



Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository

Theses and Dissertations

1. Thesis and Dissertation Collection, all items

2002

Future war and Chechnya : a case for hybrid warfare

Nemeth, William J.

Monterey, California. Naval Postgraduate School

<http://hdl.handle.net/10945/5865>

This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. Copyright protection is not available for this work in the United States.

Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun



Calhoun is the Naval Postgraduate School's public access digital repository for research materials and institutional publications created by the NPS community. Calhoun is named for Professor of Mathematics Guy K. Calhoun, NPS's first appointed -- and published -- scholarly author.

Dudley Knox Library / Naval Postgraduate School
411 Dyer Road / 1 University Circle
Monterey, California USA 93943

<http://www.nps.edu/library>

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL

Monterey, California



THESIS

FUTURE WAR AND CHECHNYA: A CASE FOR HYBRID WARFARE

William J. Nemeth

June 2002

Thesis Advisor:
Thesis Co- Advisor:

Gordon McCormick
Hy Rothstein

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE			<i>Form Approved OMB No. 0704-0188</i>	
Public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instruction, searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of information. Send comments regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of this collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden, to Washington headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports, 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington, VA 22202-4302, and to the Office of Management and Budget, Paperwork Reduction Project (0704-0188) Washington DC 20503.				
1. AGENCY USE ONLY (Leave blank)		2. REPORT DATE June 2002	3. REPORT TYPE AND DATES COVERED Master's Thesis	
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE: Title (Mix case letters) Future War and Chechnya: A Case for Hybrid Warfare			5. FUNDING NUMBERS	
6. AUTHOR(S) William J. Nemeth				
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, CA 93943-5000			8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER	
9. SPONSORING /MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES) N/A			10. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY REPORT NUMBER	
11. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.				
12a. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY STATEMENT Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited			12b. DISTRIBUTION CODE A	
13. ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) <p>Modern states are increasingly challenged by violence that has been created through the devolution of states. Devolving states are those states that have returned to a more traditional socio-political organization and as a result operate under a differing set of norms than modern states. Devolving states are unstable, highly violent, anarchic societies, as traditional norms are mixed with modern socio-political theories, norms, and technology resulting in a mixed society or a hybrid society. This thesis sets out to describe a hypothetical hybrid society by examining the ideal types of modern and pre-state societies. Likewise a hypothetical hybrid military is described by examining the salient characteristics of modern and pre-state military forces. The ideal type hybrid society and military will be explored through a case study of the Chechen separatist movement. The Chechen case study will explore the linkages between society, religion, and how the traditional and modern mix to create the hybrid society. This thesis postulates that hybrid warfare will become increasingly prevalent, and the Chechen insurgency a model for hybrid warfare. The hybrid model of society and warfare will then be used to provide recommendations as to what modern military forces; the United States in particular, can do to successfully counter the rise of hybrid warfare.</p>				
14. SUBJECT TERMS Asymmetric warfare, Chechnya, clan, command and control, guerrilla warfare, hybrid society, hybrid warfare, information operations, Islam, low intensity conflict, fourth generation warfare, pre-state societies, psychological warfare, training, Russia.			15. NUMBER OF PAGES 100	
			16. PRICE CODE	
17. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	18. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE Unclassified	19. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF ABSTRACT Unclassified	20. LIMITATION OF ABSTRACT UL	

NSN 7540-01-280-5500

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 2-89)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

FUTURE WAR AND CHECHNYA: A CASE FOR HYBRID WARFARE

William J. Nemeth
Major, United States Marine Corps
B.A., University of South Carolina 1991

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF ARTS IN NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

from the

**NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2002**

Author: William J. Nemeth

Approved by: Gordon McCormick
Thesis Advisor

Hy Rothstein
Thesis Co-Advisor

James Wirtz, Chairman
Department of National Security Affairs

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

ABSTRACT

Modern states are increasingly challenged by violence that has been created through the devolution of states. Devolving states are those states that have returned to a more traditional socio-political organization and as a result operate under a differing set of norms than modern states. Devolving states are unstable, highly violent, anarchic societies, as traditional norms are mixed with modern socio-political theories, norms, and technology resulting in a mixed society or a hybrid society. This thesis sets out to describe a hypothetical hybrid society by examining the ideal types of modern and pre-state societies. Likewise a hypothetical hybrid military is described by examining the salient characteristics of modern and pre-state military forces. The ideal type hybrid society and military will be explored through a case study of the Chechen separatist movement. The Chechen case study will explore the linkages between society, religion, and how the traditional and modern mix to create the hybrid society. This thesis postulates that hybrid warfare will become increasingly prevalent, and the Chechen insurgency a model for hybrid warfare. The hybrid model of society and warfare will then be used to provide recommendations as to what modern military forces; the United States in particular, can do to successfully counter the rise of hybrid warfare.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I.	TRADITIONAL AND MODERN STATES	1
A.	INTRODUCTION	1
B.	CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW.....	2
II.	ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK	5
A.	INTRODUCTION	5
B.	SOCIETY	5
1.	Pre-State Society.....	5
a.	<i>Culture</i>	6
b.	<i>Structure</i>	8
c.	<i>Economy</i>	11
2.	Modern Society.....	13
a.	<i>Culture</i>	14
b.	<i>Structure</i>	15
c.	<i>Economics</i>	16
B.	MILITARY	18
1.	Pre-State.....	18
a.	<i>Professionalism</i>	19
b.	<i>Organization</i>	20
c.	<i>Operations</i>	21
d.	<i>Technology</i>	23
2.	Modern	25
a.	<i>Professionalism</i>	25
b.	<i>Organization</i>	26
c.	<i>Operations</i>	27
d.	<i>Technology</i>	28
III.	THE CHECHENS	31
A.	INTRODUCTION	31
B.	SOCIETY	31
C.	ISLAM.....	35
1.	Sufism	36
a.	<i>Nasqshbandiyah</i>	36
b.	<i>Qadiri</i>	37
2.	Wahabbism	38
3.	The Role of Islam in Chechen Society	39
D.	CHECHEN HISTORY	41
1.	Sheik Mansur.....	42
2.	Imam Shamil.....	43
3.	Civil War	45
4.	World War II.....	46
IV.	MILITARY.....	49

A. ORGANIZATION FOR WAR.....	49
1. Training.....	49
2. Leadership.....	51
3. Organization	53
B. WEAPONS AND TACTICS.....	54
1. Psychological and Information Operations	57
a. <i>Psychological Operations</i>	57
b. <i>Information Operations</i>	58
C. OUTSIDE SUPPORT	59
D. CONCLUSION.....	61
V. WAR.....	63
A. WAR.....	64
1. Chechnya I.....	64
2. Chechnya II.....	66
a. <i>Dagestan</i>	66
3. Results of the War	68
B. CONCLUSION	68
VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS	71
A. CONCLUSION.....	71
1. Political.....	71
2. Military.....	73
B. RECOMMENDATIONS	76
BIBLIOGRAPHY	81
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST	87

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I would like to thank my advisors Gordon McCormick and Hy Rothstein for focusing my thoughts on the intricacies of guerrilla warfare and its implications for and on future warfare. I would also like to thank Professor McCormick for introducing me to the Mystic Diamond and the weight that it carries.

I am grateful for the patience and help of my wife, Anna, who put up with my long hours away from the house, and for her invaluable assistance in editing the final draft.

Challenging me to think outside my box while I was here was Dr Steven Garrett who pushed me to examine issues from all perspectives and to give “credit where credit is due.” Thanks; I am a much better person for it.

Making all this possible is my father Reinhold Nemeth who pushed an unwilling child to pursue an education, allowing me the ability to refine my thoughts and, hopefully, make an impact.

Thanks.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

I. TRADITIONAL AND MODERN STATES

Successful warfare is a matter of social organization not of superior weapons.¹

A. INTRODUCTION

It is commonly held that the military forces of a modern Western society are reflections of that society. The organization, manning and equipping of these forces are derived from what is prevalent and acceptable to the society and culture that generates the military forces. This belief has even been projected backwards. It is hard to argue that a society organized around feudalism created a specific type of warfare and organization of forces. Nor is it difficult to understand how the French Revolution propelled Dynastic Warfare toward the mass warfare of the twentieth century. However, this line of thought tends to breakdown when one discusses how pre-state or devolving societies build and employ military forces. In these cases we tend to view not only the pre-state or devolving societal organization, but also their military forces through the prism of modern Western concepts of the state, bureaucracy, and military organization. As Ken Booth states in *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*,

Western liberal ideas about the utility of military force cannot be safely projected onto other societies. Ideas about the usability of force are always likely to decline most amongst those with nuclear overkill, settled frontiers, a horror of violence, vivid memories of total wars and a reduced need project force beyond their own frontiers. But these conditions do not pertain outside the Western world: more traditional outlooks persist. Western observers project their own attitudes in another way. There is a familiar Western penchant for adopting patronizing attitudes toward less developed societies...²

The result of these cultural views is that Western theorists tend to overlook the inherent strengths of a pre-state or devolving society, as all that is seen to the Western eye is anarchy and despotic rule.

¹ Harry Holbert Turney-High, *Primitive War Its Practice and Concepts*. (Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971)

² Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. (New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc, 1979). 77.

Today while the developed world moves toward increasing technological sophistication and societal integration, the developing world has little chance of even attaining the current level of western technological sophistication. A result is the developing world is not only retrenching from the state system, which was imposed on it as a product of de-colonization, but also rejecting western social development. The developing world's retrenchment from the state system has a large impact on relations between states and societies that are devolving away from western models. The main challenge to western states will be how these devolving societies and their military forces interact with modern states within the prevalent state system. Specifically, this thesis will examine the relationship between devolved societies and their military organization and the modern security system. It is important to understand not only the military organization, but also its parent society in order to understand the dynamics that are driving the creation of a new warfare paradigm. Devolving societies and military organizations are difficult to understand and defeat. While this is an examination of the military implications of what I call hybrid societies, it is recognized that the use of the military is just one aspect of a multi-dimensional strategy that must be developed to address the security issues stemming from hybrid societies.

B. CONCEPTUAL OVERVIEW

There is increasingly a body of work that is challenging the accepted norm of peaceful pre-state societies that turned violent only as higher and more centralized forms of societal organization became prevalent. However, no substantive research has applied these theories of highly violent and warlike pre-state society to the current devolution of states. Devolving societies are societies that are returning to more traditional forms of organization, but are doing so unevenly. That is, these societies are bringing with them an eclectic mix of modern technology as well as political and religious theory and institutions as they devolve. These hybrid societies, as part of their devolution, appear to have adopted war in the context of Harry Holbert Turney-High, who saw primitive war, "...as a social institution that served a variety of functions. Not only could war be useful...but it was an exciting diversion."³ These societies, many of which retain the

³ Lawrence H. Keely, *War before Civilization*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). 10.

trappings of the state system, are either a multitude of warring clans contained within the previous state boundaries, or a mostly homogenous socio-political unit that is fighting against a perceived oppressor. In either case these hybrid societies are a mixture of the modern and the traditional. Hybrid societies in turn have organized hybrid military forces, and it is these forces that will challenge military and diplomatic planners in the future.

Currently a large body of work exists regarding hybrid military forces under the rubric of Fourth Generation Warfare, New Warfare, or more conventional terms such as Low Intensity Conflict and Terrorism.⁴ Fourth Generation Warfare coined by Bill Lind and others in the late 1980's saw warfare in non-states as developing along a divergent path when compared to that being developed by Western nations. The developed world is increasingly moving toward "Advanced Technology" warfare, which will embed the increasing reliance on high technology seen Western society in Western military forces. Countering this in non-western states, and especially hybrid societies, is an increasing shift toward an idea driven concept of war. This idea driven concept of war, also called the "Terrorist/LIC" form of warfare by Robert J. Bunker, envisions a mix of terrorism and Low Intensity Conflict that is non-national or transnational in nature, and bypasses the western military to directly attack western cultural. Fourth Generation Warfare will attempt to attack the west from within and is consistent with the non-Trinitarian style of warfare described by Martin Van Creveld in the *Transformation of War*.⁵

Essays on Fourth Generation Warfare deal mainly with the strategy, tactics, and organization of the forces coming from devolving societies and superficially address the genesis of these forces. Mary Kaldor's book, *New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era*, looks at the issue from the opposite side. She discusses how the breakdown of society through globalization, the "breaking up of the cultural and socio-economic divisions that defined the patterns of politics...[in] the modern period," and the

⁴ Also called Post Modern Warfare by Chris Hable Grey; Degenerate Warfare by Martin Shaw.

⁵ William Lind, Col. Keith F. Nightengale, Capt John F. Schmitt, Col Joseph W. Sutton, Lt Col Gary I. Wilson, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation," *Marine Corps Gazette*. October 1989, Vol 73, #10. 22-26.

Robert J. Bunker, "Transitions to Fourth Epoch Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*. September 1994, Vol 78, #9. 20-34.

removal of Cold War blocs have at once increased the pressure on fragile societies through the increasingly global environment while removing the pressure of governments to conform in a bi-polar global system. Her “New War” model sees in modern wars the “blurring of the distinctions between war, organized crime, and large scale violations of human rights.” She also sees the RMA (Revolution in Military Affairs) as a revolution in “the social relations of warfare, not in technology, even though changes in social relations are influenced by and make use of technology.” However, little is said in the discussion of future warfare on the relation between hybrid and pre-state societies, and how the devolution of modern society toward pre-state society affects not only social relations but also military organization and theory.⁶

Since culture impacts on war we must understand a society’s culture to understand its profession of arms. As Ken Booth relates,

Unless we attempt to understand the character of different cultures it will be impossible to appreciate the mainsprings of National Strategies. Without knowing about the pride, prestige or prejudice, moral outrage, insistence on survival, vanity, vengeance of different societies how can we begin to appreciate the roles, which such important peoples...might play in contemporary and future military problems.⁷

The intention of this thesis is to establish the links between hybrid societies, hybrid warfare and pre-state societies and warfare by examining both pre-state and modern societies and military organizations. This will establish for the hybrid society what is already accepted for modern ones, namely that military organization is derived from social organization. Studying the Chechen insurgency will examine these linkages and how the confluence of modern political theory, technology, and a devolving society creates a unique form of warfare. Finally, the implications of hybrid warfare vis a vis Western society will be assessed. The conclusion will delineate the implications that hybrid warfare has on western states and provide recommendations on adapting the current military forces to more effectively counter the threat.

⁶ Mary Kaldor, *New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era*. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999). 70; Ibid, 3; Ibid, 2.

⁷ Booth, 144.

II. ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

A. INTRODUCTION

In order to determine how devolving societies will organize their military forces and conduct warfare it is essential that a general understanding of pre-state society and warfare be developed. A general view of pre-state society will provide an understanding of the underlying strengths and weaknesses of societies organized around the tribe, clan or chiefdom. This organization is important because modernity seems to be strengthening ethnic or tribal affinity, which becomes a factor in the breakdown of the state. The increasing dislocation brought about by globalization enhances the drive toward ethnic or tribal affinity. This erosion of state control creates space in which groups with particularistic views gain power and push an exclusive agenda. The leaders of these groups, operating outside the envelope of state control, organize paramilitary forces to fight against the remaining state power and work from below to diminish state power. The end of the Cold War has exasperated these tendencies by removing the need to keep developing areas under control and in one's sphere. The benign neglect of the developing world resulting from the end of the super power competition has increased the corrosive effects of globalism and warlordism in the developing world.

The forces organized by ethnic or tribal leaders are nominally loyal to him, the warlord, and thrive in the lawlessness created by the vacuum of state control. It is this devolution of society and its concomitant anarchic military organization and goals that is the future threat against which western society must organize its military forces to counter.

To understand the basis of the identity of these devolved societies and their inherent difference from western society an overview of pre-state and modern societies as well as an overview of pre-state and modern military organization and operations will be conducted.

B. SOCIETY

1. Pre-State Society

No dissection of military organization and operations can be conducted without understanding the societal context from which the military is drawn. According to Keith Otterbein, “Military organizations...are viewed as a particular type of social organization. Like any organization they have a social structure consisting of a character and norms.”⁸ Having established that military organization is similar to other societal organizations he then goes on to say,

Organizations, including military organizations, since they are articulated within the larger social system of the political community have an influence upon and in turn are influenced by the larger social system.⁹

In the conclusion of the book Otterbein draws the links starkly. “As a political community evolves in terms of increasing centralization, the more evolved the manner of waging war.”¹⁰ Otterbein is directly linking the socio-political sophistication of society with military sophistication regardless of the era. Hence the military organization of a state, chiefdom, or tribe will reflect the sophistication of its related social organization, whether in the modern, feudal, or pre-state era.

While an exhaustive study on pre-state society is beyond the scope of this thesis the general characteristics common to traditional and modern societies will be developed and the linkages to each society’s military organization established to illustrate Otterbein’s assertions.

a. Culture

The view of pre-state society has been influenced by two of the great philosophers on the human condition, Thomas Hobbes and Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes, writing in *Leviathan*, states that if all men are equal because they were endowed with will and prudence equally they would eventually come into conflict, and this conflict would be over items that only one could possess. The result of the conflict would be that one man would defeat or subjugate the other in pursuit of possession. From this concept Hobbes extrapolates that the natural condition of man as being “War of every man against every man.” To avoid this anarchy man would agree to surrender his liberty for

⁸ Keith F. Otterbein, *The Evolution of War*. (HARF Press: 1970) 4.

⁹ Ibid, 4.

¹⁰ Ibid, 105-106.

protection from a centralizing authority. This authority, commonly viewed as the state, while preparing for and fighting wars, “organized havens of peace within each state.” Hobbes’s view is contrasted with primitive society in which he saw no “havens of peace” preserved.¹¹

Rousseau, like Hobbes, saw in primitive society an innate equality. However where Hobbes saw raw emotions leading to eventual domination Rousseau saw, “Any tendency toward violence in the natural condition...suppressed by human’s innate pity or compassion.”¹² Furthermore where Hobbes saw the creation of centralizing authority as contributing to peace and stability, Rousseau saw civil society and centralized authority as causing the creation of separate societies as well as artificial laws. These factors, in Rousseau’s view, drove modern society to become more warlike. For most of the twentieth century Rousseau’s view of a peaceful primitive society was accepted as accurate. However, by the latter decades of the century the works of Keith F. Otterbein and Lawrence Keely were challenging this assumption. These authors have begun to counter the assertion that primitive society was peaceful and unmilitaristic, and while not as bleak as Hobbesian views saw a violent anarchic world in pre-state society.

It has been commonly understood that pre-state warfare differs from that conducted by modern states. However, this warfare has until recently, been viewed through the lens of modern Western concepts of warfare. Both Quincy Wright and Harry Holbert Turney-High, the preeminent twentieth century scholars on primitive warfare, declared pre-state warfare to be defective when compared to civilized warfare.¹³ In actuality, primitive or pre-state warfare, which tactically is remarkably similar to guerrilla warfare, is not defective. However, when both are viewed from a modern, western perspective they appear anarchic and hence ineffective and defective.

