
INNOVATIONS AND CONTROVERSIES: INTERROGATING EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

Marginalisation and Aggression from Bullying to Genocide

Critical Educational and Psychological Perspectives

Stephen James Minton



SensePublishers

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Volume 5

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Stephen James Minton
Trinity College Dublin, Ireland



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INTRODUCTION

At the time of my completion of this book – June, 2016 – I have been active in the field of anti-bullying work in schools and school communities, as a researcher and a practitioner, for just over a decade and a half. One of the things that I have found that many people struggle to acknowledge (and perhaps this is more true of parents than it is of young people in schools themselves) is that as human beings, we are all capable of causing hurt (be that physical, or emotional hurt) to others, as well as being hurt by them. In my professional experience, the parents of young people who report having been bullied have consulted me far more frequently than have the parents of young people who have been involved in the bullying of others.[1] There are many reasons for this, of course – when I have spoken about this observation to others, some have opined that the behaviour of young people who bully might be disavowed by, ignored by, receive the tacit (or even direct) support of, or perhaps has been modelled on that of their parents. All of these are possibilities, of course; the point that I am attempting to make here is that both capacities – the capacities to be aggressed against and persecuted, and to aggress against and persecute others – exist within every human being, and as we shall see over the course of this book, across what appears to me to be a variety of social contexts.

Few psychologists (for such I am) find their professional niches accidentally, and I would say that this is doubly so for those involved in the practitioner disciplines of psychology. In my career, I have endeavoured to keep a foot in both the 'research' and 'practice' camps; although originally trained as a counselling psychologist in the mid-1990s, I found myself increasingly drawn to the world of research and teaching, and consequently took up an academic position at Trinity College Dublin's School of Education whilst completing my Ph.D. (2002–2007), where I have remained ever since. My initial involvement in anti-bullying research was for a temporary (three-month) contract in 2000, when I was hired to co-write a national report regarding what had been done in Ireland to prevent and counter violence in schools (published as O'Moore & Minton, 2003). Somehow, I stayed in the field of anti-bullying; and when, within a matter of eighteen months, I found my newly accrued 'expertise' called upon by schools and school communities, I took the welcome opportunity to involve myself on a practical level, talking to and with young people, their parents, teachers, and school management staff – anyone who wanted to talk, listen, and wanted to make a difference (or in a thankfully

[1] When introducing this idea to groups of parents, I often reflect that in my professional career in Ireland, many hundreds of parents have consulted me (in person, or by e-mail or telephone) regarding their child being bullied, whereas just two have telephoned me for advice regarding their child bullying others – and clearly, it cannot the same two children running around Ireland perpetrating the bullying. This reflection, which is intended to be (and thankfully, has always been received as) both humorous and thought-provoking, illustrates that parents can be more than a little blinkered regarding their own children's actions. (I know that I am.)

small number of cases, wanted to appear to be making a difference). Publications (chapters, conference papers, journal articles, even a couple of books), and involvement in national and European projects, all followed, and as the years passed, I began to feel more grounded in offering the knowledge and skills that I had accrued over the years.

But nowhere – or, as we shall see, *almost* nowhere – in this output did I publicly acknowledge what had either initially drawn me to the field of anti-bullying, or kept me active there; and, as I have already said, I believe that few psychologists find their professional niches accidentally. As we shall see, in the first chapter of this book, I posit that a form of aggressive behaviour (that often stems from marginalisation and prejudice) that most people will have at least second-hand experience of is school bullying behaviour. For me, the experience was first-hand. In my professional life, no adult – no editor, co-author, academic colleague, university student, civil servant, government minister, school manager, teacher, parent or member of the clergy – has ever asked me whether I have had first-hand experience of bullying behaviour. But young people often have had the – indelicacy? No, straightforward honesty and curiosity – to ask me. And because I believe it to be important for me to be honest with young people – it seems important to be so, if there is to be a basis for trust, safety and respect – I answer them honestly. I tell them, yes. Some parts of primary school, and the early part of secondary school, were difficult for me, because I was bullied. And I have come to realise, especially in my adult years, that when I was at school myself, I missed many opportunities to prevent others from being bullied. And to the almost invariable follow-up question to my second admission – 'So are ye tryin' to make up for it now?' – again, my honest response is, 'Yes'. I suppose that I am.

I lived for eleven years as an adult before I got directly involved in anti-bullying work, and at some level I suppose that I tried to make sense of what had gone on for me, in direct or indirect ways. Seemingly instinctively, but doubtless as an outcome of experience, I have always found myself drawn to and sympathetic towards so-called 'outsiders' – those excluded from, or marginalised by, the 'mainstream' of society. In a way, that is the genesis of this book. As I will argue, such marginalisation finds its extreme form in genocide, and the accounts of intended victims of genocide formed a not insignificant part of my reading in my student years. Consequently, I found myself relatively uninspired by my undergraduate psychology reading lists, especially when placed next to autobiographical survivor accounts such as Primo Levi's personal survival of Auschwitz, *If This is a Man* (1979). Consider the following passage, in which Levi describes the psychological impact of the process of being interred (pp. 32–33):

> Then for the first time we became aware that our language lacks words to express this offence, the demolition of a man. In a moment, with almost prophetic intuition, the reality was revealed to us: we had reached the bottom. It is not possible to sink lower than this; no human condition is more miserable than this, nor could it be conceivably so. Nothing belongs to us any more; they have taken away our clothes, our shoes, even our hair; if we

> speak, they will not listen to us, and if they listen, they will not understand. They will even take away our name: and if we want to keep it, we will have to find ourselves the strength to do so, to manage somehow so that behind the name, something of us, of us as we were, still remains.

This was surely, I thought at the time, the psychology that was worth paying attention to; this was the sort of experience and writing that really lit a fire under me. Or had the fire always been there? Whilst it would be absolutely ridiculous – nonsensical and utterly offensive, in fact – to compare my feelings on having been bullied as a child to those of Levi's in a death camp, I have to own that, 'justified' or not, accounts such as Levi's held, and still hold, great emotional resonance for me. Because although I had not 'reached the bottom', like many of those who have been bullied that I have spoken to since, I had felt low; I had felt miserable, voiceless, unheard, undignified; I had taken physical beatings and humiliations that at that time I had felt helpless to defend myself against. Compared to mine, Levi's experiences were, of course, magnified by an order that it would be senseless to attempt to compute. But he had survived.[2] (And so did I). Others had not. Early on in my period of involvement in the field of anti-bullying research, the authors of *Bullycide: Death at Playtime* (which I read on its publication in 2001), journalist Neil Marr and anti-bullying campaigner Tim Field, made an informed estimate that around sixteen children a year in the United Kingdom committed suicide rather than face another day of bullying – they were literally 'bullied to death'. The main section of the book comprised a series of such case studies, and it is one of the most profoundly moving books that I have ever read.[3] Consider the following passage quoted by Marr and Field (2001), the final diary pages of thirteen year-old Vijay Singh:

> I shall remember forever and never forget.
> Monday: my money was taken.

---

[2] Primo Levi died in 1987 after a three-storey fall from his Turin apartment's interior landing; the coroner ruled his death a suicide (Thomson, 2002). Many linked this apparent suicide to his experiences at Auschwitz, and possible 'survivor guilt': Elie Wiesel, the Nobel Peace Prize (1986) laureate, writer and political activist, himself a survivor of Buchenwald and Auschwitz (Kanfer, 2001), said that, 'Primo Levi died at Auschwitz forty years earlier' (Nadkarni, 2010). Others have questioned as to whether there exists any direct evidence to suggest that his death was a delayed response to his experiences at Auschwitz. Jochnowitz (2004) pointed to the fact that Levi was going through a period of severe depression, from which he had suffered his entire life (i.e., pre-dating his internment), and for which he was taking prescribed anti-depressant medication. Furthermore, at the time of his death, Levi had been experiencing a fear of being unable to write, a difficulty in witnessing the senility of his aged mother and mother-in-law, and had recently (twenty days previously) undergone a prostate operation. Shortly before his death, Levi had also denied the link between his depression and his experiences of Auschwitz to a close friend (Jochnowitz, 2004). Hence, although his most recent biographer (Thomson, 2002) agrees with the coroner's verdict, we have no way of knowing – nor is it apparent how we may ever know – whether Levi's death was suicide, or if it was, how accurate it is to attribute it to his experiences at Auschwitz.

[3] The reader may wish to consider the fact that the youngest victim of 'bullycide' mentioned in Marr and Field's (2001) book was eight years old – a little girl who hanged herself with her skipping rope, rather than return to school after the Christmas holidays.

Tuesday: names called.
Wednesday: my uniform torn.
Thursday: my body pouring with blood.
Friday: it's ended.
Saturday: freedom.

Vijay Singh was found hanging from the bannister rail at his home on the Sunday. On my reading this, Vijay's words and acts beggared a host of questions. Why was the only situation in which Vijay could find his 'freedom', or indeed any sense of control and agency, in his decision to commit suicide? What, in the way of hope, strength, resources did I wish – as a reader, a psychologist, as a human being – that Vijay, and others like him, could have found? How do some people survive the experiences that lead to such desperate feelings, and such absolutely hopeless situations? As a young man, I found a very evocative fictional description of the almost sacred, existentially vital (and perhaps mystical and mythical, for surely, we are talking about the embattled soul) 'last inch' that can be found in desperate situations in the graphic novel, *V for Vendetta* (Moore & Lloyd, 1988). The story's protagonist, Evey Hammond, reads a letter apparently left in her solitary prison cell[4] by a former prisoner (Valerie) of the neo-Fascist regime that governs the future dystopic England in which the graphic novel is set (pp. 159–160):

> I shall die here. Every inch of me shall perish. Except one. An inch. It's small and it's fragile and it's the only thing in the world that's worth having. We must never lose it, or sell it, or give it away. We must never let them take it from us. I don't know who you are, or whether you're a man or a woman. I may never see you. I will never hug you or cry with you or get drunk with you. But I love you. I hope that you escape this place. I hope that the world turns and that things get better, and that one day people have roses again. I wish I could kiss you. [signed] Valerie. [Evey's response:] I know every inch of this cell. This cell knows every inch of me. Except one.

To move away from the experiences of fictional characters, and back to atrocious historical realities, the passage reminded me of something that Viktor Emil Frankl (who was remarkable not only as a psychotherapist and thinker, but also as a survivor of the Nazi concentration camps) wrote of his experiences as a prisoner at Auschwitz:

> Everything can be taken from a man but one thing – the last of the human freedoms — to choose one's attitude in any given set of circumstances, to choose one's own way. (1963, p. 104)

Along similar lines, Levi (1979) reported a 'complete lesson' administered to him by his fellow prisoner at Auschwitz, the '… ex-sergeant Steinlauf of the

[4] Those who have read *V for Vendetta* will recognise the paucity of the description; this is deliberate, as to explain the situation in which Evey found herself would take rather too long, and would also be a plot-spoiler for those who have not yet read it!

Austro-Hungarian army, Iron Cross of the '14–'18 war', about the importance of washing and its apparent link to survival (pp. 46–47):

> I must confess it: after only one week of prison, the instinct for cleanliness disappeared in me …. Steinlauf sees me and greets me, and without preamble asks me severely why I do not wash. Why should I wash? Would I be better off than I am? Would I please someone more? Would I live a day, an hour longer? I would probably live a shorter time, because to wash is an effort, a waste of energy and warmth. Does not Steinlauf know that after half an hour with the coal sacks, every difference between him and me will have disappeared? … He administers me a complete lesson … precisely because the Lager [camp] was a great machine to reduce us to beasts, we must not become beasts … even in this place, one can survive, and therefore one must want to survive, to tell the story, to bear witness … [and] to survive we must force ourselves to save at least the skeleton, the scaffolding, the form of civilisation. We are slaves, deprived of every right, exposed to every insult, condemned to certain death, but we still possess one power, and we must defend it with all our strength for it is the last – the power to refuse our consent. So certainly we must wash … we must polish our shoes … we must walk erect, without dragging our feet, not in homage to Prussian discipline but to remain alive, not to begin to die.[5]

My own experience in university teaching (where, unlike my own undergraduate lecturers, I often refer to Frankl and Levi) has shown me that hearing about such accounts of the choice for dignity – and perhaps the fact that choice of attitude can and does exist, even under the most extreme sets of circumstances (which was absolutely fundamental in Frankl's theoretical and therapeutic viewpoint, which in itself was formed and remained grounded in his experiences in the camps; see Frankl, 1959) – is often deeply affecting for audiences. But other, and opposite choices in extreme sets of circumstances also exist, and it is the fact that they exist that contributes to, and generates those situations of extremity in the first place. Having already owned its importance in the early development of some of my own personal and philosophical viewpoints, I would ask the reader for a final opportunity to share (and I can only hope that this does not feel like too much of an indulgence) something else that I learnt from the graphic novels of Alan Moore. In *Watchmen* (Moore & Gibbons, 1986), the deeply emotionally disturbed former vigilante, and current mental patient, Walter Kovacs,

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[5] Levi, apparently with some regret, owned that he could not accept Steinlauf's 'complete lesson' whole-heartedly. 'These things Steinlauf, a man of good will, told me; strange things to my unaccustomed ear, understood and accepted only in part, and softened by an easier, more flexible and blander doctrine, which for centuries has found its dwelling place on the other side of the Alps [author's note: Levi was Italian]; according to which, among other things, nothing is of greater vanity than to force oneself to swallow whole a moral system elaborated by others, under another sky. No, the wisdom and virtue of Steinlauf, certainly good for him, is not enough for me … is it really necessary to elaborate a system and put it into practice? Or would it not be better to acknowledge one's lack of a system?' (p. 47).

in an uncharacteristically lengthy and apocalyptic utterance, and making full use of a sudden and stark expression of his deeply nihilistic *Weltanschauung*, forces a prison psychiatrist to confront for himself certain bleak aspects of human existence. He does so by describing the 'certain type of insight' (prompted by his own killing of a criminal who had abducted and murdered a child, and attempted to conceal his crime by feeding her body to his dogs) that it took to for him (Kovacs) to 'become' his vigilante alter-ego, 'Rorschach' (ch vi, p. 26):

> Live our lives, lacking anything better to do. Devise reason later. … There is nothing else. Existence is random. Has no pattern save what we imagine after staring into it too long. No meaning save what we choose to impose. This rudderless world is not shaped by vague metaphysical forces. It is not God who kills the children. Not fate that butchers them or destiny that feeds them to dogs. It's us. Only us …. Does that answer your questions, Doctor?

Later on, during my university and especially my postgraduate years, I would find that the importance of human choice was very heavily emphasised in the work of the phenomenological and existentialist philosophers, psychologists and psychotherapists that I became familiar with, and professionally inspired by. Arguments such as human freedom and human responsibility being, properly considered, one and the same, echoed in an important way what I had picked up in my earlier years from graphic novels, and my own teenaged musings. Such arguments form an important part of the theoretical basis of this book (where the more academically-minded reader may be relieved to be reassured that they are made on the basis of philosophical and psychological writing). It is to Frankl (1959) that I will return to conclude on this particular point, in order to reproduce the clarity which he provided concerning the absolute given that for human beings, multiple choices can and do exist, albeit delimited by the circumstances in which we find ourselves, and that we ourselves cannot be anything other than responsible for the choices that we make under that given set of circumstances. In his classic *Man's Search for Meaning*, Frankl stated that in the concentration camps (1959, p. 157):

> … in this living laboratory and testing ground, we watched and witnessed some of our comrades behave like swine while others behaved like saints …. Our generation is realistic, for we have come to know man as he really is. After all, man is that being who invented the gas chambers of Auschwitz; however, he is also that being who entered those gas chambers upright, with the Lord's prayer or the Shema Yisrael on his lips.

In summary, I have always had a curiosity in finding out what it is that underlies choices in extreme circumstances; as I grew older, I was no longer content to read about them purely in graphic novels (or any other form of fiction), or survivor accounts. I had a desire to find out what is it that can or could help human beings survive, and also how and why it is that human beings construct the very situations in which it is necessary for their fellow human beings to try to survive. For this, I had turned to the study and profession of psychology, and found that when I

needed a job on completion of my studies, what was open to me was an involvement in anti-bullying research and practice. This book, therefore, tracks some of my life-long interests and developing understandings, maintained and forged in the context of that career involvement; as a consequence, it draws primarily on the informing disciplines of psychology and education. I will now provide a summary of its five chapters.

In Chapter 1, 'Aggression and Marginalisation in Educational Systems: the Case of Bullying in School Communities', bullying – a form of aggressive behaviour which generally stems from marginalisation and prejudice and which, given its frequency, most people will have had at least second-hand experience, as I have already indicated – is examined. The ways in which researchers into bullying and cyber-bullying have designed and conceptualised their areas of enquiry is considered, before providing a summary of the chief findings of those researchers over the past three to four decades. How that research has informed the underlying philosophy, development, design, implementation and evaluation of 'whole-school' approaches to (especially) large-scale anti-bullying intervention is reviewed, as are the outcomes of such intervention programmes. It has been found that such programmes have generally had rather modest effects, in terms of changing the ways in which young people behave. Some have argued for a shift in focus, and rather than continuing to focus directly on bullying behaviour, that attention should instead be paid to the making of improvements to the learning environment in schools. I have suggested instead that attending to prejudice as an important, yet hitherto relatively unattended-to factor that may underlie bullying behaviour, should be considered in the attempt to improve the efficacy of anti-bullying interventions. This suggestion is based upon findings that so-called 'minority' groups (and here, homophobic and disablist bullying, as well as the bullying of those from ethnic minorities, and young members of alternative sub-cultures are considered) are disproportionately more likely to report having been bullied at school. As young and adult members of these so-called 'minority' groups have experienced, and continue to experience, other forms of aggressive and discriminatory behaviour, I assert that a view of school bullying not so much as a phenomenon in itself, but as one of a number of possible manifestations of broader historical and contemporary patterns of marginalisation in society, may be supported.

In Chapter 2, 'How and Why do Aggression and Marginalisation Occur? Psychological Considerations', a review of the psychological understandings of aggression, according to most of the major schools of psychological thought, is undertaken. This includes an introduction to the principles of, and insights from, evolutionary accounts of aggressive behaviour; the physiological bases of aggressive behaviour; the neuropsychology of human aggression; psychodynamic accounts of aggression and aggressive behaviour (including the contributions to this area of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and C. G. Jung); the role of learning in accounting for aggression and aggressive behaviour (including behaviourism and social learning theory); type and trait approaches in considering the potential links between aggression and personality; and some psychological models that

emphasise social interactions. Marginalisation is considered through a somewhat more multi-disciplinary lens, with psychological perspectives being supplemented with insights from other cognate disciplines. Sociological approaches to the phenomenon of social exclusion are considered, followed by a consideration of how social understandings along the lines of the 'One' and the 'Other' are constructed. My own arguments regarding the existence of a 'continuum of marginalisation' are then advanced; essentially, these are based on the assertion that a similar set of individual, group and societal mentalities and actions (all of which relate to the targeted persecution and destruction of 'Otherness') exist, which underlie and stretch across a continuum of aggressive marginalisation phenomena, spanning prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, harassment, bullying and street violence, through to acts of colonisation, forced assimilation, legally-sanctioned subjugation, war, and at its most extreme, genocide. As we shall see, these ideas are further developed in the next two chapters. Philosophical and sociological approaches to understanding marginalisation and power relationships, exemplified in the work of Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman, are then introduced; these points are developed in the consideration of the phenomenon of 'victim-blaming', and how some oppressed people may exhibit the learning of the power of the oppressor.

In Chapter 3, 'Psychology, Social Cognition and Physical Genocide', a (self) critical assessment of the contributions that experimental psychology, and more especially, the sub-discipline of social cognition, has made to our understanding of the underlying processes of physical genocide is made. It is argued that if psychology is genuinely a 'science of mind and behaviour' (i) it should offer more than an ordinary understanding of such matters; and, (ii) it should offer predictive validity, which if extended to the extremes of human behaviour, means that we should at least potentially be able to predict (and therefore take steps to avoid) the atrocity of physical genocide. In attempting to illuminate how psychologists have attempted to contribute to a social cognitive understanding of physical genocide, and in the attempt to evaluate their efforts, an eight-stage model of physical genocide is offered: (i) ingrouping/outgrouping; (ii) the construction of an aspirational national *Weltanschauung* that excludes the 'Other'; (iii) the positioning of the 'Other' as '*Gegentypen*'; (iv) the dehumanisation of the 'Other'; (v) the deindividuation of the 'One'; (vi) the vilification of resistance; (vii) the mechanisation of means of destruction; and, (viii) ongoing denial and mystification. In providing a historical exemplar of physical genocide in this chapter, specific reference is made to the Lakota-Cheyenne Campaign (1864–1890) of the so-called 'Indian Wars' of late nineteenth century United States. Through the elucidation of the afore-mentioned eight-stage model, it is contended that whilst a start was made by social cognitive psychologists in the 1960s, comparatively little has been contributed to our understanding of the fundamental underlying factors for around forty years – psychologists who have specialised in 'aggression studies' since have more often focussed their efforts on smaller-scale (e.g., peer group, school) dynamics. Nevertheless, even with the acknowledged limited psychological knowledge that we have, it is concluded that we can, at least,

learn to look out for the warning signs of 'genocidal mentality', primarily through attending to the use of linguistic signifiers of the first six stages of the model. However, it is concluded that what has been contributed by experimental psychological understandings of genocide can only be, at best, one possible (and approximate) picture of the genocidal *mentality*. The systemic and power factors that permit genocidal *behaviour* to be actualised are, therefore, to be considered in the following chapter.

In Chapter 4, 'Educational Systems and Cultural Genocide', the concept of 'cultural genocide', which has been recognised by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) as having been pursued in the historical policy of the forcible separation of Canada's aboriginal children from their families and traditional societies, and their subsequent enrolment in residential schools, is examined. It is rendered as distinct from physical genocide which, although seemingly determinative of the way in which most people think about the crime of genocide is, in terms of international law, just one of the five categories of genocidal actions, the other four of which can best be understood as forms of cultural genocide. According to international law, the intent of genocide, regardless of the means, remains the same – the destruction of a racial, religious, ethnic or national group, and the imposition of the cultural or national pattern of the oppressor. The bulk of this chapter is devoted to the provision of two extensive case studies that demonstrate the past culpabilities and participation of education systems and educators in actions of cultural genocide. These are (i) the role of schools and school systems in the policy of the 'Norwegianisation' of the Sami people during nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and, (ii) following on from the previous chapter, and thereby showing how cultural genocide can 'complete the task' that was begun in actions of physical genocide, the American Indian boarding school system. The process of the forcible separation of indigenous children from their families and native cultures, the often abusive nature of the 'education' that such children received, the conditions that they endured, and the role that education systems and educators played through this type of schooling in the marginalisation of and cultural genocide perpetrated against indigenous cultures, mean that these past processes have continued to cast a long shadow. Some concluding thoughts are provided on the possible use and likely effectiveness of truth and reconciliation processes in addressing these issues of legacy, and the challenge is laid down to today's educators that, with their historical predecessors having been part of the problem, it remains to be seen if and how they could be part of potential solutions and resolutions.

In Chapter 5, 'What Can Be Done? Some Ideas Regarding the Humanisation of Psychological and Educational Practice', some starting problems raised regarding these aims that have been raised in the previous four chapters of the book are re-stated. In the first place, the drive towards aggression is deeply embedded within the human system; secondly, so too is our tendency to understand ourselves in our relationships to others in terms of inherently and necessarily conflictual 'One' and 'Other' dynamics. Taken together, it is of little surprise that a continuum of aggressive marginalisation, introduced as a concept in Chapter 2, and exemplified

in Chapters 1, 3 and 4, is discernible. This chapter provides a final critical look at the informing disciplines of psychology and education, in the consideration of whether the understandings generated in these disciplines regarding marginalisation and aggression have been helpful in addressing these issues, or in some sense, may contribute to their persistence. The roots of traditional psychology's primary focus on behaviour are traced back through the psychological school of thought known as behaviourism, and that school's understandings of the thinking of the British empiricists, and its continued persuasiveness is considered through the broader Western cultural emphasis on the individual, and the perception of relationships in terms of oppositional dualisms. Other possibilities – ecological thinking, humanistic psychology and systemic approaches – are introduced, with a consideration of what is offered by modern positive psychology being made. It is acknowledged that traditional approaches to education (in its systems, and in terms of classroom practice) show similar influences, leading to a restricted view of education as schooling, or informational instruction. It is suggested that psychologists and educators attempt to meaningfully re-capture genuine person-centredness, in the radical form in which it was originally conceived, in their thinking and their practice. The chapter concludes with my outlining the hopes that I have had for this book; essentially, these revolve around our being, within whatever constraints that we may have, genuinely active in our possibilities for reaffirming humanity in our individual and collective choices.

I would also like to make two notes on my use of language forms here. Firstly, in my own writing, I attempt to avoid the use of gendered language; perhaps because I identify as a feminist, I am particularly conscious of the use others have made, and some continue to make, of individual masculine pronouns when expressing what should actually be a neutral form. Earlier on in the introduction (see page xiv), we have seen that Frankl (1959) made such a use; whilst that might have been typical at that time – and indeed, direct quotes will be reproduced in their original form throughout – my preferred usage is of the 'she and/or he', 'her(s) and/or his', 'herself or himself' type. Secondly, due to the considerable influence of Nordic authors in the field of bullying research (as we will see in Chapter 1), and my focus on the situation of the Sami people in Norway in Chapter 4, I have made extensive reference to Nordic authors throughout this book. The Nordic languages contain 'extra' vowels (i.e., those that do not appear in the standard Latin alphabet; in Danish and the Norwegian languages, these are 'æ', 'ø' and 'å'; in Finnish, 'ä', and 'ö'; and in Swedish, 'å', 'ä', and 'ö'. In the Nordic languages, these 'extra' vowels are *not* diacritic versions of Latin vowels (as are the French 'à', 'â', 'æ', 'è', 'é', 'ê', 'ë', 'î', 'ï', 'ô', 'œ', 'ù', 'û', 'ū' and 'ÿ', and the German 'ä', 'ö' and 'ü'), but are, rather, separate letters, and in Nordic orthographies, they are positioned at the end of the alphabet (so after 'z'). I have used the Nordic style of alphabetical ordering in my own system of referencing (to give an example, in the references section, a work by the Swedish authors Ålberg and Ljunggren, 2015, is listed *after* a work by the American author Zimbardo, 2007).

As stated above, the content and course of this book reflects the maintenance of some of my life-long interests, and some developments in my understanding that have taken place over the course of my professional life to date. Other people may have reached similar insights via different routes, and may have reached them rather more quickly; others, too, may examine the material that I place before them in this book, compare my arguments with their own knowledge bases, experiences and insights, and reach entirely different conclusions to mine. But this has been my journey, and I own that; and the reader will make of it what he or she must. Whether the reader finds herself or himself in agreement or disagreement with me, I hereby invite her or him to let me know. Let's talk. And listen. And think. And maybe do things a little differently, and who knows, maybe even a little better in the future.

CHAPTER 1

AGGRESSION AND MARGINALISATION IN EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS

The Case of Bullying in School Communities

INTRODUCTION

A familiar arena in which the aggressive behaviour which stems from marginalisation is played out – i.e., one which most human beings will have at least second-hand experience of – is bullying behaviour in schools. World-wide, where reliable evidence exists on the subject (that is to say, information based on large-scale studies), bullying behaviour in schools would appear to be commonplace. For example, in North America, Nansel, Overpeck, Pilla, Ruan, Simons-Morton and Scheidt's (2001) study of a representative sample of 15,686 sixth to tenth grade students in public and private schools in the United States showed that 29.9 per cent of students reported moderate or frequent involvement in bullying (13.0 per cent having bullied others, 10.6 per cent having been bullied, and 6.3 per cent having both bullied others and having been bullied themselves). To give an example of a European country, in the Republic of Ireland, large-scale empirical studies of bullying behaviour in schools (Minton, 2010; O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997) have shown bullying behaviour to be a persistent problem. O'Moore's survey of a representative sample of 20,422 students showed that 31.2 per cent of primary school children and 15.6 per cent of secondary school students reported having been bullied in the last school term (O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997), and my survey of a sample of 5,569 school students showed these figures to be 35.3 per cent and 36.4 per cent respectively (Minton, 2010). In Australasia, Rigby and Slee (1999) provided collated results from surveys in Australian schools (giving a total sample size of 15,152 males and 10,247 females; mean ages = 13.83 and 13.6 years respectively) which confirmed their initial estimate that '… about one child in six or seven is being bullied in Australian schools with quite unacceptable frequency, that is, on a weekly basis or more often' (p. 326). Finally, and internationally, Mona O'Moore (2013) reported that according to a study of thirty-five countries conducted by the World Health Organisation (2004), over one-third of young people reported having taken part in the bullying others at least once in the past couple of months (30 per cent of 11 year-olds, 38 per cent of 13 year-olds, and 36 per cent of 15 year-olds. For 'frequent' bullying (here, having taken part in the bullying of others two to three times or more often in the past couple of months) the age-group figures were 9 per cent, 12 per cent and 13 per cent

respectively. In the same WHO survey, over one-third of young people reported having been bullied at least once in the past couple of months (38 per cent of 11 year-olds, 36 per cent of 13 year-olds, and 27 per cent of 15 year-olds. For having been frequently bullied (again, two to three times or more often in the past couple of months) the age-group figures were 15 per cent, 14 per cent and 10 per cent respectively (O'Moore, 2013). Given such incidence rates, it can be assumed with a reasonable amount of confidence that even if you weren't bullied at school yourself, then you probably at least knew of someone who was.

Bullying behaviour has usually been defined and conceptualised as a sub-type of aggressive behaviour (Olweus, 1973, 1999a; Roland & Idsøe, 2001). For example, Olweus (1973) stated that, '… bullying is a sub-category of aggressive behaviour, which in turn is generally defined as "behaviour that is intended to inflict injury or discomfort upon another individual"'. However, although bullying behaviour may *include* physical violence, as Olweus (1999a) notes, '… there is a good deal of bullying without violence … and, likewise, there is a good deal of violence that cannot be characterised as bullying' (p. 24). Therefore, bullying may also include (Byrne, 1999, p. 115):

> … damage to property, extortion, intimidation, abusive telephone calls, isolation, name calling and 'slagging' … [in cases where the latter] extends to very personal remarks aimed again at one individual about appearance, clothing, personal hygiene or involves references of an uncomplimentary nature to members of one's family, particularly if couched in sexual innuendo … [or] sexual orientation.

In addition to these types of bullying, over the past few years, there has been a growing awareness of the phenomenon of cyber-bullying. An early study in this field by Smith et al. (2006) identified seven sub-categories of cyber-bullying behaviour: text-message bullying; bullying by the taking, sending and publication of photographs or film-clips via mobile telephone cameras; telephone call bullying; e-mail bullying; chat-room bullying; bullying through Instant Messaging (IM); and bullying via web-sites (defamatory blogs, personal web-sites, on-line personal polling sites, general polling sites, and social networking sites) (O'Moore & Minton, 2011). To these, nowadays we must surely add the possibilities of being cyber-bullied via games systems, and indeed any devices that permit remote communication between users, such as mass on-line games. Bullying behaviour has generally been differentiated from other types of aggressive behaviour on two counts – firstly, the idea of *repetition* (Olweus, 1991, p. 413; italics mine):

> A person is being bullied when he or she is exposed, *repeatedly and over time*, to negative interactions on the part of one or more other persons.

Vandebosch, Van Cleemput, Mortelmans and Walrave (2006) raised a point that has important implications for how we both characterise and deal with bulling and cyber-bullying (see Minton, 2012a). Consider the following (Vandebosch, Van Cleemput, Mortelmans, & Walrave, 2006, p. 1):

> With cyber-bullying, it is not necessarily the case that the victim is harassed repeatedly. A defamatory website, for example, will often stay online for a longer period of time and can, moreover, be read by many individuals. A spoken insult, by contrast, disappears from the moment it is uttered, and is only heard by those present at the time.

It has been argued since that this position compels us to address '… where the "repetition" lies; in cyber-bullying, the *perpetrator's act* of posting offensive material is a one-off event, but due to the possibility of multiple viewers and viewing, the *target's experience* of being abused is one of repetition' (O'Moore & Minton, 2011, p. 4). In many definitions of bullying, the focus has been placed on the perpetrator's actions, and bringing specific action under many schools' anti-bullying policies, for example, is based around the accumulation of evidence that person A has aggressed against person B on multiple occasions, rather than (say) considering person B's experiences of being continually aggressed against, or her or his feelings of being locked into a dynamic in which he or she feels powerless and afraid.

The second point of differentiation from other forms of aggressive behaviour is the idea of a *power imbalance*, in the perpetrator's favour, existing between the perpetrator and the target (Roland & Idsøe, 2001, p. 446; italics mine):

> Aggressive behaviour may involve conflict between *equals*, whereas bullying always involves *hurting someone who is not quite able to defend himself/herself*.

In the case of physical bullying, for example, the imbalance could be one of physical power (such as superior size and strength, numbers, or a greater propensity towards aggression). In non-physical (social/relational) forms of bullying, the imbalance could be in popularity or social influence (e.g., a person deliberately manipulating friendship groups in order to exclude someone). In the case of cyber-bullying, the imbalance could lie in 'technological power' (a person using his or her superior knowledge of or access to technological systems in order to abuse or harass someone), or the manifestation of the 'social/relational' forms of bullying that have just been mentioned in the cyber-environment (see also Minton, 2012a; O'Moore & Minton, 2004a).[6]

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[6] In the Republic of Ireland, however, successive government departmental definitions (Department of Education, 1993; Department of Education and Skills, 2013) have omitted this emphasis on a power imbalance existing between the perpetrator(s) and the target(s). Bullying behaviour has been defined as '… repeated aggression, verbal, psychological or physical, conducted by an individual or group against others' (Department of Education, 1993, p. 6); and, '… unwanted negative behaviour, verbal, psychological or physical, conducted by an individual or group against another person (or persons) and which is repeated over time. The following types of bullying behaviour are included in this non-exhaustive definition: (i) deliberate exclusion, malicious gossip and other forms of relational bullying; (ii) cyber-bullying; and, (iii) identity-based bullying such as homophobic bullying, racist bullying, bullying based on a person's membership of the Traveller community and bullying of those with disabilities or special educational needs' (Department of Education and Skills, 2013). I have argued elsewhere that the omission of the imbalance of power aspect precludes the possibility of the *(continued)*

As well as these three aspects (aggression; repeated or systematic nature; being characterised by an imbalance of power in favour of the perpetrator(s)), other aspects have been emphasised in some definitions, namely that the behaviour is *deliberate* on the part of the perpetrator(s), and generally *unprovoked* on the part of the target(s) of the bullying (see Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a; Minton, 2010, 2012a). It has been argued that when all of these aspects are present, we may then legitimately categorise the behaviour in question as *bullying* (Minton, 2010, 2012a; O'Moore & Minton, 2004a).[7]

The negative effects on people who have been bullied have been documented in both the scientific research literature and the popular media. Mona O'Moore and I (2004a) recorded that being made the target of bullying behaviour can, and often does, '… destroy a person's confidence and self-esteem [and] cause physical, emotional and psychological damage of the potentially most serious and long-lasting kind' (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a, p. 2). Olweus' longitudinal studies in Norway and Sweden showed that those bullied at school had higher levels of depression and poorer self-esteem in adulthood (Olweus, 1993). Roland's (2002) study of 2,083 eighth graders (ca. 14 years old) in Norway showed that depression and suicidality were associated with having been bullied. This has been found to be true also of Finnish (Kaltiala-Heino, 1999) and Irish adolescents (Mills, Guerin, Lynch, Daly, & Fitzpatrick, 2004). In an analysis of data from 130,908 students in the sixth, ninth, and twelfth grades responding to the 2010 Minnesota Student Survey, Borowsky, Taliaferro and McMorris (2013) found that suicidal ideation existed in 22 per cent of those who had bullied others, 29 per cent of those who had been bullied, and 38 per cent of those who had both bullied others and been

differentiation between incidents of bullying behaviour and 'fair-fights', which is problematic, especially when one considers working at the practical level in schools and school communities (Minton 2010, 2012a). Furthermore, this omission contradicts the intuitive/experiential sense that most of us have, from early childhood, of bullying as a fundamentally *unfair* act; this is a sense that informs the way in which the word is used in everyday speech. The Oxford Advanced Learner's Dictionary, for example, defines bully (as a noun) as 'A person who uses *strength or influence* to harm or intimidate those who are *weaker*' (italics mine), giving the example, 'He is a ranting, domineering bully', and [to] bully (as a verb) as 'use *superior strength or influence* to intimidate (someone), typically to force them to do something' (again, italics mine), giving the usage example, 'A local man was bullied into helping them' (Oxford Dictionaries, 2016).

[7] These definitional aspects are important to consider, especially when working at the practical level, i.e., attempting to prevent and deal with bullying in school communities. For example, at what age can we consider children to be capable of *deliberate* behaviour – at what age can we say bullying behaviour 'starts'? Additionally, if certain students (not only younger ones) are deemed less capable than others of executing deliberate behaviour (for example, those assessed as having attention deficit hyperactivity disorder), or understanding and responding to social cues (for example, those assessed as having autism spectrum conditions), how can this be accommodated for in anti-bullying actions in school environments? Finally – in terms of bullying being *unprovoked* – what does this say of the often-referred to 'provocative target', whose social skills (or sometimes, lack thereof) seem to others to 'invite' certain categories of peer abuse (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a), or the 'self-sabotaging' student? Small wonder that the 'first step' of getting different groups within school communities (e.g., management staff, teaching and non-teaching staff, parents, students) 'on the same page' regarding how they understand bullying behaviour can sometimes be a lengthy and concentrated process, and a state of affairs that one cannot safely assume already exists (see O'Moore & Minton, 2004a).

bullied. To give a single example from the popular media, in 2010, American and subsequent international reports were made of at least five specifically homophobic bullying-related teenage suicides in the USA in the single month of September (McKinley, 2010). 2001 saw the publication of the afore-mentioned (see introduction) *Bullycide: Death at Playtime*, which comprised a series of case studies of children who had committed suicide due to having been bullied, and in which the British authors (journalist Neil Marr and anti-bullying campaigner Tim Field) made an informed estimate that around sixteen children a year in the United Kingdom were literally 'bullied to death'. In 2004, Mona O'Moore and I positioned Marr and Field's (2001) work as demonstrating that '… our ultimate challenge, as members of school communities, must be to work together in constructive ways, in order that such heart-rending tragedies might be avoided' (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a, p. 4).

I. RESEARCH INTO SCHOOL BULLYING

In terms of empirical research, the field of developing systematic and evidence-based approaches to the investigation, prevention and countering of school bullying behaviour is a relatively 'new' area – at the time of writing, not yet a half a century old. However, in 1997, Roland and Munthe noted that, school bullying had been 'a topic of great concern in the Scandinavian countries for nearly thirty years', and 'in countries outside Scandinavia since the mid-eighties' (1997, p. 233), thus pointing out the 'head start' that had been made in the Nordic countries (compared with the rest of the world), which has been, as we shall see over the course this chapter, in many respects maintained. In Section II ('Traditional Interventions against School Bullying') we shall see that Norway was the first country to implement nationwide campaigns against school bullying; it was also in Norway that the first systematic, scientific investigations of school bullying first took place, in the pioneering work of the Swedish-born Dan Olweus (1973, 1978). By 1983, Olweus had surveyed some 130,000 Norwegian school students (aged 7 to 16 years); his research indicated that some 15 per cent of students (around 1 in 7) were 'involved in bully/victim problems with some regularity' – 9 per cent as targets, 7 per cent as perpetrators, and 1.6 per cent as both targets and perpetrators (typically, referred to as 'bully-victims')[8] (Olweus, 1997).

[8] Whereas the majority of those involved in anti-bullying research and action continue to use the terms '*bully*' and '*victim*', I have consistently (see Minton, 2012a; O'Moore & Minton, 2004a) advocated the use of the word '*(to) bully*' as a *verb* only, and not as a *noun*. Due to the potential communication of negative expectancy effects, I do not believe that it is helpful to 'label' a person as a 'bully'. Similarly, I see *victimhood* as one of a number of possible psychological responses; if a bullied person had sufficient personal resources (say, good core self-esteem and resilience), she or he would not necessarily identify herself or himself as a *victim*, but rather as a *target* of bullying behaviour (the bullying behaviour itself is unacceptable). Therefore, I have endeavoured to refer to, '*those who have been bullied*' and '*those who have bullied others*', or if noun forms are unavoidable, '*targets*' and '*perpetrators*' of bullying behaviour. Interestingly, especially given where anti-bullying research and intervention efforts began in earnest, it is more natural to translate the English word 'bully' in the Norwegian and Swedish languages as a verb ('*mobbing*' and '*mobbning*' respectively), and many *(continued)*

So how might one establish the incidence rates and sub-typology of school bullying behaviour? The Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire (Olweus, 1989) permits the investigation (via anonymous student written self-report) not only of the incidence/frequency of bullying behaviour, but also different types of bullying behaviour, reporting rates to teachers and parents by bullied students, factors of age and gender, and what students feel that they, their peers, and their teachers do in situations of bullying. Predictably, this instrument, which was used in Olweus' surveying of 130,000 Norwegian students, has been translated into a number of languages (for example, an English-language version by Ahmad & Smith, 1990), and has been widely applied – to give examples, in Belgium (Stevens & Van Oost, 1994; in Vettenburg, 1999); in England (Smith & Sharp, 1994); in Finland (Lagerspetz et al., 1982; in Björkqvist & Österman, 1999); in Germany (Hanewinkel & Knaack, 1997; in Lösel & Bliesener, 1999); in Ireland (Minton, 2010; O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997); in Scotland (Mellor, 1990; in Mellor, 1999); and in the United States (Limber, Nation, Tracy, Melton, & Flex, 2004). The use of the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire (Olweus, 1989) gave subsequent researchers the opportunity to compare their own findings with Olweus' substantial pre-existing data sets. Over the first fifteen years or so of international research efforts, a reasonably consistent finding across all surveys in terms of *gender* was that *males* were involved to a greater extent in bully/victim problems than were *females* (Olweus, 1983, in Olweus, 1999a, 1999b (Sweden and Norway); O'Moore, Kirkham & Smith, 1997 (Ireland); Rigby & Slee, 1999 (Australia); Smith & Sharp, 1994 (England)). In terms of *typology*, males were found to use *physical methods* to bully more often than did females; females used so-called '*indirect*'[9] methods more often than did males; however, the most common type of bullying experienced by both males and females was *verbal* bullying (Olweus, 1983, in Olweus, 1999b; O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997; Smith & Sharp, 1994). Factors of *age* behaved reasonably consistently across national contexts; many surveys, and particularly broad-scale surveys (for example, Slee, 1996, in Rigby & Slee, 1999; Olweus, 1983, in Olweus, 1999b) pointed to the

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research papers that I have read in the Norwegian language have presented incidence-rate data regarding involvement in bullying behaviour under the categories of '*(ha) blitt mobbet*' [literally, '(have) been bullied'] and '*(ha) mobbet andre*' ['(have) bullied others']. When I asked Professor Dan Olweus about this at a conference in Bergen, Norway, in 2011, he told me that in the translation of his work from Swedish and Norwegian into English, the noun terms of 'bully' and 'victim' were so well-established for speakers and readers of the English language that they had proved unavoidable.

[9] The distinction between 'direct' and 'indirect' bullying is well established, and dates back to Olweus' earliest work (Olweus, 1973, 1978). '*Direct*' bullying – where the target of the bullying is overtly attacked by the perpetrator – includes the categories of verbal bullying, physical bullying, gesture bullying, and extortion. '*Indirect*' bullying is, to an extent, more covert, usually involving the deliberate manipulation of social relationships in order to socially isolate someone, or to make others dislike someone. This may include ignoring someone, and/or inducing others to do so; the spreading of malicious rumours, falsehoods or gossip; and the circulation of nasty notes, or the writing of insulting graffiti (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a). 'Indirect' bullying has also been referred to as social bullying (e.g. Borowsky, Taliaferro, & McMorris, 2013), or 'relational' bullying (e.g. Wang, Iannotti, & Nansel, 2009).

fact that '… younger students … are the most exposed [to bully/victim problems]' (Olweus, 1999b, p. 33). Olweus (1999b), Rigby and Slee (1999), and Smith and Sharp (1994) all recorded that there was a general decline in involvement in bullying behaviour with increasing age; however, O'Moore Kirkham and Smith (1997) recorded a second 'peak' at around 13 years of age, or the second-year of secondary school, followed by another age-related decline.[10] Finally, the considerable reluctance on the part of targets to report the bullying that they have experienced has also been recorded – a 'code of silence' that seems to be shared by bullied students world-wide (for example, Minton, 2010, and O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997 (Ireland); Olweus, 1999 (Norway, Sweden); Rigby & Slee, 1999 (Australia); Smith & Sharp, 1994 (England)).

An interesting development that was made as research data pertaining to bullying typology emerged (as well as the contradiction of other 'common myths' about bullying (see Olweus, 2003; O'Moore & Minton, 2004a)), is that the notion of bullying being generally characterised as a dyad comprising one single, physically larger, aggressive male who physically persecutes one (or a series of) single, physically smaller, passive male(s)[11] is incorrect – or at least, describes only one of a number of possible bullying scenarios. As Olweus added (2003, p. 14):

> Many also believe erroneously that students who are overweight, wear glasses, have a different ethnic origin, or speak with an unusual dialect are particularly likely to become victims of bullying. All of these hypotheses have thus far failed to receive clear support from empirical data.

As it has informed the design of anti-bullying interventions (see below, Section II, 'Traditional Interventions against School Bullying') these positions have facilitated the sending out of the message that bullying can happen to anyone. For some of those working at the practical or 'coal face' level – i.e., those attempting to help young people who have been bullied – such a message has indeed been helpful. One of the many psychological effects of bullying is the tendency for targets to 'internalise' the abuse they have experienced, and hold themselves as being somehow to 'blame' for it. In a chapter written especially for young people within a more general practitioner handbook, Mona O'Moore and I wrote (2004a, p. 121):

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[10] It is notable that in many school systems, there is a transition between the primary and secondary phases of compulsory education at about, or just before, this age, which also coincides with the biological onset of puberty, and therefore the beginning of adolescence. For example, in the Republic of Ireland, primary schools will typically enrol students between four and twelve years of age, and secondary schools will typically enrol those aged between twelve and eighteen (Jordan, 1999); in other words, most school students in the Republic of Ireland turn thirteen in their first year of secondary school. The primary to secondary school transition is one year later than their counterparts in many areas of the United Kingdom, including school students in Northern Ireland.

[11] A stereotypical and long-standing depiction, seen in the character of the bully 'Flashman' in *Tom Brown's School Days* (Hughes, 1857/1991), and many subsequent portrayals in literature, film and television.

> Remember the bully has the problem, not you …. If we have been bullied, the bully (and others) can make us believe that it IS our fault. This is because the name-calling or teasing that is involved in bullying usually is about something that is *different* about the person being bullied. People can be picked on because a *bully* will say that there is something *wrong* or *different* about the bullied person …. So a bullied person might come to think that, 'Oh, if only I were taller/shorter/fatter/thinner/didn't wear glasses/had a different hair colour/didn't have freckles/spoke differently/were better at, or did not do so well at (insert name of sport/activity) … *then* I wouldn't get picked on!' But this is NOT true … bullying is ALWAYS the bully's fault …. *No-one deserves to be bullied – there is NO excuse for bullying others*. Bullying is ALWAYS wrong. (emphasis reproduced from the original)

Hence, models of anti-bullying intervention that have drawn extensively from the Norwegian research tradition, as will be discussed further over the course of this chapter, have typically adopted what I have called (Minton, 2014a) a 'one-size-fits-all' approach (which was perhaps influenced in its genesis by the comparative traditional homogeneity of Norwegian society), utilising the message that, 'bullying can happen to anyone'. However, as studies of 'minority' and 'marginalised' groups of young people have demonstrated (see below, Section III, 'The Bullying of 'Minority' Groups: Attending to Prejudice and Marginalisation'), this position somewhat ignores the fact that certain groups of people – again, those who belong to so-called 'minorities', especially those that are marginalised in broader societal contexts – are more 'at risk' of being bullied. As already stated, these are positions to which we will have course to return over the latter sections of this chapter.

It should also be acknowledged that, beyond providing examples for psychological theories of the rather more general field of aggressive behaviour, comparatively little has been added to the research literature in terms of providing *theoretical explanations of bullying behaviour*. However, two interesting avenues have opened up: (i) the analysis of group dynamics in situations of bullying behaviour; and, (ii) the relationship between self-esteem and involvement in bullying behaviour in schools. Regarding *group dynamism*, a good deal of anti-bullying research in Finland over the past two decades has focused upon what has become known as the 'participant roles' approach. Essentially, those who are involved in a situation of bullying behaviour can be said to occupy one of six possible participant roles: (i) bully; (ii) victim; (iii) assistant of the bully; (iv) reinforcer of the bully; (v) defender of the victim; and, (vi) outsider. This scheme was first introduced by Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, Österman and Kaukiainen (1996); the original piece of research also recorded that children were moderately aware of their participant roles, but tended to underestimate their participation in active bullying (Björkqvist & Österman, 1999). The participant roles approach has been related to the five *sociometric status groups* – 'popular', 'rejected', 'neglected', 'controversial' and 'average' – put forward by Coie, Dodge and Kupersmidt (1990). Björkqvist and Österman's (1999) summary of such peer-

ratings, based on Finnish research, records that 'defenders' were the most *popular* children; 'bullies', 'assistants' and 'reinforcers' were *rejected* children; *neglected* children tended *not* to have a clear participant role in the bullying process; whilst *controversial* children typically scored above average on *all* scales measuring participant roles. Salmivalli, Huttunen and Lagerspetz (1997) also found that participant roles can be related to broader *social networks* within the class. Children who had, or took up, similar participant roles, tended to form friendship networks with each other: in other words, how a child behaved in a situation of bullying behaviour was largely related to the behaviour of his or her friends (Björkqvist & Österman, 1999; Salmivalli, Huttunen, & Lagerspetz, 1997).

With respect to *self-esteem*, Dueholm (1999) argued that low-self esteem should be seen as one of a number of causative factors of bullying. Long-term effects – a correlation between having been bullied in childhood and low self-esteem in early adulthood – have been reported by researchers in Norway (Olweus, 1993) and Australia (Rigby & Slee, 1999). In Ireland, a consistent finding has been that those who are victimised and those who bully others show low self-esteem, and those who are engaged in both forms of bullying behaviour – i.e. those who are bullied themselves, and also bully others (so-called 'bully-victims') – have the lowest self-esteem of all. These findings have been found to hold true at the local (Dublin – O'Moore, 1995; O'Moore & Hillery, 1991) and nationwide (O'Moore, 2000; O'Moore & Kirkham, 2001; O'Moore, Kirkham, & Smith, 1997) levels. It has been argued that the perpetration of bullying behaviour may be a mask for feelings of personal inadequacy; as O'Moore (1994, p. 20) put it:

> … a child who bullies is not a happy child … if one feels good, one doesn't go picking on others.

Similar points were made by Kavanagh (1993) in his report on second-level education in Ireland. He argued that the '… attitudes and behaviour of pupils are strongly influenced by the overall school climate' (p. 67); consequently, if a student's self-esteem is eroded by her or his experience of school, either *apathy* or *hostility* may result. Kavanagh (1993) opined that the way out of this cycle lies in open communication throughout the school community, positive teacher-student relationships (geared towards the students' '… potential and achievements rather than failings and shortcomings', p. 68), and ensuring clear, consistent and just policies and practises through the implementation of a disciplinary code. Although the direction of the relationship between low self-esteem and bullying behaviour cannot be ascertained from correlational data,[12] the fact that the relationship exists

[12] Although one should never infer existence of a causal relationship from correlational data, it is tempting to speculate regarding the different possibilities that might exist regarding the link between *being bullied* and low self-esteem. It could be that the experience of being bullied lowers one's self-esteem (probable, so almost certainly correct); equally, it could be that those with pre-existing low self-esteem are more likely to be bullied in the first place (also possible). A third possibility is that a combination of these first two types of relationship exists. In terms of the link between low self-esteem and *bullying others*, it seems that those who perpetrate bullying behaviour could be attempting to make up for their low self-esteem by victimising others, and perhaps thereby achieving some form of *(continued)*

has been seen as reason enough to take heed of it in the development of Irish anti-bullying programmes.[13] Indeed, the enhancement of self-esteem in young people as an 'insulating factor' against their potential involvement in bully/victim problems has been offered as a point of thought for school staff and parents alike (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a).

II. TRADITIONAL INTERVENTIONS AGAINST SCHOOL BULLYING

Olweus' pre-1983 findings regarding the prevalence of school bullying in Norway (see Olweus, 1997, 1999b for reviews), and the tragic occurrence of three bullying-related suicides of teenagers in Norway in 1982 (see Olweus, 1999b), led the Norwegian Ministry of Education to support the generation and implementation of a nationwide programme to prevent and manage bullying in schools (the world's first), beginning in 1983. The nationwide campaign comprised materials for parents, and a video film and guidance booklet for the schools (Olweus and Roland, 1983). An overview of Olweus' core programme (reproduced from Olweus, 1999b) is provided below (where + + denotes a core component, and + denotes a highly desirable component):

General prerequisites
- + + Awareness and involvement on the part of adults

Measures at the school level
- + + Questionnaire survey
- + + School conference day
- + + Better supervision during break periods
- + Formation of co-ordinating group

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recognition in the eyes of their peers (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a). In a qualitative aspect of a study by O'Moore (see O'Moore & Minton, 2003b), when students were asked why people bully others, the most frequently recorded answers were along the lines of 'to show off' or 'to look cool' – hence, engaging in bullying behaviour could be seen as a misguided attempt to gain self- and peer-esteem. This may partially explain why neither Olweus (1993) nor Rigby and Slee (1992; also, Slee & Rigby, 1993) believed low self-esteem to be associated with bullying others. O'Moore and Minton's (2004a) argument was that although some people who bully may appear to be confident (hence, may perhaps have high 'social' self-esteem, or apparent peer popularity), their 'core' self-esteem is likely to be low, and they are likely to be feared, rather than liked, by their peers. A more definitive answer to these arguments might be possible should detailed analyses of self-esteem sub-scales in a large-scale study of bullying behaviour be undertaken.

[13] Citing Olweus (1993) and Slee and Rigby (1993) (as in footnote 12, above), Limber, Nation, Tracy, Melton and Flex (2004) opined that '… therapeutic efforts focused on boosting the self-esteem of children who bully … may be somewhat misguided …. Improving their self-esteem may help to create more-confident bullies but likely will not decrease their bullying behaviour' (p. 69). However, this seems to be based on an appeal to (Olweus') authoritative opinion, rather than a consideration of the evidence, especially the afore-mentioned broad-scale empirical evidence to the contrary (O'Moore & Kirkham, 2001). Limber, Nation, Tracy, Melton and Flex's (2004) further statement that '… anger management training is likely to be equally ineffective, as anger is not a common motivation for children who bully' (p. 69) is one that I would tend to treat with similar caution. Once again, Olweus' *opinion* is cited in support of this statement; however, establishing the *motivations* of those who bully, to my knowledge, has not yet been the focus of broad-scale empirical research.

Measures at the class level
- ++ Class rules against bullying
- ++ Regular class meetings with students
- + Class PTA meetings

Measures at the individual level
- ++ Serious talks with bullies and victims
- ++ Serious talks with parents of involved students
- + Teacher and parent use of imagination

Olweus' evaluation of the effects of the 1983 intervention programme was based on data from 2,500 students (modal ages 11–14 at the outset) from 42 primary and lower secondary schools in Bergen, who were followed for a period of 2½ years (from 1983–1985 inclusive) (Olweus, 1999b). In brief, students' self-report rates of having been directly (physical bullying, threats, extortion) and indirectly (name-calling, exclusion, rumours) bullied fell by 50 per cent or more, and self-reports of having bullied others fell by similar levels (Olweus, 1999b). However, a second evaluation of the 1983 Norwegian nationwide programme, again using Olweus' evaluation questionnaire, but this time conducted by Roland in 1986 in the neighbouring county of Rogaland, recorded that there had been considerably less success than Olweus had indicated (Munthe & Roland, 1989; Roland, 1989, 1993) – indeed, some schools in Roland's evaluation survey had shown *increased* levels of bullying. How, then, can the difference between the two sets of evaluation results be accounted for? Methodologically, there were, as both Olweus and Roland acknowledged, differences in the times of measurement between the two studies. Roland's study was carried out one and three years after the implementation of the nationwide programme, as opposed to Olweus' one and two. Additionally, as Eslea & Smith (1998) noted, Olweus' research team provided ongoing support for the schools involved in his Bergen evaluation study (see also Olweus, 1991; Roland & Munthe, 1997), whereas Roland's provided no extra support for the Rogaland schools. Roland suggested that the differences between the two studies highlighted the possibility that nationally, a very good short-term effect (as evidenced in Olweus' Bergen study) disappeared during the following two years (as evidenced in his own Rogaland study) (Roland & Munthe, 1997). A key factor seemed to be '… the degree to which the schools had seriously adopted the campaign'; Roland found that '… at most schools, the principles of the programme had not been integrated into the day to day management of the school and classes … most schools went back to a "normal" condition, which did not focus on the principles of the campaign' (Roland & Munthe, 1997, p. 236).

In an evaluation of a second implementation of the Olweus Bullying Prevention Programme in schools in Bergen (1997–1998), Olweus '… again found clear reductions with regard to bully/victim problems in the intervention schools' (Olweus, 2004, p. 24); but, as he acknowledges, '… the effects were somewhat weaker than the first project' – the reduction of bully/victim problems in the intervention schools ranged between 21 and 38 per cent. Positive results were also recorded in an evaluation of the Olweus Bullying Prevention Programme in

schools in Oslo (1999–2000), with overall reductions in 'being bullied' and 'bullying others' of 42 per cent and 52 per cent respectively. There have also been implementations of the Olweus programme outside of Norway – in Schleswig-Holstein, Germany (Hanewinkel, 2004), and South Carolina, USA (Limber, Nation, Tracy, Melton, & Flex, 2004). The Schleswig-Holstein programme (Hanewinkel, 2004) was carried out in 47 schools, with 14,788 students, and evaluated at 37 of these schools (10,600 students). Reports of direct bullying in the primary (3rd and 4th grade) and lower levels of secondary school (5th and 6th grade) showed an average reduction rate of about two per cent, whereas incidence rates for reports of having been bullied in the 7th, 8th, 9th and 10th grades remained almost unchanged, and in higher grades (11th and 12th grade) there was an increase of around six to ten per cent (Schäfer & Korn, 2001). Limber, Nation, Tracy, Melton and Flex (2004) replicated the Olweus programme in 18 middle schools South Carolina schools (1995–1997), recording a 'large decrease' in reports of bullying others, and in reports by males students of having been bullied, but only a slight (and not statistically significant) decrease in reports of having been bullied by female students.

Olweus opined that '… it has become more and more clear to me that the effects of an intervention programme are to a great extent dependent on the quality and fidelity of programme intervention' (2004, p. 14).[14] In his (surely, correct) emphasis on '… the need for evidence-based intervention programmes', Olweus (2003, 2004) cited the success of his own programme in satisfying both a US expert committee's review of more than 500 programmes that address problematic behaviour (one of only eleven that did so) for so-called 'Blueprint' status, and a similar evaluation of 56 programmes in Norway (the only programme to do so). The criteria used by the US and Norwegian review committees were similar; essentially, programmes should show (i) 'positive effects on relative target groups in a relatively rigorous scientific evaluation'; (ii) that the effects should have lasted '… for at least one year'; and, (iii) 'that the programme had produced positive results in at least one site beyond the original one' (Olweus, 2004, p. 13).

Elsewhere in Norway, *SAF* (*Senter for atferdsforskning*) [the 'Centre for Behavioural Research'], based at the University of Stavanger and led in its early years by Erling Roland, has been responsible for the development of a number of different intervention programmes that have addressed school bullying, some of which have been implemented in, or at least offered to, schools on a nationwide basis. Typically, these have shared the same 'whole school' intervention architecture as the Olweus programme, but with, and this is consistent with Roland's critique (Roland & Munthe, 1997) of Olweus' 1983 nationwide programme (see above), and the learning from of a 'second nationwide

[14] However, Limber et al. (2004) recorded that her programme team had '… remained true to the principles of the original model' (p. 58), and enjoyed '… extensive consultation from Dan Olweus' (p. 59).

intervention programme'[15] designed by SAF in 1996 (Roland & Munthe, 1997), a greater emphasis on implementation. One such programme, which eventually became known as the '*Respekt*' programme, but was initially referred to as the 'Connect Oslo' programme (as it involved a partnership between the City of Oslo, the Oslo Education Authority and SAF), began with thirty participating schools (SAF, 2004). Operationally, the programme's professional content consisted of 'a kick-off seminar to ensure a common focus for the school project groups'; 'four course days for a school's entire staff'; 'a course in colleague mentoring for the leaders of colleague mentoring groups'; 'colleague mentoring for all staff'; 'a school project group network'; 'a school principal network'; a 'modified, Norwegian version of "*Checkpoints for Schools*"';[16] and a 'follow-up by a dedicated advisor from the pilot project schools' (SAF, 2004). An evaluation of the 'Respekt' programme, as implemented in three primary schools and one secondary school, demonstrated a 'small to moderate' post-programme decrease in four areas of problematic behaviour (student disobedience, off-task behaviour, bullying and aggression) (Ertesvåg & Vaaland, 2007).

The aim of SAF's whole-school '*Zero*'[17] *p*rogramme, which has been available to schools nationwide in Norway since 2003, is to help schools implement routines to investigate, deal with and prevent bullying behaviour, by fostering positive and caring relationships, knowledge about bullying, and developing clear anti-bullying rules. The resource contents of the 'Zero' were similar to the 1996 nationwide programme in Norwegian schools (see footnote 15), but a greater weight was

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[15] This second programme utilised a support network of 350 professionals, including researchers, educational psychologists and head teachers (Roland, 2000; Roland, Bjørnsen, & Mandt, 2001), who were given a two-day course, equipped with written materials, and based on this, were supposed to help schools with their anti-bullying work. However, when the network members met at a seminar one year afterwards, '… it became obvious that only a few of them had carried out the work as expected. There were many reasons for this: unclear attitude towards the schools, no available time, the schools did not request their expertise, their leaders did not encourage them to carry on …. Moreover, most of the work they had been doing was directly dealing with bullying incidents …. Competence building was a minor activity' (Midthassel, 2005). No overall evaluation framework was set in place for the programme; therefore, little formal evaluation was undertaken, and no formal evaluation data was published. In 2001, it was expressed that '… the main conclusion so far is that the broad profile of the programme and the material were well received by the schools, but the system of local assistance has to be improved' (Roland, Bjørnsen, & Mandt, 2001, p. 7). SAF's Unni Midthassel (2005) noted that '… it became obvious that a new programme needed clearer structure with a focus on competence building and implementation as well as implementation support'.

[16] '*Towards a Non-Violent Society: Checkpoints for Schools*' (Varnava, 2000) was launched in the United Kingdom in March 1999, by the Forum on Children and Violence. The campaign offered 'a concise and practical guide enabling schools to review current activity and develop plans to promote non-violence as part of whole school policy, as well as assisting in monitoring and evaluating progress' (NCB, 2000; in Vidal, 2002). '*Checkpoints*' covered six aspects (home/school links, values, organization, environment, curriculum; and training). Each checkpoint had '… ten simple statements to consider, and the results can be plotted on a web that visually illustrates the stage reached by a school in addressing violence' (Vidal, 2002). An external (French) evaluation recorded that '"Checkpoints" can be a useful tool for self-audit and school management' (Vidal, 2002).

[17] 'Zero' refers to the often-cited 'zero tolerance' towards bullying behaviour (Roland, Bru, Midthassel, & Vaaland, 2010).

placed on implementation. Schools are steered through the programme via the formation of a co-ordinating project group, comprising personnel from three to five co-operating schools, and the scheduling of one seminar prior to (a full day on initiation), and three seminars within (a full day on forming the action plan, and a half-day each on problem solving and implementation) and one seminar after (half-day on continuation) the school year in which the programme runs. Support is given to the schools between seminars through a designated 'Zero' instructor and follow-up telephone and e-mail contact (Midthassel, 2005). An evaluation of the 'Zero' programme, as it was conducted in the school year 2003–2004 at 151 participating primary schools in Norway (n = 20,430 students), showed that there were statistically significant reductions in reports of having been bullied and having bullied others amongst fifth to seventh grade students, but not amongst second to fourth graders in the sample (Roland, Bru, Midthassel, & Vaaland, 2010). Although the authors acknowledged that '… there was no real control group and the schools were not randomly selected' (Roland, Bru, Midthassel, & Vaaland, 2010, p. 50), they concluded that even '… acknowledging these limits, there are positive considerations as this study entails a large number of pupils and the evaluation is done in a context that is of importance for Norwegian authorities' (p. 51).

So *how effective* have anti-bullying intervention programmes actually been? Internationally, following their meta-analysis of such programmes conducted between 1980 and 2004, Merrell et al. (2008) concluded that programmes *may* produce modest positive outcomes, but that they are more likely to influence knowledge, attitudes and self-perceptions than they are to influence actual bullying behaviours. Farrington and Ttofi's (2009) frequently-cited meta-analysis of 44 anti-bullying intervention programmes conducted between 1983 and 2009 (where it was possible to calculate effect sizes) showed that school-based programmes succeeded in reducing self-reported involvement in bullying others by between 20 per cent and 23 per cent, and self-reports of having been bullied by others by between 17 per cent and 20 per cent. In response to these, and other reports of the apparent modest levels of success of the effectiveness of anti-bullying intervention programmes, Lødding and Vibe (2010, in Minton, 2014a)[18] stated that:

> Bullying is not a problem that can be solved by adopting a specific programme. The prevention and discouraging of bullying is unlikely to succeed without continuous and determined efforts to improve features of schools known to have the greatest effects on bullying: finding ways to ensure that students thrive, having a good relationship with their teachers, contributing to a positive classroom climate, receiving feedback and support in their work, and feeling that they are in a safe physical environment. Furthermore, the school needs to have its administrative affairs in order and

[18] Lødding and Vibe's (2010) report was commissioned by the Norwegian Directorate for Education and Training. The data used was derived from the Norwegian National Student Surveys of 2007, 2008 and 2009 (ca. 260,000 7th–10th grade student participants).

> be a secure and respected part of the local community. In short, these features of a good learning environment can help reduce bullying. (p. 26; translation mine)

Olweus (see Olweus & Breivik, 2011) rejected the findings of Lødding and Vibe's (2010) report entirely, attacking their logic as 'untenable', describing the conclusion that '… a [good] learning environment actually causes reduced bullying' as 'pure speculation' (p. 36; translation mine, in Minton, 2014a), and defending the 'strong effect' of the Olweus anti-bullying programme. I certainly felt (see Minton, 2014a) that the material that Lødding and Vibe (2010) reviewed did confirm what we have learned from the afore-mentioned meta-analyses by Merrell et al. (2008) and Farrington and Ttofi (2009), i.e., that the levels of actual behavioural change recorded after the implementation of some anti-bullying programmes have been, in reality, rather modest. However, I also felt that Olweus and Breivik (2011) were correct in pointing to the gap that exists between the evidence presented by Lødding and Vibe (2010), and the conclusions that they drew from it. To me, Lødding and Vibe (2010) appeared to have taken an 'inductive twist', in that their conclusions seemed to have been ahead of the evidence, in which I could find nothing to support their position that '… features of a good learning environment can help reduce bullying' (Lødding & Vibe, 2010, p. 26; translation mine, in Minton, 2014a). I further noted that the research centre at the University of Stavanger responsible for the afore-mentioned 'Zero' programme (as noted above, formerly known as SAF (*Senter for atferdsforskning* ['Centre for Behavioural Research']) and since 1st January 2013 as *Nasjonalt senter for læringsmiljø og atferdsforskning* ['National Centre for Learning Environment and Behavioural Research'],[19] seemed by this re-branding to be '… well-placed to provide the evidence-based contributions to the question as to whether improved learning environments can reduce bullying' (Minton, 2014a, p. 110).

The *KiVa*[20] anti-bullying programme was developed between 2006 and 2009 by Christina Salmivalli[21] and her colleagues at the University of Turku, Finland, who had been contracted to develop and evaluate an anti-bullying programme for schools within the Finnish comprehensive school system (grades one to nine inclusive, so including school students aged between seven and fifteen years) by

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[19] This is the Centre's full and formal name. Its shortened name is *Læringsmiljøsenteret* (literally, 'the Learning Environment Centre').

[20] KiVa is a contraction of the Finnish phrase *'kiusaamista vastaan*' ['against bullying']; by deliberate coincidence, '*kiva*' is also an adjective in the Finnish language, with the English equivalent of 'nice' (Salmivalli, 2010).

[21] Salmivalli has, of course, been mentioned previously in this chapter, in the context of the development of the 'participant roles' approach (see above, Section I, 'Research into School Bullying'; also, Salmivalli, Lagerspetz, Björkqvist, Österman, & Kaukiainen, 1996). The continued output of her and her colleagues at the University of Turku (Sahlberg, 2011), and Salmivalli's own standing as an international expert in the area of bullying research, meant that this team was a natural choice in developing a Finnish national anti-bullying programme when the Finnish government decided to make a consolidated effort to address the issues of children's well-being and bullying (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b).

the Finnish Ministry for Education and Culture. The development included randomised controlled trials that involved over 28,000 students who were enrolled in 234 schools (117 schools in which the KiVa programme was run, and 117 'control' schools) (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a; KiVa International, 2016; Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen, & Salmivalli, 2011). The universal components of the KiVa programme consist of lesson units for the 7–9, 10–12 and 13–15 year-old age groups. The 7–9 and 10–12 year-old units, for example (referred to as Units 1 and 2, respectively), consist of ten structured lessons of approximately ninety minutes' duration, which are typically split into two forty-five minute sessions per month. The topics covered include being part of a team, having respect for others, learning about emotions, group interactions, peer pressure, learning about types of bullying (including how these are influenced by bystanders) and their consequences, and how individuals and groups can play their parts in reducing bullying. The delivery of the sessions is via small-group and whole-class discussion, role-play, film clips (of people talking about having been bullied), group work, written assignments and whole-class activities. Training, resources (such as a series of Powerpoint presentations to guide teachers and schools through the implementation process), parental advice and support (such as a public access website, which in amongst the other information that it provides, supports adults in talking to students about how to stand up against bullying), and on-line games (which can be played at home or at school, and are based on developing knowledge ('*I know*'), rehearsing what to do ('*I can*') and translating these skills into everyday life ('*I do*')) have been developed. KiVa posters are on display in the participating schools, and high-visibility KiVa vests are worn by teachers on yard duty during break and lunchtimes[22] (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b).

