the nonpartisan Era of Good Feelings came to an end and the second party system began to take shape.[37]

By 1824, no political party had emerged to replace the Federalists, and with no sitting president running for reelection, five men put themselves forward to succeed Monroe: the secretary of state, John Quincy Adams; the secretary of war, John C. Calhoun; the Speaker of the House, Henry Clay; the secretary of the Treasury, William H. Crawford; and General Andrew Jackson. Calhoun backed out of the crowded field to focus on securing the vice presidency, leaving four candidates with largely regional support and a deadlocked Electoral College. Speaker Clay, whose fourth-place finish eliminated him from the contest, threw his support and thus the presidency to Adams. Despite their previous antagonism over Spanish America, Adams was the only logical candidate for Clay to support. Crawford had suffered a stroke, and Jackson was unfit to be president in Clay's estimation; this left Adams. When Clay was soon after appointed by Adams to serve as secretary of state, the supporters of Jackson and Crawford suspected a "corrupt bargain" to steal the election. Over the next four years, the losing factions lined up behind Jackson as the man most likely to defeat Adams in 1828 and made it their object to oppose Adams's administration in any way they could. The early steps in the formation of this Democratic Party around Jackson became a defining element of Adams's presidency, and helps to explain the strength of the negative reaction to his first annual message to Congress.[38]

Having spent so much of his career as a diplomat and statesman, it was natural that Adams's agenda as president placed a priority on foreign-policy concerns. Especially in the early years of his presidency, Adams placed great importance on navigating a new relationship with the independent nations of Latin America and regarded participation in the Congress of Panama as an integral part of this process. Secretary of State Clay put the congress on the president's radar in April 1825, after the Colombian and Mexican ministers extended informal invitations for the United States to participate. The idea of forming a Latin American, or pan-American, organization had reached Adams as early as May 1820, and at that time he reflected in his diary that the Latin Americans "were jealous of the European alliance. . . . They were desirous of combining an American system to embrace the whole hemisphere in opposition to that of Europe."[39] Over time, their desire for such a system only grew. The main architect of this pan-American movement was Simón Bolivar, the man widely recognized as the pivotal figure in the success of the Spanish American revolutions.[40] Clay, while still Speaker of the House, described Bolivar as "the Washington of South America."[41] Bolivar recognized that the former Spanish colonies shared common interests and common challenges that could best be met through collective negotiation and action. A pan-American system not only would provide easier defense against future attacks by Spain or other foreign powers, but also would facilitate the maintenance of peace between the nations of Latin America.

Bolivar's original conception of the congress did not include the United States, and when he issued a circular letter inviting nations to Panama in December 1824, it was not sent to Washington, DC.[42] The other Latin American nations did not share Bolivar's vision for the congress, however, and three countries extended informal invitations to the United States to attend the congress by mid-1825. Adams initially hesitated to involve the United States in this international meeting, but after multiple cabinet discussions and several weeks of prodding by Clay he relented.[43] Adams stipulated that the United States would not depart from its long-standing neutrality, participate in negotiations of a belligerent nature, or commit itself to anything without the sanction of its own Congress, but would otherwise fully take part in the proceedings. Three weeks later, Adams offered the mission to the U.S. minister to Colombia, Richard C. Anderson of Kentucky, who readily accepted.[44] In November, Adams and Clay made the decision to send a second delegate to Panama, and offered the post to Albert Gallatin, an elder statesman and accomplished diplomat. When Gallatin declined, Clay gave the second spot to John Sergeant, a former congressman from Pennsylvania, with William Rochester, a former congressman from New York, named secretary.[45]

By the end of November, Adams was ready to announce the American mission to the Panama Congress in his first annual message. At no point did Adams give serious thought to the possibility that Congress would object to the mission. After

all, Anderson and Sergeant could not commit the United States to anything without congressional approval, and they would be given specific instructions not to engage in any discussions of a belligerent or nonneutral nature. The mission was little more than a sign of friendship, a show of good faith by the United States to its new neighbors in the south. As a result, the United States had little to lose but potentially much to gain. Adams consented to U.S. participation for this reason, and he was entirely unprepared for Congress's reaction.

The American press was not sure what to make of U.S. involvement in the Panama Congress. Newspapers had been printing stories about the congress throughout 1825 and were not surprised that the United States would send a delegation, but Adams's lack of specific details on U.S. objectives opened the door to competing interpretations of the president's motives.[46] The *Richmond Enquirer,* which would become a leading paper supporting Andrew Jackson, objected to U.S. participation two months before Adams announced the mission, declaring, "it is not the interest of our own country . . . to dispatch ministers to the Congress." The *Enquirer* repeated these sentiments in its coverage of Adams's message.[47] The *Daily National Intelligencer* of Washington, DC, expressed relief that participation was "to be done under instructions to [the ministers] to act as counsellors only, and with a perfect understanding, between this and other governments, that no deviation is expected of the United States from that strict neutrality which it has heretofore declared and maintained between the present belligerents." The paper's editors were especially grateful "that the idea of *alliance* between the United States and those powers is wholly out of question."[48] These two papers were among the Adams administration's biggest critics and supporters, respectively. The *Boston Courier* understood the administration's interest in the mission but complained that the "specific object such a measure is intended to produce, or what indirect benefit is to be expected from it, we are not informed."[49] Adams's ambiguity made it possible for his friends and enemies to question his plan and to fill in details and motives as they saw fit.

Members of Congress and the press repeatedly questioned if participation in the Congress of Panama would be a violation of U.S. neutrality. Adams insisted in his annual message that such a departure from traditional policy was neither intended by him nor expected by the governments that extended invitations, but since Adams offered no explanation of America's role at the congress, many found it difficult to understand how neutrality could be preserved. Insight into Adams's decision to have the United States attend as a neutral nation can be gained from two messages to the House of Representatives that the president drafted but never sent. In the first, Adams revealed that "the decisive inducement to me, to accept the invitation, was to meet in the spirit of kindness and friendship, an overture of kindness and friendship from three Sister Republics of this Hemisphere." As Adams had repeatedly explained, he qualified his agreement to attend with "an ex-

plicit avowal on our part . . . that the United States should take no part in measures at the Congress which should import a departure from the neutrality which they were determined to maintain."[50] Expanding on these points in a second message, Adams noted that even if the subjects for deliberation had been of less immediate interest to the United States, he still would have accepted the invitation "if for no other reason than because it had been given. . . . The invitation was to a meeting of consultation, between ministers of the American nations to deliberate upon objects of deep and common interest to them all."[51] There was no reason to shy away from open discussion of issues of genuine common interest between the United States and Latin America. The new countries of that region were still struggling to chart their own course in the world, and the Congress of Panama represented an ideal opportunity not only to foster international friendship and cooperation, but also to guide the nations of Latin America toward principles and policies that would serve both U.S. interests and the long-term interests of the American sphere.

Adams's first concrete expression of what might be achieved at Panama was delivered to Congress at the end of December, when he formally nominated Anderson, Sergeant, and Rochester to represent the United States there. Adams began by once again reiterating his intention to maintain U.S. neutrality, stating that "the motive of their attendance is neither to contract alliances nor to engage in any undertaking or project importing hostility to any other nation." Within this context, Adams urged that the principles of "a liberal commercial intercourse," "maritime neutrality," and "religious liberty" could be advanced. He also looked toward the "indirect influence which the United States may exercise upon any projects or purposes originating in the war in which the southern Republics are still engaged, which might seriously affect the interests of this Union, and the good offices by which the United States may ultimately contribute to bring that war to a speedier termination." Adams was keenly aware of the "moral influence" the U.S. could exert in this regard. Without the United States becoming directly involved, Anderson and Sergeant might be able to use their influence to safeguard U.S. interests. Most importantly for the debate that followed, the president revealed that he sought "an agreement between all the parties represented at the meeting that each will guard by its own means against the establishment of any future European colony within its borders." This was the noncolonization principle that had been "announced by my predecessor to the world," and he desired it to be "developed to the new southern nations that they will all feel it as an essential appendage to their independence." Adams wanted each country to adopt the noncolonization principle as its own, hoping that its collective expression might deter European interference. Adams's inclusion of noncolonization is further evidence that he saw it as a distinct principle from the doctrine of two spheres—that the two principles were not parts of a unified Monroe Doctrine as far as he understood it. Many in Congress did not make this distinction, though. For them,

using the Monroe Doctrine as justification for the mission overshadowed the rest of the message and led them to question Adams's true motives.[52]

Clay's instructions to Anderson and Sergeant constitute the best evidence of what Adams hoped to achieve at the Panama Congress. While the instructions would not be made available to Congress or the public until 1829, they spelled out in great detail the objectives and scope of U.S. participation. In later years, Clay would point to the importance of commerce in the instructions and to the U.S. mission, but a close reading reveals that the administration was arguably most concerned with spreading U.S. principles for the conduct of international affairs.[53] These instructions made clear that one of the central goals of the Panama mission was international adoption of the principles set out in Washington's Farewell Address, in both its original and expanded forms. The Panama Congress represented "a new epoch in human affairs," at which dramatic steps could be taken to ensure the permanent separation of the European and American spheres, while at the same time providing for the equitable and profitable expansion of global commerce.[54]

Clay emphasized the neutral and purely "diplomatic" role the U.S. ministers were to play at the congress. To reinforce this position, Clay suggested they take this as an opportunity to permanently put to rest the idea of the doctrine of two spheres as the basis for future alliances. Clay argued that because the danger posed by the Holy Alliance had "disappeared," there could "be no necessity, at this time, for an offensive and defensive alliance between the American Powers." Such an alliance "could only find a justification, at any period, in the existence, or continuation of such a danger," but "under present circumstances" it would be "worse than useless, since it might tend to excite feelings in the Emperor of Russia and his Allies, which should not be needlessly touched or provoked." Clay pointed to that portion of Washington's Farewell Address devoted to the avoidance of alliances, noting that this maxim "was directed to Europe, which, having a system of connexions and of interests remote, and different, from ours, it was thought most advisable that we should not mix ourselves up with them." Clay added, though, that "long since the origin of the maxim, the new American Powers have arisen, to which, if at all, it is less applicable." As if taking direct aim at the Jeffersonian reconceptualization, Clay argued that the Farewell Address was written with Europe in mind and did not preclude a closer relationship with Latin America. Despite this distinction, it remained the policy of the United States to only depart from "that established maxim" of avoiding alliances in circumstances of "great urgency," which did not exist at the present time.[55]

The avoidance of permanent alliances was not the only portion of Washington's Farewell Address put forward by Clay as a principle for the U.S. ministers to "inculcate" in their counterparts at the congress. Clay argued that "the preservation of peace among [the Latin American countries], and with the rest of the world," should be instilled in the congress's participants as "the true interest of all Nations,

but it is especially that of infant States." In the assessment of the administration, "peace is now the greatest want of America," and U.S. leaders hoped that "the policy of all America will be the same, that of peace and neutrality." Washington wrote extensively on the importance of peace to the growth and prosperity of the young United States, and Clay wanted Latin America to heed the same wise advice. Clay urged the Latin American leaders to work to prevent "foreign interference, either in the formation, or in the conduct, of their Government," and called on them to be "equally scrupulous in refraining from all interference in . . . the Governments of other independent Nations."[56] All of these warnings had been issued by Washington and had demonstrated their utility and wisdom many times over. The international community should learn from the U.S. example and advocate for the adoption of these principles by their respective governments.

Clay devoted special attention to the importance of Latin America's adoption of the noncolonization principle. The Adams administration believed, as had Monroe's in 1823, that there was "no chasm, within the described limits" of the American continents "in which a new Eropean [*sic*] Colony could be now introduced without violating the territorial rights of some American State." Any attempt "to establish such a Colony and, by its establishment, to acquire sovereign rights for any European Power, must be regarded as an inadmissible encroachment." Clay and Adams wanted to give greater weight to this principle, in order to "prevent any such new European Colonies, and to warn Europe, beforehand, that they are not, hereafter, to be admitted." The best way to accomplish this would be for the U.S. ministers at Panama to "propose a joint declaration of the several American States, each, however, acting for, and binding only, itself, that, within the limits of their respective territories, no new European Colony will, hereafter, be allowed to be established."[57] Unlike Canning's proposed joint declaration with Rush that envisioned joint Anglo-U.S. action, this proposal was in reality closer to a mutual pledge that each country would honor and defend the noncolonization principle within its own borders.

Clay was explicit that this proposal was "not intended to commit the parties . . . to the support of the particular boundaries which may be claimed by any one of them," nor would it "commit them to a joint resistance against any future attempt to plant a new European Colony." Instead, Clay hoped "that the moral effect alone, of a joint declaration, emanating from the authority of all the American Nations, will effectually serve to prevent the effort to establish any such new Colony." Only if this joint declaration failed and an "attempt should actually be made" would it be necessary "for the American Powers to consider the propriety of negotiating between themselves, and, if necessary, of adopting, in concert, the measures which may be necessary to check and prevent it." Only if Europe actually interfered in American affairs would the time be right to discuss alliances or other modes of resistance. Adams and Clay viewed the international adoption of the noncolonization principle as a vital step toward permanently eliminating

European influence and control in the Americas, but they were adamant that each country had to adopt the principle as its own. For the United States, such an announcement did no more than reiterate "the existing state of their Institutions and Laws." Properly executed, it "neither contracts any new obligations, on their part, nor makes any alteration, as to them, in the present condition of things."[58]

These instructions illustrate that the administration had high hopes for what could be achieved at the Congress of Panama. This was the moment to solidify the expanded principles of Washington's Farewell Address that would guide American foreign policy for the future and to put to rest those that would not. The instructions also add additional weight to the argument that Adams did not conceive of the doctrine of two spheres and the noncolonization principle as comprising a single foreign policy. Adams wanted to use the Panama Congress to set aside the former and extend the latter. All of Adams's messages to the U.S. Congress concerning the mission lacked the specificity and clarity of Clay's instructions, and the absence of an explicit delineation of motives, intentions, or objectives made it much easier for the administration's opponents to see realized in the mission their worst fear of the abandonment of Washington's principles.[59]

The existence of legitimate, principled differences over participation at Panama made it possible for the debate that ensued to become a venue in which political opposition could also play out. The reemergence of rival political factions in Congress and in the American press in 1825–26 meant that the pall of partisanship hung over public consideration of the mission to Panama. Somewhat ironically, while this partisanship certainly shaped the course of the debate, it has also tended, in both contemporary and historical accounts, to overshadow the honest, principled disagreements that surfaced between John Quincy Adams and his opponents. Partisanship may have led to an exaggerated view of Adams's motives, but those in Congress who believed in Washington's Farewell Address as defined by "entangling alliances with none" were always going to have a problem with American participation at Panama. The Panama debate is remembered for ushering in the second American party system, but its status as the proverbial day of reckoning for these two increasingly divergent views of the Farewell Address and America's fundamental principles of foreign policy is its true significance.[60]

The Panama Debate

The nominations of Anderson, Sergeant, and Rochester were sent to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which issued an extended condemnation of the Panama mission in its report of 16 January 1826 before an executive session. The report concluded with a resolution declaring "that it is not expedient, at this time, for the United States to send any Ministers to the Congress of American nations,

assembled at Panama."[61] More than six weeks passed before the Senate took up the resolution for debate. Newspapers around the country had taken a keen interest in the Panama mission and grew increasingly disapproving of the delay. It did not help matters that because the initial Committee report was issued in executive session, all subsequent debates were kept confidential as well.

By the end of February 1826, newspapers supportive of and opposed to the Panama mission began expressing their displeasure with the Senate. The *Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser* disclosed that "public opinion is strongly against the Senate for so long delaying to decide." The editor also cautioned patience in judging as he was "unwilling to believe that a majority or even one third of the senators would consent to unite in any improper opposition to any measure proposed by the executive."[62] The *Richmond Enquirer* described the Panama question as "absolutely a mystery to us" and expressed disbelief at reports that "the Senate have not even yet debated the expediency of the mission! They have not gone yet upon the merits of the question."[63] The most pointed criticism appeared in the *Charleston Courier,* which stated that the American public was looking on "with astonishment at all this dumb shew, and marvels at its meaning, if meaning it have any." The *Courier* placed the fault for the delay at the feet of the Senate, concluding that "the majority of that body must be either for, or against the Panama Mission; and it shews a want of self confidence, as well as of courtesy, not to avow their decision. If the majority be in favor of the President's proposal, it will '*tell well* in history,' that they allowed a worrying minority to defeat them, by protracting the discussion, until its object was unattainable."[64] The *Courier*'s critique proved to be an ominous prediction of the fate that ultimately awaited the Panama mission.

When the debate finally did begin in early March 1826, it turned into a far-ranging discussion of international commerce, religious freedom, slavery, and race, but at its core the debate revolved around the principles of American foreign policy expressed in Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. It was apparent from the start that many in the Senate viewed Washington's principles through the lens of Jefferson's reconceptualization of them. Robert Hayne of South Carolina argued that sending ministers to the Congress of Panama would produce "an entire change of the neutral position which we have hitherto so happily occupied." Hayne asserted that the mission was part of a wider system of foreign policy being pursued by the Adams administration that was designed to entwine the United States in "entangling alliances." Should the Senate vote to send ministers to Panama, it would "violate the maxim of the Father of his Country, which enjoins upon us, as the most sacred of duties, 'to cultivate peace and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'"[65] Hugh White of Tennessee echoed Hayne's sentiments when he declared, "if this mission should be advised, a new era will have commenced in the history of our foreign relations. Have peace with, and good will towards, all Nations; entangling alliances with

none—has been our cardinal principle in times past. It was recommended by the Father of our Country—repeated, and practiced upon by his *republican* successors."[66] These early salvoes made clear that this debate was as much about the meaning of Washington's Farewell Address as it was about the Panama mission.

Senators opposed to U.S. involvement simply could not believe that it would be possible for the United States to participate at Panama without compromising its neutrality; the belligerent objectives of the countries still at war with Spain or each other precluded it. Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire put this position into stark relief when he incredulously remarked, "I have been utterly astonished, that any gentleman could . . . contend that this was not a belligerent Congress. What! a Congress, originating with those engaged in war; . . . to be convened within the territories of those engaged in war; and having for its main objects, as again and again repeated, the triumphant prosecution of that very war; and yet a Congress, in no degree belligerent, and perfectly safe for neutrals to unite in?"[67] That Adams had agreed to attend only to take part in discussions of a nonbelligerent nature was an insufficient safeguard. By virtue of its very presence at the congress, the United States would assume a state of cobelligerency with the South American republics in the eyes of the world, if not in actual fact. White made the point that regardless of what actions the United States did or did not take, participation would permanently alter U.S. relations with Spain. "If we send Ministers to this Congress of belligerents," White argued, "we lose all influence with Spain. It is hardly possible that we could ever satisfy her that we were impartial in any question between her and her former colonies."[68] With one diplomatic mission, Adams could negate thirty years of foreign-policy precedent and permanently damage relations with Europe.

Even if Adams could fulfill his promise that participation would not violate American neutrality, Latin American interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine greatly complicated the mission for the United States. Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis estimated that the United States was approached about participating in the Congress of Panama in order to "convert the Monroe Doctrine into a conditional multilateral alliance among the states of the Western Hemisphere."[69] Adams had no intention of involving the country in such an endeavor and explicitly sought to use the congress as an opportunity to put the doctrine of two spheres to rest, but the fears of many senators as to how participation would be perceived in light of the Monroe Doctrine were quite legitimate. Hayne of South Carolina lamented that "the new States have conceived themselves *entitled to our aid* whenever foreign interference shall be threatened."[70] John Macpherson Berrien of Georgia took aim at the Monroe Doctrine itself, arguing that Monroe "had no authority, by his own act alone, to pledge the United States to a foreign Power. He did not intend to do so. It was a mere declaration of the policy, which, under given circumstances, he believed it proper for the United States to pursue. It did not bind him. It did not bind Congress. [Congress] declined to respond to it. No foreign Power

could demand the enforcement of it, because no foreign Power was party to it."[71] White, in contrast, concluded that, regardless of Monroe's or Adams's intentions, "If we send Ministers . . . then, indeed, will the United States be *pledged*."[72] Since the Latin American nations saw in the Monroe Doctrine a concrete pledge of support, attendance at the Panama Congress would confirm the existence of that pledge. Such a pledge was tantamount to the permanent or entangling alliances that Washington and Jefferson, respectively, had warned against.

Some of the strongest reactions against the mission focused on international adoption of the noncolonization principle. The opposition, intentionally or mistakenly, misinterpreted Adams's objectives for this principle and found great fault with his approach. White argued that "whenever we can feel the necessity for such a stipulation, to guard our Territory against the encroachments of European nations, then, indeed, . . . we are prepared for the vassal condition of colonies. If these new States set so little value upon independence, as to require such an agreement to stimulate them to exert their means to prevent colonies from being planted within their limits, then I shall conclude they are unfit for self-government, and that no agreement with them, upon any subject, can be of much utility to us."[73] White was not one to see the value of public diplomacy or the moral force of joint declarations. Mahlon Dickerson of New Jersey dismissed noncolonization entirely, concluding, "if the powers of Europe possess, by right, any portion of either of these continents, they may colonize such possessions, and this Government will not prevent them—the pledge of the late President to the contrary, notwithstanding."[74] Here again was the depiction of the Monroe Doctrine as a pledge to Latin America. For these men the noncolonization principle was a worthless international pursuit.

Despite their vigorous resistance, the mission's opponents knew from the beginning that they did not have the votes necessary to block its passage; a renewed partisanship may have been brewing, but a majority in the Senate remained willing to trust and support the president and his agenda. Aware that true victory was not an option, the opposition relied on stall tactics to delay confirmation for as long as possible. Lengthy speeches were an opportunity to both express principled views and eat up time. One of the surprising features of the debate was that while a majority of the Senate voted to ratify the mission, that majority offered no significant argument to counter the opposition's attacks. Supporters did not vocally assert that the mission was conformable to Washington's maxims; instead they quietly trusted Adams's contention that American neutrality was not at stake. On 14 March, this silent majority voted down the resolution put forward by the Foreign Relations Committee and confirmed the appointments of Anderson, Sergeant, and Rochester.[75]

The work of the Senate opposition did not stop when the debate ended. In the ensuing days, the Senate removed the injunction of secrecy from the Panama

debates, making the official Legislative Journal publicly available. The Legislative Journal contained limited information—the text of motions and resolutions, votes, and the like—but not transcripts of speeches, as these were typically recorded by the newspaper reporters that had been barred from the executive session. Sensing a rhetorical advantage in being able to marshal Washington's Farewell Address and "entangling alliances with none" in support of their cause, the mission's opponents made the transcripts of their speeches available to leading newspapers in the capital, knowing that they would subsequently be reprinted throughout the country. Many of these speeches were also quickly published and distributed in pamphlet form as well.[76] A few supporters of the mission also had their speeches published, but the opposition dominated the after-the-fact war of words playing out in the nation's press.

Regardless of the actual outcome of the debate, the opposition aimed to shape public opinion of the mission by ensuring that their arguments reached more people than did those of the mission's supporters. The opposition press even used passage of the mission in the Senate as an opportunity to once again criticize it. The *Richmond Enquirer,* for example, remarked that "there is but one pervading maxim of foreign policy, 'peace, friendship, and commerce, with all nations, entangling alliances with *none*.' The ordinary mode of diplomatic intercourse, has been found all sufficient to secure us the full benefit of this policy." If the Congress of Panama was "conformable" to this policy, then it was "unnecessary," but if it was "opposed" to the policy, then it "ought not, and I am sure will not, be sanctioned by the people."[77] If the ends of the mission could be achieved by means of traditional diplomacy, why take part in a potentially compromising international congress? And if they could not be achieved otherwise, why pursue those ends at all?

Adams and the House of Representatives

Confirmation of the nominations was only the first hurdle for the administration, as the House of Representatives and Senate would still need to pass an appropriations bill to fund the mission. This meant at least two more rounds of debate. The day after the Senate completed its work, President Adams transmitted a lengthy message to the House advocating for the allocation of the funds necessary to support the mission. Historian Samuel Flagg Bemis described the message as "one of the most important papers of [Adams's] diplomatic career" to which "he summoned all the powers of rhetoric, all the weight of his experience."[78] While Adams sought to remind the House that the Congress of Panama was "in its nature diplomatic and not legislative," and that its decisions were nonbinding unless ratified by the U.S. Congress, his primary concern was justifying the mission in terms of Washington's Farewell Address.[79] In this message, Adams put forward the clearest

exposition of his expanded view of the Farewell, and he argued persuasively that these broader principles were essential if the United States was going to effectively meet the challenges of the new global order.

Adams reassured the House—and by extension the American people—that he was "mindful of the advice given by the father of our country in his Farewell Address, that the great rule of conduct for us in regard to foreign nations is, in extending our commercial relations, to have with them as little political connection as possible." At the same time, Adams also readily understood that "like all the counsels of wisdom, [the Farewell Address] was founded upon the circumstances in which our country and the world around us were situated at the time when it was given." That world was one dominated by European powers and European colonies, a world in which Washington had warned that "Europe had a set of primary interests, which to us had none, or very remote relation," and that "our *detached* and *distant* situation, invited and enabled us to pursue a different course." Such warnings were both wise and necessary in that world; but that world no longer existed. "Compare our situation and the circumstances of that time with those of the present day," Adams urged. "Europe has still her set of primary interests with which we have little or a remote relation. Our distant and detached situation with reference to Europe remains the same." In Washington's time, the United States was "the only independent nation of this hemisphere, and we were surrounded by European colonies, with the greater part of which we had no more intercourse than with the inhabitants of another planet." The world the United States confronted in 1826 was fundamentally different. "Those colonies have now been transformed into eight independent nations, extending to our very borders, seven of them Republics like ourselves, with whom we have an immensely growing commercial, and *must* have and have already important political, connections; with reference to whom our situation is neither distant nor detached; whose political principles and systems of government, congenial with our own, must and will have an action and counteraction upon us and ours to which we can not be indifferent if we would." Rather than being surrounded by European colonies, the United States shared the Western Hemisphere with (hopefully) like-minded republics. The progress of the Americas and their evolving relationship with Europe had propelled Adams to articulate an expanded vision of the Farewell Address in the first place, and they were why he wanted to see those principles spread and adopted throughout Latin America.[80]

To better demonstrate his point, Adams argued that if Washington had written the Farewell Address in 1826 instead of 1796, its message would have been substantially changed. Washington would have asserted "that *America* has a set of primary interests which have none or a remote relation to Europe." Economically, geographically, and ideologically, it was in the best interests of the United States to not isolate itself from its American neighbors, and as a result, "the acceptance of this invitation, . . . far from conflicting with the counsel or the policy of Washington, is directly

deducible from and conformable to it."[81] This was a masterful explanation of how Washington's principles should best be understood and applied in a world so far removed from the one the Father of his Country had inhabited three decades earlier.

Adams's message struck a chord with many Americans. One correspondent wrote to Adams that it had "wrought wonders in disabusing mens minds . . . and it would seem like flattery to say how strong a feeling of admiration is expressed even from lips of political indifference."[82] Former President Thomas Jefferson, governor of Massachusetts Levi Lincoln, and Timothy Pickering, a former secretary of state and U.S. senator, also wrote approvingly of the message.[83] The increasingly partisan press offered more varied reactions. *The Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser* viewed Adams's message as throwing "the opposition in the Senate far in the back ground, and proves it to have been an opposition to persons not to measures, an opposition becoming partizans better than patriots, and highly to be censured in the present instance, as having no perceivable good object in view."[84] The *Charleston Courier* declared that the message did "not contain a sentiment to which an unprejudiced American would not, with his whole heart respond."[85] Taking an entirely different view, however, the *Richmond Enquirer* asserted that the message had done nothing "to shake the objections which we took in October last to such a Mission." That paper still contended that there "were no urgent considerations for us to join [the Panama Congress], and impelling us to depart from the sound maxims of two of the soundest men who have ever sat in the Presidential Chair: Washington and Jefferson."[86] Despite Adams's best efforts, the entrenched opposition remained unmoved.

While Adams was surely pleased with the generally positive public reactions to his address, his more pressing concern was its reception in the House of Representatives, which began its consideration of the mission on 25 March. There, despite the force of Adams's logic, it became readily apparent that he had failed to change the minds of those who understood "entangling alliances with none" to be the central meaning of the Farewell Address. For them, the existence of a free Latin America did not necessitate a new foreign policy or the abandonment of what they saw as Washington's wisdom. They believed that the United States had grown and prospered because of a strict adherence to this maxim, and they saw no compelling reason to chart a new course. The House Committee of Ways and Means reported an appropriations bill to fund the Panama mission, but, in an unusual development, the Committee of Foreign Relations likewise issued a report and supporting resolution of its own.[87] Many members of Congress argued that it was their duty to immediately consider the appropriations bill, but on 3 April the House took up the Foreign Relations resolution instead. As had been the case in the Senate, the mission's opponents knew that they did not have the votes to block the appropriation, but they believed that consideration of the Foreign Relations resolution would allow for a wider-ranging debate and would further delay final approval of the mission.

A vocal minority in the House rejected Adams's assurances that the Panama mission would not violate U.S. neutrality or threaten American principles. Much of the debate focused on two amendments that sought to limit the scope of the U.S. ministers' authority at Panama to prevent any violation of the principles set out in Washington's Farewell Address. The first amendment, introduced on 3 April by Louis McLane of Delaware, sought to explicitly tie approval of the mission both to Jefferson's reconceptualization of the Farewell Address and to a rejection of the internationalization of the noncolonization principle. It had "always been the settled policy of this Government," McLane's amendment read, "in extending our commercial relations with foreign nations, to have with them as little political connection as possible; to preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all nations, and to form entangling alliances with none." As a result, the ministers to Panama "ought not to be authorized to discuss, consider, or consult, upon any proposition of alliance, offensive or defensive, between this country and any of the South American Governments, or any stipulation, compact, or declaration, binding the United States in any way, or to any extent, to resist interference from abroad with domestic concerns of the aforesaid Governments." Furthermore, the ministers should be prohibited from pursuing any "measure which shall commit the present or future neutral rights or duties of these United States, either as may regard European nations, or between the several States of Mexico and South America."[88] Anderson and Sergeant could go to Panama, but they could not violate the precepts of Washington's Farewell Address. None of the restrictions in McLane's amendment contradicted Adams's stated intentions, but the perceived need for the restrictions revealed the level of distrust, at least rhetorically, that the mission's opponents had for Adams.

McLane's justifications for the amendment were even more interesting than the amendment itself. In structuring the amendment, McLane had "endeavored . . . to embrace all those principles which had characterized the policy of the United States from our earliest history" in hopes of preserving "that policy unimpaired." The House of Representatives could not "vote the resolution recommended by the committee [of Foreign Relations] . . . without committing itself to the doctrine, that a different line of policy is to be observed towards the New, from that which we have hitherto observed towards the Old World."[89] Adams would not necessarily have disagreed with McLane on this point; he *was* urging a new course of policy towards Latin America than had previously been followed toward Europe. What McLane failed to grasp was that by Adams's calculus both lines of policy were dictated by the original precepts laid out by Washington. In that respect, while the mission to Panama did represent a new line of policy toward the independent nations of the New World, it did not represent a change in America's fundamental principles. Recognizing the existence of common interests and attempting to wield U.S. influence to shape Latin American policy would enhance U.S. security and strengthen American principles, not scuttle them. McLane and

the mission's other opponents clung to the all-or-nothing view instilled by "entangling alliances with none": what applied to Europe in 1796 applied to Latin America in 1826, and had to be preserved at all costs.

William C. Rives of Virginia felt that McLane's amendment did not go far enough in limiting the mission. Taking explicit aim at the noncolonization principle and the Latin American perception of the Monroe Doctrine as a pledge, Rives proposed the insertion of an additional clause that would prevent "any compact or engagement by which the United States shall be *pledged* to the Spanish American States to maintain, by force, the principle that no part of the American continents is henceforward subject to colonization by any European Power."[90] Many in the House believed that the pledge they saw as implied by the Monroe Doctrine was the only reason the United States had been invited to Panama, making this an important limitation. Charles Wickliffe of Kentucky asserted that it was only because the Monroe Doctrine had "superinduced the belief . . . that the United States had 'pledged themselves'" that Latin America even considered inviting the United States.[91] John Carter of South Carolina could not "say, or know, what the exact meaning of [Monroe's] declaration was," but he entertained "little doubt . . . that we owe the invitation we have received to send Ministers to Panama, to nothing else."[92] John Forsyth of Georgia was especially critical of the mission in light of the Latin American perception of the Monroe Doctrine. Forsyth believed that the purpose of U.S. involvement in the Congress of Panama was "to concert means of resisting European interference. . . . We go not to undeceive them; not to explain to them their mistake, in supposing us pledged to any efforts for the defence of their rights; but to discuss the question of means, as if the pledge existed in full force."[93] Henry Clay's instructions to Anderson and Sergeant would eventually put the lie to Forsyth's claim, but the instructions were neither completed nor publicly available when Forsyth addressed the House.

Like Forsyth, James Buchanan of Pennsylvania and James Hamilton of South Carolina were deeply troubled by the administration's handling of the Latin American nations' mistaken belief in a pledge. Both congressmen pointed to examples in recent diplomatic correspondence of U.S. foreign ministers that explicitly referred to a pledge by Monroe, and they asserted that it was evidence of a conscious and intentional change in the established foreign policy of the United States by Adams and Clay. Buchanan argued that the Monroe Doctrine "contained no pledge to any foreign Government. It left us perfectly free: but it has since been converted into such pledge by the present Administration."[94] Hamilton believed that the "declaration of Mr. Monroe" had been "most unjustifiably termed by the administration a pledge, and, by their subsequent commentaries on it, converted into one."[95] Buchanan and Hamilton went further than anyone else in accusing the administration of intentionally fostering the Latin American belief in a pledge and perverting the long-standing principles of U.S. foreign policy.

Several representatives took a very different view of the pledge issue. They conceded that while the Monroe Doctrine may have constituted a pledge at the time it was declared, that pledge was no longer in effect by 1826. Edward Livingston of Louisiana looked to the Doctrine as "a pledge, not to ourselves or to posterity . . . but a pledge to the world, that we would interfere, according to our means, to resist [European] interference." Such a pledge, though, "related only to the state of things that then existed. . . . The circumstances under which the declaration was made, have passed away; they are not likely again to recur; but, I should wish all Europe to understand, that if they should, our conduct would redeem the pledge our Executive then made."[96] In many ways this was the exact view taken by the administration. Adams probably would never have termed the Doctrine a pledge, but the idea of the conditionality of the doctrine of two spheres had been reiterated by both the Monroe and Adams administrations on multiple occasions.

The introduction of such varying perspectives on the Monroe Doctrine begged a question: if its purpose had been served by 1826—at least in terms of the doctrine of two spheres and the threat of European intervention in Spanish America—was it still pertinent? Could it still represent an important declaration of U.S. foreign-policy principles if it was no longer applicable to the existing global context? John Forsyth of Georgia and Daniel Webster of Massachusetts believed that it could and did. Forsyth, despite his disapproval of the Panama mission and the foreign-policy objectives of the Adams administration, still saw the merits of Monroe's declarations. He argued that "the law of self-defense requires us to act, whenever any combination of Powers—Asiatic, African, European, or American—interferes with the domestic concerns of the American States. This was all that was rightfully asserted by the message of 1823."[97] Latin American perceptions of a pledge were dangerous, but they also missed the point that Monroe's message was founded on the basic principle of a nation's right to defend itself against foreign interference. This idea was just as true in 1826 as it had been in 1823, and as it had been in 1796 when Washington issued a similar warning in the Farewell Address.

Webster echoed these sentiments, proclaiming that Monroe's "declaration must be considered as founded on our rights, and to spring mainly from a regard to their preservation." Webster never believed that the Doctrine had constituted a pledge, as "it did not commit us, at all events, to take up arms on any indication of hostile feeling by the powers of Europe towards South America." Instead, Monroe's declaration mattered as a statement of American rights and American principles, rights and principles that had been hailed when they were announced but were under attack in 1826. Webster looked upon the Monroe Doctrine "as forming a bright page in our history" and questioned why "there should now be such a new-born fear, on the subject of this declaration? The crisis is over; the danger is past. . . . Most of the gentlemen who have now spoken on this subject, were at that time here [in Congress]. They all heard the declaration. Not one of them

complained. And yet, now when all danger is over, we are vehemently warned against the sentiments of the declaration."[98] Like Adams, Webster was a devotee of George Washington and saw the value and wisdom of both the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Congress. If Americans had trusted the Doctrine when it was announced by James Monroe, there was no reason they should distrust it when advanced by John Quincy Adams.

Adams still believed in the importance of the doctrine of two spheres as a statement of American principle, but he readily acknowledged that any warning or pledge contained within it was directly tied to the specific circumstances of 1823. Adams hoped that the lasting legacy of the Monroe Doctrine would be the noncolonization principle, which predated the Doctrine itself. Adams saw noncolonization as having a larger significance for the future interactions between the Old World and the New, especially if he succeeded at Panama in seeing the other Latin American nations adopt and proclaim it as their own. It was clear from the House debate, though, that many members of Congress saw the noncolonization principle as another dangerous part of Monroe's declaration and a worthless international goal. Rehashing many of the same ideas advanced in the Senate, Wickliffe wondered why the United States should "be called upon to stipulate by treaty that we will not suffer our own soil to be invaded; to be occupied by an European Power; to be colonized? We need no paper stipulations upon such a subject."[99] McLane expressed a similar sentiment when he argued that "any stipulation, or any treaty, on the subject of a resistance to colonization, or of interference, by European Powers . . . [is] utterly incompatible with the settled policy of this Government." No nation could ever "negotiate about its own policy or attitude towards foreign nations. . . . It consults its own honor and interests, and the happiness of its citizens; and when it has decided on its course, it is its duty to announce its policy to the world—not to negotiate about it." In the case of the United States, "it is the duty of the Executive to say to all People that our policy is pacific—it is neutral—it is to steer clear of the difficulties and quarrels of other People, and not to negotiate with any body whether we shall commit ourselves to their destiny."[100] Wickliffe and McLane believed that entering into agreements based on the noncolonization principle would not strengthen the ability of the United States to defend itself against foreign interference, but would instead serve to weaken the United States by binding it to defend other nations' sovereignty.

Arguments such as these showed a failure to comprehend what Adams actually hoped to gain by advancing the noncolonization principle abroad, but there were some in the House who seemed to understand. John Wurts of Pennsylvania felt that men like Wickliffe and McLane were "not treating the question fairly. It is not proposed to go abroad to gather strength, or create inducements to defend our own soil. The colonization of any part of the continent of North America, within our territorial limits, by any Government, never will be permitted, so long as this

Republic retains the power to prevent it." Rather, international adoption "would be the mean by which we should obtain the security, so far as international stipulations can give it, that no part of the territorial dominion of the Southern Republics should pass, by cession or otherwise, to European Powers, who might prove to be troublesome and mischievous neighbors to both of us."[101] Daniel Webster similarly stressed that such agreements with the South American republics could not impact America's ability to defend the noncolonization principle at home. Instead they would behoove the United States to encourage these new nations to "settle it, as part of their policy, not to allow colonization within their respective territories."[102] The United States was committed to noncolonization and so too should all independent countries.

For most involved in this debate, the future of the Monroe Doctrine was intimately connected with, but also of secondary importance to, the legacy and meaning of Washington's Farewell Address. "A crisis has now arrived," James Buchanan declared, "in which it is the duty of this House to take a firm stand in favor of the ancient and the approved policy of the country. We should proclaim to the world, that it is our determination 'to preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all nations, and to form entangling alliances with none.'"[103] James Hamilton similarly feared that Adams was attempting to pervert "the spirit and meaning of the advice of Washington." Hamilton described the Farewell Address as the "warnings of a parting friend. Posterity has the reversionary interest; and it is not the sophistry of Mr. Adams that can deprive our children of the full benefit of this long enduring legacy. Founded on the then and ever enduring circumstances of our country, were these counsels. Sir, they rest permanently on our immutable condition, as a federative Republic."[104] Contrary to Adams, who argued that foreign policy had to reflect America's evolving interests, Hamilton believed that the nation's approach to the wider world had been permanently established by its form of government. Wickliffe similarly professed, "There are certain great principles which never change; and among them I recognize those prescribed by the Father of his Country, in his Farewell Address to his beloved People, as the rule of our conduct with and toward foreign nations."[105] These men all firmly believed that as long as the United States endured, so too should Washington's principles as they were understood in 1796.