The foundations of primitive culture are seen to be an egalitarian society, based on custom, traditions and high levels of violence. While this seems contradictory

¹¹ Keely, 5; Ibid, 6.

¹² Ibid, 6.

¹³ Quincy Wright, *A Study of War Vol I*. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964). 80-85.
Turney-High, *Primitive War Its Practice and Concepts*.

upon closer examination there is a strong link between an egalitarian society and high levels of violence. The main factor for this is the inability of the informal headman, council of elders, or elected war chiefs to impose subordination.

Attempts to punish...a warrior in an egalitarian society would be foolhardy and disruptive, since the culprit would have the support of kinsman in resisting or retaliating for such abuse.¹⁴

An attempt at creating a hierarchical system, then, would lead to internal feuds and a weakening of the pre-state socio-political unit.

With regards to the level of violence, most modern anthropologists viewing primitive societies have concluded, “tribesmen conducted a more stylized, less horrible form of warfare,” by viewing the rare primitive battles. These rare battles were correctly observed as highly ritualistic with the result being that few casualties resulted from them. Battles gave observers the impression that, “Primitive warfare was not very risky.”¹⁵ Primitive warfare, when viewed through the Western prism of the preeminence of battle, is decidedly less violent than its modern equivalent. However, when one views primitive combat in its more common forms; ambushes, raids, and attacks on villages, one sees not only the frequency of combat increasing, but also the level of casualties. These more common forms of combat create a vision of pre-state society in which violence was a “...frequent and...a latent condition of pre-state existence.”¹⁶ What in the organization of pre-state societies leads them to become egalitarian yet violent? Looking at the structure of pre-state societies gives us an indication of how this might happen.

b. Structure

The structure of pre-state societies can be broadly broken into two groups, the first being tribes without rulers and the second tribes with rulers. According to Martin Van Creveld, tribes without rulers “both began and ended within the extended family lineage or clan,” and further, “all social relations that went beyond simple friendship were defined exclusively in terms of kin.”¹⁷ Lawrence Keely likewise

¹⁴ Keely, 43.

¹⁵ Ibid, 9.

¹⁶ Ibid, 16.

¹⁷ Martin Van Creveld, *The Rise and Decline of the State*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,

identifies the structure of pre-state society as based on kin. To Keely tribes are associations, which are “usually kin groups [and] ...In most cases there is no central political organization except informal councils of elders or local chiefs.” The difference between the two authors is mainly one of organization. Keely breaks out the difference between band, clans, tribes, but then later states “Primarily for stylistic reasons these terms are used interchangeably.”¹⁸ Keely’s statement indicates the differences between the two authors is mainly semantic and has little to do with the conclusion that these social organizations were based on familial ties and possessed an informal style of leadership. Societies organized around the extended family with temporary or elder leadership were bound to be egalitarian in nature.

In the absence of any institutional authority except that within the extended family the societies in question were egalitarian and democratic. Every adult male was considered, and considered himself, the equal of all others; nobody had the *right* to issue orders to, express justice over, or demand payment from anybody else.¹⁹

The North American Plains Indians are an example of this type of society. The elders that oversaw tribes without rulers had little power to enforce compliance leading to personal jealousies and agendas that could drag the whole tribe into what amounted to a personal conflict. Likewise, tribe members could split off from the kin group or, in what is commonplace today, continue fighting even though the tribal leaders wanted peace. Tribes without rulers were composed of family peer groups. While without a doubt, a hierarchical structure was present within families, the equality between families in the kin group made decision-making and implementation problematic. Overall the structure of pre-state society could be rather amorphous. The strengths of the tribe relied on its chief’s ability to satisfy his kin groups through victory in war, creating agricultural surplus, and his ability to impress his kin group with his magical powers. At any point, if his charisma or magic failed, he could be replaced.

1999). 2.

¹⁸ Keely 26-27.

¹⁹ Van Crevald, 14. Emphasis his.

At the next level of sophistication are tribes with rulers, also known as chiefdoms. Here Van Creveld and Keely disagree over the institutionalization of leadership, but not the structure of a chiefdom. Both authors view Chiefdoms as larger than tribes, possibly having a population of several to tens of thousands. Leading this organization was a chief whose job was to create a cadre of professional warriors. The creation of this cadre was made possible by the chief's control over the economic life of his people, and his ability to redistribute economic surpluses. However, Van Creveld and Keely disagree over the mechanics of the Chiefdom's succession of leaders. Specifically, they differ over the role of hereditary rights to leadership and demonstrated military prowess play in selecting a new leader. Van Creveld sees leaders as ruling by divine right, although being a successful political and economic leader was more important than hereditary right. Keely, while also agreeing that chiefs ruled by divine right places the emphasis on the hereditary transfer of authority.²⁰ However, both agree that the chief, "unlike a king, does not have the power to coerce people into obedience physically; instead he must rely on magical and economic powers."²¹ Chiefdoms were exceedingly prevalent throughout the world, and included societies throughout Europe, Asia, and the Pacific Rim to include the Pacific North West coast of North America. The modern incarnation of chiefdoms is in the various warlords that have arisen in developing societies. The essential difference is the modern warlord is usually powerfully armed and able to physically coerce people into obedience.

Outside of family-clan links, the other characteristics defining pre-state society was common ownership of tribal resources such as land, water, animals, and the common raising of the youth. Common ownership implies common management, and here we again see how pre-state society was egalitarian. If every clan member had a stake in the clan's resources he must also have a say in the management of those resources. However, on occasion the concept of equality would breakdown and respect for the rights of others would suffer. In societies without a legal system or law enforcement capabilities, traditions developed from tribal and religious custom that acted

²⁰ Keely, 26-27; Van Creveld, 10-12.

²¹ Keely, 27.

as the moral basis of the society.²² Committing crimes could result in intratribal fighting or feuding. When the traditions, which formed the moral basis of society, were violated, the tribal and religious leaders would attempt to mediate a resolution to the injustice. Vengeance would be gained through feuding, if mediation proved impossible.

Vengeance, for unmediated crimes, was received through the blood feud. Commonly viewed as an internecine struggle that disrupted society, in actuality blood feuds were a technique used to seek vengeance while limiting the feud and saving the integrity of the tribe. Christopher Boehm describes feuding as “deliberate social engineering” that contains two critical elements of conflict management, “the deliberate limitation of conflict and a deliberate attempt to resolve the conflict.” Feuding overseen by tribal or religious leaders was seen as “Socially disruptive, but also socially integrative...particularly as a practical alternative to warfare at close quarter.” Controlled resolution, whether through mediation by priest or tribal elders, paying compensation for the injustice or through revenge, was essential to ensure tribal survival. While not always feasible, efforts at resolution below the level of revenge were attempted. However, recourse to the feud, controlled as it was by custom, was viewed, “as a moral necessity... if a descent social status was to be maintained.”²³

c. Economy

While the majority of egalitarian societies were agrarian, a few were nomadic hunting bands, and most lived at or near the subsistence level. Tribes without rulers whether nomadic or sedentary were especially susceptible to this as no appointed leader had the authority to impose a system that could create and redistribute excess. Without this capability it was impossible to dedicate segments of society to unproductive labor such as the defense of the socio-political unit. Living near the subsistence level, tribes without rulers had limited opportunity to engage in long term campaigning nor did they have the capability to organize standing military forces or provide for a cadre of professional warriors, as all hands were needed to ensure the survival of the family and

²² Van Crevald, 4.

²³ Christopher Boehm, *Blood Revenge: The Anthropology of Feuding in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies*. (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1984). 87; Ibid, 244; Ibid, 66.

the tribe. Keely makes this point when he states "...society's economy may not be sustained if it is denuded of men to hunt, tend stock, clean gardens."²⁴

Militarily, the result of not having a standing military or protection force was that every male was trained as a warrior, again leading to the fact that an egalitarian society could be especially violent. In pre-state society, instead of long-term campaigns what was seen was a series of short-lived expeditions each with a discreet purpose and conducted over a lengthy period. These expeditions were conducted during periods that were beneficial to the tribe's survival and are analogous to the campaigning seasons common in warfare from the medieval period until the latter nineteenth century.

Additionally, the fragilities of clan leadership, with peers or elders appointed as the clan leader, made prosecuting war uncertain. Already alluded to is the fact that the decentralized society allowed for personal vendettas that could quickly subsume a whole clan in fighting another clan. Van Creveld, sounding similar to Turney-High, addresses this, "In the absence of a centralized decision-making body war itself might be defined less as a deliberate political act than as a characteristic activity of adult males."²⁵ It is only as clan based societies begin to develop into chiefdoms or city-states that we see the leadership develop to enable the specialization of labor, the creation of excess production, a system of taxation and redistribution, and the ability to organize a cadre of trained warriors. These warriors were supported by the chiefdom's excess production and traded military prowess, and the protection of the chiefdom, for economic support from the chiefdom. The advent of trained warriors and surplus production allowed the leaders of chiefdom's to carry out more extensive and wide-ranging warfare. An example of this is the evolution of Zulu warfare, which became increasingly capable as Zulu society became controlled by an increasingly centralized and specialized leadership stratum. As Otterbein describes it, "[In Zulu society] Dueling battles occurred at the tribal level, battles of subjugation led to the development of chiefdoms, battles of conquest brought about the emergence of the state."²⁶

²⁴ Keely 34-35.

²⁵ Van Creveld, 7.

²⁶ Keith F. Otterbein, "The evolution of Zulu Warfare," *Feuding and Warfare: War and Society Vol I*. (Canada: Gordon and Breach, 1997). 29-30.

In summary, clan based pre-state societies share the general characteristics of egalitarianism, common ownership, strong family ties, weak leaders who lacked an ability to force compliance with their decisions, subsistence existence, moral and legal control based on traditions, which are combinations of tribal custom, magic, religion. A high level of daily violence further characterizes these societies because they were an armed society without strong leaders in which intra-clan feuding and inter-clan warfare were prominent.

2. Modern Society

The characteristics of modern society should be apparent to all contemporary people. However, what is unique about modern society in relation to pre-state society? At its heart, is not modern society an outgrowth of pre-state-society? We are all accustomed to the fact that the military forces of a modern society are a reflection of that society. More importantly, the way we view and conduct war is equally a reflection of a given state's individual society, and the increasingly close-knit global society.

One point is inescapable regarding wars. Rather than being a destructive force as commonly viewed, war has been the key element in the consolidation of tribal units into chiefdoms, chiefdoms into city-states, and then into early states.

Modern warfare, by upsetting the equilibrium of traditional society with its emphasis on local autonomy and privilege paved the way for a steady increase in state power and military might.²⁷

A non-western example of this phenomenon is Keith Otterbein's analysis of Zulu societal development and its implications for military organization and strategy looked at earlier.

Bruce Porter sees war as essential to the transformation of pre-state society into modern society. Wars have resulted in the territorial coalescence of states. As an example, fourteenth century Europe was composed of approximately a thousand separate political entities. By the sixteenth century five hundred of these remained, by the time of the French Revolution under three hundred and fifty existed, and by the beginning of the twentieth century only twenty-five remained.²⁸

²⁷ Bruce D. Porter, *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. (New York: The Free Press, 1994). 297.

²⁸ Mark Greengrass, ed., *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe*. (London: Edward Arnold, 1991). 1-2.

Wars gave rulers both the incentive and the opportunity to concentrate power—and that power was the force that ultimately overcame the fragmentation of society.²⁹

The territorial extent of the nascent state increased through war, and war, by breaking down existing social and political barriers between tribes and clans, had an integrative and socializing effect on the disparate peoples brought under the control of the state. Control was extended through state provided services such as education, transportation, and medical care, and through the creation of a national army. Finally, the military could be used to forcibly assimilate sections of the state that attempted to retain their autonomy. The increased span of state control was essential to the development of the nation within the boundaries of the state. So much so that, according to Bruce Porter, “The quickest way to make a nation is to make an army.”³⁰ Martin Van Creveld sees state formation in a more Hobbsian way. He states, “...the state was originally conceived principally as an instrument of imposing law and order on groups and people.”³¹ Rather than having a socializing effect Van Creveld sees state consolidation through the physical dominance of the center over its periphery.

a. Culture

Whereas Hobbes accurately described the true face of pre-state society, Rousseau and his fellow *philosophes* constructed the foundations of what would become the modern liberal state. The enlightenment is generally viewed as the essential philosophical break between the early state, and pre-state society. The enlightenment’s effects on Western society are also widely thought to provide a philosophical underpinning for the success of the state in western society, and its absence in other areas of the world a key reason why the liberal state has not been embraced or codified there. Post enlightenment citizens began to rise up, not against the state, but rather against the dynastic leadership to gain an increased level of participation in government. This act began to reverse the trend, present since early chiefdoms that took power away from the people toward rulers and ruling classes. Only at the turn of the nineteenth century do we

²⁹ Porter, 12-13.

³⁰ Ibid, 18.

³¹ Van Creveld, 415.

begin to see the return toward the democracy that was prevalent in pre-state society. This return was not complete, however, as the structure of society had evolved.

b. Structure

The most graphic difference between pre-state and modern society is its structure. The modern Western state, while democratic in a more ritualistic manner is organized in a hierarchically. To be efficient this hierarchical state must have strong leadership and a bureaucracy capable of translating the strong leadership into political and military power abroad and implement social and economic development domestically.

In order to wield both the civilian and military aspects of ...power, they [rulers] set out to construct an impersonal bureaucracy as well as the tax and information infrastructure necessary of its support. Once the bureaucracy was in place its own nature-the fact that the rules of which it was consisted could not be arbitrarily violated without risking a breakdown...³²

Van Creveld discusses the essence of the structural differences above. As chiefdoms developed into larger, territorial based units, and as egalitarian leadership turned toward an autocratic, dynastic form, these strong leaders could not personally manage the enlarged early state. By creating a bureaucracy and a civil service class the ruler could now manage the enlarged state. However, the bureaucracy diffused the ruler's power, and the increasing bureaucratization of the state created a need to establish legal foundations on which the bureaucracy could operate. This move toward a government and society based on the rule of law further weakened the dynastic rulers claim to rule by divine right.

The state's existence is grounded in the development of law, and has become a legal entity. This legal stature gives the state the right and the bureaucracy the ability to monopolize the use of force, both internally and externally. As such, modern states with public input, make laws that govern daily life and create the bureaucratic mechanisms through law enforcement and the judicial process whereby disputes and the breakdown of society's moral basis can be regulated. Essentially, as man evolved from

³² Ibid, 416.

pre-state society to a modern state based society, he transferred his personal sovereignty first to leaders who ruled by divine right and later to the institution of the states in return for safety and increased prosperity. Van Creveld sees the legal characteristics of the modern state as interacting in the following way:

First being sovereign, it refuses to share any...functions with others but concentrates them in its own hands. Secondly, being territorial it exercises such powers over all the people who live within its borders and over them only. Thirdly, and most importantly, it is an abstract organization. Unlike any of its predecessors at any other time and place, it is not identical with either rulers nor ruled; it is neither a man nor a community, but an invisible being known as a corporation.³³

The state's strong leadership exercised through the bureaucracy prevents independent actions by individuals against states. The concept of vengeance is attenuated within society via the bureaucratic mechanism of law enforcement, and between socio-political units, is removed through international conventions, which allow only states to prepare for, declare, and conduct war. This centralization of society has lessened the number of inter-political unit conflicts, but not their destructiveness.

The bureaucratization of government and society has removed an added pressure that drove pre-state societies toward frequent combat. In a modern state not all its citizens are trained for war. The specialization of labor diffuses the warrior ethos, and the increasing technical sophistication and integration of society make those skilled in diplomacy, economics, and industry almost, if not, more important to the security and safety of society than the warrior.

c. Economics

The economy of modern western society is the second major difference that has brought about drastic cultural changes. The economy of modern states is based on industrial production, services, trade, and information technology.³⁴ Modern economies are based on surplus production achieved through the exploitation of natural resources, technology, the specialization of labor, and trade. A result of surplus production and specialization of labor is trade between states and dedicating segments of

³³ Ibid, 416.

³⁴ In the so-called post-industrial or post-modern state.

society to non-subsistence yet essential labor. These factors created higher standards of living allowing for the creation of surplus population. The combining of surplus production and population with non-subsistence labor allowed the states to create police forces to maintain domestic order and military forces to protect society from external threats as well as expand the territorial extent of the state. The establishment of these police and military forces entailed the development of a bureaucracy to administer them and manage the government tax receipts and expenditures required to support them. This relationship between government services, government expenditures, and the bureaucracy shows how interrelated the state, society and the economy were becoming, even in the early days of the state.

What is unique in the modern state is the level to which the government, economy, and society are integrated and benefit mutually from this. The state benefits from increased control and power created by the bureaucracy and economic strength; the economy benefits through government protection, regulation, and the creation of a healthy, literate society; and society benefits through state social programs and economic well being gained from the strong economy. Bruce Porter twists these links together into what he calls the “collectivist state.”

This new form of the modern state was really three states intertwined into one: a *regulatory state*, characterized by extensive state intervention in the national economy; a *mass state*, in which political participation and privilege were divorced from class or economic status; and a *welfare state*, assuming direct responsibility for the well-being of its citizens.³⁵

The characteristics of the modern state can be said to be centralization and the creation of hierarchical structures, and a bureaucracy through which strong leadership is exercised. The leadership seen in a state is codified in the rule of law. The state is sovereign and its leadership controls the legal means of coercion. The government of the state maintains tight control, both through its organs and its relations with other states and international organizations over the decision to go to war. As a result wars are less frequent, but more deadly.

³⁵ Porter, 150.

B. MILITARY

Since military organization is drawn from the organization of society as a whole it is not possible to envision the emergence of a hierarchical or a national military force from an egalitarian, clan based social structure. Likewise, if the social leadership rules without an ability to enforce compliance with their wishes, it holds that the military will have this weakness as well. It is easy to see once a society's social structure and culture are understood the generation and organization of military force are more easily understood.

Certainly a smaller, egalitarian society with simple technology and subsistence economy has to conduct warfare differently from a modern highly organized state with a complex technology and surplus economy.³⁶

When hybrid military forces are viewed from the modern western perspective of war and military organization they appear to be rather ineffective and disorganized. However, forces from hybrid societies have shown an ability to inflict substantial losses and, at times, the ability to outlast the punishment received from modern military forces to attain a victory. In order to understand how a hybrid force can accomplish this, the differences between a pre-state and a modern military forces needs to be examined.

1. Pre-State

The limitations on the effectiveness of pre-state military forces lie in society's social organization. This limiting factor is termed the "military horizon" by Turney-High. The military horizon, the point beyond which pre-state forces cannot reach, is created "not upon the adequacy of weapons, but the adequacy of teamwork, organization, and command working along certain principals."³⁷ The military horizon is a concept not entirely discredited in the years since it was proposed, and can be seen today as clan-based societies in the developing world do not appear able to adequately organize and provide effective command and control that is responsible to the national leadership. The result is anarchy in sectors of the developing world. Where Turney-High's concept is increasingly challenged is how effective pre-state societies are when operating under the military horizon. Turney-High makes light of this fact in *Primitive War*,

³⁶ Keely, 42.