As well as these preventative components, the KiVa programme provides for what it calls 'indicated actions' – detailed procedures for schools and teachers in dealing with actual incidents of bullying. In KiVa, bullying is defined according to three criteria: (i) power imbalance, so the behaviour of a more powerful or higher-status individual against a less powerful or lower-status individual; (ii) repeated actions; and, (iii) intentional nature. If the incident meets these three criteria, it is dealt with by the KiVa team, which can include members of teaching and non-

[22] This is also a feature of the afore-mentioned Norwegian 'Zero' programme (see above); clearly, the idea in both programmes is that the teacher's visibility is increased, so that a student who wishes to report a situation of bullying can more easily see a responsible adult. Incidentally, in 2004, I took a friend and colleague of mine, Gaute Bjørnsen (who was at that time employed by SAF in the development of the 'Zero' programme) on a visit to an inner-city Dublin school in which I had worked on whole-school programmes on issues of student self-esteem enhancement, and preventing and dealing with school bullying. Gaute told the sixth-year students (17–18 year-olds) about the use of the high-visibility vests, and the unanimous reply that he received from the students was that, at their school at least, the use of the vests would probably *worsen* situations of bullying, by helping troublemakers to spot a potentially intervening teacher approaching at a distance! This suggests to me that local circumstances will always, and in fact always *should,* have an effect on the precise nature of the anti-bullying measures that are appropriate in an individual school, no matter what the 'mainstreaming' ambitions of programme designers might be.

teaching staff, educational psychologists, and school governors. This involves (i) an initial meeting with the target(s) of the bullying, in order to gain an understanding of what has occurred, and to offer support; and subsequently, (ii) meeting with the perpetrator(s), in order to ask them to develop and commit to actions that will help the target(s). Typically, the class teacher arranges for one or two high-status individuals in the class (who have been identified as not having been involved in the bullying by the target(s)) to support the target(s), and follow-up meetings with the target(s) and the perpetrator(s) are arranged (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a).

In terms of evaluation, each year, all students in schools that participate in KiVa complete on-line surveys on bullying behaviour, which given the fact that by 2015, over 90 per cent of comprehensive schools (approximately 2,700 schools) in Finland were implementing the programme (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015b), has resulted in large volumes of evaluation data (KiVa International, 2016). The initial randomised control trial (2006–2009) showed a reduction in self-reports of having been bullied, and having taken part in the bullying of others, amongst the 7–11 year-old students in the programme schools, compared with those students in the control schools; results for the older students (12–15 year-olds varied by gender, with larger effect sizes being observed amongst males than amongst females (Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen, & Salmivalli, 2011). Since the nationwide rolling-out of KiVa in Finland, subsequent evaluations have shown year-by-year reductions in self-reports of having been bullied, and having taken part in the bullying of others, between 2009 and 2014 (KiVa International, 2016; Salmivalli, 2016), with reductions being discernible in incidence rates of verbal, relational, physical, and cyberbullying (Williford, Elledge, Boulton, DePaolis, Little, & Salmivalli, 2013). Internationally, KiVa currently has licensed partners in Argentina, Belgium, Chile, Estonia, Italy, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Peru, and in addition to this, is either being or has been evaluated in Estonia, Greece, Italy, South Africa, Sweden, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the United States (KiVa International, 2016).

To take the United Kingdom as an example, KiVa has been piloted in Wales, with fourteen schools in the north and south of that country taking part, along with three schools from the border county of Cheshire, England (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015b). Unit 2 of the KiVa programme (at that time, the only unit that had been translated into English) was used in years five and six of mainstream primary schools (hence, students were aged between 9 and 11 years). All 748 students who had received the KiVa programme took part in its evaluation, completing revised versions of the Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaire; pre- and post-test result comparisons showed statistically significant reductions in self-reports of having been bullied, and having taken part in the bullying of others, in all participating schools (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b),[23] with reductions

[23] Whilst it is acknowledged that the design was limited in that it lacked a control condition, and that a cause-effect conclusion could only be tentative, the Welsh programme team argued that '… there are no fundamental reasons to expect that bullying levels would have reduced over the period of the study in *(continued)*

in the sample overall of self-reports of having been bullied and having taken part in the bullying of others being 30 per cent and 17 per cent respectively (Axford & Hutchings, 2014). Elsewhere internationally, results also seem promising. In Italy, in the piloting of the KIVa programme in seven primary and secondary experimental schools and six primary and secondary control schools (n = 1,825 students: 920 KiVa students, 905 control students), there were reductions in KiVa schools of 52 per cent in self-reports of having been bullied, and 55 per cent in reports of having taken part in the bullying of others. In secondary schools, these reductions were 6 per cent and 40 per cent respectively (KiVa International, 2016). Small wonder, then, that at the time of writing (2016), KiVa seems to be, in many people's expectations, 'taking off around the world' (Dutton, 2014, p. 40).

III. THE BULLYING OF 'MINORITY' GROUPS: ATTENDING TO PREJUDICE AND MARGINALISATION

A problem that I have seen regarding traditional whole-school anti-bullying intervention programmes, and one which I feel may be linked to their modest levels of outcome success (see Minton, 2012a, 2014a), is their relative inattention to the fact that certain groups of people are more likely to report having been bullied than others. Many recent studies of bullying behaviour in schools have shown that, invariably, being a member of a group that, as a whole, experiences marginalisation outside of the school gates, means that one is more likely to experience being subjected to bullying at school. To give some examples, the situation of (i) *homophobic, transphobic and heteronormative bulling* experienced by lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender students at school has been documented, in amongst other countries, in Canada (Mishna et al., 2009; Walton, 2006), Ireland (Minton et al., 2008; Mayock et al., 2009), Northern Ireland (Carolan & Redmond, 2003) and Norway (Roland & Auestad, 2009); (ii) the *disablist bullying* experienced by school students with sensory and physical disabilities, or special educational needs, has been documented, again in amongst other countries, in England (Norwich & Kelly, 2004; Tippett, Houlston, & Smith, 2010) and on the island of Ireland (both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland – Purdy & Mc Guckin, 2011); (iii) in Norway, it has been found that students of Sami ethnicity (Norway's *indigenous people*, and an *ethnic minority*), were twice as likely to report having been bullied at school than were their non-indigenous and ethnic-Norwegian counterparts (Hansen et al., 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010;

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this age group, so the intervention is likely to have contributed to the reported reductions' (Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015b, p. 57). This is a design limitation shared, in my experience, by many evaluations of anti-bullying intervention programmes (see those documented above), which have generally omitted control measures and focussed purely on pre- and post-programme implementation comparisons. (I will own that this limitation applies to my own evaluations of anti-bullying intervention programmes, and on reporting my findings, I have used similar *post-hoc* arguments to those offered by Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015b, above). In this sense, the KiVa programme was somewhat unusual (in the most positive sense of the word) that it was developed in Finland according to a randomised control trail design (see above).

Hansen & Sørlie, 2012; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press); and (iv) in Ireland, teenaged *members of alternative sub-cultures* (e.g., punks, skaters, fans of heavy metal music, goths and emos) were, and were perceived to be, more likely to be bullied at school (Minton, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a).

It should be acknowledged that there were advantages to taking the general and broad approaches that were applied in the initial design of anti-bullying intervention programmes. As might be recalled, the idea that 'bullying can happen to anyone' (see above, Section I, 'Research into School Bullying') has been seen as a helpful message, hopefully countering the target of bullying's tendency towards self-blame, and avoiding collusion with the perpetrator's pointing out of the target's apparent 'difference' (as we have seen already – "Oh, if only I were taller/shorter/fatter/thinner/didn't wear glasses/had a different hair colour/didn't have freckles/spoke differently/were better at, or did not do so well at (insert name of sport/activity) … *then* I wouldn't get picked on!"; O'Moore & Minton, 2004a, p. 121). However, it was abundantly clear over a decade ago that the research evidence did not support the position that the making of efforts in addressing bullying behaviour in general *did not* simultaneously address the issue of *homophobic and heteronormative forms of bullying*. The Canadian researcher Gerald Walton asserted, with just cause, that, 'Even though homophobia is a prominent feature of schoolyard bullying, it is also one of the most unchallenged forms of bullying' (2006, p. 13), arguing that apparently non-targeted anti-bullying interventions in schools may be hampered by deficits of homophobia, heterosexism and heteronormativity[24] (Walton, 2006).

Research into the bullying experienced by lesbian, gay and bisexual (LGB) students at school on the island of Ireland during the mid- to late-2000s indicated that the LGB population in schools was an 'at risk' group in terms of school bullying. In Northern Ireland, Carolan and Redmond (2003) recorded that 44 per cent of their LGB sample (n = 362) reported having been bullied in the last three months because of their sexual orientation; and in the Republic of Ireland, 50 per cent of Minton, Dahl, O'Moore and Tuck's (2008) sample (n = 123) of LGBT participants (the sample included some transgender participants) reported having been bullied in the last three months because of their sexual orientation, or gender identity. A questionnaire and interview-based study utilising a much larger sample (n = 1,100) of LGB adults people in the Republic of Ireland showed that 58 per cent of the sample recalled the existence of homophobic bullying in their schools, and that 5 per cent had actually left school early because of homophobic bullying (Mayock, Bryan, Carr, & Kitching, 2009). The findings of this study, which had used a retrospective methodology, were supported by a study that investigated the

[24] I have argued elsewhere that within homophobic bullying, two often-overlapping sub-types may exist: '*heteronormative bullying*' (the type that underpins the (often aggressive) heteronormativity of the school environment, manifested, for example, in the ubiquitous use of homophobic epithets that frequently go unchallenged by teachers), and '*sexual orientation-based bullying*', manifest in the active persecution of known or suspected LGB persons (Minton, 2012a, 2013, 2014b; Minton, Dahl, O'Moore, & Tuck, 2008). Both, of course, need to be addressed in school and broader communities; the practical means by which they may be addressed in school communities will necessarily vary (see Minton, 2013).

relationship between sexual orientation and experiences of bullying of a current school-going population (Minton, 2011): in a study of 824 16–17 year-old secondary school students, it was found that whereas 9.9 per cent of heterosexual males and 1.5 per cent of heterosexual females reported having been bullied once a week or more often over the past couple of months, this figure rose to 37.5 per cent amongst homosexual males and 20.8 per cent amongst homosexual females (Minton, 2011). As Walton (2006) had, I argued at the time that it was not safe to assume that 'one size fits all', i.e. that by sending out a general anti-bullying message, one was simultaneously sending out an anti-homophobia/anti-heteronormativity message. As Norman, Galvin and McNamara (2006) have argued, homophobic bullying is not simply another type of bullying, but rather is linked to certain sections of society's prevailing negative attitudes towards people of non-heterosexual sexual orientation. In other words, non-heterosexual and non-cisgender[25] school-goers may find themselves marginalised in school communities in the same way that non-heterosexual and non-cisgender people may be marginalised in broader society[26] (Minton, 2011, 2013, 2014a, 2014b; Minton, Dahl, O'Moore, & Tuck, 2008).

Similar findings – that is to say, school-goers belonging to group that is marginalised in broader society reporting having experienced school bullying

[25] This term, which may not be familiar to all readers, is sometimes used as an antonym for 'transgender'. A cisgender person's gender identity matches precisely with that person's biological sex at birth.

[26] Whilst it is admittedly a privilege of the author to be able to refer to his own research, there are far better reasons than this for having examined homophobic bullying in Ireland in particular. Recently, the Republic of Ireland became the first country in the world to legalise same-sex marriage by popular vote (Johnston, 2015), when 62 per cent of voters a national referendum (in which the voter turnout was 61 per cent) voted to pass the *Thirty-Fourth Amendment of the Constitution (Marriage Equality) Act* on 22nd May, 2015. However, it is also to be acknowledged that marital equality for same-sex couples, and more broadly, equality for non-heterosexual people in general, are comparatively recent developments in Irish life. Male homosexual intercourse was decriminalised in Ireland only as recently as 1993, with the passing of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act (Bacik, 2004), following unsuccessful appeals to the High Court and the Supreme Court in 1984 in Ireland by David Norris (now a Senator), who had argued that as a gay man, his constitutional right to privacy was compromised by the criminalisation of homosexuality. Whilst Chief Justice O' Higgins commented in his judgement against Norris in the Supreme Court that homosexuality had been regarded from the '… earliest days with a deep revulsion as being contrary to the order of nature, a perversion of the biological functions of the sex organs and an affront both to society and to God', and that '… it remains the teaching of all Christian Churches that homosexual acts are wrong' (Bacik, 2004, p. 137), the European Court of Human Rights ruled that the criminalisation of homosexuality did, in fact, breach Norris's right to privacy under Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. Other legal reform in the Republic of Ireland (all within the last two decades) has included the Employment Equality Act of 1998 and the Equal Status Act of 2000, which make it illegal to discriminate on the grounds of sexual orientation in the areas of employment, vocational training, advertising, collective agreements, the provision of goods and services, and other publicly available opportunities, and the Prohibition of Incitement to Hatred Act of 1989, which outlaws incitement to hatred based on sexual orientation (see Minton, 2013). In a country where Church and State are still inextricably linked (Bacik, 2004), and the population is around 95 per cent Roman Catholic, traditional Roman Catholic teachings on homosexuality have prevailed, and homophobia in all its guises has remained largely unchallenged until very recent times (Bacik, 2004; Minton, 2013; Norman, Galvin, & McNamara, 2006).

disproportionately – have also emerged when one considers *ethnicity,* and (for now, we will say) curiously enough, in Norway, the country which has traditionally led the world in anti-bullying research and large-scale anti-bullying intervention practice (Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press; Hansen & Sørlie, 2012). Studies in the United States that have been conducted over the last decade have shown that ethnicity/race can be related to involvement in bullying behaviour, but the picture that has emerged is far from clear. For example, Spriggs, Iannotti, Nansel and Haynie (2007)'s study of a nationally representative sample (n = 11,033) of American adolescents in grades six to ten participating in the 2001 Health Behaviours in School-Aged Children survey, recorded that black adolescents reported having been bullied less frequently than did white and Hispanic students. However, Carlyle and Steinman (2007)'s findings, which were based on a sample of 79,492 sixth to twelfth graders in sixteen school districts across a large metropolitan area in the United States, found that reports of bullying others *and* having been bullied were more common amongst African American and Native American students than amongst white and Hispanic students. Two studies conducted in the Netherlands (Vervoot, Scholte & Overbeek, 2010, (n = 2,386, mean age: 13 years and 10 months)); Tolsma, van Deurzen, Stark, & Veenstra, 2013 (n = 739 students in their final primary school year)) found that being bullied did not depend on the ethnic background of the individual student, but rather on the diversity within the school class; specifically, both inter-ethnic and intra-ethnic bullying increased with increasing levels of ethnic diversity in school classes.

As indicated above, a rather clearer picture of the association between having an ethnic minority (in this case, indigenous) background and an increased vulnerability towards being bullied in school came from the finding that that Sami children in Norway reported having experienced bullying twice as often as did ethnic Norwegian children (Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press; Hansen & Sørlie, 2012). As we have seen, Norway can rightfully claim to be the traditional world-leader in anti-bullying research (see also Minton, 2014a); it has benefitted from nationwide anti-bullying intervention programmes for over three decades (see above, Section II, 'Traditional Interventions against School Bullying'; also, Ertesvåg & Vaaland, 2007; Olweus, 1991; Olweus & Limber, 2010; Roland, 2000), and such initiatives have not occurred in a vacuum. It may be recalled that as early as 1997, Roland and Munthe (p. 233) were able to state, without either qualification or contradiction, that school bullying '… has been a topic of great concern in the Scandinavian countries for nearly thirty years'. When the afore-mentioned Olweus anti-bullying programme, and the then newly-developed 'Zero' programme were mainstreamed (i.e. offered to all schools in Norway), this was done in the context of a nationwide effort against bullying behaviour in 2004–2005. Legal reform was a key part of supporting this '*Manifesto mot mobbing*' ['Manifesto against Bullying'] (see Manifesto Against Bullying, 2004; Tikkanen & Junge, 2004, 2005). Section 9A-1 of the then recently passed Education Act (2002) spelled out the responsibilities for schools and the State (ultimately rooted in

Norway's responsibility under international law to ensure the right of the child to feel safe in school – Norway is a signatory to the *United Nation's Declaration on the Rights of the Child* (1959); see Manifesto Against Bullying, 2004), in guaranteeing a satisfactory physical and psychosocial environment in the nation's schools. All students attending primary and secondary schools in Norway are, under Section 9A-1, legally '… entitled to a satisfactory physical and psychosocial environment conducive to health, well-being and learning', and according to Section 9A-4 of the same Act, schools '… shall actively make continuous and systematic efforts to promote the health, environment and safety of the pupils … such efforts shall apply to both the physical and the psychosocial environment'. A practical outcome of these legal requirements was that the implementation of anti-bullying programmes in schools at all times Norway was effectively mandated.[27] However, the finding that Sami[28] children reported having been bullied twice as frequently as did ethnic Norwegians (Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press; Hansen & Sørlie, 2012; Minton, 2014a) raised the question as to whether the provisions of the Education Act's chapter 9A are as satisfactorily realised in schools for Sami and other 'minority' children in Norway as they are for ethnic Norwegian majority children (Lile & Hansen, 2012; Minton, 2014a).

It is difficult for me to imagine a set of members of society who have been so marginalised – so universally across time and cultures, so consistently, and in such a variety of ways – as have *people with physical and intellectual disabilities.* To say anything remotely intelligent about the historical and contemporary

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[27] Nine years after an event at which she had served as a rapporteur (see O'Moore, 1988), Mona O'Moore wrote that the *European Seminar for Teachers on Bullying in Schools* held in Stavanger, Norway in 1987 was "instrumental in awakening Europe to the need for research into school bullying" (O'Moore, 1997, p. 136). Seventeen years later, some of the delegates who had attended that conference, and thereafter had implemented research into establishing the incidence and prevalence of bullying, and the development of anti-bullying intervention programmes, on their return to their home countries (see Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 1999, for reviews) attended another conference in Stavanger: *Taking Fear Out of Schools: International Policy and Research Conference on School Bullying and Violence* (held in 2004; see Munthe, Ytre-Arne, & Roland, 2005). At this conference, delegates heard of the recent legislative changes that seemingly made anti-bullying action mandatory in Norwegian schools (see above), and visited schools who were implementing one of the *two* governmentally supported anti-bullying programmes – the afore-mentioned Olweus and 'Zero' programmes (see Munthe et al., 2005). To me (I attended, and made a poster presentation of my planned postgraduate research; Minton, 2004), the most impressive symbol of the central support that anti-bullying efforts had in Norway was the opening address by the then-Norwegian prime minister (Bondevik, 2004), who referenced the national *Manifesto mot mobbing* ['Manifesto against Bullying' (2004)] that he had recently co-signed on behalf of the government. I will own having experienced more than a slight pang of jealousy at the time, and I would imagine that most non-Norwegian delegates experienced something similar.

[28] The Sami people, who are estimated to number between 70,000 and 100,000, are generally recognised as being the indigenous people of Scandinavia; their traditional lands comprise the northern parts of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Russia's Kola Peninsula. The story of their marginalisation, and in particular the cultural genocide committed against them by the Norwegian government between 1850 and 1950, is recorded in Chapter 4 of this book (Section II, 'Case Study I: "Norwegianisation" and the Sami People in Norway').

marginalisation of people with disabilities would fill a small library, and hence is, sadly, both beyond the scope of this book, and my own fields of research experience and professional expertise.[29] Given the sheer scale of this marginalisation, though, it is unsurprising to find that those who have physical and intellectual disabilities are disproportionately highly represented amongst those who have experienced being bullied. In a cross-border (Northern Ireland-Republic of Ireland) study, Purdy and Mc Guckin (2011) noted that *'disablist' bullying* has been defined by the Northern Ireland Anti-Bullying Forum (NIABF) as '… hurtful, insulting or intimidating behaviour, related to a perceived or actual disability' (NIABF, 2010), and has been exemplified by Bristol City Council (in the United Kingdom) thus:

> … the regular use, consciously or unconsciously, of offensive and discriminatory language, particularly the widespread use of terms like 'idiot', 'spastic', 'moron' and 'cretin' as generic insults or terms of abuse; verbal abuse and threats; disablist graffiti; disablist comments in the course of discussions in classroom; spreading rumours that cause a young person's impairment to be questioned, ridiculed or insulted; public ridicule, e.g., imitating an individual's manner of speech or movement, interfering with necessary equipment; disablist jokes, insults and comments; physical or sexual assault against a person or group because of their impairment; refusal to cooperate/work with someone because of their impairment or behaviour; making a disabled person feel unsafe, e.g., pushing, shoving; refusing to meet a disabled person's access needs; isolation or exclusion from social groups.[30] (2006, p. 18; in Purdy & Mc Guckin, 2011, pp. 9–10)

However, our confidence in the precision of estimations of the prevalence of the bullying behaviour perpetrated on and by young people with disabilities must be

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[29] To give an example of a particularly horrific episode of this history, it may be recalled that the phrase '*Lebensunwertes Leben*' ['life unworthy of life'], which became a cornerstone of the Nazi 'hygiene' policy that found its culmination in the mass murders of those deemed racially inferior in death camps, was *first* attached to people with disabilities, who were subsequently legally 'euthanised'. Indeed, the construction of the gas chambers used in the mass murders at Auschwitz was the outcome of a series experiments in finding the most efficacious and cost-efficient methods of 'euthanasia'; the possibilities of lethal injections, carbon monoxide from exhaust outputs of mobile 'euthanasia' trucks, and bottled gas were all investigated, with disabled people invariably serving as the 'guinea pigs' in such experiments (see Evans, 2004). It has been estimated by some historians that as many as 200,000 mentally ill or physically disabled people, all of whom were deemed 'life unworthy of life', were murdered by the Nazis between 1939 and 1945 (Burleigh, 1995).

[30] The primary focus of Purdy and Mc Guckin's (2011) study was the feelings of preparedness (or otherwise) amongst trainee teachers in dealing with situations of disablist bullying in schools. In a study of 257 trainee teachers at initial teacher training institutions in Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland, they found that although participants attributed a high level of importance to both special educational needs and bullying behaviour, these two issues had tended to remain separate; none of them had received any guidance at all in relation to disablist bullying as part of their initial teacher education. Accordingly, the authors recommended the introduction of '… practical, solution-focused and evidence-based courses at ITE [initial teacher education] and CPD [continuing professional development] level in both jurisdictions [Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland]' (p. 4).

limited, due to (i) inconsistent findings recorded in the small-scale studies that do exist (Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt, & Hymel, 2010); and, (ii) the fact that disability was absent as a demographic category in the first quarter century or so of large-scale studies of school bullying and violence (see Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 1999; and Smith, Pepler, & Rigby, 2004). In an early study conducted in Ireland, O'Moore and Hillery (1989) found that students with disabilities may be more likely to perpetrate bullying and aggressive behaviour, postulating that such (verbal and physical) behaviour may be a defensive strategy against their own potential victimisation; Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt and Hymel (2010) suggested that such students may thereby become 'provocative victims'. Furthermore, in reviewing the research literature regarding prevalence that does exist, Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt and Hymel (2010), cited Little's (2000) finding that up to 94 per cent of students with disabilities reported that they had experienced some form of victimisation. Such victimisation is typically characterised by verbal abuse, social exclusion, and physical aggression (Llewellyn, 2000; in Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt, & Hymel, 2010). In the United Kingdom, 83 children with moderate learning difficulties (from a sample of 101) reported having been bullied, with almost half of the bullying having been related to the students' learning difficulties (Norwich & Kelly, 2004), and parents in a study by the National Autistic Society reported that that two in five children with autism, and almost three in five children with high functioning autism, had been bullied (Tippett, Houlston, & Smith, 2010).

Sadly, the bullying of those with intellectual disabilities has also been found to take place within residential settings in which those individuals are supposed to receive care. In a study of 77 service users in the Republic of Ireland who were recorded as having a 'mild' or 'moderate' intellectual disability, McGrath, Black and Sutton (2013) recorded that some 42 per cent of their respondents reported that they had been bullied in the last year, with 54 per cent of those reporting that bullying had occurred on a daily or weekly basis. The perpetrators of the bullying were, according to the service users who reported having been bullied, mostly other service users (81 per cent), but staff members (6 per cent), parents (9 per cent) and 'others' (9 per cent) were also mentioned. The educational centre was the most frequent location in which the bullying had taken place (69 per cent of those bullied service users reported this to have been the case), and whilst 84 per cent of those who had reported that they had been bullied said the bullying was verbal in nature, the bullying was physical in nature for 28 per cent of them (respondents could, and some did, report having experienced more than one form of bullying). Additionally, although 47 per cent reported the bullying that they had been subjected to, in 50 per cent of those cases, the bullying had continued (McGrath, Black, & Sutton, 2013).

A television programme which 'shocked the [British] nation' (BBC News, 2012a), causing outrage amongst many of those who viewed it (an episode of BBC's *Panorama*, entitled 'Undercover Care: The Abuse Exposed', broadcast in May 2011), showed members of staff at the Winterbourne View Hospital, a private hospital, verbally abusing, mistreating and physically assaulting adults with learning disabilities and autism spectrum conditions. This led to the commissioning

of a Serious Case Review by South Gloucestershire's Adult Safeguarding Board (Flynn, 2012). After receiving reports from a 'whistle-blower', senior nurse Terry Bryan, who had been unsuccessful in his previous attempts to raise concerns with the Hospital, the organisation responsible for its building and operation (Castlebeck Ltd.), or the Care Quality Commission (the national regulator in England), an undercover BBC reporter secured employment as a support worker at Winterbourne View, and over five weeks filmed his colleagues '… tormenting, bullying and assaulting patients' (Flynn, 2012, p. ii). BBC News (2012a) reported that their programme had shown patients '… being slapped and restrained under chairs, having their hair pulled, and being held down as medication was forced into their mouths'; that '… one victim was showered while fully clothed and had mouthwash poured into her eyes', and that another who had tried to jump out of a second-floor building to escape the abuse was mocked by the staff members; and that a reviewer featured on the programme, Dr Peter Carter, head of the Royal College of Nursing, had said that, '… the sickening abuse revealed in this programme is more shocking than anything we could have imagined' (BBC News, 2012a). Three weeks after the programme was broadcasted, South Gloucestershire Council set about finding new placements for all of the 24 patients then living at Winterbourne View, and the Hospital, along with two other centres run by Castlebeck Ltd. (Rose Villa in Bristol, and Arden Vale near Coventry) closed on 24th June, 2011. The Care Quality Commission inspected all hospitals and homes for people with learning difficulties, and found that nearly half failed to meet the necessary standards for care and safety (Chorley & Greenville, 2012). Twelve months later, two council managers who had been responsible for the safeguarding of vulnerable adults were sacked on 24th July, 2012 (BBC News, 2012b). As a direct result of the television programme, eleven people were charged with, and pleaded guilty to, 38 counts of neglect or abuse; six of them were jailed (the longest sentence handed down was for two years to 32 year-old Wayne Rogers, identified as the 'ring-leader'), and five received suspended sentences (BBC News, 2012c). In sentencing, Judge Neil Ford QC commented that there was a '… culture of cruelty at the care home' which was '… vile and inexcusable'; that '… the guilty parties were only charged with offences shown on the Panorama programme, and it would be naive to believe that this monstrous behaviour had not been continuing for a very long time'; and, critically, that if the abuse had not been uncovered by the BBC, it would have continued (BBC News, 2012c).

As well as disablist bullying, and the abuse and violence sometimes shown towards those individuals with physical and intellectual disabilities in educational and residential settings, there is at least one other violent contemporary manifestation of the marginalisation and aggression experienced by people with disabilities. Pam Thomas (2010) has reported on the phenomenon of '*mate crime*',[31] which she describes as a play on the term 'hate crime',[32] and refers to '…

[31] 'Mate' is (originally) British slang for 'friend', and as well as its use in the United Kingdom, the term is used extensively in Australia and New Zealand. Whilst apparently sounding too 'British' to permit its widespread usage in the Republic of Ireland, and apparently being an amusing stereotype of (especially) *(continued)*

considered actions against disabled people at the hands of someone, or several people, that the disabled person considers to be their friends, or they may be relatives',[33] with these actions being '… acts of cruelty, humiliation, servitude, exploitation and theft' (p. 107). In its review of *Common Factors in Disability Hate Crime*, as part of its *Guidance on Prosecuting Cases of Disability Hate*, the Crown Prosecution Service (2016) in England and Wales notes that 'an overview of disability hate crimes reveals a common trend of extra factors, in addition to the offence itself' [including the finding that] '… there have often been previous incidents. For example, financial or sexual exploitation; making the victim commit minor criminal offences such as shoplifting; using or selling the victim's medication; taking over the victim's accommodation to commit further offences such as taking/selling drugs, handling stolen goods, encouraging under-age drinking and sexual behaviour'; that '… multiple perpetrators are involved in incidents condoning and encouraging the main offender(s), often filming on their mobile phones and sending pictures to friends/social networking sites'; and that incidents involve '… cruelty, humiliation, degrading treatment, often related to the nature of the disability', and '… escalate in severity and frequency'. Furthermore, it is noted that '… *perpetrators are often "friends", carers, acquaintances, or neighbours*' (emphasis mine), and that '… barriers to, and negative experience of, reporting to criminal justice agencies which lead disabled people to feel that they are not being taken seriously'. In terms of these barriers to reporting, Thomas (2011) notes that in 'mate crime', '… the disabled person may cling to the relationship, wanting the hostility to stop, but welcoming the company and feeling part of a family or group', and that, '… disabled people in these situations are less likely to complain to the police or other authorities, [and] because they consider the perpetrators to be their friends, they may justify the violence' (p. 108).

An on-line survey of almost 150 people with autism or Asperger's syndrome, and their carers, was conducted in early 2015 by the UK charity, the Wirral Autistic Society. Accounts included one of a seventeen year-old girl whose iPod and mobile telephone were stolen by classmates at school, and had a 'boyfriend' who '… always turns up when it is her payday for her DLA' (disability living allowance); a respondent whose brother (who had autism) '… was befriended by neighbours who robbed him and stored drugs in his flat'; and, a vulnerable young

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Australian English to some people in the United States, it should be recalled that the intent, as traditionally understood by users of the term, is the expression of friendly familiarity and (traditionally working class) solidarity.

[32] In its '*Guidance on Prosecuting Cases of Disability Hate*', the Crown Prosecution Service (2016) cautions *against* the use of the term 'mate crime', noting that whilst '… people with learning disabilities or mental health issues are often "befriended" by people who then exploit them [and] the term 'mate crime' is used by some disability organisations within the disabled community to raise awareness of the issue … it is not CPS policy to use this phrase as it may introduce further confusion regarding terminology and is potentially confusing to people with learning disabilities'.

[33] Despite the play on words, Thomas (2010) argues that, '… the occurrences of cruelty and servitude indicate that what is currently being termed "mate crime" has more in common with domestic violence than "hate crime", which is perpetrated by people with whom there is no relationship beyond acquaintance' (p. 107).

person who was tricked into giving his debit card and PIN number to a 'friend', who then ran up huge bills (Cassidy, 2015). It was found that many people with autism and Asperger's syndrome were unable to differentiate real friendships from those pseudo-friendships in which they are abused, exploited or manipulated, and that relatives and carers were the ones to spot these patterns – a parent of a 14-year-old with autism reported that, 'My son is absolutely harmless and extremely vulnerable. It is so hard explaining that people are making fun of him'. In terms of other barriers to reporting 'mate crime', one young target said that, 'I was frightened to tell anyone about the bullying and theft and manipulation' (Cassidy, 2015). Whilst I find it difficult to find strong enough words of contempt in which to characterise 'mate crime' committed against individuals with disabilities, it should be remembered that the survey undertaken by the Wirral Autistic Society found its incidence to be far from isolated. In fact, it was found that some 80 per cent of respondents over the age of 16 reported that they had been bullied or taken advantage of by someone they had thought was a friend, and that whilst the most vulnerable age group was those aged between 16 to 25, 54 per cent of 12–16 year-olds had had money or possessions stolen. Furthermore, over a third of adults with autism reported having been subjected to sexual bullying, or manipulation of a sexual nature.

Other 'differences', however, are self-chosen, and yet abusive marginalisation can and apparently does still get meted out, sometimes in the most brutal of ways. The murder of Sophie Lancaster,[34] a twenty year-old gap-year student in

[34] In the early hours of Saturday, 11th August 2007, Sophie Lancaster (20) and her boyfriend, Robert Maltby (21), were attacked, without provocation, by a large group of teenagers in Stubbylee Park, Bacup, Lancashire, England (Butt, 2007). Mr. Maltby was attacked first; Ms. Lancaster, who was trying to protect Mr. Maltby, was then attacked; both were punched and kicked unconscious, and were left comatose, with bleeding on the brain (Wainwright, 2008; Watkinson, 2009). Whereas Mr. Maltby has since physically recovered, Ms. Lancaster's injuries were such that she would never do so, and on 24th August 2007, Ms. Lancaster's family agreed to discontinue life support (Butt, 2007). Although it is estimated that upwards of fifteen people were involved in the attack, a lack of independent (in this case, non-perpetrator) witnesses meant that only two were convicted of murder, and a further three were convicted of causing grievous bodily harm (Garnham, 2008; Watkinson, 2009). It was widely reported at the time of the attack that Ms. Lancaster and Mr. Maltby had been dressed in the 'goth' style, and that it was this that had 'provoked' the attack (Butt, 2007; Garnham, 2008; Watkinson, 2009; Wainwright, 2008). Furthermore, in sentencing two of the teenagers for Ms Lancaster's murder, Judge Anthony Russell QC commented that, '… this was a hate crime against these completely harmless people who you targeted because their appearance was different to yours' (BBC News, 2008a). Ms. Lancaster's mother, Mrs. Sylvia Lancaster, has since started a charity in her late daughter's name and memory. The stated aims of the Sophie Lancaster Foundation, which was registered in the United Kingdom in 2009, are 'to create a lasting legacy to Sophie'; 'to provide educational group-works that will challenge the prejudice and intolerance towards people from alternative subcultures'; and, 'to campaign to have the UK Hate Crime legislation extended to include people from alternative subcultures or lifestyle and dress' (Sophie Lancaster Foundation, 2016). The charity gives presentations at schools, youth groups, young offenders institutions and prisons; it has developed an educational resource and training programme for teachers, youth workers and social workers to raise awareness of and address prejudice with young people; short films, radio and stage plays, and a full-length award-winning feature film have been produced, and Mrs. Sylvia Lancaster has been interviewed many times on radio and television. In 2013, Greater Manchester Police became the first United Kingdom police force to monitor and record hate crimes and incidents against people from alternative subcultures; since then, eleven other UK *(continued)*

Lancashire, England, who was beaten and kicked to death in August 2007 by a gang of teenagers due to her 'alternative' appearance and style of dress (see Butt, 2007; Minton, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a), prompted my own interest in researching the phenomenon of alterophobia,[35] and whether this specific type of prejudice is evident in patterns of school bullying (in the same way, for example, that homophobia/heteronormativity is). I surveyed 820 16–17 years old students (339 males (41.3 per cent), 481 females (58.7 per cent)), at nine secondary schools in Ireland, who responded to a short, specifically constructed questionnaire concerning membership of groups and sub-cultures and bullying behaviour. I found that (i) self-identified members of sub-cultures reported having been bullied more frequently than did members of the general sample; and, (ii) participants reported that members of 'alternative' sub-cultures ('moshers/rockers', 'goths' and 'emos') were more likely to be bullied, and that members of 'non-alternative' sub-cultures ('chavs' and 'D4s'[36]) were more likely to bully others. I concluded that whilst the data was admittedly exploratory in nature, alterophobic bullying was indeed a reality in schools in Ireland, and that members of 'alternative' sub-cultures may be considered as being 'at risk' of being bullied in Ireland[37] (Minton, 2012b, 2014a).

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police forces have also done so (Sophie Lancaster Foundation, 2016). Mrs. Lancaster was awarded an OBE for her work on tackling hate crime in 2014 (BBC News, 2014a).

[35] The term 'alterophobia' has been used in on-line communities for about seven or eight years (see Alterophobia Blogspot, 2016), but was brought into the research literature more recently, where it has been defined as '… prejudice directed towards members of alternative sub-cultures' (Minton, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a), including those who are, or are perceived as being, '… goths, punks, emos, skaters and fans of heavy metal, and those who listen to any type of alternative music'. The prejudice is held to be '… based on the way they look and that their musical and other interests differ from the mainstream' (Alterophobia Blogspot, in Minton, 2012a, 2012b). In its usage in the research literature, the term was coined as a deliberate neologism, being modelled after the term 'homophobia' (Minton, 2012b).

[36] The definitions (which were based on condensations of those found at Wikipedia) of the sub-groups provided to the research participants (who would almost certainly have been aware of the definitions anyway) might well be helpful to the present reader (who may well not be). These were as follows: 'A *chav* is a stereotypical rough young person, typically unemployed or of white working class background, who repeatedly engages in anti-social behaviour, such as street drinking, drug abuse and rowdiness'; '*D4* describes an Irish liberal elitist attitude, based on the perceived opinions and characteristics of some residents of this area, referring to the alleged wealth and posh life-style of residents'; '*Moshers* and *rockers* are typically fans of heavy metal music, and have long hair, wearing jeans, black T-shirts, boots and black leather or denim jackets. T-shirts are generally emblazoned with the logos or other visual representations of favourite bands'; 'the *goth* subculture refers to tastes in music and fashion. Gothic music encompasses a number of different styles, and styles of dress within the subculture range from punk, Victorian, some Renaissance and Medieval style, or combinations of the above, most often with black clothes, make-up and hair'; and, '*emos* are stereotyped as wearing skinny jeans, sometimes in bright colors, and tight t-shirts (usually short-sleeved) which often bear the names of emo bands. Emos have been associated with a stereotype that includes being particularly emotional, sensitive, shy, and introverted' (Minton, 2012b, pp. 89–90). As extensions of mainstream working class/underclass and upper middle class cultures respectively, 'chavs' and 'D4s' were seen as mainstream, or non-alternative sub-cultures, whereas 'goths', 'moshers/rockers' and 'emos' were seen as alternative sub-cultures (Minton, 2012b).

[37] This type of prejudice is clearly not restricted to countries east of the Atlantic. Ten years before the murder of Sophie Lancaster, the murder of 19 year-old Brian Deneke (a punk) in a deliberate hit and run attack in Amarillo, Texas, had resulted in the driver (Dustin Camp, a 17 year-old football playing 'jock') being found guilty only of voluntary vehicular manslaughter, sentenced to ten years' probation *(continued)*

IV. OTHER DIRECTIONS IN PREVENTING AND DEALING WITH BULLYING IN SCHOOL COMMUNITIES

As we have seen above (Section II, 'Traditional Interventions against School Bullying'), the forefather of anti-bullying research, Dan Olweus, vigorously disputed Løbding and Vibe 2010's conclusion that '… bullying is not a problem that can be solved by adopting a specific programme' (p. 26, translation mine; Minton, 2014a), and argued that the conclusion that '… a [good] learning environment actually causes reduced bullying' was 'pure speculation' (see Olweus & Breivik, 2011, p. 36). However, the idea of the potential usefulness of 'broader' programmes in addressing bullying, and related forms of problematic behaviour, is somewhat older. Indeed, Norwegian anti-bullying expert Erling Roland had asked the question, 'Is the direct approach to reducing bullying always the best?' some years before (Galloway & Roland, 2004), in the context of considering the SAF-developed '*Samtak*' programme, which was not exclusively focused upon the issue of bullying, but instead included it amongst five central topics (bullying, violence and severe behavioural problems, withdrawal and severe introversion problems, classes that did not function, and preventive measures at the class level (Roland, Bjørnsen, & Mandt, 2001).

A 'broad' approach to the problems of aggressive behaviour had been taken by SAF's staff as early as 1998, in an attempt to address the substantial problems of violence experienced in a school in an Oslo school that drew (and to my knowledge, still draws) its students from a lower socioeconomic and multi-ethnic base; this was the '*Prosjekt hjem/skole/nærmiljø ved Gran skole*' ['Home/School/Local Environment Project at Gran School']. Gran School is a combined primary and lower secondary school, located in Furuset, a multi-cultural district of Oslo, and typically enrols around 450 students, aged 6–15 years. In 1998, 62 per cent of the students at Gran school were from a non-Norwegian background (Soløy, 1998), and in August 2001, 68.3 per cent of the students spoke a mother tongue other than Norwegian (O'Moore and Minton, 2002). Prior to the programme, at the school in 1997, 'violence, the use of weapons, threats towards pupils and teachers, disruption and vandalism had become part of everyday life … the head teacher and staff had lost control' (Roland, Bjørnsen, & Mandt, 2001, pp. 24, 25). The interventions made in the '*Prosjekt hjem/skole/nærmiljø ved Gran skole*' included: (i) the provision of training of school staff by SAF; (ii) improved parent–school and inter-professional cooperation; (iii) activities for pupils; (iv) improvements in the aesthetics of the physical environment; (v) recruitment of specialist personnel and non-Norwegian staff; (vi) the introduction of a pupil mediation service; (vii) the establishment of school traditions, and the positioning

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and given a $10,000 fine (Lyons, 1999; Yardley, 1999). At trial, Camp's defence attorney characterised the punks as aggressors (referring to them as 'armed goons') and emphasised Camp's wholesomeness, Christianity and 'normalcy' (Lyons, 1999). Subsequently, underage-drinking related parole violations led to Camp being given an eight year sentence in 2001, from which he was paroled in 2006 (Packard, 2007), and numerous tribute gigs and concerts have been held for Brian Deneke since his death (see Lutz, 2000; Packard, 2007).

of the school as a 'Culture House'; and (viii) a general focus on social competence (see O'Moore & Minton, 2002, 2006, for full details). Just fourteen months after intervention efforts commenced, the same newspaper (*Aftenposten*) that had published an article that had caused widespread concern about the situation in Gran school was able to report that, 'Gran school has found the antidote to daily violence' (Soløy, 1998; translation mine).

An independent evaluation of the project was undertaken by an Irish team, of which I was a member (see O'Moore & Minton, 2002, 2006). Records provided by the school principal in the course of that evaluation evidenced *reductions* in: (i) violence against adult school personnel; (ii) student injuries caused by violence; (iii) gang-characterised violence in the school; (iv) cases of exclusion; and (v) vandalism, and *improvements* in (i) collaboration with parents; (ii) staff recruitment and retention; and (iii) students' evaluations of the school (O'Moore & Minton, 2002, 2006). The three annual reports of the working group of the project, and the final report, reflected five underlying success factors: (i) the introduction of mediation services; (ii) the use of students' creative work; (iii) the use of specialist subject teachers; (iv) cooperative work with parents; and (v) training to work with students and parents from ethnic minority groups (O'Moore & Minton, 2002, 2006). SAF's own evaluations (in Roland, Bjørnsen & Mandt, 2003) were positive, recording the principal stating that, '… it was not one, single ingenious thing that made the great difference, but the sum of many small moves' (p. 211). We (the Irish external evaluation team) found that there was '… no reason whatsoever to dispute the innovative solutions to the most serious of problems previously experienced at the school which have been generated by this project', and recorded that Gran School, via the implementation of the project, had received several awards and prizes. We were able to conclude that the programme '… has been received at every level as a success', and that we had seen '… how, with expert guidance, the mobilisation of considerable resources, and perhaps most of all, the sheer energy of a devoted principal and her staff, Gran school has turned itself around' (O'Moore & Minton, 2002).

At around the same time (i.e., the late 1990s) that a 'broad' approach to the issue of school violence was being taken at Gran School in Norway, an approach that was simultaneously a conceptual position, and a practical method of working with whole-school communities in addressing the issues of non-respectful behaviour and school violence, emerged in Flanders (Deklerck, Deboutte, & Depuydt, 2003). This approach is known as '*verbondenheid*', a Dutch/Flemish word that is rendered as 'linkedness' in English. Conceptually, the 'Linkedness' model draws extensively from the systemic thinking of developmental psychologist Urie Bronfenbrenner,[38] whose ecosystemic model of child development has become increasingly influential over the last four decades (see, for example and review, Mc Guckin & Minton, 2014). In the 'Linkedness' model, behaviour that might

[38] Bronfenbrenner's approach (1977, 1979, 1989) is outlined in Chapter 5 of this book (see Section II, 'Some Thoughts on Re-Humanising Psychology and Psychological Practice', sub-section on 'Other Possibilities: Ecological Thinking, Humanistic Psychology and Systemic Approaches').

traditionally have been referred to as 'delinquency' is seen, as is all non-respectful behaviour at school, as non-accidental, and as involving '… the interaction between person-related factors (both endogenous and exogenous) on the one hand, and context-related factors on the other'. The consequent ecological approach of 'Linkedness' to problems of non-respectful behaviour in schools takes into account five levels – the personal, the interaction, the material, the broad social environment, and the 'natural living' environment levels (Deboutte, Deklerck, O'Moore & Minton, 2006). The argument made is that 'de-linq-ency' is '… always the expression of the lack of a link between the offender and (one or more dimensions of) the victimised environment' (Deklerck, Deboutte, & Depuydt, 2003, p. 321), and '… consequently, re-linking is the logical answer' (Deboutte, Deklerck, O'Moore & Minton, 2006, p. 11). The 'Linkedness' concept has been applied in the development and implementation of whole-school programmes undertaken in Flanders and beyond. In such programmes, the goals of applying the 'Linkedness' concept have been the creation of a positive school ethos and environment, and the reduction of non-respectful and violent behaviour in schools, through co-operative endeavours involving the entire school team (Deboutte et al., 2006). Through the pan-European VISTA (Violence in Schools Training Action) project (see Cowie et al., 2006), some of the 'Linkedness' resources that support practical schools were made available in the Bulgarian, Dutch, English, German, and Spanish languages (Deboutte, Deklerck, O'Moore & Minton, 2006).

The notion of a 'whole school community' focus had often been cited in the implementation strategies of large-scale intervention programmes (see, for example, O'Moore & Minton, 2004, 2005);[39] however, whilst ways were found to meaningfully include intervention efforts involving the larger community in the '*Prosjekt hjem/skole/nærmiljø ved Gran skole*' (which was focussed upon a single school), such efforts have either not been routinely applied, or else have been made only at a cursory level, in evaluated intervention programmes that have involved multiple schools. An exception to this general pattern was the '*Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative*', which was designed in 2009–2010, and implemented from October 2010 (Minton, O'Mahoney, & Conway-Walsh, 2013). In August 2009, the staff of the *Iorras Le Chéile* ['Erris Together'] Community Development Project (headed by Rose Conway-Walsh) and I began working on putting together a comprehensive strategic plan to help to tackle and create a 'zero tolerance' towards bullying in the

[39] In Ireland, for example, a possible 'community approach' to dealing with bullying in schools was outlined by Brendan Byrne as early as 1994. However, Byrne outlined a series of ideas and a scheme for how a community approach *could* be implemented; a community approach was actually *realised* in the Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative (Minton, O'Mahoney, & Conway-Walsh, 2013). It should be noted that Byrne's model and the community development model that was designed, implemented and evaluated in Erris were not conceptually linked. It seems that the interventions made in medium- to large-scale anti-bullying programmes (or at least those that have been professionally evaluated) have invariably been school-located, with 'community inclusion' strategies being limited to the broader community (usually parents) being 'invited in' at certain phases of implementation. In the Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative, community groups and community members were included from the very outset of the design of the programme (see Minton, O'Mahoney, & Conway-Walsh, 2013, for details).

entire Erris[40] community. A local Steering Committee met for the first time in September, 2009, and after considerable consultation and collaboration, the final version of the practical anti-bullying plan was finalised in March, 2010, based on (i) the general desire to work in a way that is inclusive of the whole community; (ii) an active process of community consultation; and, (iii) best practice findings regarding anti-bullying intervention programmes, locally, nationally and internationally, in the past. The Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative was designed to run simultaneously in the participating schools *and* community groups (e.g. youth and community development groups, the GAA (Gaelic Athletic Association)[41] clubs, horse-riding clubs, soccer clubs), with the active and invited involvement of local members of the Garda and clergy, psychotherapists and social workers, parents, advocates for disability groups and the elderly, from October 2010. By a simultaneous involvement of schools, community groups and community members, the aim was that young people in Erris should receive a consistent message regarding the unacceptability of bullying behaviour.

In terms of evaluation, a comparison of pre- (May 2010) and post- (May 2011) programme modified Olweus Bully/Victim Questionnaires completed by students in the participating schools showed that amongst primary school students, following the implementation of the programme, there were (i) reductions in frequencies of reports of having been involved in all categories of bully/victim problems; (ii) increases in frequencies of reports in all categories of their estimations of their teachers, peers and own positive responses in situations of bullying at school; and, (iii) increases in frequencies of students' reports in most categories of feelings about bullying consistent with an anti-bullying ethos. Amongst secondary school students, there were (i) reductions in frequencies of reports in most categories of bully/victim problems; (ii) increases in frequencies of

[40] Erris itself is a rural area of some 210,000 acres (850 square kilometres), located in north-western Co. Mayo, in the far west of Ireland; according to the 2006 Census of Population (Central Statistics Office 2007), there were 8,602 inhabitants, with 2,391 of these being under the age of 19. Erris includes large *Gaeltacht* areas (i.e. where the Irish language is the first, or predominant language). Erris has five parishes, three post-primary schools and nineteen national (primary) schools, and according to an application of the Haase Index of Deprivation (Haase & Pratschke, 2005), is one of the most disadvantaged areas in the country. The Haase Index provides a single measurement of the overall deprivation of an area, and is used by all major Irish State and semi-State bodies. It takes into consideration the social class composition, the level of education, the level of unemployment and long-term unemployment, the proportion of lone parents, the extent of small farming, and the age dependency rate. The index rankings range from one (most affluent ten per cent) to ten (most disadvantaged 10 per cent). At the time of the design of the Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative, Erris' Haase Index rank factor score was ten.

[41] The Gaelic Athletic Association (GAA) (in Irish, *Cumann Lúthchleas Gael*) is an Irish and international amateur sporting and cultural organisation, which promotes the traditional Gaelic games of hurling, Gaelic football and handball. Many of the smallest villages in Ireland have a GAA club, which often serves an important social function, especially in rural communities, where sporting success at any age level instills a palpable sense of local civic pride. Success at the senior All-Ireland inter-county level in the team games of Gaelic football and hurling is widely celebrated in the counties with strong GAA traditions. In Erris, the GAA clubs have a vitally important role in the community, and those involved in coaching and administration at the clubs were enthusiastic supporters of the anti-bullying initiative.

reports in most categories of their estimations of their teachers, peers and own positive responses in situations of bullying at school; and, (iii) increases in frequencies of students' reports in one category of feelings about bullying consistent with an anti-bullying ethos (Minton, O'Mahoney, & Conway-Walsh, 2013).

CONCLUDING POINTS: SCHOOL BULLYING AND MARGINALISATION RECONSIDERED

In this chapter, we have seen that despite the considerable efforts made into researching and establishing an evidence-base for, resourcing, implementing, and evaluating anti-bullying programmes, in terms of success rates, the broad-scale implementation of whole-school programmes has led in most cases to comparatively modest levels of success. This finding has been documented in extensively cited meta-reviews (see Farrington & Ttofi, 2009; Merrell, Gueldner, Ross, & Isava, 2008; Smith, 2003; Smith, Pepler, & Rigby, 2004). In Norway, which has enjoyed central government support for anti-bullying efforts since 1983, this finding informed a report by Løddng and Vibe (2010) that proposed that 'direct' approaches to bullying be replaced by less direct methods, focussed on making improvements across the school environment. My own conclusion has been that the limited effectiveness of anti-bullying programmes, as they have been traditionally conceived, is at least partially explicable in terms of their design and informing philosophies; they rely heavily on the strategies of 'awareness-raising' and 'behaviour management', and thus can be considered rather superficial (Minton, 2014a). Could programmes based on such informing philosophies and strategies really be expected to challenge young people in schools, and the systems inside schools, and produce *actual behavioural change*, rather than merely leading to improvements in *knowledge about* bullying (which, as Merrell, Gueldner, Ross, & Isava, 2008, have noted, is more frequently the outcome of anti-bullying programmes)? We have seen that the more recently developed KiVa anti-bullying programme (Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen, & Salmivalli, 2011; Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b; KiVa International, 2016; Salmivalli, 2016) seems to offer more in the way of focussed inputs for young people, i.e. a programme of structured lesson plans that focus on the promotion of tolerance and respect for others (rather than the more egocentric informing philosophy of self-esteem enhancement, a feature of anti-bullying programmes in the past (Salmivalli, 2016)). In terms of efficacy, KiVa does seem to be offering positive results year-on-year in its native Finland, and in a number of international contexts, when the factors of involvement in bullying and cyber-bullying are considered (see Axford & Hutchings, 2014; Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b; Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen, & Salmivalli, 2011; KiVa International, 2016). So despite what Løddng and Vibe (2010) argued should be the case, there would seem to be a continued role for 'direct' whole-school approaches to preventing and dealing with bullying behaviour amongst young people.

As we have also seen, young people who belong to a variety of so-called 'minority' groups are disproportionately more likely to report having been bullied. In my own research, or research in which I have taken part, this has been found to be the case with young LGBT people (Minton, 2011, 2013, 2014b; Minton, Dahl, O'Moore, & Tuck, 2008), young members of 'alternative' sub-cultures (Minton, 2012b), and members of indigenous minorities (in this case, the Sami minority in northern Norway; see Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press). In the case of homophobic/heteronormative bullying, and the bullying of members of indigenous ethnic minority groups, my own research has merely added to what was known before – or, phrased another way, has been consistent with international research findings. We have also seen that those with intellectual and physical disabilities are also more likely to report having been bullied (see, for example, McGrath, Black, & Sutton, 2013; Purdy & Mc Guckin, 2011; Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt, & Hymel, 2010; Tippett, Houston, & Smith, 2010). It has become clear to me (Minton, 2014a), although apparently not to too many others, that the helpful message, which was seemingly offered in the best of intentions (i.e, to attempt to reduce the feelings of internalised self-blame of those who have been bullied) that 'bullying *can* happen to *anyone*' (see O'Moore & Minton, 2004a) has led to a comparative inattention to the fact that bullying *happens more often* to *some people*, and in particular, to *certain groups* of people. To me, it is significant that those groups who have been found to be 'at risk' of bullying at school have been, and still are, subject to other patterns of historical and contemporary marginalisation and aggression in society (Minton, 2012b).

Outside of the traditional whole-school intervention programmes, we have also examined a number of 'other directions' in preventing and dealing with bullying behaviours in school communities; these were systemic programmes with either a broader focus than purely bullying behaviour (i.e. attempts to address bullying amongst related problematic behaviours; e.g., 'Samtak' (see Roland, Bjørnsen, & Mandt, 2001); the 'Home/School/Local Environment Project at Gran School' (see O'Moore & Minton, 2002, 2006) and 'Linkedness' (see Deklerck, Deboutte, & Depuydt, 2003; Deboutte, Deklerck, O'Moore, & Minton, 2006, p. 11), or had implementation strategies beyond those that were solely school-located (e.g., the 'Erris Anti-Bullying Initiative'; see Minton, O'Mahoney, & Conway-Walsh, 2013). These approaches were also characterised by the attempt to 'tailor' a set of interventions to a specific school (e.g., Gran) or community (e.g., Erris) context; in the case of 'Linkedness', although the guiding philosophies remained consistent, the practical work of the interventions that are developed in the practical work of the programme emerge, by design, as school- and situationally-specific (see Deboutte, Deklerck, O'Moore, & Minton, 2006). The breadth of conceptualisation in these programmes, perhaps due to the increased attention to local circumstances and requirements, does not (with the exception of 'Linkedness') readily extend to a breadth of implementation, and it is whole-school programmes such as the Olweus Programme and 'Zero' (see above, Section II, 'Traditional Interventions against School Bullying'; also, Olweus, 1999b, 2004, and Roland, Bru, Midthassel, & Vaaland, 2010, respectively) that have been mainstreamed, and have emerged as

national programmes. Indeed, mainstreaming was an ambition for many of those who were inspired by the support of the Norwegian government for anti-bullying research-led intervention. The idea developed, and was perhaps borne out of such ambitions, that local fidelity to an externally-designed intervention programme was the key to success; to repeat Olweus' comment: '… the effects of an intervention programme are to a great extent dependent on the quality and fidelity of programme intervention' (2004, p. 14). To designers of effective single school-based, or locally/regionally based anti-bullying interventions, this might seem counter-intuitive – a case of attempting to fit the school or community to the intervention, rather than fitting the intervention to the school or community. Nevertheless, the international rolling-out of KiVa (see Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b; KiVa International, 2016) seems to evidence a continued confidence in the role and competence of external experts and agencies in the design, implementation and evaluation of anti-bullying interventions.[42]

Taking these findings together, I have increasingly come to view school bullying not so much as a phenomenon in itself, but as one of a number of possible manifestations of broader historical and contemporary patterns of aggressive marginalisation in society. As we shall see later in this book, many indigenous peoples have been subjected to genocidal actions at the hands of initially colonising and subsequently dominant cultures – both physical genocide (see Chapter 3) and cultural genocide (see Chapter 4). In addition to this, in contemporary Western societies, as we have already seen and will also see later, a plethora of negative experiences (such as social and legal prejudice, inequality of opportunity, discrimination, street crime, poorer health outcomes, and yes, school bullying) evidence the continued marginalisation of members of minority groups. In my opinion, one the best chances that the designers of anti-bullying intervention programmes have of meaningfully addressing and reducing bullying (assuming that they are set to continue with 'direct' approaches) would be to attempt to 'drill down' to the specific problems of prejudice that underpin bullying behaviour in general, and are so evident in patterns of so-called 'minority' bullying. Indeed, I have already argued elsewhere for such improvements to be made to the design of direct anti-bullying programmes, incorporating many of the criticisms that I have outlined in this chapter (Minton, 2014a, 2014b).

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[42] KiVa's designer Christina Salmivalli seems to share at least some of Olweus' ideas about the value of 'programme fidelity'. In an interview with Jon Sutton, she was asked the following question: 'People have said that anti-bullying interventions need to stem from the schools themselves in order to be effective. You haven't necessarily found that to be the case?' She replied, 'I don't think so. The KiVa programme is more systematic and structured than many others. It's not only that we provide materials for schools and say "you can use them if you have some problems", it's really supposed to become an ongoing part of the normal school life. In Finland, at first we thought teachers don't like it if you tell them that in September you should do this and in October this, and so on, but this was actually well received. I think it's a reality that schools are already struggling with little resources, and I know that for us it took a lot of time and effort to develop the programme, and years of research. So just as someone has developed materials to teach mathematics or some other curriculum subject, I think that it makes sense that this happens somewhere else, and also that the programmes and practices don't have to be different from school to school – there can be a national strategy' (p. 258).

Finally, it is noteworthy that under traditional large-scale implementation models of anti-bullying intervention, the actions that are directed at those who perpetrate bullying have moved from the simple (yet ultimately, ineffective) reliance on the application of sanctions, towards attempting to get perpetrators to understand why what they have done was wrong, and the impact on others of their actions (the 'serious talks' of the Olweus programme), and now in their active involvement in resolving the difficulties they have caused for targets (KiVa).[43] Elsewhere, interventions directed at those who perpetrate bullying have included anger management and social skills training (see examples in Smith, 2003; Smith et al., 1999; Smith, Pepler, & Rigby, 2004). With this comparatively modest battery of approaches, I wonder to what extent that others who have designed anti-bullying interventions have engaged with the overall human tendencies to perpetrate aggression, and to marginalise others. As we shall see in the next chapter, in the dynamic contexts of many aspects of interpersonal behaviour, those who perceive or position themselves, or whom society perceives or positions, as members of a 'dominant' group, will unthinkingly, unwittingly or deliberately, assume the right and role to marginalise, persecute and even destroy those whom they or society perceives or positions as being members of a less powerful group. Members of these 'dominant' groups could, for example, include street thugs, local militias, religious missionaries, designers of educational systems, government agencies or government members, expansionist and colonising societies, neo-imperial First World Powers, or (and this is something, perhaps, within the immediate experience of most of us) school bullies – and yes, you and me. To establish an understanding of why a person or group assumes the right and role to marginalise, persecute and destroy is not a simple task; indeed, the bulk of chapter two will be taken up with addressing that very concern. But perhaps I might hope that in these closing thoughts of the first chapter, the linking of the words 'bullying' and 'genocide' in this book's title, and the implication of the existence a continuum which includes the two (as I have argued for elsewhere; Minton, 2012b), might have begun to

[43] For example, over a decade ago, Mona O'Moore and I called the older approach, which was one that seemed to be an almost intuitive default position in those education systems where knowledge around bullying was not properly developed, as the '"… *blame/punishment approach*" (the seeking out and punishment of "trouble-makers")' (O'Moore & Minton, 2004, p. 13), which we argued was '… *inherently flawed*, as its focus is on attributing blame, and the labelling of individuals as deviant. It also exercises power perceived as legitimate against power perceived as illegitimate (by the 'authority', but not by the blamed individual, whose perceptions are likely to be precisely the reverse) (p. 14). We advocated the transition to what was called the '*no blame approach*', which we said, '… acknowledges that people who are involved in bullying, aggressive behaviour and harassment – whether this be as targets *or* perpetrators (or indeed, both) – need the support and intervention of the school community. Hence, those involved in bullying behaviour learn to take responsibility for their actions, through the naming and challenging of inappropriate behaviour, the teaching of new skills, the promotion of insight and understanding, and the resolution of conflict' (p. 13). We further noted that, '… "no blame" does *not* mean 'no responsibility'; rather, the precise opposite. In addressing the process – in separating, at the initial point of intervention, actions from actors – we look for constructive and rehabilitative solutions … the "no blame" philosophy, then, is really one of common sense, but offers us a way to escape from the "violence begets violence" cycle' (p. 14). (All italics in these quotes are reproduced from the original text.)

seem less hyperbolic to the reader, and more like the explanatory device that I have come to consider it to be. This line of argument, which I view as being central to the contributions that I would hope to make in this book, is one to which we shall have cause to return to in the chapters that are to follow.

CHAPTER 2

HOW AND WHY DO AGGRESSION AND MARGINALISATION OCCUR?

Psychological Considerations

> The idea that some lives matter less is the root of all that is wrong with the world. (Medical anthropologist Paul Farmer; quoted in Parshley, 2014)

INTRODUCTION

Whilst the subject matter of this chapter is far-reaching, the formal structure that has been applied is rather simple and, therefore, requires comparatively little in the way of introduction. The first of the two sections that follow introduces various *psychological understandings of aggression* that have been proposed in most of the major theoretical traditions of that discipline. The first schools of thought that are considered are those in which the physical representation of aggressive behaviour is strongly emphasised; these include *evolutionary accounts of aggressive behaviour*, including the psychological/zoological sub-discipline of ethology; a consideration of the *physiological bases of aggressive behaviour*, including a consideration of the way in which the aggressive and other emotional responses may be 'hard-wired' into the mammalian (and therefore, human) nervous system; an examination of the brain areas that have been postulated, or demonstrated, to be involved, in a sub-section on the *neuropsychology of human aggression*; and finally, an introduction to some of the debates that have ensued in the attempt to examine the *heritability of aggressive behaviour.* The next schools of thought that are considered stem from *psychodynamic accounts of aggression and aggressive behaviour*, where the contributions of Sigmund Freud, Alfred Adler and C.G. Jung to our understanding of human aggressive behaviour are introduced. Following this, those perspectives in which the *role of learning in accounting for aggression and aggressive behaviour* has been emphasised most strongly are introduced; these include approaches from the psychological sub-disciplines of behaviourism and social learning theory, the latter of which has been applied to an understanding of the potential influences of television violence on human aggressive behaviour. This is followed by an introduction to the type and trait approaches emphasised in considering the links between *aggression and personality* ('type A' behaviour, and the traits of psychopathy, psychoticism and authoritarianism). Finally, *psychological models that emphasise social interactions* are considered; this includes a focus on so-called 'mob behaviour', in which one specific approach to understanding that phenomenon (reversal theory) is focussed upon. Whilst the

psychological sub-discipline of *social psychology*, and in particular the domain of *social cognition,* has contributed greatly to our understandings of group-based aggressive behaviour, this does not feature in this chapter; instead, it will form the main theoretical basis for many of the arguments that are advanced in the next chapter, and its basic precepts and classic demonstrations and arguments appear there instead.

In the second section of this chapter, when *marginalisation* is considered, psychological perspectives are, to an extent, bolstered with insights from other cognate disciplines. Starting from the approaches taken by sociologists to the phenomenon of *social exclusion*, which emphasise its multi-dimensionality and multi-causal nature, insights from phenomenological and existential philosophy (which have had a major influence on the development of phenomenological, and especially existential, psychology and psychotherapy) into the construction of our social understandings along the lines of *the 'One' and the 'Other'* are introduced. My own arguments regarding the existence of a '*continuum of marginalisation*' are then advanced. Essentially, these are based on the assertion that a similar set of individual, group and societal mentalities and actions (all of which relate to the targeted persecution and destruction of 'Otherness') exist, which may underlie and stretch across a continuum of aggressive marginalisation phenomena, spanning prejudice, stereotyping, discrimination, harassment, bullying and street violence, through to acts of colonisation, forced assimilation, legally-sanctioned subjugation, war, and, at its most extreme, genocide. These ideas are further developed in the next two chapters. Philosophical and sociological approaches to understanding *marginalisation and power relationships*, exemplified in the work of Michel Foucault and Erving Goffman are then introduced; these points are developed in the consideration of the phenomenon of '*victim-blaming*', and how some oppressed people may exhibit the *learning of the power of the oppressor*. After these two major sections (*psychological understandings of aggression* and *marginalisation*), the chapter is concluded.

I. PSYCHOLOGICAL UNDERSTANDINGS OF AGGRESSION

In Western thought, the reasons as to why human beings act in what either individuals or societies consider inhuman and destructive ways have been speculated upon, in at least a semi-scientific way, for at least three millennia. Certainly, as soon as philosophical investigations concerning ethics appeared in written form, such questions appeared, and it would be naïve to suppose that such enquiries appeared contiguously with the development of script; indeed, such questions probably date, when mythological explanations of human aggression are considered, to the period of pre-history. Explanations with contemporary relevance, which are chiefly derived from the modern biological and social sciences, are various, and stretch back over the last 150 years. As will become apparent, these explanations of one of the many forms of 'man's inhumanity to man' include ideas of an unconscious drive towards self- and other-destruction; the existence of a now-twisted but once evolutionary adaptive survival strategy;

and the perhaps more familiar conceptualisation of aggression as a learnt behaviour, or being somehow connected to the social circumstances a person finds herself or himself in. In any event, it is probable (and therefore, it is sensible to say so at the outset) that a phenomenon as complex as human aggression is likely to be multi-factorial, and so any individual theoretical account is likely, in isolation, to be limited (if only in terms of its range of applicability).

Evolutionary Accounts of Aggressive Behaviour

The study of animal aggression, and the parallels between it and human aggression, received much attention during the post-Second World War period, when the spectre of nuclear annihilation in a Cold War flashpoint seemed to be at best a constant looming presence, and at worst an imminent certainty. During this period, 'the father of modern ethology', Konrad Zacharias Lorenz, wrote what many consider to be his masterpiece, '*Das sogenannte Böse*' (1963; first translated into English under the title, *On Aggression*, in 1966). In this work, Lorenz defined his subject matter as 'the fighting instinct in beast and man which is directed against members of the same species' (Lorenz, 1966, p. ix). Lorenz noted that *inter-specific* aggression occurs as a matter of course: firstly, some animals hunt and prey on other species to survive, and secondly, almost every animal is capable of self-defence, and will act in the protection of its own resources. He went on to provide numerous examples throughout the animal kingdom of *intra-specific* fighting, and how this will almost always – in animal species – confer a survival advantage at the species level.

The question may be put, however: isn't any confrontation, particularly amongst animals whose 'weapons' (fangs, claws and the like) are, by design, potentially deadly, a risk? If, say, two male animals fight over a desired female, do they not also risk their lives, and therefore their chances of successfully mating with her? A fight to the death, whilst eminently possible for some species, is therefore undesirable. In other words, if fighting is to be truly evolutionarily adaptive, Nature herself must provide means and measures to ensure its non-lethality. A number of interesting examples of how intra-specific fighting is instinctively limited, amongst various animal species, had been offered previously by Lorenz (1953), including a description of an 'appeasement gesture' in a fight for dominance between two male timber wolves (pp. 204–206):

> Both wolves are growling angrily, the elder in a deep bass, the younger in higher tones, suggestive of the fear that underlies his threat. But notice carefully the position of the two opponents; the older wolf has his muzzle close, very close against the neck of the younger, and the latter holds away his head, offering unprotected to his enemy the bend of his neck, the most vulnerable part of his whole body! … A dog or wolf that offers its neck to a rival will never be bitten seriously …. However, this strange inhibition from biting [in the 'top dog'] persists only so long as the defeated dog or wolf maintains his attitude of humility.

Lorenz (1953) argued that such aggressive behaviour amongst timber wolves is 'ritualised' by necessity, as wolves could, given their 'weapons' (fangs), inflict serious or even fatal injury upon each other. When such a weapon is developed, a species must develop a social inhibition[44] to prevent its usage, otherwise the survival of the species as a whole would be under threat. However, there is a notable exception to this amongst animal species: in Lorenz's (1953, pp. 216–217) words, this is '… the one being in possession of weapons which do not grow on his body and of whose working plan, therefore, the instincts of his species know nothing and in the usage of which he has no correspondingly adequate inhibition. That being is man'. Lorenz developed this point in *On Aggression* (1966), arguing thatit is our progression as a species that has sealed our potential for self-destruction, as human society has moved from acts of *instrumental aggression* (acts by which we secure a survival advantage for our species) to acts of *hostile aggression* (acts by which we threaten, without any clear survival advantage gain, the existence of individuals and ultimately, our species). From this point of view, the development of human consciousness, and its correlates of conceptual thought and technological ingenuity, was – in the absence of concomitant senses of individual and societal moral responsibility – a bad step in terms of the survival of our own, and other, species.

Physiological Bases of Aggressive Behaviour

If aggression is indeed 'hard wired' into the mammalian nervous system, the response to aggression is likely to be manifested in what has been termed as the 'fight-flight' response. This response (which is also known as the 'alarm response' (Selye, 1956), or somewhat inaccurately, the 'autonomic response') involves the activation of the sympathetic branch of the autonomic nervous system[45]. Under such activation, the pupil of the eye dilates; breathing and heart rate increase; peristalsis is inhibited; blood supply to the viscera is restricted, and blood supply to

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[44] It was once thought that the '*dominance hierarchies*' one sees in many mammalian species, especially primates, was a strategy employed with the overall 'goal' of limiting aggression. However, in such societies, much of the 'alpha' male's time is spent in maintaining the hierarchy through subordinating rivals, through aggressive (albeit ritualised) behaviour – the displaying of his 'weapons', to use Lorenz's term. The dominance hierarchy is now interpreted as having a genetic survival function: as the hierarchy system generally confers mating rights solely upon the alpha male, the 'fittest' male will impregnate all of the females, hence ensuring the 'best' genetic material is transferred to the next generation (Silk, 1986, Smith, 1981; in Gleitman, 1991).

[45] Functionally, although certainly not structurally, we can divide the mammalian nervous system into two parts: the *voluntary* nervous system, and the *autonomic* (or involuntary) nervous system. The latter provides nervous co-ordination of the so-called 'reflexes', without which we could not survive (most obviously breathing, heart beat and peristalsis, plus the vomit and gag reflexes), whereas the former is activated when we *decide* to perform a movement (for example, scanning the words on this page, or perhaps hurling this book across the room). Within the autonomic nervous system, we can make a further functional division, between the *parasympathetic* branch (which, when activated, controls the body at rest (hence, accounts for regularities in heart, breathing and peristalsis rates, and so on) and the *sympathetic* branch, which is activated in alarm or emergency situations (hence, co-ordinating the characteristic 'fight-flight' response).

the limbs is decreased. In non-human animals, this response essentially neurologically and hormonally 'primes' the entire physical system of the animal, so that it can either hunt (in carnivorous animals) or flee (in herbivorous, or 'prey' animals). In humans, the same response is evident (through the observation or measurement of a number of physiological and psychophysiological correlates) whenever a person reports a strong emotional arousal (be that anger, exhilaration, sexual excitement, stress, and so on). Hence, this response is described as having 'biological utility' (or indeed, in humans, 'biopsychological utility'). Psychophysiological measures of autonomic arousal (skin conductance response (SCR), heart rate (HR), cortical electroencephalography (EEG) and event-related potentials (ERPs)) have typically indicated *underarousal* in 'anti-social' populations, and the *reactivity* of SCR and HR seem to 'characterise impulsive-emotional forms of aggression' (Scarpa & Raine, 2000, p. 331). Persons who demonstrate such behaviour have also shown certain EEG abnormalities (specifically, increased alpha-wave activity in the brain's frontal lobe) (Scarpa & Raine, 2000).