Even outside of Congress, professions of loyalty to Washington's Farewell Address formed common aspects of the Panama conversation. Andrew Jackson, the man at the center of the political opposition forming against Adams, justified his opposition to the mission by claiming his dedication to Washington's principles. "Let the primary interests of Europe be what they may, or let our situation vary as far as you please from that which we occupied when the immortal Washington retired from the councils of his country," Jackson wrote. "I cannot see, for my part how it follows that the primary interests of the United States will be safer in the hands of others, than in her own." Regardless of a changing global context, Jackson

did not understand how it could "ever become necessary to form entangling alliances, or any connection with the governments of South America. . . . The doctrine of Washington is as applicable to the present as to the then primary interests of Europe, so far as our own peace and happiness are concerned, and I have no hesitation in saying so far as the true interests of South America are concerned." Letting his personal dislike of Adams show through, Jackson argued that "to abandon a policy so wise in itself, and so beneficial . . . to our country displays a weakness of wickedness not paralelled in the history of any country." Adams was engaged in "a bold game of ambition, that puts at once to hazzard our peace, our happiness, and for what is known may lead to the destruction of our liberty at last." All of this was risked "without the least apparent cause for a departure from that wise policy recommended by Washington, 'peace with all nations entangling alliances with none.'" Jackson and his supporters rejected Adams's contention in the 15 March message to the House that his expanded view of the Farewell Address flowed naturally from Washington's original maxims, instead seeing those maxims through the lens of the rigid and unwavering Jeffersonian reconceptualization.[106]

Opponents of the Panama mission voiced legitimate, principled objections to U.S. participation, but more importantly, they succeeded in sidetracking the House of Representatives with a three-week debate on the Foreign Relations resolution. At the end of that debate, the House still needed to vote on the two amendments to the resolution before the Ways and Means appropriation could be considered. The central purpose of the amendments was to force President Adams and his ministers at Panama to conform to America's fundamental principles of foreign policy as defined by the mission's opponents. Many in Congress purported to believe in the spirit of the amendments but not in the power of the House to actually pass them, because constitutionally the House had no purview over foreign relations and could not issue instructions to the ministers. On 18 April, James Buchanan proposed another amendment designed to "test the sincerity of those gentlemen" who raised this objection.[107]

This new amendment stated that the House of Representatives, in approving of the mission, "do[es] not intend to sanction any departure from the settled policy of this Government, that, in extending our commercial relations with foreign nations, we should have with them as little political connexion as possible; and that we should preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all nations, and form entangling alliances with none." Here Buchanan quoted both George Washington and Thomas Jefferson. Based on this view of America's "settled policy," the "United States ought not to be represented at the Congress of Panama, except in a diplomatic character, nor ought they to form any alliance, with all or any of the Spanish American Republics; nor ought they to become parties with them . . . to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European Powers with their independence or form of Government, or to any compact for

the purpose of preventing colonization upon the continent of America." Instead, "the People of the United States should be left free to act, in any crisis, in such a manner as their feelings of friendship towards these Republics, and as their own honor and policy may at the time dictate."[108] Buchanan maintained the spirit of the previous amendments, but reframed them as clearly expressing the opinion of the House rather than direct instructions. McLane accepted Buchanan's amendment and Rives withdrew his entirely, believing that it was no longer necessary.[109]

On 20 April, voting on the Foreign Relations resolution commenced in the House. On the Buchanan/McLane amendment, the result could not have been closer: it was defeated by just one vote, 93 in favor to 94 opposed.[110] McLane's original amendment narrowly passed by four votes, 99 to 95.[111] The following day, the amended resolution of the Committee of Foreign Affairs was handily voted down by an almost three-to-one margin. The House then immediately moved to consider the appropriations bill, which it overwhelmingly approved after minimal debate.[112] Back in the Senate, the Committee of Finance reported the House appropriation without amendment. In a last attempt by the Senate opposition to put some form of limitation on the prerogatives of the president and the ministers in carrying out their diplomatic duties at Panama, John Macpherson Berrien offered what was essentially the Buchanan amendment to the House Foreign Relations resolution as an amendment to the appropriations bill.[113] After brief debate, the amendment was rejected, 19 to 24.[114] The unamended appropriation passed on 3 May by a vote of 23 to 19, with every person who had voted in favor of the Buchanan/Berrien amendment voting against the appropriation. After nearly five months of debate and delay, the mission to the Congress of Panama had finally been approved.[115]

The Congress of Panama and a Legacy of Failure

Despite the preceding months of intense coverage, final congressional passage of the Panama mission received surprisingly little attention in the press. This was just as well for Adams and Clay, because the Congress of Panama proved to be a complete failure. As demonstrated in Clay's instructions to Anderson and Sergeant, the president and secretary of state had high hopes for what could be achieved at the congress and for the positive influence the United States could exert over Latin America. They saw the congress as an opportunity not only to form agreements that would benefit American commerce and security, but also to see U.S. foreign-policy principles adopted and individually defended throughout the western hemisphere. They hoped to convince the new nations of Latin America to individually assert the principles embodied in Washington's Farewell Address and the noncolonization principle to protect both American continents from European interference. The problem for the United States was that their ministers

never made it to Panama. The delayed approval of the mission meant that travel to Panama would commence when conditions were least hospitable for outsiders unaccustomed to the tropical disease climate. John Sergeant notified Clay in early May that he was unwilling to take his life in his hands and therefore would not depart until later in the year.[116] Richard C. Anderson, stationed in Colombia, did not depart for Panama until just three days before the congress convened. Anderson became ill and died of yellow fever more than a month later without ever reaching Panama. The congress had already adjourned.[117]

Even had Anderson and Sergeant made it to Panama, it is unlikely that the administration's goals would have been realized. The congress assembled on 15 June 1826 and was attended by just four countries: Colombia, Peru, the United Provinces of Central America, and Mexico. During a month of deliberations, the delegates produced five agreements that were to be ratified by their respective governments before the congress reassembled at Tacubaya, Mexico, early the next year.[118] Despite the setbacks, Adams and Clay believed that they had a second opportunity to accomplish their goals and they pressed for the utility of the mission moving forward. In his second annual message to Congress, Adams stated that the course of events to that point had only "confirmed me in the conviction of the expediency to the United States of being represented at the congress."[119] Sergeant arrived in Tacubaya on 9 January 1827 to discover only three other delegates present, and found that none of the treaties drafted at Panama had been ratified by any of the participating governments.[120] A month later, Adams nominated the U.S. minister to Mexico, Joel R. Poinsett, to take Anderson's place on the mission.[121]

In February, the congress still had not reassembled, and Sergeant wrote to Clay suggesting the possibility of its "total failure."[122] Clay urged his minister to hold on a little longer, reminding Sergeant that "the objects, which are contemplated by your instructions, are so highly important, that the President thinks their accomplishment ought not to be abandoned whilst any hope remains."[123] Any remaining hope quickly evaporated, though, as governments refused to appoint ministers to attend at Tacubaya. By the end of 1827, Adams had to regretfully inform Congress that "the treaties concluded at Panama do not appear to have been ratified by the contracting parties, and that the meeting of the congress at Tacubaya has been indefinitely postponed."[124] The divisions within Latin America that had caused the congress to fall apart reinforced for Adams how important the ideas and ideals he had hoped to instill truly would have been to the long-term stability of the American continents.

Adams had emerged victorious from his showdown with the U.S. Congress—the mission approved and all attempts to limit its scope defeated—yet because the Panama Congress accomplished nothing and American participation was essentially prevented by congressional delay, the opposition quickly claimed victory. While Sergeant and Poinsett waited in Tacubaya in early 1827, Representative

James K. Polk of Tennessee presented the mission to his constituents as having been a departure from the nation's traditional principles. "From the commencement of the Government down to that period," Polk argued, "our policy in relation to foreign Nations, had been distinctly marked and was well understood. 'A strict neutrality,' 'friendship with all Nations, but entangling alliances with none,' were our mottos." The proposed congress, "whose powers were undefined & whose secret objects were enveloped in darkness and uncertainty," had to be opposed. "The United States had nothing to gain" by participating, "but much to lose, by becoming members of such an extraordinary Assembly. I was not prepared to say that the policy laid down by Washington, and steadily pursued by his republican successors, a policy under which the Country had been prosperous and happy, should be abandoned for untried and hazardous experiments."[125] Polk and his allies, he claimed, had stood up against the Adams administration's attempt to abandon Washington's Farewell Address and extend the Monroe Doctrine; within a couple of years this resistance would be the lasting memory of the Panama debate.

At the close of Adams's presidency, the supporters of the Panama mission attempted to publish Clay's instructions to Anderson and Sergeant in order to vindicate the administration. The episode illuminated the impressive force of historical memory. Robert Hayne dismissed this renewed attempt "to convince the people that the minority was right and the majority wrong."[126] John Macpherson Berrien refused "to revive the discussion of a transaction, which was a political experiment in its origin—a political abortion in its result; which agitated the public mind in its progress; and of which the consummation may be sought in the decisive judgment pronounced by the American people on the project and its projectors."[127] In 1826, Congress sanctioned the mission, which had been generally popular with the American people, yet three years later that narrative had completely changed: only a "minority" supported participation at Panama and the populace had condemned the administration and its supporters for advancing the project. Clay's instructions were ultimately published, but they were overshadowed by the inauguration of Andrew Jackson.[128] For most Americans, the Panama Congress was best left in the past.

The significance of this historical memory rests not just in the lasting view it left of the Congress of Panama, but also in its impact on American views of the nation's principles of foreign policy. The Panama debate made abundantly clear that a significant portion of Congress rejected Adams's expanded interpretation of the Farewell Address and greatly feared the extension of any part of the Monroe Doctrine. Pointing to the idea of "entangling alliances with none," and everything that it had come to represent, these men legitimately argued that Adams was attempting to move away from its isolationist prescription and toward closer relations with Latin America. Despite their efforts, the mission's opponents did not deserve all of the credit for the way the American people remembered the Panama

debate. Adams's supporters never took any steps to dislodge or disprove the faulty assumptions and interpretations advanced by the opposition, and they never made a strong stand on behalf of the principles Adams advocated. Most failed to defend the noncolonization principle as a vital international pursuit, and no one argued for the legitimacy or necessity of Adams's interpretation of Washington's Farewell Address. Daniel Webster did issue an impassioned vindication of the Monroe Doctrine as having been declared in defense of American rights, and many others made the argument that participation would not represent a violation of American neutrality, but this was the limit of their defense. Congress authorized the mission, but the dominant arguments to emerge from the debate were those opposed to Adams and his principles. The subsequent failure of the United States to discuss these principles abroad and see them adopted in an international context only cemented the legacy of failure. Rather than gaining widespread adoption of American principles, Adams was left with the negative judgments of Congress.[129]

In the minds of most Americans, Washington's Farewell Address would continue to prescribe "entangling alliances with none," while the Monroe Doctrine would be largely forgotten.[130] By introducing the noncolonization principle as a prominent point of discussion at Panama, Adams attempted to put that principle forward as the salient legacy of the Monroe Doctrine. Had the mission succeeded in seeing noncolonization adopted internationally, the Panama Congress would have become the second chapter in the history of the Monroe Doctrine. Instead, the entire Doctrine was set aside without any explicit definition of its lasting importance, left to be taken up by later generations as a blank slate upon which to graft new meanings. And these new meanings would bear little resemblance to the expansion of the principles in the Farewell Address that Adams had originally attempted to create.

5

The Revaluing of American Principles, 1826–1850

In his first annual message to Congress in December 1845, President James K. Polk reintroduced the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 to the American people. As had become standard practice in these "state of the Union" addresses, which were delivered to the Capitol in written form rather than as formal speeches, Polk invested a great deal of space discussing U.S. relations with the rest of the world. After paragraphs of detail, Polk paused to take a broader view, observing, "The rapid extension of our settlements over our territories heretofore unoccupied, the addition of new States to our Confederacy, the expansion of free principles, and our rising greatness as a nation are attracting the attention of the powers of Europe." So concerned was the Old World with America's growth, he asserted, that "lately the doctrine has been broached in some of them of a 'balance of power' on this continent to check our advancement." While the United States was "sincerely desirous of preserving relations of good understanding with all nations," it could not "in silence permit any European interference on the North American continent." Polk boldly proclaimed that "should any such interference be attempted," the United States would be "ready to resist it at any and all hazards." Polk reminded his audience in Congress and around the world that the United States had "never interfered with the relations subsisting between other governments. We have never made ourselves parties to their wars or their alliances; we have not sought their territories by conquest; we have not mingled with parties in their domestic struggles; and believing our own form of government to be the best, we have never attempted to propagate it by intrigues, by diplomacy, or by force." This was the course navigated by the United States under the guidance of Washington's Farewell Address and Jefferson's reconceptualization of it.[1]

Employing the doctrine of two spheres, Polk claimed for "this continent a like exemption from European interference." The American people could not "view with indifference attempts of European powers to interfere with the independent action of the nations on this continent. . . . We must ever maintain the principle

that the people of this continent alone have the right to decide their own destiny." Alluding to the United States' recent annexation of Texas, Polk asserted that should any people, "constituting an independent state, propose to unite themselves with our Confederacy, this will be a question for them and us to determine without any foreign interposition. We can never consent that European powers shall interfere to prevent such a union because it might disturb the 'balance of power' which they may desire to maintain upon this continent." Polk also quoted directly from the noncolonization principle and promised that it would be applied "with greatly increased force should any European power attempt to establish any new colony in North America." According to Polk, "The reassertion of this principle . . . is at this day but the promulgation of a policy which no European power should cherish the disposition to resist." Polk did not intend to challenge the "existing rights of every European nation," but he maintained that "it is due alike to our safety and our interests . . . that it should be distinctly announced to the world as our settled policy that no future European colony or dominion shall with our consent be planted or established on any part of the North American continent."[2]

While Polk framed these declarations as a simple restatement of the Monroe Doctrine, in reality they represented something much different. Polk reasserted the Doctrine as a guiding and "settled" policy of the United States, and while its expression was limited to North America, the region most directly connected to U.S. interests and subject to U.S. influence, this version of the Monroe Doctrine contained a much more aggressive warning to Europe to keep out of American affairs and out of the United States' way. Moreover, this version of the Monroe Doctrine represented a significant departure both from Polk's earlier opposition to the Doctrine during the Panama Congress debates and from the central precepts of U.S. foreign policy as enunciated in Washington's Farewell Address.

In the Panama Congress debate, Americans reaffirmed their attachment to George Washington and his Farewell Address, but the influence of "entangling alliances with none" restricted their view of America's relationship with the rest of the world. By the 1840s, this understanding of the Farewell Address had become largely incompatible with the rising spirit of Manifest Destiny and its call for rapid territorial expansion, a spirit that Polk wholeheartedly endorsed. Polk's revived Monroe Doctrine was as much a renewed warning to Europe as it was an effort to break the United States away from the strict foreign-policy limitations imposed by Jefferson's reconceptualization of the Farewell Address. Several generations of Americans had regarded adherence to this understanding of the Farewell Address as the critical reason for U.S. growth and prosperity; by the end of Polk's presidency, a growing number of Americans saw these principles as the main obstacle.

The Washington Centennial

One of the unfortunate side effects of the heightened partisanship that emerged during the Panama debate was that it masked the large areas of agreement that existed between the foreign policies of John Quincy Adams and those of his successor, Andrew Jackson. The two presidents faced the same basic foreign-policy challenges and, with the exception of the Panama Congress, pursued similar solutions. Among these challenges were the maintenance of peace with an increasingly fractious Latin America that was being subjected to the political and economic influence of Great Britain and France; longstanding boundary disputes with Mexico over Texas and with Britain over Maine and Oregon; claims of U.S. merchants against Latin America and Europe dating as far back as the Napoleonic wars; and the desire to purchase Texas from Mexico. In responding to all of these issues, both administrations were guided by their interpretations of the foreign-policy principles enunciated by George Washington in his Farewell Address.

The Panama debate notwithstanding, a similarity in approach and principle extended to the Monroe Doctrine as well. Jackson's foreign-policy pronouncements revealed the first hints of the Doctrine's reemergence as a guiding foreign-policy ideal. In Jackson's annual message to Congress in December 1832, he praised the nation for maintaining "a state of prosperity and peace" with the rest of the world and ascribed it to "a wise attention to the parting advice of the revered Father of his Country on this subject, condensed into a maxim for the use of posterity by one of his most distinguished successors—to cultivate free commerce and honest friendship with all nations, but to make entangling alliances with none. A strict adherence to this policy has kept us aloof from the perplexing questions that now agitate the European world and have more than once deluged those countries with blood."[3] Jackson recognized Thomas Jefferson's authorship of "entangling alliances with none," but still saw it as a direct outgrowth and distillation of Washington's Farewell Address.

Aside from the fact that presidents were still proclaiming their faithfulness to the Farewell Address nearly four decades after its publication, Jackson's discussion of the Address was unremarkable. However, Jackson's effort later in the message to concretely spell out the meaning of U.S. abstention from the European sphere does stand out. Jackson clarified that when he discussed events taking place in foreign nations, he did so only "in cases where those events affect our political relations with them, or to show their operation on our commerce. Further than this it is neither our policy nor our right to interfere. Our best wishes on all occasions, our good offices when required, will be afforded to promote the domestic tranquillity and foreign peace of all nations with whom we have any intercourse. Any intervention in their affairs further than this, even by the expression of an official opinion,

is contrary to our principles of international policy, and will always be avoided."[4] While Jackson was only reiterating one half of the doctrine of two spheres, his repeated references to the idea of nonintervention illustrated that he was thinking about the separation between American and European interests in stronger terms than had presidents serving before Monroe set out his Doctrine.

Jackson's profession of loyalty to the Farewell Address in this particular message to Congress was probably motivated at least in part by the centennial celebration of Washington's birth that had taken place at the beginning of 1832. Americans had continued to commemorate Washington's birthday as an important holiday even after the decline of the Federalists and the Washington Benevolent Societies. As those groups lost their stranglehold on public perceptions of Washington, he quickly reemerged as a national figure unconnected with partisanship. Birthday celebrations were sponsored by civic and fraternal organizations as well as city and state governments, and played an important role in refreshing American interest in and devotion to Washington's precepts. In many cases, these events had a greater impact on the public's attachment to Washington than did national debates, such as the one surrounding the Panama Congress. As in earlier times, festivities for Washington's birthday still usually centered around a public address but also often featured prayers and sermons, dinners, parades, and even dances. For a people accustomed to elaborate celebrations of Washington's birth, the occasion of his one-hundredth birthday in 1832 prompted efforts to go to new and greater lengths.

Additional pomp was especially noticeable in major cities. In Philadelphia, celebrations were planned to continue from morning to night, but the highlight of the day was a grand procession featuring virtually every important (and unimportant) city and state official, large swaths of the local military, and representatives from a plethora of regional trade associations.[5] In New York City, the day began at sunrise with a gun salute fired by Revolutionary War veterans in the Veteran Company of Artillery and continued with a "national salute to be fired at the Battery at noon, and such other military display . . . *as the season will permit.*" The day also featured a procession to the Middle Dutch Church for an oration by Maj. Gen. Morgan Lewis, a Revolutionary War veteran; a reception with the mayor; and ended with a "Military and Civic Ball" in the evening.[6] In Washington, DC, the first president was honored by a public dinner presided over by Senator Daniel Webster and attended by senators, congressmen, judges, and other distinguished guests.[7]

It is through the oratory offered at such events that the modern observer can best appreciate how central the Farewell Address was to Americans' admiration of Washington and their conception of the United States' place in the world. In Lexington, Kentucky, for example, physician Charles Caldwell announced, "We are assembled to unite, in sentiment, with millions of our fellow-citizens, in a festive act, which the nation honors, and all enlightened freemen will learn to revere. We are pledged to perform our part, however humble, with suitable feelings, and in such

fitness of style and manner as we can attain, in the great Jubilee of the first Centennial Anniversary of the Birth-day of Washington." This was an important day for the nation, a day when millions of Americans would unite in spirit to honor the Father of their Country. On this day of national significance, Caldwell extolled the virtues Washington had displayed during his life, and explained their ongoing contribution to the progress and development of the nation even decades after his death. Such progress could be maintained only as long as the states continued "to be governed on the same principles, which shed such a lustre on the administration of Washington, and are so forcibly inculcated in his Farewell Address."[8]

Speaking before the Massachusetts state legislature, Francis C. Gray, a lawyer and former personal secretary of John Quincy Adams, praised the "system of administration established by [Washington], and the main principles both of foreign and domestic policy which he laid down." These principles had "for the most part, been adhered to ever since by the American government, and have never been departed from without reason for regret."[9] In Nashville, Tennessee, the Farewell Address was read aloud to the gathered crowd before educator and Presbyterian minister Philip Lindsley took the stage and remarked, "With what thrilling emotions have we not listened again to [Washington's] last paternal counsels, and yielded the conviction of honest hearts to the truth and wisdom of all his sagacious and ever seasonable instructions! . . . Nor can a more appropriate tribute of respect be offered to his memory, than the solemn recital, in the ears of the people, on each returning anniversary of his birth-day, of this precious valedictory. It is a textbook for our statesmen to study. . . . Let every youth commit it to memory. Let its maxims be engraven upon every American heart."[10] In Providence, Rhode Island, federal judge John Pitman reflected on the "rich legacy" of the Farewell Address. "It contains wisdom more precious than gold," Pitman asserted, as well as "truths which delight the moralist, piety which increases devotion, and a system of politics which may invoke the blessing of heaven, and conduct us to permanent felicity."[11] Throughout the country, speakers saw the centennial as the opportunity to remind the American people of the vital import of the Farewell Address to their country's past and future.

The most laudatory address of the centennial was Daniel Webster's, given at the public dinner in Washington, DC. Webster began with an exposition of "the maxims upon which Washington conducted our foreign relations," which were "few and simple." Washington "regarded other nations only, as they stood in political relations to us. With their internal affairs, their political parties and dissensions, he scrupulously abstained, from all interference; and, on the other hand, he spiritedly repelled all such interference by others with us or our concerns." Washington had repeatedly expressed his "deep fears, that foreign influence would insinuate itself into our councils," and he "never forgot that we had interests peculiar to ourselves." Webster hailed Washington's Farewell Address for being "full of truths, important

at all times, and particularly deserving consideration at the present. With a sagacity which brought the future before him, and made it like the present; he saw and pointed out the dangers that even at this moment most imminently threaten us. I hardly know how a greater service of that kind could now be done to the community than by a renewed and wide diffusion of that admirable paper, and an earnest invitation to every man in the country to reperuse and consider it."[12] For Webster, the Farewell remained essential, fully applicable to present conditions. New York businessman and former city mayor Philip Hone described Webster's speech as "one of the most beautiful efforts of the human imagination which I have ever seen. It is marked by a spirit of patriotism; it glows with images of exalted devotion to the high principles of the Father of his Country; it is worthy of the high fame of the orator and of the glorious subject which inspired him."[13]

Newspapers and printers around the country published editions of the Farewell Address to help commemorate the centennial events.[14] The day before Washington's birthday, the *Daily National Intelligencer* of Washington, DC, published in its entirety "the most valuable political text-book ever possessed by any country on earth—the Valedictory Address of George Washington." This act was "appropriate to the Anniversary we are about to celebrate." The editors trusted that "most of our readers are familiar with its contents, and . . . sincere followers of its precepts," but for those "who, either from their youth or their sequestered abodes, may not be so well acquainted with it," they were confident that it would "open a rich store of political wisdom and patriotic reminiscence."[15] Two days after Washington's birthday, the legislature of Pennsylvania passed a resolution declaring it to be "important that the principles inculcated in that [Farewell] address should be spread through the community, and facilities should be afforded for their diffusion." The legislature allocated funds for "three thousand copies of said address in the English and three thousand copies in the German language" to be printed "in pamphlet form for the use of the members."[16] Regardless of the language Pennsylvania's inhabitants spoke, the legislature wanted them to be able to read Washington's words.

The most interesting commemoration of the centennial was that planned by the United States Congress. Despite long-standing traditions in communities throughout the United States, Congress did not have a tradition of formally observing Washington's birthday. The House of Representatives made the first attempt to officially acknowledge the day in 1826 with a proposal to adjourn in honor of Washington, but the suggestion was voted down.[17] By 1832, given the magnitude of the centennial, there was considerably less resistance to the idea that Congress should play a role in the national festivities; however, less resistance did not mean complete acceptance. In early February, a joint committee was appointed to make arrangements for the day; among its recommendations, it called for Congress to adjourn on the 22nd and "to adopt the necessary measures to carry into effect . . . the removal

of the body of George Washington, and its internment in the capitol at the city of Washington; and that the ceremony be performed on the 22nd instant."[18] The committee wanted to memorialize Washington's one-hundredth birthday by moving his remains from Mount Vernon to the city that bore his name.

While some questioned the propriety of engaging in "Man-worship," as Littleton Tazewell of Virginia labeled it, during the debate over the celebration, it was the proposal to move Washington's remains that caused tensions in Congress to rise dramatically.[19] Unsurprisingly, Virginians expressed the most ardent objections to moving Washington's body. Richard Coke Jr. felt that both "he, as a Virginian, and the State of which he was a native, were on the verge of losing something in comparison with which all the riches of the world would . . . weigh but as dust in the balance." Coke "begged" Congress "to refrain from depriving them of that which was beyond all price." Foreshadowing the sectional conflict and Civil War that awaited the United States, Coke offered a dark vision of the country's future, observing, "There were at the present time, in the flag of the confederacy, the glittering stars of twenty-four sovereign and independent States; but the time might perhaps arrive, when, at some distant period, those stars should be dimmed of their original brightness, and present to the view twenty-four fragments of a great and powerful republic, warring the one with the other. At that lamentable time," Coke asked, "should Virginia . . . be forced to pay a pilgrimage to the remains of her own son, through scenes of blood, shed perhaps by kindred hands?"[20] Coke's prediction of civil war was a stark sentiment to be expressed in a debate over what was meant to be a joyous national celebration. Edward Everett of Massachusetts dismissed Coke's pleas for sympathy, noting that "though Washington was by birth a native of the colony of Virginia, he lived and died a citizen of the United States of America; united more by his labors, counsels, and sacrifices, than those of any other individual. The sacred remains are, as the gentleman well said, a treasure beyond all price, but it is a treasure of which every part of this blood-cemented Union has a right to claim its share."[21] Washington may have been a son of Virginia, but he was the Father of his Country. William Drayton of South Carolina opposed the relocation but rejected sectionalism as a rationale, declaring, "Whatever may be our fate hereafter, we ought to perform our duties now."[22]

In a refrain often repeated in future years, George Washington and his legacy were claimed simultaneously as the preeminent symbol of the union and as a primary source of pride and honor for Virginia and the South. Unlike in later years, however, in 1832 the sectional divide did not prove determinative and the plan to move Washington's body was passed with relative ease, although the much-anticipated event did not take place because of objections by Washington's heir. This refusal ruined the centennial for John Quincy Adams, who had been one of the most vocal proponents of the proposal and had been on the committee arranging the move. Adams had been elected as a representative from Massachusetts

in 1831 and remained in that position until his death in 1848. His election to the House marked a fundamental shift in focus for Adams away from foreign policy and toward the cause of abolition. For Adams, as it had for Coke, the debate over Washington's remains spoke directly to the deepening sectional crisis. As Adams noted in his diary on 22 February 1832, "The solemnities intended for this day at this place lost all their interest for me by the refusal . . . to permit the remains of George Washington to be transferred to be entombed under the Capitol. . . . I did wish that this resolution might have been carried into execution, but this wish was connected with an imagination that this federative Union was to last for ages. I now disbelieve its duration for twenty years, and doubt its continuance for five. It is falling into the sere and yellow leaf."[23] While Adams's prediction proved excessively dire, the debate over Washington's remains illustrated that the fault lines developing over slavery were affecting at least some Americans' views of George Washington, and, by extension, of his Farewell Address.

Texas, Slavery, and the Haphazard Reemergence of the Doctrine of Two Spheres

By the end of Andrew Jackson's presidency, foreign policy and slavery had become inextricably linked as a result of developments in Texas. Americans had laid claim to at least a portion of Texas as part of the Louisiana Purchase and had only begrudgingly renounced those claims as a condition of the Transcontinental Treaty of 1819. When Mexico achieved independence from Spain, Texas went with it, opening the door for a negotiated acquisition by the United States. President John Quincy Adams proposed a purchase price of one million dollars for Texas, and Andrew Jackson quintupled that offer, but the Mexican government was unwilling to sell. Mexico lost the region anyway in 1836 when its inhabitants—primarily immigrated Americans—rebelled and declared the independent Republic of Texas. When this new nation immediately requested annexation to the United States, most Americans understood it not as a foreign-policy issue but as a domestic question bearing directly on the sectional balance and slavery. Southerners saw a tremendous opportunity for economic expansion while many Northerners, especially those opposed to slavery and its extension, feared the first movement in a grand slave power conspiracy.[24]

President Jackson favored the acquisition of Texas, but recognized that the annexation of an independent nation was an issue fundamentally different from the purchase of territory from another country. In his final annual message to Congress, Jackson drew on Washington's Farewell Address in cautioning the nation to not commit the "great error of suffering public policy to be regulated by partiality or prejudice" in its dealings with Texas and Mexico. Concerned with

more than just regional tensions, Jackson feared that "The known desire of the Texans to become a part of our system . . . is calculated to expose our conduct to misconstruction in the eyes of the world. There are already those who, indifferent to principle themselves and prone to suspect the want of it in others, charge us with ambitious designs and insidious policy."[25] If Americans did not proceed cautiously, international observers in both Latin America and Europe would find it easy to accuse the United States of engineering the Texas revolution to bring about annexation. Jackson did not want to give foreign governments cause to distrust the United States or take action against it.

Jackson reiterated this cautious approach in a special message to Congress several weeks later. It was "known to the world," Jackson declared, "that the uniform policy and practice of the United States is to avoid all interference in disputes which merely relate to the internal government of other nations, and eventually to recognize the authority of the prevailing party, without reference to our particular interests and views or to the merits of the original controversy." Despite the U.S. desire for annexation, the revolution in Texas would remain an internal Mexican question until such time as Texan independence was an established fact. Only at that time could the United States officially recognize the government of Texas and engage in any negotiations for a cession of territory. "It becomes us to beware of a too early movement," Jackson cautioned. "Prudence" dictated that the United States "should still stand aloof and maintain our present attitude, if not until Mexico itself or one of the great foreign powers shall recognize the independence of the new Government, at least until the lapse of time or the course of events shall have proved beyond cavil or dispute the ability of the people of that country to maintain their separate sovereignty."[26] Only when independence was widely acknowledged or indisputable could the United States annex Texas while remaining above suspicion or reproach; an early move to acquire the territory could be seen as presumptive meddling. In the months following Jackson's message, Congress grew impatient with the president's caution. Unaccustomed to delays that were not of their own creation, some members of Congress decided to take action to spur Jackson. The House of Representatives appropriated funds for a diplomatic mission to Texas, and the Senate passed a resolution declaring its opinion that Texas had achieved a state of independence and deserved recognition. On the final day of his presidency, Jackson sent a message to Congress acknowledging "these proceedings as a virtual decision of the question" and his "duty to acquiesce therein." Jackson appointed a chargé d'affaires and officially recognized the Republic of Texas as an independent country.[27]

Most Americans and Texans believed that recognition was merely a precursor to annexation, but this proved not to be the case. The same concerns that had led Jackson to preach caution weighed heavily on his successor, Martin Van Buren. He was also troubled by both constitutional questions surrounding the annexation of

an independent country and the desire to maintain cordial relations with Mexico. Most important of all, Van Buren understood that Texas had become directly linked to slavery in the popular consciousness; any move toward annexation would divide the country along sectional lines, a development Van Buren sought to avoid for both national and political reasons. In his inaugural address, Van Buren pledged his allegiance to the nation's long-standing principles of foreign policy, describing them as having been "so uniform and intelligible as to constitute a rule of Executive conduct which leaves little to my discretion. . . . We sedulously cultivate the friendship of all nations as the conditions most compatible with our welfare and the principles of our Government. We decline alliances as adverse to our peace."[28] When Texas formally requested annexation in August 1837, Van Buren declined after only brief discussion in the cabinet.[29] Texas would remain at the front of Americans' minds, but it receded as a focus of U.S. foreign policy for the remainder of Van Buren's presidency.

Jackson and Van Buren had been anxious about international opinion when they decided to proceed with caution in Texas. They themselves, though, went to great lengths to avoid taking official notice of questionable acts by Great Britain and France in Latin America. Multiple instances of intervention or interference occurred throughout the Americas, especially during Jackson's eight years in office, that could have warranted a U.S. response under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine, but in almost all cases the United States turned a blind eye. The Monroe Doctrine, of course, had been "rejected" by Congress in 1826, and it remained largely dormant, at least officially, throughout the 1830s. Implicit references to the Doctrine crept into the occasional diplomatic dispatch, but, by and large, U.S. principles during this period were framed solely with regard to Washington's Farewell Address.[30] The one notable exception occurred in February 1839, in response to the French naval blockade of a portion of the Mexican coastline. The House of Representatives passed a resolution, introduced by Caleb Cushing, a Whig from Massachusetts, requesting information from the president on the country's role in the affair and its effect on U.S. vessels. What makes this resolution so interesting is that in a lengthy preamble it quoted extensively from the Monroe Doctrine (without citing Monroe by name), looking to justify interest in French actions under its precepts. All the more surprising, the resolution passed with no comment or debate.[31]

The resolution was an outlier, both in the interest it revealed in European actions in Latin America and in the principles it cited, but it did point to a shift that was about to take place in the official discourse surrounding American foreign-policy principles. Between 1840 and 1845, the year of James K. Polk's first annual message to Congress, American presidents and policy makers felt increasingly restricted by Washington's Farewell Address as defined by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization. They began to expand their sense of the sphere of American in-

terests and, as a result, began to express more expansive versions of Washington's principles. The doctrine of two spheres—a principle that John Quincy Adams had formulated in 1823 as the logical extension of the precepts of the Farewell Address and that had been rejected by Congress as endangering those principles in 1826—was recast in the 1840s to circumvent the rigidity of "entangling alliances with none." Even as policy makers expressed these principles during this five-year period, the Monroe Doctrine itself was only rarely discussed, and until Polk, no president mentioned it in a public message.

Van Buren's final annual message to Congress, in December 1840, provides the first important evidence of the reemergence of the doctrine of two spheres. Van Buren pledged the nation to "a rigid and persevering abstinence from all interference with the domestic and political relations of other States, alike due to the genius and distinctive character of our Government and to the principles by which it is directed." Van Buren further described the United States as being "bound by no entangling alliances, yet linked by a common nature and interest with the other nations of mankind."[32] This last statement simultaneously moved closer to and further away from Jefferson's reconceptualization of Washington's principles, since it both cited "entangling alliances with none" and acknowledged the common interests that the United States now shared with other nations, an idea at the heart of the doctrine of two spheres. President John Tyler, a Whig, completed Van Buren's circle in December 1842. "Carefully abstaining from interference in all questions exclusively referring themselves to the political interests of Europe," Tyler affirmed, "we may be permitted to hope an equal exemption from the interference of European Governments in what relates to the States of the American continent."[33] Tyler explicitly described two mutually exclusive spheres of interest: one for Europe and one for the Americas.

That the Tyler administration took an expanded view of American principles was not surprising. Tyler, who had been inaugurated as vice president in March 1841 and who rose to the presidency upon the death of William Henry Harrison a month later, inherited Harrison's cabinet, including his secretary of state, Daniel Webster. Webster considered himself to be a true disciple of George Washington and had been one of the only members of Congress to actively defend the Monroe Doctrine during the Panama debate. Webster repeatedly demonstrated a broader understanding of American interests and of the Farewell Address than most of his contemporaries. This was exemplified by Webster's approach to Texas before he became head of the State Department. When debates over annexation gained prominence in 1836 and 1837, Webster made no secret of his adamant opposition; however, unlike many others who shared this view and wanted to push Texas completely off the agenda, Webster still cared deeply about the new country's situation. Writing to a political associate in September 1838, Webster expressed relief that Texas had formally withdrawn its annexation request, describing it as

"an event, eminently favorable to both countries." Webster sincerely hoped that Texas would be "able to maintain her position" as an independent nation, given that "any connexion with a European State, so close as to make her dependent on that State, or to identify her interests with the interests of such State," would be "greatly unfortunate for us."[34] Webster recognized that the disposition of Texas would impact the United States.

Taking this idea a step further, Webster argued that it was essential to "remember the strong opinion, expressed by Mr. Monroe, that the U.S. could not consent to the recolonization of those portions of this Continent, which had severed the ties, binding them to a European connexion, & formed free & independent governments for themselves." As Webster saw it, "The spirit, & reason, of these sentiments, would lead us to regard with just fear, & therefore with just jealousy, any connexions between our near American neighbours, & the powerful states of Europe, except those of friendly & useful commercial intercourse." Webster did not want Texas brought into the union, but he did want it protected by both the doctrine of two spheres and the noncolonization principle. Webster wanted Texas to "keep herself free from all particular European connexion" and hoped that the United States would provide "whatever aid can be furnished to her . . . to enable her to maintain a truly independent & national character," as this "would tend to promote the welfare of the U. States as well as of Texas herself."[35] As Webster stated more succinctly in a different letter, "I go for *our* America—free as possible from all European entangling connexions."[36] Much as Webster had agreed with Adams and Clay in 1826 that these principles would have been useful in shaping U.S. relations with Latin America, he argued that they were essential for the preservation of an independent Texas and the defense of U.S. interests.

Two episodes illustrate Webster's application of these principles as secretary of state. The first of these episodes stemmed from the completion of the Treaty of Washington with Great Britain in August 1842. The Treaty of Washington, also known as the Webster-Ashburton Treaty, resolved a host of issues between the two countries, including settlement of the U.S.-Canadian border from the Atlantic Ocean to the Rocky Mountains. Article 8 of the treaty contained provisions calling for the United States to take part in efforts to suppress the international slave trade on the high seas, especially along the coast of Africa. Lewis Cass, a Democrat from Michigan and the U.S. minister to France, issued a strong protest to Webster regarding Article 8 that set off an extended transatlantic debate over the meaning of U.S. foreign policy and Washington's Farewell Address. The editors of Webster's diplomatic papers framed the debate as hinging on Webster's and Cass's "respective interpretations of the basic American foreign policy of isolationism. Webster's views seem to have been derived from Washington's Farewell Address . . . ; Cass seems to have relied more on Thomas Jefferson's 'entangling alliances with none' inaugural message."[37] In other words, Webster was

guided by his expanded view of Washington's principles, while Cass endorsed the Jeffersonian reconceptualization.

The crux of the debate was the provision in Article 8 that "pledged" the United States, according to Cass, "to concur, with [Great Britain] in measures for the suppression of the Slave Trade." Cass regarded this pledge as a departure "from our former principle of avoiding European combinations upon subjects not American," and he was highly critical of Webster for agreeing to it.[38] Webster was taken aback by Cass's letter—both by the opinion it expressed and by him sending it at all. Webster received it "as a sort of protest, or remonstrance," he replied to Cass, "in the form of an official despatch, against a transaction of the Government to which you were not a party, in which you had no agency whatever, and for the results of which you were no way answerable." On the question of American principles, Webster argued that the United States had not "departed in this treaty, in the slightest degree, from their former principles of avoiding European combinations upon subjects not American, because the abolition of the African Slave Trade is an American subject, as emphatically as it is an European subject."[39] As far as Webster was concerned, American interests extended across the Atlantic Ocean to seeing the illegal slave trade stopped.

Cass fundamentally disagreed with Webster's interpretation of U.S. interests and principles. Cass argued that "combinations of this kind are among the 'entangling alliances' against which the great statesman, whose exposition of our Constitution will go down to posterity with the instrument itself, warned his Countrymen."[40] Cass expanded on this point in a separate letter, asserting that America's "duties can be fully performed without any European combination, and that such a mutual arrangement is injurious and violates one of the articles of our political faith."[41] If the United States could accomplish the same goal without committing itself to another power, it should do so, especially when the cost was the abandonment of the nation's principles.[42] As John Quincy Adams had found before him, Webster's view of Washington's Farewell Address, expanded to meet the new challenges of the mid-nineteenth century, encountered resistance.

The other episode that highlights Webster's foreign-policy approach was his handling of the Hawaiian Islands. Representatives of the Hawaiian government had been dispatched to the United States at the end of 1842 to seek formal recognition of the islands as an independent country. While Webster and President Tyler deemed recognition unnecessary, the secretary did offer the Hawaiians a level of protection from outside interference. "The United States . . . are more interested in the fate of the Islands and of their government, than any other Nation can be," Webster announced, "and this consideration induces the President to be quite willing to declare . . . that no power ought either to take possession of the Islands as a conquest or for the purpose of colonization; and that no power ought to seek for any undue control over the existing Government, or any exclusive privileges

or preferences in matters of commerce."[43] Less than two weeks later, in what some historians have labeled the Tyler Doctrine, the president publicly reiterated and even strengthened this position. In a special message to Congress Tyler declared that while Hawaii was "far remote from the dominions of European powers," its "near approach to this continent and the intercourse which American vessels have with it" should be respected. It "could not but create dissatisfaction on the part of the United States at any attempt by another power, should such attempt be threatened or feared, to take possession of the islands, colonize them, and subvert the native Government."[44] Where Webster had made abstract references to other powers, Tyler aimed his declaration at Europe specifically. Given Hawaii's strategic importance as a way station on the route to Asia, the next burgeoning outlet for American commercial expansion, the Tyler Doctrine was clearly motivated less by altruism and more by self-interest. Regardless of the rationale, the Monroe Doctrine, at least in principle, was being expanded to include Hawaii, which Tyler's administration now considered to fall within the American sphere.[45]

George Washington's influence over the Tyler administration's foreign policy did not extend to Texas. The Republic of Texas had persisted as an independent country since 1836, despite ongoing warfare with a Mexican government intent on its reclamation. This messy international situation did not bother Tyler, who grew obsessed with annexation and became willing to abandon Washington's Farewell Address and pervert the doctrine of two spheres in order to see it accomplished. In his third annual message to Congress, in December 1843, Tyler made his first move by redefining the U.S. sphere of interest to include Texas. While the United States remained neutral in Texas's war with Mexico, "our own interests," he asserted, "are involved in the matter, since . . . we can not hope to escape the effects of a spirit of jealousy on the part of both of the powers." The warfare "waged between those two nations is calculated to weaken both powers and finally to render them—and especially the weaker of the two—the subjects of interference on the part of stronger and more powerful nations." This was an obvious reference to Europe. Such interference would surely be "detrimental to the interests of the United States. We could not be expected quietly to permit any such interference to our disadvantage." Given America's close and historic relationship with Texas, the United States was "bound by every consideration of interest as well as of sympathy to see that she shall be left free to act, especially in regard to her domestic affairs, unawed by force and unrestrained by the policy or views of other countries."[46] Only if left free to act could Texas choose annexation when the time came.

On the one hand, Tyler simply extended the same rhetorical protection to Texas that he had previously extended to Hawaii. On the other hand, given the threat of European intervention in these warring countries and the impact this could have on U.S. interests, it is curious that Tyler did not extend the same protection to Mexico as well. If anything, European intervention in Mexico would

have been more disadvantageous to America's expansion and long-term security than its intervention in Texas. As a defense of both principles and interests, for the United States to protect Mexico as well as Texas, and to refuse to take sides between them, would have been a course of policy more consistent with the Monroe Doctrine and Farewell Address than the stance Tyler actually took. Tyler was not truly interested in any of this, though; his sole motivation in citing the doctrine of two spheres was to safeguard and expedite the acquisition of Texas. In fact, Tyler's representatives were already secretly at work negotiating a treaty of annexation.

Tyler had two goals in mind when he expanded the American sphere to include Texas. First, he sought to prevent European interference, especially before annexation to the United States could be accomplished. The administration was particularly concerned about Great Britain, responding to recent rumors that that country was going to exert itself to see slavery abolished in Texas. John C. Calhoun, Tyler's secretary of state after February 1844, was a leading advocate of annexation to ward off British abolitionism. In April 1844, writing to Richard Pakenham, Britain's minister to the United States, Calhoun explained that "so long as Great Britain confined her policy to the abolition of slavery in her own possessions and colonies, no other country has a right to complain. . . . But when she goes beyond, and avows it as her settled policy, and the object of her constant exertions, to abolish it throughout the world, she makes it the duty of all other countries, whose safety or prosperity may be endangered by her policy, to adopt such measures as they may deem necessary for their protection."[47] In the case of the United States, the appropriate measure was the annexation of Texas before British influence could be felt there.

Tyler's second objective in extending the doctrine of two spheres was to use the specter of European interference to spur congressional action. When Tyler submitted the treaty of annexation to the Senate in April 1844, he raised the threat of losing Texas to Europe, warning that it was "inevitable, that if the boon now tendered be rejected Texas will seek for the friendship of others. In contemplating such a contingency it can not be overlooked that the United States are already almost surrounded by the possessions of European powers." If the United States did not act, Europe would, and the United States would suffer. Even if Europe did not intervene, the doctrine of two spheres justified the act of annexation. "Our right to receive the rich grant tendered by Texas is perfect," Tyler asserted, "and this Government should not, having due respect either to its own honor or its own interests, permit its course of policy to be interrupted by the interference of other powers, even if such interference were threatened. The question is one purely American."[48] The United States had to act before Europe intervened, should persist in the act if Europe threatened to intervene to stop it, and had the right to act regardless.