³⁷ Turney-High, 23.

Furthermore one cannot avoid the suspicion that primitive societies had more system to their fighting than they are given credit for in field reports. They made some creditable stands against the white man in spite of their small populations and simple weapons.³⁸

However, despite his reservations, he goes on to view primitive warfare from the reference point of mid twentieth century principals of war. Turney-High's views remain in vogue, and today hybrid forces capabilities and effectiveness are similarly misunderstood.

Countering Turney-High is Lawrence Keely whose main thesis is that Turney-High and those of his generation overly based their analysis of primitive war on the conduct of battles. While battles are the basis of modern warfare they were not the basis of pre-state warfare. Keely sees pre-state warfare as the antecedent to guerrilla warfare; battle is to be avoided and forces rely on the use of raids, ambushes, murders and massacres as well as propaganda and deception to counter a stronger enemy.

Because such battles are the primary goal and most dramatic events of *modern* warfare the eyes of ethnographers were drawn to comparable clashes in the tribal societies they studied...ethnographers' seldom-analyzed casualties in relation to the small numbers who fought.

He then goes on to further state,

The raids, ambushes, and surprise attacks in villages that constitute a major component of tribal warfare were seldom observed and paid little notice.³⁹

Keely views pre-state warfare differently. He views it as effective, but also more violent and total than that seen in modern times. Keely also sees pre-state tactics as highly evolved, but limited by societal constraints and abilities.

a. Professionalism

The lack of a professional leadership cadre can be viewed as the biggest detriment to the development of a more organized form of pre-state warfare. Additionally, no standing leadership cadre meant that military training was conducted at the family level creating warriors not soldiers. Little collective training was conducted as

³⁸ Ibid, 23.

³⁹ Keely, 9. Emphasis his.

no time could be found in these subsistence level societies, and no means to enforce attendance at training sessions existed.

In the realm of command and control egalitarian societies with elder leadership were incapable of ensuring clan members complied with their decisions to engage in warfare. Similarly the military leadership, often elected, had little ability to force compliance with their plans or decisions. The anarchic organization of society carried directly over into the military structure, and created a decided lack of discipline, which was further exacerbated, by the lack of collective training to create solid units.

Any punishment for flight of heedlessness was administered, if at all, solely by the enemy. Attempts to punish...a warrior in an egalitarian society would be foolhardy and disruptive, since the culprit would have the support of kinsmen in resisting or retaliating.⁴⁰

Any attempt at imposing discipline would have been counter productive and threatened the existence of the tribe or clan as it would lead to a feud that would affect tribal unity as the tribe fought its external enemies.

Effective leadership could be exercised through leaders that had demonstrated success against the enemy, courage in combat, and the ability to provide gains to society through war. The charismatic war leaders were followed, while successful, and when success escaped them, like the magic of the elders, their kinsmen were not compelled to follow them. With no systemic method of training or leadership cadres warriors with an innate ability to produce success, led their societies in combat. The role of the charismatic war leader is today assumed by the rise of the warlord in hybrid societies. Essentially, effective leaders in pre-state societies were born not grown.

b. Organization

The basis for military organization in pre-state societies was the clan. Without a standing force or institutionalized training, military organizations would by necessity become ad hoc. Furthermore, in times of conflict it is imperative to organize society as a base of support for the soldiers campaigning away from the villages. Any discussion of military organization must also take into account the ability of that society

⁴⁰ Ibid, 43.

to mobilize, equip, and support the fielded military forces. In this aspect not only are pre-state processes defective when compared to modern processes, but defective in general.

A social organization capable of producing an economic surplus by high agriculture, and a means of transporting such food is as necessary for war as the invention of tactics. Without it...campaigns are impossible.⁴¹

Essentially, pre-state forces were tactical organizations and, while pre-state societies had strategic goals, they were incapable of organizing and conducting a campaign to accomplish the strategic goals. Being a tactical organization they were only capable of achieving short-term goals and achieved the strategic goal only by increasing the frequency of war and taking a long-term view of victory.

In a glimpse of the future Lawrence Keely compares primitive war with guerrilla warfare. In doing so he delineates the characteristics of organization and operational methods that are similar between pre-state warfare and modern guerrilla warfare.

In the present day the tactics, objectives, and practices typical of primitive war survive in civilized contexts under another name: guerilla warfare. Like their tribal counterparts, guerrilla units are part-time, weakly disciplined bands of lightly armed volunteers. They prefer hit-and-run raids and ambushes to formal battle, and rely heavily on their mobility, excellent intelligence and knowledge of the terrain to exploit the advantages of stealth and surprise.⁴²

c. Operations

A key factor in understanding the level of operational ability is the level of societal sophistication. From this base level of organization, education, political complexity, and economic strength can be determined the ability of the society to prepare for and conduct war.

Tribal warriors or their recognized leaders conceived and executed plans to exactly the degree of elaborateness and sophistication that their social organization, cultural proscriptions of leadership, and economic surplus

⁴¹ Turney-High, 31.

⁴² Keely, 34.

permitted. In this regard they were no different from civilized soldiers and commanders.⁴³

As stated above and discussed later pre-state societies eschewed battles and relied on more devious and safer tactics to bring war to their enemy. Battles had a large potential to inflict horrendous casualties on both warring parties for little gain, and were fought in a highly stylized and ritual fashion when unavoidable. Viewed from this perspective pre-state battles were not similar to contemporary battles, but can rather be seen as a form of deterrence mixed with the modern tactics of demonstration and presence.

Turney-High's critique of pre-state warfare centers on their inability to develop tactically and elevate the battle to the prominence shown in modern combat. The inability to develop specific laws of war led to his belief that pre-state warfare was defective. Lawrence Keely, on the other hand, views pre-state tactics as not only effective but also more appropriate and, over the long term, more violent than modern warfare. Keith Otterbein in "Why the Iroquois Won" sees tribal warfare as modern guerrilla warfare's direct descendent, and views the dominant Eastern North American Indian society's as practicing guerrilla warfare at a high level of complexity.⁴⁴

The most common forms of combat employed in pre-state warfare were the raid and the ambush. Raids were conducted through maneuvers to the flanks and rear of the enemy's position, and at times utilized several war parties converging on the enemy position from separate routes with the goal being to capture a village, food stores, women or children. Raids were and remain a particularly brutal form of combat. The complexity of the raiding tactics shows a rather high level of military sophistication in pre-state society. Often time's raids would transform into massacres. Massacres were usually the end result of an extended period of combat between clans and had the effect of destroying one social unit and absorbing the remaining members into the dominant clan. Supporting the two main tactics were an extensive use of ruses and deception.

⁴³ Ibid, 45-46.

⁴⁴ Keith F. Otterbein, "Why the Iroquois Won," *Feuding and Warfare*. (United Kingdom: Gordon and Breach, 1994). 9.

Pre-state combat made little distinction between sex and age, and these intertribal conflicts had few rules, outside of formal battles, and, unlike feuding, there was little attempt at mediation to avoid combat. Women and children were just as likely to be killed as the men. However, the former were usually killed only after their men had been defeated or attrited through prolonged campaigns that left the clans' villages defenseless. In this instance pre-state warfare was total, and the ultimate goal was the destruction, occupation, and assimilation of the enemy's territory and people.

Besides leadership the other outstanding weakness of pre-state military forces was logistics. A pre-state warrior essentially provided for himself during combat. Along with supplying his weapon the warrior would bring "iron rations" on his person sufficient for three days. When this was consumed, it was necessary to live off the land of the enemy.⁴⁵ No system of organized supply existed simply because pre-state society existed near the subsistence level.

Overall the operational deficiencies of pre-state society can be seen as a consequence of,

[The] weaker authority of leaders, more egalitarian social structures and values, lower level of surplus production, and smaller populations of non-state societies...To argue that the warriors or war making of a village society is ill disciplined, weakly led, constrained by inadequate logistics, 'unprofessional,' disorganized and so on is to state a tautology: These terms describe not how they make war, but how they live.⁴⁶

d. Technology

It is often assumed that pre-state society could not make use of technology. While it is true that these societies had little exposure to technology, they also had little cultural bias on how to use technology once it is acquired. The use of modern technology when combined with traditional pre-state tactics was effective against other pre-state societies but has also been effectively employed against modern military forces. The use of repeating rifles by the Sioux Indians at the Battle of the Little Bighorn is an outstanding example of this combination. While the weaknesses of the pre-state

⁴⁵ Turney-High, 32.

⁴⁶ Keely, 47.

military leadership and logistics was not solved by the use of modern technology, the use of technologically advanced systems when wedded to irregular tactics allowed pre-state societies, and guerrilla forces to fight effectively against more modern or technologically advanced forces.

Having little cultural bias as to how technology is to be used, plus little of what can be considered doctrine, allows the pre-state or hybrid society to realize a technology's potential before it became apparent to the more modern forces. Working with a limited technological base, pre-state societies have adopted and used technology in ways that more modern societies had not thought possible. As an example Lawrence Keely relates how a tribal leader of the Eipo tribe of highland Irian Jaya, upon seeing an airplane for the first time, requested to be given a flight and to bring several large heavy stones along to drop on the villages of his enemies.

This tribal Billy Mitchell had immediately recognized the military value of aerial bombardment –far more quickly than the military leaders of the civilized nations that created and developed the airplane.⁴⁷

A more modern example is the use of cellular phones and television broadcasts for command and control by hybrid societies and guerrilla groups as well as grasping the importance of propaganda, the role of the media and, most recently, the internet in gaining an advantage over their more modern enemy.

Pre-state warfare was a brutal endeavor. It was total and focused on winning not a battle, but the war as societal survival was predicated on being victorious in war. Pre-state warfare is directly linked to the social organization of society. However pre-state societies and, currently, hybrid societies have shown the ability to grasp, not only new ideas and concepts, but to assimilate technology to make their existing organization and methods more effective.

Primitive (and guerrilla) warfare consists of war stripped to the essentials: the murder of enemies; the theft or destruction of their sustenance, wealth, and essential resources; and the inducement in them of insecurity and terror. It conducts the basic business of war without recourse to

⁴⁷ Ibid, 79.

ponderous formations or equipment, complicated maneuvers, strict chains of command...or other civilized embellishments.⁴⁸

Overall pre-state society's main weakness was not its methods but rather its inability to create strong leadership in order to rectify weaknesses in planning, training, and logistics. However, to do this would have entailed modernization, which most likely would have transformed these societies into western style states.

2. Modern

The modern military is an outgrowth of the contemporary technology oriented society and is rooted in the hierarchical organization necessary to efficiently manage complex organization and institutions.

a. Professionalism

The modern military is organized as a professional force and exists because of modern society's specialization of labor, and the ability of the state to subordinate its citizens to its desire. The military is based on a large cadre of long serving leaders and relies on a steady influx of volunteers willing to undergo extensive training and cultural assimilation in order to serve the state.

A modern military accepts all citizens that meet basic medical, educational and moral standards, and proceeds to train them to a standard individual level. Once the basics are met, specialized training to support the high level of specialization found in the modern military is conducted. Once all individual training is accomplished the main focus of military training is on unit or collective training to coalesce individuals into units capable of responding almost as one. Officers are similarly selected and trained. Charged with leading military units they command hierarchically organized units that are trained and organized to conduct specific missions in combat. The authority of officers is guaranteed through laws that give them the ability to coerce those unwilling to submit to their leadership. Dissent to orders is not permitted as rules and the means to enforce them are present, just as in modern society. Modern military leaders are neither elected nor appointed for a specific period of combat. Rather they are appointed and administered through a combination of the state's military and civilian leadership. A key

⁴⁸ Ibid, 75.

difference in modern society is that society controls the military via the political system, as military leaders respond to governmental control. This socio-political control of the military leadership prevents the rise of warlords and the eclipse of civilian control of the government. The modern military leaders, unlike their pre-state counterparts, are grown not born.

b. Organization

Modern military forces are national in character; that is they are comprised of all strata and groups within society. Kinship does not play a factor in either recruitment or advancement of the force. Modern forces are standing and institutionalized rather than organized ad hoc for a specific emergency. While itself a specialized segment of society, the military is internally specialized as well to provide combat forces as well as supporting forces, training centers, medical and base functions, and is a complete microcosm of society. The internal specialization is, in turn, supported by specialized sectors of society that allow for extensive support to the military establishment in their defense of the state.

If a pre-state's military was organized to support tactical operations, the modern military is organized to conduct campaigns in support of a long-term strategy. To accomplish this, the modern military organization is hierarchical and its leadership is distinct from the society's political leadership who ultimately controls the military. Hierarchical organization provides for positive control of modern forces and allows for centralized planning. It also provides for the integration of logistical functions, and ensures the uniformity of individual and collective training. Finally, hierarchical organization facilitates accountability and ensures discipline can be applied.

On the other hand, the modern hierarchical structure tends to stifle the ingenious leader, possibly preventing him from reaching his full potential. The bureaucracy created in making a hierarchical control structure effective provides a brake on the adaptation necessary by the force to counter unique threats and allows asymmetric forces, such as those employing guerrilla warfare, to be more effective than their size or capability warrants. The military bureaucracy tends to view new technology or techniques through the prism of existing doctrine, thereby nullifying rapid changes in

effectiveness. The strength of the military bureaucracy and the doctrine it creates, therefore, has a decided impact, both positive and negative, on the operations the modern forces conduct.

c. Operations

Both Keely and Turney-High offer insight into what modern military operations consist of. Keely's assertion that,

Civilized soldiers have often lost to warriors in combat despite superior weaponry, unit discipline, and military science, but they have seldom lost campaigns or wars...

Is correct and comes despite the fact that,

The techniques of civilized war are focused on winning battles, whereas those to the tribesmen and guerrillas are devoted to winning everything else especially wars.⁴⁹

At first this seems contradictory, however modern military science places a premium on winning battles in the hope of forcing the enemy into a decisive battle where he can be defeated. Turney-High's emphasis on the creation of tactical principals that can be passed on through training as the standard by which modern society determines effective vice defective military organizations supports Keely's statements. Turney-High saw the ability to conduct battle as the epitome of a modern military and completely disregards the ineffectiveness of a force organized for decisive battle against a force that refuses to engage in a western style battle.

As such the modern military is ill prepared to combat forces whose primary tactical maneuvers are the raid and ambush, who have little compunction about massacring their enemies, and who make little distinction between civilians and the military. This dichotomy is the essence of asymmetric warfare; an asymmetry in what is allowable and acceptable to each society and culture. The dichotomy also gives an insight as to why the modern society, constrained by the rule of law, has difficulty in defeating hybrid society's using pre-state methods. Modern forces are constrained by modern laws governing combat, which are derived from a contemporary view of warfare,

⁴⁹ Keely, 71, 80.

and will always be inefficient when employed against a hybrid military force that is unconstrained by the modern western perception of warfare and law of war. Furthermore, hybrid forces understand this weakness and exploit it through the use of the modern mass media. Finally, modern tactics and planning are overly centralized, ponderous, and excessively focused on logistics and force protection when compared to those employed by pre-state and hybrid societies. While these modern traits are essential if fighting culturally and technologically similar forces, they tend to be unresponsive and ineffective against asymmetric threats.

Modern logistics of necessity must be superior to pre-state or hybrid societies logistical capability. First, modern forces conduct campaigns; second, modern law prevents the denuding of an enemy's countryside to support military forces in the field; third, the high level of technology found in a modern military drives an increasing need for high levels of support whether that is fuel, food, maintenance, or comfort items. It is the logistics ability of the modern forces, when combined with a high level of technology and strong leadership that allows modern forces to overcome deficiencies in the tactical ability of the modern force. Keely sees logistics as one of the two essential variables in distinguishing pre-state forces from modern forces.

To a great extent, the superior transportation and agricultural technology of Europe and its efficient economic and logistics methods made possible its triumph over the primitive world, not its customary military techniques and advanced weapons.⁵⁰

d. Technology

While modern society has always been more technologically advanced than pre-state society, this fact has not manifested itself in an overly dominant success on the battlefield. The western military has an insatiable appetite for technology; however, it tends to have parochial views on how technology is to be employed. Advanced communications networks and computers are ubiquitous throughout the modern military yet the military remains organized as it was during the First World War. Whereas hybrid states have the ability to use technology in ways that greatly enhance their operational effectiveness, the modern force tends to employ technology in an evolutionary fashion

⁵⁰ Ibid, 75.

that provides greater efficiency, better command and control, and more detailed planning rather than allowing advances to drive new organizations and operational techniques.

The hierarchical structure and centralized leadership of the modern military provides distinct advantages and efficiencies to modern forces better command and control, standardized training, development of leaders, integration of logistics into operations, and the integration of societal surplus into the military system to sustain campaigns. Yet it also provides distinct disadvantages when called on to fight against asymmetric threats. The strengths of the modern military highlights its weaknesses; its centralized, hierarchical nature has become overly bureaucratic, hence slow and unresponsive; its reliance on technology does not, however, harness technology for greater effectiveness; thinking is dominated by a dominant paradigm, doctrine, that makes innovation and initiative difficult; and finally, a feeling of cultural superiority that tends to downplay that which is not either modern or western.

In the future the threat posed by asymmetric hybrid warfare must be addressed. It must be remembered that hybrid warfare, the contemporary form of guerrilla warfare, is a continuation of pre-state warfare that has become more effective because it employs both modern technology and modern mobilization methods. Without a capability to effectively counter the asymmetric threat, a minor threat to the West will quickly become the West's main future threat. To effectively counter hybrid warfare an understanding of how the hybrid society is organized, thinks, and views western methods is essential, as is an understanding of how the hybrid society employs modern institutions, theories, and the technology available. Currently, the Chechen insurgency gives an insight into how a modern society based on kinship, that is devolving towards particularistic roots, mixes the traditional with the modern and organizes to fight a modern technologically advanced enemy.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

III. THE CHECHENS

A. INTRODUCTION

The Chechens' strength resides in strong and crosscutting associational networks that are founded on the strength of the extended family, *teip*; a common enemy, Russia; and a pervasive religion, Sufi Islam. These components form the basis of what Anatol Lieven calls "The deep underlying strengths of Chechen society and...tradition as tempered and hardened by the historical experiences of the past 200 years." The Chechen culture is imbued with strength and confidence and has demonstrated complete solidarity and mutual reliance when threatened by an outside force. The Chechens' believe in their superiority and in the absolute moral and national justification of their fight.⁵¹

The current conflict in Chechnya has spawned a lasting guerrilla movement that employs hybrid warfare because, when threatened by an outside force, the Chechens band together into a coherent and almost fanatical mass to defend their culture, society and territory. This fanaticism is raised through the cultural ethos of an isolated traditional society. The inherent strength of the traditional Chechen society, which binds them together more firmly than the citizens of many established states, makes it difficult for the Russians to defeat them. Islam is one of the tools used by the Chechen leadership to mobilize society and is one that transcends its internal mobilizing ability by making possible the mobilization of support from Islamic states and groups to a pariah regime.