Many authors have interpreted gender differences in aggressiveness (especially concerning acts of physical aggression) as being indicative of a 'constitutional difference', especially as this difference holds true in a wide variety of different cultures (for example, Gleitman, 1991, concluded this, upon reflection on studies in Ethiopia, India, Kenya, Mexico, Okinawa and Switzerland; Maccoby & Jacklin, 1974, 1980; Parke & Slaby, 1983; Whiting & Whiting, 1975; all in Gleitman, 1991). The fact that elevated levels of testosterone in the bloodstream of males of a variety of animal species (fish, lizards, turtles, birds, rats, mice, monkeys and humans (Davis, 1964; in Gleitman, 1991) has been correlated with a higher propensity towards aggressive behaviour seems to lend weight to this argument. However, whilst Scarpa and Raine (2000) note that, '… overall, studies of testosterone and aggression have shown a positive association' (p. 326), and that links between testosterone levels and questionnaire measures of aggression are medium to large in strength in studies of violent incarcerated inmates, such links are weak or insignificant in studies of the general population. Studies of other hormonal relationships (such as the stress hormone cortisol, and hypoglycaemia (caused by the over-production of insulin)) would appear to be, from Scarpa and Raine's (2000) review, less conclusive still.

The Neuropsychology of Human Aggression

The tasks of the representation and processing of *emotions* in the human brain are complex, and involve the interaction of both sub-cortical and cortical sub-systems. *Sub-cortical regions* (including the *limbic system*, which contains the *amygdala, anterior thalamus, cingulate cortex, hippocampus, hypothalamus* and the *mammillary bodies*) are involved with the control of *physiological responses* associated with emotional reactions, and also the *attribution of emotional significance* to different stimuli. The two *cortical regions* that are most associated with emotional processing are involved in different aspects of this task: the

posterior right hemisphere has the cognitive function of being able to *interpret* emotional information, whereas the *pre-frontal cortex* is in involved in the *expression* (via certain motor pathways producing, for instance, a given facial expression) and *experience* of emotion (Heller, 1997). The functioning of three major neural regions has been related to aggression and aggressive behaviour: the *brain stem and the hypothalamus*, the *limbic system*, and the *frontal cortex*. These are, in fact, inter-related, in as much as components of the limbic system project to the hypothalamus, and the frontal cortex functions as a modulator of output of the limbic system and hypothalamus (Scarpa & Raine, 2000).

Lesion studies, utilising the selective ablation of specific sites in non-human animal species, have demonstrated that the *amygdala* has an important role in aggressive behaviour (Heller, 1997; Rolls, 1999; Scarpa & Raine, 2000). Bilateral amygdala removal in monkeys produces a series of behavioural changes including tameness, lack of emotional responsiveness, excessive examination of objects, and the ingestion of previously rejected items (including meat and faeces) (Weiskrantz, 1956; in Rolls, 1999).[46] In humans, where lesions are, admittedly, generally much less specific (resulting as they do not from deliberate ablation, but from head injuries, surgical accidents or epileptic seizures), amygdalectomy has been associated with a decrease in aggressive behaviour (Scarpa & Raine, 2000). Both the human and non-human primate amygdala contains neurones that are specialised to respond to faces (Heller, 1997; Rolls, 1999). Damage to the human amygdala can cause a deficit in the ability to distinguish between different human facial expressions of emotion (Rolls, 1999). Damage sustained to the *frontal lobe* in humans is also associated with aggressive behaviour. Lesions to this region can result in a pattern of personality changes that may include 'impulsivity, argumentativeness, lack of concern for the consequences of behaviour, loss of social graces, distractibility, shallowness, lability, violence, and reduced ability to utilise symbols' (Silver & Yudofsky, 1987; in Scarpa & Raine, 2000, p. 323). Additionally, *magnetic resonance imaging analyses* have revealed reduced frontal lobe functioning in alcoholics with antisocial personality disorder; reduced temporal lobe functioning in violent offenders suspected of organic brain disease; and reduced frontal and temporal lobe functioning in violent psychiatric patients, and in murderers pleading not guilty by reason of insanity (see Scarpa & Raine, 2000, pp. 324–325).

The Heritability of Aggressive Behaviour

The modern correlate of classical ethology is the field of sociobiology, which is an attempt to understand human social behaviour via reference to the principles of

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[46] This set of behavioural changes is known as Klüver-Bucy Syndrome, after the researchers who discovered that the amygdala was responsible for such behaviour in monkeys in which large lesions to the temporal lobe had been caused. Klüver and Bucy called this disruption between the processing of sensory information regardingobjects, and the processing of their affective properties, 'psychic blindness' (Banich, 1997).

evolutionary theory. Central to a sociobiological account of human aggressive behaviour is, as Krahé (2001) notes, the idea that such behaviour must be (or must have been) in some way evolutionarily adaptive. Very simply, and setting aside Lorenz's specific insights and theorising about aggression in humans and non-human animal species (see above, sub-section on 'Evolutionary Accounts of Aggressive Behaviour'), aggressive behaviour can be seen as being adaptive in ensuring that organisms can protect their resources (essentially, food, water, mates and territory). Hence, a propensity for aggressive behaviour might be part of the genetic make-up of the human organism.

The heritability of psychological characteristics has traditionally (and is still, with specific gene-marking techniques being applied more readily to the medical rather than the social sciences) been examined through the study of twins or adopted children.[47] In 1929, a German physician named Lange, who was much influenced by the work of Sir Frances Galton (who, in turn, was a pioneer in the study of the heritability of human characteristics, and in the use of twin studies),[48] published the results of a set of twin studies applied to the area of criminality (Pearson, 1995). Searching the records of the Bavarian Ministry of Justice, Lange was able to find reports of 30 convicted criminals who had twin brothers or sisters;

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[47] The goal of such studies is to try to establish the extent to which a given behaviour is determined by either genetic or environmental influences. The 'logic' behind the use of twin studies is that whilst both monozygotic (identical) twins and dizygotic (fraternal, or non-identical) twins are likely to share the same environment, monozygotic twins are more biologically 'related' (in terms of genetic material) than are dizygotic twins, who are no more 'related', in this respect, than 'ordinary' siblings (and indeed, may well be of different genders). Of course, it may be commented (and has been, many times) that monozygotic twins have often been treated as being more alike (e.g., being dressed alike as children, having alliterating first names, being given the same gifts and resources) than have dizygotic twins, or ordinary siblings, and therefore also share greater similarities in terms of their *environment*. In adoption studies, one compares the characteristics of an adopted child with its natural (genes) and adopted (environment) parents. The best methodology along these lines, of course, is to find identical twins that have been reared apart; however, this happens extremely infrequently.

[48] And to an audience well-read in the critical literature, best known as the forefather of, and first to use the phrase, *eugenics*. In his *Hereditary Genius* (1869) and *Inquiries into Human Faculty and its Development* (1883), Galton (1822–1911), an Englishman and a half-cousin of Charles Darwin, expressed concern that more people in so-called 'high ranking' families married late, and consequently had fewer children, than did so-called 'low ranking' people, and advocated that incentives should exist for eminent people who were willing to curb this trend (Forrest, 1974; Minton, 2012a). Despite the fact that everyday experience teaches us that people have strengths and weaknesses in different intellectual areas, Galton's picture of 'genius' or 'intelligence' as being a single, all-round, hereditary ability remained mostly unchallenged for around one hundred years (Minton, 2012a). Sir Cyril Burt (1883–1971), a former President of both the British Psychological Society and British Eugenics Society, honorary President of Mensa, and the first British psychologist to be knighted (in 1946) was a keen proponent of the idea that intelligence was entirely inherited. From the 1930s to the1950s, as one of Britain's foremost educational psychologists, Burt acted as a consultant to the committees that developed the Eleven Plus examinations, which British children from 1944 sat in the final year of their primary education. Success in the Eleven Plus (for the 20 per cent who did succeed) permitted a child's entry to a grammar school, which prepared her or him for university entrance, and therefore access to the professions. After Burt's death, it became evident that some of the twin studies data that he had published was fraudulent. The Eleven Plus examination was phased out in most parts of the United Kingdom from the early 1970s; however, the system was retained in Northern Ireland (Minton, 2012a; see also Gould, 1997, and Mackintosh, 1995).

thirteen were monozygotic twins, and seventeen were dizygotic twins. Ten of the thirteen monozygotic twins of the criminals considered in the study also had criminal records, whereas just two of the seventeen dizygotic twins of the criminals had such records. Lange concluded, as the title of his book suggests, that *Crime is Destiny* (1929; in Pearson, 1995). More recently, Krahé (2001) cited Miles and Carey's (1997) meta-analysis of twenty-two twin and adoption studies, where aggression was either rated by participants themselves (adults) or by their parents (studies of children and adolescents), and two twin studies where aggression was measured by behavioural observation. An interesting developmental component emerged in Miles & Carey's analysis – whereas nature (genes) seemed to have been more important than the environment in accounting for the similarities between the adults in such studies, the opposite was true in studies of children and adolescents. Overall, in the twenty-two studies in which aggression was measured by self- or parental ratings, shared genetic make-up accounted for some fifty per cent of the variance; however, in the two studies in which aggressiveness was measured by behavioural observation, the impact of the shared environment seemed to have been more important (Krahé, 2001).

Hence, whilst it appears that one's genetic make-up may well be an important factor in one's likelihood to behave aggressively, it is only good sense to counter claims that one's genetic material *determines* one's behaviour: in other words, crime is not necessarily destiny. Even the most basic grasp of the principles of Mendelian genetics tells us that for a given characteristic, one can discern a *genotype* (a gene, or set of genes, ultimately physically represented as a specific region or regions of DNA) that may, or may not, be expressed in the environment as a *phenotype*.[49] Hence, to talk about an individual's aggressive behaviour (or addictive behaviour, for that matter) as being genetically *determined* is inaccurate, and unnecessarily fatalistic. As Krahé (2001) noted, '… an individual's genetic make-up may dispose him or her towards being an aggressive person, but … environmental factors play a crucial role in determining whether that disposition will be reinforced or counteracted' (p. 33).

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[49] To consider this in terms of Gregor Mendel's pea-plants: *genotypically* 'tall' pea plants (those that produce plants that, if cross-bred with genotypically 'small' plants, will produce a given proportion of tall plants in the first filial generation) will grow into tall pea plants *only* within a given environmental tolerance range – that is to say, if the seeds/plants are given adequate warmth, light, an adequate growing substrate in terms of space and nutrients, and water. Outside of this tolerance range – for example, if one were to plant the seeds in a grow-bag in a cold, dark basement – the 'tall' *phenotype* will *not* be observed in the plants. Hence, even when we are examining a characteristic controlled for by a single gene (as plant height is in pea plants), the environment *always* has a strong influence on how the genetic material is *expressed*. Very few human characteristics in humans are controlled for by a single gene – ear-lobe shape, tongue-rolling ability and red-green colour-blindness are some examples – and most *physical* characteristics are controlled for by a number of interacting genes (overall human height, for example, is controlled for by six interacting genes). *Psychological* characteristics, it could be supposed, are likely to be controlled for / influenced by hundreds, or possibly even thousands of interacting genes. Given this common sense information, the protestations of the Alcoholics Anonymous conscript who argues that she or he physically abuses her or his spouse and children because she or he suffers from a disease, which is 'in the genes' in her or his family, seem spectacularly unconvincing.

Psychodynamic Accounts of Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour

Over the twentieth century, the psychodynamic approach in psychology developed from the pioneering work of the Viennese neurologist, *Sigmund Freud* (1856–1939), who developed psychoanalysis, which he believed constituted an effective therapeutic treatment of an array of psychological and psychosomatic complaints, and also permitted the scientific investigation of the unconscious mind. Freud's often controversial views on the sexual instinct, on how children develop, and his views on culture and religion, continue to challenge psychologists and the broader public to the present day (see Freud, 1940, for an overview). In *The Ego and the Id* (1923), a major (and final) overhaul of Freud's description of the structure and dynamism of the psyche was undertaken. The *super-ego*, a largely unconscious censoring agent, was introduced (thus replacing the 'ego ideal' postulated in earlier works; e.g., Freud, 1921); and significantly, in terms of the focus of the present chapter, a relatively 'new' class of *id* (an unconscious, amoral entity, which operates entirely on the pleasure principle) instincts was discussed. Previously, Freud argued, accounts of the id had outlined the instincts belonging to Eros (that is to say, the uninhibited sexual impulses) only, as these were 'more conspicuous and accessible to study' (Freud, 1923, p. 380). Having briefly mentioned the desirability of classifying the id instincts into the *life instinct* (Eros) and the *death instinct* three years previously in a footnote to *Beyond the Pleasure Principle* (Freud, 1920, pp. 334–335), he developed a fuller account of this dualistic system ('… for the opposition between the two classes of instincts we may put the polarity of love and hate'; Freud, 1923, p. 383) in *The Ego and the Id*. The object of Eros is 'to preserve, to bind together' (Freud, 1940, p. 379), whereas the object of the death instinct is to 'to undo connections … to destroy' (Freud, 1940, p. 379), to 'lead organic life back into the inanimate state'; it is expressed as 'an *instinct of destruction* directed at the external world and other organisms' (Freud, 1920, p. 381, italics in original).[50]

Whereas the operations of the death instincts, in terms of sadism and masochism (where they are, to a great extent, fused with the libidinal (Eros) instincts) are discussed in *The Ego and the Id*, it was not until some years later that Freud provided accounts of the operation of the death instincts in the external world (Freud, 1930, 1940). In the posthumously published *An Outline of Psychoanalysis* (1940), Freud contended that it is only when this instinct operates externally that it

[50] Why Freud introduced the death instincts into his metapsychology at the point that he did is unclear. Speculations have been made concerning the significance of events in Freud's personal life at this point – notably, the senseless and colossal destruction of human life in the First World War (two of Freud's sons served in the Austro-Hungarian army), and the death of his second (and supposedly 'favourite') daughter, Sophie, in 1920 – and how such tragedies might have been reflected in Freud's general estimations of the psyche. (As a considerable number of the central tenets of the 'science' of psychoanalysis owe their generation to Freud's own self-analysis, these are perhaps not unfair comments). However, Freud's biographer Ernest Jones, who knew and worked with Freud for decades, preferred Freud's own explanation – that is to say, that prior to 1923, the Eros instincts had been more accessible – and added the observation that *The Ego and the Id* was simply a timely 'revision' to basic Freudian metapsychology (Jones, 1964).

comes to our notice (thus constituting as a destructive instinct); otherwise, when this instinct operates internally, it constitutes a death instinct, and remains apparently silent. Eros and the aggressive (death/destructive) instinct operate either against each other (here, Freud drew the analogy of attraction and repulsion in the inorganic world), or combine with each other (as in the case of sadism) (Freud, 1923, 1940). Thus, in eating, the aim is 'the destruction of the object, with the goal of incorporating it'; the sexual act is cast as 'an act of aggression with the purpose of the most intimate union' (Freud, 1940, p. 380). Freud contended that a surplus of aggressiveness would turn a lover into a 'sex-murderer', whereas a 'sharp diminution' of the same would turn him 'bashful or impotent' (1940, p. 380). *Self-destructiveness* is often visible in a person in a fit of rage: '… he tears his hair or beats his face with his fists, though he would evidently have preferred to apply this treatment to someone else' (1940, p. 381). This type of behaviour is ultimately due to the influence of the inhibiting super-ego; considerable amounts of the aggressive instinct are held back and become fixated in the ego, and thus operate self-destructively: '… one of the dangers to health by which human beings are faced in their path to cultural development' (Freud, 1940, p. 381). Hence, in a statement that pre-dates, but in terms of the order of the present discussion is curiously reminiscent of some of Lorenz's arguments in *King Solomon's Ring* and *On Aggression*[51] (1953, 1966, see above), Freud (1940, pp. 381–382, italics in original) concludes that:

> … it may in general be suspected that the *individual* dies of his internal conflicts but that the *species* dies of its unsuccessful struggle against the external world if the latter changes in a fashion which cannot be dealt with by the adaptations which the species has acquired.

Mosak and Maniacci (1999) contend that it was *Alfred Adler* who 'originally proposed the concept of aggression to Freud and the early pychoanalysts' (p. 85).[52] This is, of course, somewhat debatable; what is clear, however, is that in their respective concepts of aggression, Freud and Adler were, as usual (despite their nine years of collaboration from 1902), at odds with one another. Whereas Freud saw a person's defences against attacks to the ego from the instincts as being

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[51] I can't help but see the similarity, despite the fact that Lorenz was quite critical of Freudian psychoanalysis in general and the death instinct concept in particular. In *On Aggression*, Lorenz (1966, p. x) stated, '… the death wish … is foreign to biology [and] is not only unnecessary but false. Aggression, the effects of which are frequently equated with the death wish, is an instinct like any other and in natural conditions it helps just as much as any other to ensure the survival of the individual and the species'. The two perspectives were at least partially reconciled when Lorenz, as was typical for him, drew a difference between the evolutionary-orientated animal kingdom and the culturally-orientated species *Homo sapiens*: 'In man, whose own efforts have caused an over-rapid change in the conditions of his life, the aggressive impulse often has destructive results' (p. x).

[52] Mosak and Maniacci (1999) perhaps refer to Adler's 1908 paper, *Das Aggressionstrieb im Leben und der Neurose* [The aggression drive in life and the neuroses], which certainly predates papers in which Freud specifically attended to aggression (Freud, 1920, 1923, 1930). However, Freud rejected Adler's views on the aggressive instinct, apparently considering such an approach an abandonment of the sexual theory of the neuroses (a charge that he also levelled at Jung) (Freud, 1914).

exclusively intra-psychic (the so-called 'ego-defence mechanisms'), Adler saw aggression as one of a number of 'safeguarding mechanisms' by which the person protects herself or himself from physical, social or self-esteem threats (Adler, 1956; Mosak & Maniacci, 1999). Aggression was, for Adler, *always* a secondary process; it is a '… choice individuals make in order to move them forward to their goals' (Mosak & Maniacci, 1999, p. 86), with three variant types: *depreciation* (attempting to make others feel worse in order to make oneself feel better), *accusation* (holding others responsible for one's own defeats) and *self-accusation* (hurting oneself in order to hurt others, with self-harm and suicide being prime examples) (Adler, 1956; Mosak & Maniacci, 1999).

The voluminous writings of *C.G. Jung*, whilst including considerations of alchemy, mythology, anthropology, comparative religion, astrology, Gnosticism, the Occult, the I-Ching, Eastern and Western philosophy – as well as psychology and psychiatry[53] – do not, somewhat surprisingly, include a great deal of explicit focus on the issue of aggression. In his seminal *Psychological Types* (Jung, 1921), a volume in which his theoretical break with his earlier-held Freudian doctrines is most clearly marked for the first time, Jung mentioned the mechanism of aggressive behaviour in schizophrenics,[54] and why it is that the 'introverted-sensation' type may become regularly victimised.[55] Aggressive behaviour may

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[53] Jung expressed his own view of the diverse character of his work, and the reasons for this, thus: 'My life is what I have done, my scientific work; the one is inseparable from the other. The work is an expression of my inner development' (Jung, 1967, p. 211). Anthony Stevens (1990) saw Jung's work, in the context of his life, in a similar way: 'Through rigorous self-examination, and … commitment to his inner life, he was able to enter and illuminate that inaccessible hinterland of the human spirit where all meanings originate. By turning inwards, he, the individual man, was able to reveal the universal man lurking in the dark recesses of his own soul', and opined that, '… the single most important fact about Jung is that he was an introspective genius' (p. 5). On this point, Jung was rather more modest: 'When people call me wise, or a sage, I cannot accept it. A man once dipped a hatful of water from a stream. What did that amount to? I am not that stream' (Jung, 1967, p. 387).

[54] Here, Jung commented on the 'centripetal movement of the libido' (the latter which we may take to mean as something like 'life energy') in schizophrenia (as opposed to the 'centrifugal movement of the libido' he postulated as existing in persons suffering from hysteria). By this, Jung meant that although during some aspects of a psychotic episode the schizophrenic '… turns away from the outer world in order to withdraw into himself … when the period of morbid compensation arrives, he seems constrained to draw attention to himself, to force himself upon the notice of those around him, by his extravagant, insupportable or directly aggressive behaviour' (1921, p. 500).

[55] One of Jung's eight basic 'psychological types' (Jung, 1921). In Jungian metapsychology, the ego stands at the junction of the inner and outer worlds; people differ (in terms of attitude type) as to which is the more important (for *introverts*, the inner world is more important). The introvert's nature is therefore, '… [a] hesitant, reflective, retiring nature that keeps itself to itself, shrinks from objects, is always slightly on the defensive and prefers to hide behind mistrustful scrutiny' (Jung, 1921). Of the four Jungian 'functions', one of which usually becomes superior to the other three in an individual's conscious psyche, '*sensation* establishes what is essentially given, *thinking* enables us to recognise its meaning, *feeling* tells us its value, and finally *intuition* points to the possibilities of the whence and whither that lies within the immediate facts' (Jung, 1933; italics mine). Of the '*introverted-sensation*' type, Jung commented that, '… even if the influence of the unconscious is raised only slightly, the subjective component of sensation becomes so alive that it almost completely obscures the influence of the object' (the phenomenon, physical object or person actually being consciously encountered) (p. 396). As an overall aim for the introverted-sensation type is to keep the influence of the object within

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have deep (in Jungian psychic structure) roots in the shadow archetype, which according to Jung (1928; in Storr, 1983, p. 87), is the '… "negative" side of the personality, the sum of all those unpleasant qualities we like to hide, together with the insufficiently developed functions and the contents of the personal unconscious'. According to Storr (1983), 'The shadow is also projected onto others. Examination of those attributes which a man most condemns in other people (greed, intolerance, disregard for others etc.) usually shows that, unacknowledged, he himself possesses them' (p. 87). Jung (1951, p. 8) also characterised the shadow as:

> … a moral problem that challenges the whole ego-personality, for no one can become conscious of the shadow without considerable moral effort. To become conscious of it involves recognising the dark aspects of the personality as present and real. This act is the essential condition for any kind of self-knowledge and it therefore, as a rule, meets with considerable resistance.

Jung was to talk about the (apparently unrecognised and unsuccessful) *Fight with the Shadow* in the context of Nazi Germany (Jung, 1946); this publication is discussed in the introduction to the next chapter.[56] Elsewhere in his writing, Jung for the most part confined his comments on aggression to the significance of aggressiveness in symbols – interesting in itself, but not too informative in terms of the present discussion (see, for example, Jung, 1958, p. 343).

The Role of Learning in Accounting for Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour

Much of what psychologists can claim to know about the processes of learning is derived from the psychological approach that is known as *behaviourism*, which, like the psychodynamic approach, developed over the first half of the twentieth century. As an attempt to base psychology strictly upon scientific principles, behaviourism was significantly influenced by a model of the scientific method derived from the British empiricists Locke and Hume (see Minton, 2012a), and its adherents and proponents often worked from the observation of simple processes of learning in non-human species, in order to understand what sort of stimuli and factors positively or negatively reinforced learning, and then theorised as to how this could be generalised to the human experience. In its mature form, B.F. Skinner developed behaviourism, which was influential in both psychology and education (see Skinner, 1968), from a data-rich psychological sub-discipline (Skinner, 1938) to a philosophy in itself (Skinner, 1972); Skinner (1974) once wrote that, 'Behaviourism is not the science of behaviour; it is the philosophy of that science' (p. 3). Amongst twenty things that Skinner (1974) said were both 'commonly said

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the bounds of tolerable necessity, this means that this type '… easily becomes a victim of the aggressiveness and domineeringness of others' (Jung, 1921, p. 396).

[56] The title of that chapter, 'Psychology, Social Cognition and Physical Genocide', is perhaps indicative of why it has been included there, rather than here.

about behaviourism or the science of behaviour' which were '… all, I believe, wrong' (p. 4), is the statement that behaviourism '… neglects innate endowment and argues that all behaviour is acquired during the lifetime of the individual' (p. 4). In *About Behaviourism*, Skinner (1974) devoted an entire chapter to the question of 'innate behaviour',[57] and it is in this chapter that we are to find a brief account of aggressive behaviour in human and non-human species, presented by, if not the father of behaviourism (that mantle, merely by historical precedence, must belong to Watson),[58] its most notable exponent. Essentially, much like Lorenz, and the ethologists and sociobiologists who followed him, Skinner posited that aggressive behaviour may be '… innate, and released by specific circumstances in which survival value is plausible' (p. 42).

However, whilst acknowledging the survival advantage basis of aggressive responses, Skinner was not – unlike, say, Lorenz or Freud – content to leave aggression as an instinctive or unconscious drive.[59] Aggressive behaviour, like any other, may be shaped or reinforced by the environment. In accounting for the reinforcement of an aggressive response in territorial behaviour, Skinner gave the following example: 'Food and sexual contact, reinforcing for other reasons, may reinforce an attack on a competitor if food or a sexual partner is thus obtained'. Hence, through the mechanism of operant conditioning, and via reinforcement,[60] an organism may learn to produce an aggressive behavioural response in a given environmental condition or set of environmental conditions.

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[57] 'In an important sense all behaviour is inherited, since the organism that behaves is the product of natural selection. Operant conditioning is as much part of the genetic endowment as digestion or gestation. The question is not whether the human species has a genetic endowment but how it is to be analysed. It begins and remains a biological system, and the behaviouristic position is that it is nothing more than that' (Skinner, 1974, pp. 43–44).

[58] Skinner felt that whilst in the famous article, *Psychology as the behaviourist views it*, Watson (1913) 'made important observations', his 'new science was … born prematurely. Very few scientific facts about behaviour – particularly human behaviour – were available. A shortage of facts is always a problem in a new science, but in Watson's aggressive programme in a field as vast as human behaviour it was especially damaging. He needed more factual support than he could find, and it is not surprising that much of what he said seemed oversimplified and naïve' (1974, p 6). Many of the criticisms levelled at behaviourism in general, Skinner argued,were actually criticisms of Watson's position, and 'more than sixty years have passed since Watson issued his manifesto, and a great deal has happened in that time' (Skinner, 1974, p. 7).

[59] Hence, although sharing a common emphasis on the human being as an essentially biological system (see footnote 57) with Lorenz, Skinner was critical of Lorenz's other theoretical assumptions in (if not the entire philosophical outlook of) *On Aggression* (Lorenz, 1966): 'Konrad Lorenz's recent book *On Aggression* could be seriously misleading if it diverts our attention from relevant manipulable variables in the current environment to phylogenic contingencies which, in their sheer remoteness, encourage a nothing-can-be-done-about-it attitude' (Skinner, 1966; in Skinner & Epstein, 1982, p. 171).

[60] To define such terms in Skinner's own words (1974, p. 46): 'The process of operant conditioning … is simple enough. When a bit of behaviour has the kind of consequence called reinforcing, it is more likely to occur again. A positive reinforcer strengthens any behaviour that produces it: a glass of water is positively reinforcing when we are thirsty, and if we then draw and drink a glass of water, we are more likely to do it again on similar occasions. A negative reinforcer strengthens any behaviour that reduces or terminates it: when we take off a shoe that is pinching, the reduction in pressure is negatively reinforcing, and we are more likely to do so again when a shoe pinches'.

The so-called *frustration-aggression hypothesis*, put forward by Dollard, Doob, Miller, Mowrer and Sears in their *Frustration and Aggression* (1939), is often posited as having gone some way in uniting drive theories with the insights (if not the philosophical position) of behaviourism, although to me the mechanics of this hypothesis seem to be somehow more reminiscent of a cognitive account of a mental process, and perhaps bear more similarities still to an Adlerian account (see sub-section on 'Psychodynamic Accounts of Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour', above). In any event, according to this hypothesis, human beings are to be seen as essentially goal-directed organisms; we feel frustrated when something or someone interferes with our pursuit or attainment of our goals. Aggressive behaviour is the result of a drive we have to reduce our feelings of frustration. It is quite obvious, however, that there are other possible responses to frustration than aggressive behaviour; as Krahé (2001, p. 35) noted, '… frustrated individuals may withdraw from the situation or become depressed'. Hence, in Miller (1941), we find that the '… earlier proposition of a deterministic relationship between frustration and aggression was soon changed into a probabilistic version' (Krahé, 2001, p. 35): 'Frustration produces instigations to a number of different types of response, one of which is an instigation of some form of aggression' (Miller, 1941, p. 338, in Krahé, 2001, p. 35).

From the late 1950s, in a now famous series of experiments, Albert Bandura and colleagues demonstrated (in the laboratory, at least) that children did not need to be *directly* reinforced to learn aggressive responses. In these experiments, different groups of children were either exposed to an adult model behaving aggressively (experimental group) or not (control group), and then their subsequent interactions with a 'Bobo' doll (a human size, inflatable child's play doll, popular at the time) were recorded. Members of the experimental group were more likely to behave aggressively towards the doll, imitating the adult behaviour they had witnessed; they had been *vicariously* reinforced for the *social learning* of aggressive behaviour (Bandura & Walters, 1959; Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961). Significantly, the presence of a live, aggressive adult model was *not* necessary to produce the experimental-control group differences; children were also observed, in a variation on the original experiment, to behave more aggressively after viewing violent cartoons or films (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961).

Whether the viewing of violent television has significant, and especially long-term effects on a person's behaviour has quite naturally become a matter of some concern, given the rapid increase in the number of television viewers over the last eight decades[61], and the increasingly gratuitous portrayal of violence and violent acts in films and television programmes (and, in recent years, computer games). Television industry researchers were quick to point out the necessary artificiality of the laboratory situation in Bandura et al.'s experiments (Milavsky, Kessler, Stipp

[61] In 1939, television sets first went on sale in the United States. By 1944, there were 7,000 sets nationwide; by 1947, there were 170,000; and by 1952, 18 million. These days, the average American child aged two or over spends four hours a day viewing television, and by the time they are eighteen, have been exposed to 350,000 commercials (in Bryson, 1998).

& Rubens, 1982); such studies, it was opined, could not establish whether such effects would occur in the real world, nor what the duration of such effects would be. However, in a ten-year follow-up study, it was found that children who preferred to watch a greater proportion of violent programmes were more likely to behave aggressively in a variety of real life situations later on (Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1972; in Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1977). There was some evidence provided by this research that as well as being peer-rated by acquaintances as more aggressive, 'heavy' childhood viewers of televised violence were, in the long term, more likely to be delinquent as juveniles, to be convicted of a felony involving violence, and to engage in domestic violence as young adults (Lefkowitz, Eron, Walder, & Huesmann, 1977). However, for a variety of (mainly) methodological reasons,[62] it was concluded in the Surgeon General's Report (1972) study that the study's findings were '… consonant with the interpretation that violence viewing leads to later aggression, but are not conclusive' (pp. 27–28; in Milavsky, Kessler, Stipp, & Rubens, 1982).

In an evaluation of their carefully designed, and methodologically complex study (in which '… the possibility that television effects may be magnified or attenuated by certain situational or individual predisposing influences was also tested', p. xiii), involving the interviewing of some 3,200 young people over a three-year follow-up period, Milavsky, Kessler, Stipp and Rubens (1982) concluded that there was '… no evidence that television exposure has a consistently significant effect on subsequent aggressive behaviour' (p. 482). However, we should not conclude that the methodological limitations in Lefkowitz et al.'s study render Milavsky, Kessler, Stipp and Rubens' study as automatically superior, and still less that the latter's results are more reliable;[63] neither should we be too quick to concur that because Bandura's laboratory studies were 'artificial', the results cannot tell us anything about the real world. This latter argument is at once fallacious,[64] and also not a little dangerously arrogant. Bandura, Ross and

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[62] For example, the 'television measure' (the rating of the degree to which children preferred to watch violent, as opposed to non-violent, television programmes), was rated by mothers' reports in the early phase of the study, and based on self-reports in the later phase (Milavsky et al., 1982). However, and I think more seriously, the study also failed to address a key 'dispositional' question: might it not be the case that inherently aggressive people are more likely both to prefer to view violent television programmes *and* to behave aggressively in later life? Causality is, in the absence of such measures having been taken into account, impossible to establish from such data.

[63] Though self-heralded as '… the most extensive study of television effects on childhood and adolescent aggression that has appeared in the scientific literature' (Milavsky, Kessler, Stipp, & Rubens, 1982, p. xiii), to my mind, a study based on the results of 3,200 participants, in just two cities in a single country (the United States), falls a long way of being definitive (or even conclusive), to say nothing at all about its being representative (or not) of what can be said about the possible link between viewing habits and subsequent behaviour in general.

[64] Experimental science in general has consistently informed us about the 'real world', be that physical or psychological, despite its 'artificiality'. As far as the physical realm goes, the existence of certain sub-atomic particles, and in fact, the entire basis of quantum mechanics, could only be inferred from interpretations of observations in the laboratory (Gribbin, 1984); likewise, the existence of black holes was originally based on a (necessary) mathematical inference, although wassubsequently supported by some observational results (Hawking, 1988). The 'artificiality' of the laboratory situation, it must be

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Ross (1961) provided a demonstration which showed that children *can* learn and imitate aggressive behaviour through observing violent films; rightly or wrongly, it has been argued in a court of law that they *have done so in real life* (in the British criminal law case of the murder of James Bolger).[65]

Aggression and Personality

Within the field of the psychology of individual differences, into which the study of personality falls, two distinct approaches to personality have emerged: the *type* approach (in which categories are referred to that are distinct and discontinuous; synonymous, perhaps, with personality 'styles'), and the *trait* approach (which assumes the existence of a discrete number of aspects of personality that may be measured: a continuous approach). The origins of the type approach pre-date those of the trait approach by two millennia. The father of modern medicine, Hippocrates, classified four types of *humours* (fluids), an excess of which he believed corresponded to character (ca. 400 B.C., in Phares, 1991). According to this scheme, aggression could be predicted in a person with an excess of yellow bile, which corresponds with a choleric (irritable) character.[66] In the absence of an accurate understanding of physiology, the acceptance of Hippocrates' system persisted throughout Ancient times;[67] the Roman physician Galen (ca. 140 A.D.)

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remembered, is an artefact of the attempt to limit the operation of potentially confounding variables, rather than the attempt to create new ones. This point, as it applies to the psychological world, would of course be consonant with the empirical standpoint of the behaviourists.

[65] In a crime that shocked the British public, James Bulger, who would have been three years old in March 1993, was taken from a shopping mall in Liverpool by two ten year-old boys (Jon Venables and Robert Thompson) on February 12th, 1993. The ten year-olds took James on a two-and-a-half mile walk, stopping periodically to beat and torture him. They stopped at a railway line, where they kicked and threw stones at James, smeared paint into his eyes, and pushed batteries into his anus. They left James's dead body on the tracks, with the intention that a train would hit his body, thus hiding their crime. At their trial in 1993, Jon Venables and Robert Thompson's counsel made a case for leniency on two grounds: firstly, that their young age precluded them knowing right from wrong (although their attempts to cover the crime would seem to have contradicted this), and secondly, that they had been influenced by, and had in fact been re-enacting scenes from, a 'video-nasty' horror film, *Child's Play* (the plot of which revolves around the murderous exploits of a possessed doll named 'Chucky') (Britton, 2001). To complete the citation of this case, the trial judge recommended an eight-year term; this was increased to ten years by the Lord Chief Justice, and increased again to fifteen years by the then-Home Secretary, Michael Howard. However, the European Court of Human Rights ruled that Howard had acted illegally, and Venables and Thompson were released after eight years, in June 2001. On release, they were assigned new identities; Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss passed a ruling that these should be kept secret, as their lives would be in danger if the media disclosed them. The *Manchester Evening News* newspaper did in fact publish an article concerning the pair's whereabouts, and was found in contempt of court, and fined £30,000, plus £120,000 costs (BBC News, 2001).

[66] To complete the scheme: *melancholic* (depressed) character results as an excess of *black bile*; *sanguinity* (optimism) from an excess of *blood*; *phlegmatism* (calmness) from an excess of *phlegm* (Hippocrates, ca. 400 B.C., in Phares, 1991).

[67] And perhaps further beyond that. Advancements in the understanding of the circulatory and neurological systems date only from the seventeenth and eighteenth century onwards, as a result of the practice of human dissection for the purposes of medical research (and indeed, to satisfy popular and scientific curiosity). However, leeching (originally, a way of addressing the imbalance in the humours) *(continued)*

certainly concurred, and in addition, contributed a *somatotypic* approach towards personality (that is to say, one based on body types). According to this scheme, aggressive behaviour would most typically emanate from a person with a *mesomorphic* (or somatotonic) body type – one of muscular build, which was assumed to correspond with a character that is 'active', 'assertive', 'vigorous', and 'combative' (Phares, 1991).[68] If either of these systems seem to be laughably archaic, it is to be recalled that a modern version of Galen's somatotype approach was being argued as recently as the 1940s (Sheldon, 1940, 1942; in Phares, 1991).

Additionally, some of the work of Jung and Adler – whilst the former, and most probably the latter, would have characterised such work as being descriptive of the *psyche* – can be seen, in contemporary psychological terms, as type theories of the *personality*. More recently, a personality type known as *Type A Behaviour* ('… a behaviour pattern consisting of time urgency (or hurry sickness) and an easily aroused irritability or anger'; Friedman, 1988) has been linked to coronary heart disease (Friedman, 1988; Friedman & Kasanin, 1943; Rosenman et al., 1975). In a study of over 3,000 healthy men, those who exhibited the signs of Type A Behaviour were about twice as likely to suffer future coronary heart disease than those who did not ('Type B' individuals) (Rosenman et al., 1975). Early studies relating to Type A Behaviour (i.e., that of Friedman & Kasanin, 1943, which relied on a single case-study) were often criticised by psychologists on the grounds of poor generalisability. However, later work (such as that of Friedman et al., 1986, in which it was shown that post-infarction Type A individuals who were assigned to a post-infarction Type A-modification counselling condition were 45 per cent less likely to suffer further infarctions than those assigned to a control condition (in a study of 900 such individuals)) showed that this 'personality type' may be of considerable interest to cardiologists and counsellors, if not widely accepted by psychological researchers.

Within the *trait* approach, which dominates modern personality theory, the question of the aggressive personality has often been addressed through the examination of three key traits: *psychopathy, psychoticism* and *authoritarianism*. Field (1996) maintained that the definition of *psychopathic personality* frequently fits the style of behaviour exhibited by perpetrators of bullying behaviour. However, one must be cautious: the term 'psychopathy' has both a long history and a substantial breadth of potential applications. Indeed, Reber (1995) has commented that the employment of the term's normal usage – '… any abnormal mental condition of which the aetiology is not known and a diagnosis has not been (or cannot be) made' – is '… an open admission of ignorance' (p. 619). This aside, in the context of the current discussion, it is perhaps most important to note that

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persisted in European medicine until the nineteenth century. In terms of a further persistence in language, I am also struck by the use of the word 'humour' as a synonym for 'mood' or 'emotional state' in the (especially Hiberno-) English phrase, 'to be in a bad humour'.

[68] To complete the scheme: *endomorphism* (viscerotonic type) – plump, buxom, developed visceral structure – corresponds to relaxed, sociable, tolerant, comfort-loving, peaceful character; *ectomorphism* (cerebrotonic type) – lean, delicate, poor muscles – corresponds to quiet, fragile, restrained, non-assertive, sensitive character (after Galen, ca. 140 A.D. and Sheldon, 1940, 1942; in Phares, 1991).

psychopathy is defined somewhat differently according to whether it is being conceptualised as a *personality trait* (as above) or as a *diagnostic category* (for example, in forensic psychiatry, psychopathic personality disorder). *Clinical* psychopaths, according to Cleckley (1988), evidence a poverty of emotions – they have no sense of shame (hence, it impossible for psychopaths to learn from their mistakes), and even their seemingly positive feelings for others are merely an act, for psychopaths frequently manipulate others for personal gain. Whilst typically neither neurotic nor anxious, Cleckley described the anti-social behaviour of psychopaths as being 'inadequately motivated'; often, anti-social acts are performed impulsively and hedonistically, rather than being directed towards the acquisition of a tangible external gain (for instance, money).[69]

Psychoticism, too, is described differently according to whether one is referring to clinical categories or personality traits. *Clinically*, the term 'psychotic' has a broad usage, referring to any condition in which there is a substantial 'break' with reality (the most commonly diagnosed sub-types being the so-called 'schizophrenias'). It was described as being a *personality trait* by Hans Eysenck from the 1970 onwards (Eysenck, 1970, 1990; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). Convinced by his own earlier research into the heritability of personality and criminality, and disillusioned by his failure to link crime to extraversion, Eysenck saw trait psychoticism as linking psychopathy, psychosis, sexual perversion and genius. According to Eysenck's usage, psychoticism describes the liability one has to have a psychotic episode, and to behave aggressively: '… it is conceptualised as a continuum of liability to psychosis (principally schizophrenia and bipolar affective disorder) with "psychopathy" (i.e. anti-social behaviour) defined as "a half-way stage towards psychosis"' (Heath & Martin, 1990, p. 111). Eysenck (1990) suggested that the biological basis for trait psychoticism was increased testosterone levels; Howarth (1986) reported studies of higher psychoticism scores existing amongst psychopaths and criminals. Trait psychoticism (referred to as 'P'), along with the bipolar extraversion-introversion ('E') and neuroticism-calmness ('N') axes, formed part of Eysenck's three basic dimensions of personality (Eysenck, 1990; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). This 'Gigantic Three'

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[69] Here, I can draw an example from another well-known British criminal case, that of the Kray twins, who were infamous and high-profile gangsters in 1950s and 1960s London, and built their power base on the conspiracy of silence (and the attendant criminal benefits of this, such as corruption, extortion, fraud, and seeming immunity from successful prosecution for many years), underpinned by escalating acts of violence (Pearson, 1995). According to John Pearson's account (1995), Ronald Kray (who was diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic in 1958) seems to have evidenced more signs of psychopathy than did his equally violent twin, Reginald. Pearson attributes much of the considerable financial success the Krays had as organising gangsters to Reggie's skilful 'marketing' of the twins' reputation for violence, whereas for Ronnie, 'nothing else mattered except the "little wars"' (p. 153). To give one example, whilst Reggie was incarcerated, Ronnie lost the twins' interest in what was to become an extremely successful West End gambling venture due to an inability to give up petty racketeering (always accompanied by at least the threat of violence), and act in an assigned shadow management role. Pearson, rather acerbically, explains: 'He was a villain, not a bank clerk …. He was incapable of sitting back and accepting £800 a week for doing nothing. For Ronnie, there was something wrong with money that was not dishonestly acquired' (p. 161).

('P', 'E' and 'N') approach was in marked contrast to just about every other personality theorist of Eysenck's day, who held that there were at least five dimensions of personality (notably, the 'Big Five' approach; see Phares, 1991). With the death of Hans Eysenck, the principal proponent of psychoticism as a personality trait, in 1997, it may be that the term psychoticism is set to revert to a solely clinical usage.

The term '*authoritarian personality*', according to Reber (1995), describes one who '… desires an authoritarian social system, particularly one who seeks obedience, subordination and servile acceptance of authority' (p. 72). Shortly after the Second World War, a group of researchers at the University of California at Berkeley (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) believed that they had uncovered a personality type that was '… predisposed toward totalitarian dogma and might thus be more ready to obey unquestioningly' (Gleitman, 1991, p. 515). Over the 1940s and 1950s, various scales were developed to assess aspects of the authoritarian personality: the A-S (anti-Semitic) scale, the E (ethnocentrism) scale, the P-E-C (politico-economic conservatism) scale, and the F (fascistic – later, anti-democratic) scale (Reber, 1995). Heavily influenced by psychoanalytic thinking, the Berkeley group conceptualised the authoritarian personality as developing in a childhood dominated by a punitive, perfectionistic father, who insists upon absolute obedience from his offspring. Such a child is left with no option but to push her or his (natural) feelings of hostility and resentment towards her or his father completely out of her or his consciousness; she or he subsequently adopts '… obedience and submission to authority as exalted virtues' (Gleitman, 1991, p. 516). The unexpressed hostility is then projected onto a set of 'outsiders' or 'enemies' – frequently, members of minority religious or ethnic groups – who are seen as threatening the authoritarian individual's world. Whilst challenged upon largely methodological grounds (the sample was based upon white, middle-class Californians; information about childhood was obtained by participants' recall only), there does seem to be a striking correspondence between minority prejudice and authoritarian sentiments[70] within certain individuals. However, as a defence counsel will often argue, in attempting to establish the ultimate cause of an incident or set of incidents of aggressive behaviour, it is important to consider *situational* determinants, as well as *dispositional* determinants – most importantly, how *who is there* affects what is done. However, it is also true to say that individuals and contexts are mutually influential. Hence, it is now time to move beyond the consideration of purely individual factors, and to examine the individual in context: in other words, how the psychology of *social interactions* affects aggression and aggressive behaviour.

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[70] The most obvious example perhaps being Adolf Hitler, as a reading of his *Mein Kampf* (1939) or, better still in this context, Erikson's 'psychohistory' of Hitler (*The Legend of Hitler's Childhood*) in his *Childhood and Society* (Erikson, 1963) will illustrate. However, the persecution of those deemed 'undesirable' – in other words, marginalised – by individuals, organisations and nation States that may be characterised as 'authoritarian' has been, unfortunately, rather frequent in modern times. As has already been indicated, this has reached its extreme in the crimes of genocide committed by so-called civilised societies (see Chapters 3 and 4 of this book).

Psychological Models that Emphasise Social Interactions

An area in which some European societies have had to address 'mob behaviour' in practical terms in recent decades has been the spectacle of so-called 'football hooliganism'. As police investigation into and action against this phenomenon developed over the 1980s and 1990s, it became apparent that the violence that occurred was not due to spontaneous outbursts of passionate feelings by youths on the terraces of ill-designed sports grounds, but rather to orchestrated and organised confrontations that had little or nothing to do with soccer at all, and still less to do with the results of individual games. Hence, hooligans' allegiance to soccer clubs is best seen as a 'kind of flag of convenience that allows them to engage in aggression and violence with the followers of other teams, the police or members of the public' (Kerr & de Kock, 2002, p. 2). This is perhaps best illustrated when hooligans claiming allegiance to different English soccer clubs conspire together to cause trouble at England away matches (Williams et al., 1986); this phenomenon is also known amongst German and Dutch hooligans. Hooligans have not, traditionally, attached themselves to sports clubs outside of soccer. In northern England, rugby league games attract attendees from roughly the same social background as do soccer games, and yet rugby league crowds remain comparatively trouble free. To illustrate this point, Simon Kelner (1997) documented two interesting sets of parallel incidents. Firstly, in 1982, although no fewer than 44,000 rugby league supporters attended the replay of the Challenge Cup final at Elland Road, Leeds, there was just one arrest for drunk and disorderly behaviour. The previous night, Leeds United soccer hooligans had 'gone on the rampage' at West Bromwich Albion. Secondly, in 1995, a coin was thrown from the crowd at a rugby league game in St. Helens; surveillance cameras showed spectators pointing out the person who threw the coin to the police. It was in March of 1995 that the disgraceful behaviour of English soccer hooligans forced the abandonment of a friendly match versus the Republic of Ireland at Lansdowne Road, Dublin. As Kelner commented, '… it was, and still is, valid to ask why' (p. 15).[71]

In terms of attempting to illuminate our understanding of the so-called 'Beverwijk incident' of 1997 (cited as a case study, and described in brief below) in particular, and soccer hooliganism in general, Kerr and De Kock (2002) found it illuminating to apply Apter's (1992) reversal theory rather than the usual (and limited) explanations to be gleaned from classic social psychology. The afore-

[71] The folk-theory that is most often used to account for the lack of crowd violence at rugby league games is that rugby league crowds are 'self-policing'. Whilst this theory has been generated by, and is popular with rugby league fans (and I will own that such I am), it does appear to be grounded in truth, as the afore-mentioned incident at St Helens seems to indicate. Kelner (1997) also notes that '… the shouting of racial abuse … usually provokes a vitriolic response from those nearby' (p. 15). Personally, I can recall that in Wigan, England, eight miles from the village where I grew up, and a rugby league heartland, Wigan players Ellery Hanley and Martin Offiah were treated almost like royalty in the 1980s (both were superb players, and black); at around this time, in one of the few soccer games I have ever watched on television, I recall John Barnes (equally talented, so I am assured, and also black) being pelted by bananas hurled by hooligans in the crowd.

mentioned Beverwijk incident was indeed serious, involving a confrontation of around 400–500 hooligans, and resulting in one murder, several serious woundings, forty-eight arrests and seven hooligans receiving custodial sentences. However, it was perhaps most notorious for the orchestration involved, and the lengths that hooligan leaders went to in order to escape police detection, and therefore to fight with relative impunity. As Kerr and De Kock described, the confrontation took place in the town of Beverwijk, a small town at some distance away from the home cities (Amsterdam and Rotterdam) of the clubs to whom the rival hooligans claimed allegiance (Ajax and Feijenoord respectively), on a day (Sunday) when Ajax were not due to play. At noon, Feijenoord hooligans assembled at a motorway restaurant en route to Alkmaar, where Feijenoord were due to play; they proceeded towards Alkmaar, but abandoned their cars on the motorway near Beverwijk (which has no motorway exit), jumped over the crash barrier and ran towards a car park in the town, where the Ajax hooligans were waiting for them. Hence, the police had been misled (they had thought that a confrontation would take place at the motorway restaurant, and were escorting the Feijenoord hooligans to Alkmaar when the hooligans abandoned their cars), as the real location of the fight was arranged by leaders of the two hooligan groups via the use of mobile telephones (Kerr & de Kock, 2002). The confrontation itself lasted seven minutes.

In *reversal theory*, four bipolar pairs of what are called metamotivational states are described; it is argued that humans tend to swing from one state to its opposite under the circumstances of frustration and satiation (the less a given state satisfies one's needs, or the longer one has spent in one state, the more likely one is to make a reversal; Apter, 1982). Kerr (1994; in Kerr & de Kock, 2002) proposed that soccer hooliganism, like other delinquent activities such as vandalism, tends to provide opportunities for those involved to experience the *paratelic* (high arousal, immediate sensation) state, thus escaping the low arousal, serious-mindedness of the *telic* state. Similarly, hooligans evidence both proactive and reactive *negativistic* behaviour (as opposed to the *conformist* state of the conformist-negativistic axis), seek out *mastery* over their rivals (rather than the *sympathy* of the mastery-sympathy axis), and are concerned with what happens with themselves – *autic* behaviour – rather than other people or objects (the latter constituting the *alloic* state of the autic-alloic axis).

Soccer hooliganism also provides what are known in reversal theory as *protective frames*, which are subjective mind-sets that permit those involved to enjoy paratelic emotions (such as excitement and danger), whilst the experience of telic emotions that are otherwise problematic (such as fear and anxiety) is limited. Hence, a certain amount of violence is, to hooligans, actually necessary to maintain the feelings of excitement and danger; however, this must be limited in order to prevent the protective frame being broken and hooligans dropping out of such activity. Consequently, although 200–300 Feijenoord hooligans and over 150 of their Ajax counterparts were involved in the Beverwijk confrontation, and some 200 weapons (including bats, steel poles, chains and hammers) were recovered by police, fewer people than might have been expected were killed or seriously

injured, considering that the hooligans had fought with impunity from the police for several minutes (Kerr & de Kock, 2002). The notion of the 'protective frame' offered in reversal theory is also appealing when attempting to account for school bullying. Björkqvist, Österman and Kaukiainen (2000) postulated that increased empathy might work as an 'antidote' to aggressive behaviour. Aggressive individuals are, they argued, somehow deficient in their capacity for empathy; in reversal theory terms, this could be due to the operation of a protective frame counteracting the telic emotions of sympathy, empathy, pity and the like, in order that the *paratelic* emotion of excitement may be enjoyed. Additionally, as Kerr and de Kock (2002) argued was the case with soccer hooligans, bullying behaviour may be conceptualised as *negativistic* behaviour (as opposed to the conformism of respecting, say, school rules, policy or ethos); bullies also seek out *mastery* over their targets (in their attempts to cause shame and humiliation, and also, by definition – recall the emphasis placed on the existence of an imbalance of power between perpetrators and targets of bullying in the 'Introduction' to Chapter 1). Finally, bullying behaviour may certainly be described as *autic* behaviour, corresponding with the lack of affective empathy (surely an aspect of the alloic state in reversal theory) that Björkqvist, Österman and Kaukiainen (2000) might have predicted.

Mainstream psychology is generally an individually focussed discipline, attempting to explain even human social behaviour by giving largely hypothetical internal states (as the nature of their assumed physical embodiment or representation is, more often than not, far from clear) ontological primacy. Reversal theory is a classic example; the assumed *outcome* of human social behaviour is seen as being ultimately *caused* by an individual's own levels of activation of her or his own (and once again, hypothetical) metamotivational states. Classic social psychology, and even social cognition, makes a step away from explaining human social behaviour solely in terms of internalised states, in as much as models derived from this sub-discipline stress the reciprocity between the way we reason about social behaviour, and the social behaviour that we will ultimately perform. In this book, social cognition has been used as the theoretical basis for a model of the thinking that may underlie acts of physical genocide (see Chapter 3); as it is considered in depth in the next chapter, it has not been included in this one.

The theoretical contributions that have been outlined in this section have been developed by authors and researchers with sometimes radically differing methodologies, standpoints and purposes. At a less than conscious level, whether the description of unconscious forces postulated by the psychoanalysts, or the idea of evolutionary-adaptive behavioural drives (instincts) 'hard-wired' into the mammalian system, whose physical representation (in terms of neurological and endocrinological substrates) the neuropsychologists and physiologists hope to show us is preferred, it seems that aggressive drives are 'built in'. The body of knowledge which we have now accrued concerning the structure and organisation of the brain has been largely dependent upon the development of neuropsychological laboratory techniques over the last four decades especially (such as the production of micro-lesions with lasers, modern brain scanning

procedures such as PET, CAT and MRI, single-cell electrode recording and perhaps most of all, electron microscopy) means that the early psychodynamic theorists, although all (at least in their primary training) medical men, were writing at a time of comparative neurophysiological ignorance.[72] The discipline of neuroscience continues to inform us about the nature of brain/mind, perhaps more assertively than ever before; but whether the powerful materialistic demonstrations of this and related disciplines will succeed in loosening the grip of the pervasive idea that the mental and the physical world are constituted of somehow separate 'stuff'[73] is, of course, open to question. However, we have also seen in this section, accounts of how social and cultural norms are learnt (admittedly, via mechanisms upon which psychologists from different theoretical backgrounds are unwilling to agree), and how what we have learnt previously appears to affect human social behaviour. Therefore, whilst considering how the various psychologists have approached the phenomenon of aggressive behaviour may enable us, to a certain extent, to make model-specific predictions as to when such behaviour is more or less likely, it will not, in my opinion, necessarily suffice as a basis to propose methods by which aggressive marginalisation may be countered with any real degree of confidence.

We will need to go further. In the introductory chapter of this book, we have seen that the Austrian psychiatrist Viktor Frankl reminded us of the importance of our conscious capacity to choose – even if this choice is only a choice of attitude under the most straitening of circumstances. In Frankl's own words, '… *things* determine each other, but man is ultimately self-determining. What he becomes – within the limits of endowment and environment – he has made out of himself' (1959, p. 157; italics in original). In the following section, this phenomenological/existential view of freedom[74] is further elucidated in our

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[72] Freud's attempt to describe the functions of the psyche in neural terms (in *Project for a Scientific Psychology*; from Freud's correspondence with Wilhelm Fliess in 1895, and only published posthumously; Freud, 1954) would, in all probability, appear almost comically naïve to the reader informed by the last forty years of neuroscience. However, to poke fun at Freud here would be demonstrate oneself as ignorant of the dependence of modern science upon technological innovation, and to undermine the value of Freud's attempt (which is, admittedly, written in the grandiose and ambitious style typical of Freud at the time (and many other young and hungry scientists since) and, factually speaking, is almost entirely wrong) as a pioneering effort.

[73] The idea of a mind-body duality is usually attributed to Descartes (see Descartes, 1996), although Lorenz (1966) prefers to attribute this to Kant; however, to me, this can surely be dated to the pre-Socratic, and then Judaeo-Christian theological/philosophical descriptions of the 'soul', which was usually conceptualised as having a divine (and hence, a non-material) essence. It should perhaps be noted that although their models of mind (or psyche) appear to be fundamentally incompatible with modern neuropsychological accounts of the mind/brain, both Freud and Jung opined, at different times, that the psyche must ultimately have a physicochemical basis (see Freud, 1954; Jung 1907). Until the advent of neuroscience, other psychologists were perhaps guilty of leaving this question to the philosophers of mind and the physiologists, and content to occupy a somewhat ethereal 'middle ground'.

[74] The interchangeability of ultimate freedom and ultimate responsibility in human existence is what the philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre meant in his often-quoted statement, 'Man is condemned to freedom'. In Sartre's fiercely atheistic brand of phenomenology, we human beings are ultimately and inescapably free, and are therefore responsible not only for our own behaviour, but also for the events of the times

(continued)

consideration of how *marginalisation* occurs. Frankl argued that '… freedom is but the negative aspect of the whole phenomenon whose positive aspect is responsibleness', and recommended that, '… *the Statue of Liberty on the East Coast be supplemented by a Statue of Responsibility on the West Coast*' (1959, p. 155; italics in original). If we are to accept Frankl's positions of (i) human freedom as being fundamental; and, (ii) the interchangeability of freedom and responsibility, the ethical question emerges: how can we, as conscious human beings, continue to exist freely and responsibly, and ensure that the freedom and existence of our fellow human beings is not infringed or destroyed through acts of aggressive marginalisation?

II. MARGINALISATION

Sociologists have generally approached the concept of marginalisation under the concept of *social exclusion*, which Hilary Silver (2007) stated is usually defined as '… a dynamic process of progressive multidimensional rupturing of the "social bond" at the individual and collective levels', and characterised the afore-mentioned 'social bond' as '… the social relations, institutions, and imagined identities of belonging constituting social cohesion, integration, or solidarity', and the possible forms of rupture of that social bond as including '… elimination, abandonment, segregation, assistance, *marginalisation*, and discrimination' (p. 1; see also Ravaud & Stiker, 2001). In Silver's view, people may be situated on a multidimensional continuum at any one time, they may be either moving towards inclusion, or towards a state of comprehensive, cumulative social rupture. This may include the social exclusion of individuals (and therefore includes individual experiences of social isolation, or humiliation), and also the social exclusion of groups, communities and societies, in which progressive isolation gives rise to social boundaries between 'insiders' and 'outsiders' (Silver, 2007). According to Silver (2007), the process of social exclusion (i) is *dynamic,* in that temporal matters must be taken into account; (ii) is *multi-dimensional,* in that the macro-concepts of *economic* dimensions (which may include insufficient income, food and other consumer goods, exclusion from land, credit, and employment opportunities) and *social* dimensions (which may include gender, regional and ethnic and cultural variations), which whilst varying across time, space and specific situation, must both be considered; (iii) generally exhibits multiple *causal* relations, which '… may run in many directions, reinforcing or cushioning the impact of one another' (p. 5);(iv) is involuntary, otherwise the term 'exclusion' could not be applied;and, (v) entails an *active relationship between the excluders and the excluded. S*ilver's own work has been largely focussed upon the social exclusion of, and discrimination faced by, the poor in the United States (see Silver, 1993, 1994, 2007); however, it is important to note that the concept of social

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we live in. To blame the 'animal within', or 'human nature', or to appeal to divine guidance, or to claim ignorance as to what one can do, or to state that one is simply not involved is, in each case, to act in what Sartre called 'Bad Faith' (see Sartre, 1943).

exclusion has been applied for many years across a range of academic disciplines (economics, law, philosophy (especially post-modern and post-colonial philosophy), psychology, social work and sociology) in the investigation of a wide variety of phenomena (e.g. community exclusion, crime, discrimination, equality, global relations, hate speech, immigration, individual exclusion, LGBT issues, physical and mental health, prejudice, racism and ethnic bias, religious conflict and intolerance, social control and unemployment and the poverty trap) (see Hills, Le Grand, & Piachaud, 2002).

The principal informing disciplines in this book are the academic and practice fields of psychology and education. The *multi-dimensionality* and *multi-causal* aspects of Silver's characterisation of social exclusion are illuminated in the next two chapters of this book, when the processes of physical and cultural genocide levelled at two indigenous peoples, one in North America and one in northern Europe, are examined; as these specific historical exemplars have been provided, there has been a necessary *temporal* placing. With respect to the informing discipline of education, the role of educational systems in the implementation of cultural genocide is considered explicitly (see Chapter 4), providing a reasonably in-depth consideration of one pertinent set of *dynamics*. With respect to the informing discipline of psychology, it is hoped that the nature of the *active relationship between the excluders and the excluded* that Silver (2007) referred to can be validly explored through the application of psychological understandings, particularly those understandings accrued from the sub-discipline of social cognition (see Chapter 3). From these sociological beginnings, and whilst staying within reasonable proximity to this book's informing disciplines (and thus at the outset, seeming perhaps to favour the 'individualised' understandings more typical of psychologists),[75] the remainder of the present section will draw on a somewhat multidisciplinary basis in attempting to explore the nature of marginalisation.

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[75] Although a psychologist by training, my personal academic tendencies are more in keeping with those typical of what has been termed 'critical psychology'. Prilleltensky and Fox (1997) provide an interesting framing of contrasts between critical objections to mainstream psychology on the one hand, and alternatives offered by critical psychology on the other. For example, in this framing, in terms of the relative stances towards *research and knowledge*, mainstream psychology is characterised as viewing knowledge as an '… accumulation of objective facts devoid of personal interests: "Value-free science can solve all human problems"', whereas in critical psychology, it is viewed as '… infused with political uses embedded within [the] subjectivity of its creators. Research [is] used at the service of moral values to help oppressed populations'. Similarly, in this framing, mainstream psychology is said to define *problems* '… in terms of interpersonal deficits …. Power arrangements in society [are] typically excluded from definition. Typical interventions address individuals, neglect social systems, and blame the victims of oppression', whereas critical psychology is said to define problems '… holistically in terms of psychological and social factors related to disempowering and oppressive circumstances. Interventions address personal and social dimensions, trying to equalise power, and strive to achieve distributive justice in access to resources' (Prilleltensky & Fox, 1997, p. 11). If I have not achieved this already, I would hope that the rest of the book will demonstrate my more 'critical' stance towards research, knowledge and problems; in the next chapter, for instance, whilst the starting understandings are derived from the somewhat mainstream psychological sub-discipline of social cognition, the limitations of these understandings are thoroughly (and critically!) explored.

It is possible (and indeed, perhaps usual for sociologists) to treat 'marginalisation' and 'social exclusion' as being interchangeable; indeed, thus far in this section, I may have seemed to have followed this pattern myself. But having seemed to have done so, I should perhaps say why it is that I have preferred to use the term '*marginalisation*', not least of all in the title of this book. For me, an important distinction can be found in the respective definitions of these terms in the Oxford English Dictionary. *Social exclusion* is defined as, 'Exclusion from the prevailing social system and its rights and privileges, typically as a result of poverty or the fact of belonging to a minority social group', with the exemplar sentence, 'Local authorities must work with government to tackle exclusion', being provided. My own academic and professional interests, which I have tried to reflect in this book, lie firmly within the attempt to understand the *lived experience* of such exclusion, which I believe is better reflected in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of *marginalisation* – 'Treatment of a person, group or concept as insignificant or peripheral', with the exemplar sentences, 'He worked hard to eliminate social and economic marginalisation', and 'Women experienced marginalisation in many localities'.[76] The individual agency and culpability that is so often (or at least *post hoc*) disavowed by the excluders, as well as the reduction to near-nothingness of the excluded, is more firmly embedded in this definition of marginalisation, and given my own professional (and perhaps also my personal and political) standpoints, the term marginalisation is the one which I prefer.

The 'One' and the 'Other'

How, then, can the understanding of the afore-mentioned relationship between excluders and the excluded be approached? One possible way is to begin by characterising how the construction of 'us' and 'them' (and by extension, the other possible variants between first person singular and plural pronouns, and second/third person plural pronouns, that one's language permits, so also, the 'I/me/my/mine/we/us/our/ours' and 'you/your/yours/they/them/their/theirs') understandings – in other words, the relationship between self and others – is negotiated. One approach that I have found particularly instructive here derives ultimately not from the subject disciplines of psychology and education, but rather

[76] I would also point out that I find the emphasis placed on 'belonging to a minority group' in the Oxford English Dictionary definition of social exclusion to be problematic; one can belong to a numerical majority, and still be marginalised. At the outset of colonisation, the indigenous peoples of any given land mass are usually, of course, in a position of being numerically superior; however, through processes of colonisation, indigenous peoples are inevitably marginalised. In many areas of life – including architecture, agriculture, astronomy and education – the more powerful Indian cultures of Mesoamerica and South America (including the Aztecs, Incas and Mayans) were, by most modern reckonings, culturally (as well as numerically) superior to the colonising *conquistadors* from Iberia. They did not, however, possess gunpowder, nor the immunity to smallpox or typhus, nor a fixed belief in an apparently 'God-given' right to overseas colonisation (see Stannard, 1992). On the point regarding the independence of numerical minority and marginalisation, see also footnote 78, below.

from phenomenological and existential philosophy.[77] In the introductory pages of her celebrated work '*The Second Sex*', philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1949, p. 16) described the mental distinction of a category of 'Other' as separate and distinct from one's self as being, and having always been, ontologically and existentially primal across all human societies:

> The category of the Other is as primordial as consciousness itself. In the most primitive societies, in the most ancient mythologies, one finds the expression of a duality – that of the self and the Other.

Furthermore, she argued that the categories of One and Other are not arbitrary, but are inherently oppositional (de Beauvoir, 1949, p. 17):

> No group ever sets itself up as the One without setting up the Other over against itself.

This point – the idea of the inherent and inescapable conflict that exists between the One and the Other – was also made by Jean-Paul Sartre in '*Being and Nothingness*' (1943), perhaps most lucidly to the non-specialist reader, in an example that is so memorable that it has become rather famous, even outside philosophical readership. If I may quote Sartre's example in full (1943, pp. 259–261):

> Let us imagine that moved by jealousy, curiosity or vice, I have just glued my ear to the door and looked through a keyhole. I am alone, and on the level of non-thetic self-consciousness. This means first of all that there is no self to inhabit my consciousness, nothing therefore to which I can refer to my acts in order to qualify them. They are in no way known; I am my acts and hence they carry in themselves their whole justification …. This means that behind that door a spectacle is presented as 'to be seen', a conversation as 'to be

[77] Phenomenological and existential philosophy has, of course, been extraordinarily influential on the development of post-Second World War psychology, most particularly in the practitioner discipline of psychotherapy (see May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1994). Space does not permit for anything like an adequate reflection on the history of this influence; however, the interested reader is referred to the works of Ludwig Binswanger (see Binswanger, 1975; May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1994) and Medard Boss (see Boss, 1967), who were certainly amongst the first to apply insights accrued from Heidegger's philosophy into psychoanalysis; works outlining the development of Gestalt psychotherapy (see Clarkson, 1999; Perls, Hefferline, & Goodman, 1972) and logotherapy (see Frankl, 2014); and, for a look at contemporary versions of what has become known as existential psychotherapy, the works of Rollo May (May, 1994, 2015; May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1994), Irvin Yalom (1980) and Emmy van Deurzen (2001). Where existentialism departs from phenomenology in philosophy is also an area of considerable debate, not least because many of those to whom the term 'existentialist' has been applied, and have been generally been seen by others as existentialist writers (to give just two notable examples, Martin Heidegger and Jean-Paul Sartre) vigorously refuted that application (see Warnock, 1970). Again, space does not permit for anything like an adequate account of the hows and whys of this distinction; and once again, the interested reader is referred elsewhere: Mary Warnock's short work *Existentialism* (1970) remains an excellent introduction to the key thinkers who have been historically identified as belonging to the phenomenological and existential schools (whether they accepted, or would have accepted, that identification themselves!), and in my view, provides as succinct a summary of these often heated debates as is possible.

> heard'… But all of a sudden I hear footsteps in the hall. Someone is looking at me! What does this mean? … All of a sudden I am conscious of myself as escaping myself …. I am for myself only as I am a pure reference to the Other … I am indeed that object which the Other is looking at and judging.

Warnock (1970) summarised what is happening at the doorway – the sudden experience of the emotion of shame on the part of the man at the keyhole is brought about by the inescapable realisation that One is inescapably the Other's Other (Warnock, 1970, p. 117):

> The fact that the man who caught his fellow man at the keyhole will label him an 'eavesdropper' can thus be seen to contain within it the essence of the whole relationship between one human being and another – conflict. The freedom of another person is the most fatal obstacle to my own freedom to do as I wish.

Sartre's argument was that the One and the Other are necessarily and inescapably linked in their struggle for freedom in their respective positioning of those they experience as Other, which is an inevitable function of their reciprocal self-positioning as the One. The result is that the relationship between One and Other is necessarily conflictual (Sartre, 1943; in Warnock, p. 117):

> While I attempt to free myself of the hold of the Other, the Other is trying to free himself from mine; while I seek to enslave the Other, the Other seeks to enslave me …. Descriptions of concrete behaviour must be seen within the perspective of conflict.

Whilst argued as being inherently and necessarily conflictual, positioning those who are not me/my/mine as Other is sometimes, as de Beauvoir describes, made on the most seemingly arbitrary of bases (de Beauvoir, 1949, p. 17):

> If three travellers chance to occupy the same compartment, that is enough to make vaguely hostile 'others' out of all the rest of the passengers on the train.

However, to continue this passage in de Beauvoir's (1949) text, it will be seen that these seemingly arbitrary judgements sometimes have real personal and social effects. In an apparently simple sentence, de Beauvoir (1949, p. 17) summarises a powerful basis (given the personal identification of oneself, me, my and mine as the One; the 'primordial' categorisation (to use de Beauvoir's term) of what is not the One as the Other; the inherent conflict-basis of the One-Other relationship; and, the resultant hostility that the One feels towards those he or she categorises as the Other) for understanding the conflict between individuals, within and between local communities, religious, racial and national groups:

> In small-town eyes, all persons not belonging to the village are 'strangers' and suspect; to the native of the country all who inhabit other countries are 'foreigners', Jews are 'different' for the anti-Semite, Negroes are inferior for

> American racists, aborigines are 'natives' for colonists, proletarians are the 'lower class' for the privileged.[78]

At this point, I feel it important to note that the ability to offer anything concrete in this book regarding suggestions around the potential countering of patterns of aggressive marginalisation will involve the attempt to identify whether the relationship that exists between the One and the Other, whilst inherently conflictual, must necessarily be as inevitable and inescapable as Sartre (1943) and de Beauvoir (1949) described it. Periodically, I shall return to this question throughout this book; we will see over the rest of the current chapter, and in Chapters 3 and 4 that the explanatory position that has been outlined in this sub-section has relevances in human terms far beyond that of a mere philosophical argument.

A Continuum of Marginalisation?