Tyler remained undeterred when the Senate rejected his treaty in early June. The Senate debate revealed deep concerns over slavery, sectionalism, and the potential for war with Mexico. Tyler then sent the treaty to the House of Representatives,

hoping that body would offer some sort of approval that might compel the Senate to reconsider.[49] It did not. In his final annual message as president, at the end of 1844, Tyler again asserted America's "direct interest" in the disposition of Texas. To assuage the fears of those concerned about European responses to U.S. policies, Tyler stated emphatically that in the event of annexation he did not "apprehend any serious complaint from any other quarter; no sufficient ground exists for such complaint. We should interfere in no respect with the rights of any other nation. . . . We seek no conquest made by war. No intrigue will have been resorted to or acts of diplomacy essayed to accomplish the annexation of Texas. Free and independent herself, she asks to be received into our Union. It is a question for our own decision whether she shall be received or not."[50] Somewhat ironically, Tyler used the threat of European interference to justify immediate annexation while simultaneously arguing that Europe would likely not interfere. Influenced in no small part by the election of Democrat James K. Polk to the presidency on a platform of national expansion, Congress passed a joint resolution authorizing annexation, which Tyler signed on his last day in office. When the Mexican government learned of the annexation resolution, it cut off regular diplomatic relations with the United States, recalling its minister from Washington, DC, and expelling the American minister to Mexico.[51]

In the two decades between the Panama Congress debate and Polk's inauguration in March 1845, American principles had undergone a marked change. What began in 1840 as the gradual reassertion of the doctrine of two spheres—a doctrine that had been rejected in 1826—was transformed into something much more aggressive and insidious once Tyler set his sights on Texas. This part of James Monroe's Doctrine became a tool to undermine that declaration's original meaning. Tyler's repeated assertions that Europe had no right to complain of U.S. dealings with Texas within the American sphere was correct (if naïve), but he disregarded the right of Latin America—and Mexico in particular, which still laid claim to Texas—to protest. Tyler sacrificed America's relationship with Mexico, jeopardized relations with Latin America and Europe, and risked domestic turmoil because he was too impatient to wait for a more appropriate occasion to pursue annexation. Even if European intervention in Texas or Mexico had been imminent, thus necessitating a U.S. response under the doctrine of two spheres, the most troubling aspect of Tyler's policies was his view of what that response should be. For Adams and Monroe, that response could be determined only when a specific threat had taken form; for Tyler, it was preemptive annexation to prevent intervention from taking place at all. Widespread doubts about the likelihood of European intervention made Tyler's actions and rhetoric all the more suspect.[52] By aggressively pursuing annexation and using a version of the Monroe Doctrine to achieve it, Tyler moved the United States away from strict adherence to the maxims of Washington's Farewell Address. And by catering to the slave interest, Tyler jeopardized the long-term stability of the union in the process.

James K. Polk and the Monroe Doctrine

Polk originally intended to reintroduce the Monroe Doctrine in his inaugural address of 4 March 1845. Through at least three drafts of his section on U.S. claims in the Oregon territory, Polk quoted the noncolonization principle and announced that "this principle [derives] a greatly increased force, should any European Power attempt to plant or maintain a colony on any portion of the country claimed and owned by the United States. Should such attempt be made, it is due to our interests, our safety, & the national honor, that it should be promptly & rigorously resisted. . . . It should be distinctly announced to the world, as our settled policy that no foreign colony will be permitted on any part of our Soil."[53] Polk removed all references to the Monroe Doctrine before delivering the message to Congress, but the language is strikingly similar to that used by Polk at the end of the year in his first annual message, with one important difference.[54] In early drafts of the inaugural address, Polk confined his application of the Monroe Doctrine to "any portion of the country claimed and owned by the United States"; in his first annual message, he broadened the Doctrine to include "any part of the North American continent."[55] This change in language illustrates that by December 1845 Polk had much more on his mind than just Oregon.

Two months earlier, Polk had relayed in his diary his intention to "maintain all our rights, . . . take bold and strong ground, and reaffirm Mr. Monroe's ground against permitting any European power to plant or establish any new colony on the North American continent."[56] Three days later, Polk confided to Democratic senator Thomas Hart Benton of Missouri "that in reasserting Mr. Monroe's doctrine, I had California & the fine bay of San Francisco as much in view as Oregon." With broader objectives came a broader reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine. Polk believed that Britain had its sights on the west coast of North America, and he wanted to ensure that the rest of the world understood "that the people of the U.S. would not willingly permit California to pass into the possession of any new colony planted by Great Britain or any foreign monarchy."[57] When they were first declared by Monroe and Adams two decades earlier, these principles were asserted in defense of a larger ideal; now they were being reasserted to preserve unimpaired America's ability to expand territorially across the continent.[58]

James Buchanan, the secretary of state, echoed Polk's concerns in a letter to the U.S. consul at Monterey, California. Buchanan stated that the United States "could not view with indifference the transfer of California to Great Britain or any other European Power. The system of colonization by foreign monarchies on the North American continent must and will be resisted by the United States." Buchanan urged the consul to "warn the Government and people of California of the danger of such an interference to their peace and prosperity," and "to inspire them with a jealousy of European dominion, and to arouse in their bosoms that love of liberty

and independence so natural to the American Continent."[59] Polk and Buchanan embraced American principles, but a specific view of those principles that served their larger territorial ambitions.

While Polk was candid, at least in private, about his foreign-policy objectives, the reasons for his adoption of the Monroe Doctrine as the appropriate mechanism through which to accomplish those objectives remains unclear. This is a pertinent question, because the available evidence strongly suggests that Polk disapproved of the Monroe Doctrine, despite his advancement of it in 1845. While the Panama Congress debate predates his presidency by two decades, the records of that debate provide the best indication of Polk's opinion of the Monroe Doctrine. Polk, then a member of the House of Representatives, came out strongly against the mission and the Doctrine. On 21 April 1826, Polk declared that "our policy with foreign Nations is the same now as that laid down by Washington, in his Farewell Address to the American People; that no circumstances had occurred in our foreign relations . . . which authorized us to change that policy, or to hazard the experiment of a new one." Polk then outlined the principles that he believed governed American foreign policy: "to observe a strict neutrality between all belligerent Powers; . . . we should 'preserve peace, commerce, and friendship, with all Nations, and form entangling alliances with none.'" Polk argued that the United States should not "'become parties with [the South American Republics] . . . to any joint declaration for the purpose of preventing the interference of any of the European Powers with their independence or form of Government,' or 'to any compact for the purpose of preventing colonization on the Continent of America.'" Polk further dismissed the Monroe Doctrine by announcing that he was "unprepared to depart from our settled policy."[60] These remarks are revealing, not just because Polk strenuously condemned the noncolonization principle, but also because he based that condemnation on Washington's Farewell Address. Washington's principles were America's "settled policy," and international negotiations involving the Monroe Doctrine threatened to jeopardize that policy. Until Polk proclaimed allegiance to the Doctrine in 1845, he had given no indication that his views had changed.

Despite the Mexican government's expulsion of the U.S. minister, Polk and Buchanan dispatched John Slidell in November 1845 to negotiate the purchase of California for up to $25 million. Mexico declined to receive Slidell, but the instructions Buchanan issued are fascinating in their hypocrisy. "The nations on the continent of America have interests peculiar to themselves," Buchanan explained. "The interests and the independence of these sister nations require that they should establish and maintain an American system of policy for their own protection and security, entirely distinct from that which has so long prevailed in Europe. To tolerate any interference on the part of European sovereigns with controversies in America; to permit them to apply the worn-out dogma of the balance of power to the free States of this continent; and above all, to suffer them to

establish new Colonies of their own, intermingled with our free Republics, would be to make, to the same extent, a voluntary sacrifice of our independence."[61] As members of the House of Representatives, Buchanan and Polk had vociferously objected to U.S. participation in the Congress of Panama, an international meeting at which an "American system of policy" could have been inaugurated. In reality, Polk's and Buchanan's motives were not as altruistic as their public messages and diplomatic dispatches sought to suggest. In pursuit of their short-term territorial ambitions, they wanted to see the continent unite behind the ideal of keeping European powers out of American affairs—the Farewell Address be damned. In effect, Polk and Buchanan wanted the Mexican government to adopt principles that would facilitate the acquisition of California by the United States.

While the development of Polk's foreign policy during his administration reveals that the president primarily used the Monroe Doctrine as a cover for operationalizing the ideal of Manifest Destiny that he more fully embraced, it is also clear that Polk's view of Washington's Farewell Address had changed greatly in the years since the Panama Congress debate. Throughout his presidency, Polk pursued a foreign policy much more aggressive than those of his predecessors. He engaged in brinksmanship with Great Britain in Oregon, and he allowed the United States to go to war with Mexico over the Texas boundary and over California. Polk identified what he wanted and figured out ways of getting it, regardless of the consequences. This brand of foreign policy was not conformable to Washington's precepts. War, domestic divisiveness, and international antagonism did not line up with the ideals of union at home and peace abroad. In 1826, Polk had urged against hazarding "the experiment of a new" foreign policy, yet that was exactly what he did as president.

On at least two occasions during his presidency, Polk was questioned about the seeming inconsistency between his presidential declaration of the Monroe Doctrine and the views he had expressed during the Panama Congress debate. Polk saw nothing inconsistent about his two positions. Responding to the question in January 1846, Polk replied, "There is no inconsistency between the speech of 1826 and the message of 1845. The subjects treated of at the two periods were of an entirely different character. My speech in 1826 was against forming 'entangling alliances' with other nations. My message [of 1845] asserted the great principle that we would permit no Foreign colonization or interference on the North American continent, and that the nations of this continent would regulate their own destiny."[62] Polk seemed to be splitting hairs when it came to the nature of his remarks and his evolving views on the Monroe Doctrine. When questioned again in January 1848, Polk confided to his diary that he had been "careful not to adopt or endorse all the opinions of President Washington in his message in 1796, because I did not approve them. Had I adopted them, a case of inconsistency might have been made out."[63] On the one hand, Polk's assessment was correct; in 1826 his objections to the

Monroe Doctrine were based on the Farewell Address, which he had not publicly discussed during his presidency. On the other hand, Polk overlooked the inconsistency between his earlier full-throated support of the Farewell Address and his new objections to it. Statements such as this demonstrate that Polk made a conscious effort to move beyond the Farewell Address during his presidency. However, this effort did not mean that he endorsed or approved the Monroe Doctrine.[64]

In January 1846, Senator William Allen, a Democrat from Ohio, sought to give legislative sanction to the spirit of Polk's first annual message. Allen introduced a joint resolution "declaratory of the principles by which the Government of the United States will be governed in regard to the interposition of the Powers of Europe in the political affairs of America." Polk's reassertion of the Monroe Doctrine had been necessary because of recent "manifestations of a disposition by certain Powers of Europe to interfere in the political arrangements of this continent, with a view to the enforcement of the European principle of the 'balance of power.'" As a result, the declaration of "the counter principle of non-intervention . . . was demanded by the manifest hazard to which such interference would inevitably expose the relations of peace now subsisting between the Old World and the New." Allen's resolution announced "to the civilized world the unalterable resolution of the United States to adhere to and to enforce the principle, that any effort of the Powers of Europe to intermeddle in the social organization or political arrangements of the Independent nations of America, or further to extend the European system of Government upon this continent by the establishment of new Colonies, would be incompatible with the independent existence of the nations, and dangerous to the liberties of the people of America." Any violation of the principle "would incur, as by the right of self-preservation it would justify, the prompt resistance of the United States."[65] In moving to obtain legislative approval for Polk's more aggressive version of the Monroe Doctrine—approval that the original never received—Allen sought to transform the Monroe Doctrine into a pledge of "resistance" should Europe intervene in America.

South Carolina Democrat John C. Calhoun was among the first to stand up and object to Allen's resolution. That Calhoun had been a member of James Monroe's cabinet when the Monroe Doctrine was formulated made him uniquely qualified to critique Allen's resolution. "No man could view with stronger feelings of indignation," Calhoun declared, " . . . the improper interference of the European Powers with the nations of this continent." How the United States should respond to European intervention was not the question before the Senate, though. Instead, Allen's resolution asked "whether we should take under our guardianship the whole family of American States, and pledge ourselves to extend to them our protection against all foreign aggression." Had the United States really "arrived at that state of maturity when we could wisely and effectually do so?" Calhoun asked. "Was this to be the understood and settled policy of our Government? If so, it would

become necessary to pursue a different course from that we have heretofore adopted." In fact, he asserted, it would require the abandonment of Washington's Farewell Address and America's traditional foreign-policy principles. Given that Allen's resolution expressed the same sentiments contained in Polk's annual message, why should they not "be satisfied with this announcement?" Looking back to 1823, Monroe's original declarations "had been followed by no action on the part of our Government."[66] Why was a greater step now warranted, when the danger of European intervention was even more remote? Why commit to a departure from America's long-standing principles when no such commitment was necessary?

Allen and Calhoun fundamentally disagreed on the meaning of, and appropriate response to, Polk's reintroduction of the Monroe Doctrine. Allen argued for the necessity of congressional action, predicting that "should Congress remain silent, that silence would be a negation of what the President has laid down."[67] In Calhoun's estimation, however, Allen missed the point. "It was the part of wisdom to select wise ends in a wise manner," Calhoun countered. "No wise man, with a full understanding of the subject, would pledge himself, by declaration, to do that which was beyond the power of execution, and without mature reflection as to the consequences. There would be no dignity in it. True dignity consists in making no declaration which we are not prepared to maintain. If we make the declaration, we ought to be prepared to carry it into effect against all opposition."[68] Since the United States was not going to defend all of North America against European intervention, it should not offer the empty promise that it would. To give legislative sanction to that declaration represented not only the abandonment of traditional principles but also a doubling down on a foolhardy and dangerous foreign policy.

The Senate tabled the resolution until the end of January, when Allen called it back up and Lewis Cass waded into the debate. Cass saw the resolution as timely both for its larger significance and for its practical bearing on America's more immediate future. Recalling Monroe's declaration in 1823 and the reality of the past twenty years, Cass noted that "no response was made to [the declaration] by Congress," and for this reason it had "remained a dead letter upon the history of our intercourse with other nations." In the present case, Congress could not afford to ignore Polk's "assertion of a great principle—of an everlasting principle—of the right of the independent nations upon this hemisphere to be free from the control of the powers of Europe." This principle was an "assertion by the oldest of the family of nations upon this continent, made by one for the benefit of all." Expressing a train of thought that would gain great momentum in succeeding years, Cass argued, "We are young, but we are every day becoming stronger as we become older. Time is dealing well by us. What we now want is to prevent any future pretence that by our acquiescence we have recognized this new-fangled doctrine of interference. Let us say to the world, we have no lot nor part in it." While he did not frame his argument with regard to Washington's Farewell Address, Cass used Washington's logic,

arguing that the United States had reached a point in its development where it could begin to dictate its own expectations to Europe and where it could defend itself if those expectations were not respected. The only way to confirm the significance of Polk's declarations and to make Europe respect them—the only way to protect them from becoming "as barren as was that of Mr. Monroe"—was for Congress to sanction them.[69] Interestingly enough, while Cass clearly endorsed Polk's Monroe Doctrine, he also inadvertently undermined Polk's justification for issuing it. Polk had authorized his use of the Doctrine on the grounds that it constituted America's "settled policy," but Cass acknowledged the more legitimate view that the Doctrine had been a "dead letter."

For Allen, Cass, and Calhoun, the core disagreement boiled down to the wisdom of a broad and general declaration of new American policy and principles. Allen believed it essential for the United States to take decisive action immediately. "Interference should cease; it must cease," Allen thundered. It was better that they "tell Europe calmly and mildly in the form of those resolutions, at the beginning, as by a declaration of war" after intervention had occurred, that the "sovereigns of Europe could not be allowed to interfere in the affairs of this continent."[70] Cass viewed passage of the resolution as a more moderate step. "The principle for which I contend is this," he calmly stated: "by such a declaration as that contemplated in the resolution, we would merely place our protest on record, not being thereby bound to any definite course of action, but being left free to maintain neutrality or actively engage in enforcing the principle, as we might see fit."[71] By endorsing Polk's principles, he argued, Congress would simply be granting the president the ability to enforce them or not as U.S. interests demanded.

Calhoun did not see eye to eye with either Allen or Cass. "Would it not be better," Calhoun asked, "to wait for the emergency in which we would have sufficient interest to interfere, and sufficient power to make that interference influential? . . . Will mere vaporing bravado have any practical effect? No." Europe would intervene or not based on its own interests and abilities, regardless of Polk's declarations or Congress's endorsement of them. It would be far wiser to "meet each particular case by itself, and according to its own merits, always taking care not to assert our rights until we feel ourselves able to sustain our assertions."[72] Instead of declaring a principle and then later deciding whether or not to enforce it, Calhoun argued, let Polk's message stand as the warning to Europe and then decide on the appropriate response to European aggression once such a response was needed. Many Americans had backed away from the Monroe Doctrine and condemned the Panama mission because both were seen as pledging the United States to foreign policies that ultimately might not serve American interests. Polk, Allen, and Cass sought to follow the same course the president had previously condemned. Calhoun's argument ultimately won the day, if only informally, when Allen's resolution was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, never to be seen again.[73]

The gravity with which Polk's supporters in Congress took his use of the Monroe Doctrine is fascinating, given Polk's abandonment of its principles almost as soon as he announced them. During his presidential campaign, Polk had laid claim to all of Oregon with the motto of "fifty-four forty or fight!" After the election, Polk and his all-Oregon supporters (primarily Northern Democrats) claimed that allowing Great Britain to control any portion of the Oregon territory was tantamount to consenting to British colonization of North America, in direct violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Whigs and Southern Democrats flatly rejected as absurd any suggestion that British occupation of Oregon would constitute colonization. After all, the United States and Britain had occupied the territory jointly since 1818 through an agreement that recognized the legitimacy of the claims of both countries. In June 1846, Polk violated his own assertion of the Monroe Doctrine, his campaign slogan, and the trust of his congressional backers, when he agreed to split the Oregon territory along the 49th parallel. The noncolonization principle mattered deeply to Polk—right up to the moment that it did not.

Polk's strong belief in Manifest Destiny expressed itself most clearly through his application of the Monroe Doctrine in California. Polk remained adamant that Britain be kept away from California, not out of respect for Mexico's territorial sovereignty, but so that the United States could one day possess it. Before the Mexican-American War, James Buchanan, issued instructions to U.S. agents in California and Mexico that cited both the noncolonization principle and the doctrine of two spheres as grounds for warding off British interference.[74] When the war was in its closing stages and negotiations were under way to restore peace and secure the Mexican Cession of California and New Mexico, Polk ramped up his rhetoric concerning the Monroe Doctrine to ensure that nothing would hinder a final victory for Manifest Destiny. In his third annual message to Congress, Polk pointed to "the principle avowed by President Monroe in 1824, and reaffirmed in my first annual message," and threatened to involve the United States in other "wars more expensive and more difficult than that in which we are now engaged" should that principle be violated.[75] In California, as in Oregon, Polk was less interested in upholding the Monroe Doctrine as a statement of fundamental foreign-policy principles than he was in holding off the British so that Manifest Destiny could have its day.[76]

For regions outside the Pacific Coast of North America, Polk only selectively chose to apply the Monroe Doctrine. The administration repeatedly overlooked European violations of the Doctrine in Latin America and actively ignored a call to enforce the Monroe Doctrine in Argentina from its own agent there.[77] In light of Polk's willingness to not apply the Monroe Doctrine consistently as a principle, it was probably a good thing that Allen's resolution failed. One region where Polk did choose to concern himself was the Isthmus of Panama. In the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty of 1846, the United States pledged to defend the sovereignty of New Grenada over the isthmus. This was exactly the kind of pledge that Polk had

condemned in 1826. Polk recognized that the treaty conflicted with U.S. principles, but it was not the Monroe Doctrine that bothered him. "Serious doubts were entertained" in the cabinet, Polk noted, "whether this stipulation was consistent with our long-settled policy to 'cultivate friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'"[78] The treaty was unquestionably a violation of contemporary understandings of Washington's Farewell Address. For this reason, Polk considered withholding the treaty from the Senate, but ultimately he put it forward with a series of rationales justifying the entangling alliance that would be created.[79]

Polk's final attempt to use the Monroe Doctrine to justify a change in U.S. foreign policy was also his most daring. On 29 April 1848, Polk used the doctrine of two spheres to seek congressional authorization for a potential U.S. intervention in the Mexican state of Yucatan. Since mid-February, Yucatan's commissioner to the United States, Justo Sierra O'Reilly, had been pleading with Secretary of State Buchanan for assistance in an ongoing civil war in his homeland.[80] Polk remained unconvinced of the need for action until 25 April, when Buchanan relayed to the cabinet a communication from Yucatan's governing authorities requesting help from the United States, Great Britain, and Spain. As compensation for such assistance, Yucatan's government offered "dominion and sovereignty" over Yucatan.[81] Suddenly taking Yucatan's situation much more seriously, Polk announced to the cabinet that the United States "could never agree to see Yucatan pass into the hands of a foreign monarchy to be possessed and colonized by them."[82] The president instructed Buchanan to draft a message to Congress "placing the interposition of the U.S. upon the ground that it would be dangerous to us, and a violation of our settled policy, to permit either Great Britain or Spain to possess & colonize the country." To prevent this, the United States "ought to afford the aid asked."[83] Four days later, after perfecting the message, Polk submitted it to Congress.

Polk presented the war in Yucatan as "a case of human suffering and misery which can not fail to excite the sympathies of all civilized nations." The "Indians of Yucatan" were "waging a war of extermination against the white race. . . . The inhabitants, panic stricken and destitute of arms, are flying before their savage pursuers toward the coast, and their expulsion from their country or their extermination would seem to be inevitable unless they can obtain assistance from abroad." Two months earlier, the suffering of Yucatan's inhabitants had barely registered for Polk, but now it was a humanitarian crisis worthy of U.S. action. Given this dire situation, the "constituted authorities" in Yucatan "implored the aid of this Government to save them from destruction." In exchange they offered "to transfer the 'dominion and sovereignty of the peninsula' to the United States." Polk pivoted away from humanitarianism when he pointed out that Yucatan had made similar offers to Spain and Britain. "According to our established policy," Polk reminded Congress, "we could not consent to a transfer of this 'dominion and sovereignty' either to Spain, Great Britain, or any other European power." After quoting from

the original doctrine of two spheres and his own 1845 reiteration of the noncolonization principle, Polk reminded Congress that "our own security" required "that the established policy thus announced should guide our conduct, and this applies with great force to the peninsula of Yucatan."[84] Polk's version of the Monroe Doctrine and the principle of nonintervention required the United States to intervene in Yucatan before Europe did. Polk's sudden concern for Yucatan was consistent with his earlier conduct. He did not so much care about violations of the Monroe Doctrine per se as he was concerned about possible European intervention in a place of strategic value for the United States, a place that some Americans had already identified as a potential site of future expansion.[85] Once again, the Monroe Doctrine provided a convenient cover for legitimizing what would have been unprecedented U.S. action.

Given the awkward mix of humanitarian and security concerns expressed by Polk, responses in Congress were generally divided between those who looked at the crisis in Yucatan as an isolated issue and those who placed it into the larger spectrum of American foreign policy and principles. In the first group, many were swayed by humanitarian concerns, while others feared the political impact military entry into Yucatan would have on U.S. relations with Mexico while the Mexican-American War remained unresolved.[86] In the second group, a not-inconsiderable contingent in Congress believed that the United States, on the cusp of a convincing military triumph over Mexico, now had an obligation to assert itself more actively on the world stage in defense of liberal, democratic, and republican principles whenever and wherever they should come under attack. In the case of Yucatan, they argued, American intervention not only would prevent a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, but also would uphold the right of Yucatan's leaders to determine their own form of government, free from European intrusion. Still others strenuously objected to any U.S. involvement, arguing that the United States had no right and no authority to intervene in Yucatan, regardless of how such action was rationalized. They pointed out the great irony of Polk using the Monroe Doctrine and its principle of nonintervention to justify U.S. intervention in Yucatan.

The House of Representatives considered the Yucatan question only briefly before referring it to the Committee on Foreign Relations, from which no report was ever issued. The most interesting remarks were those made by two Southerners, Isaac Holmes of South Carolina and Alexander Stephens of Georgia. Holmes wondered if the United States would actually "interpose between [Yucatan] and any other country that should attempt to give them the necessary aid and protection."[87] Any European assistance to Yucatan would be at Yucatan's own behest, rather than being, as was originally contemplated in the Monroe Doctrine, an unwanted intervention in the domestic affairs of an American nation. The Doctrine was being mobilized by Polk to thwart self-government rather than to protect it. For his part, Stephens was less concerned with Yucatan itself than the precedent

that would be set by U.S. action. He "was not prepared to say that this country should set out on a crusade to establish freedom in other Governments, and to throw the aegis of its protection over all the nations of the earth."[88] Such an interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine had been rejected in the wake of repeated Latin American proposals for alliance, and Stephens feared that aid to Yucatan would revive such expectations.

Over in the Senate, the debate that ensued was largely a continuation of the debate of January 1846 over the Allen resolution. As soon as Polk's message was read, John C. Calhoun took the floor to express his disquietude with the proposition that the United States should intervene in Yucatan, especially under the auspices of the Monroe Doctrine. Calhoun understood Polk to be asserting "the principle as deduced from Mr. Monroe's declaration, that when the people of any portion of this continent is placed in the condition in which Yucatan is, and either party should be compelled to apply to us for protection, we should interpose to protect them, to prevent the interference of England, or some other foreign Power." This was "a broad and dangerous principle, truly! It goes far beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration."[89] In spite of Calhoun's objections, Polk's message was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations, which reported a bill a week later authorizing the president to "take temporary military occupation of Yucatan."[90]

Debate over the bill consumed much of the Senate's time and attention over the next two weeks. Once again, though, it was the remarks of Lewis Cass and John C. Calhoun that best represented the arguments on each side.[91] Cass focused on the Monroe Doctrine in an attempt to demonstrate that its principles fully supported the proposed intervention in Yucatan. He reminded the Senate that the "declaration[s] of Mr. Monroe . . . contemplated no interference with European settlements on this continent. They merely looked to a prevention of the reduction of any of the free States of America to European dependence." The United States had to "act promptly and vigorously when we see any evidence of a desire on the part of European Powers to interfere with us." In Cass's estimation, "the war with Mexico . . . placed us in a position to enforce the policy laid down by Mr. Monroe. If we had not obtained a foot of land in Mexico, the war would be worth all that it had cost us, in the glory which it had shed around our country. No European Power will now venture an interference with us." Despite American strength, Britain had already "stretched her powerful arm so as to touch every cape and headland on every ocean," and recent intelligence indicated that there were already "four companies of British artillery in the southern portion of Yucatan." Cass did not know "what course England would pursue, but it was our duty to be on our guard against any interference which may be injurious to our interests. When she lays the lion's paw on Yucatan, it will be difficult to displace it."[92] The United States had an obligation to Yucatan, to its own principles, and to its own security to intervene before Great Britain could. Cass envisioned a

world where the United States lived and acted much more outside its own borders than had previously been contemplated by those committed to Washington's and Monroe's principle of noninterference in the concerns of other nations.

Calhoun took a contrasting view. Rather than seeing the Yucatan measure as providing an opportunity for the United States to achieve a positive good, he regarded it as "pregnant with consequences, both near and remote, which may deepyl [*sic*] affect the peace and interests of this country." Calhoun saw great value in the doctrine of two spheres when it was enunciated by Monroe in 1823, but he argued that it belonged "to the history of that day" and had ceased to be applicable shortly thereafter. Calhoun also rejected the noncolonization principle as justification for action, since British intervention in Yucatan would not technically be colonization—Yucatan had requested aid and Britain would be providing it. British intervention (or American, for that matter) could lead to colonization, but it was not a necessary result.[93]

Calhoun also looked beyond the specific crisis in Yucatan to balk at Polk's continuing use of the Monroe Doctrine as U.S. foreign-policy principle. Its tenets were "declarations, nothing more; declarations, announcing to the world that we should regard certain acts of interposition of the Allied Powers as dangerous to our peace and our safety." The Doctrine, he argued, did not contain "one word . . . in reference to resistance" to European intervention, but this had not stopped President Polk from holding forth "these declarations as imposing a solemn duty on him as Chief Magistrate to resist on all occasions; and not only to resist, but to judge on the measure of that resistance." More troubling, Polk had described the Monroe Doctrine as being "the settled policy of this country," to which Calhoun retorted that "declarations are not policy, and cannot become settled policy." Surmising that Polk "must mean that it has become the settled policy of this country to resist what these declarations refer to; and to resist, if need be, by an appeal to arms," Calhoun then asked, "Is this the fact? Has there been one instance in which these declarations have been carried into effect by resistance? If there be, let it be pointed out. Have there not been innumerable instances in which they have not been applied? Certainly." The best evidence in support of Calhoun's point was that "these declarations, under this broad interpretation, were disavowed entirely three years afterwards by the vote of the Republican party, when the administration of Mr. Adams endeavored to carry them out practically, by sending ministers to the Congress at Panama." Here was further evidence of the success of the Panama mission's opponents to control the historical memory of the debate; in Calhoun's version of events, Congress had not ratified U.S. participation, but instead the mission and its principles had been rejected. Calhoun's remarks also leveled another allegation: that Polk was turning his back on the nation's traditional principles of foreign policy.[94]

Calhoun offered a dire prediction should Congress continue on this course. The Monroe Doctrine "is not, and never has been, the established policy of the country,"

Calhoun asserted, "and if it should ever become so, to the wide extent to which these declarations have been interpreted to go, our peace would ever be disturbed; the gates of our Janus would ever stand open; wars would never cease." Calhoun believed that "what the President has asserted in this case is not a principle belonging to these declarations; it is a principle which, in his misconception, he attempts to graft upon them, but which has an entirely different meaning and tendency. . . . It goes infinitely and dangerously beyond Mr. Monroe's declaration."[95]

Cass saw the Monroe Doctrine as facilitating the defense of American security, while Calhoun saw it, especially when framed as aggressively as Polk had presented it, as dangerous to American peace and safety. Calhoun was arguing for the maintenance of America's traditional principles as defined by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization of the Farewell Address, while Cass looked toward a foreign policy not limited by the overly restrictive "entangling alliances with none." All of the gnashing of teeth over intervention in Yucatan proved to be for naught, as it was announced on 17 May that the whites and Indians had negotiated a treaty to end the war.[96] Much as Tyler had done with the doctrine of two spheres and Texas, Polk had attempted to use the Monroe Doctrine to legitimize preemptive intervention in international affairs. More importantly, the Yucatan episode revealed a growing tension between those who argued for the continuing centrality of the principles embodied in Washington's Farewell Address and those who believed that the United States had outgrown their limitations.[97]

The Nadir of the Farewell Address

While the Yucatan debate was an important, albeit abortive, epilogue to the Mexican War, exacerbated sectional tensions formed the war's more significant long-term legacy. Slavery had been thrust forward as an issue that was not only dangerously divisive but that also impinged on the consideration of all other policy questions, both domestic and foreign. Slavery and the sectional crisis are important in this context because they threatened the union Washington had placed at the heart of his Farewell Address. Indeed, throughout the 1840s, even as the Address continued to be publicly celebrated, it was increasingly obvious that unionist concerns and a growing ambivalence about America's foreign-policy principles were increasingly influencing popular interpretations.

This change in focus was evident in birthday celebrations around the country. At a ceremony held at Georgetown College in 1842, Joseph Johnson of Mississippi described the Farewell Address as containing "the golden treasure of wisdom, adorned with a perspicuity of thought and force and reasoning, which will do everlasting honor to the heart and intellect of its author; an address which has justly been celebrated to the present time, and will continue to be held up to our admi-

ration as long as wisdom finds its admirers and patriotism is regarded with veneration." Speaking at the same ceremony, John M. Heard of Maryland urged that the Address "be frequently rehearsed; every statesman, connected in any manner with government, should make it the object of his most serious attention; like the name of its illustrious author, it should be the first thing lisped by every babe of America."[98] In 1846, speaking at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, Lutheran pastor C. P. Krauth warned that "when we as a people shall cease to disregard [*sic*] the advice of our Washington, when a spirit different from that of his valedictory address shall prevail in our midst, when we trample upon the sacred truths which he inculcates, then may be written upon the Capitol of our Country, and all its ensigns, '*the glory hath departed.*'" Krauth also recommended that Washington's "advice be pondered well; and as the last counsel of him whom all delight to honor, commending itself by its wisdom and excellence, adopted to produce the highest good to us and our posterity, we should give heed to it, the more earnest heed, lest at any time we let it slip."[99]

The following year in Albany, New York, Presbyterian clergyman William B. Sprague proclaimed Washington to have seen "with a prophet's eye; he wrote with a prophet's pen; and when we see how much more he knew of the future and how much wiser he was in providing for it, than other great men of his age, even the greatest, we are ready almost to say, without a figure, that he was a prophet indeed." If the Farewell Address "be engraven on the memory and the heart of the young men of the nation, . . . till they shall have gone to their graves at least," Sprague proclaimed, "there will be a wall of fire round about our liberties, which will be proof alike against treason and faction at home, and jealousy and tyranny abroad."[100]

Celebrations in the nation's capital in 1848 took on a somber tone when, on 21 February, John Quincy Adams fell into a stupor at his desk in the House of Representatives, only to die two days later in the office of the House Speaker, Robert C. Winthrop. That Fourth of July, during a ceremony commemorating the laying of the cornerstone of the Washington Monument, and in an oration originally intended to be delivered by Adams on Washington's birthday, Winthrop cautioned that there had been no time "more important than at this moment where the two great leading principles of [Washington's] policy should be remembered and cherished." The first principle asserted "the most complete, cordial, and indissoluble Union of the States;" the second, "the most entire separation and disentanglement of our own country from all other countries. Perfect union among ourselves, perfect neutrality towards others, and peace, peace, domestic peace and foreign peace, as the result; this was the chosen and consummate policy of the Father of his Country."[101] The union and neutrality, just as Washington would have wanted.

As these passages demonstrate, public celebrations of Washington continued to place a high priority on the importance of his Farewell Address to America's future, but they did not as frequently highlight his foreign-policy maxims as the

reason for its importance. Other contemporary sources likewise reveal a diminished allegiance to Washington's principles by the 1840s, even aside from James K. Polk's significant move away from the precepts of the Farewell Address. Given the progress of the United States and its foreign policy, the priorities of the nation's leaders, and the impact of decades of interpretation of the Farewell Address as constricted by the Jeffersonian reconceptualization, it should come as little surprise that not all Americans saw the nation's destiny as tied to Washington's principles. Writing to John C. Calhoun at the end of 1843, the secretary of state, Abel Upshur, argued that "a dictum of Washington's suited to our infant condition had induced our people to believe that we have no interest in progress of other nations. But we should remember that the infant of that day has grown into a powerful commercial nation, whose interests are diffused over every quarter of the globe, and that the purpose for which the federal Government was constituted was to protect those interests."[102] Unknowingly agreeing with Washington's original intent, Upshur was arguing against the Farewell Address as limited by "entangling alliances with none."

In 1849, future diplomat William Henry Trescot wrote *A Few Thoughts on the Foreign Policy of the United States,* in which he argued that the country had outgrown Washington and his Farewell Address. "It is true that at the commencement of our existence, with the caution of a nation at once wise and weak, we resolved to stand apart from the entanglements of European politics," Trescot observed. "It is true that while every other vestige of his policy, has been trodden out by the press of new circumstances and strong necessities, the warning of Washington against foreign policy has been stereotyped into a political proverb." However, he asserted, fifty years later, the country had fundamentally changed; its interests and capabilities had evolved. Given that the United States stood "in such intimate relation to the colonial empires of the world, has it not a direct interest in their relation to each other; . . . has it not a right to be heard in all matters touching their mutual power? Is it not time, that by some distinct and unequivocal manifestation, it should declare its intention to participate in the counsels of the world?" Now was the time for the United States to assert itself on the world stage in defense of its interests. And now was the time for Europe to start listening. "There is but one principle upon which American intervention in the international relations of Europe can be justified," Trescot continued, "that wherever the changes among European powers are such as to modify the respective weight of its colonial empires, we are directly interested in the resulting balance of power."[103] Intervention by Europe to preserve the balance of power in North America had been strongly condemned by Presidents Tyler and Polk, yet now Trescot was claiming that same right for the United States, seemingly wherever European colonies should appear. Trescot's view of the Farewell Address as containing a "warning . . . against foreign policy" took the virtual isolation of "entangling alliances with none" to an extreme, but all versions

of the Jeffersonian reconceptualization contrasted sharply with this new vision of the role the United States could play in the world. This new view was at the heart of the Yucatan debate and would continue to define the struggle between those who desired to hold to America's traditional principles and those who wanted to move in a bold new direction.

By midcentury, the place occupied in the larger American consciousness by Washington's Farewell Address had changed; the Address was still publicly celebrated, but in many respects it had lost its universal support. This was true not only with regard to foreign policy, but also as it pertained to the preservation of the union. In January 1850, Henry Clay introduced a resolution in the Senate authorizing the purchase of the original manuscript of the Farewell Address, which was being put up for auction by the heirs of David C. Claypoole.[104] "To say nothing of the nature and character of that address," Clay professed, "who is there, sir, amidst the discordant and ungrateful sounds of disunion and discord which assail our ears in every part of this country, and in both halls of Congress—who is there that would not find refreshment and delight behind the Farewell Address of Washington to the people of this country?"[105] Many, including Daniel Webster, concurred in Clay's sentiments, but others questioned the necessity of the purchase. James A. Pearce of Maryland, in remarks lasting less than a minute, expressed the idea four separate times that manuscripts of this sort were "valuable merely as relics."[106] "What is there so sacred in the manuscripts of this Address?" asked Jefferson Davis of Mississippi. "It is known to have been the joint production of Washington and one, at least, of his Cabinet—not the emanation of his mind alone. I feel no such respect as has been here expressed for it, and cannot perceive how this manuscript is to effect such happy results."[107]

When the House of Representatives debated Clay's resolution, Samuel W. Inge of Alabama struck a desolate tone. "The glorious sentiments embodied by General Washington in his Farewell Address," he lamented, have " . . . faded away. These sentiments, which were so wisely, so patriotically expressed in that important paper had passed away, and were now lost sight of. Does public opinion respond to the sentiments contained in that Address? No. There is no such response. Instead of responding to the exhortations contained in that paper, our country throughout her whole extent is at this moment torn by dissensions, which threaten, in their progress and their termination, to tear down the existing fabric of our Government, and to destroy the most precious relic which has heretofore been preserved in the ark of the Constitution."[108] Joseph R. Chandler of Pennsylvania disagreed with Inge's opinion "that the spirit of this Address had departed among us. He thought it was not dead, but sleeping, and he agreed . . . that the influence of this paper would reanimate it." Believing that the purchase of the original manuscript would have useful consequences by drawing American attention back to Washington's wisdom, Chandler "sincerely hoped . . . that we might all go together to the perusal of this

Address, and emphatically dwell on that part which treats on the importance of preserving the Union, and the dangers which must result from its dissolution."[109] This debate, focusing on the manuscript of the Farewell Address rather than the abstract principles it embodied, encapsulated the ambiguous position the Address had come to occupy. For many, it remained an enduring statement of American ideals, but for a vocal minority, it was little more than a relic of the past.

The purchase authorization comfortably passed both houses of Congress, but by the time all of the political maneuvering had ceased it was too late. On 12 February 1850, Rev. Henry A. Boardman, a pastor from Philadelphia acting on behalf of millionaire book collector James Lenox of New York, purchased the manuscript for the sum of $2,300.[110] The loss of the Farewell Address because of petty and partisan disputes in Congress must surely have been seen as a bad omen by those who praised the document as a symbol of the union. Over the previous quarter-century, the Farewell Address had been held up as inviolable; its principles had been expanded to give it lasting efficacy; but they also had been dismissed as too narrow to meet America's new challenges and broadening interests. As Tyler and Polk perverted those expanded principles into something unrecognizable, the Farewell Address came to be little more than a tool for the celebration of George Washington the man. As the nation became increasingly divided, the importance of the Address even as a symbol of the union came to be largely disregarded.

The nadir of the Farewell Address was relatively short-lived. The moment of reanimation Chandler had hoped for arrived less than two years later, stimulated by the arrival of Hungarian revolutionary Louis Kossuth. American responses to Kossuth revealed that loyalty to Washington and his Farewell Address remained greater than the events of the previous decade had suggested.

6

"Washington or Kossuth?"

The Farewell Address in the American Mind at Midcentury

Speaking in New York City on 11 December 1851, at a dinner being held in his honor, Hungarian revolutionary leader Louis Kossuth presented his argument that America's long-standing principles of foreign policy were antiquated and were preventing the United States from assuming its rightful place in the world. "There can be scarcely any thing more dangerous to the progressive development, of whatever nation," Kossuth declared, "than to take for a *basis* that which is none; to take for a principle that which is but the convenience of the passing situation; to take for substantial that which is but accidental, or take for a constitutional doctrine that which was but the momentary exigency of administrative policy." Kossuth, of course, was talking about George Washington's Farewell Address.[1]

Kossuth had come to the United States to generate support for Hungary's recently quashed revolution against Austria. He was specifically looking for a declaration by the United States government that it would go to war to prevent a European power from intervening on Austria's behalf to put Hungary down, as Russia had in Hungary's original defeat in 1849. Kossuth believed that every nation had a sovereign right to determine its own fate without outside interference, and that this principle of nonintervention should be part of international law. Kossuth toured the United States for seven months, advocating this principle of intervention to defend nonintervention, and, while it is largely overlooked today, this tour was a watershed moment for the country. Kossuth's arrival set off a spirited debate in Congress over the fundamental nature of U.S. foreign policy, but this debate was not limited to the legislative halls of the nation's capital; Americans of all classes and political persuasions were drawn to Kossuth, the power of his oratory, and the cause he represented. Kossuth's visit was a cultural phenomenon: people traveled hundreds of miles just to see him in person and hear him speak. Most importantly, people throughout the nation engaged with Kossuth on his own terms, openly debating the merits of his arguments and the meaning and significance of Washington's Farewell Address to America's past and future. Kossuth's tour of the

United States, his central arguments and Americans' responses to them, and his larger cultural impact reveal a great deal about the place the Farewell Address occupied in the American mind fifty years after Washington's death. This episode also provides insight into broader popular conceptions of America's principles of foreign policy and the role the United States should play in the world. While Kossuth was ultimately unable to convince the United States to endorse the principle of intervention for nonintervention, he did succeed in producing the most significant reevaluation of Washington's Farewell Address to take place in the nation's history.