B. SOCIETY

Chechen society remains primordial and is characterized by close family relations, reverence for the *teip* and *tukum*, egalitarian relations, and a lack of state or national institutions. While nominally Islamic in character, Chechen society is a mix of ancient customs, Christianity, and Islam. The strength and adaptability of Chechen society is its decentralized clan and village structure. In Anatol Lieven's words,

⁵¹ Anatol Lieven (1998), *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 325.

In peacetime they recognize no sovereign authority, and may be fragmented into a hundred rival clans. However, in time of danger, when faced with aggression the rival clans unite and elect a military leader.⁵²

Chechen society developed without outside influence for almost four thousand years. Separated from the Kingdom of Georgia by the Caucasus Mountains and from Kieven Rus by the steppes, the Chechen nation developed without any major power contact until the sixteenth century.⁵³ Lack of major power influence prevented a feudal system from being established and resulted in a Chechen society that was egalitarian with strong intra-clan ties. Without any powerful enemies, the need for strong or centralizing state structure was lacking, and Chechen society developed around the extended family. Chechen society revolves around two organizing structures. The main structure is the tribe or clan, which can be further dissected into tribes of the lowlands and tribes of the mountains or highlands. This social and physical division of Chechnya is recognized in the official name of the Chechen Republic: Chechnya-Ichkeria. Ichkeria is comprised of the two mountainous southern districts of Shaoti and Veden.⁵⁴

The tribal organization of Chechen society is based on the *teip*.⁵⁵ Chechnya is composed of approximately 150 *teips*, the members of which are identified by tracing their lineage back twelve generations. Physically, a *teip* covers two or three villages consisting of approximately 400-600 people and is sub-divided into groupings known as *neke* or *gar*, which are smaller kinship groups consisting of 10-50 households.⁵⁶ *Teips* are organized into nine *tukums* or tribes, as legend holds that all Chechens are descendants from an original family of nine brothers.⁵⁷

⁵² Anatol Lieven, "Nightmare in the Caucasus," *The Washington Quarterly*. Winter, 2000; Vol 23, #1. 145-159.

⁵³ Lieven (1998), 331.

⁵⁴ John Arquilla and Theodore Kivasick, "Chechnya a Glimpse of Future Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. London, March 1999; Vol 22 #3. 209, 225.

⁵⁵ Also seen spelled as Taip.

⁵⁶ Valery Tishkov, *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union: The Mind \ Aflame*. (Thousand Oaks: Sage). 191; Arquilla (1999), 210.

⁵⁷ Francesca Mereu, "Russian War Destroyed Chechen Clan Structure." Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/04012002113240.asp>. Accessed Jan 22 2002; Arquilla (1999), 210.

The leadership of the *teips* is a council of elders, and each of the 150 *teips* not only has their own council of elders, but also has their own leadership traditions. Generally, elders receive the utmost respect from the members of the *teip*. At times the elders' authority has been strong. However, ten years of war with Russia and economic collapse has weakened this strong leadership based on respect and brought to the forefront younger leaders. These younger leaders, essentially war leaders, have been chosen due to their demonstrated leadership and courage in combat with the Russians. The concept of war leaders is not new to the Chechens and, during the seventeenth century, war leadership among the Chechens had developed into a system that was based on "personal achievement and prestige not hereditary with the council of elders of a *teip* choosing its leader."⁵⁸ The current leadership arrangement has the council of elders making recommendations that may or may not be followed by the younger war leaders and is not unlike that seen historically in Chechnya during conflict. Sergei Arutyunov, a member of the Russian Academy of Sciences and head of the Caucasus Department at Moscow Ethnology Institute, characterizes the Chechen clan leadership similarly.

[A] Clan may have more or less informal elders. These elders may form a kind of council—a clan council—which may give nonobligatory recommendations, which will probably be more or less followed by the majority of the clan members.⁵⁹

This elder merit based leadership operated in a manner similar to that of the Plains Indians of America. These characterizations of clan leadership, a leadership based on respect for elders, voluntary compliance, and the election of war leaders based on personal abilities and valor, has been commonly found in egalitarian societies throughout history.

The social cohesion created by a society organized around the extended family has been repeatedly seen in the two contemporary Chechen wars. Ian Chesnov, a professor of anthropology at Russia's State Humanitarian University in Moscow, says, "[A] ccording to Caucasus tradition a member of a *teip* is never abandoned in a time of

⁵⁸ Lieven (1998), 341.

⁵⁹ Mereu (Clan Structure), 1.

trouble.”⁶⁰ This underlying loyalty to family and duty has been transferred to contemporary Chechen warfare where teips send fighters to battle the Russians in shifts.⁶¹ The result of this intra-teip rotation of forces is that Chechens are always fighting with kinsmen and benefit from the moral and ethical justification this provides.

The *tukum*, loosely composed of *teips*, in the past has been the basis of organizing forces for combat. The nine *tukums*, according to Valery Batuev, a Caucasian issues reporter for the *Vremya MN* daily, are “Political-military unions meant to function in cases of [outside] threats of aggression.”⁶² Today this fighting role has been taken over by the *teip* and the *tukum*, perhaps because it is a leaderless collection of clans, has little, other than symbolic influence over events in contemporary Chechnya.

The loose association, egalitarianism, and strong family ties evident in contemporary Chechen socio-political organization have long been the hallmark of Chechen society. As Lieven states:

In particular the tribal and egalitarian form of traditional Chechen society has in more recent times contributed greatly to the Chechen ability, both to resist conquest and assimilation, and to maintain ethnic numbers by co-opting members of neighboring ethnic groups. The Chechens have been much less likely than their neighbors to be demoralized by destruction and cooption of their elites, for the simple reason that in the past four centuries they never really had any, whether secular or religious.⁶³

While gaining an increasingly strong feeling of Chechen nationhood through almost three centuries of conflict with the Russians and surviving thirteen years of internal exile, the Chechens have not been able to break the tribal bonds and create modern state institutions. In fact clan associations have become increasingly important in the last decade as a survival mechanism and a counter to Russian aggression.

Two concepts introduced by Robert Montague, regarding the Berber tribes of Morocco, are central to understanding contemporary Chechen society and politics. The concepts are,

⁶⁰ Ibid, 1.

⁶¹ Arquilla (1999), 210-211.

⁶² Mereu (Clan Structure), 2.

⁶³ Lieven (1998), 341.

That of ‘Oscillation’ between a loose tribal democracy, and an unstable personal autocracy; and that of ‘Ordered Anarchy,’ whereby a society appears to an outsider to be utterly chaotic and riven by internal feuds in fact obeys extremely strict rules and restraints in its behavior, and most importantly in its capacity to mobilize against a common enemy.⁶⁴

“Oscillation” can be seen in the succession of charismatic and religious leaders; Sheik Mansur, Imam Shamil, and Golinsky. Even today, Shamil Basayev and Khattab have more charismatic and nationalistic appeal than the elected Chechen president Aslan Mashkadov. “Ordered anarchy” is a brilliant description of Chechen society. Being tribal in nature, Chechen society appears anarchic, corrupt, and violent when viewed from a modern western perspective, but is in fact governed by strict *adat*, ancestral customs, and Sufism, which maintain order and discipline in society.

The second organizing principal of Chechen society is Islam. The Chechens adhere to the Sunni branch of Islam; however, Sufism has been the most prevalent of Chechen religious beliefs since it blended well with the egalitarian nature of Chechen society. Furthermore, it combined well with the *adat*, and even allowed these customs to supercede religious teachings at times. Sufism, while varying from one *teip* to another, remains a common point of reference all Chechens hold, and it is understandable that all pre-twentieth century Chechen leaders were foremost religious leaders.

C. ISLAM

Although losing some of its appeal to the secularism underlying the Soviet system and the nationalism driven by the Russian invasion, Islam has been the unifier of Chechens throughout the entire history of the Russian-Chechen conflict. Chechens adhere to Sufism, which differs greatly from the commonly held Western vision of Islam, as a radical and violent religion. In the unlikely even that a Sufist state would form the state would be inward looking and regionally oriented, and not the radical state feared by Russia.

Islam entered the north Caucasus during the seventh and eighth centuries via Dagestan. From Dagestan, Sunni Islam spread westward along the northern rim of the Caucasus Mountains weakening as it moved west. By the eighth century, the north

⁶⁴ Ibid, 331.

Caucasus was mostly Islamicized. However, Islam remained in competition with, and was influenced by ancient religious beliefs and cultural traditions, which resulted in the religion being influenced by local customs and traditions. The result is a population that is not strongly converted to Islam. Conversions began to increase at the same time that Russian influence and zeal at spreading Orthodox Christianity in the region was on the rise.⁶⁵

1. Sufism

The Chechens' converted to Islam later than the rest of the Caucasian peoples because religion was not enthusiastically accepted. However, by the late eighteenth century Sunni Islam with a particular emphasis on Sufism, had taken root in Chechnya. Sufism is not easily defined. However, it is generally accepted as a "popular" form of Islam. Its adoption was most likely due to its amenability to the incorporation of outside influences, such as the Chechen *adat*, as well as the vestiges of Christianity that remained in the region. Sufi's look upon themselves,

[A] s Muslims who take seriously God's call to perceive his presence both in the world and in the self. They tend to stress inwardness over outwardness, contemplation over action, spiritual development over legalism, and cultivation of the soul over social interaction.⁶⁶

Sufism is a reflective, internal belief commonly referred to as Mysticism in the West, whose strength lies in its ability to mobilize people as it allows them the ability to find God's presence within themselves and their community. The goal of Sufism is to establish a direct contact with God. In Chechnya Sufism followed in the tradition of al Bistami's Nasqshbandiyah Order, however, a minority follow Abd al-Qadiri al-Gilani's Qadiri Brotherhood.

a. Nasqshbandiyah

Nasqshbandiyah is a Central Asian form of Sufism that spread east to west becoming less radical as it entered Ottoman lands. Subsequently adopted by the Ottomans, Nasqshbandiyah became the dominant form of Sufism in the Ottoman Empire and the Caucasus. The Nasqshbandiyah Order served as a significant part of the social

⁶⁵ Paul Henze, *Islam in the North Caucasus*. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1995). 3-5.

⁶⁶ William C. Chittick, "Sufism: Sufi Thought and Practice," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 102-103.

fabric in the region of Chechnya, and provided a structure for intra-and interregional networks among the *ulama* and commercial classes. Two of the leading characteristics of the Nasqshbandiyah Order is “a frequent tendency to political involvement,” and passive resistance to secularism.⁶⁷ These characteristics have prepared Chechen society to support the organization of resistance movements. These anti-foreign⁶⁸ movements became more pronounced in Chechnya during the nineteenth century when the Nasqshbandiyah leaders organized resistance movements against the Russians calling them *jihad*.⁶⁹ While successful in waging *jihad*, these same leaders were incapable of establishing a viable Islamic state in the region as Sufism in the nineteenth century, much like Islam today, was not capable of being used as an alternative to the nation state. Outside of the Caucasus, Nasqshbandiyah exhibited similar tendencies toward revolt and state building. In Kurdistan, Nasqshbandiyah became gradually intertwined with Kurdish separatism and nationalism, much like what is seen in Chechnya today, helping to create the Kurdish uprising of 1880, which, although successful in creating an independent Kurdistan, was not successful in consolidating the victory with a viable state.⁷⁰

b. Qadiri

The Qadiri Brotherhood arose in the Persian province of Gilan near Baghdad. Its basis is the writings and seminars of Abd al-Qadiri who had a reputation as a great holy man, but only became interested in Sufi activities toward the end of his career. His sons and grandsons founded the Brotherhood after his death. While leaving no particular Sufi tradition of his own, his son’s loose arrangements and focus on the philanthropic aspects of Sufism led to its rapid spread. The Qadiri Brotherhood has a strong influence from the sub-continent and it still widely practiced there.⁷¹

⁶⁷ Hamid Algar, “Nasqshbandiyah,” *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 226, 229.

⁶⁸ Distinct from anti-Christian

⁶⁹ John O. Vell, “Sufism: Sufi Orders,” *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 114.

⁷⁰ Algar, 227.

⁷¹ Bradford G. Martin, “Qadiriyyah,” *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995) 375-378.

Qadiri first entered the Caucasus in the mid-nineteenth century from Turkey. The Brotherhoods' patron, a Dagestani named Kunta Khaji, believed in an open more "ecstatic" form of devotion than that practiced by the Nasqshbandiyah Order, and is likely a legacy of the Indian influences on the Brotherhood.⁷² The Qadiri's, being a minority sect within Chechnya, have little impact on the Nasqshbandiyah's influence over Chechen society. Positively the two sects coexist peacefully, and the Qadiri brotherhood, with its Caucasian roots in Dagestan, illuminates the role Dagestan has and continues to play as the Caucasus's center of Islam.

Nasqshbandiyah and Qadiri provide a societal framework, which strengthened the communal identity and provided organization to the resistance against the Orthodox Christian Russians attempts at suppressing the Caucasian peoples and Islam. Nasqshbandiyah and Qadiri have remained influential in society throughout the modern era, but have not played a leading role in resistance to either Soviet or Russian repression as "the Order has not produced in the twentieth century a leader of notable gifts that would give him broad universal appeal and reinvigorate the order as a whole."⁷³ The lack of leadership is possibly a result of the Soviet suppression of Islam and the execution of its religious leaders in 1937. In any case, the result is that the Nasqshbandiyah Order has gone on divergent paths throughout Chechnya as nationalism began to strengthen and eclipse Islam as the main mobilizing force in society.

2. Wahabbism

The rise of nationalism, while diffusing the effects of Sufism, has not caused its eclipse, nor has it led to an increase in radical Islamic beliefs to fill the religious void. Throughout the twentieth century only a small minority of Chechens have held radical Islamic beliefs. Today this minority belongs mainly to the Wahabbi sect and has minimal influence among the population and the state. Wahhabism is opposed to the principals upon which Sufism is based, and the antagonism between the two forms of Islam is substantial and cannot be overcome.

⁷² Francesaca Mereu, "Islam Plays a Fundamental Role in North Caucasus." Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. <http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/04012002113240.asp>. Accessed January 22, 2002.

⁷³ Algar, 229.

Wahhabism has been ardently anti-Sufi since its inception. Adherents of Wahhabism see in Sufis “spiritual stagnation and ...excesses,” and denounce the Sufi practice of praying to saints, and seeing this as polytheism. Al-Wahhab also sought to replace the tribal solidarity present in Sufi lands with religious solidarity, “purifying the religion from what [he] considered extraneous practices.”⁷⁴ Wahhabists view themselves as followers of a pure Islam and believe that incorporating any practices not specifically sanctioned by the Koran is a deviation of Islam, and those practicing anything but pure Islam are heretics. A further difference between Sufists and Wahhabists lies in their differing interpretation of the concept of *Jihad*. To the Sufis, *jihad* is the inner battle on the road to perfection of oneself, while for the Wahhabis, *jihad* is an external conflict against infidels.

It can be seen that Wahhabism is a drastically different view of Islam than that practiced by the Sufis in the Caucasus and Chechnya. The small percentage of Chechens who do claim to be Wahhabists follow a loser form of Wahabbism that is only remotely linked to the teachings of the eighteenth century Sheik Wahhab.⁷⁵ By following a watered down version of Wahhabism, these Chechens are considered no better than the Sufists and are likewise viewed as apostates by the “true” Wahhabists. The true Chechen Wahabbists are currently outside Chechnya. In Chechnya the true Wahhabists are currently only the small number of Arab and other foreigners helping to fight the Russians.⁷⁶

3. The Role of Islam in Chechen Society

Domination by the secular Soviet state for over 70 years and the rise of nationalism created by this domination are partly the reasons a Nasqshbandiyah or Qadiri leader has not emerged during the current insurgency. Throughout the insurgency, Islamic beliefs have taken a back seat to kinship loyalties and nationalism. According to professor Salvi, “Sufi brotherhoods were unable to function in the new conditions [of war

⁷⁴ Earl H. Waugh, “Tawhid,” *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 194.

⁷⁵ Lieven (2000), 157.

⁷⁶ Numbers of these foreign fighter range from the Russian figure of 700 to the Western estimate of 200. Although the total number having cycled through Chechnya during the war has undoubtedly been much higher.

and nationalism], the sheiks were able to exercise moral authority only in the conditions of social peace.”⁷⁷

In 1991 Jokhar Dudayev, going against Chechen history, explicitly ruled out the creation of an Islamic republic stating, “ Where any religion prevails over the secular constitutional organization of the state either the Spanish Inquisition or Islamic fundamentalism will emerge.”⁷⁸ Illustrating the secular basis of the government and the desires of the people Dudayev’s election platform said almost nothing regarding Islam or religion. Dudayev’s military commander and successor as President, Aslan Mashkhadov, also supports a secular government. Shamil Basayev, the charismatic leader of the insurgency, and regarded as an Islamic opponent to Mashkhadov’s Presidency, has also repeatedly denounced a desire to establish an Islamic regime. In a September 1999 interview, Basayev, considered a “convinced” Muslim, but not a “strict” one,⁷⁹ reiterated his rejection of militant Islam and the creation of an Islamic state.⁸⁰ Despite Basayev’s stated intentions the Russians continue to claim that he desires to establish a radical Islamic state, vice a anti-Russian nationalistic state, in Chechnya.

All sides of the conflict have used, and continue to use, the threat of a radical Islamic government to further their ends. According to Lieven, the Russian,

[E] xaggeration of the political role of religion in pre-war Chechnya was an effort to brand the Chechen separatists as Muslim fundamentalists. The intention...has generally been threefold: to appeal to Western audiences with the line that the war has been a Western crusade against a common Islamic enemy; to argue that the Chechens are too “primitive” to have developed a modern nationalism and a sense of national identity; and to suggest that as simple primitive people they have been misled by religious propaganda into acting contrary to their own best interests.⁸¹

The Chechens have exploited radical Islam to receive external support; money, military training, manpower, and equipment from radical former Afghan Mujahideen. While

⁷⁷ Mereu (Islam), 2.

⁷⁸ Lieven (2000), 155. Curiously this statement correctly links Christianity to terrorism and radical behavior in an earlier era, something many Christians appear to have forgotten.

⁷⁹ Ibid, 155

⁸⁰ Thomas de Waal, “Portrait of 2 Warlords,” *Moscow Times*, 18 Sept 1999.

⁸¹ Lieven (1998), 367.

small in scale this support, along with participation in criminal activities such as drug and weapons smuggling, has allowed the Chechens to continue fighting Russia even though they are not recognized or receive support from other nations. The support received from Arabs, possibly related to the nineteenth century diaspora, has increased the effectiveness of the insurgency, but has opened a rift between the Islamists, who are mostly non-Chechens, and the Chechen authorities and remaining Sufi leaders. Radical support for the insurgency, and the destruction of the existing state institutions, has only slightly increased the number of Chechens adhering to radical beliefs. Unfortunately, the longer Russia continues to assert its domination over Chechnya the greater the void of political and social control will become. Filling this void will either be a more radical Islamic leadership, fulfilling Russia's prophecy of having a radical regime on its flank, or more likely, strongly anti-Russian radical groups which can operate in the lawlessness created by a lack of state control in the region.