In the previous chapter (see Section I, 'Research into School Bullying'), we reviewed some of the contributions made by Christina Salmivalli and her colleagues in the development of the 'participant roles' approach, which has, to an extent, loosened many people's ideas regarding the erroneous, but often assumed dyadic nature of bullying behaviour (i.e., a single identifiable perpetrator aggressing against a single target). It was interesting for me to note Morita, Soeda, Soeda and Taki's (1999) comments that, in their careful attempt to find a Japanese-language correlate for the English word 'bullying', it was found that most acts of school violence in Japan are conceptualised along 'group behaviour' lines. The Japanese word '*ijime*', which corresponds most closely to the English word 'bullying', is defined as '… a type of aggressive behaviour by which someone who holds a dominant position in a group-interaction process, by intentional or collective acts, causes mental and/or physical suffering to another inside a group' (p. 311).[79] The critical point that I am trying to make here regarding the phenomenon of *ijime* is not only that it happens in the context of a group (as we

[78] As we have seen in this section above (see especially footnote 78), in societal terms, being marginalised – in other words, being categorised as the 'Other' – is not, of course, dependent on belonging to a numerical minority. The point that de Beauvoir was to make so ably in *The Second Sex* (1949), a book that is correctly seen as a foundation stone in second-wave feminist thinking and political action, was that women are invariably positioned as 'Other' in most societies – and of course, there are, and always have been, as many women as there are men in existence. It is no great stretch of the imagination for most of us to think of situations in which numerical majorities have been positioned as Other – for politically-aware people of my age group, the position of the black people, a clear majority of the country's population, in apartheid-era South Africa, probably comes readily to mind.

[79] Morita, Soeda, Soeda and Taki (1999) reported that many Japanese people believed that the *ijime* problem had been solved in the 1980s, until an ijime-related suicide in 1991, in which it was revealed that teachers had joined in the mental *ijime* of the thirteen year-old victim, showed otherwise. The Tokyo District Court that dealt with the case in 1991 focused solely on the physical aspects of the school violence, and not the mental *ijime*, although this decision was overturned by the Tokyo High Court, in the process of which *ijime* was judicially recognised in Japan for the first time (Morita, Soeda, Soeda, & Taki, 1999).

shall see in the next chapter, 1960s social psychology abounds with demonstrations of the finding that one's propensity to behave anti-socially is greater if one is afforded the anonymity of a group), but that people committing *ijime* apparently felt that they *had the right* to join in bringing someone 'into line'.

In an attempt to cast some light on the potential underlying processes of alterophobia and alterophobic bullying (see Chapter 1, Section III – 'The Bullying of "Minority" Groups: Attending to Prejudice and Marginalisation'), I proposed examining a form of aggressive behaviour that I had termed '*pro-conformist aggression*'. As I stated in Chapter 1, my interest in researching the phenomenon of alterophobia was prompted by the murder of Sophie Lancaster (see Chapter 1, footnote 34), a twenty year-old gap-year student in Lancashire, England, who was beaten and kicked to death in August 2007 by a gang of teenagers due to her 'alternative' appearance and style of dress (see Butt, 2007; Minton, 2012a, 2012b, 2014a).[80] In my subsequent investigations of alterophobic bullying, I found out that young people felt that the directionality of the bullying behaviour experienced by young members of alternative subcultures was unidirectional, with it being perpetrated against those with an 'alternative' appearance by 'mainstream' young people (Minton, 2012b, 2014c). For me, this echoed with what had come to light regarding the circumstances of Ms. Lancaster's murder, and also the Japanese phenomenon of *ijime*: namely, that those who see themselves as representing the 'normal', or mainstream group or culture, will assume the right to attack those who 'stand out', and by that standing out, appear to reject or threaten the norms of the mainstream or normative group or culture (Minton, 2012b).

Whilst I was, to my knowledge, the first to apply the specific term 'pro-conformist aggression' in the academic literature to this particular type of school and street violence, in developing this idea further (Minton, 2014c), I of course recognised that the phenomenon itself has had an almost indeterminable recorded history. To me, it seemed to have been evidenced in acts of war, invasion, conquest and imperialism; it had taken form in colonisation, forced labour, slavery, physical and cultural apartheid, feudalism, genocide, and many forms of discrimination, as well as acts of individual, group, collective and societal violence (Minton, 2014c). It would seem to have parallels in ethnocentrism, in that it is marked by the assumption on the part of members of the dominant group or culture (however that 'dominance' might have been gained or enforced) that their group or culture is the

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[80] As we shall see in Chapter 3 (Section V, 'Deindividuation of the "One"'), a series of classic demonstrations of 'bystander apathy' – when people fail to intervene in situations of accident or emergency (see also Latané, 1981, for review) – was also precipitated by a murder case, that of Catherine Susan 'Kitty' Genovese in New York City in 1964 (see Chapter 3, footnote 123). It was reported at the time (erroneously, as it turns out) that thirty-eight people had seen Ms. Genovese being murdered, none of whom attempted to intervene, nor had even telephoned the police (Gansberg, 1964). The researchers who subsequently investigated and provided demonstrations of bystander apathy were concerned with illuminating the social psychological processes that underlay people's failure to help; my motivation in proposing the examination of 'pro-conformist aggression' was different, in as much as I was concerned with attempting to illustrate the factors surrounding why people might have carried out, or joined in, an attack.

sole, 'natural' and legitimate culture, and that marginalised individuals, groups or cultures will want to, or *should* want to, conform to the dominant group or culture.[81] If this conformity is not forthcoming, then it is to be enforced by the dominant group or culture by whatever means are possible – means which are generally perceived by the dominant group or culture, at least at that point in time, as being legitimate, or are 'legitimised' *post-hoc* (Minton, 2014c).

Through my developing understanding that bullying behaviour is often one of a range of possible aggressive manifestations and mechanisms of the marginalisation of 'minority' and disempowered individuals and groups (see Chapter 1, 'Concluding Points: School Bullying and Marginalisation Reconsidered'), it became apparent to me that a similar set of individual, group and societal mentalities and actions – the targeted persecution and destruction of 'Otherness' – may underlie, and thus stretch across, a continuum of aggressive marginalisation phenomena. This continuum of aggressive marginalisation may span the unfortunately often commonplace acts of aggression, discrimination, harassment and prejudice (e.g., school bullying, stereotyping, street violence), through to acts of colonisation, forced assimilation, legally-sanctioned subjugation and war, and at its most extreme, genocide – the denial of a group of people, or a culture, to exist, perpetrated in instances of physical genocide through the horrors of 'ethnic cleansing' and mechanised large-scale slaughter. It is this understanding, of course, that has informed the title and material of this book. The notion that 'all human beings are equal', enshrined in the dogma of some of the world faiths, and in many of the constitutions of the world's democracies, does not always seem to be have been applied in practice; as human beings, our folk psychology of 'fairness' does not seem to have been afforded to those whom we have deemed or positioned as being 'Other'.[82] Our very consciousness of ourselves, and 'people like us', as belonging to the dominant, natural 'One', and the subsequent positioning of people 'not like us' – *them* – has led, under certain sets of circumstances, to our seeing *them* as being not 'equal' to *us*, and the development of what Jacques Semelin (2009) has characterised as the 'purify and destroy' mind-set. In the next two chapters, when we turn our attention fully towards what I have described here as the extreme end of the aggressive marginalisation continuum – genocide – we shall read of examples of the horrific end-point of that mind-set, and perhaps also be

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[81] In a note of black humour, the crass stupidity and arrogance of this idea was (to me) memorably and insightfully lampooned in the popular *Asterix* comic series, in *Asterix at the Olympic Games* (which was published in French in 1968, and in English in 1972). Following yet another defeat by the inhabitants of the sole (fictional) Gaulish village that is still resisting the Roman conquest, a Roman centurion comments, 'I ask you! You fight people, you massacre them, you invade and occupy their territory, and then they turn against you for no reason at all!' (Goscinny & Uderzo, 1972).

[82] Those who have read Orwell's '*Animal Farm*' may be reminded of the final reduction of the original 'Seven Commandments of Animalism' (the most important one of which had been, 'All animals are equal') to a new single commandment, an act that take place near the end of the book. The new single commandment was, 'All animals are equal, but some animals are more equal than others' (see Orwell, 1945/2000).

horrified by how apparently unthreatening, and worse still, even familiar, that some parts of that mind-set may seem to us to be.[83]

Marginalisation and Power Relationships

One of the most high-profile American white supremacists over the last four decades has been Tom Metzger, a former Grand Wizard in the Ku Klux Klan, and since the early 1980s, the leader of a neo-Nazi group called White Aryan Resistance. The views and ambitions of Metzger and his organisation were neatly expressed in White Aryan Resistance's answering service message of 1988, which according to Atkins (2011) was:

> You have reached WAR Hotline. White Aryan Resistance. You ask: What is WAR? We are an openly white-racist movement. Skinheads, we welcome you into our ranks. The federal government is the number one enemy of our race. When was the last time you heard a politician speaking out in favour of white people? You say the government is too big; we can't organise. Well, by God, the SS did it in Germany, and if they did it in Germany in the thirties, we can do it right here in the streets of America. We need to cleanse this nation of all non-white mud races for the survival of our own people and the generations of our children.

The 1990 answering service message, according to the Southern Poverty Law Centre (2006), included the statement, 'We will put blood on the streets like you've never seen. And advocate more violence than both world wars put together', and in 2004, in a speech to skinheads at a music festival, Metzger urged that, 'We have to infiltrate! Infiltrate the military! Infiltrate your local governments! Infiltrate your school board! Infiltrate law enforcement!' What makes Metzger a ridiculous figure, whereas Hitler is widely and justifiably reviled as one of the most evil men in history, is the fact that Hitler did, in fact, achieve many of his horrific political and 'social' aims and ambitions, whereas Metzger, thus far, has not. Despite the passage of nearly three decades, it is quite clear that unlike the National Socialists of 1930s Germany, Metzger's group has failed to overthrow and replace the federal government, and that his ambitions to do so areludicrous fantasies.[84] The question

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[83] Thereafter, I would hope that those who were perhaps more reluctant to accept the connection between acts of bullying and genocide (suggested in the book's title) will be more likely to accept the arguments that I have made regarding the continuum of aggressive marginalion.

[84] Whereas I have described Metzger as a 'ridiculous' figure, and his ambitions as being 'ludicrous', he is most emphatically not to be seen as comical, as some of the outcomes of his so-called political career have involved the infliction of violence of the most serious kind. In 1988, White Aryan Resistance-affiliated skinhead Ken Mieske beat an Ethiopian immigrant to death, and in 1993 17 year-old Richard Campos was arrested for a series of fire-bombings in Sacramento, California (including the house of a Sacramento city councilman, a National Association for the Advancement of Coloured People office, the office of the Japanese American Citizens League, a synagogue, and a State anti-discrimination office), telling police on his arrest that he had become 'racially aware' after reading White Aryan Resistance materials. (He had called the White Aryan Resistance telephone line referred to above 34 *(continued)*

is: why? After all, the founding philosophies and political ideologies are of course similar, with White Aryan Resistance's viewpoints being deliberately modelled after those of the German National Socialists (but applied to the specific issues that White Aryan Resistance see as being faced by white people in the United States). So is it a question of a lack of 'organisation'? Or the respective German national socialist and American neo-Nazi movements being located in different countries, at different points in history? Undoubtedly, post-First World War Germany was a very different sociopolitical and economic place and time to California (where Metzger and White Aryan Resistance were based in the 1980s). Or is it something else? For like Metzger, Hitler could have remained the no-doubt ridiculous figure that he must have seemed to many of the patrons of the Bavarian beer halls who endured the development of his political rhetoric, had he not been able to successfully *seize power* in Germany.

When we talk about 'seizing power', I believe that we should call to mind Foucault's (1980) assertions that, whereas power '… reaches into the very grain of individuals, touches their bodies, and is embedded in their actions and attitudes, their discourses, learning processes, and everyday life' (p. 39), it is also to be recalled that '… individuals are the vehicle of power, not its points of application" (p. 98), and that '… *power is relations: power is not a thing*' (p. 198; emphasis mine). Sociologist Erving Goffman provided a famous and massively influential account of how power relationships are constructed and conducted in his 'A*sylums: Essays on the Social Situation of Mental Patients and Other Inmates*' (1961). According to Goffman, regardless of the avowed intention to medically 'treat' or 'cure', what actually takes place in psychiatric hospitals, is the socialisation of people into the 'dull, harmless and inconspicuous' role of the 'good patient'. On admission to the hospital, the patient's former life – that is to say, her or his social context, and eventually her or his sense of self – is stripped away; Goffman termed this process 'disculturation'. This leads to her or his demoralisation, the deterioration of her or his pre-existing life skills, and eventually results in the diminishment of the patient's abilities to manage her or his life in the outside world – she or he is thereby *institutionalised*. The involuntarily committed individual, through what Szasz (1961) described as the 'skewed' relationship between the law and the field of medicine that is made manifest in the practice of psychiatry, is effectively stripped of some of the most basic human rights; in the closed social system of the psychiatric hospital, she or he is not permitted to exert agency. For example, the involuntarily committed psychiatric patient has no legal right to choose where she or he lives, nor even the right to refuse medical treatments. What makes these processes of 'disculturation' and 'institutionalisation' possible is that the psychiatric hospital is an example of what Goffman (1961) called a 'total institution'[85] – and what is 'total' here is the directionality of power relationships.[86]

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times in the month preceding the fire-bomb attacks). Campos was tried as an adult, convicted, and sentenced to 17 years in prison (Southern Poverty Law Centre, 2006).

[85] Foucault discussed such institutions as being examples of 'complete and austere institutions' (1975).

According to these philosophical and sociological points of view, power ultimately lies in how human beings treat one another; or rather, how a society permits its members to treat one another. However, those who use and/or abuse power ensure their continued access to the rewards of whatever society they belong to (position, social influence, liberty, resources, ownership of land and housing) by that very use and/or abuse. Human beings treat, or use and/or abuse power over their fellow human beings, in a variety of ways (thus, one could say that power may be asserted): legally, militarily, philosophically, spiritually, through the practices of society and society's institutions (including the practices of education, health and social service provision), and the determination of access to means and resources. However, one of the more interesting aspects of the manifestation of power between people, and in society, is when that such manifestations can be disavowed by those who abuse it (sometimes, even to themselves): when what are, properly considered, blatant instances and patterns of power abuse can be made covert, or denied, or even recast as being benign or even charitable. As we shall see, this 'mystification', as I generally refer to it, will be important in considering the material of the next two chapters. In the next sub-section, we will confine ourselves to a single exemplar of mystification – that of 'victim-blaming'.

'Victim Blaming'

The phrase 'victim-blaming' was first coined by William Ryan who, in his 1971 book, '*Blaming the Victim*', identified it as having been, and still being, an ideology that was used to justify racism and social injustice against black people in the United States. However, and as we shall see in this section (below), the term now has a broader usage, and one which extends across the afore-mentioned postulated continuum of marginalisation. The term is, to an extent, self-explanatory; in its broadest sense, those who are the targets of that marginalisation are deemed, or otherwise held responsible (in other words, blamed) for their own marginalisation, by the agents or perpetrators of marginalisation. As the reader may infer from reading some of the examples of victim-blaming outlined below, in this rather unwieldy description, it would be possible to substitute the word 'marginalisation' for 'discrimination', 'prejudicial treatment' (including specific prejudices, such as 'racism', 'sexism', 'homophobia', 'transphobia', etc.), 'bullying', 'abuse', 'torture', 'rape', 'persecution', 'colonisation' and 'genocide'.

No matter how logically inconsistent, or downright unfair, victim-blaming is, the fact remains that this specific form of abuse can be *internalised* by the person

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[86] Although in *Asylums* Goffman was mostly concerned with the provision of an in-depth consideration of one type of total institution, the mental hospital (1961), he described the following as also being examples of total institutions: boarding schools, concentration camps, leprosariums, mansions (at least from the servants' points of view), nursing homes, orphanages, penitentiaries and prisons, poor houses, prisoner-of-war camps, sanitariums, religious retreats (including abbeys, convents, monasteries and other cloisters), ships and work camps (Goldstein, 1984). I would ask the reader to keep in mind Goffman's descriptions of the 'total institution' when reading the accounts of the experiences of indigenous peoples in residential schools in Chapter 4.

or people who are or have been blamed. Let us consider how this process of internalisation might occur in the case of school bullying, which as I said in Chapter 1, is a form of aggressive marginalisation that most readers will have had at least second-hand experience of. In a chapter written specifically for parents, Mona O'Moore and I explained how, in the case of school bullying, victim-blaming by perpetrators of school bullying can become internalised, and thereby transformed into self-blaming on the part of the person who has been bullied (O'Moore & Minton, 2004a, p. 83):

> Because those who bully typically single out a person for being somehow 'different', the person being bullied comes to believe (or is made to, through the abuse of the bullying process) that it is this 'difference' that causes or invites the bullying. Hence, people who have been persistently made fun of due to their hair colour may attempt to change this; the high achiever, labelled a 'swot', deliberately sabotages his or her own results; the short-sighted student, ridiculed for his or her style of glasses, removes them and thus cannot see the board in lessons. Pitifully, we have even heard tell of a very young black girl who, ridiculed by her white classmates as being 'dirty', attempted to scrub off the colour of her skin with lavatory cleaner, causing more than superficial tissue damage in the process.

A persistent feature of patriarchal societies (usually, where societal norms and rules, and their codification into systems of legalisation, are underscored by Judaeo-Christian or Islamist ethics) is the blaming of women for the (especially violent or sexual) crimes that are perpetrated against them by men (see Grubb & Turner, 2012; Mardorossian, 2002). Ringrose and Renold (2012, p. 334) positioned victim-blaming in the specific case of sexual assaults committed by men against women as being:

> … steeped in the cultural belief that women are the bearers of morality, and essentialised understandings that this morality is held within the female body … drawing on an evolutionary fantasy about hard-wired male sexuality, is the idea that somehow an electromagnetic, biological (or affective) force will stir up crazed, uncontrollable hormonal sexual desire when in the company of women.

Ringrose and Renold (2012) provided this description of victim-blaming in the context of illuminating a contemporary form of re-signification and feminist political action – that of *Slut Walks*, the first one of which was held in Toronto, Canada,[87] and have now spread across many major cities world-wide. Re-signification (see Butler, 1997) involves the politics of the deliberate 're-claiming'

[87] This originated with the opening statements made by Canadian police officer Michael Sanguinetti in his 'personal safety' visit to the Law School at Toronto's York University (24th January 2011) – 'I've been told I'm not supposed to say this – however, women should avoid dressing like sluts in order not to be victimised'. Outraged by these comments, young women in the audience, along with feminist staff members at York University, organised the first Slut Walk (Ringrose & Renold, 2012).

of a word that was used as a pejorative or insult, and using it in an affirmative or celebratory way.[88] In this sense, as Ringrose and Renold (2012, p. 334) stated that:

> … the dynamic is apparent in the use of 'slut' as a point of celebration and a banner for political action, rather than shame [In order] … to purposefully disrupt the normalising sexualising gaze upon the female body, the crowds at the SlutWalks dressed up in all manner of clothing … this ranged from 'sexy' uniforms, to lingerie and nipple tassels as well as T-shirts, head scarves and boiler suits …. Large, hairy men donned bras and knickers. There was also an enormous range of placards and banners deconstructing discourses which blamed the victims of sexual violence for misogynist rape culture.

Ringrose and Renold (2012, p. 334) summed up:

> The Slut Walks as a collective movement are thus attempting to turn the blaming the victim of sexual violence for attack on its head! One of the goals is to push the gaze off the dress and behaviour of the victim of sexual violence back upon the perpetrator, questioning the normalisation and legitimisation of male sexual aggression.

As well as instances of bullying, and the institutionalised sexism that prevails in patriarchal societies (as we have seen above), victim-blaming is apparent across other areas of the afore-mentioned continuum of marginalisation. Some of the material of the next two chapters will provide evidence for the reader that even at the most extreme end of the continuum, victims of genocide, too, have been blamed by those who physically annihilated them, or systematically destroyed their cultures. Over the next two chapters, the reader will see, in the case of indigenous peoples (Chapter 3 refers extensively to the experiences of the Lakota and Cheyenne peoples of the final military phase (1864–1890) of the so-called 'Indian Wars' in the United States; Chapter 4 refers to Sami people in Norway, and Indians in residential schools in North America), acts of genocide being perpetrated, more often than not, in the name of advancing 'civilisation'.[89] As we shall see, questions

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[88] Many examples abound; Ringrose and Renold (2012) point to the use of the word '*queer*', which had been used as a pejorative for non-heterosexuals/non-cisgender people since the late nineteenth century, but has since been 'reclaimed', and thus re-signified, by LGBT communities. Similarly, whilst the word '*nigger*' – originally, a variant pronunciation of the Spanish and Portuguese '*negro*' or the (originally non-pejorative) French '*nègre*' – has become loaded with such offence word that the *N-word* euphemism is now commonplace, the variant pronunciation/spelling 'nigga' may be used between some (but certainly not all) African-Americans in a non-pejorative way (Bryson, 1998) (and hence, constitutes a re-appropriation/re-signification confined to intra-group usage).

[89] As we shall see in Chapter 4, in 1851, the Norwegian parliament created '*Finnefondet'* ['the Lapp Fund'], in order to 'promote the teaching of Norwegian in the transitional districts and to ensure the enlightenment of the Sami people' (Minde, 2005); however, this 'enlightenment' involved the deliberate replacing of the native languages and culture of Sami children with Norwegian. As we shall see in Chapters 3 and 4, the native languages of Indian children were also replaced in boarding and residential schools in Canada and the United States, again under the guise of the so-called 'civilising' of these indigenous peoples.

about *whose* civilisation it was, and about how 'civilised' that civilisation really was, of course, were never asked.

On Learning the Power of the Oppressor

British clinical psychologist David Smail (1938–2014) wrote that whilst conventional psychology has generally asserted that what motivates human beings is rational appraisal and the considered choice of action, the truth is, in fact, diametrically opposite; what motivates us is the impress of influences of which we may be distinctly unaware – the push and pull of power as it manipulates our *interest* (Smail, 2001). At best, *reason* can be seen as a tool of power, rather than as being a power in itself. This is why, argued Smail, that *Mein Kampf* was as persuasive to twentieth century Germans as Thomas Paine's *The Rights of Man* was to eighteenth century French people and Americans – not due to its 'reason', but rather to the interests to which 'reason' became attached. Smail (2001) argued that power is generated within and through social institutions, and it is the more distal forms of power influences (politics, economics, culture and the information media) that are the stronger (especially in terms of the number of people that are affected by these distal influences). However, proximal influences (domestic and work situations, education, personal relationships and family); are experienced by individuals as more powerful; Smail (2001) gave the example of many human beings' feelings about their employers, whose apparent 'decisions' over individuals are actually conditioned by economic events from which employers and employees alike are generally at some distance. Each individual is, therefore, surrounded by a spatio-temporal 'power horizon', beyond which she or he cannot see. It is possible to say that, in general, a factor such as social class has an influence, in as much as those who are better educated and better connected can be said to have 'longer' power horizons, although Smail (2001) noted that, '… the majority of us probably find ourselves in boats more similar than different – hence the ability of higher-order power to manipulate entire populations in terms of their understanding of how the world works'. Further, Smail (2001) summarised that '… the extent to which an individual can be said to "have" power will depend upon the *availability* to him or her of power within the system, i.e., how much power is transmitted *through* him or her from outside sources.…an individual can in this way be defined as *an embodied locus in social space through which power flows'* (Smail, 2001; emphasis reproduced from the original). The freedom of individuals to exercise power – for example, to change their social position, or to influence others and events – is limited by the amount of power that is *available* to them, i.e., that which lies within their social environment (Smail, 2001).

Smail (2001) argued that at the most basic physiological levels, human beings are simultaneously attracted and repelled by '… the sensations which our dealings with the world give rise to, and it is through this process that we learn what appears to be in our interest, and what not'. Human beings become manipulable, through punishment and discipline (the principal means of which are the making of threats to one's livelihood), via the provision of opportunities for pleasure, which

inevitably engages the individuals' interests in furthering a system that in the long term benefits only a small number of people. Small wonder, then, that the power wielded by oppressors becomes attractive, and that in total systems, in the sense that Goffman referred to them, rather than active resistance, mimicry and even exaggeration of the oppressors' means and methods of power abuse are more commonly observed by those lifted (strategically, or by circumstance or their own guile) even one step above the lowest ranked of the oppressed. in the Nazi concentration camps, those referred to as *'Funktionshäftlinge'* ['prisoner functionaries'] by the camps' officials, and more generally as '*Kapos'*, were prisoners who were assigned by the SS to supervise the forced labour of other prisoners, or other administrative tasks. As well as setting prisoners against one another, this system minimised costs, as fewer SS guards were needed. Most Kapos were German criminals, rather than Jewish, racial or political prisoners. Primo Levi (1979, pp. 96–97) described the so-called '*Prominenten*' at Auschwitz thus:

> '*Prominenten*' is the name for the camp officials, from the Häfling-director [the German '*Häftling*' translates as 'prisoner'] to the Kapos, the cooks, the nurses, the night-guards, even to the hut-sweepers and to the *Scheissminister* and *Bademeister* (superintendents of the latrines and showers). We are more particularly interested in the Jewish prominents, because whilst the others are automatically invested with offices as they enter the camp in virtue of their natural supremacy, the Jews have to plot and struggle hard to gain them …. They are the typical product of the German Lager: if one offers a position of privilege to a few individuals in a state of slavery … there will certainly be someone who will accept. He will be withdrawn from the common law and will become untouchable; the more power that he is given, the more he will be consequently hateful and hated.[90] When he is given command of a group of unfortunates, with the right of life and death over them, he will be cruel and tyrannical, because he will understand that if he is not sufficiently so, someone else, judged more suitable, will take over his post. Moreover, his capacity for hatred, unfulfilled in the direction of the oppressors, will double

[90] My colleague Jerry Lynch and I (see Lynch & Minton, 2016) have pointed to the existence of a similar pattern in a school context; that is to say, in the system of industrial residential schools operated by the Christian Brothers in Ireland between 1868 and 1969, where the Brothers assigned some older boys, who were known as monitors, supervisory assistance duties (which in most schools included physically punishing younger boys), in return for which they enjoyed a privileged status, and often extra food. Monitors were generally detested by the other boys, who called them 'squealers', and considered them to be traitors or spies (Lynch & Minton, 2016). Tyrrell (2006) referred to monitors in the industrial school to which he had been sentenced, including one who '… often copied the Brother who was in charge of him [and] beat the younger children under him in the same manner as he had been beaten himself', another who used a heavy cane walking stick to beat boys (as Brother Dooley did), and one who used a leather strap (as Brother Walsh did). There is some evidence that monitors also perpetrated predatory sexual assaults. Given that it is no exaggeration to state that the children in such institutions were *routinely* physically neglected, and physically and sexually abused by staff members, we argued (Lynch and Minton, 2016) that '… such patterns of peer abuse are best understood as occurring within the psychosocial contexts of primary adjustment, collaboration and re-enactment' (p. 76). See also Chapter 4, footnote 153.

> back, beyond all reason, on the oppressed; and he will only be satisfied when he has unloaded onto his underlings the injury received from above.

Levi (1979, pp.107–108) also described the content of the '… short speech in the foul German of the barracks' made by the Kapo in charge of the Chemical Kommando to which he had recently been re-assigned. (This was a Kommando, or work-group, whose 'skilled work' – for on his re-assignment, Levi was questioned about his chemistry degree, which he had successfully undertaken at the University of Turin – seemed to be confined to labouring work in the magnesium chloride yard.) Levi had already noticed that the Kapo was a 'green triangle', i.e. wore the inverted green triangle identification badge of German criminals in the camp:

> So these were the chemists; well he was Alex, and if they thought they were entering paradise, they were mistaken …. Secondly, if they imagined, being *Intelligenten*, intellectuals, that they could make a fool of him, a *Reichsdeutsche*, well, *Herrgottsacrament*, he would show them, he would … (and with his fist clenched and index finger extended he cut across the air with the menacing gesture of the Germans) … whosoever failed to walk in line and step would have to deal with him. He was a Kapo like all the other Kapos.

We shall see many further examples of this 'learning of the power of the oppressor' amongst those elevated one step above the very bottom in Chapters 3 and 4; many, if not all of these examples, are also understandable in the context of the post-traumatic experience of having been oppressed.

CONCLUSIONS

In this chapter, we began by reviewing approaches to understanding human aggression by representatives of many of the schools of thought that prevail in the informing discipline of psychology. These afore-mentioned schools of thought varied widely regarding their stances towards human free will or determinism; however, it was concluded that whether we accept that drives towards aggression are hard-wired into our nervous systems, are an indelible part of the fundamental workings of our unconscious minds, or are otherwise physically or psychically represented, or not, that as human beings, we are conscious entities, and therefore have at least the capacity to choose how we treat our fellow human beings (even if we do not always, or even very often, actualise that capacity). Furthermore, as human beings with the capacity for choice, we are responsible for the choices that we do and do not make. However, as human beings, we also have the tendency to understand the relationships between ourselves and our fellow human beings as the ever- and necessarily – conflictual relationship between the 'One' (ourselves, and perhaps 'people like us') and the 'Other' (other people, and perhaps 'people not like us'). The potential for the conflict of interests is, therefore, built-in, and with differences in social power, the marginalisation of the less powerful 'Other' by the powerful 'One' seems almost inevitable. The next two chapters will look at the

extreme position of the 'continuum of marginalisation' that was proposed in this chapter – genocide. Whether it is a realistic possibility for human beings to buck these horrific trends, and to remind themselves of their capacity to choose, and of their responsibility to choose in the interests of all of our fellow human beings, will ultimately determine whether human beings can expect to survive at all. We shall return to this argument in Chapter 5.

CHAPTER 3

PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL COGNITION AND PHYSICAL GENOCIDE

INTRODUCTION

In 1946, in an article entitled 'The Fight with the Shadow',[91] Carl Gustav Jung sought to find a psychological explanation for the 'indescribable events of the last decade', that is to say, the rise of the National Socialists in Germany, and subsequent events in Europe and world-wide. Jung claimed that during the immediate pre-Nazi period, he noticed '… a disturbance in the collective unconscious in every single one of my [his] patients' (p. 219). Such a change in the psychology of the masses was:

> … not by any means a purely Teutonic phenomenon …. The onslaught of primitive forces was more or less universal. The only difference lay in the German mentality itself, which proved to be more susceptible because of the marked proneness of Germans to mass psychology. Defeat and social disaster had increased the herd instinct in Germany, so that it became more and more probable that Germany would be the first victim among the Western nations – victim of a mass movement brought about by an upheaval of forces lying dormant in the unconscious, ready to break through all moral barriers.

Jung argued that in German people at this point, feelings of powerlessness and 'non-existence' were '… thus compensated by the eruption of hitherto unknown desires for power. It was the revolt of the powerless, the insatiable greed of the "have-nots"' (p. 222). Critically, therefore, as much as the defeated and humiliated German people pursued power, they also craved order; hence (p. 223):

> … the avalanche rolled on in Germany and produced its leader …. But what was his original intention? He dreamed of a 'new order' …. And that is the real reason why practically every German fell for him …. In Hitler, every German should have seen his shadow, his own worst danger. It is everybody's allotted fate to become conscious of his shadow. But how could the Germans be expected to understand this, when nobody in the world can understand such a simple truth?

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[91] It should be noted that some people, and not without cause, consider this piece to be 'popular journalism'. The article was written for and appeared for the first time in *The Listener*, and was therefore originally written in English by Jung, rather than in his native German.

Hence, despite his assertion that this was 'not by any means a purely Teutonic phenomenon', Jung raised the idea that the Germans, or at least the unconscious elements of their psyches at that point in time, were in some critically important way 'different' in their mentality. Such a point of view was held by many people in the former Allied, neutral and occupied countries in the years immediately after the Second World War. It was perhaps comforting for people of my grandparents' generation to think that the war had been the fault of the inherently 'bad' Germans and Japanese, and their evil leaders, Hitler and the Emperor; after all, had their 'badness' and collective guilt not been established in the genocide of the European Holocaust, and in the brutality of the Pacific War respectively? Surely, such evil things could not happen elsewhere. However, two decades after the end of the Second World War, the psychologist Stanley Milgram (1965) rejected this point of view entirely; such things could and had happened, and indeed were happening, elsewhere[92], and that this 'evil' was ultimately due to the way in which human beings tend think about other people – more specifically, as we shall see, due to the way in which our sense of our moral responsibility for our individual actions is massively reduced when we believe that someone else can be held responsible for those actions. The purpose of this chapter is to see whether the phenomenon of physical genocide can, as Milgram (1965) suggested it could, be understood via insights into the way people think and reason (or abandon reason) in social groups. Our field in this chapter, then, shall be the specific sub-discipline of social cognition – an area of psychology in which, not coincidentally, some of the classic experiments and demonstrations (Haney & Zimbardo, 1977; Milgram, 1965, 1974; Seligman, 1974) were inspired by their designers' attempt to understand aspects of the Nazi Holocaust.

Psychology itself has been defined as 'the science of mind and behaviour' (Gross, 2010), a definition which may be applied to much of modern (and especially experimental) psychology. As I have argued elsewhere (Minton, 2012a), psychology has concerned itself over the last century-and-a-half with the some of the same problems that western *philosophers* have been engaged with over the last two-and-a-half millennia (e.g. the nature and scope of knowledge; questions of belief, and of the best way to live; how we perceive and reason; the nature of the mind, and the nature and usage of language and so on). Therefore (Minton, 2012a, p. 3):

> The chief demarcation point of psychology from its parent discipline of philosophy is in the methods of inquiry that it uses. Whereas in philosophy, one might use logical analysis, introspection, rational argument and so on, the methods that psychologists use belong to the methods of science.

The scientific method itself, as psychologists generally understand it, grew out of the philosophy that is known as British Empiricism, and a considerable

[92] A cursory glance at world history, and particularly the histories of (i) atrocities committed against civilians in situations of war; and (ii) the treatment of indigenous peoples by colonising powers (see this chapter and the next), would seem to support Milgram's position here.

intellectual debt is owed (and sometimes even acknowledged) to John Locke (1632–1704), George Berkeley (1685–1753) and David Hume (1711–1776), especially by those who have strived hardest for the scientific basis (or perhaps respectability?) of their discipline – essentially, behaviourists and cognitive psychologists.[93] A (psychology) dictionary definition of the scientific method, supplied by Reber (1995), states that it is characterised by: (i) a clearly defined problem being stated in a way that (ii) ties it in with 'existing theory and known empirical fact' (p. 458), (iii) leading to the formulation of a testable hypothesis and (iv) the determination of investigatory procedures, which lead to (v) the collection and analysis of data which, when analysed, in turn lead to (vi) the support or rejection of the hypothesis, and ultimately to (vii) the modification of the existing body of scientific knowledge to accommodate the new findings.[94]

On these bases, then, Jung's contribution to knowledge concerning the 'Nazi mentality' (above) is really nothing more than a *post hoc* interpretation. Jung claimed to have made the observations he did of the German mentality before the Holocaust (the only possible conclusions that one can reach with reference to the published evidence that we have to hand is that either he did, and did not see fit to publish his observations, or that he was lying), but Jung's interpretations, as they have appeared here, were made and published after the war had ended and, significantly, after the horrors of the concentration camps had finally become publicly acknowledged. One could take a certain amount of comfort in the Danish philosopher Søren Kierkegaard's (1813–1855) often-quoted journal entry:

> It is quite true what philosophy says: that life must be understood backwards. But then one forgets the other principle: that it must be lived forwards. (1843; in Kierkegaard, 1996, p. 161)

However, confining oneself to understanding life backwards is not quite good enough from a discipline that is, or has aspirations towards being, a *science* of the mind and behaviour and, therefore, must surely offer *more than* an *ordinary,* 'wise-after-the-event' understanding of such matters. In other words, if psychology is to be genuinely considered a *science*, shouldn't it have predictive validity? And shouldn't this predictive validity extend to the extremes of human behaviour? In

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[93] Locke's rejection of the existence of *a priori* knowledge – his argument of the mind at birth being a *tabula rasa* – has been influential in understanding the psychology of learning, and in education (see Chapter 5, Section III, 'Education: Addressing Certain Issues of Legacy'). Hume's arguments for the study of quantity, fact and existence have also been influential, even if these arguments have been less often used to underline the limits of human knowledge (Hume's original purpose), than they have to delimit what some consider the 'proper' subject matter of 'scientific psychology' to be (Minton, 2012a; see also this book, Chapter 5, Section II, 'Some Thoughts on Humanising Psychology and Psychological Practice').

[94] Note how quickly one can run into the difficulties of whether psychology can be considered a science or not. When one works from the definition of 'the science of the mind and behaviour', one can see how the scientific method may be more easily applied to the study of 'behaviour', which is, after all, external, physical, observable and measurable, than it might be to the study of the 'mind', which is, of course, a (presumably) internal, non-observable entity with no clear means of direct 'measurement' (Minton, 2012a).

other words, with reference to psychological knowledge and methods, shouldn't we be able to predict (and therefore take steps to avoid) the atrocity of physical genocide?

Following the Rwandan genocide of April 1994, Gregory Stanton, the president of the organisation 'Genocide Watch', presented an eight stage model of genocide to the US Department of State. Although I have structured the main body of text of this chapter around a 'stage' approach (there are also eight stages here), and there is a considerable overlap of concepts, I have not adopted Stanton's model – not because I do not think it a good and useful one (in fact, I do), but rather because my primary purpose differs from Stanton's. Stanton tried to offer an understanding of why that particular (Rwandan) genocide occurred; I am trying to illuminate how psychologists have attempted to contribute to a social cognitive understanding of physical genocide. Hence, before commenting on the success or otherwise of their attempts to do so, we shall examine the following psychological 'stages' of physical genocide:

(i) In-grouping/Out-grouping
(ii) Construction of an Aspirational National *Weltanschauung* that Excludes the 'Other'
(iii) Positioning of the 'Other' as *'Gegentypen'*
(iv) Dehumanisation of the 'Other'
(v) Deindividuation of the 'One'
(vi) Vilification of Resistance
(vii) Mechanisation of Means of Destruction
(viii) Ongoing Denial and Mystification

As we have already seen, when psychologists have considered genocide in the past, they have usually made reference to the Holocaust of the Second World War years. In providing a historical exemplar of physical genocide in this chapter, we will make somewhat of a departure; we will consider quite another period of history, on another continent. Stannard (1992), whilst noting that although the definition of genocide provided by the 1948 UN Convention has been criticised by some as too broad and others as too narrow, argues that '… it is impossible to know what transpired in the Americas during the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and not conclude that it was genocide' (p. 281). He refers, of course, to the extermination of the native peoples of the Americas following the European conquest of the 'New World'. Stannard (1992) asserts a conservative contemporary estimate of the native population of the Americas prior to the arrival of Columbus as being between 75 and 100 million (with eight to twelve million living north of Mexico); in the near four centuries between Columbus' arrival at San Salvador and the massacre of Spotted Elk's band of Minneconjou and Hunkpapa Lakota at Wounded Knee,[95] the native population of the Americas had

[95] Many people can remember the date that traditionally marks the *beginning* of the European conquest of the Americas, and might tell you that Columbus 'discovered America' in 1492. (This is in fact incorrect; Columbus, who never reached the American mainland, was by no means first European to *(continued)*

been reduced by between 90 and 98 per cent, with a best working estimate of 95 per cent, although Stannard argued that '… even figures of 95 and 98 and 99 per cent destruction may time and again be too low' (1992, p. 129).[96]

These numbers, of course, are staggering. But how can we best avoid being overwhelmed by them, thereby losing the *human* sense of the destruction? In modern European terms, it would be as if the present-day combined populations of France, Belgium, the Netherlands and Switzerland were reduced to that of Paris. Stannard (1992) encourages his reader to hold on to the story of an individual, and provides examples of unthinkingly slaughtered anonymous individuals. But is it not also possible, and perhaps desirable, to find *named* individuals amongst the victims of the American Holocaust, and to hear the voices of those named individuals? Brown (1970) notes that such voices were seldom if ever heard; even if members of the pre-twentieth century native population of the Americas had known how to write in English, it would have been most unlikely that they could have found publishers. And yet, as he notes, some voices have remained. This chapter includes some of the voices of the more famous of those who fought, unsuccessfully in the long run, against the encroachment of the European-American – for example, the Lakota Red Cloud, Sitting Bull, Little Big Man, Black Elk and Crazy Horse – who, along with the Apache leaders Cochise, Victorio and Geronimo, have emerged from decades of cinematic portrayal as the 'dark and savage villains' of the mythologised West to emerge as something like tragic heroes in the popular consciousness (and in some contemporary media portrayals).

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reach North America. L'Anse aux Meadows, an archaeological site at the northernmost point of the island of Newfoundland, Canada, dating to between 950 and 1000 AD, was discovered by in 1960 by two (husband and wife) Norwegians, the explorer Helge Ingstad and the archaeologist Anne Stine Ingstad. It is the site of a Viking settlement, and has been linked by some historians to the once thought-of as legendary 'Vinland' settlement of Erik the Red, whose exploration of the west Greenlandic and North American coasts are documented in the Icelandic sagas (Ingstad & Ingstad, 2000). L'Anse aux Meadows was named a World Heritage site by UNESCO in 1978, and is the only widely-accepted physical evidence of trans-Atlantic contact prior to Columbus (Parks Canada, 2016) – and hence, pre-dates Columbus' so-called 'discovery' of the Americas by five centuries). This historical point aside, it is not insignificant that very few people know the date of the *completion* of the European-American conquest of the United States, or of the appalling act which marked it. The Massacre of Wounded Knee, which involved the slaughter of 153 (although most of the wounded died, so in all almost 300) of a band of 350 surrendering Minneconjou and Hunkpapa Lakota people (120 men, 230 women and children) by four divisions of the US Army's Seventh Cavalry, took place on 29th December, 1890. Thereafter, none of the surviving Indians in the United States territory were living freely; as we shall see over the course of this chapter, the remainder, aside from a few 'outlaws', had by then been confined to reservations (Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992).

[96] Many historians have pointed out that it was the spreading of 'Old World' diseases, such as smallpox, diphtheria, typhus and syphilis, to which the Western Hemisphere native peoples had no inborn resistance, that was responsible for the bulk of the post-Columbus native population decline. However, Stannard (1992) argues that, '… by focussing almost entirely on disease, by displacing responsibility for the mass killing onto an army of invading microbes, contemporary authors increasingly have created the impression that the eradication of those tens of millions of people was inadvertent. … The near total destruction of the Western Hemisphere's native people was neither inadvertent nor inevitable. From almost the instant of first human contact between Europe and the Americas firestorms of microbial pestilence *and* purposeful genocide began laying waste the American natives' (p. xii).

Therefore, to be more specific, in providing our prime exemplar of physical genocide, this chapter focuses on the Lakota[97]-Cheyenne Campaign (1864–1890) of the so-called 'Indian Wars' of late nineteenth century United States.

I. IN-GROUPING/OUT-GROUPING

In a previous chapter (see Chapter 2), we have already seen that the philosophers Jean-Paul Sartre (1943) and Simone de Beauvoir (1949) argued that the basis of understanding one's existence in relation to others was invariably one of conflict. In the decade after that in which the works by Sartre and de Beauvoir that were referred to appeared, a study which has become somewhat of a classic in the field of child and adolescent psychology provided empirical support for this position. In the *Robber's Cave Experiment* (it was undertaken at a summer camp in Robber's Cave State Park in Oklahoma, USA), Muzafer Sherif and his colleagues (1954) investigated in-group formation and competition between two groups of twelve twelve-year-old boys, hitherto unknown to one another. This was accomplished by the initial bussing of the two groups to separate locations, and keeping the groups unknown to one another for the first few days; subsequently, the two groups were brought together into a single camp. Almost as soon as the groups became aware of one another, 'in-groupness' appeared in the boys' language (Sherif had disguised himself as the camp janitor in order to be able to observe such behaviours). Members of the self-named 'Eagles' and 'Rattlers' groups were openly hostile to one another, and the competitive activities that had been organised for the 'single group' phase of the study could not safely continue. It was not easy to bring the two groups together; the only way in which this could be achieved was by organising activities where the boys *had* to work co-operatively (physically moving a 'broken-down' camp truck, building a raft to cross a river and so on) (Sherif et al., 1954; in Sherif, 1967). Once 'in-groupness' had been established through making the most superficial of divisions – or, to borrow from de Beauvoir, once the 'One' had been set up, inevitably *against* the 'Other' – the recognition of commonality between individuals could not be easily established.

For colonising peoples, as European settlers in the Americas were, not even a superficial division was unnecessary; the distinction between the 'One' (the civilised, literate, God-fearing European) and the 'Other' (the savage, ignorant, heathen 'native') was clear from the outset. In the early nineteenth century, it seemed sensible for European-Americans (in terms of the government not having to provide resources to fight a perpetual war) to set a limit to the western geographical expansion of the United States into Indian territory. In other words, a

[97] The term 'Sioux' is often used to refer to the Lakota and Dakota peoples. Whereas some individuals and groups of the Lakota and Dakota peoples continue to use it, others do not. The word does not appear in their own languages; it was a name given to them, and as one possible meaning is 'snake', or possibly 'enemy', it is sometimes seen as derogatory. In referring to tribal groups and affiliations as specifically as possible, I will tend against the use of the word 'Sioux', apart from when reporting official terminology, and the direct speech of others.

boundary, or as it was referred to at the time, and has passed into the western mythos since, a 'frontier', was established. In 1834, the United States Congress passed *An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse with the Indian Tribes and to Preserve Peace on the Frontiers*. Dee Brown (1970) records that the idea originated with President Andrew Jackson who, despite being known to the Indians as 'Sharp Knife' due to his soldiers slaughtering '… thousands of Cherokees, Chickasaws, Choctaws, Creeks and Seminoles', suggested '… the propriety of setting apart an ample district west of the Mississippi … to be guaranteed to the Indian tribes, as long as they shall occupy it' (p. 5). The 1834 Act determined that all land west of the Mississippi, excluding that within the states of Missouri and Louisiana and the territory of Arkansas, would be Indian country; any white persons attempting to settle west of the 'permanent Indian frontier' would be removed by the United States military. In the years after the passing of this Act, many eastern Indian tribes were forcibly relocated west of the frontier (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a).

Nevertheless, United States territory continued to grow – which was inevitably based on the conquest of Indian lands, and the constant western movement of the so-called 'permanent' frontier. Just fourteen years after the 1834 Act, gold was discovered in California (which became a state in 1850), as it was in Colorado a few years later, leading fortune-seeking white settlers to breach the frontier. Furthermore, Minnesota became a state in 1858, and the Kansas and Nebraska territories that were organised in the 1850s bit deep into Indian country (Brown, 1970). In short, United States expansionism meant that the *physical* manifestation of in-and out-grouping – the *geographical* separation between the European-American and the Indian tribes – was to be a short-lived strategy.

II. CONSTRUCTION OF AN ASPIRATIONAL NATIONAL *WELTANSCHAUUNG*[98] THAT EXCLUDES THE 'OTHER'

By the beginning of the United States civil war of the 1860s, then, the notion of a 'permanent western frontier' was already nonsensical. So how were attempts made to 'justify' all of this expansionism? Brown (1970, p. 8) notes:

> To justify these breaches of the 'permanent Indian frontier', the policy makers in Washington invented Manifest Destiny, a term which lifted land hunger to a lofty plane. The Europeans and their descendants were ordained by destiny to rule all of America. They were the dominant race and therefore

[98] *Weltanschauung* is a German word, which may be literally translated as 'outlook-on-the-world', or perhaps understood by aficionados of Douglas Adams' work as a personalised sense of the 'Ultimate Question' (to which 42 is the answer) of 'Life, the Universe, and Everything' (see Adams, 1995). In German, is possible to talk about an individual *Weltanschauung*, i.e. the entirety of a person's perceptions, opinions and feelings about herself or himself, her or his life, and 'how things are' (and hence, the term has reasonably frequent untranslated usage in some Anglophone existential psychologies), and also the *Weltanschauungen* of collectives, such as families, friendship groups, regions and nation states.

> responsible for the Indians – along with their lands, their forests and their mineral wealth. Only the New Englanders, who had destroyed or driven out their Indians, spoke out against Manifest Destiny.

So how can this tunnel vision best be understood, even within the obvious confines of its being an outcome of the lust for gold and land? Psychologically, *ethnocentrism* (which many psychologists are content to leave to be studied by sociologists and anthropologists, save when it influences individual attitudes such as prejudice) bears more than a passing resemblance to *egocentrism*, which developmental psychologists have, at least historically, taken much interest in. In his well-known four-stage qualitative model of cognitive development, Jean Piaget describes *egocentrism* as one of the limitations of the child at the 'pre-operational' stage of development (ca. two to six years-old), in which the relatively high-order schemas that Piaget called 'operations', which will ultimately allow us to mentally manipulate ideas according to sets of rules, have not yet emerged (Minton, 2012a). Whilst 'egocentrism' has entered common usage as a slur for a perhaps selfish or self-indulgent adult, when Piaget used it about children he meant it in a literal sense – the child assumes that others see the world in exactly the same way as they do. However, it is important to recognise (as Gleitman, 1991, p. 554, did) that it is '… not that children seek to benefit at the expense of others; it is rather that they haven't fully grasped that there are other selves … they are as yet unable to recognise that different points of view exist'. Santrock (1996, p. 282) synopsised research from social psychologist Donald Campbell and colleagues, who had revealed that people in all cultures have a tendency to:

> Believe that what happens in their culture is 'natural' and 'correct' and that what happens in other cultures is 'unnatural' and 'incorrect';
> Perceive their cultural customs as universally valid; that is, what is good for us is good for everyone;
> Behave in ways that favour their cultural group;
> Feel proud of their cultural group; and,
> Feel hostile toward other cultural groups.

In other words, in the same way that an egocentric toddler *has not yet* fully grasped that other selves exist, the ethnocentric adult *refuses* to grasp that other cultures exist; the possibility of 'others' existing is not entertained as a valid mental construct. Of course, in how one reaches this position, the element of *choice* here is vital; egocentric children are *cognitively limited* due to the immaturity of their mental apparatus, whereas ethnocentric adults *limit themselves* – the difference is, perhaps, the same as exists between person A being blind, and person B refusing to see. However, the end result is remarkably similar; as Santrock (1996, p. 282) went on to state, 'Many cultures define the word human with sole reference to their own cultural group.[99] …The implication is that people from other cultures are not

[99] For example, Inuit, the collective name for the indigenous Arctic peoples of North America and Greenland, rendered ᐃᓄᐃᑦ in Inuktitut (the Eastern Canadian Inuit language), means simply 'the *(continued)*

perceived as fully human'. This certainly seems to have been the case in United States constitutional law, as it became applied to Indians.[100] The United States Constitution begins with the well-known optimism of the emergent former colonies, seeking to underscore their right to a better type of nationhood than that which pertained in the lands of their former colonial overlords[101] (the idiosyncratic capitalisation and spelling is reproduced from the original):

> We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

However, the third paragraph of Section Two of Article One (which concerned the legislative powers of the United States Congress) makes it clear that Indians (and slaves) were not, constitutionally speaking, 'fully' people:

> Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and *excluding Indians not taxed*, three fifths of all other Persons' (italics mine).[102]

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people'. Before their first contacts with the Norsemen who first explored and later settled in what are now Greenland and Canada from the eleventh century, the Dorset and Thule cultures who were the ancestors of the Inuit could not have been aware that other 'people' existed.

[100] In many respects, a dreadful irony; see footnotes 101 and 102, below.

[101] It is also interesting to note that the *comparative* aspect of the aspirational opening statement – the '*more* perfect Union' – refers to the framers' of the United States Constitution's positive assessment of a previous union that had existed in the lands that were to become the northeastern United States, that of the Iroquois Confederacy of (originally) five Indian Nations (the Cayuga, Mohawk, Oneida, Onondaga, Seneca; a sixth, the Tuscarora, was added in 1722), which dated from the mid-fifteenth century, until its dissolution at the end of the American Revolutionary War (1776–1783), and its Great Law of Peace (*Gayanashagowa*). In October 1988, the U.S. Congress passed Concurrent Resolution 331, 'To acknowledge the contribution of the Iroquois Confederacy of Nations to the development of the United States Constitution and to reaffirm the continuing government-to-government relationship between Indian tribes and the United States established in the Constitution' (United States Senate, 1988), which stated that '… the original framers of the Constitution, including, most notably, George Washington and Benjamin Franklin, are known to have greatly admired the concepts of the Iroquois Confederacy' (United States Senate, 1988). With this knowledge in mind, the purpose of the comparative adjective ('more') in the opening words of the United States Constitution becomes clear: if Indians could produce a long-lasting and peaceful union, why shouldn't the representatives of the thirteen colonies be able to produce a 'more perfect' union? The Lakota activist and author Russell Means put it this way: 'The Constitution Is Indian Law, and that's why I love it!'

[102] This phrase and paragraph were subject to the Fourteenth Amendment (ratified July 9th, 1868), but the constitutional position of Indians did not change. The Fourteenth Amendment reads: 'Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of

(continued)

Furthermore, Section Eight of Article One states that Congress shall have the power to 'regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes', the implication of the wording used being that Indian tribes were constitutionally *separate* from the federal government (and foreign nations, and the states). Technically, this meant that the United States simultaneously withheld personhood from, and relinquished federal power over Indians under its Constitution. However, further legislation passed in the time period that is referred to in this chapter made it easier for the United States government to seize lands from Indians; under the Indian Appropriation Act of March 3, 1871, 'no Indian nation or tribe' would be recognised 'as an independent nation, tribe, or power with whom the United States may contract by treaty'; henceforth, individual Indians were to be treated as individual 'wards of the federal government' (Schultz et al., 2000). Furthermore, the General Allotment Act of 1887 (also known as the Dawes Act) broke up tribal lands into farmlands, to be auctioned off to white purchasers, and distributed to Indian families who, if they accepted such allotments, were made United States citizens. Land itself, and the Indian tradition of communally-owned land, were lost under the provisions of this Act, and so too were many of the remaining Indian ways of life (McDonnell, 1991).

In an interesting contrast, it was adjudicated that prior to European settlement from 1788, Australia had been *terra nullis* (Lat., 'a land belonging to no-one'), in a series of early nineteenth century legal cases concerning land ownership between white settlers and indigenous Australians (Aboriginals). Indigenous Australians had, of course, been in Australia for many thousands of years; however, from 1835, indigenous Australians were not legally allowed to own or sell land, other than through distribution by the Crown. Australia was judged as having belonged to 'no-one' prior to colonisation because European settlers had found (to them, rather conveniently) that indigenous Australian societies were not organised in such a way that they could sign treaties or otherwise barter for land with them. So officially, it was deemed that no-one was (at least legally) 'there', with indigenous Australians being considered as merely part of the local fauna and flora (see Connor, 2005).[103] In North America, of course, the Indians were unmistakably 'there', and recognised as being so in the wording of the United States Constitution, and in the passing of the 1834 *Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse*

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age, and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State' (Government of the United States, 1992).

[103] In a notable contrast, the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, signed by representatives of the British Crown, and Hano Heke and other Māori chiefs from New Zealand's North Island, whilst giving Britain sovereignty over New Zealand and establishing a British Governor, gave the Māori the rights of British subjects and supposedly recognised Māori land and property ownership rights (New Zealand Ministry of Justice, 2014), although this last was all but ignored until the mid-1970s. Māori friends of mine have linked this to the fact that physical resistance to British/European settlement in New Zealand was significant amongst the Māori warrior societies, and certainly more so than it was amongst the essentially nomadic Australian aboriginal societies across the Tasman.

with the Indian Tribes and to Preserve Peace on the Frontiers. But as the nineteenth century progressed, the ethnocentric European settlers increasingly treated the Indians as if they and their cultures were an obstacle to their 'Manifest Destiny' to be overcome by whatever means were necessary. So the Indians came to be seen as 'there', yes, but with no right to be so; and, like the western frontier itself, regardless of what might have been agreed in the recent past, certainly not to be 'there' on a permanent basis.

III. POSITIONING OF THE 'OTHER' AS '*GEGENTYPEN*'[104]

In his introduction to his perennial best-seller, *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*, Dee Brown (1970) stated that, during the thirty-year span between 1860 and 1890, '… the culture and the civilization of the American Indian was destroyed, and out of that time came virtually all of the great myths of the American West – tales of fur traders, mountain men, steamboat pilots, goldseekers, gamblers, gunmen, cavalrymen, cowboys, harlots …. The Indian was the dark menace of those myths' (p. xv), and that readers of his book '… may be surprised to hear words of gentle reasonableness coming from the mouths of Indians stereotyped in the American myth as ruthless savages' (p. xvii). For such was the positioning of the American Indian at that time; a positioning which continued in popular American and international media for around another century.

A prime example of this regards the practice of 'scalping', which became a key part of what was supposedly 'understood' about Indian war (and even general cultural) practices by the white readers, television viewers and cinema-goers of the early twentieth century. This 'understanding' was of scalping as being practiced by Indians on hapless white settlers, and has a long history; a 'redskin scalper' is described by J.M. Barrie in his 1911 novel, *Peter Pan and Wendy* (Barrie, 2007), and an anti-hero from children's literature, Harry Flashman[105] (the bully of Thomas Hughes' 1857 *Tom Brown's School Days*; Hughes, 1991) survives an attempted scalping in *Flashman and the Redskins* (Fraser, 1989). The 1990 film *Dances with*

[104] The term '*Gegentypen*' (a German word literally translated as 'against-types') appears in *Der Geist im Wort und der Geist in der Tat* ['The Spirit in the Word and the Spirit in Deeds'] (1927), which was written by the author/dramatist Arthur Schnitzler (1862–1931). According to Arens (1986), Schnitzler '… intended this book to be an *anthropology* of man's character, or a *characterology*: a study of the types of human spirit observable in the world' (p. 100). From this standpoint, the human personality may reveal itself from two perspectives, a positive type (*Positiv Type*) and a negative type (*Gegentype*). The positive type is assimilated into the group, but lonely, and exists in the realm of truth; the negative is isolated, but companionable, and exists in the realm of lies. At the extremes of the positive and negative types respectively are God and the Devil. Like the work of his fellow Viennese Jew, Otto Weininger (1880–1903), Schniztler's ideas subsequently found fertile ground (though bastardised in form) in pan-Germanic and Nazi ideologies (Arens, 1986), where the term '*Gegentypen'* was sometimes applied to 'enemy' populations.

[105] A grown-up Flashman, the bully depicted in Thomas Hughes' *Tom Brown's School Days*, and a relatively minor character in that novel (although he is rather more prominent in the 1916, 1940, 1951 and 2005 film adaptations), was the central figure and hero of a series of historical novels written by George MacDonald Fraser between 1969 and 1999 (see, for example, Fraser, 1989).

Wolves, which is generally seen as showing Indians in a positive light, shows the scalping of a white man by a Pawnee warrior (the film's reversal of the Hollywood Western's traditional 'good guys' ([white] 'cowboys', or in this case, soldiers) and 'bad guys' (Indians), does not extend to the Pawnee, who were positioned in the Lakota-focussed film solely as co-villainous collaborators with the whites).[106]

Whilst the accuracy – technical and historical – of *Dances with Wolves* continues to be debated (e.g., Sirota, 2013), professional historians have left us in no doubt as to the total warfare that regularly flared up between the Pawnee and the Lakota/Cheyenne peoples in the mid-nineteenth century (Hyde, 1974; Weltfish, 1977),[107] and the fact that during these inter-tribal wars, scalping was practiced by both the Pawnee and Lakota/Cheyenne, with non-combatants being seen by both sides as legitimate targets (van de Logt, 2012). However, continued reference to professional historians, rather than to children's literature and American cinema, shows that the picture of scalping as being an essentially Indian practice, conducted on rival tribes or white settlers, is far from accurate (Grenier, 2005, 2008; Haley, 1981; Sonnebor, 2006). In the early-eighteenth century colonial wars between New England and the Iroquois Confederacy on one side, and New France and the Wabanaki Confederacy on the other (1688–1763), Grenier (2005) records that *all* sides took scalps, including those of non-combatants. In the wars between the mid-eighteenth century wars between the British and the French and the Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia, the French paid the Mi'kmaq Indians for British scalps, and the British paid (amongst others, the New England Rangers) rewards for Mi'kmaq scalps. Both the British and the French killed non-combatants (Grenier, 2008). Further south during these wars, in the Massachusetts Bay colony in 1755, Governor William Shirley offered rewards of £40 per male Indian scalp, and £20 for those of women, and children under twelve years of age (Sonnebor, 2006). In the early-nineteenth century, the price placed on scalps by the Mexican state of Chihuahua in 1835 was 100 pesos per warrior, 50 pesos per woman, and 25 pesos per child. Hence, there was not only official approval, but also considerable financial incentive for European colonists to seek the scalps of American Indians – for purposes of comparison, the annual salary of a schoolteacher in Virginia was £60 (Crews, 2002), and 100 Mexican pesos in 1835 has a US dollar value of $3, 226 today. Nevertheless, it was the image of the savage and blood-thirsty Indian,

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[106] As Boughter (2004) puts it: 'The problem with Costner's approach is that all of the Sioux are heroic, while the Pawnees are portrayed as stereotypical villains. Most accounts of Sioux-Pawnee relations see the Pawnees as victims of the more powerful Sioux' (p.105). In the context of the current discussion, it is interesting to note that the single act of scalping depicted in *Dances with Wolves* is that of a white man by a Pawnee.

[107] The Pawnee's traditional lands were located in what became the United States' Midwest, and hence, they were relatively isolated from other peoples. However, from the 1830s, first the Lakota (who brought war) and, later, white settlers (who brought war, and Eurasian diseases) invaded from the east, with the effect of reducing the Pawnee population from 12,000 in the 1830s to 3,400 in 1859. That year, the remaining Pawnee were involuntarily confined to a reservation in Nebraska, and twenty-five years later, they requested removal to Indian Territory (Oklahoma), the stress of which reduced their numbers even further (Hyde, 1974; Weltfish, 1977). In 2012, there were approximately 3,240 enrolled (which requires a minimum of 1/8th blood quantum) Pawnee (Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma, 2013).

terrorising the peaceable white settlers with his supposed native and barbaric practice of scalp-hunting, which was implanted in the popular (white) memory.

Over the last three decades, the 'dark menace' media stereotype of the American Indian seems to be being replaced. It is worth considering that a further hope on the part of the author for the readers of *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* was that they '… may learn something about their own relationship to the earth from a people who were true conservationists' (Brown, 1970, p. xvii). Since Brown's work was first published, ecological consciousness has gone from being a fringe idea to one protected in national and international legislature. The afore-mentioned '*Dances with Wolves*' is generally seen as something of a landmark in changing depictions of the American Indian, at least in Hollywood; indeed, it was reported that '… the Sioux nation, a group seldom thrilled with its portrayal on-screen, has adopted Costner as an honorary member' (Svetsky, 1991).[108] In a negative review of *Dances with Wolves*,[109] Richard Grenier (1991) disputed the accuracy of the film's image of the American Indian (especially the Lakota) as a pacifist environmentalist. Revealing his own perspectives rather clearly in the statement that during the mid-Civil War years, the Lakota '… spread over the countryside, killing, raping, pillaging, torturing. In the long prairie nights, with no television, it was the Plains Indian custom to torture captives for entertainment', Grenier made the point that the view of the Lakota depicted in '*Dances with Wolves*' was indicative of a 'holy triad of the new belief system' in Hollywood of '… (1) environmentalism; (2) a vague sort of pacifism … [and] (3) racial minorities'. He went on to argue that '*Dances with Wolves*' '… is vehemently, dishonestly, even illogically anti-white. Its portrait of the Sioux, the most bloodthirsty of all Plains Indian tribes and neither pacifists nor environmentalists, is false in every respect'.

However, at a distance of nearly quarter of a century, Grenier's (1991) comments read as oddly out of kilter, and something of a throwback to the 'bad old days'. Presently, there is an ongoing construction that will depict and commemorate (in statue form) Crazy Horse, the Oglala Lakota warrior famed for his role in the War for the Black Hills, and especially the Battle of the Little Bighorn (see Section VI, below), in which he was one of the leaders of the resistance to the United States' incursion into the lands of the Lakota Nation. Sculpting began in 1948 by Korczak Ziolkowski (who died in 1982, although his

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[108] However, this apparent gratitude to Costner at his portrayal of the Lakota was not universal amongst the Nation's people. In naming some 'good' Hollywood Indian films some years later (in 2009), Russell Means, an Oglala Lakota, and a high-profile American Indian activist from the late 1960s until his death in 2012, mentioned *Broken Arrow*, *Tell Them Willie Boy Is Here*, *Little Big Man*, *The Outlaw Josey Wales*, *Last of the Mohicans* and *Thunderheart*, but *Dances with Wolves* was not amongst them. Means drew attention to the fact that Lakota has a male-gendered and a female-gendered language, and that the woman who had taught the actors in *Dances with Wolves* taught them the female-gendered language, which had amused Means and his Lakota friends when they went to see the film (Means, 2009). He summed up the movie thus: 'Remember *Lawrence of Arabia*? That was "Lawrence of the Plains"'.

[109] These were famously thin on the ground at the time. Gary Larson's *The Far Side* cartoon of 5th June 1991 depicted just three people in a function room gossiping about extremely trivial points about the film, and was captioned 'At the international meeting of the "Didn't Like *Dances with Wolves* Society"'.

widow and seven of his children continue to work there) out of Thunderhead Mountain in the Black Hills (Voice of America News, 2003). On completion, it may become the world's largest statue. Ziolkowski's intention was that the statue of Crazy Horse would not just represent one Indian leader, but would stand as a symbol of the proud American Indian; the mounted Crazy Horse is to be depicted as pointing into the distance, proclaiming, 'My lands are where my dead lie buried' (Obidinski, 1995).[110]

Whilst the sculptor Ziolkowski '… did not care for depictions of the Indian as a defeated and dejected race of people' (Obidinski, 1995, p. 1), and to move away from media and artistic depictions of the American Indian, this was certainly not true of the US Army in the late nineteenth century. The month after the massacre committed by the US Army of the Cheyenne-Arapaho village at Sand Creek in November 1864 (see Section V, below), they demanded the unconditional surrender of all 'hostile tribes' at Fort Cobb, promising they would be fed if they did so (the Army had already burned the Indians winter meat supply) (Brown, 1970). A paraphrased utterance from General Philip Henry Sheridan (1831–1888) during this surrender has since become famous (Brown, 1970, pp. 171–172):

> A few days later, Tosawi [Silver Knife] brought in the first band of Commanches to surrender. When he was presented to [General] Sheridan, Tosawi's eyes brightened. He spoke his own name and added two words of broken English. 'Tosawi, good Indian'. It was then that General Sheridan uttered the immortal words: 'The only good Indians I ever saw were dead'. Lieutenant Charles Nordstrom, who was present, remembered the words and passed them on, until in time they were honed into an American aphorism: The only good Indian is a dead Indian.

Indeed, twenty-two years after Sheridan's utterance, the then future US President Theodore Roosevelt stated (Stannard, 1992, p. 245):

> I don't go so far as to think that the only good Indians are dead Indians, but I believe nine out of ten are, and I shouldn't like to inquire too closely into the case of the tenth.

In an exceptionally moving chapter in a moving book (the afore-mentioned *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee*), Dee Brown (1970) told the story of *Standing Bear Becomes a Person*. The immediate origin of what Brown described as '… the now almost forgotten civil rights case of *Standing Bear v. Crook*' (p. 360), which began on April 18th, 1879, lay over two years earlier, with the decision to move the

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[110] However, some Lakota people are not happy with the memorial. Elaine Quiver, a descendant of Crazy Horse, said that no-one had asked the opinions of the descendants of Crazy Horse beforehand; the Memorial was initiated by a single Lakota elder, Henry Standing Bear. 'They don't respect our culture because we didn't give permission for someone to carve the sacred Black Hills where our burial grounds are. They were there for us to enjoy and they were there for us to pray. But it wasn't meant to be carved into images, which is very wrong for all of us. The more I think about it, the more it's a desecration of our Indian culture. Not just Crazy Horse, but all of us' (Elaine Quiver, quoted in Voice of America News, 2003).

Ponca people from their lands in the Dakota territory south to Indian Territory. Although the Poncas had never engaged in warfare with the United States army, their lands had been erroneously assigned by the United States to the 'Sioux Territory' in 1868, and after years of Lakota harassment (who claimed the land as their own), the Poncas were included amongst the Plains Indians to be removed to Indian Territory following the Lakota defeat of Custer's Seventh Cavalry at Little Bighorn in 1876 (see Section VI, below). The news was broken to White Eagle, Big Elk, Standing Bear and other Ponca chiefs in January, 1877, and an attempt was made (which Standing Bear tried to resist, resulting in his temporary imprisonment) to forcibly remove them to Indian Territory in April of that year, which was undertaken at gun- and bayonet-point on May 21st. Following a fifty-day journey in which the Poncas were plagued by constant hunger, flies, thunderstorms and illnesses (malaria, pneumonia), resulting in the deaths of men, women and children, they reached their new reservation, but without the provisions and medicines that had been promised to them. When Standing Bear and his people started a return journey north to their traditional lands, they were arrested by General George R. Crook's (1830–1890) soldiers, and placed under guard until arrangements could be made for their removal back to Indian Territory. Judge Elmer S. Dundy issued a writ of *habeas corpus* on General Crook, requiring Crook to bring his Ponca prisoners before the judge, and to show by what authority he held them.[111] Judge Dundy ruled that (Brown, 1970, pp. 361–362):

> … an Indian was a 'person' within the meaning of the *habeas corpus* act, that the right of expatriation was a natural, inherent, and inalienable right of the Indian as well as the white race, and in times of peace no authority, civil or military, existed for transporting Indians from one section of the country to another without the consent of the Indians or to confine them to any particular reservation against their will.

The decision resulted in Standing Bear and his band being given a few hundred acres of unclaimed (by the United States) territory in their old lands, and the 530 Poncas who had remained on the reservation in Indian Territory made plans to join them. However, they found themselves forced to remain put. Big Snake, the brother of Standing Bear, decided to test the new legal precedent set by Judge Dundy's decision (that an Indian could not be confined to any particular reservation against his will), and to go north to join his brother, but first to travel with thirty companions only a hundred miles to the nearby Cheyenne reservation. When he got there, he and his companions were arrested by General Sherman's men, with Sherman decreeing that (Brown, 1970, p. 364; italics in original):

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[111]Standing Bear's words to the judge and officers on this occasion, delivered on behalf of his people, are worthy of recollection: 'I am now with the soldiers and officers. I want to go back to my old place north. I want to save myself and my tribe …. May the Almighty send a good spirit to brood over you, my brothers, to move you to help me. If a white man had land, and someone should swindle him, that man should try to get it back, and you would not blame him. Look at me. Take pity on me, and help me to save the lives of women and children. My brothers, a power, which I cannot resist, crowds me to the ground. I need help. I have done' (Brown, 1970, p. 360).

The release under writ of *habeas corpus* of the Poncas in Nebraska *does not apply to any other than that specific case*.

After being brought back to the Poncas' reservation, and following accusations of threatening and attempting to kill white Indian agents, which he denied,[112] Big Snake was re-arrested in October, and in resisting arrest by attempting to push the armed soldiers who surrounded him away, Big Snake was shot dead (the statement of the Interior Department recorded that he had been 'shot accidentally').[113] Hence, the diminishing Poncas on the reservation never rejoined Standing Bear's free band in their traditional lands in the north (Brown, 1970).