A More Interventionist Foreign Policy

After the victory over Mexico in 1848, a growing number of Americans began to urge the adoption of a more activist and interventionist foreign policy. President Polk tried to implement such views under cover of the Monroe Doctrine, but people became increasingly willing to express these ideas openly on their own terms. This impulse was expressed, for example, in some of the arguments made to justify intervention in Yucatan. These arguments were among the earliest strains of thought in what became known as the Young America movement. The basic premise of Young America was that the development of the United States by midcentury in terms of territorial and population growth, the maturation of political institutions, and the recently demonstrated strength of the nation's military, represented its transition from proverbial infancy and adolescence to manhood. Proponents of Young America, primarily Democrats, believed that the United States had not just the ability but also the responsibility to act internationally in defense of republicanism and liberal principles. The Yucatan debate in Congress is not typically discussed in relation to the rise of Young America, at least in part because liberal principles were not truly at stake, but the arguments and, more importantly, the leading proponents were consistent, such that the debate provides a revealing look into the early formation of the movement. Given their beliefs, those subscribing to Young America warmly received Kossuth's calls for the United States to move past its old modes of foreign-policy thought toward greater engagement with international movements.[2]

Of greater notoriety in the years preceding Kossuth's arrival in the United States were American filibustering expeditions into the Caribbean and Latin America. Some U.S. citizens, discontented with the unwillingness of the federal government to take a more activist approach to international, and especially hemispheric, affairs, chose to take matters into their own hands by outfitting private expeditions to invade neighboring islands and nations, most notably Cuba and Nicaragua. Those involved in these filibustering expeditions were often motivated as much by the desire for economic gain as by political ideals, but many Americans saw the expeditions within the context of the larger struggle over the direction of U.S. foreign

policy after the Mexican War. Private interventions in Cuba in 1851 generated so much national attention that President Millard Fillmore issued a proclamation disapproving of filibusters, and prominent Whig newspapers vigorously condemned them.[3] The *Daily National Intelligencer* of Washington, DC, for example, repeatedly condemned filibustering in Cuba in its editorials and, on 26 August 1851, argued that these expeditions were a violation of existing treaties with Spain. "This Government," the paper noted, " . . . would be bound by a regard to its own honor and professions, to compel its citizens to respect the authority of Spain so far as to abstain from all enterprises against its territories. Non-intervention in the internal administration of other Governments is the established policy of the United States, and universally recognised as such by every Administration of this Government."[4] Personal foreign policies of intervention threatened long-standing national principles, as well as the reputation of the United States around the world.[5]

Filibustering and Young America were but two outgrowths of growing tensions over the role the United States should be playing in the world. The first great challenge the nation faced in this regard was Louis Kossuth. American interest in Kossuth stretched back to 1848, when outbreaks of revolution throughout much of Europe captured the national imagination in the United States.[6] These revolutionary movements, acting in the name of liberal reform on a continent historically dominated by aristocracy and monarchy, were hailed in the United States as the dawning of a new era of republican government. Americans paid special attention to events in Hungary, where rebels fought for an autonomous existence from Austria and continued the fight long after many of the other revolutions had been quashed. At the center of Hungary's struggle was Governor Louis Kossuth, a man who most Americans believed epitomized all that was right and praiseworthy about the revolutionary movements on the continent. Kossuth, widely labeled a genius, was dubbed the George Washington of Hungary.[7] The Austrian government, realizing that it could not put down the Hungarian resistance on its own, called on the Russian military for assistance. On 11 August 1849, Kossuth abdicated in favor of Hungary's leading general and fled to Turkey; two days later, the revolution ended in surrender and defeat, largely because of Russia's intervention. Turkey soon took Kossuth into custody, where authorities held him under house arrest in order to somewhat appease the Austrians, who wanted him executed.

After his capture, Kossuth dropped out of public view but remained a subject of public interest, especially in the United States, where many people sympathized with the plight of his nascent country and condemned his imprisonment. The strength of this sympathy was demonstrated in February and March 1851, when Congress passed a resolution "to authorize the employment of some one of the public vessels . . . to receive and convey to the United States the said Louis Kossuth and his associates in captivity." Those who supported the resolution believed that it was the "wish" of Kossuth and his fellow exiles "to emigrate to the United States."[8]

For Congress to authorize the use of a government vessel to transport the rebels was unprecedented, and some observers in the United States and Europe believed that it represented an act of intervention in European affairs. Proponents of the measure countered that they were simply facilitating the emigration of a group of exiles to the United States upon their release from Turkey; they were providing transport for Louis Kossuth, émigré, not Louis Kossuth, revolutionary leader. This distinction would have been somewhat dubious if it were true, but unbeknownst to Congress, Kossuth did not consider himself a mere exile. During his house arrest he assumed responsibility for the continuation of his country's revolution, going so far as to reappropriate the title of governor of Hungary to himself.[9]

Turkey released Kossuth into the custody of the United States on 10 September 1851, when he boarded the USS *Mississippi* bound for New York City.[10] John C. Long, captain of the *Mississippi,* was under strict orders to keep his crew and passengers under control and to "'avoid the expression of any opinion . . . inclined towards any particular party or nation. It is the determination of the government to preserve our neutrality strictly. . . . [A]ny deviation from the foregoing order . . . will hardly, under any circumstances, admit of an excuse.'"[11] If Kossuth truly planned on settling into a life of quiet peace in the United States, such instructions should have been easy to follow, but Kossuth's behavior on the *Mississippi* made it immediately clear that quiet peace was not the future he had chosen. At every port, Kossuth courted the crowds that cheered both him and the United States for taking the side of European freedom, and in doing so he jeopardized American neutrality. The situation grew increasingly untenable until Captain Long allowed Kossuth to leave the *Mississippi* to travel to Britain, from whence he would proceed to the United States several weeks later on a private vessel.[12] These events, frustrating for both American authorities and for Kossuth, should have signaled to both sides that there would be difficult times ahead.

Kossuth docked at Southampton, England, on 23 October for four weeks of public speeches and private meetings. He felt that his time in England was vital for organizing a renewed revolutionary movement throughout Europe, and especially in Hungary. While his efforts at organization were largely unsuccessful, the trip to Britain still proved significant, both for the effect it had in the United States and for its impact on Kossuth's expectations for what he could achieve when he got there. Appearing before immense crowds numbering in the tens of thousands, Kossuth spoke out in defense of the liberal principles that had garnered him international acclaim in the first place. He also revealed for the first time that, far from looking to settle down, his purpose in going to the United States was to garner support for the Hungarian cause. At a speech in Manchester, Kossuth declared his hope that he would be able to enlist the United States in an alliance with Great Britain in defense of the principles of nonintervention and human liberty. Kossuth viewed American efforts to facilitate his release from Turkey as evidence of

the desire of the United States to stand up for his principles and for Hungary's right to an independent future. Nonintervention was the key to both. As Kossuth explained to his cheering audience, nonintervention meant that no nation had the "right to interfere with the domestic affairs of another country." A refusal to act when that principle was violated, and in the face of humanity's suffering, was not nonintervention, but "an encouragement even to despotism, to carry their victory of absolutism, which has gone so much too far already."[13] The implication, soon to be confirmed, was that Kossuth expected the United States to change its traditional foreign policy to support these new principles.

Kossuth did not settle on such a bold course on his own. At a dinner held in Kossuth's honor just days after he arrived in England, Robert J. Walker, a former U.S. senator and treasury secretary, expressed what Kossuth assumed to be U.S. principles. Declaring the liberation of Kossuth from his house arrest in Turkey to be the "first joint intervention of England and America in favour of freedom," Walker identified with Kossuth's principles and described "*non-intervention*" as "one of the doctrines taught by Washington, and all his successors." The United States, Walker avowed, "sympathised deeply in every struggle for freedom, but her government had never intervened to impose upon any nation any change in its form of government. America believed, that it was the right of every people to establish for themselves, such institutions, as in their judgment, would best promote their happiness; and that any interference with this sacred right, by any other nation, was unjust and despotic." Walker spoke passionately about the struggle between liberty and despotism raging in Europe and announced that "when England should be summoned to the support of the freedom of Europe, if she desired the aid and countenance of his country, it would be cheerfully accorded, and millions of his countrymen would come to the rescue of the cause of freedom. . . . The country would rise as one man, and flock upon their call to the standard of their forefathers." While the United States "would permit no intervention or espionage by European powers," at the same time "they were no propagandists, and had no desire to force their principles upon other governments. They had left, heretofore, the example of their success to propagate their principles, by that moral force, which is more potent than the sword or bayonet, when nations are permitted by non-intervention to choose for themselves." Seeing freedom and commerce as intimately linked, Walker expressed the hope that "nations should not be deprived of both, with American assent, by the armed intervention of despotic powers."[14]

Frequently interrupted by cheers and applause, Walker gave a very careful performance. He strongly and repeatedly endorsed the idea of nonintervention, and even went so far as to suggest that the American people would rise up to defend Europe's revolutionaries against future attempts to violate that principle. What Walker did not do, though, was endorse the principle of intervention for nonintervention; he did not commit the United States government to acting in defense of

that principle or to acting without British assistance. Walker's speech was designed to play to his audience and especially to Kossuth, but was nuanced in its approach to these questions. These nuances were lost on Kossuth, who was deeply struck by Walker's words. Kossuth believed that Walker spoke for the American people and government, and that the sentiments he expressed were tantamount to a pledge of American support for Hungary. When Kossuth departed for the United States on 20 November, he did so with a declared agenda and an expectation of its success.

Louis Kossuth in the United States

On 2 December 1851, two days before Kossuth arrived in New York City, President Millard Fillmore delivered his second annual message to Congress. "This country has been justly regarded as a safe asylum for those whom political events have exiled from their own homes in Europe," Fillmore stated, "and it is recommended to Congress to consider in what manner Governor Kossuth and his companions, brought hither by its authority, shall be received and treated."[15] Fillmore expected to welcome Kossuth as a political exile and not as a foreign revolutionary, but Congress was less certain of how it wanted to handle the Hungarian. Democratic Senator Henry S. Foote of Mississippi introduced a resolution calling for a formal reception of Kossuth that led to a lengthy and heated debate in Congress. Foote requested a "joint committee of the two Houses of Congress . . . be appointed . . . to make suitable arrangements for the reception of Louis Kossuth, Governor of Hungary, on his arrival in the United States, and to communicate to him assurances of the profound respect entertained for him by the people of the United States; and to tender to him, on the part of Congress, and in the name of the people of the United States, the hospitalities of the Metropolis of the Union."[16] Foote wanted this resolution of welcome to be passed immediately, as its terms were "exceedingly guarded, and can do no harm any way," but he encountered a great deal of resistance and was forced to withdraw it two days later.[17] New York Whig William H. Seward introduced a simpler substitute that stated, "the Congress of the United States, in the name and behalf of the people of the United States, give Louis Kossuth a cordial welcome to the capital and to the country."[18] Even this resolution was subjected to a strenuous debate and was not passed by both houses of Congress until 15 December.

Most of the debate over the welcoming resolutions focused on the principle of intervention for nonintervention as well as on the implications of an official congressional welcome of Kossuth for U.S. foreign policy and for international perceptions of the United States. Early in the debate, Joseph Underwood, a Whig from Kentucky, expressed the concern that "if we commence the system of complimenting foreigners for distinguished services in their own country in behalf of human liberty, there is no end; there is no limit to the exercise of this power,

from this time forth forever." Underwood feared that it was a short distance between bringing "your aid and assistance by words, before you must carry it out by deeds." He was "not for making idle declarations which we are not to carry out. If we do intervene by word, I am for intervening by action also. But I am not for intervening in any way. I think the soundest policy for any man, family, or nation, is to mind its own business and let the business of other people alone."[19] It was far better to remain silent than to offer empty platitudes.

John Macpherson Berrien, a Whig from Georgia, lamented that Kossuth "comes here for the purpose of propagating a political principle." Berrien worried that knowing "the object for which he has come," the rest of the world would be "much more authorized than they were . . . to conclude that the welcome to Governor Kossuth implies a pledge that we will interpose, if necessary, and in the manner he desires, for the protection of the Hungarian nation." Berrien feared that "such a pledge once given would be irrevocable." As had been made clear during the Panama debate twenty-five years earlier, in which Berrien participated as an opponent of the mission, international pledges were precarious. To counteract the perception of any pledge, Berrien proposed an amendment to the welcoming resolution clarifying "that it is not the purpose of Congress to depart from the settled policy of this Government which forbids all interference with the domestic concerns of other nations."[20] Whig Jacob Miller of New Jersey was likewise unwilling "to go to war on the Continent of Europe, by money, men, and political influence, for the cause of human liberty there," or to "put an end to that wise policy which we have practised from the days of Washington to this hour." Miller was one of several senators to hold up the United States as an example to the world of the success of republicanism. "The altar of our liberty has its own temple. It is here," Miller declared. "Here let the oppressed of every land come to worship. . . . Let them come; but let us not take away that altar from our own temple and carry it off into the wilderness of European Revolution, there to be taken by the Philistines, or its fires to be quenched forever beneath an ocean of blood. No, sir; it is here that our duty is to be performed." The United States did have an important role to play in the progress of liberty around the world—but it was at home as a shining beacon and not on foreign soil as a vindicating army.[21]

Charles Sumner, a freshman senator from Massachusetts, delivered his first speech in the Senate in an attempt to focus attention away from Kossuth's principles and onto the man himself. Sumner's fellow senators had repeatedly connected the welcoming resolution "with the critical question of intervention by our country in European affairs," and Kossuth's own speeches illustrated that "such intervention is sought by our guest." Qualms about the implications for U.S. intervention from welcoming Kossuth were overstated, though, because "*no such intervention is promised or implied by the resolution.* It does not appear on the face of the resolution; it cannot, in any way, be inferred from the resolution. It can be found only in

the imagination, in the anxieties, or in the fears of Senators. It is a mere ghost, and not a reality. As such we may dismiss it." Sumner, a member of the Free Soil Party and an avowed opponent of slavery, was eager to welcome Kossuth to American shores as a tribute to the cause of human liberty, and wholeheartedly supported the resolution. Since intervention was the talk of the day, Sumner emphasized that in dismissing interventionist concerns in this debate he was in no way "encouraging any idea of armed intervention in European affairs." Could Sumner address Kossuth directly, he would say to him "with the respectful frankness of a friend: ' . . . respect our ideas, as we respect yours. Do not seek to reverse our traditional, established policy of Peace. *Do not, under the too plausible sophism of upholding non-intervention, provoke American intervention on distant European soil.* Leave us to tread where Washington points the way.'"[22] Sumner was arguing for the continued centrality of Washington's Farewell Address to America's foreign relations.

In response to Sumner, Robert Stockton, a New Jersey Democrat, presented the other dominant view of the Farewell Address in the aftermath of the Mexican War, which understood the Jeffersonian reconceptualization as being overly restrictive. Stockton stated that he was not "one of those who think that no change will ever be made in the principles of national policy which govern our foreign relations; on the contrary, I feel assured that the wonderful growth and development of the United States . . . will demand a modification of our national policy, in various respects different from that which prevailed in the infancy of the country." Recalling "the rigid neutrality of the Washington administration," Stockton argued that "wise and just as it then was, [it] would not now (if a similar belligerent State of the world existed) be possible." Whereas in the 1790s the United States had had to accept insults and injustices from abroad in order to preserve peace, in 1851 "no American statesman can now contemplate any condition of the world, or any principle of public policy which would for a moment permit the United States to submit to any indignity from any power on earth. We acknowledge no superiors." The point of Stockton's speech was not to endorse a rugged intervention on Hungary's behalf, but rather to suggest that a full-throated endorsement of Washington's Farewell Address was not always going to be the appropriate response to foreign-policy questions.[23]

Fellow Democrat Stephen A. Douglas, without necessarily intending to, issued the strongest defense of the Farewell Address as originally conceived by Washington. Other senators strenuously declared their opposition to American interference abroad, but Douglas would make no guarantee, as he wanted to "judge of the case when it arises." A preemptive declaration "that the United States will not interfere in vindication of the laws of nations" would be tantamount to giving American "consent that Russia may interfere, in violation of the international code, to destroy the liberties of an independent nation." As much as Douglas opposed granting "license to the absolute governments of Europe," it did not mean that he would ultimately support an interventionist stance either. "Such a declaration," he warned, "might be

looked upon as a blustering, empty threat." Douglas's argument boiled down to the assertion that there was no need to make a declaration either way until there was a need to act. Instead, Douglas "would have this Republic retain within herself the control over her own action, so that we may be in condition to do whatever our interests and duty may require when the time for action comes." Douglas had keyed in on one of the most important, but by then largely forgotten, aspects of the Farewell Address—a result of "entangling alliances with none" dominating interpretations of Washington's principles. Washington's warning against permanent alliances was not so much a statement against engagement with other countries or intervention in their affairs as it was a reminder that the United States needed to maintain the freedom to act in its own best interests. Blanket declarations, like alliances, bound the nation to courses of action that might not ultimately be in its best interests. In 1851, nonintervention remained the best decision for the country, especially as it pertained to revolutions in Europe, but it was not the only choice and would not always be the right choice. "The peculiar position of our country," Douglas concluded, "requires that we should have an *American policy* in our foreign relations, based upon the principles of our own Government, and adopted to the spirit of the age." Neither George Washington nor John Quincy Adams could have put it better.[24]

The Senate debate over the resolutions of welcome consumed two weeks, but ultimately produced the result everyone expected: Berrien's nonintervention amendment was rejected and Seward's original resolution, despite the spirited opposition, passed easily. Three days later, the House of Representatives approved the resolution with almost no debate.[25] By the time Congress approved its official welcome, Kossuth had already been in the United States for almost two weeks. While an extended debate over his merits and the principles he hoped to spread was not the governmental welcome Kossuth had been expecting, his popular reception in New York City was fervent, to say the least. Kossuth's transport from Britain landed on Staten Island late on 4 December, but he was still greeted by city officials eager to hear him speak. From the moment Kossuth landed on American soil, he did not utter a frivolous word, instead always working to educate Americans about the plight of his country, discussing what he hoped to accomplish in America, and, most importantly, laying out how he hoped to do it. One thing that Kossuth had learned in Britain was that everything he said would be widely reported in the press, so he treated every speech as an opportunity to address not just those gathered before him but a much larger national audience as well.

In his first speech on U.S. soil, before a small crowd on Staten Island, Kossuth made two important statements, through which he sought to shape American and global perspectives on his time in the United States. First, Kossuth declared his desire to "see respected the right of every nation to dispose its own domestic concerns." This respect meant that while he was in the United States, Kossuth would not "intermeddle" with America's "internal concerns. You are the sovereign masters

of your fate."[26] This was a somewhat awkward statement for Kossuth to make, because he was, in fact, planning on intermeddling. After all, he hoped to change the basic principles and application of U.S. foreign policy. It was a necessary statement, however, since Kossuth needed to assuage the concerns of those who believed that he would attempt to influence the upcoming presidential election, or, worse yet, speak out against slavery. Many Southerners worried that Kossuth's speeches about liberty, self-determination, and intervention were going to be redirected at them. Kossuth keenly understood that, regardless of his personal view of slavery, he could not afford to alienate America's pro- or antislavery factions if he wanted to succeed in gaining U.S. help for Hungary; he hoped, therefore, that this declaration would put the slavery issue to rest without his ever having to acknowledge it directly.[27]

Kossuth also thanked the people of the United States for giving him the title of "Governor of Hungary" in various messages and invitations. It was "not out of ambition that I thank you for the work you have assigned to me in naming me Governor of Hungary," he explained, "but I thank you for it, because the acknowledgment, on the part of the people of the United States . . . is an acknowledgment of the rightful existence of the Declaration of Independence of Hungary." While this gratitude elicited cheers from his audience, the courtesy of addressing Kossuth as governor hardly represented the grand statement he claimed for it. Americans traditionally used former titles as a sign of respect for past accomplishments. Moreover, Kossuth had already reappropriated the title for himself, so to call him anything other than governor could have been interpreted as a sign of disrespect. In fact, by presenting Americans' use of the title governor as an acknowledgement by all Americans of the legitimacy of Hungarian independence, Kossuth was revealing more about his own objectives, and his determination to advance them, than about American intentions. His interpretation of the courtesy as an American acknowledgment of the legitimate existence not just of his work but also of the Hungarian declaration of independence was certainly a stretch in logic—but Kossuth was masterful at turning everything to his advantage.[28]

Two days after his Staten Island address, Kossuth arrived in New York City for an extravagant welcome. Upward of two hundred thousand people greeted Kossuth at Castle Garden, and when he spoke he could barely be heard over the roaring masses. The speech gave further insight into his aims. Kossuth once again stretched probability in the motives and beliefs he ascribed to the American people based on their statements and actions. He was pleased "to know that the United States of America, conscious of their glorious calling," had demonstrated that they were "resolved not to allow the despots of the world to trample upon oppressed humanity." As the debate taking place in the U.S. Senate at that very moment revealed, even his supporters did not regard Congress's offer to transport Kossuth to the United States as a declaration of new principles. Nor did it suggest that the United States were ready to "become the protectors of human rights." These facts

did not stop Kossuth from presenting the offer as such, though. The raucous cheers of an audience swept up in the enthusiasm of finally seeing the legendary Hungarian only confirmed him in his conclusions. The Castle Garden speech was also the first time Kossuth definitively stated his intention to "use every honest exertion to gain your operative sympathy, and your financial, material and political aid for my country's freedom and independence."[29] Anyone who still thought of Kossuth as a mere exile had their expectations corrected at Castle Garden. After the speech, Kossuth joined in a grand procession through the streets of New York. Later, from city hall, he looked on as much of the state's militia, the city's mayor, the state's governor, New York's entire congressional delegation, and virtually every other major and minor official in or from the city and state proudly passed in review for the honored guest to behold. As one report described it, the "entire route of the procession was . . . one continued scene of ovation."[30]

Kossuth remained in New York until 23 December and maintained a hectic schedule. Throughout his time in the city, he received delegations from a variety of states, cities, and organizations, and delivered several major speeches before the city authorities, the state bar association, the militia, the press, and the ladies of the state. In all of these formal orations and impromptu remarks, Kossuth demonstrated an amazing ability to continually present new material specifically tailored to engage the interest and earn the respect of each audience he addressed, while simultaneously bolstering the different facets of his argument. He missed no opportunity to enlist a single person or raise a single dollar. Kossuth toured the United States for seven months, delivering hundreds of speeches, speaking to large crowds and small for minutes or for hours, always hitting upon his central themes while never delivering the same speech twice. At each stop and to each crowd, Kossuth and his rather large retinue crafted his remarks to reflect interest in his audiences' local histories. At the press banquet in New York, Kossuth discussed at length the importance of a free press to a free society; in St. Louis, he reflected on American expansion and the gateway to the west; and in Boston, he remarked on the lessons he drew from the birthplace of the American Revolution. At his core, Kossuth was a highly skilled propagandist, engaging his listeners' attention and appealing to their sympathies while also laying out a convincing case for supporting the Hungarian cause.[31]

Perhaps the best demonstration of the force of Kossuth's personal appeal was the outpouring of monetary support he garnered during his tour. Whether addressing prominent individuals who donated large sums of money or average Americans donating a dollar or two, Kossuth turned most events into successful fundraisers. To facilitate this fund-raising, New York's Central Hungarian Committee devised the Hungarian bond. Available in sums ranging from $1 to $100, every dollar invested in a bond went directly to the Hungarian cause, and the bonds were repayable once Hungary had an independent treasury.[32] These bonds were also great collectible

items, as each one featured Kossuth's likeness and a replica Kossuth signature. By the time Kossuth left the United States in July 1852, he had raised more than $80,000.[33] Many, including Kossuth himself, saw this sum as a disappointment, but the total was still impressive given that most of it came in small denominations.[34] Much to Kossuth's chagrin, purchasing Hungarian bonds was not the only way Americans could monetarily demonstrate their support for Hungary. Enterprising merchants began making and selling hats styled after Kossuth's, which they fittingly called the Kossuth hat. One report suggested that Americans spent as much as $500,000 on these hats, not a penny of which actually went to support Hungary.[35] Supporters could also purchase Kossuth coats, which closely resembled the Hungarian leader's, and Kossuth oysters, which were distinctive in no way from regular oysters besides the fact that they sold much better.[36]

Few segments of the economy were left untouched by Americans' Kossuth-mania. Kossuth stories dominated virtually every newspaper in the country; even those papers opposed to the man and his cause begrudgingly printed extensive accounts of his speeches and travels so as to not lose readers to other newspapers offering better coverage.[37] For those who wanted to read still more, publishers widely distributed countless books and pamphlets detailing Kossuth's life and speeches, as well as the prominent speeches made both for and against Kossuth in Congress and elsewhere. People could also purchase poems, portraits, sheet music, and a variety of knick-knacks commemorating Kossuth's visit.[38] For some, though, a visit by Kossuth had its downside. Several cities and towns had difficulty figuring out how they were going to pay for the lavish receptions, banquets, and accommodations they had provided for Kossuth. Moreover, the influx of cash to merchants selling Kossuth memorabilia left less enterprising businesses in trouble. At the beginning of 1852, for example, the American Art-Union, a subscription art distributor, found itself unable to pay its contracted engagements because the preceding December had been "extremely cold and inclement, an extraordinary scarcity of money prevailed throughout the country, and Kossuth excitements and festivals engrossed the thoughts of all, and drew upon the purses of many thousands."[39] For better and for worse, people were eager to spend their money on Kossuth.

Kossuth and the Farewell Address

Partly as a result of the enthusiastic reception he experienced, Kossuth overestimated American support for the Hungarian cause. More importantly, Kossuth vastly underestimated Americans' attachment to George Washington and the principles he espoused in his Farewell Address. In order to enlist the military and political might of the United States on Hungary's behalf, Kossuth needed to convince the American people and government that it was time to abandon the Farewell Address

in favor of a more internationalist (and interventionist) foreign policy. Kossuth had given hints to this effect in some of his earliest remarks, but it was in his Corporation Dinner speech on 11 December 1851 that he revealed the full extent of his expectations for the United States as well as his complete and explicit critique of the Farewell Address. Kossuth began the speech by admitting that his "confident hopes" for success in the United States were being "checked by that idea of non-interference in foreign, chiefly European, affairs, which . . . we are told to be one of the ruling and lasting principles of the policy of the United States." Kossuth understood Americans' "religious attachment to the doctrines" of the founding fathers, he said, and the "instinctive fear" people had "to touch, even with improving hands, the dear legacy of those great men." But, Kossuth asked his audience, "is the dress which well suited the child, still convenient to the full-grown man; nay, to a *giant,* which you are? Would it not be ridiculous to lay the giant in the child's cradle, and to sing him to sleep by a lullaby?" The Farewell Address had been declared when the United States was in its infancy, but now that the nation had reached its maturity, did it make sense to follow those same ideas? Kossuth thought not, and argued that the United States had "entered into the second *stadium* of political existence, the destination of which is, not only to exist for yourself exclusively, but to exist as a member of the great human family of nations." This meant that "the glorious republic of the United States must feel resolved to be a *power* on earth—a power among the nations," and had to "unhesitatingly accept all the natural consequences of this situation."[40] America's growth, strength, and maturity meant that it now had obligations to meet on the world stage.

In order to convince the American people that adoption of the principle of intervention for nonintervention was a necessary consequence of this new station, Kossuth attempted to define for them what the Farewell Address did and did not mean. Kossuth asserted that it was "entirely an unfounded supposition, that the doctrine of non-interference in foreign matters had been, . . . bequeathed to be a constitutional principle to you" by Washington. In fact, Washington had never "recommended non-interference, or indifference, to the fate of other nations, to you. He has only recommended *neutrality.* And there is a mighty difference between these two ideas." Neutrality referred to "a state of war between two belligerent powers" and was what Washington contemplated when he advised Americans "not to enter into entangling alliances." Instead, Americans should "consider your own concerns, and let foreign powers quarrel about ambitious topics, or scanty, particular interests." Neutrality, then, was "a matter of convenience, not of principle." Noninterference, on the other hand, referred to "the sovereign right of nations to dispose of their own domestic concerns." Neutrality and nonintervention were "two entirely different ideas, having reference to two entirely different matters."[41]

Kossuth was adamant that Washington had "recommended *neutrality* in the case of foreign wars, but he never recommended indifference to the violation of

the common laws of humanity, by interference of foreign powers with the sovereign right of nations to dispose of themselves." Even neutrality, in Washington's own words, had been intended only as "a matter of temporary policy . . . as a temporary convenience," and not as "a lasting regulation for all time." Kossuth reminded the audience that "policy is not the science of principles, but of exigencies; and that principles, are, of course, by a free and powerful nation, never to be sacrificed to exigencies."[42] Kossuth may have been placing too much emphasis on single words, on the distinction between policy and principle in Washington's writing, but his larger point—that much of the Farewell Address was only temporary in nature—was a valid one. In many ways what Kossuth was actually arguing against was the permanency and rigidity of the Jeffersonian reconceptualization and "entangling alliances with none" as a basic principle. At the same time, Kossuth failed to define how the adoption of intervention for nonintervention would advance U.S. interests moving forward; after all, this was truly the main thrust of Washington's original advice.

Kossuth then investigated "how your policy has been developed, in the course of time, with respect to the principle of non-intervention in foreign concerns." Quite logically, Kossuth looked to the Monroe Doctrine. He argued that the Doctrine had been a declaration that "the interference of foreign powers in the contest for independence of the Spanish colonies, was . . . sufficient motive for the United States to protect the natural right of those nations to dispose of themselves." Kossuth also referred to the instructions given to the U.S. delegates to the Congress of Panama, which "clearly stated, that the United States would have opposed, with their whole force, the interference of Continental powers with that struggle for independence."[43] While the original intent of the Monroe Doctrine was, at least nominally, to stave off European intervention, the United States quickly backed away from its warnings and emphasized its quite limited nature. As for the Congress of Panama, the ministers were instructed to reinforce the notion of a limited Monroe Doctrine, and not, as Kossuth claimed, to highlight America's willingness to go to war to defend Latin American independence. The salient point Kossuth neglected to mention when discussing both the Monroe Doctrine and the Panama Congress was that many Americans had ultimately rejected both as endangering U.S. principles.

Kossuth felt that he had shown "how Washington's doctrine of perfect neutrality in your foreign relations, has, by-and-by, changed into the declaration to oppose, with all your forces, absolutistical Europe, interfering with the independence or republican institutions of Central and Southern America." By 1851, the only reason this "manly resolution" had not been extended to Europe was its distance from American shores, but, with the advent of the steam engine, distance had become an antiquated notion. "Distance," Kossuth contended, "is no more calculated by *miles,* but by *hours.* And, in being so, Europe is, of course, less dis-

tant from you than the greater part of the American continent . . . even nearer than perhaps some parts of your own territory." In the "present condition" of the world, Americans were "at least, as much interested in the fate of Europe, as your fathers, twenty-eight years ago, declared themselves interested in the fate of Central and Southern America." When these facts were combined with America's recent "general interference with the Turkish captivity of the Governor of Hungary," it became clear that "the natural, logical, unavoidable, practical consequences of your own freely-chosen government policy, which you have avowed to the whole world," were that the United States, by its own principles and interests, was ready to intervene in Europe to defend nonintervention.[44]

Having demonstrated America's true policy, Kossuth laid out three requests to the government of the United States. First, he wanted the United States to enter into an alliance with Great Britain to ensure the international enforcement of intervention for nonintervention. Second, Kossuth asked the United States to maintain its commercial intercourse with all European nations, even if they were in a state of revolution. He wanted to ensure that Hungary would have access to supplies and external revenue. Finally, Kossuth urged the government to officially recognize the independence of Hungary "at the earliest possible time." Beyond these requests, Kossuth encouraged people throughout the country to "form committees," pass resolutions, and offer "financial aid," all in support of the Hungarian cause.[45]

Throughout the Corporation Dinner speech, applause and cheers interrupted Kossuth, but this did not translate into many new converts to his way of thinking. There were certainly those people and politicians, most notably proponents of Young America, who had already been advocating these principles before Kossuth arrived in New York and who believed that it was time for the United States to pursue, in the words of historian Donald S. Spencer, a more "evangelical foreign policy."[46] It was these people and groups who had been most enthusiastic about welcoming Kossuth. But Kossuth interpreted their strenuous support and the enthusiasm of the crowds he addressed as representative of a larger movement in his direction. He was mistaken. Those who had supported intervention for nonintervention would continue to do so, but most Americans—while still sympathetic to Kossuth's cause and willing to attend and cheer his speeches and to give monetary aid—were not willing to abandon Washington's principles in order to ensure that Hungary got a fair fight the next time it sought independence.

This split in public opinion was reflected in the partisan press of the day. Newspapers like the abolitionist *New York Evangelist* and magazines such as the *American Whig Review* came out in defense of Kossuth after his Corporation Dinner speech. The *Evangelist* felt that Kossuth had moved the debate away from questions of "whether we shall preserve a strict neutrality" or "enter into 'entangling alliances'" in favor of the more important question of whether the United States was "prepared to contemplate a violation of the law of nations with indifference,

such as was perpetrated . . . upon Hungary, and was threatened against the Spanish Colonies of South America in their struggle for liberty? We say—NO: we protest against it on the ground of both duty and interest."[47] The *American Whig Review* argued that Kossuth's "coming to us begins an epoch, and throws a new light upon our own future and that of the world. Hitherto we have thought only of ourselves and our internal relations; the time has arrived when we must take our position before the world as one of the brotherhood of nations, and employ our powerful influence for the establishment of a law of nations congenial to our own institutions."[48] This was the moment to pursue the foreign policy that success in the Mexican War required of the quickly rising nation.

While there was a strong argument to be made in favor of the defense of American principles abroad, a much larger number of periodicals—national, local, and niche—came out in favor of America's traditional principles in the wake of Kossuth's Corporation Dinner speech. The *Advocate of Peace* believed that a departure "from the advice and example of Washington . . . would prove fatal to ourselves, and dangerous to the cause of freedom throughout the world." Intervention for nonintervention was a "suicidal and interminable absurdity."[49] The *Mercersburg Review,* a publication of the Reformed Church in the United States, feared that Kossuth could "change our whole policy hitherto, and entangle us in a general European war."[50] The *Boston Herald* described Kossuth as possessing "a very incorrect idea of the nature as our government and the tendencies of our people," and declared that "interference would be entirely against the Washingtonian policy of non-intervention."[51]

Several newspapers expanded on the idea that the United States should stand as an example to the rest of the world. One of the more interesting editorials in this vein appeared in the *National Era,* an abolitionist newspaper, which argued, "The first duty . . . of the American Union is to preserve its own Republicanism, to keep its fires ever burning, like the sacred fire of the vestal virgins—to do nothing that can touch its vitality or purity. This duty it owes not only to its own People, but to mankind."[52] Echoing the Washingtonian sentiments Stephen A. Douglas expressed in the Senate, several newspapers took a wait-and-see approach to the question of intervention. The *New York Observer and Chronicle,* while opposing an immediate endorsement of Kossuth's principles, argued that the United States should consider each potential case for intervention on its own merits, as "a nation may be so far off, or oppressed by such a formidable power that we could not render efficient aid if we should interfere." As a result, "In all cases we are to ask, *What good can we do?* If we are in danger of merely getting harm to ourselves, and doing nothing to help others, the better part of valor would be discretion."[53] The Anglican evangelical *Christian Observer* took perhaps the best approach to these issues by praising Kossuth for raising "questions and principles which have never before been discussed in the popular assemblies of our country. . . . The strong

excitement of the popular mind in defence of great principles of right, is not to be deprecated as an evil. It is healthful and salutary. It inspires thought—and leads many not accustomed to intellectual efforts of the kind, *to think* as they never thought before."[54] Thinking about America's interests, principles, and objectives was certainly better than blindly accepting the arguments of either side.

The debate over the place Washington should hold in determining the principles of U.S. foreign policy extended beyond the editorial pages, as speeches were made and pamphlets were published throughout the country that discussed Kossuth and his arguments. William B. Reed, a professor of American history at the University of Pennsylvania and former private secretary of Joel R. Poinsett while he was minister to Mexico, wrote *A Few Thoughts on Intervention,* in which he lamented the "exotic and Anti-Republican doctrine" Kossuth had introduced. Intervention for nonintervention threatened "to launch the fortunes and destiny of this Republic on the whirlpool of European politics." Reed described the arguments made by Kossuth in his Corporation Dinner speech as being "absurdly overstrained," and he took umbrage that "a foreigner comes amongst us to set to rights our notions and traditional opinions; to tell us, after the study of a week, what Washington's Farewell Address really means, and to reverse the elementary principles of our foreign policy." The Monroe Doctrine had already been "stretched" by American politicians, but it still fell "far short . . . of sanctioning our involving ourselves directly in the sharp and ragged net-work of European politics." The Panama Congress was an even worse justification, as "every leading member of the Democratic party . . . took open and decided ground against the mission, on this very ground of its contravention of the Washington and Jefferson doctrine of rigid neutrality." Reed even questioned on what grounds Kossuth had come to the United States to plead for the cause of Hungary and for the "immediate recognition of the Hungarian Republic as an existing institution—a *de facto* Government," given that "no *de facto* sign remains but M. Kossuth's title by courtesy, of Governor."[55] Reed believed that Kossuth was significantly off base in his interpretations of American principles and American history and that his authority to act on Hungary's behalf was questionable at best.[56]

Henry A. Boardman, a prominent Presbyterian pastor in Philadelphia who frequently spoke out on issues of public concern, also offered a scathing critique of Kossuth's interpretation of America's history and principles in a speech entitled, *The New Doctrine of Intervention, Tried by the Teachings of Washington.* In this speech, Boardman contended that the United States owed its "present position" more to George Washington than to "any other individual," and had to repel "all attempts to pervert his principles and to seduce our government from the wise policy he prescribed to it." Boardman did not object to American sympathy for liberal revolutions, but feared that intervention for nonintervention "would be most disastrous to the cause of liberty and enlightened progress both at home and abroad."

It would "throw the influence of this nation, hitherto the beneficent guardian of peace and happiness among the nations, into the scale of merciless and insatiable war." This did not mean that intervention would never happen, but, as Senator Douglas had suggested, "Cases must be disposed of as they arise, each on its own merits." Endorsing an all-encompassing principle would prevent the United States from exercising due circumspection in deciding upon its foreign policy.[57]

Like Reed, Boardman invested a great deal of time in discussing the Corporation Dinner speech, which he described as Kossuth's "ingenious argument to explain away the principles of the Farewell Address." Boardman questioned "whether it became [Kossuth], an exile, invited to our shores by the generous hospitality of our Government, to set himself up, almost before the spray of the ocean was dry upon his clothes, as the expositor of that immortal instrument, and to undertake to instruct the American people in the true import of sentences which are among their household words, and written upon their heart of hearts." Boardman did not understand the behavior of Kossuth and "his American coadjutors, who in one breath laud our present position to the skies, and in the next exhort us to quit the broad thoroughfare which has conducted us to it, for intricate and tangled by-paths which no nation ever yet attempted without being seriously damaged, if not ruined." If the United States was going to "sacrifice all our national traditions, and embark on the stormy sea of European politics," then the proponents of Kossuth's principles needed to "show some solid reasons for it." The alternative had seemingly become "Kossuth or Washington," but no one had adequately demonstrated why the answer should be anything but an emphatic "Washington."[58]

As these editorials, pamphlets, and speeches demonstrate, the American people substantively engaged with the issues Kossuth raised. Kossuth made complex and compelling arguments in support of intervention for nonintervention, and, rather than blindly endorsing or unthinkingly dismissing them, the American people confronted those arguments in a sophisticated manner. This response was epitomized by those who answered Kossuth's impassioned pleadings by arguing that with no crisis afoot, there was no reason to make a permanent declaration of future policy; by those who reasoned that circumstances and not rhetoric should dictate future action. While defending contemporary understandings of the Farewell Address, they were also upholding Washington's original ideal that the wisest foreign policy was one that maintained America's freedom to act in its own best interests. History indicated that the United States possessed sound principles and that the Farewell Address would continue to be a wise guide, but history could not predict future circumstances and future interests.

This national debate was still taking shape when Kossuth left New York for Washington, DC, just before Christmas, 1851. To that point, Kossuth's brief time in the United States had been both highly successful and greatly disappointing. Kossuth had presented his case to hundreds of thousands of cheering Americans,

had been celebrated at multiple extravagant galas given by important and influential people, had been daily courted by visitors from around the country, and had raised thousands of dollars for the Hungarian cause. At the same time, he could only look on while the United States Senate criticized his principles before issuing a tepid resolution welcoming him to the country two weeks after he arrived. And, despite Kossuth's best efforts to stay out of the slavery controversy, he had already been condemned by leading abolitionists for his refusal to come out against slavery. Most Southerners had likewise abandoned Kossuth, both because they feared the domestic implications of his rhetoric on liberty and intervention, and because he had been vocally supported by prominent opponents of slavery, like Charles Sumner.[59] Kossuth encountered a great deal more resistance than he had originally anticipated, but he made his way to the nation's capital confident in himself and still hopeful that the enthusiastic support of the American people would compel the government to action.

In the Nation's Capital: Webster, Fillmore, and Clay

Kossuth's main hope was embodied in the persons of Secretary of State Daniel Webster and President Millard Fillmore. Webster, the first person to be twice appointed to the position of secretary of state, was best known in Europe for his 1824 speech in the House of Representatives defending the cause of Greek liberty. In the middle of Greece's revolutionary struggle against the Ottoman Empire, Webster gave a stirring speech advocating the recognition of that country as an independent nation.[60] If any of the influential people in Washington would be for Hungary, Kossuth believed, it would be Daniel Webster. Kossuth was mistaken: Webster considered himself to be an unwavering defender of Washington's principles. Even in the Greek speech, Webster had only proposed American recognition of Greek independence, not military intervention to help establish it.[61]

Kossuth's trust in Fillmore was even less well founded, as it rested on an out-of-context passage from Fillmore's most recent annual message to Congress. Kossuth frequently referenced the president's statement that the United States felt a "deep interest . . . in the spread of liberal principles and the establishment of free governments and the sympathy with which we witness every struggle against oppression forbid that we should be indifferent to a case in which the strong arm of a foreign power is invoked to stifle public sentiment and repress the spirit of freedom in any country." On its own, this passage seemed to bolster Kossuth's arguments in favor of a new foreign policy for America; however, he was considering this quotation out of context. Fillmore had preceded this passage with a reminder that the United States had proclaimed and continued to adhere to "the doctrine of neutrality and nonintervention. . . . 'Friendly relations with all, but entangling

alliances with none,' has long been a maxim with us. Our true mission is not to propagate our opinions or impose upon other countries our form of government by artifice or force, but to teach by example and show by our success, moderation, and justice the blessings of self-government and the advantages of free institutions."[62] Fillmore believed that the United States should sympathize with liberal revolutions around the world, but the passage as a whole clearly stated his conviction that the country's role was as exemplar and not as vindicator.