The tension between Sufism and radical Islamic beliefs as well as the Chechens' hostility toward those with radical beliefs, will make it difficult for a radical Islamic state to be formed. Links to radical Islamic and terrorist organizations exist, as they did with the Muslims in Bosnia, but Chechnya, like Bosnia, is a case of receiving support and recognition from co-religionists, and not a case of accepting the beliefs and desires these supporters espouse. The Chechens' strongest desire is to recreate the high point of Chechen cultural and political dominance, the Mountaineer Republic, and not create an Islamic state, radical or not.

D. CHECHEN HISTORY

Chechen culture has been shaped by the clashes between the competing ideologies and religions of the Ottoman, Persian, and Russian Empires. The initial contact between the Russians and the Circassians⁸² came in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.⁸³ However, it is only in the early eighteenth century and Russian conflict with

⁸² Those Caucasian peoples living in the Western Caucasus, including the Chechens, however Soviet ethnographers exclude Chechens from the Circassian group and include them among the N. Caucasian nationalities.

⁸³ Paul B. Henze, *The North Caucasus: Russia's Long Struggle to subdue the Circassians*, (Santa Monica: Rand 1990) 15-16.

the Ottoman Empire, that we begin to see an interest in, and efforts to control the Caucasus.

1. Sheik Mansur

Increasing tensions between the Ottomans and the Russians was felt in the north Caucasus by an increasing Russian repression of the Circassians. It is during the early period of the Russo-Turkish Wars that we see the rise of the first great Circassian leader, Ushurma. Ushurma, claiming to be a Chechen, was the Mountain tribes' first organized leader.⁸⁴ Ushurma, later adopting the title Sheik Mansur (Victor), was a strong religious leader as well as a charismatic military leader. Mansur's egalitarian Nasqshbandiyah Order of Sufism appealed to Chechen society because it was tolerant of local customs and traditions while supporting the Chechen will to resist Russian subjugation of their lands. Sheik Mansur united the Circassians, including the Chechens, by declaring a *gazavat*, holy war,⁸⁵ against the Russians. Resistance began in 1785 and, in this year, he surrounded and killed 600 Russian soldiers sent by Catherine the Great to subdue the rebellion.⁸⁶ However, after this initial success and his only famous victory, Mansur's fortunes began to turn, and by 1787 the Russians had regained the initiative.⁸⁷ Mansur was captured in 1791, and was imprisoned in St. Petersburg, where he died in 1794. Sheik Mansur's main impact on the North Caucasus was the ending of internecine conflict, which had previously prevented the Circassians from uniting and effectively defending against Russian attempts at subjugation.⁸⁸

Without a successor the resistance fragmented, and internecine conflict among the Circassians returned. The peoples of the central North Caucasus, the Ossetian, Kabardians, and the Ingush, sought accommodation with the Russians rather than continuing the struggle, effectively splitting the resistance efforts between the Cherkess in the west and the Chechens and Dagestanis in the east. This split resistance made the

⁸⁴ Carlotta Gall, and Thomas de Waal, *Chechnya Calamity in the Caucasus*. (New York: New York University Press, 1998). 38.

⁸⁵ Henze (1995), 11.

⁸⁶ Gall, 38.

⁸⁷ Paul B. Henze, *Russia and the Caucasus*. (Santa Monica: Rand, 1996), 7.

⁸⁸ "The Life of Mansur, Great Independence Fighter of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples," *Central Asian Survey*, London Vol 10 #1/2 1991, 81-92.

Russian counterinsurgency efforts considerably easier than if they faced a united movement.⁸⁹ Nevertheless, the Russians were not able to translate this opportunity into any lasting territorial gains, and their treatment of the subjugated Caucasian peoples alienated them furthering their hatred at the Russians.

2. Imam Shamil

During the later Russo-Turkish Wars the man regarded as Mansur's successor and held as the greatest of all Caucasian leaders, Imam Shamil, rose to prominence. Shamil, a Dagestani, continued the use of Sufi Islam to bind together the resistance to Russian attempts at subjugation. Initially leading a rebellion in Dagestan from 1834-1839, he was chased from the region and found refuge in Chechnya. However, within three years Shamil had not only reformed the insurgency in Dagestan, but also spread it to Chechnya at the request of the Chechens.⁹⁰ Under Shamil the Chechens became the most fiercely dedicated of the North Caucasian peoples to north Caucasian independence and were initially Shamil's most ardent supporters.⁹¹

During the 1840s Shamil established a nascent state comprising the Chechens, Ingush, and the Dagestanis. A rudimentary taxation system was implemented and this supported a standing army of 5500 cavalry and 8870 infantry as well as a reserve of between 30-40,000 people. Shamil also established a legal system based on the *sharia* with which he intended to replace some of the more onerous *adats* then governing Chechen society.⁹²

Shamil's rule was extremely repressive, almost as repressive as Russian occupation. His repressive rule was partly a function of the state being formed during war and remaining in continuous conflict with Russia and partly because the basis of the state was Islam with its legal foundations rooted in religious law. The repressive nature of Shamil's rule and the suspension of Chechen *adat* caused extensive dissent. However, the Russians conquered the *Imamate* before dissent could build enough to cause it to

⁸⁹ Gall, 39.

⁹⁰ Ibid, 43.

⁹¹ Henze (1995), 11-12.

⁹² Gall, 48.

collapse from within. The Chechen historian Yanus Akhmadove explains the paradox of desiring independence and strong leaders, but loathing repression and the giving up of individual sovereignty to a state,

The tough military discipline prevailing in the *Imamate* was unusual for the Mountain People of Chechnya; the excessive regulation of private and public life, the arbitrary actions of the *naids*, of the Shamil administration as a whole, caused protests that ranged from simple flight to armed uprisings.⁹³

This same paradox, could be seen as President Dudayev's government formed in the early 1990s and remains as an underlying tension in all attempts by Aslan Mashkhadov's attempt at rebuilding Chechnya after the 1994-96 war.

Imam Shamil's rebellion, while overall more coherent and better organized than Sheik Mansur's, lacked three decisive characteristics in addition to alienating the Mountain Peoples, which might have made his efforts lasting. First, the rebellion did not incorporate all the Circassian groups; second, Shamil never succeeded in coordinating his actions with the rest of the rebelling Circassians; and third, his struggle received little outside help or recognition even during the Crimean War.⁹⁴ Shamil left a legacy of stubborn resistance, extreme tenacity, and the ability to recover from apparently crushing defeats, which can be seen in today's rebellion.⁹⁵ Taking Mansur's efforts one-step further, Imam Shamil attempted, unsuccessfully in the end, to create a centralized Islamic administration for Chechen society.⁹⁶ While Shamil failed in both his rebellion and his attempt at state building, he did heighten the national feeling among the Chechens and, more specifically, reinforced the deeply militant, anti-Russian stance the people possessed. Shamil also initiated the beginnings of a distinct Chechen vice Caucasian or Circassian identity.

After Shamil's defeat in 1859, and the creation of the Terek Province by the Russians in 1860, the will of the Chechens to resist increased. Despite this the Russians

⁹³ Ibid, 48

⁹⁴ Henze,(1995), 12.

⁹⁵ Lieven (1998), 304, 308.

⁹⁶ Ibid, 305.

brutally subjugated the region, but due to the Chechen's fierce and long lasting resistance they retained, "the right to practice Islam and the *Shariat*, bear arms, and not be conscripted into the Russian Army."⁹⁷ The goal of Russian occupation was to force the emigration of the inhabitants of the North Caucasus while subjugating those remaining. Emigration left the Chechens, already the most nationalistic of the Circassian peoples, now the most numerous as well.⁹⁸ By-products of Russian policy was the creation of a diaspora willing to continue the fight against the Russians and the rise of Chechnya as the driving force of Caucasian separatism and resistance. Russian policies resulted in a permanent occupation of Chechnya. Only during the years of the Mountaineer Republic, and between 1994 and 1999, were Russian or Soviet troops absent from the region

Russian occupation did not quash the Chechens' desire for independence. The stories of Sheik Mansur and Imam Shamil's exploits were passed by word of mouth to succeeding generations keeping the spirit of resistance alive. According to Henze, "A significant portion of the population rallied to rebel leadership as each generation brought a new burst of resistance to Russian domination most often led by men of religious status."⁹⁹ Active and passive resistance would continue throughout Chechnya and, as late as 1894, the region was still not considered pacified.

3. Civil War

The Bolshevik revolution provided the Chechens with an opportunity to once again throw off Russian subjugation. In August 1917, Golinsky¹⁰⁰ was elected Imam of Dagestan and Chechnya. He established a religious monarchy, the Mountaineer Republic, enthroning Said Bek, a great grandson of Imam Shamil, as its symbolic leader and created an army of 10,000 followers.¹⁰¹ By 1919 General Deniken's White Russian forces, attempting to maintain the territorial extent of the Tsar's empire, came into conflict with Golinsky's forces and savagely repressed the Chechens' attempt at autonomy. This repression and the Bolsheviks' stated liberal policies regarding

⁹⁷ Henze (1995), 16.

⁹⁸ Henze (1990), 55.

⁹⁹ Henze (1995), 14.

¹⁰⁰ Russian name for Sheik Najmuddin of Hotso

¹⁰¹ Henze (1996), 3; Henze (1995), 16.

nationalities drove Golinsky into openly cooperating with them. After the defeat of the White Russian forces, the Bolsheviks consolidated power in the Caucasus and squeezed out local rule, forcing the practice of Islam to go underground, and causing Golinsky to revolt against the Bolsheviks.

In January 1921, Stalin, as the Bolshevik Commissar on Nationalities, promised amnesty for those participating in Golinsky's rebellion if they recognized Soviet power. As part of Stalin's deal the Mountaineer Republic was disbanded and "The Mountainous Autonomous Republic was created...[which] had both a constitution based on *shariat* law and a flag with a Soviet emblem."¹⁰² The Mountainous Autonomous Republic was comprised of all the northeastern Caucasian republics except Dagestan. With this agreement Chechen resistance began to wane. In 1922 the Chechens were given their own autonomous republic, effectively ending any pretense of regional autonomy. By the late 1920s the collectivization of the region's agriculture and the realization that the Bolsheviks desired to keep the Russian Empire intact forced the Chechens into rebellion once again. Revolt over collectivization culminated in a Red Army crackdown in 1930, which began a cycle of resistance and repression that would culminate in 1937 when Stalin ordered 14,000 Chechen and Ingush arrested and executed.¹⁰³ These executions, targeting social and religious leaders, broke the back of the revolt, for the time, and the region remained quiet until 1940 when rebellion again flared up.

4. World War II

The 1940 rebellion provided the pretext for the deportation of the Chechens and Ingush to Kazakhstan. This rebellion is unique in Chechen history because it was led by a writer, Hasan Israilov, and a lawyer, Maribek Shevpov, instead of a religious leader¹⁰⁴ and reached its climax in 1942 as the Germans were pushing into the Caucasus. The rebellion was crushed by massive force in early 1943, but the revolt had given Stalin the opportunity he needed to end Chechen rebellion against Soviet rule. As the rebellion was

¹⁰² Gall, 53.

¹⁰³ Ibid, 55. 3% of the total population.

¹⁰⁴ Resulting from the executions of 1937.

being crushed, the Politburo approved a plan to expel all the Chechens and Ingush and to liquidate the territory of Chechnya and Ingushetia.¹⁰⁵

Exile would have a searing effect on the Chechens; well over 100,000 would die over the next two years, and all present day Chechen leaders were either forced into exile or born in exile. The next thirteen years saw the Chechens struggling to survive while scattered throughout Central Asia. The harsh conditions encountered during the years of exile strengthened the bonds within the extended family and the Chechens' attachment to their ancestral lands. In April 1956 Khrushchev lifted internal exile and the Chechens moved en masse back to Chechnya where they became outsiders on their own lands. As Aleksandr Nekrich describes it,

Difficulties arose in connection with the reparation of the Chechen and Ingush, not only because of their large numbers but also as a result of their irrepressible determination to reoccupy ancestral homes. The situation was further complicated by the fact that after 1944 the territory they had formerly inhabited was rather heavily colonized by new settlers from other regions and Republics.

And further that,

It was difficult to normalize relations between Chechens and Ingush on the one hand, and those who had occupied their land on the other. The return of the Chechens and Ingush was, to put it mildly, not greeted with...enthusiasm by the local population.¹⁰⁶

The Chechens, returning faster than the Soviet government planned for, faced extreme poverty and discrimination. Their official resettlement package included barely enough funds to repurchase or rebuild family property. Additionally, the returnees were placed on a waiting list for membership on a collective farm, and had limited access to education and industrial jobs.¹⁰⁷ The Ingush, being less anti-Russian, initially faced less discrimination, but struggled to regain control of the Prigorodnyi district that was transferred to the North Ossetian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (ASSR).

¹⁰⁵ Gall, 57, 63.

¹⁰⁶ Aleksandr M. Nekrich, *The Punished Peoples*, George Saunders trans. (New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1978). 146-148.

¹⁰⁷ Ibid, 147, 156. The Chechens and Ingush received up to 1400 rubles in credits to rebuild or purchase homes and livestock; were relieved of tax and production quotas for one year and received a 50

In August 1958 tensions in the ASSR erupted over the killing of a Russian sailor by an Ingush at a dance in Grozny. The incident brought four days of unrest and the worst post war racial clashes to that time. Russian residents pressed for the re-expulsion of the Chechens and randomly beat and killed those with Caucasian features. Order was restored only by the introduction of Soviet troops. The period of the 1960s was one of relative calm as the booming oil industry and the process of rebuilding their lives ameliorated the Chechens proclivity to rebellion. However, the underlying issues that created the tensions between the Chechens and the Russians were not addressed and large-scale unrest began again in February 1973. As the large February demonstrations were forcibly broken up smaller clashes with Soviet authorities spun off and would become a constant feature of life in the ASSR.¹⁰⁸ These constant low level clashes and demonstrations against the Russian and Soviet system were part of the struggle to right the injustices the Chechen and Ingush had suffered through deportation. This constant state of tension, plus the experience of exile is the environment that most of the current rebellion's leaders grew up in.

ruble credit. In 1959 only 301 Chechens and Ingush had a higher education out of a total of 8997 in the ASSR, and only 551 Chechens and Ingush had secondary education out of a total 14150 in the ASSR.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid, 151-154, 159.

IV. MILITARY

A. ORGANIZATION FOR WAR

The Chechens fight much like they are organized socially decentralized with a lack of strong central leadership. While organized, and on occasion, employed conventionally the Chechens excel at guerrilla warfare. They have elevated this ancient form of warfare to new heights of efficiency by combining modern communications with a socially cohesive population that can implement swarming tactics effectively against the Russians. The common western perception of the Chechen military organization, reinforced by Russian rhetoric, is that the Chechens are an untrained bandit force that is derived from a warrior culture. While true the Chechens are from a society that places immense prestige on military prowess, their individual skill only partly accounts for their success in battle. The less addressed aspect of the Chechen military is that they are a well-trained and equipped force that has blended Soviet and Western doctrine with classical guerrilla strategies and have demonstrated the ability to use modern technology more appropriately than their opponent.

1. Training

The Chechen Republic began with a good military foundation. In addition to being a martial people, many of the original Chechen fighters had served in the Soviet military. These conscripts, serving mainly in the enlisted ranks, learned the basics of military discipline, leadership, weapons handling, and tactics. The fact that few Soviet military officers were Chechen would become important, as the Chechens that rose to senior leadership in the insurgency would not be constrained in their tactical or operational thought by Soviet doctrine.

The training of the Chechen military has always received a high priority. Three distinct phases of training can be discerned, pre-war training in addition to that provided by the Soviet military, training during the first Chechen campaign, and training during the 1996-1999-time period. The prewar training was paradoxically accomplished by the Russians and produced the leadership cadre that would defeat them during their first campaign, and which still operates effectively against them.

Many of the pre-war fighters received additional training and experience during the 1991-1994 period by participating in the various disputes between the newly independent Trans-Caucasian states. The most well known unit of the era was the Chechen Battalion that supported the Abkhazian succession from Georgia. This 500 man battalion led by Shamil Basayev, who would later become the leading and most charismatic of the Chechen commanders, was trained by Russian GRU and Spetsnaz. During the 18 months the battalion was involved in the Abkhazian succession movement Chechens were rotated through the battalion.¹⁰⁹ Unknowingly, the Russians were training the leadership cadre they would soon be facing. Additional training was received by Chechens fighting on both sides of the Nagorno-Karabakh dispute, and small numbers of Chechens are said to have trained in guerrilla warfare, mine warfare, and ambush planning in the border area of Afghanistan and Pakistan.¹¹⁰

During the initial period of the first campaign the size of the Chechen forces expanded exponentially. At first rigorous training was not possible as all available forces were placed in contact with the Russians near Grozny. However, training still occurred in what can be considered a cadre style. During this period, established units would provide cadres to recently formed units, and training would occur while in contact with the Russians. Once trained, the cadre would move on to train another unit. According to Shamil Basayev the process worked similarly in his units.

Every time a new group came under my command I took two, three, or five people from my battalion of 70 that I had trained for 6 months [and] put them in every new group. They organized things, fought for a day or two, and taught the others the basics. They taught them right in battle, and then my five people would come back, and I would put them in another new group.¹¹¹

In this way Shamil's forces grew from 70 fighters in the beginning of December to over 700 by the end of the month.

¹⁰⁹ Dodge Billingsley, "Chechnya Seizes Independence, but Unity Still Beyond Reach," *Janes Intelligence Review*. March 1999; Vol 11 #3. 14.

¹¹⁰ Ibid, 15.

¹¹¹ Dodge Billingsley, "Casus Belli for the Caucasus," *Janes Intelligence Review*. November 1999; Vol 11 #11. 36.

After the initial battle of Grozny, training became more regimented and Chechens would spend up to three months training, depending on their assigned task; less time for riflemen and more for those manning crew-served weapons, or one of the few pieces of artillery or armor the Chechens maintained.¹¹² A key aspect of this training was to inculcate the standard tactical unit of the resistance the 10-12-man hunter-killer group.

In the 1996-1999 period regimented training continued at three camps in Chechnya. The goal of President Mashkhadov was the demobilization of all militias that were created during the campaign and their replacement with a national force of 5-6000 soldiers.¹¹³ However, demobilization of all militias proved difficult, especially the militias formed around foreign fighters that had come to Chechnya to fight the Russians. The most notable foreign fighter during the 1995-1999 period was Khattab, an Arab fighter ostensibly supporting Chechen goals. Khattab established three training camps where his fighters received 6-12 weeks of training in guerrilla warfare, weapons, demolition techniques as well as Arabic and *sharia law*.¹¹⁴ Khattab's camp remained open because he had strong supporters within the Chechen military establishment, provided excellent training and equipment due to his outside contacts, and has a small, well-trained force of Arab fighters that protect him from his Chechen enemies.