If it seems difficult for European-Americans at the beginning of the twenty-first century to get to grips with the American Indian as a person (not least in their media depictions of her or him), with all of the virtues, frailties and complexities that personhood involves, it is to be recalled that history seems, however cynical Sherman's motives were, to have validated his assertion. Standing Bear's legal recognition as a 'person' in that 1879 case was indeed exceptional (and, as we have seen, to all intents and purposes meaningless). Indeed, the apparent reversals (in media depictions of the American Indian) of the final decade of the twentieth century that we have discussed above could not have been predicted by the attitudes and actions taken towards the American Indian by nineteenth century European-Americans. In the next section of this chapter, we will review how, as the nineteenth century progressed, the American Indian was reduced in the eyes and minds of many European-Americans, from being an only-good-when-dead enemy, to not being human at all.

IV. DEHUMANISATION OF THE 'OTHER'

Psychologists owe a large part of their experimentally-derived knowledge about the processes of how we dehumanise our fellow human beings to Philip Zimbardo and his colleagues' attempts to understand the factors that underpin prison violence. Two 'folk' personality-driven theories of prison violence existed at the time of their now ethically notorious 'Stanford Prison Experiment' (see Haney & Zimbardo, 1977): it could be attributed to either to the criminal nature of the prisoners, or the assumed authoritarian (or even sadistic) personalities of the prison staff (or possibly a combination of the two). The Stanford Prison experiment was designed to test whether there was, in fact, another alternative: that there may be something about the very environment of prisons themselves that produce such power dynamics, and subsequent reactions to those dynamics. So in 1969, Zimbardo and his colleagues at Stanford University endeavoured to create a mock-up of a prison environment, using the basement of the psychology department and

[112] This seems unlikely from Brown's (1970) description (p. 363) of Big Snake as '… a giant with hands like hams …. Like many huge men, Big Snake was quiet and gentle of manner (the Poncas called him the Peacemaker)'.

[113] Once again, this seems unlikely – Brown (1970) provides an account given by Big Snake's companion, Hairy Bear, who witnessed the unarmed Big Snake's beating and murder by six soldiers.

undergraduate student volunteers, who were randomly assigned to either a 'guard' or 'prisoner' role. 'Guards' wore uniforms and sunglasses with reflective lenses; 'prisoners' wore 'caps' (to imitate shorn hair) and uniforms. The experiment was originally scheduled to run for two weeks, and both 'prisoners' and 'guards' were to keep diaries. Famously, the experiment had to be abandoned after just six days due to extremely negative reactions on the part of the 'prisoners' and the increasing sadism of the 'guards'' thinking and behaviour. In other words, six days' experience of a role-playing exercise was enough to develop power dynamics such that one group of people (the 'guards') came to think of another group of people (the 'prisoners' – who were, let us not forget, in everyday life, their fellow students) as somewhat less than human. Small wonder then, that if we live out our professional lives secure in the role of a powerful 'one' against a dispossessed 'other' – who we are told by powerful authorities is not really human at all[114] – that our display of aggressive impulses (for which we may be rewarded) may run uninhibited by feelings of common humanity.

One of Zimbardo's observations during the Stanford Prison Experiment was that the language used by those assigned as prisoners and the guards in talking about one another changed; a 'them and us' polarity quickly emerged, and within a few days, the 'guards' typically spoke in ways (and recorded comments in their diaries) that were derogatory to the 'prisoners'. This is also reflected in times of war, when rival soldiers (and even civilian populations on opposite sides of a conflict) use collectivising, derogatory, deindividuating and ultimately dehumanising language to refer to one another (Zimbardo, 2007). Stannard (1992), too, has documented this; at the time of the Vietnam war, soldiers and civilians from southeast Asia were referred to as 'gooks', 'slopes' and 'dinks',[115] and tellingly for the present chapter, Vietnam itself was often referred to as 'Indian country', with the US Army's General Maxwell Taylor referring to Vietnamese opponents as 'Indians' in his Congressional testimony on the Vietnam war. At the time of the Iraqi war, Stannard (1992) noted that Iraqi soldiers were referred to as 'ragheads' and 'cockroaches' by US soldiers, and the existence of graffiti on bombs (under the

[114] This theme is further explored in Section V, below.

[115] This is by no means a solely American phenomenon. Having been born in England in 1971, I am of an age where I can (i) recall cringing, as a leftist teenager, at the seeming inability of members of my grandparents' generation to give up their Second World War-time nicknames for Germans ('Hun', 'Bosch', etc.); and, (ii) be appalled by, but not at all surprised at, members of current far-right movements in the United Kingdom referring to Muslim populations as 'towelheads', 'Muzzos' and the like (see below, 'Concluding Points' section). In 2015, Katie Hopkins, a columnist with the British tabloid newspaper *The Sun*, and her editor David Dinsmore, were reported to the London's Metropolitan Police by D. Peter Herbert, the Chair of the Society of Black Lawyers, for incitement to racial hatred, following Hopkins' description of desperate migrants who had drowned in the Mediterranean as 'cockroaches' (Selby, 2015). Whether Hopkins, who used the very language employed by active participants in genocides in the United States, Rwanda and Israel saw or sees those desperate migrants as an 'enemy population' is not clear; however, as Suzanne Moore (2015) noted, Hopkins' use of such language demonstrated that, '… on immigration, the language of genocide has entered the mainstream'.

wings of US aircraft) such as 'Mrs Saddam's sex toy' and 'a suppository for Saddam'.[116]

In investigating as to whether the cognitive content of emotions (and in his case, specifically *anger*) could be understood, cognitive linguist George Lakoff (1987) argued that whereas emotions are often viewed as being devoid conceptual content, the opposite is true: we also impose an understanding on what it is that we feel, and thus emotions have extremely complex conceptual structures, '… which give rise to a wide variety of non-trivial inferences' (p. 380), which he traced linguistically through an analysis of metaphor and metonym. In other words, how we speak about something reflects (through a system of reciprocal influences and structuring) both how we understand and feel, and how we *come to* understand and feel, about that something. As well as the collectivising, derogatory and de-individuating language noted by Stannard (1992) and Zimbardo (2007), dehumanising language can be used for purposes of emotional distancing, i.e. a systematic abdication of personal responsibility or emotional liability for one's actions towards towards a dehumanised other.[117] This was seen in the language of the Third Reich; famously, when the Holocaust was referred to as the 'Final Solution', i.e., as a problem to be solved effectively, rather than physical genocide, and also in more commonplace (for those times) situations. For example, Frankl (1985) noted that prisoners of the Nazis were not referred to as prisoners, or in any person-related way; when talking about prisoners, Nazi soldiers would invariably use the multi-purpose, but usually object-related, German word *Stück*[118] (literally, 'piece') instead.

In *Man's Search for Meaning*, Frankl (1985) provided many examples of dehumanisation of the 'Other' and de-individuation of the 'One' beyond the linguistic. Perhaps the starkest of all is that those he observed operating the physical mechanism of the gas release into the chambers were not the Nazi guards, but a detail of prisoners who understood all too well the consequences of their being relieved of their duties by their fellows. However instructive and informative they may be, we too will move beyond linguistic examples in considering the dehumanisation of the 'Other'. It is worth, then, considering the following report from former Japanese soldier Uno Shintaro, who had had an active part in the

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[116] A fairly clear symbolic representation of rape as an act of, and in, war; the reader may wish to reflect upon this when reading some of the descriptions of acts committed by US soldiers at Sand Creek in 1864 in the paragraphs that follow.

[117] As one might expect from Sartre's (1946) description of the inherently conflictual relationship between the 'One' and the 'Other' (see Chapter 2), the two processes are inevitably intertwined, but in this chapter will be treated separately: whereas the current section (Section IV) deals with dehumanisation of the 'Other', deindividuation of the 'One' is discussed in Section V, below.

[118] This very common German word does not translate into English directly. *Stück* is an all-purpose noun used in counting *things,* but ordinarily, *not* people. If one wants to ask how many of some *things* there are, one asks '*Wie viele* [how many] *Stücke* [pl.] *gibt es* [is there]?' However, if one wants to ask how many *people* there are, one asks, '*Wie viele Mennschen gibt es?*' Primo Levi (2006) reported that on his arrival at Auschwitz, '… the officer asked, "*Wieviel Stück*?" The corporal saluted that there were six hundred and fifty "pieces", and that all was in order' (p. 22).

atrocities committed against the Chinese in the Second Sino-Japanese War (1937–1945) (Cook & Cook, 1992, p. 153; italics mine):

> The major means of getting intelligence was to extract information by interrogating prisoners. Torture was an unavoidable necessity. Murdering and burying them follows naturally. You do it so you won't be found out. I believed and acted this way because I was convinced of what I was doing. We carried out our duty as instructed by our masters. We did it for the sake of our country. From our filial obligation to our ancestors. On the battlefield, *we never really considered the Chinese humans*. When you're winning, the losers look really miserable. We concluded that the Yamato[119] race was superior.

With regard to the historical events that have been chosen as exemplars in this chapter, we can document the repulsive extremes of dehumanisation of the 'Other' (the Indian) in two ways: (i) the political/military strategy of extermination; and (ii) the desecration of bodies of the massacred dead and dying. As we shall see, both featured at the massacre committed by the US Army of the Cheyenne-Arapaho village at Sand Creek in November 1864, and the afore-mentioned (see footnote 95) massacre at Wounded Knee in December 1890.

In the Colorado territory in 1864, '… a special volunteer unit of voluntary cavalry [had been] raised for the expressed purpose of "exterminating" all Cheyennes and Arapahos residing within territorial boundaries' (Churchill, 2003a, p. 53). The volunteer cavalrymen saw precisely such action before the year was over. Stannard (1992) records that a week and a half prior to the massacre of almost 600 Indians at the Cheyenne-Arapaho village at a bend at Sand Creek, the following had appeared in an editorial of South Dakota's '*Aberdeen Saturday Pioneer*' (Baum, 1864[120]; in Stannard, 1992, p. 127):

> The nobility of the Redskin is extinguished, and what few are left are a pack of whining curs who lick the hand that smites them … the best safety of the

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[119] A term that historically refers to the dynasty that ruled Japan from the sixth century, but used from the late nineteenth century to describe the dominant ethnicity in Japan, and therefore distinct from ethnic minority groups in Japan, such as the Aino of of Japan's northernmost prefecture, Hokkaido; the Nivkh and Orokh peoples (indigenous peoples of Sakhalin island, since 1945 Russian territory, but long disputed between Russia and Japan), and the indigenous Ryukyuan islanders (Willis & Murphy-Shigematsu, 2007). Robertson (2002) noted that, '… the concept of "pure blood" as a criterion of authentic Japaneseness began circulating in public discourse by the 1880s in many venues and media' (p. 194), and went on to document the extensive interest of Imperial Japanese scientists in eugenics, and the sociopolitical implications of this interest, in the seven decades that followed. Hence, and as we can see from the quote in the text to which this footnote refers, in the years of the Greater Japanese Empire (1868–1947), and especially during what might be somewhat euphemistically called its 'expansionist' phases, the term 'Yamato' was often used with understandings similar to those of the Nazis in their use of the term 'Aryan'.

[120] Later, L. Frank Baum became better known as the author of the children's classic *The Wizard of Oz*. The reader must make of this what she or he will. In 2006, members of Baum's family offered a public apology (via a South Dakota Public Radio broadcast) for their ancestor's editorials concerning Indians (South Dakota Public Radio, 2006).

> frontier settlements will be secured by the total annihilation of the few remaining Indians. Why not annihilation? Their glory has fled, their spirit broken, their manhood effaced; better that they should die than live as the miserable wretches that they are.

The cavalrymen were under the command of Colonel John Chivington, a former Methodist missionary and a then-candidate for Congress, who had said that his policy was to '… kill and scalp all [Indians], little and big'; he advocated the wholesale slaughter of the Indian children, as 'nits make lice' (Stannard, 1992, p. 131).[121] Chivington had been informed that the village at Sand Creek could have been taken with far fewer than the 700 heavily armed soldiers that he had at his command, as of the 600 Indians in camp on the 29th November, 1864, perhaps just 35 were warriors (the rest were away on a hunt) – the vast majority were, therefore, old men, women and children. Yet the mostly unarmed Indians who gathered around Black Kettle's flag of truce, surmounted on his lodge pole with a United States flag (a gift from the Commissioner of Indian Affairs), whom the old chief (who had always urged peace with the white men) had told that they were under protection, were fired upon by the five divisions of cavalrymen, who proceeded to hunt down, shoot, stab, slash and club the Indians, and then scalp and otherwise mutilate the dead and dying (Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992). Few survived; Stannard (1992, p. 127) records the comments of one, American Horse:

> Right near the flag of truce a mother was shot down with her infant; the child not knowing that its mother was dead was still nursing, and that especially was a very sad sight. … After most all of them had been killed a cry was made that all those who were not killed or wounded should come forth and they would be safe. Little boys who were not wounded came out … as soon as they came in sight a number of soldiers surrounded them and butchered them there.

President Theodore Roosevelt subsequently described the Sand Creek Massacre as '… as righteous and beneficial a deed as ever took place on the frontier' (Stannard, 1992, p. 134). However, the accounts that the soldiers and other witnesses gave of the hellish mutilations of the Indian's bodies are entirely incompatible with Roosevelt's description (Stannard, 1992, pp. 132–133):

> … I saw fingers cut off (to get rings off them), saw several bodies with privates cut off, women as well as men.
> … the ears were cut off White Antelope … and I heard that the privates of White Antelope had been cut off to make a tobacco bag out of.
> … they were scalped, their brains knocked out; the men used their knives, ripped open women, clubbed little children, knocked them in the head with their guns, beat their brains out … children two or three months old.

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[121] As Stannard (1992) points out, half a century later Heinrich Himmler described the extermination of Jewry as 'delousing'.

> I heard one man say he had cut out a woman's private parts, and had them for exhibition on a stick. … I also heard of numerous instances in which men had cut out the private parts of females and stretched them over the saddle-bows, and wore them over their hats whilst riding in the ranks.

On 29th November, 2014, the one-hundred-and-fiftieth anniversary of the Sand Creek Massacre, the Governor of Colorado, John Hickenlooper, gave a public address, which included the following words (Colhoun, 2014):

> Today, we gather here to fully acknowledge what happened – the massacre of Sand Creek. There is no rationalising; there should be no sugar-coating of history. We should not be afraid to criticise and condemn that which is inexcusable. So I am here to offer something that has been too long in coming. On behalf of the State of Colorado, I want to apologise. And I don't make that apology lightly. I talked to all of the living former Governors of Colorado going back for the past forty years and each one of them agrees and in spirit is standing here beside me. Governor Lamm commented that two of the most powerful words in the English language are, 'I'm sorry.' To to all of the indigenous people – and the proud and painful legacy you all represent – on behalf of the good, peaceful and loving people of Colorado, I want to say, I am sorry for the atrocity that our government and its agents visited upon your ancestors.

It was reported that many people in Hickenlooper's audience, which of course included Cheyenne and Arapaho people, were moved to tears (Calhoun, 2014). Almost by way of contrast, just over a century after the massacre at Wounded Knee, the governmental *Nebraska State Historical Society*'s journal featured an article by Jerry Green (1994). This article addressed the now extremely controversial awarding of eighteen Congressional Medals of Honour, the United States Army's highest military commendation, to some of the soldiers responsible for the massacre. It will be recalled (see footnote 95, above) that this 'military action' involved the unprovoked attack on 350 (of whom 300 died) Minneconjou and Hunkpapa Lakota (including 230 women and children), who were in the act of surrender, by four divisions of the US Army's Seventh Cavalry (Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992). However, Green (1994, p. 207) concluded only that:

> The Wounded Knee medals have been a source of aggravation for a century, and the question of rescinding them surfaces periodically. At the same time, the Medal of Honour has evolved into a far more prestigious and selective award than its status in the nineteenth century would indicate …. More elaborate speculations on the motivations of military leaders will have to wait.

It is noteworthy that of the seven pictures that Green (1994) provided in his article, only one depicts Indians (the Minneconjou leader, Spotted Elk,[122] and two companions, photographed two years before the massacre, in 1888), another photograph being a view of a ravine, two more being of the Medal of Honour itself, and three more featuring the US soldiers responsible for (but not in the process of perpetrating) the massacre. Yet the enduring visual image of the Wounded Knee Massacre for many is the photograph of the sixty-four year old Spotted Elk's body, lying twisted and frozen in the snow at the site of the massacre (unlike Green, but like many, I do not find the word 'battlefield' appropriate). Stannard's (1992) descriptions of the mutilations of the Indian bodies at the Sand Creek Massacre, along with what we know and have seen of the Wounded Knee Massacre, strike deeply into our sense of what is decent about our treatment of the human form in death; in the same way, perhaps, whilst many can stand to see still photographs of the emaciated but still-living forms of human beings incarcerated in the Nazi death camps, the films of similar (or perhaps, by chance, even the same) bodies when dead being bulldozed into mass graves at those camps will cause all but the least desensitised of us to turn our faces away. Like the Pulitzer-Prize winning Vietnam War photograph of Phan Thị Kim Phúc (taken on 8th June, 1972, and showing her at nine years of age, running naked a road after being severely burned on her back by a South Vietnamese napalm attack; see Chong, 1999), these (descriptive or visual) images of the desecration of the human form – at Auschwitz, Sand Creek and Wounded Knee – seem to have a potential to burn deep into the iconic memory. If I may be permitted a psychological speculation, I would suggest that this can be understood by the fact that these images (physical or mental) transgress our deep sense of the very limits of what can ever be considered 'right' for human beings to do to another; and that the circumstances of the generation of these images are brought about by the victims depicted therein as no longer being considered human at all.

One living 'trophy' of the Wounded Knee massacre, the one year-old Lakota girl Zintka Lanuni (Lost Bird), taken off the site by General Leonard W. Colby for exhibit for profit and eventual release to Buffalo Bill's Wild West Show, did return to her people and homeland, at least in a way. She died at the age of twenty-nine in Los Angeles, but the Lakota people had her remains exhumed, and interned at Wounded Knee (Stannard, 1992). A similar act of re-internment at Wounded Knee had been undertaken in 1877, when the heart and bones of Crazy Horse, the legendary Lakota warrior who was instrumental in inflicting the greatest defeat ever suffered by an American army on home soil, were secretly buried by his parents following his murder (Brown, 1970). But the story of Crazy Horse's victory at Little Bighorn, and that of his subsequent assassination, must wait a while longer (see Section VI, below).

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[122] In the picture in Green's article, Spotted Elk is referred to as 'Big Foot', as he is in many other sources (including Brown, 1970). However, as 'Big Foot' was a derogatory nickname originally coined by a US soldier at Fort Bennett (Michno, 2003), I have referred to this Minneconjou chief as 'Spotted Elk' throughout.

V. DEINDIVIDUATION OF THE 'ONE'

Inspired by the story of the murder of Catherine Susan 'Kitty' Genovese in New York City in 1964,[123] Bibb Latané and John Darley set out to investigate why people fail to intervene and to help in emergency situations; that is to say, why they fail to help, or act pro-socially. In a typical experiment, participants in a 'waiting room' would see smoke pouring over the top of the laboratory door, or perhaps hear a female scream or a crash from behind the door. The factors which determined whether the participants attempted to intervene were the presence of others (the more people there were around, the less likely they were to intervene) and ambiguity or otherwise of the situation (the more clearly the situation appeared to be an emergency, the more likely they were to act). The 'bystander effect', also known as 'bystander apathy' and 'social loafing' is accounted for by the fact that in uncertain situations, the initial response of human beings is to look for what others are doing, and then to behave in a similar way (see Gleitman, 2010; Zimbardo, 1992, for reviews); in 'one-of-many' situations, the individual's own sense of *social responsibility* becomes 'diffuse' (Latané, 1981), as she or he 'deindividuates'. As well as explaining why people fail to behave pro-socially, the social 'reasoning' and diminished sense of social responsibility of individuals in 'one-of-many' situations have also been used to explain why some people behave anti-socially, as the sense of anonymity within the crowd disinhibits impulsive anti-social behaviours (Latané, 1981).

Our sense of moral responsibility for our own actions, at least in as far as we may experimentally measure its behavioural correlates, appears to be diminished further when we are directly told or ordered to do something. In one of the most famous studies in the history of psychology, Stanley Milgram (1965) produced a laboratory demonstration of this very pattern of behaviour. His experimental set-up involved duping genuine participants into believing that they were acting in a 'teacher' role in delivering, via an electroshock generating machine, shocks of increasing severity to a fellow participant in a 'learner' role in the room next door (once again, the 'learners' were 'stooges'[124]), according to the 'learners'' 'errors' in a 'word-association learning task'. The genuine participants' apparently

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[123] Catherine Susan 'Kitty' Genovese (1935–1964) was stabbed to death in three separate attacks over a thirty-five minute period by the same assailant (a necrophile named Winston Moseley, who raped her whilst she was dying) outside an apartment building in Queens, New York City, in the small hours of the morning of 13th March, 1964 (Manning, Levine, & Collins, 2007). Two weeks later, a *New York Times* article reported that thirty-eight people had seen her being murdered, but that none of them attempted to intervene, nor even called the police (Gansberg, 1964), although this coverage was later shown to have been inaccurate (Manning, Levine, & Collins, 2007). Moseley was refused parole for the seventeenth time in December 2013 (Newsmax, 2013).

[124] It should be noted that the Milgram (1965, 1974) and the Stanford Prison experiments (Haney & Zimbardo, 1977; Zimbardo, 2007) have often been criticised from an ethical standpoint, partially due to the fact that participation in these studies caused considerable emotional distress to the people involved, and partially due to the fact that the deceptive nature of the experimental set-up (including the use of 'stooges') runs contrary to the principle of informed voluntary consent outlined in most professional codes of ethics. These factors mean that such experiments of a similar design would not be accorded ethical approval to be undertaken today.

'random' assignation to the 'teacher' role was fixed; the 'shock generating equipment' was bogus; the people under investigation were the genuine participants, who were instructed to give the 'learner' a 'shock' each time he made a mistake. The 'shocks' were to increase by 15 volts each time; the 'shock machine' had levers up to '450 volts', followed by three more levers marked by large 'X's and 'Danger'. At 120 volts, the 'teacher' would hear the 'learner' complain of pain; at 210 volts, of a 'heart condition', and make repeated requests to be able to get out of the room; and after 330 volts, there was only an ominous silence. On hesitation, the genuine participant received prompts from the experimenter such as, 'It's essential to the experiment that you continue' and latterly, 'You have no choice, you have to go on'. How many participants would go 'all the way' to the third 'X' after '450 volts'? Astonishingly, over 60 per cent of the participants did so.

The genesis of this series of experiments, which could perhaps be deduced from what has already been said about Milgram in the opening section of this chapter, is also interesting. As a young man, Milgram had seen the results of the Nuremberg trials, at which many Nazi officer and soldier defendants – apparently cultured, educated and reasonable European people, who had been inexplicably willing to take their parts in genocide – attempted to evade their responsibility for their crimes, on the basis of their simply having 'followed orders'. As was mentioned above, Milgram argued that the views that had developed that 'Germans are different' and that 'the same thing couldn't happen here' were dangerous falsehoods; and in this series of experiments, he had demonstrated that 'normal' American people could and did reject or ignore their own feelings of sympathy or empathy for an apparently suffering and dying fellow human being in favour of showing obedience to authority of an experimenter (Milgram, 1965, 1974). Of course, a greater sense of their own history of genocide against the indigenous inhabitants of the New World might have meant that this was not in doubt.

Considering the conclusions that Milgram (1965, 1974) drew from his demonstrations of obedience to authority, we might ask ourselves the following questions: from which 'powerful authorities' did those involved in the genocide against the native peoples of the New World receive their orders? For one, the federal Indian agents and US Army officers who were involved in the negotiations of treaties[125] with the American Indians in the latter half of the nineteenth century often referred to the 'Great Father'[126] in the East, who, according to whatever best suited the white men's points, was alternately full of love for, or full of anger with, his 'red children' (see Brown, 1970). However, there was a more powerful

[125] Indians invariably emerged from such treaty negotiations with less land than before, and although most Indian chiefs and their people usually honoured treaty commitments, white settlers, loggers, miners and soldiers rarely felt compelled to do so; furthermore, whilst Indians were brutally punished by the US Army for real or imagined breaches of treaties, soldiers either ignored or encouraged such breaches by whites (see Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a; Stannard, 1992). As the Oglala Lakota chief Red Cloud (1822–1909) put it in later life, 'They made us many promises, more than I can remember, but they never kept but one; they promised to take our land, and they took it' (in Brown, 1970).

[126] The United States President.

authority still, who apparently commanded the obedient whole-scale slaughter and destruction of the Indians by the immigrants from the Old World and their descendants – God Almighty himself. Stannard (1992, p. 221) argued that the four hundred year conquest of the New World was an extended series of Holy Wars mounted by the European colonists, and that the differences in the genocidal activities in North and Central/South America is explainable via the temporal, and above all, denominational differences between the Anglo-American settlers and Spanish *conquistadors*:

> Mass murder and torture and mutilation had their place, of course, as instruments of terror to recruit the recalcitrant natives and to be sure they stayed in line. But the extermination of entire communities and cultures, though commonplace, was rarely the Spaniards' declared end goal, since to do so meant a large expenditure of energy with no financial return … in British America, extermination was the primary goal, and it was so precisely because it made economic sense.

Stannard (1992) documents that in the medieval Spanish/Roman Catholic mindset, the mirror ideology of yearning for Heaven – the tradition of *contemptus mundi* ('contempt for the world') – developed into fourteenth century practices by the especially devout of self-flagellation, self-starvation, and a variety of other forms of corporal mortifications. Coupled with the unquestioned widespread beliefs in witchcraft, Satanic practices and the Papal-approved hunt for, torture and killing of heretics by the Inquisition, the simultaneous fascination with and acclaimed horror of the sexual became devolved onto the uncivilised, non-Christian, non-European races (p. 171):

> In sum, the wild man and his female companion, at their unconstrained and sensual worst, symbolised everything that Christian's ascetic *contemptus mundi* tradition was determined to eradicate – even as that tradition also acknowledged that the wild man's very *same* carnal and uncivilised sinfulness gnawed at the soul of the holiest saint.

Within the European tradition, of course, and back to the time of Ancient Greece, slavery provided an economically sound alternative use of non-persons (as slaves were under Roman law) (Stannard, 1992, p. 211), which was to prove helpful to the *conquistadors* who:

> … possessed neither the manpower nor the inclination for mining America's vast stores of precious metals themselves. But along with all these riches, God had provided more labourers than could be imagined – tens of millions – so many, in fact, that the first Portuguese governor of Brazil claimed it would be impossible to exhaust the supply even if the Europeans were to cut up the natives in slaughterhouses.

In contrast, the Calvinist and Puritanical British settlers of North America, according to Stannard (1992), reasoned that '… those without a sense of private property were, by definition, not putting their land to "good or profitable use"' and

'… therefore, they deserved to be dispossessed of it' (p. 234). The Spanish were hungry for the mineral wealth that could be extracted from the land, and so economically, needed (at least some of) the native people of Central and South America as slaves; the British were hungry for the land itself, and therefore had no use for the native people of North America, who were an economic obstacle to their territorial ambitions (Bercovitch, 1975; in Stannard, 1992, p. 239):

> The Puritans, despite their missionary pretences, regarded the country as theirs and its natives as an obstacle to their destiny as Americans. They could remove that obstacle either by conversion (followed by "confinement") or else by extermination; and since the former course proved insecure, they had recourse to the latter. The Spanish, for all their rhetoric of conquest, regarded the country as the Indians' and native recruitment as essential to their design of colonisation.

As Stannard himself concluded, 'allegedly having shown themselves to be beyond conversion to Christian and civil life – and with little British or American need for them as slaves – straightforward mass killing of the Indians was deemed the only thing to do' (p. 247).

VI. VILIFICATION OF RESISTANCE

Of course, there are numerous examples of American Indians (here, we shall consider those of the northern plains between 1864 and 1890) attempting to defend their own lands. In 1865, Colonel Samuel Walker's campaign against the Arapaho, Lakota and Northern Cheyennes resulted in his troops being driven out of the 'Sioux country' at the Battle of Tongue River (Churchill, 2003a). However, the very next year, the United States again invaded the 'Indian Territory', building a line of US military forts across present-day Wyoming and Montana, in order to protect a transport route. From a United States perspective, this invasion was only partially successful; they had not reckoned on the resistance of the Lakota under Red Cloud. The successes of 'Red Cloud's War' (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a) resulted in a treaty being sought by the United States (and signed at Fort Laramie) in 1868, recognising the Sioux Nation's ownership of about what is now five per cent of the landmass of the continental United States (Churchill, 2003a). Part of the 1868 Treaty read (in Brown, 1970, p. 273):

> No white person or persons shall be permitted to settle on or occupy any portion of the territory, or without consent of the Indians to pass through the same.

However, and once again, this so-called 'permanent' arrangement was to change, and to change quickly. The most famous victory of the northern plains Indians against the army of the United States – that which became known to the European-Americans as 'Custer's Last Stand' at the Little Bighorn – stemmed directly from the United States' breach of the Fort Laramie Treaty, just six years after it was signed. Gold had been found in the Black Hills (in present-day South

Dakota) in 1874, an area which the United States had thought to have been economically worthless, and which was allocated in perpetuity to the Lakota (who held, and indeed still hold, it to be spiritually sacred (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a; Stannard, 1992; Streshinsky, 2011)) as part of the 1868 Treaty. Predictably, the United States government attempted to compel the plains Indians to relinquish the Black Hills (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a). Although a road was built by the United States into the Black Hills (which was referred to by the Indians as the 'Thieves' Road'; Brown, 1970), under Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer, whom the Lakota called 'Long Hair' (Brown, 1970), there was no military response from the Indians (Churchill, 2003a), who wished to preserve the terms agreed at the Fort Laramie Treaty, even though the presence of so many whites in their country (who did not seek the Indians' consent) angered them (Brown, 1970). Some spoke for selling the land (Spotted Bear; in Brown, 1970, p. 274):

> Our Great Father has a big safe, and so have we. The hill is our safe. We want seventy million dollars for the Black Hills. Put the money away some place at interest so we can buy livestock. That is the way white people do.

However, Little Big Man had promised, 'I will kill the first chief who speaks for selling the Black Hills!' (in Brown, 1970, p. 283). Crazy Horse, to whom the notion of private ownership of land was entirely foreign, and ludicrous, had reasoned that, 'One does not sell the earth upon which the people walk' (in Brown, 1970, p. 273), was also completely opposed to any sale, as was Sitting Bull. At a meeting at which the United States was instructed to treat with the plains Indians by officials in Washington, attended by agency[127] (e.g., Red Cloud, Spotted Tail) and non-agency (e.g. Sitting Bull) Indian chiefs (Crazy Horse was invited, but refused to attend, sending Little Big Man[128] instead to act as an observer for the non-agency Oglala Lakota), who met with a commission comprised of military officers, traders, politicians and missionaries, the following transpired (Brown, 1970, p. 279):

> Half-breed Louis Richard [the interpreter for the commission] took the government letter to Sitting Bull and read it to him. 'I want you to go and tell

[127] That is to say, those Indians living on reservations. Having been made false promises regarding the size of the reservations, the quality of land there (which turned out to be worthless) and the amount of provisions to be made to Indians by the United States' Indian agents (see Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992), Red Cloud and Spotted Tail had been tricked into leading their people onto reservations after the Fort Laramie Treaty.

[128] Little Big Man was present at the end of Crazy Horse's life, although perhaps not in the way that one might have expected. On April 27th, 1877, Crazy Horse was told by Red Cloud that General Crook would provide a reservation for Crazy Horse and his nine hundred people, who were by now starving, if he would surrender to Crook at Fort Robinson. After deliberation, Crazy Horse instead set out for the Powder River country, which by then had been stripped by the United States from the lands of the Lakota Nation. Crook had Crazy Horse arrested on August 31st, and he was turned over to the officers at Fort Robinson where he was murdered in custody on September 5th, 1877. The Indian policeman who received Crazy Horse on behalf of Crook was Little Big Man; he was holding Crazy Horse's arm when Private William Gentles fatally stabbed Crazy Horse in the abdomen with a bayonet (Brown, 1970).

> the Great Father', Sitting Bull responded, 'that I do not want to sell any land to the government'. He picked up a pinch of dust and added: 'Not even as much as this.'

The Lakota refused to be manoeuvred into selling[129] or accepting the United States' overtures towards granting temporary mining rights in the Black Hills, and attitudes hardened. Lakota and Cheyenne agents were ordered to notify all free-living Indians (those living off the Red Cloud and Spotted Tail reservations) to report to agencies by January 31st, 1876, or 'a military force will be sent to compel them'. The Indians under Sitting Bull's and Crazy Horse's leaderships did not comply, and from February, Generals Sheridan, Crook and Terry prepared their soldiers for war. Sitting Bull said at the time (in Brown, 1970, p. 273):

> We want no white men here. The Black Hills belong to me. If the whites try to take them, I will fight.

On March 17th, 1876, General Crook's column attacked a peaceful camp of Northern Cheyenne and Oglala Lakota people, who were travelling from the Red Cloud agency to go hunting in the Powder River country, destroying their possessions, and driving away over twelve hundred ponies. The homeless Indians were given food, clothing and shelter at Crazy Horse's village. A few weeks later, Crazy Horse led the Oglalas and Cheyennes in his village to the place where Sitting Bull and his Hunkpapas had camped over the winter; they were joined by Lame Deer and his Minneconjous, and over the spring, bands of Brulé, Sans Arcs and Blackfoot Lakota, and more Cheyennes, who had left their reservations ostensibly to hunt (as they were permitted to do so under the Fort Laramie Treaty) (Brown, 1970). Shortly after, at the Hunkpapa annual sun dance, Sitting Bull had a vision (Vestal, 1957, pp. 150–151):

> For three days, Sitting Bull danced, bled himself, and stared at the sun until he fell into a trance. When he rose again, he spoke to his people. In his vision, he had heard a voice crying, 'I give you these because they have no ears'. When he looked into the sky he saw soldiers falling like grasshoppers, with their heads down and their hats falling off. They were falling into the Indian camp. Because the white man had no ears and would not listen, Wakantanka the Great Spirit was giving these soldiers to the Indians to be killed.

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[129] This is still the case. One of the judgements of the United States Supreme Court's hearing of the *United States v. Sioux Nation of Indians*, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) case was that the Sioux had not received just compensation for the loss of the Black Hills. The Court ordered that 'just compensation to the Sioux Nation, and that obligation, including an award of interest, must now, at last, be paid' (United States Supreme Court, 1980). However, the Lakota have declined to accept the money, which remains in a Bureau of Indian Affairs account, and had compounded to over a billion dollars by August 2011 (Streshinsky, 2011), because acceptance would legally terminate their demands for the return of the Black Hills.

On June 17th, 1876, General Crook's soldiers and their Crow scouts attacked the now great Indian village on the Rosebud River, and were roundly beaten by the Crazy Horse's Lakota and Comes-in-Sight's Cheyennes (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a). After the Battle of the Rosebud River, knowing that his column alone could not defeat the Indians, Crook awaited reinforcements under Terry or Custer, and the Indians (now around ten thousand in number, including three or four thousand warriors) moved from the Rosebud to what they called the valley of the Greasy Grass, and the white men called the Little Bighorn (Brown, 1970). Sitting Bull did not believe that the Battle of the Rosebud River fulfilled his prophetic vision; on June 24th, Custer and his soldiers were spotted by Sitting Bull's female cousin, Pte-San-Waste-Win, approaching about eight miles away. This gave the Cheyenne and Lakota warriors time to arrange cover for their women and children, and to prepare for battle under their war chiefs Two Moon (Cheyenne), Low Dog and Crazy Horse (Oglala), Iron Thunder (Minneconjou), Kill Eagle (Blackfoot), and Crow King and Gall (Hunkpapa). Following a massive charge from the Indian village, the Indians surrounded Custer and his men, who dismounted and (at least initially) fought bravely. Towards the end, according to Red Horse (in Brown, 1970, p. 296):

> These soldiers became foolish, many throwing away their guns and raising their hands, saying, 'Sioux, pity us; take us prisoners'. The Sioux did not take a single prisoner, but killed all of them; none were alive for even a few minutes.

In all, the Seventh Cavalry suffered 52 per cent losses – sixteen officers and 242 troopers were killed on the field or subsequently died of wounds, and one officer and fifty-one men were wounded but survived. Every soldier in the five companies with Custer was killed. Red Horse indicated that there were sixty Lakota and Cheyenne dead (Kershaw, 2008). Subsequently, although as we have seen (above, Section IV) that the massacre by US soldiers of almost six hundred Cheyenne and Arapaho unarmed old men, women and children at Sand Creek who had gathered around a flag of truce was called 'a battle', the confrontation between Lakota and Cheyenne warriors and the United States cavalry at Little Bighorn in 1876 was described by officials in Washington as a 'massacre'. Following Little Bighorn, General Sherman was given authority to assume military control of all Lakota reservations, and to treat the Indians as prisoners of war (this effectively punished the reservation Indians who had not fought, rather than the non-agency Indians who had) (Brown, 1970). On August 15th, the Fort Laramie Treaty was unilaterally overturned by United States legislation, stripping the Indians of the Black Hills and the Powder River country (the traditional hunting grounds of the plains Indians) on the grounds that the Indians had violated the Fort Laramie Treaty by going to war with the United States.[130]

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[130] It is hard to imagine an alternative. As the Hunkpapa warrior Gall, Sitting Bull's adopted brother, had said in 1868, when commissioners were attempting to persuade the Lakota to take up farming: 'We were born naked, and have been taught to hunt and live on game. You tell us that we must learn to farm, *(continued)*

The great Indian village at the Little Bighorn broke camp after the battle; Crook's soldiers pursued Indians all over the plains thereafter (Brown, 1970), mounting a campaign of attacking Indian winter camps and killing as many Indians as possible (Churchill, 2003a). Sitting Bull took his people first to Yellowstone, and then north of the border to Canada in the spring of 1877[131]; he had tried to find Crazy Horse in order to persuade him to join him, but as Crazy Horse's people were constantly on the move in attempting to escape Crook's forces, he could not (Brown, 1970). Over the fourteen years that followed the Indians' victory at Little Bighorn, the avowed policy of the United States towards the Indians was one of extermination (announced by General Sheridan) (Churchill, 2003a), and via various treaties (see Brown, 1970, for details), the northern plains Indians were forced into ceding ninety per cent of their lands to the United States (Churchill, 2003a). After being chased by thousands of US soldiers for weeks, 500 weakened and starving Cheyennes, who were seeking to return to their ancestral lands in what is now Southern Montana after being interned in Oklahoma, were massacred *after their surrender* at Camp Robinson, Nebraska, in 1878 (Churchill, 2003a). By this point in time, then, the United States had succeeded in its attempts to seize the former vast lands of the Indian nations of the northern plains, and to subdue any form of military resistance from those peoples.

The last form of resistance that was left to the Lakota, and perhaps unsurprisingly for a people that had lost everything, was found in a new spiritual practice that was seen on the meagre reservations carved out of the one-time lands of the Great Sioux Reservation by the military cartographers – the 'Ghost Dance' (Brown, 1970). On 9th October, 1890, a Minneconjou named Kicking Bear came to visit Sitting Bull at the Standing Rock agency, in order to tell him about the teachings of the Paiute Messiah, Wovoka, news of which had already been delivered to Indians at the Cheyenne River, Rosebud and Pine Ridge reservations, and to Spotted Elk's band of free (i.e., non-reservation) Minneconjous. Essentially, Wovoka's Ghost Dance religion taught that Christ, who had been treated so badly by the white man (in his crucifixion), had returned to Earth as an Indian. Wovoka had revealed that the following spring would see a re-covering of the Earth which would bury the white man; the horses and buffalo herds would come back, and the Indians who danced the Ghost Dance would be suspended in the air whilst this took place, eventually being set down with their resurrected ancestors on a new

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live in one house, and take on your ways. Suppose the people living beyond the great sea should come and tell you that you must stop farming and kill your cattle, and take your houses and lands, what would you do? Would you not fight them?' (in Brown, 1970, p. 293). Or, as the Cheyenne Two Moon, whose village had been decimated by General Crook's soldiers' attack on March 17th, 1876 (see above), replied to Crazy Horse, who had announced that they were to fight the white man again, 'All right. I am ready to fight. I have fought already. My people have been killed, my horses stolen; I am satisfied to fight' (in Brown, 1970, p. 287).

[131] Sitting Bull and his people stayed in Canada for four years, but having been refused a reservation there, and having been promised a complete pardon by the United States army, he and 186 of his remaining followers crossed back into the United States on 19th July 1881, surrendering at Fort Buford. Despite the promises, Sitting Bull was initially kept as a prisoner of war at Fort Randall, and transferred in August 1883 to the Hunkpapa agency at the Standing Rock reservation (Brown, 1970).

Earth, where only Indians would live. Sitting Bull did not believe in resurrection of the dead; however, many of his people had already heard of the Ghost Dance, and were afraid of being passed over by the Messiah if they did not join it. Sitting Bull's objections arose in the fact that some white agents at the reservations were attempting to prevent the Ghost Dance by calling in soldiers; however, Kicking Bull explained that the people would be safe if they wore certain garments ('Ghost Shirts', painted with magical symbols), which were impenetrable to the soldier's bullets (Brown, 1970).

Although Sitting Bull's attitude towards the Ghost Dance fell well short of wholehearted support, his very presence at Standing Rock sparked fears amongst the whites, not least on the part of James McLaughlin[132], the US Indian Agent at Fort Yates on Standing Rock, that the influential leader was about to lead the Ghost Dancers off the reservation (Vestal, 1957). One week after Kicking Bear's visit, in the early morning of 15th December, 1890, McLaughlin ordered the arrest of the last remaining leader of the resistance shown at the Battle of Little Bighorn (as we have seen, Crook's men had chased down most of the plains Indians, whether they were involved or not, following the battle; Crazy Horse had been murdered three years previously) (Brown, 1970). Although forty-three Indian police, led by Lieutenant Bull Head, surrounded Sitting Bull's cabin, they found themselves outnumbered four-to-one by a crowd of Ghost Dancers. One of these, Catch-the-Bear, fired a rifle at Bull Head, wounding him in the side; when, falling, Bull Head tried to shoot Catch-the-Bear, he hit Sitting Bull instead, who had been shot through the head at almost the same time by another Indian policeman, Red Tomahawk. The cavalry detachment that had been waiting three miles away, as an emergency support force to the Indian police, saved the Indian police from being slaughtered by the Ghost Dancers. Sitting Bull was already dead (Brown, 1970).

In the days after Sitting Bull's death, two hundred members of his Hunkpapa followers left the Standing Rock Agency in order to join Spotted Elk and his Minneconjous at the Cheyenne River reservation. Fearful of reprisals, on December 23rd Spotted Elk and his Minneconjous, and thirty-eight Hunkpapas, left Cheyenne River in order to travel to Pine Ridge to seek refuge with Red Cloud. They were intercepted by Major Samuel Whitside's detachment of the Seventh Cavalry, who forced them to make camp at the Wounded Knee Creek. In disarming Spotted Elk's band, a shot was fired in an argument involving a deaf Indian named

[132] Brown (1970) points out that despite being a Roman Catholic, McLaughlin, who was known to the Indians at Standing Rock as 'White Hair', '… failed to recognise the Ghost Dance as being entirely Christian' (p. 435). McLaughlin (1842–1923) is best known to history for having ordered the arrest of Sitting Bull (Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992; Utley, 2008), and was portrayed in the HBO film *Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee* as unsympathetic and harsh, and something of a minor 'villain'. However, in much that was written by (e.g. McLaughlin, 1910) and about him (Pfaller, 1978; Utley, 2004, 2008), a more complex character emerges: that of an experienced Indian agent (he supervised the Devil's Lake Agency from 1876, until his transfer to Standing Rock in 1881, where he stayed until 1895), who had positive relationships with many Indians, and seemed to have been motivated by a genuine, deep-seated belief that the only way in which the physical survival of the Indian could be ensured was by assimilation into white culture.

Black Coyote, who said that he had paid a lot for his rifle and did not want to give it up, and could not hear well enough to understand the orders being given to him (Brown, 1970). The US soldiers opened fire indiscriminately, and the massacre at Wounded Knee began. As has already been noted, the shooting at the Wounded Knee Creek and the pursuit of the Minneconjous and Hunkpapas over the plains ended with the deaths of three hundred Indians (see footnote 95, above), and after a period of a few days due to the frost (which had frozen the bodies of the dead in strange and often grotesque shapes) the burial of their remains in a mass grave (Brown, 1970; Stannard, 1992). So much else had ended too – as has been noted, after the massacre, none of the surviving Indians in the United States territory were living freely, and the massacre marked both the end of the 'Indian Wars' and the completion of the European-American conquest of the United States (again, see footnote 95, above). A fitting reflection was made by Black Elk,[133] who said of Wounded Knee (Black Elk, 1972, p. 230):

> I did not know then how much was ended. When I look back now from this high hill of my old age, I can still see the butchered women and children lying heaped and scattered all along the crooked gulch as plain as when I saw them with eyes young. And I can see that something else died there in the bloody mud, and was buried in the blizzard. A people's dream died there. It was a beautiful dream. And I, to whom so great a vision was given in my youth – you see me now as a pitiful old man who has done nothing, for the nation's hope is broken and scattered. There is no centre any longer, and the sacred tree is dead.

We have also seen (see above, Section IV) that Green (1994), in his commentary on the Medals of Honour awarded to the soldiers who perpetrated the Wounded Knee Massacre, commented that '… more elaborate speculations on the motivations of military leaders will have to wait' (p. 207). Churchill (2003a) has done more, I think, than speculate elaborately when he opines that, '… the ostensible purpose [of the US soldiers at the Massacre of Wounded Knee was] to end the "insubordination" embodied in the Indians' practice of the Ghost Dance. More than likely, the troops [(who were of the same regiment as Custer's men, the US Seventh Cavalry) were] intent on revenging themselves for the fate of Custer fourteen years earlier' (p. 57).

In the way that one might expect in situations of genocidal conflict (after the phases of in-grouping and out-grouping, the construction of an aspirational national *Weltanschauung* that excludes the 'Other', the positioning of the 'Other' as *'Gegentypen',* the dehumanisation of the 'Other', the de-individuation of the 'One', and the vilification of resistance that we have discussed in Sections I to VI, above), Sitting Bull, who was a hero to his people, had by 1890 become the polar

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[133] Black Elk (1863–1950) was an Oglala medicine man, and the second cousin of Crazy Horse. He arrived shortly after Spotted Elk's people had been massacred at Wounded Knee, and helped to rescue some of the wounded (Black Elk, 1972).

opposite[134] to the United States Army and white Indian agents, their very devil incarnate. And what Sitting Bull had become to those whites, Nelson Appleton Miles (1839–1925) had long since been for the Indians. Although he served in the Civil War and would go on to serve in the Spanish-American War, Miles, who was known to the Lakota as 'Bear Coat' due to the heavy winter fur coat that he sometimes wore (Brown, 1970), is best known to history for the role that he played in the US Army's campaigns against the Indians of the Great Plains. He was a Field Commander at the defeat of the Kiowa, Apache and Southern Cheyenne (1874–1875); he was involved in the pursuit of the various scattered Lakota and Northern Cheyenne bands after Little Bighorn (1876–1877); and he was involved in the capture of Chief Joseph and his band of Nez Percé (1877). Subsequently, he was deployed the Southwest, where he led those fighting against Geronimo (1886), but he returned to the northern plains to play a role in subduing the 'resistance' on the Lakota reservations offered in the 'Ghost Dance' (Brown, 1970; De Montravel, 1998). However, even as seasoned and unapologetic an 'Indian fighter' as Bear Coat Miles was appalled at the Wounded Knee Massacre; he described the incident in a letter to his wife, as, '… the most abominable criminal military blunder and a horrible massacre of women and children' (De Montravel, 1998, p. 206), and following his retirement, campaigned for compensation payments to the few surviving Indians (De Montravel, 1998).

VII. MECHANISATION OF MEANS OF DESTRUCTION

The period of history with which we have been primarily concerned in this chapter (1864–1890) was one in which the plains Indians resisted, although ultimately unsuccessfully, the reservation system that had been forced upon them: the final phase of the so-called 'Indian wars'. The reservation system did, at least, give individual tribes title to and protection of their lands, and therefore the right to self- and tribal government; however, the new policy of assimilation of Indians into European-American culture was enshrined in law with the passing of the General Allotment Act (also known as the Dawes Act) on February 8th, 1887. Under this

[134] Visual representations of this 'polarisation' in a situation of conflict were common during the years of the 'Troubles' in Northern Ireland, when street murals (often painted on the gable ends of terraced houses in working-class communities) sometimes depicted the 'freedom fighters' and heroes of one community, who were in their person the very 'terrorists' decried for their infliction of lethal damage on the other. For example, following his arrest and trial, a mural of loyalist paramilitary Michael Stone appeared in Killarn Close, in Protestant East Belfast, which included the wording, 'His only crime was loyalty'. This sentiment rather overlooked the fact that Stone was apprehended after his attack on an IRA funeral at Milltown Cemetery, Belfast in 1988, where he killed three people, and injured sixty others, and subsequently confessed to shooting dead three other Roman Catholics between 1984 and 1987. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with sentences totalling 684 years, with a recommendation that he serve at least thirty years, but was released from prison in 2000 under the terms of the Good Friday Agreement. Whilst Stone claimed that all his victims were linked to the IRA, only one in fact was (one of the mourners he killed at Milltown); the other five of his victims were ordinary members of the Roman Catholic community, amongst whom, quite understandably, he was perceived completely differently.

act, reservation land was broken up, and the head of each Indian family would receive a grant of 160 acres; a single person or orphan over eighteen years of age would receive a grant of 80 acres; and persons under the age of eighteen would receive 40 acres each, these allotments being held in trust by the United States government for twenty-five years. Eligible Indians had four years to select their land; thereafter, the selection would be made for them by the Secretary of the Interior (Otis, 1973). On receiving land allotments, Indians were given United States citizenship. However, in order to be eligible for the land allotment (which was subject to the laws of the State or Territory in which they resided), Indians had to have '… adopted the habits of civilised life', which meant living separately from the tribe; hence, about 90,000 Native Americans were made landless (Case & Voluck, 2002).

The Dawes Act, therefore, ended the Indians' communal holding of property, and enforced the European/European-American ideal of the nuclear family as the basic economic and social unit (Gibson, 1988). This measure was legally consolidated by the subsequent Burke Act (1906) and Curtis Act (1908). Under the former, the United States government's Secretary of Interior could force Indians to accept the title for allotted land, without the individual having to move off the reservation, and the land allotted to Indians was taken out of trust and made subject to taxation. Under the latter, the United States government no longer recognised tribal governments, and abolished tribal communal jurisdiction of Indian land. Whereas the 'New Deal' for Indians offered by Franklin D. Roosevelt's administration in the 1934 Indian Reorganisation Act renewed their rights to reorganise formal tribal governments, the overall downward trend in terms of Indian land ownership remained in place (Otis, 1973). Land owned by Indians (which ranged from deserts and Badlands to prime agricultural land) decreased from 138 million acres in 1887, to 78 million acres in 1900, and to 48 million acres in 1934 (Gunn, 2004). The overall depletion of the land base, and the cessation of communal land ownership, ended the possibility of hunting as a means of subsistence. Furthermore, in many cases, the land that was actually allotted to Indian claimants was not of sufficient quality to make farming economically viable, even for the first generation; this problem was inevitably worsened when the original allottees died, leaving their land fractionalised amongst their heirs. Non-allotted land, and a good deal of allotted land after the twenty-five year period of allotted land being held in trust had elapsed, was sold to non-Native buyers at minimal prices (Case & Voluck, 2002).

In 1881, Senator Henry M. Teller of Colorado had said that the real aim of the allotment policy was '… to get at the Indian lands and open them up to settlement. The provisions for the apparent benefit of the Indians are but the pretext to get at his lands and occupy them'. Teller's opinion – that '… if this were done in the name of greed, it would be bad enough, but to do it in the name of humanity is infinitely worse' (Otis, 1973) seem, to this author, quite understandable, in terms of both Teller's outrage, and the fact that such apparent hypocrisy should occur. In the section above on the 'Deindividuation of the One' (Section V) we saw, that in 'one-of-many' situations, the individual's own sense of *social responsibility*

becomes 'diffuse' (Latané, 1981); further, that our sense of moral responsibility for our own actions is diminished when we feel we have been told or ordered to do something by someone in authority (Milgram, 1965, 1974). So when assimilation progressed from being an ideology to being the law of the land (whose land?) under the Dawes Act, it was obvious that for the benefit of these miserable, backward savages (see Section IV, 'The 'Dehumanisation of the Other'), they should learn good, civilised, white Christian culture. If hope existed for the Indian, it was reasoned, it lay in her or his seeing the 'good sense' of giving up her or his Indian ways, her or his communal (and sometimes matrilineal) systems of living, and adapting to the patriarchal and nuclear family-orientation of the whites. For the plains Indian man at the turn of the twentieth century – who if he was an older man, might have proved that manhood to his people in his resistance of the white encroachment, and if he was a younger man, would have heard people of his father's and grandfather's generation talk of such times – this meant that, having had to give up hunting some years or decades before, he now had to adopt the traditionally female role in his attempt farm the worthless Badlands allotment that he had been legally forced to accept. After all, there was by now no other choice to make, if he wished to survive; although it sometimes suited those who had so limited the Indian's choices to pretend that there was.

The afore-mentioned Pine Ridge Reservation (see above) was created for the Oglala Lakota (today, it is the eight-largest in the United States, and located within the southwest corner of South Dakota), via the partitioning of the Great Sioux Reservation established by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868 (see Section VI, above), which created five smaller reservations and a good deal of 'unoccupied territory' (which was subsequently sold to whites) (Brown, 1970) under the Dawes Act. Pine Ridge's lands include the sites of the last of the Ghost Dances, and Wounded Knee, where the 1890 Massacre took place (Brown, 1970; Churchill, 2003a; Stannard, 1992). The reservation includes the entirety of Oglala Lakota County (re-named in November 2014, formerly Shannon County; see Montgomery, 2014), the second poorest of the 3,143 counties of the United States. Of the 3,469 square miles that the reservation encompasses, only 84,000 acres are suitable for agriculture. Miserable poverty at the Pine Ridge Reservation was in evidence over seventy years ago, when a rather famous figure (at least, for psychologists) visited – Erik H. Erikson. In his famous '*Childhood and Society*' (1963), Erikson described his impressions of the Oglala Lakota of 1938, in a chapter entitled 'Hunters Across the Prairie'. Ostensibly, his commission as a psychological expert was to identify the problems that educational authorities faced in educating Oglala children; however, Erikson took the opportunity to attempt an anthropological study of the people he found there, with an emphasis on comparing the child-rearing practices of the Oglala with those he had observed as a teacher and psychoanalyst in Austria and amongst European-Americans in the United States.[135] At the time, 8,000 Oglala lived at Pine Ridge (population estimates today

[135] The interested reader is encouraged to read Erikson's chapter, but it may be of value to record some of his observations here. The old Oglala birth traditions involved delivery from a bed of sand, with two *(continued)*

vary considerably, ranging between 28,000 and 40,000). Erikson recounted the tragic story of the previous seventy years of the Lakota people, including the War for the Black Hills, the Massacre of Wounded Knee, and the forcing of the plains Indians onto reservations. Erikson found that the Oglala Indian '… receives all his sense of security and identity out of the status of one to whom something is owed'. As the Oglala had had no choice but to develop the 'habits of dependence', Erikson noted that as a consequence, they '… own little and maintain it badly' (Erikson, 1963).

As we have seen, this misery did not come out of nowhere. The Lakota had been disarmed and dispossessed of land through being forced onto reservations; the buffalo had been wantonly and then strategically slaughtered in their millions by white hunters (Standard, 1992); and the Dawes Act and its allotments of land destroyed the traditional way of life. Although Erikson (1963) stated that one of the most deplorable aspects of the Indian boarding school system had desisted by 1920 – that is to say, the active kidnapping of Indian children by the white 'authorities' – Churchill (2003a) noted that the policy of forcibly transferring thousands of Indian children into boarding schools (of which there were 153 at the height of the system (Bruchac & Smelcer, 2013)), where horrific conditions prevailed, ended less than thirty ago, when the Phoenix Indian School held its final commencement ceremony on May 13th, 1990. Hence, at first accompanying, and then following the physical genocide that has been documented in this chapter, there was a cultural genocide. The transition from physical to mechanised cultural genocide was legally kick-started by the Dawes Act, but it was also co-implemented and enforced in educational systems and schools, as we shall see in Chapter 4.

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stakes for the mother to brace her feet against. Whilst potentially surprising to Europeans, Erikson noted that this was in keeping with hygienic practices of the plains (afterbirth and blood dries quickly, and is blown away). Birth involved no 'moaning or groaning' on the part of the mother, and the Oglala saw medicalisation of birth as a threat to the fortitude of the mother and the child, the latter of whom would '… learn to cry like a white baby'. Babies were not breast-fed until a steady stream of 'pure' milk could be produced; until then, the baby was fed on berry juice. The colostrum-containing early breast milk was not given to babies as it is thin and watery – the Oglala idea was, how could a child trust a world that greeted him in such a way? Infantile rage was seen as a sign of strength, and such rage was, to an extent, encouraged rather than being immediately soothed away. From the fifth year, girls were encouraged to stay near mother and home, and boys were encouraged to play (which was seen as serious training) outside. Erikson was intrigued to see that Oglala boys enjoyed playing with 'bone horses', the separated vertebrae of buffalo, which apparently resemble horses; the practice reminded him of European boys playing with toy cars. Certain problems emerged in mixed (i.e., Indian and European-American classrooms) regarding 'cleanliness'; amongst the Oglala, cleanliness was judged by the avoidances of certain practices, which differed from white conceptions of cleanliness. Erikson noted that the most unpopular Oglala boy (amongst his peers) was the one whose 'father had money', i.e. money that he did not share with others. This unpopularity was not informed by jealousy, but by his family's transgression of a deeper value – generosity, a former necessity of the hunting life, was almost universally imparted in Lakota child-rearing (Erikson, 1963).

VIII. ONGOING DENIAL AND MYSTIFICATION

It is by no means an exaggeration to assert that genocidal activities against the American Indian, perpetrated through legislation, social policy, denigration of native culture and profound inequality of opportunity, continue to the present day. This oppression is tangible in the continuing wretched state of existence that prevails upon many Indian reservations, including the afore-mentioned Pine Ridge. Stanard (1992) noted that the poverty rate on Indian reservations in the United States overall was four times the national average; at Pine Ridge, 60 per cent of the homes were without adequate plumbing (the national average is barely 2 per cent); the suicide rate for male and female Indians aged 15–24 years was twice the national average; alcohol-related mortality amongst male Indians aged 15–24 years was nine times the national average; and for female Indians in this age group, it was thirteen times the national average. More recently, Kulkarni et al. (2011) found that of those resident at Pine Ridge, 80 per cent of the residents were unemployed; 49 per cent lived below the Federal poverty level; the infant mortality rate was five times higher than the national average; and that life expectancy was 48 for males, and 52 for females.

In 1936, the position of Oglala Sioux Tribal Chair, based at Pine Ridge, was created (Reihardt, 2007), and famously, thirty-six years later, there was a failed attempt by the Oglala Civil Rights Organization (OSCRO) to remove tribal chairman Richard 'Dick' Wilson from office (Crow Dog & Ergoes, 2011; Reihardt, 2007). Wilson was accused of corruption, the intimidation and abuse of political opponents through his private militia, the 'Guardians of the Oglala Nation' (the GOONs), and cronyism – specifically, systematic prejudice against full-blooded Oglala people (Wilson and his supporters were mostly mixed blood) (Crow Dog & Ergoes, 2011). Members of the recently-formed American Indian Movement (AIM, formed in 1968), which included in its membership politically-minded Indians from all over North America (who at that time, drew inspiration from direct-action civil rights groups, such as the Black Panthers and the anti-Vietnam War movement), allied with approximately two hundred Oglala Lakota residents of Pine Ridge who were opposed Wilson's administration in occupying the town of Wounded Knee, South Dakota (Crow Dog & Erdoes, 2011), the historical and symbolic significance of which is surely by now apparent to the reader. During their 71-day occupation (February 27th–May 8th, 1973) the protestors, who were joined by civil rights activists and supporters from North America and beyond, also highlighted the United States government's failure to honour treaties it had made with the Indian nations (possibly most significantly, the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie) and demanded the re-opening of treaty negotiations between the United States government and Indian representatives (Churchill, 1997; Crow Dog & Erdoes, 2011). During the occupation, the Wounded Knee site was cordoned off by US Marshals and FBI agents; there were exchanges of gunfire, resulting in the deaths of two Indians, and injuries to thirteen others (two United States Marshals were injured). The protestors made a formal declaration that the territory of Wounded Knee was the independent Oglala Nation; a small delegation flew to

New York in an unsuccessful attempt to have sovereign nation status recognised by the United Nations (Crow Dog & Erdoes, 2011).[136]

After the Wounded Knee occupation, the AIM leaders Dennis Banks and Russell Means, who had often addressed the world's press during the time of the occupation, were indicted, but the cases against them were dismissed, as were the subsequent appeals against the original dismissals (Sayer, 1977). With the vote spilt between twelve challengers, Wilson was re-elected in 1974 (he was originally placed second, but defeated Russell Means in a subsequent run-off election that was investigated by the United States Civil Rights Commission (USCRC), following complaints of Wilson's ballot tampering and continuing intimidation of opponents) (Reihardt, 2007).[137] Violence on the Pine Ridge Reservation increased over the three years that followed the occupation; between March 1973 and March 1976, the murder rate on the reservation was 170 per 100,000, compared with the United States national average of 9.7 per 100,000 (Perry, 2002). More than sixty opponents of Wilson's tribal government died violently during this period, and physical attacks and intimidation perpetrated by Wilson's GOONs on those involved in the Wounded Knee occupation, their friends and families were widely reported (Crow Dog & Ergoes, 2011; Perry, 2002). Wilson was easily defeated at the tribal chair election in 1976 (Lichtenstein, 1976; Reihardt, 2007), and moved off the reservation for fourteen years. In 1990, whilst campaigning for a council seat, Wilson died, aged 55, of kidney failure and an enlarged heart (Foderaro, 1990).

Churchill (2003a) reported that the United States' continued treatment of and policies towards indigenous peoples have been found to be in breach of international laws and agreements on numerous occasions. For example, an international tribunal convened in New York in December 1991 found that the repression by the United States of national liberation movements within its borders violated several of the articles of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and also the 1960 Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. A similar tribunal convened in San Fransisco in October 1992 concluded that (i) the relationship of the United States to Native Americans, Native Hawaiians, Puerto Ricans, Mexican- and African-Americans was a colonial one, and therefore violated the 1946 Affirmation of the Principals of International Law as well; and (ii) violations of the 1948 UN Convention on Genocide had occurred in the case of Native Americans. In these cases, Churchill reported (2003a) that the

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[136] The Wounded Knee occupation is remembered by many in association with Marlon Brando's declining of the Oscar that he was to be awarded for his performance in 'The Godfather'. Brando asked an Apache actress, Sacheen Littlefeather, to appear at the 45th Academy Awards ceremony on his behalf. Although she was not permitted by the Academy to read the speech given to her by Brando at the ceremony (she was threatened with arrest if she attempted to do so) Sacheen Littlefeather read it to the world's press immediately afterwards, thereby highlighting the then-ongoing occupation at Wounded Knee, and Brando's support for AIM and the Oglala protestors' position (Rampell, 2005).

[137] The USCRC's report concluded that the election results were invalid, citing ballot tampering, a large number of ineligible voters, improprieties in the appointment of the election commission, and 'a climate of fear and tension'; however, a federal court upheld Wilson's re-election (Reihardt, 2007).

US government 'ignores these findings and continues business as usual (pp. 205, 216). In January 2001, when the UN Draft Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples was being finalised, the US would not accept legislation for the rights to self-determination of indigenous peoples, and so proposed 'alternative language', where indigenous people within its borders had a legal right only to 'internal self-determination' – effectively, legitimising internal colonialism. However, in July 1998, the United States did respond decisively when 120 UN Member States voted to create an International Criminal Court to preside over cases of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes – like China, India, Iraq, Israel, Libya, Qatar and Sudan, the US voted to *oppose* it. Churchill (2003a, p. 241) noted that:

> According to US Senator Jesse Helms, the US will never endorse the ICC [International Criminal Court] until such time as it extends blanket immunity to all US officials and military personnel for all offences, past, present and future. … It is obviously impossible to reconcile such a posture with the noble principles declaimed by Justice Jackson at Nuremberg [at the trials of Nazi war criminals, on November 20th, 1945] that the US would never hold others to a standard of legality it was unwilling to accept for itself.

In short, the United States has consistently used its reactions (and more often, its non-reactions) to the processes of international legislation to ensure that it will neither recognise the rights of Indians to self-determination, nor the genocide that it committed against them. As Churchill argued (2003a), the mechanisms of the United Nations have proved entirely unsuccessful in these respects; as unsuccessful as its peace-keeping responses have been, as others have argued, in preventing more contemporary physical genocidal actions in Israel, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda and Syria.

To me, what is quite probably one of the final and compounding acts of denial and mystification, seems to be that now, many years after the completion of her or his acts of physical genocide, the 'One' is celebrating the nobility of the vanquished 'Other'. These days, the environmentalist, pacifist and even secular sage-like aspects of high profile Indians, including the Lakota, are emblazoned on T-shirts, posters, coasters – practically anything that one can print an image on – and a seemingly endless set of images and other depictions, shared via social networking sites or via other Internet avenues. Sitting Bull, who as it will be recalled was once seen by United States officials as too dangerous to leave at liberty across the border in Canada, or even in peaceful surrender on the Standing Rock reservation (see Section VI, above), is now perhaps the most prominent amongst Indians 'celebrated' in this way. For example, of the thirty-five quotes attributed to Sitting Bull at the popular website 'Brainy Quote' in June, 2016 (where the 'biography type' is listed as being that of a 'statesman'), thirty-four were of the ecological (e.g., 'They claim this mother of ours, the Earth, for their own use, and fence their neighbours away from her, and deface her with their buildings and their refuse') and pacifist (e.g., 'Let us put our minds together and see what life we can make for our children') types, with the sole exception to this typology being, 'I wish it to be remembered that I was the last man of my tribe to

surrender my rifle'. There is the rather patriotic, 'Is it wrong for me to love my own? Is it wicked for me because my skin is red? Because I am Lakota? Because I was born where my father lived? Because I would die for my people and my country?' British philosopher and peace activist Bertrand Russell opined on more than one occasion that, 'Patriots always talk of dying for their country, and never of killing for their country' (in Parris, 1995). As it may be recalled from Section VI, Sitting Bull was also prepared to kill for his people and his country, and to do his part in fulfilling his Sun Dance vision of the earless white man being given up by Wakantanka to the Indians to kill at Little Bighorn (Brown, 1970; Vestal, 1957). His statement of that time – 'We want no white men here. The Black Hills belong to me. If the whites try to take them, I will fight' is recorded in Brown, 1970 (p. 273), but absent from the mocked-up images that adorn the mouse-pads and Facebook pages of white liberals the world over. Now that the lion is old, toothless and long-since dead, the descendant of the hunter will tolerate few interruptions, and certainly not those brought by the intrusions of ongoing realities, in his weeping for the braveness of the departed hunted.

These realities cluster around two basic facts. The first of these is that, as I hope I have demonstrated through my brief descriptions of a small part of what we know of the words, actions and perhaps even the characters of some nineteenth century Indians, is that she or he was neither the mindless, bloodthirsty savage of innumerable Westerns and similar depictions of the early twentieth century, nor the embodiment of some sort of latter-day hippy/New Age ideal depicted in the popular media of the past three decades. We have already seen that it seems difficult, if not impossible, for present-day European-Americans to embrace the realities of the American Indian as a person in their media depictions of him or her (see Section III, above). Hopefully, through allowing the reader to hear the voices of some nineteenth century Indians, largely courtesy of Dee Brown (1970), this chapter has demonstrated that like every human being before and since, individual nineteenth century Indians were complex, fully-formed personalities, embodied souls existing and acting within social and historical contexts. The second fact that must be acknowledged is that the concerns of the indigenous peoples of the Americas did *not* end at the massacre at Wounded Knee. For despite the four centuries of sustained acts of near-complete physical genocide levelled against the Indian that preceded the slaughter of Spotted Elk's people, she and he has continued to exist. The ongoing poverty – of physical and financial resources, of opportunity, of dignity, of human rights – that prevail upon the Indian reservations in the United States should serve as a stark reminder of what has been done historically to indigenous peoples in what is now the United States, and also of what remains to be addressed now, before any thinking person can bring herself or himself to seriously entertain the brands of freedom and democracy trumpeted by successive United States administrations ever since.

CONCLUDING POINTS: PSYCHOLOGY, SOCIAL COGNITION AND PHYSICAL GENOCIDE RECONSIDERED

As I, like many before me, have not hesitated in pointing out the failure of the UN in its role as a world peace-keeper (which may be due to that organisation's or its constituents' 'ineffectiveness' (for want of a better phrase), or the sheer scale of the world's problems) then I, as a psychologist, should not avoid a similar critique of the stance of my own profession. So, with physical genocide in mind, what is, or should or could be, the role of psychology, and how well has it performed in this role? It has been argued that amongst the social sciences, psychology has an important part to play; for example, Christie (2012, p. 11) asserted that:

> Psychology is an appropriate lens for understanding killing. After all, acts of killing involve human cognitions, feelings, and actions, all of which fall within the purview of psychology. Moreover, human psychology is involved in killing whether the level of analysis is interpersonal or international. As the preamble of UNESCO noted in 1945: '… since war begins in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed'.

However, and as we have already seen, psychology has said less than it might have done about genocide; it may be argued that its contribution to our understanding of this most serious form of man's inhumanity to man has been rather cursory. Being as some of the colossi (in terms of historical influence) of the field of psychodynamic psychology hailed from German-speaking countries, yet were opposed to the Nazis and had professional careers that coincided directly with the Nazi period,[138] one might have expected a wealth of insight into the genocidal mind from such sources.[139] Curiously, this is not the case. As we have seen, Jung, one of the most prolific of writers and, in the eyes of many, the most intellectually astute psychologist of the twentieth century, contributed only a populist post-hoc interpretation of the National Socialist collective unconscious, ironically using the

[138] Of Sigmund Freud, at least, it may be said that he died on September 23rd 1939 (that is, three weeks after the beginning of the Second World War), and whilst as a prominent Jewish intellectual living in Vienna he suffered numerous indignities after the Anschluss, he was spared by his death from seeing the direct effects of the Holocaust upon his own family. His sister Adolfine died of starvation at Theresienstadt, and his three other sisters were killed, probably at Auschwitz in 1942 (Gay, 1998). Whilst his private letters of the 1930s of course make numerous references to the political situation in Europe with its attendant anti-Semitism, Freud wrote nothing of broader academic interest on the genocidal mindset.

[139] Erik Erikson's (who was born of Danish Jewish parents in Germany, and left Europe for the United States in 1933) classic psychohistory of *The Legend of Hitler's Childhood* (in Erikson, 1963) has had considerable influence on how historians, biographers and their readers have viewed the genocidal extremes of National Socialism as an outcome of Hitler's individual personality. However, whilst eminently readable and certainly insightful, this, like other psychohistories, suffers from its own inherent methodology. In his *Shrinking History: On Freud and the Failure of Psychohistory*, David Stannard (1980) considers at length such methodological limitations, which he sees as having been fatal, and led inevitably to the complete demise of the psychohistorical approach.

metaphors of the 'herd mentality' used by the Nazis themselves[140] (Jung, 1946; see above, Introduction).