Kossuth's hopes of support from Webster and Fillmore were dashed almost as soon as he reached the nation's capital. On the eve of Kossuth's appearance in Washington, Webster complained that his arrival in the United States had given "great strength and vivacity" to the already existing "zeal . . . for intervention in the affairs of other states."[63] Webster later remarked that he would "treat [Kossuth] with all personal and individual respect, but if he should speak to me of the policy of 'intervention,' I shall 'have ears more deaf than adders.'"[64] Webster's approach to Kossuth seemed to be a common one in Washington, as demonstrated by the responses to the Hungarian of Charles Sumner and Lewis Cass, two members of the official welcoming committee from the United States Senate. As Sumner described to an associate, when he first shook Kossuth's hand and greeted him by asking, "'Governor, how do you do'?" Kossuth immediately replied, "'Let me rather ask you a question. What will you do?' Thus at once, on the threshold, he opened his cause." When Cass was greeted similarly, he "turned the conversation from Hungary to the ease with which [Kossuth] spoke our language!" Sumner believed that "in this way [Kossuth] will be met at every turn."[65] These senators wanted to welcome the man, but they did not intend to become tied to Kossuth's principles or cause.

On New Year's Eve, Webster formally introduced Kossuth to the president in what would be one of the defining moments of the Hungarian's time in the United States.[66] In a very brief speech, especially by his standards, Kossuth praised the United States for its inspiring history and for restoring him to "life" and to "freedom." He thanked the president for raising him "in the eyes of the many oppressed nations to the standing of a harbinger of hope, because the star-spangled banner was seen cast in protection around me, avowing to the world that there is a nation, alike powerful as free, ready to protect the laws of nations, even in distant parts of the earth and in the person of a poor exile." Kossuth presented himself to the president as a "living protestation against the violence of foreign interference oppressing the sovereign right of nations to regulate their own concerns," and expressed gratitude for Fillmore's recent declarations on behalf of his principles in his annual message to Congress. Fillmore, later described by one witness as looking as "rigid as a midshipman on a quarterdeck," began by welcoming "Governor Kossuth" to "this land of freedom." Acknowledging that "as an individual, I sympathized deeply with you in your brave struggle for the independence and freedom of your native land," he was careful to distinguish sympathy from for-

eign policy. Fillmore stated very plainly that "our policy as a nation . . . has been uniform, from the commencement of our Government; and my own views, as Chief Executive Magistrate of this nation, are fully and freely expressed in my recent message to Congress, to which you have been pleased to allude."[67] Without explicitly rebuking Kossuth, Fillmore made clear that he had never endorsed intervention for nonintervention and he was not going to do so now.

Kossuth's supporters did not treat Fillmore kindly in the days following the meeting of the two men. James Shields, a Democratic senator from Illinois, wrote that Kossuth had been treated "shabbily," adding that Fillmore's statement to Kossuth was "worse spoken than it read."[68] The *National Era* described Kossuth's speech as "admirable in sentiment and devotion," and the president's reply as "cold and unimpressive."[69] The *Democrat's Review* was harsher yet, complaining of the administration's "churlish inhospitality" and "Cossack civility."[70] For Kossuth, the meeting with the president was deeply disappointing, demonstrating that the United States would not be abandoning its traditional foreign-policy principles or turning away from Washington's Farewell Address. Just days after the meeting, Sumner wrote to a relative that Kossuth "confesses that his mission has failed." While many would later argue that Kossuth's failure was the result of Americans' devout attachment to Washington, Sumner believed that it stemmed "from his asking too much. Had he been content with stating his case, without directly proposing any change in our national policy, he would have secured the hearts of the people, & would have prepared them for all that is practicable when the great exigency arrives. But it is a rank absurdity to suppose that our Govt.—at this nether extreme from Russia—can pledge itself to be the *executive power* to enforce a new reading of the Law of Nations against that distant empire."[71] Sumner's was an astute analysis of what had transpired to that point. Given the already widespread sympathy he had engendered, it is likely that Kossuth could have accomplished more in the long term by looking for less in the short term.

While his mission as originally conceived had failed, Kossuth felt that he still had work to do in Washington and beyond. On 5 and 7 January, the United States Senate and House of Representatives, respectively, formally received Kossuth, and on the evening of the 7th, members of Congress threw a banquet in his honor, attended by three hundred guests, including prominent members of all three branches of government.[72] At this event, Kossuth once again gave a forceful speech; he may not have convinced these men to support him, but he was not going to change his message.[73] Despite the courtesies extended to him, Kossuth's time in Washington ended as inauspiciously as it began, at an interview with another venerable statesman, Henry Clay. Just as Webster was famous for his defense of the Greeks, Clay had long been a defender of national self-determination and was especially well known for the years he devoted to seeing the United States recognize Spanish American independence. Yet also like Webster, and at least

partially because of his experience as John Quincy Adams's secretary of state, Clay had become an ardent advocate of America's traditional foreign policy.

During his meeting with Kossuth, Clay issued what was probably the most pointed critique of Kossuth's views and the strongest defense of American principles endured by the Hungarian during his visit to the United States. Complimenting Kossuth's "wonderful and fascinating eloquence [which] had mesmerized so large a potion of our people," Clay went on to say that he "feared to come under its influence, lest you might shake my faith in some principles in regard to the foreign policy of this government, which I have long and constantly cherished." Clay entertained the "liveliest sympathies" for Hungary, he told Kossuth, but was greatly concerned that war would "be the issue of the course you propose to us." In the event of war, most likely with Russia, Clay questioned if the United States would be able to "effect any thing for you, ourselves, or the cause of liberty." The past experience of the world had demonstrated that such a conflict had little hope of success; the cost of carrying out a war halfway around the globe was too high, and the might of the Russian army was too great. Thus, "after effecting nothing in such a war, after abandoning our ancient policy of amity and non-intervention in the affairs of other nations, and thus justifying [the despots of Europe] in abandoning the terms of forbearance and non-interference which they have hitherto preserved toward us; after the downfall, perhaps, of the friends of liberal institutions in Europe, her despots, imitating, and provoked by our fatal example, may turn upon us in the hour of our weakness and exhaustion." These despots, apparently familiar with the language of Washington's Farewell Address, could rightfully say to America, "'You have set us the example. You have quit your own to stand on foreign ground; you have abandoned the policy you professed in the day of your weakness, to interfere in the affairs of the people upon this continent.'" Clay was less concerned with the fate of Hungary than he was with the ramifications for the United States of a failed intervention in Europe.[74]

The recent collapse of liberal revolution in Europe had given the United States "an impressive warning not to rely upon others for the vindication of our principles, but to look to ourselves, and to cherish with more care than ever the security of our institutions and the preservation of our policy and principles." Clay was an advocate of the idea that America's example could do "more for the cause of liberty in the world than arms could effect." He then concluded with a question: "If we should involve ourselves in the tangled web of European politics, in a war in which we could effect nothing, and if in that struggle Hungary should go down, and we should go down with her, where, then, would be the last hope of the friends of freedom throughout the world?" It was "far better . . . for ourselves, for Hungary, and for the cause of liberty, that, adhering to our wise, pacific system, and avoiding the distant wars of Europe, we should keep our lamp burning brightly on this western shore as a light to all nations, than to hazard its utter

extinction amid the ruins of fallen or falling republics in Europe."[75] As Kossuth left, Clay reiterated the great respect he had for the Hungarian, but such a compliment was small consolation. Clay had done what no one else could. He had told Kossuth, clearly and finally, that his principles were not America's principles.

Kossuth's failure in Washington meant that he had to drastically change his plans. Rather than triumphantly returning to England, as he had originally intended, Kossuth set out to tour the rest of the United States. Kossuth was probably hoping that such a trip would generate an outpouring of sympathy from across the country strong enough to pressure the president and Congress to take decisive action in his favor; he may even have hoped that he could somehow influence the presidential election taking place that fall to bring in a more friendly administration. At the very least, Kossuth expected to generate positive press and raise additional funds for Hungary. Even these more limited hopes were almost dashed before Kossuth left Washington because of the negative press he received as a result of his interview with Clay. Some newspapers that supported intervention tried to put a positive spin on the meeting when reports leaked of Clay's rejection of Kossuth, but it was clear that Clay had given Kossuth no encouragement. To make matters worse, rumors began circulating that Kossuth had criticized Clay after their meeting. Kossuth maintained that he had made no disparaging comments and had the utmost respect for Clay, adding that he was only upset that their private meeting had been publicly reported. The original negative story was impossible to suppress, though, and it undermined Kossuth's efforts to win support throughout the West and South.[76]

Kossuth's Tour

Kossuth set out from Washington, DC, and after a brief stop in Maryland, spent the rest of January making his way across Pennsylvania. The highlight of Kossuth's time in that state was an address before the legislature in Harrisburg, where a crowd of people, very excited to hear him speak, overran the chambers and refused to let the legislators have their seats.[77] Kossuth spent all of February in Ohio, including more than two weeks in Cincinnati, which boasted one of the largest German immigrant populations in the country. Through the end of February, Kossuth's tour was largely successful, although he did not raise as much money as he had anticipated; in Cincinnati, he fell short of expectations by as much as $20,000. In an ominous prediction of what was to come for Kossuth, Rutherford B. Hayes, the future president and a Cincinnati resident, wrote to his uncle, "Kossuth is expected today and will be marched and huzzaed, feasted, and spoken at, at a terrific rate. Poor man, I pity him. To be dragged about so, and to get so little real substantial aid! I shall not wonder if he dies under his labors and disappointments!"[78] Hayes

was more prescient than he realized, as the huzzahs for Kossuth began to disappear as soon as he left Ohio.

Unlike many of his stops in the North, and with the notable exception of New Orleans, Kossuth was not invited to most of the places he visited in the South. His time in Louisville, Kentucky, was representative of his reception throughout much of the South. Kossuth's formal speeches were still reasonably well attended, drawing at least a few hundred listeners, but virtually all of the enthusiasm was gone. Cheering crowds and ostentatious displays no longer welcomed him to each new city, eager supporters no longer courted him on a daily basis, and the sale of Hungarian bonds slowed considerably. Just as problematic was the diminishing national newspaper coverage that resulted from Kossuth's poor reception. Even in those places most energized by Kossuth, papers stopped carrying daily reports of his travels or transcripts of his speeches. For most Americans, Kossuth's moment had passed.

From Louisville, Kossuth moved on to spend a slightly more successful week in St. Louis, Missouri. This was followed by five days in New Orleans that were among the worst Kossuth spent in the United States. Despite having been invited to come, Kossuth was greeted with icy and at times hostile treatment by the city's residents. Once he left New Orleans at the end of March, Kossuth largely abandoned his Southern tour, taking only ten days to race through multiple stops in Alabama, Georgia, and the Carolinas, before returning to Washington, DC.[79]

Many Southerners took pride in their cold treatment of Kossuth and found fault with the North for offering a much warmer reception. This was unsurprising, given Southerners' views of the Hungarian and the rising sectional tensions of the time. An editorial appearing in the *Richmond Whig* in the weeks leading up to the 1852 celebration of Washington's birthday amply demonstrated such views. The paper condemned the "recent attempts by a meddling foreigner to get us to renounce the wise counsels of him who has hitherto been the polar star by which our foreign policy has been guided," as well as the "apparent success of [Kossuth's] efforts in some of the cities North of us." The editorialist found it "refreshing and comforting to see the whole South sound and conservative on the new-fangled doctrine of intervention. . . . It appears to us to be *a duty,* in this state of things, to signify the strong public disapprobation of the *Kossuth madness and folly,* and our deep-rooted approval of the principles and policy of Washington, by the observance of his birthday with more than usual attention and respect."[80] Of course, the South did not have a monopoly on using the occasion of Washington's birthday to reassert his principles. For example, Henry A. Boardman's speech condemning intervention was offered in honor of this day. In New York City, Judge William W. Campbell quoted at length from the Farewell Address as part of a birthday oration. Pointing to Hungary, Campbell acknowledged that "the heart of the freeman beats when he listens to the stories of wrongs, and oppressions, with which earth is filled; and it is natural that he should be impatient to aid in the redress of those

wrongs, and to let the oppressed go free." Yet, he added, every American should remember that "we are the trustees, of a precious trust, 'the blessings of liberty to ourselves and our posterity' given to our children by the will of our common ancestors, and we should see to it, that we do not peril the treasure."[81] Campbell's city had done much to welcome the Hungarian in ways that Southerners found distasteful, but he ultimately shared their sentiments about Kossuth, Washington, and their respective principles.

By the time Kossuth returned to the nation's capital, he was desperate to generate positive press coverage to remain in the public eye. Some newspapers had criticized Kossuth for not visiting Mount Vernon during his initial visit to Washington, so he made a special trip there the second time around, accompanied by several newspaper correspondents.[82] Kossuth knew that favorable press was crucial if he was to have any chance of salvaging his American tour. This was especially true in the U.S. capital, where attention was increasingly focused not on the man but on his principles. Just days after Kossuth first departed Washington, Congressman James Conger, a Michigan Whig, introduced a resolution in the House of Representatives declaring American support for intervention for nonintervention. Objections were raised against the resolution on procedural grounds and it was seemingly never introduced again.[83] Several days later, Senator John Clarke, a Whig from Rhode Island, offered a resolution that sought to reaffirm America's attachment to its traditional principles of foreign policy. The resolution proclaimed "that this Government has solemnly adopted, and will preservingly adhere to, as a principle of international action, the advice given by Washington in his Farewell Address." Echoing Stephen A. Douglas's comments of the prior month, the resolution stressed "that although we adhere to these essential principles of non-intervention as forming the true and lasting foundation of our prosperity and happiness, . . . whenever a prudent foresight shall warn us that our own liberties and institutions are threatened, then a just regard to our own safety will require us to advance to the conflict rather than await the approach of the foes of constitutional freedom and of human liberty."[84] The United States would adhere to its traditional principles until it had a compelling interest to pursue a different course. Over the ensuing months, many speeches were made on both sides of the issue, but the declining national attention being paid to Kossuth removed any urgency and the resolution was forgotten by the end of the congressional session without being put to a vote.

Like many others around the country, the defenders of the Farewell Address in Congress also latched onto Washington's birthday as an ideal occasion to demonstrate the nation's continuing faith in the first president's wisdom. The organizers of a banquet in Washington's honor were quite open in their private correspondence that it was "an anti-Kossuth affair, or at least . . . a demonstration in favor of the neutral policy of Washington."[85] The *New York Observer and Chronicle* later described the banquet as "the strongest demonstration against

Kossuth yet made."[86] Those speaking at the banquet, including many members of Congress, Supreme Court Justice James Wayne, and General Winfield Scott, never mentioned Kossuth by name, but the content of their speeches and toasts made it abundantly clear that they were explicitly refuting the Hungarian. Justice Wayne offered a toast to "*The Congressional Banquet of 1852, in celebration of the Birthday of Washington*—It will aid to make in the hearts of the American people, a sanctuary and a fortress for his virtues, from which native and naturalized citizens may combat for his principles, against the sophism of 'Intervention for Non-Intervention.'" Another toast was given to "*Intervention*—We are not to be deceived by artful definitions. Our true policy is, 'Friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'" The final regular toast of the evening was offered to "*The Memory of Washington*—May it 'moderate the fury of party spirit, and guard against the mischief of foreign intrigue.'"[87]

A largely anonymous week in Washington left Kossuth eager to get to Massachusetts, which was virtually the only place left in the country excited to have him. The state's residents had taken a keen interest in Kossuth from the moment he reached the United States. When word arrived that Kossuth had landed at Staten Island, four hundred Bostonians traveled to New York City to see his reception, only to arrive a day too late.[88] Richard Henry Dana, a prominent writer from Cambridge, Massachusetts, also traveled to New York to see Kossuth, making a "hurried visit . . . of one day" to hear "the wonderful Kossuth . . . at the bar reception." Dana described Kossuth as "a hero & a miracle," but felt that he was "doomed to disappointment here. I do not believe our country will interfere in the affairs of Europe."[89] In the weeks before Kossuth was set to arrive in Boston, Tracy Patch Cheever, a lawyer from Chelsea, Massachusetts, likewise remarked in his private journal that "I feel yet a strong sympathy for him even if his intervention notions *are* untenable, for in a case of such dire extremity to his country, in a case so noble and patriotic, he is surely somewhat excusable for arguing doctrines which may be unsound. . . . If he is right in the *grand object,* he should be encouraged even though his view of one of the means to be employed, be erroneous."[90] Dana and Cheever epitomized the perspective of many in Massachusetts and the rest of the nation: excited to see Kossuth, but neither hoping for his success nor enthusiastic about his principles.

One Massachusetts man who came out early and strongly in Kossuth's favor was the state's Democratic governor, George S. Boutwell. In his annual message to the state legislature for 1851, Boutwell declared that if Austria and Russia "shall assert the right of interference in the domestic affairs of European nations, . . . it would seem proper for our government to give them notice that we assert, on our part, an equal right to interfere in favor of republican or constitutional governments." The governor was careful to add that the nation needed to reserve for itself "the power to judge the circumstances and the necessity of interference, as

events transpire."[91] Boutwell generally endorsed Kossuth's principles but was not willing to guarantee American action if they should be violated. Boutwell had been very pleased when the legislature nearly unanimously resolved to invite Kossuth to the state, and was even more so when Kossuth appreciatively accepted the invitation a few weeks later.

Members of the Massachusetts legislature traveled to New York to await Kossuth's arrival from Washington, and on 23 April a special train left Newark, New Jersey, to bring Kossuth to New England. At several stops in Connecticut, Kossuth was joyously greeted and cheered, and in Springfield, Massachusetts, a crowd of over five thousand waited for him to arrive; the following morning Kossuth delivered a very enthusiastically received speech. Two days later in Worcester, Massachusetts, state legislator Anson Burlingame gave the most positive speech the Hungarian had probably heard since his departure from Ohio. Burlingame was a member of the Free Soil Party who would achieve acclaim throughout the North for his spirited condemnation of Preston Brooks's caning of Charles Sumner in 1856. Burlingame cautioned the crowd that "a nation can have no such thing as a fixed policy. It must have fixed *principles*." Pointing to the Corporation Dinner speech, Burlingame noted that Kossuth "has told us that policy is one thing, and principle quite another thing. One takes its hue and form from the passing hour; the other is eternal, and may not be departed from with safety." Burlingame hoped that they would "not wrong our fathers by believing they intended to chain this nation to the cradle of its infancy. Washington himself has told us that his was a temporary policy, suited to the requirements of the time, but not intended to stand as our guide through all eternity."[92] Like Kossuth and others, Burlingame called for a more progressive view of Washington's Farewell Address.

The following day Kossuth made his triumphant entrance into Boston. Thirty-four companies of the military met Kossuth on the Boston Neck and formed a long procession to escort him to the State House. Along the route, people lined the streets and watched from the windows to see the great spectacle. The procession of sixteen hundred volunteer militia lasted two and a half hours and culminated in speeches and a formal review of the military from the State House steps.[93] As one observer described it, "The lines were drawn as usual at the foot of the Common, and the surrounding hills were covered with the assembled thousands, like vast swarms of human bees."[94] When Kossuth reflected on the day's proceedings thirty years later, he expressed gratitude to the "hundreds of thousands of people who had gathered for the occasion," although a more accurate estimate of the number of people assembled was probably closer to fifty thousand.[95]

The most anticipated event for most Bostonians was Kossuth's evening address in Faneuil Hall on 29 April. According to one report, by the time the doors were opened at six o'clock, "it had become so densely packed in the streets before the hall that there was no moving through it, and some ladies fainted before the pressure

was relieved by admission." An hour later, the hall was so full that "the pressure at the centre was uncomfortably severe."[96] The proceedings began at eight with a speech by Boutwell, in which he praised American principles and decried Russia's intervention in Hungary. Boutwell suggested that the United States had obligations to defend liberal principles abroad, but once again he did not unconditionally endorse intervention for nonintervention.[97] Kossuth then took the stage and spoke with the same passion on Hungarian independence and American aid as he had since he first arrived in New York five months earlier. Tracy Patch Cheever wrote about the speech in his journal after reading it in the newspaper and reflected, "I find some striking thoughts indeed, but not that impressiveness which has of course grown old by reason of the great number of addresses which have been made by its Author."[98] Kossuth's soaring oratory had become routine and expected.

Departing from his normal themes, Kossuth devoted part of his Faneuil Hall speech to an attempt to explain the failure of his mission. Kossuth pointed to two factors in particular, both of which were beyond his control. First, he said, he had arrived in the United States "on the eve of an animated contest for the presidency," and domestic political machinations had greatly hindered a fair consideration of his principles and requests. The second factor was sectionalism. "Many a man has told me," Kossuth asserted, "that, if I had only not fallen into the hands of the abolitionists and free-soilers, he would have supported me; and, had I landed somewhere in the south, instead of New York, I would have met quite different things from that quarter." Despite his efforts to avoid the debate over slavery, Kossuth felt that he had been pulled down by them. Now he was "being charged from one side with being in the hands of abolitionists, and from the other side with being in the hands of the slaveholders." Kossuth found himself "at a loss what course to take." The only silver lining to these "contradictory charges" was that they gave him the "satisfaction to feel that I stand just where it is my duty to stand, on a truly *American* ground."[99]

Boutwell later argued that Kossuth "attributed too much importance" to the presidential election, and blamed his failure on "other, deeper-seated and more adverse causes." Boutwell specifically pointed to the fact that "the advice and instructions of Washington as to the danger of entangling foreign alliances were accepted as authority by man, and as binding tradition by all. Consequently, there was no, and could not have been, any time in the century when his appeal would have been answered by an aggressive step, or even by an official declaration in behalf of his cause." As for Kossuth's other claim, Boutwell believed that even had Kossuth been "spurned by the Abolitionists and the Free-soilers, he would not have been accepted by the South; for there was not a *quadrennium* from 1832 to 1860 when that section would have contributed to the election of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency with the weight of the Declaration of Independence upon his shoulders."[100] Any person striving for freedom, independence, and government action to secure

it would have failed in the American South in this era, especially when that person also argued against George Washington's Farewell Address.

The day after Kossuth's first speech at Faneuil Hall, he appeared there again for a Legislative banquet. The demand for tickets was so great that they were sold and resold by enterprising Bostonians for much more than their original $2 price in an example of mid-nineteenth-century ticket scalping.[101] Over the ensuing two weeks, Kossuth moved on to the suburbs, visiting the Bunker Hill monument in Charlestown, Harvard University in Cambridge, the Revolutionary battlegrounds at Lexington and Concord, Plymouth Rock, and a host of other cities and towns in eastern Massachusetts. At each location, Kossuth spoke eloquently about the historic events that had taken place there and how they related to Hungary's struggle.[102] Kossuth drew large and cheering audiences to each speech, but as his time in Massachusetts came to a close, public enthusiasm was clearly fading. Kossuth returned to Boston for a farewell address of his own on 14 May, and while Faneuil Hall was once again "densely filled," those who were admitted faced "much less inconvenience" in securing a ticket and navigating the crowds than at Kossuth's first appearance there.[103] People were still excited to hear Kossuth, but for many the novelty had worn off.

As much as most Americans genuinely sympathized with Kossuth over his people's plight, and while some strongly believed in the principle of intervention for nonintervention, the vast majority of Americans regarded Kossuth more as a celebrity than as a serious shaper of public opinion. Once people had made contact with him, had heard his stirring oratory for themselves, had donated their small sum of money or purchased their memorabilia, many no longer felt the need to give up their time or treasure to him. After attending Kossuth's address to an audience of fifteen thousand at the Bunker Hill monument, Cheever commented in his journal, "I rejoice in the privilege of having heard one of the greatest orators and Patriots . . . of modern days," and then never mentioned him again.[104] The mayor of Charlestown, Richard Frothingham, who introduced Kossuth on that day, kept a scrapbook of newspaper clippings detailing Kossuth's visit to Massachusetts.[105] It was the same phenomenon symbolized by the Kossuth hats and books and the Hungarian bonds featuring Kossuth's face: people wanted a piece of Kossuth and a story to tell their children, not an American crusade halfway around the world.[106]

Kossuth left Massachusetts a few days after his final Faneuil Hall address and took up a less hectic schedule while visiting the far reaches of New York State. By the time he made his final return to New York City in mid-June, public excitement over the man and his cause had thoroughly passed everywhere in the country. The most revealing evidence of this decline in Kossuth's popularity and influence was the fact that when he departed the country on 14 July 1852, he did so with no fanfare and under a false name.[107] Kossuth did not make the triumphant return to England that he had originally expected; the American government and people had not endorsed

intervention for nonintervention, they displayed little continuing enthusiasm for his cause, and almost no money remained from the sale of Hungarian bonds.[108]

That summer, as one final sign of the failure of Kossuth's tour to compel government action, the major political parties refused to endorse his principles at their national conventions. The Democratic Party's official platform for 1852 contained no reference to intervention for nonintervention, while the Whig platform rejected the principle outright. The Whigs resolved "that while struggling freedom everywhere enlists the warmest sympathy of the Whig party, we still adhere to the doctrines of the Father of his Country, as announced in his Farewell Address, of keeping ourselves free from all entangling alliances with foreign countries, and of never quitting our own to stand upon foreign ground." The "mission" of the American republic was "not to propagate our opinions, or impose on other countries our form of government by artifice or force; but to teach, by example, and show by our success, moderation and justice, the blessings of self-government, and the advantages of free institutions."[109] At the end of his tour, with his case fully stated, in answering the question of "WASHINGTON or KOSSUTH," both parties resoundingly answered "Washington."

Kossuth and America

Kossuth's most significant mistake was, as the old saying goes, that he did not quit while he was ahead. Despite his self-confidence, his oratorical skills, and the truly sympathetic nature of his story, Kossuth never had a real chance of succeeding in the United States. There were simply too many interests—a good portion having nothing to do with his actual mission—arrayed against him. After his meeting with President Fillmore convinced him of his mission's failure, Kossuth's decision to invest six months in touring the nation was understandable. It was also an error in judgment, cementing his legacy of failure in the minds of most Americans. Had Kossuth left the United States near the height of his popularity, after being welcomed in front of both houses of Congress and celebrated at a Congressional banquet, his story would have been different. Americans' desire to see and hear him would not have been sated, the press would not have begun circulating stories about poor receptions and diminishing interest before it stopped circulating stories at all, and the opposition to him might not have grown so pitched. Once the president had rejected his arguments and his cause, there was realistically nothing Kossuth could have done to persuade the United States to intervene on Hungary's behalf, but an early departure could have at least maintained American interest in him and prolonged the discussion of intervention for nonintervention in useful ways. Instead, Kossuth's lengthy tour dissipated public enthusiasm almost entirely; he was still there, but Americans stopped caring.

Conclusion

The timing of Kossuth's departure aside, the biggest reason for his failure was his attack on George Washington and the Farewell Address. The American people understood that intervention for nonintervention flew in the face of Washington's wisdom, but, as a multitude of pamphlets and speeches demonstrated, this did not mean that they saw no value in the principle. Even those still convinced that the United States should adhere to Washington's maxims understood that a time could come when the country's interests would require it to move past them—or at least to move past Jefferson's reconceptualization and the rigidity of "entangling alliances with none." As Charles Sumner pointed out, though, Kossuth asked for too much. Had Kossuth promoted intervention for nonintervention without asking the government for an official declaration of support—without asserting that the United States needed to formally renounce Washington's precepts as no longer applicable—the principle would have been left to percolate in American minds. In this way, if Hungary did seek independence again, Americans would have been keenly attuned to questions of intervention at a time when the need for action was apparent, rather than having already rejected it in principle. Instead, Kossuth gave the American people a specific reason to disagree with him and gave his opponents a persuasive argument to use against him.

The main result of Kossuth's attempt to convince Americans to abandon the Farewell Address was to reinvigorate popular consideration of and allegiance to it. This renewed interest in the place the Farewell Address and its principles should hold in determining U.S. foreign policy and the nation's global mission also helped to frame the collective American memory of Kossuth's time in the United States and the reasons for his failure. This framing process began as early as the summer of 1852. At an Independence Day celebration at Burlington College in Burlington, New Jersey, Episcopal bishop George Washington Doane quoted at length from the Farewell Address, concluding with the sentiment, "These are immortal words. Immortal, as wisdom. Immortal, as freedom. Immortal, as truth.

While they are clung to, with the other precious counsels of that inimitable paper, which is to us the Will and Testament of him, who was, indeed, the Father of his Country, the independence of this nation, will remain impregnable; and virtue will go out from it, to elevate and bless the races of mankind." When considering how the United States would diffuse its principles abroad, Doane asked, "Shall it be, by the force of arms? Shall it be, by diplomatic art [?] Shall it be, by any of the forms of that, which is proverbially known, as 'intervention'? I most distinctly answer, No!" Without ever mentioning Kossuth by name, Doane expressed pride in the nation's political establishment and in his countrymen for refusing "to recognize the claim, for foreign intervention."[1]

In speaking before the alumni of Harvard University later that month, the former Massachusetts congressman and senator Robert C. Winthrop likewise reflected on Kossuth and Washington. "The great name, the greater principles, of Washington are suffered to be drawn into dispute, and even to be derided as temporary," lamented Winthrop. Fortunately for all Americans, "the sober second thought has come apace"; Kossuth had been turned away, and "the danger is over."[2] The expression of such sentiments was not limited to college campuses. In a book review appearing in the *North American Review* later that same year, the author lauded the fact that the result of Kossuth's "endeavors to set aside the authority of Washington, and to give a new interpretation to the Farewell Address" had been "not to weaken the influence of Washington's great name and divine wisdom, but to freshen, in the minds of the people, a knowledge of his doctrines, and to exalt their reverence for his character."[3]

The passing years only served to further confirm this view of Kossuth's visit. An 1856 biography of Millard Fillmore reflected, "The deep, wide-spread sympathy manifested for [Kossuth] wherever he went, was unparalleled; but he misconstrued it, and was much chagrined when forced to discriminate between sympathy and policy. To unsettle the national policy of a country consolidated on the maxims of Washington and Jefferson, was a task he could not accomplish."[4] In 1852, Kossuth had attempted to blame his mission's failure on the upcoming presidential election and sectional conflict, and it would have been reasonable for Americans to have remembered events that way, at least in part. Instead, they remembered Kossuth's mission for his attempts to overturn the precepts of Washington's Farewell Address, and they remembered his failure for their unwillingness to see him succeed.

This memory outlived Kossuth himself, who passed away in March 1894. In a memorial service held for him in St. Louis, Missouri, in early April, one speaker looked back on the "bitter disappointment" Kossuth experienced as a result of his tour. The American people had enthusiastically received and feted him in ways far surpassing their prior treatment of any other foreigner save Lafayette, yet even though he came as "Kossuth, the Governor of Hungary," he was received as "Kos-

suth, the Hungarian patriot and exile." "Any other reception was impossible." Asking why this was impossible, the speaker explained it was because "the warning words of the nation's first and greatest citizen were still too fresh" in the nation's collective memory. The orator then offered a lengthy quote from the Farewell Address.[5] Even in death, Kossuth could not live down his attack on Washington's legacy.

As the Kossuth episode demonstrated, the majority of Americans still drew wisdom from Washington's Farewell Address and believed that continued adherence to its maxims was of great importance to America's future growth and happiness. It also highlighted the ways in which American understandings of the Farewell Address had evolved over time. Washington had intended the Address as a warning to all Americans to always be guided by the nation's best interests when constructing foreign policy. Those interests would change over time as the nation grew and matured, but interest should always be the guide. When Jefferson recast Washington's flexible and evolutionary principles into a more permanent foreign policy with his pledge to seek "peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none," most Americans began to view both the Address and U.S. interest through a much more unbending and isolationist lens. In many ways, this process culminated in the all-or-nothing approach taken in the debate over the Congress of Panama. Where John Quincy Adams asserted that the United States had more interests in common with the new nations of Latin America than it did with Europe, and thus should pursue a different relationship with each region of the world, his opponents in Congress argued that "entangling alliances with none" prohibited any such closer relationship.

In the twenty-five years after the Panama debate, more Americans began to recognize the validity of Adams's original arguments (although, for the most part failing to ascribe them to Adams), extending the United States' sphere of interest to cover places like Hawaii, Texas, and, ultimately, all of North America. By 1852, the debate over the Farewell Address centered not on the question of whether or not the United States had common interests with other nations, or whether it should take an interest in Europe's interventionist actions in other countries, but on how broadly those common interests should be defined and how far the United States should be willing to extend a blanket of protection (or at least how far it should be willing to declare that blanket to exist). Those who had moved far beyond the Farewell Address in their conception of America's proper relationship with the rest of the world favored the broadest possible sphere of American interest; however, most Americans maintained a narrower view more in line with their understanding of Washington's original intent.

Of course, for America's future, it was Tyler's and Polk's more aggressive interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine, rather than an expanded view of the Farewell Address, that would increasingly influence U.S. policy makers. By manipulating long-standing national principles to achieve goals reflective of short-term and

largely regional interests, such as slavery, Tyler and Polk not only undermined the sanctity of Washington's principles but set a dangerous precedent for the future. Polk had established a model for later generations to follow of how to use the Monroe Doctrine to justify foreign policies that shared little with Monroe's original intent. That Polk did this in an effort to undermine Washington's Farewell Address has been a point overlooked by historians. Recognizing the importance of the Farewell Address in Polk's decision making may only represent a subtle change in our understanding of Polk's foreign policy, but it is a critical subtlety. It more fully explains why Polk looked to the Monroe Doctrine as the rhetorical foundation for his foreign policy in the first place.

Looking back to 1812, many opponents of the War of 1812 interpreted, with some legitimacy, James Madison's decision to go to war against Great Britain as a violation of the Farewell Address; however, there were truly national objects at stake in the decision. Economically, prosecution of the war had the greatest negative impact on the North, but the freedom of commerce the war sought to protect served the North's best interests in the long term. For Tyler and Polk in the 1840s, no such universal objects were at stake, and rather than accomplishing a long-term good at the expense of short-term disquietude from one region of the country, the annexation of Texas and the war with Mexico deepened an already dangerous divide and most likely hastened the onset of the Civil War.

Kossuth's tour of the United States reaffirmed the widespread popular interest taken in foreign revolutions and revolutionary leaders. Americans were always impressed with revolutionary movements and figures they saw as inspired by the United States' example, as demonstrated by Americans' expressions of support for France in the 1790s, Spanish America in the 1810s, Spain and Greece in the 1820s, Texas in the 1830s, the European revolutions of the 1840s, and the causes of such individual personages as Bolivar and Kossuth. More often than not, Americans were left disappointed or disillusioned by the results of these revolutions, but the persistence of republican revolution abroad only served to confirm their own conviction of the importance of the United States as an exemplar for the rest of the world. The Farewell Address fostered this mindset, as American presidents encouraged sympathy for foreign revolutionary movements while refusing to take action on their behalf, because Washington's maxims called for noninvolvement. This noninterference, in line with the advice in the Farewell Address, not only allowed the United States the time at peace necessary to grow and prosper but also reinforced in most Americans' minds the belief that the United States was a persuasive example for the rest of the world.

The most important revelation highlighted by the American reaction to Kossuth was the great significance still attached to George Washington and his Farewell Address more than fifty years after its publication. The Farewell Address did not rise to the level of a sacred text until after Washington's death, and Americans

may have held largely false interpretations of it as a result of the influence of Jefferson's pledge of "entangling alliances with none," but the Address remained the single most important document in shaping Americans' understandings of their foreign-policy principles and the relationship of their nation with the rest of the world. From the Washington Benevolent Societies to the debate over the Panama Congress, from the Washington centennial celebrations to Americans' reception of Kossuth, the Farewell Address persisted as a key component of American popular political culture. Even in the face of the increasingly tense ordeal of the union in the 1840s, and especially after the Compromise of 1850, as slavery came to dominate the American political landscape, Kossuth's suggestion that the United States had somehow outgrown the Farewell Address, or that it never meant what they thought it did, served only to reaffirm and reinforce its status as a fundamental statement of American principles. Eventually, as various statesmen had been predicting for a generation, even Washington's plea for union would not be enough to hold the country together. After the Civil War, the Monroe Doctrine largely replaced the Farewell Address as the core expression of U.S. foreign-policy principles and ideals. However, this later state of affairs cannot overshadow or undermine the fundamental importance of Washington's Farewell Address to the development of the American nation and its people in the first half of the nineteenth century.

Notes

Introduction

1. Joseph Alden, *The Example of Washington Commended to the Young,* 3rd ed. (New York: M. W. Dodd, 1851), 20–21. The first edition was published in 1847.

2. For a sampling of approaches to and interpretations of the Farewell Address, see Felix Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address: Ideas of Early American Foreign Policy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1961); Samuel Flagg Bemis, "Washington's Farewell Address: A Foreign Policy of Independence," *American Historical Review* 39 (Jan. 1934): 250–68; Alexander DeConde, "Washington's Farewell, the French Alliance, and the Election of 1796," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 43 (Mar. 1957): 641–58; Joseph A. Fry, "Washington's Farewell Address and American Commerce," *West Virginia History* 37 (July 1976): 281–90; Patrick J. Garrity, "Warnings of a Parting Friend," *National Review* 45 (Fall 1996): 14–26; Albert K. Weinberg, "Washington's 'Great Rule' in Its Historical Evolution," in *Historiography and Urbanization: Essays in American History in Honor of W. Stull Holt,* ed. Eric F. Goldman (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1941), 109–38; Arthur A. Markowitz, "Washington's Farewell and the Historians: A Critical Review," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 94 (Apr. 1970): 173–91; Matthew Spalding and Patrick J. Garrity, *A Sacred Union of Citizens: George Washington's Farewell Address and the American Character* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 1996); and François Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father: Washington's Legacy, Slavery, and the Making of a Nation* (New York: Penguin Books, 2006).

3. Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," 4 Mar. 1801, in *A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Presidents, 1789–1908,* ed. James D. Richardson, 11 vols. (New York: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1908), 1:323 (hereafter, Richardson, *Messages and Papers*).

4. See Horace Binney, *An Inquiry into the Formation of Washington's Farewell Address* (Philadelphia, PA: Parry and McMillan, 1859).

5. John Marshall to Bushrod Washington, 3 Oct. 1825, in *The Papers of John Marshall,* ed. Herbert A. Johnson, 12 vols. (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1974–2006), 10:202.

6. Committee on Washington's Valedictory Address, "Papers Relative to the Valedictory Address of President Washington," in *Memoirs of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania,* ed. Edward Armstrong, vol. 1, *Being a Republication* (1826; repr., Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1864), 247.

7. For a fuller discussion of the authorship controversy, see Jeffrey J. Malanson, "'If I Had It in His Hand-Writing I Would Burn It': Federalists and the Authorship Controversy over George Washington's Farewell Address, 1808–1859," *Journal of the Early Republic* 34 (Summer 2014): 219–42.

8. Alden, *Washington Commended to the Young,* 20.

1. Constructing the Farewell Address

1. The Farewell Address was originally published in David C. Claypoole's *American Daily Advertiser* on 19 Sept. 1796 under the simple heading, "Friends, and Fellow-Citizens." It was not referred to by its more famous title until it was published as Washington's Farewell Address by the *Courier of New Hampshire* several weeks later. It should be emphasized that despite being termed an address, evoking images of the president reading it to an eager audience, Washington's valedictory was never delivered as such and was instead prepared with newspaper publication in mind. Victor Hugo Paltsits, ed., *Washington's Farewell Address, In Facsimile, with Transliterations of All the Drafts of Washington, Madison, and Hamilton, Together with Their Correspondence and Other Supporting Documents* (New York: New York Public Library, 1935), 55, 67.

2. George Washington, "Farewell Address," 19 Sept. 1796, in *The Writings of George Washington from the Original Manuscript Sources, 1745–1799,* ed. John C. Fitzpatrick, 39 vols. (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office [hereafter, GPO], 1931–44), 35:218 (hereafter, Washington, *Writings*). The full text of the Farewell Address can be found in countless sources, including Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 139–59; and Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:213–24. This book will refer to the version in Washington, *Writings,* 35:214–38.

3. Washington, "Farewell Address," in Washington, *Writings,* 35:231.

4. Samuel West, *Greatness the Result of Goodness: A Sermon, Occasioned by the Death of George Washington, Late Commander in Chief of the Armies, and First President, of the United States of America, Who Died December 14, 1799, Aged 68* (Boston, MA: Manning and Loring, [1800]).

5. Washington, "Farewell Address," in Washington, *Writings,* 35:231–33.

6. Ibid., 35:233–34.

7. Ibid., 35:234–35, 35:237.

8. The ensuing discussion does not suggest that the principles of foreign policy Washington expressed in the Farewell Address were fundamentally new; in his book *To the Farewell Address,* Felix Gilbert argues that U.S. foreign policy in the 1790s was a direct outgrowth of European foreign-policy ideals and American experience in the 1770s and 1780s. Instead this section seeks to demonstrate how Washington's experience, both before and during his presidency, produced his particular understanding of these principles and shaped the final form and content of the Farewell Address. Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address.*

9. See, for example, Joseph J. Ellis, *His Excellency: George Washington* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2004), 124–28.

10. George Washington to Benjamin Harrison, 18–30 Dec. 1778, in Washington, *Writings,* 13:466.

11. George Washington to Joseph Jones, 31 May 1780, in Washington, *Writings,* 18:453.

12. Alexander Hamilton to James Duane, [3 Sept. 1780], in *The Papers of Alexander Hamilton,* ed. Harold C. Syrett, 27 vols. (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1961–87), 2:400–402 (hereafter, Hamilton, *Papers*); the full letter is on pages 2:400–418. In 1781–82, Hamilton brought his argument for a stronger central government directly to the American people in a six-part series of anonymous essays published as *The Continentalist* in the *New York Packet, and the American Advertiser.* See *The Continentalist* nos. 1–6, 12 July 1781–4 July 1782, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 2:649–52, 2:654–57, 2:660–65, 2:669–74, 3:75–82, and 3:99–106.

13. For the Franco-American Treaties of 1778, see "Treaty of Amity and Commerce," 6 Feb. 1778, and "Treaty of Alliance," 6 Feb. 1778, in *Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States of America,* ed. Hunter Miller, 8 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1931–48), 2:3–44.

14. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 31 Mar. 1783, in Washington, *Writings,* 26:276–77.

15. Merrill Jensen, *The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of the American Revolution, 1774–1781* (Madison, WI: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1948); Robert W. Hoffert, *A Politics of Tensions: The Articles of Confederation and American Political Ideas* (Niwot, CO: Univ. Press of Colorado, 1992); Richard B. Morris, *The Forging of the Union, 1781–1789* (New York: HarperCollins, 1987); and Robert Middlekauff, *The Glorious Cause: The American Revolution, 1763–1789,* rev. ed. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), chaps. 23 and 24.

16. George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 30 May 1787, in *The Papers of George Washington: Confederation Series,* eds. W. W. Abbot and Dorothy Twohig, 6 vols. (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1992–97), 5:208 (hereafter, Washington, *Papers: Confederation Series*).

17. Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 3 July 1787, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 4:223–24.

18. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 10 July 1787, in Washington, *Papers: Confederation Series,* 5:257.

19. George Washington to William Gordon, 1 Jan. 1788, and George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, [1 Jan. 1788], in Washington, *Papers: Confederation Series,* 6:1, 6:4.