2. Leadership

While the Chechens have a relatively modern view of training there is little military or government influence over the selection and training of the military leadership. In the pre-war period leaders were chosen either through former relations to Dudayev, for example Salmon Raduyev is related to the former president, or through demonstrated leadership or training ability, for example Shamil Basayev. These leaders along with several others initially demonstrated their skills by fighting in the disputes throughout the Caucasus and in the initial defense of Grozny. The government has supported these successful leaders without having tight control over them because they attract followers who are used as soldiers.

¹¹² Billingsley (March 1999), 19.

¹¹³ Ibid, 19.

¹¹⁴ Roddy Scott. "Chechnya Strains Russian Resolve," *Janes Intelligence Review*. September 2001, Vol 13 #9. 22.

These original leaders have been promoted because of their successes. For example when Shamil Basayev was promoted to commander of the Grozny Garrison, he retained personal control of the two battalions he raised. After the fall of Grozny he was promoted to the commander of the Shali battlefield, which comprised eleven battalions.¹¹⁵ As a battlefield commander Basayev was responsible for the operational level employment of his forces under the Minister of Defense, Aslan Mashkhadov's direction. However, while an operational level commander, he retained tactical control of the battalions he raised. Finally, in the period between Russian campaigns Basayev was appointed as field commander of the eastern half of Chechnya.¹¹⁶ While it is not known if he still retains personal control of the units he raised, the forces under Khattab operate in his sector apparently only nominally under his control.

While basing leadership on demonstrated ability and charisma makes eminent sense when your state is fighting for its existence, not being able to control leaders with their own bases of support is detrimental to the creation of a viable state. The personal loyalty of the fighters to the charismatic war leaders is the beginning of the rise of warlords. Additionally, several war leaders possibly have bases of support outside of Chechnya through either the black market or foreign influence within their organization. This makes them even more independent of the central government. Without strong government control over the selection, training, and promotion of leaders the military becomes a confederation of militias that may or may not support the state's desires.

Lacking complete authority over its military commanders decision making by the government in regards to security policy can only be through consensus, and the government can never be certain if its military commanders are supporting the state's goals. An example of this is the rift that developed between Chechen President Mashkhadov and Basayev. When asked about the rift Basayev has stated, "My relationship with Mashkhadov is tolerable, although he was unhappy with my going to Dagestan. Mashkhadov and I agree on some things and disagree on many others."¹¹⁷ A

¹¹⁵ Billingsley (November 1999), 36.

¹¹⁶ Thomas Valasek. "Interview: Shamil Basayev Chechen Commander of the Eastern Sector of the Chechen Front," *Janes Defense Weekly*. 6 October 1999; Vol 32 # 14. 32.

¹¹⁷ *Ibid*, 32.

quite unbelievable exchange when viewed from a modern western perspective, but not at all unusual for a society that is rooted in pre-state egalitarianism and elder leadership.

A decentralized system of control can, however, be advantageous when engaged in combat. First, one doctrine does not dominate so, in essence, the Russian's have to be prepared to fight different leaders in different ways. Additionally, the absence of a dominant doctrine plus the need to win in order to preserve their society encourages the Chechens to think out of the box. The Chechens have shown an ability to adapt not only tactics but also technology to fit their needs rather than the western paradigm of fitting new technology to old methods with the hope of increasing their effectiveness. On the negative side decentralization can be fatal to the insurgency if the insurgents either lose the initiative or are drawn into fighting Russian strengths. Avoiding Russian strength is one reason the Chechens have always conceded the region of Chechnya north of the Terek River to the Russians; they cannot fight effectively against them on the steppes. This dichotomy may also be a result of the lowlanders being more willing to seek accommodation with the Russians than the highlanders.

3. Organization

The Chechen military and militia forces basic unit of organization is the hunter-killer groups of 10-12 fighters, which can be split into two teams as needed but will always operate in support of each other.¹¹⁸ These "squads" ideally comprise two RPG gunners, two machine gunners, and two snipers with the remainder being either riflemen or ammunition bearers depending on the amount of weapons available. Three hunter-killer groups plus a support squad comprise a cell. Support in a cell varies, but can include medical personnel, drivers, and possibly additional snipers, or ammunition bearers depending on the mission and weapons availability. Three cells are grouped together into a 75-100 man unit that is usually equipped with a mortar and a dedicated command and planning cell.¹¹⁹

Much of what is known about the Chechen military organization and operations appears to have been confirmed by what the Russians characterize as a captured diary.

¹¹⁸ Billingsley (March 1999), 19.

¹¹⁹ Olga Oliker. "Russia's Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons Learned from Urban Combat," (Santa Monica: Rand, 2000). 19.

Published in April 2000 in the *Independent Military Review* the diary has been accepted as genuine by analysts of the war. The diary describes the organization of the military forces as including:

1. A single commander with a staff, and several field commanders.
2. Field commanders control two 500-man (approximate numbers) units, one active and one reserve.
3. The 500-man unit is split into detachments of 100 men.
4. Detachments are split into three fighting groups; a central full readiness group that remains with the commander [a combination of a staff, praetorian guard and a reserve]; a 20 man group that includes reconnaissance, mining specialists and snipers; support group which are the friends and allies of the commander and remain in their homes.¹²⁰

Several salient points can be drawn from the descriptions of the military organization. First, the active and reserve groupings supports the contention that the Chechen wars can be viewed as “commuter wars”¹²¹ where *teip* members rotate in and out of battle; second, the overall number of fighter can be quickly expanded through the support groups, and that the members of the hunter-killer groups reside in the support group; third that the fighters are physically supported by the network of kinship and religious relationships while engaged in fighting, and that units are organized on the basis of a particular region and retain close ties with their kinsman and co-religionists during the campaign; finally this flexible organization allows the Chechens to rapidly shift from guerrilla operations to more conventional operations and back confounding Russian attempts at effectively countering the Chechens. The Chechen tactical organization moves and thinks flexibly. Unencumbered by an organization and a doctrine suited to a high technology war against NATO and having an intimate knowledge of the areas in which they are fighting the Chechen fighters are frequently able to counter or pre-empt Russian moves. While not true guerrillas they also cannot be accurately classified as a conventional force.

B. WEAPONS AND TACTICS

The Chechens are equipped with Soviet weapons that were either abandoned by the Russians as they withdrew from the Caucasus prior to 1994, captured during the war, or bought from Russian soldiers during the war. The use of Russian weapons provides

¹²⁰ Ibid, 66-68.

¹²¹ Michael Specter, “Commuting Warriors in Chechnya,” *New York Time.*, 1 February, 1995. 6.

for ammunition commonality with their enemy plus many fighters are familiar with these weapons. The Chechens are mainly equipped with small arms, rocket propelled grenade (RPG) 7/16s, and mortars. The RPG quickly became the weapon of choice in urban and mountain combat due to their effectiveness against the lightly armored tops and rear of Russian armored fighting vehicles. Additionally, RPGs were used as mortars, firing over buildings, as an area weapon against troops targets, and with effect against Russian helicopters.¹²² The main source of fire support has been mortars, however Russian artillery and GRAD multiple rocket launchers (MRL) have been captured and used against the Russians. Reliance on man-portable weapons provides the Chechens a mobility advantage over the Russians in their chosen battlegrounds of cities and mountains as well as being more easily infiltrated through Russian lines and cached in Russian occupied areas.

While combat has focused on the Chechen use of man-portable weapons, heavier weapons have been available to the Chechens as 12-15 tanks, a substantial amount of artillery as well as BMPs, anti aircraft guns, and the MRLs already discussed fell into Chechen hands during the initial phases of the Russian invasion.¹²³ Most of the heavy equipment was used against the Russians in the December 1994-January 1995 period and subsequently either abandoned or destroyed. A unit of five tanks was kept operational and fought throughout the campaign. Many anti-aircraft guns were taken to the mountains and emplaced to provide protection for Chechen camps, and have been used in ambushes.

Tactically the Chechens outfought the Russians. They were better prepared, their tactics better matched the environment, and they made better use of non-standard supporting arms; psychological warfare and information operations. The Chechens main operational weakness is their lack of ability to conduct a sustained campaign either in Chechnya or within Russia. This disadvantage plus the lack of substantial outside support makes an extended insurgency likely.

¹²² Whether the Chechens knew of the Somali's use of RPGs against American helicopters is unknown.

¹²³ Billingsley (March 1999), 19.

The preferred tactic of the Chechens, like that of all pre-state societies, is the ambush. The advantages of the ambush are the preservation of the insurgent's strength while inflicting physical and psychological damage to the enemy. The Chechens, particularly in urban areas, modernized the ambush. The highly networked and cohesive units combined modern communications means with the ambush to conduct a fluid non-linear style of warfare that has been named swarming. Swarming is,

A seemingly amorphous, but deliberately structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions at a particular point or points by means of a sustainable pulsing of force and or fire, close in as well as from stand-off positions...swarming will work best-perhaps it will only work—if its is designed mainly around the deployments of myriad, small, dispersed, networked maneuver units.¹²⁴

A typical Chechen anti-armor ambush was organized around at least two hunter-killer squads broken down into teams centered on the RPGs and machine guns.

The sniper and machine gunner would pin down Russian supporting infantry while the anti-tank gunner would engage the armored target. The teams deployed at ground level, and also in second and third stories, and in basements. Normally 5-6 hunter-killer teams attacked an armored vehicle in unison.¹²⁵

For fighting within buildings the Chechens adopted the concept of “vertical pincers” where the Chechens would occupy parts of a basement and portions of the second or third floors. The Chechens would attack the Russians on the floors between their two forces by fire, and then extract themselves from the building leaving the Russians engaged in an intramural firefight.¹²⁶ The urban tactics adopted by the Chechens were equally effective in the mountains where, as in Afghanistan, the Russian forces remained road bound in the valleys giving the Chechens, with their greater mobility on the mountains and ridges, the same advantage they possessed fighting from buildings.

¹²⁴ John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt. “Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future,” 16. Available from First Monday at http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html. Accessed 12 October 2001.

¹²⁵ Arquilla (1999), 214.

¹²⁶ Ibid, 214.

1. Psychological and Information Operations

The Chechens made better use of psychological and information operations than the Russians. Furthermore, the Chechens were unhindered by a command structure inculcated in Soviet ways, saw the righteousness of their actions, and could draw on the rhetorical support of those in the west that were against the continuation of a Russian empire. The Chechens' psychological and information operations were successful on the tactical and operational level, but while raising the level of awareness of their plight in the west did not gain western support, recognition for their cause, or create a lasting peace becoming a strategic failure.

a. Psychological Operations

The Chechens have also made effective use of psychological operations. The four most prevalent uses of psychological operations by the Chechens included ruses, with Chechens dressing as Russian soldiers, members of the Red Cross, or other NGOs in order to gain access to Russian positions. The grisly treatment of Russian dead was the second prevalent operation. The booby-trapping of bodies, although denied by several Chechen leaders appears to have been a common occurrence as was the decapitating of the bodies of Russian soldiers and the staking of their heads along Russian lines of communication. Additionally, Russian dead and wounded were hung near Chechen positions so Russian troops would have to fire through their comrades to hit Chechen positions.¹²⁷

More insidious was the threat of nuclear terrorism against Russia proper. While never carried out, its possibility was demonstrated when Shamil Basayev arranged for a container of medical grade radioactive Cesium 138 to be placed in a Moscow Park. The act was announced to the local media, which sent a reporter to find the material. The ease with which this was accomplished frightened the Russian population. This fear was enhanced when the Chechens claimed to be in possession of several nuclear warheads that had previously been stored on Chechen territory. While viewed as an empty threat by the Russian government, the possible use of WMD continues today.

¹²⁷ Ibid, 217-218.

The last and most successful use of psychological warfare has been the continuing threat to turn the separatist struggle into a religious war by creating an Islamic state in the Caucasus from which a terrorist campaign against Russia can be launched. This threat, on a receptive Russian audience, has caused the Russians to classify the Chechen insurgency as religiously based and prone to the use of terrorism. With the second Chechen campaign taking on a more Islamic character than the first is seen as proof by the Russians that an Islamicized insurgency intent on attacking Russia and the West has been established in the Caucasus. Despite Russian propaganda, the West, until the 11 September attacks on the United States, was not inclined to believe the validity of the Russian claims. However, since September 11th the West, while not fully accepting Russian claims, appears to be more receptive to them.

b. Information Operations

Chechen propaganda would not have been as effective on Russia or the West was it not for their sophisticated use of information operations to gain a clear advantage over the Russians. The Chechens were operationally successful in their media campaign as they garnered great private support from the West. This support included strong NGO pressure on the Russian leadership, something they were not used to and did not know how to handle. Although tactically successful, the information campaign, like the psychological campaign, was strategically unsuccessful because it did not result in support or recognition from Western states.

The Chechens used the media during the first Russian campaign to sow fear in the Russian people while winning the “hearts and minds” of Western citizens. Their success showed how the Chechens were able to use non-standard tactics and techniques to great effect. As John Arquilla points out, “The [media] campaign itself also emphasizes the point that the Chechens saw the battle space in broad non-linear terms a key principle of information age conflict.”¹²⁸ Additionally, being Russian speakers, the Chechens were able to influence Russian actions by using radios to mimic higher command echelons causing Russian units to engage in combat with each other, thereby increasing an already high fratricide rate. Conversely, when speaking in their native

¹²⁸ Ibid, 218.

language, Chechen radio messages were almost undecipherable to the Russians as few Russians speak Chechen.

The Chechen use of communications equipment was highly effective and shows their ability to adapt available technology to the military situation. They used hand-held radios complete with repeaters to allow for communication throughout Chechnya. Mobile television transmitters as well as short wave radios were used to provide command and control for the military forces and civilian auxiliaries as well as to transmit propaganda and disinformation to the Russian civilians and military forces in and around Chechnya.¹²⁹

During the first Chechen campaign, counter to common perception, there was no use of cellular phones as there was no established cellular network in the region. The Chechens did use INMARSAT and Iridium satellite phones toward the end of the first campaign, but mainly to communicate outside of Chechnya. By 1999 a cellular network had been established in Chechnya complete with repeaters and a relay station in Ingushetia, which allowed each field commander to link between 20-60 fighters into his own cellular phone network facilitating command and control. Chechen short wave radio enthusiasts maintained this system.¹³⁰

By all accounts, the Chechen command and control network proved to be extensive, simple and highly effective. It allowed leaders to exercise command and control over small dispersed cells of fighters more effectively than in any previous insurgency. It also allowed the hunter-killer groups to operate semi-autonomously while facilitating swarming tactics by being able to draw dispersed elements together for an attack, and then allowing the detailed coordination needed for the attack to occur in near real-time.

C. OUTSIDE SUPPORT

A final aspect of the Chechen insurgency has been its success in gaining financial or physical support from non-western and non-state sources. The Chechens appear to have increasingly turned to crime and Islamic countries for support. While the

¹²⁹ Olikier, 69-70.

¹³⁰ Ibid, 70.

insurgency has undoubtedly benefited from monetary and weapons support provided by the Islamic world, it is more likely that Chechens involved in the smuggling of drugs, arms, and other black market activities supplied the majority of the money and supplies the insurgency required. Overall outside support, including that from Muslim countries, has been minimal. What is received from the Islamic world most likely goes to support the foreign fighters in the region.

The issue of foreign fighters in Chechnya has become increasingly important since the end of the first campaign. The numbers of foreign fighters present in Chechnya ranges from a few dozen to between 700-1000 with western sources claiming around 200 in the region at any one time.¹³¹ There is little doubt that the conflict has attracted foreign fighters. However, not all are Islamic, and many appear to be westerners or from states that were formerly part of the Soviet Union. Reports of British, Chinese, French as well as Russians, Ukrainians, female snipers (the White Stockings) from the Baltic States, and Armenian Christians abound. Arab fighters linked to the former Taliban regime and Osama bin Laden, as well as Muslims from Azerbaijan, Nigeria, and the Sudan are claimed to have fought in Chechnya.¹³² Despite strenuous Russian claims that foreign fighters are present, only four captured fighters have been displayed as being foreigners, and of these four only one, a Dane of Iraqi descent, has been acknowledged by his respective government.¹³³ The inability to present proof of foreign activity makes the Russian claims seem dubious. What is known is that Khattab has attracted a fairly large group of foreigners into his organization of which approximately 100 have supported the training of Chechens¹³⁴ while the others have supported his actions against the Russians in Dagestan. Regardless of the actual numbers of foreign fighters, it

¹³¹ Billingsley (March 1999), 19. The numbers given reflect the Russian estimate 700-1000, Western estimate 200, and media speculation several dozen. All figures were given prior to operations in Afghanistan and the dislocation of Al-Qaeda from Afghanistan.

¹³² Daniel Williams, "Muslims From Afar Join Fight in Chechnya," *The Washington Post*. October 12, 1999.

Micheal Wines, "War on Terror Cssts Chechen Conflict in New Light," *The New York Times*. Dec 9, 2001.

Oliker, 37; Billingsley (March 1999), 21

¹³³ *Economist*, "Europe: Are Foreigners Fighting There." July 8, 2000.

¹³⁴ Oliker, 40.

remains a small percentage of the total number fighting against the Russians. Additionally, these fighters, with the exception of Khattab, do not appear to have been given a leading combat role against the Russians. It is also apparent that the foreign fighters have rotated in and out of Chechnya and, except for a small cadre, around Khattab appear to be in Chechnya for the adventure.¹³⁵

D. CONCLUSION

The Chechens have been able to use their experience in the Soviet military and the training they received during the Caucasian disputes of the early 1990s to build an effective fighting force. The Chechen military is comfortable fighting as guerrillas, but also as more conventional units albeit using mainly unconventional tactics. The Chechens have also demonstrated a surprising ability to transition between the two when needed. The Chechens exhibit the tendencies of pre-state societies that organize for war; they organize military units along social lines, provide informal military training to the entire population through the family, and use war leaders that come from within the kinship group comprising the military unit, and have charismatic appeal plus have demonstrated success against the Russians. Operationally, the similarities with pre-state societies continue as the Chechen's employ the ambush as their basic tactical maneuver. They also use assassination, kidnapping, and bombing or mining against the Russians, tactics that straddle the contemporary boundary between guerrilla warfare and terrorism, though they would have been common in pre-state societies at war.

The Chechens have demonstrated ease with technology that allows them to employ it in ways many westerners would think laughable, such as the use of television to transmit orders and the creation of mobile television transmitters and studios to facilitate this. The ability to blend technology with guerrilla warfare enhances the Chechens effectiveness and increases their ability to affect the Russians morale. Drawing on an intimate knowledge of the Russian psyche, the Chechen's have been able to target Russian society effectively while remaining almost immune from Russian attempts at splitting the resistance from its popular support. The strong anti-Russian sentiment,

¹³⁵ Possibly why there is such a variance in the given figures.

ethnic homogeneity, and most importantly, the tight religious and kinship links between the fighters and their supporters make Russian propaganda mostly ineffective.