Overall, through the elucidation of the eight-stage model above, it can be seen that whilst an interesting start to understanding the mentality of genocide was made by social cognitive psychologists in the 1960s, psychology (and especially experimental psychology) has contributed comparatively little to our understanding of the fundamental factors for around forty years, and for various reasons internal and external to the profession, what was contributed back then has apparently not been learnt from. As we have seen, in the 1960s, psychologists of social cognition attempted to uncover those negative human tendencies of obedience to authority, dehumanisation, deindividuation, and the diffusion of social responsibility. In more recent decades, as we have seen in the first two chapters of this book, psychologists who specialise in 'aggression studies' have focussed their efforts more often on phenomena such as bullying behaviour, and the analysis of smaller-scale (e.g., peer group, school) dynamic situations, thus leaving the question of genocide to the historians and sociologists. In attempting to put together a psychological understanding of physical genocide, this has indeed been problematic – I have often pondered the question, 'What has been contributed recently?' As Miller (2004, p. 188) noted:

> It is striking how extremely rare is the mention of terms like suffering, anguish, sorrow in the literature of psychology. Such things are clearly of no real theoretical concern, merely symptoms to be classified under 'less emotional' descriptions.

Taking on board Miller's (2004) observation, it is also instructive to recall that in the criminal trial of Norwegian mass-murderer Anders Behring Breivik, the thirteen months that elapsed between his atrocious acts (22nd July, 2011) and his being incarcerated (24th August, 2012) were not devoted, legally speaking, to establishing responsibility for those acts – Breivik freely admitted to that – but rather, to establishing whether he was, and has since remained, *sane*. Faced with such an appalling series of events, brought about by an individual who was (and apparently remained) all too eager to elucidate his jaundiced *Weltanschauung* at

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[140] As far as the Nazis were concerned, this was probably based on the deliberate and politically-motivated misinterpretation of Nietzschean concepts such as the *Slavenmoral* and the *Übermann* by their 'race hygienists'. The value placed on Nietszche's ideas has, of course, suffered from this association, not least because commentators such as Bertrand Russell compounded it by apparently not seeing the misinterpretation (Russell, 1946, argued that Nietzsche's ideas had *inevitably lead to* Nazi 'philosophy'). However, this was surely unfair. Nietzsche was as sharp a critic of the religious mentality, especially as it applies to group psychology, as has ever lived, and allowed himself considerable literary license in taking such a stance; he also preached the advent of the 'Superman' through his mouthpiece 'Zarathustra' (Nietzsche, 1885/1961). Syphilitic and inane he most certainly became in the years before his early death, but he was never a nationalist of any persuasion (see Nietzsche, 1889/1979).

whatever length he was permitted (see Berwick/Breivik, 2011),[141] one could neither explain away his actions as 'madness', nor too readily, in a largely secular society, in terms of 'evil'. Although the first of Breivik's two court-ordered psychiatric reports did refer to the possible presence of psychoticism, the second ruled this out. Breivik's case shows that when a nation faced with such extremes of behaviour justifiably cries out 'why',[142] the so-called specialists of the 'science of the mind' in 2011 were still lacking in cogent and robust explanations.

But can this neglect be corrected, or must it be (even temporarily) 'lived with'? We have already considered the issue that if psychology genuinely is, or has aspirations towards being, a 'science', then we should have the ability to make accurate and valid predictions, or at the very least, informed hypotheses. So can we, even with the acknowledged limited psychological knowledge that we have, predict genocide, or look out for its 'warning signs'? To an extent, many of the 'signs' should be evident in the language that is used about groups, and especially minority or marginalised groups (by which time, in-grouping and out-grouping, or the setting up of the 'One' and the 'Other' has already taken place) in a society. This is certainly evident in the 'hate speech' used – sometimes initially disavowed, but very quickly becoming apparent – by the supporters of many right-wing political movements. For example, in its mission statement, 'Britain First' defines itself as '… a patriotic political party and street defence organisation that opposes and fights the many injustices that are routinely inflicted on the British people'. In a clear positioning as being the 'One', it goes on to say that '… we love our people, our nation, our heritage and culture and will defend them at all times and no matter what odds we face'. There is also a strong indication as to whom it defines as the 'Other', and therefore from whom it feels that the British people should be defended, in the statement that, '… the rapid growth of militant Islam is leading to the suppression of women, freedom of speech and racist attacks. Britain First has a proven track record of opposing Islamic militants and hate preachers and this fightback will continue' (Britain First, 2016a). This 'One' and 'Other' positioning is also spelled out in Britain First's 'Statement of Principles', the fifth of which reads (the unusual capitalisation is reproduced from the original source; Britain First, 2016b):

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[141] For reasons that remain unclear, or at least I have not been able to clarify, Anders Behring Breivik self-published (on-line) his 'manifesto' using an Anglicised form of his name, 'Andrew Berwick', as well as the Norwegian form. The version of the document in my possession runs to 1,518 pages.

[142] Unsurprisingly, there was no shortage of opinions offered in the Norwegian national press as to 'why' Breivik did what he did, and many Norwegian newspapers have featured soul-searching opinion pieces since July 2011. An interesting article, '*Min venn Anders*' ['My friend Anders'] bucked this trend somewhat; its author, Peter Svaar (2011), who knew and socialised with Breivik as a teenager, states that there was nothing unusual about him at all; nothing to indicate that he would be capable of such acts. After describing a summer barbeque, Svaar closes: 'Av oss som grillet pølser den sommerkvelden i 1994 er det i dag to som er leger. En er marinbiolog. En er PR-rådgiver. Jeg ble journalist i NRK. Og Anders Behring Breivik ble massemorder' ['Of those of us who grilled sausages on that summer evening in 1994, two today are doctors. One is a marine biologist. One is a PR advisor. I became a journalist with NRK (*Norsk rikskringkasting* – the State-owned radio and television Norwegian Broadcasting Corporation). And Anders Behring Breivik became a mass murderer' (translation mine)].

> Britain First stands opposed to all alien and destructive political or religious doctrines, including Marxism, Liberalism, Fascism, National Socialism, Political Correctness, Euro Federalism and Islam. Britain First is a movement of British nationalism, patriotism and democracy.

By the time that an aspirational national *Weltanschauung* that excludes the 'Other' (see above, Section II) has taken place, and the 'Other' has been positioned as *'Gegentypen'* (see above, Section III), the language used about an 'out-group' will long since have become politicised, and have taken on the character of propaganda. Britain First's list of publications and leaflets (Britain First, 2015a) included six items on 3rd February, 2015: (i) a 'recruitment leaflet', the first item of which read 'put an end to Islamic Extremism and deport hate preachers'; (ii) a 'new general recruitment leaflet', one half of which was dominated by a banner item entitled, 'Say "NO" to Islamic Extremism: Deport the Hate Preachers'; (iii) the 2014 No. 2 edition of 'Sovereignty: The Official Magazine of the Britain First Movement', with the banner headline, 'In 20 years these people will dominate Britain', referring to a picture of three radical Islamic preachers; (iv) a brochure of 'Islam and Women: A report by Britain First'; (v) the Spring 2013 edition of 'Sovereignty', with direction to its lead article on 'The Ugly and Hidden Face of Islam'; and (vi) 'our [Britain First's] Muslim grooming[143] brochure'. This speaking of the 'Other' in dehumanising terms (see above, Section IV), continues in Britain First's news on its operational campaigns, of which by far the most supported was, '4953 patriots ['patriots' being defined by Britain First as those visitors to their website who had followed the direction in their 'Campaigns' section to 'hit "Complain" to join them'] have complained to Birmingham Council to halt the construction of a new mosque in the Acocks Green area' (Britain First, 2015b).

This dehumanising and genocidal language (see above, Section IV) is most evident on Britain First's Facebook page (Britain First, 2015c), which is directly linked to by Britain First's website. To the following 'news item' – '*The Kill List: Half of ISIS top commanders believed dead ... but Jihadi John still free to commit barbaric slaughter*', the following comments had been made by 3:43 p.m. on 3rd February, 2015 (the idiosyncratic spelling, punctuation and capitalisation of the comments has been preserved):

> Here's to the other half.
> Don't stop here boys go for the rest.
> Scum should wipe em off the face of the earth.
> Still not enough.
> Ugly fuckas … No wonder they're angry with the world!!!
> Keep killing the filthy SCUM.

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[143] There is no ambiguity in the sense in which 'Muslim grooming' is being used in Britain First's brochure. The opening lines of its introduction state that, '… across Britain there is an epidemic of child grooming, sexual abuse, rape, and exploitation occurring … the victims are mainly young, white British girls – although the Sikh community has also been targeted. The offenders are primarily Muslim men, often of Pakistani origin, spanning all age groups'.

> GOOD JOB!!! now let them die like the rest.
> Every dead muslim is a good one.[144]

When the apparent 'response' of the 'One' to the 'Other' is accounted for in ways that delimit and absolve the responsibility of individual members of the 'One' (see above, Section V), and the resistance of the 'Other' is being vilified (see above, Section VI), then if this is not already the case, large scale destruction via the engagement of political and military/paramilitary systems is at the very least being prepared for, and the means of empowerment that will serve to 'justify' such an engagement are being formulated or enforced. On June 30th, 2014, Israeli politician Ayelet Shaked, a representative of the far-right Jewish Home party, had said of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict on her Facebook page (cited in Hillel, 2014):

> This is not a war against terror, and not a war against extremists, and not even a war against the Palestinian Authority. The reality is that this is a war between two people. Who is the enemy? The Palestinian people. Why? Ask them, they started it.

On Monday, 7th July 2014, Shaked wrote (cited in Hillel, 2014):

> Behind every terrorist stand dozens of men and women, without whom he could not engage in terrorism. They are all enemy combatants, and their blood shall be on all their heads. Now this also includes the mothers of the martyrs, who send them to hell with flowers and kisses. They should follow their sons, nothing would be more just. They should go, as should the physical homes in which they raised the snakes. Otherwise, more little snakes will be raised there.[145]

The day after Shaked's post regarding the 'mothers of martyrs', Israel launched an invasion of the Hamas-governed Gaza territory, which it called Operation Protective Edge. The seven-week offensive resulted in the deaths of 2,104 Gazans and 73 Israelis. Of the Israeli dead, 67 were soldiers, and five were civilians, including one child; of the Gazan dead, the UN estimated that 69 per cent were civilians, including over five hundred children (BBC News, 2014b). Human rights

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[144] Surely reminiscent, and perhaps intended to be so, of the famous paraphrase of General Sheridan's 'The only good Indians I ever saw were dead': 'The only good Indian is a dead Indian' (see Section III, above).

[145] Reminiscent of Colonel John Chivington's advocacy of the slaughter of Indian children at the massacre of Sand Creek ('nits make lice') which, as we have seen,Stannard, (1992) linked to Heinrich Himmler's description of the extermination of Jewry as 'delousing' (see above, footnote 121). There is something quite horrifying about an Israeli politician using a similar line of genocidal argument, and this was expressed by journalist Mira Bar Hillel (2014) said that on reading Shaked's statement, that she felt on the verge of burning her Israeli passport. 'Not in my name, people. Not in my name!' (Hillel, 2014). Shaked's statement had made Hillel think of her aunt Klara and her children (who had died by 1942) were living in Krakow in 1939 when the Germans decided that all Jews were the enemy and had to be eliminated: '"Why? Ask them – they started it", as the Nazis would say if asked'. As she knew '… what it is to have been helpless victims, living and dying under racist oppressors' boots', Hillel said that she knew that in July 2014, '… today's Israelis are no longer the victims but the perpetrators of the current crisis'.

groups said that Israel's offensive had '… killed more children than fighters', with the Save the Children official Osama Damo stating at the time that 'This is why we described the ongoing operation as a war on children' (Spencer & Blair, 2014).

In terms of the vilification of resistance (see above, Section VI), the Israel prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu argued at the time that Hamas bore the responsibility for its civilian deaths, because it stored and launched rockets from civilian areas, and asserted that '… all civilian casualties are unintended by us, but intended by Hamas. They use telegenically dead Palestinians for their cause' (Spencer & Blair, 2014). Hence, as we may expect that by the time the penultimate stage of the model is reached – the mechanisation of the means of destruction (see above, Section VII) – genocidal activity is already taking place, although this may be concealed or even temporally punctuated by ongoing denial and mystification (see above, Section VIII).

Finally, it is to be acknowledged that in providing an explanatory account of physical genocide, the stage model that has been outlined in this chapter is necessarily limited. Most psychological accounts, almost inevitably, take the 'individual mind' as their point of reference – when something appalling occurs, such as the afore-mentioned attacks by Anders Behring Breivik, the psychologist asks (or is asked), 'What sort of *a person* does that?' However, prejudicial cognition does not always equate to prejudicial action or behaviour; we may think in a certain way (or express that we think a certain way), but behave in quite another. In other words, simply because someone or some people think murderously or genocidally, does not mean to say that he, she or they will act murderously or genocidally. So a psychological, or more accurately, social cognitive account of physical genocide, will always be limited.

For murderous action to take place, would-be murderers must also be possessed of the means of physical destruction, and be empowered to act. Part of Milgram's (1965, 1974) methodological ingenuity in his laboratory demonstration of obedience to authority (see above, Section V) was that as far as his participants were concerned, he had handed them the means, and temporarily authorised their power, to punish an unknown other, as well as simultaneously taking away the participants' responsibility for the effects of their exercising that power in the employment of those means. Similarly, had Anders Behring Breivik not been able to access firearms and the chemicals with which to manufacture explosives, he would have remained the impotent fantasist and keyboard warrior that even a cursory reading of his so-called 'manifesto' indicates that he had been for many years prior (see Berwick/Breivik, 2011). For murder to take place at a societal scale – that is to say, for physical genocide to occur – that empowerment must take the form of legitimisation. Hence, in furthering our understanding of why genocide takes place, we must now turn our attention to how power is vested, developed, sustained and exercised within interlocking societal systems. In this chapter, we have seen incidences of how genocidal thinking has been reflected in legislature and policy; in the next, we will attend to how the power to implement cultural genocide has been developed and manifested in an exemplar societal system, common to all developed societies – in education and in schooling.

CHAPTER 4

EDUCATIONAL SYSTEMS AND CULTURAL GENOCIDE

> For over a century, the central goals of Canada's Aboriginal policy were to eliminate Aboriginal governments; ignore Aboriginal rights; terminate the Treaties; and, through a process of assimilation, cause Aboriginal peoples to cease to exist as distinct legal, social, cultural, religious, and racial entities in Canada. *The establishment and operation of residential schools were a central element of this policy, which can best be described as ,cultural genocide.* (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, p. 1)

INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides two extensive case studies that demonstrate the past culpabilities of education systems and educators in actions of cultural genocide. These are (i) the role of schools and school systems in the policy of the 'Norwegianisation' of the Sami people during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries; and, (ii) following on from the previous chapter, and thereby showing how cultural genocide can 'complete the task' begun in actions of physical genocide, the American Indian boarding school system. In 2015, an explicit and unequivocal acknowledgement from a government-mandated body of the central role that *educational systems* can have, and indeed have had, in the propagation of *cultural genocide* was made. The statement above (the emphasis is mine) was positioned at the very beginning of the '*Executive Summary of the Final Report of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada*'. The Commission, which was mandated to inform all Canadians about what happened in Indian residential schools,[146] and to document the truth of survivors, families, communities and

[146] Residential schools were also a feature in the policy of the removal of indigenous Australian children (Australian Aboriginals, and Torres Strait Islanders) from their parents and families – the Stolen Children, or Stolen Generations. This was undertaken between 1905 and 1969, and in some areas, into the 1970s, by successive Australian Federal and State governments, and church missions, under various Acts of the Australian parliament (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2007). The extent of this removal is difficult to quantify, although very significant: 'Nationally, we can conclude with confidence that between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until 1970. In certain regions and in certain periods the figure was undoubtedly much greater than one in ten. *In that time not one family has escaped the effects of forcible removal* (confirmed by representatives of the Queensland and WA [Western Australia] Governments in evidence to the Inquiry). Most families have been affected, in one or more generations, by the forcible removal of one or more children' (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 1997; italics in original). As the limited space of this book permits *(continued)*

anyone personally affected by the Indian residential schools experience (University of Winnipeg, 2014), went on to acknowledge that:

> … cultural genocide is the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group. States that engage in cultural genocide set out to destroy the political and social institutions of the targeted group. Land is seized, and populations are forcibly transferred and their movement is restricted. Languages are banned. Spiritual leaders are persecuted, spiritual practices are forbidden, and objects of spiritual value are confiscated and destroyed. And, most significantly to the issue at hand, families are disrupted to prevent the transmission of cultural values and identity from one generation to the next. In its dealing with Aboriginal people, Canada did all these things. (p. 1)

Furthermore, the Commission stated that '… the Canadian government pursued this policy of cultural genocide because it wished to divest itself of its legal and financial obligations to Aboriginal people and gain control over their land and resources' (2015, p. 3). Additionally, '… Canada separated children from their parents, sending them to residential schools. This was done not to educate them, but primarily to break their link to their culture and identity' (p. 2). In understanding the enormity of the situation, it is important to be aware of the fact that the Canadian federal government has estimated that over 150,000 First Nations, Inuit, and Métis children[147] – approximately 30 per cent of Aboriginal

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for the inclusion in this chapter of just two of what I have called 'case studies' (Section II, Case Study I: Norwegianisation and the Sami People', and Section III, 'Case Study II: Indian Boarding Schools in the United States', the interested reader is referred to Anderson (2006), and especially the 524-page report, *Bringing Them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families* (Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, 2007), which was tabled into the Federal parliament in 1997. This led to an official apology being made to indigenous Australians (the wording of which was determined in consultation with indigenous Australians) by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on February 13th, 2008, which was passed unanimously by the members of the lower house. Armitage (1995), too, should be consulted: he compares the indigenous assimilation policies in place in Australia, Canada and New Zealand, and finds many parallels, including the policies of the forcible abduction of indigenous children from parents, and the enrolment of those children in residential schools, the experience of which, for many students, was characterised by horrific abuse. Additionally, a direct comparison of the experiences of indigenous Australian children and Indian children in the United States in boarding schools is provided by Jacobs (2006).

[147] These are the official terms, now generally accepted, used to refer to the various Aboriginal peoples of the land-mass that is now Canada. '*First Nations*' is a term that came into common usage in Canada in the 1970s, to replace the word 'Indian', which some people found to be offensive (Library and Archives of Canada, 2016). From the seventeenth century, the aboriginal people of Arctic Canada (along with the Arctic peoples of Alaska, Greenland and Siberia) were called 'Eskimos', but the term *Inuit* (which is from the Inuktitut language, and translated literally, means 'the people') is what the people of these regions prefer to call themselves, and is now used (Library and Archives of Canada, 2016). The *Métis* people are of mixed ethnicity (First Nations and European/African descent), originating in the eighteenth century from the inter-marriages of French and Scottish fur traders with First Nations women (such as the Cree and Ojibway). The Métis subsequently developed into a distinct culture, in what is now northwest Canada. Section 35(2) of Canada's Constitution Act of 1982 recognises all three groups equally as 'aboriginal peoples of Canada' and reads: 'In this Act, 'aboriginal *(continued)*

children – attended Canada's residential schools (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015). The existence of some Indian residential schools pre-dated Canadian confederation (1867), but most of the residential schools (the total number of which peaked at 80 in 1931) were set up following the passing of Canada's Indian Act (1876; the Act made attendance at day school, industrial or residential school compulsory for First Nations people[148]), with the last such school being closed in 1996. The death rates in the residential schools were alarmingly high. In early 2013, CBC (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation) News reported that at least 3,000 children were known to have died whilst attending the residential schools, due to diseases such as tuberculosis (from about 1910) and the Spanish flu epidemic of 1918–1999, malnutrition, drownings, exposure, accidents, schools burning down, and 'excessive corporal discipline' (CBC News, 2013). Eighteen months later, ICTMN (Indian Country Today Media Network) reported that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada had found that more than 4,000 indigenous children had died in the residential schools, further highlighting disease, abuse and fires, and mentioning suicide (ICTMN, 2014). In May, 2015, less than a week before the publication of the final report from the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, CBC News reported that the Chair of the Commission, Justice Murray Sinclair,[149] said that at least 6,000 aboriginal children had died while in the residential school system, and that this figure was just an estimate, and was likely to be much higher (CBC News, 2015). In the executive summary of its final report, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) recorded that he number of students who died at Canada's residential schools is '… not likely ever to be known in full' (p. 99),[150] although it has

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peoples of Canada' includes Indian, Inuit and Métis peoples of Canada. The Supreme Court in Powley held that the Métis have "full status as a distinctive rights-bearing peoples", a characteristic they share with the Indian (First Nation) and Inuit peoples of Canada' (Library and Archives of Canada, 2016). In 2011, 851,560 people in Canada identified as First Nations , 451,795 people identified as Métis, and 59,445 people identified as Inuit, representing 60.8 per cent, 32.3 per cent and 4.2 per cent of the Canadian Aboriginal population respectively, and 2.6 per cent, 1.4 per cent and 0.2 per cent of the total Canadian population respectively. Many First Nations people live in Ontario and the western provinces, and almost three-quarters of the Inuit people live in Inuit Nunangat (which comprises the four regions of Nunatsiavut, Nunavik, Nunavut and Inuvialuit (Statistics Canada, 2011).

[148] It is important to note that in some parts of Canada, residential schools were the only 'option' if one was to attend school. Due in part to Canada's distinctive geography, a disproportionate number of Aboriginal children in less populated areas of the country (and notably, Inuit children) legally had to attend residential schools – quite simply, there was no alternative, as there was no day school provision in some rural areas (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015).

[149] The Honourable Mr. Justice Murray Sinclair was appointed as the Chair of Canada's Indian Residential Schools Truth and Reconciliation Commission in June 2009. He is an Ojibway-Canadian (his Ojibway name, Mizanay Gheezhik, means 'the one who speaks of pictures in the sky') and was Manitoba's first Aboriginal judge, having been appointed as Associate Chief Judge of the Provincial Court of Manitoba in 1988 (University of Winnipeg, 2014).

[150] The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) reported that this uncertainty is due primarily to the incompleteness of the documentary record, stating that, '… many records have simply been destroyed. According to a 1935 federal government policy, school returns could be destroyed after five years, and reports of accidents after ten years … between 1936 and 1944, 200,000 Indian Affairs files were destroyed' (p. 92). Furthermore, the Commission found that general health records were *(continued)*

identified the confirmed deaths of 2,040 named individuals, and the confirmed deaths of a further 1,161 unnamed individuals (hence, a total of 3,201 reported deaths; see footnote 150, below), the greatest number of which (2,434, or just over 76 per cent) took place prior to 1940.

As we shall see over the course of this chapter, such an explicit and unequivocal acknowledgement of the realities of cultural genocide propagated by governments against indigenous peoples, and the central role of State educational systems therein, is somewhat of a rarity. We will return to the aims, findings, and work of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada throughout this chapter, and it is particularly informative in Sections III ('Case Study II: Indian Boarding Schools in the United States') and the concluding comments ('Some Preliminary Reflections On Possibilities For Understanding, "Reconciliation" And Prevention'). And although, for the time being, I have chosen to illustrate the enormity of the situation that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) has attempted to address through the communication of its most grim findings – the appalling death rates of students attending the residential schools – it is to be remembered that the primary and avowed purpose of the residential school system in Canada was not *physical* genocide, but *cultural* genocide. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015, p. 1) quoted Canada's first Prime Minister, Sir John A. Macdonald, telling the House of Commons in 1883:

> When the school is on the reserve the child lives with its parents, who are savages; he is surrounded by savages, and though he may learn to read and write his habits, and training and mode of thought are Indian. He is simply a savage who can read and write. It has been strongly pressed on myself, as the head of the Department, that Indian children should be withdrawn as much as possible from the parental influence, and the only way to do that would be to put them in central training industrial schools where they will acquire the habits and modes of thought of white men.

Furthermore, Deputy Minister of Indian Affairs Duncan Campbell Scott told a parliamentary committee in 1920 that '… our object is to continue until there is not a single Indian in Canada that has not been absorbed into the body politic' (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, pp. 2–3). Similar aims for Indian boarding schools south of the Canada-United States border were outlined even

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regularly destroyed, with reports by doctors, dentists, and nurses routinely being assigned a two-year retention period. The Commission reported that although the Canadian government's Department of Indian Affairs had belatedly adopted a formal policy on how deaths at the schools were to be reported and investigated in 1935 (therefore, the period after the majority of the deaths that the Commission has been able to confirm), '… there can be no certainty that all deaths were, in fact, reported to Indian Affairs' (p. 93), and that the Commission had '… located reports of student deaths in church records that are not reported in government documents' (p. 93). It is to be noted that the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada has established a National Residential School Student Death Register, made of up three sub-registers – those confirmed and named, those confirmed but unnamed, and those that require further investigation (to determine whether they should be placed on the named or the unnamed register) (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015).

more starkly by Captain Richard Henry Pratt, who after serving as an officer in the 10th Cavalry during the Red River War, was given charge of a group of 72 Indian prisoners of war. His 'success' in 'transforming' them led to the development of the first Indian residential school in the United States, the Carlisle Indian School. Pratt summarised his philosophy in a speech in 1892 (Bruhac & Smelcer, 2013, p. 2):

> A great general has said that the only good Indian is a dead one[151]. In a sense, I agree with the sentiment, but only in this: that all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man.

With regard to the Indian in North America, then, the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (as we have seen in the previous chapter) saw a policy of *physical genocide* – 'killing the Indian' – being employed by settler populations from Europe, and their white descendants. The twentieth century, then, was to see the employment, principally through the apparently benign medium of education in the methods of (white) 'civilisation' ('saving the man') of *cultural genocide* ('killing the Indian in him'). This is a theme to which we shall return later in the chapter (below, Section III, 'Case Study II: Indian Boarding Schools in the United States'), but for now, we must turn our attention to what can be understood by, and via the use of, the term 'cultural genocide'.[152]

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[151] The attentive reader will recognise, from the previous chapter, that the 'great general' to whom Pratt referred here was General Philip A. Sheridan, and also that Sheridan's actual words of 1864 were, 'The only good Indians I ever saw were dead' (see Chapter 3, Section III, 'Positioning of the 'Other' as "*Gegentypen*"'). Pratt's 1892 rendering provides an early example of what Brown (1970, p. 172) described as Sheridan's words being '… honed into an American aphorism: The only good Indian is a dead Indian'.

[152] Before moving on, the reader may also wish to consider that residential schools have not only been used as key strategy in the forcible assimilation of indigenous people, but as also as a 'moral hospitalisation' measure in the supposed 'reformation' of 'potential adult criminals' in Ireland (MacLellan & Mauger, 2013). Almost inevitably, the students of these institutions were the children of the poor (Lynch & Minton, 2016). The industrial school system in Ireland, which was to last a century (from 1868 to 1969), involved the detention of 105,000 children, who had been directly committed by the courts (from the age of seven years) for a range of 'offences': 'lack of proper guardianship', 'non-attendance at school', 'indictable offences' (Raftery & O'Sullivan, 1999, p. 20), and being 'uncontrollable' (Tuairim, 1966). The institutions themselves were operated, in the main, by Roman Catholic religious orders, the largest providers being the Congregation of Christian Brothers and the Sisters of Mercy, in which the punishment regimes were '… chronically excessive, cruel and perverse' (Arnold, 2009, p. 7). The reality of life in these institutions was kept secret for decades; indeed, the publication of survivors' accounts of these institutions (e.g., Clemenger, 2009; Finn, 2012; Touher, 2001; Tyrrell, 2006) and official investigations into what took place (Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009), have been a feature of only the last two decades. However, what has emerged is a picture of horrific incidences and frequencies of physical and sexual abuse, which was apparently commonplace in these institutions. In a study of 247 adult survivors of the various residential institutions for children and adolescents, almost all reported having experienced physical neglect (97.6 per cent), physical abuse (97.2 per cent), and emotional neglect (95.1 per cent) as children in these schools; furthermore, almost half (47 per cent) reported having been sexually abused (Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse, 2009). In an article where we attempted to illuminate the context of incidents of peer abuse in industrial schools, Jerry Lynch and I (see Lynch & Minton, 2016), concluded that, for over a century, many children (with the inclusion of children detained in other residential institutions *(continued)*

CHAPTER 4

I. THE CONCEPT OF CULTURAL GENOCIDE

In the previous chapter, the phenomenon of *physical genocide* – and as a specific exemplar, the final phases of the physical genocide conduced against the Indian peoples of the northern plains of what became the United States – was considered. As we have already seen, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015) defined *cultural genocide* as '… the destruction of those structures and practices that allow the group to continue as a group', occurring when States '… set out to destroy the political and social institutions of the targeted group', and exemplified when, '… land is seized, and populations are forcibly transferred and their movement is restricted. Languages are banned. Spiritual leaders are persecuted, spiritual practices are forbidden, and objects of spiritual value are confiscated and destroyed. And, most significantly to the issue at hand, families are disrupted to prevent the transmission of cultural values and identity from one generation to the next' (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, p. 1). The Commission rendered cultural genocide as being distinct from *physical genocide,* which it defined as '… the mass killing of the members of a targeted group', and *biological genocide,* which it defined as '… the destruction of the group's reproductive capacity' (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015, p. 1).

The term '*cultural genocide*', although almost certainly not as familiar to most readers, is actually as venerable as the term '*genocide*' itself, although neither term is nearly so venerable as the practice of cultural, or other forms, of genocide. In 1945, the Polish lawyer Raphael Lemkin (b. 1900, d. 1959) wrote (emphasis mine):

> The crime of the [German] Reich in wantonly and deliberately wiping out whole peoples is not utterly new in the world. It is only new in the civilised world as we have come to think of it. It is so new in the traditions of civilised man that he has no name for it. *It is for this reason that I took the liberty of inventing the word, 'genocide'.* The term is from the Greek word 'genos' meaning tribe or race and the Latin 'cide' meaning killing. Genocide tragically enough must take its place in the dictionary of the future beside other tragic words like 'homicide' and 'infanticide'… the term does not necessarily signify mass killings although it may mean that. More often it refers to a coordinated plan aimed at destruction of the essential foundations of the life of national groups so that these groups wither and die like plants that have suffered a blight.

In this April 1945 article, itself a summarisation for a popular audience of the concepts he had presented in a 1944 chapter, Lemkin said (again, emphasis mine) that the end of genocide may be '… accomplished by the forced disintegration of

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such as county homes, the overall total of children so committed amounted to around 170,000, and hence involved about 1.2% of the age cohort; CICA, 2009) lived a parallel and precarious existence in an Irish society that '… claimed to cherish and hold them sacred, but in fact marginalised and ignored them' (Maguire, 2012), and positioned them as '"moral dirt"' (Fergusen, 2007).

political and social institutions, of the culture of the people, of their language, their national feelings and their religion. It may be accomplished by wiping out all basis of personal security, liberty, health and dignity. *When these means fail the machine gun can always be utilised as a last resort*'. The National Socialists in Germany, who had long-since upheld '… the doctrine of the biological superiority of the German people' had, said Lemkin, '… transformed an ancient barbarity into a principle of government by dignifying genocide as a sacred purpose of the German people'. Amongst eight 'techniques of genocide' that he argued had been employed by the National Socialists (the other seven were political, social, religious, moral, economic, biological and physical), Lemkin discussed cultural genocide, which he exemplified in the Nazi's obliteration of former cultural patterns, the supplanting of the German language over local languages in the occupied territories, compulsory German schooling, and the rigid enforcement of the prohibition of the artistic expression of (non-German) culture. I would argue that what Lemkin (1945) discussed under the Nazi-employed strategies of religious (the undermining of religion, wherever it represented a vital influence in the national life), moral (devices for the moral debasement of national groups, such as the foisting of pornographic publications upon the Poles), and social (the weakening of national spiritual resources, such as the targeting of the intelligentsia and resistance) genocide can also be understood within a broader conception of cultural genocide. Similarly, some of what Lemkin (1945) discussed under the Nazi-employed strategies of biological genocide (for as well as the encouragement of the increase in the birth rate within Germany and amongst *Volksdeutsche*[153] in the occupied countries,[154] Lemkin stated that '… every means to decrease the birth rate among "racial inferiors" was used') falls within an understanding of physical genocide, described by Lemkin as '… simply murder. It may be the slow and scientific murder by mass starvation or the swift but no less scientific murder by mass extermination in gas chambers, wholesale executions or exposure to disease and exhaustion'. The *political* and *economic* genocidal strategies outlined by Lemkin (1945) described the specific circumstances engineered by the National

[153] Literally, 'ethnic Germans', but predictably enough, understood and used by the National Socialists in terms of blood and race (see Bergen, 1994).

[154] Lemkin (1945) explained that subsidies were offered for children begotten by German military men by women of 'related blood', such as Dutch and Norwegian women – this was one aspect of the *Lebensborn* [literally, 'Fount of Life'] programme. Whilst fascinating, the dreadful situation that unfolded after the end of the war for children born of German soldier-fathers and non-German mothers in occupied countries, and their mothers (in Norway, this included the ostracising of the children, and the arrest, internment, beating, head-shaving, rape and sometimes deportation to Germany of the mothers) lie outside the scope of this chapter, and indeed, this book. The title chosen by *Dagbladet* (a popular Norwegian daily newspaper) for its review of Kåre Olsen's 1998 book, *Krigens barn: De norske krigsbarna og deres mødre* ['War Children: The Norwegian War Children and their Mothers'] gives an indication of how these mothers were popularly thought of in post-war Norway: *14.000 «tyskertøser» internert etter krigen*. The Norwegian word '*tøser*' translates as 'sluts' or 'whores', so an English translation of the title is, '14,000 "German-sluts"' (this term is also in quotation marks in the original Norwegian) interned after the war'. The interested English-speaking reader is referred to Simonsen (1996).

Socialists to employ the strategies of cultural/religious/moral/social and biological/physical genocide throughout the German Reich and the Nazi-occupied countries.

The term 'cultural genocide' has been used quite broadly since, notably in describing the persecution of members of the Bahá'í faith in Iran (Frelick, 1987) – over 200 Bahá'ís were executed between 1978 and 1998 (International Federation of Human Rights, 2003) – and by the Dalai Lama in describing the deliberate and systematic destruction of Tibetan culture under the Chinese annexation of Tibet (BBC News, 2008b). The related term '*ethnocide*' has been suggested as an alternative, although that term has not received as wide a usage as either 'genocide' or 'cultural genocide' (Shaw, 2007). Delanty and Kumar (2006) argue that 'ethnocide' is not an adequate replacement for 'cultural genocide', as there is an obvious risk of confusing ethnicity and culture. Whilst the term 'cultural genocide' was considered in the drafting of the United Nations' 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (which became effective on 12th January, 1951), it was ultimately dropped in favour of the term 'genocide' (Davidson, 2012).

However, it is worth noting (as Churchill, 2003b did) that Article II of that Convention '… specifies five categories of activity, only one of which involves outright killing' (p. 45). The five categories specified in Article II are:

(a) Killing members of the group;
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;
(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group; and,
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.

Hence, the international legal definition of genocide specifies the intent on the part of those perpetrating it (i.e., the destruction of a racial, religious, ethnic or national group), and a multiplicity of means that the perpetrators of genocide employ (Davidson, 2012). However, Churchill (2003b, p. 44) noted that:

> The crime of genocide is usually understood in the United States as being more or less exclusively associated with the forms and programs developed by Nazi Germany in its drive to physically exterminate such *untermenschen* (sub-human peoples) as the Slavs, the Gypsies and the Jews. This is an entirely erroneous view. The meaning of the term [genocide] is something very much broader, both in temporal scope and in terms of techniques employed.

I share Churchill's view that the narrower popular understanding of genocide is problematic. As Churchill has, during his career, been concerned most explicitly with the situation of Indians in the United States (see, for example, Churchill, 2003b), it was, I think, natural for him to refer to how genocide has been (mis)understood in the United States. I would add that this narrower understanding of genocide as physical extermination exists elsewhere, in contradiction to the fact

that the broader understanding of cultural genocide was present in Lemkin's (1944) conception of genocide, and remains present in the international legal definition of genocide. I would appeal to the reader to hold the broader understanding in mind – at the very least, as far as the breadth of the five categories of activity specified in the afore-mentioned Article II of the United Nations' 1948 Convention on Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide extends – as he or she reads the case studies (Section II, 'Case Study I: "Norwegianisation" and the Sami People', and Section III, 'Case Study II: Indian Boarding Schools in the United States') that follow this section.

Churchill (2003b, p. 44) also noted a further observation of Lemkin's, made in 1944 (p. 79) – 'Genocide has two phases; one, destruction of the national pattern of the oppressed group; the other, the imposition of the national pattern of the oppressor'. These phases are not, I think, to be understood as a strictly temporal sequence; indeed, although even the separate placing of this and the previous chapter may, unfortunately, serve to cement an inaccurate mental division between the two, these two so-called 'phases' may indeed progress hand-in-hand[155]. I would argue that the means by which genocide is levied yields important considerations; further, the restricted understanding of genocide as physical destruction that is held by many, has in my view made the distinction between physical and cultural genocide necessary, and therefore the inclusion of this chapter in this book important, if only to ensure that cultural forms of genocide are not disavowed. As we will see in the two case studies that are included in this chapter, when genocide is waged by cultural means, it is more insidiously covert than the physical extermination of peoples. To borrow the heading of section VIII of Chapter 3, as an act of 'further mystification and denial', it has been easier for protagonists to position culturally genocidal activities as 'benign', and even as a helpful act of 'charity' or 'public service' to the people whose culture is, through that so-called 'charity' or 'public service', being systematically destroyed. Small wonder that, as we shall see, education systems, and educators themselves, have been at the very forefront of the forcible assimilation of indigenous peoples.

[155] To give a single example of the temporal overlap between acts of physical and cultural genocide, the reader may recall from Chapter 3 that the final deliberate act of the physical extermination of Indian people in the United States by that country's military forces was the Massacre of Wounded Knee in 1890. As we shall see in this chapter, below (Section III, 'Case Study II: Indian Boarding Schools in the United States'), the Carlisle Indian School, which is described and served as the model for many of the schools that are described in this chapter, had been founded some eleven years earlier, in 1879. Having said all of this, it is notable that, broadly speaking, the means by which genocide has been waged against indigenous peoples generally has undergone changes from the physical to the cultural, with cultural acts of genocide seemingly completing the task of the destruction of indigenous culture that was begun in the initial acts of physical genocide.

II. CASE STUDY I: 'NORWEGIANISATION' AND THE SAMI[156] PEOPLE

The Sami people, who are estimated to number between 70,000 and 100,000 (estimates vary, according to inclusion criteria such as genetic/family heritage, knowledge and use of Sami languages, and self-identified ethnicity) are generally recognised as being the native people of Scandinavia. It has been suggested recently (Nordmark, 2015), in an article that was clearly written to provoke debate, that the Sami people are not, in fact, Norway's indigenous people, but are in fact immigrants to Norway, along with other minorities (such as the Kven, Jews, Forest Finns, and Romani peoples). Nordmark's assertion seems to be based on two inter-related points. In the first place, she points out that the Sami language (erroneously, as we shall see below, she refers to this in the singular[157]) is a Finno-Ugric language, and that the Old Norse from which the modern Norwegian languages descended from belongs to the Nordic branch of the Indo-European group. However, this ignores the fact that the regional-sounding terms that have been applied to language families do not consistently reflect the geographical origin of the ethnic groups that use, or have historically used, those languages.[158] Nordmark's (2015) other major point was her assertion that during the last Ice Age, about 10,000 years ago, there was no settlement in the land that we now call Norway, but when the ice retreated, the first settlements along the coast were made by Norse-speakers, whose descendants (modern Norwegians) are the true

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[156] Another recognised minority people (since 1996) in northern Norway are the Kven people, who are the descendants of emigrants to Norway from neighbouring northern parts of Sweden and Finland in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, who were escaping poverty and famine (Hansen, 2011). In 2001, the Kven population was estimated to be between 10,000 and 15,000 (Government of Norway, 2001). The Kven people speak an old Finnish dialect, also called Kven, which is mutually intelligible with Finnish (although the Kven language contains Norwegian loan words and archaic words no longer found in modern Finnish), and was recognised as a minority language in Norway in 2005 within the framework of the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages. The Kven share the Sami's history of linguistic and cultural assimilation in Norway (Hansen, 2011); however, for the purposes of this chapter, we shall be examining the situation of the Sami in Norway. For the reader who wishes to learn more about the Kven, there is a Norwegian Kven Organisation (*Norske Kveners forbund/Ruijan Kveenilitto*), whose website can be found at www.kvener.no (in Norwegian and Kven only), or for English-speakers, there is an interesting article on the history and language of the Kven by Marjut Aikio (1989).

[157] There is, in fact, a greater degree of mutual intelligibility between the modern Nordic (Danish, Norwegian and Swedish) languages (in particular, between the written standards of modern Danish and *Bokmål* (the language of ca. 85 per cent of Norwegians)) than there is between some of the Sami languages.

[158] For example, representative languages of the Finno-Ugric group that are spoken today include Estonian, Finnish, Hungarian, Karelian and the Sami languages, and whilst it is generally accepted by linguists that these languages are descended from a proto-Finno-Ugric language, this ancestor tongue is hypothetical rather than being directly attested, and the geographical origins of proto-Finno-Ugric language speakers remain a matter of speculation (Campbell, 2004). Similarly, the six 'living' languages of the Celtic group are Breton, Cornish, Irish, Manx, Scottish Gaelic, Welsh, and a proto-Celtic language remains hypothetical, rather than being directly attested; the Celts themselves, though, almost certainly originated in Iron Age central Europe, rather than the fringes of western Europe to where they either spread or were displaced to, and where the speakers of the modern Celtic languages now live (Chadwick, 1998).

indigenous people of Norway. However, outside of Nordmark's deliberate provocation (which seems to have been aimed primarily at University of Tromsø Sami academics who she names, and describes as having '… defined themselves as belonging to indigenous people in the world. They live for, and largely also to develop, the idea of the nation *Sápmi*';[159] translation mine), archaeological and anthropological evidence points to the fact that the Sami have inhabited these regions for at least 5,000 years, with some archaeological evidence pointing back to a continued Sami civilisation for 10,000 years (Broadbent, 2010).

Although many Sami people have moved southwards, considerable numbers of them live in their traditional Samiland areas, which comprise the northern parts of Norway (which has a Sami population of ca. 60,000), Sweden (ca. 36,000), Finland (ca. 10,000) and Russia's Kola Peninsula (ca. 2,000) (Hansen, 2011). Although reindeer herding was, and still is, considered by many as 'traditional' and a cultural marker of the Sami,[160] it is of relatively recent (sixteenth century) vintage, and the Sami people have been engaged in a variety of livelihoods, including farming, fishing and trapping (Hansen, 2011). Rather than there being a single Sami language, ten Sami languages can be distinguished, six of which have written standards. Northern Sami has by far the greatest number of speakers (ca. 15,000–20,000), accounting for about 75 per cent of speakers of Sami languages (Cultural Survival, 2016).

Historically, the Sami and the Norwegians lived and worked in geographically separate areas until the arrival of bubonic plague in 1349; the Sami lived inland, and were occupied in hunting and fishing, and the Norwegians lived on the islands, and at the mouths of the fjords, and were engaged in marginal farming, sea fishing and trading. The Norwegians' proximity to trade routes meant that their exposure to plague, and consequently their death rate from it, was higher than that of the Sami people (Urbanczyk, 1980). As well as physical incursions into Sami lands from the mid-fourteenth century, Norwegians made advances into what might be called the 'spiritual space' of the Sami people, in the form of the sending of religious missionaries (especially after the Protestant Reformation). Hitherto, the traditional Sami religion had been polytheistic, and pagan, and it was practiced by most Sami people until the eighteenth century (Hagen, 1999). One of the most famous witchcraft trials in Scandinavia was the one that took place in Vardø[161] in

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[159] The land traditionally inhabited by the Sami people, therefore, stretches across four modern nation states. This region is known as *Sápmi* in Northern Sami. The traditional English language equivalent has been 'Lapland', although these days 'Samiland' is to be preferred, as 'Lapp' (referring to a Sami individual) is an outdated term, and is often considered pejorative.

[160] Despite the enduring stereotype, which exists outside and even within Scandinavia, in 2009 only 3,010 Sami people in Norway (therefore, less than 5 per cent of the Sami population) worked in reindeer herding (Statistics Norway, 2010). Furthermore, as many Sami people live in cities (especially the northern cities of Alta and Tromsø, but also the southern Norwegian capital, Oslo), Sami people are of course represented in all professions, occupations and trades in Norway (Young & Bjerregaard, 2008; in Hansen, 2011).

[161] These trials have a similar resonance in the collective Norwegian memory as do the trials of the Pendle witches in Lancashire in 1612 for British (and especially, northern English) people (see Robert

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1621 (northern Norway's first), which followed a violent storm that occurred in Finnmark on December 24th, 1617, in which ten boats and forty men were drowned, and the passing of a law in Denmark-Norway[162] that year which criminalised sorcery and witchcraft (Hagen, 1999). Under torture, a woman named Mari Jørgensdatter, in addition to 'confessing' to serving Satan and acting as his agent (apparently, she had transformed into a fox on one occasion, and on another had flown to attend a Satanic sabbath near Bergen in southern Norway and back), claimed that other witches (in the company of demons with whom they had had sexual intercourse) were responsible for the great storm of 1617. Jørgensdatter's neighbour, Kirsti Sørensdatter, was identified as the leader by Jørgensdatter and other local women who had been similarly interrogated (that is, under torture), and Sørensdatter was burned alive at the stake on April 28th, 1621 (the last of ten women to be so sentenced in this case) (Hagen, 1999). 'Experts' in witchcraft at the time generally held that, 'Evil came from the North';[163] in 17th century Finnmark, this was generally taken to be Nordkalotten, the traditional home of the then-pagan Sami people, who were believed to be able to exert magical control over the winds (and thus were able to summon storms) (Hagen, 1999). Of the 150 people who were executed for sorcery in northern Norway between 1621 and 1663, all of the men were Sami and most of the women were Norwegian (Hagen, 2015). The Steilneset Memorial, a memorial to the victims of the Vardø and other witchcraft trials in northern Norway, which is located on the coastline at Vardø, was opened on 23rd June, 2011 by Norway's Queen Sonja (Rosenfield, 2012).

On the back of the decades of missionary activity and witchcraft trials that followed the Protestant reformation in Norway, a major conversion effort was made between 1716 and 1723, when a Lutheran priest named Thomas von Westen (1682–1727) made three missionary visits to northern Norway. During these visits, he converted pagan Sami people to Christianity, and had pagan sacred sites and Sami drums burnt. As with many other indigenous peoples, including the American Indians (Struthers, Eschiti, & Patchell, 2004), the drum for the Sami was traditionally both a musical instrument and a sacred object. Of the thousands of sacred Sami drums that once existed, only around seventy now remain. Ánde Somby, who is a traditional Sami *joik* artist and a professor at the University of Tromsø's Faculty of Law, has said (2015) of this history that:

Neill's excellent and classic novelisation, *Mist Over Pendle* (1951/2011), and as do the Salem witchcraft trials of 1692–1693 for American people (see Adams, 2009).

[162] Denmark-Norway (in Danish and Norwegian, *Danmark-Norge*) was a political entity that lasted from 1524 (when Denmark and Norway entered into a personal union under Danish hegemony, due to Norway's weakened position after the plague) until 1814 (when Denmark was forced by the victorious powers in the Napoleonic wars to cede Norway to Sweden). Norway achieved full national independence on 7th June, 1905, after a peaceful separation from a union with Sweden under the Swedish crown.

[163] This belief is also reflected in the fact that some medieval (and older churches) in the United Kingdom have what are called 'Devil's doors'; these are the doors that face due north. Christian churches were often deliberately built over pre-Christian pagan sites of worship, and pagans would sometimes continue to worship in their traditional ways at the northern side of the church (Matthews, 1996).

> During that process, our instruments were burned. The drum was burned. But we made these songs [*joiks*[164]] survive. And we've even got a saying, and I want that saying – that saying is my gift to you. That, 'You can always burn my drum, but you can never burn the song that is inside me.'

Some time ago, I came across a slightly 'staged'-looking photograph of a group of South Sami people, which I later found out had been taken in 1928; however, it was the *location* of the photograph that most surprised me. Rather than having been taken in (say) some Nord-Trøndelag village, the photograph had been taken at Tierpark Hagenbeck in Hamburg in 1928, where the South Sami group had been *exhibited* with their traditional tents, sledges and weapons, and beside a group of reindeer, as part of a *human zoo* (hence the slightly 'staged' appearance of the photograph, and my surprise). I subsequently found out that Sami people were exhibited in human zoos – or, as they were more often termed at the time, 'ethnological exhibitions' – across Europe from the late nineteenth century until the 1950s (Bancel, Blanchard & Lemaire, 2000).[165] I have since found that a Ph.D. thesis (entitled '*Gone astray? Live exhibitions of the Sami people in Europe*') was completed in 2012 on this issue by archaeologist Cathrine Baglo, who was critical of the image of the Sami people as victims, the image which she says is commonly associated (and I would argue, understandably so) with the live exhibitions of Sami people. Baglo stated (in Berg, 2012) that, 'It is quite wrong to see this as a history of unilateral exploitation', asserting that no one before her had ever examined the practice of live exhibition in depth to see what the conditions were. Baglo surveyed information from roughly 400 Sami who participated in these exhibitions between 1822 and 1950, and found that, 'There was never anyone who tried to portray Sami as if they were animals …. In addition to earning money, many learned foreign languages, which laid the foundation for their later education. They had contracts that governed their work assignments, pay and travel expenses and the medical supervision of both people and animals' (Baglo, 2012; in Berg, 2012). Furthermore, '… the Sami themselves participated in creating the scenarios. They, in no way, sold their souls, but sold exhibitions of their lives and culture, exhibitions that they themselves, through being there, helped to shape' (Baglo, 2012; in Berg, 2012).

Whilst I have no doubts regarding Baglo's methodology, I feel that my questions and conclusions would have been somewhat different. Whilst we are, at the present time, considering the lived experiences of a marginalised people, we are doing so in order to understand the social and political contexts that make marginalisation possible, and we have also concerned ourselves with the

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[164] The *joik* (sometimes spelled '*yoik*') is a form of singing, usually unaccompanied, and is the traditional mode of musical expression for the Sami people. Probably the best-known joik artist internationally (primarily, due to his work with the popular Swedish folk/roots band *Hedningarna* in the early 1990s) is is Wimme Saari, who is from Kelottijärvi in Finnish Samiland.

[165] I hardly need add that I find the notion of a 'human zoo', and in particular, the fact such entities existed in Western Europe at a time that precedes my own birth by just thirteen years (a Congolese village was displayed at the World Fair in Brussels in 1958; Coos, 2002) to be absolutely abhorrent.

characteristics of those who marginalise others. Hence, Baglo's conclusions do not address the serious questions that I would have had about the people who saw fit to exhibit, and to view the exhibition, of their fellow humans. 'Ethnographic exhibitions' revelled in the pseudo-science of emphasising the cultural differences between those of Western civilisations and indigenous and non-European peoples – invariably and inevitably at the time, stressing the 'superiority' of Western civilisations over the 'primitive races', who according to the Social Darwinism that informed such displays, occupied a space on the continuum that was assumed to exist between the great apes and human beings of European descent. Additionally, I have to own my curiosity here, as I cannot help but wonder about the restricted range of possibilities that a person might have had to have had before her or him, before she or he made the decision that the best way to secure a livelihood was to exhibit herself or himself in such a way.

Despite their history of being subjected to discrimination and prejudice of the worst kinds (as we seen in the section), Urnanczyk (1980) reported that until the middle of the nineteenth century, the Sami people thrived due to their adaptation to their environment. After the formation of the Norwegian state in 1814,[166] the Sami and Norwegian languages were given equal status in Norway, which Minde (2005, p. 11) reportedwas '… in accordance with the humanistic and romantic ideas of that period … it was believed that to speak one's native tongue was a human right'. However, from the outset, this policy found opposition from the Norwegian upper classes in Finnmark. The mid-nineteenth century brought with it the formation and implementation of a culturally genocidal policy towards the Sami in Norway which, as we shall see, can be said to exert a profound, if covert, influence on the relationships between Sami and non-Sami people in Norway to the present day. That policy was, and is, known as '*fornorsking*', or in English, 'Norwegianisation', and as Niemi (1997) put it, 'From 1850 to 1980, Norwegianisation was introduced in the field of culture, *with school as the battlefield and teachers as frontline soldiers*' (p. 268, italics mine).

In his 2005 account of the consequences of the forcible assimilation of the Sami people in Norway, Henry Minde discerned three phases in the one-hundred year history of the Norwegianisation policy: a *transitional phase* (ca. 1850–1870), a *consolidation phase* (ca. 1870–1905), and a *culmination phase* (ca. 1905–1950). In direct contradiction of what had been agreed regarding the co-equal status of the Norwegian and Sami languages at the formation of the Norwegian constitution in 1814, from 1850 the Norwegian state made concerted efforts to eradicate the Sami language, and introduced the compulsory education of Sami children at residential schools where they were taught in Norwegian only. Minde (2005) noted that the

[166] The United Kingdoms of Sweden and Norway, or Sweden-Norway (in Swedish, *Svensk-norska unionen*; in Norwegian, *Den svensk-norske union*) lasted between 1814 (following Norway's formation of its Constitution on 17th May (the Norwegian National Day), and the enforced ceding of Norway under the 1814 Treaty of Kiel from the King of Denmark-Norway to the King of Sweden) until 1905 (see footnote 163, above). Whilst the countries were united under a Swedish monarch and shared a foreign service, Norway was in all other respects a legally independent state within this union, and enacted its own legislature.

Sami languages were also forbidden in schools in Sweden and Finland during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries; in Russia today, whilst the Sami people are recognised as culturally distinct, the Sami languages still have no official status (Laihiala-Kankainen & Pietikäinen, 2010). This 'transitional' phase was also marked by the creation of a special budget in the Norwegian parliament, termed '*Finnefondet'* ['the Lapp Fund'] in 1851, with the express purpose of serving '… to promote the teaching of Norwegian in the transitional districts and to ensure the enlightenment of the Sami people' (Minde, 2005). In other words, the 'enlightenment' of the Sami people was seen as being synonymous with the deliberate, and central government-funded, replacing of the native languages of Sami children with Norwegian.

Despite these efforts, by the late 1860s it was found that the use of the Norwegian language was actually in *decline* amongst the Sami and Kven people, so further measures were applied. In 1868, *Finnefondet* was doubled, and efforts were aimed at the Kven population as well as the Sami population. Minde (2005) also noted that in 1880, the Troms diocese instructed that only Norwegian was to be spoken, read and written in Norwegian schools, and that school regulations that had allowed Sami and Kven students to learn their native languages were immediately repealed. An interesting policy regarding the promotion of the Norwegian language by teachers was the explicit linking of teachers' pay rises to their levels of success in promoting Norwegian. Put bluntly, teachers who were unable to demonstrate good results in this 'change of language' did not receive pay rises, and for someone who had taught for seven years, the pay rises could be considerable (between 23 and 30 per cent). Teachers who themselves had a Sami or Kven background generally saw no point in applying for the rises, whereas Norwegian teachers became financially dependent on documenting the efforts they had put into implementing Norwegianisation (Minde, 2005).

From 1898, new Norwegianisation measures were introduced. Several boarding schools were built around Finnmark, which were aimed at isolating the pupils from their original environments (which, as we have seen, was acknowledged as having been the case in the building of residential schools for Aboriginal children in Canada; Truth and Reconciliation Committee of Canada, 2015). In terms of pre-service teacher training, courses in Sami and Finnish, and the previously-granted tuition scholarships for candidates with a Sami or Kven background at the Tromsø Teacher Training Seminar (the teacher training institute in northern Norway at that time) were terminated. This had the effect of severely limiting the number of people with a Sami or Kven background entering the teaching profession, ensuring that Sami and Kven children in the future would be taught by those ethnic Norwegian teachers who had never known those children's native languages.[167] It

[167] How might it be possible to teach children who do not speak the language that one is instructing them in? Minde (2005) provides two accounts of a demonstration of the method of *visual instruction*, which at the turn of the twentieth century, was heralded by the Norwegian Directorate of Schools as a new method which would replace the need for Sami and Kven language instruction among teachers. *(continued)*

was directed that in the classroom, the use of the Sami and Kven languages must be limited to what was strictly necessary, and used only '… as an aid to explain what is incomprehensible to the children'. (However, even this possibility of using Sami and Kven as auxiliary languages was abolished in the Elementary School Act of 1936). Teachers also had to check that Sami and Kven pupils did not use their native tongue during breaks between lessons (Minde, 2005).

In 1913, the Norwegian parliament passed an Act to allocate the best and most useful lands to ethnic Norwegian settlers, causing the dislocation and relocation of the Sami people. Anyone who wanted to buy or lease state lands in Finnmark for farming had to register with a Norwegian name, and to prove her or his knowledge of the Norwegian language. *Finnefondet* was more than doubled in the years before the outbreak of war in 1914, to cover the expansion of the boarding schools initiative (Minde, 2005). The following quote from Brygfjeld, who held the office of Director of Schools, and was the chief inspector of Norwegianisation measures from 1923 to 1935, indicates that he saw Norwegianisation as a 'civilising' task for the Norwegian State (quoted in Eriksen and Niemi 1980; in Minde, 2005, p. 17):

> The Lapps have had neither the ability nor the will to use their language as written language …. The few individuals who are left of the original Lappish tribe are now so degenerated that there is little hope of any change for the better for them. They are hopeless and belong to Finnmark's most backward

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Indeed, the Director of Schools' inspector Thomasson took over a classroom lesson in Lakselv in 1903, in order to provide such a demonstration. Let us first consider Thomasson's own account of it:

> The school superintendent demonstrated how teaching could be effected by means of visual instruction, without the use of the Sami or Kven language. What was to be learned was the word "out". A child was required to leave the room for this purpose, and the remaining children were asked where he was. Their answer was to be: "Johan has gone out". After this had been repeated several times, Johan was asked to come back in. However, he had misunderstood the situation. The whole thing was therefore repeated with another boy, and Johan realised his misunderstanding. The teacher was impressed by the superintendent's simple and good method of instruction. And the superintendent had been forced to bang the stick on the table a couple of times in order to have the children's attention.

However, this same episode was also reported – rather differently – in a Sami language newspaper at the time:

> The school superintendent shouted to one of the children, "Go out! Go out!", and when the child did not understand the foreign language, the superintendent seized him by the neck and threw him into the hall with the words "Go out!". The child was frightened and began to cry. Then one of the other children was told to go and fetch him back, again on the school superintendent's order – which was again, "Go out! Go out!". This child fared no better than the first. Then the superintendent fetched a stick and pointed around the room at various objects with it. And when the children failed to understand his foreign tongue, he banged the stick on the table. And then the children understood nothing at all, as they had become utterly terrified.

I have my own opinions as to which of these accounts I find the more convincing, and I shall refrain from further commentary here, in order that the reader can make her or his own assessment on the matter.

> and wretched population, and provide the biggest contingent from these areas to our lunatic asylums and schools for the mentally retarded.[168]

Very few accounts of how children themselves experienced their encounters with schools exist, perhaps due in part to common Sami attitudes of letting bygones be bygones (Minde, 2005) and resilience (Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Minton & Sørlie, in press; see also footnote 174, below). However, Minde (2005) provided a few examples from pamphlets, from Tor Edvin Dahl's report of 1970, and from his own collection of interviews (recorded in 1991):

> I cannot remember anything of what my teacher said during my first years at school, because I did not understand him, and I was certainly not among the least gifted. I profited sadly little from school. I was intellectually malnourished. My soul was damaged. These are the most barren and fruitless of my learning years. They were wasted, so to speak, and a wasted childhood can never be made good. (Anders Larsen (1870–1949), a Sami teacher turned Sami activist, from Seglvik) (p. 23)

> Oh, what helpless experiences those first school lessons were! It was as if all doors were closed! – What was he saying? It sounded so stiff. There was something revolutionary going on in your mental life. The bright, bold receptiveness left you; the childlike cheerfulness disappeared! You did not dare ask a question; you only guessed. No utterance of amazement at what you saw ever crossed your lips. It was as if you had suddenly become old. You became uncommunicative, you were seized by a feeling of loneliness …. School lessons were so boring and so poor, so poor in content …. Sometimes when I think about this, it is such a great pain that I can't sleep. I stay awake at night, I feel I have to speak up. Tell this story to someone, everything that causes pain, that has been trampled down. There is something inside me that shouts: Don't suffocate me! Something that needs air, that wants to rise, that wants to live. But we were branded. We were trampled down and I can never forget it. Never forget what it was like. Everything was taken away from us. Our native language we were not allowed to speak. Nobody listened to us. (Per Fokstad (1890–1973), a Sami teacher turned Sami and Labour Party politician, from Tana) (p. 24)

> I wondered why the teacher didn't speak Sami in school when he was a Sami. He probably wasn't allowed to, I thought …. We were so used to being repressed – it didn't matter much. (Sami man from Ullsfjord, born in 1911) (p. 25)

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[168] Minde (2005) noted that, 'It should be remarked that, to my knowledge, nobody has checked whether there are grounds for the allegation that the Samis were over-represented among the mentally ill. If this were to prove correct, it seems likely that the Norwegianisation policy in school had been a contributing factor' (p. 17).

> When I started school I could not speak Norwegian. Had to learn. Of course it sounded broken. I have to say many times, that when I think back, I was bullied many times for my language alone, the poor Sami language. (Sami woman from Skånland, born in 1924) (p. 25)

> I suppose I am quite simple, as you will understand who have come from Oslo to make a book. But I have always got along. I have even learned Norwegian, even though it is said to be so difficult for us Sami. I didn't understand a word at school, and the teachers gave us the Bible stories, and we were told to read. But of course it was quite incoherent to us. (Sami woman, a housewife from Polmak, born ca. 1915) (p. 26)

> I went to school for 17 months, but didn't learn a word of Norwegian and could neither read nor write. Grey sheep, my teacher called me. Maybe I could have won the court case and been paid money because I didn't learn anything, many people up here could have done that. But I am not like that. (Sami man, a carpenter from Karasjok, born ca. 1920) (p. 26)

Finally, a couple from Ullsfjord (born ca. 1915) were asked if there were problems for students from a Sami background in schools:

> Wife: 'Yes, you know, there were….'
> Husband: (interrupting) 'Oh no, because all the other kids spoke Norwegian. Even in the homes where they spoke Sami, they had to learn Norwegian. It was more convenient to use the language spoken in Norway. It is a dying language. What is the point of keeping it alive? It is the old, old people who can't walk anymore who have the Sami. And you university people who are working to get the Sami language back. That is just foolish!' (Minde, 2005, p. 29)

It is often argued that it was the controversial construction of a hydro-electric power station in Alta in 1979, and the protests of Sami people against it, that brought Sami rights onto the broader political agenda in Norway;[169] thereafter, the

[169] In 1970, the Norwegian Water Resources and Electricity Board proposed building a dam on the Alta River which, had it gone ahead as originally planned, would have entirely submerged the Sami village of Masi. However, due to the activities of Sami protestors, Masi was designated a 'heritage area'. Renewed plans for the dam's construction, which would still interrupt reindeer grazing lands and migration routes, began in 1979. Norwegian environmentalist protestors erected and manned a stone barrier in order to prevent the construction of an access road to the proposed site of the dam; many Sami people saw the issue primarily as one of ethnic rights, rather than one of purely environmental concerns. Seven young Sami protestors camped outside the national parliament in Oslo; however, their threats of hunger strike unless the construction of the dam was suspended, and their demands for political rights and recognition to be granted to the Sami people, were ignored. With the support of several thousand Oslo residents, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and the Work Group for Indigenous Affairs (IWGIA) appealed to then-Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland for support of the Sami people. However, the Sami protestors in Oslo were told that their occupation of the parliamentary lawn was illegal, and when they did not strike camp after the allotted single day, they were arrested; a further 200 arrests of supporters were made the following day. When they were released, the Sami *(continued)*

idea of *Sápmi*, a Sami nation, gained acceptance amongst some Sami people (Hansen, 2011). Significant markers of Sami cultural pride, and to some, prospective 'nationhood', have included the recognition of a Sami national day (which is on February 6th, the date of the first Sami Congress in 1917) in Norway, Finland and Sweden in 1983; the creation of a Sami national flag[170] in 1986; and the setting of a Sami traditional poem to music to produce a Sami national song, '*Sami soga lávlla*' (usually translated as, 'Song of the Sami People', but literally translated, 'Song of the Sami Family') in 1986, which was approved by the Sami Congress in 1992. In terms of legal provisions in Norway, the *Sami Act* (1987) provided for a national Sami Parliament;[171] more recently, the *Reindeer Herding*

protestors and their supporters continued their demonstrations, and within three says, the government temporarily rescinded authorisation of the dam (according to Harlem, not as a response to the hunger strike, but out of simple concern for Sami interests). The protests at Alta and Oslo were suspended. However, in 1981, the Norwegian government sent 600 police officers (ten per cent of the country's total) to Alta in order to protect the construction of the access road. Protestors, who had vowed to return, constructed an ice barrier at Alta, and announced their willingness to chain themselves to it and to freeze to death. Of the approximately 800 demonstrators and 150 Sami activists, 70 did in fact chain themselves to the ice barrier, and the police carefully removed them. A second hunger strike at a university in Oslo (rather than the more public first hunger strike in front of the national parliament) failed to command the same media attention. In autumn 1981, the Norwegian Supreme Court denied a final challenge to the Alta dam project, upholding the earlier finding that the Sami people did *not* have legal claim to their pastoral lands, and the Alta Dam began producing electricity in 1987 (Lawrence, 2011). Whilst the construction and operation of the dam was not prevented, the Alta controversy is generally reckoned to have instilled pride amongst the Sami people, and as stated above, brought Sami rights onto the mainstream Norwegian political agenda (Hansen, 2011). The protestors remained resolutely non-violent. Bjarne Store Jakobsen, who was the spokesman for the Sami hunger strike at the time (and is now the Head of SVT's (Sveriges Television [Sweden's Television, the Swedish national broadcaster]) 'Lappland' (the company's Sami language editorial) told a fascinating story of the Sami protestors rejection of an offer of 'assistance' from abroad that would have contravened their non-violent stance. In an interview with the *Nordlys* newspaper in 2003, he reported that, 'The temperature was very high at the beginning of the 1980s. The popular resistance against the Alta development was great, but the Government was determined to continue …. During the hunger strike in Oslo, the management of the Sami movement was approached by an elderly, grey-haired Irishman who worked at Sinn Fein, the IRA's political organisation, at its information office in Stockholm …. We were unsure what they wanted, but rejected any form of discourse. It was against our philosophy of non-violence, and we would not be associated with the IRA. Despite the fact that we rejected the enquiry, he contacted us again somewhat later. We would not embark upon the discussion of specific actions, but it was on the cards that they could also assist with more violent attacks. There was also talk about crippling the infrastructure within Norway, more concretely, about explosions that would cut the power supply to Oslo …. We dismissed him very clearly again for a second time' (Bjarne Store Jakobsen, interviewed in Nordlys, 2013; translation mine).

[170] The Sami flag contains red, yellow, blue and green, and these colours have since become referred to as the 'Sami (national) colours'. The flag features a circle, which is a sun/moon symbol, which appears on many traditional Sami drums.

[171] The Sami Parliament (in northern Sami, *Sámediggi*; in Norwegian, *Sametinget*) of Norway, which was opened on October 9th 1989 by the Norwegian King Olav V, is located in Karasjok, and is the representative body, and acts as an institution of cultural autonomy, for the indigenous Sami people of Norway. It has the responsibilities of managing the Sami Development Fund; the development and maintenance of co-equality (with Norwegian) of the Sami language in Norway; protection of Sami cultural heritage sites; and the development of Sami teaching materials. There are 39 representatives (none of whom receive salaries), who are elected from 7 constituencies that cover all of Norway. It is *(continued)*

Act (2007) allocated the Sami people special rights to reindeer husbandry. However, it was as late as 1990 that Norwegian constitutional law finally recognised the Sami people as Norway's indigenous people, and formally acknowledged '… the responsibility of the authorities of the State to create conditions enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop its language, culture and way of life'.

Despite these changes, it is clear that the Sami people are still affected by the psychological and cultural consequences of the 'Norwegianisation' policy, a cultural genocide committed against them for over a century which brought with it the near-loss of the Sami languages, institutionalised schooling and the stigmatisation of Sami identity, language and culture. As Hansen, Minton & Sørlie (in press) put it, 'Many Sami people remain influenced by past assimilation politics, despite the official legislation having been reversed. Simply "being different" in any respect is often the source of discrimination and harassment, and, as a minority population, the Sami people are vulnerable'.[172] One key area in which this is evident is people's identification (or not) with being Sami. Over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, many Sami people changed their everyday language, occupations and places of residence, and adopted the ethnic Norwegian majority's way of life; this often resulted in 'double discrimination' (Hansen, 2011). This internalised sense of inferiority in relation to the Norwegian majority, and similar types of feelings amongst Sami people, has been called 'Sami shame' (Somby, 2015). Some people from a Sami background in Norway are reluctant to recognise it; in some Sami families, some of the members consider themselves as having a Sami background, whilst other members consider themselves as having a non-Sami identity. Many such examples were found in the SAMINOR 2 study (discussed below) in coastal (Sami minority) areas in northern Norway, where 'Norwegianisation' efforts were particularly acute (Hansen, Minton & Sørlie, in press). This phenomenon was a practical consideration for the designers of the SAMINOR and SAMINOR 2 studies (see Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo & Lund, 2008; and Hansen, Minton & Sørlie, in press, respectively). These studies were cross-sectional surveys on health and living conditions in mixed population (that is to say, both Sami and Norwegian) areas in northern Norway, and were conducted in 2003–2004, and 2012, respectively. In these studies, great care was taken in accurately representing the ethnic makeup of participants, who were asked to respond to survey items on the language that they themselves used at home, and the language that was/had been used by their parents, and their grandparents, as well as being asked, 'What do you consider yourself as [being]?' (The available response options in each case were 'Norwegian', 'Sami', 'Kven' or 'Other', and respondents were allowed to use more than one of these). The treatment of the data in both the SAMINOR and SAMINOR 2 studies resulted in the emergence of three different

funded by the Norwegian government (Sami Parliament, 2016). There are also Sami parliaments in Finland, Russia and Sweden.

[172] Minde (2005, p. 6) quotes Beate Hårstad Jensen: 'If it has taken 100 years to Norwegianise the coast Samis, then it will perhaps take another 100 years to make us Samis again?'

statistical sub-populations amongst participants with respect to Sami affiliation. Those with '*strong Sami affiliation*' answered 'yes' to the three questions, 'I consider myself Sami', 'my ethnic background is Sami'; and 'my home language is Sami'. A '*self-reported Sami*' group of participants answered 'yes' to one or two (but not all three) of those questions. However, there was a group of participants who reported the use of the Sami language by, or the Sami ethnicity of, their parents and/or grandparents, and yet did not consider themselves to be Sami, or reported that they had a personal Sami background; for the purposes of the research, this group was defined as people with a *Sami family background* (see Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; and Hansen, Minton & Sørlie, in press).