20. George Washington to Henry Knox, 10 Jan. 1788, in Washington, *Papers: Confederation Series,* 6:28.

21. George Washington to Edward Newenham, 29 Aug. 1788, in Washington, *Papers: Confederation Series,* 6:487.

22. Many works discuss the establishment of the government during Washington's first term. For two excellent accounts, see Forrest McDonald, *The Presidency of George Washington* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1974), esp. chaps. 2–4; and Gordon S. Wood, *Empire of Liberty: A History of the Early Republic, 1789–1815* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), esp. chaps. 1–5.

23. Russia also planned to extend its trading network southward from Alaska and likewise looked to Nootka Sound; however, it did not feature in this controversy.

24. For a fuller discussion of the Nootka Sound Controversy, see William R. Manning, "The Nootka Sound Controversy," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1904* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1905): 281–478; Derek Pethick, *First Approaches to the Northwest Coast* (Vancouver, BC : J. J. Douglas, 1976); Derek Pethick, *The Nootka Connection: Europe and the Northwest Coast, 1790–1795* (Vancouver, BC: Douglas and McIntyre, 1980); Barry M. Gough, *Distant Dominion: Britain and the Northwest Coast of North America, 1579–1809* (Vancouver, BC: Univ. of British Columbia Press, 1980), chaps. 6–9; Frank T. Reuter, *Trials and Triumphs: George Washington's Foreign Policy* (Fort Worth, TX: Texas Christian

Univ. Press, 1983), 81–85; Francis D. Cogliano, *Emperor of Liberty: Thomas Jefferson's Foreign Policy* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2014), 79–94; Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, 29 May 1790, and Alexander Hamilton to Washington, [8 July 1790], both in George Washington, *The Papers of George Washington: Presidential Series,* ed. Dorothy Twohig, 16 vols. to date (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, 1987–), 5:438n1 and 6:26–29, source note (hereafter, Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series*). Julian Boyd, editor of Thomas Jefferson's papers, also compiled an extensive analysis of Alexander Hamilton's relationship with a representative of the British government, George Beckwith, and discussed how the Nootka Sound Controversy played into Hamilton's larger efforts to "bend American foreign policy toward a closer connection with Great Britain." See "The War Crisis of 1790," editorial note and accompanying documents, in Thomas Jefferson, *The Papers of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Julian P. Boyd, 39 vols. to date (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1950–), 17:35–160 (hereafter, Jefferson, *Papers*). Boyd subsequently expanded his treatment of the incident in Julian P. Boyd, *Number 7: Alexander Hamilton's Secret Attempts to Control American Foreign Policy, with Supporting Documents* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1964), above quote, ix. Some historians have taken issue with Boyd's interpretation of Hamilton's conduct. See John Lamberton Harper, *American Machiavelli: Alexander Hamilton and the Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2004), 74–75.

25. Gouverneur Morris to George Washington, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 5:430. See also Washington's entry for 1 July 1790, in George Washington, *The Diaries of George Washington,* ed. Donald Jackson, 6 vols. (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1976–79), 6:80.

26. Thomas Jefferson, "Outline of Policy Contingent on War between England and Spain," 12 July 1790, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 17:109–10.

27. Ibid. Jefferson based his suggestion that the United States pursue independence for Spanish territories on a letter received by Washington from the Comte d'Estaing, in which d'Estaing suggested "the honesty, the convenience and the utility of making Louisiana a free colony under its own government & its own laws, and immediately protected by France & Spain." See d'Estaing to George Washington, 20 Mar. 1790, and accompanying notes, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 5:256–61, 5:261–63, esp. 257.

28. Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 22 July 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:114 and 6:114–16, source note. The editors of Washington's papers noted that both Alexander Hamilton, then secretary of the treasury, and Henry Knox, then secretary of war, had knowledge of the plans of Venezuelan revolutionary Sebastian Francisco de Miranda to conduct filibustering expeditions against the Spanish in South America. They also raised the question of whether or not Hamilton and Knox might have discussed these plans with Washington in light of the Nootka Sound Controversy. Miranda met with Britain's prime minister on 14 February 1790, three days after the British government first received word of the incident at Nootka Sound, and during that meeting the prime minister pledged British support for Miranda's plans for invading South America in the event that Britain went to war with Spain. Miranda met with the prime minister again in May and received similar assurances. See Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:114–15, source note; Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, [c. 15–22 July 1790], in ibid., 6:81–82n8; and Manning, "Nootka Sound Controversy," 370–71, 380, 383–84.

29. Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 8 Aug. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:217–18, source note. See also Thomas Jefferson to William Carmichael, 2 Aug. 1790, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 17:111–16.

30. George Washington to Lafayette, 11 Aug. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:234–35.

31. George Washington to John Adams, 27 Aug. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:343–45. Washington also sent similar letters to Hamilton, Jay, Jefferson, and Knox.

32. John Jay to George Washington, 28 Aug. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:354–55.

33. Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 28 Aug. 1790, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 17:129–30.

34. John Adams to George Washington, 29 Aug. 1790, in *The Works of John Adams, Second President of the United States,* ed. Charles Francis Adams, 10 vols. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1850–56), 8:498–99.

35. Henry Knox to George Washington, 29 Aug. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:365–66.

36. Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 15 Sept. 1790, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 6:439–59.

37. Washington's approach to the crisis also revealed that he was still in the process of figuring out the mechanics of being president. There were no cabinet discussions, and Washington consulted with two advisors, Jay and Adams, whom he would not regularly look to in the future.

38. Joseph Ellis, *Founding Brothers: The Revolutionary Generation* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), esp. 3–19; Wood, *Empire of Liberty,* esp. chaps. 4 and 5; and Jeffrey L. Pasley, *The First Presidential Contest: 1796 and the Founding of American Democracy* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 2013).

39. George Washington to James Madison, 20 May 1792, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 10:400.

40. James Madison, "Memorandum on a Discussion of the President's Retirement," 5 May 1792, in *The Papers of James Madison,* ed. William T. Hutchinson and William M. E. Rachal, 17 vols. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962–91), 14:301 (hereafter, Madison, *Papers*).

41. James Madison to George Washington, 20 June 1792, in Madison, *Papers,* 14:323–24. Later in the year, after he had consented to forego retirement and stand for reelection, Washington took up the issue of partisanship directly with Jefferson and Hamilton. See George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 23 Aug. 1792, and George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 26 Aug. 1792, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 11:23–31, 11:38–40.

42. George Washington to David Humphreys, 23 Mar. 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 12:362–63.

43. George Washington to Gouverneur Morris, 25 Mar. 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 12:380.

44. Tobias Lear to George Washington, 8 Apr. 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 12:434–37.

45. George Washington to Thomas Jefferson, 12 Apr. 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 12:448. See also George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 12 Apr. 1793, in ibid., 12:447.

46. George Washington, "Proclamation of Neutrality," 22 Apr. 1793, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:156–57.

47. See, for example, Patrice Higonnet, *Sister Republics: The Origins of French and American Republicanism* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1988); and Susan Dunn, *Sister Revolutions: French Lightening, American Light* (New York: Faber and Faber, 1999).

48. See "Cabinet Opinion on the Rules of Neutrality" and "Cabinet Opinion on French Privateers," 3 Aug. 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 13:325–27 and 13:327–29.

49. Stanley Elkins and Eric McKitrick, *The Age of Federalism: The Early American Republic, 1788–1800* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1993), 335–36. Also see Harry Ammon, *The Genet Mission* (New York: Norton, 1973).

50. See "Cabinet Opinion on the *Little Sarah* [*Petite Démocrate*]," [8 July 1793], in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 13:180–85.

51. Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 352; Harry Ammon, "The Genet Mission and the Development of American Political Parties," *Journal of American History* 52 (Mar. 1966): 727; quote taken from the introductory note from Alexander Hamilton to Rufus King, [13 Aug. 1793], in Hamilton, *Papers,* 15:233.

52. See "Notes of Cabinet Meeting on Edmond Charles Genet," 1 and 2 Aug. 1793, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 26:598, 26:601–3. A final resolution of the recall issue was not reached until 23 August. See "Cabinet Opinions on Edmond Charles Genet," 23 Aug. 1793, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 26:745.

53. Veritas to George Washington, 30 May, 3 June, and 6 June 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 12:647–49, 13:17–19, 13:34–37. Quotes are taken from the letter of 3 June. The letters were published in the *National Gazette* of Philadelphia on 1, 5, and 8 June 1793. Genet believed that the Veritas letters had been composed by Thomas Jefferson. While the true identity of Veritas is not known, there is no evidence to suggest that it was Jefferson. See Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 343–45.

54. "A Citizen" to George Washington, 4 July 1793, in Washington, *Papers: Presidential Series,* 13:175–77.

55. For the development of the partisan press in the 1790s, see Jeffrey L. Pasley, *"The Tyranny of Printers": Newspaper Politics in the Early Republic* (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2001), esp. chaps. 3 and 4.

56. See "Definitive Treaty of Peace" between Great Britain and the United States, more commonly referred to as the Treaty of Paris, 3 Sept. 1783, in Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts,* 2:151–57.

57. For the text of the Jay Treaty, see "The Jay Treaty. Treaty of Amity, Commerce, and Navigation," 19 Nov. 1794, in Miller, *Treaties and Other International Acts,* 2:245–74.

58. John Jay to Alexander Hamilton, 19 Nov. 1794, in *The Correspondence and Public Papers of John Jay,* ed. Henry P. Johnston, 4 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1890–93), 4:135.

59. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 29 July 1795, in Washington, *Writings,* 34:262. Hamilton, with the aid of Rufus King, attempted to counter the Republican press by publishing a defense of the Jay Treaty that they called, appropriately, "The Defence." From 22 July 1795 to 9 Jan. 1796, they published thirty-eight articles in which they minutely analyzed the various provisions of the treaty to show how it was beneficial for the United States, and to demonstrate that it was neither contrary to the country's declared neutrality nor in violation of its treaties with France. See the introductory note: "The Defence No. I" [22 July 1795], in Hamilton, *Papers,* 18:475–79.

60. See Pasley, *First Presidential Contest,* esp. chap. 3; and James D. Tagg, "Benjamin Franklin Bache's Attack on George Washington," *Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography* 100 (Apr. 1976): 191–230.

61. George Washington to Charles Carroll, of Carrollton, 1 May 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:30. For a more detailed discussion of the entire Jay Treaty episode, see Samuel

Flagg Bemis, *Jay's Treaty: A Study in Commerce and Diplomacy* (New York: Macmillan, 1923); Jerald A. Combs, *The Jay Treaty: Political Battleground of the Founding Fathers* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1970); and Todd Estes, *The Jay Treaty Debate, Public Opinion, and the Evolution of Early American Political Culture* (Amherst, MA: Univ. of Massachusetts Press, 2006). For an overview of the debate in the House of Representatives, see Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 441–49. Finally, for a discussion of the impact of Washington's support of the Jay Treaty on the failure of Republican efforts, see Barry Schwartz, *George Washington: The Making of an American Symbol* (New York: Free Press, 1987), 76–77; and Ellis, *His Excellency,* 229–30.

62. In late July 1795, George Hammond, Britain's minister to the United States, delivered a paper to Oliver Wolcott Jr., the secretary of the treasury. The paper, dated 31 Oct. 1794, was a dispatch to the French government containing the allegations against Randolph. A copy of the dispatch in its original French can be found in Frederick Jackson Turner, ed., "Correspondence of the French Ministers to the United States, 1791–1797," *Annual Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1903,* 2 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1904), 2:444–55; an imperfect English translation can be found in Edmund Randolph, *A Vindication of Mr. Randolph's Resignation* (Philadelphia, PA: Samuel H. Smith, 1795), 41–48. For more on the difficulties with the English translations of the dispatch, see Mary K. Bonsteel Tachau, "George Washington and the Reputation of Edmund Randolph," *Journal of American History* 73 (June 1986): 15–34.

63. Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 425–26.

64. For another view of the Randolph resignation episode, see John J. Reardon, *Edmund Randolph: A Biography* (New York: Macmillan, 1974), 307–34.

65. George Washington to Edmund Randolph, 24 July 1795, in Washington, *Writings,* 34:247.

66. See James Monroe to George Logan, 24 June 179[5], in *The Writings of James Monroe, Including a Collection of His Public and Private Papers and Correspondence Now for the First Time Printed,* ed. Stanislaus Murray Hamilton, 7 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1898–1903), 3:6–7 (hereafter, Monroe, *Writings*).

67. Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 498–503; and Harlow Giles Unger, *The Last Founding Father: James Monroe and a Nation's Call to Greatness* (Philadelphia, PA: Da Capo Press, 2009), 109–27.

68. Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 30 July 1796, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 20:265.

69. For a sampling of the discussion on the authorship question and the relative contributions of Washington and Hamilton, see Samuel Flagg Bemis, "The Background of Washington's Foreign Policy," *Yale Review* 16 (Jan. 1927): 335; Ron Chernow, *Alexander Hamilton* (New York: Penguin Press, 2004), 506; DeConde, "Washington's Farewell," 648; Gilbert, *To the Farewell Address,* 133; Gilbert L. Lycan, *Alexander Hamilton and American Foreign Policy: A Design for Greatness* (Norman, OK: Univ. of Oklahoma Press, 1970), 283, 294; Broadus Mitchell, *Alexander Hamilton: The National Adventure, 1788–1804* (New York: Macmillan, 1962), 388; and Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 53–54.

70. The process employed by the two men to construct the Farewell Address is quite interesting but is of secondary importance to the larger point of this study. For a thorough description of the process, see Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 31–54.

71. George Washington, "Farewell Address [First Draft]," [15 May 1796], in Washington, *Writings,* 35:51–61, esp. 56–57.

72. Washington himself wrote to Hamilton in June 1796 complaining that he should have published the Address earlier in the year because "it would have been announcing *publicly,* what seems to be very well understood, and is industriously propagated, *privately.* It would have removed all doubts from the mind of *all,* and left the field clear for *all.*" George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 26 June 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:103.

73. The most prominent historians to describe the Address in this way were Alexander DeConde in "Washington's Farewell," 641–58; and Jeffrey L. Pasley in *First Presidential Contest,* 218–21.

74. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 15 May 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:50.

75. Ibid., 35:48, 35:50.

76. Alexander Hamilton to George Washington, 30 July 1796, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 20:265.

77. Alexander Hamilton, "Draft of Washington's Farewell Address," 30 July 1796, in Hamilton, *Papers,* 20:284.

78. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 10 Aug. 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:178; and George Washington, "Farewell Address," 19 Sept. 1796, in ibid., 35:236.

79. George Washington, "Farewell Address [First Draft]," [15 May 1796], in Washington, *Writings,* 35:57.

80. Alexander Hamilton, "The Defence No. II," [25 July 1795], in Hamilton, *Papers,* 18:499.

81. George Washington, "Farewell Address," 19 Sept. 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:234.

82. Ibid., 35:237.

83. George Washington, "Fifth Annual Address," 3 Dec. 1793, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:138–42. Two years later, Washington reminded Congress of the need to conduct a "review of our Military establishment," and in his final annual address he moved past the regular military and stressed that "the protection of a Naval force is indispensable," a point he elaborated in some detail. George Washington, "Seventh Annual Address," 8 Dec. 1795, and "Eighth Annual Address," 7 Dec. 1796, in ibid., 1:182–86, 1:199–204.

84. James Madison to George Washington, 20 June 1792, in Madison, *Papers,* 14:323.

85. George Washington to Alexander Hamilton, 1 Sept. 1796, in Washington, *Writings,* 35:199–200.

2. Washington's Farewell in the American Mind, 1796–1817

1. Stephen Howard Browne, *Jefferson's Call for Nationhood: The First Inaugural Address* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M Univ. Press, 2003), 42.

2. Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," 4 Mar. 1801, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 33:148–52, esp. 149–50. The version of the inaugural address published in Richardson's *Messages and Papers* capitalized Republicans and Federalists, which has a significant impact on potential interpretations of Jefferson's language and intentions. See Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:322.

3. Forrest McDonald, *The Presidency of Thomas Jefferson* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1976), 39.

4. "To the People of the United States; Friends and Fellow Citizens," *Claypoole's American Daily Advertiser* (Philadelphia), 19 Sept. 1796.

5. See, for example, "To the People of the United States," *Philadelphia Gazette,* 19 Sept.

1796; "To the People of the United States," *Federal Gazette* (New York), 21 Sept. 1796; "Resignation of the President," *Connecticut Journal* (New Haven, CT), 28 Sept. 1796; "President's Resignation to the People of the United States," *Rural Repository* (Leominster, MA), 29 Sept. 1796.

6. Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 62.

7. Jasper Dwight [William Duane], *A Letter to George Washington, President of the United States: Containing Strictures on His Address of the Seventeenth of September, 1796, Notifying His Relinquishment of the Presidential Office* (Philadelphia, PA, 1796), 35, 26. For another politically charged attack on Washington's motives, see [Samuel Relf and James A. Neal], *President II: Being Observations on the Late Official Address of George Washington: Designed to Promote the Interest of a Certain Candidate for the Executive, and to Explode the Pretensions of Others; Addressed to the People of the United States* (Newark, NJ: Daniel Dodge, 1796).

8. *Daily Advertiser* (New York), 21 Sept. 1796.

9. Benjamin Pickman Jr., *An Oration, Pronounced, February 22, 1797, before the Inhabitants of the Town of Salem, in Massachusetts, Assembled to Commemorate the Birth-day of George Washington, President of the United States of America* (Salem, MA: Thomas C. Cushing, 1797), 16.

10. Oliver Wolcott Sr. to Oliver Wolcott, 3 Oct. 1796, in George Gibbs, *Memoirs of the Administrations of Washington and John Adams: Edited from the Papers of Oliver Wolcott, Secretary of the Treasury,* 2 vols. (New York: W. Van Norden, 1846), 1:385–86.

11. Malanson, "'If I Had It in His Hand-Writing,'" 219–42.

12. Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 311–60. Paltsits listed every newspaper and every separate edition of the Address; the above statistics do not include international printings.

13. In 1796, seven of the sixteen states provided for some form of popular election of electors (meaning that people would vote for electors who would then elect the president), seven had legislative selection (meaning that people would vote for their state legislators, who would choose the electors who would then elect the president), and two states had systems that melded popular and legislative selection of electors. Given how removed the average citizen was from the actual election of the president, it is difficult to trace the specific influence of the Farewell Address on the outcome of the election. For a breakdown of state methods of selecting electors, see Susan B. Carter, et al., eds., *Historical Statistics of the United States,* millennial ed. online (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2006–), 5:171. For more on the Electoral College, see Lawrence D. Longley and Neal R. Peirce, *The Electoral College Primer* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1996). For more on the election of 1796, see Pasley, *First Presidential Contest.*

14. John Adams, "Inaugural Address," 4 Mar. 1797, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:231.

15. John Adams, "Special Session Message," 16 May 1797, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:236, 1:238.

16. Adams's nonpartisanship is discussed in Ralph Ketcham, *Presidents Above Party: The First American Presidency, 1789–1829* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1984), 93–99.

17. For more on the Quasi-War, and Adams's presidency more generally, see Alexander DeConde, *The Quasi-War: Politics and Diplomacy of the Undeclared War with France, 1797–1801* (New York: Scribner, 1966); Ralph Adams Brown, *The Presidency of John Adams* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1975); Stephen G. Kurtz, *The Presidency of John Ad-*

ams (Philadelphia, PA: Univ. of Pennsylvania Press, 1957); Manning J. Dauer, *The Adams Federalists* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1953); and Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* chaps. 12–15.

18. John Adams, "Second Annual Message," 8 Dec. 1798, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:273.

19. Washington famously invested a great deal of time and effort putting together an exact replica of the uniform he wore during the American Revolution. See Ellis, *His Excellency,* 253–54.

20. George Washington to William Heath, 20 May 1797, and George Washington to Thomas Pinckney, 28 May 1797, both in *The Papers of George Washington: Retirement Series,* ed. Dorothy Twohig, 4 vols. (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1998–99), 1:149, 1:158 (hereafter, Washington, *Papers: Retirement Series*).

21. George Washington to Lafayette, 25 Dec. 1798, in Washington, *Papers: Retirement Series,* 3:284.

22. Celebrations of Washington's birthday had occurred as early as 1781, but increased in popularity once he became president. Schwartz, *George Washington,* 33. For a discussion of early Washington biographies, see Catherine L. Albanese, *Sons of the Fathers: The Civil Religion of the American Revolution* (Philadelphia, PA: Temple Univ. Press, 1976), 152.

23. Isaac Weld, 22 Feb. 1796, quoted in Morton Borden, ed., *George Washington* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1969), 98. For two representative samples of birthday celebration addresses during Washington's presidency, see James Miltimore, *A Discourse Delivered in Newmarket, at the Particular Request of a Respectable Musical Choir, to a Numerous Assembly, Convened for Celebrating the Birth-day of the Illustrious Washington* (Exeter, NH: Henry Ranlet, 1794); and Josiah Bartlett, *An Address: Delivered at Warren Hall, in Charlestown, Massachusetts, at the Request of King Solomon's Lodge: February 22, 1797; Being the Birth Day of the President of the United States* (Charlestown, MA: John Lamson, [1797]).

24. For the primary account of Washington's illness and death, see "Tobias Lear's Narrative Accounts of the Death of George Washington," in Washington, *Papers: Retirement Series,* 4:542–55.

25. John Marshall, 19 Dec. 1799, in *Annals of Congress,* 6th Cong., 1st sess., 203.

26. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate unanimously passed a resolution to that effect on 30 December 1799; see *Annals of Congress,* 6th Cong., 1st sess., 223 and 22. For an extended discussion of how Americans commemorated Washington's passing, see Gerald E. Kahler, *The Long Farewell: Americans Mourn the Death of George Washington* (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2008). Kahler identified 421 separate funeral rites held for Washington between 18 December 1799 and 9 March 1800, and acknowledged that this was only a "partial listing," adding that there were "undoubtedly hundreds of other commemorative rituals held throughout the nation." Kahler, *The Long Farewell,* 137–49, esp. 137, 149.

27. Boston Committee on the Death of Washington, *Boston, January 6, 1800: The Committee Chosen By the Town . . .* (Boston, MA, 1800); and Schwartz, *George Washington,* 96.

28. Gary Laderman, *The Sacred Remains: American Attitudes Toward Death, 1799–1883* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1996), 15–16. For descriptions of many other funeral services, see Franklin B. Hough, *Washingtoniana: Or, Memorials of the Death of George Washington, Giving an Account of the Funeral Honors Paid to His Memory, with a List of Tracts and Volumes Printed upon the Occasion, and a Catalogue of Medals Commemorating the Event,* 2 vols. (Roxbury, MA: Elliot Woodward, 1865).

29. Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father,* 39, 44.

30. Ibid., 38.

31. West, *Greatness the Result of Goodness,* 16–17; Abiel Abbot, *An Eulogy on the Illustrious Life and Character of George Washington; Delivered Before the Inhabitants of the Town of Haverhill, on His Birth Day, 1800, at the Request of Their Committee* (Haverhill, MA: Seth H. Moore, 1800), 21; and John D. Blair, *A Sermon on the Death of Lieutenant General George Washington; Delivered in the Capitol in Richmond* ([Richmond, VA]: Meriwether Jones, 1800), 12.

32. Daniel Dana, *A Discourse on the Character and Virtues of General George Washington: Delivered on the Twenty-Second of February, 1800: The Day of National Mourning for His Death* (Newburyport, MA: Angier March, 1800), 27.

33. Quotes from eulogies given by George Richards Minot, Thomas Paine, David Ramsay, and Jonathan Mitchel Sewall, included in the collection, *Eulogies and Orations on the Life and Death of General George Washington, First President of the United States of America* (Boston, MA: Manning and Loring, 1800), 25, 66, 88.

34. William Cunningham, *An Eulogy Delivered at Lunenburg, on Saturday the 22d of February 1800, the Day Recommended by Congress to Commemorate the Unequalled Virtues and Preeminent Services of Gen. George Washington* (Worcester, MA: Isaiah Thomas Jr., 1800), 15. Many eulogists frequently compared Washington favorably with Moses. See Robert P. Hay, "George Washington: American Moses," *American Quarterly* 21 (Winter 1969): 780–91.

35. See, for example, Jedidiah Morse's eulogy of Washington, the inscription to which called for "a copy [to be] delivered to the respective families in town. A frequent perusal of its contents, was earnestly recommended, as containing the life, character, opinions and advice, of the greatest patriot, statesman, and hero of the age; and as a most valuable legacy to their children's children, and their successors, to the latest period of time." Also see that by Aaron Bancroft, of which the town voted that "each head of a family should be furnished with one." Jedidiah Morse, *A Prayer and Sermon, Delivered at Charlestown, December 31, 1799; on the Death of George Washington; Late President; and Commander in Chief of the Armies of the United States of America; Who Departed This Life, at Mount Vernon, in Virginia, on the 14th of the Same Month, in the 69th Year of His Age; with an Additional Sketch of His Life* (Charlestown, MA: Samuel Etheridge, 1800), 10; and Aaron Bancroft, *An Eulogy on the Character of the Late Gen. George Washington; Delivered Before the Inhabitants of the Town of Worcester, Commonwealth of Massachusetts, on Saturday the 22d of February 1800* (Worcester, MA: Isaiah Thomas Jr., 1800), title page.

36. *Eulogies and Orations; A Selection of Orations and Eulogies, Pronounced in Different Parts of the United States, in Commemoration of the Life, Virtues, and Pre-eminent Services of Gen. George Washington, Who Died, at Mount Vernon, December 14, 1799; in the 68th Year of His Age* (Amherst, NH: Samuel Preston, 1800); and *The Washingtoniana: Containing a Sketch of the Life and Death of the Late Gen. George Washington; with a Collection of Elegant Eulogies, Orations, Poems, &c., Sacred to His Memory; Also, an Appendix Comprising All His Most Valuable Public Papers, and His Last Will and Testament* (Lancaster, PA: William Hamilton, 1802).

37. Michael Kammen, *Mystic Chords of Memory: The Transformation of Tradition in American Culture* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1991), part one.

38. For a discussion of the increasingly important role that the celebration of civic holidays held for Americans in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, see David

Waldstreicher, *In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776–1820* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1997).

39. William Alfred Bryan, *George Washington in American Literature, 1775–1865* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1952), 83–84.

40. For example, Catherine Albanese determined that Mason Locke Weems's *Life of Washington* had gone through fifty-nine editions by 1850. Forrest McDonald discussed the lack of a Jefferson biography before 1857 in his survey of Jefferson's presidency. Albanese, *Sons of the Fathers,* 174; and McDonald, *Presidency of Thomas Jefferson,* 167.

41. Examples include *A Political Primer, For the Use of Schools in the State of Maryland* (Abingdon, MD: Ruff, 1806), which contained Washington's Farewell Address and the constitutions of the United States and Maryland; *The Constitution of the State of Massachusetts, and That of the United States; the Declaration of Independence, with President Washington's Farewell Address* (Salem, MA: Cushing and Appleton, 1811); Noah Webster, *Elements of Useful Knowledge,* vol. 2, *Containing a Historical and Geographical Account of the United States; for the Use of Schools,* 3rd ed. (New Haven, CT: Increase Cooke, 1808); and Samuel Temple, *The Child's Assistant in the Art of Reading: Being a Collection of Pieces, Suited to the Capacities of Children, in the Early Stages of Education; Designed as a Medium between the Spelling-book, and the American Selection of Lessons, American Preceptor, and Other Books of a Similar Kind,* 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Munroe and Francis, 1802).

42. In his study of Washington, historian Garry Wills argued that "by the time of his own presidency, Jefferson was teaching the Washington doctrine on neutrality so emphatically that he gave to it the catchphrase some still mistakenly attribute to Washington himself: 'no entangling alliances.'" Wills's assertion is interesting both because he draws a more direct connection between Washington and Jefferson, and because he misquoted Jefferson's actual phrase. Garry Wills, *Cincinnatus: George Washington and the Enlightenment* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 91. For an extended discussion of Jefferson's first inaugural address, see Browne, *Jefferson's Call for Nationhood.*

43. Curtius [John Taylor], *A Defence of the Measures of the Administration of Thomas Jefferson* (Providence, RI: William Olney, 1805), 61–62.

44. "For the Bee. Better Late than Never," *Bee* (New Haven, CT), 26 Aug. 1801; and "At a numerous and respectable meeting of republicans and others assembled at Stewart's Inn, Fell's Point, to celebrate the anniversary of American independence . . . ," *Democratic Republican; and Commercial Daily Advertiser* (Baltimore), 6 July 1802.

45. "Select Toasts Given on the 4th of July," *Alexandria Expositor, and the Columbian Advertiser,* 22 July 1803.

46. The *Independent Chronicle* (Boston) started using the quotation "'*Peace, Commerce, and honest Friendship, with* all *Nations—entangling* Alliances, *with* none.'—Jefferson" at the bottom of its masthead on 21 December 1801.

47. Tristam Burges, *Liberty, Glory and Union, or American Independence: An Oration, Pronounced Before the People of Providence, July 4th,* A.D. *1810* (Providence, RI: Dunham and Hawkins, 1810), 16.

48. In 1809, for example, David Allen, while discussing America's place in the world, declared that he would "adopt the sentiment of 'impartial justice to all nations, entangling alliances with none.'" David Allen, *An Oration Delivered in the Brick Church in Lansingburgh, July 4th, 1809* (Lansingburgh, NY: Tracy and Bliss, 1809), 21.

49. James A. Bayard, *Speech of the Hon. James A. Bayard, in the Senate of the United States, upon His Motion, Made on the 16th of June, to Postpone the Further Consideration of the Bill Declaring War Against Great Britain, to the 31st of October* (Wilmington, DE: Riley, 1812), 2.

50. Historians have often engaged in lengthy debates over the extent to which the foreign policies of Washington and Jefferson were isolationist. For several prominent and interesting examples, see DeConde, *Quasi-War,* 335; Lawrence S. Kaplan, *Entangling Alliances with None: American Foreign Policy in the Age of Jefferson* (Kent, OH: Kent State Univ. Press, 1987), xi; Marie-Jeanne Rossignol, *The Nationalist Ferment: The Origins of U.S. Foreign Policy, 1792–1812,* trans. Lillian A. Parrott (Columbus, OH: Ohio State Univ. Press, 2004), 98, 106; Albert K. Weinberg, "International Affairs: The Historical Meaning of the American Doctrine of Isolation," *American Political Science Review* 34 (June 1940): 541–42; and Louis B. Wright, "'The Founding Fathers and 'Splendid Isolation,'" *Huntington Library Quarterly* 6 (Feb. 1943): 180, 183.

51. Francis Scott Key, *An Oration* (Alexandria, VA, 1814), 6.

52. George Washington, "Eighth Annual Address," 7 Dec. 1796, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:201.

53. Jefferson put much of the navy into dry dock, but did keep a small contingent of ships active, primarily to fight in the Barbary Wars in the Mediterranean Sea. See Frank Lambert, *The Barbary Wars: American Independence in the Atlantic World* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2005); Robert J. Allison, *The Crescent Obscured: The United States and the Muslim World, 1776–1815* (Chicago, IL: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1995), esp. chap. 1; and Cogliano, *Emperor of Liberty,* chap. 5.

54. Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 3 Oct. 1801, in *The Works of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 12 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1904–5), 9:309 (hereafter, Jefferson, *Works*).

55. Abraham Bishop, *Oration Delivered in Wallingford, on the 11th of March 1801, Before the Republicans of the State of Connecticut, at Their General Thanksgiving, for the Election of Thomas Jefferson to the Presidency and of Aaron Burr to the Vice Presidency of the United States of America* (New Haven, CT: William W. Morse, 1801), 81.

56. Jefferson had a habit of not capitalizing the first word at the beginning of a new sentence. Thomas Jefferson to John Taylor, 4 June 1798, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 30:389.

57. Thomas Jefferson to Thomas Paine, 18 Mar. 1801, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 33:358.

58. As Jefferson demonstrated with his rejection of the Monroe-Pinkney Treaty later in his presidency, he was not always willing to sacrifice principles for the sake of maintaining peace. See Cogliano, *Emperor of Liberty,* chap. 7.

59. Thomas Jefferson to Elbridge Gerry, 26 Jan. 1799, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 30:646.

60. Thomas Jefferson to William Short, 3 Oct. 1801, in Jefferson, *Works,* 9:309.

61. John Fowler, 15 May 1800, in Noble E. Cunningham Jr., ed., *Circular Letters of Congressmen to Their Constituents, 1789–1829,* 3 vols. (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1978), 1:210–11 (hereafter, Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen*).

62. Thomas Sumter, 1 May 1803, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 1:304.

63. James Holland, 26 Feb. 1807, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 1:500.

64. Even international commerce pushed Jefferson's limits. In 1784 he revealed to George Washington his distaste that "all the world is becoming commercial. Was it practicable to keep our new empire separated from [Europe] we might indulge ourselves in speculating whether commerce contributes to the happiness of mankind. But we cannot separate our-

selves from them. Our citizens have had too full a taste of the comforts furnished by the arts and manufactures to be debarred the use of them. We must then in our own defence endeavor to share as large a portion as we can of this modern source of wealth and power." Thomas Jefferson to George Washington, 15 Mar. 1784, in Jefferson, *Papers,* 7:26.

65. John Adams, "Special Session Message," 16 May 1797, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:238.

66. *An Inquiry into the Present State of the Foreign Relations of the Union, as Affected by the Late Measures of Administration* (Philadelphia, PA: Samuel Bradford, 1806), 7–8, 12.

67. McDonald, *Presidency of Thomas Jefferson,* 163–64.

68. For a more thorough discussion of the Louisiana Purchase than will be offered here, see Everett Somerville Brown, *The Constitutional History of the Louisiana Purchase, 1803–1812* (Union, NJ: Lawbook Exchange, 2000); Thomas J. Fleming, *The Louisiana Purchase* (Hoboken, NJ: J. Wiley, 2003); and Peter J. Kastor, *The Nation's Crucible: The Louisiana Purchase and the Creation of America* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2004).

69. On American fears of French possession of Louisiana, see Thomas Jefferson to Robert R. Livingston, 18 Apr. 1802, in Jefferson, *Works,* 9:363–68; and James Madison to James Monroe, 29 July 1803, in *The Papers of James Madison: Secretary of State Series,* ed. Robert J. Brugger, 9 vols. to date (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1986–), 5:240–44.

70. Joseph Winston, 20 Mar. 1804, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 1:369–70.

71. Rossignol, *The Nationalist Ferment,* 179.

72. Joseph Desha, 25 Feb. 1809, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:623.

73. See McDonald, *Presidency of Thomas Jefferson,* 100–103.

74. John Rhea, 15 Mar. 1808, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:531.

75. Burwell Bassett, 23 Mar. 1808, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:534.

76. William A. Burwell, 23 Apr. 1808, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:583.

77. McDonald, *Presidency of Thomas Jefferson,* 152.

78. Thomas Jefferson, "First Inaugural Address," 4 Mar. 1801, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:323.

79. Robert Allen Rutland, *The Presidency of James Madison* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1990), 62–66.

80. *The Poetical Apotheosis of Gen. George Washington, the Friend of Man, and Father of His Country; with an Address to the Citizens of Philadelphia, on the Propriety of Erecting a Statue to His Memory in Their Metropolis, Opposite the State-House in Chestnut Street* (Philadelphia, PA: J. Rakestraw, 1810), 7.

81. Rutland, *Presidency of James Madison,* 86. Among the new generation of leaders to emerge in this period were three men who would have a sustained impact on the shape and direction of U.S. foreign policy into the 1850s: Henry Clay, John C. Calhoun, and Daniel Webster. While Webster's rise to prominence was gradual after his election in 1812, Clay and Calhoun made an impact almost immediately. Clay was chosen speaker of the House of Representatives in his first session in that body, and Calhoun was appointed secretary of war under James Monroe after only six years of service in the House. For more on their intertwined careers, see Merrill D. Peterson, *The Great Triumvirate: Webster, Clay, and Calhoun* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1987). For a more general take on generational change in the young nation, see Joyce Appleby, *Inheriting the Revolution: The First Generation of Americans* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 2000).

82. For Madison's war message to Congress, see James Madison, "Special Message," 1 June 1812, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:499–505.

83. For more on the War of 1812, see David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *The War of 1812* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 2002); Donald R. Hickey, *The War of 1812: A Forgotten Conflict,* bicentennial ed. (Urbana, IL: Univ. of Illinois Press, 2012); Julius W. Pratt, *Expansionists of 1812* (Gloucester, MA: P. Smith, 1957); J. C. A. Stagg, *Mr. Madison's War: Politics, Diplomacy, and Warfare in the Early American Republic* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1983); and J. C. A. Stagg, *The War of 1812: Conflict for a Continent* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2012).

84. Tagg, "Benjamin Franklin Bache's Attack on George Washington," 191–230, esp. 208; Glenn A. Phelps, "George Washington and the Paradox of Party," *Presidential Studies Quarterly* 19 (Fall 1989): 733–45; Simon P. Newman, "Principles or Men? George Washington and the Political Culture of National Leadership, 1776–1801," *Journal of the Early Republic* 12 (Winter 1992): 477–507, esp. 495, 502; Schwartz, *George Washington,* 41–89; Marcus Cunliffe, *George Washington: Man and Monument* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1958), 201; and Bernard Mayo, *Myths and Men: Patrick Henry, George Washington, Thomas Jefferson* (Athens, GA: Univ. of Georgia Press, 1959), 36–37.

85. Philip J. Lampi, "The Federalist Party Resurgence, 1808–1816: Evidence from the New Nation Votes Database," *Journal of the Early Republic* 33 (Summer 2013): 255–81. For more on the Federalists after 1801, see David Hackett Fischer, *The Revolution of American Conservatism: The Federalist Party in the Era of Jeffersonian Democracy* (New York: Harper and Row, 1965); James M. Banner Jr., *To the Hartford Convention: The Federalists and the Origins of Party Politics in Massachusetts, 1789–1815* (New York: Knopf, 1970); James H. Broussard, *The Southern Federalists, 1800–1816* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1978); Rudolph J. Pasler and Margaret C. Pasler, *The New Jersey Federalists* (Rutherford, NJ: Fairleigh Dickinson Univ. Press, 1975); and Malanson, "'If I Had It in His Hand-Writing,'" 222–36.

86. Fursetenberg demonstrated that the years leading up to and during the War of 1812, roughly 1809 to 1815, comprised the longest sustained period of publication for new editions of the Farewell Address, peaking in 1812, when more editions were published than in any other year, including the year the Address was first issued and the year of Washington's death. Furstenberg, *In the Name of the Father,* 43.

87. *Constitution of the Washington Society* ([Alexandria, VA, 1800]).

88. Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism,* 116. For a complete list, see ibid., 117–19.

89. *The Constitution of the Washington Society of Maryland* (Baltimore, MD: John L. Cook, 1810), 3.

90. Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania, *A Summary Statement of the Origin, Progress, and Present State of the Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania: With an Account of the Opening and Dedication of the Washington Hall, on the First of October, 1816* (Philadelphia, PA: United States Gazette, 1816), 3, 9.

91. Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania, *Constitution and By-Laws of the Washington Benevolent Society, of Pennsylvania* ([Philadelphia, PA]: Thomas T. Stiles, 1813), 10.

92. Address of 7 Apr. 1813 (Records, 1810–1815), Washington Benevolent Society of the County of Worcester, Records, 1810–1836, Misc. mss. box, "Worcester County," vol. "W," American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, MA.

93. *A Directory, Containing the Names, Places of Business, and Residence, of the Members of the Washington Benevolent Society, of Massachusetts, from Its Commencement* (Boston, MA: C. Stebbins, 1813), 5.

94. *An Historical View of the Public Celebrations of the Washington Society, and Those of the Young Republicans: From 1805, to 1822* (Boston, MA: True and Greene, 1823), 46.

95. This competing society ultimately outlived its Federalist counterparts in Massachusetts by as much as a decade. See Washington Society Records, 1805–1833, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA; and Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts Records, 1812–1824, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

96. Isaac C. Bates, *An Oration, Pronounced Before the Washington Benevolent Society of the County of Hampshire, on Their First Anniversary, 1812; in Commemoration of the Nativity of Washington* (Northampton, MA: William Butler, 1812), 15; and William Sullivan, *An Oration Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent Society of Massachusetts on the Thirtieth Day of April, 1812, Being the Anniversary of the First Inauguration of President Washington,* 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: John Elliot Jun., 1812), 20.

97. *An Address Delivered Before the Washington Benevolent Society, Brimfield, February 22d, 1813, by a Member of the Society* (Brookfield, MA: E. Merriam, 1813), 19.

98. Stephen Bemis, *The First of Patriots Gathered to His Grave in Peace; and the Evil Since Brought Upon His Country: An Address, Delivered before the Washington Benevolent Society of Lancaster and Sterling, Feb. 22, 1815* (Worcester, MA: William Manning, 1815), 8, 15.

99. Contemporary Republican accounts of this illicit trade alleged that "'the [Washington] Benevolent Society men have been detected in aiding the enemy. Nine tenths of all the evasions of law have been committed by Washington Benevolents; nine tenths of all the smugglers are members of that society.'" The veracity of such statements is difficult to assess, but they are interesting nonetheless. Excerpt from "The Fourth Book of the Washington Benevolents," quoted in William A. Robinson, "The Washington Benevolent Society in New England: A Phase of Politics during the War of 1812," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 49 (1916), 284.

100. For more on the Hartford Convention, see Banner, *To the Hartford Convention,* esp. chap. 8.

101. The peace negotiations will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

102. Toast 16 on 4 July 1816, Washington Society Records, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

103. For an examination of the Federalists after 1815, see Shaw Livermore Jr., *The Twilight of Federalism: The Disintegration of the Federalist Party, 1815–1830* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1962).

104. Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism,* 128. The crowning achievement of the Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania did not occur until October 1816 with the opening of their Washington Hall in Philadelphia. Five thousand people gathered in the hall in what the Society claimed was "a larger number than was ever before assembled, in one room, in the city of Philadelphia." Fischer expanded the claim to suggest the event featured what was "in all probability the largest crowd ever gathered under one roof in the country up to that time." A lengthy discussion of Washington Hall's construction and opening celebration can be found in Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania, *Summary Statement,* 40–41; and Fischer, *Revolution of American Conservatism,* 125. Also see Washington Benevolent Society of Pennsylvania, Records, 1814–1829, Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.

105. Bryan, *George Washington in American Literature,* 15.

106. Israel Pickens, 20 Feb. 1815, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:912.

107. John Rhea, 27 Feb. 1815, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:925–26.

108. Joseph Pearson, 10 Mar. 1815, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 2:953, 2:963–64.

109. Albert Gallatin to Matthew Lyon, 7 May 1816, in *The Writings of Albert Gallatin,* ed. Henry Adams, 3 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1879), 1:700.

110. Jerome Loring, *An Oration Pronounced at Hingham, July 4, 1815, in Commemoration of American Independence* (Boston, MA: Rowe and Hooper, 1815), 13.