Unable to defeat the Chechens, and under increasing world pressure to reach a settlement with them, the Russians have attempted to make an issue of the presence of foreign fighters and the Islamic character of the insurgency to show the west that the Russians are acting in everyone's best interest. Undeniably, foreigners are present. However, with the exception of Khattab and a small cadre around him, foreign fighters appear to be a rather inconsequential part of the insurgency. The radical Islamic character of the foreign Muslims supporting the insurgency does not appear to have made inroads into the predominantly Sufi, anti-foreign character of the majority of Chechens.

Overall Olga Oliker has best captured the character of the Chechen insurgency in his *Rand* report.

Whatever their outside support the Chechen rebels proved that they were not, as some had believed, random bands of irregulars. Neither were they as General Troshev, the second in command of the Combined Force, said 'a well prepared and professional army.' Rather they were a well-prepared reasonably well-equipped guerrilla force defending its own territory.¹³⁶

The key to the insurgency is not the foreign fighter or Islamic support rather it is the strength of the Chechen society, their vehement anti-Russian stance, and their pre-state social construct, and their ability to assimilate technology as needed into an effective albeit not thoroughly modern insurgency.

¹³⁶ Oliker, 72.

V. WAR

Jokhar Dudayev, elected president on 27 October 1991, officially declared Chechnya independent on 1 November.¹³⁷ Chechnya's independence did not escape notice in Moscow, and on 8 November Russia declared the election invalid and implemented a state of emergency in Chechnya. Moscow's confrontation with President Dudayev was handled ineptly leading to a strengthening of Dudayev's power, and transforming him into a national hero, the liberator of Chechnya.

By mid-1992, a nascent Chechen state structure was in existence, and this structure did not contain any institutions that could be construed as Islamic. Additionally, the constitution adopted during 1992 was entirely free of ethnic and religious particularism.¹³⁸ In an attempt to create a strong government, which is anathema to the Chechens, President Dudayev centralized the government, and populated it with members of his *teip*. Tensions that arose over the centralized and nepotistic character of the government helped hinder the developing civil society. However, the Russian economic embargo and the returning of skilled Russian workers to Russia proper had a devastating effect on Chechen civil society and its economy. As the Chechen economy collapsed, what there was of civil society collapsed with it. Societal collapse led to the rise of nationalism, specifically anti-Russian feelings, that rallied the nation. In the place of the collapsed economy there was a rise in banditry in the region as well as increased smuggling and kidnapping. The clan structure combined with Islam remained as the only social structure in society and became the organizational basis of the Chechen insurgency.

While working to create a viable state, President Dudayev continued to work toward the goal of building a Caucasian Federation, which would be dominated by Chechnya and himself. Dudayev sponsored a Congress of the Confederation of the

¹³⁷ Gall, 98-99.

¹³⁸ Henze (1995), 34.

Mountain Peoples in October 1992¹³⁹ where he urged all Caucasian nations to resist Russian troops and to strive for independence. Put off by Chechen chauvinism and fearing Chechen dominance, most Caucasian nations shied away from the Chechen stance.¹⁴⁰ Despite a lack of support, Dudayev organized Chechen “volunteer” fighters, led by Shamil Basayev, to fight for the creation of a Confederation of the Mountain Peoples, and, interestingly, support Russian interests in the region. Basayev’s involvement with the Russians during this period has given rise to speculation that through at least the mid 1990s he was an agent of the Russians, a theory that was given added credence when General Alexander Lebed stated bluntly that Basayev had long been a KGB informer who, he added, retained “levers of influence” in Moscow.¹⁴¹ If true this might partly explain the Chechen and, in particular, his own successes in Chechnya.

A. WAR

The Russians have equated the use of terrorism in the war with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism. However, what was really at work was not radical Islam, but rather a strong nationalism and ingrained hatred of the Russians channeled into the only strategic action available, terror.

1. Chechnya I

Basayev returned to Chechnya in 1994 because of Russian attempts to overthrow Dudayev and became the insurgent government’s leading military commander. His reputation allowed him to easily organize an elite unit of volunteers. Basayev supported the secular government of Dudayev because it maintained the support of the Chechen population, although he personally disliked Dudayev, and from mid 1994 until December 1994, he supported operations against Chechen lowlanders organized by the Russians to overthrow the Dudayev government. After the insurgents were defeated, the Russians committed forces in December 1994 to retake Chechnya. Basayev and other Chechen war leaders operated against the Russian advance using guerrilla tactics, while falling

¹³⁹ Edgar O’balance, *Wars in the Caucasus 1990-1995*. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995). 171.

¹⁴⁰ Bodansky, 4; O’balance, 135.

¹⁴¹ Time, “Back Into The Inferno,” Oct 11 1999; Vol 154, Issue 15. 47.

back toward Grozny. During the subsequent Russian attack on Grozny, the Chechens defeated the initial Russian attempts at taking the city by successfully combining guerrilla and conventional tactics.

After the Chechens were pushed out of Grozny they began a successful guerrilla campaign in the mountains of the southern districts. This campaign was punctuated by several strategic acts of terrorism; among them the planting of the Cesium 138 already discussed, Basayev's raid on Budenovsk which culminated in a humiliated Russian government openly negotiating with the rebels, and several lesser actions including the hijacking of a Turkish ferry by Turks sympathetic to the Chechen cause, and a raid by Salmon Ruduyev on the town of Kizlar in Dagestan. This period of guerrilla war drove the Russians from the verge of victory to being forced to establish fortified garrisons, move about Chechnya only as part of a large, heavily armed force, use indiscriminant firepower and overwhelming force whenever operating against Chechen insurgents, and establish filtration camps to separate the male population from possible contact with the insurgents. These techniques failed, and, by mid 1996, the Chechen forces were again operating in a quasi-conventional manner, which culminated in the attack and defeat of the Russians in Grozny during August 1996.

The 1994-1996 war with Russia ended with a truce signed in August 1996. Later that year Aslan Mashkhadov, the popular Minister of Defense of the Chechen state, was overwhelmingly elected to replace President Dudayev who was killed in the latter stages of the first campaign. Mashkhadov beat his main opponent, Shamil Basayev, and received 59 percent of the vote.¹⁴² Fortunately for the Chechens, Mashkhadov and Basayev respect each other, and Basayev, the purported radical Islamist, entered into the secular government of Mashkhadov serving at times as the prime minister. During the next three years, Chechnya continued to totter on the brink of collapse. Economically ruined and its state institutions inoperable, a void of state control appeared into which entered warlordism. Many saw warlordism in general and the central role Khattab has played in Chechen military operations since the truce, as proof that the Chechen state had been captured by a violent Islamic organization intent on exporting terrorism. What is

¹⁴² Gall, 366.

being seen in Chechnya however, is not unlike that seen in other failed third world states, and is not an Islamic phenomenon. Rather, it develops from the inability of a state rooted in tribal loyalties and egalitarian rule to monopolize the use of coercion within its boundaries. These weak states do not have the ability to force compliance with the central government's desires and decrees and strongly armed alternate centers of power, in the Chechen case the *teip*, arise and compete with each other as well as the central government for control of the territory. These warlords maintain power through the social and economic exploitation of society by force, terror, and the use of organized crime.

2. Chechnya II

After the first Chechen war ended, tensions between Chechnya and Russia remained high. The tensions manifested themselves over Dagestan, which had become the center for the Caucasus's Wahabbi movement during *Perestroika*. The region of strongest Wahabbist beliefs is in the central mountains along the western border with Chechnya and along the southern border with Azerbaijan. While small in number, it appears the Dagestani Wahabbists are capitalizing on the importance of Dagestan to Caucasian Islam and are intent on spreading their influence within Dagestan and if possible to Azerbaijan and Chechnya.

a. Dagestan

The Russian's second Chechen campaign can be said to have started in Dagestan. Between the middle of 1997 and the October 1999 invasion of Chechnya a cross border guerrilla conflict took place in the mountainous region straddling the southern Chechen –Dagestan border. There is little doubt Chechen forces were involved, as part of this region is home to the Akkinty Chechens, who are Chechens living in Dagestan whose ancestral lands were taken over by the Laks after their deportation and the subsequent redistribution of their lands.¹⁴³ It is not certain that the Chechens initiated the combat. However, the true issue over the guerrilla conflict in Dagestan is whether Chechens commanded by Shamil Basayev or Khattab fostered

¹⁴³ Tishkov, 196.

unrest in order to intervene expanding the conflict into a region the Russians view as strategically essential.

It appears the Dagestani Wahhabi's did in fact rise up to create a small Wahabbi enclave within Dagestan. It was not apparent if this enclave wanted to succeed or form a union with Chechnya. However, the Russians took quick and heavy-handed action against it. The August and September 1997 incursions into Dagestan by fighters led by Khattab appears to have been in response to the Russian encirclement and shelling of the villages of Ansalla, Raklotta, Akhino, and Miarso in the Botlikh region of Dagestan. The intention of the Chechen incursion was to allow the villagers to escape the encirclement, and, once that was accomplished, the Chechens withdrew. Despite the denials by the Chechen civilian leader Aslan Maskhadov, the incursion is viewed as an attempt by the Chechens to foment rebellion in Dagestan and engineer its eventual succession from Russia. When it is considered that between August 31st and September 16th 1999, approximately the period of the incursion into Dagestan, five bombs were exploded in Dagestan and Russia, a systematic campaign of terror focused on weakening the Russian hold on the Caucasus could easily be inferred.¹⁴⁴

The August-September incursions to assist Dagestani separatists was followed up in December by a raid, led by Khattab against the 136th Armored Brigade's cantonment area near Buinsk Dagestan. This incursion was undoubtedly meant to be provocative and reportedly included a large percentage of the available Arab fighters. The Chechen civilian leadership again denied involvement. Shamil Basayev also denied involvement and stated, "Chechnya was absolutely not interested in fanning tensions on its borders...we don't need to travel 200 km to put two Russian tanks out of action. If we needed to do this, we could have gone to Khasavyurt..." Raduyev, another military leader, also denied involvement adding, "The entire Army was located in Chechnya

¹⁴⁴ Maura Reynolds, "Russia Uses Force in Bid to Put Down Insurgents," *Los Angeles Times*. 11 Aug 1999; Carlotta Gall, "Rebel Chief Denies Terror Fight to Free Chechnya," *New York Times*. 16 October 1999.

and...none took part in the incident at Buinsk.”¹⁴⁵

While undoubtedly these denials obfuscate the facts, it also points to another conclusion, that Khattab, while helping and supporting the Chechen resistance, is interested in spreading an Islamic revolt, rather than fighting for Chechen independence from Russia. Khattab has stated that he wants to replicate Imam Shamil’s *Imamate*, and he apparently sees himself filling the role of charismatic spiritual and military leader of the region. He is able to attempt this because of a void of state authority within Chechnya, pockets of sympathetic peoples in Chechnya and Dagestan, and links to outside support.

3. Results of the War

As the second Chechen war continues, many such as Anatol Lieven think we may be seeing the Afghanization of Chechnya as the rise of warlordism has created the appearance of overall lawlessness. Lieven and others foresee the continued degeneration of society and postulate that this state is bound to bring about the rise of radical leaders. These authors see the rise of organizations such as the Taliban not as an anomaly, but rather as the result of a failed and lawless Islamic state. While true that continued war has destroyed Chechnya, it is an over statement to conclude that a homogenous nation will Balkanize, causing radical religious leaders to gain power in a state that has demonstrated its desire for a secular government. While true that the dissolution of society, economic collapse, and war has brought lawlessness the underlying social fabric of society, the *teip*, and Sufism each having a stronger following than radical Islam, together can form the basis of a reformed society once the fighting ends.

B. CONCLUSION

The paradox of Chechnya easily comes to light when its history and recent operations are viewed. First, while desiring independence and exhibiting strong nationalism, the Chechens have little use for modern state institutions. Second, Chechnya remains primordial; it is a strong clan based society whose current unifying force is kinship, hatred for the Russians, and only then nationalism. Chechen society, despite its contradictions, remains strong. From the socio-military viewpoint the link

¹⁴⁵ Adam Geibel, “Khattab’s Audacious Raid (22 December 1997): Prelude to the Second Chechen War.” *Central Asian Survey*. September-December 2000; Vol 19, #3/4. 341-349.

between society and the military is readily apparent. Chechnya is an example of a networked society that rises to the challenges offered by outside repression. The hatred for the oppressor is an integral part of their identity, and provides cohesiveness to the society, which tends to become more loosely associated minus the external threat.

The case study shows how the component parts of society and history have shaped Chechen culture. These components, the extended family, *teip* loyalty, egalitarianism and elder leadership, and hatred for the Russians plus the proclivity for the Chechens to fall under the sway of charismatic leaders have had a decisive impact on the organization of society. Chechen society though outwardly modern, remains at its foundation decidedly pre-state, and is a perfect example of a cohesive hybrid society

The Chechen case further shows how an outwardly modern society that is rooted in a pre-state culture will quickly devolve toward its roots when removed from or rejected by modern society. The hybrid state results as this devolution brings with it the legacies of modernity: religion, political ideologies, technology, and modern social norms. The mixing of these modern legacies with traditional socio-political norms creates a society that is highly unstable and torn by internal rivalries and contradictions. The hybrid society is characterized by a weak central government that is challenged throughout the “state’s” territory by warlords, and high levels of violence, more so than in pre-state societies due to the use of modern weapons systems directed at those outside the social group. Economically, the hybrid society runs on the exploitation and discrimination of its people and the warlords, if not the state itself, is funded through criminal activities.

Militarily, hybrid societies are not strong, but they are extremely resilient and can defeat a modern, highly technical military force. Organizationally, the decentralized nature of the Chechen forces, those nominally “national” plus those controlled by the warlords, suffer from the same defects that are exhibited by a decentralized, egalitarian society namely weak leadership and a lack of unit discipline. Likewise, the nominally “national” leadership has no mechanism with which it can exert positive control over its senior commanders and eradicate individual agendas amongst these men. Overall, the system of weak leadership plus the need for strong war leaders creates a vacuum into which charismatic leaders step nullifying any pretext of national control.

Operationally, hybrid military forces are superior to western forces within their limited operational spectrum. Their main strength lies in the hybrid's ability to employ modern technology against its enemies as well as its ability to operate outside the conventions governing war, which continually restrains its modern foe.

VI. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

In fact, there are solid military reasons why modern regular forces are all but useless for fighting what is fast becoming the dominant form of war in our age. Perhaps the most important reason is the need to look after technology on which the force depends...¹⁴⁶

The Chechen case highlights several salient points regarding hybrid societies and war, however, Chechnya is an example of only one form that a hybrid society may take. Another form characterized by Afghanistan and Somalia has multiple fault lines within the hybrid society and is not looked at in this thesis. The general traits of both types of hybrid societies and warfare are similar, but more complex in the latter form.

A. CONCLUSION

While the focus of this thesis is on hybrid military forces, it has been demonstrated that, like in pre-state society, there is little distinction between the hybrid society and military. The salient points of this thesis address socio-political issues that impact the military organization and doctrine of hybrid military forces.

1. Political

Politically, two main points can be drawn from the devolution that creates hybrid forces. First, as a society devolves it brings with it modern religious and political theories, and social mores. These are then mixed with traditional social organization and mores. This hybridization creates dislocation similar to that caused by modernization, altering society in ways that affects its ability to regain the comfort and security thought to have existed in the pre-state era. Second, many hybrid societies outwardly appear to be based on a dominant religion or ideology. However, this religion or ideology has been altered and bears little resemblance to the base religion or ideology, and makes categorizing hybrid societies into the commonly accepted Western definitions of authoritarian, democratic, Islamic or secular for example, problematic. Islam and its role in Chechen society is an example of this.

Socially, hybrid societies operate within a gray zone between modernity and pre-state. Structurally most hybrid societies create and use modern bureaucratic structures.

¹⁴⁶ Martin Van Creveld, *The Transformation of War*. (New York: The Free Press, 1991). 118.

However, these structures tend to be less stable and operate within traditional vice modern norms. Three salient points are essential to understanding hybrid societies.

1. *Hybrid societies appear anarchic and unjust when viewed through a Western or modern lens.*

However, when viewed in the context of the society's traditional mores with an understanding of the role pre-state institutions play in that particular society, the hybrid is not as anarchic as it first appears. Furthermore, the imposition of Western style values and institutions can have a highly destabilizing effect on society as norms and the institutions to inculcate and administer them are imported into the society rather than grown from within society.

2. *War and a high level of inter-personal violence are accepted as normal in most hybrid societies.*

This is a direct link to the pre-state roots of these societies and helps explain the apparent willingness of hybrid societies to set few, if any, boundaries to military activities. Hybrid societies practice a form of pre-state warfare, which recognizes few, if any, of the modern limitations on warfare. For example little distinction between combatants and non-combatants is made, kidnapping is commonplace, and massacres are common in the period following a victory. Similarly, the concept of law or international conventions regulating war, when even acknowledged by the hybrid society, is either couched in terms that tend to justify their actions, or dismisses these conventions as not applicable because they are Western or Christian in origin. The debate over which is proper the Palestinian suicide terrorists killing Israeli citizens or the Israeli soldiers accidentally killing Palestinian civilians in refugee camps is a case in point.

3. *Hybrid societies, while emphasizing their traditional roots, create and use state institutions and exploit modern technology that suits their needs.*

As seen in the case of Chechnya, the Chechens are a modern people who wish to live in a more traditional manner. They are not a lost people or throwbacks to an ancient era, and as a modern people they have been able to choose what aspects of modernity they wish to include in their society. The result is a tribal style society that has a nominal central government along with nascent bureaucratic institutions, which are used by the hybrid society to interact with more modern societies. Few societies attempt a radical

elimination of modernity, as did the Khmer Rouge and Taliban. Most choose to adapt technology to be useful in more traditional settings.

As societies devolve, they incorporate technology at different levels. Technology is usually incorporated into society at a level that allows the leadership to retain control while controlling its people. In hybrid societies while the leadership may have access to computers, and cellular phones, and the military might have access to modern weapons, air defense systems, radars, and modern communications society as whole likely does not.

2. Military

The socio-political characteristics of hybrid societies leave a decided impact on the structure and doctrine of the hybrid military. These characteristics create the norms from which the military is created. Without a doubt each hybrid society develops a unique military culture with its own organizational and doctrinal tenets. This fact is difficult for modern intelligence agencies and military forces to accept because it requires them to have a detailed knowledge of individual societies to understand military forces, and prevents the practice, common in Western forces since the initiation of the Cold War, of templating your enemy by analyzing the one dominant military philosophy and doctrine. Four salient points can be made regarding hybrid military forces.

4. *Military organization reflects the level of socio-political development, and a society's military theory and doctrine reflects the prevailing societal norms.*

The common Western view of hybrid forces as being individually ill disciplined and suffering from a lack of training is drawn from the western view that their society is anarchic. However, this is not borne out in all cases. In the case of Chechnya, Anatol Lieven has observed that

Compared to what I have seen of the Afghan Mujahideen, the Georgians, and various other forces, the care and professionalism with which the Chechens handled their weapons was indeed highly impressive (no doubt because of Soviet military training). Above all, they did not wave them around, they did not fire them in the air for fun, and kept their safety catches on when not in action.¹⁴⁷

¹⁴⁷ Lieven (1998), 118.