As well as issues of Sami self-identification being apparent in the very methodology, the results of the SAMINOR studies demonstrated that Sami people (at least, those living in mixed population areas in northern Norway) reported experiencing discrimination on a disproportionate basis, and in a number of respects. In the first SAMINOR study, conducted in 2003–2004 (n = 12,265), it was found that 3.5 per cent of ethnic Norwegians, but around 35 per cent of those of Sami ethnicity, reported having been subjected to discrimination, and that having been subjected to discrimination was associated greater levels of depression, anxiety and poorer self-rated health (Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008). The results of the SAMINOR 2 study, which was conducted in 2012 (n = 11,600), showed that Sami participants reported experiencing the same high levels of discrimination in 2012 as they had done almost a decade previously (and also that non-Sami participants reported higher levels of discrimination in the SAMINOR 2 study of 2012 than they had done in the SAMINOR study of 2003–2004). Whereas about one in ten non-Sami respondents reported having experienced discrimination, this rose to one in three amongst Sami respondents with a strong Sami affiliation. Those with a strong Sami affiliation who lived in Sami minority areas were the most likely of all the participant sub-populations to report having experienced discrimination. The most frequent types of discrimination reported were those based on ethnic background, gender and geographical affiliation, with ethnic discrimination being reported by 51.7 per cent of Sami respondents who reported having been discriminated against (Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press). Only a few of those who reported having been discriminated against (less than 2 per cent) in the SAMINOR 2 study had been in contact with the Equality and Anti-Discrimination Ombudsman Service (in Norwegian, *Likestillings- og diskrimineringsombudet*, or LDO). In explaining why this might have been the case for Sami people, Hansen, Minton and Sørlie (in press) made reference to the traditional value of Sami resilience, which may prevent Sami people from seeking help when facing discrimination, and instead to attempt to manage on their own, and not to show 'weakness'.[173] They also pointed

[173] Hansen (2011) has also explained that Sami people do not have a tradition of talking about psychological problems outside of the family; there is also the religiously-rooted concept of 'the evil ear', which means that some Sami people believe that they will become sicker if they talk about mental or physical illness. Illness has been seen by some Sami people as a punishment for having done *(continued)*

to the rather practical consideration that the LDO has neither a website in the Sami language, nor Sami-speaking advisors, although they do offer interpreters. Whilst a large proportion of Sami people are Norwegian speakers, it has been shown elsewhere that in public services that Sami people prefer Sami-speaking advisors to interpreters (Mollersen, Sexton, & Holte, 2009; Nystad, Melhus, & Lund, 2008), and of course, Sami-speaking people may feel more comfortable using their own languages.

As we have seen in Chapter 1, Norway has benefited from nationwide anti-bullying intervention programmes for over three decades, although as I have pointed out elsewhere (Minton, 2014), a shortcoming of these programmes has been their relative inattention to the addressing of prejudice as an underlying factor in bullying behaviour, which I have suggested as being a design priority in the future development of anti-bulling intervention programmes. It may be recalled from Chapter One (see Section III, 'The Bullying of "Minority" Groups: Attending to Prejudice and Marginalisation'), that a finding in the first SAMINOR study, which as it will be recalled was conducted in 2003–2004 – so in the two years that followed the passing of the *Education Act*, 2002 – was that Sami children reported having been bullied twice as frequently as did ethnic Norwegian children (Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press; Hansen & Sørlie, 2012), raising the question as to whether the provisions of the Act as satisfactorily realised in schools for Sami and other 'minority' children in Norway as they are for the ethnic Norwegian majority (Lile & Hansen, 2012; Minton, 2014).

As well as bullying at school, in recent years there has been a prominent example (certainly in terms of its media exposure in Norway) of street violence experienced by a Sami person. In October 2012, 23-year-old Eli Anne Nystad, who is from the Sami community in Karasjok,[174] was attacked outside a bar in Trondheim, after a gang of young men heard her accent, and the attack escalated when they understood that she was Sami. Ms. Nystad was verbally abused and physically assaulted, and one of the gang tried to set fire to her coat with a lighter. The attack was recorded by the bar's security cameras. There was widespread condemnation of the attack in the media (e.g., Hammervik et al., 2012; Kristiansen & Moe, 2012). The national Anti-Racism Centre, the Norwegian Sami Parliament, and then-Prime Minister Stoltenberg (who reminded people that harassment based on ethnic background is illegal in Norway) also condemned the attack (Hammervik et al., 2012). The young man who attempted to set fire to Ms. Nystad's jacket was fined NOK 8,0000 (ca. €850 as of June 2016), and Stoltenberg went on to honour

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something wrong, which in turn means that the disease or illness itself is perceived as shameful (Øvreberg, 2012).

[174] Karasjok (Norw., known as *Kárásjohka* in the Northern Sami language) is the administrative centre of Karasjok municipality in the county of Finnmark, and as we have seen (see footnote 172, above) the Sami parliament is located there. The municipality's population, which was estimated at 2,708 as of 1st January 2016 (Statistics Norway, 2016) includes those of the Sami, Kven and Norwegian ethnicities.

Ms. Nystad's standing up against bullying in his New Year's speech of January 2013[175] (Brustad, 2013).

When Sophie Lancaster (see Chapter 1, Section III, 'The Bullying of "Minority" Groups: Attending to Prejudice and Marginalisation', especially footnote 34), a young woman in the United Kingdom who was murdered on the basis of the 'difference' of her personal appearance in August 2007, there was no statement on the matter by the British Prime Minister; indeed, it is doubtful as to whether he even knew about the murder.[176] However, when similar incidents occur in Norway, they tend to shock the populace, and publicly, at least, political leaders in Norway seem to manage to do what the liberal Western world generally perceives as being the 'right' or the 'decent' thing. The history of 'Norwegianisation', a policy of the forcible assimilation of marginalised indigenous peoples that exemplifies the processes of cultural genocide, seems to be at odds with a country that today (say) contributes generously towards the United Nations[177], and impressed many people internationally with its response to the tragedy of the murderous actions of Anders Behring Breivik in 2011, a response which seemed to be characterised by quite incredible dignity and the quest for fairness, rather than the punishment and revenge expected by many in the international right-wing media (see Chapter 3, section on 'Concluding Points: Psychology, Social Cognition and Physical Genocide Reconsidered', including footnote 142). The compensatory pseudo-explanations that, 'things were different back then', and that many countries have at least some shameful episodes in their histories, are not quite sufficient. For, as Hansen, Minton & Sørlie (in press) have noted, despite the fact that Norwegian legislation and policy has been reversed, the existence of a Sami parliament in Norway, and the re-embracing of Sami cultural identity and even rising in *Sapmi* consciousness amongst some Sami people in recent decades, 'Norwegianisation' continues to cast a long shadow. As we have seen in this section, 'Norwegianisation' itself, in its proper historical context, was the nineteenth/twentieth century manifestation of a marginalisation of an indigenous people that had in the centuries before been manifest in forcible religious

[175] Stoltenberg's speech celebrated 100 years of full voting rights for women in Norway, and mentioned Eli Anne Nystad's courageous stance alongside the achievements of celebrated Norwegian women such as the marathon runner Grete Waitz, and former Norwegian prime minister Gro Harlem Brundtland. On a personal note, the attack on Ms. Nystad occurred just days before I travelled to a conference at the University of Tromsø, in order to meet Sami colleagues who had invited me there.

[176] In terms of comparing UK and Norwegian murder rates: in 2011, the year that Anders Behring Breivik committed the mass killings, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) Global Study on Homicides showed that the murder rate in the United Kingdom was 1.0 per 100,000 (a total of 653 murders) (the world's 187th highest, out of 218 countries), whereas in Norway, the murder rate was 2.2 per 100,000 (a total of 111 murders; the 152nd highest). However, when the 77 murders committed by Anders Behring Breivik are subtracted from the Norwegian total for 2011, the rate observed in Norway falls to 0.6 per 100,000 (the world's ninth lowest). For completion's sake, the highest rate observed was in Honduras (84.3 per 100,000, or a total of 6,757 murders), and the lowest rates (zero) were in Leichtenstein and Monaco (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, 2013).

[177] Norway was ranked number six amongst member state contributors to the United Nations, having contributed US$3,992,495,471 between 2011 and 2013 (Norway: Mission to the UN, 2016).

conversion and persecution. In the previous chapter, we saw that in nineteenth century North America, the marginalisation of the indigenous peoples was implemented through *physical genocide*; in nineteenth/twentieth century Norway, the marginalisation of the Sami was implemented through *cultural genocide* – as Niemi (1997) put it (see above), '… with school as the battlefield, and teachers as frontline soldiers' (p. 268). Minde's (2005) work (above) reminds us that one of the 'battlefields' in which the Norwegian authorities invested considerable efforts in its cultural 'war' was the residential school. As we noted at the beginning of this chapter, the residential school was also the site of the cultural genocide committed against the North American Indian that sometimes accompanied, to perhaps a greater extent followed, and in some cases, can even be considered to have continued, the physical genocide that had been committed against her and him. It is to this story that we shall now return.

III. CASE STUDY II: INDIAN BOARDING SCHOOLS IN THE UNITED STATES

In Section III ('Positioning of the "Other" as "*Gegentypen*"') of Chapter 3 of this book, we saw that General Sheridan's reply to the surrendering Commanche leader, Tosawi [Silver Knife]'s introduction of himself as 'Tosawi, good Indian' – 'The only good Indians I ever saw were dead' had been '… honed into an American aphorism: "The only good Indian is a dead Indian"' (Brown, 1970, pp. 171–172). In the 'Introduction' to the present chapter, we have already seen that this aphorism was quoted with partial approval (in 1892) by 10th Cavalry officer Captain Richard Henry Pratt (whose 'success' in 'transforming' 72 Indian prisoners of war led to the development of the Carlisle IndianSchool, the first Indian residential school in the United States), who said that he agreed with Sheridan's sentiment in that '… all the Indian there is in the race should be dead. Kill the Indian in him, and save the man' (Bruchac & Smelcer, 2013, p. 2).

I have positioned this as a historical marker of the transition between the sixteenth, seventeenth, eighteenth and nineteenth century policy of the implementation of *physical genocide* ('killing the Indian') and the twentieth century of *cultural genocide* ('killing the Indian in him') (see above, 'Introduction') being employed by settler populations from Europe, and their white descendants, towards the Indian (see above, 'Introduction').[178] Just as Sheridan's words have been quoted in shortened form, so too have Pratt's been curtailed (although in his case, slightly more moderately) – they are typically rendered as 'Kill the Indian, (and) save the man' (e.g. Altaha & Kraus, 2012; Bess, 2000; Churchill, 2004; Green, 1923). The following section documents some of the experiences of Indians in the United States in boarding schools, and here, Pratt's words have an ominous significance as the very starting position, or founding

[178] Temporally, it will be recalled from Chapter 3 that the last act of the so-called 'Indian Wars', the Massacre at Wounded Knee in December 1890 (see Chapter 3, 'Introduction' and especially footnote 95, and Section IV, 'Dehumanisation of the "Other"'), occurred less than two years before Pratt's outlining of his 'educational philosophy'.

philosophy of Indian residential schools in North America – an unambiguous avowal of intended cultural genocide.[179] Bruchac and Smelcer (2013) describe the general programme as it developed thus:

> From 1879 until the early 1960s,[180] the federal government tried to assimilate American Indians by sending school-aged Indian children to distant boarding schools where, it was believed, the Indian in them would be slowly and forever replaced by Western traditions, language, education, and religion (conversion to Christianity was part of the indoctrination).[181] By law, Indian children were literally abducted by the government and sent off to institutions designed to destroy their cultural identity. They were the stolen generations.[182]

It has also been described by the Lakota People's Law Project (2016, p. 4) in similar terms:

> During the Boarding School Era, the US government forcibly separated Native American children from their families, thereby committing genocide under the United Nations' definition of this term,[183] by forbidding and degrading Native practices and languages.

In South Dakota, the co-operation between State agencies, private religious organisations and federal agents, under the federal government authority to involuntarily remove Lakota children from their families and tribe, and to place them into mandatory Indian Boarding Schools, was executed as a direct implementation of Article VII of the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie, which provided

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[179] Explicitly recognised as such, as we have seen, by the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada (2015; see also above, 'Introduction'), but not so recognised, to this author's knowledge, by any government or government-mandated body to date in the United States.

[180] Bruchac and Smelcer (2013) seemingly underestimated the time period involved – as we have already seen in Chapter 3 (see Section VIII, 'Ongoing Denial and Mystification') Churchill (2003a) noted that the last Indian school closed less than thirty years ago, when the Phoenix Indian School held its final commencement ceremony on May 13th, 1990.

[181] In his review of the education of Indian girls at non-reservation boarding schools, Robert Trennert (1982) noted that the federal government committed itself to '… educating Indian girls in the hope that women trained as good housewives would help their mates assimilate' (p. 272). The programme that was developed for the education of girls rigidly reinforced European American ideas regarding gender roles; in Trennert's (1982, p. 275) words, 'Academic learning clearly played a subordinate role. The girls spent no more than half a day in the classroom and devoted the rest of their time to domestic work' which entailed, and here Trennert quotes the Annual Report of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs of 1880, 'the manufacture and mending of garments, the use of the sewing machine, laundry work, cooking, and the routine of household duties pertaining to their sex' (p. 272).

[182] As we have already seen (see this chapter, footnote 147), this is a term that is more often used to refer to the indigenous Australian children (Australian Aboriginals, and Torres Strait Islanders) who were forcibly removed from their families from 1905 up until the 1970s. Although Bruchac and Smelcer (2013) note that, 'Parallel histories exist in Canada's treatment of First Nations people and in Australia's dealings with Aborigines', it is not clear from their text whether they use the term in a deliberate comparison.

[183] On this point, see this chapter above (Section I, 'The Concept of Cultural Genocide'), especially the outlining of Churchill's (2003b) position and perspectives.

that, 'In order to ensure the civilisation of the Indians entering into this treaty, the necessity of education is admitted … and they, therefore, pledge themselves to *compel their children, male and female, between the ages of six and sixteen years, to attend'* (Lakota People's Law Project, 2014, p. 1; italics in original).[184]

Somewhat surprisingly, Bruchac & Smelcer (2013) concluded that, 'While it is easy to catalogue the detrimental effects of the residential Indian school system, there were mixed blessings' (p. 4). The element of my surprise here comes from the fact that whilst Bruchac and Smelcer (2013, pp. 3–4) do not shirk from cataloguing the 'detrimental effects', e.g.:

> In the early years, thousands of children died from diseases to which they had no previous immunity, especially from trachoma, influenza, and tuberculosis … [others] were shipped infected back to their families who then contracted the deadly diseases.
> Students were punished—often drastically—when caught speaking their Native languages. There exist numerous accounts of students locked in basements or boiler rooms for days without food or water.
> Child abuse and pedophilia was rampant in residential schools …. Students were so mistreated, so isolated, lonely, and dehumanised that many who attended such schools would rarely speak of their experiences, even as adults.
> Indian boarding schools were built to be places that would utterly transform Indian people, obliterating tribal identity, destroying Native languages, and eradicating Native religions, customs, and traditions.
> … though it was not their choice to leave their homes, many were ostracised when they returned. Unable to reconcile the old and the new, many returning students lived socially detached and abusive lives as outcasts and alcoholics.

– that they offer only the 'unintentional' (p. 4) effects of the forging of inter-tribal friendships,[185] and the fact that some Indians were able to continue to pursue their

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[184] As the reader may recall from Chapter 3 (Section VI, 'The Vilification of Resistance'), the successes of the Lakota chief Red Cloud resulted in a treaty being sought by the United States (which was signed at Fort Laramie in 1868). As we have seen, the provision in this treaty that, 'No white person or persons shall be permitted to settle on or occupy any portion of the territory, or without consent of the Indians to pass through the same' (in Brown, 1970, p. 273) was first violated by the United States in the building of a road by the United States into the Black Hills (which under the terms of the Fort Laramie Treaty, lay within the Sioux Territory), where gold has been found, under Lieutenant Colonel George Armstrong Custer. However, after Custer's defeat at Little Bighorn in 1876, the Fort Laramie Treaty was unilaterally overturned (on August 15th that year) by United States legislation (in order to strip the Lakota people of the Black Hills) on the grounds that it was the *Indians* who had violated the Fort Laramie Treaty by going to war with the United States. It is interesting, and perhaps by this stage, far from entirely unpredictable, to see here that a separate part of the Fort Laramie Treaty (i.e., that pertaining to the mandatory education of Indian children) was enforced by the United States *after* the federal government had already overturned the treaty.

[185] Inter-tribal friendships made at the Indian boarding schools are not, despite the overall slant of my argument, to be under-estimated in one key respect, though; they were important in the development of inter-tribal co-operation in the fight for Indian rights from the 1960s onwards. Davis (2001) notes that an autobiography written by a Shoshone teacher, Esther Burnett Horne, reveals that her students included '… Dennis Banks, George Mitchell and Leonard Peltier [who] became leaders of the American

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education and take their places as legal and community-working advocates, as evidence of the Indian residential schools offering 'mixed blessing[s]' (p. 4). Hence, the accounts of people who survived those schools will surely be instructive. Bear (2008) reported that the memories of leaving the reservation in South Dakota, where his home was, for the Wahpeton Indian Boarding School in North Dakota (the first of the boarding schools where he was to spend the rest of his childhood) still haunted well-known singer, songwriter, actor and Indian activist Floyd Red Crow Westerman (1936 – 2007), over sixty years later. At first, Westerman had thought that he was on the bus because his mother didn't want him any more, but then he noticed that she was crying, too (in Bear, 2008, pp. 2–3):

> It was hurting her, too. It was hurting me to see that. I'll never forget. All the mothers were crying.

Margaret Jacobs (2006, pp. 202–203) shared Rose Mitchell's, or Tall Woman's (a Navajo woman from northeastern Arizona) account of Indian children attempts to avoid being removed from their parents and families:

> The agents were sending out police on horseback to locate children to enrol [in school]. The stories we heard frightened us; I guess some children were snatched up and hauled over there because the policemen came across them while they were out herding, hauling water, or doing other things for the family. So we started to hide ourselves in different places whenever we saw strangers coming toward where we were living.[186]

Bear (2008) also reported the experiences of the Pattwin Indian Bill Wright, who was sent to the Stewart Indian School in Nevada at the age of six years (p. 3):

> Wright remembers matrons bathing him in kerosene and shaving his head. Students at federal boarding schools were forbidden to express their culture –

Indian Movement, through which they worked for Indian people's political self-determination [and] advocated a return to traditional spirituality, and cultivated cultural pride' (p. 22).

[186] In a compelling comparison of the experiences of Indians in the United States and indigenous Australians of boarding schools (see above, footnote 147), Jacobs (2006) also provided the following account from Iris Burgoyne, a Mirning-Kokatha aboriginal woman from South Australia: '[A Sister] would visit the mission every month or so in a shiny black car with two other officials and always leave with one or two of the fairer-skinned children… [We] wised up! Each time that car pulled into the mission, our aunties, uncles and grandparents would warn the older children and they grabbed the little ones and ran into the scrub. Although adults in Rose's and Iris's communities tried to hide the children, the authorities eventually found many of them and spirited them away to schools, missions, or other institutions. [Iris wrote that] "I shed tears when I remember how those children were ripped from their families, shoved into that car and driven away …. The distraught mothers would be powerless and screaming, 'Don't take my baby!'" (p. 203). Jacobs (2006) noted that, 'Although these two stories sound remarkably and disturbingly similar, they took place in almost opposite corners of the world in the early twentieth century …. Rose and Iris, as well as their indigenous communities, shared a common experience at the hands of white governmental authorities and the missionaries and local police forces that carried out their bidding' (p. 203).

> everything from wearing long hair[187] to speaking even a single Indian word. Wright said that he lost not only his language, but also his American Indian name. 'I remember coming home and my grandma asked me to talk Indian to her and I said, "Grandma, I don't understand you". She said, "Then who are you?"' Wright says he told her his name was Billy. 'Your name's not Billy. Your name's TAH-rruhm', she told him. '"And I [Wright] went, 'That's not what they told me.'"

Systematically stripped of all vestiges of their former cultural identity – their long hair, jewellery and clothing, the ability to use their native languages or follow traditional religious practices, and their given (tribal) names having been replaced by convenient English-language substitutes[188] – the Indian children in boarding schools began the process of their 'civilisation' and learning the culture of the white American.[189] Like others have, Bear (2008) described how students in the Indian boarding schools were abused, beaten, malnourished and forced to do hard labour; there was a major emphasis on so-called 'discipline' and punishment. She quoted the following excerpts from the federal government's 1928 '*The Problem of Indian Administration'* report (also known as the 'Meriam Report', after Dr Lewis Meriam, who led the survey team; available from the National Indian Law Library, 2016):

> The survey staff finds itself obliged to say frankly and unequivocally that the provisions for the care of the Indian children in boarding schools are grossly inadequate …. At a few, very few schools, the farm and the dairy are

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[187] Hair-cutting was particularly undignified and traumatic for Indian children, and the practice of doing this on the first day of the enrolment of Indian children seems to be both a metaphorical and literal 'cutting away' of culture. Jacobs (2006) quotes a Lakota woman, Zitkala-Sa's, account: 'I remember being dragged out, though I resisted by kicking and scratching wildly. In spite of myself; I was carried downstairs and tied fast in a chair. I cried aloud, shaking my head all the while until I felt the cold blades of the scissors against my neck, and heard them gnaw off one of my thick braids. Then I lost my spirit …. Not a soul reasoned quietly with me, as my own mother used to do; for now I was only one of many little animals driven by a herder …. Our mother had taught us that only unskilled warriors who were captured had their hair shingled by the enemy. Among our people, short hair was worn by mourners, and shingled hair by cowards!' (p. 216).

[188] A clear example of what Goffman (in another context) termed 'disculturation' (see Chapter 2, Section II, 'Marginalisation', sub-section on 'Marginalisation and Power Relationships'. Re-naming was approached by the 'educators' at the boarding schools as a random, and certainly meaning-devoid process, at least according to one account of the practice of re-naming at the Carlisle Indian School, provided by Jacobs (2006): 'Daklugie, a Chiricahua Apache taken to Carlisle, recalls, "They marched us into a room and our interpreter ordered us to line up with our backs to a wall …. Then a man went down it. Starting with me he began: 'Asa, Benjamin, Charles, Daniel, Eli, Frank …. I became Asa Daklugie. We didn't know till later that they'd even imposed meaningless new names on us …. I've always hated that name. It was forced on me as though I had been an animal"' (pp. 217–218).

[189] Davis (2001) notes that this process of education included being '… introduced to unfamiliar conceptions of space and time; and [being] subjected to militaristic regimentation and discipline', with tribal languages and cultural practices being replaced with '… English, Christianity, athletic activities, and a ritual calendar intended to further patriotic citizenship. They instructed students in the industrial and domestic skills appropriate to European gender roles and taught them manual labour. For many Indian children, this cultural assault led to confusion, homesickness and resentment' (p. 20).

> sufficiently productive to be a highly important factor in raising the standard of the diet, but even at the best schools these sources do not fully meet the requirements for the health and development of the children. At the worst schools, the situation is serious in the extreme …. The term 'child labour' is used advisedly. The labour of children as carried on in Indian boarding schools would, it is believed, constitute a violation of child labor laws in most countries.

Bear's (2008) respondent, Billy Wright, remembered an adviser hitting a student (p. 5):

> Busted his head open and blood got all over …. I had to take him to the hospital, and they told me to tell them he ran into the wall and I better not tell them what really happened.

For many of those detained at Indian boarding schools, the conditions of neglect, deprivation and abuse were intolerable. A public health report of 1989, conducted by Manson, Beals, Dick and Duclos, addressed the issue of suicidality as part of a longitudinal study (which utilised self-report questionnaires) into the prevalences and incidences of symptoms of depression, anxiety, and substance abuse in a Bureau of Indian Affairs-funded boarding school in the southeastern United States. Amongst the approximately 200 students in the secondary school, 96 per cent of whom lived there all year-round, approximately 23 per cent of the students had attempted suicide at some time in the past, and 33 percent reported suicidal ideation within the past month[190]. Students at the greatest risk for suicide included those '… who reported having either family or friends who had attempted suicide, and those who reported on standardised psychological measures as having experienced greater depressive symptomatology, greater quantity, and frequency of alcohol use, or little family support' (Manson, Beals, Dick, & Duclos, 1989, p. 609).

Unsurprisingly, the Indian boarding schools, which were (as we have seen, from the very outset) designed to 'kill the Indian within', also cast a long shadow across those who survived them. Journalist Marsha King (2008) reported on one of her respondents' (85 year-old Genevieve Williams) haunted memories of physical abuse in the Indian boarding schools:

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[190] Manson, Beals, Dick and Duclos (1989) noted that a few years prior to their study, the average suicide rate for Indians and Alaskan Natives in the United States for the period 1980–1982 was 19.4 per 100,000, or 1.7 times the average for the United States population as a whole. This discrepancy was greater still amongst the young: suicide rates for Indians and Alaskan Natives aged 10–14, 15–19 and 20–24 years were 2.8, 2.4 and 2.3 times greater respectively than the national averages for those age groups. The suicide rate for Indians and Alaska Natives in the United States remains alarmingly and disproportionately high amongst young adults (those aged 18–24 years). In 2012–2013 (the most recent year available), the rate was 22.5 per 100,000, or over twice the average for the United States population as a whole. The problem is at its most acute amongst men (the rate is 34.3 per 100,000 amongst Indian and Alaskan Native men, and 9.9 per 100,000 amongst Indian and Alaskan Native women) (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention's National Center for Health Statistics, 2015; in Sifferlin, 2015).

> [She] lies in failing health in her daughter's small house on the Tulalip Reservation …. She sees herself as a little girl. Marching everywhere in a line. Scrubbing floors on her hands and knees. Being forced to stand silent for hours in a dark hall. Watching children get strapped for speaking their native language. 'I got to know that strap', she said. 'Everybody knew what that strap was for, hanging inside the door.' It was especially bad for girls who wet the bed. Dresses pulled up and underwear pulled down, they were beaten. 'We all had to line up and watch'.

These long-term effects are not confined to the unbearably painful memories of survivors; the cast of the long shadow of the Indian boarding schools extends to generations of children born to those who survived the schools. Bear (2008, p. 5) reported that her respondent, Billy Wright, not only still suffered from nightmares from the severe discipline, but also worried that he and other former detainees at the Indian boarding schools had inadvertently re-created that harsh environment within their own families. Wright said:

> You grow up with discipline, but when you grow up and you have families, then what happens? If you're my daughter and you leave your dress out, I'll knock you through that wall. Why? Because I'm taught discipline..

King (2008) reported that, 'Increasingly, the damage from that early abuse, loneliness and lack of love is being seen as a major factor in ills that plague tribes today, passed from one generation to the next and manifesting in high rates of poverty, substance abuse, domestic violence, depression and suicide'. Brave Heart, Elkins, Tafoya, Bird and Salvador (2012) recorded that American Indians in the twelve Indian Health Service areas had '… higher rates of death from tuberculosis (500 per cent higher), alcohol (514 per cent), diabetes (177 per cent), unintentional injuries (140 per cent), homicide (92 per cent), and suicide (82 per cent) than all other US ethnic and racial groups' (p. S177), and that between 2001 to 2005, 11.7% of all American Indian deaths were attributed to alcohol (which was more than twice the rate of the general US population). The lead author of that account, Maria Yellow Horse Brave Heart, has examined such health disparities that exist to the detriment of American Indians, and especially males, within the frameworks of *historical unresolved grief* and *historical trauma*. Conceptually, she identified six phases of unresolved historical grief: (i) *first contact*, which involves life shock, the period of colonisation, the introduction of diseases and alcohol, and traumatic events; (ii) *economic competition*, with loss of economic and spiritual sustenance; (iii) *invasion/war period*, extermination, refugee symptoms; (iv) *subjugation/ reservation period,* confinement and translocation, forced dependency on the oppressor; (v) significantly, for the current chapter, *the boarding school period* – the destruction of family systems, beatings, rape, the prohibition of Native languages and religions – with the lasting effects of people being ill-prepared for parenting, and identity confusion; and finally, (vi) *the forced relocation and termination period*, which involves the transfer to urban areas, the prohibition of religious freedom, being subjected to racism and viewed as second class, and the

loss of the native governmental system and community (Diversity Foundation, 2016).[191]

As well as outlining the features of historical trauma and its mechanisms of inter-generational transmission, Brave Heart has developed a system of interventions for the grieving and healing of those losses (see Brave Heart, 2000; Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 2000). The four major community intervention components are (i) confronting the historical trauma; (ii) understanding the trauma; (iii) releasing the pain of historical trauma; and, (iv) transcending the trauma, and the three major hypotheses for the intervention model are (i) education (which increases individual and community awareness of trauma); (ii) the sharing of the effects of trauma (which provides relief); and (iii) grief resolution through collective mourning/healing (which creates positive group identity and commitment to community) (Diversity Foundation, 2016; see also Brave Heart, 2000; Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 2000). These interventions have been used with Brave Heart's own Oglala people, and other Indian communities within the United States (see, for example, Brave Heart, 2000; Brave Heart & DeBruyn, 2000; Brave Heart, Elkins, Tafoya, Bird, & Salvador, 2012); Brave Heart's conceptual framework has been applied in exploring the impacts on individuals and communities with Native Alaskan peoples (Evans-Campbell, 2008).

The closing of these 'harsh, racial, abusive and all-white-run Indian Boarding Schools' (Lakota People's Law Project, 2014, p. 1), which were found to be, in the afore-mentioned Meriam report (1928; see National Indian Law Library, 2016), '… understaffed, focused on writ memorisation and resulting in the creation of individual Indian children unfit for employment in either their Native communities or in the wider Anglo-American society' was federally mandated by order of the United States Congress; specifically, by the passing of the American Indian Policy Review Commission in 1975 (Lakota People's Law Project, 2014).[192] The

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[191] It may well have been possible to utilise at least some parts of Brave Heart's model as the basis for a sequential series of steps in understanding cultural genocide, in the same way that a series of steps was developed in understanding physical genocide in the previous chapter. There would seem to be certain correspondences in the experiences of forced assimilation of indigenous peoples; to give a single example with respect to the case studies included in this chapter, correspondences would certainly seem to exist in the fifth phase of Brave Heart's model of historical trauma (Sami and Indian experiences of residential schools). As we have seen in this chapter, this experience was also pertinent to the indigenous Australian peoples (see footnote 147) and, whilst not involving the forcible assimilation of a minority indigenous people, certainly relevant in the system of industrial schools in Ireland (see footnote 153). Such a 'working-out' may well be worthy of a more lengthy exploration, outside of this chapter, with the provision being made that sociocultural and historical differences are not ignored, or 'brushed over', in providing an exaggerated emphasis on the commonality of experiences. For the purpose of this chapter, however, it has been important to examine cultural genocide itself using the situations illuminated in two specific exemplar case studies, presented in as accurate historical context as I have been able to achieve, and to demonstrate the roles and activities of educational systems and educators in the perpetration of cultural genocide.

[192] The passing of half a century between the completion of the Meriam Report (1928) and the disestablishment of the Indian boarding school system (1975) is, once again, telling. Over the past few years, the Lakota People's Law Project has argued that the process of the forcible separation of Indian children from their families by the authorities in South Dakota still continues: 'Native American

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Commission was chaired by United States Senator James Abourezk of South Dakota, who testified to Congress in 1978 that:

> Few are knowledgeable about the difficulties American Indians face in a matter of vital concern to them; namely, the welfare of their children and their families. It appears that for decades Indian parents and their children have been at the mercy of arbitrary or abusive action of local, State, Federal, and private agency officials. Unwarranted removal of children from their homes is common in Indian communities. Whereas most non-Indian communities can expect to have children out of their natural homes in foster or adoptive homes at a rate of 1 per every 51 children, Indian communities know that their children will be removed at rates varying from 5 to 25 times higher than that.

To me, the fact that Abourezk could only guess at the rates of removal of Indian children from their families (and even then, he was speaking only of the rates that might prevail in his own State) is troublesome. We have already seen that similar difficulties have been faced in Australia (see footnote 147, above); that is to say, that the Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission (1997) was able to conclude only that '… somewhere between one in three and one in ten Indigenous children were forcibly removed from their families and communities in the period from approximately 1910 until 1970', with that figure being '… undoubtedly much greater in certain regions and in certain periods'. In Canada, where it will be recalled (see above, 'Introduction'), the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada was mandated to inform all Canadians about what had happened in Indian residential schools, there exists an estimate of how many First Nations, Inuit, and Métis children attended Canada's residential schools (over 150,000, or approximately 30 per cent of Aboriginal children) (Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, 2015). However, it will also be recalled that there was an acknowledgement that, due primarily to the incompleteness of the documentary record (which in itself results in large part from the deliberate destruction of

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children were brutalised emotionally, psychologically and spiritually in boarding schools, in some cases to the point of death. The boarding school era policies persist to the present day in a more subtle form, where Native American children are taken from their families and placed in state foster care and adoptive systems' (Lakota People's Law Project, 2016, p. 4). A report authored by the Coalition of Sioux Tribes for Children and Families, and the Lakota People's Law Project (2013) showed that between 1999 and 2009, in South Dakota, whereas Indian children made up approximately 13.5 cent of the child population, 54 per cent of those children who entered foster care in that State were Indian; that the average number of Indian children removed from their homes each year was 742, and that these removals were sometimes made under questionable circumstances; and that once removed, Indian children were placed in non-Indian homes or group care in over 90 per cent of cases. In a comprehensive review, the members of the Coalition for Sioux Tribes and Families concluded that these findings were accurate, and that South Dakota had, for well over a decade, '… systematically violated the spirit and the letter of the Indian Child Welfare Act. The state appears to have done this wilfully, and a flawed system of constraints on Native families and perverse financial incentives has likely led the state to do so in order to bring federal tax dollars into South Dakota' (Lakota People's Law Project, 2013, p. 23).

records; see footnote 150, above), that the number of students who died at those schools is '… not likely ever to be known in full' (p. 99), although 3,201 have been confirmed. Furthermore, we have seen that in Ireland (see footnote 153, above), where 105,000 children were detained in the industrial school system between 1868 and 1969, the reports of the Commission to Inquire into Child Abuse (2009) have indicated that physical and sexual abuse perpetrated on children by school staff was commonplace. It is to be noted that there has, to date, been no federally-mandated truth and reconciliation body south of the Canada-United States border, although The Lakota People's Law Project is, at the time of writing (2016, p. 4), petitioning for the United States Congress to begin such a process:

> We are calling for the US federal government to establish a Truth and Reconciliation Process for the purpose of reporting and formally acknowledging the crimes perpetrated by the US against Native Americans during the Boarding School Era.

In making this call, the Lakota People's Law Project (2016) noted that, '… the Truth and Reconciliation format is an effective methodology used successfully in numerous countries faced with historic injustices that continue to have lingering repercussions. Notable examples include South Africa and Canada' (p. 2), and held that such a commission should serve a three-fold purpose. Specifically (Lakota People's Law Project, 2016, p. 2):

> (i) To expose the true extent of the injustices caused to various Native American tribes due to the federal policy of the Boarding School Era, which subjected numerous individuals to forced assimilation into the dominant Caucasian culture';
> (ii) To determine to what extent those policies continue to contribute to social ills that continue to plague Native American communities, particularly on reservations, where poverty, neglect, unemployment, poor health outcomes, and high dropout rates continue to be an unaddressed problem'; and,
> (iii) To effect a reconciliation between the Native American communities and the federal government, and to give Native American individuals an effective means of redress so a renewal can take place.

What the likelihood of success for this call might be, at the time of writing, can only be guessed at. However, without such a process, it seems that the true extent of the abuse suffered by Indian children in boarding schools the United States (in other words, the first purpose outlined immediately above) can also only be guessed at. However, I would venture to suggest that the evidence that may be pieced together from similar 'educational' systems outside the United States indicates that should the truth (perhaps as established by a truth and reconciliation process) ever emerge, it would not be one that would in any way contradict the existing accounts given by survivors of Indian boarding schools in the Unites States, nor would it, in all likelihood, support a conclusion of these institutions as having provided much in the way of 'mixed blessings'.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUDING POINTS: SOME PRELIMINARY THOUGHTS ON THE POSSIBILITIES FOR UNDERSTANDING, 'RECONCILIATION' AND PREVENTION

As we may infer from some of the material that was presented in Chapter 2 (see Section II, 'Marginalisation', sub-section on 'Victim-Blaming'), a major barrier in any possibility of 'reconciliation' is the fact that, in many cases, those people who have been historically marginalised, or are currently being marginalised, are often held responsible for their own marginalisation. This process of conscious or sometimes less than conscious obfuscation, or again, to borrow a term from Chapter 3, the process of 'ongoing denial and mystification', obstructs from the very outset any meaningful dialogue – because it serves to negate the truth of the dynamics between the dominant and the marginalised peoples, and to the latter, can only be experienced as a continuation of the processes of marginalisation. There can be no possibility of success for a process of reconciliation without the uncovering of the truth; and, whilst at a philosophical level it is possible to say that many of the truths by which we live as human beings are indeed subjective, the truths of lives lived, as experienced by marginalised people, must be allowed to emerge as a starting point in a process of meaningful reconciliation. As the Lakota People's Law Project has stated in its afore-mentioned petitioning of the United States Congress to being a process of truth and reconciliation, 'Formally acknowledging the painful truth will prepare the way for a new era of reconciliation and healing' (Lakota People's Law Project, 2016, p. 4).

Hayner (2010) has defined a truth commission as being (i) focussed on the past, rather than ongoing, events; (ii) an investigation of 'a pattern of events that took place over a period of time'; (iii) a direct and broad engagement with the affected population, gathering information on their experiences; (iv) 'a temporary body, with the aim of concluding with a final report'; and, (v) 'officially authorised or empowered by the state under review'. The most internationally famous Truth and Reconciliation Committee, and the first to use that name, was that established by the first post-apartheid South African government in 1995, whose function was to uncover the *truth* about human rights violations that had occurred during the apartheid period (rather than prosecuting people for past *crimes*, as had been the case in the Nuremberg Trials). It was chaired by Archbishop Desmond Tutu, who had been appointed by the then-South African president, Nelson Mandela. Over 22,000 statements were taken, concerning experiences of torture, killings, disappearances and abductions, and severe ill-treatment. Despite certain challenges and limitations (for example, the top echelons of the military did not co-operate; many felt that the policies and political economy of apartheid did not receive sufficient attention; the post-Mandela government was slow to implement the TRC's recommendations), the TRC was regarded as successful, and its hearings attracted global attention (Tutu, 2016). Since then, over twenty truth and reconciliation committees have been established around the world (Hayner, 2010). As we have seen, the processes of the Truth and Reconciliation of Canada (2015; see also the introduction to this chapter) seem to offer some promising possibilities, regarding addressing the historical forcible assimilation of indigenous peoples. At

the time of writing (2016), these possibilities are also beginning to be explored in Norway, regarding Sami experiences of Norwegianisation. As well as calling for a large-scale research project to elucidate all aspects of the period of the Norwegianisation policy,[193] University of Tromsø professor Jens Ivar Nergård has called for the setting up of a truth and reconciliation process, modelled on that of Canada (Andersen, Idivuoma, & Somby, 2016). Henrik Olsen, a member of the Sami Parliament, has reported that the Sami Parliament and the Norwegian national government are already discussing the need to establish a truth and reconciliation commission that can chart the impact of Norwegianisation that happened in Sami areas, and that the case is to be raised in the autumn of 2016 at the Sami Parliamentary Council. Olsen has opined that there is a need to appoint (Somby, 2016):

> … a Commission that travels out to meet the victims, and gets the silent to speak … it is important to record the stories of the people, and a Commission can help to heal the wounds that many are struggling. (Somby, 2016; ttranslation mine)

Olsen, too, has referred to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, and also that of Greenland[194] (with whom meetings have already been held); additionally, as abuses committed against the Sami people took place in four countries, it will be important to talk about common experiences of the Sami people across modern national divides.

However, from a certain perspective, it is also possible to say that what truth and reconciliation committees and processes can offer is a form of reconciliation *within* the physical and population bounds of the modern nation state in which they are situated. In some situations, this has been largely immaterial; in the truth and

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[193] Nergård reported that (i) talking about the boarding life of many thousands of children (in Finnmark, 35 percent of school students resided in dormitories, including seven year-old Sami children who had to leave their parents in order to be placed with other children of school age and teachers, neither of whom spoke the same language as them) is still taboo; and that (ii) many children were damaged for life. He stated that, 'What is difficult with this situation is that teachers involuntarily got involved in an assault …. It's a situation of abuse, no matter how you twist and turn it' (Andersen, Idivuoma, & Somby, 2016; translation mine).

[194] In the summer of 2014, Greenland established a Reconciliation Commission, with the aim of initiating a process of reconciliation with its long-time colonial ruler Denmark (DIIS, 2015; Jacobsen, 2014). The work of the Commission is linked to the ongoing discussions on the future political status of Greenland; on announcing plans for the establishment of the Reconciliation Commission in August 2013, Greenland's Prime Minister, Aleqa Hammond, had described its purpose as being '… to break away from the colonisation of this country' (Andersen, 2014), and on its establishment in 2014, Hammond stated that, 'Reconciliation is very important on a path where Greenland strives for independence …. For a country that moves toward greater autonomy and independence its people need to know about their own story' (Jacobsen, 2014). As Greenland's Reconciliation Commission may lead to the development of a model that could be drawn upon in other post-colonial societies. The process will be analysed in a global context in a postdoctoral research project undertaken by Dr Astrid Nonbo Andersen, who will also examine the social memories that are revealed by the process of reconciliation (Andersen, 2014; DIIS, 2015). The Reconciliation Commission in Greenland has already begun to map out the consequences of assimilation and colonisation; the Commission members will visit remote villages in order to collect testimonies and document events (Somby, 2016).

reconciliation process in post-apartheid South Africa, for example, the national boundaries and population of South Africa were not of the remotest importance, compared with the issues of dismantling the legal and governmental systems that had ensured that one racial section of the population within those national boundaries had been disadvantaged in every possible way. Nevertheless, for at least some members of one of the two peoples that have been considered in this chapter, sovereign independence has been an at-least intermittent aspiration. As we have seen, during the Wounded Knee occupation of 1973 (see Chapter 3, Section VIII, 'Ongoing Denial and Mystification'), there was a failed attempt to gain recognition for a sovereign Lakota Nation, independent of the United States (see also Crow Dog & Erdoes, 2011). A similar strike for political autonomy, as sovereign status for the Lakota people, has been raised since, when the Lakota Freedom Delegation (led by Russell Means, who was a leader within the American Indian Movement before, famously during, and after the 1973 Wounded Knee Incident) travelled to Washington DC in December 2007 in order to declare the independence of the Republic of Lakotah (an area of 77,200 square miles within the states of North Dakota, Montana, Nebraska, South Dakota and Wyoming; the borders are those established at the 1868 Treaty of Fort Laramie between the United States and representatives of the Arapaho, Arikara, Assiniboine, Cheyenne, Crow, Hidatsa, Mandan and Sioux nations) from the United States (Republic of Lakotah, 2016). To date, however, the independence of the Republic of Lakotah, has not been recognised by any sovereign state, nor any elected tribal government[195] within the United States.

In respect of the other of the two peoples that have been considered in this chapter, to my knowledge, and as far as I have been able to find out, whilst some individuals might have promoted the idea, there has never been a Sami organisation that has had sovereign independence as an avowed and serious political aim.[196] The Sami Parliament has a crucial role in speaking on behalf of the

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[195] Russell Means died in 2012; however, it is almost a certainty that had he lived, he would have been entirely unsurprised and unaffected by a lack of recognition from this particular source. Throughout his life as an activist, author and broadcaster, Means consistently criticised the elected tribal governments that are recognised by the Bureau of Indian Affairs as being federal government 'puppets', or 'stay-by-the-fort Indians' (see, for example, Means, 1996). The Republic of Lakotah does not acknowledge the validity of Bureau of Indian Affairs-recognised elected tribal governments (Republic of Lakotah, 2016).

[196] In attempting to validate my own conclusions here, I am indebted to my colleague Dr Hadi Strømmen Lile (Østfold University College, Norway). Dr Lile also drew my attention to the lampooning of the conspiracy theories of the Norwegian political right by a satirical Sami organisation, who call themselves the 'Sami Liberation Front' (SLF), and describe themselves as '… a fanatical and extremist movement for a free Sami Samiland. Our goal is a separate Sami state, and our vision is world domination' ('Sami Liberation Front', 2016). Such lampooning can easily find fertile ground; although widely ridiculed for expressing the view, five years ago the Chair of the Ethnic and Democratic Equality organisation stated that, via the operation of the Sami Parliament and other Sami cultural and political organisations, the Sami people have a secret plan to take control in Finnmark and parts of Troms and Nordland, and to implement ethnic cleansing against ethnic Norwegians living in those three northernmost counties (Måsør, 2011). Of somewhat more concern are the attacks made on the Sami Parliament made by members of Norway's Progress Party (a neo-liberal right-wing populist party, and the third largest at the 2013 Norwegian general election of 2013, winning 16.3 per cent of the votes, 29

(continued)

unified interests of the Sami people in Norway; however, we have also seen (see this chapter above, Section II, 'Case Study I: "Norwegianisation" and the Sami people', especially footnote 172) that the Sami Parliament has relatively limited powers, and the question arises as to what extent the Sami parliament can continue to develop the range of its responsibilities. To an extent, existing arrangements regarding Sami self-governance perpetuates the division of the traditional Sami homelands, or *Sápmi*, between four (former colonising) nation states. For those who would favour solutions of sovereign independence for indigenous peoples, keeping the 'settlements' made regarding the historical (and current) marginalisation of indigenous peoples within the remit of nation states established by the former colonising powers, even if limited forms of representations within the political life of that colonising power are permitted, obviates the fact that life, land, culture, and traditional forms of self-governance have been taken away from indigenous peoples by processes of physical and cultural genocide. According to the perspectives of certain authors who have commented on the situation of the American Indian (see Churchill, 2003a, 2003b; Means, 1996), such apparent settlements only serve to cement the processes of colonisation and assimilation, and to conceal the genocidal activities that underpin them. Perhaps a larger number of people, though, see the possibilities that exist for processes of truth and reconciliation.

At the time of writing (June, 2016), it will be interesting to see whether, in fact, the processes outlined in the Truth and Reconciliation Committee of Canada's (2015) can succeed – however that success is measured. So too will it be interesting to see how the truth and reconciliation process in Greenland, which is, as was previously acknowledged, at an earlier stage than Canada's, continues to develop. And of course, it will be interesting to see how the Sami Parliament's intention to lobby for and support a truth and reconciliation process in Norway is ultimately received. For those who favour solutions of sovereign independence, truth and reconciliation processes based within the remit of nation states established by the former colonising powers, may seem to offer, and can by definition only offer, too little, too late. It also, perhaps, pertinent to ask whether what it is that can be done now can be, or could ever be, enough.

This chapter has demonstrated the past culpability of educators and education systems in the perpetration of cultural genocide against indigenous peoples. It will be recalled (from footnote 194) that whilst Jens Ivar Nergård (in Andersen, Idivuoma, & Somby, 2016) has characterised individual educators' actions as an 'involuntary' involvement in an 'assault', he characterised the overall policy of

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out of 169 seats in the Norwegian national parliament, and a position in government in coalition with the Conservative party). In April 2016, at the party's National Convention, Arthur Tørfoss decried the fact that the national Norwegian parliament gives 430 million Norwegian kroner per annum to the Sami Parliament, which the Sami Parliament politicians (curiously enough, of which he is one of his party's two, but I take it that he exempted himself from this generalisation) '… use in a rights struggle against the State'. Tørfoss asserted that, '… the Progress Party is not against the Sami, or Sami language, culture and history. What we oppose is the Sami Parliament power in Northern Norway' – and did so, apparently, to enthusiastic applause (see Wahlgren, 2016; translation mine).

Norwegianisation as '… a situation of abuse, no matter how you twist and turn it' (translations mine). It will be recalled that Niemi (1997) characterised those actions somewhat differently (see this chapter above, Section II, 'Case Study I: "Norwegianisation and the Sami people'): '… school as the battlefield, and teachers as frontline soldiers' (p. 268). I raise this not to invoke the spectre of collective guilt, but only to suggest – for 'systems' are, of course, made up of individual people – that in outlining some possibilities for how things may be done differently in the future, (the subject matter of the following chapter), that individual responsibility not be obviated. Over the course of this chapter, sufficient evidence has surely been provided to support the conclusion that the cultural genocide that has been levelled at marginalised peoples would not have been possible without the compliance, and indeed active involvement, of education systems and individual educators. Having been part of the 'problem', so to speak, it remains to be seen if, and how, they could be part of potential (re)'solutions'.

CHAPTER 5

WHAT CAN BE DONE? SOME IDEAS REGARDING THE HUMANISATION OF PSYCHOLOGICAL AND EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE

Me. We.

(Two-word poem, and according to many commentators, the shortest to be recognised as such in the English language, delivered by the late Muhammad Ali in his speech to a graduating class at Harvard in 1975. Ali gestured to himself when speaking the first word, and to his audience when speaking the second.)

I. SOME STARTING PROBLEMS

In Chapter 2 (Section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression'), we reviewed certain theoretical accounts that advanced the idea that the drive towards aggression and aggressive behaviour was deeply (and some argued, physically) embedded within the human system, i.e. aggression as part of our evolutionary make-up, and therefore 'hard-wired' into our nervous systems (physiological approaches to aggression, including neuropsychology), or as an indelible part of our unconscious psyches (psychodynamic accounts). The other psychological understandings of aggression that were reviewed in that section – the role of learning and social learning, personality theories, and the models that emphasised social interactions – have contributed to our understandings of why certain individuals, or individuals in certain situations, are more likely to behave aggressively. Suffice it to say, we have seen that psychologists of all stripes generally understand that aggression is somehow 'part of us' as human beings; its influence is, therefore, inescapable. Lorenz (1953, 1966**)** saw the aggressive instinct in non-human species as being evolutionarily adaptive, as it ensures their continued survival; and that in intra-species aggressive behaviour (with a very few exceptions), non-human species have successfully developed means by which this aggressive instinct may be expressed in a non-lethal way. However, Lorenz (1953) argued that in human beings, our evolution of consciousness, and in particular, the fact that the pace of our development of technological ingenuity has outstripped that of our development of moral inhibitions against fighting, has enabled us to ensure our own and other species' destruction through our development of monstrous weapons, and hence can be considered almost a perversion of the

evolutionary adaptive instinct of aggression. Freud (1920, 1923, 1940), on the other hand, saw the conscious aspects of the psyche as (at least potentially) being in constructive opposition to our unconscious impulses (which include the drives towards aggression). Hence, two of the historical giants of psychology, although agreed upon the fact of the deep embedding and profound influence of aggressive impulses in the human system, had directly opposite stances on the question of how the conscious aspects of our psychic life relate to these aggressive drives. This is no trivial philosophical difference; it poses the question as to whether our conscious development may damn us entirely (Lorenz), or is already responsible for securing the possibility of the civilised aspects of our individual and societal conduct (Freud).

Later on in Chapter 2 (Section II, 'Marginalisation'), we reviewed the position of the setting up (in our understanding of social relationships) of the 'One' and the 'Other', which de Beauvoir (1949) argued was fundamental in human beings. In Chapter 1, we had already seen that this type of positioning is evident in situations of school bullying; in Chapter 3, it was argued that such positioning was evident in the initial stages of physical genocidal thinking and activity (see Section I, 'In-Grouping/Out-Grouping'); and, in Chapter 4, we have seen how it has been manifested in the 'thinking' (if that is the correct term) behind the implementation of, and the attempts to 'justify' or disavow, actions of cultural genocide. Hence, the drive towards aggression, and our tendency to perceive social relationships in terms of dualistic opposition ('One' and 'Other', or 'us' and 'them'), both seem to be deeply and irrevocably embedded in human thinking. It is, or at least it should be, of little surprise that these tendencies would be behaviourally manifested across the continuum of aggressive marginalisation, whose existence I posited in Chapter 2 (see Section II, 'Marginalisation'), and attempted to exemplify in Chapters 1, 3 and 4. In such exemplification, I believe that I have shown that the ways in which we human beings have often conducted, and continue to conduct, ourselves in relation to our fellow human beings have fallen well below what we may reasonably consider to be 'humanitarian' standards – that is, those appropriate for conscious, decision-making, socially-aware and entities, capable of moral thought and action. If I have achieved nothing else so far in this book, I would hope that I have at least demonstrated that. I will argue in this chapter that in order for us to avoid the aggressive marginalisation that has so often characterised our interactions with one another in the past, and which continues to be perpetuated in many situations in the present, we human beings will need to make *active choices* in actualising our humanity in our perceptions and experience of, and interactions with others. Regardless of whether one finds the Lorenzian pessimism or Freudian optimism regarding human consciousness in its relationship to the aggressive drives more convincing, one thing perhaps stands in our favour here – we *do have* conscious minds, and therefore we have at least the *potential* to make choices. Speaking personally, I cling to the beleaguered hope that we can choose to do things differently in future.

This book was informed by two disciplines; psychology and education. Over the course of this chapter, I propose to take a final critical look at these disciplines, in a

consideration of whether the specific understandings that they have produced regarding marginalisation and aggression have been helpful in addressing these issues, or whether they may have, in some senses, contributed to the persistence of these issues. In this way, having spent the past four chapters illustrating humankind's capacities for and culpabilities of inhuman behaviour, I hope to be able to respond to this chapter's titular question, 'What can be done?' with at least 'some thoughts', which I would earnestly hope to be helpful. We shall begin with psychology.

II. SOME THOUGHTS ON HUMANISING PSYCHOLOGY AND PSYCHOLOGICAL PRACTICE

Mainstream Psychology and its Primary Focus on Behaviour

In Chapter 2 (see section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression'; sub-section on 'The Role of Learning in Accounting for Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour'), I introduced the reader to the psychological approach that is known as behaviourism, which was developed over the first half of the twentieth century. Behaviourism was, as it was acknowledged in that sub-section, grounded in the attempt to base psychology upon strictly scientific principles, and the scientific model that it adopted was significantly influenced by, and to an extent deliberately positioned within, the philosophical tradition of the British[197] empiricists John Locke (1632–1704), and David Hume (1711–1776). These philosophers were interested in the nature and limits of human knowledge; Hume, in particular, wished to introduce the method of reasoning that Newton had used in the physical sciences into the area of moral subjects. In his *An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding* (1777), Hume famously argued (citation in Minton, 2012a, p. 4):

> If we take into our hand any volume – of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance – let us ask, 'Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number?' No. 'Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence?' No. Consign it then to the flames – for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.

Hume's general purpose, expressed in a nutshell in the quote above, was to establish the limits of what we can be said to know; however, this well-known quote has also been interpreted by many as a caution against metaphysical enquiry (Gaarder, 1991), and so for some it seemed to delimit what should be considered to be the 'proper' subject matter of philosophy. It is this latter interpretation which

[197] As I have noted elsewhere (Minton, 2012a), in the term 'British empiricists', the term 'British' is used in a geographical sense, and refers to the 'British Isles' origin of its original proponents: the Englishman, Locke; the Scotsman, Hume; and the Irishman, George Berkeley (1685–1753). Berkeley, although in many ways the most consistent of the three in his anti-materialism, and admired greatly by Hume (see Bracken, 1999), does not seem to me to have been as influential on the development of behaviourism as were Locke and Hume.

became most influential in the development of behaviourism. Following on from the late-nineteenth, and turn of the twentieth century experimental psychology that had historically preceded them (in which the likes of Gustav Fechner (1801–1887), Wilhelm Wundt (1832–1920) and William James (1842–1910) systematically investigated the human sensory, perceptual and memory systems in the laboratory (see Boring, 1950)), the behaviourists held firm to the idea that psychologists should confine themselves to the study of that which was directly observable. This restriction is, perhaps, understandable; as I have said elsewhere, not all of what passed for 'psychology' at that time adhered to the strict experimentalism of Fechner, Wundt and James: clairvoyance, fortune-telling, mesmerism, phrenology and spiritualism had all achieved varying levels of respectability even amongst academic audiences (see Szasz, 1978). Furthermore, whilst its findings were always proposed as scientifically accrued discoveries about the human psyche by its founder, Sigmund Freud (see, for example, Freud, 1914, 1940), the methods of enquiry employed in psychoanalysis, which historically speaking, had developed alongside behaviourism (seeChapter 2, Section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression'; sub-section on 'Psychodynamic Accounts of Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour'), seemed far removed from the experimental ideal advanced by the early experimental psychologists and behaviourists. Generally speaking, behaviourists preferred to work from the recording of simple processes of learning (hence, those with observable behavioural outcomes) in non-human species. If it were possible to talk about human psychology at all, then this should be based on either similar observations in the human species or be made via a process of generalisations to human learning from the patterns of learning observed in animal experimental subjects in the laboratory. Thus, behaviourists established (at least, for themselves) that learning – as a pattern of changes in observable behaviour – should be the proper subject matter of psychology; and, as philosophical materialists, that learning would be represented in terms of physiological changes, located somewhere within the organism's biological system.[198]

From the 1950s, various challenges to the assumptions and findings of behaviourism (see Eysenck & Keane, 2010, for a review) meant that radical behaviourism of the kind outlined above would become less dominant as a

[198] Behaviourism is often seen as having its beginnings in the demonstration of the 'conditioned reflex' by Ivan Petrovich Pavlov (1849–1936), who showed that in dogs, the pre-existing glandular response of salivation to the stimulus of food could also be elicited by another stimulus (usually cited as being the sound of a bell), if the dogs had learnt to associate the two stimuli. This is known as classical conditioning, which has formed the basis for behaviourist accounts of learning, including the acquisition of phobias, antecedent control strategies, and behaviour modification (Olson & Hergenhahn, 2009). In 1904, on his fourth successive nomination, Pavlov won the Nobel Prize for Physiology or Medicine for his work on the digestive system of the dog; and despite his recognition by some as a psychologist (e.g. Haggbloom et al., 2002), he was, of course, a physiologist by training and by practice. Although they were sometimes vague regarding precise locations and mechanisms, the idea that learning was physically represented in the endocrine, muscular, and especially in the nervous system, was a pervasive one for behaviourists. Most psychologists since have likewise approached the mind (properly speaking, a metaphysical entity) and the brain (or higher nervous system, a physical structure) as interchangeable.

theoretical force over the next three decades than would be a newer school of thought – cognitive psychology. As I have stated elsewhere (Minton, 2012a), cognitive psychology 'inherited' the scientific emphases of behaviourism, but unlike radical behaviourism, did not deny the existence of mental structures (see Skinner, 1972), but rather focussed directly upon the study of them. This had the effect of massively increasing the subject matter that was perceived as 'fit' for scientific enquiry in psychology, as the way in which human beings could be said to 'process information' – perception, attention, memory, planning, reasoning, problem solving, knowledge representation and thought – all became 'fair game'. However, the emphasis placed by the behaviourists on the primacy of behaviour, and especially learned behaviour, as the solely legitimate, outward, genuine and objective manifestation of human psychological functioning, has continued to persuade, and to influence how we think about, and particularly how we practice psychology, long after the demise of behaviourism in its radical form as a major influence in theoretical psychology.

Over the last three decades, the importance of *physicalism* in theoretical and clinical psychology has become increasingly emphasised; from the late 1980s, brain-imaging techniques became both more sophisticated (with the development of magnetic resonance imagery (MRI)), and significantly more affordable. The opportunity to apply these techniques within psychological research, and thereby trace how the *in vivo* human brain physically functions and responds, has been enthusiastically seized upon. The field that combines experimental cognitive psychology with brain imaging, together with input from the fields of molecular biology and pharmacology, is known as *cognitive neuroscience*. Prior to the possibilities offered by modern brain-imaging techniques, the field of *neuropsychology* had had its evidence basis in post-mortem studies of human brains, observations of behaviour that followed brain injury in human beings, and in generalising from experimental studies of the causing of selective brain damage in non-human species (see Banich, 1997). With the greater affordability of microcomputers in the IT revolution of the late 1970s and 1980s, an approach known as *cognitive science* had developed, in which the 'modelling' of human psychological functions in artificial intelligence systems was undertaken as a method of research (e.g., Johnson-Laird, 1980). However, as I have noted elsewhere (Minton, 2012a), it is of course possible for the comparability between human and computer intelligence systems to be over-stated. In other words, just because such artificial modelling *could* be undertaken, this did not mean that this was necessarily how a given function *actually* operated in the human system – only that it was a theoretical possibility. Cognitive neuroscience brings together the psychological, biomedical and information technology sciences, and for many, is a powerful explanatory medium. However, it is equally important to remember that the discernment of the physical representation of a psychological function does not automatically support an assumption of biological causality, and this fact can often

be obscured in our tendencies, and apparent enthusiasm, to embrace somatogenic explanations.[199]

Of course, nowhere else in the world of applied psychology is the physical representation of behavioural differences more heavily emphasised than it is in the practice of *psychiatry*, in which certain categories of psychological and behavioural differences are treated as clusters of 'symptoms' of diagnosable 'mental diseases', which are to be treated by medical interventions. Generally, psychiatry can also be said to embrace, at least at a conceptual level, explanations of somatogenic causality far more readily than it does psychogenic explanations; although having said that, one of the major criticisms of psychiatry has been that even when the supposed 'cause' of a 'symptom' is unclear, or is outright unknown, the primary means of intervention (or 'treatment') that is offered is inevitably medical/physical (see Laing, 1967; Szasz, 1961) in nature, which would also seem to demonstrate a certain conceptualisation, or perhaps theory-practice, inconsistency.[200] With

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[199] It is very common for anatomical and physiological differences in the brain to be assumed to be the *cause* of behavioural differences – i.e, the assumption is made that the physical differences (from whatever is considered the 'norm') that are observed are *in themselves* evidence of a *physical* (or sometimes, *hereditary*) *predisposition* or *cause* of an individual *behaving* in a certain way (that differs from whatever is considered the 'norm'). However, anatomical and physiological differences in the brain can also be the result of *psychogenesis*. To give an example, in *The Making of Memory: From Molecules to Mind*, neuropsychologist Steven Rose (2003) documented the results of a series of experiments on simple patterns of learning (specifically, chickens learning to differentiate pecking at different coloured beads, through classical conditioning, based on the pre-existing aversive taste of quinine, which was then associated with certain colours). Post-mortem, the physical representation of this learning was found to be discernible in chemical and structural changes in the brains of the chickens. The point I am trying to make here is that learning, and our experience of the world, also shapes the anatomy and physiology of our nervous systems. In other words, at least some physical differences have psychogenic origins. To be able to discern the physical representation of a psychological function does not mean that one has found its 'cause'; it may be only be that a physical pattern of a psychological experience (or 'effect') has been observed. Having made that point, if the interested reader wishes to follow this up, and in doing so step away from the chickens and back towards human experience, then she or he is referred to Sue Gerhardt's fascinating *Why Love Matters: How Affection Shapes a Baby's Brain* (2014), in which the author demonstrates the importance of early attachment relationships in both brain development in the early years, and longer-term emotional and physical health.

[200] Laing (1967) provided an interesting, and characteristically damningly critical, description of the development of electroconvulsive therapy. The procedure was first developed in the 1930s, and based on observations that epilepsy and schizophrenia were rarely observed in the same individuals, and therefore, it was reasoned, the induction of a brain seizure could have a curative effect on psychotic patients. (The facts that (i) correlation does not imply causality; and, (ii) many primary school children could illustrate, perhaps via a newly acquired familiarity with Venn diagrams, that the overlap between two comparatively rare conditions in the human population is likely to be very small indeed, do not appear to have occurred.) From the 1940s onwards, ECT was widely used in the treatment of individuals diagnosed as having schizophrenia; these days, it is usually used with those diagnosed as having depression. In a recent substantive review, psychiatrists Abbott, Gallegos, Rediske, Lemke and Quinn (2014) asserted that, '… electroconvulsive therapy (ECT) is the most effective treatment for a depressive episode'; however, it should be borne in mind, that they concluded that same sentence with the acknowledgement that, '… the mechanism of action [of ECT] and neural correlates of response are poorly understood'. In other words, ECT was developed, via spurious logic, for the treatment of a different clinical population than which it is now used; and, after eight decades of use, the means by which it apparently 'works' is still not known. Due to concerns about its physical side-effects, the use of

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many psychiatric interventions (e.g., psychopharmacology, psychosurgery, electroconvulsive therapy) leading to 'side-effects', some of which are irreversible, questions continue to be asked regarding whether psychiatric service users are genuinely suffering from a *bona fide* physical 'illness', or are, as Szasz (1961) commented over half a century ago, rather experiencing 'problems of living'. If the latter is true, then we must surely ask ourselves about what rights we have assumed, as a society, in enlisting our health professionals to detain people involuntarily under the law, and to administer physical treatments to those so detained without their consent? Such 'treatments', Szasz (1961) argued are, properly considered, tortures, and are likely to be experienced as such. Smilarly, we might ask ourselves, what rights have we assumed, as a society, in enabling our health professionals to medicalise (i.e., to 'diagnose' and 'treat') patterns of diversity that may be problematised or otherwise on the basis of the specific paradigms of morality and normality that prevail in a given society at a given time (and are, therefore, subject to change)?[201] Despite the critique of psychiatry that exploded in the 1960s (see the afore-cited works of Goffman, 1961; Laing, 1960, 1961, 1967; Laing & Esterson, 1964; and Szasz, 1961), and the continued existence and voicing of such critical positions, these questions remain just as relevant – and just as unanswered – to this day. Nevertheless, such is the dominance of the medical model in our approach to the provision of educational, health and social services, that in order for individuals and their families and carers to access additional support in these areas, an initial assessment, or 'diagnosis', is often a pre-requisite. This has impacts on service users themselves, and also their support networks (Vane & Minton, 2013).

ECT has been increasingly restricted over recent years in the United Kingdom, with the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE; a government body designed to standardise treatment in England and Wales) stating in 2003 that: '… NICE has looked carefully at the evidence and has recommended that ECT should only be used for the treatment of severe depressive illness, a prolonged or severe episode of mania, or catatonia', and that '… ECT should be used to gain fast and short-term improvement of severe symptoms after all other treatment options have failed, or when the situation is thought to be life-threatening'.

[201] Homosexuality was categorised as a 'mental disease' or 'abnormality' in the first version of the American Psychiatric Association's 'Diagnostic and Statistical Manual' (1952), known as the DSM. The DSM has had various incarnations since its first edition (most recently DSM-5 in 2013), in which various categories of 'disease' or 'abnormality' have been added or removed, according (supposedly) to advancements in knowledge in psychiatry and psychology. Homosexuality was removed from the APA's listings in the DSM as a mental disease in 1973. However, a new category called 'ego-dystonic sexual orientation' (when an individual wished to change her or his sexual orientation or gender identity) was included, although this was removed in 1987. Hence, officially, if one wasn't heterosexual between 1952 and 1973, then one had a mental disorder; if one wasn't heterosexual, and was unhappy with that fact, between 1973 amd 1987, then one had a mental disorder; and since 1987, non-heterosexual sexual orientation has no longer been seen as a mental disorder. I will allow the reader to make up her or his own mind as to whether this peculiar timeline is best explicable in terms of the medical profession's accrual of greater insight into mental disorders through ongoing research, or in terms of liberalising changes in prevailing societal attitudes towards varieties of sexual orientation.

Why is the Primary Focus on Behaviour so Persuasive?

A question that Dr Julie Vane and I posed in a conference paper of 2013, in our consideration of diagnostic systems and people with autism spectrum conditions, was, 'What else might we need?' (see Vane & Minton, 2013). Here, we invited our audience to think about what may be being missed when professionals focus exclusively on (assumed) individual behaviour, in a psychiatric diagnostic system informed primarily by medical and cognitive-behaviourist psychological understandings. One thing that JulieVane and I attempted to communicate in that paper was to highlight the fact that diagnostic systems, including the at-the-time new DSM-5, appear to neglect of the *totality of experience* of people with autistic spectrum conditions. If one bases one's understanding of human psychology, as the behaviourists did, on extrapolations from the observable behaviour of animals tested in the laboratory, then it is almost inevitable that what will emerge is a set of over-individualised, 'disembodied' psychological understandings, in which environmental, social, economic, socio-political, and temporal/historical contexts are either ignored entirely, or are seen merely as the arenas in which individuals 'perform' behaviour (behaviourism), or from which they extract certain fragments of information to process (cognitive psychology). The totality of experience[202] is missed if one continues to take a reductionist stance in giving decontextualised individual behaviour absolute primacy in understanding human psychology. As Julie Vane and I argued (2013):

> There is far more to human experience than the apparently 'scientific' study of observable, de-contextualised behaviours, and the exclusive focus on check-listed behaviours leads us into serious problems, ethically and conceptually. People with ASCs [autistic spectrum conditions] are more than what we see and can describe of their behaviour … [and, in terms of embodied subjectivity] we are more than what we do.

Nevertheless, there is still a pervasive idea, in my mind if not rooted in, then at least strongly influenced by, the persistence of behaviourist understandings in psychology, that in order to be 'objective', and 'professional' (or at a theoretical level, maybe to be scientifically 'respectable' – to avoid 'metaphysical conjuring', and thus avoid Humeian charges of 'sophistry and illusion'?), we need to focus on behaviour.[203] However, almost half a century ago, R. D. Laing (1967, p. 53)[204] spelled out what he felt were the results of this dehumanised stance:

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[202] As R. D. Laing (see footnotes 201, above, and 205, below) put it in 1967 (pp. 16–17): 'I do not experience your experience. But I experience you as experiencing. I experience myself as experienced by you. And I experience you as experiencing yourself as experienced by me. And so on …. Social phenomenology is the science of my own and others' experience. It is concerned with the relationship between my experience of you and your experience of me. That is, with inter-experience …. Since your and their experience is as invisible to me as mine is to you and them, I seek to make evident to the others, through their experience of my behaviour, what I infer of your experience, through my experience of your behaviour. This is the crux of social phenomenology.'

[203] The continued 'temptation' apparently experienced by psychologists of taking up Hume's project of applying the methods of physical sciences in the understanding of moral problems was also noted over *(continued)*

> The theoretical and descriptive idiom of much research in social science adopts a stance of apparent 'objective' neutrality. … Human beings relate to each other not simply externally, like two billiard balls, but by the relations of two worlds of experience that come into play when two people meet. If human beings are not studied as human beings, then this once more is violence and mystification.

So why are individualised, behaviourally-focussed accounts of human psychology, rooted in a particular school of thought long since side-lined in its radical form, apparently so persuasive and still influential? Whilst one can only speculate regarding the possible historical genesis and maintenance of such a global idea, such understandings would seem to be almost inevitable consequences of the similarly individualised theologies, philosophies, cultures and economic systems that are prevalent in the Western societies that produced that discipline. To begin with theology, the God of the Abrahamic faiths is singular; indeed, the first commandment given to the Israelites emphasises that doctrine of monotheism (Exodus, 20: 1–3, King James Version):

> And God spake all these words, saying, I am the LORD thy God, which have brought thee out of the land of Egypt, out of the house of bondage. Thou shalt have no other gods before me.

In the Christian tradition, which continues to form the bases of the legal systems of, and the types of ethical thinking prevalent within Western societies, the torture and death of Jesus of Nazareth is seen as *the* supreme *individual* sacrifice (1 Peter 2: 21–25, King James Version):

> For even hereunto were ye called: because Christ also suffered for us, leaving us an example, that ye should follow his steps: Who did no sin, neither was guile found in his mouth: Who, when he was reviled, reviled not again; when he suffered, he threatened not; but committed *himself* to him that judgeth righteously: Who his own self bare our sins in his own body on the tree, that we, being dead to sins, should live unto righteousness: by whose stripes ye

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half a century ago, by the Austrian philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein: '*Das Bestehen der experimentellen Methode läßt uns glauben, wir hätten das Mittel, die Probleme, die uns beunruhigen, loszuwerden; obgleich Problem und Methode windschief aneinander vorbei laufen*' [The existence of the experimental method makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by] (1953, p. 232).