3. John Quincy Adams and the Legacy of the Farewell Address

1. John Quincy Adams, *An Address Delivered at the Request of a Committee of the Citizens of Washington; on the Occasion of Reading the Declaration of Independence, on the Fourth of July, 1821* (Washington, DC: Davis and Force, 1821), 28–29.

2. Elkins and McKitrick, *Age of Federalism,* 237–39, esp. 237. Many readers of the Publicola letters believed them to have been written by John Adams. The Publicola letters can be found in John Quincy Adams, *The Writings of John Quincy Adams,* ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, 7 vols. (New York: Macmillan, 1913–17), 1:65–110 (hereafter, J. Q. Adams, *Writings*).

3. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 16 Dec. 1792, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:126–27.

4. John Quincy Adams, "Marcellus I," 24 Apr. 1793, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:135.

5. John Quincy Adams, "Marcellus II," 4 May 1793, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:139–40, 1:142. "Marcellus III" was published on 11 May 1793. See J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:142–46.

6. For the Columbus essays, see J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:148–76.

7. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 22 May 1795, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:360.

8. John Quincy Adams to Timothy Pickering, 15 Nov. 1795, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:428.

9. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 22 May 1795, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:356, 1:358.

10. George Washington to John Adams, 20 Aug. 1795, in Washington, *Writings,* 34:279.

11. John Quincy Adams to Sylvanus Bourne, 24 Dec. 1795, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:468.

12. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 21 July 1796, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 2:3–4.

13. John Quincy Adams to Sylvanus Bourne, 24 Dec. 1795, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:468.

14. John Quincy Adams to George Washington, 11 Feb. 1797, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 2:119–20.

15. Samuel Flagg Bemis, "John Quincy Adams and George Washington," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 67 (1945): 377, 381.

16. For a discussion by Adams of his views on the Louisiana Purchase, see John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 31 Aug. 1811, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 4:204–7; and Henry Adams, ed., *Documents Relating to New-England Federalism, 1800–1815* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1905), 52–55.

17. 15 Apr. 1806, in *Annals of Congress,* 9th Cong., 1st sess., 240; and 18 Dec. 1807, in ibid., 10th Cong., 1st sess., 50–51.

18. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 27 Dec. 1807, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 3:168.

19. John Quincy Adams to Orchard Cook, [22] Aug. 1808, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 3:240–41.

20. The Massachusetts legislature elected John Quincy Adams's successor and passed resolutions opposing the embargo on 2 June 1808. Adams resigned on 8 June. For the election of Adams's successor and passage of the anti-embargo resolutions, see the *Boston Gazette,* 6 June 1808. For Adams's resignation, see the *Boston Gazette,* 13 June 1808; John Quincy Adams

to the Honorable Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 8 June 1808, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 3:237–38; and "Reply to the Appeal of the Massachusetts Federalists, by John Quincy Adams," in H. Adams, *New-England Federalism,* 203.

21. John Quincy Adams to Thomas Boylston Adams, 31 July 1811, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 4:163, 4:162.

22. John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, 14 July 1813, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 4:494–95.

23. John Quincy Adams to John Adams, 17 Feb. 1814, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 5:22. Adams reiterated these sentiments after the treaty negotiations began. See John Quincy Adams to William Harris Crawford, 29 Aug. 1814, in ibid., 5:104–6.

24. John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, 29 Nov. 1814, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 5:219–20.

25. John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, 24 Dec. 1814, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 5:248.

26. John Quincy Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, 3 Jan. 1815, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 5:261.

27. John Quincy Adams to Alexander Hill Everett, 16 Mar. 1816, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 5:537–38.

28. For a more extensive discussion of the Ghent negotiations, see Bradford Perkins, *Castlereagh and Adams: England and the United States, 1812–1823* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1964); and Frank Updyke, *The Diplomacy of the War of 1812* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins, 1915).

29. John Quincy Adams left for France in February 1778 and did not return to Massachusetts until July 1785. He then departed for the Netherlands in September 1794 and stayed in Europe until September 1801. On what would prove to be his final mission to Europe, Adams left for Russia in August 1809 and returned in August 1817. All told, Adams had spent twenty-two and a half of the previous forty years in Europe.

30. John Quincy Adams to Abigail Adams, 30 Dec. 1786, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 1:29.

31. One analyst described the Holy Alliance as a "police body, to assure the peace of the civilized world" by giving "a full and combined support . . . to legitimate or monarchical governments as against any revolutionary movement originating from the people." Worthington C. Ford, "John Quincy Adams and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Review* 7 (July 1902): 676.

32. "Treaty of Alliance and Friendship between Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia," 20 Nov. 1815, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, *British and Foreign State Papers,* 170 vols. (London: James Ridgway and Sons, 1834–1977), 3:279.

33. John Quincy Adams to George Washington Campbell, 28 June 1818, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 6:374.

34. For more on the revolutions in Spanish America, see Timothy E. Anna, *Spain and the Loss of America* (Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1983); Jay Kinsbruner, *Independence in Spanish America: Civil Wars, Revolutions, and Underdevelopment,* 2nd ed. (Albuquerque, NM: Univ. of New Mexico Press, 2000); and Jaime E. Rodríguez O., *The Independence of Spanish America* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1998). For a fuller discussion of the impact these revolutions had on the United States, see James E. Lewis Jr., *The American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood: The United States and the Collapse of the Spanish Empire, 1783–1829* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 1998).

35. D. A. G. Waddell, "International Politics and Latin American Independence," in *The Independence of Latin America,* ed. Leslie Bethell (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1987), 202.

36. James Madison, "A Proclamation," 1 Sept. 1815, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 1:561–62.

37. James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, 10 Dec. 1815, in *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States Concerning the Independence of the Latin-American Nations,* ed. William R. Manning, 3 vols. (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1925), 1:18 (hereafter, Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence*).

38. 30 Oct. 1817, in John Quincy Adams, *Memoirs of John Quincy Adams, Comprising Portions of His Diary from 1795 to 1848,* ed. Charles Francis Adams, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1874–77), 4:15–16 (hereafter, J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*).

39. Dexter Perkins, "John Quincy Adams," in *The American Secretaries of States and Their Diplomacy,* ed. Samuel Flagg Bemis (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1928), 4:38–39.

40. John Quincy Adams to Don Joaquin de Anduaga, 6 Apr. 1822, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 7:217–18.

41. John Quincy Adams to Alexander Hill Everett, 29 Dec. 1817, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 6:281.

42. For Clay's earliest efforts, see his "Speech on Bill to Raise an Additional Military Force," [8, 9 Jan. 1813], in *The Papers of Henry Clay,* ed. James F. Hopkins, 10 vols. (Lexington, KY: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1959–91), 1:758–59 (hereafter, Clay, *Papers*).

43. "Speech on Direct Tax and Public Affairs," [29 Jan. 1816], in Clay, *Papers,* 2:155–56. For an additional argument against U.S. neutrality in Spanish America, see [William Cobbett], *Our Anti-Neutral Conduct Reviewed* ([1817]).

44. 6 Dec. 1817, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 4:28.

45. The resolution read, "*Resolved,* That the House of Representatives participates with the people of the United States in the deep interest which they feel for the success of the Spanish provinces of South America which are struggling to establish their liberty and independence; and that it will give its Constitutional support to the President of the United States, whenever he may deem it expedient to recognise the sovereignty and independence of any of the said provinces." The resolution was divided into two clauses for the purposes of voting, separated at the semi-colon. The first clause passed by a vote of 134 to 12; the second clause passed 87 to 68. 10 Feb. 1821, in *Annals of Congress,* 16th Cong., 2nd sess., 1081–82, 1091–92.

46. John Quincy Adams to Albert Gallatin, 19 May 1818, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 6:316–17.

47. John Quincy Adams to George Washington Campbell, 28 June 1818, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 6:379.

48. Viscount Castlereagh to Earl Bathurst, 2 Nov. 1818, in *Britain and the Independence of Latin America, 1812–1830: Select Documents from the Foreign Office Archives,* ed. C. K. Webster, 2 vols. (London: Oxford Univ. Press, 1938), 2:57.

49. For a discussion of the Congress of Aix-la-Chapelle, see Walter Alison Phillips, *The Confederation of Europe: A Study of the European Alliance, 1813–1823, as an Experiment in the International Organization of Peace* (London: Longmans, Green, 1914), 254–58; Leonard Axel Lawson, *The Relation of British Policy to the Declaration of the Monroe Doctrine* (New York: Columbia Univ., 1922), 38–39; and Waddell, "International Politics," 205.

50. For more on Jackson's invasion of East Florida, see David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, *Old Hickory's War: Andrew Jackson and the Quest for Empire* (Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1996); and Robert V. Remini, *Andrew Jackson and the Course of American Empire, 1767–1821* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), esp. chap. 23.

51. 29 Apr. 1820, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:81.

52. For more on the origin, negotiation, and significance of the Adams-Onís, or Transcontinental, Treaty, see Philip Coolidge Brooks, *Diplomacy and the Borderlands: The Adams-Onís Treaty of 1819* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1939); Samuel Flagg Bemis, *John Quincy Adams and the Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (1949; repr., Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1981), 300–340; William Earl Weeks, *Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 40–53; and Lewis, *American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood,* 115–25.

53. 22 Feb. 1819, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 4:274–76.

54. Samuel Flagg Bemis, *The Latin American Policy of the United States, an Historical Interpretation* (New York: Harcourt, Brace, 1943), 37; and D. Perkins, "John Quincy Adams," 7.

55. 27 Mar. 1820, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:42.

56. 13 Apr. 1820, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:67, 5:69.

57. See Henry Clay, "Remarks on Recognition of South American Independence," [10 Feb. 1819]; Henry Clay, "Resolutions on South American Independence," [4 Apr. 1820]; and Henry Clay, "Speech on South American Independence," [10 May 1820], all in Clay, *Papers,* 2:667–68, 2:817, and 2:853–59 respectively.

58. The United States Senate unanimously ratified the treaty on 24 February 1819, but Spain refused to ratify until October 1820. On 16 February 1821, the Senate reratified the treaty by a vote of 40 to 4, and official ratifications were exchanged on 22 February 1821. For the text of the treaty, see "Treaty of amity, settlement, and limits, between the United States of America and his Catholic Majesty [Spain]," [1819], in United States Congress, *American State Papers: Documents, Legislative and Executive, of the Congress of the United States, Class I: Foreign Relations,* 5 vols. (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1832–61), 5:127–32 (hereafter, *ASP:FR*).

59. 12 Nov. 1820, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:200. For Monroe's problematic message, see James Monroe, "Fourth Annual Message," 14 Nov. 1820, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:77.

60. James Monroe, "Special Message," 8 Mar. 1822, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:117–18.

61. For a description of this first act of recognition, see 19 June 1822, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:23. Also see William Spence Robertson, "The Recognition of the Hispanic American Nations by the United States," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 1 (Aug. 1918): 239–69.

62. See "Convention with Great Britain," [20 Oct. 1818], in *ASP:FR,* 4:406–7.

63. 26 and 27 Jan. 1821, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:243–59, esp. 252–53.

64. "Rules established for the limits of navigation and order of communication along the coast of the Eastern Siberia, the northwestern coast of America, and the Aleutian, Kurile, and other islands," 4/16 Sept. 1821, in *ASP:FR,* 4:857–61.

65. John Quincy Adams to Pierre de Poletica, 25 Feb. 1822, in J. Q. Adams, *Writings,* 7:213.

66. Alaskan Boundary Tribunal, *Proceedings of the Alaskan Boundary Tribunal: Convened at London, under the Treaty between the United States of America and Great Britain, Concluded at Washington, January 24, 1903, for the Settlement of Questions . . . with Respect to the Boundary Line between the Territory of Alaska and the British Possessions in North America,* 7 vols. (Washington, DC: GPO, 1904), 2:42.

67. Baron von Tuyll to John Quincy Adams, 12/24 Apr. 1823, in *ASP:FR,* 5:435.

68. John Quincy Adams to Baron von Tuyll, 7 May 1823, in *ASP:FR,* 5:435.

69. 17 July 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:163.

70. "Observations on the claim of Russia to territorial possessions on the continent of North America, communicated with Mr. Adam's letter to Mr. Middleton of July 22, 1823," in *ASP:FR,* 5:445.

71. The noncolonization principle can also be seen as an outgrowth of the no-transfer resolution of January 1811. President James Madison and Congress had grown concerned that parts of East Florida could be ceded by Spain to another colonial power. To give the United States options should this happen, without raising international attention, Congress secretly passed the no-transfer resolution, which declared "That the United States . . . cannot, without serious inequitude, see any part of the said territory [East Florida] pass into the hands of any foreign power; and that a due regard to their own safety compels them to provide, under certain contingencies, for the temporary occupation of the said territory." No action was ultimately taken under the no-transfer resolution's auspices. 3–15 Jan. 1811, in *Annals of Congress,* 11th Cong., 3rd sess., 369–80, 1117–48. In 1918, the State Department issued a confidential memorandum detailing the secret passage of the resolution. See David Hunter Miller, *Secret Statutes of the United States: A Memorandum* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1918).

72. John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, 22 July 1823, in *ASP:FR,* 5:446–48.

73. Historian Nikolai N. Bolkhovitinov argued that the noncolonization principle had as much to do with Adams's and America's expansionist ambitions as with any direct concern for Russian or European colonization. See Bolkhovitinov, "Russia and the Declaration of the Noncolonization Principle: New Archival Evidence," trans. Basil Dmytryshyn, *Oregon Historical Quarterly* 72 (June 1971): 101–26.

74. Lawson, *British Policy,* 46–48; and Phillips, *Confederation of Europe,* 280.

75. George Canning to Sir Charles Stuart, 31 Mar. 1823, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, *State Papers,* 10:69. Also see Bemis, *Latin American Policy,* 52–53.

76. Phillips, *Confederation of Europe,* 262.

77. George Canning to Sir Charles Stuart, 31 Mar. 1823, in Great Britain, Foreign Office, *State Papers,* 10:69.

78. Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 19 Aug. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1476–77.

79. Rush's dispatches detailing his conversations with Canning stepped off a lengthy period of debate that culminated in the creation of what history has termed the Monroe Doctrine. There are many excellent works that detail the creation of the Monroe Doctrine, including Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1823–1826* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1927); Jay Sexton, *The Monroe Doctrine: Empire and Nation in Nineteenth-Century America* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2011); Thomas B. Davis Jr., "Carlos de Alvear and James Monroe: New Light on the Origin of the Monroe Doctrine," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 23 (Nov. 1943): 632–49; and T. R. Schellenberg, "Jeffersonian Origins of the Monroe Doctrine," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 14 (Feb. 1934): 1–31. For a comprehensive collection of primary sources related to the development of the Doctrine, see J. Reuben Clark, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* (Washington, DC: GPO, 1930). For an alternative interpretation of the Doctrine's formation, see Ernest R. May, *The Making of the Monroe Doctrine* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univ. Press, 1975).

80. George Canning to Richard Rush, 20 Aug. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1478–79.

81. Richard Rush to George Canning, 23 Aug. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1479–80.

82. Richard Rush, *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London, Comprising Incidents Official and Personal from 1819 to 1825; Including Negotiations on the Oregon Question, and Other Unsettled Questions between the United States and Great Britain* (Philadelphia, PA: Lea and Blanchard, 1845), 414.

83. Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 19 Sept. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1487–93.

84. Richard Rush to John Quincy Adams, 10 Oct. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1500–1503.

85. Augustus Granville Stapleton, *The Political Life of the Right Honourable George Canning, from His Acceptance of the Seals of the Foreign Department, in September, 1822, to the Period of His Death, in August, 1827; Together with a Short Review of Foreign Affairs Subsequently to that Event,* 3 vols. (London: Longman, Rees, Orme, Brown, and Green, 1831), 2:23–25.

86. "Memorandum of a Conference between the Prince de Polignac, French Ambassador to Great Britain, and Mr. Canning, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Great Britain, Begun Thursday, October 9, and Concluded Sunday, October 12, 1823," in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1495–1500.

87. James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 2 June 1823, in Monroe, *Writings,* 6:308–11.

88. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 11 June 1823, in *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson,* ed. Paul Leicester Ford, 10 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1892–99), 10:256–59 (hereafter, Jefferson, *Writings).* Monroe's habit of turning to Jefferson for advice greatly aggravated John Quincy Adams. In December 1818, after learning of the influence a letter from Jefferson was having on the president's thinking, Adams confided to his diary, "There is what in vulgar language is called an undertow always working upon and about the President—what used in English to be called a back-stairs influence—of which he never says anything to me, and which I discover only by its effects." 8 Dec. 1818, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 4:187.

89. James Monroe to Thomas Jefferson, 17 Oct. 1823, in Monroe, *Writings,* 6:323–25.

90. Thomas Jefferson to James Monroe, 24 Oct. 1823, in Jefferson, *Writings,* 10:277–79.

91. On American interest in Cuba, see Lewis, *American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood,* 172–74.

92. James Madison to James Monroe, 30 Oct. 1823, in *The Writings of James Madison, Comprising His Public Papers and His Private Correspondence, Including Numerous Letters and Documents Now for the First Time Published,* ed. Gaillard Hunt, 9 vols. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1900–1910), 9:157–59.

93. "Adams's Account of his Communications with Baron Tuyll," in Worthington C. Ford, "Some Original Documents on the Genesis of the Monroe Doctrine," *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society,* 2nd ser., 15 (1902): 394–95. Also see Baron von Tuyll to John Quincy Adams, 4/16 Oct. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1868.

94. 15 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:186. The Chimborazo is an inactive volcano and the highest summit in modern-day Ecuador.

95. 7 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:177–78.

96. 16–17 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:187–88.

97. 7 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:177–79. Also see H. U. Addington to George Canning, 1 Dec. 1823, in Webster, *Britain and the Independence of Latin America,* 2:503.

98. Dexter Perkins noted that the appellation "Monroe Doctrine" was not applied until 1853; up to that point, "the references are invariably to [the] 'principles' of Mr. Monroe, or to the 'Monroe declaration.'" For ease of reference, it will be referred to as the Monroe Doctrine throughout this book. Dexter Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine: A New*

Revision of the Book Originally Published under the Title "Hands Off: A History of the Monroe Doctrine" (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1963), 99. Also see Dexter Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867* (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1933), 223.

99. 17 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:190.

100. 21 Nov. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:194.

101. Historian Albert Bushnell Hart first coined the term "doctrine of two spheres" in 1901. See Hart, *The Foundations of American Foreign Policy* (New York: Macmillan, 1901).

102. See, for example, the discussion between Adams and Attorney General William Wirt on 25 November 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:199–202.

103. "Observations on the Communications recently received from the Minister of Russia," in Ford, "Some Original Documents," 405–8.

104. John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, 30 Nov. 1823, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 1:213–16. Also see John Quincy Adams to Richard Rush, 29 Nov. 1823, in ibid., 210–12.

105. James Monroe, "Seventh Annual Message," 2 Dec. 1823, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:209. Monroe's entire message can be found in ibid., 2:207–20.

106. Ibid., 2:218.

107. Ibid.

108. Historian Jay Sexton noted that Monroe and Adams gave the Monroe Doctrine a negative frame, which "stated what European powers could not do, but stopped short of announcing any specific policy." Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine,* 4.

4. America's Fundamental Principles of Foreign Policy and the Panama Congress of 1826

1. Lynn Hudson Parsons, *The Birth of Modern Politics: Andrew Jackson, John Quincy Adams, and the Election of 1828* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2009), 113.

2. Lewis, *American Union and the Problem of Neighborhood,* 199; Robert V. Remini, *Henry Clay: Statesman for the Union* (New York: W. W. Norton, 1991), 284; Robert V. Remini, *John Quincy Adams* (New York: Times Books, 2002), 81; and Robert V. Remini, *Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party* (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1959), 104.

3. John Quincy Adams, "First Annual Message," 6 Dec. 1825, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:302.

4. Charles Wilson Hackett, "The Development of John Quincy Adams's Policy with Respect to an American Confederation and the Panama Congress, 1822–1825," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 8 (Nov. 1928): 526.

5. "President's Message," *New-York Evening Post,* 5 Dec. 1823.

6. *Boston Gazette,* extracted in the *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 15 Dec. 1823.

7. *National Gazette* (Philadelphia), extracted in the *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 15 Dec. 1823.

8. "The President's Message," *Richmond Enquirer,* 6 Dec. 1823.

9. "European Intelligence," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 1 Dec. 1823.

10. "The President's Message," *Richmond Enquirer,* 6 Dec. 1823.

11. Extract from Plumer's diary, dated 15 Dec. 1823, in William Plumer Jr., *Life of William Plumer,* ed. Andrew P. Peabody (Boston, MA: Phillips, Sampson, 1857), 512.

12. 31 Dec. 1823, in Hezekiah Prince Jr., *Journals of Hezekiah Prince, Jr., 1822–1828* (New York: Crown, 1965), 109.

13. 2 Dec. 1823, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:224.

14. 20 Jan. 1824, in *Annals of Congress,* 18th Cong., 1st sess., 2463–64.

15. The legislature of the state of Pennsylvania did pass a resolution favorable to the Monroe Doctrine in February 1824. It stated, in part, "that the magnanimous declaration of the President of the United States, in defence of the cause of liberty in this western hemisphere, meets the entire approbation of the General Assembly of this Commonwealth." *Resolution of the General Assembly of Pennsylvania, Approving of the Declaration of the President of the United States in Favor of the Cause of Liberty in the Western Hemisphere* (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1824), 4.

16. Albert Bushnell Hart, *The Monroe Doctrine: An Interpretation* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1916), 87.

17. Philo-Jackson, *The Presidential Election, Written for the Benefit of the People of the United States, but Particularly for Those of the State of Kentucky; Relating, Also, to South America, a War with the Holy Allies; and to an Alliance with Great Britain.* Fifth Series (Frankfort, KY: Printed for the author, 1824), v–vi, iv.

18. Lewis Williams, 17 Apr. 1824, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 3:1196.

19. John Long Jr., 15 May 1824, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 3:1209–10.

20. John W. Taylor, 4 June 1823, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 3:1236.

21. Henry Clay, "Remarks on Resolution on European Intervention in America," [26 May 1824], in Clay, *Papers,* 3:765. J. Reuben Clark concluded that a resolution passed by the House of Representatives on 4 Apr. 1864 represented the first official approval of the Monroe Doctrine by Congress. Clark, *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine,* 185.

22. Harold Temperley, "Documents Illustrating the Reception and Interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine in Europe, 1823–4," *English Historical Review* 39 (Oct. 1924): 590–93.

23. Quoted in Bemis, *Latin American Policy,* 67. For his part, Rush later claimed credit for giving Canning "the moral certainty" to approach Polignac. Rush, *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London,* 458–59.

24. "Mr. Canning's Reply to the King's Message Relative to the Affairs of Portugal," 12 Dec. 1826, in Robert Walsh, ed., *Select Speeches of the Right Honorable George Canning; with a Preliminary Biographical Sketch, and an Appendix, of Extracts from His Writings and Speeches* (Philadelphia, PA: Key and Biddle, 1835), 467.

25. Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson Jr. and John Sergeant, 8 May 1826, in Clay, *Papers,* 5:317. Also see Henry Clay to John M. Forbes, 3 Jan. 1828, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 1:292–93.

26. Rush, *Memoranda of a Residence at the Court of London,* 471–72.

27. For other works dealing with Europe's reaction to the Monroe Doctrine, see Harold Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822–1827: England, the Neo-Holy Alliance, and the New World,* 2nd ed. (London: Frank Cass, 1966); Waddell, "International Politics"; Phillips, *Confederation of Europe;* Dexter Perkins, "Europe, Spanish America, and the Monroe Doctrine," *American Historical Review* 27 (Jan. 1922): 207–18; and William Spence Robertson, "The Monroe Doctrine Abroad in 1823–24," *American Political Science Review* 6 (Nov. 1912): 546–63.

28. Quoted in Samuel Guy Inman, "The Monroe Doctrine and Hispanic America," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 4 (Nov. 1921): 641–42. For additional discussion of the

reception of the Monroe Doctrine in Latin America, also see Bemis, *Latin American Policy,* 68; William Spence Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine, 1824–1828," *Political Science Quarterly* 30 (Mar. 1915): 82–105; and Joseph Byrne Lockey, *Pan-Americanism: Its Beginnings* (New York: Macmillan, 1920), chap. 6.

29. Heman Allen to John Quincy Adams, 29 Apr. 1824, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 2:1091–94.

30. José Maria Salazar to John Quincy Adams, 2 July 1824, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 2:1281–82.

31. José Silvestre Rebello to John Quincy Adams, 28 Jan. 1825, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 2:808–10.

32. For Mexico, see Lucas Alaman to Joel Roberts Poinsett, 16 Aug. 1825; and Joel Roberts Poinsett to Lucas Alaman, 17 Aug. 1825, both in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1628–29, 3:1629–30. For extracts from the proposals of Rio de la Plata, see Robertson, "South America and the Monroe Doctrine," 101–3; and for the message transmitting those proposals to the United States, see John M. Forbes to Henry Clay, 5 Sept. 1826, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 1:657–58.

33. 7 July 1824, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:399.

34. John Quincy Adams to José Maria Salazar, 6 Aug. 1824, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 1:224–26.

35. Henry Clay to José Silvestre Rebello, 13 Apr. 1825, in Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 1:233–34.

36. Gretchen Murphy, *Hemispheric Imaginings: The Monroe Doctrine and Narratives of U.S. Empire* (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 2005), 4–5.

37. On the transitions taking place during and after Adams's presidency, see Harry L. Watson, *Liberty and Power: The Politics of Jacksonian America,* updated ed. (New York: Hill and Wang, 2006), esp. chaps. 1–3.

38. Lynn Hudson Parsons offered an excellent overview of the election of 1824 and its aftermath in *The Birth of Modern Politics,* esp. chaps. 3–6.

39. 13 May 1820, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 5:115.

40. For more on Bolivar and his role in the revolutions, see John Lynch, *Simón Bolivar: A Life* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 2006); and David Bushnell, *Simón Bolivar: Liberation and Disappointment* (New York: Pearson Longman, 2004).

41. Henry Clay, "Remarks and Toast at Public Dinner," [1 Jan. 1825], in Clay, *Papers,* 4:1. Bolivar often compared himself to Washington as well. See William R. Shepherd, "Bolivar and the United States," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 1 (Aug. 1918): 273–77.

42. The invitation was sent to Colombia, Mexico, Rio de la Plata, Chile, Central America, and Peru. Simón Bolivar, "Invitation to the Governments of Colombia, Mexico, Rio de la Plata, Chile, and Guatemala to Hold a Congress in Panama," 7 Dec. 1824, in *El Libertador: Writings of Simón Bolivar,* ed. David Bushnell, trans. Frederick H. Fornoff (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2003), 159–61.

43. Clay introduced the Panama Congress on 23 Apr. 1825 after several conversations with the Colombian and Mexican ministers. The cabinet further discussed the invitations on 27 April, and Adams made the final decision to accept the invitations on 7 May. J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 6:531, 6:536–37, 6:542. Official invitations were received from Mexico, Colombia, and Central America on 1, 2, and 14 November 1825, respectively. See Manning, *Diplomatic Correspondence,* 3:1641; 3:1642–43; 2:1286–88; and 2:883.

44. 27 May 1825, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 7:15–16.

45. Henry Clay to Albert Gallatin, 8 Nov. 1825, Albert Gallatin to Henry Clay, 10 Nov. 1825, and Henry Clay to John Sergeant, 16 Nov. 1825, all in Clay, *Papers,* 4:801, 4:813, 4:832–33; John Sergeant to Henry Clay, 19 Nov. 1825, National Archives Microfilm Publication M662, roll 1: Records of the Department of State Relating to the First Panama Congress, 1825–27, Records of United States Participation in International Conferences, Commissions, and Expositions, Record Group 43, National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD (hereafter, Panama Congress Microfilm); Henry Clay to William Rochester, 30 Nov. 1825, in Clay, *Papers,* 4:871.

46. For a discussion of early press coverage of the Panama Congress, see Frances L. Reinhold, "New Research on the First Pan-American Congress Held at Panama in 1826," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 18 (Aug. 1938): 343–50.

47. "American Confederation," *Richmond Enquirer,* 21 Oct. 1825; and "*The President's Message.* Splendid Government!" ibid., 8 Dec. 1825.

48. *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 9 Dec. 1825.

49. "Congress at Panama," *Boston Courier,* 14 Dec. 1825.

50. John Quincy Adams to the House of Representatives of the United States [not sent], 9 Feb. 1826, Reel 474, Adams Family Papers Microfilm, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA (hereafter, Adams Family Papers Microfilm).

51. John Quincy Adams to the House of Representatives of the United States [not sent], Feb. 1826, ibid.

52. John Quincy Adams, "Special Message," 26 Dec. 1825, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:318–20.

53. Clay spent a little over a quarter of the instructions discussing commercial principles and commercial agreements, but devoted much of the rest to an elaboration of the principles associated with Washington's Farewell Address and the Monroe Doctrine. For the complete instructions, see Henry Clay to Richard C. Anderson Jr. and John Sergeant, 8 May 1826, in Clay, *Papers,* 5:313–44.

54. Ibid., 5:313–14.

55. Ibid., 5:319.

56. Ibid., 5:320–21, 5:339.

57. Ibid., 5:330–31.

58. Ibid., 5:330–31, 5:338–39.

59. For the rest of his life, Clay maintained that the Panama instructions were among his most notable accomplishments as secretary of state. Supporters and subsequent campaign biographers agreed. See Henry Clay to Robert Walsh Jr., 25 Apr. 1836, and Henry Clay to Epes Sargent, 16 July 1842, both in Clay, *Papers,* 8:845 and 9:736 respectively; *Mexico and Mr. Poinsett. Reply to a British Pamphlet, Entitled "Observations on the Instructions Given by the President of the United States of America to the Representatives of that Republic, at the Congress of Panama, in 1826; on the Conduct of Mr. Poinsett, Minister of the United States at Mexico; and Generally on Our Relations with Spanish America, with a Copy of the Instructions"* (Philadelphia, PA: 1829), 3; Henry Clay, *The Life and Speeches of the Hon. Henry Clay,* ed. Daniel Mallory, 2 vols., 2nd ed. (New York: R. P. Bixby, 1843), 1:143; Henry Clay, *The Life and Speeches of Henry Clay,* ed. James B. Swain, 2 vols. (New York: Greeley and McElrath, 1843), 1:142; Epes Sargent, *The Life and Public Services of Henry Clay,* new ed. (New York: Greeley and McElrath, 1844), 42.

60. For a discussion of the relationship between the Panama debate and the rise of the second party system, see Andrew R. L. Cayton, "The Debate over the Panama Congress and the Origins of the Second American Party System," *Historian* 47 (Feb. 1985): 219–38.

61. 22 Mar. 1826, in United States Congress, Senate, *The Executive Proceedings of the Senate of the United States, on the Subject of the Mission to the Congress at Panama, Together with the Messages and Documents Relating Thereto* (hereafter, *Executive Proceedings of the Senate*), 19th Cong., 1st sess., S. Doc. 68, 57–76. The Foreign Relations Committee was composed entirely of men who would ultimately align themselves with Andrew Jackson.

62. Editorial, *Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser,* 25 Feb. 1826.

63. Editorial, *Richmond Enquirer,* 28 Feb. 1826.

64. Editorial, *Charleston Courier,* 15 Mar. 1826. The nominations were ratified the day before this editorial appeared, but news of the debate's conclusion would not reach South Carolina for several days.

65. Robert Y. Hayne, Mar. 1826, in *Register of Debates* (hereafter, *RD*), 19th Cong., 1st sess., 153, 166, 175.

66. Hugh L. White, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 198.

67. Levi Woodbury, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 187.

68. Hugh L. White, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 214.

69. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams,* 548–49.

70. Robert Y. Hayne, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 162.

71. John Macpherson Berrien, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 284.

72. Hugh L. White, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 201.

73. Hugh L. White, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 206.

74. Mahlon Dickerson, Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 297.

75. The resolution was defeated by a vote of 19 to 24. The nominations of Anderson, Sergeant, and Rochester were confirmed by votes of 27 to 17, 26 to 18, and 28 to 16 respectively. United States Congress, Senate, *Executive Proceedings of the Senate,* 100–103.

76. At least eleven speeches were printed as pamphlets; seven of them by the mission's opponents.

77. "Panama Mission—Creek Treaty," *Richmond Enquirer,* 17 Mar. 1826.

78. Bemis, *John Quincy Adams,* 554.

79. John Quincy Adams, "Special Message," 15 Mar. 1826, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:336.

80. Ibid., 2:337–38.

81. Ibid.

82. Letter to John Quincy Adams, author unknown, 21 Mar. 1826, Reel 475, Adams Family Papers Microfilm.

83. Thomas Jefferson to John Quincy Adams, 30 Mar. 1826, and Levi Lincoln to John Quincy Adams, 30 Mar. 1826, both in Reel 475, Adams Family Papers Microfilm; Timothy Pickering to Elijah H. Mills, 15 Apr. 1826, Reel 16, Timothy Pickering Papers Microfilm, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. The U.S. minister in Buenos Aires described the message as "so lucid an exposition of American policy and of such transcendent interest to all the new States, that I have put it into the hands of an able translator and shall immediately have it printed . . . to be circulated in such manner as may produce the most extensive and beneficial influence." J. M. Forbes to John Quincy Adams, 22 June and 2 July 1826, Reel 476, Adams Family Papers Microfilm.

84. "Panama Question—President's Message," *Baltimore Gazette and Daily Advertiser,* 20 Mar. 1826.

85. "The President's Message," *Charleston Courier,* 27 Mar. 1826.

86. "The Panama Mission," *Richmond Enquirer,* 21 Mar. 1826.

87. 17 Mar. 1826, in United States Congress, House, *Message from the President of the United States, upon the Subject of an Appropriation to Carry into Effect a Mission to Panama,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., H. Doc. 162; and 25 Mar. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 1764–65.

88. Louis McLane, 3 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2009.

89. Louis McLane, 4 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2011, 2020.

90. William C. Rives, 5 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2059–60.

91. Charles A. Wickliffe, 5 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2034.

92. John Carter, 15 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2283–84.

93. John Forsyth, 17 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2322.

94. James Buchanan, 11 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2172.

95. James Hamilton, 10 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2146.

96. Edward Livingston, 12 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2211–12.

97. John Forsyth, 17 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2321.

98. Daniel Webster, 14 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2269–70.

99. Charles A. Wickliffe, 5 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2045.

100. Louis McLane, 4 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2015–16.

101. John Wurts, 11 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2189.

102. Daniel Webster, 14 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2271.

103. James Buchanan, 11 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2172.

104. James Hamilton, 10 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2158, 2160.

105. Charles A. Wickliffe, 6 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2085–86.

106. Andrew Jackson to James Buchanan, 8 Apr. 1826, in *Correspondence of Andrew Jackson,* ed. John Spencer Bassett, 7 vols. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Institution of Washington, 1926–35), 3:300; and Andrew Jackson to James K. Polk, 3 May 1826, in James K. Polk, *Correspondence of James K. Polk,* ed. Herbert Weaver, 12 vols. to date (Nashville, TN: Vanderbilt Univ. Press, 1969–), 1:39–40.

107. James Buchanan, 18 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2368.

108. Ibid., 2368–69.

109. Louis McLane and William C. Rives, 18 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2369.

110. 20 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2453. The House records do not list the individual votes on the Buchanan/McLane amendment, making it impossible to compare the votes on that measure with any subsequent votes.

111. Ibid., 2457. While the final tally states that 95 representatives voted against McLane's amendment, the *RD* listed only 94 names as voting nay.

112. The votes were 54 to 143 on the amended Foreign Relations resolution and 134 to 60 on the appropriation. 21 and 22 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2490, 2514. At first glance it is not immediately apparent why 99 representatives voted in favor of amending the foreign relations resolution (McLane's amendment), yet the next day, only 54 voted to pass the amended resolution. A close examination of the votes reveals an interesting pattern. Of the 99 representatives that voted to amend the Foreign Relations Committee resolution, 50 then voted in favor of the amended resolution and 49 voted against it. Of the 50 who voted for the amended resolution, 43 also voted for the appropriations bill; however, every single

one of the 49 who voted against the amended resolution, voted against the appropriations bill. It seems clear that this second group wanted to limit the scope of the mission's authority but also refused to sanction the mission by actually voting in favor of the amended resolution or the appropriation. On the other side, 87 representatives could be said to have toed the Adams line, voting against McLane's amendment, against the amended resolution, and for the appropriations bill. Voting data taken from 20–22 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 2457, 2490, 2514.

113. John Macpherson Berrien, 27 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 641–42.

114. 2 May 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 667.

115. 3 May 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 671.

116. John Sergeant to Henry Clay, 8 May 1826, in Clay, *Papers,* 5:346.

117. Anderson died on 24 July. Richard Clough Anderson Jr., *The Diary and Journal of Richard Clough Anderson, Jr., 1814–1826,* ed. Alfred Tischendorf and E. Taylor Parks (Durham, NC: Duke Univ. Press, 1964), 262–72; and John M. MacPherson to Henry Clay, 26 July 1826, in Clay, *Papers,* 5:572.

118. José Maria Salazar to Henry Clay, 20 Nov. 1826, in Clay, *Papers,* 5:939–40.

119. John Quincy Adams, "Second Annual Message," 5 Dec. 1826, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:356.

120. John Sergeant to Henry Clay, 17 Jan. 1827, Panama Congress Microfilm.

121. Further demonstrating Adams's continued high expectations for the Panama mission, he asked his predecessor, James Monroe, if he would be willing to act as one of the ministers. Monroe declined, and Poinsett was chosen instead. John Quincy Adams to James Monroe, 21 Oct. 1826, Reel 148, Adams Family Papers Microfilm.

122. John Sergeant to Henry Clay, 24 Feb. 1827, Panama Congress Microfilm.

123. Henry Clay to John Sergeant and Joel R. Poinsett, 16 Mar. 1827, in Clay, *Papers,* 6:312.

124. John Quincy Adams, "Third Annual Message," 4 Dec. 1827, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:384. No action was ever taken by those ministers present at Tacubaya to formally adjourn the congress. On 28 July 1828, more than a year and a half after the congress was supposed to open, Poinsett relayed to Clay his unsuccessful efforts to officially adjourn the Panama Congress. John Sergeant to Henry Clay, 10 May 1827, Panama Congress Microfilm; and Joel R. Poinsett to Henry Clay, 23 July 1828, in Clay, *Papers,* 7:396.

125. James K. Polk, 4 Mar. 1827, in Cunningham, *Circular Letters of Congressmen,* 3:1383–84.

126. Robert Y. Hayne, 3 Mar. 1829, in *RD,* 20th Cong., 2nd sess., 77–78.

127. John Macpherson Berrien, 28 Feb. 1829, in *RD,* 20th Cong., 2nd sess., 69.

128. One of the most interesting responses to the Panama instructions came not from the United States but from Great Britain. See *Spanish America: Observations on the Instructions Given by the President of the United States of America to the Representatives of that Republic, at the Congress Held at Panama, in 1826; on the Conduct of Mr. Poinsett, Minister of the United States in Mexico; and Generally on Our Relations with Spanish America; with a Copy of the Instructions* (London: Effingham Wilson, 1829). For the American response, see *Mexico and Mr. Poinsett.*

129. One speaker at a pro-Adams convention held in Ohio in 1827 claimed that congressional opposition to Panama had been so dominant that it produced a negative reaction against Latin America as a whole. According to the speaker, "Until this measure was denounced in Congress, the whole nation had expressed a lively interest, in the success and prosperity of

what were then called the Sister Republics. . . . But since the nomination of ministers referred to, they have ceased to be in favor with the opposition at home. They are no longer applauded or toasted. They are viewed with cold neglect, or made the subjects of smeers and sarcasms." National Republican Party Convention, *Proceedings and Address of the Convention of Delegates, that Met at Columbus, Ohio, Dec. 28, 1827, to Nominate a Ticket of Electors Favorable to the Reelection of John Quincy Adams, President of the United States, to Be Supported at the Electoral Election of 1828* (Columbus, OH: P. H. Olmsted, 1827), 12–13.

130. D. Perkins, *A History of the Monroe Doctrine,* 72; and Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine,* 80–84.

5. The Revaluing of American Principles, 1826–1850

1. James K. Polk, "First Annual Message," 2 Dec. 1845, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:398.

2. Ibid., 4:398–99.

3. Andrew Jackson, "Fourth Annual Message," 4 Dec. 1832, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 2:592.

4. Ibid., 2:596.

5. For a broadside laying out the ordering of the grand procession, see "Washington's Birth Day: Centennial Celebration" (Philadelphia, PA, 1832). For a more detailed broadside describing the procession, see "Grand Civic and Military Procession in Philadelphia, February 22d, 1832, Being the 100th Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington, the Soldier and Statesman—The Brave and Good" (Philadelphia, PA, 1832). Copies of both broadsides can be found at the Library Company of Philadelphia.

6. *Celebration of the Centennial Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington. New-York, February 22, 1832* ([New York, 1832]), 4–5, 10. Also see Morgan Lewis, *An Oration Delivered in the Middle Dutch Church, in the City of New-York, Before the Common Council and Citizens, on the First Centennial Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington, the Father of His Country* (New York: G. F. Hopkins and Sons, 1832).

7. Speeches and Other Proceedings at the Public Dinner in Honor of the Centennial Anniversary of Washington; to Which Is Added, Washington's Farewell Address (Washington, DC: Jonathan Elliot, 1832).

8. Charles Caldwell, *A Discourse of the First Centennial Celebration of the Birth-Day of Washington, Delivered by Request, to the Citizens of Lexington, on the 22nd of February, 1832* (Lexington, KY: N. L. Finnell and J. F. Herndon, 1832), 6, 8, 56.

9. Francis C. Gray, *Oration Delivered Before the Legislature of Massachusetts, at Their Request, on the Hundredth Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington* (Boston, MA: Dutton and Wentworth, 1832), 66.

10. Philip Lindsley, *An Address Delivered at Nashville, Ten., Feb. 22, 1832, at the Request of the Citizens of Nashville and its Vicinity, on the Occasion of the Centennial Birth Day of George Washington* (Nashville, TN: Hunt, Tardiff, 1832), 5.

11. John Pitman, *An Oration, Delivered on the Centennial Anniversary of the Birth of George Washington; February 22, 1832* (Providence, RI: Weeden and Knowles, 1832), 31.

12. *Speeches and Other Proceedings,* 7–8.

13. Philip Hone, *The Diary of Philip Hone, 1828–1851,* ed. Allan Nevins, new and enlarged ed. (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1936), 57–58.

14. Special commemorative editions were also produced. For one fine example, see "Centennial Anniversary, Eighteen Hundred Thirty-Two: Washington's Farewell Address, to the People of the United States, September, 1796," HSP Poster and Broadside Collection (Collection V94), Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA.

15. *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 21 Feb. 1832.