As the study of Chechnya bears out, decentralized, egalitarian, and clan based society will create a similar style of military organization. The inability of Western states to comprehend the socio-political ramifications of hybridization makes it difficult for them to understand the military organization and doctrine of a hybrid society and places Western forces at a disadvantage when conducting operational planning against or engaging a hybrid force.

5. *The strengths of hybrid forces do not match the Western conceptions of military strength and are mainly discounted by the west. The components of hybrid strengths are:*

- *Ideas.*
- *Individuals, the charismatic leader.*
- *Society and military can absorb tremendous punishment.*
- *Strong belief in their cause.*
- *Decentralized tactics, swarming being one example.*

The strengths of hybrid warfare lends itself to the use of guerrilla tactics, which technologically advanced and highly bureaucratic forces have a difficult time countering. Hybrid's view warfare as total because, in their view, the society is fighting for its existence, and this creates a strong belief in their cause. As a struggle for existence, the hybrid society will use all tactics at its disposal including kidnapping, control of the enemy's food or water supply, massacres, and blurring the distinction between combatants and non-combatants bringing the charge against them, by modern states, that the hybrid society is a terrorist state.

6. *Hybrid forces can effectively incorporate technologically advanced systems into their force structure and strategy, and use these systems in ways that are beyond the intended employment parameters.*

The Chechen example strongly brings this point out. Their use of the modern media as a means of command and control and spreading disinformation or propaganda is a unique and effective way to control and inform your people while spreading propaganda to the enemy combatants and non-combatants. Hybrid forces have transformed the use of RPGs from a hand held anti-tank weapons into hand held rocket

mortars, anti-personnel weapons, and anti-helicopter weapons showing their ingenuity under fire.

Hybrid's use of technology in ways not anticipated by its creators is a consequence of adapting an available technology to fit a specific need instead of the Western method of designing a new system to fit a perceived requirement. In the West, once this new system is adopted and incorporated into the doctrine, it becomes difficult to use the system in ways not anticipated before its adoption, as this will become a non-doctrinal use and discouraged. A seminal example of this is the increasing availability of communications assets, computers, and other information management tools that are applied to a fundamentally unaltered military force structure.

7. *Asymmetry in combat is not completely a reflection of differing warfighting capabilities or styles, but also one of societal norms and acceptance of international norms.*

The asymmetry in warfighting styles revolves around the increasing reliance on technology in the modern military force which makes it easier for hybrid forces to deliver unexpected blows by using techniques and methods discarded by the modern forces. Essentially, modern and hybrid forces operate on different planes with each having a distinct advantage within its warfare niche. However, only the modern state's prestige is at stake making it easier for the hybrid force to damage the modern state's credibility. Modern states need to learn that combat against hybrid forces entails targeting the enemy's strategy and strengths, not merely applying a doctrine designed to defeat a different enemy with vastly different strengths.

In most cases, civilized soldiers have defeated primitive warriors only when they adopted the latter's tactics. In the history of European expansion soldiers repeatedly had to abandon their civilized techniques and weapons to win against even the most primitive opponents...In other words, not only were civilized military techniques incapable of defeating their primitive counterparts, but also in many cases the collaboration of primitive warriors was necessary because civilized soldiers were inadequate for the task.¹⁴⁸

¹⁴⁸ Keely, 74.

The impact of hybrid society and warfare creates a persistent disparity of forces between the West and the hybrid creating the rise of asymmetric responses to the West's military superiority. However, Western views that hybrid societies accept the prevailing Western norms exasperates the asymmetry because, as has been shown, hybrid norms are rooted in pre-state and not modern society. Removing the hybrid's asymmetric advantage will require the creation of a new paradigm of relations between Western states and non-state societies. This new paradigm has to recognize that hybrid societies lie outside of the pluralistic security community, and its concept cannot be transferred to hybrid societies in their current form. Additionally, the role of International Organizations and NGOs, themselves mainly non-state actors, has to be reevaluated. These organizations originally created to help foster state-to-state relations are increasingly irrelevant as conflict is increasingly between states and non-state or transnational actors. Two specific recommendations are,

8. *Western states must recognize that the norms currently in existence within the Euro-Atlantic Community are alien to hybrid societies and place Western diplomats and forces at a disadvantage when negotiating or fighting hybrid societies.*

In fact, the extension of these norms to hybrid societies makes Western military forces especially vulnerable to the tactics used by hybrid forces as the restraint required of these forces is not reciprocated.

9. *It must be recognized that this new warfare paradigm foresees warfare becoming increasingly focused between states and non-states.*

This fact demands an overhaul of the assumptions that the Geneva and Hague conventions, and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) are based. These current conventions are an outgrowth of nineteenth and early twentieth century state vs. state warfare and are increasingly irrelevant when applied to hybrid warfare because their focus is on the state rather than the non-state actor even if the non-state actor is violating the rules of warfare.¹⁴⁹

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The increasing likelihood of hybrid warfare becoming the dominant form of combat facing the West demands that changes be made to the Western styles of warfare.

¹⁴⁹ Claudia Rosett, "The Red Cross Needs to get Real." *The Wall Street Journal*. 23 January 2002. Accessed via the Early Bird on 23 January 2003. <http://ebird.dtic.mil/jan2002/e20020123red.htm>

Specifically changes must be made to American military doctrine, training and organization to counter the threat from hybrid forces. Within the American military changes must be made to the organization, doctrine and training of forces to more effectively operate against hybrid forces regardless of the international environment.

10. Organizationally, the echelons of command above the Brigade need to be flattened by taking advantage of the United State's advantage in computing, communications, and information management technologies.

Flattening the military organization reduces redundant command levels creating less obtrusive oversight, less redundant command and staff actions, and increases the flow of information up the chain of command and guidance down. The flattened organization when combined with more realistic, effective and decentralized training opens the way for increased initiative and adaptation at lower levels increasing the effectiveness of the United State's smaller military force.

11. It must be recognized that each conflict with a hybrid society will be unique.

This demands that the services train and employ regionally educated and experienced staff officers and commanders at all levels as well as officers familiar with interagency operations. True effectiveness will most likely mean the assignment of military officers as integral members to deployed cells from State or Justice Department, Central Intelligence Agency and Federal Bureau of Investigation, and the assignment of members of other departments to lower levels within the Department of Defense.

12. Force structure and doctrine must be oriented away from the highly mechanized model designed to fight the non-existent Soviet threat to Central Europe. Additionally, the role and means of fire support must be reevaluated to make it more useful and effective in hybrid warfare.

Doctrine must transition to focus on a more agile force supported by a heavy, mechanized and fire power intensive force. This more agile force will be manpower intensive and based on light foot mobile units that are trained to operate in a decentralized manner with minimal support. Supporting arms doctrine must be revamped to support this decentralized forces and also operate with minimal support. The doctrine must also place a greater emphasis on non-traditional supporting arms such as information and psychological operations, combining SOF with conventional forces, and

using constabulary or indigenous forces, which usually have a greater knowledge of the local area. The new doctrine must,

- Use technology as an adjunct to, not a substitute for high quality forces.
- Recognize the effectiveness and limitations of SOF, and explore the use of conventional forces operating in support of SOF.
- Establish a standing Joint Task Force to implement greater integration between Expeditionary Forces, in order to arrive in an AO early with the ability to quickly begin sustained operations.
- Recognize and train to use non-standard supporting arms to reduce the need for traditional fire support on the hybrid battlefield.
- Become less prescriptive, less focused on tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and more focused on training sets of skills.

The updated doctrine must then be inculcated in the force through training.

13. The current training program must be revamped to offer more realistic and varied training to effectively imbue the tenants of small unit decentralized warfare. Forces that fight together must train together

Outside of entry-level training the use of routinization, the application of specific techniques in specific situations, for training needs to be abandoned. Routinized training is unrealistic and the least efficient, but most measurable way to train forces. Its basic flaw is that it trains individuals not to think, but to react to certain actions in specific ways. These reactions have been drawn from a detailed study of ones enemy's doctrine. However, when an enemy does not posses a comprehensive or written doctrine, or when the force does not know who it will be called on to fight, the TTPs developed for one enemy might not work on a different one. To alleviate this problem skills, not specific techniques, need to be trained. Along with training skills leaders need to be educated in tactical decision making through the extensive use to TDGs or sand table exercises. This education must then be tempered through extensive leadership experience involving numerous small unit free-play and live fire and maneuver exercises. The goal being to create leaders that can choose the appropriate skill set to match the appropriate situation. What is being suggested is not unlike the difference between training chefs, who creates meals from a range of skills he learned, and short order cooks who prepare food according a prescriptive set of rules that ensure a uniform, but not necessarily satisfying

result, and the goal is to make combat arms leaders into chefs. By creating chefs out of our leaders it will become easier to flatten the command structure, as chefs need less supervision than cooks.¹⁵⁰

To enhance trainings effectiveness increased realism needs to be integrated into the training system at all levels. For example, why does the Marine Corps conduct ten combined arms exercises (CAX), regimental exercises replicating a Desert Storm type operation, a year, but does not conduct similar exercises that supports expeditionary operations such as amphibious landings or maritime prepositioning force operations. Nor does the Marine Corps conduct any regimental combined arms exercise in jungle or mountainous terrain.¹⁵¹ Similarly, why does the Army invest a huge amount of resources into its Combat Training Centers (CTCs) only to make rotations a game? In the Army the OpFor has a published TO/TE and doctrine. The author's experience with the Army Officer Basic and Career Courses is that they train TTPs that will be successful against the OpFor rather than skills that can be used regardless of the enemy and the environment. This educational technique should create leaders proficient at the techniques required to defeat the OpFor, but does not create leaders able to choose skills necessary to defeat varied enemies in varied terrain. In both cases the training has proven mostly effective, but only because our recent combat has centered in desert terrain. However, when operations were moved to an urban environment like that seen in Mogadishu or the mountains of eastern Afghanistan the training has proven to be less than adequate

Conducting short notice CAX or CTC rotations would enhance realism. These rotations also need to be against a unique enemy force in differing environments as most contingency operations are on short notice in difficult terrain, and against the least likely enemy. To support this realism the OpFor TO/TE and doctrine should not be published. The days of templating the Soviet military is gone and should not be resurrected. At the

¹⁵⁰ Derived from lecture notes, SO 3802 Guerrilla Warfare, Gordon McCormick.

¹⁵¹ MEU training/Bridgeport rotations (summer and winter) are all battalion level training. Regimental exercises that do occur are mainly conducted at the home station, which is not normally suited to true free play or live fire and maneuver exercises. This leaves only desert training at CAX where Marine Corps units at the Regimental level train to employ all assets in a realistic environment.

small unit live fire and maneuver training supported by all anticipated fire support assets needs to become the predominant focus of training. Brigade and battalion level training is needed, however, if small units are ill trained the battalion and brigade will be ill trained or spend an inordinate amount of time supervising subordinate units. The result of ill-trained small units is decreased effectiveness throughout the force.

Training the contemporary force for hybrid warfare entails leaving routinized training at the Recruit Depots, Officer Candidate Schools and Schools of Infantry. Skills not techniques must be trained and leaders educated, and provided with extensive leadership experience in order to grow old prior to entering into combat with a hybrid force. Many personnel issues, such as assignment policies, promotion policies, and recruiting policies will have to be addressed in order to make this force a reality, but if the United States is to truly have what it claims to have, a professional volunteer force, quality and skill must be the dominant characteristics.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Algar, Hamid. "Naqshbandiyay," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Al-Yassin, Ayman. "Wahhabiyah," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Arquilla, John and Theodore Kavasick, "Chechnya a Glimpse of Future Conflict," *Studies in Conflict and Terrorism*. London: July-September 1999; Vol 22 #3.
- Arquilla, John and David Ronfeldt. "Networks, Netwars, and the Fight for the Future," Available from First Monday. Accessed October 12, 2001.
http://www.firstmonday.org/issues/issue6_10/ronfeldt/index.html.
- Billingsley, Dodge. "Chechnya Seizes Independence, but Unity Still Beyond Reach." *Janes Intelligence Review*. March 1999; Vol 11 #3.
- "Casus Belli for the Caucasus." *Janes Intelligence Review*. November 1999; Vol 11 #11.
- Bodansky, Yossef. "Tinderbox in the Caucasus." *Defense and Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy*. April 2000; Vol 28, Issue 4.
- Boehm, Christopher. *Blood Revenge: The Anthropology of Feuding in Montenegro and Other Tribal Societies*. Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1984.
- Booth, Ken. *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*. New York: Holmes and Meier Publishers Inc, 1979.
- Bunker, Robert J. "Transitions to Fourth Epoch Warfare," *Marine Corps Gazette*. September 1994, Vol 78, #9.
- Chittick, William C. "Sufism: Sufi Thought and Practice," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- De Waal, Thomas. "Portrait of Two Warlords." *The Moscow Times*, 18 September 1999.

- Economist*, "Europe: Are Foreigners Fighting There." July 8, 2000
- Fitch, Raymond. "A Face of Future Battle: Chechen Fighter Shamil Basayev." <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/mayjun97/fitch.htm>. Accessed 27 July 2001.
- Fuller, Graham E, and Rajan Menon. "Russia's Ruinous Chechen War." *Foreign Affairs*, March/April 2000; Vol 79, #2.
- Gall, Carlotta, and Thomas de Waal. *Chechnya Calamity in the Caucasus*. New York: New York University Press, 1998.
- Gall, Carlotta. "Rebel Chief Denies Terror Fight to Free Chechnya," *New York Times*. 16 October 1999.
- Geibel, Adam. "Khattab's Audacious Raid (22 December 1997): Prelude to the Second Chechen War." *Central Asian Survey*. September-December 2000; Vol 19, #3/4.
- Greengrass, Mark. ed., *Conquest and Coalescence: The Shaping of the State in Early Modern Europe*. London: Edward Arnold, 1991.
- Henze, Paul B. *Conflict in the Caucasus*. Santa Monica: Rand, 1993.
- The North Caucasus: Russia's Long Struggle to Subdue the Circassians*. Santa Monica: Rand 1990.
- Islam in the North Caucasus: The Example of Chechnya*. Santa Monica: Rand 1995.
- Russia and the Caucasus*. Santa Monica: Rand 1996.
- Kaldor, Mary. *New and Old Wars, Organized Violence in a Global Era*. Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999.
- Karawan, Ibrahim A. "Takfir," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Keely, Lawrence, F. *War before Civilization*. New York: Oxford University Press, 1996.
- Lieven, Anatol. *Chechnya: Tombstone of Russian Power*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998.

- “Nightmare in the Caucasus,” *The Washington Quarterly*. Winter 2000; Vol 23, #4.
- Lind, William and Col. Keith F. Nightengale, Capt. John F. Schmitt, Col. Joseph W. Sutton, Lt Col. Gary I. Wilson, “The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation,” *Marine Corps Gazette*. October 1989; Vol 73, #10.
- Martin, Bradford G. “Qadiriya,” *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
- Mereu, Francesca. “Russian War Destroyed Chechen Clan Structure,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. Accessed Jan 22 2002.
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/04012002113240.asp>.
- “Russia: “Islam Plays a Fundamental Role in North Caucasus,” Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty. Accessed Jan 22, 2002.
<http://www.rferl.org/nca/features/2002/01/04012002113240.asp>.
- Moscow Times*, “Shamil Basayev: The Lone Wolf,” (30 June-6 July).
- Nekrich, Aleksandr M. *The Punished Peoples*. George Saunders trans. New York: W. W. Norton and Co, 1978.
- O’Ballance, Edgar. *Wars in the Caucasus 1990-1995*. New York: New York University Press, 1997.
- Oliker, Olga. “Russia’s Chechen Wars 1994-2000: Lessons Learned from Urban Combat.” Santa Monica: Rand, 2000.
- Otterbein, Keith F. *The Evolution of War*. HRAF Press: 1970.
- “The Evolution of Zulu Warfare,” *Feuding and Warfare: War and Society Vol 1*. Canada: Gordon and Breach, 1997.
- “Why the Iroquois Won,” *Feuding and Warfare*. United Kingdom: Gordon and Breach, 1994.
- Porter, Bruce D. *War and the Rise of the State: The Military Foundations of Modern Politics*. New York: The Free Press, 1994.
- Scott, Roddy. “Chechnya Strains Russian Resolve,” *Janes Intelligence Review*. September 2001; Vol 13 #9.

- Reynolds, Maura. "Russia Uses Force in Bid to Put Down Insurgents," *Los Angeles Times*. 11 Aug 1999.
- Rosett, Claudia. "The Red Cross Needs to Get Real," *The Wall Street Journal*. 23 January 2002. Accessed via the Early Bird on 23 January 2002.
<http://ebird.dtic.mil/jan2002/e20020123red.htm>.
- Specter, Michael. "Commuting Warriors in Chechnya," *New York Times*. 1 February, 1995.
- "The Life of Mansur, Greatest Independence Fighter of the Caucasian Mountain Peoples." *Central Asian Survey*. 1991; Vol 10, Issue 1&2.
- Time, "Back Into The Inferno," Oct 11 1999; Vol 154, Issue 15.
- Tishkov, Valery. *Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Conflict In and After the Soviet Union: The Mind Aflame*. Thousand Oaks: Sage.
- Turney-High, Harry Holbert. *Primitive War Its Practice and Concepts*. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press, 1971.
- Valasek, Thomas. "Interview: Shamil Basayev Chechen Commander of the Eastern Sector of the Chechen Front," *Janes Defense Weekly*. 6 October 1999; Vol 32 # 14.
- Van Crevald, Martin. *The Rise and Decline of the State*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- The Transformation of War*. New York: The Free Press, 1991.
- Vell, John O. "Sufism: Sufi Orders," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Ware, Robert Bruce and Enver Krisiev, "The Islamic Factor in Dagestan," *Central Asian Survey*. June 2000; Vol 19, #2.
- Waugh, Earl H. "Tawhid," *Oxford Encyclopedia of the Modern Islamic World*. John Esposito ed. New York: Oxford University Press, 1995.

Williams, Daniel. "Muslims From Afar Join Fight in Chechnya," *The Washington Post*. October 12, 1999.

Wines, Micheal. "War on Terror Casts Chechen Conflict in New Light," *The New York Times*. Dec 9, 2001.

Wright, Quincy. *A Study of War Vol 1*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964.

Yablokova, Oksanna. "Chechen Warlord Behind New Revolt," *The Moscow Times*. 12 August 1999.

THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK

INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Defense Technical Information Center
Fort Belvoir, Virginia
2. Dudley Knox Library
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
3. Marine Corps Representative
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
4. Director, Training and Education,
MCCDC, Code C46
Quantico, Virginia
5. Director, Marine Corps Research Center,
MCCDC, Code C40RC
Quantico, Virginia
6. Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity
(Attn: Operations Officer)
Camp Pendleton, California
7. Professor Gordon McCormick
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
8. Professor Anna Simons
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
9. Hy Rothstein Senior Lecturer
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California

10. Professor Stephen Garrett
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California
11. Major William Nemeth
2nd Marine Division
Camp Lejeune, North Carolina