[204] R. D. Laing (1927–1989) was a Glaswegian psychiatrist and author, whose practice and writing was influenced by existential philosophy, and whose own work has been massively influential in the development of existential psychotherapy, and as a profound critique of conventional psychiatry and psychology. As a significant figure in the 1960s counter-culture, his fame and influence spread well beyond the fields of psychiatry and psychology; he became known as a member of the 'anti-psychiatry' movement, although he rejected that label. I will own that such is my admiration of Laing's (early) work, which I read at a very formative age, that I find it almost impossible to be objective regarding him; the biography written by Laing's son, contract lawyer Adrian C. Laing, is an excellent introduction to R. D. Laing's writing and practice work, effectively linking these to his often turbulent personal life (see Laing, 1994).

were healed. For ye were as sheep going astray; but are now returned unto the Shepherd and Bishop of your souls.

In itself, the story of Christ's sacrifice is a potent version of the hero myth,[205] which had earlier found expression in the Greek stories of Heracles, Jason, Theseus, Oedipus, Hector, Odysseus, and numerous others. As we have already seen, in times rather closer to our own, the emphasis placed on *individual* conquest and achievement also took form in the construction of the myth of 'Manifest Destiny' (see Chapter 3, Section II, 'Construction Of An Aspirational National *Weltanschauung* that Excludes the "Other"'), or the conquest of North America by Europeans – all in the name, of course, of God and the nation. Previously, in South America, such European greed for the wealth derived via the conquest of Indian lands, and the physical genocide of those who originally walked upon them – again, acts perpetrated in the name of God, King and country – were directly theologically supported (see Stannard, 1992; also, Chapter 3, Section V, 'Deindividuation of the "One"'). The *Inter caetera* papal bull issued by Pope Alexander VI in 1493 granted all lands one hundred leagues west and south of the Azores and Cape Verde islands (thus protecting Portugal's existing claims) to the Spanish crowns of Castile and Aragon, and exhorted the Spanish monarchs to spread the Roman Catholic faith west of that line. This was interpreted by the Spanish monarchs and *conquistadors* as giving Spain full political sovereignty over those lands[206] (in today's terms, the entire South American continent, excepting the far eastern tip of Brazil). The result, as we have already seen (Chapter 3), was the enslavement, torture, dispossession and widespread slaughter of native populations, with a reduction in their population of somewhere between 90 and 99 per cent over the four centuries that followed Columbus' arrival in the New World (Stannard, 1992).[207] In the twentieth century, such dreams of the self-reliant, ever-resourceful

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[205] Here, the interested reader is referred to Otto Rank (1884–1939), who wrote a fascinating psychoanalytical account of *The Myth of the Birth of the Hero* in 1914, in which he examined cross-cultural similarities in myths, folklore and legends, regarding birth narratives – including those of Moses, Oedipus, Perseus, Romulus, Hercules, and Jesus of Nazareth. According to Rank, a 'standard saga' emerges: the hero is the child of distinguished parents; his origin is preceded by difficulties, such as continence, or prolonged barrenness; during or before the pregnancy, there is a prophecy, in the form of a dream or oracle; he is surrendered to the water, in a box; he is then saved by animals, or lowly people, and is suckled by a female animal or humble woman; he grows up, and finds his distinguished parents; he either takes his revenge on his father, or is acknowledged; and, finally, he achieves rank and honours (see Rank, 2015).

[206] However, *Sublimus Deus*, the Papal bull issued by Pope Paul III in 1537, which declared the indigenous peoples of the Americas to be rational beings with souls, and therefore condemned and forbade their enslavement, was usually ignored by the *conquistadors* and colonists. Although anti-slavery eventually became the official position of Charles V of Spain, he opposed the excommunication of Christians who enslaved indigenous people (Maxwell, 1975).

[207] Although it recognises that it does not have governing control over the Vatican, on January 14th 2016, the UN Council Committee on the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD) called upon the Holy See to engage in meaningful dialogue with designated representatives of indigenous peoples of the Americas in order to address their concerns regarding the *Inter caetera* and related papal bulls (which are together referred to as the 'Doctrine of Discovery') (Romero Institute, 2016). The UN's CERD condemned the role of missionaries and Church leaders in *(continued)*

hero, escaping his own restrictive past and striding bravely forth to at first battle with, then make his own way in, and finally leave his own indelible stamp on the world, has been ever-available in whatever version of the 'American Dream' is current at the time.

The myths, religions and cultural values that have emerged from such understandings have also prompted us to think in *dualistic* terms, and *extremes in polarity*. The creation myth appropriated by the Abrahamic faiths posit these as having been caused by God at the very beginning (Genesis 1: 1–5, King James Version):

> In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth. And the earth was without form, and void; and darkness was upon the face of the deep. And the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. And God said, Let there be light: and there was light. And God saw the light, that it was good: and God divided the light from the darkness. And God called the light Day, and the darkness he called Night. And the evening and the morning were the first day.

Even the left and right hand sides of the human body – in reality, a function of our evolution of bilateral symmetry, which dates back to life forms that had yet to emerge from the oceans[208] (Miller & Harley, 2009) – have taken on, as manifested in our superstitions, rituals and beliefs, different and opposite moral senses.[209] As well as the polarities of good and evil, sin and righteousness,

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authorising and encouraging enslavement, forced conversion and genocide; asserted that the damage caused by the Doctrine was not restricted to antiquity; and, stated that the Papal decree, '… continues to deeply and directly influence politics and policies, land rights, external identity determination, and judicial processes and decisions therein, regarding Indigenous Peoples' (Romero Institute, 2016). At the time of writing (June, 2016), as far as I have been able to establish, no response to the UN's CERD call has been issued by the Holy See.

[208] There are ancient and modern animal species that did not, and do not, have a bilateral body plan. Adult echinoderms, who are members of an exclusively marine phylum (*echinodermata*) that includes 7,000 species (such as genera of sea cucumbers, sea urchins, and starfish), generally have five-point radial symmetry. Member species of the super-phylum *chordata* (65,000 species), to which we human beings belong (as do all other vertebrates), have bilateral symmetry (Miller & Harley, 2009).

[209] In Latin, the left and right hand sides are referred to as *sinister* and *dexter*, although these terms are rarely used outside of heraldry, where they refer to the right and left hand sides of the coat of arms as we see it respectively (i.e., the sides of the shield that physically protected the left and right hand sides of its bearer, respectively). Note also the antonymic senses of the adjectival forms of these Latin derivatives ('sinister' and 'dexterous') in everyday English. The practice of throwing salt over the left shoulder (where the Devil supposedly 'sits') in order to put off the 'bad luck' apparently due to one who has spilt salt, is just one form of superstitious ritual that some people will instinctively undertake, if they have learnt this precaution (as I did) in early childhood. Notice also that, regardless of handedness preference, in most Western societies under Christian influence, it is considered polite or proper to shake hands with the right hand only. This is true of Islamic societies, too: in traditional Islam, the right hand is seen as more noble and honoured, and everything that is done with the right hand (including shaking hands, putting on clothes and shoes, entering the mosque, saying *salaam* at the end of prayer, touching the Black Stone, etc.) reflects that view. Actions of the opposite type (e.g. blowing one's nose, cleaning oneself after using the toilet, exiting the mosque, taking off clothes and shoes) are all performed with the left hand.

Christ and anti-Christ, God and Satan, we also learn estrangement from others, as we learn to separate self from non-self (or, as we have seen, the 'One' from the 'Other'). In the writings of C.G. Jung (whose knowledge of comparative religions massively outranked my own rather rudimentary speculations), this dualism also appeared in the archetypes of Self and Shadow (see Chapter 2, Section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression', sub-section on 'Psychodynamic Accounts of Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour'). Taken together, these cultural tendencies towards the valuing of *individualism* and the perception of *oppositional dualism* mean that for every concept we Westerners formulate – e.g., 'light', 'good' and 'One' – we almost unthinkingly, and apparently simultaneously, formulate its antonymic concept – e.g., 'dark', 'evil' and 'Other'. We have our individual 'heroes' – hence, individual 'villains' inevitably emerge. Thus, we learn to recognise our fellow human beings in another land not as that, but as 'foreigners', or perhaps as 'enemies'; as we have already seen (see Chapter 3, Section II, 'Construction of an Aspirational National *Weltanschauung* that Excludes the "Other"'), our egocentric and ethnocentric (see Santrock, 1996) assumption is that no matter what the culture of a 'foreigner' might be, it is inferior to our own, and that she or he *really* wants to, or *should* really want to, belong to our own culture, instead. Should we have designs on the land which she or he inhabits, if she or he shows resistance to this assumption, then she or he is to be forcibly assimilated or destroyed (see Chapters 3 and 4; also, Minton, 2012c, Semelin, 2009). Such 'reasoning' is also observed in our childhood patterns of excluding, or perhaps 'bringing into line' our same- or near-age peers who, for whatever reason, do not fit in with our expectations (see Chapter 1).

In various education, health and social care settings, it has sometimes proved all too easy for some staff members to come to view that service as existing to provide them with their wages or salaries, occupational and financial security, and promotion prospects and social position. The service-users for whom that service has actually been established may become seen as an 'enemy' that is to be subdued or overcome, and family members of those service-users may become seen as 'interfering', at best. Any 'problems' (whatever those might be) are thus located within the individual service user, and this is apparently confirmed for those who have so located it in all future interactions with that individual. Subsequently, what is expected from those individuals who have been identified as having 'problems' is that they accept, without protest, but with gratitude, their socialisation into the 'good patient' role (see Goffman, 1961; also in Chapter 2, Section II, 'Marginalisation'; sub-section on 'Marginalisation and Power Relationships'). In other words, it is the assumed 'pathological individual' as the intended passive recipient of psychological services that has formed the basis for many psychiatric and psychological understandings, 'interventions' and 'treatments'. Small wonder, then, that it has been easy for some service-providing staff to see service users as part of the 'them', and not part of the 'us'; small wonder, too, that abuses against the 'them' by staff members, as we saw in the case of the Winterborne View

hospital (see Chapter 1, Section III, 'The Bullying of "Minority" Groups: Attending to Prejudice and Marginalisation'; see also Flynn, 2012) are, unfortunately, likely to be a far from infrequent occurrence.

Other Possibilities: Ecological Thinking, Humanistic Psychology, Systemic Approaches and Positive Psychology

Ecological Thinking. The monotheistic Abrahamic faith bases that perhaps reflect and underpin, and to an extent continue to inform our Western cultural values and norms, can be considered as imparting a further sense of separation, and this is our estrangement and alienation from the natural world and our fellow living organisms. Consider the following (Genesis 1: 27–28, King James Version):

> So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him; male and female created he them. And God blessed them, and God said unto them, Be fruitful, and multiply, and replenish the earth, and subdue it: and have dominion over the fish of the sea, and over the fowl of the air, and over every living thing that moveth upon the earth.

Whilst the theory of natural selection (Darwin, 1859, 1871) has been (correctly) positioned as a philosophical and scientific challenge to, and even an outright rejection of, the doctrine of creationism (Dawkins, 2007), the way in which certain misunderstandings of evolutionary theory have developed evidence their shaping by a dominant idea of the separation of man from beast. Hence, an erroneous picture of 'evolution as progression' has sometimes developed, in which so-called 'lower life forms' are seen as evolving and progressing along a 'Great Chain of Being' towards a human 'ideal'. Properly understood, however, natural selection acts on genetic diversity (physically represented in the differing frequencies of available alleles) which, in turn, are produced by the factors of mutation and genetic recombination in sexual reproduction (see Ayala & Avise, 2014). Hence, what the forces of natural selection work on are the random factors of variations, and not according to any form of progressive 'plan'. This proper understanding of natural selection, however, was conspicuously absent from what has become known (certainly from a critical standpoint) as 'Social Darwinism' – a term which has been applied to various theories of society, beginning with those of Sir Francis Galton in the 1870s,[210] in which attempts were made, or were claimed to have been made, to apply the concepts of natural selection to the development of social theory and policy (see Claeys, 2000, for a review). Social Darwinist understandings constitute prime examples of how cultural, economic and racial differences between human beings have been falsely 'biologised' (see Gould, 1997) in pseudo-scientific approaches that are motivated by and perpetuate 'One' and 'Other' thinking, the justification of situations of inequality, and the acts of

[210] Whose ideas regarding heritability and their link to the developing 'science' of eugenics we have already come across in Chapter 2 – see Section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression', sub-section on 'The Heritability of Aggressive Behaviour', especially footnote 48.

institutionalisation, colonisation, war and genocide that are the outcomes of those types of thinking (as we have seen in Chapters 3 and 4). Almost predictably, creationist critics (e.g. William Jennings Bryan (1860–1925); see Kazin, 2007) have argued that social Darwinism is a logical consequence of 'Darwinism' (i.e., the theory of natural selection), rather than (as I believe it to be) a bastardisation of it.

As I have already said, a proper understanding of evolution highlights commonalities in ancestry between life forms, and the variations in life forms as an outcome of the forces of natural selection acting on diversity, rather than a view of evolution as progression, and evolutionary outcomes as gradations in that progression. No special place is allotted to mankind; our form, our consciousness, and our intellectual and technological abilities are all the result of random occurrences, as are the forms and abilities (where that word is appropriate) of any other living organism. In *Origin of Species*, Darwin (1859) stated, '… probably all the organic beings which have ever lived on this earth have descended from some one primordial form'. The most likely candidate for what has become known as the 'Last Universal Common Ancestor' (which has been a matter of considerable debate over the last three decades) is a '… complex community of protoeukaryotes with a RNA genome, adapted to a broad range of moderate temperatures, genetically redundant, morphologically and metabolically diverse', which lived between 3.5 and 3.8 billion years ago to (Glansdorff, Xu, & Labedan, 2008, p. 3). The spiritual and philosophical view that all living things are inter-connected is common to many non-Abrahamic faiths (in terms of modern world faiths, Hinduism and Buddhism), including the pagan[211] traditions and beliefs replaced by Christianity in Europe over the first millennium (see Jones & Matthews, 1990), and the traditional pagan beliefs of the indigenous peoples of the Americas (Forbes, 2008; Levy, 2013). The reader may recall (from Chapter 3, Section VI, 'Vilification of Resistance') Crazy Horse's response to the suggestion that the Black Hills, which formed part of the 'Sioux country' established by the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868, be sold to the United States (in Brown, 1970, p. 273):

One does not sell the earth upon which the people walk.

I further noted that to Crazy Horse, the notion of the private ownership of land was entirely foreign, and therefore ludicrous. However, as well as this negation, Crazy Horse's comment can also be seen as an expression of a so-called 'primitive'

[211] The term 'pagan' derives from the Latin, *paganus*, which was a term used by the newly-Christianised Romans to refer to polytheists; it meant something like 'country dweller', and hence was only mildly pejorative. However, with the increasing dominance of the Christian tradition in Europe, and that tradition's oppositionally-dualistic tendency to damn forms of spirituality other than its own as belonging to its own understandings of evil, the term 'pagan' has become synonymous in the minds of some with Satanism, or the worship of a supreme evil being – an entity in which pagans ancient and modern have *never* had a belief (Jones & Matthews, 1990). In Europe, paganism took (and modern paganism still takes) a variety of forms and traditions; it is polytheistic, with a belief in female and male deities, including a strong emphasis on a multi-aspected Goddess figure who is generally allied with the land, or nature, itself; and it is generally animistic (see Jones & Matthews, 1990).

spiritual position, in which the inter-connectedness of all living things is an absolute given. Another, somewhat more 'prophetic' statement of this position in an Indian voice (in this case, that of Alanis Obomsawin,[212] an Abenaki woman, who grew up on the Odanak reservation in Quebec; in Poole, 1972) is:

> When the last tree is cut, the last fish is caught, and the last river is polluted; when to breathe the air is sickening, you will realise, too late, that wealth is not in bank accounts and that you can't eat money.[213]

A similar position is held today by many environmentalists, whose influence has been felt in psychology in the development of a sub-discipline known as *ecopsychology*. The term was coined in 1992 with the first publication of Theodore Roszak's '*Voice of Earth*' (see Roszak, 2002), in which he examined the bond between the human psyche and the living planet, and positioned the needs of the planet (rescue from the industrial system) and the needs of the person (quality of life) as a continuum. Ecopsychology explores how to develop emotional bonds with nature, as members of certain cultures and adherents of certain faiths are held to do so already (Roszak considered Hinduism, Buddhism and Shamanism). Without these bonds, it is argued, our mental health and quality of life is inevitably impoverished (Roszak, 2002). At present, it is perhaps fair to say that ecopyschology remains a critical perspective, rather than having broken through as a mainstream influence in psychology, although interest is certainly developing; an international society (ICE, the International Community for Ecopsychology), which has published its own academic journal, '*Gatherings*', since 1999, is in existence, and five international conferences have been held by the group to date (see International Community for Ecopsychology, 2016).

Humanistic Psychology. Some of the most notable and informative criticisms of the reductionism and dehumanisation inherent in the approach taken by adherents of behaviourism to psychology were made by *phenomenological*, or *humanist*, psychologists, whose influence began to be felt during the 1950s and 1960s. Its best known adherents were Carl R. Rogers (1902–1987), in the fields of psychotherapy, personality theory and education (see Rogers, 1951, 1957, 1967, 1969, 1980; Rogers, Lyon, & Tausch, 2013) and Abraham H. Maslow (1908–1970), in the fields of motivation, personality theory and philosophy of psychology (see Maslow, 1954, 1966, 1968). Humanism has been argued to be a 'third force' in psychology; as I have written elsewhere (Minton, 2012a, p. 10):

> The first 'force', historically speaking, was reckoned to be psychoanalysis, which critics from a humanistic standpoint felt placed too much focus on the

[212] Alanis Obomswain (b. 1932) is a multiple award-winning film-maker in Canada; in 2010, for example, she was nominated into the Canadian Film and Television Hall of Fame (see Bailey, 2010). She is the subject of a biography by Lewis (2006).

[213] There are multiple variations of this statement, attributed to various sources, and most often under the umbrella category of an 'Indian' or a 'Cree' saying. For a discussion on these attributions, the reader is referred to Quote Investigator (2011).

> unconscious aspects of the mind, particularly our supposedly 'animalistic' drives. The second 'force' was behaviourism, which humanists have seen as being too reductionistic, placing too much emphasis on animal learning, and attempting – inaccurately – to generalise to human experience from such perspectives …. [What was needed was] a new approach – a genuine psychology of human beings. Humanists feel that it is necessary to view the whole human and his or her existence[214], and focuses on areas such as the construction of identity and personal meaning, and human growth and potential.

A key idea that humanist psychologists have advanced in their working towards of a focus on the whole human, and her or his existence, is *person-centredness*. This originally described a style of psychotherapy that was developed by Rogers (1951); instead of assuming the 'expert' role in either interpreting the client's unconscious mind (as in psychoanalysis), or in disputing areas of the client's thinking or behaviour that are assumed to be erroneous (as in cognitive and cognitive-behavioural therapy), in *client-centred therapy*, the therapist attempts to create the correct conditions for change (hence the term, 'non-directive therapy'). Rogers (1957) stated that there are six conditions which are necessary and sufficient for therapeutic change: (i) therapist-client psychological contact (a relationship between the two in which each perceives the other as important); (ii) client incongruence (the idea of a mismatch between the client's experience and her or his awareness); (iii) therapist congruence, also known as 'genuineness' (the deep involvement of the therapist in the therapeutic relationship); (iv) unconditional positive regard (the therapist's acceptance, without judgment, of the client); (v) the therapist's accurate empathic understanding of the client; and, (vi) the client's perception, at some level, of the therapist's unconditional positive regard and empathic understanding. The third, fourth and fifth of these conditions (i.e., genuineness, unconditional positive regard, and empathy), have become known as the 'core conditions' for therapeutic change, or the 'core attitudes' of the therapist in client-centred/person-centred therapy (Rogers, 1967, 1969). When these attitudes and orientations on the part of the therapist are experienced by the client in the therapeutic encounter, she or he is more likely to be able to make the changes in her or his own life for herself or himself. The client remains the expert on herself or himself (see Rogers, 1951, 1967, 1969, 1980; Rogers, Lyon, & Tausch, 2013).

Given its aims (see Maslow, 1954, 1966, 1968; also, May, 1994; May, Angel, & Ellenberger, 1994) and philosophical standpoints, and its critique of reductionism in the social sciences and their attendant practitioner disciplines (e.g., clinical

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[214] There is a version of the 'Law of the Instrument', which cautions against the over-use of familiar, and thereby restricted and restrictive understandings that is sometimes incorrectly attributed to Mark Twain, but actually comes from Maslow: 'I suppose it is tempting, if the only tool you have is a hammer, to treat everything as if it were a nail' (Maslow, 1966). This has become known as 'Maslow's Hammer' (see, for example, McRaney, 2012), and is usually expressed in a somewhat shorter form: 'If all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail'.

psychology and education), humanism was, for at least a while, genuinely influential in those fields which had been long been dominated by biomedical and behaviouristic understandings. Client-centred therapy became a core informing discipline in the training of counselling psychologists; Maslow was President of the American Psychological Association in 1968, and Rogers was recognised by that body in its 1972 Award for Distinguished Professional Contributions to Psychology. According to Haggbloom et al. (2002) (whose criteria included journal citation frequency, introductory psychology textbook citation frequency, and the use of one's surname as an eponym), Rogers and Maslow were found to be the sixth and tenth most eminent psychologists of the twentieth century respectively. Additionally, Rogers was positioned as the second most eminent psychotherapist of the twentieth century (in case the reader is curious, Sigmund Freud was ranked first). However, although clinical psychologists have historically been trained in four major schools of practice (psychodynamic, humanistic, systemic and cognitive-behavioural) (Plante, 2005), over the past quarter of a century in particular, the claim that cognitive-behavioural approaches most accurately satisfy the demand that clinical practice should be limited to treatments supported by empirical research (see Pilgrim & Treacher, 1992) – a claim made despite the finding that different schools of practice have broadly similar levels of effectiveness (Leichsenring & Leibing, 2003; Reisner, 2005) – means that cognitive-behavioural approaches have become dominant as theoretical models offered in pre-service clinical psychology training programmes, and in the provision of psychological services that are publicly funded (Bohman, Säll, & Ögren, 2015). However, there have been some calls for this dominance to be broken, at least in Sweden. Bohman, Säll and Ögren (2015) reported that 'the one-sided focus on CBT is damaging Swedish mental health'; they pointed out that a recent report by the government's National Audit Office (Ålberg & Ljunggren, 2015) represented '… a devastating critique of an experiment that lasted eight years, cost 6.7 billion kroner[215] and that in no way had the intended effect, to reduce sick leave by mental illness', as was noted that:

> To control the specific therapies has been ineffective in achieving the goals of increasing the return to work …. To seek to treat everyone with only one method is stupid, and in many cases, is even harmful. People are different, and it is obvious that treatment should be tailored to each individual's specific problems, resources, and preferences – and not the reverse. Not everyone can be cured with a single method, but it is possible to treat many – using multiple methods. (translation mine)

Bohman, Säll and Ögren (2015) argued that the Swedish government had chosen to prioritise CBT as a treatment method due to cost factors, as CBT could be 'performed' by someone who had only a basic training in CBT, rather than a fully trained and licensed psychotherapist. However, this apparent 'cost-

[215] Equivalent to ca. €713 million, or £565 million (based on exchange rates of 1 SEK = 0.106471 EUR/0.0843081 GBP, June, 2016).

effectiveness' had proved illusory; during the same period that CBT was prioritised, the incidence of mental illness, especially amongst the young, rose in Sweden, as did the country's per capita consumption of antidepressants, which became one of the world's highest (Bohman, Säll, & Ögren, 2015). The authors called for different psychotherapeutic treatments to be made available to anyone with mental illness throughout Sweden; for the public funding only of psychotherapy conducted by fully trained and licensed psychotherapists; and, for the right of the patient to choose the treatment that suits her or his needs (Bohman, Säll, & Ögren, 2015). However, at the time of writing, it is not yet possible to estimate the likely impact of this report on the dominance of the cognitive-behavioural approach in initial training programmes in clinical psychology, and publicly-funded clinical psychology service provision, either inside or outside of Sweden

Systemic Approaches in Psychology. Although what has become known as *systemic psychology* draws from a number of different informing disciplines (such as various strands of health care, practitioner forms of psychology (including critical perspectives in clinical, counselling and educational psychology), and sociology and social work), humanistic psychology also opened the door to this type of thinking and action on a theoretical level, in its insistence that humans need to be seen not as decontextualised individuals, but rather as whole, embodied beings, within their social and temporal contexts. Paying attention to social context has been, seemingly, a struggle for psychologists – it is possible that in their demarcation of their discipline, psychologists have preferred to focus on the individual, and the attempt to generate 'laws' governing the behaviour of individuals, and to leave the analysis of social context to those occupied with generating 'laws' concerning the operations of society – anthropologists, cultural theorists, historians and sociologists, perhaps. This cannot, to me, appear as anything other than a mistake, and an unnecessary truncating of what could and should be the subject matter of psychology.

Yet this resistance to considering social contexts has even manifested itself in theoretical approaches to developmental psychology. This is particularly surprising, as I would surmise that it is within the intellectual capability of most people to recognise that the social identity with which we are, and will be, endowed, precedes the development of our own sense of our personal identity. In other words, we are *born* into a social context, or into multiple social systems. In European and Europeanised societies, this may take the form of being someone's daughter or son, and granddaughter or grandson, and depending on family structure, niece or nephew, sister or brother, cousin, and maybe even aunt or uncle (and so on). In tribal societies, other forms of kinship might be available, which are as (or sometimes even more) important. However, in developmental psychology, a non-contextual, individualised approach was dominant from the outset of that

discipline (the early decades of the twentieth century),[216] and this remained largely unchallenged until the late 1970s. This was not due to the direct influence of the behaviourists (who had comparatively little to say about child and adolescent development), but rather due to the pervasive influence of individualised accounts of founders in the field such as Freud (who saw the child's individual unconscious representation of family dynamics as being important, but in the views of many, neglected the influence of conscious social relationships) and Piaget (whose early interests in embryology influenced his view of a gradual and inevitable unfolding of the child's cognitive development, seemingly independent of social relationships) (see Mc Guckin & Minton, 2014; Minton, 2012a, pp. 14–30, for reviews). Urie Bronfenbrenner's (1917–2005) development of what became known as the '*ecosystemic approach*' in developmental psychology over the late 1970s and 1980s, therefore, began on a note of protest at this prevailing decontextualised focus (1977, p. 317):

> It can be said that much of contemporary developmental psychology is *the science of the strange behaviour of children in strange situations with strange adults for the briefest possible periods of time.* (emphasis in original)

Bronfenbrenner (1977, 1979) went on to develop a model of the developing child as being at the centre of a multi-layered set of interconnected environmental systems – the *micro-* (those who are physically and emotionally closest to the child; usually, the family of origin), *meso-* (socialising influences such as the neighbourhood, the school and peers), *exo-* (influences in which the child is not directly involved, but which still exert an effect, e.g., parents' places of work, governmental agencies) and *macro-* (cultural, ideological and organisational patterns, regional or global, in which the other systems are set) *systems*, and in 1989, added the *chrono-system*, the 'temporal component' in which the ecosystem is immersed (see Bronfenbrenner, 1977, 1979, 1989; see also Mc Guckin & Minton, 2014, and Minton, 2012a, for reviews).[217]

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[216] I think this starting date, whilst approximate, is fair; whilst various Greek and Romantic philosophers had made attempts to divide the human lifespan into various stages, and described what might be typical at each stage, Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) published his first case study of a child patient in 1909, having published *On the Sexual Theories of Children* the year before (see Freud, 1908, 1909). Jean Piaget (1896–1980), who is generally seen as being the father of child developmental psychology, made his first major publication in 1923 (*Le Langage et la pensée chez l'enfant* ['The Language and Thought of the Child']; the first English translation was in 1926). It should be stated that Erik H. Erikson, who we met in Chapter 3 (in Section VII, 'Mechanisation of Means of Destruction'; see also footnotes 45 and 49), was a notable exception to the overall trend of studying development in the absence of its social context. Erikson's *psychosocial* model of development (see Erikson, 1963), the *Eight Ages of Man*, was a huge step forward in this respect, and also in the recognition of development as a life-long process, which extends past the childhood and adolescence periods that Freud, Piaget, and most of those who had followed them, had focussed solely upon. Hence, *lifespan developmental psychology* also begins with Erikson.

[217] Bronfenbrenner's former student, sociologist Melvin L. Kohn, said of Bronfenbrenner's work that it impelled social and behavioural scientists to '… realise that interpersonal relationships, even at the smallest level of the parent-child relationship, did not exist in a social vacuum, but were embedded in the larger social structures of community, society, economics and politics' (in Woo, 2005).

As I have alluded to previously, in a clinical sense, the idea that the 'problem' that the presenting individual brings to services (or is brought to services with) is inevitably located within that individual was challenged from a number of directions in the 1950s and 1960s, all of which emphasised the importance of the social contexts in which problems of living are experienced, and sometimes generated. Having developed phenomenological descriptions of psychosis of lasting merit in *The Divided Self* (1960) and *Self and Others* (1961), the aforementioned R. D. Laing, together with his colleague Aaron Esterson, made a further contribution to making the process of going 'insane' comprehensible in *Sanity, Madness and the Family* (published in 1964; see Laing & Esterson, 1990). Although *not* representing the position of 'schizophrenogenesis' that many people, both supporters and critics, have held it to (in the preface to the second edition of the book, Laing stated that they (he and Esterson) had never claimed that psychosis was illusory, nor that it was 'caused' by disturbed family relationships) the authors showed, in a series of eleven interviews with young women who had been diagnosed as schizophrenic and their families, how the specific patterns of their so-called 'symptomatologies' were comprehensible in the light of their family contexts and patterns of communication.[218] One of the cases that they presented was that of Ruth Gold, a twenty-eight year-old woman who had been hospitalised six times since the age of twenty, with an initial diagnosis of hysteria that had firmed into one of schizophrenia, and who lived with her parents when she was not in hospital. Her parents reported, with approval, that in childhood she had 'conformed' entirely, but after her 'breakdown', she had started to 'ape' her older brother, a writer, who also (i.e., like Ruth) dressed 'strangely'. Laing and Esterson (1990, p. 163) reported that:

> Her brother realised, as he put it, that his parents were very 'limited' people. He had 'made a break for it'. They had accommodated themselves to some extent to his 'artistic' pursuits, but they could not see any validity whatever in Ruth's propensities in that direction.

Ruth's 'uncontrollable' behaviour involved her meeting people – beatniks – and socialising in places that her parents did not approve of. Her mother had pleaded with a boy that Ruth had been dating, and his parents, for him to break up with her, but had insisted to Ruth (and occasionally to the interviewers) that she had not

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[218] Specifically, Laing (1969; in Laing & Esterson, 1990) stated that, 'We do not accept "schizophrenia" as being a biochemical, neurophysiological, psychological fact, and we regard it as an error, in the present state of evidence, to take it to be a fact. Nor do we presume its existence. Nor do we adopt it as a hypothesis. We propose no model of it …. A common reaction has been to forget our question, and then to accuse us of not going about answering other questions adequately. Eleven cases, all women, prove nothing. There are no controls. How do you sample your data? … And so on. Such criticism would be justified if we set out to test the hypothesis that the family is a pathogenic variable in the genesis of schizophrenia. We set out to illustrate by eleven examples that, if we look at some experience and behaviour without reference to family interactions, they may appear comparatively senseless, but that if we look at the same experience and behaviour in their original family context they are liable to make more sense … this is the sort of thing we have found out every time we have taken the trouble to do so (now over two hundred times).' (Laing, 1969; in Laing & Esterson, 1990, pp. 12–13).

done so, and had commiserated with Ruth when he did break up with her. At the end of the case study, the still-hospitalised Ruth reported that she had given up the things that her parents disapproved of, but that she sometimes still had doubts (Laing & Esterson, 1990, p. 175):

> RUTH: Over this matter, I am a bit in the air … most people look down on beatniks and things like that, don't they? I know my girl-friend wouldn't tolerate going out with them.
> INTERVIEWER: Well, it's a different point of view, isn't it?
> RUTH: Yes, it's just a different point of view.
> INTERVIEWER: But do you feel that you have to agree with what most of the people round you believe?
> RUTH: Well, if I don't, I usually end up in hospital.

What has become known as *systemic therapy* took on its modern form in the 1970s, drawing from the work undertaken on, and practice of, *structural family* and *family systems* therapy by author-practitioners such as Salvador Minuchin (see Minuchin, 1974; Minuchin, Rosman, & Baker 1990) and Virginia Satir (see especially Satir, 1990, 1993). In family systems therapy, instead of a focus being placed on the diagnosis and treatment of an individual in which the problem is 'located', efforts are made to identify and facilitate movement on the stagnant patterns of interaction that may have created, and will certainly have at least maintained, the 'problem' (see Minuchin, 1974; Minuchin, Rosman, & Baker 1990; Satir, 1990, 1993). Modern systemic therapists may work with groups of people other than families (say, businesses, groups within education systems, work-teams), or with the over-lapping systems in which an individual service-user is involved. Systemic therapy has been influential in many fields (e.g., clinical psychology, counselling psychology, education and educational psychology, psychiatry, social care and social work), and is widely used, especially with certain service-user populations. In a substantive review of the area, Cottrell and Boston (2002, p. 573) concluded that:

> 'Family therapy' encompasses a wide range of interventions and it is not always clear what treatment intervention has been delivered. Nevertheless, there is good evidence for the effectiveness of systemic family therapies in the treatment of conduct disorders, substance misuse and eating disorders, and some support for their use as second-line treatments in depression and chronic illness … further well-designed outcome studies are needed using clearly specified, manualised[219] forms of treatment and conceptually relevant outcome measures.

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[219] Whilst Satir (see Satir, 1993; Satir & Baldwin, 1983) did indeed write 'manuals' of family therapy (her classic *Conjoint Family Therapy*, first published in 1964, was based on a manual she had written for postgraduate trainees), the necessary complexity of considerations and formulations, and the emphasis on creative practice within systemic therapy make it perhaps less easy (and less valid) to *(continued)*

Hence, whilst enjoying some influence, systemic therapy has remained somewhat of an adjunct to the practice of mainstream clinical psychology and psychiatry, and has accordingly maintained and developed its critical positions (see McCarthy & Simon, 2016, for an overview).

Positive Psychology. Almost from the outset, Maslow had referred to his own approach as *humanistic psychology*; however, he also occasionally referred to it as *positive psychology* (Rennie, 2008) and positioned his work as a necessary complement to that of psychoanalysis: 'It is as if Freud supplied us the sick half of psychology and we must now fill it out with the healthy half' (Maslow, 1968). These days, a quite different approach than Maslow's calls itself *positive psychology* – one which also has an avowed aim of focussing on the 'healthy half'. In a review of the modern sub-discipline of positive psychology published in 2006, Linley, Joseph, Harrington and Wood stated that whilst its beginnings are usually traced back to Martin Seligman's Presidential Address to the American Psychological Association in 1998, and its development was '… clearly shaped and energised by the considerable efforts of Seligman and the other major players in the field' (p. 4), that positive psychology did not, in fact begin, in 1998, but rather, has common interests with the emphasis that humanistic psychology places on the fully functioning person. They, too, quoted Maslow (1954, p. 354):

> The science of psychology has been far more successful on the negative than on the positive side. It has revealed to us much about man's shortcomings, his illness, his sins, but little about his potentialities, his virtues, his achievable aspirations, or his full psychological height. It is as if psychology has voluntarily restricted itself to only half of its rightful jurisdiction, and that, the darker, meaner half.

The modern sub-discipline of positive psychology has been defined as '… the study of the conditions and processes that contribute to the flourishing or optimal functioning of people, groups, and institutions' (Gable & Haidt, 2005, p. 104). In recent years, many positive psychologists have concerned themselves with what is called the *PERMA* theory of *well-being*, an acronym that stands for *P*ositive emotions, *E*ngagement, *R*elationships, *M*eaning and *A*ccomplishments, as an area of enquiry (see, for example, Seligman, 2011). So where does the 'positive' in 'positive psychology' come from? According to Taylor (2001), Seligman uses the word in three ways: (i) to reflect the tradition of positivism, the basic set of assumptions that have informed, and continue to inform, much of experimental psychology; (ii) positive reinforcement, the phenomenon observed by behaviourists in operant conditioning, where behaviour is manipulated through the provision of rewards for behaviour that is deemed desirable; and (iii) in the sense of the Hegelian opposites – '… the somewhat naively dualistic opposite of anything negative, especially with regard to bad behaviour and faulty cognitive thought

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'manualise' than the individualised cognitive-behavioural approaches more typical of current mainstream clinical psychology and psychiatry.

processes' (p. 16). It is this third sense that has been most emphasised by positive psychologists (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5):[220]

> The exclusive focus on pathology that has dominated so much of our discipline results in a model of the human being lacking the positive factors that make life worth living. Hope, wisdom, courage, spirituality, responsibility and perseverance are ignored or explained as transformations of more authentic negative impulses.

However, despite the remarkable similarity of the project of positive psychology (as outlined in the quote from Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000), above) and Maslow's critical comments on what was being 'missed' in mainstream psychology (1954, 1968, above), Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) were extremely critical of humanistic psychology. Indeed, Taylor (2001) held that Seligman had '… tried to appropriate the growth-oriented theory of personality' from the humanist tradition, whilst simultaneously claiming that the work of positive psychology is more research-based, and therefore more scientific than that of the humanistic psychologists, whom they claimed (i) never developed a research tradition; (ii) are guilty of founding a cult of narcissism; and (iii) are anti-scientific. However, Taylor (2001, p. 14) noted that humanistic psychologists have countered that:

> There is a long and important research tradition established especially within the past 40 years in psychology and that Seligman, too busy pontificating about the scientific superiority of his theory, has failed to perform even the most basic literature search required of any graduate student …. Seligman is claiming for himself credit that is actually due to more distinguished predecessors. Many of these forerunners devoted their entire careers to pursue holistic, integrative, or broad-based research agendas, often in blatant opposition to the more fundamentalist climate of academic laboratory-oriented learning theory that persisted during their own era. Their efforts established the liberal climate that permits Seligman and his colleagues to function today.

Taylor (2001, p. 13) concluded that Seligman, in his critique of humanistic psychology, '… may be rushing to exclude on a priori grounds the very tradition his own theory represents'.

Despite the energy of positive psychologists, the disseminations of which have included the publication of books, the establishment of local, national and global networks (see Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006), and the setting up of postgraduate training programmes in positive psychology,

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[220] We have seen that the emphasis on this third sense of the word 'positive' in 'positive psychology' is reflected in Gable and Haidt's (2005) definition, above, and also features in this one, supplied by Sheldon and King: 'It is nothing more than the scientific study of ordinary human strengths and virtues. Positive psychology revisits "the average person', with an interest in finding out what works, what is right, and what is improving'.

penetration into mainstream psychology, whose positivist assumptions positive psychology shares, remains elusive, and therefore (inh my thinking, at least) 'endows' positive psychology with many of the attributes of narcissism and cult-mentality that Seligman and Csikszentmihalyi (2000) stated were typical of humanistic psychology. The disseminations of positive psychologists include a plethora of primers, introductions and applications, and the research-base that they have developed is heavily biased towards confirmatory research into the applications of positive psychology constructs, and has been published primarily in either journals devoted to positive psychology (the *Journal of Positive Psychology* began publication in 2006) or special issues of journals devoted to positive psychology, and therefore guest-edited by positive psychologists.[221] Whether positive psychology can be said to represent the humanistic tradition today is highly debatable; certainly, positive psychologists themselves seem to be divided on whether to acknowledge that heritage (Linley, Joseph, Harrington, & Wood, 2006), or to reject it entirely (Seligman & Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5). I am left doubtful as to whether the new approach of positive psychology actually offers anything 'new'; I would concur with Taylor (2001) in that the holistic focus of the humanistic psychologists, which at the time it was offered, really was a breakthrough, has been appropriated as the subject matter of positive psychology, and the research methods that have been utilised in their investigation/promotion of the importance of this subject matter belong firmly within the positivist, and therefore, mainstream psychology, tradition.[222]

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[221] Seligman, whose sense of the history of psychology (or, at least, his tendency to disavow it) has been questioned by humanist psychologists (see above, and Taylor, 2001), would also seem to be lacking in his understanding of how certain positions in the philosophy of science have informed the conducting of psychological research, not least the way in which researchers determine the statistical significance of their results. I feel bound to say that this is incomprehensible, and indeed scarcely credible, in a former APA President. Karl Popper's (1902–1994) *The Logic of Scientific Discovery* (1959) was enormously influential in how psychologists conduct and think about their own work (I have made a brief review of this elsewhere – see Minton, 2012a). Popper was critical of the circularity that abounded in many positivist positions, which eventually renders them untestable, and therefore biased. (Freud, for example, invariably attributed criticisms of the 'hard-won' truths of psychoanalysis to personal 'resistance' on the part of critics). Popper suggested that *falsification* should be a 'hallmark' of empirical science – that every genuine test of a theory would bean attempt to refute it. A memorable example has been provided by popular philosophical writer Jostein Gaarder (1991), who wrote about the impossibility of establishing whether crows are black by simply counting black crows – 'You might almost say that hunting for the "white crow" is science's principal task' (Gaarder, 1991, p. 231). Along these lines, I would venture to suggest that one does not genuinely 'test' the principles of positive psychology through confirmatory research, which is the feature that has seemed to dominate dissemination outputs in that field.

[222] I have had my own encounter with positive psychology, through my supervision (to successful completion) of a doctoral thesis by positive psychologist Dr Jolanta Burke (see Burke, 2016). Whilst I remain (i) concerned regarding the philosophical inconsistencies and franchising tendencies of its founder, Martin Seligman (to say nothing of his political involvements), and many of its adherents since; and, (ii) unconvinced as to whether positive psychology actually offers anything new, or has merely appropriated the understandings that should be correctly attributed to humanistic psychology (see above), through Dr Burke's project I have seen at least one area in which a prevailing focus on negative characteristics that has been stultifying could potentially be moved via a positive psychology-based consideration. Dr Burke's project addressed the issue of highlighting the 'character strengths' that

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Furthermore, whilst positive psychology sets itself up against mainstream, or what it considers to be 'negative' psychology, the reality is that mainstream and positive psychology share broadly similar views of where the 'problems of living' might originate and be located – and that is, 'within' the individual.[223] Hence, systemic thinking in psychology, as it opened up in humanistic psychology and of course elsewhere, does not seem to be an area with which positive psychologists are likely to overly concern themselves.[224]

Re-Capturing Genuine Person-Centredness

The combination of simultaneously charging humanistic psychology with being 'unscientific' and appropriating some of its concepts that is evident amongst some (but not all) writers in the modern sub-discipline of positive psychology is also evident in mainstream psychiatry and psychology (that is, that in which individualised biomedical and cognitive-behavioural understandings have become dominant). In 2006, Sommers and Satel asserted that, due to a lack of empirical support, Maslow's ideas have fallen out of fashion, and are '… no longer taken seriously in the world of academic psychology' (p. 74). We have already seen in this chapter that cognitive-behavioural approaches have become dominant (certainly, in comparison with humanism) in clinical psychology training and publicly-funded practice (see above). In addition, cognitive-behavioural approaches have sometimes appropriated at least the names of concepts from some humanistic positions – for example, it is possible to see all manner of psychotherapeutic interventions and services that owe their genesis to cognitive-behavioural understandings being referred to as 'person-centred'. In this, I think, the original and genuine sense of what 'person-centred' meant, and still means to many adherents (amongst which I number myself), is obscured. It will be recalled

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might exist amongst those who engage in the bullying and cyber-bullying of others, in order that these strengths might be pedagogically built upon, rather than finding their maladaptive expression through bullying. Folk psychology prompts many to locate the problems of bullying behaviour as being 'within' pathological bullies, and to look no further than that (and certainly not into the systemic features that I and others have seen as being worthy of examination – see this book, Chapter 1). The practical upshot of the dominance of this folk psychology is that the development of productive anti-bullying strategies, to be undertaken with those who have perpetrated it, has remained in its infancy. Dr Burke's work has the poitential, I feel, to usefully inform this area of anti-bullying and anti-cyber-bullying research and practice.

[223] To what should person A attribute his depression? If he visits a cognitive-behavioural therapist (person B), he might be told that his underlying (and internal) cognitions are somehow at fault. If he consults a positive psychologist (person C), he might be encouraged to develop certain under-utilised character strengths (which are also assumed to be internal). However, it is also possible to imagine that person A could instead have spent the money that he paid to B and C on a new suit for a job interview, and therefore enhanced his chances of lifting himself out of the malaise caused by his recent unemployment. (You see, neither B nor C asked him about that; perhaps they could not hear A above their own 'hammering'? See footnote 215, above.)

[224] Engagement, relationships, meaning and accomplishments are of course featured in the PERMA model (see Seligman, 2011), but conceptually, the model focusses on our *internalised* sense of these, which is assumed to contribute to our – also *internal* – sense of well-being.

that 'person-centredness' was a key concept and descriptor of the Rogerian approach to psychotherapy (see above,), which in itself constituted a milestone development in the humanist position in applied psychology. It will also be recalled that humanistic psychology stood (and still stands) in radical and deliberate opposition to the reductionistic stances taken by other theoretical fields in psychology (including the cognitive-behavioural approaches). Such appropriations, therefore, are exactly that; a use of the term 'person-centredness' merely because the term sounds, to the contemporary ear, somehow 'nice', or benign, or 'user-friendly'. However, if one takes the trouble to read Maslow and Rogers at source, rather than as citations in introductory texts where their arguments are often simplified, one quickly finds out that the humanist third force in psychology was never motivated by sounding 'nice', or benign, or 'user-friendly'.[225] It is not, and was never, a 'soft', or 'warm and fuzzy' alternative. It is vital to appreciate that Maslow was not in any way ignorant of, or worse yet, incapable of conducting or understanding experimental/behavioural psychology; in the three years that he spent studying psychology at the University of Wisconsin's graduate school, he researched the link between primate dominance and sexual behaviour, and completed his Master's thesis on verbal learning and memory[226] (Hoffman, 1999). Rather, Maslow, familiar through his postgraduate studies with the positivist methods of experimental and behavioural psychology, concluded that these methods were limited, and inadequate to the project of achieving a genuine understanding of human beings.[227]

Elsewhere (Minton, 2012a), whereas I have expressed a certain degree of sympathy with Reber's (1995) assertion that 'psychology cannot be defined; indeed, it cannot even easily be characterised', I have found that the definition of psychology as 'the science of mind and behaviour' (Gross, 2010) to be broadly acceptable (as I indicated was the case in the introductory section of Chapter 3). Let us think about Gross's definition for a moment – 'the science of mind and behaviour' – and appreciate just what an exciting area of enquiry that is, or could be! My belief is that when we restrict our discipline to only one part of that definition's specified areas of enquiry (behaviour), and adopt uncritical positivism as our approach to science, then we as psychologists lose so much of the potential for our discipline. The study of academic psychology has been informed by, and

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[225] As Brian Thorne (2007) put it: 'Person-centred work was born as a protest against the diagnostic, prescriptive point of view prevalent at the time. Emphasis was placed on a relationship between counsellor and client based upon acceptance.'

[226] Both, predictably, were positivist treatments. Subsequently, Maslow removed his thesis from the psychology library, and tore out the listing of the thesis from the library catalogue, so embarrassed was he by it (Hoffman, 1999).

[227] Neither was Maslow ignorant of the psychodynamic approach; one of his early mentors was Alfred Adler (1870–1937) (see Hoffman, 1999), an early follower, and later opponent of Sigmund Freud, mentioned in Chapter 2 (Section I, 'Psychological Understandings of Aggression', sub-section on 'Psychodynamic Accounts of Aggression and Aggressive Behaviour'). Others have not, rightly or wrongly, seen the same limitations that Maslow saw, and have accordingly stayed invested in the experimental/behavioural/cognitive-behavioural approaches to research in, and the practice of psychology.

has informed (to give a few examples) the cognate disciplines of anthropology and cultural studies, the biological and medical sciences, education, the fine arts, information technology, linguistics, literature, media studies, philosophy, religion and theology, sociology and social work/social care. Academic psychology has also informed (and properly considered, has developed alongside) the practitioner disciplines of clinical, counselling, educational, forensic and occupational psychology (amongst others), many of which are practiced in multi- and inter-disciplinary contexts, bringing practitioner psychologists into a potentially mutually-informative contact with educational, health, legal, and social work/social care practitioners. In short, we, as psychologists, are the heirs to so much more than a narrow, pseudo-objectivist emphasis on decontextualised behaviour, some of the implications of which have led to our *misunderstandings of,* or even *alienation from* those who would come to us for the help that we are often so keen to proffer (be that help in understanding from theoreticians and researchers, or help with problems of living as practitioners).

So, whilst I am critical of my own discipline (as I think is a healthy response to it), I still believe that psychology has an important role in its *potential* to shape our understanding of human existence and society. I wonder what the possibilities might be if, instead of taking the starting point as the 'science of behaviour' (and here, we return to a theme that was introduced earlier in this chapter), we began instead from the world of *inter-experience*. The ideas inherent in Laing's (1967) comment that, '… human beings relate to each other not simply externally, like two billiard balls, but by the relations of two worlds of experience that come into play when two people meet' (p. 53), and his announcement of 'social phenomenology' as '… the science of my own and others' experience' (p. 16; see also, footnote 203, above) have not had, in my opinion, sufficient impact on the development of psychological research and practice over the past half century. Nevertheless, I, for one, find Laing's point that, '… if human beings are not *studied* as human beings, then [the result] is violence and mystification' (p. 53, italics mine) persuasive.Similarly, I believe that in the first, third and fourth chapters of this book, I have demonstrated that if human beings are not *treated* as human beings, the result has been, and still is, *violence* and *mystification* – or to put it another way, *marginalisation* and *aggression*.

In conclusion, I believe that the 'opening up' of academic psychology, when radical behaviourism as a major academic force fell into decline, was more restricted than it could and should have been. As we have seen, cognitive psychology took the place of radical behaviourism, having appropriated the same positivistic ambitions and methods of enquiry. Due to these appropriations, and the similarities in certain founding assumptions that exist between the behaviouristic and cognitive psychology approaches (e.g., similar values being placed on 'objective' understandings of decontextualised individuals, similar (although more sophisticated in the case of cognitive psychology) approaches to physicalism), we have seen that something of a 'merger' has taken place, and that one can, and indeed many do, refer to (without dwelling too long on the historical differences between the approaches that were trumpeted by the first cognitive psychologists)

the 'cognitive-behavioural' approach. Regardless of the dominance of those understandings in my own field, I maintain that *my* experience, as a human being, is neither an illusory outcome of my personal history of stimulus-response conditioning by my environment (behaviourism), nor can it be adequately captured by an experimental focus on the ways in which I can be said to process information (cognitive psychology), nor by any compromise in between these two reductionistic positions (a cognitive-behavioural approach). And neither is, nor can, *your* experience. I believe that in order to develop a genuine understanding of human psychology, which gives rise to the compassionate and respectful practice of that discipline, we will need to recapture, in our conceptualisations, research and practice, the original radicalism of 'person-centredness', and in doing so, we will need to attend (again) to our experience of human beings in their systemic contexts – physical, social, temporal, cultural and ecological. Then, and only then, perhaps, can we be more confident that we will not experience, nor respond to those who turn to us for our 'help' and 'wisdom', as disembodied, decontextualised, problematic Others, from whom we, and 'people like us' are inevitably and irrevocably alienated.

III. EDUCATIONAL PRACTICE: SOME THOUGHTS ON ADDRESSING CERTAIN ISSUES OF LEGACY

It can be said that the practice of education, like the development and practice of psychology, has been influenced by British Empiricist philosophy. For example, in an argument also favoured by the behaviourist psychologists, John Locke, in the first book of his '*Essay Concerning Human Understanding*' (1689), argued against the idea of *a priori* knowledge (which was a popular idea at the time, and very often conceived of as being a 'spark of the divine') as existing within human beings. Locke argued that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa* ('blank tablet', or 'blank slate'), upon which knowledge, gained solely through life's experiences, may be written. The adults of societies, therefore, have the role and responsibility to 'write' on that 'blank slate' useful, rather than useless, knowledge. This argument has informed the development, and to some extent assured the dominance, of rote learning methods, the practice of teaching as the provision (or at best, translation) of information, the development of school curricula in accordance with the cultural and sociopolitical values of the country in which the school is situated, and the examination process as being one of checking the student's ability to reproduce facts that she or he has previously committed to memory. The afore-mentioned behaviourist B.F. Skinner turned his own attention towards education during the 1940s and 1950s, when his own children were in the American school system, and he noticed a number of what he called 'instructional weaknesses' (in Snowman & Biehler, 2003, p. 233):[228]

[228] I am always struck when reading this passage by how many of these 'instructional weaknesses' are also representative of criticisms raised by students or the parents of students (depending on the educational institution) today, over half a century later.

> The excessive use of aversive consequences to shape behaviour (students trying to study to avoid a low grade or embarrassment in the classroom), an overly long interval between students taking tests or handing in homework and getting corrective feedback, and poorly organised lessons and workbooks that did not lead to specific goals.

Skinner's suggested that the principles of operant conditioning should be more systematically applied to education – in other words, teachers and schools should (i) be clear about what is being taught; (ii) teach first things first; (iii) allow students to learn at their own rate; and (iv) programme the subject matter. If this were to be undertaken, Skinner argued that '… all such weaknesses could be reduced or eliminated' (in Snowman & Biehler, 2003, p. 233).

Notice, however, that Skinner's views were consistent with a view of education – or rather, *schooling* – solely as *instruction*, i.e., the means by which factual information is to be (hopefully reliably) transferred from one source (the teacher) to another (the learner). Skinner was, I believe, probably correct in talking about the means by which schooling as instruction could, by a more consistent application of behaviourist principles and methods, be made more *efficient*. However, we should not for a moment underestimate the narrowness of this particular approach to education. Is all that we can hope for in a process of education – which is, after all, legally compulsory for all citizens of developed countries, and remains a fervent hope and aspiration for many children and their families in developing countries – an extended period of instruction in factual information? Or might we also hope that our educators and educational systems are able to facilitate children in their development of other important qualities – let us say, for example, the acquisition of appropriate social skills and understandings, the development of the ability to critically assess information, and their emergence into adulthood with a sense of moral and humanitarian values? After all, whilst James Vander Zanden reported a limited number of studies that have indicated a positive correlation between intelligence quotient and certain facets of honest behaviour (1993), we cannot assume that the development of the intellect, and the development of moral reasoning and behaviour, are one and the same thing.[229] However, quite apart from the fact that other views of education (i.e., other than education solely as instruction in information) are indeed possible, and many would say desirable, the question of *who decides* what is to be taught, regardless of the means employed in that teaching, would also seem to be important. In traditional and mainstream schooling there is, therefore, a double restriction in place: when one's experience of education is restricted to the acquisition of information (rather than, say, the development of the ability to critically assess information), that corpus of information is invariably restricted to that which the powerful in society (through their design and implementation of educational

[229] The infamous Josef Mengele (1911–1979), an SS officer who was known as the 'Butcher of Auschwitz' and the 'Angel of Death' due to his undertaking of grotesque and lethal human experimentation whilst a camp physician at Auschwitz, held *two* doctoral degrees from the University of Munich – an M.D. and a Ph.D. (in the field of anthropology) (see Kubica, 1998).

systems) have deemed to be important in serving their own ends and aspirations.[230] Philosopher of education Richard Pring (2004, p. 24) provided an example of a poem[231] that illustrates the contrast between education conceived of solely as the acquisition of selective information, and education conceived of as moral practice:

> Dear Teacher,
> I am a survivor of a concentration camp. My eyes saw
> What no man should witness.
> Gas chambers built by learned engineers.
> Children poisoned by educated physicians.
> Infants killed by trained nurses.
> Women and babies shot and burned by high school and college graduates.
>
> So, I am suspicious of education.
> My request is: Help your students become human.
> Your efforts must never produce learned monsters, skilled psychopaths,
> educated Eichmans.
> Reading, writing, arithmetic are important only if they serve
> To make our children more human.

'Help your students become human'. A noble, and I would say, given the past complicity and overt activity of education systems and educators in the perpetration of cultural genocide (see Chapter 4), a *necessary* aim. But how could this be brought about? Have steps been taken towards this since the mid-twentieth century, and if so, how effective have those steps been? Carl Rogers developed what he called a 'learner-centred' approach to education, initially as an analogue to 'client-centred' therapy (see Rogers, 1951), and later as a goal itself (in *The Freedom to Learn*, Rogers, 1969). Rogers' five hypotheses regarding education were that: (i) 'a person cannot teach another person directly; a person can only facilitate another's learning'; (ii) 'a person learns significantly only those things that are perceived as being involved in the maintenance of or enhancement of the structure of self'; (iii) 'experience which, if assimilated, would involve a change in the organisation of self, tends to be resisted through denial or distortion of

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[230] What has been, is, should be and could be included in, say, school curricula, and how this relates to the maintenance of power structures in society (and that is to say nothing at all about the related area of the politics of overall educational provision) is properly located in critical sociological approaches to education, where it has already filled, and will continue to fill, many volumes. As such, with this observation having been made, I will have to state that for reasons of space, this lies outside the possibilities for this book, and I instead refer the interested reader to Michael Apple's excellent article, 'The Politics of Official Knowledge: Does a National Curriculum Make Sense?', as something of a primer in this area. I can also recommend Ivan Illich's classic *Deschooling Society* (1971) as a stimulating and still-relevant critical position in this debate.

[231] Pring (2004) recorded that the poem was written by the principal of a large school in Boston, Massachusetts whom he had met, as a letter to newly appointed teachers in that school. Both Pring and the principal shared an interest in the work of developmental psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1927–1987), who was notable for his lifelong work on understanding the development of moral reasoning (see Kohlberg, 1983). The principal and Pring met when Pring was visiting Kohlberg at Harvard.

symbolism'; (iv) 'the structure and organisation of self appears to become more rigid under threats, and to relax its boundaries when completely free from threat'; and (v) 'the educational situation which most effectively promotes significant learning is one in which (a) threat to the self of the learner is reduced to a minimum; and, (b) differentiated perception of the field is facilitated' (Rogers, 1951). This standpoint positions the teacher as a *facilitator* (i.e., one who connects the learner to the learning), or mentor who is open to learning from the learners herself or himself, and encourages a critical approach to the learning, rather than being an *instructor* who provides information.

Whilst Pring (2004) noted that 'child-centredness' had become a 'term of abuse' in educational circles by the late 1960s, he also noted that, '… exactly what this term means was rarely examined' (p. 2). Philosophically, he stated that the term had been informed by different and distinct traditions, with some emphasising the individual nature of growth, and others emphasising the social context of development. Both are, of course, important; however, opposition to such self-evidently important potential features of the educational experience is often based on the existence of a 'false dualism' between subject-centred and child-centred practice (Pring, 2004, pp. 80–98). In attempting to provide suggestions regarding the reconciliation of this 'old debate', Pring (2004, p. 98) concluded:

> Perhaps, however, the fault lies in polarising the two traditions and in failing to see that subjects at their best provide the resources, the inspirations, the forms of intellectual and aesthetic activity, which (when properly mediated by the teacher) illuminate and extend the valuing and the interests of the curious and active learner. Subjects, too, can come into the broad church of child-centredness.

We must own that most people's expectations of modern educators go beyond their mere provision of subject-based instruction. However, it is not necessary for educators to become part-time psychologists, or part-time social workers, in order to 'help their students become human'. The compassionate and thoughtful practice of their own profession, their attention to the needs of individual learners, including their encouragement of their critical thoughts and abilities, is what our society requires of our educators, and our systems of education should support those tasks. In the past, we have seen (see Chapter 4) that such compassionate and thoughtful practice was missing in educators and educational systems. Once again, in order to confront the legacy of the past, I believe that it is time to think, and to choose to do things differently in the future.

Before concluding this book, I should like to come 'full circle' in making a final point regarding the potential for educational practice in addressing marginalisation and aggression. In Chapter 1 (see Section II), I reported on the rather modest outcomes of what I called 'traditional' anti-bullying programmes in schools (see Farrington & Ttofi, 2009; Lødding & Vibe, 2010; Merrell, Gueldner, Ross, & Isava, 2008). Further, I documented the finding that those who belong to so-called 'minority' populations report having been bullied more frequently than do members of 'majority' populations (see Carolan & Redmond, 2003; Mayock,

Bryan, Carr, & Kitching, 2009; Hansen, 2011; Hansen, Melhus, Høgmo, & Lund, 2008; Hansen, Melhus, & Lund, 2010; Hansen & Sørlie, 2012; Hansen, Minton, & Sørlie, in press; McGrath, Black, & Sutton, 2013; Minton, 2011, 2012a, 2012b, 2013, 2014b, 2014c; Minton, Dahl, O'Moore, & Tuck, 2008; Mishna et al., 2009; Norwich & Kelly, 2004; Purdy & Mc Guckin, 2011; Roland & Auestad, 2009; Swearer, Espelage, Vailancourt, & Hymel, 2010; Tippett, Houlston, & Smith, 2010) and therefore cannot be considered as being adequately protected by current anti-bullying practices (see Minton, 2014a, for a review; also, Walton, 2006) or (where it exists) attendant educational legislature (see (Lile & Hansen, 2012; Minton, 2014a). I have also opined that, given that the informing philosophies of many 'traditional' anti-bullying programmes were limited to acontextual strategies of awareness-raising and behavioural management, rather than addressing the prejudice that often underlies bullying behaviour, the accrual of modest levels of success was, in fact, fairly predictable (Minton, 2014a). However, I also believe that anti-bullying programmes should continue to be implemented in schools – but in a substantially revised, rather than in their traditional, form. In my view, this should incorporate an extensive and rigorous 'working-through' of students' knowledge, attitudes and behaviours (as seems to be being offered in the KiVa programme; see Hutchings & Clarkson, 2015a, 2015b; KiVa International, 2016; Kärnä, Voeten, Little, Poskiparta, Kaljonen, & Salmivalli, 2011), but with a particular emphasis being placed on addressing issues of prejudice and discrimination (Minton, 2014a, 2014b). Cast this way, anti-bullying practices could provide an ideal opportunity to begin to break down the 'us and them' thinking and behaviour that we have observed at so many levels over the course of this book, when people are at a very formative (school) age. This potential has not, as yet, been fully utilised; and it is for this reason that I would hope that anti-bullying programmes could be developed further, and strategically so, rather than being withdrawn.[232]

[232] Urgent attention to this matter would seem to be warranted, at least in Norway. There, it has been reported recently in a popular national newspaper (*Aftenposten*) that although anti-bullying programmes have been one of the most important measures over the past decade in Norwegian schools, and the State has spent over 200 million kroner (equivalent to ca. €21.2 million, or £16.8 million (based on exchange rates of 1 NOK = 0.106029 EUR/0.0839293 GBP, June 2016) on them in that period, a lot of schools have now 'lost interest' in anti-bullying programmes. In 2003, 380 schools started the Zero programme (see Chapter 1, Section II); since 2013, no new schools have done so. The number of schools that run the Olweus programme (again, see Chapter 1, Section II), which had 400 schools in 2005, has also reduced. Professor Solveig Østrem (Lillehammer University College) stated that, 'These programs have one function. Politicians get to show to the world that they are doing something. It is a waste of money. Using reward systems and regulations, you may get children to comply with adult rules – some children may be very good at this, whilst bullying may take on more subtle forms' (in Svarstad, 2016; translation mine).

CONCLUDING POINTS: REAFFIRMING HUMANITY THROUGH INDIVIDUAL AND COLLECTIVE CHOICES

I am cautious regarding my ending of this book, as I am conscious of the breadth of ideas with which I have attempted to engage in this chapter, and in this book as a whole; and also that, in many places, restrictions of space have meant that such engagements have been all too brief. R.D. Laing, whose work I have frequently referred to in this chapter, ended his essay, *The Bird of Paradise*, with this statement (p. 156):

> If I could turn you on, if I could drive you out of your wretched mind, if I could tell you I would let you know.

Whilst I understand something of the passion in Laing's plea, and share many of the frustrations he expressed in that essay and the book that preceded it (*The Politics of Experience*; see Laing, 1967) regarding the inhumane psychological and psychiatric systems, and the society that supported them,[233] I have no such fantasies of driving my reader insane; or at least, I do not wish to voice my final appeals to the reader in quite the same way that he did. At the end of the introduction to this book, I invited the reader, whether she or he finds herself or himself in agreement with me or not, to let me know, and to talk, and to listen, and to think, '… and maybe do things a little differently, and who knows, maybe even a little better in the future'. Perhaps such an imprecise invitation (to do things a little differently, and maybe even a little better in future) is what I would wish to extend to everyone, and in particular, those who practice psychology and education. Amongst the opening statements in the preface of the afore-mentioned *The Politics of Experience* was (Laing, 1967, p. 11):

> Few books today are forgivable …. What is to be done? We who are still half alive, living in the often fibrillating heartland of a senescent capitalism – can we do more than reflect the decay around and within us? Can we do more than sing our sad and bitter songs of disillusion and defeat?

I am conscious, too, that I have reflected the 'decay around and within', and sung 'many sad and bitter songs' over the course of this book. But I would earnestly hope that by now I have made the reasons as to why I have chosen to do so clear; in other words, I would hope that the reader has found this book to have been 'forgivable'. I would also hope that I have demonstrated that, as much as it always seems to have been in our societies, that 'us and them' thinking and action is still evidenced in many areas of life; that it is deep-rooted in our folk psychologies, our cultures, our informing religions and mythologies; that it may be manifested in our economic and political systems, and the ways in which we may

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[233] I find much of Laing's critique here as valid today as I believe it was at its time of writing, almost half a century ago. In itself, this is an indictment, and a demonstration of the existence of the barriers that apparently preclude the influence of critical thinking, and also the reason why I have seen fit to refer to his writing so frequently in this final chapter.

provide, and historically have provided, education, health and social services. Above all, I would hope that I have provided sufficient evidence to show that when 'us and them' thinking and action continues to run unchallenged and unabated, the outcomes are monstrous. I have also argued that this 'us and them' thinking, is unaddressed, and indeed is seemingly unaddressable, by some of our current mainstream educational and psychological practice. So – what is to be done?

I doubt that I am unusual in sharing Lorenz's horror at the destructive capabilities of nuclear weapons (it can be seen from the publication date alone, as well as the specific formulation of the arguments of the final chapter, should the reader care to consult Lorenz's *King Solomon's Ring* (1953) at source, that he was writing at the time of the Cold War), and his despair at the inability and unwillingness of human beings, and their political leaders in particular, to resolve their differences without recourse to violence. However, as I said in the introduction to this chapter, I still see a *potential* for certain aspects of our consciousness (whilst acknowledging that these have been, and usually are, distinctly under-utilised) in helping, rather than destroying us. At this stage, we would seem to have no other option – whilst some might find the idea tempting at times, as a species we cannot retreat back up the trees, or go back into the oceans. In Chapter 2 (see Section II, 'Marginalisation'; sub-section on 'On Learning the Power of the Oppressor'), we saw that David Smail (2001) argued that the freedom of individuals to exercise power is limited by the amount of power that is available to them, and that each individual is surrounded by a spatio-temporal 'power horizon', beyond which she or he cannot see. Smail (2001) noted that the reason why higher-order powers can manipulate entire populations in terms of their understanding of how the world works is down to the fact that '… the majority of us probably find ourselves in boats more similar than different', although some people – perhaps the better educated – might have 'longer' power-horizons than others. My ultimate hope for this book is that it could serve as something of an educational measure, and perhaps extend the power-horizons of those who have read it; not to 'drive them out of their wretched minds', but to remind them of the possibilities that lie before them in reaffirming humanity in their individual and collective choices.

In pondering what the content of this book could possibly mean, in terms of my hopes for such 'better choices', I have often found myself recalling (or sometimes even looking at) a reasonably well-known photograph. In the *Pale Blue Dot*, an image of the planet Earth taken from 3.7 billion miles away by the Voyager 1 spacecraft on 14th February, 1990, the Earth appears as a single pixel of pale-blue light. In his introduction to his book, *Pale Blue Dot: A Vision of the Human Future in Space*, astronomer and science broadcaster Carl Sagan gave the following reflection (versions of which, coupled with the image itself, have seen extensive circulation on the Internet) on what the image meant for him (Sagan, 1997, pp. xv–xvi):[234]

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[234] Carl Sagan (1934–1996) was an astronomer, cosmologist, Pulitzer Prize-winning author and broadcaster. The thirteen-part television series which he presented and co-wrote (with Ann Druyan and *(continued)*

> From this distant vantage point, the Earth might not seem of any particular interest. But for us, it's different. Consider again that dot. That's here. That's home. That's us. On it everyone you love, everyone you know, everyone you ever heard of, every human being who ever was, lived out their lives. The aggregate of our joy and suffering, thousands of confident religions, ideologies, and economic doctrines, every hunter and forager, every hero and coward, every creator and destroyer of civilization, every king and peasant, every young couple in love, every mother and father, hopeful child, inventor and explorer, every teacher of morals, every corrupt politician, every 'superstar', every 'supreme leader', every saint and sinner in the history of our species lived there – on a mote of dust suspended in a sunbeam.
>
> The Earth is a very small stage in a vast cosmic arena. Think of the rivers of blood spilled by all those generals and emperors so that in glory and triumph they could become the momentary masters of a fraction of a dot. Think of the endless cruelties visited by the inhabitants of one corner of this pixel on the scarcely distinguishable inhabitants of some other corner. How frequent their misunderstandings, how eager they are to kill one another, how fervent their hatreds. Our posturings, our imagined self-importance, the delusion that we have some privileged position in the universe, are challenged by this point of pale light. Our planet is a lonely speck in the great enveloping cosmic dark. In our obscurity – in all this vastness – there is no hint that help will come from elsewhere to save us from ourselves.
>
> The Earth is the only world known, so far, to harbour life. There is nowhere else, at least in the near future, to which our species could migrate. Visit, yes. Settle, not yet. Like it or not, for the moment, the Earth is where we make our stand. It has been said that astronomy is a humbling and character-building experience. There is perhaps no better demonstration of the folly of human conceits than this distant image of our tiny world. To me, it underscores our responsibility to deal more kindly with one another and to preserve and cherish the pale blue dot, the only home we've ever known.

I could think of no better ending for this book, or indeed any book of its kind; I can only hope, without any expectation, that the book that preceded this final quote could be considered by its readers as being worthy of it. But for the moment, that's all I have to say.

Steven Soter), *Cosmos: A Personal Voyage*, was broadcast on British television in 1981, when I was a very impressionable and science-obsessed ten year-old boy. I was far from unusual in having watched it; the series has been broadcast in sixty countries to over half a billion people. The impact of that series, in terms of its intellectual scope and ambition, its visual beauty, and Sagan's sheer ability as an effective communicator of complex ideas to mass audiences without trivialisation, has never left me. The *Pale Blue Dot* image, and a version of the accompanying text included here, hung on the outside of my office door for many years. I felt that students reading the *Pale Blue Dot* text, perhaps after calling to my office in my absence, certainly had a greater opportunity to reflect on matters of personal value than they would have had I been there to receive them.

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