16. *Washington's Valedictory Address to the People of the United States; Published in September, A.D. 1796, Printed in Pursuance of a Resolution of the Senate of Pennsylvania, Adopted on the 24th of February, A.D. 1832* (Harrisburg, PA: Henry Welsh, 1832), 2.

17. 21 and 22 Feb. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Cong., 1st sess., 1419–21, 1428.

18. 13 Feb. 1832, in *RD,* 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 368. Congress originally adopted a resolution calling for Washington to be buried in the capital on 23 December 1799, shortly after his death. See 23 Dec. 1799, *Annals of Congress,* 6th Cong., 1st sess., 208.

19. Littleton Tazewell, 7 Feb. 1832, in *RD,* 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 297.

20. Richard Coke Jr., 13 Feb. 1832, in *RD,* 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 1785.

21. Edward Everett, 13 Feb. 1832, in *RD,* 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 1787.

22. William Drayton, 13 Feb. 1832, in *RD,* 22nd Cong., 1st sess., 1795–96.

23. 22 Feb. 1832, in J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs,* 8:478–79.

24. For a discussion of American relations with Mexico regarding Texas during the Adams and especially the Jackson administrations, see John M. Belohlavek, *"Let the Eagle Soar!": The Foreign Policy of Andrew Jackson* (Lincoln, NE: Univ. of Nebraska Press, 1985), 215–38.

25. Andrew Jackson, "Eighth Annual Message," 5 Dec. 1836, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 3:237.

26. Andrew Jackson, "Special Message," 21 Dec. 1836, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 3:266, 3:268–69.

27. Andrew Jackson, "Special Message," 3 Mar. 1837, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 3:282.

28. Martin Van Buren, "Inaugural Address," 4 Mar. 1837, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 3:319.

29. Major L. Wilson, *The Presidency of Martin Van Buren* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1984), 151.

30. For several examples of diplomatic correspondence that included references to the Monroe Doctrine (both implicit and explicit), see Martin Van Buren to Thomas P. Moore, 17 Aug. 1829, Martin Van Buren to Cornelius Van Ness, 2 Oct. 1829, 13 Oct. 1830, and 25 Apr. 1831, and Edward Livingston to Thomas P. Moore, 9 June 1831, 16 Feb. 1832, and 31 Oct. 1832, all in National Archives Microfilm Publication M77, roll 9; Instructions, American States, Diplomatic Instructions of the Department of State, 1801–1906, Record Group 59; National Archives at College Park, College Park, MD.

31. The resolution was introduced by Cushing on 31 December 1838 and passed on 11 February 1839. *Congressional Globe* (hereafter, *Cong. Globe*), 25th Cong., 3rd sess., 81–82, 176.

32. Martin Van Buren, "Fourth Annual Message," 5 Dec. 1840, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 3:602–3.

33. John Tyler, "Second Annual Message," 6 Dec. 1842, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:197.

34. Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle, 10 Sept. 1838, in *The Papers of Daniel Webster,* ed. Charles M. Wiltse, 15 vols. (Hanover, NH: Univ. Press of New Hampshire, 1974–89), Series 1: Correspondence, 4:324–25 (hereafter, Webster, *Papers: Correspondence*).

35. Ibid., 4:325–26.

36. Daniel Webster to Nicholas Biddle, 9 Sept. 1838, in Webster, *Papers: Correspondence,* 4:324.

37. *The Papers of Daniel Webster,* ed. Charles M. Wiltse, 15 vols. (Hanover, NH: Univ. Press of New Hampshire, 1974–89), Series 3: Diplomatic Papers, 1:710–13 (hereafter, Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic*).

38. Lewis Cass to Daniel Webster, 3 Oct. 1842, in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 1:719.

39. Daniel Webster to Lewis Cass, 14 Nov. 1842, in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 1:724, 1:727.

40. Lewis Cass to Daniel Webster, 11 Dec. 1842, in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 1:737–38. This quote is intriguing, as it is unclear to which "great statesman" Cass was referring. The phrase "entangling alliances" would suggest Thomas Jefferson, but by 1842 that phrase was just as commonly attributed to George Washington. The more instructive part of the passage is Cass's description of "entangling alliances" as a warning and in connection with the "exposition of our Constitution" that would "go down to posterity with the instrument itself." While not conclusive, language such as this strongly indicates a reference to the Farewell Address, as Jefferson's first inaugural address was not often discussed in this manner.

41. Lewis Cass to Daniel Webster, 7 Mar. 1843, in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 1:767.

42. Also see Frank B. Woodford, *Lewis Cass: The Last Jeffersonian* (New York: Octagon Books, 1973), 212–23; and William Carl Klunder, *Lewis Cass and the Politics of Moderation* (Kent, OH: Kent State Univ. Press, 1996), 113–17.

43. Daniel Webster to Timoteo Haalilio and William Richards, 19 Dec. 1842, in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 1:870. The Hawaiian Islands were also often referred to as the Sandwich Islands.

44. John Tyler, "Special Message," 30 Dec. 1842, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:212.

45. For more on the Monroe Doctrine and Hawaii, see Kenneth E. Shewmaker, "Forging the 'Great Chain': Daniel Webster and the Origins of American Foreign Policy toward East Asia and the Pacific, 1841–1852," *Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society* 129 (Sept. 1985): 225–59.

46. John Tyler, "Third Annual Message," 5 Dec. 1843, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:261–62.

47. John C. Calhoun to Richard Pakenham, 18 Apr. 1844, in *The Papers of John C. Calhoun,* ed. Robert L. Meriwether, 28 vols. (Columbia: Univ. of South Carolina Press, 1959–2003), 18:274 (hereafter, Calhoun, *Papers*). Also see John C. Calhoun to Percy Walker and Others, 15 May 1845, in Calhoun, *Papers,* 21:553–54.

48. John Tyler, "Special Message," 22 Apr. 1844, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:310–11.

49. John Tyler, "Special Message," 10 June 1844, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:326.

50. John Tyler, "Fourth Annual Message," 3 Dec. 1844, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:341, 4:344–45.

51. On the annexation crisis, see Joel H. Silbey, *Storm over Texas: The Annexation Controversy and the Road to Civil War* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006); Sam W. Haynes, *Unfinished Revolution: The Early American Republic in a British World* (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2010), 217–21, 230–61; Daniel Walker Howe, *What Hath God Wrought: The Transformation of America, 1815–1848* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2007), chap. 17; Norma Lois Peterson, *The Presidencies of William Henry Harrison and John Tyler* (Lawrence, KS: Univ. Press of Kansas, 1989); and Sexton, *Monroe Doctrine,* 86–93. For another perspective on Tyler's presidential foreign policy, and on the Texas question in

particular, see Edward P. Crapol, *John Tyler: The Accidental President* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2006), esp. chap. 6.

52. Henry Clay, for example, dismissed the possibility of British intervention in Texas. "It will turn out that there is not the smallest foundation for the imputation of a design on the part of Great Britain to establish a colony of Texas," Clay wrote in late 1843. "Such an attempt, on her part, would excite the hostility of all the great Powers of Europe, as well as the United States." The following year, Theodore Sedgwick published a pamphlet likewise dismissing interventionist fears, asking, "What ground is there for the apprehension? What reason to suppose that England will undertake such a scheme, or that we cannot prevent it?" Pointing to Monroe's declarations of twenty years earlier in response to the threat of Holy Alliance intervention in Spanish America, Sedgwick asked, "Are we weaker now than we were then? or less competent to prevent unjustifiable interference with foreign powers?" Sedgwick concluded that "Texas is not threatened by any foreign power. She scarcely needs a government. All that she requires is the guaranty of this country that she shall not be oppressed by the European powers, and that guaranty she possesses in our own interests." Henry Clay to John J. Crittenden, 5 Dec. 1843, in Clay, *Papers,* 9:899; and Theodore Sedgwick, *Thoughts on the Proposed Annexation of Texas to the United States: First Published in the "New-York Evening Post," under the Signature of Veto* (New York: D. Fanshaw, 1844), 26–27.

53. James K. Polk, draft of Inaugural Address, 4 Mar. 1845, Reel 59, James K. Polk Papers (microfilm), Manuscript Division, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

54. Historian Charles Sellers suggested that it might have been the influence of the outgoing secretary of state, John C. Calhoun, that led Polk to remove the language from his inaugural address. Calhoun feared that inflammatory rhetoric could impede ongoing negotiations with Britain over Oregon. By December, those negotiations had broken down, and any earlier fears had been removed. Charles Sellers, *James K. Polk: Continentalist, 1843–1846* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton Univ. Press, 1966), 243.

55. James K. Polk, "First Annual Message," 2 Dec. 1845, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:398–99.

56. 21 Oct. 1845, in James K. Polk, *The Diary of James K. Polk, During His Presidency, 1845 to 1849,* ed. Milo Milton Quaife, 4 vols. (Chicago, IL: A. C. McClurg, 1910), 1:64–65 (hereafter, Polk, *Diary*).

57. 24 Oct. 1845, in Polk, *Diary,* 1:71.

58. For a variety of interpretations of Polk's motives for reissuing the Monroe Doctrine, see, among others, Frederick Merk, *The Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism, 1843–1849* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1966), 66–103; Kenneth Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America, 1815–1908* (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1967), 124–61; D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 62–101; Norman A. Graebner, "American Interest in California, 1845," *Pacific Historical Review* 22, no. 1 (1953): 13–27; Frank A. Knapp Jr., "The Mexican Fear of Manifest Destiny in California," in *Essays in Mexican History,* ed. Thomas E. Cotner and Carlos Eduardo Castañeda (Austin, TX: Univ. of Texas Institute of Latin American Studies, 1958), 192–208; William Earl Weeks, *Building the Continental Empire: American Expansion from the Revolution to the Civil War* (Chicago, IL: Ivan R. Dee, 1996), 109–12; Kinley J. Brauer, "1821–1860: Economics and the Diplomacy of American Expansionism," in *Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy Since 1789,* ed. William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells Jr. (New York:

Columbia Univ. Press, 1984), 55–118; and John A. Logan Jr., *No Transfer: An American Security Principle* (New Haven, CT: Yale Univ. Press, 1961), 208–9.

59. James Buchanan to Thomas O. Larkin, 17 Oct. 1845, in *The Works of James Buchanan, Comprising His Speeches, State Papers, and Private Correspondence,* ed. John Bassett Moore, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1908–11), 6:275–76 (hereafter, Buchanan, *Works*).

60. James K. Polk, 21 Apr. 1826, in *RD,* 19th Con., 1st sess., 2473, 2489. On 11 April, Polk introduced resolutions formally condemning the mission. See James K. Polk, 11 Apr. 1826, in ibid., 2166. As discussed in chapter 4, Polk's secretary of state, James Buchanan, also repeatedly tried to prevent the Adams administration from talking about the Monroe Doctrine abroad.

61. James Buchanan to John Slidell, 10 Nov. 1845, in Buchanan, *Works,* 6:295, 6:304–5.

62. 31 Jan. 1846, in Polk, *Diary,* 1:205.

63. 19 Jan. 1848, in Polk, *Diary,* 3:306.

64. For a discussion of the transition from a foreign policy defined by Washington's Farewell Address to one defined by Polk's aggressive expansionism, see Lane Crothers, "The Cultural Roots of Isolationism and Internationalism in American Foreign Policy," *Journal of Transatlantic Studies* 9 (Mar. 2011): 21–34.

65. William Allen, 14 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 197.

66. John C. Calhoun, 14 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 197.

67. William Allen, 14 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 197.

68. John C. Calhoun, 14 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 197–98.

69. Lewis Cass, 26 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 240–41.

70. William Allen, 26 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 246.

71. Lewis Cass, 26 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 245.

72. John C. Calhoun, 26 Jan. 1846, in *Cong. Globe,* 29th Cong., 1st sess., 245–46.

73. For more on the debate over Allen's resolution, see Merk, *Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism,* 94–100; and D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 99–109.

74. Polk's administration misread the situation in California. The British government had no intention of colonizing or interfering. The Mexican government, on the other hand, grew so fearful of the United States and its Manifest Destiny in California that it actively encouraged the British and the French to act. See Knapp, "The Mexican Fear of Manifest Destiny in California"; Bourne, *Britain and the Balance of Power in North America,* 150; and Brauer, "1821–1860," 103.

75. James K. Polk, "Third Annual Message," 7 Dec. 1847, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:540.

76. Some have argued that taking territory from Mexico after the war was itself a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. See Hiram Bingham, "Should We Abandon the Monroe Doctrine?" in *The Monroe Doctrine: Its Modern Significance,* ed. Donald Marquand Morgan, rev. ed. (Tempe, AZ: Arizona State Univ. Press, 1976), 52–53.

77. Walter LaFeber, "The Evolution of the Monroe Doctrine from Monroe to Reagan," in *Redefining the Past: Essays in Diplomatic History in Honor of William Appleman Williams,* ed. Lloyd C. Gardner (Corvallis, OR: Oregon State Univ. Press, 1986), 128. Also see D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 127–71; Bemis, *Latin American Policy,* 100–101; and Brauer, "1821–1860," 104–12.

78. 30 Jan. 1847, in Polk, *Diary,* 2:363.

79. James K. Polk, "Special Message," 10 Feb. 1847, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:511. For more on the Bidlack-Mallarino Treaty, see D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 156–62; and Bemis, *Latin American Policy,* 105–6.

80. For O'Reilly's communications with Buchanan, see Justo Sierra O'Reilly to James Buchanan, 15 Feb., 24 Feb., 3 Mar., 7 Mar., 3 Apr., 18 Apr., and 21 Apr. 1848, in William R. Manning, ed., *Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States: Inter-American Affairs, 1831–1860,* 12 vols. (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1932–37), 8:1061–73, 8:1075–78, 8:1080–81, 8:1082 (hereafter, Manning, *Inter-American Affairs*). O'Reilly's 3 April message cited the possibility of a British or Spanish intervention in Yucatan and the fact that this would be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. For an extended discussion of O'Reilly's efforts to spur U.S. involvement, see Louis De Armond, "Justo Sierra O'Reilly and Yucatecan-United States Relations, 1847–1848," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 31 (Aug. 1951): 420–36.

81. Santiago Mendez to James Buchanan, 25 Mar. 1848, in Manning, *Inter-American Affairs,* 8:1074.

82. 25 Apr. 1848, in Polk, *Diary,* 3:433.

83. Ibid., 3:433–34.

84. James K. Polk, "Special Message," 29 Apr. 1848, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 4:582. For a more thorough discussion of the background to the Yucatan episode, see Merk, *Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism,* 194–207; D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 171–78; and Mary W. Williams, "Secessionist Diplomacy of Yucatan," *Hispanic American Historical Review* 9 (May 1929): 132–43.

85. Frederick Merk, *Manifest Destiny and Mission in American History: A Reinterpretation* (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), 202; and Merk, *Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism,* 195–97.

86. Virtually everyone in Congress expressed sympathy for the white people being exterminated by the Indians, but it was a racial issue as much as a humanitarian question. Indians constituted a substantial majority of Yucatan's population and had long been oppressed by the white minority holding power. In Congress, however, rather than being seen as two populations struggling for control, the conflict was portrayed as a savage race war. The whites were depicted as the legitimate inhabitants of Yucatan, while the Indians were something separate. One newspaper report demonstrated this attitude by lamenting the "dreadful condition of Yucatan and the destruction of its inhabitants by the Indians." Had roles been reversed, or had both parties in the contest been white, it seems likely that this war would have been depicted as a revolutionary struggle by an oppressed people against tyrannical rule. "Yucatan," *National Era* (Washington, DC), 20 Apr. 1848. For a fascinating discussion of the racial aspect of Yucatan intervention from the U.S. perspective, see David Kazanjian, *The Colonizing Trick: National Culture and Imperial Citizenship in Early America* (Minneapolis, MN: Univ. of Minnesota Press, 2003), 173–95, 209–12.

87. Isaac Holmes, 29 Apr. 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 711.

88. Alexander Stephens, 29 Apr. 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 711.

89. John C. Calhoun, 29 Apr. 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, 590–91.

90. 4 May 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 727.

91. The remarks of John J. Crittenden of Kentucky also deserve brief consideration given the applicability of the sentiments they expressed to future American conflicts. Crittenden saw the proposed measure as hypocritical, regarding it as a "violation of the principle of

intervention which we laid down for the observance of all other nations." Once the United States had violated this principle, he argued, "other nations would be induced to create slight pretexts, on which they would justify themselves in following our example," a state of affairs that could lead to "a slobbering and protracted war everywhere." Crittenden also pointed out that in authorizing the U.S. military to enter Yucatan, no one had discussed how or when it would leave. Crittenden strongly disliked the fact that there "were no fixed limits to the occupation in the bill. How long may it be before the vengeance of these Indians will be satisfied? How long will it be before these fifty thousand white people would be able to make head against their enemies? We must make a permanent military settlement there to effect any beneficial result." John J. Crittenden, 5 May 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 730.

92. Lewis Cass, 11 May 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 754.

93. John C. Calhoun, 15 May 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., Appendix, 630–31.

94. Ibid.

95. Ibid.

96. Edward Hannegan announced that this intelligence had been published in that day's Baltimore *Sun.* Edward Hannegan, 17 May 1848, in *Cong. Globe,* 30th Cong., 1st sess., 778.

97. For more on the specific importance of Polk's Yucatan message for the subsequent development of the Monroe Doctrine, see Cecil V. Crabb Jr., *The Doctrines of American Foreign Policy: Their Meaning, Role, and Future* (Baton Rouge, LA: Louisiana State Univ. Press, 1982), 33; Merk, *Monroe Doctrine and American Expansionism,* 231–32; and D. Perkins, *The Monroe Doctrine, 1826–1867,* 175–76.

98. John M. Heard, *Address Delivered Before the Philodemic Society, of Georgetown College, D.C., on the 22d February, 1842, by John M. Heard, of Maryland; to which are Prefixed the Remarks of Joseph Johnson, of Mississippi, Previous to His Reading the Farewell Address of Washington* (Washington, DC: Gales and Seaton, 1842), 4, 6.

99. C. P. Krauth, *Address Delivered on the Anniversary of Washington's Birth-Day, at the Request of the Union Total Abstinence Society of Gettysburg* (Gettysburg, PA: H. C. Neinstedt, 1846), 17, 22.

100. William B. Sprague, *An Address Delivered on the Evening of the Twenty Second of February, 1847, before the Young Men's Association of the City of Albany* (Albany, NY: Joel Munsell, 1847), 16, 45.

101. Robert C. Winthrop, *Oration Pronounced by the Honorable Robert C. Winthrop, Speaker of the House of Representatives of the United States, on the Fourth of July, 1848, on the Occasion of Laying the Corner-Stone of the National Monument to the Memory of Washington; with an Introduction and an Appendix* (Washington, DC: J. and G. S. Gideon, 1848), 32.

102. Abel P. Upshur to John C. Calhoun, 30 Nov. 1843, in Calhoun, *Papers,* 17:578.

103. William Henry Trescot, *A Few Thoughts on the Foreign Policy of the United States* (Charleston, SC: John Russell, 1849), 4, 14.

104. 23 Jan. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 220.

105. Henry Clay, 24 Jan. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 226.

106. James A. Pearce, 24 Jan. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 227.

107. Jefferson Davis, 24 Jan. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 227.

108. Samuel W. Inge, 6 Feb. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 297.

109. Joseph R. Chandler, 6 Feb. 1850, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 1st sess., 298.

110. Paltsits, *Washington's Farewell Address,* 96–102.

6. "Washington or Kossuth?": The Farewell Address in the American Mind at Midcentury

1. *Report of the Special Committee Appointed by the Common Council of the City of New York, to Make Arrangements for the Reception of Gov. Louis Kossuth, the Distinguished Hungarian Patriot* (New York: McSpedon and Baker, 1852), 141 (hereafter, *Report of the Special Committee*).

2. The classic primer on Young America is M. E. Curti, "Young America," *American Historical Review* 32 (Oct. 1926): 34–55. For more recent explorations of Young America's formation and impacts, see Edward L. Widmer, *Young America: The Flowering of Democracy in New York City* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999); and Yonatan Eyal, *The Young America Movement and the Transformation of the Democratic Party, 1828–61* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2007).

3. For Fillmore's proclamation against filibustering in Cuba, see Millard Fillmore, "Proclamation," 25 Apr. 1851, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 5:111–12.

4. "The Issue of the Cuban Conspiracy," *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 26 Aug. 1851.

5. For more on filibustering in this era, see Robert E. May, *Manifest Destiny's Underworld: Filibustering in Antebellum America* (Chapel Hill, NC: Univ. of North Carolina Press, 2002); Amy S. Greenberg, *Manifest Manhood and the Antebellum American Empire* (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005); Joseph Allen Stout Jr., *The Liberators: Filibustering Expeditions into Mexico, 1848–1862, and the Last Thrust of Manifest Destiny* (Los Angeles, CA: Westernlore Press, 1973); and William Walker, *The War in Nicaragua* (Tucson, AZ: Univ. of Arizona Press, 1985).

6. See, for example, Timothy Mason Roberts, *Distant Revolutions: 1848 and the Challenge to American Exceptionalism* (Charlottesville, VA: Univ. of Virginia Press, 2009); and Howe, *What Hath God Wrought,* chap. 20.

7. See, for example, "The Hungarian Victory," *Littell's Living Age,* 16 June 1849, 521; and William Lloyd Garrison, "Patriotism and Christianity—Kossuth and Jesus," Summer 1849, in *Selections from the Writings and Speeches of William Lloyd Garrison* (Boston, MA: R. F. Wallcut, 1852), 78.

8. "Joint Resolution for the relief of Louis Kossuth and his associates, exiles from Hungary," introduced in the Senate by Henry Foote, 26 Feb. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 31st Cong., 2nd sess., 710.

9. John Komlos, *Louis Kossuth in America, 1851–1852* (Buffalo, NY: East European Institute, 1973), 47–48, 40–41.

10. On the same day Kossuth was released by Turkey, Austria tried Kossuth in absentia for treason and hanged him in effigy. Donald S. Spencer, *Louis Kossuth and Young America: A Study of Sectionalism and Foreign Policy, 1848–1852* (Columbia, MO: Univ. of Missouri Press, 1977), 44.

11. Quoted in Komlos, *Kossuth in America,* 53.

12. Kossuth's departure from the *Mississippi* is discussed at some length in Komlos, *Kossuth in America,* 53–60.

13. Transcript of speech at Manchester, England, 10 Nov. 1851, in *Authentic Life of His Excellency Louis Kossuth, Governor of Hungary. His Progress from His Childhood to His Overthrow by the Combined Armies of Austria and Russia, with a Full Report of the Speeches*

Delivered in England, at Southampton, Winchester, London, Manchester, and Birmingham; to which Is Added, His Address to the People of the United States of America (London: Bradbury and Evans, 1851), 87.

14. Robert J. Walker, *Speech of the Hon. Robert J. Walker, Late Secretary of the American Treasury, at the Banquet Given by the Mayor and Municipal Authorities of Southampton to M. Lewis Kossuth, Late Governor of Hungary, on the 28th Day of October, 1851, in Reply (by Request) to a Toast, in Favour of the Constitutional Governments of England and the United States* (London: Waterlow and Sons, 1851), 2, 5, 6, 8.

15. Millard Fillmore, "Second Annual Message," 2 Dec. 1851, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 5:119–20.

16. "Joint Resolution in relation to the reception and entertainment of Louis Kossuth, Governor of Hungary, in the United States," 1 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 5.

17. Henry S. Foote, 2 Dec. 1851, debate of 3 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 12, 21–27.

18. William H. Seward, 8 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 34.

19. Joseph Underwood, 3 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 25–26.

20. John Macpherson Berrien, 9 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 43–44.

21. Jacob Miller, 9 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 45–46.

22. Charles Sumner, 10 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 51.

23. Robert Stockton, 10 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 51.

24. Stephen A. Douglas, 11 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 70–71.

25. 12 and 15 Dec. 1851, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 90, 96.

26. *Report of the Special Committee,* 29.

27. For an extended discussion of Kossuth and his approach to American slavery, see Steven Béla Vardy, "Louis Kossuth and the Slavery Question in America," *East European Quarterly* 39 (Jan. 2006): 449–64.

28. *Report of the Special Committee,* 31–32.

29. Ibid., 60–62, 64.

30. "The Welcome to Kossuth," *New-York Daily Times,* 8 Dec. 1851.

31. For many of Kossuth's American speeches, see Francis W. Newman, *Select Speeches of Kossuth: Condensed and Abridged, with Kossuth's Express Sanction* (New York: C. S. Francis, 1854). For a description of a modest Kossuth event, see *Grand Kossuth Demonstration at Burlington* ([Burlington, NJ], 1852).

32. Reflecting on the Hungarian bonds, one skeptical newspaper commented, "Certainly nothing can well be imagined more worthless than the promise to pay imprinted on the face of the certificates. Who is it that assumes to make the promise? Kossuth? By what right? Who authorized him to bind a future government that, as yet, has no existence?" "The Hungarian Bonds," *German Reformed Messenger* (Philadelphia, PA), 11 Feb. 1852.

33. Historical accounts vary as to the total amount of money raised, some claiming as little as $80,000 by July 1852, and some as much as $180,000 through the middle of February 1852. The most complete discussion of fund-raising in English can be found in Komlos, *Kossuth in America,* 157–58. Also see Arthur James May, "Contemporary American Opinion of the Mid-Century Revolutions in Central Europe" (Ph.D. diss., University of Pennsylvania, 1927), 108.

34. To put Kossuth's fund-raising in perspective and to further illuminate his disappointment with it, one must only turn to the 1850–51 concert tour of Swedish singer Jenny

Lind. Lind was a sensation, touring the country and performing ninety-five sold-out shows. Her promoter, a young P. T. Barnum, claimed in his memoirs that the total receipts for the concerts amounted to $712,161.34. Other contemporary accounts confirm the significant sums of money generated by Lind. See P. T. Barnum, *Life of P. T. Barnum: Written by Himself, Including His Golden Rules for Money-Making; Brought up to 1888* (Buffalo, NY: Courier, 1888), 100–131, esp. 129–31; C. C. Rosenberg, *Jenny Lind in America* (New York: Stringer and Townsend, 1851); and N. Parker Willis, *Memoranda on the Life of Jenny Lind* (Philadelphia, PA: Robert E. Peterson, 1851).

35. *Pittsfield (MA) Sun,* 11 Mar. 1852.

36. Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America,* 58.

37. Two newspapers demonstrate the extreme approaches taken to Kossuth. The first was the *New York Times,* which had been founded in September 1851, just a few months before Kossuth's arrival in the United States. According to Elmer Davis, author of a 1921 history of the *Times,* the paper asserted itself as Kossuth's "principal champion in America." Kossuth's arrival was the "first big local news story" since the *Times*'s founding and was seen by the paper's editors as the perfect opportunity "to show New York what the new paper could do." On the other end of the spectrum, the avowedly anti-Kossuth *Boston Pilot,* a Catholic newspaper, emphasized that it did not report on Kossuth "for his sake," but in deference to "our readers, particularly such of them as take no other paper" and would "like to know what is going on." Elmer Davis, *History of the New York Times, 1851–1921* (New York: New York Times, 1921), 27–28; and "The Pilot on Intervention," *Boston Pilot,* 27 Dec. 1851.

38. Some excellent examples of Kossuth merchandise can be seen in Tibor Tollas, ed., *Gloria Victis: Szabadsagharcunk a világirodalomban, 1848–1849* [Glory to the Vanquished: The Hungarian War of Liberation in World Literature, 1848–1849] (Munich: Nemzetor, 1973); and Joseph Széplaki, ed., *Louis Kossuth, "The Nation's Guest": A Bibliography of His Trip in the United States, December 4, 1851–July 14, 1852* (Ligonier, PA: Bethlen Press, 1976).

39. American Art-Union, "American Art-Union. New-York, January 2, 1852: The Committee of Management of the American Art-Union . . . ," 2 Jan. 1852, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, MA.

40. *Report of the Special Committee,* 140–43.

41. Ibid., 145–46.

42. Ibid., 148–49.

43. Ibid., 152.

44. Ibid., 153, 156–58.

45. Ibid., 175–78.

46. Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America,* 89.

47. "Kossuth—Non-Interference," *New York Evangelist,* 18 Dec. 1851.

48. "The Policy of Non-Intervention," *The American Whig Review* (New York) 9 (Jan. 1852): 4.

49. "Kossuth in Washington," *Advocate of Peace* 10 (Jan. 1852): 16; and "Kossuth and the Friends of Peace," *Advocate of Peace* 10 (Feb. 1852): 23.

50. T. A., "Kossuth in America," *The Mercersburg Review* 4 (Jan. 1852): 85.

51. "Kossuth and Congress," *Boston Herald,* 12 Dec. 1851; and "Kossuth, and the Metropolis of New England," *Boston Herald,* 8 Jan. 1852.

52. "Foreign Policy," *National Era* (Washington, DC), 20 Nov. 1851. Also see "Kossuth, and the Metropolis of New England," *Boston Herald,* 8 Jan. 1852.

53. "The Right and Wrong of Intervention," *New York Observer and Chronicle,* 25 Dec. 1851.

54. "Excitement on Great Principles," *Christian Observer* (Louisville, KY), 20 Dec. 1851.

55. William B. Reed, *A Few Thoughts on Intervention* (Philadelphia, PA: King and Baird, 1852), 5, 18, 19, 26, 14, 15. Reed's pamphlet originally appeared as a series of articles in the *National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC) between November 1851 and January 1852.

56. Reed was not the only critic to attack Kossuth's standing. Orestes A. Brownson, a Catholic preacher from Boston, launched a speaking tour of the United States in an attempt to counter the enthusiasm for Kossuth. Brownson also published the self-titled *Brownson's Quarterly Review,* and in his April 1852 issue he challenged the basic premise of Kossuth's argument that Hungary possessed the right of self-determination as a nation. As Brownson saw it, the "doctrine of non-intervention" applied "to Austria and Russia, not to Hungary, for Hungary was not an independent nation, was not in herself a complete state." For any nation "to have intervened to prevent Austria from invoking the aid of Russia, or to prevent Russia from granting it, would have been a direct intervention in the domestic affairs of independent states, and an undeniable violation of the law of non-intervention." Brownson also contended that even if he agreed to term Russia's actions as intervention, it should be described as "justifiable, for she has as good a right to intervene to put down revolution as we have to intervene to sustain revolution." Orestes A. Brownson, "Austria and Hungary," *Brownson's Quarterly Review,* Apr. 1852, in Henry F. Brownson, *The Works of Orestes A. Brownson* (Detroit, MI: Thorndike Nourse, 1885), 16:220–21. Also see "Was the Russian Entrance into Hungary a Real Intervention of a Foreign Power?" *Boston Pilot,* 27 Dec. 1851. For more on Brownson's opposition to Kossuth, see Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America,* 126–29.

57. H. A. Boardman, *The New Doctrine of Intervention, Tried by the Teachings of Washington: An Address Delivered in the Tenth Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, on Monday and Tuesday Evenings, the 23d and 24th of February, 1852* (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, Grambo, 1852), 11, 15, 20.

58. Ibid., 22, 28–29. Boardman's speech elicited an angry reply from a fellow clergyman. See W. L. McCalla, *Review of Dr. Boardman's Address Against Kossuth: A Lecture Delivered in the Union Presbyterian Church, Philadelphia, Tuesday Evening, March 9, 1852* (Philadelphia, PA: William S. Young, 1852).

59. America's Irish and Catholic populations also came out against Kossuth. See Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America.*

60. For Webster's speech on Greek independence, see Daniel Webster, *The Papers of Daniel Webster,* ed. Charles M. Wiltse, 15 vols. (Hanover, NH: Univ. Press of New Hampshire, 1974–89), Series 4: *Speeches and Formal Writings,* 1:83–111.

61. For two different takes on how Webster may have viewed Kossuth, see Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America,* 89–90; and Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 2:39.

62. Millard Fillmore, "Second Annual Message," 2 Dec. 1851, in Richardson, *Messages and Papers,* 5:116–17.

63. Daniel Webster to Abbott Lawrence, 29 Dec. 1851, in Hamilton Andrews Hill, *Memoir of Abbott Lawrence,* 2nd ed. (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1884), 91.

64. Daniel Webster to Richard Milford Blarchford, [30 Dec. 1851], in Webster, *Papers: Diplomatic,* 2:96.

65. Charles Sumner to Samuel Gridley Howe, 30 Dec. 1851, in *The Selected Letters of Charles Sumner,* ed. Beverly Wilson Palmer, 2 vols. (Boston, MA: Northeastern Univ. Press,

1990), 1:345 (hereafter, Sumner, *Selected Letters*). Sumner apparently did not address Kossuth in the manner he suggested he would in his first Senate speech.

66. When Webster informed Fillmore that Kossuth wanted to be introduced to him, Fillmore famously replied, "'If he desires simply an introduction, . . . I will see him, but if he wants to make a speech to me, I must most respectfully decline to see him.'" Fillmore described the exchange with Webster in a newspaper interview given in 1873. In further discussing Kossuth, Fillmore characterized him as "not a statesman; he depended entirely upon his oratory." The original interview appeared in the *New York Herald* of 16 Sept. 1873, and was reprinted in Frank H. Severance, ed., *Publications of the Buffalo Historical Society,* Vol. 11: *Millard Fillmore Papers, Volume 2* (Buffalo, NY: Buffalo Historical Society, 1907), 138.

67. "Reception of Kossuth by the President, December 31, 1851," *National Era* (Washington, DC), 8 Jan. 1852. The description of Fillmore is from James Shields to Gustave Koerner, 2 Jan. 1852, in Thomas J. McCormack, ed., *Memoirs of Gustave Koerner, 1809–1896: Life-Sketches Written at the Suggestion of His Children,* 2 vols. (Cedar Rapids, IA: Torch Press, 1909), 1:579.

68. James Shields to Gustave Koerner, 2 Jan. 1852, in McCormack, *Gustave Koerner,* 1:579.

69. "Reception of Kossuth by the President," *National Era* (Washington, DC), 8 Jan. 1852.

70. "Presidential Courtesies," *Democrat's Review* 30 (Jan. 1852): 39–40.

71. Charles Sumner to George Sumner, 5 Jan. 1852, in Sumner, *Selected Letters,* 1:346.

72. Kossuth was just the second foreign leader to be formally received by Congress; the Marquis de Lafayette was the first, when he toured the United States in 1824–25. For more on Lafayette's tour, see Marian Klamkin, *The Return of Lafayette, 1824–1825* (New York: Scribner, 1975); Auguste Levasseur, *Lafayette in America in 1824 and 1825: Journal of a Voyage to the United States,* trans. Alan R. Hoffman (Manchester, NH: Lafayette Press, 2006); and Benjamin T. Hill Collection, Lafayette in the United States, 1824–1825, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

73. For more on the Congressional banquet, see, *Proceedings, Speeches, &c., at the Dinner Given to Louis Kossuth, at the National Hotel, Washington, Jan. 7 1852* (Washington, DC: Printed at the Globe Office, 1852).

74. Henry Clay, "Speech to Kossuth," 9 Jan. 1852, in Clay, *Papers,* 10:944–45.

75. Ibid., 10:945–46.

76. See, for example, *Farmers' Cabinet* (Amherst, NH), 1 Apr. 1852.

77. Andor M. Leffler, "The Kossuth Episode in America" (Ph.D. diss., Western Reserve University, 1949), 164.

78. Rutherford B. Hayes to his uncle, 9 Feb. 1852, in *Diary and Letters of Rutherford Birchard Hayes, Nineteenth President of the United States,* ed. Charles Richard Williams, Ohio State Archeological and Historical Society, Hayes Series, vols. 3–7 (Columbus, OH: Ohio State Archeological and Historical Society, 1922–26), 1:407.

79. For a lengthier discussion of Kossuth's tour, see Komlos, *Kossuth in America;* Spencer, *Kossuth and Young America;* Leffler, "Kossuth Episode," esp. chap. 6; May, "Contemporary American Opinion," esp. chaps. 7–9; and John W. Oliver, "Louis Kossuth's Appeal to the Middle West—1852," *Mississippi Valley Historical Review* 14 (Mar. 1928): 481–95. *Report of the Special Committee* provides an account of Kossuth's time in New York City in December 1851. *Kossuth in New England: A Full Account of the Hungarian Governor's Visit to Massachusetts; with His Speeches, and the Addresses that Were Made to Him, Carefully Revised and Corrected* (Boston, MA: John P. Jewett, 1852) gives an authoritative overview of Kossuth's time in Massachusetts at the tail end of the tour. Finally, Newman, *Select Speeches*

of Kossuth, contains transcripts of many of the major speeches Kossuth gave throughout his seven months in the United States.

80. "Washington's Birth-Day," *Richmond Whig,* reprinted in the *Daily National Intelligencer* (Washington, DC), 9 Feb. 1852.

81. William W. Campbell, *An Oration, Delivered by the Honorable William W. Campbell, Judge of the Superior Court of New York; February 23d, 1852, at Metropolitan Hall, New York City, on the Occasion of the Celebration of the Birth Day of George Washington, by Order of United Americans* (New York: H. R. Piercy, 1852), 16.

82. Multiple newspaper accounts of Kossuth's trip to Mount Vernon highlighted the fact that he cried over Washington's grave. One newspaper openly opposed to Kossuth, the *Boston Pilot,* was skeptical of this behavior, writing, "He cried. And we laughed. We could not help it. . . . Months ago, the papers commented, in a tone of murmur and of censure, upon [Kossuth's] forgetfulness or neglect in not visiting the tomb of Washington. It *was* a mistake, but he rectified it last week, after his return to Washington. He positively visited the tomb, and cried over it. But he spoiled the thing by over acting, which was as palpable as if he showed the onions. He cried because he did not get more money." "Kossuth," *Boston Pilot,* 1 May 1852. For a less cynical account, see Helen Irving, "Mount Vernon," *Ladies' Wreath, a Magazine Devoted to Literature, Industry and Religion,* 1 July 1852, 85–88.

83. See debate on 15 Jan. 1852, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 285.

84. Clarke's resolution further declared "that while we cherish the liveliest sympathy towards all who strive for freedom of opinion and for free institutions, yet we recognize our true policy in the great fundamental principles given to us by Jefferson: 'Equal and exact justice to all men, of whatever State or persuasion—religious or political—peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.'" "Joint Resolutions reaffirming the doctrine of non-intervention," 19 Jan. 1852, in *Cong. Globe,* 32nd Cong., 1st sess., 298.

85. Alexander H. Stevens to John J. Crittenden, 17 Feb. 1852, in Mrs. Chapman Coleman, *The Life of John J. Crittenden, with Selections from His Correspondence and Speeches,* 2 vols. (Philadelphia, PA: J. B. Lippincott, 1871), 2:27.

86. "The Birthday in Washington," *New York Observer and Chronicle,* 26 Feb. 1852.

87. William Hincks and Francis Hickox Smith, *Washington's Birthday: Congressional Banquet at Washington, in Honor of George Washington, and the Principles of Washington, February 22, 1852* (Boston, MA: Dutton and Wentworth, 1852), 24, 27, 33.

88. "Kossuth's Movements—Visits of Bostonians, &c., &c.," *Boston Herald,* 10 Dec. 1852.

89. Letter of Richard Henry Dana, Dec. 1851, box 12, folder 11, Dana Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. Richard Henry Dana was the son of Francis Dana; when the latter was the U.S. minister to Russia in the 1780s, John Quincy Adams had served as his secretary.

90. 16 Apr. 1852, in Tracy Patch Cheever Journal, 1851–1855, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

91. *Kossuth in New England,* 3.

92. Ibid., 63.

93. Gov. Boutwell believed that it was fitting that they officially welcomed Kossuth to Boston on 27 April 1852, because that was the "day that [Kossuth] completed his fiftieth year." In a private conversation with Kossuth, Boutwell remarked "that it was my good fortune to welcome him to the State on that anniversary." Kossuth replied, "'Yes, it is a

marked day; but unless my poor country is saved I shall soon wither away and die.'" This exchange was rather curious, because Kossuth's birthday was actually in September. Either Boutwell, writing many years later, simply misremembered the events, or Kossuth did not feel the need to dissuade the governor from attaching added significance to his presence in the state. George S. Boutwell, *Reminiscences of Sixty Years in Public Affairs,* 2 vols. (New York: McClure, Phillips, 1902), 1:207.

94. *Kossuth in New England,* 73.

95. By the time he compiled this memoir, Kossuth's memory of his days in Boston had become suspect, or had at least been romanticized. He described Massachusetts as a "free, cultivated, happy, model state (in which there is not a single person who cannot write, not a single pauper, not a single tumbledown house)." Louis Kossuth, *Memories of My Exile,* trans. Ferencz Jausz (New York: D. Appleton, 1880), xviii.

96. *Kossuth in New England,* 82.

97. For Boutwell's remarks, see ibid., 84–86.

98. 30 Apr. 1852, in Tracy Patch Cheever Journal.

99. *Kossuth in New England,* 91–93. For Kossuth's entire speech, see ibid., 86–96.

100. Boutwell, *Reminiscences,* 1:195.

101. *Kossuth in New England,* 97.

102. See ibid., 97–259.

103. Ibid., 260.

104. 3 May 1852, in Tracy Patch Cheever Journal.

105. Scrapbook, 1829–1880, series I, box 1, Richard Frothingham Charlestown Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA. Another prominent Boston family, the Channings, kept a similar scrapbook of several of Kossuth's major addresses in the United States. Box 7, folder 3, Channing Family Papers, Massachusetts Historical Society, Boston, MA.

106. A telegraph operator in Louisville, Kentucky, cut out and preserved Kossuth's signature from the bottom of a telegraph that had been sent through his office. Lajos Kossuth Manuscripts, Library of Congress, Washington, DC.

107. James Watson Webb to Daniel Webster, [July 1852], in *Proceedings of the Massachusetts Historical Society* 44 (1910–11): 212.

108. Based on Kossuth's own financial records, maintained by members of his traveling retinue, the Hungarian fund had roughly $1,100 left in it by June 1852. Komlos, *Kossuth in America,* 157–58.

109. Kirk H. Porter, ed., *National Party Platforms* (New York: Macmillan, 1924), 36.

Conclusion

1. George Washington Doane, *Influence, Without Intervention; the Duty of Our Nation to the World: The Oration, at Burlington College, on the Seventy-Sixth Anniversary of American Independence, and Sixth, of the Founding of the College, July 5, 1852* (Burlington, NJ: John Rodgers, 1852), 13, 11, 14.

2. Robert C. Winthrop, *Addresses and Speeches on Various Occasions, from 1852 to 1867* (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1867), 29.

3. "Stiles's *Austria in 1848–49,*" *North American Review* 75 (Oct. 1852), 465.

4. W. L. Barre, *The Life and Public Services of Millard Fillmore* (Buffalo, NY: Wanzer, McKim, 1856), 370–71.

5. *Report of the Proceedings of the Meeting Held in Memoriam Louis Kossuth, at Memorial Hall in the City of St. Louis and State of Missouri, Wednesday, April 4, 1894* (St. Louis, MO: Buxton and Skinner, [1894]), 11.

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